

Ref Doc 1657

文書ノ出所竝ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分、林 馨 ハ 外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セ
ラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ 五 頁ヨリ成ル在独大島大使宛電報ト
題スル書類ハ日本政府(外務省)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ拔萃ノ
正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年 五月二十一日 於東京

林 馨 (Seal)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人

堀 部 晴 馬 (Seal)

昭和二十一年二月

外交資料

日米交渉記録ノ部

外務省編纂

(昭和十六年二月ヨリ十二月マデ)

日米交渉資料(一) 第二次近衛内閣時代

頁六三——六四

五月二十四日松岡大臣發在独大島大使宛電報

「リ」外相ニ於テハ日米諒解案ニ関スル通報ニ接シ意外ニ感シ本大臣先般渡歐ノ際右ニ付何等具體的ノ話ヲ為ササリシ故ヲ以テ不審ノ念ヲ抱キ居ル趣ノ處實ハ伯林滯在中日米問題ニ付テハ同外相トモ一般的意思見交換ヲ行ヒ居リ又三國條約ノ主要目的ハ米國ノ參戰防止ニ在リ之カ為メ適切ナル外交工作ヲ施スコトハ三國共通ノ利益トナルコト論ナキニ鑑ミ本大臣ハ往電申進メノ通り歸途莫斯科ニ於テ米國大使ヲシテ(一)參

戰セサルコト及ヒ (二) 蔣介石ニ和平ヲ勸告スルコトノ二點ニ付キ考慮ヲ促
スト同時ニ (三) 三國條約ニ微塵ノ影響者ト雖モ之ヲ及ホスカ如キコトハ一切
許ス能ハス、若シ米國ニシテ參戰セハ日本ハ直ニ參戰スヘシト迄言明シ
右本大臣ノ個人的「メツセーヂ」トシテ大統領ニ電報セシメタリ、然ルニ米
國政府ハ四月十六日日本大臣ハ歸朝ニ先立テ國交調整ニ關スル全般的
協定案ヲ提示越シタリ本大臣ハ歸京後初メテ之ヲ承知セル様ノ経緯
ニシテ從ツテ柏林ニ於テハ本件ニ付テ具體的協議ヲ行フ何等ノ基礎
ヲ有シ居ラサリシ次第ニテ此點ニ關シテハ獨側ニ對シ何等疚マシキ所
ナシ、尙上記三點ハ我方ニ於テハ現在將來共堅持スヘキニ付帝國政府
ノ關スル限リ「リ」外相ノ危懼スルカ如キ三國條約ノ弛緩ヲ致ス虞アル措
置ヲ取ル如キ懸念ハ毫末モク無之又米國側ニ於テモ其後本大臣ノ講
シタル處置及野村大使ノ「ハル」長官ニ對スル陳述等ニ依リ此點ハ更ニ明

カニシアリ

二、「ルーズヴェルト」ノ真意ハ蓋シ臆測ニ難カラス「リ」外相ノ觀察ニハ本大臣
モ概ネ同感ナルカ苟クモ相互ニ三國條約ヲ不動ノ國策トスル以上米國ノ
日独離間策ノ如キハ敢テ恐ルルニ足ラス尤モ英米ノ離間策ハ今後益々
熾烈トナルヘク、從ツテ此ノ際日独伊三國當局ハ愈々精神的結束ヲ強
固ニスル必要アリト存セラレ独伊カ本件ニ関シ些カニテモ我心事ヲ疑フカ
如キコトアラハ夫レ丈ケニテモ既ニ敵ノ術策ニ陷リタルニ等シト稱スヘク本大
臣トシテハ「ヒ」總統及「リ」外相カ此際一々本大臣ヲ信賴スル様要望
シテ已マサルモノナルカ此點ニ就テハ充分處置シアリ「リ」外相ヨリモ絶
對信賴ノ旨ヲ既ニ申越セリ

