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MISSION #44 Rangoon FESTOONERY 3  
17 March 1945

2-5239-73

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Authority *NDG/063*  
By *WNAKA* Date *2/5/05*



9 April 1945

ERRATA - Tactical Mission Report No. 44.

Title page to Annex C "Enemy Air Opposition" states ".....no enemy aircraft were sighted....." Actually 12 fighters were sighted, but none entered within combat range.

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. P & A	
Deputy C. of S. T.M.&E.	<i>Q</i>
A. G.	

9 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 22 March 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

1. Enclosed for your information and files is the Tactical Mission Report of the B-29 attack on 22 March 1945 against Japanese installations in the Rangoon area, two Groups attacking Supply Dump Areas "C" and "E", and two Groups attacking the Mingaladon Cantonment Area.

2. Request accomplishment of the original of the attached receipt and return to this Headquarters.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

*Leo I. Herman*

LEO I. HERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Acting Adjutant General

1 Incl:  
Incl 1 - Tactical Mission Rpt.  
No. 45, dtd 8 Apr 45.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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Authority *NND 760063*  
By *M/NARA* Date *2/5/05*

STATION - National Marine Service, Inc.  
157-1000  
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1546  
HEADQUARTERS  
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
ADJUTANT GENERAL  
IN IN  
APR 17 25

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# XX BOMBER COMMAND



## Tactical Mission Report

No. 44

DATE 17 MARCH 1945


GENERAL OF THE ARMY H.H. ARNOLD

COPY No. 1

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*2-5239-72*

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 6063*  
By *M* NARA Date *2/5/05*



2-5-239-73

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Authority: 11/17/06/03  
By: WNAKA Date: 2/5/05



C O N F I D E N T I A L

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

TACTICAL MISSION  
REPORT

Field Orders No. 44

Mission No. 44

TARGET: DUMP "B", RANGOON AREA,  
BURMA

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Prepared by:

Intelligence Section

XX Bomber Command

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB and C  
APO 493

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 17 March 1945.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington, 25, D.C.

1. UNITS PARTICIPATING: Four Bombardment Groups of the XX Bomber Command were directed by Field Orders Number 44 to participate in a daylight attack against supply and storage facilities in the Rangoon, Burma, Area. A force composed of 78 aircraft, two Groups supplying 15 aircraft each, and the remaining two Groups supplying 24 aircraft each, was to take part. Groups, their locations, and their Commanding Officers were as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Base</u>	<u>Commanding Officer</u>
40th	Chakulia	Colonel W.K. Skaer
44th	Dudhkundi	Colonel A.L. Harvey
462nd	Piardoba	Colonel A.F. Kalberer
468th	Kharagpur	Colonel J.V. Edmundson

2. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Attack No. 44.

b. Target Specified:

(1) Primary Target: Rangoon Dump Area "B" at 16°51'30"N -- 96°08'00"E (AAF Target No. 82.2-N)

3. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Importance of Target:

The influx of Japanese supplies into Burma has been reduced to a relatively small flow due to continuous attacks on Japanese shipping and on the Burma - Thailand Railroad. For this reason, the accumulated stores now in Burma are of utmost importance to the enemy as the chief means of sustaining his resistance. Approximately 75 per cent of the military supplies stored in Burma are located in the Rangoon area, and nearly 50 per cent are contained in Dumps "A", "B", and "F". Dump "F" has already been attacked and severely damaged. The loss of Dump "B", with its stores of gasoline and ammunition, would definitely speed up the progress of Allied Troops on the road from Mandalay to Rangoon.

b. Details of Planning:

(1) Operational Planning:

(a) A high altitude practice bombing mission was planned for the purpose of familiarizing combat crews with operations at high altitude, since this may be necessary in the future. The target for the mission was supply dump "B", near Rangoon, Burma. Bombing altitudes of the different Groups were 27,000, 28,000, 29,000, and 30,000 feet, with 78

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airplanes to be employed. No damage to our aircraft was anticipated from anti-aircraft fire at this altitude. Although approximately six 120mm anti-aircraft guns are located near Rangoon. The bombing run was so planned that these guns should be ineffective. Another part of the training was to be the overwater assembly point at an altitude of 25,000 feet. The 444th and 468th Bombardment Groups were to mark their assembly points with six 100 pound M-47 A-2 (W.P. filled) bombs, clustered with special adapters and fused to burst at one second intervals beginning with 9 seconds delay. The 40th and 462nd Bombardment Groups were to mark their assembly points with the same type bombs and special adapters each fused to burst at 9 seconds delay. Since the 444th and 468th Bombardment Groups used bombs with the one second delay between bursts giving a stringing out effect, it enabled the aircraft to identify their respective Group assembly points. Lead aircraft dropped (W.P. filled) white phosphorous grenades while circling Group assembly points. Because of the coordinated attack with the Strategic Air Force and other units of the Eastern Air Command, a Wing assembly point at Diamond Island was used in order to control more closely the time over the target.

(b) Eastern Air Command was designated to mark the target area aiming point from low level, at target time minus five minutes, using a special red (TI) target identification flare which burns for a period of 7 minutes. This particular British flare bursts in the air and burns with an intense red color. It was extremely important that the first bombing formation should not arrive over the target before target time, but that it should arrive within 7 minutes after the target had been marked. Another point of interest on this particular mission was that the Strategic Air Force was to attack dump "A", located four miles from dump "B", at the same time and their aiming point was to be marked using green flares. The aiming point for each of these targets was the center of each supply dump.

(c) Visibility at 30,000 feet is such that identification of this type target is difficult. The proximity of dump "B" to dump "A" and the fact that other aircraft would be bombing at 14,000 feet required positive identification of the aiming point.

(d) Aircraft marking our aiming point were to broadcast on channel "C" VHF to the lead airplane and number 3 aircraft in each formation, stating in the message the accuracy with which the aiming point was marked. Our aircraft were to acknowledge the message and re-broadcast it to the other aircraft in their formation. This would not interfere with our communication within the formation as it would if all aircraft were standing by on channel "C".

(e) It was originally planned to strike the target at 1000 local target time, but time over the target was changed to 1330 hours so that marking aircraft and the Strategic Air Force aircraft might not be delayed in case of early morning ground fog on their respective fields.

(f) Since this was to be a coordinated attack, Group Commanders were authorized to vary their bombing altitude, lower in case a cloud deck was at the assigned altitude which might prevent their bombing visually.

(2) Determination of Bomb Load and Bombing Data:

(a) The Field Orders specified that 78 aircraft would participate in the attack on dump "B". The Groups were to provide the following number of aircraft: 40th Group - 15, 444th Group - 24, 462nd Group - 15, and 468th Group - 24. All bombs were to be released electrically in train with the intervalometer set at a 50 foot interval. The method of bombing was to be one 9 plane V of Vee formation and one 6 plane javelin

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down formation for the 40th and 462nd Groups and two standard 12-plane formations for the 444th and 468th Groups.

(b) The axis of attack was 69° magnetic. Each Group was to bomb at the following true altitudes: 40th - 28,000 feet, 444th - 29,000 feet, 462nd - 30,000 feet, and 468th - 27,000 feet. The Groups were instructed that under no condition would formations bomb the primary target prior to the specified time over the target. The prescribed time over the target was as follows for each Group: 40th - 0502Z, 444th - 0504Z, 462nd - 0506Z, 468th - 0500Z. In this manner an attempt was made to control the time of successive attacks and thus insure better aiming point identification.

(c) The assigned visual aiming point for each of the 4 Groups was the center of the roughly square 6,000 feet x 6,000 feet area contained within dump "B". Within this area, scattered military supplies varied in size from motor pools to gasoline and ammunition dumps. It was decided that the best way to knock out such a target was by a concentration of incendiary and fragmentation bombs within the general area. The bombs selected were the M-18 incendiary bomb fused for cluster opening at 5,000 feet, and the M-81 260 pound fragmentation bomb fused instantaneous.

(d) The bomb load for each aircraft in the attacking force was specified as a maximum possible load of M-81 260 pound fragmentation bombs, loaded 2 per station using M-12 adapters, fused instantaneous, for the 40th and 468th Groups, and a maximum possible load of M-18 incendiary bombs fused to separate at 5,000 feet for the 444th and 462nd Groups.

4. EXECUTION OF THE MISSION (See Annex A):

a. Take-off:

(1) Times of take-off were not specified in the Field Orders, but were left to the discretion of the Group Commanders. A definite time over the target for each Group was specified, with each Group attacking at two minute intervals.

(2) Take-off was accomplished as follows:

<u>Group</u>	<u>A/C Scheduled for Take - off</u>	<u>A/C Airborne</u>	<u>First A/C Off</u>	<u>Last A/C Off</u>
40th	15	15	170200Z	170221Z
444th	24	23	170153Z	170229Z
462nd	15	15	170155Z	170209Z
468th	24	24	170142Z	170226Z

(3) Visibility at bases on take-off was from 3 to 8 miles. Wind was calm to light variable at Chakulia; at Dudkundi was SE at 7 mph; at Piardoba was SE at 3 mph; at Kharagpur was SSW at 10 mph.

b. Route Out:

(1) The route out was from base to individual Group Assembly points to a common Wing Assembly point at Diamond Island to the Initial Point, which was the Northern tip of an unnamed island at 16°15'N - 94°39'E to the target.

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(2) There were 7 deviations from the planned route to the primary target. Of these, 2 aircraft bombed targets of opportunity and 5 aircraft jettisoned their bombs.

c. Primary Target:

(1) Of the 77 aircraft airborne, 70 were over the primary target with their bomb loads and all are credited with bombing. A total of 1393 M-18 incendiary bombs and 1917 M-81 260 pound fragmentation bombs (491.14 short tons) were dropped on this target. The first formation was over the target at 0457Z and was composed of 10 aircraft. It was followed by 14 formations of from 2 to 13 aircraft, and 5 aircraft which bombed singly. The last formation over the target bombed at 0538Z.

(2) Bombing altitudes ranged from 27,000 feet (pressure altitude) to 30,000 feet for the lead aircraft of each formation. Headings varied from 44° to 260° magnetic.

