Chairman:

First, I should like to know of the progress made in the examination of cases by the Appeal Board, how these cases are being dealt with, and what policy is followed.

Attorney General:

So far, the Board has held 58 meetings, applications for appeal received number 31,000, and the examination of 8,099 cases has been completed up to this date. Board meetings are held on every Tuesday and Friday. There may have to be some delay in regard to cases involved with complex circumstances, but, generally speaking, cases are examined in the order of applications received, and it is anticipated that the examination will be completed about August next year.

Shimojo: (former Minister of Education)

Is it not possible to release from the framework of purge designation those purgees who have been so designated on slight grounds?

Attorney General:

The standards for examination form themselves in the course of examinations.

Shimojo:

How far have the consultations with the quarters concerned gone?

Chairman:

If you so desire, we may go into a secret meeting.

Attorney General:

I am not in a position to speak freely. Efforts are being made, so that the results of examination can be published as soon as possible.

Shimojo:

Are there any cases on which the consultations with the quarters concerned have been finished?

Attorney General:

So far, none.

Sasaki:

Speaking of the cases the examination of which has been completed, may I ask how many and what kind of cases have passed the examination?

Attorney General:

I am not in a position to say.

Chairman:

I think I remember reading in the newspapers that Prime Minister Yoshida is said to be making consultation with a view to the overall dispurge of city, town and village heads. I should like to hear your views.

Attorney General:

This is a question of the change of criteria. It is not for the Board to deal directly with that question.

Shimojo:

Will the examination end in August of next year?

Attorney General:

If the examination proceeds at the present speed, I think it will so end.

Shimojo:

I hope that the speed of examination will be further accelerated.

Hori:

Has the Government ever entered into liaison with the quarters concerned in regard to any particular individuals? I also should like to know of the views of those quarters.

Attorney General:

The results of examination have all been conveyed to the other quarters, but it is not known what those quarters think of them. No decided views have been let known.

Hori:

Does the Board examine cases in the order of applications received, or does it take up first those cases whose particulars are clear?

Attorney General:

Generally speaking, in the order of applications received, but sometimes cases with very simple particulars are taken up first.

Hori:

I think there may be instances where discrepancies occur between applicants and the Board authorities in viewpoints concerning the data submitted by the applicants. What steps are taken in such instances?

Attorney General:

Appropriate judgements are made by taking note of explanatory statements made by applicants and by the Government offices responsible for their designation. Further, the Board itself makes investigations, and takes decisions in the light of all the factors concerned.

Hori:

If any new data become available after applications have been made, will such data be taken into consideration?

Attorney General:

Of course, they will be taken into consideration.

Shimojo:

With regard to persons of whom the examination has been completed, I hope that its results will be published as soon as possible.

Attorney General:

Efforts are being made to that end. The former Board published results little by little, then a delay occurred midway, and finally, with the abolition of that Board, all the results were published together. As this time there are still many cases which are not examined yet, it is desired to publish results before the examination of all of them is completed, if possible.

Shimojo:

Is it not unnecessary to convey the results of examination in cases where the appeal has been negatived?

Attorney General:

All the results are sent forward.

Shimojo:

The newspaper reported that the GHQ had no intention to relax purge. How about this?

Attorney General:

I think what was said was that it was not a question of modifying the criteria.

Shimojo:

Does the newspaper report mean that the criteria are not to be changed, or that men in higher stations of life are not to be released from purge?

Attorney General:

As a relaxation of purge is directly related to the question of the criteria, I think the report means that the criteria will not be modified. In newspaper reports there are often things with which we are not concerned.

Shimojo:

As the question of purge is a very serious matter to purgees, I wish that the results of their appeal may be published as soon as possible, so as to meet the hope of appellants.

Attorney General:

Efforts will be made to that end.

Chairman:

I should like to convey to the Government the wish just expressed as a unanimous desire of this Committee.

.....

PUBLIC OFFICE QUALIFICATIONS APPEAL BOARD

MEMO : Re. English Translation of the Stenograph Record

24 November 1949

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(At a Meeting, 2 p.m., 21 November 1949)

Question by KIKUCHI, Giro (Democratic Liberal Party):

"Then, about the question of purge. I am one of those who have barely escaped being purged. I am one of those who have escaped by a hair's-breadth. # Apart from the question of men like me, I am sad to say that such persons as village heads or members of village assemblies in rural districts have been purged for no other reason than that they, without any knowledge about the international situation or about any such things, were made automatically to cooperate in the war. That such persons should be left purged is very regrettable, also in the interest of Japan's reconstruction. I think that these persons should be released from purge through an approach by the Government to GHQ authorities. On this point, I should like to learn the views of the Prime Minister."

Answer by Prime Minister YOSHIDA:

"Now, about the question of purge. On this matter, I am of the same opinion. I might say that this matter is now a subject of consultation with the other party, rather than that their intentions are being sounded. I would like to ask the interpellator to wait a while for what may result."

#

Remarks: KIKUCHI, Giro was formerly the deputy chief of the 2nd Division, 5th Bureau, Asia Development League of Great Japan (the post not falling under the Memorandum). As to another career of his, he was formerly lecturer of colonization policies at the Nihon University and at present he is an adviser of the Tokushima Zosen K.K. (Tokushima Ship-building Co. Ltd.)

Purge

23 July 1949

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Purge Appeals

The principle that any person purged by the Japanese Government pursuant to SCAPIN 550 could appeal on the basis of individual injustice has been preserved throughout the implementation of the Purge. In the beginning, appeals were by petition to the Prime Minister. Later, the Prime Minister, in order to receive proper advice for his decisions, set up an appeal commission. Over a period of a year, until it was dissolved by the Japanese Government, the appeal commission examined approximately 1700 cases, and as a result of which examination, the Prime Minister recommended to SCAP that 248 purgees be reinstated. This recommendation was accepted without exception.

Thereafter appeals continued to be accepted on petition to the Prime Minister on the basis of extreme injustice or error in original screening, and 1100 persons were reinstated on the basis of such individual appeals. Of these, 1000 were reinstated after 1 December 1948.

The purgees reinstated upon petition to the Prime Minister after dissolution of the appeal board fall generally into the following categories:

A - Reserve Officers, mistakenly presumed to be career officers;

B - ASTP trained type regular officers commissioned during the war; and

C - Miscellaneous categories purged through mistaken identity or clerical error in original records.

Again feeling the need of qualified assistance to the examination of appeals from the Purge, the Prime Minister on 8 February 1949 by Cabinet Order No.39 established a Public Office Qualifications Appeal Board consisting of seven members selected from "qualified men of standing and experience."

Because of campaign promises recklessly made and the wishful thinking of affected individuals, plus some rather confusing reports from Washington, purged persons of all categories have presented appeals in great numbers on the premise that the Board would examine the structure of the legislation implementing the Purge as well as individual injustice under the present implementation.

Of approximately 203,000 persons now listed as purgees, 31,190 have appealed. The tremendous physical labor of filing and cataloging that number of petitions has occupied the present appeal board until this date, and it has not yet submitted any formal recommendations to the Prime Minister. However, between 8 February 1949 and 7 July 1949, the board is reported to have held 25 meetings and to have tentatively reviewed 1717 cases, in the categories and with the tentative decisions indicated below:

PETITIONS SUBMITTED

Category	Number (a)	Number of Purgees (b)	Percentage of (a) to (b)
A	0	71	0
B	5,839	118,406	4.9
1 (Army)	2,409		
2 (Navy)	1,602		
3 (M.P.)	1,825		
C	49 7	3,267	14.8
D	11,664	35,412	33.0
1 (I.R.A.A.)	5,604		
2 (I.R.A.Y.A.)	5,925		
3 (Others)	135		
E	200	507	39.4
F	9	61	14.7
G	12,981	45,936	28.2
1 (Economic circles)	948	1,538	61.3
2 (Press, writers)	292	1,075	27.0
3 (Recommended candidates)	138	352	38.9
4 (Ex-Servicemen's Association)	10,764	39,950	27.0
5 (Butokukai)	632	1,223	52.0
6 (Special Higher Police & Thought Police)	97	349	26.6
7 (Others)	110	1,449	7.5
TOTAL	31,190	203,660	15.3

PETITIONS REVIEWED

	B	C	D	E	F	G	TOTAL
RESCISSION	428	4	107	11	0	187	737
NON-RESCISSION	574	20	196	18	0	162	980
							1717

It is further reported that the board has not yet reviewed the appeal of any noteworthy individual.

Jack P. Napier
Maj AGD

O

Annex "O" Public Officers Qualifications Appeal Board"

As pointed out by you in Appendix "I" to J.C.S 1380/6 of 6 July 1949 the ~~Supreme~~ United States Basic initial Post Surrender Directive, Record number 18 of November 8, 1945 has been brought into consonance with the purge provisions of NSC 13/2 by the removal of paragraphs 5B, 23 and 40 thereof, but is still in conflict with the controlling policy (Decision of the Far Eastern Commission (Decision record number 82). Within the limitation of existing policy and directives the Japanese government has an ~~appellate~~ appellate body in session on the National level to hear, consider and act upon individual appeals based upon alleged ~~infact~~ injustices occasioned by errors ~~made by~~ of the Screening bodies throughout the country in their findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom and to hear arguments and act upon any new contingency which may be presented. This appellate body now has before it approximately 30,000 individual appeals but as yet has had sufficient time for finalized action

within the limitation of existing policy and directives

Comic Press B/G file

Evening

n-60

CAMPAIGN FOR PURGED
LEADERS' REINSTATEMENT

JIJI PRESS

Osaka, June 17 - The anti-coalition Democratic Party, at its national convention opened yesterday evening, decided that it launch a campaign to have purged compextent financial and local community leaders reinstated in public office in the interest of reconstruction of Japan.

The party is the first political organization to officially take up the depurge problem. It stipulates, however, that the campaign should be limited only to those competent persons who were purged as a matter of form for negligible wartime records.

The convention also decided to launch drives for a house-cleaning of the political world and democratizing taxation.

- - - - -

s/n

C O P Y

June 11, 1949

Application for Extraordinary Jokoku Appeal

From: FUKUI Seita, Procurator-General

To: MIBUCHI Tadahiko, President of the Supreme Court

We hereby apply for an extraordinary Jokoku Appeal under Art. 516 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure from the judgment of "not guilty" rendered by the Nara District Court on Feb. 23, 1949 for the case of violation of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 1947 (Imperial Ordinance relating to Exclusion, Retirement, Resignation etc. in respect to Public Offices) against the undermentioned person because the said judgment is considered to be against the laws and ordinances for the following reasons:

ONC Shōichi,

Lawyer

Permanent address: No. 1,353-1, Aso, Takihara-cho, Doai-gun, Mie-ken.

Present address: c/o Toshodaiji, Gojō-machi, Nara-city.

Age: 53

Reasons

For the case of violation of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 1947 (Imperial Ordinance relating to Exclusion, Retirement, Resignation, etc. in respect to Public Offices), for which the aforesaid person was indicted, the Nara District Court rendered the judgment of "not guilty" on Feb. 23, 1949. And the reasons

C O P Y

for having rendered the above judgment stated by the said Court may be extracted thus:

"The facts charged may be summarized as follows:

The accused, who had been a lawyer from September, 1927 to January, 1946 belonging to the Tokyo Lawyers' Association, was appointed the Governor of Nara-ken on January 25, 1946 and retired therefrom on July 9 of the same year. In addition to the above business as a lawyer, he had been a committee of the Political Bureau of, a member of the Central Committee of, and the Chief of the Daily Living Improving Bureau, of the Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai (The Loyalty Manifestation Deliberation Council) which had been founded in the end of January, 1941, and as well he had been in a responsible post of the Koishikawa District Branch of Tokyo of the said Council. Despite the facts stated herein, he, in his submitting the questionnaire of the examination of qualification as prescribed by Art. 7, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 to the Prime Minister through the then Governor of Nara-ken on Feb. 20, 1947 at the time of his candidacy for the Governor of the said Prefecture, failed to make entries of those facts mentioned above and made entries lacking full and complete disclosure on what is called material matters in the said questionnaire.

