

Dec. 2009

(140)

Dec. 2009

(140)

Doc. # 2009

Vol. 9



Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee
on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
S. Con. Res. 27

November 26, 1945

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 1450 to 1587

NATIONAL { 4266
 { 4267
 { 4268

WARD & PAUL
(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)
OFFICIAL REPORTERS
1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. IX

(3)

--	--	--

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

HULL, Cordell (Resumed)

1451

GREW, Joseph Clark

1474

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

25

1511

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Monday, November 26, 1945

- - -

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
of counsel, for the joint committee.

- - - -

WARD N. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

2 Secretary Hull, are you ready to resume?

3 Mr. Hull: Yes.

4 TESTIMONY OF CORDELL HULL (resumed)

5 The Chairman: Counsel were still examining Secretary
6 Hull when his testimony was recessed the other day.

7 The chair would like to state, in view of the request
8 originally made that we not examine Secretary Hull more
9 than forty-five minutes at a time, that I hope the commit-
10 tee will keep that in mind notwithstanding that that time
11 was extended the other day at the suggestion of the Secre-
12 tary himself.

13 Mr. Hull: Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would
14 like to undertake to run for an hour and to come here just
15 as often and just as long as any member of the committee
16 may desire. I may not be able to come both in the after-
17 noon and the forenoon. I will do the best I can about that.

18 The Chairman: We appreciate your generosity in re-
19 gard to time.

20 Mr. Hull: It is my heart that gives me this trouble
21 about testifying.

22 The Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

23 Mr. Gesell: Mr. Hull, I inquired of you when you were
24 last here as to what the Department of State's position was
25 with respect to the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor

Witness Hull:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 and I do not believe you had an opportunity to complete your
3 answer on that subject. We are anxious to know what posi-
4 tion the Department of State took on that subject.

5 Mr. Hull: We unhesitatingly felt that it would be to
6 a more or less extent useful, especially after the Navy was
7 based at Pearl Harbor, that it remain there during the
8 critical state of relations between us and certain other
9 countries, including Japan especially, on the policy that
10 I stated the other day to the effect that we were dealing
11 with one of the worst international desperadoes within the
12 memory of man and that he was at large and on the rampage,
13 dangerous, treacherous, undependable in every way.

14 We felt at the State Department, I think we all felt
15 that way, that it would be a little more wholesome in our
16 many matters of discussion and our many relations with that
17 Japanese area for our Navy to be standing there and I think
18 from all of the tangible and intangible reactions I had we
19 were thoroughly justified in that view.

20 Mr. Gesell: Did Admiral Richardson in discussing this
21 matter with you state anything to you which to your mind
22 indicated that the Fleet was insecure or unsafe at Pearl
23 Harbor?

24 Mr. Hull: My memory could be at fault but I do not
25 think at any time that any person suggested the idea that the

1 Witness Hull:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 Fleet could not protect itself, that it would have to be
3 moved somewhere where it could protect itself. I do not
4 think anyone suggested that view.

5 Mr. Gesell: Now, turning to another subject. We have
6 in evidence here exhibit 19, a draft of a proposed message
7 to the Congress which you transmitted to President Roosevelt
8 under date of November 29th.

9 I would like to ask if you would tell the committee
10 what the facts and circumstances were which led to the deci-
11 sion not to deliver that message to the Congress prior to
12 December 7th?

13 Mr. Hull: In brief the Japanese were completely in
14 charge of the war lords, as they were called, headed by
15 Tojo. In this country the President and I, with other sup-
16 porters in Congress and out of Congress, had a few weeks be-
17 fore dealt with the matter of the extension of the Conscrip-
18 tion Act.

19 We found that public opinion in the country was split
20 wide open on the question of nationalism, as some people call
21 it, and a broader international viewpoint. I think the best
22 that Congress could do, held down and held back as it was by
23 public opinion, was to enact this law reenacted by one vote
24 and to do that they had to continue as one of its provisions
25 a prohibition against service by American soldiers beyond

Witness Hull:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 this hemisphere and beyond our territories.

3 I felt, and I did not have much doubt about it from my
4 knowledge of the situation here and in Japan that to send a
5 message to Congress stating that we were just in the act of
6 getting into a fight with Japan, she assuming completely the
7 offensive, that we were threatened with danger there that
8 was very imminent.

9 Knowing as we did that Japan was liable to break out
10 on any day, it was apparent that we could do but little more
11 by exploiting this situation at that time than to play into
12 the hands of the Japanese military.

13 Mr. Gesell: In other words, you felt that this message
14 if sent out might be seized upon in Japan and used as a
15 provocation towards some action on their part?

16 Mr. Hull: I got the impression that they did that pre-
17 cise thing when we passed the Conscription Act a year before.
18 They saw our wide division here of opinion; we had just seen
19 on any matter pertaining to foreign affairs we were ex-
20 tremely nationalistic in our ideas here to the extent of an
21 immense portion of the public and of officials wherever one
22 went. They were all equally patriotic and possessed of equal-
23 ly high purposes but that was an honest difference of view
24 and that was the situation.

25 We would have gotten nowhere with any kind of affirma-

Witness Hull:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 tive legislation, in the first place, and we would have had
3 no time to have gotten anywhere in the second place.

4 Mr. Gesell: Now, about this time and, indeed, earlier
5 our records here in evidence indicate that messages to the
6 Emperor of Japan were under consideration. We have drafts as
7 early as October 17, 1941 and, as Congressman Keefe pointed
8 out the other day, somewhere there is an indication that
9 there were even earlier drafts.

10 Now, I wanted to ask if you could tell us a bit about
11 the discussions between you and President Roosevelt concern-
12 ing the advisability of sending a message to the Emperor and
13 why, specifically why a message was not sent sooner than it
14 was.

15 Mr. Hull: Specifically it was not sent for this pri-
16 mary reason, that the military element in Japan was in su-
17 preme, arbitrary control of the government at this time and
18 the little Emperor, so far as we could ascertain, was going
19 along with them and under their domination.

20 We felt that, in the first place, this whole military
21 situation was being ruled with an iron rod by the military
22 group, not by the Emperor, that he was going along with them
23 and we remembered that some time along there they were so
24 powerful, the military group, that they touched the Emperor
25 on the shoulder and said, "You sign up in blank a declaration

Witness Hull:

Questions by Mr. Casell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

of war." With what we knew was the fact, that the military group had him in control to all intents and purposes it was, we felt satisfied, that if they saw the President going over their heads to the little Emperor, as he was at that time, it would only react against the whole situation and the military group would merely tighten up. - by reason of our action tighten up their military situation, all the while keeping the Emperor under their domination. That was the main reason.

We analyzed every phase and every available detail of conditions both in Japan and in this country in our efforts not to overlook any fact or factor that might shed any light on what would be the correct decision in the matter.

Shaf--15
Shack
fls

WATER FILE WASHINGTON

Shack
follows
Shefner
(1)
AL-1

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Chairman

Mr. Gesell: Now, if the committee please, we have no further questions from Mr. Hull. He is available for questioning by the committee.

The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, I gather from your statement which was read last week that during these days prior to the transmission of your message of October 26th you had also considered the question of the modus vivendi, and of course that meant a sort of temporary patching up method by which you would keep the negotiations alive for a short period of three months, as I gather, with the possibility of its extension, if it was entered into, and you decided against that because, among other reasons, it would have been regarded by China as an appeasement movement, and by most of the nations with which we were conferring and with which we were concerned about that Far Eastern situation, and therefore it was not wise to sign that.

Is that practically the situation?

Mr. Hull: Yes. The fact was that Japan had come in with what seemed to be the most extreme demands and proposals that she had made during the six or seven months of conversations with us. That was on the 20th. We could not, under our view, say "No" and stop right there, although Japan, as I have said here, Japan, after six or seven months of intimate conversations with us, knew what our attitude was and that

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Chairman

we could not think of accepting her proposal, not even remotely could we think of doing so, and, on the other hand, she knew how far we would go.

When we look back there and see that for six or seven months we were at the closest possible grips with this American-Japanese situation in our conversations -- I think I must have had 35 or 40 conversations in my Department with the Japanese, all in the most earnest effort to find some approach that would solve this threatened and threatening situation without it getting out of hand -- so we knew after six months -- and if we did not we ought to have been taken out and pilloried -- we knew by some very remote possibility, some bare possibility, we knew where each other stood. But our policy was not to say "No" to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20. It was not to remain silent even, it was to grab at every straw in sight, in an effort to keep up the conversations and to give time to our Armies and Navies here, and among our future Allies, to make further preparation, and also to show our continuing interest in peace.

So this modus vivendi was given every possible consideration and attention. On November 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25, we made a desperate effort to get something worked out that might stay the hand of the Japanese Armies and Navies for a few days, or a few weeks, at any rate, by some possibility. I am sure

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Chairman

I was making every possible effort to get some delay.

(2)

I am sorry I have to depart to some rather pointed remarks I made to the Chinese and to the British and the others because of my disappointment at their course and attitude with respect to this matter, but with all of my efforts, and those who were cooperating, it became clear by the end of the 25th or the 26th that this was not feasible. The Chinese, as I said some days ago, the Chinese made a terrific attack on the situation. Secretary Stimson agreed with others of us that he was satisfied the Japanese would not accept it, but it could be tried as another grabbing at a straw proposition.

Then you notice this last release of a dispatch from Mr. Churchill to the President where he went the whole distance in expressing his fear of a collapse generally of the Chinese situation.

Now this modus vivendi was tied in with our basic principles. We were to go right along discussing our plan, not the Japanese plan, which negatived their whole proposition of force and conquest, we were to go right along with them while we gave them what, as I have said, was just a little chicken feed compared to the vast amount that they had demanded in their ultimatum of November 20 and which we knew they would need if they were going forward with their plans of conquest, as they evidently were.

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So we had every reason to feel, under every rule of chances, the chances were overwhelming, not quite unanimously so, but overwhelming that they would not accept it, but this would explore their attitude and let the public here and elsewhere see that we were offering something in the way of an inducement, even though it was a day-to-day concern, such as the consignment of oil, \$600,000 worth of money, which was nominal compared to what they had been getting before oil was cut off.

Now it was in those circumstances, as I say, that I upbraided the other future Allied governments for not taking more interest in this thing.

As I strove, with my associates, to get this thing over, the opposition, the difficulties and virtually impossibilities from our standpoint got worse, so there was no other recourse except that that be laid aside.

The Chairman: Then you stated in your original written statement the other day, and you state now, that you regarded, and the State Department regarded their note of the 20th of November as an ultimatum and your note of the 26th, which is described as the Ten-Point Note, was a reply to that ultimatum?

ek
fols.

HACK(3)
WLC

Witness Hull

Mr. Hull: Yes, that was the third alternative we had, either to refuse to accept the ultimatum, which was confirmed by their interceptions, as I recall, plus further interceptions directing the Ambassador to discontinue conversations, first on the 25th and, later, on the 29th I believe it was, and so we took the third alternative, which was to keep alive the negotiations. The fact that they had put up an ultimatum to us did not prevent us from offering a proposal for them to consider, if by any speculative possibility they should decide to consider, at anytime. That was the first proposition. The second, in Japan they had lashed the public to the highest possible war pitch. They had ignored our set of policies and principles that we had talked about to them. They had put forth one or two false issues that they were being choked by the British in the Far East, by the Dutch and by ourselves, and they were being denied the creation of what they called the co-prosperity sphere. That was a spurious and false disguise of what they were really after in the Pacific area. In this country we were divided, unfortunately, among ourselves, with the result that our statement of principles had been confused in the public mind. They had almost been lost track of, and there was serious need to bring them back together, bring them up to date, especially as the Japan were in the act of moving in the stage of events -- they were going out.