(3) Cloud cover over the target consisted of 3/10 cirrus at 30,000 feet. One formation which was late found the coverage built up to 7/10. There was also 3/10 fair weather cumulus encountered, with base at 4,000 feet and tops at 8,000 feet.

d. Targets of Opportunity:

(1) Sagyi Airfield, Sagyi, Burma: Aircraft 424 bombed this target at 0455Z from 16,300 feet. Bombing was visual, and a total of 56 M-81 260 pound fragmentation bombs were dropped.

(2) Warehouses at Bassein, Burma: Aircraft 202 bombed this target at 0459Z from 29,200 feet. Bombing was visual, and a total of 40 M-18 incendiary bombs were dropped.

e. Route Back:

(1) The return route was from the target area direct to home bases.

(2) Few small cumulus covered two bases, with visibility to 7 miles. Wind was calm at one base and NNE, 8 mph at another. At the remaining two bases, weather was clear with unlimited visibility. Wind was NW, 9 mph at one base and calm at the other.

5. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT (See Annex B):

a. Nil (6%) to meager (74%) to moderate (20%) and inaccurate (86%) to accurate (14%) black heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered over the target area from 0457Z to 0539Z at altitudes of 28,000 to 31,950 feet true through CAVU to 7/10 undercast conditions. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude, and fire was either continuously pointed or predicted concentration, possibly both.

b. No B-29 was lost due to enemy antiaircraft and only 2 aircraft (2.5%) sustained minor flak damage.

c. There were no smokescreens, balloons, or ground-to-air rockets reported. As aircraft were tracked by early warning radars in the Rangoon Area (as determined by RCM observers), it is reasonable to assume that the enemy had 30 minutes prior warning of the attack.

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6. ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION (See Annex C):

a. None.

7. WEATHER (See Annex D):

a. At one base low visibilities and ceilings increased the take-off interval from one to one and one-half minutes. Otherwise, weather was essentially as forecast, excellent for formation flying and precision bombing.

b. Metro winds were generally rated as good to excellent.

8. COMMUNICATIONS (See Annex E):

a. Bombs away messages were received from 20 of the 72 aircraft bombing, and accounted for all of the aircraft. Position reports at 400 miles from base also accounted for all aircraft. In addition, 4 abort messages were received. No attack messages were transmitted, as aircraft were not intercepted, and no distress traffic involving distressed aircraft on this mission was logged.

b. Frequencies remained in use for approximately eight hours. Static level was the lowest encountered in some months. Signal strength was excellent. No attempts at jamming or deception on the part of the enemy was reported.

c. Radio beacons were utilized by 51 aircraft while no requests for D/F facilities were made on this mission.

d. A total of 7 equipment malfunctions was reported.

9. RADAR (See Annex F):

a. The target for this mission was definitely a visual target. Radar operators did provide considerable assistance in establishing the course to the target as well as identifying the target area.

b. An additional bombing procedure was used by one Group on this and a previous mission and reported it quite an aid to more accurate bombing.

c. Radar photographic coverage was secured of the area on route and also of the target on past missions; therefore photographs were taken only of the bombing runs.

d. Pressurization failures were the principal malfunctions of the radar systems.

10. RCM (See Annex G):

a. Six RCM search aircraft, each with one RCM observer, participated in this mission. The RCM Observer searched for early warning radar en route to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area. In addition, one communication search aircraft with a Nisei radio observer monitored the 1.5-10 mc. band for possible radio fighter control nets.

b. The 80 mc. and the 101mc. radar sites guarding the Rangoon area were in operation and undoubtedly warned the enemy of the impending attack.

c. Several radar intercepts with fire control characteristics were made in the target area. These radar sites were probably used to obtain

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fire control data. However, the inaccuracy of the flak does not substantiate this.

d. There were numerous signals of the mark Model 2 type also made in the target area, but due to inconclusive intercept data, these intercepts were classed as suspected pending further verification.

e. No radio intercepts were made in the 1.5-10 mc. band.

11. CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY (See Annex H);

a. The mission was accomplished without special incident in regard to gunnery. No enemy opposition was encountered and only 12 enemy aircraft were seen at a distance. No claims by gunners were made against enemy aircraft and there were no losses to enemy fighters.

b. There were no malfunctions of CSFC equipment, and the total number of rounds fired was 6,137, all of which were used in test firing.

12. CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS (See Annex I);

a. Seventy-two cameras of the K-18, K-20 and K-22 types were carried in aircraft airborne on the mission, and a total of 423 usable negatives were obtained. Five cameras failed to photograph for mechanical reasons and 16 for other reasons.

13. LOSSES AND DAMAGE (See Annexes J and M);

a. There were no losses on this mission and only 2 aircraft suffered minor damage from antiaircraft fire.

14. FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT (See Annexes K and M);

a. Of the 77 aircraft airborne, 6 failed to reach the target for mechanical reasons, and 1 because of personnel error.

b. There were 55 additional mechanical malfunctions, none of which prevented aircraft from bombing the primary target. For details, see Talbe XI, Part II, of Annex M.

c. Over-all averages in fuel consumption were; average - 3820 gallons; maximum - 4330 gallons, minimum - 3375 gallons. Averages by Groups were: 40th - 3830 gallons (maximum - 4275, minimum 3490); 444th - 3760 gallons (maximum - 4330, minimum - 3375); 462nd - 3926 gallons (maximum - 4200, minimum - 3650); 468th - 3780 gallons (maximum - 4100, minimum - 3425).

15. TARGET DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (See Annex L);

a. Assessment of damage was made from good quality post-strike photographs obtained on 18 March 1945.

b. The main weight of the attack was well concentrated in the central and northern area of the target resulting in the destruction of the majority of the storage units. At least 173 miscellaneous hutments were destroyed and many were undoubtedly damaged. Interpretation was rendered difficult by the small scale of the photographs, the dense foliage obscuring many of the buildings, and the type of bombs used. Since the majority of the fragmentation bombs fell in the target area it is reasonable to assume damage to many buildings even though the damage is not readily apparent on

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the photographs.

c. Damage outside the target area included the destruction of approximately 30 native type hutments immediately adjoining the target on the east and approximately 10 business/residential buildings just south of the Okllyn R.R. station. Although several fires were observed burning in Dump "F" during the attack no damage was identified.

*R.M. Ramey*  
R.M. RAMEY,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Deputy Commander.

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By *M* NARA Date *2/5/05*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

A

EXECUTION OF THE MISSION

- I - Information on Take-offs
- II - Details of Routes
- III - Track and Vertical Flight Path \*
- IV - Bombing Data \*\*
- V - Bomb Loading
- VI - Disposition of Bombs
- VII - Formations Flown
- VIII - Navigation Report \*

\* Prepared by Staff Navigator

\*\* Prepared by Staff Bombardier

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I - INFORMATION ON TAKE-OFFS

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

Group	First A/C Off	Last A/C Off	Elapsed Time	No. A/C Taking Off	Average Take-off Interval
40th	170200Z	170221Z	21 min.	15	90 sec.
444th	170153Z	170229Z	36 min.	23	98 sec.
462nd	170155Z	170209Z	14 min.	15	60 sec.
468th	170142Z	170226Z	44 min.	24	115 sec.
Over-all	170142Z	170229Z	47 min.	77	

II - DETAILS OF ROUTES

A. Routes Planned

Base	40th	444th	462nd	468th
	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur
Group Assembly Point	18°15'N - 92°00'E	18°15'N - 92°45'E	18°50'N - 92°50'E	19°00'N - 92°00'E
Wing Assembly Point	Diamond Island (15°52'N - 94°17'E)			
Initial Point	North tip of unnamed island (16°15'N - 94°39'E)			
Target	Rangoon Dump Area "B" (16°51'30"N - 96°08'00"E)			
Base	Chakulia	Dudhkundi	Piardoba	Kharagpur

B. Deviations from Planned Routes

1. Aircraft Bombing Assigned Targets:

None.

2. Aircraft Bombing Targets of Opportunity:

- a. A/C 202 (444th Group) flew the briefed flight line to the initial point (northern tip of unnamed island in mouth of Bassein River) and due to blowing of astrodome blister and the loss of two parachutes, flew directly to Bassein, altitude 29,000 feet, and at 0500Z, bombed the warehouses north of the city.
- b. A/C 424 (468th Group) flew as briefed to Group Assembly point where it was forced to feather #2 propellor due to a broken oil line. A/C 424 then flew to 19°05'N - 95°10'E, bombing installations at Sagyi Airfield at 15,500 feet. From this point flight was direct to base.

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3. Aircraft Jettisoning Bombs:


- a. A/C 659 (40th Group) due to mechanical difficulties with #3 engine was forced to jettison entire bomb load at 18°50'N - 91°15'E, at 0400Z, and return to base.
- b. A/C 739 (40th Group) due to mechanical difficulties was forced to jettison entire load at 17°10'N - 92°51'E, at 0433Z, and return to base.
- c. A/C 873 (444th Group) jettisoned entire load when #4 propellor ran away.
- d. A/C 252 (462nd Group) jettisoned its bombs at 20°27'N - 90°44'E due to an oil leak in #1 engine and returned directly to base.
- e. A/C 719 (468th Group) flew on course to 21°44'N - 88°02'E where bombs were jettisoned and returned directly to base.

4. Aircraft Landing at Other Than Home Base:

None.

A-II-2

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF BOMBING OFFICER

Date Prepared: 20 March 1945

Field Order Number 44  
Date of Mission: 17 Mar '45

1. Weather at the target was 3/10 to 6/10 low strata clouds resulting in several formations picking up the target rather late.
2. All formations bombed visually and on approximately the briefed axis of attack with the exception of one that made a dry run because the bombardier did not identify the A.P. in time. This formation made a second run on a reciprocal heading.
3. One possible source of errors in bombing was not having a pinpoint upon which to place the crosshairs. All bombs, however fell within the limits of the target area except those from one three (3) plane formation which dropped short.
4. Reported malfunctions of bombing equipment:
  - a. 468th Group:
    - (1) #660 - Rear bomb bay doors would not close for approximately twenty minutes after bombs away because of low pressure.  
Cause: Unknown.
    - (2) #701 - Rear bomb bay doors would not close after bombs away until pressure had built up.  
Cause: Unknown.
    - (3) #663 - One bomb hung up but was finally released after hitting salvo switch several times.  
Cause: Adapter believed to have jammed release.
  - b. 40th Group:
    - (1) #914 - The number one station on the forward rack of the front bomb-bay failed to release. The bomb from the second station fell on top of it and knocked it out.  
Cause: Adapter believed to have jammed release.
    - (2) #908 - Fourteen bombs hung up on the left side of the rear bomb bay. The rear doors failed to open electrically and the emergency handle was used to open them.  
Cause: The circuit failed to close the solenoid to open the doors fully; therefore the limit switches were not energized to allow current to pass through the 4-4 releases. Equipment failure.
    - (3) #580 - When the bomb bay doors opened the strain broke the anchor bolt mounting which in turn severed the air hose and released the pressure. Three bombs were prevented from releasing because there was not enough pressure to hold the doors open against the limit switches. These bombs dropped when the slip stream finally forced the doors open far enough.  
Cause: Equipment failure.
  - c. 462nd Group:
    - (1) #459 - Bombs failed to drop electrically from front bomb bay.  
Cause: Plane ground checked all right. No explanation.