However the following became clear as a result of the examination of evidences:

The accused made statement in the public trial to the effect that he had attended a lecture meeting once and had participated in the preparation for the holding of a concert, both of which had been sponsored by the above Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai, but he explained that he had done so at the request of FUKUSHIMA Masanori, the then

one of his intimate friends, merely with a view to preparing and assisting the election campaign in the interest of the said friend's candidacy for a member of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly. Any other reasonable evidences exist enough to make us convince of the fact that the accused had been appointed any of such officers or important posts of the Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai as mentioned in a bill of indictment."

As is clear from the above extracts, the Nara District Court has, for the accused's acts of false entry lacking full and complete disclosure on material matters in the questionnaire only for which the accused had been indicted, not only determined if he had actually acted such, but also traced back to the facts, which he failed to enter and which would cause his being nominated as a purgee, as to whether or not he had actually assumed any of the officers or important posts of the Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai, thereby taking up the matter as the subject matter of decision. Thus the Court has, on the grounds of no such evidences as were enough to have made them convince of the above facts, rendered the judgment of "not guilty" because the facts charged could not be verified after all.

Properly speaking, the accused was, prior to his having been pronounced the above judgment, designated on April 11, 1948 as a man who was subject to the Purgee Directive under Art. 4 of the above Imperial Ordinance No. 1, and as for the reasons for the purge, the facts of his assumption of the post as an officer of the above mentioned Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai were stated. Judging from this fact, it may well be said that those facts have been affirmed by the Screening Committee.

To speak of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1, it has been enacted in conformity with the Memorandum dated Jan. 4, 1946 from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (Memorandum concerning Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office), and the above Memorandum is a directive issued for the Japanese Government from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to implement the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, "there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest....." And "the machinery and procedures for its implementation have been established with the approval of the Supreme Commander; the Prime Minister is directly responsible to the Supreme Commander for all action taken pursuant thereto; the Supreme Commander, while leaving these matters generally to the governmental process, reserves his inherent authority to intervene in any stage of any proceeding thereunder; the Japanese courts, as a consequence, are without jurisdiction over any removal or exclusion proceedings in implementation of the aforesaid directive."

Hence it must be construed that a Japanese court has no jurisdiction not only over the designation itself of the accused as a purgee as mentioned above but also over the procedures traceable relating to the removal and exclusion of the said person. In other words the court has no jurisdiction over the facts which form the grounds for a person's being designated as a purgee. Hence it can be construed that in this case too, the court is not vested with the jurisdiction over the determination as to whether or not the accused had actually assumed any of the officers or important posts of the Komin Jissen Kyogi Kai. Nevertheless, the Nara District Court has, as is mentioned in the extracts from their judgment, extended

their decision even over the facts as to the accused's assumption of his post as such officers or any other important posts, and on the grounds of no such evidences as were enough to make them affirm the said facts, rendered the judgment of "not guilty" as the charged facts could not be verified to be an offence.

Such, therefore, must be said to be an illegal judgment, for it is considered that the court concerned has rendered decision upon the facts over which they had no actual jurisdiction as if they had had jurisdiction over them. Hence we hereby make an application for an extraordinary Jokoku appeal requesting the said judgment to be quashed.

C O P Y

Carrie
Purge B/G file

No. 17

UEDA CALLS FOR STERN
OBSERVATION OF PURGEES (Evening)

KYODO

TOKYO, June 10.---Attorney-General Shunkichi Ueda today called for stern observation of purgees in his address to the prefectural governors conference.

He pointed out that re-screening of purgees was one thing and the observation of purgees quite another.

Ueda advised the governors to create a new section in prefectural governments to handle that business.

He also called for the cooperation of prefectural governors in the registration of foreign residents.

The Attorney-General wanted governers to be discreet in choosing candidates for civil liberty commissioners to be created in July.

Ueda 2 (Evening)

As for the public safety ordinance, he cautioned against possible violation of Constitution. "The Attorney General's office," he said, "will not directly intervene in the matter but not be indifferent at all."

---000---

Man/kk

THE PURGE

13 May 1949

1. Potsdam Declaration

Remove for all time those who misled the people of Japan....Assure that only those who would be democratic leaders....

2. Civil Liberties Directive

SCAPINS 93 etc. - October '45

3. Purge Directive

SCAPIN 550 - 4 Jan 46

a. Only Purge Directive and has never been amended in any way since issue;
b. Not punitive;
c. Implemented by Japanese Government, first at higher levels and from 4 Jan 47 at all levels required by SCAPIN 550.

4. Purge Operationally Complete - 10 May 48

Persons affected:

Category A - War Criminals	54
Category B - Career Military	116,892
Category C - Ultra-nationalistic Orgs.	3,250
Category D - IRAA and Affiliates	35,402
Category E - Executives of Expansionist Economy	512
Category F - Governors of Occupied Territories	61
Category G - Other Militarist and Ultra-nationalist writings, speeches and actions. (Principally Veterans organizations.)	45,790
	201,961

Only necessary screening of new persons entering public office and required designation of recently repatriated career militarists continues within Prime Minister's Office.

5. Right of appeal and submission of counter-evidence guaranteed by SCAP.

An examination of appeals cases on individual merits continuing in Prime Minister's Office.

(Copy made for Mr. Grilli - 16 May 49)

13 May 1949

THE PURGE

1. SCAPIN 550 - 4 January 1946.

2. SCAPIN 550 (Extension) - 4 January 1947.
(Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947) -

3. The purge was declared complete in effect with the issuance of Cabinet Order 62 on 27 March 1948. This order abolished the screening committees and the Appeals Board as of 10 May 1948.

4. As of 10 May the number of persons purged by categories was:

Category A -	War Criminals	54
Category B -	Career Military	116,892
Category C -	Ultra-nationalistic Orgs.	3,250
Category D -	IRAA and Affiliates	35,402
Category E -	Executives of Expansionist Economy	512
Category F -	Governors of Occupied Territories	61
Category G -	Other Militarist and Ultra-nationalist writings, speeches and actions. (Principally Veterans Organizations.	45,790
		201,961

5. Reinstated thru appeal (or rescreening) to the same date:

		Retroactive to 10 May	Total
Category A	2	-	2
B	14	-	14
C	6	1	7
D	26*	-	26
E	4	-	4
F	-	-	-
G	94	4	98
	146	5	151

* 3 by rescreening

6. Interim policy providing for screening by offices of the Prime Minister and the prefectural governors have brought the 10 May 1948 total purged from a net of 201,810 to the following as of 7 May 1949:

Category A	69
B	119,570
C	3,263
D	35,418
E	508
F	61
G	45,907
	204,796

7. Cabinet Order 39 issued 8 February 1949, established a new Appeals Board.

ROBERT W. BORMAN
Capt Inf
Chief, Statistics and Review Branch

To Comrie
Purge B/D file

Sekai Keizai Shimbun 5 May 1949

Sub-Editorial: Public Office Qualification Examination Committee

The Public Office Qualification Examination Committee is working actively on the re-reviewing of purgees at the rate of 30 persons at a sitting or 60 per week as it is supposed to meet twice a week. Those who are found unqualified are called "reserved" and not "failed".

Nothing binds one's life more severely than the purge directive. It deprives them of a means of living, and results in the distribution of more imcompetent persons throughout different circles, specifically at present when talented men are hard to find. The earlier the more purgees are cleared, the better.

It is said, however, that there is a tendency among certain quarters against the easing of purge bans. We are not told why, but we guess they fear that the return of their seniors to public office will affect their positions which they obtained without their own efforts.

Assuming we guess right, it is a really a narrow view of things. Such a frame of mind explains the criticism that they are small fish who do not deserve the right to handle the present situation of Japan as well as her future, and that there is need, therefore, for calling back their purged seniors.

We were optimistic at the outset that the resultant dearth of able men would be met by the young generation. We were wrong, we think. Not only in literary circle, but also in political or economic circles, the post-war groups proved themselves powerless and incapable. In short, they cannot be expected to prove men of higher calibre than ordinary office clerks who cannot see things from a broader viewpoint, for they were abvanced so as to speak from Branch Office Chief-class position to presidency, or from Vice Branch Office Chief-class position to managing directorate.

They are easily elated with getting an advance on their position and extremely unreliable. It is a mistake to think that all persons who are removed from the purge list are competent: some will be incompetent, to be sure, but some praise-worthy and reliable persons who have never stopped thinking will emerge with their ability unaffected during the 3 or 4 "blank" years. The post-war groups will do well to get off their high horse and welcome them with humility.

Samii
550 B/G file

COPY

AIR MAIL

AGAO-C 095 Fujinuma
Shohei (25 Apr 49)
CSCAD

WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

29 April 1949

SUBJECT: Request for restoration to official position - Japan.

TO : Commander-in-Chief
Far East
APO 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Inclosed are copies of a letter to the Secretary of the Army, from Shohei Fujinuma, dated 18 March 1949, and a letter from Civil Affairs Division, SSUSA, to Shohei Fujinuma, dated 25 April 1949 for your information.

BY ORDER OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

s/ Joseph W. Robinson
Adjutant General

2 Incls.
1. Cy of ltr frm
Mr. Fujinuma dtd 18 Mar 49
2. Cy of CAD ltr to
Mr. Fujinuma dtd 25 Apr 49

COPY

COPY

AIR MAIL

Genri 550 B/G file

AGAO-C 095 Fujinuma
Shohei (25 Apr 49)
CSCAD

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Mr. Fujinuma dtd 25 Apr 49

COPY

C O P Y

Tokyo, March 18, 1949.

Mr. Kenneth C. Royall
U.S. Secretary of the Army

Sir,

Permit me to write to you for an appeal from a citizen of the occupied Japan.

I was purged from the office of Privy Councilor by the Japanese Government under date of February 20, 1947 by virtue of the directive issued by Major-general Whitney to the Japanese Government.

The proof that I do not deserve to be screened, the course leading to my purge, and my views why I should not be purged are stated in detail in the two copies of my petition presented to General McArthur.

However, I have so far heard nothing from the general, and no action has been taken on my complaint.

The directive issued by Major-general Whitney is utterly in violation of the provisions of the new Japanese Constitution, and there is nothing in the Imperial Ordinance prescribing the purge categories under which I may possibly fall.

The directive issued by Major-general Whitney is evidently an encroachment upon personal rights and is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the Potsdam Declaration; it also works injustice to a citizen of the occupied Japan, and is, it appears to me, entirely discordant with the administrative policies of the Occupation Forces.

Major-general Whitney is the responsible person for teaching the Japanese to respect freedom and protection of personal rights, both of which are implemented by provisions codified through the General Headquarters here.

To leave such infringement on personal rights unremedied especially when it is committed by such a responsible person as Major-general Whitney, will impair the prestige and confidence of the Occupation Forces which they enjoy.

Such infringement on personal right by a responsible person is, I believe, against the sense of rationality and the spirit of fairness and justice of the American people.

Therefore, I beseech you that you will take up the matter of my complaint and will inquire into and deal with the matter.

Most respectfully submitted,
Yours very obedient,

/s/ Fujinuma Shohei
Shoehei FUJINUMA

138 Higashi-tamagawa-cho,
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo-to, Japan.

C O P Y

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Special Staff, United States Army
Washington 25, D. C.

25 April 1949

Mr. Shohei Fujinuma
138 Higashi-tamagawa-cho
Setagaya-ku
Tokyo-to, Japan

Dear Mr. Fujinuma:

Your letter dated 18 March addressed to Secretary Royall is acknowledged.

The Potsdam Declaration requires the removal from the Japanese body politic those who deceived and misled Japan into totalitarianism at home and military aggression abroad. General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is vested with the sole executive authority for the enforcement of the Potsdam Declaration.

