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S P E E C H

DELIVERED BY

MAJOR-GENERAL M^CDOWELL

Commander in Chief of the U. S. Military Forces on the Pacific Coast,

AT PLATT'S HALL, SAN FRANCISCO,

ON THE

EVENING OF FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21ST, 1864,

AT ONE OF THE

Most Crowded and Enthusiastic Meetings ever held in this City.

S P E E C H

OF

HON. JOHN CONNESS,

DELIVERED AT

PLATT'S HALL, SAN FRANCISCO,

ON

TUESDAY EVENING, OCTOBER 18, 1864.

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SPEECH OF MAJOR-GENERAL M^CDOWELL

When, soon after my arrival in California, I met for the first time the citizens of San Francisco on a public occasion, and evaded as long as I could, and finally declined; when I could evade no longer making an address, or even a few remarks—though the occasion made it eminently proper and fit that I should do so—I acted in accordance with my feelings, still unchanged in that particular, and in harmony with the antecedents of my whole life. I have ever had the greatest repugnance to mingling in any way with the current party politics of the day. It would be difficult to find any man throughout the United States of my age who has had so little to do with them as I, and it has been with a reluctance, that I fear I shall fail to make you appreciate, that I have within a few days broken through a life-long rule, and attended a political meeting, and ventured to make a public speech. Nothing but an overpowering sense of what I think is due from me in this crisis could make me so far deviate from a course I have hitherto followed, and which is in every way so much more congenial to my tastes, my prejudices, and my habits.

But I have been told by those whose opinions in such matters I respect, that there has been, and still may be, an impression prevailing to some extent in the States on the Pacific coast, that in the political contest now pending, the sympathies of the military Department of the Pacific are generally for the officer who has been placed in nomination by the party who oppose the re-election of Mr. Lincoln!

Also, that as the next President will still have war on his hands, it is the belief of a respectable party that it is in the interests of the country that our next President should be General McClellan, who is competent to carry on the war, rather than Mr. Lincoln, who is not. That, therefore, it has become a question of some considerable interest, and one which would be apt to influence many well-intentioned and patriotic men, whether General McClellan continues to receive the confidence and support of his fellow-soldiers, for, if so, under existing

circumstances, this would be an argument in his favor.

I am not here to pledge the sentiments, much less the vote, of any person in the military service of the United States in the Department of the Pacific, but myself. This is a matter foreign to my duty; but, in the time I have been here, and with such opportunities as my duties have given me to become acquainted with this command, thus far I have heard of but very few persons in the Department, who have not the opinion, I have thought, and still think, all officers and soldiers should have as to the existing war, as to the nature and extent of the support the Government should receive in its efforts to maintain it, or as to whom the government of the nation should be entrusted—those who now administer it, or those who seek their places. And I believe they will do as I intend to do, though not because of my intention or of my acts, but because their own good sense, and their true, sound, and self-sacrificing patriotism tells them to do it—vote for the re-election of Mr. Lincoln.

In ordinary times, when the country is in its normal state of peace and prosperity, I have ever maintained, for reasons too obvious to dwell upon, that officers and soldiers should have nothing to do with the ordinary political contests of the day—not that they should feel no interest in them, and exercise, if they are in a position to do so, their right of suffrage, but that they should not take an active part; but in the present contest, they have not only the general interest of American citizens, but of every lover of civilization, of freedom, and self-government. Besides the special interest—and it is a deep and abiding one—that is felt by every person who has done, and is again to do, battle, and peril health, limb and life for that cause, concerning which the stay-at-home voter speculates, argues and questions, and this interest is become greater since a soldier has been taken up by the opposition. I feel, therefore, there is no class of Americans to whom this next election is so

momentous, none who have a better, few so good a right to be heard, or whose votes should have more influence.

As the political, moral, social and humanitarian aspects of this mighty struggle have been so frequently, so recently, and so ably discussed by those who have made them their special study, I will confine myself to the practical question as to whom the country should entrust with the management of this war from and after the expiration of the present Presidential term.

It is not now a question whether a better man might or might not have been nominated from the leaders of the Union party, or a better or worse General might have been taken up by the opposition. The question is narrowed down to a choice between two persons—Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan. I have not read with any great care the Baltimore platform of the Union party, on which Mr. Lincoln stands, or the Chicago platform of the opposition, on which General McClellan does *not* stand! and I think the mass of the country will not recollect much of either of them. But we laymen in politics know enough of these platforms; enough of the two parties; enough of the two candidates and their supporters to be able to see the position they do, in fact, actually occupy. They both seek peace!

Mr. Lincoln leaves us in no doubt as to the terms on which he seeks it. He wishes it after the rebellion is put down, after its armies are defeated and dispersed, and the flag of the Union is hoisted, respected and recognized over the length and breadth of the land. He does not want peace till it is, nor should any true American wish it.

General McClellan either means to seek peace by treating with traitors in arms, as if they belonged to what they claim to have, a separate independent sovereignty, invaded by a hostile foreign nation; to seek it by compounding this felony of secession, or he means to seek it on the same basis and conditions as Mr. Lincoln.

If on the former, the question needs no discussion; if the latter, then it comes to the point—that as both are seeking the same conclusion to the war and on the same terms, and I am willing, for the purpose I have now in view and the remarks I have to make, to admit it, then, wherein does the character, the patriotism and the talents, the acquirements, the public services and the antecedents of General McClellan make him, rather than Mr. Lincoln, the better man to carry on this war, and terminate it by an honorable and a lasting peace?

Both these men have been before the nation during this war, in the two most prominent positions. It is so well known what Mr. Lincoln is, and what he is not; what he has done, and what he has omitted to do, that I will

only refer to him incidentally with his opponent.

It is not pretended he has made no mistakes, and as I do not admit he should be set aside because he has not, I do not, on the other hand, propose that General McClellan should be rejected because he, in his turn, has made them; for it has been truly said, by one of the greatest captains, that “he who has made no mistakes has never made war.”

But the question is, is it true that General McClellan has that breadth of brain, that greatness of heart and that depth of soul, that comprehensiveness of view united to the knowledge of detail, those high professional acquirements combining the theory of war with the practical execution of its laws and maxims; that high, pure patriotism, unsullied by any unworthy ambition, and devoid, as he so frequently protested it was, of all personal considerations? Did he come, as he says, with reluctance, and at a sacrifice of his private happiness, from what he calls the obscurity from which events drew him, and—what is of more consequence—is he honestly anxious to return to it? Is it true, as he states, that his nomination was unsought by him? Did he never look forward to it? Did he never do anything to procure or induce it? What I have to say will bear more or less on some of these points.

I do not propose that my remarks shall be in reference to events in their chronological order, or in any particular order at all. Nor do I mean, by citing some instances, to have it inferred there are not others perhaps stronger than those I bring forward; but they are those with which I have been in some way connected or concerned, and in relation to which I therefore feel more particularly called on to speak.

The incidents of military service brought me on duty in the city of Washington, just prior to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln. In the service then at the capital were Cooper, Lee, Joe Johnston, Huger, Pemberton, Magruder, Sam Jones, Fields, Lomax, and Elsey, all of whom left the Government in its greatest need, to become leaders in the enemy's army, and I soon found myself one of the senior officers there; and as I did not follow the example of those I have named, and did not go, I naturally came to be trusted, confided in, and, to a certain extent, consulted. The most of those whom Mr. Lincoln had in his Cabinet confessedly knew nothing of either military affairs or military men.

It was thus I came to have a full share in the responsibility of bringing Gen. McClellan into the military service, and of placing him, so far as my opinion and earnest recommendation went, in the high position he soon filled.