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(2) #174 - Four (4) bombs failed to release electrically in rear bay.  
Cause: Bad release. Equipment failure.

d. 444th Group:

(1) None

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

V - BOMB LOADING

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

Load per A/C and* Type Bomb	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total			Load per A/C (pounds)
	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-18	A/C	M-18	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-18	M-81	
56 M-81	12	728					22	1232	35		1960	14,240.8
54 M-81	2	108					2	108	4		216	13,732.2
40 M-18			21	840	11	440			32	1280		14,208.0
39 M-18			2	78	3	117			5	195		13,852.8
38 M-18					1	38			1	38		13,497.6
Total	15	836	23	918	15	595	24	1340	77	1513	2176	Ave M-18 14,142.57 Ave M-81 14,188.64

\* Two types of bombs were used, (1) the M-18 (actual weight 355.2 pounds) incendiary bomb fused to separate at five thousand feet and (2) the M-81 (actual weight 254.3 pounds) fragmentation bomb loaded two per station using M-12 adapters fused instantaneous. Also carried were 24 x 100 pound M-47 A-2 (W.P. filled) bombs clustered with special adapters used to mark the Group Assembly Points, and smoke grenades used by lead aircraft.

VI - DISPOSITION OF BOMBS

Disposition of Bombs	40th		444th		462nd		468th		Total			Total Tonnage
	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-18	A/C	M-18	A/C	M-81	A/C	M-18	M-81	
All Targets	13	636	22	878	14	555	23	1284	72	1433	1973	505.37
Primary Target	13	639	21	838	14	555	22	1228	70	1393	1917	491.14
Tgt of Opp.			1b	40			1c	56	2	40	56	14.22
Jettisoned	2a	147	1c	40	1d	40	1f	56	5	80	203	40.02
Returned												
Total	15	836	23	918	15	595	24	1340	77	1513	2176	545.39

a. Two aircraft jettisoned entire load; and three aircraft jettisoned partial load after bombing the Primary Target as follows:

- (1) A/C 659 jettisoned 56 M-81's and returned early due to failure of #3 engine.
- (2) A/C 739 jettisoned 56 M-81's and returned early due to failure of #3 engine.
- (3) A/C 908 dropped 28 M-81's on the Primary Target and jettisoned 28 M-81's due to faulty release.
- (4) A/C 914 dropped 52 M-81's on the Primary Target and jettisoned 4 M-81's due to a faulty release.

A-V -1

A-VI -1

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- (5) A/C 580 dropped 53 M-81's on the Primary Target and jettisoned 3 M-81's due to a faulty release.
- b. A/C 202 blew a blister and dropped 40 M-18's on the Warehouses in the northern section of Bassein.
- c. A/C 873 had #4 propellor run away and jettisoned 40 M-18's before returning to base.
- d. A/C 252 jettisoned 40 M-18's at 20°27'N - 90°44'E due to an oil leak in #1 engine.
- e. A/C 424 dropped 56 M-81's on Sagyi Airfield located at 19°05'N - 95°10'E.
- f. A/C 719 jettisoned 56 M-81's due to an oil pressure line break in #2 engine and returned to base.

A-VI-2

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

VII - FORMATIONS FLOWN

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

A. Formations Planned

Field Orders No. 44 called for bombing by one 9 plane formation and one 6 plane formation each for the 40th and 462nd Groups, and two 12 plane formations each for the 468th and 444th Groups. The Strategic Air Force, Eastern Air Command, was to mark the target area aiming point from low level, at target time minus five minutes. Therefore it was extremely important that the first formation did not arrive over the target before time, but that it did arrive within 7 minutes (the burning time of the identification flare) after the target had been marked.

B. Formations over Target

Formations are shown below as they were at the time of bomb release. Diagrams are intended to indicate relative position only. Individual statistics are those of the lead aircraft, "W" is used for an aircraft of the 40th Group, "X" for 444th, "Y" for 462nd, and "Z" for 468th Group. Note: All bombing was accomplished visually.

1. Formations over the Primary Target:

1st. Z 445  
Z 529 Z 660 Z 663  
Z 272 Z 714 Z 665  
Z 456 Z 542 Z 893

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 27,000'P
No. of A/C	- 10	Axis of attack	- 45°M
No. releasing	- 10	IAS	- 190
Time of release	- 0457Z	Bomb Load	- 558 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 558 M-81

2nd. X 730

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 30,000'P
No. of A/C	- 1	Axis of attack	- 69°M
No. releasing	- 1	IAS	- 185
Time of Release	- 0459Z	Bomb Load	- 40 M-18
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 40 M-18

3rd. W 752

W 233 W 328 W 542 W 795  
W 580 W 527 W 740 W 738

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 28,000'P
No. of A/C	- 9	Axis of attack	- 32°M
No. releasing	- 9	IAS	- 190
Time of release	- 0500Z	Bomb Load	- 502 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 499 M-81

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

4th.

W 914

W 908

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 28,000'P
No. of A/C	- 2	Axis of attack	- 63°M
No. releasing	- 2	IAS	- 180
Time of release	- 0502Z	Bomb Load	- 112 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 80 M-81

5th.

W 846

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 28,000'P
No. of A/C	- 1	Axis of attack	- 50°M
No. releasing	- 1	IAS	- 185
Time of release	- 0506Z	Bomb Load	- 54 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 54 M-81

6th.

X 899

X 584 X 731

X 270

X 724

X 732

X 446

X 720 X 857

X 268 X 533

X 537

X 559

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 29,000'P
No. of A/C	- 13	Axis of attack	- 65°M
No. releasing	- 13	IAS	- 182
Time of release	- 0511Z	Bomb Load	- 519 M-18
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 519 M-18

7th.

Z 858

Z 471 Z 534

Z 500

Z 530

Z 464

Z 909

Z 227

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 27,000'P
No. of A/C	- 8	Axis of attack	- 60°T
No. releasing	- 8	IAS	- 190
Time of release	- 0513 1/2Z	Bomb Load	- 446 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 446 M-81

8th.

Z 879

Z 701

Z 276

Aiming Point	- Center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 27,000'P
No. of A/C	- 3	Axis of attack	- 69°M
No. releasing	- 3	IAS	- 192
Time of release	- 0514Z	Bomb Load	- 168 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 168 M-81

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

9th. Y 459  
Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 30,000'P  
No. of A/C - 1 Axis of attack - 115°M  
No. releasing - 1 IAS - 180  
Time of release - 0515Z Bomb Load - 38 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 38 M-18

10th. Y 838  
Y 919 Y 454  
Y 480  
Y 531

Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 29,000'P  
No. of A/C - 5 Axis of attack - 62°M  
No. releasing - 5 IAS - 185  
Time of release - 0516Z Bomb Load - 199 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 199 M-18

11th. X 884  
Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 29,000'P  
No. of A/C - 1 Axis of attack - 65°M  
No. releasing - 1 IAS - 185  
Time of release - 0516Z Bomb Load - 40 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 40 M-18

12th. X 228  
X 277 X 485  
Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 29,000'P  
No. of A/C - 3 Axis of attack - 44°M  
No. releasing - 3 IAS - 183  
Time of release - 0517Z Bomb Load - 120 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 120 M-18

13th. X 337  
X 273  
Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 29,000'P  
No. of A/C - 2 Axis of attack - 89°M  
No. releasing - 2 IAS - 185  
Time of release - 0518Z Bomb Load - 79 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 79 M-18

14th. X 861  
Aiming Point - Center of Dump "B" Altitude - 29,000'P  
No. of A/C - 1 Axis of attack - 63°M  
No. releasing - 1 IAS - 185  
Time of release - 0518Z Bomb Load - 40 M-18  
Method - visual Bombs dropped - 40 M-18

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

15th.

Y 299

Y 661

Y 734

Y 801

Y 473

Y 329

Y 474

Y 786

Z 877

W 757

Aiming Point	- center of Dump "B"	Altitude	- 27,000'P
No. of A/C	- 10	Axis of attack	- 260°M
No. releasing	- 10	IAS	- 185
Time of release	- 0538Z	Bomb Load	- 318 M-18 112 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 318 M-18 112 M-81

2. Aircraft over Targets of Opportunity

1st.

Z 424

Aiming Point	- Center of North end of Buildings West of Sagyi Airdrome (19°05'N - 95°10'E)	Altitude	- 16,300'P
No. of A/C	- 1	Axis of attack	- 186°M
No. releasing	- 1	IAS	- 167
Time of release	- 0455Z	Bomb Load	- 56 M-81
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 56 M-81

2nd.