Through the proper agency of General Headquarters you were determined to have been an active exponent of militaristic nationalism and as such barred from public service. Such action is final and conclusive and is not subject to review by any agency of the Japanese Government under the Japanese Constitution or any Japanese law or ordinance since the power and authority of the Supreme Commander over the Government and people of Japan is plenary.

Accordingly, your communication is returned herewith, without consideration.

Sincerely,

REX E. GREAVES
Chief, Analysis Branch
Civil Affairs Division

1 Incl:
Ltr fm Mr. Fujinuma
w/incls:
Ltr to Gen. MacArthur dtd 3 Dec 48
GHQ Memorandum dtd 16 Jan 47
subj: adm of SCAPIN 500 (Fujinuma)
Ltr to Gen MacArthur dtd 31 Dec 48

(c c p y)

Excerpt from the Tokyo District Court JUDGMENT, 26 Apr 49:

ONO Bamboku

....."III. As has been described at the beginning of this Judgment, the accused ONO was an important person in the Democratic Liberal Party, as one of the highest officers, and has the duties and competence, as a Member of the House of Representatives, to introduce bills in the Diet in relation to government, to interpellate and debate thereanent, and so forth; to interpellate on bills and budget introduced, to move debate, and vote; and in particular, to introduce bills concerning investigations in relation to government, to interpellate, debate and vote thereanent. As mentioned above, at the time when the Second Diet took up the Showa Denko case for investigation, which threatened to change gradually into a political issue, the accused was requested by the accused SHIGEMASA, at the place and on the date mentioned in II. above, to act in the manner described therein. About May 6, at his aforesaid house, he received ¥200,000 in cash, though he was aware that the sum was offered as fund for the activity for the aforesaid purpose and in appreciation of his service. Thus he accepted a bribe in connection with the duties of a Member of the House of Representatives.

"The acts of the accused SHIGEMASA mentioned in I., (a) and (b) above were committed with a continual criminal intent.

(Evidence omitted.)

(The arguments of the defense counsel and the opinion of this Court.)

"ONO Seiichiro, the defense counsel for the accused SHIGEMASA, argues as follows:

"Article 15, Paragraph 1, and Article 16, Paragraph 1, Item 7, of Imperial Ordinance No. 1, 1947, relating to the Exclusion, Retirement, Resignation, etc., in respect to Public Offices (to be hereinafter briefly called the "Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance') have been laid down in excess of the scope of delegation of authority prescribed by Imperial Ordinance No.542, 1945: "Re Order to be Issued in Consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration" (to be hereinafter briefly called the 'Potsdam Imperial Ordinance'), authorizing orders to provide for matters which ordinarily require the law to make provision therefor. Hence the aforesaid Articles are invalid for the following reasons:

Article 15, Paragraph 1, of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance prohibits any person falling under the Memorandum from all political activities. The said Ordinance has been issued by virtue of the aforesaid Potsdam Ordinance for the purpose of realizing the matters provided for in the Memorandum of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated Janu-

ary 4, 1946 (to be hereinafter briefly called the 'Memorandum'). This is evident from Article 1 of the said Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance. The Memorandum merely provides that any person subject to it should be removed and banned from public office; it does not provide that all and every political activity of such person should be prohibited. As a general rule, imposition of duty and provision for penal regulations against any offender thereof require that such be laid down by law, which should be enacted after discussion and voting in the Diet. In order that an order may provide for such matter, authority should be particularly delegated by law. However, the said Articles of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance have provided, in the form of an order, for matters not designated by the Memorandum, and meted out punishment to offenders of the said Articles. Hence they are invalid. Assuming that such were not the case, the political activities mentioned in Articles 15, Paragraph 1, of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance should mean such acts as committed with an intent of influencing politices, and with the object of realizing such an intent; in other words political acts for political purposes. The acts in question of the accused SHIGEMASA, which subjectively had no political purpose in view, and objectively were private conversations without any ground for being considered as political activities, could not be deemed as such, even if they should have influenced politics.

"In the opinion of this Court, it is evident that the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance has been promulgated on the basis of the Potsdam Ordinance for the purpose of putting the aforesaid Memorandum into force. The intention of the Potsdam Ordinance is to provide for the rule that in case it is particularly necessary for conducting affairs demanded by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, necessary provisions may be made by order as far as such affairs are concerned, and no matters other than those demanded by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers should be provided for by order on the basis of the said Ordinance. It is true, as the defense counsel argues, that restriction of political activity of any person is a matter to be provided for by law, and that no provision exists in the said Memorandum prohibiting all the political activities of persons falling under it. However, the absence of the formal provision prohibiting political activities of any person in the Memorandum does not justify the argument that the pertinent provisions of the aforesaid Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance are in excess of matters demanded in the Memorandum. It is essential to understand the substance and purpose of the contents of the affairs demanded by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as mentioned in the said Memorandum, before deciding whether or not the provisions in question are in excess of the said contents.

"The said Memorandum has been directed to the Japanese Government by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in order to put into force the 6th Paragraph of the Potsdam Declaraton, viz. "There is to be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a New Order of peace security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world." Upon examination of each paragraph of

the said Memorandum, this Court understands that the demands of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers through the Memorandum consist in completely eliminating the power of mistaken leaders of this country from national administration, eradicating their influence, and directing the Japanese Government to take necessary and appropriate measures in order to attain the object. Hence all acts which, directly or indirectly, may possibly affect the formation and activity of the Diet and local assemblies should be prohibited (in spite of this statement, this Court understands that, since Article 6 of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance prohibits a person falling under the Memorandum from exercising his right of eligibility for election, the enjoyment of franchise by such person, inversely said, is not included in matters to be prohibited, in other words, the exercise of franchise by a person falling under the Memorandum is excluded from matters to be prohibited as political activities). In the understanding of this Court, it is hardly necessary to say that the acts prohibited in Article 15, Paragraph 1, of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance are such acts as are mentioned above. Hence this Court is unable to hold to the insistence of the defense counsel that Article 15, Paragraph 1, and Article 16, Item 7, of the Exclusion from Public Office Ordinance are invalid." .....

Copies made for:

Purge Background File
Mr. Rizzo
Mr. Hauge - then 201 File

Purge
Moseley C+C

12 April 1949 CW

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Government Section

Dr. R. H. van Gulik, Political Advisor of the Netherlands Mission, called on Major Napier on 11 April to express his personal interest in the appeal from purge of Matsumaru Chosaburo, a person known to Dr. van Gulik by reason of their common interest in calligraphy and seal-carving. During the course of the conversation, Major Napier asked Dr. van Gulik how long he had been in Japan and what his station had been before he came here. Dr. van Gulik replied that he had been in Washington, D. C. with the Far Eastern Commission. He added that he had left the Far Eastern Commission at his own request because it had become a "backwater".

Dr. van Gulik's further remarks on the subject of the Far Eastern Commission are summarized as follows:

"I enjoyed my work in the Far Eastern Commission very much. However, I felt that to stay there longer would not advance my career at all, as the Far Eastern Commission is now nothing more than a place for arguments over things which are already settled. I was Chairman of Committee No.1 which is the Reparations Committee, and that is a very dead issue as everyone knows.

"Actually, everything which the Far Eastern Commission does is merely a re-hashing of things settled. The Far Eastern Commission has a wonderful secretariat, and the members are fine and conscientious people who try to do all that they can to advance the common cause. However, the only purpose the FEC's continued existence can serve now, if present tendencies continue, is to maintain the nucleus of the operational group for the peace treaty. That, of course, is in itself a very important purpose, and those people of the FEC and of the secretariat who have been working so long with the problems of the East are naturally the outstandingly qualified group to prepare the peace conference.

"I had some ideas concerning the FEC which would have made it a much more effective agency. However, I approached various quarters with my ideas, including the American State Department, and they were not well received. I proposed that the FEC maintain a liaison officer at a level commensurate with the importance of the FEC and of SCAP, who could communicate matters directly to the FEC while those matters were still alive enough to be of moment. Without such an agency,

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the FEC is blind and deaf. Everything the FEC receives has been so thoroughly sifted and moulded and its form is so settled, that it lacks contemporary interest.

"A further difficulty in the FEC is that though the friendly nations present a common front to Russia, the Russian, because he has the same information or perhaps better information in some instances than the other agencies, can use the FEC to express his propaganda, and often the conferences degenerate into shoutings and quarrels. This is unfortunate, and if the friendly countries could be advised beforehand of things contemplated, this propaganda could be turned against the Russian.

"Another cruel fact which militates in favor of the Russian, unfortunately, is that Australia and some of the other countries must take certain lines in order to satisfy elements of their own people and government.

"All in all, though I was very fond of everyone in the FEC and consider the group to be wonderfully well qualified, I am glad to be out of it, and I feel that the French showed good judgment when they withdrew the greater part of their highly qualified delegation."

Jack P. Napier
Maj. AGD

D

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SPECIAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 Apr 49
no action
cw

12 April 1949

Major Jack P. Napier
GHQ, SCAP
A.P.O. 500, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

Dear Major Napier:

The material on the "purge" with which you supplied me just before I left Japan has been very helpful. However, our Department of State colleagues in certain offices continue to press us on the matter and in view of this situation it has occurred to some of us here in the Department of the Army that it would be very beneficial to have a report from SCAP each month covering the events which have transpired and progress that has been made concerning the "purge."

This message is being hand carried by Lt. Colonel C. D. Sterner, Operations Group, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army. The problem has been discussed with him by Colonel Riggs of this Division and by Lt. Colonel Walker Milner, Plans and Policy Group, P&O.

Sincerely yours,

George M. Pollard

George M. Pollard
Civil Affairs Division

Purge file
(see Civil Liberties file for complete correspondence)

PERSONAL & ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority TPSC 12
By SB NARS, Date 3-2-77

Tokyo, Japan.
29 March 1949.

Dear Mr. Baldwin:

Upon receipt of your letter of February 23rd, I asked Major Napier to prepare a brief memorandum covering the Matsumoto purge which is herewith enclosed. I have always felt that although from the start it was clear that he fell technically under the purge, he should be left alone because of his leadership of the ETA class. For this reason we relieved him of the purge provisions in 1946 despite his categorical inclusion thereunder.

During the coalition government of Prime Minister Ashida, his case was further investigated in the light of a new ultra-nationalistic society which had been discovered by the government of which he was a founder and a national officer. Even so, the government was reluctant to proceed against him even after other officers and national directors had been purged. Toward the end of that regime, however, we learned from various sources that the position of the government vis-a-vis the Matsumoto purge was dictated largely by political considerations, i.e. a desire not to alienate the voting potential of his some two million followers. When the Yoshida group went in as a caretaker government pending enactment of the Public Service legislation and call for a new general election, the investigation into Matsumoto's case was intensified. Much pre-war as well as wartime activity on his part was brought to light to show a close affiliation with the militarists, and speeches in the Diet were revealed demonstrating his active support of the pre-Pearl Harbor expansionist policy. The Yoshida Government thereupon decided upon his purge and were about to make the same effective just prior to the campaign for the recent elections. At this point I personally intervened, informing the Attorney General that whereas we would not dictate the decision in the Matsumoto case, we felt that if he were purged just at the start of a political campaign it could only give the purge program the attaint of a political instrument. Resulting from my talk, no action was taken on his purge until following the campaign.

I looked into the matter quite thoroughly and discussed the same with General MacArthur, as I rather suspected that much of the impulse against Matsumoto might have been generated by a revulsion against his attitude ~~toward~~ the Emperor. The Government, however, presented such strong evidence in support of its action that I felt that there existed no justifiable basis for direct SCAP intervention.

We shall of course watch developments in the appeal on this case carefully and do anything we can to ensure its just determination. Do not hesitate to query me thereon if further matters are brought to your attention which support the allegation of arbitrary or unjust action.

Apart from this case, you will be interested to know that against strong objections in Washington the General has just cleared Mr. Pryns Hopkins for entry into Japan. He followed this course entirely upon your assurances previously given with respect to Hopkins' patriotism and integrity.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

COURTNEY WHITNEY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army.