Here let me ask your pardon for referring to a personal matter, and say, once for all, and in answer to not a little that has been said on the

subject, that I am under no personal obligations whatever to Gen. McClellan, and as illustrating a prominent trait in his character, I will add, that I once thought I was, in one particular; but I see from his official report that he says he "carefully abstained" from doing what, before it was written, he told me and my friends he had done.

Immediately after the disaster of Bull Run, Gen. McClellan came to Washington to command the forces in that vicinity. When he first came he had, I believe, the proper feelings and views of a soldier, and was for immediately doing something to retrieve the ground lost in that battle. In his conference with me his whole soul seemed to be in that direction. He wanted to know how soon a force of 20,000 men could be had for a short service. He spoke of coming over the river (Gen. Scott was then in command in Washington), and of encamping with his army. He came at a time when the troops on the Virginia side were in large numbers going out of service, and as the force he named could not be immediately assembled from the command on that side, the plan, if any, was given up, and nothing whatever of an offensive character at all commensurate with his forces—soon increased to an immense army, with the enemy for many weeks not further off from him than Oakland is from this hall—was done during the months of August, September, October, November, December, January, February, and March.

Gen. Barnard, in speaking of this delay, says:

"Of all Gen. McClellan's faults and incapacities, nothing, not even his irresolution and mismanagement in the face of the enemy, or his inability, ever, in any case to act when the time came, furnished a clearer proof of the lack of those qualities which make a great general or a great statesman than his failure to do something for these eight months."

Gen. McClellan, in justification of this delay, says, after reciting the instructions given to the officers commanding the armies in Kentucky, Missouri, and the expeditions to North Carolina, South Carolina, and New Orleans:

"The plan indicated in the above letters comprehend in its scope the operations of all the armies of the Union, the Army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in co-operation along the whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the Army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work."

When were these instructions* given? To Buell on November 7th and 12th; Halleck, November 11th; Burnside, January 7th; Sherman, February 14th; and Butler, February 23d.

Well, what, if anything, was done by the Army of the Potomac prior to even the earliest of

these dates? *Nothing!* Why was nothing done? Was the enemy inaccessible to the army? No, not further off than the seal rocks from this place. Were they so entrenched, so fortified, or were they so numerically our superiors as to make it impossible to dislodge them? Nothing of the kind. Was it who were intrenched, and our forces, compared to those who occupied Munson's and Upton's Hills and adjacent positions, were more than three to one, not counting those on the Washington side. Was there any co-operation required from any other army, or was any possible? No. The nearest army was then in Western Virginia, more than two hundred miles off. Why, then, was nothing done all time by one who, in the beginning, was so anxious for 20,000 men for a short expedition? The men he had; and the enemy had greatly shortened the expedition to be made. It was a thing to be done between breakfast and dinner, and involved no transportation of baggage. It was because he had become thus early filled with ideas of personal aggrandizement, and he cared not at what cost he pursued them.

It is well known to many who were in Washington at that time, how—on account of the hopes centered in him, of the immense trust and power conferred on him—he absorbed all the interest of the day. Foreign ministers spoke of him at the dinner table as the next President. The opposition saw in him, at an early day, material for their present purposes; and the press of *all* parties vied with each other who should sustain him the most thoroughly. It was natural, under the circumstances, they should. *We all did;* and had he realized but one tenth of what he promised, and had he shown an average amount of earnestness, of sincerity and of disposition to self-sacrifice to which he so often made claim, he would not now have an opponent in Mr. Lincoln for the Presidency, but would have gone in by the acclamation of all parties. But as it was, he wanted to make sure of his case; he would run no risk *himself*, others must do that. He cared not at what cost of millions of treasure, and took no thought of the thousands of lives, so he made his election sure. He had the highest place in the army. He stood well, and, following the old adage, *he stood still!*"

He says in his report he had hoped to make a general advance during the good weather in December, but was defeated in that hope by—not the condition of the Army of the Potomac—but as he says, by the "utter disorganization and want of preparation which pervaded the Western armies." They lacked, he says, when he came to command as General-in-Chief, "transportation, arms, clothing, artillery and discipline,"—certainly a bad state for an army to be in. But he does not say that one of the great causes of their deficiency in the material

of war was on account of his absorbing everything for his own army; for even before Gen. Scott retired, he had everything he asked for that could be had. But his army being in good condition, and the Western armies being deficient in everything which goes to make an army efficient, is it not strange that these Western armies moved and fought the battles of Mill Springs, took Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Columbus and Nashville, and reached the southern borders of Tennessee before the Army of the Potomac under McClellan had fairly inaugurated its campaign?

Where here was that grand co-operation of which McClellan speaks, and of which the Army of the Potomac was to perform its share? The army attacked nothing, and did not prevent the enemy—what was left of him—from retiring at his own good pleasure and without molestation from Manassas, and going where he pleased, and wherever his means of communication enabled him. This grand combination was called in the language of the day, the great Anaconda movement. It was claimed for it that it was something Napoleonic in its comprehensiveness, something above the appreciation of the ordinary matter-of-fact man. Whatever it was, good or bad, his part in his own plan was not carried out. He kept his own especial well appointed army inactive, and left the badly prepared, badly equipped, badly supplied Western boys to do the fighting, and they did it—and no credit or thanks to him, either.

In connection with this subject, and as an illustration in a remarkable degree of the relations between Mr. Lincoln and Gen. McClellan, I will mention here some interviews between Mr. Lincoln and myself in the early part of January, 1862. What occurred struck me, at the time, as something so extraordinary in the history of a great nation, revealing a state of affairs that I am quite sure never existed before, and I was assured could never exist again, that I made, at the time, notes of these interviews, and have thus retained them fresh in my mind.

The questions discussed at the time have long since become matters of history, and I feel, on that account, and because of existing circumstances, justified in referring to them.

It was on the 10th of January, 1862, that, being at Arlington, I received a telegram, and soon after a confidential note, saying the President wished to see me. I went to the White House, and was ushered into the northeast room, where I found the President and Gen. Franklin. The President appeared to be greatly depressed in consequence of the desperate condition of the national affairs. He spoke of the exhausted condition of the treasury; of the loss of public credit; of the Jacobinism in Congress; of the delicate state of our foreign relations; of the bad news just re-

ceived from the West, as contained in a letter from General Halleck, on the state of affairs in Missouri; of the want of co-operation between Generals Buell and Halleck, each having to report direct to Washington; but, more than all, of the sickness of General McClellan.

The President said he was in great distress, and as he had been to General McClellan's house, and the General did not ask to see him, and as he must consult somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and myself, to obtain our views, and our opinion as to the possibility of soon doing something with the Army of the Potomac.

To use his own expression, "if something was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair!" and "if Gen. McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something."

It is unnecessary to go into the details of the conferences had on this occasion. They lasted several days. In reference to the movement of the army, I advocated its going out from Alexandria against the enemy then in front of that place, and Gen. Franklin, at first, favored its going by way of York River. We directed our inquiries to both cases, and were ordered by the President to obtain all the information necessary to form an opinion from the staff officers of the Army of the Potomac.

It was on the 10th of January that the President in person went to the headquarters of Gen. McClellan, but could not see him. Secretary Seward had also gone to McClellan's headquarters, but was refused admission because the General had been, and was, so sick that he could not be disturbed. This, at a time when Gen. McClellan's chief of staff was absent sick, and when there was no one at Washington but Gen. McClellan himself who knew anything about his plans—whatever they may have been—or the instructions to be given our armies in the field at a time they needed them to secure their effective co-operation, or to place them in a position or condition for the campaign.