三、「リ」外相ハ我方カ独側意見到著ヲ待タス交渉ヲ開始セルニ對シ多大ノ
不滿ヲ有スル趣ナルカ當方ハ一週間ニ亘リ對米回答ヲ留保シ（結局米側

原案提示ノ時ヨリ四週間餘モ回答ヲ留保セリ誠意ヲ盡シタル次第ニ
テ當時ハ國內情勢ノミナラス米國國情甚夕切迫セルモノアリ此ノ上ハ
半日モ遷延シ難キ形勢トナリタル爲メ（八日ノ米政府閣議ニ於テハ「コ
ンヴグアイ」ノ方針決定セラレタルヤノ内報アリ、十四日ニハ大統領ノ聲明行
ハルル手筈トナリ居リタリ）我方トシテハ如何様ニモシテ米國ノ「コンヴグアイ」
實施ヲ阻止シ參戰ノ危險ヲ封シ度キ見地ヨリ遂ニ二十日米側ニ我提案
ヲ提示セルモノナリ、本大臣カ「或一派ニ引摺ラレバムナク同意セリ」ト云フカ
如キハ本大臣ノ眞意ヲ解セサルノ甚シキモノト云フ他ナク本件ハ前記ノ如
ク其ノ由來ニ於テ本大臣ノ時キタル種カ形ヲ変ヘテ結實セルモノニ過キス
唯本大臣ハ三國條約ニ飽迄忠實ナランカ爲ニ軍部（本件ハ貴電ニ所謂
現狀維持派ノ勢カトハ全然關係ナク寧ろ陸海軍カ最モ熱心ナリ）其他
カ頻リニ焦慮スルヲ抑ヘ幾多ノ困難ニ遭遇シツツモ一週間ニ亘リ回答

發出ヲ差控ヘタル次第ナリ、又我對案提示カ能ク心理的「モメント」ヲ擱シ居
タルコトハ「ルーズヴェルト」カ右ニ接シテ十四日ノ聲明ヲ二十七日ニ延期セル事實ニ
徴スルモ明カナリ、何レニセヨ本大臣ハ從來同様將來モ亦独伊トノ了解疏通
ニハ全カラ盡スヘキモ帝國ニハ又自ラ帝國独自ノ立場アリ政策ノ運用ニ付
テ迄モ独伊ノ意ヲ迎フル必要ハナキモト信シ居レリ
但シ三國條約ヨリ些カニテモ逸脱スルカ如キコトヲ考慮シ居ルモノハ我政府
部内ニ現ニ一名モナキニ付此點御安心アリタク又本件交渉方針ニ関シテ
ハ目下日独(伊)ノ意嚮ハ同様ニシテ其間何等ノ齟齬ナク又其後「オ
ット」トノ數次ノ懇談ニ依リ独逸側ノ懸念モ既ニ氷解シ居ルモノト信ス
ルモ以上ノ諸點貴大使ヨリモ「リ」外相ニ篤ト御説明相煩度シ

No 1

Ref Doc 1657

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分、林 毅香ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ五頁ヨリ成ル五月二十四日松岡大臣發在独大島大使宛電報ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(外務省)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ抜萃ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月二十一日

於東京

林 毅香 (林)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ為サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人

浦部勝馬 (浦部)

No 1

Ref Doc 1657

文書ノ出所並ニ成立ニ關スル證明書

(三號)

自分、林 毅 閣下ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處、茲ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ五頁ヨリ成ル五月二十四日松岡大臣發在松岡大使宛電報ト題スル書類ハ日本政府(外務省)ノ保管ニ係ル公文書ノ沿革ノ正確ニシテ眞實ナル寫シナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月二十一日 於東京

林 毅 (印)

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ為サレタリ

同日於同所

立會人 浦部 隆 (印)

Ref Doc 1657

No. 2

昭和二十一年二月

外交資料 日米交渉記録部 外務省編纂

(昭和十六年二月ヨリ十月マデ)

日米交渉資料(一)第二次近衛内閣時代頁三―益

五月二十四日松岡大臣發在独大島大使宛電報
 一、外相ニ於テハ日米諒解案ニ関スル通
 報ニ接シ意外ニ感シ本大臣先般渡歐際
 右ニ付何等具體的ノ話ヲ為ササリシ故ヲ以
 テ不審ノ念ヲ抱キ居ル趣ノ處實ハ伯林滯
 在中日米問題ニ付テハ同外相トモ一般の意
 見交換ヲ行ヒ居リ又三國條約ノ主要目
 的ハ米國ノ參戰防止ニ在リ之カ為メ適切
 ナル外交工作ヲ施スコトハ三國共通ノ利
 益トナルコト論ナキニ鑑ミ本大臣ハ往電申
 進メノ通り歸途莫斯科ニ於テ米國大使ヲ
 シテ(一)參戰セサルコト及ヒ(二)蔣介石ニ和平
 ヲ勸告スルコトノ二點ニ付キ考慮ヲ促スト同
 時(三)三國條約ニ微塵ノ影響ヲ雖モ之
 ヲ及ホスカ如キコトハ一切許ス能ハス若シ
 米國ニシテ參戰セハ日本ハ直ニ參戰スヘシ

