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INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 20 March 1946, 1350 - 1615 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator  
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.  
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. The purpose of the questioning this afternoon, Mr. Matsuoka, will be in a manner to sum up your writings -- books, pamphlets, speeches -- both as a private citizen and perhaps touching on the period when you were Foreign Minister, for the purpose of setting them down in order of time, and briefly touching on the circumstances of these booklets and pamphlets. There may be many which I do not have record of at present, but those that I have a record of I will go through, then, commencing with 1931.

A. That is Showa about ten years before I joined the government; no, about nine years before.

Q. Were you, in 1931, holding any office, either with the South Manchurian Railway or with the Government? That is the year of the Manchurian Incident, the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

A. I was not holding any office. I was an MP.

Q. For the purpose of the record, my understanding is that the Manchurian Incident took place September 18 1931.

A. I was then MP and I was very possibly busy in electioneering in my prefecture.

Q. You were an MP. And what party did you represent?

A. SAIYUKAI Party.

Q. According to IPS Document #485, there was a book which was published in July 1931 by yourself, entitled "Changing Manchuria and Mongolia." Do you recall that publication?

A. Yes.

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Q. Now, I will read you, in substance, what the summary indicates here that it contains, and then ask you whether or not that substantially states at least a part of the contents of the book. "The book contains speeches and papers of Mr. Matsuoka and the annex; the agreements regarding Manchuria and Mongolia. Included are Parliamentary inquiries to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA and MATSUDA.-- page 106. The inquiry of January 1931 criticizes Shidehara's foreign policy because it is "too subservient" to America in order to maintain friendly relations with her, and 'considers only the feelings of security on the side of the American people, without thinking of the feeling of security and the pride of the Japanese.'"--page 226. In the speech of July 1931 the importance of the Manchuria and Mongolia is stressed (a) from the standpoint of national defense and (b) economically, and (c) as 'lifeline of the Empire' from which Japan must withdraw.

"In addition to all this, and aside from the question of the existence or non-existence of Japanese emigration, territorial acquisition or investments, the historical relationship between Japan and Manchuria and Mongolia is written with the blood of sacrifice; therefore Manchuria and Mongolia must be held at all cost against any other nation."

This book was published in July 1931, shortly before the Manchurian Incident. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. That substantially comprises the contents of the book and some of the statements?

A. Yes. A collection of speeches and articles over, I think, six or seven years, collected by some newspaperman.

Q. Your speeches and articles, or that of someone else?

A. Mine.

Q. Now, accordingly, Document 477 IPS is a book entitled "Unrest Over the Whole of East Asia," by MATSUOKA, Yosuke, dated 25 September 1931. It is written in the Japanese language. The background is made especially in reference to Manchuria and the HAKAMURA incident. Do you recall any Hakamura incident? What is meant by that?

A. Yes, I think it was Hakamura who was killed in Mongolia. In Inner Mongolia while he was traveling. He was apparently killed by Chinese rebels.

Q. He was a Lieutenant, was he not, in the Army?

A. Yes, and doubtless killed by Chinese troops.



Q. "This book shows expansionist ideas as far back as 1931, and his views on Manchurian-Japanese relations. He states as a basis principally 'Manchuria and Mongolia are the lifeline of Japan.' On page 1 he complains about the secrecy which commonly surrounds diplomatic affairs in Japan, citing the fact that the Foreign Minister has not made any announcement regarding the Bombosson incident, which is a Japanese spelling of a Chinese place name, and the Korea incident which occurred two months earlier, on page 5. In the chapter dealing with Russia he predicts that no concerted action on Russia and the U. S. will be forthcoming, on page 21. Regarding the Nakamura incident, he attributes it to the Chinese atrocities and the weakness of the Shidehara foreign policy. The Chinese Foreign Minister OSETA (Japanese pronunciation for Chinese name) stated to Japanese newspaper man on August 3, 'According to our investigations the Nakamura incident was proven to be fictitious and made up by the Japanese.' Fortunately, China has recently recognized that the incident was true after all."

Now, do you recall that book and the title and the quotations which I have read to you from it?

A. Yes, and the title may better be translated as "The Shaking of East Asia from Its Very Foundation." Or just as you have it. That was written in a day, overnight. I dictated it to a man.

Q. Well, that is quite an accomplishment, isn't it? Is it a large volume?

A. No, a very thin book, a pamphlet of forty-some pages.

Q. That was published September 25 1931?

A. Yes, thereabouts.

Q. Having in mind that the Manchurian Incident occurred 18 September.

A. Yes, that was written before.

Q. Did the murder, or alleged murder of this Lieutenant Nakamura have any connection, Mr. Matsuoka, with the Manchurian Incident?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. The next document, No. 615 IPS, is an extract from the Daily Manchurian confidential files. It has reference to "Mr. Matsuoka, one INUKAI and YOSHIZAWA and also MATSUZO Yogai, on the subject matter of establishing puppet governments. A letter dated 15 February 1932 from MATSUZO Yogai, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to General SUGIYAMA, Vice Minister of War,



states Mr. Matsuoka is to go to Shanghai at the request of Prime Minister Inukai and Foreign Minister Yoshisawa, as personal representative.

A. Oh yes, yes, yes! It was this Inukai, Prime Minister, was very much disturbed over what we called the Shanghai incident, the fighting there, and Inukai, I heard later, told Yoshisawa, the Foreign Minister, and at the same time who was very intimate friend of mine, to request me to go to Shanghai to stop the fighting. I was then an MP I was no government official, so Inukai wished that I would accept that request and so Yoshisawa made request to me to go to Shanghai as his personal representative, such as we find in the U. S., personal representative of the President to Mexico, etc., very often.