Yet, if you will refer to Gen. McClellan's report, you will see that just prior to this date, when he could not see the President of the United States, nor the Secretary of State, he was (January 7th) writing despatches to Burnside, and I was assured by a gentleman of high character and position, and of undoubted veracity, that at this very time of our conferences, he himself had had an interview with McClellan, not on his own direct application, which had been denied, but through the intervention of a reporter of an influential newspaper, the *New York Herald*.

During these conferences with the President, and shortly after the visit of the gentleman before referred to—if, indeed, not in consequence

of it—Gen. McClellan left his house and went to see the President. When he did, the President told us that, as Gen. McClellan was now looking very well, and would take charge of the army himself, he would dismiss further proceedings with us, but he wished we would come together once more and meet Gen. McClellan.

At this final meeting the President explained to him why he had called in and consulted Gen. Franklin and myself, going over pretty much the same ground he had already gone with us. To all of which Gen. McClellan said, “the case was so clear a blind man could see it.”

At this meeting, where Gen. McClellan, Gen. Franklin, myself, and several members of the Cabinet were present, the subject of the ensuing campaign was brought up, and a member of the Cabinet put a direct question to Gen. McClellan as to *what* he intended doing with his army, and *when* he intended doing it? After a long pause, he answered that he was very much averse to telling his plans, as, in military matters, the fewer knowing them the better; that he would do so if the President ordered it!—but “that any movement of the Army of the Potomac must be preceded by that of Buell’s army in Kentucky, and that that movement [with emphasis] might now be forced!”

The President then asked him: “Have you counted on any particular time—I do not ask what that time is; but have you, in your mind, any particular time fixed when a movement can be commenced?” He replied, he had. “Then,” said the President, “on that I will adjourn this meeting!”

I cite this as an example of great trust on the part of the President, and as showing to what an extent Gen. McClellan was allowed to have everything his own way.

This movement of Buell’s in Kentucky, which Gen. McClellan thought, in the middle of January, *could be forced*, was nothing less than a march through Cumberland Gap to Knoxville, to cut off railroad communications from Virginia to the South and West. This was to be done by this badly supplied, badly armed, badly clothed, and badly disciplined army, over two States, Kentucky and Tennessee, and a chain of mountains; whilst McClellan, on a subsequent occasion (October 7th, 1862), declared that he had concluded to adopt for his fine army, “the line of the Shenandoah, for immediate operations against the enemy, now near Winchester.” But that over the smooth, broad stone road which leads up this valley, he says: “If the enemy abandon Winchester, and fall back on Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route.” “We cannot go,” he says, “more than twenty to thirty-five miles beyond a railroad or canal terminus!”

What is this line, so impracticable for McClel-

lan? The very one on which—a hundred miles from where he said he could not go—the gallant Sheridan has gone, and on which, near Strasburg, a day’s march beyond McClellan’s stopping point, Sheridan has just gained his great victory over Early!

January and part of February having passed by without anything being attempted by the Army of the Potomac, the twelve Generals of Division were called together in council at McClellan’s headquarters, to determine on a plan of action, to be submitted to the President. The question was determined on personal grounds, not on the merits of the case. I knew nothing of political caucusses, but the action then appeared very like what I suppose them to be. After some discussion between the Generals, Gen. McClellan came in and submitted his plan, which was to leave the enemy where he was, and fight him where he was not; to embark his army at Annapolis, and go around and up the Rappahannock to the rear of the enemy, and thence into Richmond before the enemy could take his army back to its defence by direct railroad communication. This magnificent scheme involved, first, the division of his army into two parts, and second, the embarkation of the larger part, with its batteries, cavalry horses, forage, munitions, siege guns, commissary stores, teams, etc., and transportation of the same by water, and land marches, to the gates of Richmond! And all to be done in a *week* from the time it should be commenced.

To show how little he had digested his own plan, and how just were the objections urged at the time, as to the possibility of his making such a movement so as to answer his purpose—just refer to his own opinions when he became wiser by experience. when, on being reproached by Halleck for his tardiness in coming up with his army from the Peninsula to reinforce Pope, he says—August 12th, 11 P. M.:

“With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington (6) six weeks, about, were occupied in embarking this army and its material.”

Yet he was to march forty miles to Annapolis, and embark without so many facilities, and get to the Rappahannock in a week! and before the enemy should find it out and get down to resist him.

I opposed the plan as impracticable at the time, and for the purpose required. Three Generals—Sumner, Heintzleman and Barnard—agreed with me in the plan of going to the front from Alexandria against the enemy, where he then was, with the whole army, instead of [a part, and by the shortest line. Eight were against us—a majority of two thirds. Then it was proposed—as is the case, I understand, among politicians—to *make it unanimous*. This I refused to sanction, so far as I was concerned. We went to the President

in a body, and found him doubled up, sitting by the fire-place. He said he was glad to see us; hoped something would be done; for, as he remarked, "Napoleon himself could not stand still any longer with such an army. I don't care, gentlemen, what plan you have; all I ask is for you to just pitch in!"

When the scheme was broached to him, his countenance fell, and he said he did not see how he could get his consent to allow the army to leave Washington with the enemy in front of it and the Potomac blockaded; that if the army was to be removed from its present base, some of it at least must go down the Potomac!

Nothing came of it, however, for the enemy having staid as long as he pleased, left the Potomac and abandoned Manassas, and we went there, after they had retired in safety!

McClellan then went to the Peninsula, and took up the plan of campaign by way of York River and the Chickahominy.

The Peninsula campaign and the causes which led to the separation of my corps from Gen. McClellan's army, are among the most important matters effecting Gen. McClellan's reputation. Any account that would be at all justice to them would extend my remarks beyond the time that can now be given. Fortunately, these subjects have been most ably handled by one who, as a soldier, an engineer, as a man of the highest professional attainments, of the greatest military knowledge, as a distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, and subsequently as the Superintendent of that institution, as a mathematician, and a man of science and of letters, and as a man of character and perfect independence of thought, has no superior in the army or out of it. I mean one not unknown to many of my hearers—Gen. Barnard, who but lately gave a beautiful example of self abnegation in asking the President to withdraw his nomination from before the Senate for the place of Chief of the Corps of Engineers of the whole army, when he learned that his senior, Gen. Delafield, was strong enough physically to discharge the duties of the place.

This view of the Peninsula campaign is so full, so overwhelming, that I am sure if my friend—if he will suffer me so to call him—Mr. W. T. Coleman, will be at the pains to procure and read it, he will have an internal trouble, in all candor, to reconcile his position as sub-leader of the opposition, with the conviction that will be forced on his mind of the worthlessness of his chief! There is one point too characteristic of Gen. McClellan, and too much connected with my own operations, for me to pass by. At the close of his report he says:

"The brilliant battle of Hanover Court House was fought, which opened the way for the First Corps (then forming part of the Army of the Rappahannock,) with the aid of which, had it come, we

should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came!"

How disingenious, to say the least of it, this is. The First Corps of the Army of the Potomac, as organized by him, consisted of the three divisions of Franklin, King and McCall. Of these, at the time to which he refers, he had Franklin and McCall. He had, on the 7th of June, assured the President he would be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall's division reached him—and McCall reached him on the 12th and 13th. On the 14th of the same month he was still asking for more troops, which he insisted should be sent to him by water. The troops he wanted were under my command and near Fredericksburg. From Fredericksburg to Richmond it is about 58 miles, about the distance from here to the New Almaden mines! The country was the same over which subsequently Grant marched his army. There was then nothing of the enemy between Gen. McClellan's army and mine. The march would not require for my forces more than three days. I had an abundant supply of wagons and beef cattle, yet Gen. McClellan would not hear of my marching down the straight open road, but insisted my troops should be marched to the river and embarked on transports, so as to come in his rear instead of on his right—to come by detachments instead of in a body, even when he knew from his own experience, and was reminded in the most pointed manner by the President that it would take three times as long. He ends one of his despatches at this time with this remarkable statement: "If I cannot fully control all his (McDowell's) troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results."

