

Doc. 4062

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State Secretary Japan
vol 4
a

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. ²⁰⁶²

Date 5 June - 11 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT Photostat

Title and Nature: *File of telegrams between German Foreign Office and Embassy in Rome and Tokyo (State Sec'y Japan vol 4 a)*

Date: 1-14 July, 1941 Original () Copy (✓) Language:

Has it been translated? Yes () No (✓) *German and English (Hans 7, 8, 11)*
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LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)
Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Nuremberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SHIRATORI, Toshio; OHASHI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: conspiracy for aggressive warfare.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Contains, among others, the following items:
~~Item 1: Note for State Secretary from WOERMANN, Berlin, 1 July 1941~~

~~Advises that German Foreign Minister not speak today concerning dissolution of the Polish, etc., Embassy in Tokyo, since the Japanese could then demand removal of the Chinese Embassy in Berlin. This demand will soon come directly, and we could then make use of the occasion to apply pressure on Japan.~~

(Insert attached pages)

Analyst: Leo Traynor
St Steiner

Doc. No.

~~60237 60520~~

4062

Item 1: Telegram from Mackensen, Rome, 1 July, 1941,
concerning visit of Japanese Ambassador to
~~Hatton~~ German Embassy in Rome.

~~His first purpose was to be informed concerning
the present situation in the Russo-German theater
of war.~~ who hinted at impending cabinet changes in Japan.

He said that Japan had a change of
cabinet to reckon with. He indicated by this
that Japan intended to advance activity actively
against Russia, but needed still a few weeks.
But such a policy would demand the ^{retirement} return of
MATSUOKA; since he had concluded a non-aggression
pact with Russia such a short while ago, he
would have to disappear from the political
scene for a certain time.

He mentioned that Japanese policy must
do everything to prevent America from entering
the war. [60233]

Item 2: Telegram to German Embassy in Tokyo from
Ribbentrop, 1 July, 1941

Identical with IPS Doc 4033, Item 8.

"Please write the following telegram over my signature and give it personally to the Foreign Minister. (MATSUOKA):"

1. A description of the success of the German armies and air force over Russia.

~~From this he concludes that the time is ~~now~~~~

2. The obligation falls upon German leadership to bring about in the future a political situation in the East which will exclude for all time a repetition of such contingencies.

As long as Russia, as the germ-cell of Bolshevism remains, neither Europe nor East Asia will be at rest. In this connection we hope for the cooperation of Japan.

3. The impending breakdown of the Russian military might offers Japan the opportunity to free herself of the Russian threat, to give her security in the north so that she may expand to the south. It therefore appears to me ^{Ribbentrop} that the demand of the hour is that the Japanese army seize VLADIVOSTOK as soon as possible and push forward as deeply as possible to the west. The objective

of such an operation would be for the Japanese and German armies to join before the cold season sets in. This would solve the entire Russian question for Japan and Germany.

4. By the defeat of the Soviet Union with Germany will be able to bring pressure upon England, and Japan will be free to pursue her interests to the south. The solution of the Chinese problems would be made easier by the removal of the Soviet regime.

After the defeat of Russia ^{Ribbentrop} hopes that the weight of the nations of the Tri-Partite Pact, plus any other European states that may come in will be sufficient to paralyze the increasing tendency in the United States to mix into the war.

He is convinced that now is the opportunity for Japan to solve the Russian question with Germany. R. Ribbentrop

~~60234 - 60237~~

Item 3: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from Weizsäcker, Berlin, 3 July

OSHIMA, at a conference concerning recognition of WANG CHING WEI by Denmark and

Finland, told ^{Weizsäcker} ~~me~~ that he had received the following preliminary information concerning the present Japanese attitude:

1. The Tri-Partite Pact remains the basis of Japanese foreign policy.

2. Japan will further fight communistic organizations and strengthen her military preparations (presumably in Manchukuo).

3. Japan will ~~shackle~~ ^{tie up} the two Anglo-Saxon nations by pressure on England and the United States in the Southwest Pacific Ocean.

4. ~~The aim is the finishing~~
~~of the Chinese conflict~~ ^{is to be finished} by every possible means.

OSHIMA said that Point 2 was especially incomprehensible to him and that he had wired Tokyo for a commentary. ^(He said that) He ^{had} pointed out the danger of losing an historic opportunity and that he had declared he ~~would not~~ was not ready to champion a weak Japanese policy.

^{Weizsäcker} confirmed this surprising communication with OSHIMA through the information that OTT had just reported to ^{them} concerning the unsatisfactory course of the cabinet session. [60238-9]

Item 4: Memo from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin, 3 July, 1941
Weizsäcker

Asked the Japanese Ambassador ~~today~~
whether there was any Japanese interest in the
recognition of WANG CHING WEI by Denmark and
Finland. In case it should apply (he said) ^{Germany} we were
ready in combination with Italy to take suitable
steps in Denmark and Finland. The Ambassador
will ask ~~at~~ in Tokyo, ~~and then come to me~~
again.

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Item 5: Telegram ^{from OTT to Ribbentrop} ~~to German Foreign Ministry~~ from OTT,
Tokyo, 3 July, 1941. Identical with IPS Doc 4033, Item 9.

~~OTT ^{reports that he} ~~has~~ tried all means to influence the
Japanese government and other influential circles
towards a rapid military advance against
Soviet Russia. But the aim persists stubbornly in
favor of a push toward the south. According to
reliable information MATSUOKA has declared
himself personally strongly in favor of an unequivocal
decision. But he was unable to carry through an
immediate decision to enter the war in the
executives committees of the cabinet, in the full
cabinet, and with the Emperor.~~

After this morning's cabinet session MATSUOKA invited ~~me~~ ^{OTT} and the Italian Ambassador ^{to them}. He recited ^{an} oral statement compiled on the basis of a cabinet decision for the German Foreign Minister, the English translation of which he handed over to OTT as an English translation. Text follows separately. In the statement to the Italian Government nothing is said of the German-Soviet war, but of the war of the Axis powers against the Soviet Union. MATSUOKA explained ~~that~~ the delivered statement verbally to the effect that Japan was not at the time in a position to enter into war against the Soviet Union, without entering into other ~~political~~ developments.

OTT asked for a technical explanation how far the East Siberian area extended since according to the statement of the Japanese Government it wanted to annihilate communism there. MATSUOKA replied that this area was not exactly bounded geographically, but according to his interpretation extended to

IRKUTSK.

Natsnoka said he would see the Russian Ambassador afterwards. He would give him a statement, the wording of which he handed over to ~~OTT~~ ^{OTT} in English translation. He emphasized especially the closing sentence.

At today's cabinet session only a communiqué will be communicated. This is also to serve as guidance (Sprachregelung) in reference to the American and English Ambassadors.
(60241-3)

Item 6 Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 3 July, 1941.

The English translation of the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister for Ribbentrop.

"... I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combatting the communist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in particular, determined as she is to destroy

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the communist system established there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add, that the augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining the Soviet Russia at the Far Eastern end in her struggle with Germany is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government. At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese Government have decided to secure points d'appui in French Indo-China which will enable Japan to further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. - ~~In this connexion, I would like to draw Your Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant vigil in the Pacific including the south-western ocean with a view to restraining these two powers and will continue the efforts and even intensify them, if necessary.~~ [60244-5]

I assure you Excellency once again that the Japanese Government will not fail to act in accordance with the aims and spirits of the Tripartite Pact" (60244-5)

Item 7: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 1 July, 1941, containing English translation of oral statement made to the Soviet Ambassador.

~~Japan finds herself in a awkward position faced with the war between Germany and Italy, her allies, on one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, with whom she has but recently begun to improve relations in sincere desire to promote and maintain good neighbourliness. Japan is, therefore, most anxious to see the termination of the hostilities at the earliest possible date, earnestly wishing that it may at least be confined to regions not immediately adjacent to the Far East where she possesses vital interests. [60246-7]~~

~~Item 9: Telegram for German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 3 July, 1941, containing English translation of introduction to oral statement given Italian Ambassador, irrelevant to case. [60248]~~

Item 19: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 3 July 1941.

OTT handed over personally to MATSUOKA the message from the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA was ~~grateful~~ ^{in full agreement with it} for the message and would bring it to the attention of the Army and Navy and Emperor tomorrow. In the Cabinet session (he said) he warned KONOYE and other cabinet members that after some time the Japanese people would demand action against the Soviet Union.

MATSUOKA ^{pointed out that} ~~made~~ the working of the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador ^{was whined in such a way} ~~to~~ deceive the Russian or leave them in darkness. This was necessary because of the ~~causing~~ ^{causing} the incomplete armament. ~~(He said that)~~ SMETANIN had no suspicion that preparations against the Soviet Union were progressing at an accelerating rate.

~~(He said that)~~ he further declared to SMETANIN that, as far as Japan knew, neither the USA had ~~neither~~ ^{promised} any aid in weapons nor had such aid been requested ~~by~~ by the Soviet Union. He

advised strongly against any sort of co-operation like that, since Japan, at the desire of her allies, would not permit deliveries.

OTT explained to MATSUOKA that ^{Germany} they could not be satisfied with the Japanese stand. ~~He~~ ^{Matsuoka} replied that he personally was sorry about the cabinet's decision, but he assured ^{that} he would see that deficiencies in preparations were eliminated and that the army prepared for all eventualities. [60249-60250]

Item 9: Telegram to Tokyo Embassy from Ribbentrop, 3 July, 1941.

Ribbentrop wants to find out whether SHIRATORI is really sick or not. [60260]

Item 12: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 4 July, 1941
~~Indivant (60261)~~

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Item 10: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 4 July
 Military attaché reports following
 personal impression from conversation with
 Japanese General Staff.

The Japanese Army is preparing
 zealously and with accentuated camouflage for:

1. ^{occupation} ~~possession~~ of SAIGON at a not too
 distant time ^{as prerequisite} ~~it is under the presupposition~~
^{possible} for an advance further south, ~~but the~~
~~tangible point of attack is not yet recognizable.~~

2. A surprise, but not headlong
 opening of war against Russia with the
 seizure of the coastal provinces as the first
 goal. ~~Therefore General YAMASHITA was retained~~
~~on account of his experiences with the Kwangtung~~
~~army.~~ (60264)

Item 11: Telegram to German Embassy in Tokyo,
 from Ribbentrop, 5 July, 1941 (~~Partial Translation~~)

(A) ~~On the occasion of the discussion of~~
 Japan's stand against Soviet Russia, I should
 like to orient you personally relative to the
 communication MATSUOKA made to you.

A

Ribbentrop corrects statements about his conversation with MATSUOKA re: Japanese-Russo Neutrality pact, made ~~by~~ Matsuoka ~~to~~ Schulenburg in Moscow and Ott in Tokyo. Ribbentrop states, ~~on~~ ⁱⁿ ~~hand~~ ^{of} the memo by Schmidt about the conversation, that he told MATSUOKA that the conclusion of the pact is inopportune.

concerning my conversation with him concerning the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese non-aggression or neutrality pact.

Matsuoka told you, as you reported 6 May, that he had counted on the possibility of the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact after his departure from Berlin. (He told you that) he had expressed this to me and explained that he just wanted to seize the opportunity in case of Russian willingness. By this communication to you, Matsuoka apparently wanted to say that I had to count on the conclusion of the pact after the Berlin conversations.