Q. So this letter dated 15 February 1932, from Matsuro to General Sugiyama, in which he states Mr. Matsuoka is to go to Shanghai at the request of Prime Minister Inukai and Foreign Minister Yoshisawa, does state a fact that did exist at that time?

A. Yes, yes. But I don't know Matsuro.

Q. No, that could be true. This is a letter which states such a request had been made.

A. Yes, particularly they felt that it may lead to a clash between America and Japan. That they dreaded, and especially requested me to smooth over.

Q. Now, Document No. 472 IPS, is a "mimeographed collection of addresses, radio broadcasts, press and newsreel interviews by Mr. Matsuoka." This is dated October 1932 to April 1933, and deals mostly with the Manchurian Incident and Japan's exit from the League of Nations. And I judge from this statement, Mr. Matsuoka, is a collection of speeches and addressed which we went over somewhat, here, a couple of days ago, when you were on this tour of the U. S.

A. Yes.

Q. The summary on this indicates "your early sympathy for National Socialist Germany is founded on a statement to the German press on 4 March 1933, in which you call Germany 'the one and only country the history of which shows many parallels with that of Japan and which also fights for recognition and its place in the eyes of the world.'"--page 175. Do you recall that?

A. I may have. In those days I had the idea of forming an Anglo-German-Japanese alliance, and I told Sir Robert Craig, the British Ambassador, that. But that is before the European war.

Q. So that you were of that opinion as of March 4 1933, but your explanation is that it was in connection with your belief that an alliance between



Japan and Germany and England was in your consideration desirable, or perhaps a good one.

A. Yes, my purpose in order to prevent the possibility of a European war breaking out.

Q. Now, Document No. 481, IPS, is a "collection of addresses which Mr. Matsuoka, Ambassador Plenipotentiary, made in May 1933. Written in the Japanese language. This book contains addresses by Mr. Matsuoka in connection with the Manchurian Incident and subsequent exit of Japan from the League of Nations. An English translation of the speeches -- No. 8, "East is East and West is West", Chicago, broadcast in April 1933; No. 11 at the Chicago Foreign Affairs Association, and No. 12, "Sayonara" Speech, can be found in the mimeographed collection of addresses, etc., by Mr. Matsuoka, on file in this document. The statement regarding the incident of September 18 1931 includes the following: "The incident of September 18 of last year was merely an opportunity cutting the wire that was already stretched to extreme. That is to say, it was caused by a single destruction of a railway line, which was overlooked in other cases, but was grave on the above-mentioned background. The Japanese Army stationed along the railway took immediate military action. It was natural that this army, composed of 14,000 men, was well prepared for an unforeseen event for the sake of self-protection, surrounded, as it was, by Chungking's 300,000 men equipped with fighting planes and the most modern weapons China ever had." He denies this incident followed the 'Japanese continental policy'. -- page 38. He declares that the "Tanaka Memorial" is a falsification, distribution of which would have been stopped in accordance with the promise of the Chinese Foreign Minister WONG in April 1920." -- page 16. He stresses that Manchukuo was founded without the participation or interference by any Japanese. It was founded by the Manchurians themselves. -- page 66. In his speech "Japan on the Cross", page 99, ff, delivered before the extraordinary general assembly of the League of Nations, December 8 1933, he denies the existence of a Japanese military clique. He restates his belief that the true internationalism can be constructed through sound nationalism, and by way of explanation concludes that Japan contributed to the internationalism of Asia. He asserts that Japan's action in Manchuria should not be considered as the action of the militarists, since all Japanese were stirred by it and supported it. The same is true of the Shanghai affair. In "Forty-two Against One", 24 February 1933, he objects to the League's plan to put Manchukuo under international control, giving as his reasons that Manchukuo is not part of China because it is not properly a nation, and that the League Committee that investigated the situation did not give a true report. He asks the League to revoke its decision and then announces that Japan cannot cooperate with the League in its Far Eastern policy, thus ending Japan's membership in the League.

"On My Return from Geneva", which is dated May 1933, which was broadcast from Tokyo, Mr. Matsuoka reviewed the circumstances which led to Japan's



withdrawal from the League. He claims that almost all of the intelligent public in France, Germany, Holland, England and in the U.S.A. sympathize with and support Japan's position."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, substantially correct.

Q. Well, in substance are the analysis and statements contained therein, to the best of your recollection, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Document 483 IPS is a booklet "Appeal to the Japanese People After Seceding from the Party" by Mr. Matsuoka, published by the Osaka Mainichi and Tokyo Nichi Nichi, December 1933. Summary of relevant points -- the content of this pamphlet is a speech by Mr. Matsuoka, "Japan is Unsited for Diplomacy and It is Unnecessary to Japan." Diplomacy is only a bad reflection of the true character of a nation. -- page 6. "I despise diplomacy. I went to Geneva with the intention of revealing the true character of Japan to the Western world. I firmly believe that I succeeded in this respect."

The diplomatic difficulties of Japan he attributes to the Japanese themselves, for being superior to others. "It is natural that many diplomatic troubles will occur because the Japanese people are superior to others." Finally, "There is no power in nature to prevent a nation destined by God to become powerful." -- page 26 and 27.

Page 2 of document 483, -- The booklet contains evidence of his early admiration of Mussolini and Hitler. "Benito Mussolini is the only one who is showing the seed for a new era. Mussolini says 'The individual should sacrifice himself for the good of the nation.' The Western civilization is worthless without this sacrifice. Mr. Hitler is making progress along the same philosophy. What is the cancer of civilization in Europe and America? They show symptoms of the corrupted civilization of today. We cannot profit by digesting the remnants of Western civilization.'" -- page 59.

Do you recall that?