Let it be understood that he had then precisely the control of McDowell's troops which he asked for; but even if he had not, is it not rather an equivocal position for a patriot to occupy, to be willing, in this pert manner, to throw away what he swore before a court, to be a certainty of taking the enemy's capital and crushing the rebellion, because the President, whose orders he had sworn to obey, wished the troops should go to him in the most expeditious manner.

Why was this? He says to the President: "The stake is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained; you know I have none." He thanks God he is not like other men!

The simple, plain, unvarnished truth, I have been told by those who were in McClellan's army at the time, was that the whole affair was one of personal consideration. He wanted my troops sent to him in such a way as to reinforce his partizans; I subsequently found that McCall's division had been assigned by him to Gen. Fitz John Porter.

One instance more, and I will have done. The conduct of Gen. McClellan at the second battle of Bull Run has been represented by his party as some-

thing noble, patriotic and self-sacrificing to an unheard-of degree.

That on this occasion he was disgraced by the Administration, confined at Alexandria, and compelled for hours to listen to the distant sound of the conflict, and when the army in front was defeated and routed, scattered, disorganized, dispirited, and totally incapable of making a successful defence—he was sought with tearful eyes, and entreated to save the capital, which he magnanimously consented to do!

He protests in his report that he lost time in moving the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the Army of Virginia; that he left nothing undone in his power to forward supplies and reinforcements to Gen. Pope!

He is, I suppose, the best judge of what he was capable of doing. If so, I can only say that it amounted to but little.

The whole of this case is very fully given in Raymond's book on Lincoln's Administration and in the Congressional documents—and these may be safely referred to, to prove, that, instead of doing anything to send reinforcements or supplies to Pope, he did just the reverse. And I here wish to assert it as a fact, which you can see yourselves from McClellan's own reports—in the books before mentioned—that one of his first acts on taking charge of the duty assigned him at Alexandria, was to countermand the order for Cox's brigade, then on their way to Pope, and place it with Franklin's corps. And that this corps—ordered over and over again, in the most peremptory manner, to move by forced marches, and reinforce an army then actually engaged in a battle, the distant sound of which he heard—was not suffered by McClellan to join Pope till after Pope had been fighting the enemy for three days, and he (McClellan) had succeeded in his efforts to procure his defeat.

First Cox's command, then Franklin's Corps—then Sumner's, and then others—all withheld! Sumner himself testifies that had he been ordered forward, upon landing at Alexandria he would have been in the second battle of Bull Run.

I will not, I am sure, be thought by any one who studies the testimony, to use too strong language when I say these corps were all withheld on the most miserable, flimsy pretexts—such pretexts as would have caused him to withhold Kearney, Heintzelman, and Porter, had he arrived before they marched.

He also refused to send forward any supplies till Pope should send his troops—then engaged with the enemy—back to escort them!! This when Banks' wagon train was coming down from the front without any molestation whatever!

One fact of his conduct on this occasion should not be forgotten. He was told by the superintendent of the railroad—Gen. Haupt—that Gen. Scammon was holding Bull Run bridge with 1,500 men, and needed reinforcements. Now, this is a case in which strategy is not involved, but a plain simple question, that any person in this assembly is perfectly competent to understand—an officer holding a position with a inferior force, and within a few miles of a large body of his comrades.

The following is Haupt's testimony in the case:

“*Question*—What action did Gen. McClellan take upon the information which you communicated?

Answer—He decided that it would not be safe to send an expedition to reinforce the command of Col. Scammon until he could get further information of the number and position of the enemy.

Q.—Did you recommend that the command should be reinforced?

A.—I was very anxious that it should be either reinforced or relieved. I wished also to bring off the remainder of Gen. Taylor's command, and, if I had not found Gen. McClellan, would certainly have sent out a force that afternoon.

Q.—Had you reason to believe that this movement could have been made successfully?

A.—I thought the circumstances were such as to justify some risk, and as Gen. McClellan did not seem willing to send a force for the reasons assigned, I determined to assume the responsibility of making a reconnoissance on the following morning, unless positively forbidden. I accordingly sent to Gen. McClellan the following telegram:

AUGUST 27, 1862.

I propose to start at 4 o'clock, precisely, a wrecking and construction train, bound for Bull Run; also, a forage train and subsistence train. It is, perhaps, proper that two hundred good skirmishers should be sent with the trains, who should be at the depot at Alexandria before 4 A. M. to-morrow morning. Gen. Pope will be notified by courier to-night to have his wagons ready at Sangster's Station by daylight to-morrow. If the troops are not here by 4 A. M. we propose to go ahead without them.

H. HAUPT.

Maj. Gen. McClellan.

No reply having been received within the time designated, I sent out the train! I cannot speak in too strong terms of the zeal and courage of the railway employes and of the telegraph operators, who, with a full understanding that the service was very hazardous, volunteered for the occasion.”

* * * * *

Not safe to reinforce because he did not know how great was the danger! and then neither reinforcing nor withdrawing this command, but leaving it to its fate!

Fortunately, the indefatigable Haupt, without any aid from the military, and with his brave corps of civilians, railroad employes, and telegraph operators, did what the General did not feel himself authorized on military grounds to attempt!

Haupt further testifies to the fact that nearly all the information given to the Government at Washington, during this battle, was given by civilians! And you will see that not a particle was obtained by Gen. McClellan, though he had under his control nearly 40,000 men, with a sufficiency of everything necessary for the purpose.

The animus with which all this was done was not left in doubt even by his own reports. You will see that he actually suggests to the President to withhold all help from Pope, and to leave *him*—which means many thousands of gallant men—“to get out of his scrape as best he can!” This on the pretext to make the capital secure!

Yet when, soon afterward, he, McClellan, was again at the head of this army he proposed thus to be sacrificed, he says (September 11, 1862): “But even if Washington should be taken, this would not bear comparison with the ruin and disasters which would follow a single defeat of this” his “army.”

When he had charge of Washington he proposed

to sacrifice the army; and when he has the army, he proposes to sacrifice the capital! Yet he is constantly protesting he has no personal considerations; that high, patriotic, unselfish and disinterested motives only have animated him! Yet will any one, in all candor say, from these statements, that he has not given ample evidence of the very reverse?

How came it that with a knowledge of his conduct on this occasion, the President should have replaced him in command of the army? It was on account of the representations made to him—that that army would not fight under any one else, and that he must accept McClellan or the enemy!

I was at both battles of Bull Run. What I *did* or *did not do* at the first, is of no consequence in this connection; that matter has been abundantly investigated and commented on; but what I *said* is of consequence. For I claim to have given the country a true and faithful account of it—one that has never been gainsayed; and I claim therefore to

be believed now when, in reference to the second, I tell you that those representations as to that army being routed, disorganized and demoralized, and not willing to fight under any one the Government might assign to it, are false, utterly false! and that personal considerations were at the bottom of the whole matter; and it was on personal grounds, and not on public and patriotic ones, that McClellan was at this time forced on the President.

This is the General whom the opposition wish to take the place of Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln is confessedly not a military man. You have seen how he confides in and sustains those whom he trusts. Whom does he now have to conduct this war? who are his Lieutenants?

Look at the brilliant campaigns of Vicksburg, Atlanta, and the Shenandoah, and tell me if you want other or better men than Grant, than Sherman, than Sheridan—"No! no! no!" Then here I rest the case without another word on this subject.

SPEECH OF HON. JOHN CONNESS.