Also in Moscow Matsuoka expressed himself to Count SCHULENBURG after the already successful agreement concerning the conclusion of the pact ^{and} of its formal signing. At this opportunity Matsuoka represented his Berlin conversations with me in such a way that he had said to me that he would not ~~be~~ be able to avoid longer reference to the long undecided question of a Japanese-Soviet neutrality or non-aggression pact... and that I had agreed.

Xobv

Neither what he said to you nor to Count Schulenburg corresponds to the facts.

According to Minister's Schmidt's notes, the conversation went thus: following a remark about the long-delayed Russo-Japanese commercial agreement taking place, Matsuoka asked me directly whether he should stay longer in Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression or a neutrality pact with the Russians. At that time he emphasized a direct accepting of Russia into the Tri-Partite Pact would not be admitted by the Japanese people and would call forth an angry clamor from the whole country. I answered his question that Russia's entry into the pact did not come into the question, and I recommended that he not enter into the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression or neutrality pact in Moscow, since this didn't fit into the frame of the present situation. To Matsuoka's remark that the conclusion of a fishing and commerce agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that nothing hindered the conclusion of that sort of

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purely commercial agreement. Thus my words made it clear that I did not consider a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact suitable. The announcement that a pact had taken place was a surprise to me. Nevertheless, at that time, I waived expressing this to Matsnoka.

Even now there would be no purpose in pointing out his incorrectness in putting the conclusion of the pact up to the German government as a surprising fait accompli. Nevertheless, I inform you of the actual ~~course of matters~~. Likewise you may have the opportunity to remind Matsnoka that in the interview he had with you about the Japanese-Soviet pact ^{he made the following remarkable declaration} "No Japanese ~~president~~ ^{premier} or foreign minister would ever be in a position to keep Japan neutral, in case Germany went to war with the Soviet Union; in this case Japan would necessarily be driven to attack Russia along with Germany. No neutrality pact would be able to change that." "

[60265-7]

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Item ~~12~~ Memo from KRAMARZ, Berlin, 5 July, 1941,
concerning ^{Russian and Japanese troop} ~~displacement of troops and~~ movements
~~ammunitions~~ ^{from} Far East. ~~includes + to case,~~
[60268]

~~Item 16: Telegram from WAGNER, HSINKING, 5 July, 1941,
containing a report from Harbin confiscation
of tractors in North Manchuria. [60269]~~

Item 13: Memo from KRAMARZ, Berlin, 6 July, 1941
Colonel YAMAMOTO, with Major HIGUTI
explained to Colonel von LAHOUSEN that:

"The Japanese General Staff had commissioned
him to communicate that the Japanese General
Staff is ready to execute sabotage-attacks
in the far East against Soviet Russia,
especially from Mongolia and from
Manchukuo, and in the first place against
the area around Lake Baikal." (60270)

Item 14: Telegram from Ribbentrop, Westphalia,
8 July, 1941

Ribbentrop

asks Ambassador STAHMER to ^{write} ~~communicate~~ the following in ~~my~~ ^{his} behalf to ~~Ambassador~~ OSHIMA to a visit to the Eastern front.

1. ~~If it would interest OSHIMA, it would be possible for him to inspect the North-East Front.~~

~~Since the special daily reports from the eastern war situation probably do longer interest OSHIMA, with his permission Ribbentrop will stop sending them to him, although he promises to let him know if something of particular interest is not made known in the newspapers or on the radio.~~

Then follows an over-all description of the advances of the German Army on the Eastern Front. ^{which is to be given to OSHIMA.} In Finland, he says the offensive has been held back according to plan. Germany has mastery of the air, and Soviet tank power seems to have been broken.

(60271-2)

Item 15: Telegram to ~~German~~ Foreign Minister from OTT, ^{to Ribbentrop}
Tokyo, 7 July, 1941 (in reply to Item 9)

giving a report of ~~the truth about~~ SHIRATORI'S illness.
~~Since the end of April he has been suffering from~~
~~kidney trouble, and was at one time in~~
~~great danger. He does not hope for recovery~~
~~before autumn. He seems very tired and had~~
~~difficulty in walking.~~ He asked that OTT
assure the ^{German} Foreign Minister that as soon as
he could ~~again~~ resume his political
work he would without change apply
himself for Japan's active advancing and
that he considered entry into war against
Russia as the most pressing objective. 60273

Item 16: Telegram for German Foreign Minister from OTT,
8 July, 1941.

The Foreign Minister handed OTT the
following draft (in English) of a report of
the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, 4 July,
describing the ~~wretched~~ ^{low morale} conditions of the
Russian populace and soldiers, ~~stating that~~
~~the end seemed near at hand.~~ OTT

MATSUOKA

remarked then to ~~the Japanese Foreign Minister~~ that this should move the Japanese Cabinet to speed up their preparations against Russia. MATSUOKA replied that things ~~he also spoke to~~ ~~OT~~ certainly would develop in this direction. ~~the Japanese attack against Russia as a natural necessity.~~ He (60274-5)

Item 17: Note for State Secretary and Foreign Minister from Woermann, Berlin, 8 July, 1941
~~Japanese Ambassador~~ ^{Counsellor of the Jap Embassy} ~~former~~ KASE, in behalf of OSHIMA, met ~~a Japanese Ambassador~~ ^{and, on the hand} from London, SHIGEMITSU in Lisbon. ~~USHIBA~~ of his statements compiled the Memo ~~the former legation secretary, also assisted.~~
 "On the condition in England", ^{which follows} ~~was compiled~~ by ~~SHIGEMITSU and USHIBA.~~ In my opinion article 4, "The Defense of the Invasion", should not remain in this form to ~~Japanese assumption.~~
 (60276-60277)

Item 18: Memo, "On the Condition in England", from the beginning of June, 1941. Giving detailed description of bomb damages, ~~to~~ ^{preparations against German landings etc.} ~~reference to case~~ [60278-60283]

~~Item 23: Telegram to OTT from Ribbentrop, 9 July, 1941.~~

Ask Matsnoka whether he has received an
reply from Washington to his answer to the
American Government concerning an American
Japanese agreement, and what is the state
of the discussions on that subject. [60284]

Item 19: Telegram to German Embassy Tokyo,
from Ribbentrop, 10 July, 1941. Identical with IPS Doc 571

~~Let me know the following points:~~

- 1. What is the relation between Japan and
the United States? Ribbentrop then reprimands
OTT for not letting him know about
NOMURA's verbal assurances to the American
Government which could have moved Roosevelt
to the occupation of Iceland in the knowledge
that Japan would have no objection to it.
- 2. How was America's occupation of Iceland
received by the Japanese public, in the press, and
in government and military circles? Do you have
the impression that Japan is inclined to a
to be sure short-sighted policy aiming, through
a settlement with America, at linking
America to a European war in order to

give herself a free hand in ~~the~~ East Asia without coming to open conflict with America, and indeed to settle the Chinese matter and to expand further to the South? For Japan will never be able to construct a Greater East with England and America, but only ~~against these two countries.~~

3 Ribbentrop should like exact news of the reaction of the Japanese Government to ~~his~~ message to MATSUOKA.

4. Thank the Japanese Foreign Minister for passing on the wire from the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. It would be good, if the ~~we~~ Germans received further news from Russia in this way.

(Then follows an exhortation pointing out the advantages Japan would have in entering war against Russia.)

That Japan wants to assure herself of further positions in Indo-China, etc., is understandably also in German interest, as every expansive measure of Japan is welcomed by ~~the~~ the Germans.

Ribbentrop has no doubt that Japan will stand by her obligations to the Tri-Partite Pact in case of the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and America, which seems today certain.

He asks OTT to do all he can to effect Japan's entry into war against Russia as soon as possible. He is convinced that, after the defeat of Britain and Russia, if the Tri-Partite countries stand together, and if every action of the Americans is immediately met with the like weapons, the New Order will be assured. (60285-9)

Item 20: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 10 July, 1941
 A report from ~~re~~ Japanese Ambassador in Washington concerning attitude of America. ~~Statement to case.~~ (60290-1)

Item 26: Telegram from PRUEFER, Rio de Janeiro, 11 July, 1941

Japanese Embassy communicated that traffic to East Coast of America via Panama + South Africa has stopped, that to Buenos Aires + Rio de Janeiro ^{via Cape Horn} continues for the time being. Inform O.K.M + O.K.W. (60295)

1941.

Item 21: Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 10 July, 1941.

OTT states that he has kept Foreign Minister informed of all necessary events pertaining to the state of Japanese-American discussions. OTT has received information from the other side, that Admiral. NOMURA is making efforts to keep Japanese-American negotiations in progress, but that the stand of the American Government had not yet reached him. Matsuoka told OTT he was too busy with the Japanese attitude to the German-Russian conflict to give much attention to the American problem. OTT understands from his informant that an American answer to the matters urged by Admiral NOMURA attempted to re-establish the American plan of 18 April. In particular, America would suggest to Japan a plan, which would preclude the fulfillment of the Tri-Partite Pact in the Pacific. In reference to China, the American Government would not agree to break her obligation with CHIANG KAI SHEK in case he should refuse to accept the American counsel of settling with Japan.

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Finally, HULL is said to have explained verbally to Nomura that successful continuation of the discussions would only be possible if they were desired by the entire Japanese cabinet.

According to my informant, Matsuoka, basing on Hull's statement, hopes to take the wind out of the sails of the Americophile clique by reference to this unheard of meddling with the internal affairs of Japan.

The session of the executive committee this morning, at which time Matsuoka first told of the existence of an American reply, has been adjourned until Saturday. (60298-60298)

Item 22: Telegram for OKW from OTT (~~per Kraetschmer~~), Tokyo, 12 July, 1941

A. Ott has the impression that the following ~~single~~ individual measures have been taken as part of Japanese war preparations.

1. Numerous officers have been called to new employment assignments.
2. Alleged summons of 24 to 27 year old reservists.

3. Supplementary summons of drivers of vehicles.
4. Confiscation of tractors in Manchuria
5. Students forbidden to make for travels.
6. Drafting of all who can speak Russian.

B. According to rumor, the 17 July is expected to be the occupation of SAIGON. Allegedly only 3 divisions have been alerted.

C. Bringing the Kwantung Army up to full strength for the impending war against Soviet Russia apparently around Shanghai and Tientsin, where reservists and 2 Japanese divisions (including the sixteenth) have been transferred.

D. In China no greater Japanese operations are apparent for the time being. (60300)

Item 23: Telegram for the German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 12 July, 1941

Re OTT ~~had~~ conversation with Vice-Foreign Minister OHASHI. ~~OHASHI~~ ^{about} OHASHI confirmed an American answer, ~~essentially as OTT had reported before.~~ He added that the American Government refused to allow themselves to be bound by any

sort of arrangement in the question of entry into war for self-defense. The American Government said it could not agree to the presence of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; it wants to maintain the principles of the open door in China. The answer also proposed to settle ^{fairly} all questions of commerce and the purchase of raw materials in the Pacific on the basis of reciprocity. Ohashi ~~explained~~ ^{declared} this ~~was~~ ^{to be} unacceptable. ~~In his~~ ^{his} personal opinion, however, the Japanese Government would not immediately break off relations. [C0301-2]

Item 2A: From the liaison man in Prague, the following report from Moscow, ^{via Prague} compiled in the latter half of June, was placed before State Secretary, 12 July, 1941.