A. No, I don't recall, but I must say then. In this pamphlet compiled of my speeches, many misquotations and errors.

Q. Well, this was done in December 1933.

A. No, wait. Even those. I took no trouble in correcting.



- Q. I mean, generally speaking, did you praise Mussolini and Hitler?
- A. Well, I must have said those things, the sense of them. Although many, as I have said, errors and misquotations.
- Q. Well, are they substantive misquotations or are they technical?
- A. Well, I recall some of them are entirely wrong, but that doesn't matter. I had no time to correct them.
- Q. You mean there might be errors in your own speeches, but you didn't have time to correct them?
- A. No, I mean in the taking down by stenographers, by the papers. And those pamphlets were published without my permission.
- Q. Well, this quotes you exactly, "Benito Mussolini is the only one who is sowing the seed for a new era. Mussolini says 'The individual should sacrifice himself for the good of the nation.'" Now, according to this document, you made that statement. Do you mean that is entirely wrong, or that in the translation some word or words are changed?
- A. I am saying that I do not recollect, but it is likely that I said those things.
- Q. Well, did you at that time feel that way concerning Mussolini?
- A. Yes, I was admiring him.
- Q. And Hitler?
- A. Not Hitler exactly. In those days Hitler was still an unknown quantity. He comes from Socialism. I was watching him.
- Q. It says here, "Mr. Hitler is making progress along the same philosophy."
- A. Yes, that is the way I felt.
- Q. Now, Document No. 480 IPS is a book the title of which is "Young Men, Wake Up" by Matsuka, Yosuke, published by the Nippon Shiso Kenkyukai, Japanese Society for Ideological Research, dated 21 December 1933, in the Japanese language. Now, "The book by Mr. Matsuka reflects his expansionist and ultranationalistic views. He traces Japan's emergency to the population problem. Since the increase of the Japanese population should not be checked, he foresees a crisis for which Japan should prepare herself thoroughly." -- page 11. Acknowledging the desirability of peace, he finds that freedom is interested only in maintaining the status quo. He ridicules the Japanese government for conducting foreign affairs the same way as Europe



and the U.S.A., and states "Having signed the anti-war pact and all kinds of treaties, they (Japanese government) have bound their own hands and feet so that they cannot move freely" -- page 39.

He denounces the Soviet policies and praises Italy and Germany. --p. 58. Particularly the latter for having belted the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in spite of her vulnerability, which is so much greater than Japan's, because Germany is not an island.

He wishes to awaken Japan to the fact that in this time of crisis, all nations are making strenuous efforts. "The all-around effort of the nation should be devoted to this." Page 88.

He states the importance of Manchuria and Mongolia to Japan. In spite of foreign nations which claim to have successfully chained Japan, he declares "It will be impossible in the end to check the development of the Yamato Race (Japan) with any treaty."

Speaking about the Manchurian situation and peace in the Far East, he writes, "For the next ten years Manchuria and Mongolia are plenty for us to deal with. The whole problem of China exceeds our nation's strength for the present time." -- p. 118.

About U. S.-Japanese relations, he writes that he always declared himself for "pro-Americanism" and that he regrets the disagreement about the naval power. He then declares that the Japanese character is such that they dare to fight even when they think it almost hopeless to win, and he hopes the U.S.A. will understand this point. He predicts tremendous disaster for both countries if the U. S. thinks peace can be kept by checking Japan. - p. 180. He praises the Manchurian Incident of September 18 as an epoch-making event for Japan, the Far East, and the World. - p. 284, and states his belief in Kamikase (divine word), the favor of the gods, which finds expression in the Meiji Restoration, the withdrawal from the League of Nations, and the Manchurian Incident." This book was published December 21 1933.

Do you recall that title, and the substance?

A. Yes, it is substantially correct, except I don't recall criticising the Japanese government for its diplomacy. I used to say in those days devote our energy for the next thirty years at least in developing Manchukuo. If I limited it to ten, I don't know why. I put the time limit of thirty years, and I used to advise people, don't bother about the China problem. Just leave them alone.

Q. According to this document, you mentioned a ten-year period.

A. Well, I don't recall.







Q. Well, do you recall now that you have made statements, the substance of which has been stated here?

A. Yes.

Q. The only difference is if you said ten years, you meant thirty years?

A. I used to say on other occasions always thirty years --devote solely to the development of Manchukuo and never bother about other things. And from my younger days I used to have this difference with Shidehara. He said peace between the U. S. and Japan, the same, but Shidehara was going about it in a weak way, and weakness in diplomacy generally leads eventually to clash.

Q. And you disagreed with his methods?

A. Yes, I used to advise him take a decided attitude. That is, I was saying to Shidehara always, and I still believe, that weakness in diplomacy I am afraid leads to war.

Q. Now, Document 474 is a pamphlet by Mr. Matsuoka entitled "Why do I Cry Out Loudly for the Dissolution of the Old Parties?" This was written in 1935, in the Japanese language.

A. After a year's tour throughout the country.

Q. Yes. Now, this pamphlet was published by "Saito Kaise Renmei" (League for the Dissolution of the old political parties.) In it Mr. Matsuoka advocates a Japanese brand of one-party system. He refers

A. Oh no. In it I particularly took pains to inform the people that you can't work out one party system, and I brought Mr. Uehara and contrasted my contention with his. I said it is a big difference between my one house theory and Mr. Uehara's one party. You can't work out with one-party system in Japan.

Q. Well, were you opposed to the parties altogether?

A. Yes.

Q. Opposed to all parties?

A. Yes, all parties for the time being, but I was for the Parliamentary system, and I said you have any number of opinions and, well, associations inside of the Parliament, and fight that, but one party system throughout the country, such a thing can never be realized.