ト迄言明シ右本大臣ノ個人的「マツセ」ト
 シテ大統領ニ電報セシメタリ。
 然ルニ米國政府ハ四月十六日日本大臣ハ歸朝
 ニ先立テ國交調整ニ關スル全般的協
 定案ヲ提示越シタリ本大臣ハ歸京後
 初メテ之ヲ承知セル様ノ経緯ニシテ
 從ツテ伯林ニ於テハ本件ニ付テ具
 体的協議ヲ行フ何等ノ基礎ヲ有
 シ居ラサリシ次第ニテ此點ニ關シ
 テハ独側ニ對シ何等疚マシキ所
 ナシ。尚上記三點ハ我方ニ於テハ
 現在將來共堅持スヘキニ付帝國
 政府ノ關スル限リテ外相ノ危懼
 スルカ如キ三國條約ノ弛緩ヲ致ス
 虞アル措置ヲ取ル如キ懸念ハ毫
 末モ無之又米國側ニ於テモ其後
 本大臣ノ講シタル處置及野村
 大使ノ「ハル」長官ニ對スル陳述
 等ニ依リ此點ハ更ニ明カニシアリ

(以下次頁)

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ト述言明シ右本大臣ノ個人的「ロメツセー」ダウト
 シテ大統領ニ電報セシメタリ
 然ルニ米國政府ハ四月十六日本大臣ハ歸朝
 ニ先立テ國大調教正ニ關スル全般的協
 定案ヲ提不起シタリ本大臣ハ歸京後
 初メテ之ヲ承知セル様ノ経緯等ニシテ
 從ツテ伯林ニ於テハ本件ニ付テ具
 体的協議ヲ行フ何等ノ基礎ヲ有
 シ居ラザリシ次第ニラ此點ニ關シ
 テハ俄側ニ對シ何等ノ疾マシキ所
 ナシ尙上記ニ點ハ敢テ於テハ
 現在將來共ニ持スルハキニ付帝國
 政府ノ関スル限リテ外相ノ責任
 スルカ如キ三國條約ノ他種ヲ致ス
 虞アル指置直ニ取ル如キ懸念ハ毫
 末モ無之又米國側ニ於テモ其後
 本大臣ノ歸朝シタル處置及野村
 大使ノ「ハル」長官ニ對スル陳述
 等ニ依リ此點ハ更ニ明カニシアリ

(以下省略)

ニ、ルースヴェルトノ真意ハ蓋シ臆測ニ難カラス。リ外
 相ノ觀察ニハ本大臣モ概不同感ナルカ苟クモ相互ニ三
 國條約ヲ不動ノ國策トスル以上米國ノ日獨離間策
 ノ如キハ敢テ恐ルルニ足ラス尤モ英米ノ離間策ハ今
 後益々熾烈トナルヘク、從ツテ此ノ際日獨伊三國當局
 ハ愈々精神的結束ヲ強固ニスル必要アリト存セラレ
 獨伊カ本件ニ関シ此ニカニテモ我心事ヲ疑フカ如キ
 フトアラハセ、總統及リ外相カ此際一々本大臣ヲ信
 頼スル様要望シテ已マサルモノナルカ此點ニ就テハ充
 分處置ニアリリ、外相ヨリモ絶對信賴ノ旨ヲ既ニ
 申越セリ
 三、リ外相ハ我方カ獨側意見到着ヲ待タス交渉ヲ開
 始セルニ對シ多大ノ不滿ヲ有スル趣ナルカ當方ハ一週
 間ニ亘リ對米回答ヲ留保シ(結局米側原案提示、
 時ヨリ四週間餘モ回答ヲ留保セリ)誠意ヲ盡シタ
 ル次第ニテ當時ハ國內情勢カ、ミナラス米國國情甚
 タ切迫セルモノアリ此ノ上半日モ遷延シ難キ形勢トナ
 リタル爲メ(八日ノ米政府閣議ニ於テハ「コンヴオイ」ノ方
 針決定セラレタルヤノ内報アリ、十四日ニハ大統領ノ聲
 明行ハルル手筈トナリ居リタリ)我方トシテハ如何様
 ニモシテ米國ノ「コンヴオイ」實施ヲ阻止シ參戰ノ危險
 ヲ封シ度キ見地ヨリ遂ニ二十二日米側ニ我提案ヲ提示セ
 ルモノナリ、本大臣カ「或一派ニ引摺ラレ己ムナク同意セリト