BARKOW, the councillor of the Foreign Commissariat, said that in the opinion of the Soviet diplomats MATSUOKA'S mission to Moscow was designed to discover in what degree Japan could receive help from Germany and Italy.

Japan needs friendly relations with the Soviet in order to continue her war with China. Japan (in the opinion of the Soviet diplomats) must strive for a situation in which the Soviet Union will be disinterested in this war. Japan is ready to share spheres of influence in the Far East with Russia and to settle differences such as the question of the fishing concessions on the condition that the Soviet Union cease her deliveries of arms to China. The Soviet Government, informed of Japan's weakness, will, however, not change her relations with CHUNGKING and in close co-operation with China will defend the Russian possessions in the Far East against Japanese conquest. So, in Barkov's opinion, Matsuoaka returned to Japan unsuccessful. Matsuoaka's co-operators spoke of the great difficulty of waging war in China who was receiving aid from the Anglo-Saxon nations.

(60303-5)

Item 25. Memo for German Foreign Minister from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin, 12 July, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador expresses thanks to the German Government for its assistance ^{friendly powers in regard to the} ~~communication~~ with the recognition of the WANG CHING WEI Government ^{and also not request it now} ~~and this government~~ ^{is to work} ~~is working~~ to the same end in Copenhagen and Helsinki, also recognition of Manchuria (60306)

(Identical with IPS 4025, Sten II)

Item 26. Memo from WEIZSÄCKER, Berlin, 12 July 1941 re conference with OSHIMA ~~(at the Japanese Embassy)~~ ~~The Japanese Ambassador mentioned to~~

Weizsäcker that he and his foreign minister had been corresponding. He tried to induce the foreign minister to decide upon further Japanese politics and to make up his mind between the South and the North, since the dispersion of the Japanese forces is impracticable. In principle MATSUOKA agreed with OSHIMA without expressing himself unambiguously.

In regard to Indo-China, OSHIMA replied that the possession of sure positions in southern Indo-China as a foothold for

aircraft and war-ships was an urgent Japanese need. OSHIMA did not think an advance against South Indo-China in the near future likely. He believed that Tokyo would probably wait for a good opportunity.

OSHIMA appears not to be too well informed about Japanese-American relations. (He said) he had advised MATSUOKA to cut short his conversation with Washington flatly.

~~(60307H 60307/2)~~

~~Item 32: Telegram to German Ambassador in Tokyo, from GAUS, 12 July, 1941~~

~~The German Foreign Minister requests OTT to find out something about the American reply which is supposed to have arrived in Tokyo regarding Japanese-American advances. (60308)~~

4062

Item 37: Memo from Deutsche Informationsstelle, Berlin, 12 July, 1941

A report from Singapore through a confidant in Prague information received from Giljarow, officer of the former Russian fleet, ~~gives the following information about the cause of the present English-Japanese conflict, stating, that~~

Japan proceeds to provoke THAILAND to seize areas in French-Indochina. In Indo-China Japan is urging a policy of economical and industrial colonization etc. ~~The organization of a new technical corps is provided for in the plans of the English government, to which 5 divisions of Chinese Infantry will be assigned. In Singapore American pilots and aircraft are entering. Mixed English and American air squadrons are being organized. One hears from American officers that a strong air fleet would suffice to secure Singapore from a Japanese attack, and that in such an eventuality, the English-American forces,~~

~~without the intervention of the Australian air fleet,
would be superior to the weak Japanese
air fleet. (60309)~~

~~Item 34: Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 10 July, 1941.~~

~~The American Ambassador asked the
Japanese Foreign Ministry about the rumor
that Japan's entry into a war against
the Soviet Union was imminent. As a
reply he received the communication
MatsuoKa gave SMETANIN. The Vice-Foreign
Minister told OTT that the announcement
of the AFTONBLADET that Tokyo was ready
to improve Japanese-American relations
by the conclusion of a Non-Agression Pact
was ~~untrue~~. (60310)~~

~~Item 35: Memo from WEISSÄCKER, Berlin, 13 July, 1941~~

~~The Japanese Ambassador told WEISSÄCKER
that, according to a telegram from HSINGKING,
the German Consul General from Vladivostok
and 3 members of the Consulate General in
Manchuria were received unharmed. (60311)~~

~~RE~~

Item 28. Telegram to German Foreign Minister
 from OTT, Tokyo, 14 July, 1941
 Annex to Item 19. Identical with IPS Doc 522

~~Japanese American relations are characterized by increasing strain. Economic strangulation measures on the part of the United States against Japan aggravate the situation. Japanese Anglo-phile circles are still trying to make an agreement, but they are condemned to be frustrated by the American attitude and by the increasing will for defense of the Japanese ultra-nationalists. The majority of the Japanese cabinet and the Foreign Minister are observing the possibility of America's entry into war with great concern.~~

~~(The next 1 1/2 typewriter pages are completely garbled)~~

~~In the army and navy and in other nationalistic circles one finds the conviction that Japanese political power in East Asia can only be realized against the Anglo-Saxon powers.~~

In these circles there is also discussion that the further course of the war and German victory can only be accompanied by the constantly increasing weakness of the Soviet Union and of the Anglo-Saxon powers in the Pacific. The chief difficulty will be to convince these circles that a further delay will be no gain for Japan.

Then follows discussion about Matsukawa's "personal message" to the German foreign minister. OTT says that the German foreign minister's message found extensive assent among Army leaders, in which the necessity of a certain preparation time for interference against the Soviet Union was emphasized.

OTT believes that Japanese participation will follow in the not too distant future. The greatest obstacle which must be combatted is the splitting up of the activist group, which pursues different goals without unified leadership and

adapts itself slowly to a changed situation.
 (60312-5)

Item 37; (Repetition of Item 36 with omitted and garbled portions added or corrected. Statements not included in the previous analysis:)

Matsuoka is extremely concerned with keeping America out of active intervention, since he is convinced that American assault activity in the Atlantic would necessarily mean the dreaded prolongation of the war in the Pacific. However, Japan is taking precautionary measures in case of war with America. Admiral KONDO states that Japan had stopped navigation to the American East coast and avoids the Panama Canal as much as possible. Also navigation to the West Coast is so directed that an immediate withdrawal is possible.

✓ The possession of Iceland was considered as an unequivocal step on the

part of America in the direction of entry into war. DTT does not believe that the Japanese Government is striving for an agreement with America and for America's entanglement in a long European war to leave her a free hand in East Asia. Nevertheless, the Anglophiles and the nationalists viewed the removal of the strong American fleet from the Pacific with relief since by this they expect to be able to carry on undisturbed the undertaking in Indo-China. (60316-9)

~~Item 38: Telegram from DTT, Tokyo, 14 July, 1941.~~

~~The director of the Economic Department of the Foreign Ministry told DTT that Japanese navigation will no longer call at the Atlantic Coast of North, Central, and South America. Japanese ships would therefore only maintain traffic with the Pacific Coast of America. [60320]~~

施錠事項トシテノ取扱フコト

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月三日 三時五五分
着 一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月三日 八時二五分

一九四一年七月二日付才一〇二号

註
特別列車へ、
第二三三一号、
下ニ転送

独逸外務大臣宛

一九四一年七月三日付
Telko

二日付電報才一〇二号ニ関聯シテ。

日本外務大臣ノ声明書ノ本文ハ後ニ續ク。

極秘
口頭聲明書

(翻訳)

フオニリツベントロツポ閣下ニ次ノ事ヲドラカ即傳ヘ下サイ。
私ハ東京ノ大使オット將軍及ビ伯林ノ大使大島將
軍ヲ通ジテ為サレタル閣下ノ要請ニ充分注意シマヌ。
ソノ要請ヲ以テ日本ノ政府ニ近ツカントシテ閣下ニ依ツテ
開陳サレタル御意見ヲ研究セント 特別ノ注意ヲ拂ヒマヌ。
其ニ対スル答トシテ、私ハ共産黨ノ脅威ニ対シ積極
的ニ闘争セントシテ独逸ト協カセシガ為ニソワイエト社会主
義共和聯邦ニ関スルアリトアラユル不測ノ事件ニ対シ日本

が準備ヲナシツツアルト述ベルヲ喜トスルモノデアリマス。日本ハ
 特ニ東部ニベリヤニ於ケル事情ノ発展ヲ鋭ク監視シテ居
 リ、其知ニ建設サレタ共産黨組織ヲ破壊シ得ルト確信
 シテキルモノデアリマス。次ノ事ヲ附ケ加ヘル必要ハ殆ニドナイト
 信ズルノデアリマス。即チ軍備ノ増大。就中此ノ目的ヲ
 達成セシト企ニテ、同時ニ独逸トノ戦闘ニ於テ、ソヴィエト
 ロシヤヲ極東ニ於テ牽制セシトスル目的ヲ有スル軍備ノ増
 大ハ固ク日本政府ノ心ノ中ニ保持サレキルデアリ。同
 時ニ私ハ次ノ事ヲ述ベルヲ才願ヒスル。即チ日本政府ハ
 日本ノ壓迫ヲ英米及ビ合衆國ニ更ニ強化スルヲ可能
 ナラシムル様ニ據點ヲ佛領印度支那ニ確保スルニ決定
 シタト。之ニ對シ、私ハ日本ハ是等ニ國ヲ牽制セシカ爲ニ南
 西大洋ヲ含ム太平洋ニ絶エズ監視ヲナシテ居リ、且ツ
 努力ヲ繼續シ、且ツ必要ナレバ、ノ努力ノ強化サヘ計ルテ
 アラウト云フヲ實ニ對シ閣下ノ注意ヲ引カント欲スル
 モノデアリマス。此ノ事カ真ニ我々ノ共通ノ目的ニトシテ重々
 貢獻ヲナシ、且ツ蘇戰ニ於ケル此ノ機ニ於ケル日本ノ干渉
 ニ劣ラズ重大ナル貢獻ヲナシテキルト云フヲ閣下ハ私
 ト全然同感セラレルデアラウト信ズルモノデアリマス。
 独伊カヤガテ勝利者トシテ出現スルヲ確信シテキル戦
 争ノ全経過ニ對シ、非常ニ重大ナル態ニテ結局存シテ
 キル南洋ニ於ケル努力ヲ日本ハ死ノルヲモ去来ナシ
 又ニナイデアラウ。私ハ日本政府カ必ずヤ三島同盟ノ目標
 ト精神ニ則ツテ行動スルデアラウヲ今一交閣下ニ確言
 スルモノデアリマス。

オット

No 3.