Q. Well, I will continue and read the rest of this. It is highly important. Mr. Matsuka, if you disagree with this that you do make a statement so as to keep the record clear. Reading from the same paragraph as the words "one party system" -- "He refers to two previous articles on the same subject published in December 1933 issue of 'Kaizo' and in the issue of December 15 1933 issue of "Showa Ishin" and the "Showa Restoration" respectively. The latter magazine is the organ of the Association for the Dissolution of the Old Political Parties." He writes, "This is the time for discussion by action. I think that action is the dissolution of the old parties now." -- p. 2.

"The reason why those in leading positions don't wake up is the fact that the economic conditions here are not as difficult as in Europe or in the U.S.A." -- p. 9.

"One country, one policy (kokutai) is the origin of all Japan, to which we should return at once". -- p. 19.

"Unless the general public in Japan realizes the fact that an outbreak of war is just ahead, it is almost impossible to have the existing political parties really unite." -- p. 23.

Mr. Matsuka agrees with the generally expressed view of Tomita Kojiro at a friendship party of Sayukai and Minshito that Japan should not follow Germany and Italy as examples. However, he disagrees on the question of cooperation between the existing parties as in England, since in Japan many people do not belong to any party. A union of political parties would not mean a union of the whole nation." -- p. 36.

"In Japan there are many who oppose those letting the political parties administer the country any longer." -- p. 37.

When asked "what comes after the dissolution of the old parties?" he answers "I have a plan to be carried out after it, but it is not yet the time to follow it. What I aim at is the creation of an atmosphere in which my plan can be put into operation."

When asked "Is it your plan to advocate Fascism?" he replies that the question is rather vague, but that there may be something that looks like the establishment of Fascism under Mussolini in the plan he envisions for the era after the Showa Restoration. However he finds Leninism and Fascism impractical in Japan, and advocates "Nipponism" instead.

When the dissolution is achieved, the mission of the "Saito Kaizo Rennyai" is fulfilled, and its existence should end. At that time, many of the same belief may remain and organize a new and radically different Japanese type of party. -- p. 53.



After such incidents as the May 15 incident, or the Blood Brotherhood Alliance (Ketsu Meiden Affair), political parties behave for a time prudently because of the shock. Then they show signs of self-reflection or hesitation when they meet with the decisive attitude of the military men. But this is just momentary. If the military men and the people give enough power to them, they would immediately follow the old selfish spirit. Among the chief party men there are some who may dare to plot the separation of X and X, which would be dreadful."

Now, Mr. Matsuoka, in this book as I recall from previous examination, there appears here and there this reference X and X. What do you mean by that?

A. Generally, I think some word blotted out by the government.

Q. Well, it loses its sense. "Separation of X and X, which would be dreadful."

A. In those days, very often books have X.

Q. It says here, "Matsuoka probably referred to the separation of the military and the people by the original use of the X in place of these words." Is that what you mean?

A. Something is left out and unprinted.

Q. And you can't remember now what that would be?

A. No.

Q. All right. That is on page 57. "After the dissolution of the parties a few more opinions may appear. Small groups like Koseirai and the Koyu club (analyst's note: -- These were groups in the House of Peers.)"

A. Yes, those are associations.

Q. "will be welcomed." -- p. 63. "What I am worried about is the problem of securing unity in the coming for or five years, which will be a time of great crisis. If war breaks out I shall stop the movement for the abolition of political parties on that very day, because then it will not be necessary to talk about such things." -- p. 73.

"If what I advocate cannot be realized, to my regret there will be a X X."

A. Yes, very often X X.



Q. What would you insert there in place of that? If the government had stricken out those words.

A. "If what I advocate cannot be realized, to my regret there will be a X X."?

Q. Does that mean a revolution, or what?

A. Maybe revolution.

Q. "It won't stop without seeing X X." (Again Mr. Matsuoka uses X X instead of words in this place. The words are probably "revolution" and "blood.")

A. Well, the government doesn't allow the use of those words.

Q. "This I want to avoid. I wish to find a way to save modern civilization by a regime without force and to lead Europe and America which stand at a deadlock. My dream for tomorrow will be realized." Dated December 20 1934. Do you recall that?

A. In a sense I recall it.

Q. Was that substantially how you felt on that subject?

A. Yes.

Q. The next document is Document No. 476, IPS, a book the title of which is "Talking About Matsuoka, Yosuke." Now, this book was written upon the request of Shimomura Yasaburo, President of the Eastern Cultural Institute (Toho Bunka Gakkai) enterprise. It contains an enthusiastic appraisal and biography of Matsuoka, followed by two essays by Mr. Matsuoka, "Stop Rivalry, Reconciliate" and the "Mission of the Japanese Race." Do you recall those essays?

A. No, I have never read it.

Q. Well, you are supposed to have contributed those two essays to this book.

A. I don't recall it. I heard his name but I am not very intimate with him.

Q. Well, did you write an essay "Stop Rivalry and Reconciliate"?

A. I don't recall.

Q. And did you write another one "Mission of the Japanese Race"?

A. I don't recall.

Q. If you heard the substance read, you might recall it?



A. Yes, I might.

Q. The next is a document No. 484 IPS, "Speaking about the Manchurian Railroad" by Matsuoka, Yosuke, May 1937, written in the Japanese language. The book contains essays by Mr. Matsuoka on historic, industrial and diplomatic political developments in Manchuria, with particular emphasis on the role of the Manchurian Railroad. In a reference to the Washington conference, he writes, "We must never forget this gloomy conference which was held on the one hand for the fulfillment of the hopes of the U. S. in Manchuria and China, and on the other hand for the eradicating or diminishing of Japan's international position and her special interest there. It is for the preparation of a bold step that I look back into the past and that I talk about the great men in the past."