Witness Hull

Furthermore, the Ten-Point contained at least five points that the Japanese would have found to their benefit had they accepted them. There has been more misinformation and more ignorant misrepresentation --unintentionally, no doubt-- of really what we were faced with there, the many angles, many factors, and what the significance of this last proposal was. The Japanese knew any hour what they could get out of us after six months of conversation. It did not take a soothsayer or some fortune-teller to make that clear to somebody who did not seem to know anything about it, but the fact was that there was nothing in there that any peaceful nation pursuing a peaceful course would not have been delighted to accept. It was a broad, constructive, progressive, up-to-date proposal for the most desirable and mutually profitable relations between nations. The only trouble with this was that the Japanese were bent -- if I did not see ladies present, I would say were hell-bent -- on carrying forward their military policy. They could not any more have abandoned that military policy at that stage, when they had their guns drawn, when their fleets were afloat, as we know since, for Pearl Harbor waters, when the conversations had been abandoned -- there is nothing more clear that they would hunt excuses about the so-called Ten-Point. The whole truth is that whenever we have peaceful nations pursuing peaceful policies in their relations to each other, they will welcome,

Question by The Chairman

Witness Hull

and would have welcomed, this formula that we suggested.

Furthermore, as I say, the Japanese could, at anytime, have said: "Let us see if we cannot narrow this somewhat. We will decide whether we cannot consider it further. They knew exactly how we could resume the conversations, leaving off a few of these things not extremely essential but retaining those that were absolutely basic. They knew they could get back at anytime to the same basis of conversations, if there was any difference in fact after we had rested our six months of discussions.

The Chairman: Just one other question, and that is with reference to the Fleet. You are familiar with the evidence, I presume, that the Fleet had been sent out to Hawaiian waters in the spring of 1940.

Mr. Hull: Yes.

The Chairman: Did you discuss that matter with the President?

DSHACK
ARRY FWS

Witness Hull

LARRY (1)
fws
hack

1 Mr. Hull: I don't undertake to recall everything that was
2 said. I just know that I was favorably disposed towards it my-
3 self, and the President naturally was. He was accustomed to ask
4 me an oral question now and then about what I thought of the psy-
5 chological effect of sending the Fleet, for instance, to Pearl
6 Harbor, and other consideration that might occur to him -- orally.
7 But we have no record anywhere, so far as I can find in the State
8 Department on that subject.

9 The Chairman: Admiral Richardson testified that on the 8th
10 of October, 1940, he discussed the matter with the President
11 and that there was a disagreement between them. That is, the
12 Admiral wanted to get the Navy back to the Pacific Coast. The
13 President felt that it ought to remain out in Hawaiian waters.
14 Admiral Richardson says the President stated to him on that day
15 in that conversation that he felt that the Navy's presence there,
16 the Fleet's presence, was a deterrent against Japan and that he
17 knew it had been up to that time. Were you in a position to
18 concur in that position of the President at that time?

19 Mr. Hull: That was my judgment. I think we overlook some
20 of the broader aspects of this situation. Japan, even before the
21 Tripartite Pact in September 1940 was working along under the so-
22 called Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, working along in the
23 course of relations with Germany, and we did not know, dealing
24 with wholly unreliable and treacherous persons as we were, we
25 did not know what express relations might then exist between

Witness Hull

Question by The Chairman

WLC2

Japan and Germany. Any evidence that we were preserving a fairly firm policy would find an echo even in Berlin at that time.

It was a world situation, that was knit together increasingly by every imaginable agreement between these international desperadoes who were waging world conquest and nothing else.

The Chairman: Now, in view of the fact that the actually attack occurred in December, 1941, which was one month after the conversation related by Admiral Richardson, would you be in position to express any opinion as to whether during that period the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters continued to exert any deterrent influence over Japan?

Mr. Hull: Well, as I said, there were a vast number of facts and circumstances accumulating with respect to the Japanese mind on this subject. They were not available to us, except to a very limited and occasional extent. I got the impression somewhat back there that the Japs wanted not only to tell us where to keep our Fleet in the Pacific to move it out into the Atlantic, keep it over there. I may have been wrong in that impression, but I think it is worth checking on if you are interested in running down every minute phase of this matter.

Now, someone suggested that the Government was trying to bluff the Japanese. The whole truth is that we were in our own waters, in our territory, on our own side of the Pacific, and that we were pursuing a perfectly peaceful and defensible course. In all our talks with the Japanese and all of our

WLC3

Questions by: The Chairman 1466
The Vice Chairman

Witness Hull

representations, we were pleading with them for peaceful relations and their continuance. If we happened to have a double-barreled shotgun sitting back in the corner somewhere in the house when we are talking to a desperado, it does no harm, to say the least. I always feel a little better and I think he would feel a little worse if he could see the outlines of that gun back there. It is a psychological thing that nobody can escape.

The Chairman: That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire briefly.

Mr. Secretary, I want to invite attention to a few points made in your written statement presented to the committee, and as a convenience to you, I will quote the points that I want to ask you about.

On page 9, you include this statement:

"Throughout this period the United States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China."

Mr. Hull: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: It had been the historic policy of the United States for a long time to favor a policy of a strong China, had it not?

Mr. Hull: That raises a bunch of questions.

Witness Hull

Back during the period of our difficulties extending through the 30s and on up to Pearl Harbor in dealing with Japan and Germany, I recall only too vividly our terrific distress when some American citizen would get shot or their women and children outrageously injured, or their property seized or their merchant shipping, like Panay, recklessly bombed and shot. When we protested to Japan, there were a few in our own country who would cry out and demand that we get out of there. "What are you doing over there on that side of the world, trying to start a war?" I think one of them lectured all over the country and his slogan was "Get the hell out of China; come back home where you belong; mind your own business and keep out of trouble."

That sounded to all of us people who were reared in a primitive section of this country very possible at first blush, but there were some points of opposition to that possible theory.

In the first place, we were under solemn obligation in writing in the Nine-Power Treaty to cooperate to preserve the integrity of Chinese territory and the sovereignty of China and the equality of ingress and egress to all nations alike in trading, in commerce, finance.

In the second place, we had always been the friend of China, and there were four hundred-odd million of people to deal with in the future, and we felt that we could not act in a course of bad faith and in almost a cowardly way in the light of our

Witness Hull

Question by The Vice Chairman

obligations.

In the third place, Japan and we were under solemn obligation under the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In the fourth place, we, ourselves, stood for a policy of international cooperation for the peaceful settlement of any controversies that might come up between nations in the future.

In the fifth place, we had discovered and proclaimed it as early as 1936 in this hemisphere that a war or a course of aggression in one country was a matter of concern to all the countries of the world.

On top of that we had discovered by this time that Germany and Japan were linked together, operating together as any two highwaymen operate and as closely as any two could operate. We found this movement for each one to conquer his respective half of the world and to enslave the people just as they did enslave them later in both Europe and in parts of Asia.

That whole thing was developed, all those considerations were developed, right in front of us. We couldn't have retired and have come away. I would hate to look you gentlemen in the face and describe what I think would be our condition today had we done that.

The Vice Chairman: You think undoubtedly that subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that the policy we had with China was sound?

Witness Hull

Question by The Vice Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Hull: It was sound and it has been testified to by the leading Japanese statesmen in power in loud, vociferous speeches which they made, not only from year to year but from month to month and from week to week. So, we didn't have to go outside of that range of testimony to convince ourselves about their plans and purposes.

The Vice Chairman: Then, Mr. Secretary, on page 33 of your written statement there appears two brief paragraphs that I would like to read:

"There was never any question of this country's forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.

"To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation."

Mr. Hull: At that time -- it is well to keep in mind a little of the background. At that time we could not tell just what would be the outcome of the German invasion of Russia. It was extremely critical. We did not know whether Japan intended

Witness Hull

in

to carry her reported desire to invade Russia in Siberia. The whole situation seemed to be very critical and very doubtful, and it was in those circumstances that Japan came back to us with her final offer and that, as I have said, was probably more extreme -- substantially more extreme -- than any she had made.

In the first place, she did not agree to abandon her policy of military conquest and aggression except in certain local areas and for 90 days.

In the second place, I think I must have observed dozens of times the Japanese close military alliance with Germany aimed at the United States primarily and paramountly.

LaCharity
(3)
follows
Creek
AL-1

1471

Witness Hull

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

If a person could flinch before one could get through speaking to him the Japanese Ambassador would flinch before I could conclude my question about the Japanese hanging on to the Germans by this hard and fast pact aimed at the United States. They never came within sight of any acceptance of a proposal that they get out of that close military partnership with Hitler who, it seems now, was ordering not only the Jews but all the Poles, men, women and children, killed.

This bunch of Japanese in extreme control, knowing what kind of a savage they were in partnership with, and Tojo and the others being savages themselves when they were at war or getting into war, they hung on to the Germans with this pact. They wouldn't talk about either stopping their military policy, their aggression policy, nor would they talk about getting out of this pact, but asked us to go into what they would call an honest and honorable agreement with them, while all the fruits of that agreement would go to Hitler as well as to themselves.

To the extent that it was possible they wanted us to furnish them all the oil that they would need to fight us as well as others. They were on their way then to an attack and they said you must give us all the oil we need now or we might have trouble in attacking -- and for some reason we declined to do it. There were a number of impossible things

WARD B PAUL WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

like that in that ultimatum of November 20.

The Vice Chairman: Then you did regard the Japanese proposal of November 20 as nothing but an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Well, they said so both in writing and orally and we could only regard it as that from its very nature.

The Vice Chairman: Now, was your reply of November 26 in any sense an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Well, the truth is we were most anxious, as we have said here at different times, to go forward with the conversations, and we had every motive to desire to go forward with them, and we offered this, as I say, as an ordinary, normal plan for international relations, on these lines, and I think everybody in the State Department, the President and others, were in agreement; and, as I say, the Japanese would have found a way at once, all they had to do was to announce that they were through with conquest and aggression and automatically they would have become the beneficiaries of these proposals.

The Vice Chairman: Did you receive any information that the Japanese regarded your message of November 26 as an ultimatum?

Mr. Hull: Not until sometime afterward. They then had their fleet on its way, as I say, to Hawaiian waters. They themselves had ordered the discontinuance of conversations. We were satisfied, of course, that they would attack at any

Witness Hull

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

time. We didn't know what time. They had that solely within their own power. But it wasn't until they proceeded to manufacture a falsehood in order to dodge the effect of their own ultimatum, the old fraudulent cry, "Stop thief", they thought if they could pretend to their own people, they knew that that wouldn't travel far in this country, except at the hands of people who might be a little prejudiced or a little extreme in their views, but they felt that they could put over the idea in their own country just as Hitler put over one falsehood after another to shield and disguise his own plans and his own course to his armies of invasion.