Doc 4062A

書類第四〇六二A 號

證

余 *Ulrich Strauss* ハ 余ガ 独逸 語 及 ビ
日本 語ニ 精通 セル 者ナル コト 並ニ
独逸 語 原文 及 ビ 日本 語 原文ヲ 對照
ノ 上 右ハ 本 書類ヲ 眞實ニ 且 正確ニ 翻譯セ
ルモノナルヲ 確證セルコトヲ 茲ニ 證ス。

Ulrich A. Strauss

DOC 4062B

電報(秘密暗号法)

秘録事項トシテノミ取扱ノ事

東京一九四一年七月四日 十時三十分

着 " " 五日 零時五十分

取急

七月四日附 三五〇号

大使館附武官ハ日本ノ参謀本部長ト會談カラ次ノ如キ個人的印
象ヲ報告スル 日本軍隊ハ急イテ而モ甚ダシク秘密ニ準備ヲ
ス、メテナル。

(一)西貢ノ占領ハソウ遠イ時様ノ事デハナク。ソレハ万一ノソレ以上ノ南進
ニ對スル前提デアルカシソレニ對スル明日ト支度ハ未ダ見ラレナイ。
(二)沿海州ヲ占領スル亦一目的ヲ以テ不意ニ然シ躁急ニテハナク
「ロシヤ」ト戰端ヲ開キ事「旋ツテ山下指軍モ亦自己ノ經驗ヲ傳ヘ
ル為ニ當分ノ間、関東軍ニ留マツタ。

オット

書類才四〇六ニB号
證

余 Whitch Strawn ハ余ガ「ドイツ」語及ビ日本語ニ精ニ通セル者
ナル事並ニ「ドイツ」語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對照シ上右ハ本書
類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セル事ヲ茲ニ證ス

Whitch, A. Strawn

701.

電報（公開）施錠事項トシテノニ取扱了事

歐洲特別列車 一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月五日 零時十七分

着 " " 五月一時十分

五九八号

(一) 暗号局

(二) 東京独逸外務省（暗号電報 秘密暗号法）

東京へ九八号ノ下上回送

電報一九四一年七月五日

日本ノソゴトトシマニ対スル態度ニ就テ予論議スル機会ニ
乘貴君ノ個人ノ指針ノタメニ松岡ガアノ多時日蘇不可侵
又ハ中立條約締結ノ題目ニ就テ彼ト私トノ會談ニ関シテ厚
ニ夕所ノ報告ヲ以下ニ修正シタイ。

一九四一年（昭和十六年）五月六日付ノ貴電才六八五号ヲ

以テ貴君ガ報告サレタ通り松岡ハソノ多時貴君ニ次ノ
様ニ語ツタ即チ彼ハベルリンカフ彼ノ出發後日蘇中立條
約締結ノ可能性ヲ甚ツ差シテ予ニシテ居ナイト。
彼ハ私トノ會談ニ於テモエノ事ヲ言ヒ表ハシ唯口ニヤ側ノ
用意アル場合ニハソノ機ヲ相ニタイト言明シタ。多時
貴君ニ対シ爲サレタ報告ヲ以テ松岡ハ明カニ私カシル

リン會談後條約締結ヲ當ニキカヌデアラウト云々下ニクテ
アツタ。

ニテリンバルが伯ニ対シテモ松岡ハモスクワニ於テ條約締結
ニ因ニテ既ニ成立セル一致ニ從ツテ而モソノ正式署名ノ寸前
ニ同ジ様ノ意味ヲ意見ヲ述ベタノデアツタ。ユノ機会ニ松
岡君ハ私トノベルリン會談ヲ次ノ様ニ陳述シテ申ル。即チ
彼ハモスクワニ於テ長イ困難ヲアツタ日蘇中立又ハ
不可侵條約ニ觸レル事ヲ避ケ得ナイデアラウト彼ハ
私ニ語ツタト。彼ハ何等氣垂リヲ見セナイ事ハ勿論デ
アレガ然シモ若シロニヤガ日本ノ希望ニ同意スルテ止ム
ヲ得ズ何事カラ爲テカルヲ得ナイデアラウト私ハコト考ノ
方ニ賛成セシタ。

貴方ニ對シテモ亦ニテリンバルが伯ニ對シテモ與ヘ
ラシク陳述ハ事實ニ適合シテ井ナシデアル。日蘇不可侵
條約又ハ中立條約ノ課題ハ一九四一年一昭和丁二年三月ニ
十八日付ノ我々ノ會談ニ於テ松岡ト私トノ間ニ論ゼラレ
然モ會談後直チニニユミット公使ニ依ツテ作成サレタ覺
書ニ依レバ次ノ如クデアリ。長期日蘇通商條約ノ成立
ニ就テノ摘要ニ因リテ松岡ハ彼ハロニヤトノ不可侵又
ハ中立條約ヲ交渉スルタメニ彼ノ帰途モスクワニヨリ長
ク止マルベキカ否カノ旨問フ私ニ直接ニシタ。ソノ際彼ハ強
調シテ即チ三ノ同盟ノ中ニロニヤヲ直接受ケ入レル事ハ
日本ハ民ニ依ツテ許サレズ且ツ全日本ニ憤激ノ叫ビヲユ
ソ引キ起ステアラウト。私ハ松岡ノ 旨問ニ對シロニヤ

リン會談後條約締結ヲ當ニシカラスデアラウト云ハソトシタリデ
アツタ。

ニテリンバルグ伯ニ對シテモ松岡ハモスクワニ於テ條約締結
ニ因リテ既ニ成立セル一致ニ從ツテ而モソノ正式署名ノ寸前
ニ同ジ様ナ意味テ意見ヲ述ベタリデアツタ。ソノ機會ニ松
岡君ハ私トリベルリン會談ヲ次ノ様ニ陳述シテキル即チ
彼ハモスクワニ於テ長イ回懸案デアツタ日蘇中立又ハ
不可侵條約ニ觸レル事ヲ避ケ得ナイデアラウト彼ハ
私ニ語ツタト。彼ハ何等氣乘リヲ見セナイ事ハ勿論デ
アレカ然シモ若シロシヤガ日本ノ希望ニ同意スルテラズ止ム
テ得ズ何事カヲ爲サザルヲ得ナイデアラウト私ハコレ考メ
方ニ賛成セシタ。

貴君ニ對シテモ亦ニテリンバルグ伯ニ對シテモ與ヘ
ラシク陳述ハ事實ニ適合シテ井ナシデアル。日蘇不可侵
條約又ハ中立條約ノ課題ハ一九四一年一昭和十六年三月ニ
十八日付ノ我々ノ會談ニ於テ松岡ト私トノ間ニ論ゼラレ
然モ會談後直チニニミット公使ニ依ツテ作成サレタ覺
書ニ依シバ次ノ如クデアリ。長期日蘇通商條約ノ成立
ニ就テノ摘要ニ因リテ松岡ハ彼ハロシヤトノ不可侵又
ハ中立條約ヲ交渉スルタニ彼ノ帰途モスクワニヨリ長
ク止マルベキカ否カノ旨問フ私ニ直接ニシタ。ソノ際彼ハ強
調シテ即チニソノ同盟ノ中ニロシヤヲ直接受ケ入レル事ハ
日本ハ民ニ依ツテ許サズ且ツ全日本ニ憤激ノ叫ビヲユ
ソ引キ起ステアラウト。私ハ松岡ノ 旨問ニ對シロシヤ

Doc 406 2-4

同盟加入の問題ト厚リ得ナイト答(上述ノ問題即チ
 不可侵又ハ中立條約ノ締結ノ問題ヲ、コレハ現在ノ状況
 ノ枠内ナハ適当ニナイカラ、出来ルカケ始メナイ様ニ彼ニ
 勸メテ、漁業及ヒ通商條約ノ締結ガ日露ノ雰囲気ヲ良
 好ニスルカラウト、松岡ガ更ニ語ッタニ対シ、私ハ斯カル純
 粹ニ商業的條約ノ締結ニ対シ何等躊躇スルモノデハナ
 イト答(7)。

(次頁ニ續ク)

松岡ニ対スル私ノ當時ノ言明ハ從ツテ全ク誤ナク私ガ日ヲ蘇不ク侵
 條約又ハ中ニ條約ノ締結ヲ適当ト思ツテ中ナカッタ事ヲ認識サセタ
 ノヤウナ、其レ故ニ條約成立ノ報告ハ私ニツテハ不意打デアッタ、
 然レモモ拘ラズ當時私ハ此事ヲ松岡ニ対シテ言ハス事ヲチキ
 カッタデアルト、今テモ松岡ニイハル當時貴君ニ対シテ其レ(ラシク
 ル陳述)未ダ甚ニ彼ガ「ドイツ」政府ニ対シテ條約締結ヲ以テ不意打
 ノ既成事實ヲツキツケタト言フ事實ヲ指摘シタトテ何ノ目的
 ガアラウヲ然レモ拘ラズ松岡ニ対シテ此ノ點ヲ適当ナ形式テ
 修正スルヲ思フク必要ト思ハレル様合ガ貴君ノ將來ノ政治的
 會談ニアツテ生ズルガ故ニ私ハ事ノ真ノ經過ニ就イテ貴君ニオ
 知ラセスルデアル、同ニ松ニ將來ノ經過ニ於テ然ラク松岡ニカ
 事ヲ想起サセル様合ガ生ズルデアラウ即チ彼ガ日ヲ蘇條約ノ成立
 ニ就イテ貴君ト語ッタソノ同ジ會談中テ彼ガ貴君ニ対シ
 次ノ如キ注目スベキ聲明ヲ發シテ中デアアル「若シドイツガ蘇
 聯邦ト衝突スル場合日本ノ如何ナル總理大臣又ハ外務大臣
 モ日本ヲ中立ニ保ツ事ガ出来ナイデアラウ、此ノ場合ニ日本ハ自然
 必然性ヲ以テ獨乙ノ側ニツイテロシヤ」ヲ攻撃スル以テ込ヒ込ヒ
 アラウ、如何ナル中ニ條約モソノ事ニツキ何事モ変更スル事ハ出来
 ナイデアラウト」若シ貴君ガ以上ノ二點ヲ機會ノアル時ニ指摘スル
 事ヲ正シイト思ハレルナラバ私ハ私ガ此ノ事ノ事ニ彼ヲ同キセント
 シテカルク如何ク松岡ガ感ハナイニ松ニ非常中ニ輕クヤツテ世々タイ
 トオ救スル次第デス

4

リツメントトップ

Doc 4062-g

書類第四〇六ニ号

證

余 Michio Stano、余が獨逸語及日本語ニ精通セル者ナルト並ニ獨逸語原文及日本語原文ヲ對照、上右ノ本書類ヲ眞実ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Michio A. Stano

5

供 述 書

余、W. P. Cumming
余、W. P. カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ
証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル國獨逸國務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ國獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫爲眞ノ謄本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫爲眞謄本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ爲眞謄本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユレ・ピー・カミング
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

電報 (秘密暗号法)

錠ヲ掛ケ保管スルニ

Doc 4062E

東京 一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月三日 三時五五分
着 一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月三日 六時三十分

元四年(昭和十六年)七月三日附才二〇九号

至急報

獨逸國外務大臣宛

日附電報才九四二号ヲ参照

外務大臣發

上記電報訓令ノ到着直後余ハ松岡ヲ訪テ彼ニ獨逸

外務大臣ノ個人的報告ヲ傳達シタ。松岡ハ余ニ彼ハ大島大

使カ、此ノ報告ノ通知ヲ既ニ天皇ヲ議長トシタ本日ノ内閣々

議ノ開催前ニ得ニ牛ノト説明シタ。精確ナ本文ハ知ラズ

カ彼ハ彼ノ立場支持ノメテノ獨逸外務大臣ノ特別ナル傳達カ

正ニ到着セントシテ牛ノトイフ事ニ同意ヲ。明確ナル決定ニ到達スル爲

ニ利用シタ。彼ハ報告ヲ感謝シ居リ、之ヲ彼ハ明日直ニ陸海軍並

ニ天皇ニ告知セルテアラウ。彼個人トシテハ彼ハ獨逸外務大臣ノ考へ方

ニ全然同意見ヲアル。彼ハ彼ノ意見ハ現在母國ニ於テアリ

101

遺憾ニ思フヤル。閣議ニ於テ彼ハ總理大臣近衛及ゴ他ノ閣僚ニ
 日本國民ハ聽テソ聯ニ対スル政府ノ行動ヲ要求スルデアラウト警告
 告的ニ指摘シタ。今前面ニ立ツヤル反討勢力ハ結局ソノ意
 志ヲ貫徹デキヌカラ。彼獨逸外務大臣ニ彼ガ從來ノ線ヲ固
 弁スル事ヲ保証スル様ニ要請シタト。