X 202

Aiming Point	- Middle Warehouse North of Bassein	Altitude	- 29,200'
No. of A/C	- 1	Axis of attack	- 10°M
No. releasing	- 1	IAS	- 176
Time of release	- 0459Z	Bomb Load	- 40 M-18
Method	- visual	Bombs dropped	- 40 M-18

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By M NARA Date 2/5/05

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 495

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
XX BOMBER COMMAND NAVIGATION OFFICER

Date Prepared: 26 March 1945

Field Order No. 44

Date of Mission: 17 March 1945

1. The mission against the supply areas at Rangoon involved no complicated navigation problems. Navigators experienced difficulty, however, in navigating in the almost constant climb to the target and the practically constant let-down from the target to the base. It was considered that the over-water assembly points were much too close together. Although the mission was short some navigators did not join their proper formations.

a. Average navigation times out and back are as follows:

	<u>NAV TIME OUT</u>	<u>NAV TIME BACK</u>	<u>ASSEMBLY TIME</u>
40th	2h 49m	3h 25m	12m
444th	3h 01m	3h 13m	19m
462nd	3h 11m	3h 22m	20m
468th	3h 06m	3h 08m	19m

b. The following statistics on navigational aids are presented:

	<u>CHEL LOP'S</u>	<u>RADIO FIXES</u>	<u>QDM'S</u>
40th	4	8	0
444th	0	0	0
462nd	15	18	0
468th	31	18	0

c. Forecast winds were satisfactory. Computed winds follow:

	<u>ONE HALF OUT</u>	<u>TARGET</u>	<u>ONE HALF BACK</u>
40th	27,500' 300°37K	28,000' 297°27K	15,400' 295°24K
444th		29,000' 291°33K	
462nd	15,000' 310°25K	27,500' 305°37K	15,000' 310°28K
468th	18,000' 315°30K	27,000' 325°35K	18,000' 290°30K

2. Comments by Groups:

- (a) 40th Group. Although it was difficult to shoot under the conditions mentioned above, only few shots were reported.
- (b) 444th Group. The effort of this Group with respect to navigational aids and wind finding was not commensurate with that of the other Groups.
- (c) 462nd Group. None.
- (d) 468th Group. None.

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

B

ENEMY ANTILAIRORAFT

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* * * * *
*   Prepared by:   *
*                 *
*   Flak Officer   *
*                 *
*   XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

22 March 1945

P R E L I M I N A R Y   R E P O R T

ANTI-AIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 44, (DAYLIGHT) 17 MARCH 1945

Primary Target - RANGOON - MINGALADON Area, Dump "B",  
Secondary and Target of Last Resort - None

A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. RANGOON - MINGALADON Area (16°53'N - 96°08'E)

Nil (6%) to meager (74%) to moderate (20%) and inaccurate (86%) to accurate (14%) black heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered for the 80 aircraft runs over the area from 0457Z to 0539Z at altitudes of 28,000 to 31,950 feet true through CAWU to 7/10 undercast conditions. No enemy aircraft were reported on the same course and altitude, and fire was either continuously pointed or predicted concentration, possibly both.

The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to time and heavy AA fire encountered.

Table I: Formations vs. Heavy Flak Encountered

Forma- tion	Number of A/C	Bomb Release Time	Time Encount- ered	Heavy Flak Encountered	True Altitude in Feet	Under- cast	Total Bursts	Headings
1	10	0457Z	0457-58Z	Meager to Moderate Inaccurate	28,600	0-3/10	30	45°M
2	1	0459:30Z	0453Z	Meager - Inaccurate	31,700	1/10	15	69°M
3	9	0500Z	0458 - 0502Z	Meager - Inaccurate to Accurate	29,300 - 30,000	3/10	30	62°M
4	2	0502Z	-----	-----None-----	29,400	3/10	--	63°M
5	1	0506Z	-----	-----None-----	29,400	3/10	--	50°M
6	13	0511:30Z	0510-15Z	Meager to Moderate Inaccurate	29,100 - 30,500	4/10	40	65°T
7	8	0513:30Z	0509-15Z	Meager to Moderate Inaccurate	28,750	0-3/10	40	60°T
8	3	0514Z	0514-15Z	Meager - Inaccurate	28,600	0-3/10	15	69°M
15	10	1st Run	0515-16Z	Meager - Accurate to Inaccurate	28,800	4/10	40	68°M
9	1	0515Z	0515Z	Meager - Inaccurate	31,950	5/10	30	115°M
10	5	0516Z	0515-17Z	Meager - Inaccurate	31,000	3/10	25	62°M
11	1	0517Z	0515Z	Meager - Inaccurate	30,500	3/10	15	65°M
12	3	0517Z	0516Z	Meager - Inaccurate	30,700	3/10	12	44°M
13	2	0518Z	-----	-----None-----	30,200	3/10	--	89°M
14	1	0518Z	0518Z	Meager - Accurate	30,800	3/10	7	63°M
15	10	0536-39	0538Z	Meager to Moderate Accurate -Inaccurate	28,000 - 28,500	4 to 7/10	40	260°M

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Overlapping of reports of fire encountered is evident in the above table, no doubt caused by failure to distinguish between observations of fire directed at some other formation (or air void), and that encountered by the reporting aircraft. Fire was encountered on an average of 1.5 minutes prior to bombs away and continued to an average of 0.7 minutes following bomb release, which times of engagement coincide closely with the known potentialities of the 75mm M88 and 120mm M10 capable of engaging aircraft penetrating the defenses.

Following are reports of intensity, accuracy and deviations. The percentages have been determined from the total number of affirmative reports in one direction, as above, level, or below:

Table II: Intensity, Accuracy, and Deviations

<u>Reports of Accuracy</u>		<u>Reports of Intensity</u>	
Struck . . . . .	2 (2 $\frac{1}{2}$ percent)	Intense . . . . .	0 (0 percent)
Rocked . . . . .	2 (2 $\frac{1}{2}$ percent)	Moderate . . . . .	16 (20 percent)
Within 150' . . . .	7 (9 percent)	Meager . . . . .	59 (74 percent)
Outside 150' . . . .	69 (86 percent)	Nil . . . . .	5 (6 percent)

Reports of Deviations

Above . 11 (16 percent)	Ahead . . 17 (30 percent)	Left . . 12 (23 percent)
Level . 23 (32 percent)	Abreast . 19 (33 percent)	In Line. 25 (47 percent)
Below . 37 (52 percent)	Behind. . 21 (37 percent)	Right. . 16 (30 percent)

Comparison of the intensity and accuracy of fire encountered on this mission with that of #36 under approximately the same conditions, except for the increase in altitude - 10,000 feet, would indicate that the Japanese has no gun in the RANGOON - MINGALADON Area with capabilities better than those known for the 75mm M88 and 120mm M10. Also evident on this mission was a general drop in efficiency between 28-29,000 feet and 30-32,000 feet, a trend that would not have been manifest had guns with higher maximum altitude, as for example the 8-cm M99, been employed.

Unfortunately the type of fire could not be definitely determined further than either (or possibly both) continuously pointed or predicted concentration types. The Flak Officer, XX Bomber Command, rode with Formation #15 and observed a group of 30 to 40 bursts directed at Formation #7 which had all the characteristics of a predicted concentration. Observation, however, was made only from the rear and not from the side which precludes positive identification. Conversely it is also possible that those sites in range of the formation conducted continuously pointed fire independently producing this burst pattern. But it is known, from personal observation and reports of fire encountered, that the enemy did not resort to barrage fire.

The number of bursts observed at any one instant varied from 2 to 12 resulting in a total of from 6 to 40 for any encounter. Also, reports were received of fire directed at other Allied aircraft participating in the coordinated attack at lower altitudes concurrent with engagement of B-29 aircraft, further confirmation of the flexible and competent utilization of the RANGOON Flak defenses.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

R.C.M. Observers intercepted tracking signals with gun-laying radar characteristics while under fire over RANGOON. Conclusive evidence of the utilization of radar for fire control purposes, however, was not obtained, though D/F'ed locations, total tracking times, or visibility conditions. That the enemy was employing gun-laying or searchlight control radars to provide some form of data is quite certain, but because of limitations of guns, fire control equipment, or state of training of radar crews it is evident that he did not benefit through its application.

B. SMOKE SCREENS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKET

None reported.

C. DAMAGE FROM HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Two aircraft or 2.5% of the aircraft runs over RANGOON sustained minor flak damage, as follows:

Table III: Flak Damage

<u>Formation</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>True Altitude</u>	<u>Heading</u>	<u>Classification</u>
15	801	462nd	28,800'	?*	Minor
15	329	462nd	28,800'	?*	Minor

\* It could not be determined whether damage was sustained on the first or second bomb run of this formation.

D. WARNING NETS

As aircraft were tracked by early warning radars in the RANGOON Area (as determined by R.C.M. Observers), it is reasonable to assume that the enemy had 30 minutes prior warning of the attack.

*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Chief, Intelligence Section.

B-I-3

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

C

ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION

In the course of this mission, our aircraft met no air opposition, and no enemy aircraft were sighted at any time during the mission.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

D

WEATHER INFORMATION

- I - Weather Information
- II - Chart - Weather as Forecast and  
as Encountered
- III - Synoptic Map

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I -- WEATHER INFORMATION

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base at Take- Off	<p><u>CHAKULIA</u>; Broken to overcast stratocumulus, base 1000' tops 1500'. Visibility 5 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>PIARDOBA</u>; Broken stratus, base 2000' tops 3500'. Visibility 7 miles.</p> <p><u>KHARAGPUR</u>; Broken to overcast stratocumulus, base 1000' tops 3500'. Visibility 5 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>DUDHKUNDI</u>; Clear. Visibility 7 miles.</p>	<p><u>CHAKULIA</u>; Overcast with breaks. Base of stratus deck 200'. Visibility 3/8 mile in fog, improving to 1 mile. Wind calm to light variable.</p> <p><u>PIARDOBA</u>; 8/10 stratocumulus at 2000'. Visibility 8 miles. Wind SE 3 mph.</p> <p><u>KHARAGPUR</u>; Clear. Visibility 6 miles in light fog. Wind SSW 10 mph.</p> <p><u>DUDHKUNDI</u>; Clear. Visibility 7 miles. Wind SE 7 mph.</p>
Route Out	<p><u>BASE TO 20°N</u>; 8-10/10 stratocumulus, base 1000' tops 1500' to 20°N.</p> <p><u>20°N TO DIAMOND PT.</u>; 3/10 cirrus at 30,000'. Nil to 2/10 small cumulus with tops at 5000'.</p> <p><u>DIAMOND PT. TO TARGET</u>; 3/10 cirrus at 30,000', tops 31,000'. 3/10 cumulus or less, base 2000' tops 6000'.</p>	<p><u>BASE TO COAST</u>; 6-10/10 stratus tops at 1000'.</p> <p><u>COAST TO 19°N</u>; 2-3/10 cumulus and stratocumulus, tops at 4000'.</p> <p><u>19°N TO 18°N</u>; 1-2/10 cumulus, tops 3-4000'. 1/10 altocumulus at 17,000'.</p> <p><u>18°N TO I.P.</u>; Clear.</p> <p><u>I.P. TO TARGET</u>; 3/10 cirrus at 30,000', 3/10 fair weather cumulus, base 4000' tops 8000'.</p>
Target Area	<p>3/10 cirrus at 30,000', tops 31,000'. 3/10 cumulus or less, base 2000' tops 6000'.</p> <p><u>SEA LEVEL PRESSURE</u>; 29.90 inches.</p> <p>Mean Temp. to 30,000'; -2 Deg C.</p> <p>Mean Temp. to 25,000'; 3 Deg C.</p>	<p>3/10 cirrus at 30,000'. 3/10 fair weather cumulus, base 4000' tops 8000'. One formation which was late found the coverage built up to 7/10.</p>
Route Back	<p><u>TARGET TO 21°N</u>; Same as route out.</p> <p><u>21°N TO BASE AREA</u>; 3/10 cumulus, tops 6000'. Few large cumulus with tops at 12,000'.</p>	<p><u>TARGET TO 19°N</u>; 1/10 stratus at 2000'. 1/10 altocumulus at 13,000'. 2/10 stratocumulus with tops at 4000'.</p> <p><u>19°N TO COAST</u>; 3-4/10 cumulus, tops variable from 5000' to 8000'.</p> <p><u>COAST TO BASE AREA</u>; 2/10 cumulus tops 6-7000'.</p>
Base on Return	<p><u>CHAKULIA</u>; 3/10 cumulus, base 3000' tops 5000'. Visibility 7 miles in haze.</p> <p><u>PIARDOBA</u>; 7/10 cumulus, base 3000' tops 10,000'. Visibility unlimited.</p>	<p><u>CHAKULIA</u>; Few small cumulus, base 5000'. Visibility 7 miles. Wind NNE 8 mph.</p> <p><u>PIARDOBA</u>; Clear. Visibility unlimited. Wind NW 9 mph.</p>