The Japanese alibi was taken up and adopted by a few people in other parts of the world but not to any very great extent.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I have a few other questions but I observe that the Secretary has been before us about an hour. So I suggest we might suspend at this point with his testimony.

The Chairman: We will excuse you now, Mr. Hull, for the time being, and you may consult counsel as to when you will return. If you wish to come tomorrow morning it will be entirely agreeable to the committee.

Mr. Hull: I apologize to the committee. My throat is not quite as strong as it should be. It is improving so long

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

as I give it a chance to improve. I don't want to give it a set-back. That is why I am taking these precautions that I am.

The Chairman: The committee thoroughly understands that, Mr. Hull, and you do not need to apologize. You may be excused now until you return.

Mr. Hull: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. Grew.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH CLARK GREW

(Having been duly sworn by the Chairman)

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Grew, will you state your full name for the record, please.

Mr. Grew: Joseph Grew.

Mr. Gesell: During what period of time were you our Ambassador to Japan?

Mr. Grew: I arrived in Japan on June 6, 1932; left on June 25, 1942.

Mr. Gesell: And you were there more or less continuously during that period, particularly during 1941, were you not?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, if the committee please, before proceeding with Mr. Grew I want to direct specific attention to Exhibit 15 in evidence, a series of three dispatches from Mr. Grew to the Department of State dated January 27, November 3,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

and November 17, 1941, respectively. I would like to read portions of these into the record.

The dispatch of January 27, 1941, states:

"My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the United States, to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their various facilities. He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information."

The second, the dispatch of November 3, is a lengthy one, and I simply want to call attention to the very last portion thereof, which reads as follows:

"It would be similarly shortsighted to base our policy on the belief that these preparations are merely in the nature of saber rattling the exclusive purpose of giving moral support to Japan's high-pressure diplomacy. Japan's resort to measures which might make war with the United States inevitably may come with dramatic and dangerous suddenness."

The third dispatch, dated November 17, reads as follows:

"In emphasizing need for guarding against sudden military or naval actions by Japan in areas not at

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

present involved in the China conflict, I am taking into account as a probability that the Japanese would exploit all available tactical advantages, including those of initiative and surprise. It is important, however, that our Government not place upon us, including the military and naval attaches, major responsibility for giving prior warning. The control in Japan over military information, both primary and secondary is extremely effective, and we have no expectation that any advance information would be obtained either through the press or from personal contacts with Japanese; the few American left in Japan are mostly concentrated in Tokyo, Yokohama and Kobe, and are in no position to observe military movements and the absence of American and other foreign vessels in adjacent waters almost assures to the Japanese the ability to dispatch troop transports in various directions without foreign observation. Recent reports from our Consuls at Taihoku and at Harbin point to Japanese troop concentrations in both Taiwan and Manchuria, and all other available indications are that since the general mobilization of July last, troop dispositions have been made to enable new operations to be carried out on the shortest

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

possible notice in either Siberia or the Southwest Pacific or in both.

"We fully realize that possibly our most important duty at this time is to watch for premonitory indications of military or naval operations which might be forthcoming against such areas, and we are taking every precaution to guard against surprise. However, our field of military and naval observation is almost literally restricted to what can be seen with our own eyes, which is negligible. We would, therefore, advise that our Government, from abundance of caution, discount as far as possible the likelihood of our being able to give substantial warning."

Now, with those dispatches in mind, Mr. Grew, I want to ask you whether, with the exception of the dispatch of January 27 which I have read referring to the possibility of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, you had any information of any nature which indicated the possibility of the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I had no specific information or information of any character.

Mr. Gesell: I notice in your book, which I am sure will be referred to from time to time here, your note of that day, for January 27, 1941, in which you say:

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

"There is a lot of talk around town to the effect that the Japanese in case of a break with the United States are planning to go all out in a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor. Of course, I informed our Government."

Your reference to "a lot of talk around town" suggests that at that time you had heard the same rumor from sources other than the Peruvian Ambassador; is that correct?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Could you indicate to what extent there was talk around town at that time?

Mr. Grew: I wouldn't say that talk was widespread but it came from various sources. I could not now recollect from what sources because they were not important, but this telegram which I sent on January 27 was based practically entirely on the report which had been brought to me by my Peruvian colleague.

Mr. Gesell: Did that talk persist of a general rumor category or did it prevail only at or about the time of your dispatch?

Mr. Grew: I would say only about the time of my dispatch.

Mr. Gesell: You don't remember any talk about town subsequent to that time concerning a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I do not.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Was there any talk or gossip or discussion of the possibility of an attack against the United States at any other point other than Pearl Harbor during this period from January on?

Mr. Grew: Well, do you refer to talk by Japanese, from Japanese sources?

Mr. Gesell: Well, I think my question was intended to be as broad as possible, but let's take the Japanese sources first.

Mr. Grew: Well, we were very largely during that last year cut off from our Japanese contacts. The Japanese did not dare to be seen with us and did not dare come to the American Embassy and most of my contacts had just slipped away so it was very difficult to keep in touch with what people were thinking. You see, the secret police were constantly watching every Japanese who had contact with any foreigner and in many cases I am quite sure Japanese -- in fact I know -- were arrested and kept in prison for some time as a result of having seen too much of foreigners. So it was very difficult to pick up what the people were thinking at that time apart from what was published in the press.

Mr. Gesell: I suppose you received rumors second-hand, so to speak, through your other diplomatic colleagues who themselves may have been in touch with Japanese; is that correct?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Grew: Yes, of course I received reports of what was going on from diplomatic colleagues constantly during all that year.

Mr. Gesell: Did you get from any of your diplomatic colleagues any information indicating that Japan was to attack the United States at any point subsequent to January 27, which was of a specific military nature?

Mr. Grew: I couldn't put my finger on any one conversation which would confirm that, but all the evidence which we accumulated during those years intensified as time went on, made it abundantly clear that they were likely to attack.

Mr. Gesell: And, of course, my questions have had to do more with specific military objectives rather than the broad question of likelihood of an attack.

Now we have had here, Mr. Grew, the statement from a Navy Officer concerning the Japanese plans for an attack, based upon captured documents and prisoner interviews, and I want to ask you two or three questions based on that.

The reports indicate that the Japanese task force left from Etorofu Jima sometime around the 26th of November Jap time.

Did you have any information which indicated in any way that there was a Japanese task force at that Island at about that time?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Grew: None whatever.

Mr. Gesell: The report also indicates that in August 1941 Admiral Yamamota ordered the fleet commanders and key staff members to Tokyo for war games preliminary to the final formulation of operation plans for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and that war conferences were thereafter continuously held at the Naval War College in Tokyo from the 2nd of September to the 13th of September.

Did you have any information concerning those war plans or those conferences that were being held which indicated in any way the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack or an attack on the United States anywhere else?

Mr. Grew: Those conferences were generally of a routine nature. They took place from time to time. We knew, of course, that they were going on, but what they were talking about we did not know.

I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even know that they existed.

Mr. Gesell: I want to ask you about that in a moment, but now let me ask you this.

This report that I have been discussing indicates that on December 1st the Cabinet Council met and approved the commencement of hostilities against the United States.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(6)

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Were you aware that there was a Cabinet meeting in December around December 1st or 2nd?

Mr. Grew: I recollect we were informed at that time of such a meeting.

Mr. Gesell: Was any announcement made or any information made available to you in any way indicating that one of the matters considered at the Cabinet meeting was the commencement of hostilities against the United States by an attack at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: No, sir. That was all guess work.

Mr. Gesell: Did you guess that that had been considered at that time?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Did you report that you had so guessed, to the State Department?

Mr. Grew: Well, I think that my reports were complete in themselves. I think that the warnings that I had issued covered the field. I very likely did report that meeting but I cannot tell you without consulting our files.

Mr. Gesell: You don't recall, do you, any specific report that you made at that time to the effect that you thought the Cabinet was considering an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: I don't recollect any specific report to that effect. I would have to consult the records on that.

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Witness Grew

Mr. Gesell: I think we have your dispatch concerning the Cabinet meeting. I will bring it forward in a moment.

Now, I would like to ask you a general question.

First I have this dispatch, your dispatch of December 1 to the Department of State, and with reference to the Cabinet meeting the information that you appear to have given at that time was to this effect:

"Tonight's newspapers report that the Cabinet at its meeting today while realizing the difficulty of adjusting the respective positions of the two countries nevertheless determined to continue the Washington conversations."

WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shefner follows

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Shefner
fls LaC

291

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Gesell: Does that refresh your recollection that you did not at that time have any information that you reported indicating that one of the matters discussed was the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Grew: I doubt if I reported that precise point at that time.

Mr. Gesell: Now I would like to ask you a general question by way of leading up to several others.

During this period what was your general information as to the state of the Japanese preparations and readiness for war, the strength of their military and their general mobilization activities as you reported them to the Department of State?

Mr. Keefe: May I ask what period that is? May I ask what period is embraced in your question, counsel?

Mr. Gesell: I would like to have him cover in a general way his period there, perhaps, progressively to show what steps he knew were being taken.

Mr. Keefe: The whole ten years?

Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, if I may read a few passages that were written at that time as contemporary comments I think that that would be the best way to answer this question. May I do that, sir?

The Chairman: Yes.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 Mr. Grew: Shortly after my arrival in Japan in the
3 spring of 1932 I wrote a series of letters to Mr. Stimson
4 who was then Secretary of State, after sizing up the situa-
5 tion as we saw it in Tokyo at that time.

6 On August 13th, in a letter to Mr. Stimson, I said I
7 was surprised --

8 Senator Brewster: Would you give the year in each case
9 so the record will be clear?

10 Mr. Gesell: The year, Mr. Grew.

11 Senator Brewster: The year.

12 Mr. Grew: 1932, Senator. I told Mr. Stimson how the
13 Japanese were working up an anti-foreign and an anti-American
14 psychology in the country, as a matter of fact against all
15 countries but especially against the United States, and I
16 said to Mr. Stimson (Reading):

17 "This situation reminds me strongly of the efforts
18 of the German Government, by calumniating foreign na-
19 tions, to build up a public war psychology in 1914, the
20 effort being repeated whenever some new venture, such
21 as the indiscriminate submarine warfare, was about to
22 be launched. Here in Japan the deliberate building up
23 of public animosity against foreign nations in general
24 and the United States in particular has doubtless a
25 similar purpose--to strengthen the hand of the military

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

in its Manchurian venture in the face of foreign, and especially American, opposition.

"I believe that on the part of the Japanese it is a sign of weakness, not of strength. * * *

"Such a national temper is always dangerous. The German military machine, supported by a carefully nurtured public war psychology, took the bit in its teeth and overrode all restraining influences in 1914. The Japanese military machine is not dissimilar. It has been built for war, feels prepared for war, and would welcome war. It has never yet been beaten and possesses unlimited self-confidence. I am not an alarmist but I believe that we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies. The facts of history would render it criminal to close them."

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may we have the page in the book that the witness is reading from?

Mr. Grew: The page of that in my book is page 64.

Then two years later I have some pages from a long report I sent to the Secretary of State which I think are probably pertinent to the point. (Reading)

"Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor of prime importance" --

The Chairman: May I ask what is the date of that?

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 Mr. Grew: The date of this, sir?