1 Incl: Staff Study.

Mr. Roger Baldwin, Director,
American Civil Liberties Union,
170 Fifth Avenue,
New York 10, N.Y.

GOVERNMENT SECTION

11 March 1949

MEMO FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conference Between General Whitney and Public Office Qualification Appeal Commission

1. At 1630 hours on 8 March 1949, members of the Public Office Qualification Appeal Commission called upon General Whitney officially.

2. General Whitney told the Commission that the Purge Directive was issued to the Japanese Government, not as a punitive measure, but in an earnest effort to ~~benefit and~~ improve political, social and economic conditions for the Japanese people by providing an opportunity for new and democratic leadership. He emphatically declared that in spite of rumors and counter-rumors, there is no alteration of purge policy by the FEC either at hand or contemplated. Moreover, General Whitney stated, ~~that~~ if the question of alleviation of the terms of the Purge were brought before the FEC at this time, such a proposal would not only fail to be adopted but incident discussion might even result in further tightening of purge provisions.

3. The General, in referring to the work before the Appeal Commission advised strict adherence to the terms of the purge ordinances and cautioned against attempts which would be made by selfish interests to bring special benefits to individuals in spite of provisions of the Directive to the contrary. He reminded the Commission that the Supreme Commander's desire for justice in administration of the purge, as in all other matters, would insure equity for all persons. General Whitney added that if any instances of gross injustice or erroneous designation existed, and he assumed that there might be some such cases, then the Commission should by all means remedy such inequalities in accordance with procedures made precedent by earlier appeal bodies.

4. The full text of this statement was reported to SCAP who expressed his personal gratification that the matter had been disposed of in this exact manner.

5. Present at the above conference were:

General Whitney
Major Napier
Captain Berman
Mr. Matsukada

Messrs. UEDA Shinkichi, Attorney-General
TANIMURA Tadaichiro, Chairman of Ap. Com.
AKIYAMA Konosuke, Member of Ap. Com.
AOKI Kinichi, " " " "
KITAZAWA Shinjiro, " " " "
KOBAYASHI Yoshio, " " " "
KOJIMA Toshio, " " " "
WATANABE Tetsuzo, " " " "

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ITEM 22 - GHQ OFFICIAL DENIES RUMORED EASING OF PURGE ORDER - Asahi - 10 Mar 49

Summary:

While recent foreign dispatches report the possibility of the Occupation authorities' watering down the present purge ordinance, thus depuring lower-rank officers of the former Japanese Army and Navy as well as lower-echelon officials of the wartime government, the Purge Rescreening Appeals Committee sources are of the opinion that the chance for such alleviation of the existing purge ordinance is very slim.

Chief IZEKI of the Secretariat of the Purge Rescreening Appeals Committee Tuesday conferred with Chief WHITNEY of the Government Section, GHQ, with the view to confirm the attitude of the Occupation Authorities on the rumored easing of the purge. Following his conference, Chief IZEKI made this statement at his press conference yesterday.

"Chief WHITNEY of the Government Section, GHQ, said that the GHQ authorities have no intention whatsover of alleviating the existing purge ordinance. The release from purge is and will be limited to such cases where the purge was carried out inadvertently or unfairly. He flatly denied current reports on the possibility of purge alleviation as totally groundless."

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Legal Section

17 March 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Decisions of Japanese Courts on Violations of the Purge Ordinance.

1. A conference was held on 14 March 1949 between Messrs. Rizzo and Matsukata, GS, the undersigned, and acting Chief Justice Tsukazaki, Associate Judge Kuriyama, Secretaries Higuchi and Ishi, and interpreter Satagawa, all of the Supreme Court.

2. Mr. Rizzo, in his introductory remarks, pointed out that it has been the established policy of GHQ to let the Japanese authorities carry out their own governmental affairs with a minimum of interference by the Occupation. Even when objectives of the Occupation are involved, the Japanese authorities are used to execute SCAP policies. Up to now all three branches of the Government have performed their duties in this respect with gratifying ability and energy. This is also true, generally speaking, of the way the courts have helped to enforce the Purge Directive and the Imperial Ordinances which implement it. SCAP could have entrusted this task to Occupation courts, but in consistency with the policy previously outlined and also in the interest of the prestige of the Japanese judiciary, it appeared preferable to rely on the domestic courts.

3. Mr. Rizzo then explained that he had called the representatives of the Supreme Court because of G.S.'s grave concern about and serious criticism of the recent decision of the Tokyo District Court in the case against a purgee, Matsuoka, Matsukei. He characterized as "impossible" the interpretation given by the Court in this case to the term "any other form of political activity" used in the Purge Ordinance. He stated that this decision, if not reversed as soon as possible, would threaten to make enforcement of the purge, one of the main political objectives of the Occupation, illusory. The purpose of our meeting was to consult the judges concerning ways and means to avoid this result without interference in a pending trial. Mr. Rizzo referred to the undersigned as the strongest advocate of judicial independence in Japan, and made the statement that, representing Legal Section, I concurred in the opinion of GS.

4. Acting Chief Justice Tsukazaki expressed his gratitude for the general confidence which Mr. Rizzo had voiced in the Japanese judiciary. As to the Matsuoka decision he emphasized that he had not yet seen the complete record and could therefore not come to any final conclusion. The undersigned answered that our criticism was not directed against the evaluation of the evidence, but against the application of the law to the facts, as stated in the decision, which could be judged from the decision itself without further study of the record.

5. Judge Tsukazaki then argued that the term "political activity" used in the Imperial Ordinance in connection with election campaigning was not completely unambiguous. It appeared that some of the judges understood it in a rather narrow sense. Therefore, he suggested that an authentic interpretation of what political activity of purgees really meant be given by SCAP in listing the various forms of activities falling thereunder. The undersigned pointed out that this was exactly what we did not want to do. Apart from the consideration that such a directive would openly and officially prejudice the courts, the broad language of the Ordinance was deliberately chosen to cover all types of political activities. Any listing of specific acts, however exhaustive would inevitably result in unintended omissions. The undersigned reminded the judges of the fact that the Japanese Criminal Code repeatedly uses definitions of a general nature and that a constructive application and interpretation of such terms was the proper task of the courts. Mr. Rizzo elaborated

this idea in referring to the example of the United States, where the statute is only the beginning, while the law is actually created as well as continuously developed by the courts. The undersigned admitted that there may be a marginal field of uncertainty as to whether specific types of human behavior should be regarded as p olitical activity; that, however, the acts committed by the defendant Matsuoka were clearly not within this marginal field. That was particularly true of his helping to influence the Democratic Liberal Party to refrain from an investigation of the Showa Denko scandal as well as of his financial support of the Party Magazine. Judge Tsukazaki replied that he personally agreed with me regarding the first count.

6. Mr. Rizzo then stressed the point that the courts, in rendering judgment in purge cases had not only to apply the Japanese law, but also the SCAP directive which is implemented by that law. Therefore, they must be familiar with the letter and understand the spirit of the Purge Directive. He raised the question as to whether the Supreme Court could give general instructions to the inferior courts including the proper interpretation of both the directive and the Imperial Ordinance. Judge Tsukazaki did not think this possible. He stated that the Supreme Court could interpret the law only when deciding individual cases property brought before it. Thereupon both Mr. Rizzo and the undersigned suggested that the Matsuoka case should be given highest priority; that the Tokyo High Court, where it was now pending on appeal, should accelerate it as much as possible; and that when it comes to the Supreme Court in the last instance, the Supreme Court give it first preference, use it as a test case and in its decision establish general principles and standards for the interpretation of the Purge legislation, particularly of the meaning of "political activity".

7. This suggestion was accepted by Judge Tsukazaki who promised to do everything in his power to speed up the trial. The conference was concluded by Mr. Rizzo thanking the judges, on behalf of General Whitney, for their cooperation. The judges, on their part-, expressed their gratitude for the way the matter had been handled by the representatives of GHQ.

ALFRED C. OPPLER

Keep Purge B/S file

ITEM 8 Mitigation of Purge, by Yamaura Kanichi -- Tokyo Shimbun - 6 Mar 49.

Summary:

We sometimes hear reports that the purge rulings may possibly be mitigated, then, right after that, other reports saying that no such thing has been planned are circulated. Japanese have nothing to say about it. We, however, begin to feel a change in the political season, from winter's cold to spring's sunshine.

The purge policy and its scope was directed by SCAP, against which we can make no criticism. However, actual execution of this policy was decided upon by the Japanese, and personal relations, political intrigues and other factors played a large part in deciding who were to be purged. In many cases, decisions on the fates of men by the screening committee were anything but in keeping with common sense.

If the decisions were fatal only to individuals, that could be overlooked. If, however, the decisions vitally hindered the reconstruction of our country as "the Switzerland of the Pacific" and its protection from communism domination, they should be reconsidered.

Needless to say, politicians and militarists who instigated the war and the bureaucrats, businessmen and journalists who supported them should be purged. If any of them are still in public service, they should be re-screened and purged. If, however, those who were reluctant to cooperate with the military but did so by mistake or by malicious intrigue, were purged, they should be released from the purge to work for the reconstruction of JAPAN.

The mass purge of veteran politicians caused a political vacuum which cannot be filled by new people, who lacked the experience and ability of their predecessors. The purge brought similar results to business and press circles, and especially to local governments. In the latter case, the purge resulted only in encouraging growth of the Communist influence in local provinces.

Three years have elapsed since the enforcement of the purge. Even though they are released from the purge, purgees will find it difficult to re-establish control of their old spheres of influence, from which they have been out of touch for the past three years. It will take courage, ability and energy to re-establish their former positions, and, perhaps, many of them will fail to make the grade.

Premier YOSHIDA is reported to have said that he would endeavor to release KAWAKAMI Jotaro, KONO Mitsu, MIWA Juso and others from the purge in order to help the Socialist Party grow as a sound Opposition party. Though I support the premier's opinion, it will be no easy task for these former leaders of the socialist movement to regain party leadership.

A struggle for survival of the fittest will develop among those released from the purge and will result in the return to power of only those who actually possess ability. Thus, the lifting of the purge will serve to speed the rehabilitation of our country, which is also the objective of the Allied Powers.

Premier YOSHIDA, whose anti-Communistic views are famous, should petition the Allied Powers to revise the purge rules in order to help fight Communism in the reconstruction of JAPAN as the Switzerland of the Far East. Since the premier, in the 2nd YOSHIDA Cabinet, restored the Screening Appeals Committee, there is no doubt that he prefers mitigating the purge rules. I ask him to have further courage and put his views into action.

(TN: The writer is a well-known political critic)

COPY

7 March 1949

Number of Regular Army and Navy
Officers designated according to Ranks

(as of March 7, 1949)

		A	B	Total
(1)	Career Army Officers			
a.	Generals	0	34	34
b.	Lt. Generals	0	665	665
c.	Major Generals	0	1,456	1,456
d.	Colonels	0	4,273	4,273
e.	Lt. Colonels	34	4,360	4,394
f.	Majors	7,662	4,313	11,975
g.	Captains	13,327	984	14,311
h.	1st. Lt.	8,113	51	8,164
i.	2nd. Lt.	5,549	34	5,583
	Total	34,685	16,170	50,855
(2)	Career Navy Officers			
a.	Fleet Admirals	0	21	21
b.	Admirals	0	10	10
c.	Vice Admirals	0	337	337
d.	Rear Admirals	0	691	691
e.	Captains	0	2,378	2,378
f.	Commanders	20	1,468	1,488
g.	Lt. Commanders	1,105	1,726	2,831
h.	Lieutenants	3,598	9,443	13,041
i.	Ensigns	1,980	2,481	4,461
	Total	6,703	18,555	25,258
	Grand Total	41,388	34,725	76,113

Remarks:

A: Number of persons whose age was 30 or less at the beginning of the Pacific War.