The chapter on the Manchurian Incident and the Manchurian Railroad is entitled "Collaboration of the Army and the Manchurian Railroad." After asking "Did the Manchurian Railroad give its fullest cooperation to the Army at the time of the Manchurian Incident?" he answers this question in the affirmative, and adds "At the same time it took part in the sacred task of establishing Manchukuo."--p. 269. "The Manchurian Incident was indeed an expansion of the sphere of the establishment of our empire by Emperor Xinnu onto the continent."

Do you recall that?

A. I am saying or writing something like that.

Q. This is supposed to have been written in May 1937.

A. Yes.

Q. And did you feel that way about these facts and circumstances then?

A. Yes. And some part merely statement of facts as we saw them.

Q. Some parts are?

A. Merely statement of facts as we saw them, while other parts were my opinions.

Q. Now, the next document is No. 479 IPS. It is a book entitled "Showa -- Restoration" by Matsuoka, Yosuke. Dated January 1938, written in the Japanese language. Summary of relevant points with page references follows:

This is a collection of essays written by Mr. Matsuoka for the magazine "Showa Restoration", organ of "The Association for the Abolition of



Political Parties", which Mr. Matsuoka founded in December of 1933, according to page 1. Added is the essay "Appeal to the Japanese for Seceding from the Party" which is on file in the Document Division in a separate pamphlet. It shows Mr. Matsuoka is an early advocate of Japanese totalitarianism because of the crisis at hand.

In regard to the Shanghai Incident, "Some members of Japan's intelligentsia were afraid that these actions carried out by the Japanese soldiers in rightful indignation might be too rash, but have they not awakened us from the organization of defeatism and driven us to the restoration of the Japanese spirit." -- p. 77.

He praises the Ketsumeidan (Blood Brotherhood Association) incident and the May 15 incident for having achieved in one morning as much as twenty or thirty years' teaching or preaching. In a play on words he describes the assassination of the Premier in broad daylight, "not in a dark plot, but rather a light one."--p. 77 and 78.

Do you recall that book, and series of essays?

A. I don't recall those words. I used to always condemn the expansion of the Ketsumeidan.

Q. Well, if this book quoted, as I have read here, that "it was not a dark plot but rather a light one," referring to the May 15 incident, would that be your feeling and attitude on the subject?

A. Well, I must see it because I was always condemning those who executed.

Q. Did you have the opinion that the intelligentsia of Japan were alarmed at the action of the military, and that they had an attitude of defeatism?

A. Well, some intelligentsia yes, and I think the majority of the intelligentsia, I should say. Maybe there, you know, I was praising it. Maybe overstating my case. I simply said for twenty or thirty years we are beaten. I merely stated the facts.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoka, I would like to inquire further concerning the procedure at a so-called Imperial conference. At these Imperial Conferences is there any of the proceedings taken down in writing by some secretary?

A. What do you mean, in the presence of the Emperor or do you mean

Q. Well, according to official reports there was an Imperial Conference held July 2 1941.

A. That is a conference in the presence of the Emperor.

Q. I assume that it is on a very high level.



A. Yes, yes. And no record is taken.

Q. This is the type of conference where little or no discussion is had on any matter, but it is just represented to the Throne that the parties have agreed on certain matters, isn't that it?

A. The government agreed. It is merely a report but the Chairman of the Privy Council takes part. He is not of the government so he is free to say anything he thinks fit.

Q. Well, inasmuch as the Imperial Conference referred to by persons having knowledge and dealing with the Japanese government is always referred to in a manner that would indicate it is one of the greatest formality and great importance to the government.

A. Oh yes.

Q. And you say there is no debate, and no record made.

A. Hardly any. But just a little thing, now. For instance, I asked once for the postponement of the recognition of the Chinese government in Hanking until the end of September 1930. Some would like to have it terminated, and some later. Little things like that. But on the whole, the main thing is not disputed. And it is very funny to say. I can't lay down the rule. Strictly speaking a conference in the presence of the emperor must be held after the cabinet agreed on the proposition.

Q. How about the high liaison conference? Does that intervene?

A. I am going to explain exactly that. Strictly speaking, we must decide in the cabinet -- full cabinet -- but sometimes the conference in the presence of the Emperor is held without the consent of all the cabinet members, merely the consent of the members of the highest liaison conference, but I think strictly speaking that is illegal.

Q. Well now, in reading the interrogations of other persons high in the government of Japan, both civil and military, it is my impression that the Imperial Conference held on July 2 1941 was an extremely important conference.

A. Yes.

Q. And according to the record of that conference, which I have recently examined, the names of those who were in attendance includes your name.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, why was this referred to as extremely important conference?



A. Whether to join the Soviet-German war or not.

Q. I see.

A. That was the great question then in Japan, and we agreed not to join the war, nor were we obliged to join under the Tripartite Pact, and that was decided at the highest liaison conference.

Q. I see. Before it was decided by the Imperial Conference of 2 July, it had previously been considered by the high liaison conference?

A. Yes, and strictly speaking, in my opinion that ought to be put before the cabinet members, but that wasn't, I believe, done. You know, that is mostly out of of the fear that I referred to at Berlin, that a secret leaks out.

Q. Well then, the same question that was presented at the Imperial Conference was previously decided at the high liaison conference?

A. Yes.

Q. Does the debate concerning the question take place at the Imperial Conference or the high liaison conference?

A. Highest liaison conference.

Q. It would be before that body that most of the debate and actual controversy would be had?

A. Yes, and let me interject here just a minute. Suppose I was a member of the conference and such a question was not brought before the cabinet meeting and reported to the Emperor in the Imperial Conference. If I considered the question serious and I objected, that can be made the cause of the immediate resignation. Strictly speaking, such a grave matter ought to be placed before all the members of the cabinet. I would have a right to resign immediately if I objected to it. You know, in order to guard secrecy, this rather extraordinary step is taken, that really ought to be discussed at the cabinet conference. You do get the point, don't you?