D-I-1

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

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	As Forecast	As Encountered
Base on Return (Cont'd)	<p>KHARAGPUR: 6/10 cumulus, base 3000' tops 6000'. Visibility 10 miles.</p> <p>DUDHKUNDI: 6/10 cumulus, base 2000' tops 6000'. Visibility 10 miles.</p>	<p>KHARAGPUR: Few fair weather cumulus at 3000'. Visibility 7 miles. Wind calm.</p> <p>DUDHKUNDI: Clear. Visibility 10 miles. Wind N 2 mph.</p>

A. Winds Aloft - Forecast

Altitude	1st Half	2nd Half
1,000'	200/05K	50/05K
5,000'	270/15K	70/10K
10,000'	300/30K	240/20K
15,000'	310/30K	290/25K
20,000'	330/30K	350/30K
25,000'	320/35K	340/35K
30,000'	280/40K	290/40K

B. Winds Aloft - Encountered

Altitude	21°N	19°N	18°N	16°N	Target	16°N (Ret)
10,000'	310/15K					
15,000'		300/20K				
15,400'						295/14K
18,000'				315/30K		
20,000'			300/30K			
27,000'					315/36K	
27,500'				300/37K		
28,000'					282/44K	
30,000'					290/35K	

C. Temperatures

Forecast

Altitude	Target
1,000'	25 Deg C.
5,000'	17 Deg C.
10,000'	9 Deg C.
15,000'	-1 Deg C.
20,000'	-11 Deg C.
25,000'	-21 Deg C.
30,000'	-30 Deg C.

Encountered

Altitude	Target
27,000'	-25 Deg C.
28,000'	-26 Deg C.
30,000'	-30 Deg C.


D-I-2

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
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 WEATHER AS FORECAST

MISSION NO. 44




MISSION NO. 44

WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
 ROUTE OUT



MISSION NO. 44

WEATHER AS ENCOUNTERED  
 ROUTE BACK



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ANNEX

E

COMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
 \* Prepared by: \*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 \* Communications Section \*  
 \* \* \* \* \*  
 \* XX Bomber Command \*  
 \* \* \* \* \*

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)  
 NND 740120  
 By Cb/jmt NARS, Date OCT 21 1975

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 Authority NND 740120  
 By M NARA Date 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT  
OF STAFF RADIO OFFICER

Date prepared: 21 March 1945. Mission Number: 44.

Date of Mission: 17 March 1945.

I - TRAFFIC STATISTICS

1. Based on the greatest number of such messages which could be received (i.e., one per aircraft) the following tabulations indicate number of aircraft accounted for by bombs away messages and position reports, transmitted when 400 miles out, on return to base:

a. Bombs away messages:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
No of a/c from which msg could be expected:	15	22	14	23	72
No of msgs received:	3	8	4	5	20
No of a/c accounted for by messages:	15	22	14	23	72
Pct. of a/c accounted for by messages:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

b. Position Reports:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>	<u>Total</u>
No of a/c from which msg could be expected:	13	22	14	23	72
No of msgs received:	5	7	14	5	30
No of a/c accounted for by messages:	13	22	14	23	72
pct of a/c accounted for by messages:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

2. A total of four abort messages were received from aircraft, two from aircraft of the 40th Group, and one each from aircraft of the 462nd and 468th Groups. No attack messages were transmitted, as aircraft were not intercepted.

3. No distress traffic involving aircraft on this mission was logged.

II - VIOLATIONS

4. Aircraft 337 of the 444th Group in broadcasting a message to an aircraft of the 444th Group announcing ETA at rendezvous point, made use of the XX Bomber Command Pre-arranged Message Manual. Upon broadcasting a second message, the indicator was wrongly given as "ZQB", rather than "ZQN".

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Consequently the balance of the 444th Group aircraft demanded authentication upon receipt of the message. This transmission error resulted in other unnecessary transmissions, but at the same time gave proof that 444th Group radio operators are alert to any unusual occurrences and are aware of the proper procedure to be used on such occasions.

5. Aircraft of the 462nd Group carried a compromised edition of Aircraft Code Number 16 (CSP 1270 ( ) ), through an error on the part of the Cryptographic Security Officer of that Group. Some confusion resulted at the CP until this error was discovered and that edition of this code obtained. This is the first occurrence of this type of cryptographic security violation this Command has experienced and measures have been taken by the 462nd Group to prevent its recurrence.

6. All aircraft complied with the provisions of the Tactical Doctrine insofar as communications was concerned.

III - FREQUENCIES

7. Takeoff was at approximately 0200Z and frequencies remained in use until approximately 1000Z. Static level was the lowest encountered in some months, a W-1 level being the highest reported. Signal strength at the ground station never was lower than S4 R-4 and aircraft signals were correspondingly strong.

8. Station "AU2" was reported interfering on 8260 kilocycles for a period of one hour beginning at 0230Z. Identity of this station has not yet been established. Interfering signal was never strong enough to seriously interfere with the passing of air-ground traffic.

9. No attempts at jamming or deception on the part of the enemy were reported.

IV - RADIO AIDS TO NAVIGATION

10. Statistical data on radio aids to navigation is as follows:

a. Radio Homing Beacons:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>No of a/c Reporting</u>	<u>Average Initial Contact</u>	<u>Extreme Initial Contact</u>
Kharagpur	1200W	15	265 miles	475 miles
Chakulia	1200W	15	300	550
Dudhkundi	25W	6	197	300
Calcutta	3000W	3	460	520
Paardoba	2000W	9	278	500
Chittagong	1200W	3	150	200

b. No aircraft reported the use of radio range facilities.

c. Direction Finding (D/F) facilities were not used on this mission.

d. Only the 444th and 462nd Groups utilized air-to-air homing to effect rendezvous on this mission. Results were as follows:

- (1) Aircraft 337 transmitted homing signals which were received by only one aircraft, which, at time of reception was within visual distance

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of aircraft 537. Radio operator of aircraft 537 stated that he could not load his transmitter properly at this frequency (1100 kilocycles). This is the first instance of this difficulty being reported. Cause has not as yet been determined. Aircraft 899 transmitted homing signals which were used by ten aircraft to achieve rendezvous, signals being initially received at distances varying from 15 to 50 miles.

- (2) Five aircraft of the 462nd Group used air-to-air homing signals as an aid in rendezvousing, one aircraft reporting that signals were initially received at a distance of 200 miles from the rendezvous point.

V - MALFUNCTIONS TO RADIO EQUIPMENT

11. Following malfunctions to radio equipment were reported:

- a. 40th Bomb Group reported no malfunctions occurred on this mission.
- b. 444th Bomb Group:
  - (1) Aircraft 533 reported the VHF (SCR-522) receiver failed in flight. Could not be repaired while aircraft was airborne.
  - (2) Aircraft 537 reported the VHF (SCR-522) transmitter failed in flight. Could not be repaired while airborne.
  - (3) Top gunners throat microphone extension cord on aircraft 721 broke during flight. Replaced in flight.
- c. 462nd Bomb Group:
  - (1) Liaison receiver (BC-348) of aircraft 480 was extremely weak, operator reporting that only reception he could achieve was that of his formation leaders liaison transmissions. No corrective action was taken while airborne.
  - (2) Aircraft 661 reported the failure of the top gunners microphone switch shortly after takeoff. A hand switch was substituted.
- d. 468th Bomb Group:
  - (1) Aircraft 3534 reported the failure of the left hand gunners microphone switch. New switch was installed while airborne.
  - (2) PL-55 at radio operators position on aircraft 5227 failed. Replaced in flight.

VI - SPECIAL PROCEDURES

12. During this mission aircraft of the Strategic Air Force, Eastern Air Command, were scheduled to mark the target

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with smoke and target marking pyrotechnics. As the markings would be visible for a period of only seven minutes, a close coordination between the target marking aircraft and the B-29 striking force was necessary. It was arranged that this coordination would be achieved using "C" Channel of the SCR-522 Radio set. The formation leader and one other aircraft of each formation monitored Channel "C" to intercept traffic on this frequency, and the formation leader of the first formation of the first Group scheduled over the target was directed to acknowledge transmissions from the target marking aircraft, all transmissions being in the clear. Satisfactory communications were established, and all formations intercepted the target marking transmissions.