B: Number of persons whose age was more than 30 at the beginning of the Pacific War.

Okada Norikazu

3 March 1949

PRESS RELEASE:

To clarify recent conflicting press reports from Washington respecting revisions in policy governing the purge program and limitations upon the Japanese police system, a Government Section spokesman today pointed out that no directives have been received here with respect to such reported revisions and that controlling policy in such matters is contained in policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission which body, as far as is known here, does not have any such revisions even under consideration.

Reports have often appeared in newspapers recently on the re-establishment of the Appeal Commission to deal with appeals for release from purge. Since there are indications that such reports may have caused misunderstanding in some circles, the Government desires to clarify its intention.

The Government has no intention to fundamentally alter the principles for purge which have hitherto been observed. The Appeal Commission to be newly established will be so operated as to accept appeals and examine them according to the former practice; in so doing it will attach importance to individual examination based on actual circumstances, since instances of unfairness in individual cases may occur in the course of routine screening which is being continued, as they did in the past in the original screening.

The Government also intends to see that both political purge and economic purge are handled by the same Appeal Commission, and to select its members from among persons in non-governmental circles who have no affiliation with political parties.

For the purpose of avoiding unnecessary misunderstanding or malignant distortion, the Government desires to state that it will strictly adhere to a just and fair attitude in the establishment and operation of the proposed Commission.

9 February 1949

Cabinet Order No. 39
Promulgated 8 February 1949

Cabinet Order concerning Special Remission for Persons Designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with Imperial Ordinance relating to the Exclusion, Retirement, Resignation, etc. in respect to Public Offices.

In accordance with Ordinance concerning the Orders to be issued in consequence of the Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration (Imperial Ordinance No. 542 of 1945), the Cabinet establishes this Cabinet Order, (Application for Special Remission of Designation).

Article 1. Any person, who has been designated as falling under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 relating to the Exclusion, Retirement, Resignation, etc. in respect to Public Offices (hereinafter referred to as "Ordinance No. 1"), (including those who were defined to have been designated as falling under the Memorandum mentioned in Ordinance No. 1 in pursuance of the provisions of Article 5 -(4) of the Ordinance concerning the Prohibition against the Organization of Political Parties Societies and other Associations (Imperial Ordinance No. 101 of 1946); hereinafter referred to as "persons falling under the Memorandum", may submit application for special remission of the designation, if they deem such designation involves gross injustice, to the Prime Minister.

Article 2. The validity of the designation as a person falling under the Memorandum shall not be affected by the presentation of the application for special remission as prescribed in the preceding Article.

(Submission of Written Application)

Article 3. Any person, who intends to submit an application for special remission pursuant to the provisions of Article 1

(hereinafter referred to as the appellant), shall present to the Prime Minister a written application for special remission.

2. The appellant shall in accordance with the Prime Minister's Ordinance concerned, clarify the reasons why he deems his designation involves gross injustice in the written application under the provision of preceding paragraph, and shall submit together with required documents in evidence and his questionnaire.

3. The appellant shall submit the written application for special remission in order that it reaches the person who made the designation concerned within three months from the day of the promulgation of the present Cabinet Order (in case of persons whose designation will be made after the promulgation of the present Cabinet Order: within three months from the day of their designation).

4. If the designation as a person falling under the Memorandum has been made by a Prefectural Governor or the Attorney-General, the written application as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall be submitted by way of the Prefectural Governor concerned or the Attorney-General. The Prefectural Governor or the Attorney-General shall forward the documents pertaining to application for special remission, immediately on receipt of such documents, to the Prime Minister, together with an explanatory statement.

5. The Prime Minister shall, upon receipt of the documents pertaining to application for special remission of the persons designated by the Prime Minister, immediately forward them with an explanatory statement, and shall, upon receipt of a written application and an explanatory statement in accordance with the preceding paragraph, thereupon forward them to the

Public Office Qualifications Appeal Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission").

(Special Remission)

Article 4. The Prime Minister may make special remission of the designation of the person concerned as falling under the Memorandum, in the light of the result of examination made by the Commission.

Article 5. The special remission of the designation as a person falling under the Memorandum shall be made by the Prime Minister through his notification to the person concerned.

(Invalidity of Designation)

Article 6. In case where special remission of the designation in regard to a person falling under the Memorandum has been made, the relative designation shall lose its validity on and after the day of such remission. In this case, the provision of paragraph 1 of Article 5 of Ordinance No. 1 (as well as the corresponding provisions of Imperial Ordinance No. 109 of 1946 as amended by the said Ordinance) shall be deemed as not having been applied.

(Announcement)

Article 7. The Prime Minister shall, on having made special remission of the designation of a person as falling under the Memorandum or rejection of application in the light of the result of examination of the Commission, immediately make an announcement to that effect.

(Constitution of Commission)

Article 8. The Commission shall belong to the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, and shall be composed of not more than seven members.

2. In the case of necessity for enquiring into or deliberating on special subjects, temporary members may be appointed; pro-

vided that they shall not partake in the Commission's decision.

3. The chairman of the Commission shall be appointed by mutual election of members.

4. The members and the temporary members shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from among learned and experienced persons.

The following persons have been selected to be members of the Commission:

Shinjiro Kitazawa, professor at Waseda University;

Toshio Kojima, lawyer;

Tetsuzo Watanabe, president of the Toho (motion picture and theatrical) Company;

Tadaichiro Tanimura, ex-Vice-Justice Minister;

Kinichi Aoki, president of the Shinagawa White Brick Company; and

Yoshio Kobayashi, professor at Sophia University, Tokyo.

(Proceedings of Commission)

Article 9. A quorum of five or more members including the chairman shall be required for holding a meeting of the Commission.

2. The decision of the Commission shall be made by a majority vote of the members present including the chairman. In case of a tie, the decision of the chairman shall be binding.

(Explanation to Commission)

Article 10. If necessary for the purpose of examination, the Commission may demand the Prime Minister or the Prefectural Governor concerned to make explanations on the reasons for having designated the person concerned as falling under the Memorandum, or may cause the necessary data presented or the facts explained by the appellant or other persons concerned.

(Duty to keep secrecy)

Article 11. The chairman and members as well as the temporary members shall be under obligation not to disclose any informa-

tion relating to the Commission's examination, except for such subjects as are released by the Prime Minister.

Article 12. The Commission shall have a secretariat. The secretariat shall be staffed with the undermentioned personnel:

Chief of the secretariat,

Secretaries of the Prime Minister's Office:

Full-time 2nd-class: 12 persons (one of them may be replaced by a 1st-class official)

Full-time 3rd-class: 24 persons.

2. The chief of secretariat shall be appointed by the Prime Minister from among the 1st or 2nd-class secretaries of the Prime Minister's Office as prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

3. The chief of secretariat shall take charge of the affairs of the secretariat under the directions of the Commission's chairman.

4. The secretariat may, in addition to the personnel as prescribed in paragraph 1, have personnel necessary for help within the limit not exceeding 24 persons.

(Procedures of Examination)

Article 13. The procedure of examination and other matters required in relation to the Commission's affairs shall be determined by the chairman.

(Penal Provisions)

Article 14. Any person who comes under any of the following items shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or to a fine not exceeding 100,000 yen;

(1) Any person who has submitted the statement of reasons or documentary evidences, mentioned in Article 3, with false contents or with relevant facts concealed;

(2) Any person who, having been demanded in accordance with the provision of Article 10 to present data or to make explana-

tions of facts, has failed to do so;

(3) Any person who, having been demanded in accordance with the provision of Article 10 to present data or to make explanations of facts, in reference to important matters, has presented data with false contents or with relevant facts concealed, or has made false explanations or has explained without disclosing full facts.

Supplementary Provisions:

1. The present Cabinet Order shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

2. Any application for rescission of the designation as a person falling under the Memorandum, which has been submitted to the Prime Minister after May 10, 1948 and prior to the enforcement of the present Cabinet Order, shall be regarded as an application for special remission presented in accordance with Article 1 paragraph 1.

Government Section
Public Affairs Division

1 February 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Commission Policy Concerning the Purge

1. The Far Eastern Commission policy decisions with regard to Trade Unions and Farmers' Cooperatives, the latter approved only six weeks ago, indicate full and specific acceptance of the purge program as basic policy. Both decisions state explicitly that persons subject to the purge directive of 4 January 1946 are unacceptable as officers of trade unions or of cooperatives. (See Tabs A and B.)

2. Throughout the first year following issuance of the purge directive the Commission received and distributed much detailed information concerning progress of the purge program. This material was culled from official radio reports from the Headquarters, from Japanese newspaper and radio reports. The most comprehensive of these reports was contained in General Whitney's statement to the Allied Council concerning implementation of the purge on 17 April 1946, which was distributed to the members of the Commission. (C4-010, 16 May 1946, See Tab C2.) A full progress report was submitted to Committee No. 4 by the United States member on 21 August 1946. (See Tab C3.) Following examination of this report, the Committee decided that "no further action was required on this matter, subject to the right of any member of the Committee to raise the issue later". (See Tab C4.)

3. The Soviet representative subsequently suggested to the Commission that it accept a policy decision calling for more speedy completion of the purge and recommending deletion of paragraph 5 of "Directive No. 550 of January 4, which permits the Japanese government under the pretext of 'irreplaceability' to keep in public office persons who fall undoubtedly under the purge directive of January 4". (See Tab C5.) In the course of discussion the Commission agreed "to postpone further consideration of this subject" pending receipt of information concerning points raised by the Soviet representative and on "other developments subsequent to the first report by the United States government on the purge". (See Tab C6.) The Headquarters did not receive another request for a formal report, but the Commission subsequently reproduced and distributed to all Commission members information copies of "Plan of Japanese Government for Purge of Local Government Agencies" (MI-066/1, 11 December 1946), "Plan of Japanese Government for Further Application of the Purge" (MI-066/2, 6 January 1947), and "Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 Re Purge" (C4-007/4). These reports were accepted without dissent or comment.

Memo for C/GS, subj: Far Eastern Commission Policy Concerning the Purge.

4. An examination of the record of deliberations preceding final agreement on the Basic Post-Surrender Policy, announced by the Far Eastern Commission on 19 June 1947, reveals that the Commission evidently considered it unnecessary at any time to discuss that portion of the document which requires that "persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility". This provision remained substantially the same throughout the year that the document was under consideration. (See Tab D.) Since Commission members were fully informed concerning progress of the purge, mere acceptance was apparently considered sufficient.

5. Examination of Far Eastern Commission records reveals that the purge principle has been consistently recognized and accepted. The Policy for Revision of the Educational System, for example, issued on 27 March 1947, provides that "exponents of ultranationalistic, militaristic, or totalitarian ideas should be forbidden to teach or engage in other employment connected with education". (See Tab E.) A year later the principle was recognized in FEC-017/21, 30 March 1948, in the policy decision concerning Control of Japanese Military Activity, which forbids employment in the public service of career military personnel. (See Tab F.) The fact that the purge provisions of these policy decisions remained unchanged and undiscussed throughout the period of deliberation by the FEC and by its Committees suggests that the principle was so fully accepted that it did not warrant discussion.

6. Review of the radios received and dispatched during 1946 reveals that the Far Eastern Commission took an active interest in the purge. On several occasions it requested specific information concerning progress of the program or inquired concerning the status of certain individuals under SCAPIN 550. Copies of all these radios are included in Tab G.

7. Appended as Tab H are copies of documents, or extracts therefrom, which bear on the question of purge application.

OSBORNE HAUGE
Chief, Public Affairs Division

Purge B/O file

31 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Whitney

SUBJECT: Proposed Letter to Allied Council re Rescission of SCAPIN 550

1. Attached draft letter would place before the Allied Council the question of rescission of SCAPIN 550. Favorable action by the Council on such a proposal is highly unlikely, but even if it were to be favorably considered it would still require some FEC action to permit complete rescission of the SCAP directive. Otherwise the most that the SCAP could rescind would be those categories of purgees not specifically covered by existing FEC directives.