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ニ「ルースヴェルト」ノ英意ハ蓋シ臆測ニ難カラス「リ」外
相ノ觀察ニハ本大臣モ概不同感ナルカ苟クモ相互ニ三
國條約ヲ不動ノ國策トスル以上米國ノ日獨離間策
ノ如キハ敢テ恐ルルニ足ラス尤モ英米ノ離間策ハ今
後益々熾烈トナルヘス從ソテ此ノ際日獨伊三國當局
ハ愈々精神的結束ヲ強固ニスル必要アリト存セラレ
獨伊カ本件ニ關シ此ニカニテ我ハ事ヲ疑フカ如キ
「~~トアラハヒ~~」總統入り「リ」外相カ此際一々本大臣ヲ信
賴スル様要望シテ己マサルモノナルカ此點ニ就テハ充
分處置シ「リ」外相ヨリモ絶對信賴ノ旨ヲ既ニ
申越セリ

三「リ」外相ハ我方カ獨側ノ意見到着ヲ待タス交渉ヲ開
始セルニ對シ多大ノ不滿ヲ有スル趣ナルカ當方ハ一週
間ニ亘リ對米回答ヲ留保シ（結局米側原案提示
時ヨリ四週間餘モ回答ヲ留保セリ）誠意ヲ盡シタ
ル次第ニテ當時ハ國內情勢カ「リ」ラス米國團情甚
ク切迫セルモノアリ此ノ上ハ半日モ遷延シ難キ形勢トナ
リタル爲メ（八日、米政府閣議ニ於テハ「~~リ~~」方
針決定セララルヤノ内報アリ、十四日ハ大統領ノ聲
明行ハル手續ヲ「リ」居リタリ）我方トシテハ如何様
ニモシテ米國ノ「~~リ~~」ソングワイニ實施ヲ阻止シ參戰ノ危險
ヲ封シ度キ見地ヨリ遂ニ十二日米側ニ我提案ヲ提示セ
ルモノナリ、本大臣カ「~~リ~~」一派ニ引摺ラレ己ムナク同意セリト

No. 5

Ref Doc 1657

云フカ如キハ本大臣ノ真意ヲ解セサルノ甚シキモノト云
フ他ナク本件ハ前記ノ如ク其ノ由来ニ於テ本大臣ノ時
キタル種カ形ヲ変ヘテ結實セルモノニ過キヌ唯本大臣ハ
三國條約ニ飽迄忠實チランカ爲ニ軍部(本件ハ貴
電ニ所謂現状維持派ノ勢力トハ全然關係ナク寧テ口
陸海軍カ最モ熱心ナリ)其他カ頻リニ焦慮スルヲ抑(幾
多ノ困難ニ遭遇シツツモ一週間ニ亘リ回答發出ラ差
控ヘタル次第ナリ)又我對案提示カ能ク心理的「モメント」
ヲ擱ミ居タルコトハ「ルーズヴェルト」カ右ニ接シテ十四日ノ聲
明ヲ二十七日ニ延期セル事實ニ徴スルモ明カナリ、何レニ
セヨ本大臣ハ從來同様將來モ亦獨伊トノ了解疏通
ニハ金カヲ盡スヘキモ帝國ニハ又自ラ帝國獨自ノ立場
アリ政策ノ運用ニ付テ迄モ獨伊ノ意ヲ迎フル必要ハナキ
モノト信シ居レリ。但シ三國條約ヨリ此ニカニテモ逸脱スル
カ如キコトヲ考慮シ居ルモ、ハ我政府部内ニハ現ニ名モナキ
ニ付此點御安心アリタク又本件交渉方針ニ関シテハ目下
日獨(伊)ノ意嚮ハ同様ニシテ其間何等ノ齟齬ナク又
其後「オット」トノ數次ノ懇談ニ依リ獨逸側ノ懸念モ
既ニ氷解シ居ルモノト信スルモ以上ノ諸點貴大使ヨ
リモ「外相ニ篤ト御説明相煩度シ

Telegram from Foreign Minister Matsuzaka to Ambassador Oshima
in Germany, dated 24 May 1941.

1. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, according to your report, ~~was~~
surprised by the communication ^{of} ~~concerning~~ the draft of the
Japanese-American understanding, and ~~is~~ ^{was} suspicious because
I made no concrete ^{reference} ~~talks~~ during my recent visit to Europe
~~concerning~~ ^{to} this matter. Actually I had a general exchange
of opinion on the Japanese-American question with him during
my stay in Berlin, ~~and it is naturally a matter of common~~
~~advantage to the three powers,~~ As the main aim of the
Tripartite Pact is to prevent the American participation in the war
it will naturally suit the common interests of the three powers to
^{appropriate} take diplomatic measures for that purpose. Therefore, I told
on my way home in Moscow, as I communicated to you by the
previous telegram, ~~to the American Ambassador~~ to consider, (1)
that the USA will not participate in the war, and (2) that the
USA will recommend peace to Chang Kai-shek; moreover I
declared to him, that (3) Japan cannot tolerate anything
which affects the Tripartite Pact even in the slightest degree,
and will go to war immediately if America ^{enters} ~~participates~~ in the
war. I had him to send these points as a personal #2

message of mine by telegram to the President. The US government
(on 16 April, prior to my return home,
proposed a draft of general agreement concerning the regulation
of Japanese-American relations, ^{which came to my knowledge} and I learned it for the first
time after my arrival in Tokyo. Therefore I had in Berlin no
basis for a concrete discussion concerning this matter, and I
have no bad conscious towards Germany. Besides, above-mentioned

Three points will be kept firmly by us, now as well as in
the future, and as far as the Japanese Government is concerned
there is no need for ^{anxiety} ~~fear~~ as expressed by Ribbentrop that
it might take measures ^{to} ~~which~~ weaken the Tripartite Pact.

We made this point also clear to the USA by measures taken
by me, ^{by} Ambassador Nomura's statement to Secretary of State
Hull etc..

2. Roosevelt's real intention is not difficult to surmise. I
almost agree to the observations of Ribbentrop, but I think
there is no need to be afraid of intrigues to separate
Japan and Germany, so long as the both countries ^{consider} ~~note~~
^{each other} the Tripartite Pact ^{as} ~~to~~ the firmly established national policy.
Of course such intrigues of England and America will
be intensified in the future, and the three countries ^{of} ~~pan~~.

Germany and Italy must, ^{increasingly} strengthen their moral ^{tie} unity.
Should Germany and Italy have any doubt as to our intentions
even in the slightest degree concerning this matter, it would
mean that they fell victim to the intrigues of our opponents.
I therefore sincerely hope that Hitler and Ribbentrop trust
me wholeheartedly now. I already took appropriate steps,
and Ribbentrop sent a message that he trusts me fully.

3. You reported that Ribbentrop ^{was} ~~is~~ very unsatisfied because
we opened the negotiation without waiting for the arrival of
German opinion. However, we showed our utmost sincerity
in withholding our answer ~~to~~ to the USA for a week (we
withheld the answer after all, ^{more than} four weeks since the American
proposal of the original draft); moreover, not only
the ^{Japanese} ~~internal~~ situation but also the American internal
situation at that time was so strained that no more
delay of even half a day could be tolerated (we had
a confidential information that the US cabinet meeting of the 8th
decided upon the policy of convoy, and a statement of the
President was ^{forthcoming} ~~going to be issued~~ on the 14th), and it

~~presented~~^{sent} at last our counter-proposal on the 12th to
the USA, in order to prevent at any cost the carrying
out of American convoy and to forestall the danger
of war-participation. When Ribbentrop said that "I
was compelled to agree by a certain faction," he entirely
misunderstood my real intention, this matter being historical
only the fruit, ^{in a different form} from seeds I had sown. In order to
be loyal to the Tripartite Pact, I suppressed the desire
of the military etc. to hasten the matter (this matter
has no connection with the influence of "status-quo party"
mentioned in your telegram, army and navy being most
eager), and overcoming much difficulties I withhold
the dispatch of our answer for a week. Also, that our
counter-proposal ^{(was psychologically very well timed} grasped well ~~the psychological moment~~
can be seen from the fact that Roosevelt, upon receiving
it, postponed his statement from the 14th to the 27th.
At any rate, I will do my utmost in the future as
in the past to keep understanding with Germany and
Italy; however Japan has her own standpoint, and

I don't think it necessary to meet the intention of Germany and Italy even in the matter concerning the execution of policy.

However, you can be assured that there is no one in our Government who considers to ^{deviate from} ~~go beyond~~ the Tripartite Pact even in the slightest degree, and I think that the policy of Japan and Germany (and Italy) concerning this negotiation is the same, ^{and there is} ~~containing~~ no discrepancy between them ^{thereafter}. I believe that German suspicion has been removed completely by the intimate talks I had with Ambassador Ott for several times; yet I ask you to explain to Ribbentrop the above-mentioned points very thoroughly.