余ハ松岡ニ閣議決定ハ政府ノヨリ遲キ遲滞ヲ嚴シク非難
 スルデアラウ國民カ確カニ理解サレヌデアラウト注意シタ。

「松岡ハソ聯大使ニ対スル日本ノ聲明用語ヲ軍備ノ不完全

ナルニ鑑ミ露西亞人ヲ欺キ又ハ少クモ不明瞭ニサセル必要ニ基
 礎ヲ置イタ」スメタイミンハ現在我々ニ傳達セラレタ政府ノ決定ガ

暗ホスル如ク、ソ聯ニ対スル準備ガ迅速ニ為サレノニ感付ケ居テ、
 彼ハ更ニ「スメタイミン」ニ日本ガ知ラヤル限リテハ米國モ武器後

助ヲ約束シテソ聯ノ軍事的援助モ要請サレヤイト
 説明シタ。彼ハ斯ル協カヲ決シテ試ミヌ様ニ切ナル勸告ヲ故

スル何故ナレバ日本ハ供給ヲ自國ノ同盟國ノ希望ニ基キテ、
 許ラヌデアラウデアルト。余ハ松岡ニ日本ノ態度ハ我々ヲ満足セ

シメ得ヌデアラウト説明シタ。松岡ハ彼ハ此レヲ豫期シテヤル。
 ソレテ個人的内閣決定ヲ遺憾ニ思フヤル。彼ハ然レドモ準備

703

Items Doc 4062E

ノ不足ハ出来支^ト早^ク除^去セラル^テアラウシ。陸軍ハ凡^ソ元^ノ不^慮
ノ場合ニ備^ヘテ^ハ今^一度^確言^スル^ト答^ヘテ^ハ。

オツト

註

特別列車へ宛^テオ^ニニ^九号^ヲニ^テ轉^送セリ。

TEL. K 77 四一年七月三日

No. 4

Item 8 Doo 4062 E

書類第四〇六二E號

證

余 *Ulrich Straus*、余が獨逸語及ビ
日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ
獨逸語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對照
ノ上右ノ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯
セルモノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ贍本タル事

三 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞贍本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
點檢圖覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞贍本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツテ・ガード
G. H. Garde

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

No 1.

4062H
Item 13

ベルリン、一九四一年（昭和十五年）七月五日
独逸不秘密事項

え部作成中 第一号

二覧書

陸海軍最高司令部ハ七月六日次ノ如ク通報シ来ツタ。
ベルリン日本大使館付陸軍武官補佐官、陸軍大佐山本ハ、
一九四一年（昭和十五年）七月四日陸軍少佐樋口ヲ帶同シテ
防衛中局長（Abw Abt II）ヲシテラハセン大佐ノ許ニ現レ見ツ
次ノ如ク説明ス。

日本ノ参謀本部ハ彼ニ次ノ事ヲ傳ヘル様 委任シタト
即チ日本参謀本部ハ極東ニ於テ、ソヴィエツト、コレヤニ
対シテ特ニ蒙古及ビ滿洲ニウラ而モ先ヅヤ一ニ、バイカル湖
周辺ノ地域ニ対シ、サボタービニ攻撃ヲ実施スル準備ガ
アルト

クラマ
ー
ツ

No 2.

4062 H
Stem 13

書類 4062 H 號

證

余 *Wairich Stem* ハ余ガ独逸語及ヒ
 日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト 並ニ
 独逸語原文及ヒ 日本語原文ヲ对照
 ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞実ニ且正確ニ翻譯
 セルモノナルヲ 確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Wairich A. Stem

40620

電報(秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四一年七月十二日 十時二十五分

着 十三日 一時

七月十二日附一二〇〇号
陸海軍司令部宛

A 日本ノ戦争準備ニ対シ次ノ如キ個々ノ処置ノ
印象ヲ有スル

新ヲナル仕事ノ爲ニ多クノ士官ヲ召集スル事
二十四ヨリ二十七才迄ノ豫備兵表面的召集
追加的自動車運転手ノ召集

滿洲國ニ於ケルトラクターノ没收
学生ノ遠距離旅行禁止
口シヤ語ヲ喋ル者ノ徵集

B (六) (五) (四) (三) (二) (一)
噂ニ依ルト七月十七日ト期待サレル西貢占
領ニ対シテハ假定上只三ヶ師團ノミガ準備
サレテ中ル

C 未ダ直接ニハ差迫ツテ中ナク対ソビエト

ロシア戦ノ爲ノ関東軍ヲ表面上上海並ニ天津
ヲ経テ補充シテ中ル。其処ハ豫備軍

(A2ト比較セヨ)ガ而シテ先ヅオーソノ下ニ十師

團ガアル約ニケノ日本師團ガ輸送サレル

D 支那ニ於テハ現在ヨリ大ナル日本ノ作戦ハ
有リサワニ思ハレナイ



クレツケタル

オット

注意 電信所ヲ通ジテ陸海軍司令部ノ秘
書記ニ転送サレタ。

Tel.
Ktr
13.7

書類 才四〇六ニC号

證

406.2C

原 *Ulrich Strauss* ハ余ガ独逸語

及ビ日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並

ニ独逸語 原文及ビ 日本語 原文

ヲ对照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞実

ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナ

ルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

Ulrich A. Strauss
署名

Cont- Page 1

余、W・P・カミング（W・P・CUMMING）ハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ語項ヲ證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル發落ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國遣征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル／＼柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ
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ナル直接復寫寫真ノ證本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真原本ノ文書原
本ハ、余ノ保管、製保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ
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流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫真原本ヲ提
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー、カミング

(W. B. OUBRING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

G. E. GARDNER

高級副官事務取扱

Lt. Colonel. AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL.

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

Doc. 4062 Evid

Folder 2

(105)

Telegram (Secret Cipher process) - to be kept in locked file

Tokyo, 3 July 1941 3.55 hours
Arrival 3 July 1941 8.25 hours

No. 1102 of 2 July '41

For German Foreign Minister TELKO, 3 July '41. Following telegram of 2nd, No. 1101.

Note: Sent on to special train under No. 2131.

Text of declaration of Japanese Foreign Minister follows:
Oral statement. Strictly confidential. (Translation)

Please convey the following to His Excellency Herr von Ribbentrop:

I have duly noted your excellency's request made through Ambassador General Ott in Tokyo and Ambassador General OSHIMA in Berlin. I have taken particular care in studying the views set forth by your Excellency in approaching the Japanese Government with the request.

[In reply I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combating the Communist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system established there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add that the augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet Russia in the Far East in her struggle with Germany is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government.]

At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese Government have decided to secure points d'appui in French Indo-China which will enable Japan further to strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. In this connection I would like to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that Japan has been keeping constant vigil in the Pacific, including the southwestern ocean with a view to restraining these two powers and will continue the efforts and even intensify them, if necessary.

I trust that your Excellency is in full agreement with me that this really constitutes a vital contribution to our common cause, indeed no less vital than Japan's intervention at this juncture in the German-Soviet War.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Japan cannot and will not relax her efforts in the south which after all possess a very important bearing upon the whole course of the war out of which I am most confident that Germany and Italy will soon emerge victoriously. I assure your Excellency once again that the Japanese government will not fail to act in accordance with the aims and spirits of the Tri-Partite Pact.

/s/ OTT

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No.4062A.

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

Nur als
Verschlußsache
zu behandeln.

Telegramm

(Geh.Ch.V.)

Tokyo, den 3. Juli 1941 - 3.55 m
Ankunft: " 3. " 1941 - 8.45 Uhr

Nr. 1104 vom 1. Juli.

Citissime !

Für Herrn Reichsaußenminister.

Im Anschluß an Drahtbericht Nr. 1101 vom
1. Juli folgt Wortlaut der Note englischer
Übersetzung der dem Sowjetbotschafter über-
mittelten mündlichen Erklärung:

Strictly confidential **oral** statement,
(translation.)

I take pleasure in informing Your Excellency
that Japan necessarily feels deep concern with the
german - sovjet war that has unfortunately broken
out. To be frank, Japan finds herself in the most
awkward position faced with the war between Ger-
many and Italy, her allies, on one hand, and the
Union of Socialist Sovjet Republics on the other,
with whom she has but recently begun to improve
relations in sincere desire to promote and maintain
good neighbourliness. Japan is, therefore, most
anxious to see the termination of the hosti ties
at the earliest possible date, earnestly wishing
that it may at least be confined to regions not
immediately adjacent to the Far East where she
possesses vital interests.

The Japanese Government take this opportunity
to

Handwritten note:
Nachricht. Wuppelberg
für R & M.

- Chief AD
- St. S. Keppler
- U. St. S. Pol. ~~_____~~
- U. St. S. R. ~~_____~~
- Botsch. Ritter ~~_____~~
- Leiter Abt. Pers.
- " " Ha Pol.
- " " Kult.
- " " Presse ~~_____~~
- " " Dischid.
- " " Inf. ~~_____~~
- Chief Prot.
- Dg. Pol. ~~_____~~
- Arb. Expt. bei *Pol*

60246

to state that they do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the Union of Socialist Sovjet Republics except to the extent of their natural desire not to give rise to misunderstandings to their allies. It is their sincere hope that they will be able to pursue a course of policy carefully calculated at once to serve their own interests and to preserve the spirit of mutual trust among the allies while maintaining good relations with the Union of Socialist Sovjet Republics. I need hardly add that their Excellencies, Messrs. Stalin and Molotoff, may rest assured that I will do my best but that future developments will largely decide if the Japanese Government can consistently abide by this policy.

Tokio, Juli 1st, 1941.

Ott.

-60247

Item 11
Telegram (Open) To be kept in locked file.

Special Train EUROPA	5 July 1941	0.17 hours
Arrival	5 July 1941	1.10 hours

No. 598

- 1.) Code Bureau
- 2.) German Embassy Tokyo
(Telegram Cipher, secret cipher process)

Remark: Sent to Tokyo under No. 981, Tel. Ktr., 5.7.41.

At the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, I wish to rectify below for your own orientation what MATSUOKA has told you at the time concerning my conference, with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression or Neutrality.

As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of 6 May 1941, MATSUOKA told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Neutrality. He said he had even brought this up in his conversation with me merely stating his willingness to accept in case Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By talking to you in this way, MATSUOKA obviously wanted to say that I would have had to reckon with the conclusion of the Treaty after the conversations at Berlin.

After agreement had been reached on the conclusion of the treaty and immediately before it was formerly signed, MATSUOKA also informed Count SCHULENBURG in Moscow in a similar vein. At this occasion Mr. MATSUOKA described his conversations with me at Berlin as follows: He had told me that while at Moscow he would probably not be able to avoid touching upon the long pending question of a Japanese-Russian treaty of neutrality or non-aggression. He would, of course, show no empressement whatever, but should the Russians comply with Japan's wishes, he would be obliged to do something. I had consented to this trend of thought.