2. If it is decided to relax the scope of the purge as a logical and politically desirable transition device between the restriction of occupation directive and the complete freedom which will follow the peace treaty, it is possible for the SCAP to accomplish considerable relaxation within his existing policy directives.

3. A plan for such partial relaxation by SCAP administrative action should be prepared for any eventuality.

1 Incl
Draft Letter

F. R.

RESTRICTED

COPY NO. 25

28 January 1949

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

PARTIAL RESCISSION OF DIRECTIVE SERIAL NUMBER EIGHTEEN TO SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

1. The following partial rescission of Directive, Serial Number 18, prepared by the Department of the Army, has been received from the State and Army Departments for transmission to you for your guidance:

"Paragraphs 5 B, 23 and 40 of the United States Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive, Serial Number 18, of November 8, 1945, having to do with a purge program for Japan, are rescinded. The parts of the Far Eastern Commission basic post-surrender policy for Japan (Directive Serial Number 82) which have to do with a purge program, and other pertinent Far Eastern Commission policy decisions, remain the sole directives to SCAP in force in connection with the purge.

"The intent of the above action with respect to the purge includes provision of latitude and permits action in the area not covered by Far Eastern Commission directives for reviewing the cases of certain indivuduals purged by category in addition to those already reviewed. Appropriate cases can now be reviewed on the basis of their having held relatively [illegible] positions

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority TS 812
By SB NARS, Date 3-7-77

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority TS012
By SB NARS, Date 3-7-77

Initial Post-Surrender Directive, Serial Number 18, of November 8, 1945, having to do with a purge program for Japan, are rescinded. The parts of the Far Eastern Commission basic post-surrender policy for Japan (Directive Serial Number 82) which have to do with a purge program, and other pertinent Far Eastern Commission policy decisions, remain the sole directives to SCAP in force in connection with the purge.

"The intent of the above action with respect to the purge includes provision of latitude and permits action in the area not covered by Far Eastern Commission directives for reviewing the cases of certain indivuduals purged by category in addition to those already reviewed. Appropriate cases can now be reviewed on the basis of their having held relatively harmless positions, on the basis of their personal actions or of the youth of the individuals concerned."

2. The foregoing is not an interim directive but a United States Government policy decision partially rescinding previous pre-Far Eastern Commission instructions. The rescission will be filed with the Far Eastern Commission for information.

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Serial No. 82

COPY NO. 16

26 June 1947

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

BASIC POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN

The following directive, serial number 82, prepared by the Department of State to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on June 19, 1947 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference:

This document is a statement of general policy relating to Japan after surrender. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included or not fully covered will be dealt with separately.

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS on September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers and is now under military occupation by forces of these powers under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and

WHEREAS representatives of the following nations, namely, Australia, Canada, China, [illegible]

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PREAMBLE

WHEREAS on September 2, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers and is now under military occupation by forces of these powers under the command of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and

WHEREAS representatives of the following nations, namely, Australia, Canada, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and

the United States of America, which were engaged in the war against Japan, have on the decision of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers met together at Washington as a Far Eastern Commission, to formulate the policies, principles and standards in conformity with which the fulfillment by Japan of its obligations under the Terms of Surrender may be accomplished;

THE NATIONS COMPOSING THIS COMMISSION, with the object of fulfilling the intentions of the Potsdam Declaration, of carrying out the instrument of surrender and of establishing international security and stability.

CONSCIOUS that such security and stability depend first, upon the complete destruction of the military machine which has been the chief means whereby Japan has carried out the aggressions of past decades; second, upon the establishment of such political and economic conditions as would make impossible any revival of militarism in Japan; and third, upon bringing the Japanese to a realization that their will to war, their plan of conquest, and the methods used to accomplish such plans, have brought them to the verge of ruin,

RESOLVED that Japan cannot be allowed to control her own destinies again until there is on her part a determination to abandon militarism in all its aspects and a desire to live with the rest of the world in peace, and until democratic principles are established in all spheres of the political, economic, and cultural life of Japan;

ARE THEREFORE AGREED:

economic conditions as would make impossible any revival of militarism in Japan; and third, upon bringing the Japanese to a realization that their will to war, their plan of conquest, and the methods used to accomplish such plans, have brought them to the verge of ruin,

RESOLVED that Japan cannot be allowed to control her own destinies again until there is on her part a determination to abandon militarism in all its aspects and a desire to live with the rest of the world in peace, and until democratic principles are established in all spheres of the political, economic, and cultural life of Japan;

ARE THEREFORE AGREED:

To ensure the fulfillment of Japan's obligation to the Allied Powers;

To complete the task of physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by measures including total disarmament, economic reform designed to deprive Japan of power to make war, elimination of militaristic influences, and stern justice to war criminals, and requiring a period of strict control; and

To help the people of Japan in their own interest as well as that of the world at large to find means whereby they may develop within the framework of a democratic society an intercourse among themselves and with other countries along economic and cultural lines that will enable them to satisfy their reasonable individual and national needs and bring them into permanently peaceful relationship with all nations;

AND HAVE ADOPTED the following basic objectives and policies in dealing with Japan:

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PART I - ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES

1. The ultimate objectives in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform, are:

a. To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.

b. To bring about the earliest possible establishment of a democratic and peaceful government which will carry out its international responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, and support the objectives of the United Nations. Such Government in Japan should be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.

2. These objectives will be achieved by the following principal means:

a. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.

b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will

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a. Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be determined.

b. Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized. The authority of the militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated. All institutions expressive of the spirit of militarism and aggression will be vigorously suppressed.

c. The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.

d. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted.

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PART II - ALLIED AUTHORITY

1. Military Occupation

There will be a military occupation of the Japanese home islands to carry into effect the surrender terms and further the achievement of the ultimate objectives stated above. The occupation shall have the character of an operation in behalf of the powers that have participated in the war against Japan. The principle of participation in the occupation of Japan by forces of these nations is affirmed. The occupation forces will be under the command of a supreme commander designated by the United States.

2. Relationship to Japanese Government

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander, who will possess all powers necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to carry out the policies established for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan.

The Supreme Commander will exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor, but only to the extent that this satisfactorily furthers the objectives and policies stated herein. According to the judgment and discretion of the Supreme Commander, the Japanese Government may be permitted to exercise the normal powers of government in matters of domestic administration, or the Supreme

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After appropriate preliminary consultation with the representatives of the Allied Powers in the Allied Council for Japan, the Supreme Commander may, in case of necessity, take decisions concerning the removal of individual ministers of the Japanese Government, or concerning the filling of vacancies created by the resignation of individual cabinet members. Changes in the governmental machinery, or a change in the Japanese Government as a whole, will be made in accordance with the principles laid down in the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission.

The Supreme Commander is not committed to support the Emperor or any other Japanese governmental authority. The policy is to use the existing form of government in Japan and not to support it. Changes in the pre-surrender form of the Emperor institution and in the form of government in the direction of modifying or removing its feudal and authoritarian character and of establishing a democratic Japan are to be encouraged.

3. Protection of United Nations Interests

It shall be the duty of the Supreme Commander to protect the interests, assets,,and rights of all members of the United Nations and their nationals. Where such protection conflicts with the fulfillment of the objectives and policies of the occupation, the government of the nation concerned shall be informed through diplomatic channels and shall be consulted on the question of proper adjustment.

4. Publicity as to Policies.

The peoples of the nations which have participated in the war against Japan, the Japanese people, and the world at large shall be kept fully informed of the objectives and policies of the occupation, and of the progress made in their fulfillment.

PART III - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization

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PART III - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament and Demilitarization

Disarmament and demilitarization are the initial tasks of the military occupation and shall be carried out promptly and with determination. Every effort shall be made to bring home to the Japanese people that part played by those who have deceived and misled them into embarking on world conquest, and those who collaborated in so doing.

Japan is not to have any Army, Navy, Airforce, Secret Police organization, or any Civil Aviation, or Gendarmerie, but may have adequate Civilian Police Forces. Japan's Ground, Air and Naval Forces shall be disarmed and disbanded, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, the General Staff and all

Secret Police organizations shall be dissolved. Military and naval material, military and naval vessels and military and naval installations, and the military, naval and civilian aircraft, wherever situated, shall be surrendered to the appropriate Allied commanders in their zones of capitulation of the Japanese troops and shall be disposed of in accordance with decisions of the Allied Powers already adopted or which may be adopted. Inventories shall be made and inspections authorized to insure complete execution of these provisions.

High officials of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and General Staff, other high military and naval officials of the Japanese Government, leaders of ultra-nationalist and militarist organizations and other important exponents of militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

The restoration, even in a disguised form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part

militarism and aggression will be taken into custody and held for future disposition. Persons who have been active exponents of militarism and militant nationalism will be removed and excluded from public office and from any other position of public or substantial private responsibility. Ultra-nationalistic or militaristic social, political, professional and commercial societies and institutions will be dissolved and prohibited.

The restoration, even in a disguised form, of any anti-democratic and militaristic activity shall be prevented, particularly on the part of former Japanese career military and naval officers, Gendarmerie, and former members of dissolved militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and other anti-democratic organizations.

Militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices, including para-military training, shall be eliminated from the educational system. Former career military and naval officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned, and all other exponents of militaristic, ultra-nationalistic and anti-democratic doctrines and practices shall be excluded from supervisory and teaching positions.

2. War Criminals

Stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who visited cruelties upon prisoners of war or other nationals of members of the United Nations. Persons charged by the Supreme Commander, or appropriate United Nations agencies with being war criminals shall be arrested, tried and, if convicted, punished. Those wanted by another of the United Nations for offenses against its nationals, shall, if not wanted for trial or as witnesses or otherwise by the Supreme Commander, be turned over to the custody of such other nation.

3. Encouragement of Desire for Individual Liberties and Democratic Processes

Freedom of worship and observance of all religions shall be proclaimed and guaranteed for the future. It should also be made plain to the Japanese that ultra-nationalistic, militaristic and anti-democratic organizations and movements will not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.

The Japanese people shall be afforded opportunity and encouraged to become familiar with the history, institutions, culture and the accomplishments of the democracies.

Obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be removed.

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Obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be removed.

Democratic political parties, with rights of assembly and public discussion, and the formation of trade unions shall be encouraged, subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.

Laws, decrees, and regulations which establish discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, creed or political opinion shall be abrogated; those which conflict with the objectives and policies outlined in this document shall be repealed, suspended or amended as required, and agencies charged specifically with their enforcement shall be abolished or appropriately modified. Persons unjustly confined by Japanese authority on political grounds shall be released. The judicial, legal and

police systems shall be reformed as soon as practicable to conform to the policies set forth herein and it shall be the duty of all judicial, legal and police officers to protect individual liberties and civil rights.

PART IV - ECONOMIC

1. Economic Demilitarization

The existing economic basis of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and not be permitted to revive.

Therefore, a program will be enforced containing the following elements, among others: The immediate cessation and future prohibition of production of all goods designed for the equipment, maintenance, or use of any military force or establishment; the imposition of a ban upon facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control designed to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those industries or branches of production which would provide Japan with the capacity to rearm for war; and the prohibition of specialized research and instruction contributing directly to the development of war-making power. Research for peaceful ends will be per

lishment; the imposition of a ban upon facilities for the production or repair of implements of war, including naval vessels and all forms of aircraft; the institution of a system of inspection and control designed to prevent concealed or disguised military preparation; the elimination in Japan of those industries or branches of production which would provide Japan with the capacity to rearm for war; and the prohibition of specialized research and instruction contributing directly to the development of war-making power. Research for peaceful ends will be permitted, but shall be strictly supervised by the Supreme Commander to prevent its use for war purposes. Japan shall be restricted to the maintenance of those industries which will sustain the level of economy and standard of living fixed in accordance with principles determined by the Far Eastern Commission, and consistent with the Potsdam Declaration.