At a Mass Meeting of Union men, held at Platt's Hall, San Francisco, on Tuesday evening, the 18th instant, Senator Conness was introduced to the audience, and spoke as follows:

Mr. Chairman, ladies and fellow-citizens of San Francisco: I have been summoned before you to-night by the inexorable order of the Union State Central Committee. It is not, fellow-citizens, by even a wish of mine that I appear before you, and you must not think it strange that I say this. However I may have acquired some reputation for public speaking by reason of its having been forced upon me in conflicts through which I have passed, it is not my *forte*. I fear it. I fear public audiences, and more than I can tell you. In addition to that, fellow-citizens, in this canvass I have been unfortunate enough not to be possessed of my ordinary vigor, and I have been advised of the necessity of husbanding what little I have, in order that in the sphere of my official duties I, too, may contribute to the success that we all so earnestly contemplate—the preservation of the country, of liberty and freedom in America and the whole world. [Applause.]

It has been said by some that there is a lukewarmness felt by me in this contest. Why, fellow-citizens, there are none who have heads to think and hearts to feel who can possibly be lukewarm in a contest such as the one before us. [Applause.] The mightiest stake is at issue, the greatest contest is being waged that was ever known in America. Heretofore, for generations past, since our country

character, were determined by the popular voice. We are now to determine by the popular voice the great question of who shall be the Chief Magistrate of this nation for four years to come; and by and by, in addition to that, we are to determine whether or not we shall continue to be a nation—whether or not the United States of America shall still be considered, and be in fact, the home of the oppressed of every nation; the home, the secure home, of liberty. [Applause.] But while this civil contest is going on at this time, war, deadly and horrible war, is carried on upon the fields of this country—a war in which the lands and homes of the country are laid waste and her sons are slaughtered by hundreds of thousands. We have thus a double contest inaugurated against us—one of the most important civil contests and one of the most terrible and sanguinary conflicts that the world ever saw.

Who is it that is responsible for this double contest? Who is it that has invoked this terrible war and brought it upon us? In part, that is the theme of our discussion to-night. And I submit now to this audience, to you, fellow-citizens, to every man in the land who has a spark of reason and a particle of justice in his composition—I submit to all the question whether there was cause for this terrible war; whether we might not have gone on as we had gone on ever since the nation began its existence, submitting every question to popular arbitration, and in that respect commanding the admiration of all the nations of Europe? Until this war began, no matter how fierce our contests were, no matter how strong and deep our convictions were,

when the majority decided, the great body of the people acquiesced in the decision. Then we were the admiration of the civilized world; now, we have almost become its sport.

I say we have come together in part to discuss, to-night, and determine as to who are responsible for this terrible change, and to shape our actions accordingly. No ordinary influence could have produced this great result, this dire calamity. It must be a cause or causes that enter deep into the convictions of men. It must be a cause or causes that stirred up the passions of men to their deepest depths and have aroused them to the exertion of their utmost power. What was it? Some States of this Union professed and pretended that their rights were invaded—that they possessed a class of property guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States, which another part of the country was constantly engaged in trying to wrest from them. That was their assertion. They maintained that assertion in various forms for a number of years, and what is singular and remarkable is, that they maintained it strongly and constantly while they as constantly held the power of the nation in their own hands. They invariably, or almost invariably, elected the Chief Magistrate of the nation. They almost invariably had Congressional power. They organized the Courts. They obtained decisions; and their fellow-citizens of the free or Northern States acquiesced in the decisions made. If they protested civilly, if they carried their protests into discussion, public discussion, complaint was made by Southern men in the halls of Congress, and on the stump in the various districts and States. Yet the protest of the North, at the best, was but the expression of an opinion, based on the nobleness of nature and humanity, against human slavery. [Applause.] But so educated had the people become even to the existence and toleration of slavery which the great majority of them hated and detested; so educated, I say, had they become, to acquiesce in the decision of the majority, that, excepting in the rarest instances—instances so rare and so contemptible by the measure of their power, as to be unworthy of notice—nothing but civil discussion ever arose as a consequence of any decision. But they talked of State rights—the men of the South. What State rights had they been deprived of? As I before stated, they invariably controlled the power of the Nation. They held the offices of the Nation; they filled the army, they filled the ranks of the navy. To such an extent did they do that, that it was no matter whether the President elected was a Northern President or a Southern President; they alike had the power, and wielded it. And when they inaugurated this terrible war upon us they controlled the Administration, in the person, aye, the hated and detested person of James Buchanan. [Applause.] They had, through him, filled every embassy that we sent abroad. There was no court of Europe at which we were not represented either by a Southern man, like Faulkner, of Virginia, or a baser and more detested Northern man, like Glancey Jones, of Pennsylvania. [Approbation.] And they were not idle with this great potent agency. Let me tell you, my fellow-citizens, a fact that is not generally and popularly known—and I state it to you from the highest source of intelligence—

that when Mr. Lincoln took the office of President of the United States, in 1861, the education of every court in Europe, aye, and in South America, that was of the slightest political consequence, was complete; having been carried on and completed by American ministers. They had been taught by those ministers that our country and Government were at an end. ["Shame".] Yes, it is a shame, and a damning proof of a treason early hatched, and thus attempted, in the most fraudulent and despicable manner, to be launched against a generous, a magnanimous and a noble people. [Cheers.]

This fact, fellow-citizens, accounts for a most remarkable circumstance—a circumstance entirely new in the history of the intercourse of nations, namely, the immediate recognition of belligerent powers in this bastard Confederacy. It had no sooner sprung into existence than the powerful nations of the earth recognized them as our equals, admitted their pirate ships into their ports and gave their representatives audiences. This circumstance is accounted for by the fact I have stated to you—that they had been told, and educated to believe, by the ministers of our country, that our nation was at an end; and so they hurried up to divide the garments of Christ between them. They desired to make an early association with the Southern Confederacy. They clamored and strove, each with the other, for early treaties and bargains, by which they could gain advantage; and they were unwilling to listen to the declaration of our Government that we could maintain it intact.

And this state of facts, now forming a part of the history of the country, exists, while those blatant allies, to which your Chairman referred, of the traitors South, now talk about Democracy—of organizing what they call Democracy—that the South in arms against us may carry out their damned purpose of destroying our country, thus pre-arranged and predetermined by those men who had possession of the Government.

I need not say what is so oft repeated, that, a more causeless and baseless war the world never knew. [Cheers.] Why, upon the subject of slavery our Government, the Republican Administration, the Republican Congress, offered to do everything. It is within your recollection that one of the very first acts of that Congress was to pass an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which should put it out of the power of the Central Government to affect slavery hereafter in any State of the Union, especially disclaiming the exercise of any such power. That amendment came to our State Capital when I had the honor of a seat there as a representative. It had the name of William H. Seward [applause], Secretary of State of the United States of America, attached to it. I gave it my vote. And I tell you, fellow-citizens, to-night, that it did not get my vote because I loved slavery, nor because I did not detest it; but it got my vote because I felt, as every good citizen felt, that every reasonable concession should be made, that every reasonable protest should be hearkened to, in order that peace and unity might still abide with us. [Cheers.] That Congress, too, although the political platform on which a majority of its members were elected declared in favor of the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in the Territories—organ-

ized Territories on what we call the principle of popular sovereignty, and thus ceased to exercise the power it claimed. There was another great and liberal act on the part of that party—on the part of the men against whom the South launched its complaints, that they were going to take possession of its property, or destroy the value of it, going to ruin its industry, to leave it without State rights or independence.