Q. Yes.

A. Because the cabinet, in such occasion, is responsible, you know.

Q. Now, if there were in existence a document--and by document I mean either telegraphic message between Tokyo and Berlin, or Tokyo and Washington, between the Foreign Office and their representative in these two capitals or any other capital of the world -- if such document is in existence and it should read as follows:



"At Imperial Conference 2 July the principal points in the Imperial policy for coping with changing situation were adopted. First part is the policy, second part is the principal points. Policy 1) Japan will adhere to establishing the Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity regardless of how the world situation changes."

Now, was that ~~xxx~~ question before the Imperial conference on 2 July?

A. To the best of my memory, no.

Q. So that if this document indicated that this material was considered, and that quoting it exactly, that "Japan will adhere to the establishing of the Greater East Asia sphere of co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation changes", then you don't recall having been present if such a thing was agreed upon?

A. No.

Q. 2) Japan shall endeavor to dispose of the China incident and move southward, and establish a firm basis for self-protection and self-existence." Do you recall that that was announced at the Imperial conference?

A. No.

Q. Had either one of the two been discussed at the highest liaison conference?

A. Maybe.

Q. The principal points that were brought out, according to this document, was (1) to defeat China pressure will be increased from the south, by fighting, propoganda, diplomatic negotiations regarding the vital points (2) advance south will be reinforced and the policy decided regarding Indo China and Thailand executed, (3) Re Russo-Japanese war, spirit of the Three Power Pact shall be maintained and every preparation made now, and the situation dealt with in our own way with extreme care, and meanwhile in diplomatic negotiations, (4) Though every effort will be made to avoid war with the U. S., if need be Japan will act according to the Three-Power Pact and decide when and how her forces will be employed."

Now, having in mind what has been read as the contents of this document, or messages from the Japanese government to the representatives of the Japanese government in other capitals, does that refresh your recollection that these matters were decided upon either at the Imperial conference or the highest liaison conference?

A. Fabrications, the whole thing. I must tell you that if we decided on those points, we seldom wired to our representatives abroad.



Q. Let me ask you this question -- if it should develop that this message is taken from intercepted diplomatic messages sent from Japan, would you still say that it would not be true?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, here is another message. Tokyo, from Matsuoka, Foreign Minister, to Washington, No. 255, 14 July 1941, that was a day or two before you left office: "1) Recent mobilization order expresses irrevocably decision by Japan to end Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her expansion, (2) Occupation French Indo China to (a) achieve our purposes there and (b) base to launch rapid attack. Next will be ultimatum to Netherlands Indies. In seizing Singapore Navy will play principal part. Army one division but two to seize Netherlands Indies. Air arm at Spratley Island, Palau, Singora, Portuguese Timor, and Indo China. Sub fleet in south mandated islands, Hinen Islands and Indo China will at once move to crush Anglo-American military power. (3) Troops to soon occupy Indo China will reorganize as 25th air corps."

Do you recall any such message as that?

A. From me? No, that is all fabrications.

Q. There is no basis, in your opinion, for a message of that sort?

A. No.

Q. So far as you know, no such message was ever sent from your office?

A. No. I was already very ill in those days, and I don't go to the government office.

Q. Is it possible such a message might have been sent by someone authorized to do so?

A. Not by the Foreign Office, no. My Vice Minister was bringing important papers, you know, for my signing, and on 14th of July -- on 16th I handed in my resignation. That is all fabrications.

Q. Well, just for your information, here is another one which is after you left the government, which says: "Cabinet shakeup only to expedite national affairs. Japan's foreign policy is unchanged, and she will remain faithful to principle of Tripartite Pact." 19 July.

A. That I don't know.

Q. But that does state a likely set of facts?



A. Yes, likely. If such message with such content were at all intercepted that must be either military or naval, an attache's telegram. We never handled the military matters in our telegrams to embassies.

Q. You did have a method of course of communicating with your ambassador in Berlin?

A. No! Oh yes.

Q. And was that by code message?

A. Those things if I had to say I always put in cipher telegram.

Q. Did you send any message, or order messages sent from your Foreign Office, to any of your representatives in the various capitals of the world, particularly those which might be of greater interest, concerning the Imperial Conference of 3 July?

A. Oh yes, and we had to about our decision not to join the Soviet-German war. We had to inform them.

Q. That was the decision made, and that was all?

A. Yes. I think it was July 3, the next day, that I handed my memorandum to the Russian Embassy, the German and Italian Embassies.

Q. Do you recall now, Mr. Matsuoka, any of the circumstances or the principal circumstance by which it became necessary for this question of Japan's joining the war against Russia, how it came to a situation to be brought before the Imperial conference?

A. Well, as I said the other day, Hitler questioned whether Japan would join or not.

Q. Can you recall the nature of the question?

A. No, simply that Hitler was sending this question, inquiring if Japan wishes to join Japan may do so. If Japan does not wish to join, well that is equally all right. That was his inquiry, it was very simple.

Q. Well, if it were just an inquiry, couldn't you have informed him from your Foreign Office that you had no intention of joining, without bringing it before an Imperial Conference to decide?