3 The Chairman: Yes.

4 Mr. Grew: December 27, 1934, page 145 in my book.

5 This dispatch is on record in the Department of State.

6 (Reading):

7 "Behind our day-to-day diplomacy lies a factor
8 of prime importance, namely national support, demon-
9 strated and reinforced by national preparedness. I
10 believe that a fundamental element of that prepared-
11 ness should be the maintenance of the present naval
12 ratios in principle and the eventual achievement and
13 maintenance of those ratios, so far as they apply to
14 Japan, in fact. With such a background, and only with
15 such a background, can we pursue our diplomacy with any
16 confidence that our representations will be listened
17 to or that they will lead to favorable results. General
18 Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the United States
19 Army, was recently reported in the press as saying:
20 "Armies and navies, in being efficient, give weight to
21 the peaceful words of statesmen, but a feverish effort
22 to create them when once a crisis is imminent simply
23 provokes attack." We need thorough preparedness not
24 in the interests of war but of peace.

25 "It is difficult for those who do not live in

29 5

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1 Japan to appraise the present temper of the country.
2
3 An American Senator is reported to have recommended re-
4 cently that we should accord parity to Japan in order
5 to avoid future war. Whatever the Senator's views may
6 be concerning the general policy that we should follow
7 in the Far East, he probably does not realize what harm
8 that sort of public statement does in strengthening
9 the Japanese stand and in reinforcing the aggressive
10 ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of
11 course picks out such statements by prominent Americans
12 and publishes them far and wide, thus confirming the
13 general belief in Japan that the pacifist element in the
14 United States is preponderantly strong and in the last
15 analysis will control the policy and action of our Gov-
16 ernment. Under such circumstances there is a general
17 tendency to characterize our diplomatic representations
18 as bluff and to believe that they can safely be dis-
19 regarded without fear of implementation.

20 "It would be helpful if those who share the Sen-
21 ator's views could hear and read some of the things
22 that are constantly being said and written in Japan,
23 to the effect that Japan's destiny is to subjugate
24 and rule the world (sic), and could realize the expansion-
25 ist ambitions which lie not far from the surface in the

Witness Grew:

n Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 minds of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the
3 patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists
4 throughout the country. Their aim is to obtain trade
5 control and eventually predominant political influence
6 in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements,
7 Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces
8 and Vladivostok, one-step at a time, as in Korea and
9 Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and
10 then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles
11 can be overcome by diplomacy or force. With such
12 dreams of empire cherished by many, and with an army
13 and navy capable of taking the bit in their own teeth
14 and running away with it regardless of the restraining
15 influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo
16 (a risk which unquestionably exists and of which we
17 have already had ample evidence in the Manchurian af-
18 fair), we would be reprehensibly somnolent if we were
19 to trust to the security of treaty restraints or inter-
20 national comity to safeguard our own interests or,
21 indeed, our own property. * * *

22 "When Japanese speak of Japan's being the 'stabil-
23 izing factor' and the 'guardian of peace' of East
24 Asia, what they have in mind is a Pax Japonica with
25 eventual complete commercial control, and, in the minds

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Cesell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

of some, eventual complete political control of East Asia. While Ambassador Saito may have been misquoted in a recent issue of the Philadelphia Bulletin as saying that Japan will be prepared to fight to maintain that conception of peace, nevertheless that is precisely what is in the minds of many Japanese today. There is a swashbuckling temper in the country, largely developed by military propaganda, which can lead Japan during the next few years, or in the next few generations, to any extremes unless the saner minds in the Government prove able to cope with it and to restrain the country from national suicide. * * *

"I wish that more Americans would come out here and live here and gradually come to sense the real potential risks and dangers of the situation instead of speaking and writing academically on a subject which they know nothing whatever about, thereby contributing ammunition to the Japanese military and extremists who are stronger than they have been for many a day. The idea that a great body of liberal thought lying just beneath the surface since 1931 would be sufficiently strong to emerge and assume control with a little foreign encouragement is thoroughly mistaken. The liberal thought is there, but it is inarticulate and largely impotent, and

WARD B. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 in all probability will remain so for some time to come.

3 * * *

4 "In view of all these considerations, I have little
5 hesitation in reiterating and emphasizing the potential
6 dangers of the situation and the prime importance of
7 American national preparedness to meet it. As a nation
8 we have taken the lead in international efforts toward
9 the restriction and reduction of armaments. We have
10 had hopes that the movement would be progressive, but
11 the conditions of world affairs as they have developed
12 during the past twelve years since the Washington con-
13 ference have not afforded fruitful ground for such
14 progress. Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a Pax
15 Japonica in the Far East, with all that this movement,
16 as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound to en-
17 tail, we should rapidly build up our Navy to treaty
18 strength, and if and when the Washington Naval Treaty
19 expires we should continue to maintain the present ratio
20 with Japan regardless of cost, a peacetime insurance
21 both to cover and to reduce the risk of war. In the
22 meantime every proper step should be taken to avoid or
23 to offset the belligerent utterances of jingoes no less
24 than the defeatist statements of pacifists in the United
25 States, many of which find their way into the Japanese

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 press, because the utterances of the former tend to
3 inflame public sentiment against our country, while the
4 statements of the latter convey an impression of Ameri-
5 can weakness, irresolution, and bluff."

6 Mr. Gesell: Would it be fair to say, Mr. Grew, that
7 those views which you expressed in those early dispatches
8 were repeated and strengthened by you from time to time as
9 we come nearer to December 7th?

10 Mr. Grew: Yes, definitely.

11 Mr. Gesell: And that they represent your judgment that
12 Japan was mobilizing both psychologically and militarily
13 for gradual steps of aggression?

14 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, definitely.

15 Mr. Gesell: Now, when did you reach the conclusion in
16 your own mind that war with the United States was inevitable?

17 Mr. Grew: Mr. Chairman, I think my position on that is
18 perhaps somewhat similar to the position of a candidate for
19 political office who knows that he is going to be defeated
20 but he does not admit it until it is all over.

21 Our foreign service is our first line of national de-
22 fense and our duty is to hold that line if we can do it.
23 For any diplomatic officer in the foreign service or for any
24 foreign service officer to go abroad and throw up his hands
25 and say "War is inevitable" might as well go home because he

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 would be a discredit to the service in which we are members.

3 I cannot tell you of any moment at which I really felt
4 that war was inevitable.

5 Mr. Gesell: You recognized, I think, for a long period
6 that it was a strong probability?

7 Mr. Grew: Definitely.

8 Mr. Gesell: Did you have any views or opinions as to
9 whether Japan was likely to strike without a declaration of
10 war?

11 Mr. Grew: When a criminal commits a crime I find that
12 the FBI or Scotland Yard look up the technique of that crime
13 and go back and look at previous crimes committed with the
14 same technique and thereby spot the criminal. If we had
15 remembered our history we would have recollected that the
16 Japanese did precisely the same thing at Port Arthur in 1905.
17 It struck at Russia without a declaration of war, so that
18 their attack on Pearl Harbor was exactly the same pattern.

19 Mr. Gesell: Would it be safe to say that in making
20 references in your dispatches to the strong possibility of
21 a surprise attack by Japan that you had in mind just those
22 considerations of that part of history?

23 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Gesell: Now, in reaching your conclusion and in
25 considering the developments I understood you to say that you

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 did not know or have access to any information resulting from
3 the intercept of the Japanese diplomatic messages.

4 Mr. Grew: That is a fact.

5 Mr. Gesell: No copies of intercepted messages were sent
6 to you and you did not even know they were being intercepted?

7 Mr. Grew: I did not.

8 Mr. Gesell: Have you any information which would indi-
9 cate whether or not the Japanese knew we were intercepting
10 their messages?

11 Mr. Grew: I have no evidence to that effect, no.

12 Mr. Gesell: The question has come up here, Mr. Grew,
13 concerning the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

14 Did any information come to your attention which indi-
15 cated that the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor had any
16 effect one way or the other on Japanese opinion?

17 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, definitely. The Japanese press
18 from time to time and, as I remember, in public speeches took
19 the position that relations between Japan and the United
20 States could never improve until we removed our Fleet com-
21 pletely from the Pacific to the Atlantic because it was
22 always a source of suspicion to the Japanese.

23 I do not think that that preposterous suggestion was
24 ever advanced officially but it certainly was heard from
25 time to time.

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 Mr. Gesell: Of course, my question was directed to a
3 more limited movement of the Fleet from Pearl Harbor to the
4 West Coast. Was there any discussion of whether such a
5 movement would have any effect or whether the movement in the
6 opposite direction was having some effect?

7 Mr. Grew: I think the statement which I just mentioned
8 had in mind the removal of the Fleet completely from the
9 Pacific, not merely to the West Coast.

10 Mr. Gesell: You do not remember, I take it then, any
11 reaction to the movement of the Fleet from the West Coast
12 to Pearl Harbor in 1940, I believe it was?

13 Mr. Grew: I cannot recollect at present any specific
14 reaction.

15 Mr. Gesell: Now, there has been considerable said here
16 in the testimony so far concerning the relationship between
17 the civil and military government of Japan, and Mr. Hull and
18 other witnesses have expressed opinions that the military
19 branch of the government was in a position to considerably
20 dominate the civil branch of the government.

21 Have you any comments or information to give us on that
22 subject?

23 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. I think in order to shed light
24 on that subject we ought to go back very briefly a little in
25 history, to the middle of the last century we will say,

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 around the time of the Restoration of the Emperor in 1868.

3 The Japanese had watched what they considered the al-
4 leged encroachments of Western powers in the Far East. They
5 remembered the Opium War, the second Chinese war, and they
6 were afraid that the same thing might happen to them. There-
7 fore, they put the responsibility for the defense of the
8 country entirely in the hands of the army and navy.

9 As I remember it, in the constitution of 1889 it was con-
10 firmed that the army and navy should determine their own
11 organization. In any case, after many years went by and
12 things quieted down there and Japan began to gather confi-
13 dence and believed she was not in danger, the control gradual-
14 ly passed from the military to the civil element and in the
15 twenties I have been told, - I was not there myself, but I
16 have been told that the prestige of the Japanese military was
17 so low that officers when they went off duty did not wear a
18 uniform in the streets.

19 In any case, the days of the so-called Shidehara diplo-
20 macy then arose. Shidehara, who is now Prime Minister of
21 Japan, was then Foreign Minister and he and his associates
22 did everything that was possible to bring about good rela-
23 tions with the United States, Great Britain, China and the
24 other countries.

25 I have always thought, and I think it is a fair premise,

2914

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 that one of the principal reasons why the Japanese army in-
3 vaded Manchuria in 1931 was in order to put itself on the map
4 again, to bring up their prestige.

5 In any case, that is then what happened. The Japanese
6 army went into Manchuria and it was a question of time. Of
7 course, they immediately were in a position of control.

8 Now, during that period a development came about which
9 I do not think is provided for in any law, that the Navy and
10 War Ministers in Japan could have their own access to the
11 Emperor over the heads of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet,
12 so, of course, that gave them tremendous power.

13 They also had it in their hands to make it impossible
14 for the Emperor to form any Cabinet of which they did not
15 approve. In other words, if they did not like a Prime Min-
16 ister they would refuse to appoint a War or Navy Minister
17 and the Cabinet could not be formed.