Neither the description made to you nor that made to Count SCHULENBURG corresponds to the facts. [The subject of a Japanese-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality has been touched upon by MATSUOKA and myself in our conversation of 28 March 1941, in the following way, according to the memorandum made immediately after the conversation by Minister SCHMIDT:]

Following^a remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long-term trade agreement, MATSUOKA asked me directly whether during his return trip he should stop over in Moscow somewhat longer, in order to negotiate a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact. He stressed that the Japanese people would not allow a direct admittance of Russia into the Tri-Partite Pact, which would cause one cry of indignation all over Japan. I replied to MATSUOKA that the adherence of Russia to the Pact was out of the question and recommended that he not broach the previously mentioned question, i.e., the question of a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact with the Russians in Moscow, since this would not fit into the frame of the present situation. On MATSUOKA's further remark that the conclusion of a trade and fishery agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no objections against the conclusions of such purely commercial treaties.

Hence, what I said to MATSUOKA at the time unmistakeably revealed that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact to be suitable. The news of the conclusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I refrained at the time from making this known to MATSUOKA.

Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to MATSUOKA the incorrectness of the statement which he made to you at the time as well as to point to the fact that with the concluding of the Pact, he has surprised the German Government with a fait accompli. I am nevertheless informing you of the actual course of events because during your future political conversations, there may arise the chance to rectify this point to MATSUOKA in a suitable way, should it be deemed useful.

In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further course of events to remind MATSUOKA that during the same conversation in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Treaty with you, he made the following noteworthy statement: "Should Germany come to blows with the Soviet Union, no Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral. In this case Japan would be driven by the force of necessity to attack Russia at the side of Germany. No Neutrality Pact could alter any of this."

Should you deem it advisable occasionally to draw attention to both of the points, please do it in a very gentle manner so that MATSUOKA will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to task on these matters.

RIBBENTROP

Item 8

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

Tokyo 3 July 1941 3:55 m
 Arrival 3 July 1941 6.30 hours
 No. 1109 of 2 July 1941

Most Urgent!

For the German Foreign Minister
 Re Telegram of the 1st, No. 942 (Foreign Minister)

Immediately upon receipt of the above telegraphic order I have called on MATSUOKA, personally, transmitting the message of the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA stated that he had already received from Ambassador OSHIMA the announcement of the message already before today's Cabinet Session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut decision. He was thankful for the message with which he would tomorrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the trend of thought set forth by the German Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not prevailed for the moment. During the Cabinet Session he had warningly pointed out to Premier KONOYE and other Cabinet members that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government action against the SOVIET UNION. Antagonistic forces, who now are in the foreground, will in the long run be unable to carry their point.

He requests to assure the German Foreign Minister that he will adhere to the previous way /an alter Linie Festhalten/.

I brought to MATSUOKA's attention that the resolution of the Cabinet will certainly not be understood by the people, who will in the future heavily blame the government for the missing /their opportunity/.
 ((Matsuoaka said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the SOVIET Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present SMETANIN was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the SOVIET UNION as is hinted at in the government resolution transmitted to us.))

He has furthermore informed SMETANIN that, as far as was known to Japan the USA had not promised armed assistance /Waffenhilfe/ nor had the SOVIET UNION asked for it. He wished to give the earnest advice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind since, at the request of her Allies, Japan would not tolerate shipments.

I told MATSUOKA that JAPAN's attitude could not satisfy us. MATSUOKA replied that he had expected this, personally regretted the Cabinet resolution, but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness

/ would

would be eliminated as fast as possible, and that the army was preparing for all eventualities.

OTT

Remark: Transmitted to Special Train under No. 2129

Tel. Ktr. 3 July 1941

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062E

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cuning, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cuning
W. P. CUNING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. GARDE
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGO
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 4062 H
Item 13

Page 1

Secret State Matter

Berlin, 6 July 1941

Pol I M. 2107 g.Rs.

Six copies were made
This is No. 1

Ref.: LR. KRANARZ

MEMORANDUM

(The Army High Command has informed us on 6 July:

"Colonel YAMAMOTO, assistant of the Japanese
Military Attache, in Berlin called on Colonel
von LAHOUSEN, Chief of Counter Intelligence
Section II, on 4 July 1941, accompanied by Major
HIGUCHI, and said the following:

"The Japanese General Staff has commissioned
him to communicate /to us/ that the Japanese
General Staff is ready to carry out sabotage
attacks against SOVIET RUSSIA in the Far East,
especially from MONGOLIA and MANCHUKUO and, primarily
against the area adjoining Lake BAIKAL."

KRANARZ.)

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062H.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 4062

11 July 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Photostat File of Telegrams between German Foreign Office and Embassy in Rome and Tokyo (State Sec'y Japan, Vol. 4 a)

Date: 1-14 July 41 Original () Copy (x) Language: German and English (Items 7, 8, and 9)
Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)
Has it been photostated? Yes (x) No ()

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL

Nurnberg

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MATSUOKA, Yosuke; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SHIRATORI, Toshio; OHASHI

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Conspiracy for aggressive warfare

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Contains, among others, the following items:

Item 1. Telegram from Mackensen, Rome, 1 July 1941, concerning visit of Japanese Ambassador to German Embassy in Rome.

He indicated by this that Japan intended to advance actively against Russia, but needs still a few weeks. But such a policy would demand the retirement of MATSUOKA; since he had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia such a short while ago, he would have to disappear from the political scene for a certain time. Ecl

He mentioned that Japanese policy must do everything to prevent America from entering the war. /60233/

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Page 1

Item 2. Telegram to German Embassy in Tokyo from RIBBENTROP, 1 July 1941. Identical with IPS Doc. 4033, Item 8.

Item 3. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 3 July 1941.

OSHIMA, at a conference concerning recognition of WANG CHING WEI by Denmark and Finland, told WEIZSACKER that he had received the following preliminary information concerning the present Japanese attitude:

1. The Tri-Partite Pact remains the basis of Japanese Foreign policy.
2. Japan will further fight communistic organizations and strengthen her military preparations (presumably in Manchukuo).
3. Japan will tie up the two Angle-Saxon nations by pressure on England and the United States in the Southwest Pacific Ocean.
4. The Chinese conflict is to be finished by every possible means.

OSHIMA said that Point 2 was especially incomprehensible to him and that he had wired Tokyo for a commentary. (He said that) He had pointed out the danger of losing an historic opportunity and that he had declared he was not ready to champion a weak Japanese policy.

WEIZSACKER confirmed this surprising communication with OSHIMA through the information that OTT had just reported to them concerning the unsatisfactory course of the cabinet session. /60238-9/

Item 4. Memo from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 3 July 1941,

WEIZSACKER asked the Japanese ambassador whether there was any Japanese interest in the recognition of WANG CHING WEI by Denmark and Finland. In case it should apply (he said) Germany was ready in combination with Italy to take suitable steps in Denmark and Finland. The ambassador will ask in Tokyo. /60240/

Item 5. Telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP, Tokyo, 3 July 1941. Identical with IPS Doc 4033, Item 9.

Item 6. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 3 July 1941.

The English translation of the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister for RIBBENTROP.

" . . . I take pleasure in stating that Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities as regards the U.S.S.R. in order to join forces with Germany in actively combatting the communist menace. Japan is keenly watching developments of conditions in Eastern Siberia in particular, determined as she is to destroy the communist system established there. It is, I believe, hardly necessary to add, that the augmentation of military preparations, among other things, with an eye to realizing this object, together with the aim of restraining the Soviet Russia at the Far Eastern end in her struggle with Germany is steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese government. At the same time I beg to state that the Japanese government has decided to secure points d'appui in French Indo-China which will enable Japan ~~furthert~~ strengthen her pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. . . . I assure your Excellency once again that the Japanese government will not fail to act in accordance with the aim and spirit of the Tri-Partite Act." /60244-5/

Item 7. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 1 July 1941, containing English translation of oral statement made to the Soviet Ambassador. /60246-7/

Item 8. Telegram for German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 3 July 1941.

OTT ~~hand~~ personally to MATSUOKA the message from the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA was in full agreement with it and would bring it to the attention of the Army and Navy and Emperor tomorrow. In the Cabinet session (he said) he warned KONOYE and other cabinet members that after some time the Japanese people would demand action against the Soviet Union. /

MATSUOKA pointed out that the Japanese statement to the Soviet Ambassador was worded in such a manner as to deceive the Russians or leave them in darkness. This was necessary because of the incomplete armament. SMETANIN had no suspicion that preparations against the Soviet Union were progressing at an accelerating rate.

OTT explained to MATSUOKA that Germany could not be satisfied with the Japanese stand. MATSUOKA replied that he personally was sorry about the cabinet's decision, but he assured that-(he would see that)-deficiencies in preparations were eliminated and that the army prepared for all eventualities. /60249-50/

Item 9. Telegram to Tokyo Embassy from RIBBENTROP, 3 July 1941.

RIBBENTROP wants to find out whether SHIRATORI is really sick or not. /60260/

Item 10. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 4 July 1941.

Military attache reports following personal impression from conversation with Japanese General Staff.

The Japanese Army is preparing zealously and with accentuated camouflage for:

1. Occupation of Saigon at a not too distant time, as prerequisite for a possible advance further south.
2. A surprise, but not headlong opening of war against Russia with the seizure of the coastal provinces as the first goal. /60264/

Item 11. Telegram to German Embassy in Tokyo, from RIBBENTROP, 5 July 1941.

RIBBENTROP corrects statements about his conversation with MATSUOKA re Japanese-Russia Neutrality Pact, made to *by* MATSUOKA and Schulenburg in Moscow and OTT in Tokyo. RIBBENTROP states on hand of the memo by Schmidt about the conversation that he told MATSUOKA, that the conclusion of the pact is ineopportune.

"Likewise you may have the opportunity to remind MATSUOKA that in the interview he had with you about the Japanese-Soviet pact he made the following remarkable declaration: 'No Japanese premier or foreign minister would ever be in a position to keep Japan neutral, in case Germany went to war with the Soviet Union; in this case Japan would necessarily be driven to attack Russia along with Germany. No neutrality pact would be able to change that.'" /60265-7/

Item 12. Memo from KRAMARZ, Berlin, 5 July 1941, concerning Russian and Japanese troop movements in the Far East. /60268/

Item 13. Memo from KRAMARZ, Berlin, 6 July 1941, Colonel YAMAMOTO, with Major HIGUTI explained to Colonel von LAHOUSEN that:

"The Japanese General Staff had commissioned him to communicate that the Japanese General Staff is ready to execute sabotage attacks in the Far East against Soviet Russia, especially from Mongolia and from Manchukuo, and in the first place against the area around Lake Baikal." /60220/ 60270

Item 14. Telegram from RIBBENTROP, Westphalia, 8 July 1941.

RIBBENTROP asks Ambassador STAHRER to invite OSHIMA to a visit to the Eastern front.

Then follows an over-all description of the advances of the German Army on the Eastern front which is to be given to OSHIMA. /602712/ 60271-2

Item 15. Telegram from OTT to RIBBENTROP, Tokyo, 7 July 1941 (In reply to Item 9), giving a report of SHIRATORI's illness.