But more than that, fellow-citizens. While, after the war began thus causelessly and thus basely, the South used its myriads of negroes in producing the means, and the only means, by which war could be made by the people of the South against us, the Government forebore to act against slavery as an institution; and it was not until a very large body of people, an immense body of people, demanded that slavery should be attacked, because it was a war weapon of the South, that the President of the United States issued his great Proclamation of Emancipation, [immense applause] which, let me say to you now, was the first honest word officially spoken by America to the people of the civilized world in favor of the rights of all men. [Great applause.] We, up to the time of the issuing of that proclamation, the enunciation of that great edict, had denied upon all occasions any intention to interfere with slavery. It had been announced, and steadily insisted upon, by the President, by the Secretary of State, by a solemn resolution of our Congress in civil convocation, that the paramount—nay, the great, the only object of maintaining the war against those that made war upon us, was simply and singly to preserve the Union, and to do nothing else. And our President went so far, at a very late period, as to declare that if, to preserve the Union, it was necessary to abolish slavery, he would abolish it [cheers;] but if, to preserve the Union, it was necessary to preserve slavery, he would preserve it. [Applause.] In other words, the preservation of the Union was declared by us, prior to the great proclamation, as the paramount and great object of the American people in the contest. [Cheers.]

There is no doubt, I think, that if a vote had been taken at any time before or at the beginning of the contest upon the question, Shall we have war without seeing its end or termination, and attempt to abandon slavery as a system in the Union, or shall we have peace and Union? a majority would have decided in favor of the latter proposition. But, fellow-citizens, the time finally came when patience ceased to be a virtue, when forbearance was misinterpreted or denominated cowardice, and when the fatal hand of foreign intervention would not have been stayed had not the President, representing the American people, the loyal, humane, enlightened American people, issued the great edict telling the people of the world that we are now for the Union without slavery [great applause]; that there can be no peace with slavery. [Applause.] Slavery was furnishing our enemy with power—building his fortifications, producing his supplies, his forage, his subsistence, and was corrupting the minds of his people and demoralizing the minds of a part of ours, and the Chief Magistrate resolved to strike it down. May the Lord God bless him for that! [Vociferous and repeated applause].

When the war was begun upon us, a set of men in this State, that we and all loyal men call and know as Secessionists, opposed what they called coercion. They echoed the feeble and traitor voice of the traitor President who had said that there is no power in the Constitution to make war upon a State. States could make war upon States and upon the National Government, and upon liberty; but there was no power in the Government to make war upon a State! The pettifogging dishonesty of that man, in cooking up and presenting that proposition in that light, cannot be contemplated without exciting the uttermost contempt. Why did he get up a false issue of that kind, that the National arm might be paralyzed? Why did not the base, cowardly man take his position then side by side, as his false Ministers had done—as his Cabinet had done, with the leaders of the rebellion, and aid to the full and entire extent of his power the dismemberment of the Union? Why, if there can be any such thing as an honest devil, an honest devil is more respectable [applause and laughter] than a cowardly, hypocritical, deceitful devil. [Cheers.] I don't know that there are degrees of this kind, but it is enough to say, that in that false and deceitful issue presented by him he exhibited himself in the meanest aspect of them all. [Applause.]

We call them Secessionists, I said. You all remember the session of the Legislature of this State of 1861. Sidney Johnson was in command of your forces here, and in the State Library of this State and in the Supreme Court room there were nightly meetings of those reptiles to determine when blood should begin to flow, when civil war should be organized in California, as it had been organized in Maryland, in Kentucky, in Missouri and in Tennessee. They scarcely called themselves at that time by the somewhat respectable, certainly once respectable, certainly theoretically grand, name of Democrats. Why, there was not a loyal man in the State who had been a Democrat that would allow fellowship with them. [Applause.] They call themselves Democrats now. What is democracy? Is it not that scheme of government which proposes to confer rights alike upon you and upon me? Is it not that scheme of government that proposes the greatest extent of civil rights to mankind consistent with civil order? [Cheers.] If it is not that, it is not worth much, and its votaries, whatever honest votaries it ever had, have been miserably deceived. The men who are now haranguing the multitudes and calling themselves Democrats did not admit then that these original Secessionists were Democrats; nay, they were opposed at that time to being known themselves as Democrats—men like Eugene Casserly. After the Legislature of 1861 had stood up nobly to the cause of the Union, and the minds of the people of the State were aroused, and it was palpable that the Union people would sweep the State by an immense majority, what were Casserly and Hoge, and others like them, doing? I will tell you what they were doing; for I know perhaps more intimately than the great body of the people at large. I sat in the office of Eugene Casserly, in this city, attending a meeting of what was then denominated the Union Democratic State Central Committee, and read (I confess it) admiringly the product of his pen, in the shape of resolutions to be

submitted to that Committee, in which he denounced all party. Those resolutions were all written by him—every line, every word; every punctuation mark was made by him; and they were presented to the Committee, by a traitor named White, who is now upon the secession electoral ticket of this State. [Cheers.] I have here, thanks to the *Sacramento Union*, which keeps an exact record of the times [applause], the resolutions as they came from the pen of Casserly. I will only trouble the meeting and consume your time by reading a very small portion of them ["Read them all," "Read them all,"] to show you the drift of the mind of the man at that time; and then I will, perhaps, attempt to give you some of the reasons for that drift. These are the resolutions before they were amended by the State Central Committee to which they were presented, and as they came from Casserly's pen:

"WHEREAS, The Democratic party has ever been the party of fealty to free government and fraternal devotion to the rights of the States of the Union, and of unwavering fidelity to the laws, the Constitution, the Union and the country—ready to maintain them by all proper means and at every sacrifice;

"And, whereas, The country is now defending itself against a war without justification or decent excuse, waged upon it by certain seceded States, which is manifestly a war for the invasion of our National Capital; for the overthrow of our National Government; the oppression of the loyal States; the subjugation of the Union; a war to humble in the dust our National flag; to wrench from the American people their constitutional rights of determining for themselves their own policy, foreign and domestic, and to blot them out from the class of the great Powers of the world;

"And, whereas, Such war, so aggressive in its character and so deadly in its purposes, forces upon the country an issue which can be met but in one way by any people having the common instinct of self-preservation, or worthy of an existence as a nation;

"Therefore be it unanimously resolved by this Committee,

"1. That at this time, when the country is resisting with all its might a war of invasion and destruction, indifference is impossible to the patriot, and neutrality is cowardice, if not premeditated disloyalty." [Applause.]

That is a pretty good resolution. [Applause.]

"2. That the people of California in the past have been most anxious for peace throughout the land, and will hail with joy an honorable adjustment in the future; at the same time they are, above all things, for the Union, the country and the flag against all assailants—no matter who they are, whence they come or with what power armed.

"3. That this is the great crisis of the American nation and name, our State will always, as heretofore, faithfully discharge her constitutional obligations to the Union and the Federal Government, and, as in duty bound, will earnestly sustain the constituted authorities at Washington in all measures necessary to defend and protect either against this most unjustifiable and unnatural war."

The fourth relates simply to steamships. I will pass that.

"5. That all former partisan differences are lost in the present overwhelming crisis; and he who would seek, by reviving them, to distract the people, or to wrest from their honest and patriotic devotion some sordid partisan advantage, is not true to the country nor worthy of the name of American citizen. [Immense applause.]

"6. That as Californians, we appeal to the whole people of California—not to any party—but without distinction of party or reference to partisan issues, to stand with us by our country and our flag, that all may know that the great Union party of California is the overpowering majority of her citizens. [Applause.]

"7. That with these views we cordially invite all patriotic men, who hold these sentiments, to meet in Grand Mass Convention—not Democratic Convention—of the State at Sacramento, on the 4th day of July next, at twelve o'clock, to nominate candidates to be supported at the ensuing election; and we recommend in the election of delegates, that the only test be approval of these resolutions and willingness to support the candidates nominated."