18 An illustration of that was in 1937, I think, where the
19 Emperor asked General Ugaki to come forward and form a Cabin-
20 et. General Ugaki was a very fine military officer, but he
21 was of a moderate type. He was not one of the extremists;
22 he did not commend himself to the Army as a whole and after
23 working for five days he finally had to go to the Emperor
24 and confess himself defeated, so that he never formed a
25 Cabinet, and he communicated to the press at that time that

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

2 he never again would wear a Japanese military uniform.

3 That was the way those things worked out during that period.

4 Now, to come down to the question of the relative con-
5 trol between civilians and military, I would put it more
6 relative control between the moderates and the extremists.

7 You sometimes had a civilian Prime Minister, such as
8 the first two ministries of Prince Konoye, in which the worst
9 acts of international banditry in all history probably were
10 carried out and yet, on the other hand, you had the Cabinet
11 of Admiral Yonai, who was a military and naval officer.
12 His regime was one of the most moderate that there had been
13 in Japan for a great many years.

14 Mr. Gesell: Well, during the period from July 1941,
15 say, to December of 1941 were the extremists or the moderates
16 in control of the government?

17 Mr. Grew: At the time of the Konoye Cabinet, that was
18 the third Konoye Cabinet, up to during the summer of 1941 he,
19 I believe, was doing his best to bring about an improvement
20 of relations with the United States, but from the moment of
21 his fall, when Tojo came in, it was quite clear that the ex-
22 tremists' policy prevailed.

23 Mr. Gesell: Did the Japanese give any publicity to their
24 note of November 20th? Did they at that time indicate what
25 position they had taken to their own people that you recall?

2916

Witness Grew:

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2 Mr. Grew: I do not recall that that note was published.
3 It could have been. I will have to look up the records on
4 that.

5 Mr. Gesell: You do not recall any substantial publicity
6 being given to their November 20th note?

7 Mr. Grew: I do not recall it now.

8 Mr. Gesell: Did the Japanese give any publicity to
9 our note of November 26th?

10 Mr. Grew: They did not until after Pearl Harbor and
11 then when it was published in a newspaper that newspaper was
12 promptly confiscated. The Japanese did not want that note
13 to become known and certain prominent Japanese at that time
14 said to me that they had been informed that the note was in
15 the nature of an ultimatum but they were unable to confirm
16 that and in the light of the contents of the note which I
17 passed on to my Japanese friends they said if that were a
18 fact, if the note was couched along those lines, the Japanese
19 people would be definitely opposed to an intransigent atti-
20 tude on the part of the Japanese Government in dealing with
21 it. That is on record.

22 Shef--
23 Shack
24 fls
25

SHACK(1)
fws
Shafner

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Did the Japanese attempt to characterize the note without revealing its contents at that time?

Mr. Grew: They definitely did.

Mr. Gesell: In what manner did they characterize it?

Mr. Grew: They characterized it as in the nature of an ultimatum.

Mr. Gesell: What did they say about it?

Mr. Grew: I do not know what more they said about it, because I have no access to the records. I suppose you are speaking of the Japanese press now?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Mr. Grew: I cannot recollect exactly how that was put forward, but that was the impression created among the Japanese public.

Mr. Gesell: Did you ask for any authority to release the text of the note of November 26th?

Mr. Grew: I do not recollect having asked that. It would not have done any good if I had.

Mr. Gesell: Now, coming to a subsequent message, the message to the Emperor, which was transmitted by President Roosevelt to the Emperor on or about December 6, could you state to the committee the circumstances, under which you received that note, when you first learned of it, and what steps you took to deliver it to the Emperor?

WLC2

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. That was the evening of December 7, Japanese Time. I was listening to the radio broadcasts from San Francisco on that evening and heard that the President had sent, or was sending a message to the Emperor. I promptly telephone to Mr. Dooman, the Consul for the Embassy to stand by. Not long thereafter I received a very brief, urgent message from Mr. Hull saying an important message for the Emperor was being then encoded and I should be ready to receive it. A long telegram containing the message was received in the Embassy at 10:30 p.m. The record on the face of the telegram showed it had been received in the Japanese Post Office at 12 noon. It was, I understand, sent from Washington 9 p.m., which would have meant 11 a.m. Tokyo Time, 14 hours difference. So, in other words, the telegram appears to have been delivered to the Japanese Post Office, which handled telegrams one hour after its receipt, and they held it up throughout that day, from 12 noon until 10:30 p.m.

Finally, at 10:30 p.m., it came. I had already arranged for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to stand by. I said I would probably be able to see him about midnight, which I did. When the message was finally decoded, I saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs about a quarter past twelve, about fifteen minutes after midnight. I show him the communication and I said that I wished to ask for an audience with the Emperor to

WLC3

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Gesell

1 present it personally. I did not want any doubt as to getting
2 it into his hands. The Minister began to discuss the matter
3 with me, and I said, "I am making an definite application for
4 an audience with the Emperor," which is the right of every
5 ambassador, and Mr. Togo -- not Tojo, the Prime Minister, but
6 Togo -- and the Minister finally said, "I will present your
7 request to The Throne."

8
9 I left the Foreign Office at about half past twelve a.m.,
10 half past midnight. I got to bed rather late. At 7 o'clock
11 the next morning, the 8th of December, my telephone beside my
12 bed rang, and Mr. Kase, the private secretary to the Minister,
13 said he had been trying to get me ever since 5 a.m. I said,
14 "That is surprising, because the telephone is right beside my
15 bed and it has not rung." He said, "Please come over as soon
16 as possible to see the Minister."

17 I got to the Minister's official residence about 7:30
18 a.m. He came into his room dressed in formal clothes.
19 Apparently he had been with the Emperor, and he had a document
20 in his hand, he slapped it on the table, and he said, "This is
21 the Emperor's reply to the President." I said, "I have asked
22 for an audience in order to present that memorandum, that
23 message, to the Emperor personally. Mr. Togo merely said
24 -- I remember his words -- "I have no wish to stand between you
25 and The Throne." but nothing more was said about it. Then he

WLC4

Witness Grew

read it, and he asked me to notice especially the last paragraph. He said, "In view of the fact the conversations in Washington had made no progress it had been decided to call them off." That did not strike me as very serious. They had been called before, when the Japanese first went into Indo-China and they had been resumed at a later date. So, I said, "Well, I am very sorry. I hope we can get them started again." The Minister made a little pleasant speech to me, thanking me for my cooperation for peace, and came down and saw me off at the door. He said not one single word about the attack on Pearl Harbor, and yet that was at 7:30 o'clock the next morning and the attack had occurred at about 3:30 a.m. Japanese Time, or at any rate it had occurred several hours previous. I never understood why he did not tell me, whether he did not have the courage to do it or whether he thought it was not diplomatic protocol, -- I have no idea.

I went back to the Embassy and a few minutes later we heard newsboys calling out "Gogi" in the street. "Gogi" is a special edition of the paper, it is a single sheet containing an important piece of news. I sent one of my secretaries out to get it and he brought it in and that is the way I learned about the attack on Pearl Harbor, was when this news sheet was brought in and put on my desk. An hour later, the police came in and locked us up in the Embassy, and that is the story.

WLC5

Witness Grew

Questions by The Chairman

Mr. Gesell: We have no further questions of Mr. Grew.

The Chairman: It is 10 minutes to 12. You became a diplomatic prisoner from then on until you were exchanged?

Mr. Grew: Yes, Mr. Chairman, from then on until we were exchanged the following June.

The Chairman: So that getting back to the morning on which you were told by the Foreign Minister practically that you would not be permitted to see the Emperor, the attack had already taken place some four hours before that. When did you receive from the State Department here, or did you after that receive any dispatch from the State Department that was delivered to you in Tokyo?

Mr. Grew: After the attack upon Pearl Harbor?

The Chairman: After the interview with Togo.

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I think we did not receive any telegrams after that. I was able to establish a telephone connection with Mr. Hamilton of the State Department and we merely spoke for a minute about the attack and he said he hoped we were all well in the Embassy and a few personal remarks of that kind, but I recollect nothing else.

The Chairman: Does your record show whether, after the Japanese Government took over the Embassy and locked you up, any messages were sent to you that were not delivered by the Japanese Government, and I presume they would have been delivered

WLC6

Witness Grew

Questions by The Chairman

by the Japanese Government if you had got them?

Mr. Grew: I recollect no messages received. I sent two or three messages to Washington and I did not know whether they got through. As a matter of fact, they did get through.

The Chairman: The testimony here shows that the Japanese Fleet, the task force, left the Kurile Islands headed towards Pearl Harbor on the 25th, United States Time, which would have been the 26th Japanese Time, and that Secretary Hull dispatched or gave to the Ambassador of Japan here on the 26th his reply to the Japanese message of the 20th. When did you receive information, if you did receive information, that that message to the Japanese Government had been delivered on the 26th?

Mr. Grew: I presumably received that in a telegram from the Department of State, which kept me informed of the exchange of documents and conversations going on in Washington. Without consulting records, Mr. Chairman, I could not tell you just what moment I received them.

The Chairman: Your recollection is you did receive notification through the State Department that such message had been delivered?

Mr. Grew: In all probability, I think I did.

The Chairman: I do not think I want to ask any other questions now.

Mr. Cooper.

LC7

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Clark

1 The Vice Chairman: I do not have any questions now.

2 The Chairman: Senator George.

3 Senator George: Nothing now, at this time.

4 The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

5 Mr. Clark: I want to ask you if you inquired from your
6 diplomatic colleague the source of his information in regard
7 to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
8

9 Mr. Grew: I do not think I did, Mr. Congressman. After all,
10 sometimes when an official, diplomatic official, receives informa-
11 tion of that kind or even a rumor report of that kind, it may
12 put him in a rather difficult position to ask him to reveal the
13 source. I do not think I did ask that question.

14 Mr. Clark: You did not ask him where he learned that there
15 was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

16 Mr. Grew: What is that?

17 Mr. Clark: You did not ask him where he learned that there
18 was likely to be an attack on Pearl Harbor?

19 Mr. Grew: I do not recollect having asked that question.

20 Mr. Clark: Well, now, I do not mean to insist upon this,
21 but you considered it important enough to make it the subject
22 of a special dispatch to your Government, did you not?

23 Mr. Grew: Definitely.

24 Mr. Clark: You say now you made no effort to find out the
25 source from which he obtained that information?

WLC8

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Clark

Mr. Grew: To have gone to my Peruvian colleague and said, "I would like to know the source from which you received that information," would have put him in a very difficult position, because most of those pieces of information were received from Japanese friends who would have been endangered by the knowledge that they had passed that information on. I think in all probability if I had asked my colleague for the source he probably would have felt that he could not give it to me. In any case, it is a rather difficult thing to do, to ask for such a thing as that.

Mr. Clark: Did you know him pretty well?

Mr. Grew: I knew him pretty well. He was a man I trusted. I trusted his word and I trusted his judgment.

Mr. Clark: You made some reference in your testimony to some warlike activity by Japan I think in 1905 with other declarations of war. Was that against Russia?

Mr. Grew: That was against Russia, yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: There is just a hazy recollection in my mind that there was some activity by our Fleet about that time. Probably it was headed entirely around the world as a kind of demonstration against Japan. Do you recollect about that?