He asked that OTT assure the German Foreign Minister that as soon as he could resume his political work he would without change apply himself for Japan's active advancing and that he considered entry into war against Russia as the most pressing objective. /60273/

Item 16. Telegram for German Foreign Minister from OTT, 8 July 1941.

The Foreign Minister handed OTT a draft (in English) of a report of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, 4 July, describing the low morale of the Russian populace and soldier soldiers. OTT remarked then to MATSUOKA that this should move the Japanese cabinet to speed up their preparations against Russia. MATSUOKA replied that things certainly would develop in this direction. /60274-5/

Item 17. Note for State Secretary and Foreign Minister from WOERMANN, Berlin, 8 July 1941.

Counsellor of the Jap Embassy KASE, in behalf of OSHIMA, met former Japanese ambassador to London, SHIGEMITSU in Lisbon and, on the hand of his statements compiled the memo "On the condition in England" which follows. /60276-7/

Item 18. Memo, "On the condition in England", from the beginning of June 1941, giving detailed description of bomb damages, preparations against German landings, etc. /60278-83/

Item 19. Telegram to German Embassy, Tokyo, from RIBBENTROP, 10 July 1941. Identical with IPS Dec. 571.

Item 20. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 10 July 1941.

A report from Japanese Ambassador in Washington concerning attitude of America. /60290-1/

Item 21. Telegram for German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 10 July 1941.

OTT states that he had kept Foreign Minister informed of all necessary events pertaining to the state of Japanese-American discussions. OTT, has received information from the other side, that Admiral NOMURA is making efforts to keep Japanese-American negotiations in progress, but that the stand of the American government had not yet reached him. MATSUOKA told OTT he was too busy with the Japanese attitude to the German-Russian conflict to give much attention to the American problem.

According to my informant, MATSUOKA, using Hull's statement, hopes to take the wind out of the sails of the Americophile clique by reference to this meddling with the internal affairs of Japan. /60296/8/

Item 22. Telegram for OKW from OTT, Tokyo, 12 July 1941.

A. OTT has the impression that the following individual measures have been taken as part of Japanese war preparations.

1. Numerous officers have been called to new assignments.
2. Alleged summons of twenty-four to twenty-seven year old reservists.
3. Supplementary summons of drivers of vehicles.
4. Confiscation of tractors in Manchuria.
5. Students forbidden to ~~make for~~ ^{travel} travels.
6. Drafting of all who can speak Russian.

B. According to rumor, the 17 July is expected to be the occupation of SAIGON. Allegedly only three divisions have been alerted.

C. Bringing the Kwantung Army up to full strength for the impending war against Soviet Russia apparently around Shanghai and Tientsin, where reservists and two Japanese divisions (including the sixteenth) have been transferred.

D. In China no greater Japanese operations are apparent for the time being. /60300/

Item 23. Telegram for the German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 12 July 1941, re conversation with Vice Foreign Minister OHASHI about American answer. /60301-2/ *which should be made more acceptable.*

Item 24. Report from Moscow, via Prague re MATSUOKA's mission to Moscow. /60303-5/

Item 25. Memo for German Foreign Minister from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 12 July 1941.

The Japanese ambassador expresses thanks to the German government for its assistance with the ~~theft of~~ ^{theft of} powers in regard to the recognition of the WANG CHING WEI government and requests it now to work to the same end in Copenhagen and Helsinki, also re recognition of Manchukuo. /60306/

Doc. No. 4062 - Page 8 - SUMMARY Cont'd

Item 26. Memo from WEIZSACKER, Berlin, 12 July 1941, re conference with OSHIMA. (Identical with IPS Doc. 4025, Item 11)

Item 27. Memo from Deutsche Informationsstelle III, Berlin, 12 July, 1941.

A report from Singapore through a confidant in Prague re information received from Giljarow, officer of the former Russian fleet, stating, that

Japan proceeds to provoke THAILAND to seize areas in French Indo-China. In Indo-China Japan is urging a policy of economical and industrial colonization, etc. /60309/

Item 28. Telegram to German Foreign Minister from OTT, Tokyo, 14 July 1941.

Answer to Item 19. Identical with IPS Doc. 522.

Analyst: Lt Leo Traynor
Lt. K. Steiner

Doc. No. 4062
Page 8

Notiz für den Herrn Staatssekretär.

16/7

Nach nochmaliger Überlegung halte ich es für besser, daß der Herr R.A.M. heute nicht mit dem Japanischen Botschafter über die Aufhebung der Polnischen Botschaft usw. in Tokio spricht, da die Japanier dies dann zum Anlaß nehmen könnten, um die Beseitigung der Chinesischen Botschaft in Berlin schon jetzt zu fordern. Diese Forderung wird wohl sowieso bald kommen und wir könnten dann die Gelegenheit zum Druck auf Japan benutzen.

Berlin, den 1. Juli 1941.

-60232

Ex 797

Item 1.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Rome, 1 July 1941
Arrival, 1 July 1941
No. 1473 of 1 July
Secret

1520 hours
1540 hours

4) Clear text evidently missing

The Japanese ambassador, who previously my /) stated his desire to be received by BISMARCK, today called on the latter. The object of his call was, in the first place, to obtain information on the present state of the German-Russian theatre of war.

Worthy of note was his remark that a change of Cabinet must be reckoned with in JAPAN. (He intimated that JAPAN has the intention to actively advance /Vorgehen against Russia on its part, but needs a few more weeks. Such a policy, however, necessitates the resignation of Mr. MATSUOKA; since the latter has only recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with SOVIET RUSSIA, he would have to leave the political arena, at least for a certain period of time.) The Japanese ambassador further remarked that JAPAN's politics must do everything in order to prevent America from entering into the war.

WACKENSEN.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062-F.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

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/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Telegramm
(Offen)

Nur als
Verschlußsache

Europa, Nr. 634, den 1. Juli 1941
Ankunft, den 1. Juli 1941

zu behandeln.
1.35 Uhr
18.40 Uhr

Mit Vorrang!

- 1.) Chiffrierbüro Nr. 572
 - 2.) Diplogerma Tokio.
- Tel.i.Ziff. (Geh.Ch.V.)
Geheimvermerk für Behördenleiter.

Citissime!

Ich bitte Sie, mit grösster Beschleunigung dem dortigen Aussenminister das nachstehende von mir an ihn persönlich gerichtete Telegramm zu übergeben. Das Telegramm ist dort auf weissen Bogen ohne Kopf mit meiner Unterschrift zu schreiben. Es folgt der Wortlaut des Telegramms:

An Seine Exzellenz den japanischen Aussenminister,
Herrn Matsuoka, Tokio.

Persönlich.

Bei der Anwesenheit Euerer Exzellenz in Berlin wurde von uns in Aussicht genommen, dass wir bei Anlässen, die für das Wohl unserer beiden Länder von besonderer Bedeutung sind, persönlich in Verbindung treten würden. Dieser Augenblick ist nunmehr gekommen, und ich beehre mich, Euerer Exzellenz heute folgendes mitzuteilen:

1.) Durch die wuchtigen Schläge der deutschen Wehrmacht ist es gelungen, innerhalb der ersten acht Tage des deutsch-russischen Feldzuges der russischen Armee das Rückgrat zu brechen. Ein bedeutender Teil der besten Kampfddivisionen des Feindes sind teils vernichtet, teils gefangen, teils so angeschlagen, dass deren Reste während dieses Krieges wohl kaum mehr effektiv in Erscheinung treten dürften. Die feindliche Luftwaffe ist fast völlig zerschlagen, sodass auf der Hauptkampffront die deutsche Herrschaft zur Luft seit gestern vollkommen geworden ist. Unübersehbares Material wurde erbeutet oder vernichtet, über dessen Ziffer die deutschen Heeresberichte im einzelnen Aufschluss geben.

Chief A. G.

St. S. Keppeler

U. St. S. Pol.

U. St. S. R.

Botsch. Ritter

Leiter Abt. Pers.

" " Hn. 1941

" " K. 1941

" " E. 1941

" " S. 1941

" " 1941

Chief Prot.

Dg. Pol.

Arb. Exp. bei

60234

Inzwischen stossen die deutschen Heere auf der ganzen Front immer weiter nach Osten vor. Die kommenden Operationen des deutschen Heeres werden - ich zweifle hieran nicht - die sich noch stellenden feindlichen Streitkräfte in der gleichen Weise vernichten, und es ist damit zu rechnen, daß - vielleicht schon in wenigen Wochen - der russische Widerstand, und zwar im gesamteuropäischen Raum der Sowjetunion gebrochen sein wird. Mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit dürfte dies, wie ich Buerer Exzellenz bereits vor einigen Tagen durch Botschafter Ott mitteilen liess, wiederum in absehbarer Zeit zu einem endgültigen Zusammenbruch des bolschewistischen Regimes führen.

2.) Aus diesen geschichtlich einmaligen militärischen Erfolgen, die vor allem der Tapferkeit des deutschen Soldaten zu verdanken sind, und die die große militärische Bedrohung, der Europa ausgesetzt war, beseitigt haben, entsteht für die deutsche Führung die Verpflichtung, in Zukunft eine politische Lage im Osten herbeizuführen, die eine Wiederholung solcher Vorkommnisse ein für allemal ausschliesst. Hinzu kommt unsere Überzeugung, daß, solange Rußland als Keimzelle des Bolschewismus bestehen bleibt, weder Europa noch Ostasien noch die Welt im ganzen jemals zur Ruhe kommen wird. Deutschland ist entschlossen, aus diesen Erkenntnissen die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Es hofft hierbei auf die Mitwirkung Japans, da eine endgültige Bereinigung der russischen Frage am schnellsten und durchschlagendsten durch Japan und Deutschland gemeinsam erfolgen kann.

3.) Der kommende Zusammenbruch der Hauptmilitärmacht Rußlands und damit voraussichtlich des bolschewistischen Regimes selber, bietet für Japan die einmalige Gelegenheit, sich auch seinerseits von der russischen Bedrohung zu befreien und dem japanischen Reich die Sicherheit im Norden zu geben, die die Voraussetzung für seine lebensnotwendige Ausbreitung im Süden darstellt. Es scheint mir daher das Gebot der Stunde, daß die japanische Armee baldmöglichst sich Wladiwostoks bemächtigt, und so tief wie möglich nach Westen vorstösst. Das Ziel dieser Operationen müsste sein, daß noch vor Eintritt der kalten Jahreszeit die nach Westen marschierende japanische Armee den nach Osten vorstossenden deutschen Truppen auf halbem Wege die Hand reicht, daß dann sowohl auf der transsibirischen Bahn als auf dem Luftwege die unmittelbare Verbindung zwischen Deutschland und Japan über den russischen Raum her-

gestellt wird, und daß schliesslich die gesamtrussische Frage gemeinsam von Deutschland und Japan in einer Weise gelöst wird, die eine Bedrohung sowohl Deutschlands als auch Japans durch Rußland für alle Zeiten ausschliesst.