The eventual disposition of those existing production facilities within Japan which are to be eliminated in accord with the program, as between transfer abroad and the purpose of reparations, scrapping, and conversion to other uses, will be determined, after inventory, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission. Pending decision, no such facilities either suitable for transfer abroad or readily

convertible for civilian use, shall be destroyed except in emergency situations.

2. Promotion of Democratic Forces

Organizations of labor in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged. Other organizations in industry and agriculture, organized on a democratic basis, shall be encouraged if they will contribute to furthering the democratization of Japan or other objectives of the occupation.

Policies shall be laid down with the object of insuring a wide and just distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade.

Encouragement shall be given to those forms of economic activity, organization and leadership deemed likely to strengthen the democratic forces in Japan and to prevent economic activity from being used in support of military ends.

To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct

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To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander:

a. To prohibit the retention in important positions in the economic field of individuals who because of their past associations or for other reasons cannot be trusted to direct Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful and democratic ends; and

b. To require a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations accompanied by their progressive replacement by organizations which would widen the basis of control and ownership.

3. Resumption of Peaceful Economic Activity

The policies of Japan have brought down upon the people great economic destruction and confronted them with economic difficulty and suffering. The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage. It can be repaired only if the

Japanese people renounce all military aims and apply themselves diligently and with single purpose to the ways of peaceful living. It will be necessary for them to undertake physical reconstruction and basically to reform the nature and direction of their economic activities and institutions. In accordance with assurances contained in the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies have no intention of imposing conditions which would prevent the accomplishment of these tasks in due time.

Japan will be expected to provide goods and services to meet the needs of the occupying forces to the extent that this can, in the judgment of the Supreme Commander, be effected without causing starvation, widespread disease and acute physical distress.

The Japanese authorities will be expected, and if necessary directed, to maintain, develop and enforce programs, subject to the approval of the Supreme Commander, which are designed to serve the following purposes:

a. To avoid acute economic distress.

b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

c. To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries.

d. To make such provision for the needs of the Japanese population as may be dee

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b. To assure just and impartial distribution of available supplies.

c. To meet the requirements for reparations deliveries.

d. To make such provision for the needs of the Japanese population as may be deemed reasonable in accordance with principles formulated by the Far Eastern Commission in the light both of supplies available and of obligations to other peoples of the United Nations and territories formerly occupied by Japan.

4. Reparations and Restitution.

Reparations

For acts of aggression committed by Japan and for the purpose of equitable reparation of the damage caused by her to the Allied Powers and in the interests of destruction of the Japanese war potential in those industries which could lead to Japan's rearmament for waging war, reparations shall be exacted from Japan through the transfer of such existing Japanese capital

equipment and facilities or such Japanese goods as exist or may in future be produced and which under policies set forth by the Far Eastern Commission or pursuant to the terms of reference of the Far Eastern Commission should be made available for this purpose. The reparations shall be in such a form as would not endanger the fulfillment of the program of demilitarization of Japan and which would not prejudice the defraying of the cost of the occupation and the maintenance of a minimum civilian standard of living. The shares of particular countries in the total sum of the reparations from Japan shall be determined on a broad political basis, taking into due account the scope of material and human destruction and damage suffered by each claimant country as a result of the preparation and execution of Japanese aggression, and taking also into due account each country's contribution to the cause of the defeat of Japan, including the extent and duration of its resistance to Japanese aggression.

Restitution

Full and prompt restitution will be required of all identifiable property, looted, delivered under duress, or paid for in worthless currency.

5. Fiscal, Monetary, and Banking Policies

While the Japanese authorities will remain responsible for the management and direction of the domestic fiscal, monetary, and credit policies, this responsibility is subject to the approval and

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6. International Trade and Financial Relations

Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. During occupation and under suitable controls and subject to the prior requirements of the peoples of countries which have participated in the war against Japan, Japan will be permitted to purchase from foreign countries raw materials and other goods that it may need for peaceful purposes. Japan will also be permitted under suitable controls to export goods to pay for approved imports. Exports other than those directed to be shipped on reparations account or as restitution

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may be made only to those recipients who agree to provide necessary imports in exchange or agree to pay for such exports in foreign exchange usable in purchasing imports. The proceeds of Japanese exports may be used after the minimum civilian standard of living has been secured to pay for the costs of non-military imports necessary for the occupation which have already been made since the surrender.

Control is to be maintained over all imports and exports of goods and foreign exchange and financial transactions. The Far Eastern Commission shall formulate the policies and principles governing exports from and imports to Japan. The Far Eastern Commission will formulate the policies to be followed in the exercise of these controls.

7. Japanese Property Located Abroad

The clauses herein on reparations and references to this subject are without prejudice to the views of governments of the overseas assets issue.

8. Equality of Opportunity for Foreign Enterprise within Japan

All business organizations of any of the United Nations shall have equal opportunity in the overseas trade and commerce of Japan. Within Japan equal treatment shall be accorded to all nationals of the United Nations.

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9. Imperial Household Property

Imperial household property shall not be exempt from any action necessary to carry out the objectives of the occupation.

Purge

" I understand that you want to reinstate those who had been purged as much as possible through the re-established of the Appeals Board."

" I have the complete understanding with that side(referring to GHQ) with regard to the Appeals Board. In the first place, the Appeals Board was abolished by the former Government, but not by the directive of that side. Don't you think something should be done for those people who were purged for holding the post of village head only temporarily? I also want to give some consideration to change the purge criteria itself."

(3 Jan 49 Jiji Shimpo.)

(Excerpt from article in Jiji Shimpo.)

(Interview with Prime minister Yoshida by Reporter A)

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Serial No. 63

COPY NO. 5

13 December 1946

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(C) and 5(D) or (E)
Authority 775012
By SB NARS, Date 3-2-77

DIRECTIVE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS REGARDING PRINCIPLES FOR JAPANESE TRADE UNIONS

The following directive, prepared by the State Department to implement the policy adopted by the Far Eastern Commission on 6 December 1946 under the provisions of paragraph II, A, 1, of its terms of reference, has been received from the State, War and Navy Departments for transmission to you for your guidance in accordance with paragraph III, 1, of those terms of reference:

"1. Japanese workers should be encouraged to form themselves into trade unions for the purpose of preserving and improving conditions of work, participating in industrial negotiations to this end, and otherwise assisting the legitimate trade union interests of workers, including organized participation in building up a peaceful and democratic Japan.

"2. The right of trade unions and their members to organize for these purposes should be assured and protected by law. The freedom of workers to join trade unions should be provided for by law. All laws and regulations preventing trade unions achieving these objectives should be immediately abrogated. Employers should be forbidden to refuse employment to, ordiscriminate against, a worker because he is a member of a trade union.

"3. Trade unions should have the right of free assembly, speech and the press, and access to broadcasting facilities on a

non-discriminatory basis, provided only that such assembly, speech, or writing does not directly interfere with the interests of the occupation.

"4. Trade unions should be encouraged to negotiate with the employers on behalf of their members regarding terms and conditions of employment. The Japanese Government should establish mediation and arbitration machinery for dealing with industrial disputes that cannot be settled by direct and voluntary negotiation between the worker or his representative and them employer. The mediation and arbitration machinery should operate under conditions assuring the protection of the interests of the workers, and if employers are represented on the machinery, trade unions should be given equal representation.

"5. Strikes and other work stoppages should be prohibited only when the occupation authorities consider that such stoppages would directly prejudice the objectives or needs of the occupation.

"6. Trade unions should be allowed to take part in political activities and to support political parties.

"7. Encouragement should be given to organized participation by trade unions and their officials in the democratization process in Japan and in measures taken to achieve the objectives of the occupation, such as the elimination of militaristic and monopolistic practices. But such participation should not be encouraged in such a way as to hinder the achievement of the principal obligation and responsibility of the unions and their officials to organize for the protection of union members and union interests.

"8. Trade unions should be encouraged to promote adult

education and an understanding of democratic processes and of trade union practices and aims among their members. The Japanese Government should as far as possible assist trade union officials in obtaining information on trade union activities in other countries. These objectives should be given due weight when allocations of paper supplies and imports of foreign publications are made.

"9. The Japanese should be free to choose the form of organization of their unions, whether on a craft, industry, company, factory or territorial basis. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of a solid local basis for future trade union activity in Japan. However, unions should be allowed to form federations or other groupings, for example in the same area or in related industries or on a nation-wide basis.

"10. The formation of trade unions should be a process of democratic self-expression and initiative, proceeding from the workers themselves. Employers should not be allowed to take part in the organization or conduct of unions or to finance them.

"11. Trade union officials and standing committees should be elected by the workers concerned by secret ballot and democratic methods. It should be the responsibility of the unions to ensure that all officials have been democratically elected at regular stated intervals and that all their activities are democratically conducted.

"12. No person who is subject to the purge directive of 4 January 1946, or to subsequent purge directives, should be allowed to hold office in a trade union. All persons who were directly connected in the past in a responsible capacity with the

obstruction or repression of trade union organization or activity should be prohibited from employment as union officials, in labor agencies or as mediators, conciliators, or arbitrators. All persons who held office in government-sponsored or controlled trade unions should be subject to screening before being allowed to take office again.

"13. Japanese Government and other agencies which were set up or functioned for the purpose of obstructing or in such a way as to obstruct free labor organization and legitimate trade union activities should be abolished or their powers in respect to labor revoked. No police or other government agencies should be employed in spying on workers, breaking strikes, or suppressing legitimate union activities.

"14. Any undemocratic workers' organizations or their affiliates, such as the patriotic industrial associations, should be dissolved and not allowed to revive. No new workers' organizations with militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, fascist, or other totalitarian aims should be permitted.

"15. Persons who have been imprisoned because of activity or 'dangerous thoughts' in connection with trade unions and other labor organizations should be released.

"16. The balance sheet and table of income and expenditure of each trade union showing also the source of large contributions should be available for public inspection. Safeguards such as annual audit by a professionally competent auditor appointed by the members should be taken to ensure the accuracy of these statements."

COMMENTS FROM KADES: 6 January 1949

The Purge Re-Examination:

The policy statement regarding the purge and the re-examination of purgees' cases is an excellent illustration of the success a small but active pressure group within the Government can achieve. The policy and the cables were all drafted by Mr. Max Bishop, Chief of the Japan Division in the State Department with the assistance of Mr. Robert Feary, relative and former secretary in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. The policy and the cables were all opposed by the Economic Branch of the Civil Affairs Division, especially by Mr. Pollard who had been convinced by Major Napier during his visit to Tokyo last summer that the purge was a dead issue, the revival of which would be disturbing rather than helpful to industry as well as political stability. However, CAD was overruled by the office of Undersecretary Draper (which makes all civil affairs policy for the Army) after constant pressure had been applied by Bishop via Reid to Draper. The matter was then handed to Lt. Col. Hendrick, the Far East desk of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Office (CSCAD/ICO to which I am attached during my TDY here) for coordination with the Air Forces, Navy, and other interested divisions in the Army Department. Although disagreeing himself, Col. Hendrick of course effected the coordination, referring objections to Bishop for overcoming, and then once the National Security Council had recommended the new policy and the President had approved it, it became the policy of the U. S. Government which the State Department and the Department of the Army were simply executing.

NIPPON TIMES - 12 January 1949
TOKYO, JAPAN

PURGE AMNESTY IS NOT PLANNED:
By Howard Handleman
INS Far Eastern Bureau Manager

A high Government Section official Tuesday labelled false the reports that an "amnesty from the purge" was being considered by SCAP.

Maj. Jack Napier, Executive Officer of Government Section and head of the Purge Division, told International News Service:

"I know of nothing under the consideration within SCAP to in any way change the categorical definitions of the purge as they now stand.

"To my knowledge, there is no basis in fact for recent speculation of a change."

Major Napier made his statement after he was informed of press reports from Okayama which quoted Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida as saying:

"Generally speaking, when the time comes a sort of amnesty may be expected."