Mr. Grew: I recollect the sending of the Fleet around South America and into the Pacific. I do not recollect the date.

Mr. Clark: Well, did it have any connection with the military activity of Japan against Russia?

Witness Grew

Questions by Mr. Clark
The Chairman

1 Mr. Grew: I would have to refresh my memory on that.

2 Mr. Clark: It is not material anyway.

3 Mr. Grew: I am sorry; that is a long time ago. It is a
4 matter of history. I would not like to answer that question
5 without looking it up.

6 Mr. Clark: I was trying to refresh my own memory through
7 you.

8 Mr. Grew: I am afraid my memory is bad on that.

9 The Chairman: There is one question I omitted to ask, if
10 I may do it now.

11 Mr. Grew: Yes.

12 The Chairman: In regard to this rumor brought to your
13 attention by the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador.

14 Mr. Grew: Minister.

15 The Chairman: The testimony here shows that in January,
16 1941, Admiral Yamamoto, I believe it is, the Japanese Admiral,
17 had formulated some plan by which to attack Pearl Harbor at
18 some indefinite date in the future. Would you be able to know
19 whether the formulation of such plan by the Japanese Admiral
20 might have had any connection with the rumors that the Peruvian
21 Minister passed on to you?

22 Mr. Grew: I think that is very doubtful, Mr. Chairman.

23 The Japanese were pretty effective in their secrecy. I think
24 it is very unlikely that that information would have been allowed
25

WLC10

Witness Grew

Questions by The Chairman

to leak out anywhere. It would have been probably retained in a very small group of the highest military and naval officers, so that I would doubt very much if the rumor which I telegraphed the Secretary of State on January 27 had any connection whatever with the elaboration of the plan.

The Chairman: The telegram, the dispatch, which you sent to Secretary Stimson in 1932 was sent to him as Secretary of State?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: In the meantime, by the time you sent your dispatch of 1934, Secretary Hull had become Secretary of State?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: He was at that time in the office of the State Department?

Mr. Grew: That is correct.

The Chairman: That is all.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I make one request of counsel before you adjourn?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: I notice in The New York Times they have an article which is dated Nuremburg, Germany, November 23.

"The following excerpts from the official German report on discussions between Adolf Hitler and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4,

Jan

1932

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

spld

1941, were introduced in the Nuremburg War Criminals Trial today."

It shows the discussion of the plan of a war between Japan and the United States. I think that is pertinent in this inquiry in view of the interpretation that has been put by some people on the note of November 26, 1941. I request that we obtain an authenticated copy of it.

Mr. Gesell: We will try to do that. Is that mentioned in today's New York Times?

Mr. Murphy: Saturday's New York Times.

The Chairman: All right, the committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m., of the same day.)

Shefner

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH C. GREW (resumed)

- - -

The Chairman: The committee will be in order. The chair thinks Mr. Clark had concluded his examination of Mr. Grew and Senator Lucas will now come to bat.

Mr. Gesell: If the committee please, before Senator Lucas commences my attention was called during the recess to the fact that I had neglected to introduce the dispatch from Mr. Grew under date of December 1 referring to the meeting of the Cabinet, from which I have read during his examination and I think, to make the record complete, I should offer that document in the record now as exhibit 25.

The Chairman: That will be received as exhibit 25.

(THE DOCUMENT ABOVE REFERRED TO WAS MARKED
EXHIBIT NO. 25)

The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas: Mr. Ambassador, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the message or memorandum that was issued by the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan on the evening of December 6th was ever delivered to the Emperor?

Mr. Grew: No, Senator, I have no evidence to indicate that it was delivered to the Emperor.

Senator Lucas: Who was the Minister at that time of

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1 Witness Grew:

2 Japan with whom you conferred?

3 Mr. Grew: I conferred that night with the Foreign
4 Minister, Mr. Togo, and I asked for an audience with the
5 Emperor to present the document and he said that he would
6 present my request to the Emperor and then I saw him the next
7 morning at 7:30 and he said, "This is the Emperor's reply."

8 Senator Lucas: Did he give you that reply in writing --

9 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- or was it oral?

11 Mr. Grew: In writing.

12 Senator Lucas: Was it signed by the Emperor?

13 Mr. Grew: No, no, it was not signed by the Emperor.

14 Senator Lucas: And you do not know, other than what he
15 told you, whether the Emperor ever saw this last message?

16 Mr. Grew: I do not know.

17 Senator Lucas: I should like to direct your attention
18 to a statement which was made by Mr. Hull in his treatise on
19 this subject on page 3, in which he said the following:

20 (Reading)

21 "In 1928, however, following the advent of the
22 cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-
23 called "positive" policy toward China under which it
24 manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in
25 China's internal affairs."

353

Witness Grew

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1
2 I should like to ask you whether or not you are famil-
3 iar with the memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on
4 July 25, 1927 by Premier Tanaka outlining the positive pol-
5 icy of Japan for the conquest of the world?

6 Mr. Grew: That is the so-called Tanaka memorial?

7 Senator Lucas: That is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Grew: Of course, I have seen it in times past but
9 I have never known whether it was authentic or not.

10 Senator Lucas: That is the question that I desired to
11 ask you. I read it in a magazine entitled, "China at War",
12 which was published in this country in March 1942 and I was
13 wondering whether or not you had ever read the article,
14 or in your experience in Japan whether you had reached the
15 conclusion that this memorial was an authentic document?

16 Mr. Grew: I never reached that conclusion, Senator.
17 I do not recollect whether I read that precise article or
18 not, but, of course, that was discussed at considerable
19 length in the old days and nobody that I ever saw was ever
20 able to adduce any concrete evidence to prove its authenti-
21 city.

22 Senator Lucas: Thank you, sir.

23 Now, I want to direct your attention, Mr. Ambassador,
24 to the report made by the Army Board, including George
25 Grunert, Lieutenant General, Henry D. Russell, Major Gen-

1
2 eral and Walter H. Frank, Major General, U. S. Army, who
3 investigated, as I recall, at the request of Secretary
4 Stimson the attack on Pearl Harbor and in that report, -
5 and this is on page 51 of the September issue of the United
6 States News, which purports to have a full text of the of-
7 ficial report concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, the
8 following information is found. Starting at the top of the
9 page in the right hand column it reads in this way:

10 "Apparently on the 26th, in the morning, Mr. Hull
11 had made up his mind not to go through with the pro-
12 posal shown the day before to the Secretary of War
13 containing the plan for the three months' cruise.
14 Evidently the action to kick the whole thing over was
15 accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter
16 proposal of the ten points which they took as an ulti-
17 matum. It was the document that touched the button
18 that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly ex-
19 pressed."

20 Now, as I understand it, Mr. Ambassador, you were a wit-
21 ness before that General Board and I should like to have
22 you elaborate or comment, if you care to do so, upon this
23 conclusion that was reached by the Army Board making this
24 independent investigation.

25 Mr. Grew: Senator, may I read briefly the record of my

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1. actual testimony before that committee on that subject?

2. Senator Lucas: I want the testimony read, sir.

3. Mr. Grew: I was asked what was the reaction of the
4. Japanese people, both private and official, to that document,
5. if you remember. That is Mr. Hull's memorandum of November
6. 26, 1941. I replied: (Reading)

7. "The reaction of the Japanese military people and
8. also of probably the majority of the civil government
9. officials, who took their cue from the military at
10. that time, was that they characterized that memorandum
11. as an ultimatum."

12. Senator Lucas: What page are you reading from, if I
13. may ask?

14. Mr. Grew: I am reading now my actual testimony before
15. that Army Board.

16. Senator Lucas: All right, sir.

17. Mr. Grew: (Reading):

18. "If I may do so, I should like in that connection"--
19. I am still reading my testimony -- "I should like, in
20. that connection, to express the personal opinion that
21. that attitude of the Japanese officials to the memorandum
22. as an ultimatum was totally unsound and wrongly based."

23. Then I was asked:

24. "It is your considered opinion, therefore, that they
25.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1
2 used it as a pretext for the accomplishment of what
3 they desired?"

4 My reply: "Yes, sir. It was in no respect an ultima-
5 tum, either in tone or in substance."

6 I continued --

7 Senator Lucas: What page is that on in the report?

8 Mr. Grew: That is on page 4208.

9 Senator Lucas: That is correct.

10 Mr. Grew: I go on to 4215, where the point came up
11 again. This was my testimony. (Reading)

12 "Now, to go back and coming to your question, we
13 will go back to the military people, the army and the
14 navy. At what point did they decide definitely to at-
15 tack? Naturally, they had all their plans made for
16 years beforehand. In the case of war with America
17 they were very far-sighted in those respects and they
18 had their plans drawn up probably" -- although I had
19 no means of knowing that, of course -- "probably right
20 down to the last detail, but as for the moment at which
21 the button was pushed I do not myself know exactly how
22 long it would have taken their carriers to get from
23 where they were to the point at which they attacked
24 Pearl Harbor, but it has always been my belief that it
25 was about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memo-

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1
2 randum of November 26th that the button was pushed. I can
3 not prove that, I have no evidence. It is just my general
4 feeling."

5 Now, in that connection, Senator, I think that my testi-
6 mony, - a wrong impression has been given to my testimony
7 because it appeared from the official report that I had
8 said that Mr. Hull's memorandum actually touched the button
9 that started the war.

10 I never said that. I said it was my belief that the
11 thing had been started at about that time, that is all.

12 Then, if I may, as throwing light on this general sub-
13 ject, I would like to read the brief comment that I wrote
14 in connection with Mr. Hull's memorandum. Shall I do that,
15 sir?

16 Senator Lucas: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Grew: This is on page 482 of my book, "Ten Years
18 in Japan."

19 Senator Lucas: 482?

20 Mr. Grew: Page 482 in my book, "Ten Years in Japan."

21 Mr. Murphy: At the bottom of the page.

22 Mr. Grew: That is not in Foreign Relations.

23 Senator Lucas: Proceed, Mr. Ambassador.

24 Mr. Grew: (Reading):

25 "November 29, 1941.

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1 "Our Government has handed to the Japanese" -- mind
2 you, this was written on the spot at the time in Tokyo --
3 "Our Government has handed to the Japanese a ten-point
4 draft proposal for adjusting the whole situation in the
5 Far East. It is a broad-gauge, objective, and states-
6 manlike document, offering to Japan practically every-
7 thing that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she
8 will simply stop her aggressive policy. By adopting
9 such a program she would be offered free access to
10 needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, finan-
11 cial co-operation and support, withdrawal of the freez-
12 ing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty
13 of commerce with us. If she wants a political and
14 economic stranglehold on the countries of East Asia
15 (euphemestically called the New Order in East Asia and
16 the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)--which most of her
17 extremists do want--and if she pursues her southward
18 advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of
19 the A B C D powers and will unquestionably be defeated
20 and reduced to the status of a third-rate power. But if
21 she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain without
22 further fighting all of the desiderata for which she
23 allegedly started fighting--strategic, economic, finan-
24 cial, and social security."
25

1 Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 Then I said further:

3 "I have had conversations with friends and after ex-
4 amining their feelings I have come to the conclusion
5 that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual
6 contents of the American document of November 26, that
7 Washington has delivered an ultimatum" --

8 now, wait a moment. I beg your pardon, sir, I am wrong.