Now, fellow-citizens, I was a member of the Committee that considered those resolutions. My name stands at the bottom of a report of the sub-committee to whom they were referred, reporting them back unanimously for adoption to the committee. We desired then, Casserly desired—he professed to desire—an abandonment of party. That was the temper of the times; and, let me say, it was the only avenue to power. But was Mr. Casserly at that time the advocate of those resolutions because they were true, or was it because he deemed them the true means and only avenue to power? We went into the committee with the resolutions. There was a majority there to strike out words here and there and insert partisan words in their places. This was against the wish of Mr. Casserly. It was against the wish, as I believed then, of the true men in that committee and in the State. But they were so amended. I went back to Sacramento, to the Capital, where the Legislature was still in session, and within a week I discovered that Eugene Casserly had concocted those resolutions to make himself Governor of California. [Cheers.] Fellow-citizens, I tell you to-night from this stand that that was the secret of my candidacy in 1861. [Applause.] When I found beyond any controversy that Mr. Casserly was in league, as he was at that time, with men that I believed to be false to the country, I determined, for one, that if any effort of mine could prevent it, the power of the people of California should never be vested in his hands. [Great applause.] The contest went on. It was a remarkable one, and Casserly was beaten in the popular Convention of the party, and he did not become Governor. [Laughter and applause.] You can now see by his present course how basely he would have betrayed the Union men of California. He stands to-day more responsible than any citizen of this State for the unpatriotic—I undertake to say it, the unpatriotic—position of a large portion of the Irish people of California [applause]—a people who love liberty by instinct—[cheers]—with whom love of freedom is a passion, but who, unfortunately for themselves, have too little learned from their teachers at home and abroad the value of individual judgment, and who are thus led off by false and heartless teachers and traitors like these. [Tremendous and long continued applause.] I pass over and by the ascent of that man into my room at the Orleans Hotel at Sacramento and the presentation of his hand voluntarily; I rarely seek the hand of a Judas—[cheers]—with the assurance that he would support me, who had received the nomination. I pass that over, as well as subsequent acts of antagonism and opposition to the candidate nominated in opposition to me. They cut no figure in this contest. Perhaps it was well that the people chose Leland Stanford as Governor. [Applause.] It may be that if I had been chosen I too would have been false to liberty. ["No!" "No!" "No!"] But, fellow-citizens, my words are on record on that point. After I had received the nomination for Governor, and Leland Stanford was nominated, I met him in the Orleans Hotel in Sacramento, and I said to him in these words: "Governor, we are both nominated for the office of Governor. One of us, in my opinion, must be elected. I don't know what your

course will be if you are elected, but I will tell you what mine will be: Believing it to be the first necessity, a national necessity above and beyond all party, I shall, if I get the power of the State, undertake at once to organize a Union party in California; and if any partisan of mine shall put himself in my way in that undertaking I will cut him off at the knees." [Great cheering.] If Casserly had been elected I don't think he would have swung his political scythe among the men who would stand in the way of organizing a Union party. No. Shortly after his defeat before the Convention his common language was, as this great contest progressed, expressions of grief for what they call their Southern brethren—that now he was in favor of establishing slavery in every free State. ["Nary time."]

Such is one of the men who undertake to teach, to govern, to reign, to control the Irish heart of California. O God! O God! in Thy mercy look down and act upon this people! Take them from out the hands of these vile teachers and make them what Thou intendest them to be, advocates and apostles of liberty and freedom! [Tremendous applause.] Where, I ask, and when, out of the republic, and before they came into it, did they, the Irish, find their education against freedom to the negro? Why, I undertake to say, there is none of it in the land from which they have come. [Cheers.] O'Connell denounced it. The inspiration of the greatest bard of the country was directed against it, and he sang against it in noble strains in the first and only visit that the lamented Moore made to America. [Applause.] He could not understand, great soul that he was, he could not understand how a people professing liberty and freedom, enjoying it for themselves, and stand by, and, by statute, by custom, by habit, by daily observation, see children produced as beasts are for sale in the market, sold from the public block to the highest bidder. He could not not understand it. [Cheers.] And, O, think of that people following the Casserlys and turning their backs to the O'Connells and the Moores! [Applause.] A base, degraded, bleared sheet, pretending to be a Catholic organ, yclept the *Monitor*, says I have no right to talk to Irishmen. Well, fellow-citizens, it never has been my habit to classify society anywhere. [Applause.] If Irishmen who take the obligations of citizens upon themselves in this great republic are not by that and in that made Americans, they are the basest creatures that ever saw the light. [Vociferous and long continued applause.] If they desire, or their instincts teach them, to look back to their native land, to bring in review to their minds the places where they played, the brooks by which they strayed, the churches in which they assembled, the fireside that they adorned, perhaps—they may do all that; yet beyond that and above it, it is a high, a glorious privilege to each of them to be ennobled by being made an American citizen. [Applause.] A great American who, having seen much of his country, some years ago, perhaps a quarter of a century now, traveled extensively in Europe; his position in society gave him access to the highest circles on the continent of Europe; he was received at the courts, and by the statesmen, and by the divines of those countries he visited. I allude to the now venerable and distinguished Orville Elwell—Rev. Or-

ville Elwell—now residing at the capital, and now a sound and true Union man. [Cheers.] On his return, he wrote what he saw, and I remember a simple passage in his book. It was entitled, I think the book was, "The Old World and the New." He said: "I have been in the halls of enthroned monarchs, but I was proud that I was an American citizen." [Applause.] Yes, fellow citizens, there was a time when the panoply of American citizenship spread as broad and ample a shield over a citizen of the republic, as Roman citizenship ever spread over a son of the Eternal City. There came a time again, under the administration of one James Buchanan, when the ministers of the republic taught abroad that there was an end of American citizenship and of the great republic. There is a time now, when all the manhood, all the nobility, all the courage, cemented and made invincible by right and patriotism, nerves the soul to say that the republic shall be glorious again. [Applause.]

Every subterfuge that meanness could suggest, that cowardice could invent, that treason, dark and foul, could spawn forth, has been exercised to discover excuses and reasons for opposing this war. First they were against coercion. There was no power to make war upon a State. You could not maintain the Union by force. The simple proposition that the Government could only live among any people by two simple principles—by the love the people bear for it or the fear that it imparts to objectors—was denied. They would have us understand that that simple proposition was not true and well understood, and that when any contemptible fragment of the Nation saw fit to rise up in opposition and rebellion, we had but to ground our arms and become, as I said before, the sport of the world. To that end when we began to employ negroes as laborers in building fortifications, they protested that it must not be done. It prevented, they said, poor white men from getting employment! Oh, what a prostitution of the instincts of generosity! Next, they should not be employed as soldiers. That passed away, and then they must not be paid as other soldiers were paid. Next they were opposed to the draft. Then that particular portion of the draft law called and known as the three hundred dollar clause was against the poor man, they said, and they were opposed to it on that account. Well, in Congress we proposed to repeal that clause, and every Copperhead in the Senate voted against the repeal. [Laughter and cheers.] Why? Because they were opposed to the raising of soldiers. That was it. They fomented and invented every species of opposition against this war, and now they are for peace.