Mr. Yoshida spoke specifically of the economic purge.

STARS & STRIPES - 12 January 1949 - TOKYO, JAPAN

-PURGE POLICY NOT TO ALTER:

No Amnesty is Foreseen
By H. Handleman
INS Correspondent

Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, taking cognizance of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's declaration that an amnesty from the purge could be expected, denied yesterday that any change in purge policy was contemplated.

The chief of General MacArthur's Government Section told International News Service.

"I know of no change in the policy governing the purge."

Whitney's executive officer, Maj. Jack Napier, went a bit further to say:

"I know of nothing under consideration within SCAP to in any way change the categorical definitions of the purge as they now stand.

"To my knowledge, there is no basis in fact for recent speculation of a change."

Napier made his statement after he was informed of press reports from Okayama which quoted Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida as saying:

"Generally speaking, when the time comes a sort of amnesty may be expected."

Yoshida spoke specifically of the economic purge.

"If and when foreign trade among foreign traders is boosted," he was quoted as saying, "the services of men who enjoy the confidence of foreigners will be required. From this viewpoint, too, it will be necessary to release purgees in financial circles."

Economic & Scientific Section officials refused to comment on this statement, saying the purge was out of their province. They referred all questions to the Government Section.

In some quarters there was a feeling that the Prime Minister was either throwing up a "trial balloon" to see how SCAP would react, or that he was attempting to arrange a "fait accompli."

COPY

INCOMING MESSAGE

22 Jan 1949

From: DA (Draper)

to: CINCFE

NR: W-83090

1. Recurad W-81792 of 24 Dec. there is under consideration here a proposed communication from the JCS to SCAP designed to modify JCS Directive Serial Nbr 18, "basic initial post-surrender directive," as it pertains to the purge. This JCS communication, when dispatched to you, would be filed with the Far Eastern Commission.

2. In view of the arrival of Mr. Royall in Japan in the near future, it is proposed to await the results of his discussions with you before determining finally upon the directive. This message contains 2 proposals under consideration.

3. The first proposal would delete entirely certain paragraphs of JCS Directive Serial Nbr 18. Begin proposed JCS message to SCAP:

"Para 5 B, 23 and 40 of US basic initial post-surrender directive of Nov. 8, 1945 (JCS Directive Serial No. 18), having to do with a purge program for Japan, are rescinded. The parts of the FEC basic post-surrender policy for Japan (W-81011 JCS Directive Serial Nbr 82, 26 Jun 47) which have to do with a purge program, and other pertinent FEC policy decisions, remain the sole directives to SCAP in force in connection with the purge." Proposed JCS message to SCAP.

Para 4. The alternate proposal to the above under consideration would proceed by deleting from JCS Serial Nbr 18 that language concerning the purge which is excessive to the comparable provisions of the FEC basic post-surrender directive and would also modify certain provisions of JCS directive Serial Nbr 18 which are now very inconsistent with your mission of economic recovery. Begin proposed JCS message to SCAP:

1. "You are informed that certain portions of Paras. 3 C, 5 B, 23, 35 and 40 of US basic initial post-surrender directive of Nov 45 (JCS Serial Nbr 18) are modified so that these parts henceforth are worded as follows:

"3 C. This directive does not finally formulate long-term policies concerning Japan nor prescribe in detail the measures which you are to take to give effect to the Potsdam Declaration. Those policies and the appropriate measures for their fulfillment will in large measure be determined by develop-

ing circumstances in Japan. It is, therefore, essential that surveys dealing with economic, industrial, financial, social and political conditions in Japan be constantly maintained by you and made available to your govt. These surveys should be developed in such a manner as to form the basis for effecting modifications in measures of control as well as for the progressive formulation of policies to promote the ultimate objectives of the United Nations. Supplemental directives will be issued to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be required.

"5 B. No persons will be allowed to hold public office or any other positions of responsibility or influence in public or important private enterprises who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, or who manifest hostility to the objectives of the Occupation.

"23. You will prohibit the retention in or selection for positions of important responsibility or influence, finance, commerce, or agriculture of all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression, and of any who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely towards peaceful ends.

"35. Japanese financial organizations and the public finance system will be expected to function on the basis of Japanese resources.

"40. You will remove and exclude from positions of important responsibility or influence in all public and private financial institutions, agencies or organizations all persons who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression. You will also prevent the retention in or selection for places of importance in the financial field of individuals who do not direct future financial effort solely towards peaceful ends."

Para 2. The first sentence of Para. 12, Part 2, JCS Directive Nbr 18 is hereby rescinded. This rescinded sentence reads: "You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan or the strengthening of the Japanese economy." Proposed JCS message to SCAP.

Para. 5. The 2 draft messages in the foregoing paras. are provided for your consideration prior to discussion of the problem with Mr. Royall.

COPY

R ROUTINE

CINC CW/sh

23 JANUARY 1949

FROM : SCAP

TO : DEPARTMENT OF ARMY

PAREN PAREN PERSONAL FOR UNDERSECRETARY DRAPER

PD REURAD WILLIAM EIGHT THREE ZERO NINE ZERO PD ITEM DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER OF THE PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION COULD BE INTERPRETED AS REQUIRING THE MODIFICATION OF THE PURGE PROGRAM AS NOW IMPLEMENTED PD IF HOWEVER ABLE CONTRARY PURPOSE IS INTENDED CMA ITEM REQUEST THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE FILING WITH THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION OF ABLE COPY OF THE ACTION TAKEN CMA THE COMMISSION BE ASKED AT MY REQUEST TO REVIEW THE PURGE PROGRAM WITH ABLE VIEW TO RENDERING ABLE POLICY DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT REPEAT NOT MY DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY FOURTH CMA ONE NINE FOUR SIX AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT APOSTROPHE SUGAR IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCES SHOULD BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT TO CONFORM TO EXISTING FAR EASTERN COMMISSION POLICY PD IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH MY DIRECTIVE AND THE RELATED ORDINANCES HAVE BEEN UNDER THE SCRUTINY AND FREQUENT DISCUSSION OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION AND ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN SINCE THEIR INCEPTION WITHOUT SUGGESTION AS TO MODIFICATION OTHER THAN TO INCREASE ITS SEVERITY CMA AND THAT THE POLICY OF THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION ON THE PURGE WAS WRITTEN IN BROAD OUTLINE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ACTION ALREADY CONSUMMATED HERE PD IN FACT JUST RECENTLY IN ITS POLICY DECISION ON QUOTE PRINCIPLES FOR JAPANESE FARMER APOSTROPHE SUGAR ORGANIZATIONS UNQUOTE CMA THE PROVISIONS OF SCAP DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY FOURTH CMA ONE NINE FOUR SIX ON THE PURGE WERE EXPRESSLY CONFIRMED BY THE COMMISSION AS CRITERIA FOR SCREENING OF FARMER APOSTROPHE SUGAR COOPERATIVES IN JAPAN PD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ITEM WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT FEEL EMPOWERED TO ALTER THE PROVISIONS OF MY DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY FOURTH CMA ONE NINE FOUR SIX UNLESS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED BY THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION TO DO SO PD PARA IN THIS CONNECTION ITEM REPEAT MY PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE PURGE

PROGRAM IN JAPAN HAS BEEN SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED WITHOUT THE SL IGHTEST DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES UPON ITS REHABILITATION AND WITH MARKED BENEFICIAL EFFECT UPON ITS POLITICAL CMA SPIRITUAL AND CULTURAL RENOVATION PD EXCEPT FOR CURRENT SCREENING OF APPLICANTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND APPELLATE PROCEDURES IN EXTRAORDINARY CASES WHERE SERIOUS INDIVIDUAL INJUSTICE IS ALLEGED CMA IT SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE UNTIL ITS FURTHER CONSIDERATION AT THE PEACE TABLE PD PARA THE FOLLOWING UNITED PRESS DISPATCH UNDER ABLE WASHINGTON DATELINE OF JANUARY TWENTY SECOND SEEMINGLY DRAWN FROM FOX EASY CHARLIE SOURCES HAS JUST REACHED TOKYO AND REFLECTS THE IMPACT ANY MATERIAL CHANGE IN THIS PHASE OF THE OCCUPATION MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE UPON THE PUBLIC PRESS AND THE BITTER INTERNATIONAL QUARREL WHICH WOULD MOST CERTAINLY RESULT COLON PARA QUOTE INFORMED SOURCES SAID THE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION HAS INDICATED SATISFACTION WITH THE JAPANESE HANDLING OF THE PURGE PD PARA QUOTE THESE SOURCES SAID CMA THEREFORE CMA NO REPEAT NO CHANGE WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN CONTEMPLATED BY FOX EASY CHARLIE IN THE BASIC POST HYPHEN SURRENDER POLICY AS IT AFFECTS THE PURGE SETUP PD PRESS REPORTS FROM TOKYO INDICATE PREMIER YOSHIDA APOSTROPHE SUGAR POLITICAL CAMPAIGN RECENTLY HAS BEEN CALLING FOR RELAXATION OF THE PURGE REGULATIONS PD OTHER INFORMED SOURCES SAID YOSHIDA APOSTROPHE SUGAR PRESSURE FOR ABLE CHANGE CMA EVEN IF SYMPATHIZED WITH IN CERTAIN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT QUARTERS CMA ACTUALLY WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT AFFECT THE PRESENT SETUP BECAUSE SUCH ABLE POLICY IS DETERMINED BY FOX EASY CHARLIE PD PARA QUOTE THEY SAID IT WAS EXPECTED THAT FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS ABLE NEW PURGE COMMISSION WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO READJUDICATE THE CASES IN WHICH THE PURGEES FEEL ABLE GROSS INJUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE THEM PD HOWEVER CMA INFORMED SOURCES SAID IT WAS ASSUMED THAT ABLE FEW INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS FORMER SEIYUKAI LEADER ICHIRO HATAYAMA AND EDITOR TANZAN ISHIBASHI WHO WERE PURGED BY SCAP ORDER WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEIR CASES READJUDICATED PD PARA QUOTE THE LAST PUBLIC REPORT ON THE SUBQUOTE PUBLIC OFFICE QUALIFICATIONS COMMITTEE CLOSE SUBQUOTE AS THE PURGE COMMITTEE WAS CALLED BEFORE ABOLISHMENT LAST MAY SHOWED THAT OF SEVEN ONE SEVEN CMA FOUR ONE FIVE PERSONS SCREENED SINCE

THE OCCUPATION BEGAN CMA TWO ZERO ONE CMA EIGHT ONE FIVE WERE PURGED AND ONLY EIGHT CMA SEVEN EIGHT ONE BARRED OR REMOVED FROM PUBLIC OFFICE PD PARA QUOTE OF THE LAST FIGURE ONE CMA ZERO SEVEN ZERO APPEALED AND THE PRIME MINISTER REQUESTED SCAP TO AUTHORIZE ONE TWO NINE TO BE REINSTATED WHICH SCAP DID PD PARA QUOTE INFORMED SOURCES SAID THE BROAD FOX EASY CHARLIE DIRECTIVE IN ITS POST HYPHEN SURRENDER POLICY AND SUBSEQUENT CLASSIFICATION OF PURGE SUBJECTS IN SUBQUOTE REMOVAL AND EXCLUSION CATEGORIES CLOSE SUBQUOTE CMA IS SUFFICIENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NEW COMMITTEE TO CARRY ON AFTER THE ELECTIONS PD PARA QUOTE INFORMED SOURCES EXPRESSED SUBQUOTE SURPRISE CLOSE SUBQUOTE AT JAPANESE PRESSURE FOR PURGE REGULATION RELAXATIONS PD THEY SAID WHEN COMPARED TO THE DENAZIFICATION PROCEDURES IN GERMANY THE JAPANESE PURGE POLICY APPEARED MILD CLOSE QUOTE PD MACARTHUR

OFFICIAL:

R.M.LEVY
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

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