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ANNEX

F

RADAR

I - RADAR INFORMATION\*

Section A - Navigation and Bombing

Section B - Scope Photography

Section C - Serviceability

II - RADAR TABLES\*

Table A - Bombing

Table B - Photographic Results

Table C - Serviceability

Table D - Malfunctions

III - RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS CHARTS\*\*

\* Prepared by Radar Section, XX Bomber Command

\*\* Prepared by Target Intelligence Unit,  
XX Bomber Command

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION  
REPORT OF

XX BOMBER COMMAND RADAR OFFICER

Date Prepared: 22 March 1945 Field Orders No. 44  
Date of Mission: 17 March 1945

I - RADAR INFORMATION

A - Navigation and Bombing

1. This mission, the bombing of Supply Dump, Rangoon, Burma, was designed primarily to practice operation at the higher altitudes. The target was clearly a visual target and definitely not a radar target. The radar operators did aid a great deal in establishing the course to the target and the identification of the target area. All of the bombing was accomplished visually by the use of the radar-bombsight procedure.

2. Aircraft assembly was made over water with no geographical reference point. Several radar operators reported identifying aircraft around the assembly point at distances of twenty (20) to thirty (30) nautical miles. This interpretation provided considerable assistance to the assembling.

3. A new procedure was used by one group on the past two missions and has been reported quite an aid to more accurate bombing. This procedure provides for the normal run on the initial point on the axis of attack to the target and a dry blind release on this point or a convenient point along the axis of attack. The combat crew tension is eased in this manner by the radar operator giving warning on the approach to the target. The bombing team of radar operator, navigator and bombardier can check the wind and drift data previously secured. Checking of the tangent of the dropping angle that the bombardier has previously computed and the operation of the bombsight for extended vision are a few of the other items that might be accomplished on this dry run procedure.

4. The rivers in the target area were again readily identifiable and a few radar operators reported viewing Victoria Lake on the radar scope. The target was not expected to appear on the radar equipment.

B - Scope Photography

1. The usual radar scope photographic results were obtained on this mission. Coverage was secured of the area on route and of the target on previous missions and were quite satisfactory. For this reason the number of cameras installed were minimized and only photographs of the bombing run were taken.

2. Twelve (12) sets of photographs were returned producing nine (9) useable sets. Tracing of the bombing run was possible on seven (7) of the useable sets.

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C - Serviceability

1. Pressurization failures again increased and the operational serviceability of the radar systems decreased with the aircraft operating at the higher altitudes. Seven (7) systems were completely inoperative and seven (7) partially inoperative. The partial operation was a notable decrease in range with the loss of pressurization. Radar operators reported a number of sets could not be operated above 25,000 feet.

2. A total of sixty-five (65) APQ-13 sets were operative over the target for an operating percentage of ninety (90%) per cent. There were no malfunctions of auxiliary equipment.

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
By M/NARA Date 2/5/05



ALL SWEEPS 20 MILES, ALTITUDES 31,700'


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RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS  
RANGOON AREA-BURMA  
MISSION NO. 44

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: *11/17/00/3*  
By: *MM/AR/A* Date: *2/5/05*




6

HEADING 61° MAG.



8

HEADING 61° MAG.





LOG DOES NOT INDICATE EXACT BOMB RELEASE


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RADAR PHOTOGRAPH ANALYSIS  
RANGOON AREA—BURMA  
MISSION NO. 44

R82.2-N SHEET A.

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Authority: *11/17/00/63*  
By: *MM/AR/A* Date: *2/5/05*




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Authority 11/17/2003  
By MNAKA Date 2/5/05




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
HEADING 49° MAG.



HEADING 61° MAG.



HEADING 54° MAG.



HEADING 52° MAG.

PREPARED BY RADAR INTELLIGENCE, TARGET UNIT, INTELLIGENCE SECTION - XX BOMBER COMMAND  
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DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority: 11/17/2003  
 By: MNA/RA Date: 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

G

RCM INFORMATION

\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* RCM Section \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TWENTIETH AIR FORCE  
Office of the Deputy Commander, IB & C  
APO 493

26 March 1945

SUBJECT: RCM Report - Combat Mission No. 44, Rangoon,  
Burma, 17 March 45 - Daylight.

TO : Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force,  
Washington 25, D. C.

A. General

Six RCM search aircraft, each with one RCM observer, participated in this mission. The RCM observers searched for early warning radar enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area.

In addition, one communication search aircraft with a Nisei observer monitored the 1.5-10 Mc. band for possible radio fighter control nets.

B. Results

1. Early Warning Radar:

a. 80/486/32: This radar was first intercepted while the aircraft were at the group assembly point, a distance of approximately 200 nautical miles from the target. There is reason to believe that the radar was experiencing transmitter trouble inasmuch as the transmitter would occasionally fade, unlike that of searching antennas. This fading condition made d/f'ing difficult, however the majority of the cuts obtained intersect at the previous location:  $96^{\circ}01'E$   $16^{\circ}37'N$ .

b. 101/732/55: As noted on previous missions, this radar operates in an erratic manner, not confining its search to any one formation. Rough d/f cuts locate this radar South - east of Rangoon at approximately  $96^{\circ}18'E$   $16^{\circ}45'N$ . This location does not agree with the previous location,  $18^{\circ}00'N$   $94^{\circ}50'E$ , and therefore the two locations will be carried as suspected pending further verification.

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

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2. Gun Laying Radar:

The interception of radar signals in the target area with short pulse widths leads to the possibility that radar was being used to obtain fire control data. The inaccuracy of the flak does not substantiate this although this may be attributed to the limitations of the anti-aircraft weapons and personnel.

a. 192/1100/5: This radar was intercepted momentarily just prior to bombs away. Succeeding search aircraft intercepted the signal after bombs away indicating that the radar confined itself to one formation until that formation reached a definite area and then swung back and picked up the next formation even though the bombs may have already been dropped. One operator reported this intercept as double pulsed which would suggest two radar sites with similar characteristics. Two d/f cuts locate this radar at  $96^{\circ}06'E$   $17^{\circ}05'N$ .

b. 198/1177/2.7: Due to conditions at the target a search aircraft was required to make two runs before dropping its bombs. On the second run this signal with gun laying characteristics was intercepted, strong and tracking. However, the radar continued to track the aircraft for a distance of 103 miles, unlike that of a gun laying radar. Good d/f cuts locate this radar site at  $96^{\circ}20'E$   $17^{\circ}24'N$ , not near any known anti-aircraft gun sites.

c. 195/1010/2.5: Tracking momentarily. Two d/f cuts intercept at  $95^{\circ}38'N$   $17^{\circ}26'E$ , not near any known anti-aircraft gun sites.

d. The following intercepts were made in the target area but due to inconclusive intercept data, will be carried as suspected pending further verification.

205/735/40: Moderately strong, possibly Moulmein.

199/584/5.5: Rotating rapidly.

134/High/3: Rotating.

200/- /7.5: Intercepted momentarily.

200/1494/14.4: Tracking erratically, fading.

180/910/5.5: Tracking weakly.

e. Radio fighter control net interceptions: No intercepts were made in the 1.5-10 Mc. band.

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C. Enemy Countermeasures

Negative.

D. Equipment

1. AN/APA-11 pulse analyzer failed after two hours of operation. Rectifier tube burnt out before the protecting fuse.
2. AN/APA-11 Pulse Analyzer cut out in the target area due to overheating. Operation was resumed after cooling.
3. AN/ANQ-2 airborne recorder operated satisfactorily. The playback of the recording is clear and loud.
4. Communication search receiver antenna: The new installation proved satisfactory and will be used on future missions. The liaison antenna is used, with a coaxial cable leading back through the tunnel to the RCM position. The radio operator reports no interference with liaison operation.

FOR THE DEPUTY COMMANDER:

*Leo I. Lerman*  
LEO I. LERMAN  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Actg. Adjutant General

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ANNEX

H

CENTRAL STATION FIRE CONTROL AND GUNNERY

\*\*\*\*\*  
\* Prepared by: \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* Staff Gunnery Officer \*  
\* \* \* \* \*  
\* XX Bomber Command \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

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Authority 11M76063  
By ML NARA Date 2/5/05

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

CONSOLIDATED  
SPECIALIST MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF GUNNERY OFFICER

Date Prepared: 29 March 1945

Field Order Number 44  
Date of Mission: 17 Mar 45

1. On the mission directed by Field Order No. 44 no enemy opposition was encountered. Approximately twelve (12) enemy aircraft were seen at a distance.
2. The mission may be regarded as satisfactory from the gunnery standpoint.
3. The following statistical information is submitted:

	<u>40th</u>	<u>44th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Ammunition used test firing	1560	1537	1360	1730
Ammunition used, combat	0	0	0	0
Malfunctions of GFC equipment	None	None	None	None
Claims by our gunners	None	None	None	None
Losses to fighters	None	None	None	None

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

I

CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

I - CAMERAS AND PHOTOGRAPHS

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

	40th			444th			462nd			468th			Total		
	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22	K-18	K-20	K-22
No. cameras airborne	2	15	5	4	5	9	1	3	4	4	14	6	11	37	24
No. in A/C not bombing targets	0	2-b	1-b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1-b	0	0	1-b	1
No. in A/C bombing targets	2	13	4	4	5	9	1	3	4	4	13	6	11	34	23
No. in A/C photographing targets	0	3	3	3	5	7	1	1	1	4	13	6	8	32	17
Failure to photograph - mechanical	1	0	0	0	0	2-e	0	0	2-f	0	0	0	1	0	4
Failure to photograph - other reasons	1-a	10-c	1-c	1-c	0	0	0	2-e	1-c	0	0	0	2	12-c	2
Usable negatives	0	11	26	40	0-d	68	6	3	3	82	23	151	128	37	258

- a. Personnel failure
- b. A/C aborted
- c. A/C failed to take pictures for no given reason
- d. No usable negatives
- e. Information not available or incomplete
- f. Focal plane shutter

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ANNEX

J

AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

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By ML NARA Date 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I - AIRCRAFT LOSSES AND DAMAGE

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

A. Aircraft Losses

1. There were no losses of any kind on this mission.

B. Aircraft Damage

1. For details of battle and operational damage by aircraft, see Consolidated Mission Statistical Summary, Annex M, Table V.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