9 I was quoting a statement made to me by a prominent Japan-
10 ese. I will withdraw that and begin again, just that last
11 passage, if I may. This is written on December 5, 1941.

12 (Reading):

13 "Yesterday I received in his own handwriting a
14 letter from a prominent Japanese who is closely in
15 touch with Government circles here. This letter reads
16 in part as follows: "The situation is very regrettable.
17 You know how I feel and I may understand your feelings.
18 Permit me to set forth frankly to you what is now in my
19 mind. I have had conversations with friends and after
20 examining their feelings I have come to the conclusion
21 that they believe, with no knowledge of the actual con-
22 tents of the American document of November 26, that
23 Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us. Such is
24 the regrettable psychology of our people."

25 Now, that document, as I think I said this morning, was

3810

Witness Grew:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

not published in Japan until after Pearl Harbor and when it was published the paper publishing it was immediately confiscated. In other words, the authorities did not want the Japanese people to know what was in that document.

Shel--
Shack,
fls

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shack
F.C.S.
Goffner
11-1

1521

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas

Senator Lucas: Let me ask you if you are acquainted with any of the members of the General Board that made this investigation and so made the report that I have read to you heretofore?

Mr. Grew: I beg pardon, sir?

Senator Lucas: Are you acquainted with any of the members of the Army Board that made this report which was described to you in the statement "it was the document that touched the button that started the war as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it"?

Mr. Grew: Are you asking me the names?

Senator Lucas: I am asking you if you personally know any of the Generals that made that report.

Mr. Grew: Let me see. I do not recollect now. I may have met them. I did not know any of them well, certainly. General Russell it appears was the officer who questioned me on this particular point. I did not know him well.

Senator Lucas: Do you have any knowledge why the Army Board reached such a strained construction of your language and placed it in this report?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I never understood that. I think my evidence is clear.

Senator Lucas: I certainly agree with you, from what you have read. I examined the transcript and it is rather difficult

AL-2

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas

for me to understand why the Army Board used that statement of yours in the way it did.

Another thing, while I am on that subject, it is difficult for me to understand why it was that the Army Board said practically nothing about the ultimatum that was issued by Japan, which has been testified to here over and over again by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Welles, and that they used the Ten-Point Program of Mr. Hull so far as their report on the question of ultimatum was concerned.

One other question and then I am through. During your stay, Mr. Ambassador, in Japan, did you have any opportunity to discover what the Japanese naval forces or military forces were doing in the way of building up their military or naval machines?

Mr. Grew: We had very little opportunity to get really inside information on that. As I say, the Japanese were past masters at secrecy and their secret police were constantly watching all foreigners and all Japanese who were regarded as possibly pro-American or in any way pro-foreign, watching them continually, and if they felt there was any chance of them having imparted information they would generally arrest them immediately.

So it was very difficult to find out exactly what was being done, but those things dripped through from various

WASH. & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas

channels from time to time.

We had a pretty good idea in the Embassy, apart from the statement published in the press, that they were steadily strengthening both their Army and Navy. While, of course, there were various announcements made from time to time of the building up of both forces.

Senator Lucas: Did you have any military or naval attaches in the Intelligence Department attached to your Embassy?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: How many did you have at that time?

Mr. Grew: I think a military and a naval attache and several so-called language officers, young officers in the Army and Navy who were there to study the Japanese language.

Senator Lucas: Was that the only intelligence service that you had at that time in Japan that was connected with your department?

Mr. Grew: That was the only intelligence service we had, except insofar as we were able to receive information from various sources, our Consuls in the different places, and in some cases friendly foreigners, and in other cases I might say also friendly Japanese.

Senator Lucas: The reason for these questions takes me back to April, 1940, when Admiral Stark appeared before the

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Naval Affairs Committee of the United States Senate, which I was a member at that time, and he gave the committee the information that it was practically impossible to learn just what Japan was doing at that time in the way of strengthening her military and naval forces.

They knew from past treaties and past information as to the number of battleships, the number of cruisers, and so forth, but after the termination of the treaty in 1936 he advised us it was very difficult to obtain any information at that time as to what the Japanese were doing either in the way of building battleships or other ships.

Incidentally, he thought they were building at that time two battleships, but he was not certain about it. I just call that to your attention, because it seems to me their secrecy must have been of the highest order if our intelligence service was not able to ascertain whether or not they were building a couple of battleships.

Mr. Grew: Admiral Stark was quite right about that. They took the utmost precautions to see that information of that kind came into the hands of no foreigner. I know, for instance, on the railway trip from Tokyo down to Shimonoseki at the foot of Honshu Island, very close to one of the Japanese navy yards where they were building ships, they had a big stockade erected around the yard and as the train passed they

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

always pulled down the curtains. Of course the police were watching all the time to prevent any foreigner from coming into that area. That is just one little instance, but that was the whole system throughout Japan, and it was exceedingly difficult to get accurate information about what they were doing.

Senator Lucas: Did I understand you to say in your direct examination that the Ten-Point Program that was promulgated by Mr. Hull was published in one newspaper in Japan and that newspaper was immediately confiscated? Is that correct?

Mr. Grew: That is correct, sir, yes sir.

Senator Lucas: That was after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Grew: That was after Pearl Harbor. That, as far as I was concerned, was of course hearsay, because I was locked up in the Embassy and had no contacts with the outside.

Senator Lucas: Did you have an opportunity while you were locked up in the Embassy to read the daily Japanese newspapers?

Mr. Grew: After about two or three weeks of our internment, I have forgotten how long it was, they finally did allow the Japanese newspapers to come in to us. The first few weeks they did not.

Creek
follows

SHACK
WLC

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Lucas
Mr. Murphy

Senator Lucas: The first few weeks you were totally ignorant of what was going on?

Mr. Grew: Yes. I would not like to set a date on it. I would have to consult my record.

Senator Lucas: Anyhow, they had no free press in Japan, as far as the publication of any document was concerned?

Mr. Grew: Absolutely not. It was completely controlled.

Senator Lucas: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Ambassador, you have already been asked about the Army Pearl Harbor Report at page 51. So that the record will be clear, I would also like to ask you about the part at page 27, which reads as follows:

"This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare, but it was too late as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the Ten-Points counter-proposals to the Japanese on the previous day, and it was, as the Secretary of State remarked, washing his hands of the matter."

Then, again, on page 56, and I quote:

"The Secretary of State -- the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the

WLC2

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

counter-proposals of November 26, 1941 was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy departments to gain time for preparation for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government."

I would like to state for the record that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have the benefit of the testimony of Admiral Inglis, apparently.

I am wondering if counsel is familiar with the report, whether the Army had the benefit of the testimony, to the effect that the Jap Fleet was advancing on November 25 in the direction of American waters? Are you familiar with that, counsel, whether there was such knowledge in the Army Board, or such evidence?

Mr. Gesell: I believe at the time of the Army Board hearing, at least a good portion of it was missing. There was even doubt as to where the Jap transport started from.

Mr. Murphy: Then, at any rate, this evidence which has been introduced would throw a new light on the advance of the japs from November 25, and you, Mr. Ambassador, would be right in saying it was about the time of the note of the 26th, but not

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

that the note of the 26th was the cause of the act; is that right?

Mr. Grew: That is correct, sir.

The Chairman: Did you answer?

Mr. Grew: I said I think that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, I direct your attention to page 359 of your book -- or first to page 358 of the book in which you stated that -- and I am reading now from the second to the last paragraph:

" -- it may become open to question whether we can afford to await a British victory and whether we should allow Japan to dig in throughout the area where she now visualizes far-flung control. That question, I think, will depend upon the tempo of the Japanese advance. In the meantime let us keep our powder dry and be ready -- for anything."

Those were your sentiments, I take it? That is on page 358.

Mr. Grew: Page 358?

Mr. Murphy: Yes. Those were your sentiments as of January 1, 1941; is that right? That is the second to the last paragraph, near the bottom of the page.

Mr. Grew: Yes, I have it.

Mr. Murphy: Did you hear my question?

1 Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Grew: I would like to have it again.

3 Mr. Murphy: Will you read the question, Mr. Stenographer?

4 (The question was read by the reporter.)

5 Mr. Murphy: I say: Those were your sentiments as on the
6 first of the year 1941?

7 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, will you turn to page 365?

9 At page 365 you make a statement to the effect that the
10 Germans were opposing the sending of Ambassador Nomura to
11 Washington and that they were trying to break diplomatic
12 relations with the United States. Was that your considered
13 judgment as of January 3, 1941?

14 Mr. Grew: That is true.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I direct your attention to page
16 366, to an editorial in the Kokuin. You refer there to a
17 Japanese editorial and a warning of war with America. Is that
18 the kind of editorials that were running in the papers in Japan
19 on January 7, 1941?

20 Mr. Grew: Mr. Congressman, yes, that is the sort of editor-
21 ial that was appearing at that time, but all sorts of editorials
22 were appearing. The Japanese press, I would say, was totally
23 irresponsible in its editorial statements and often in its
24 actual reports.

25 Mr. Murphy: Then, I direct your attention to page 366,

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

the luncheon at which you were present and at which Matsuoka practically threatened the United States with war, on January 18, 1941. Did that occur?

Mr. Grew: What is that?

Mr. Murphy: That is the first line of the second paragraph under your note of January 18.

The Chairman: He asked if that occurred.

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir, that did occur at that luncheon. I think it is rather important for the record that this whole passage should be read, that is, after I have looked into it.

The Chairman: Read it.

Mr. Murphy: Will you read the pertinent part that you think should go in the record?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

"January 18, 1941.

"At the Farewell Luncheon given by Matsuoka for Admiral Nomura today I was talking with them both and was expressing the hope that the Admiral would be able to exert his influence -- I didn't say where the influence was to be exerted -- to improve American-Japanese relations. Matsuoka remarked: 'They certainly couldn't be worse,' and turned away.

"At the luncheon also practically threatened the United States with war, and I immediately replied to the

Witness Grew.

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 following effect: 'The Minister too has lived long
2 enough in the United States to know that the American
3 people are fundamentally peace-minded and furthermore
4 that they stand for justice and equity. He also knows
5 that the American people are firmly determined on certain
6 matters among which, on the one hand, are their obligations
7 and, on the other hand, their rights. Their profoundest
8 wish is to see peace, prosperity, security, stability,
9 and happiness assured to all nations. In the present
10 state of world affairs we must inevitably realize that
11 what counts in international relationships today is the
12 concrete evidence of facts and actions, regardless of the
13 persuasive garb in which such facts and actions may be
14 dressed. Let us say of nations as of men: "by their
15 fruits ye shall know them"."

16
17 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, Mr. Ambassador, you were asked
18 about the Fleet being in the Pacific, and you stated certain
19 Japanese felt the Fleet should be taken entirely out of the
20 Pacific. I direct your attention to page 368 of your book,
21 to an editorial, or rather an item in the Korean-Japanese
22 language daily newspapers in which the following occurs:

23 "Should Japan make a proposal it would be for
24 instant withdrawal of the American Fleet from the
25 Pacific."