4.) Die Niederringung der Sowjetunion durch Deutschland und Japan wird die tatsächliche Macht der im Dreimächtepakt zusammengeschlossenen Staaten erst zur wirklichen Entfaltung bringen lassen. Deutschland und Italien werden somit der absolut beherrschende Faktor in der gesamteuropäisch-afrikanischen Hemisphäre sein. Sie werden in der Lage sein, dann ihren Druck auf England durch Bombardement der Luft und durch U-Boote enorm zu verstärken, und durch entsprechenden Einsatz die endgültige Niederlage Englands herbeizuführen. Japan seinerseits wird, im Rücken frei, seine gesamte Macht zur endgültigen Regelung der es interessierenden Probleme im Süden einsetzen können. Daß die Beseitigung des Sowjetregimes schon an sich die Lösung der chinesischen Fragen erleichtern wird, sei nur nebenbei erwähnt.

Was Amerika anbetrifft, so hoffe ich, daß nach der Niederringung Rußlands das Gewicht der Dreierpaktstaaten Deutschland, Italien und Japan und der ihnen angeschlossenen Mächte, zu denen, wie ich hoffe, in nächster Zeit eine Anzahl weiterer europäischer Staaten hinzutreten wird, genügen wird, um jede etwa dann noch aufkommende Tendenz in den Vereinigten Staaten, sich in den Krieg einzumischen, zu paralisieren.

Zusammenfassend möchte ich sagen:

Ich bin der Überzeugung, daß mit dem Sieg der deutschen Waffen in der vergangenen Woche nunmehr die vielleicht nie wiederkehrende historische Gelegenheit für Japan gekommen ist, die russische Frage gemeinsam mit Deutschland zu lösen, und unsere Völker auf längste Sicht von jeder Bedrohung sowohl weltanschaulich-politischer als auch militärischer Art aus diesem großen Raum zu befreien. Daß unsere Nationen dabei gleichzeitig im Verfolg der von uns seit jeher geführten gemeinsamen Antikomintern-Politik den entscheidenden Schlag zur Beseitigung des Bolschewismus, dieses größten Feindes der Menschheit, führen können,

- 60236

wird für die beiden Völker und ihre Führer die klassische Bewährung ihrer gemeinsamen politischen Konzeption und für immer der grösste Ruhmestitel sein.

Darüber hinaus aber, glaube ich, wird die Besiegung Russlands auch die Niederlage Englands durch die Achsenmächte wesentlich beschleunigen. Damit wären die Voraussetzungen für die von unseren Völkern ersehnte Neuordnung in Europa und Ostasien gegeben, und niemand in der Welt, die sich bereits heute immer geschlossener in ihrem Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus hinter die Achse stellt, wird den Staaten des Dreimächtepaktes mehr das Recht zur Schaffung einer neuen und gerechten Weltordnung streitig machen können.

Schluss des Telegramms.

Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop

Randvermerk:

Unter Nr. ~~1087~~ nach Tokio weitergeleitet.

942 Tel.Ktr. 1.7.41

60237

Item 3

Teletype

Berlin, 3 July 1941

To German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the occasion of a conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA concerning the recognition of WANG CHING-WEI by Denmark and Finland, I have drawn the Ambassador's attention to the latest "Revue Diplomatique". In this the Japanese attitude after the Cabinet Session is familiarly described as iridescent.

In this connection OSHIMA told me he had last night received an interim report from Tokyo concerning the present Japanese attitude, running about as follows:

1. Substance and spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact will remain the basis of Japanese foreign politics.
2. Japan wants to continue fighting the Communist organizations with Germany and strengthen her military preparations for this purpose (presumably in Manchuria.)
3. By bringing pressure to bear on England and the United States in the Southwest Pacific, Japan wants to tie down both of the Anglo-Saxon states.
4. All efforts shall be directed towards the termination of the Chinese conflict.

OSHIMA said that in this report he especially did not understand item 2. He has wired to Tokyo for commentary and has pointed out the great danger of missing an historic opportunity. He finally stated his unwillingness to help champion a wear policy on the part of Japan.

I confirmed this surprising communication to Ambassador OSHIMA with the information that Ambassador OTT has just informed us of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Cabinet Session.

WEIZSAECKER

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document # 4062 J.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Item 3

Teletype
Berlin, 3 July 1941
To German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the occasion of a conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA concerning the recognition of WANG CHING-WEI by Denmark and Finland, I have drawn the Ambassador's attention to the latest "Revue Diplomatique". In this the Japanese attitude after the Cabinet Session is familiarly described as iridescent.

In this connection OSHIMA told me he had last night received an interim report from Tokyo concerning the present Japanese attitude, running about as follows:

1. Substance and spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact will remain the basis of Japanese foreign politics.
2. Japan wants to continue fighting the Communist organizations with Germany and strengthen her military preparations for this purpose (presumably in Manchuria.)
3. By bringing pressure to bear on England and the United States in the Southwest Pacific, Japan wants to tie down both of the Anglo-Saxon states.
4. All efforts shall be directed towards the termination of the Chinese conflict.

OSHIMA said that in this report he especially did not understand item 2. He has wired to Tokyo for commentary and has pointed out the great danger of missing an historic opportunity. He finally stated his unwillingness to help champion a wear policy on the part of Japan.

I confirmed this surprising communication to Ambassador OSHIMA with the information that Ambassador OTT has just informed us of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Cabinet Session.

WEIZSAECKER

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document # 4062 J.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

Berlin, den 3. Juli 1941.

St.S. No. 454

Ich habe heute dem J a p a n i s c h e n Botschafter die Frage gestellt, ob ein japanisches Interesse an der Anerkennung Wang Ching Wei's durch Dänemark und Finnland bestehe. Zutreffendenfalls seien wir bereit, in Verbindung mit Italien geeignete Schritte in Dänemark und Finnland zu tun.

Der Botschafter wird sich in Tokio erkundigen und sich dann wieder an mich wenden.

gez: Weissücker.

Herrn U.St.S.Pol.

Herrn Dg. Pol.

Pol VIII

Abt. Recht

Abt. Presse

Abt. Inf.

60240

Jap.

Telegramm

(geh.Ch.V.)

Nur als
Verschlussache
zu behandeln.

Tokio, den 3. Juli 1941 - 3.55 Uhr

Ankunft:" 3. " " - 10.50 "

Nr. 1101 vom 2.7. C i t i s s i m e !

Für Reichsaussenminister.

Im Anschluss an Drahtbericht Nr. 1069⁺) vom
28. Juni und auf Drahterlass Nr. 916⁺⁺) vom
28. Juni und Nr. 917⁺⁺⁺) vom 28. Juni.

Habe weisungsgemäss sofort nach Eingang
obiger Drahterlasse mit allen Mitteln versucht,
auf japanische Regierung und sonstige massge-
bende Kreise im Sinne eines schnellen militä-
rischen Vorgehens gegen Sowjetrussland einzu-
wirken. Habe zu diesem Zweck sowohl mit Aussen-
minister als auch mit namhaften Führern Natio-
nalisten Fühlung gehalten, im gleichen Sinne
Wehrmachtsattachés und Botschaftsmitglieder
eingesetzt sowie mich der Mitwirkung des ita-
lienischen Botschafters versichert. Dabei
zeigte sich, dass nationalistischer Flügel, der
bisher im Sinne Südeinsatzes bearbeitet
worden war, nur mit Schwierigkeit auf neue
Linie einschwenkt. Diese Richtung will
weiter hartnäckig an Betreibung Südaktion fest-
halten, womit angesichts Langsamkeit der Re-
aktion fast zu rechnen war, was aber im Augen-
blick zu der im Drahtbericht Nr. 1069 vom 28.
Juni erwähnten Paralyisierung der widerstrebenden
Richtungen geführt hat. Nach zuverlässigen
Informationen

+) Pol VIII
++) RAM
+++) RAM.

Vermerk: Unter Nummer
213 an Sonderzug weiterge-
leitet. Telko.d.3.7.41

Handwritten notes:
Hochzeit...
für R.A.M.

- Chef A O
- St. S. Keppler
- U. St. S. Pol. ~~_____~~
- U. St. S. R. ~~_____~~
- Beaufh. Ritter ~~_____~~
- Leiter Abt. Pers.
- " " Ha Pol.
- " " Kult.
- " " Presse ~~_____~~
- " " Dtschld.
- " " Inf.
- Chf. Prot.
- Ed. ~~_____~~
- A. B. Expt. bel ~~_____~~

Handwritten: N. L.

Handwritten: Jan

60241

Informationen hat sich Matsuoka persönlich stark für eine eindeutige Entscheidung eingesetzt. Er konnte aber eine sofortige Entscheidung über einen Kriegseintritt Japans in allen Führungsausschüssen Kabinetts, Vollkabinetts und beim Kaiser nicht durchsetzen.

Nach der heitemorgen abgehaltenen Kabinettsitzung unter Vorsitz des Kaisers bat Matsuoka mich ebenso wie italienischer Botschafter um 14 Uhr zu sich. Er trug uns zunächst eine an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister auf Grund eines Kabinettsbeschlusses abgefasste mündliche Erklärung vor, deren englische Übersetzung er mir anschliessend überließ. Text folgt mit besonderem Telegramm. Eine Erklärung, die an italienische Regierung gerichtet ist, wurde gleichfalls übergeben. Sie ist inhaltlich gleichlautend, unterscheidet sich aber durch Fassung einleitenden Satzes. Text folgt gleichfalls mit besonderem Telegramm. In Erklärung an italienische Regierung ist im übrigen nicht von deutsch-sowjetischem Krieg, sondern von Krieg der Achsenmächte gegen Sowjetunion die Rede. Matsuoka erläuterte die übergebene Erklärung dahingehend mündlich, dass Japan zur Zeit nicht in der Lage sei, in den Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion einzutreten, ohne andere Verwicklungen einzugehen. Sinn und Zweck der japanischen Haltung werde der deutschen Regierung bei einem genauen und eingehenden Studium der Erklärung klar werden.

Ich erwiderte Matsuoka, dass ich seine Mitteilung sofort an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister weiterleiten würde. Eine Stellungnahme müsse ich mir vorbehalten, bat aber um eine technische Erläuterung darüber, wie weit sich das ostsibirische Gebiet erstrecke, in dem nach der Erklärung der japanischen Regierung diese eine Vernichtung des Kommunismus durchsetzen wolle. Matsuoka erwiderte, dass dieses Gebiet nicht genau geographisch abgegrenzt sei, sich aber seiner Auffassung nach bis etwa Irkutsk erstreckt.

Matsuoka erklärte weiter, dass er im Anschluss an den Empfang der Botschafter der Achsenmächte den russischen Botschafter zu sich bitten werde. Er werde ihm eine Erklärung übergeben, deren Wortlaut er mir in englischer Übersetzung übergab. Text folgt mit besonderem Telegramm.

Matsuoka

60242

ind

Matsuoka unterstrich besonders den Schlußsatz.

Der Öffentlichkeit werde über die heutige Kabinettsitzung unter Vorsitz des Kaisers nur ein Communiqué mitgeteilt werden. Dieses Communiqué werde auch als Sprachregelung gegenüber dem amerikanischen Botschafter und englischen Botschafter dienen. Falls diese auf weiteren Mitteilungen über den Kabinettsbeschluss bestehen, werde er auf die Verpflichtungen Japans aus dem Dreimächtepakt verweisen.

Matsuoka bedankte sich sodann dafür, dass er durch die Informationen des Herrn Reichsaussenministers vor Ausbruch des deutsch-sowjetischen Konflikts in diesem schwierigen Zeitpunkt von den Ereignissen nicht überrascht worden sei.

O t t .

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