K

FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

I - Functioning of Equipment

II - Performance Data \*

\* Prepared by Staff Flight Engineer

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L

I - FUNCTIONING OF EQUIPMENT

Mission No. 44

17 March 1945

- |   |    |
|---|----|
| 1. A/C Airborne   | 77 |
| 2. Less A/C failing to bomb primary target - mechanical                       | 6  |
| a. Bombed target of opportunity (2)   |    |
| (1) A/C 202 (444th Group) - blew astrodome blister<br>and lost two parachutes |    |
| (2) A/C 424 (468th Group) - #2 propellor feathered due<br>to broken oil line  |    |
| b. Jettisoned (4)   |    |
| (1) A/C 659 (40th Group) - believed swallowed valve<br>on #3 engine           |    |
| (2) A/C 739 (40th Group) - oil leak   |    |
| (3) A/C 873 (44th Group) - #4 propellor ran away                              |    |
| (4) A/C 719 (468th Group) - oil pressure line break<br>in #2 engine           |    |
| 3. Less A/C failing to bomb primary target - other reasons                    | 1  |
| a. Personnel error (1)  |    |
| (1) A/C 252 (462nd Group) - oil tank too full                                 |    |
| 4. A/C bombing primary target   | 70 |

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By M/NARA Date 2/5/05

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CONSOLIDATED SPECIALIST  
MISSION REPORT OF  
STAFF FLIGHT ENGINEER

Prepared: 21 March 1945

Field Order Number 44

Date of Mission: 17 March 1945

1. The attached table contains a summary of the aircraft that bombed the primary target and returned to their own base.

2. Bomb loads were limited by space and all aircraft carried a maximum load. The average bombing altitude of the 444th Bcnb Group was 29,000 feet pressure altitude or approximately 31,000 density altitude. The number of aircraft malfunctions due to altitude were less than expected and engine cooling was not critical. Fuel consumption was as anticipated.

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By M NARA Date 2/5/05

SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE  
 FIELD ORDER #44  
 PRIMARY TARGET

Group		Overall	40th	444th	462nd	468th
*Number of Aircraft		70	13	21	14	22
Total Time		6:34	6:45	6:31	6:52	6:19
Time to Target		3:02	2:53	2:46	3:29	3:07
Fuel	Ave	3820	3830	3750	3926	3780
Burned	Max	4330	4275	4330	4200	4100
	Min	3375	3490	3375	3650	3425
Fuel	Ave	4875	4850	5010	4800	4810
Carried	Max	5200	5000	5200	4800	5000
	Min	4800	4800	5000	4800	4800
Burnable	Ave	1055	1020	1250	874	1020
Reserve	Max	1625	1350	1625	1130	1375
	Min	525	525	670	625	700
**Air Miles		1653	1624	1628	1763	1623
Ground Miles		1540	1638	1520	1594	1466
*Gal/Air Miles		2:31	2:36	2:31	2:23	2:32
***Bombing Altitude		28,000	28,100	29,000	27,900	27,000
Starting	Ave	125,275	125,440	125,414	124,789	125,350
	Max	126,963	126,885	126,800	125,219	126,963
Weight	Min	124,289	124,462	124,700	124,289	124,715
	Ave	14,200	14,265	14,160	14,130	14,250
Weight of Bombs	Max	14,450	14,290	14,220	14,270	14,450
	Min	13,500	14,190	13,930	13,500	14,200
Number of Bombs	M-81	27.8	55.7	0	0	55.6
	M-18	19.9	0	39.8	39.7	0
	M-47	0.6	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.8

\*Aircraft that bombed the primary target and returned to their own bases.  
 \*\*Air miles are of doubtful accuracy due to difficulty in determination.  
 \*\*\*Pressure Altitude

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ANNEX

L

TARGET INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT

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* * * * *
*   Prepared by:   *
*                 *
*   Target Intelligence Unit *
*                 *
*   XX Bomber Command *
* * * * *
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By M NARA Date 2/5/05

C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Intelligence Section  
APO 493

23 March 1945

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO. 50

TARGET: Dump "B", Rangoon - Mingaladon Dump Area, Burma (16°51'N-96°08'E)

GENERAL STATEMENT:

This report relates to damage resulting from a daylight attack by 70 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command, on 17 March 1945, Mission No. 44. A total of 491 short tons of bombs were dropped, consisting of M-81 fragmentation bombs and M-18 incendiary bombs. Assessment of damage was derived from good quality photos obtained by the 468th Bomb Group, XX Bomber Command, on 18 March 1945.

The attack was accomplished by ten formations of from two to thirteen planes each, and five single plane attacks, over the target from 0457Z to 0538Z. Weather encountered over the target area varied from CAVU to 4/10 undercast. Bombing altitudes ranged from 26,800' to 30,000' with all bombing accomplished visually.

The main weight of the attack was well concentrated in the central and northern area of the target resulting in the destruction of the majority of the storage units. At least 173 miscellaneous hutments were destroyed and many more were undoubtedly damaged. Interpretation of damage is rendered difficult by the small scale photography, the dense foliage obscuring many of the buildings, and the type of bombs used. Since the bulk of the fragmentation bombs fell in the target area it is reasonable to assume damage to many buildings even though subject damage is not readily apparent on the air photos.

Damage outside of the target area included the destruction of approximately 30 native type hutments immediately adjoining the target on the east and approximately 10 business/residential buildings just south of the Okkyin R.R. Station. Although several fires were observed burning in Dump "F" during the course of the attack no damage was identified.

- REFERENCES: (1) C.P.I.C., S.E.A., Preliminary Damage Assessment Report No. PM(S)571, 12 March 1945.  
(2) Annotated Mosaic, Project No. 116 Neg. No. 7PTS CFX 1955, 17th AAFPID and 7PTS, November 1944.

WEIGHT OF ATTACK:

<u>Group</u>	<u>No. of A/C</u>	<u>No., Weight, and Type Bomb</u>
40th B.G.	13	689 M-81 (87.61 tons)
444th B.G.	21	838 M-18 (148.83 tons)
462nd B.G.	14	555 M-18 (98.57 tons)
468th B.G.	22	1228 M-81 (156.14 tons)
Total:	70	1917 M-81*(243.75 tons) 1393 M-18** (247.40 tons)

\* M-81 frag bombs (actual weight 254.3 lbs) fused instantaneous.  
\*\* M-18 incendiary bombs (actual weight 355.2 lbs) fused to separate at 5000'.

- PHOTOGRAPHY: (1) Strike Photos 5MB44, 17 March 1945, quality and scale variable.  
(2) Strike Photos 5MB36, 444th B.G., A/C 492, 11 February 1945, scale approximately 1:9,200, quality excellent.  
(3) XX Bomber Command 5MR48, 18 March 1945, scale approximately 1:14,000, quality good.

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ANNEXES: (1) Annotated Mosaic.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE:

All subsequent paragraph numbers refer to corresponding numbers on Annex No. 1.

(1) A total of 173 storage units were destroyed in this area, of which 154 were of a barrack/stores building type and 19 were of an earth covered type. A post strike study of this area reveals a total of 50 units of all types remaining. However since the bulk of the M-81 frag bombs fell in this area, it may be assumed that many of these 50 units suffered damage not revealed in the photo coverage. The majority of the barrack/stores building type destroyed measured approximately 55' x 30', while the earth covered stores were 35' x 20'.

(2) 9 residential/business structures were destroyed in this area. Of the 9, the 2 largest measured approximately 95' x 30' and 65' x 45' respectively.

(3) 1 storage unit approximately 65' x 30' destroyed.

(4) In this area 90 native type hutments were destroyed. This destruction, plus that effected by Allied strike of 9 March 1945, has virtually wiped out this entire area.

(5) In the Coolie Line area, a 250' x 45' building has been about 40% gutted. A larger building just S. appears to be damaged on the E. end.

(6) Of 5 storage units in this immediate area, 1 small unit was destroyed, and 1 unit approximately 125' x 30' was 50% destroyed.

(7) 1 large barracks/storage type building 110' x 40' was 50% destroyed.

(8) 1 barracks/storage type building 50' x 35' was destroyed.

(9) 1 barracks/storage type building 50' x 35' was destroyed. Due to proximity of adjacent buildings, plus the bomb pattern observed, it is reasonable to assume damage to at least 2 structures of similar size and type.

*Frank L. Scott, Jr.*  
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR  
Colonel, Air Corps  
Chief, Intelligence Section

PREPARED BY: TARGET UNIT  
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

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**LEGEND**




WIDE SPREAD DAMAGE



LOCAL DAMAGE



DUMP AREA BOUNDARY



GYOGEN  
R.R. STATION

AM  
D.A. RE  
RANGOON-MING

CON

DUMP  
"A"

DUMP  
"K"

OKKYIN  
R.R. STATION

3

4

5

9

1

DUMP  
"B"

6

8

7

DUMP  
"F"

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ANNEX I  
D.A. REPORT NO. 50  
RANGOON-MINGALADON DUMP AREA  
BURMA

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SPREAD DAMAGE  
DAMAGE  
AREA BOUNDARY

GYOGEN  
R.R. STATION

DUMP  
"A"

DUMP  
"K"

MENTAL  
HOSPITAL

DUMP  
"B"

DUMP  
"F"

0000' 2000'

3

4

5

9

1

6

8

7

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX

M

CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

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* * * * *
* Prepared by:
* Statistical Control Section
* XX Bomber Command
* * * * *
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table I and II - Aircraft Participating \*

Group	Mis- sion No.	Field Order No.	** A/C Taking Off	Airborne A/C Failing to Bomb Designated Primary Target								Time Of First Takeoff	Time Of Latest Return	Average Time of Flight	
				Total No.	Percent	Reason					A/C Bombing Primary			Airborne A/C Not Bombing Primary	
						Mech.	Pers.	Wea.	Not in Form.	Misc.					Unknown
40th	44	44	15	2	13.3%	2					0200Z	0906Z	6:36	4:52	
444th	44	44	23	2	8.7%	2					0153Z	0857Z	6:29	3:13	
462nd	44	44	15	1	6.6%		1				0155Z	0910Z	6:51	3:40	
468th	44	44	24	2	8.3%	2					0142Z	0845Z	6:23	3:14	
TOTAL	44	44	77	7	9.1%	6	1				0142Z	0910Z	6:33	3:45	

\* Mission was run from Rear Area Bases; Tables I and II consolidated because there was no Rear to Forward Area Movement.  
 \*\* Field Order #44 required 40th and 462nd Groups to furnish 15 A/C each; 24 A/C each from the 444th and 468th Groups.  
 A/C 24507 - 444th Group failed to takeoff due to electrical fire in the tail section.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table III - Bombing Runs