A. No, I had to bring it up to the Throne.

Q. What made that necessary?



- A. The nature of the subject matter. It was a question of great importance for Japan to decide, to go to war or not.
- Q. Who first received that message from Germany? Your Office?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was it in the nature of a dispatch, or what?
- A. A message from Oshima.
- Q. Your ambassador in Berlin sent a message to you, inquiring whether or not the Japanese government would join the war against Russia?
- A. Yes. A request from Hitler.
- Q. Now, in connection with the same message from Mr. Oshima, in Berlin, did any representative of the German government in Japan, that is the ambassador or Stahmer, or anyone from their offices, government office, make a similar request at the same time?
- A. Stahmer was not in Japan then. It was General Ott! It is my recollection that Ott had nothing to do with it.
- Q. I see. Well now, if it was just an inquiry whether or not Japan would go to war against Russia, couldn't you have dismissed the matter from your own office, as Foreign Minister, by informing them that at present there was no intention of Japan going to war against Russia?
- A. No, I had to bring it to the knowledge of the Premier.
- Q. Was that question debated at a meeting of the cabinet?
- A. No, it was placed before the highest Liaison conference.
- Q. Immediately? Without being presented to the cabinet as a whole?
- A. No, I waited for some days lest the secret should leak out. Then, after the decision was made at the liaison conference, we took it to the Throne.
- Q. Now, every inquiry that comes from another government to the Japanese government, to the Foreign Office, doesn't necessarily go before the high liaison conference or the Imperial conference, does it?



- A. No, not small inquiries. It depends on the subject matter.
- Q. What was the nature of this that made it necessary to take it to the high liaison conference and then to the Imperial Conference?
- A. The contents -- inquiry to join or not to join.
- Q. I notice in previous questioning you make a distinction between request and inquiry -- a distinction whether Germany requested or asked or expressed a desire -- you make a distinction, it was merely an inquiry.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Now, what did Germany base this inquiry on?
- A. It appeared to me that Hitler, while giving chance for Japan to join, doesn't place any importance which way Japan decides. That is the impression this inquiry gave me, and moreover I think he implied, I would say, that the Tripartite Pact doesn't oblige Japan to join if she doesn't wish.
- Q. Nevertheless you considered it such an important question as to require the treatment and consideration of the high liaison conference and the Imperial conference?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why do you say that?
- A. It is a big question whether to join the war or not join the war.
- Q. Well then, in that case, whether or not the message sent from Germany was a request, an urging, an expression of desire, or want, or merely an inquiry, so far as the high liaison conference was concerned and the report of the Imperial conference, it got the same treatment, isn't that true?
- A. I think so. Anyhow, the Foreign Minister can't himself decide to start a war or not to start.
- Q. I realize that. I mean, let us assume that Germany sent a message in which they urged Japan to join the war now, at an early stage, designating certain advantages to Japan to join it now, from which you could see that they were presenting it in a light that they wanted you to join, rather than inquiring. In the light of these two circumstances, so far as the government of Japan is concerned, both receive the same treatment and official consideration?



A. But what you are now presenting would be far graver.

Q. But in any event there is no other conference in the government except the high liaison conference and the Imperial conference?

A. No.

Q. Was this question presented, to your knowledge, to any advisory board of the government, military or otherwise, separate from the other two?

A. No.

Q. What was the reaction in the high liaison conference concerning this inquiry, in relation to the fact that Japan had concluded a non-aggression pact with Russia? Was that a controlling factor?

A. No. Well, you may say yes, too. First, consideration was were we obliged under the Tripartite Pact to join. That is the most important question. Second, of course, this non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia. But, as I said the other day, upon my return from Europe I reported to the Premier about the dangerous relations between Soviet Russia and Germany, and I added my remark that, in my interpretation, that even if such a war did take place, Japan was of course not obliged under the Tripartite Pact.

Q. Was the non-aggression treaty or pact between Japan and Russia, was that referred to the high liaison conference and the Imperial conference?

A. That is after my return from my European visit.

Q. Yes, and was it referred?

A. I said I might try my best in my visit to conclude such a pact, at the highest liaison conference. In fact, the members of the highest liaison conference knew that negotiations between our ambassador at Moscow and Soviet Russia -- as a matter of fact, it was with Mr. Molotov -- were going on for years and years, you knew.

Q. Well, the point I am trying to make is, after it was concluded and you returned to Tokyo, having in mind that the Tripartite Pact was approved, let us say, by Imperial Rescript or by Imperial consent, was the same procedure followed with respect to the approval of the non-aggression treaty between Russia and Japan?

A. No, we don't ask the Throne to grant any Imperial Rescript. We reported and explained before the highest liaison conference and before the Privy Council.



Q. What, in your opinion, is the distinction between the two, in relation to the necessity of requirement for the Emperor's approval by rescript, between the Tripartite Alliance and the non-aggression treaty with Russia?

A. There is really no distinction. It depends on the occasion, and I really can't today say there was any distinction. Sometimes we asked, and sometimes not. At first, for instance, I don't ask for Imperial rescript in connection with the Tripartite Pact. I had no notion about it, but on one day, after the signing of it, as the date for the signing of it, drew nearer, I thought I might just as well get the Imperial rescript.

Q. Within your understanding, Mr. Matsuoka, what effect does the Imperial rescript or Imperial approval by Imperial rescript on such a matter, have on the thing itself? What is the effect of it, legally?

A. Well, the effect is that it demands relation more forcibly about the conclusion.

Q. In other words, when it is approved by Imperial rescript, it ties into the essence of the thing itself the approval of the Emperor, with all the implications of his sovereignty and duty as ruler of Japan?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Whereas, if it lacks that, it doesn't have those implications?

A. Well, it does, because without the permission of the Emperor we can't enter into any treaty. That the people know. But it makes the matter more formal.

Q. The information I have is that when it is approved by Imperial rescript, it puts it beyond contention or further debate.