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Were editorials of that nature, or statements of that nature made in other papers in Japan?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir. That thought appeared from time to time in the Japanese press.

Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to page 378 of your book and I note that you record the fact, under your entry of April 10, 1941, that "Matsuoka went to Europe". Is that right?

Mr. Grew: That is correct.

END SHACK
LARRY
FWS

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

LaCharity
follows
Shack
:35 - (1)
AL-1

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Murphy: That, Mr. Chairman, is the reason for my asking for the exhibit from the Nuremburg trials, to follow up with the trip of Mr. Matsuoka at that time.

I direct your attention to page 390 of your book. There was some testimony given to the committee by Admiral Richardson to the effect that his impression was that the United States was bluffing. In connection with the word "bluffing" and the idea of "bluffing" I direct your attention to page 390 of your book where you make reference to the fact that the Japanese had tried to intimidate you.

Will you expand on that a little bit, please? I direct your attention to the middle of the page.

Mr. Grew: This statement, Congressman, as I remember it, was based on a long talk I had with Mr. Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister, at his own private house, walking up and down his garden, and just chatting about the things, and I say:

"The Minister thereupon makes perfectly clear his interpretation of the Tripartite Pact to the effect that if the United States should convoy its ships to England and if Germany should sink such ships, and if war with Germany should result, he, Mr. Matsuoka, would regard the United States as an aggressor in the sense of Article III of the Pact, and it is his belief that war would thereupon ensue between Japan and the United

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 States. He adds that this is only his own opinion and
2 that there would have to be a deliberation not only
3 among his colleagues in the Japanese Government but
4 with Japan's allies, in which deliberation Japan would
5 have but one out of three votes. (In this connection
6 it is interesting to note that when Germany attacked
7 Greece this spring, Mr. Matsuoka, according to the
8 Greek Minister here, informed Mr. Politis that Japan
9 herself would determine her obligation under the
10 Tripartite Pact, that her decision would be guided
11 by common sense, and that Mr. Matsuoka thought that
12 it was quite clear what the decision would be. Nothing
13 was then said of Japan having but one out of three votes.)"
14 I expressed my surprise at that statement.

15 I also noted in that entry on that particular day:

16 "Soon after Mr. Matsuoka took office he indicated
17 that his platform would be that the United States could
18 and should be intimidated into adopting an attitude of
19 complete isolation with regard to both the Far East and
20 Europe. That platform was implemented by the Three
21 Power Alliance, which action not only failed to have
22 the desired effect but was one of the major factors in
23 stimulating the trend of American opinion away from
24 isolationism. It would seem that, despite the egregious
25

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

failure of that attempt, Mr. Matsuoka would prefer to persist in a course fraught with the gravest dangers than to chart a new course which would constitute admission on his part that he had completely misread the character and temper of the American people, and which would inevitably make his position as Foreign Minister untenable."

Mr. Murphy: At any rate you did state in your entry on page 390 that:

"He at once expresses his astonishment that Mr. Hull had sent for Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and had told him that Mr. Matsuoka had sought to 'intimidate' me in our conversation on the 14th."

Mr. Grew: That is true.

Mr. Murphy: Finally I direct your attention to page 415 of your book. You were asked whether or not you knew of these Japanese intercepts. You were also asked the question, at least the question has been raised here, whether the Japanese knew of our messages. You make a statement on page 415 which would seem to indicate that the Japanese knew of some of our messages, except "one confidential code"; is that correct?

Mr. Grew: That is true. I can tell you how that came about. One of the high officials of the Japanese Government

Witness Grew

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Senator Brewster

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
: wanted to send a secret message to our Government which they
did not want the Japanese military to see and in passing this
message on they asked me to please put it in our most secret
code. I said of course I would do so. Then after a little
hemming-and-hawing this official said to me, "We understand
that you have one code which is unbreakable".

Mr. Murphy: I have no other questions.

The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Ambassador, in connection with the
basing of the Fleet at Hawaii, stationing it there, when did
you first have knowledge of that?

Mr. Grew: I beg your pardon, I didn't understand.

Senator Brewster: When did you first have knowledge of
the Fleet being retained at Honolulu?

Mr. Grew: Retained at Honolulu?

Senator Brewster: Retained, yes.

Mr. Grew: Well, I can't remember the precise date.

Senator Brewster: I inquire with particular relation to
whether or not you were advised in advance or whether you
learned of it after the event; that is what I am concerned with.

Mr. Grew: Frankly, Senator, I couldn't answer that
question without consulting the record. I have no recollection
of having been specifically advised of it.

Senator Brewster: Could you say whether or not you were

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 asked for an opinion or whether you were consulted in advance,
3 before that action was taken?

4 Mr. Grew: I have no recollection of that, Senator. I
5 would have to look at the record.

6 Senator Brewster: You have no recollection that you
7 were, but if you find that you were you will advise us?

8 Mr. Grew: Right.

9 Senator Brewster: So that if we have no further record
10 we will understand that you were not consulted before the event.

11 Mr. Grew: That is correct.

12 Senator Brewster: You understand that the Fleet went
13 out to Pearl Harbor for maneuvers in March or April 1940 and
14 subsequently on May 7 I believe the decision was notified to
15 Pearl Harbor that the Fleet would be retained there and so
16 far as the evidence now shows it remained there from then on
17 based at Pearl Harbor.

18 Mr. Grew: Yes.

19 Senator Brewster: You have just spoken about the code.
20 Did you ever have any reason to think that the Japs had
21 knowledge of our codes or were getting any of our messages?

22 Mr. Grew: Well, I think that, from that which the
23 official mentioned, to the effect that he understood that we
24 had one code that was unbreakable, I think that implied that
25 they were able to break our other codes, but I have no concrete

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

evidence on that, Senator.

Senator Brewster: Did you ever have reason to think that they knew we were breaking some or all of their codes?

Mr. Grew: I have no evidence to that effect, Senator.

Senator Brewster: Nothing ever came to your attention which would indicate that they even had a suspicion of that?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, did not.

Senator Brewster: Did you receive copies of any of these intercepts at any time, of the diplomatic communications?

Mr. Grew: No, sir, I received no copies of such intercepts.

Senator Brewster: Were you ever apprised of the information which they contained?

Mr. Grew: No, sir.

Senator Brewster: So you proceeded all through this period without whatever benefit there may have been to that knowledge in appraising the situation?

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: As one of, perhaps, more experience than any other single person in our country with the Japanese, their preparations and their psychology, would you give us your opinion as to whether there was any possibility that if the modus vivendi, which we have heard discussed, which was under consideration in the latter part of November, had been submitted to the Japanese instead of the message that was sub-

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

mitted, that it would have made any difference in the action of the Japanese at that time?

Mr. Grew: My impression is that it would have made no difference.

Senator Brewster: That they were determined on that course and that they, irrespective of our replies, short of a complete surrender to their message, would have continued on?

Mr. Grew: I feel that.

Senator Brewster: Was that because of their situation at the time in a military sense or did it rest on other factors?

Mr. Grew: It was based mainly on the fact that throughout those many years the military had been developing the program, gradually exerting control over all of East Asia, which they called their prosperity sphere, first economic control, to be followed by gradual political control, and every step taken by the Japanese military was to the way of implementing that program.

Senator Brewster: Now, there had gone on, for a considerable period, over some years, the policy of allowing Japanese to secure scrap iron and aviation gasoline from our country before their right in that respect finally terminated. To what extent, if you recall, were you consulted in connection with the various decisions to permit that traffic to go on?

Mr. Grew: I cannot recollect now whether that precise

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

question was asked me or not, but I frankly expressed my own opinion from time to time in my reports.

(3)

Senator Brewster: What were they?

Mr. Grew: Those opinions were rather concisely stated in the Army Report. Would you wish to have me rehearse that statement?

Senator Brewster: If you would, yes.

Mr. Grew: Shall I read it?

Senator Brewster: Whichever way you prefer.

Mr. Grew: " During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan -- and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults -- I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes.

"I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan into effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily downhill and it might, and probably would, end in war, and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan, I felt it would be very short-sighted to go into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats.

"We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abyssinian campaign.

"But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes into effect; and shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect.

"Our relations then started directly on a downhill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been three years earlier.

"It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions."

That, in general, expressed my views at that time, Senator. In other words, I didn't want to see us get into a

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

position with the Japanese where we might be obliged to step back in our tracks until we were ready to go ahead with whatever program we put into effect.

Of course, at the same time, especially after the autumn of 1940, when we realized that there was always the risk of conflict, I felt we couldn't afford to continue to give these materials to the Japanese, that might eventually be used against us.

Senator Brewster: So that you were of the opinion then, and events have seemed to justify it, that that did mean a very definite breach which might well eventually lead to war?

Mr. Grew: There was always that possibility. It was something to be taken into consideration.

Senator Brewster: The economic impact of the embargo upon Japan would tend to force them to some move in order to maintain their present economic position?

Mr. Grew: The longer those embargoes went on, of course, the more difficult their economic position became. They had very large stocks of those commodities themselves.

Senator Brewster: Of this scrap iron and gasoline?

Mr. Grew: Yes; very large stocks. So there was no telling at what point they would feel they must go down and get the oil by force. We couldn't possibly foresee that.

Senator Brewster: Now, we were in the same position --

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1
2 Mr. Grew: I would like to add, if I may, this statement.

3 Senator Brewster: Yes.

4 Mr. Grew: Whether in the meantime they would be able to
5 come to some kind of an agreement with the United States and
6 satisfy the Netherlands Indies by which they would be able to
7 have access to that oil without fighting.

8 Senator Brewster: The negotiations with the Dutch East
9 Indies went on following that time in their attempt to secure
10 access to those supplies?

11 Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.

12 Senator Brewster: So that in both the case of the embargoes
13 and the case of the Fleet at Hawaii, they constituted action
14 from which once taken we were compelled to follow through?
15 That is, we couldn't take then a backward step?

16 Mr. Grew: It was merely my personal view that it would
17 be a mistake to initiate that action and then have to withdraw
18 that action.

19 Senator Brewster: Both of those actions, the embargo
20 and the stationing of the Fleet at Hawaii, constituted a show
21 of firmness on the part of the United States in the situation,
22 did they not?

23 Mr. Grew: Yes; the policy which I had recommended.

24 Senator Brewster: In the case of the embargo, the embargo
25 was recommended by you?

Witness Grew

Questions by: Senator Brewster

Mr. Grew: Yes.

Senator Brewster: So far as you know the location of the Fleet was not a matter on which you recollect being consulted?

Mr. Grew: I do not.

(4) Senator Brewster: Subsequent to the stationing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor did you have occasion to express an opinion regarding its consequences or effects?

Mr. Grew: Senator, that is perfectly possible, but I made, of course, a great many reports to Washington during those years, and I can't for the moment recollect whether I actually touched on that point in some of my reports or not. I probably did. It would be rather difficult to put my hands on it.

Senator Brewster: Do you recall whether your opinion was ever asked regarding it?

Mr. Grew: I can't recall that particular point, no.

Senator Brewster: Would you examine the records and find out if you were and let us know subsequently, as it may be a matter that will be of considerable concern, as to any opinion which you did express as to the effect, as you were, naturally, the one on whom we would depend for an estimate of Japanese opinion.

Mr. Grew: Yes, sir.