

Doc. 3112 (1) To (H₂) Evid.

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(17)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3112-(1) to 3112-(4)

Date: 27 August 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: File of Reports on High Policy Conferences Titled, "SUPPLEMENT, JAPANESE-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS," Envelope marked "12."

Date: 2 July Original (X) Copy () Language: Japanese
to 13 Oct. 1941

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Japanese Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

TOYODA, Teijiro; AMAU, Eiji; HOTTA, Masaaki

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Japanese-American Negotiations; Imperial Conferences (GOZEN KAIGI); Relations with France, Netherlands, Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Following is a list of titles of general reports on Imperial Conferences on national policy and two memorandums outlining the opinions of the Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister on the stand Japan should take in the Japanese-American negotiations.

/A.N. Copies of rather detailed summaries of these documents have been supplied to Mr. Keenan, Mr. Tavenner, Mr. Maxon, Mr. Crowe, the Scanning Unit, Files - Room 361./

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Summary Cont'd.

Doc. 3112-(1) PRINCIPLE OF THE EMPIRE'S NATIONAL POLICIES
IN KEEPING WITH THE SHIFTING SITUATION; Meeting
in the Imperial Presence (GOZEN KAIGI),
July 2, 1941.

Doc. 3112-(2)a (State Secret)
OUR PROPOSAL OF SEPTEMBER 6; PRINCIPLES IN
EXECUTING THE EMPIRE'S NATIONAL POLICIES; Decided
at the Cabinet Meeting in the Imperial Presence
(GOZEN KAIGI), September 6, 1941.

Doc. 3112-(2)b DRAFT OF OUR SEPTEMBER 6th PROPOSAL; Mimeographed
Pamphlet.

Doc. 3112-(3) THE EMPIRE'S FOREIGN POLICIES IN COPING WITH THE
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; Mr. Amau's
Opinion, October 13, 1941.

Doc. 3112-(4) (Foreign Top Secret)
Supplement to the Japan-United States Negotiations,
THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEW REGARDING THE JAPAN-
UNITED STATES NEGOTIATIONS; October 13, 1941.

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SECRET

Transcript of the Foreign Minister's views concerning the Japanese-American negotiation as of about 23 May of this year. Had been delivered, but at the time it was not known where it belonged. However, this transcript was found so kindly file it.

Mr. NAKAMURA /signature: NAKAMURA/, please show this to Mr. HOTTA, Masaaki.

/TH: Above two paragraphs are marginal notes written in ink./

The Empire's Foreign Policy for Coping with the Present International Situation

ANAU's Opinion (13 October 1941)

1. The Empire's immutable national policy consists of the thorough execution of the Sino-Japanese Incident and firm establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Empire will reach a decision independently and she intends to carry this out independently. She will brook no interference by other powers. However, even if, disregarding the present complicated situation in international relations, the Empire attempted to accomplish this, it would be extremely difficult to count on success. There is an inseparable relationship between the European War and the development of the international situation accompanying it.

2. The present war first broke out between England and France, on one side, and Germany and Italy, on the other; then it spread to the Balkans, whereupon the Soviet Union became involved, and it seems that America, without declaring war, is actually exercising belligerent rights by giving out and out assistance to England.

At the time of concluding the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan, Germany and Italy endeavoured to win the Soviet Union over to their side. Now, however, the Soviet Union has gone over to the Anglo-American camp, thereby forming a coalition between England, America, the Soviet, and Chiang, and further strengthening the position of the encircling countries, England, America, the Netherlands, and Chiang, in the southern regions.

3. The focal point of the present war lies principally in the war between Russia and Germany. If Germany should fail, it would exert a truly fatal influence upon the morale of her people as well as in the occupied areas, and it would also be a death dealing blow to the Anglo-German

war. If Germany should succeed in capturing Moscow before winter, the Soviet Union would probably sue for a separate peace. Even if the negotiations for peace do not materialize, Germany could conquer Soviet Russia with her military power or could advance to Southern Russia or to the Near East. In any event, Soviet Russia will blockade the eastern regions and turn to the decisive war with England. However, judging from her present condition, England, supported by the United States, will continue a more stubborn resistance. Therefore, it will probably be a long war. Generally speaking, a protracted war will be disadvantageous to Germany and Italy. The prospects of the war cannot be predicted.

4. The successful settlement of the Sino-Japanese Incident and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere are mutually related. Although four years of holy war have already elapsed since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese Incident, and in spite of the various efforts made during this period, there is no immediate prospect of the collapse of the Chiang regime. Although the foundation of the Chungking Regime is shaking, it continues its resistance, relying on England and the United States. The Empire is now standing at a cross-road, whether to rely exclusively on the sweeping force of military might, or to cut off British and American aid through diplomacy. The establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere has become more and more difficult through the rupture of economic relations with Japan and pressure through encirclement by England, the United States, and the Netherlands. Therefore, the Empire is now compelled to consider the advantages and disadvantages of the use of arms in enforcing its policies.

If the Empire should start operations in the southern regions, she would at once clash with the English, American, and Dutch encirclement camp; the Soviet Union and the Chiang regime would act in conjunction with them, and the Empire would be forced to carry out operations on four fronts by herself. Even if Germany and Italy, in accordance with the operation of the Tri-Partite Pact, tried to assist the Empire, it would actually be extremely difficult under the present conditions. Moreover, even supposing that the Soviet Government would collapse, the advance into Russian territory in the Far East by the German and Italian armies would actually be difficult, and the German and Italian navies would not have enough reserve strength to assist the Imperial Navy. Although it would not be impossible for Germany in European Russia to restrain the Soviet Far Eastern Army from the rear, not much could be expected here either. We may say that German and Italian assistance would be chiefly spiritual. On the other hand, the United States would be able to assist the Soviet Union and to undertake operations against the Empire by taking advantage of Eastern Siberia. The Chiang regime in China would continue its resistance with added spirit and the attitude of the Wang Regime (National Govt.) also would be something which could not harbor designs (TN: Perhaps the author erred for "could not be predicted"/.