Group	No. of A/C Bombing	Target Bombed	Time of Release		Altitude of Release		Visual Bomb	Radar Bomb	Blind Bomb	On The Leader			A/C Dropping On			
			Earliest	Latest	Highest	Lowest	A/C Sight-	A/C Sight-	A/C Sight-	Visual	Radar	Blind	AFCE	Manual		
							ing For	ing For	ing For							
							R&D	Range	R&D	Range	R&D	Range				
40th	13	Rangoon	0500Z	0538Z	28000	26800	3					10			3	10
444th	21 1	Rangoon Opportunity	0459Z	0518Z	30000	28500	6					15			7	14
			0459Z	0459Z	29200	29200	1								1	
462nd	14	Rangoon	0515Z	0538Z	30000	27000	3					11			2	12
468th	22 1	Rangoon Opportunity	0457Z	0538Z	28000	27000	4					18			3	19
			0455Z	0455Z	16300	16300	1								1	
TOTAL	70 2	Rangoon Opportunity	0457Z	0538Z	30000	26800	16					54			15	55
			0455Z	0459Z	29200	16300	2									2

Primary Target - Rangoon.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table IV - Bomb Loading & Disposal

Group	* Type of Bombs	Bomb Loading on A/C Airborne in R. A.			On Targets		Bomb Disposal		
		Fusing		Average No. Loaded	**		Jettisoned	Returned	Unknown
		Nose	Tail		Total Loaded	Rangoon Opportunity			
40th	M-81	Inst	N.D.	55.7	836	689		147	
444th	M-18	45.8 SEC.	--	39.9	918	838	40	40	
462nd	M-18	45.8 SEC.	--	39.7	595	555		40	
468th	M-81	Inst	N.D.	55.8	1340	1228	56	56	
TOTAL	M-81	Inst	N.D.	55.8	2176	1917	56	203	
	M-18	45.8 SEC.	--	39.8	1513	1393	40	80	

\* AN-M 18 Incendiary Clusters - 500# - Actual weight 355.2 pounds.  
 AN-M 81 Fragmentation Bomb - 260# - Actual weight 254.3 pounds.  
 \*\* Excludes 42 - 100# M-47 A2 (WP Filled) Bombs dropped to indicate group assembly point.  
 Twelve each carried by 3 groups (2 A/C - 6 each), 6 carried by one A/C in 462nd Group.  
 In accordance with Field Order.

NOTE: Bomb weight information supplied by Ordnance Section, XX Bomber Command.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table V - Aircraft Lost and Damaged

Aircraft Lost

NEGATIVE REPORT

Aircraft Damaged

Major Damage

<u>Group</u>	<u>Serial Number</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>A/A</u>	<u>Own Guns</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
462nd	63454				X	Flare chute door. (Minor) Outboard line to expander tubes on right wheel installed wrong and broken on retraction. On landing the emergency brakes went out and ship left taxiway. Nose gear badly damaged and right inboard tire blown.
Total					1	

Minor Damage

462nd	24801		X			Wing, radar dome and tail turret.
	63474				X	Bomb bay door bent out of shape.
	65329		X			Fuselage near nose.
Total			2		1	

Table VI - Attacks and Passes by Enemy Aircraft

NEGATIVE REPORT

Table VII - Personnel Losses

NEGATIVE REPORT

<u>Crew Position</u>	<u>Total Participating</u>			
	<u>40th</u>	<u>444th</u>	<u>462nd</u>	<u>468th</u>
Pilot	19	23	15	34
Co-Pilot	15	23	15	26
Navigator	15	23	15	24
Bombardier	15	23	15	24
Flt. Engr.	15	23	15	25
Radar	15	23	15	24
Radio	15	23	15	24
CFC Spec.	15	23	15	24
Right Gnr.	15	23	15	24
Left Gnr.	15	23	15	24
Tail Gnr.	15	23	15	24
R C M				5
Voice Interceptor				2
Others	5	17	14	7
TOTAL	174	270	179	291

Table VIII - Expenditures of Ammunition and Claims Against Enemy Aircraft

NEGATIVE REPORT

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table IX - Gasoline Loading and Consumption

Group	Average Gross Weight Per Plane Before Rear Area Takeoff	Average Gals Gas Loaded Per A/C Before Rear Area Takeoff	Average Gallons Consumed on Mission		Average Gallons Remaining in A/C After Mission	
			Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Not Bombing Primary	Per Aircraft Bombing Primary	Per A/C Not Bombing Primary
40th	125644	4877	3831	2875	1027	2125
444th	125423	5000	3761	2050	1239	2950
462nd	124789	4600	3913	2500	887	2300
468th	125343	4813	3781	1900	1032	2900
TOTAL	125318	4879	3810	2307	1065	2607

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
Mission Number Forty Four  
17 March 1945

Table X - Airborne A/C Failing To Bomb Primary Target

<u>A/C</u> <u>Serial</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Specific</u> <u>Mechanical</u> <u>Malfunction</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Reasons</u>	<u>Local Action</u> <u>To Prevent</u> <u>Recurrence</u>
<u>40th Gp.</u>			
24739	oil seal in the return oil line from the front sump had given away causing oil leak.		Replaced seal.
69659	Loose spark plug lead causing engine to backfire and run rough.		Checked over ignition harness and leads.
<u>444th Gp.</u>			
65202	Blown astro dome.		Astro dome replaced. U. R. #45-117 submitted.
24873	Propeller governor out.		Governor changed. U. R. #45-118 submitted.
<u>462nd Gp.</u>			
63252		oil tank too full. Personnel error.	
<u>468th Gp.</u>			
24719	Nose oil pressure line broken causing oil leak.		Replaced line. U. R. #45-149 submitted.
63424	Nose oil pressure line running from prop governor to firewall worked loose at the firewall connection causing oil leak.		Fitting check found O.K. and tightened.

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XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table XI - Engineering Malfunctions

Part I - Engineering Malfunctions Preventing Airborne A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT.	Engine Running Rough	1				1
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Governor		1			1
OIL SYSTEM	Oil Leaks	1			2	3
MISCELLANEOUS	Pressurization		1			1
TOTALS		2	2		2	6

NOTE: For details, see Table X - "Summary of A/C Failing to Bomb Primary".

Part II - Engineering Malfunctions Not Preventing A/C From Bombing Primary

		40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
POWER PLANT & ACCESSORY SECT.	Engine Running Rough			1		1
	Engine Running HOT	4		1		5
PROPELLERS & GOVERNORS	Governor			2	2	4
	Governor Oil Leak			2		2
OIL SYSTEM	Oil Leaks		1	2		3
	Oil Temperature Regulator	1		1		2
FUEL SYSTEM	Fuel Transfer System		1			1
	Carburetor	1				1
	Engine Fuel Pump			1		1
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM	Generators	1				1
	Voltage Regulator	1		1	1	3
	Starter		2			2
	Malfunction of A-4 Releases	1				1
	Shortage of Wires		1			1
INSTRUMENTS	Carb. Air Temp. Gage	1	3	1	1	6
	Cylinder Head Temp. Gage	1		1	1	3
	Outside Air Temp. Gage				1	1
	Nose Oil Press. Gage	1				1
	Oil Temp. Gage		1			1
	Tachometer	2	1			3
	Airspeed Indicator		1			1
	Flight Indicator		1			1
	AFCE		1			1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TABLE XI - Engineering Malfunctions  
part II - cont'd

	40th	444th	462nd	468th	Total
MISCELLANEOUS					
Pressurization		1	2		3
Hydraulic System				1	1
Landing Gear		3			3
Pneumatic Doors Failed					
To Latch		1			1
Bomb Door Actuating Cylinder Bracket		1			1
TOTALS	15	18	15	7	55

NOTE PERTAINING TO BOTH PART I AND PART II:

Only engineering malfunctions are listed. All other malfunctions, such as radar, are excluded. If one aircraft had more than one engineering malfunction, all malfunctions have been listed.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

XX BOMBER COMMAND  
 CONSOLIDATED MISSION STATISTICAL SUMMARY  
 Mission Number Forty Four  
 17 March 1945

Table XIII - Utilization of Useful Load  
 (Based on A/C Bombing P.T.)

Group	No. of Ground Miles	Number of A/C Considered	Type of A/C	Av. Gross Weight at Takeoff for Mission	Aver Basic Weight of A/C	Aver Useful Load	Aver. Number* of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight* of Bombs Loaded	Aver Weight of Gas Loaded at 6 Pounds Per Gal	Average Miscellaneous Weight
40th	1638	13	Center Wing Tanks	125445	75095	50350	M-81 55.7 M-47A2WP .9	14227	29148	6975
444th	1520	21	Center Wing Tanks	125436	75513	49923	M-18 39.9 M-47A2WP .6	14214	30000	5709
462nd	1594	14	Center Wing Tanks	124775	75075	49700	M-18 39.6 M-47A2WP .4	14111	28800	6789
468th	1466	22	Center Wing Tanks	125351	74887	50464	M-81 55.8 M-47A2WP .5	14233	28882	7349
TOTAL	1540	70	Center Wing Tanks	125279	75151	50128	M-81 27.9 M-18 19.9 M-47A2WP .6	14197	28839	7092

\* AN-M 81 Fragmentation Bomb - 260# - Actual weight 254.3 pounds.  
 AN-M 18 Cluster, Incendiary - 500# - Actual weight 355.2 pounds.  
 M-47 A2 (WP Filled) Bomb, Incendiary - 100# - Actual weight 70.1 pounds.  
 \*\* Includes 42 - 100# M-47A2 (WP Filled) Bombs dropped to indicate group Assembly Point. 12 carried by three Groups (2 A/C 6 each), 6 carried by one A/C in the 462nd Group in accordance with field order.

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HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 493

DISTRIBUTION -- MISSION NO. 44

17 March 1945

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4 Chief, Intelligence Section, XX Bomber Command  
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6 Commanding Officer, 444th Bombardment Group  
7 Commanding Officer, 462nd Bombardment Group  
8 Commanding Officer, 468th Bombardment Group  
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Intelligence, Collection Division  
39 Assistant Chief Air Staff, Intelligence  
40 CINCPAC (Thru DEPCOMAF Twenty)  
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1357

HEADQUARTERS  
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