Now, fellow-citizens, for one moment let me give you a glance, or glance yourselves, at the class of men in this State, in your midst, who are for peace. Just think of those Knights that are now traveling on the mountain roads, putting pistols at the head of every traveler and demanding his money or his life—think of the men who went around through this State for ten years or more, like traveling arsenals, bestrung with deadly weapons, and drawing them upon their superiors, destroying our noblest men and putting them to death, establishing a bloody and terrible code which made, as the lamented Baker said, "the mere trick of the weapon

superior to the noblest cause and the truest courage." [Applause.] Just think of those men crying "Peace!" Just think of their becoming missionaries of peace and apostles of civilization! [Cheers and laughter.] If they would only now perform one office I don't know but I would forgive them a great many sins of the past. If they would, in their wretched agony, as their power has passed away, and as their ordinary means of filching a living from the community illegitimately has passed away or is passing away—if they would but turn about and use their arsenals upon the Casserlys, the doughfaces and dirt eaters of the North [great applause] I don't know but I would forgive them a part of their former wrongs and misdeeds. They would rid us of the meanest, the most despicable and lecherous crew that ever disgraced our country. [Laughter and cheers.] Why they stand by and see the proxies of the enemies of the country organizing in the Union in a raid against New England—making a plot by which New England is to be set off, the West is to be made another Confederacy, the Middle States another, so that Jeff. may have his way; and as an excuse, too, and pretense for all, Cox of Ohio, known as Sunset Cox, and Casserly agree that the great crime of New England is that her people mix morals with their politics. [Laughter and applause.] They want politics without morals. [Laughter.] Well, they have got it. [Vociferous cheers and laughter.] They have quit their raid on New England. Her granite rocks and her hearts of steel have resisted their deadly and contemptible shafts, and she stands to-day one of the proudest and most peerless parts of the world. [Cheers.] The West, the noble West—her sturdy and stalwart sons have left their fields, have left their shops, and have thundered along the Mississippi and pushed the current into the sea. [Applause.] The great Central States—take Indiana from the West, and the noble Buckeye State and the Keystone of the arch—have recently spoken in the night of the Republic's gloom, and they sing a hymn to liberty. [Cheers.]

But they say the war has been reduced to a contest for the abolition of slavery. O! great God, shall it be said, can it be maintained to-day, eighty years after the organization of this Republic, after eighty years of teaching, first by the fathers and then by every good and great man along the line to the present period, that, to tell the world that we will rise and remove the damning stain is a crime! [Cheers.] Ignorant and untaught men sometimes imagine that if negroes get their freedom, that is, if they have a right to themselves and to the profits of their labor, that they will be encroached upon. Do they not know that they never can be elevated, that they never can rise, that capital has its foot and its heels upon labor as long as such a mill-stone weight as slavery hangs around the neck of labor? [Applause.] If there be one class who, above another, ought to sing peans to the rising star of liberty in the land, it is the men who toil and sweat in daily labor. [Cheers.]

I don't know, fellow-citizens, that I should close this brief and somewhat irregular address without alluding, and I hope that you will pardon me for it, to the little intimations made by some of our papers that the enlightened, honest and patriotic man who

stands at the head of this Government and myself, in my humble capacity, have disagreements. Why, fellow-citizens, I have stood day by day and night by night giving all that I had and all that I could think and feel to build him up and make him stronger. [Immense applause.] How ridiculous now that any man shall be found professing to be a Union man who shall talk about this man or that who reaches a high public station, and has one spark of the light that fits him for it, as thinking of mere groveling conditions, and not giving himself, whatever there is of him, be it little or much, to the great cause of American liberty! [Cheers.] The President with me never sinks the President in the Senator, and it is not necessary for me to say to those who know me that to him the Senator is never, has never been and never will be sunk in the President. [Cheers.] We each, in our sphere, stand by each other through this great conflict. [Cheers.] We stand by you, the great Union people, and you stand by us. [Deafening applause, renewed again and again.] In that, like the Union, I trust and religiously believe, we will be one and indivisible. [Applause.] Otherwise, divide, disagree, or stand by in a false or fancied security, and let these creatures elect the man that they have proposed, and I would not give this piece of paper that I hold in my hand for the great American Republic. [Cheers.] I have passed days and nights, and weeks and months, in agonizing toil and mental sufferings because of the scenes, and acts, and facts transpiring around me. I do not upon every occasion seek to emblazon them all. War has its great horrors. We understand it makes no cause better to constantly present them. Leave that cowardly office to the base traitors who would make capital out of it against their country. We know that many brave men must fall. We know that no such cause as ours was ever won but by the consumption of humanity by the great Moloch. It should be our manly part to realize these principles, and realizing them, allow them to go on with steady tread to the consummation of the great glory. [Cheers.]

From the condition that I have described of our foreign affairs let me say it to you now, for it can be stated publicly—we are now in security and we can state it—from the condition of things not more than two years since, less than that time, when we had not taught the nations of the world that the teachings they had received from traitor Ministers were not true and that the nation would certainly live—from that condition of things our foreign policy has been brought by the wise man who stands at the head of the Department of State [applause], so that we are oftener consulted to-day by foreign nations in their disputes than they consult each other concerning our troubles. [Applause.] And the War Department is presided over by a man of integrity; decision, nerve—a man by whose dexterity and courage and prescience of judgment the mighty armies of the Republic are hurled against the enemy. [Cheers.] I cannot close this address without saying to you, fellow-citizens and Union men of California, when this great battle shall have been fought and the great national victory won, there will be no single man in America entitled to more unqualified praise than Edwin M. Stanton. [Great applause.] And I might speak of the Naval De-

partment in like terms. [Cheers.] We improvised the greatest navy in the world, and are now beginning to sweep the miserable pirate ships of our enemies from the seas. [Applause.] Nay, in addition to that, we are beginning to present an invincible iron front to the nations of the earth. [Cheers.]

We have had a Minister of Finance who has conducted the war up to the maximum of about two thousand millions of debt, without borrowing a dollar from a foreign country. [Applause.] These base, miserable traitors, these cowardly traitors in our midst, who prate about the depression of currency—why, it is a success beyond human contemplation. The world has never seen anything like it. And it was based, by the great man who originated it, upon the faith he had in the patriotism of the American people. [Cheers.] When he wanted to borrow money, he conferred with the bankers in the East, who felt that they hold the big, long, and well filled purse, and that they had a kind of right to lend, as well as the power to loan. And when he negotiated with them about the first thirty million dollars, and found the per centage at which it could be had, he then said: "Gentlemen, that will only last about thirty days; what can we obtain the next fifty millions for?" They looked wild, and very serious, as moneyed men always look [laughter] and they named a figure, although very loth to do it—did not desire to press it. "Now," said he, "gentlemen, that will last thirty or forty days more; what can I obtain the next fifty millions for?" They could not answer. It was an extension of credit by the Government that they had never contemplated, and it was a use to which they had never thought of putting their purses. "Well," said he, "gentlemen, it is apparent to me

that you have not got any credit at all unless the Government has a credit, too. If the people of this Republic do not believe that this Government shall exist, your credit is not worth anything. [Cheers.] If the people of the Republic do believe it, and that it can and will exist, that is the best basis for borrowing in the world." [Cheers.] And it was upon that plain, simple, invincible logic that he based his credit scheme. And what have you got to-day? You have got the securities of your Government—gold-paying bonds—scattered through every loyal State in the Union. [Cheers.] The banks have them: The merchants have them. The mechanics have them. The laboring men have them. And servant-girls have their one-hundred-dollar bonds. [Cheers.] And the credit of the Government is safely lodged in the faith of the people in the perpetuity of the Republic. [Great applause.] But the Copperheads whine. *They* whine! The majority of them in this State never had much money to lend. [Laughter.] To use a trite and common phrase, they had an excellent reputation on the borrow, [renewed laughter,] but they had a very bad reputation on the pay. [Great merriment.] And, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Mayor, when a man is bad on the pay, it is not any wonder to find him bad on the patriotism. [Applause.]

But, thank God again, the Republic will live. [Applause.] It lives in the hearts, in the minds, in the courage, and in the virtue of the people. [Cheers.] We are told that there is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the stars. Let it be ours, fellow patriots and citizens, that the Republic shall live in glory, represented by the national starry ensign—the signal of hope, the light of the world, and the security of liberty for mankind. [Tremendous applause.]