If Japan and America should fight, America would reduce her assistance to England in the Atlantic Area and concentrate her strength in the Pacific Area, thereby giving Germany the advantage in her attack on England. However, it would not be easy for Germany to conquer England. A fact which cannot be overlooked is that Japan's participation in the war might even increase the possibility of a separate peace between England and Germany. Moreover, America, while she would not precipitate a decisive struggle with the Empire, would launch upon long-term operations by strengthening the anti-Japanese encirclement camp. If, in the meantime, the European war should come to an end or England and Germany should come to terms, Japan would be placed in the awkward position of being forced to carry on a desperate struggle along. If the Empire were to start operations in the southern regions, the northern regions might become agitated; if she were to advance into the northern regions, the southern regions might become excited. The Empire must expect that in carrying out her policy by force she would meet with the above-mentioned most unfavorable situation.

Since all ranks in the Imperial Army and Navy have always been unequalled in loyalty and bravery and since the Imperial subjects also have ever been loyal, brave and ardently patriotic, they should be well able to endure a long-term war. However, the increasing efforts already extending over many years would occasionally make rest and recuperation necessary. Since in the near future the international situation is expected to change, thereby stirring the nation to still further exertion, one cannot help but state that now is the very time to devise long-range national policy.

5. There is a contention in some circles that the Empire, now under economic blockade by Britain and America, is cut off from her means of obtaining raw materials and is facing the gradual drain of her basic economic resources; that procrastination would result in the end, in an unavoidable miserable death; and that the Empire should seek salvation by taking a desperate step by waging war rather than simply awaiting death. However, since the North, by nature, is poor in natural resources, if an advance is made to the north, raw materials would be unobtainable. On the other hand, the South is abundant in resources, but if our military strength is used the equipments for the development of these abundant resources would be destroyed, and its recovery would require considerable time and effort. Moreover, great difficulties would be met in the utilization of these natural resources if development and transportation is considered, to say nothing of greatly weakening the national strength if the Empire should enter a protracted war in which natural resources cannot be replenished. At the time of the establishment of peace after the conclusion of the European War, it is feared that the Empire, because of her extreme exhaustion, would lose the power to speak in deciding international matters. At the present, the Empire is in a situation in which she has no import of raw materials and is only depleting her stocks. However, the fact cannot

be overlooked that the major powers are engaged either in a war or in a quasi-war and are depleting their strength at an accelerating rate. At this juncture, what is most important for the Empire is to do its utmost to preserve her national strength and to manifest this strength fully and most effectively in the event that an emergency should arise at a later date.

6. Under the above-mentioned situation, it is extremely dangerous for the Empire to deplete her national strength by venturing forth with her military force and to stake the fortune of her nation on the outcome of the European War. It is necessary for the Empire to be patient and develop first of all, her actual strength which is truly predominant in East Asia. At this juncture, it would be a wise policy for the Empire to strengthen the position of Manchuria by reaching a decision on China's recognition of Manchuria based on negotiations between Japan and the United States, to strengthen Japan's position in China by settling the Sino-Japanese Incident, and furthermore, to secure the basis for carrying out in the future, her southern policies by thrusting into French Indo-China with her superfluous force.

1 PS 3112 - (2) 6

Proposal of Japan dated Sept. 6

1. To the proposal of the US president dated July 24 and the offer of the US, the Imperial Government has already given an answer in full details. In addition to this, the Premier's message was given and it could be said that we have said all what we could. ^{Today,} At length we will frankly state the following points and will proceed to the following political disposition

(that means Communiqué)

1. Japan shall promise to accept the following items

A

Japan shall agree to the items which have been tentatively agreed by ~~America~~ the US and Japan ~~in~~ the America Japan preliminary informal conferences.

B Japan shall make no ~~adv~~ military advancement to the adjoining territories using the French Indo China as its base, nor shall make the similar advancement to the north without due reasons.

C The attitudes of the US and Japan towards the European War shall be measured according to the idea of defence and self protection. In case of the US entry to the European war ~~the~~ ^{Japan's} interpretation and the execution of the Tripartite Alliance

shall be independently carried out.

D. Japanese Empire shall endeavour for the complete recovery of the normal relations with China and in case of the realization of the same, she ~~will~~ is ready to withdraw her troops ^{from China} as soon as possible according to the Pact to be concluded between Japan and China.

E. The economic activities of the US in China shall have no restriction if they are carried on ~~the~~ fair basis.

F. Japan's activities in the south western Pacific territories shall be carried out in peaceful ways and according to the principle of non-discriminating treatment in the international commercial relations and shall

Cooperate in development and production
of the natural resources in these territories
which are needed by the U.S.

- 9 The Government of Japan shall
conceive the measures which are
necessary for the recovery of the
normal commercial relations between
Japan and the U.S and with respect
to the above the frozen act shall
be immediately abolished with
the mutual reciprocation as its
condition.
- 2 The U.S shall promise to accept
the following items .
- A. As the equivalence of what was
mentioned in D, the U.S shall have
no disposition or actions which
would give any interference

to the efforts of Japan in connection
with China

B The US shall reciprocate the
promise of ~~the~~ Japan ~~which is~~
mentioned in (F)

C The military despositions in the
Far East and the South western
Pacific area shall be stopped.

D The US shall reciprocate the
promise of Japan mentioned in (G)
and abolish the anti Japanese
freeze act and remove the
prohibition order for the Japanese
steamers to navigate Panama
Channel