A. No, not necessarily.

Q. Well, is that partly true?

A. To some extent, but for instance the members of the Parliament too dispute about it. Even after receiving the rescript.

Q. Well, does it have an effect to minimize, or does it place upon the Japanese people the obligation of observing it without their personal attitude toward it when the Emperor, by rescript, approves it?

A. No. It makes it more formal, and I might say because there was an Imperial rescript, we feel it more

Q. Binding in conscience, would it be?



A. No. More formal. That is all I can say. More formal and august.

Q. Well, according to the Japanese government and the constitution, the Emperor holds a very high position in the government, doesn't he?

A. Yes, but all these treaties, you know, people knew that they must have received the sanction of the Emperor.

Q. Well, isn't there a distinction between sanction of the emperor and this Imperial rescript?

A. Well, it has this much difference, that one has the Imperial rescript and another has not, but how much weight that carries with them, it is very hard to explain. Somewhat formal, we say. That is all I can say, according to my conscience.

Q. Yes, but the fact remains that the Tripartite Pact did have such a rescript from the Emperor, whereas the non-aggression pact with Russia did not. Is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. Now, subsequent to the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan, other nations came into it too, this so-called Tripartite Alliance, didn't they?

A. Yes, yes. Small countries.

Q. Well, those countries joined at a time when they felt under the influence of the German armed forces, isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, I notice in some of your previous answers that you say Italy was a sort of surprise member of the Tripartite Alliance when it was concluded.

A. Yes.

Q. Why do you say that, Mr. Matsuoka?

A. Well, I didn't know Italy would come in. I had no conversations about the matter.

Q. Did you, as Foreign Minister, have a desire to have Italy come in?

A. No.



Q. Did you direct your ambassador, or representatives of your office, to make inquiries or invitations to Italy?

A. No. As I said the other day, all of a sudden words from Ribbentrop were forwarded to me at Tokyo, asking me to agree to inviting Italy to sign the pact in Berlin. After some consideration, well I said I would agree. Whereas, down to that moment, I thought it was to be signed at Tokyo between Germany and Japan alone.

Q. I see. Now, do you have any personal knowledge, Mr. Matsuka, whether or not any member of your Foreign Office or representative of the Japanese government in Berlin had been requested by Ribbentrop to go to Mussolini or the Italian government with any request concerning the joining of the Tripartite Pact?

A. No.

Q. If it subsequently develops that Shiratori or some other representative of your office, some Japanese representative, did go to Rome, to the Italian government with some request similar to this, would you say it was without your knowledge?

A. Yes.

Q. You would have no knowledge of it?

A. No.

Q. Now then, it seems from the title of this treaty, namely, Tripartite Pact, or Alliance, that from the very understanding of the term--tri-party--which includes more than two parties, that it included more than Germany and Japan, doesn't it?

A. That is Japan, Germany and Italy.

Q. Yes, so that if there wasn't a third party being considered, certainly they wouldn't give it the name of Tripartite Pact.

A. No.

Q. So that somewhere along the proceedings, particularly where the pact got its name, there was this conception that it would include three nations.

A. Yes, but that was not the notion while it was in conversation and discussion.



Q. Well, when Stahmer called on you in September with this word directly from Ribbentrop, did he refer to it as Tri-Party Pact?

A. No. And I beg your pardon, Shiratori was in Tokio; he was not in Europe.

Q. I know. But you didn't know Shiratori, at the request of Ribbentrop, went to Rome and made some representations in Rome to that government, concerning that alliance?

A. No. Not only that, but I am volunteering to remind you that Shiratori was all the time in Tokyo. That I know.

Q. Well, didn't he eventually wind up as the Ambassador to Rome?

A. No, that was Mr. Horikiri, who used to be the speaker of the house before.

Q. Did Shiratori have any dealings with the German government concerning the Tripartite Alliance?

A. No, he was foreign office adviser.

Q. Where?

A. In Tokyo. So he couldn't have been out of Tokyo. But I never consulted Shiratori about the matter.

Q. In any event, the inclusion of Italy in the pact came as a surprise to you?

A. Yes.

Q. How far along had the negotiations between Germany and Japan progressed before Italy was suggested as a partner?

A. Finished.

Q. And was that because Mussolini and Hitler the Italian government was in doubt, or steering a course away from it?

A. No, that was not my understanding. I think at the last moment Ribbentrop invited Mussolini to send Count Ciano to sign that treaty, that Tripartite Pact, and he wanted to give the honor of signing it to the son-in-law of Mussolini, to flatter his vanity.

Q. Who wanted to do that?

A. von Ribbentrop.



Q. Well then, you consider that Italy was only a nominal party?

A. Yes.

Q. You consider the two nations having the most vital interest were Japan and Germany?

A. Yes.

Q. I think that is all for this afternoon.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, \_\_\_\_\_ hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,  
\_\_\_\_\_

certify that on \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) \_\_\_\_\_, and according to \_\_\_\_\_, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Place

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date



4192

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 28 March 1946, 1400 -- 1635 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, Interrogator  
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English  
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. Now, Mr. Matsuoaka, I will show you a book and ask you if you know what it is, if you can identify it.

A. I never saw this pamphlet.

Q. Well, can you look at the title and see what it is, and see if that will refresh your recollection?

A. Oh yes, I understand. I never wrote this preface myself, they just put my name on without my knowledge.

Q. What does it say there?

A. It says this lecture was made at Hibiya Kokaido.

Q. I will read this to you -- "This speech was delivered at Hibiya Public Hall on April 26 1941 immediately after my return from a trip to Europe."

A. Yes, that is exactly translated.

Q. "As this one hour's speech was made without any manuscript, with no preparation, just as I felt honestly, frankly, and the phrasing and wording were extemporaneous so that there may be some words that are inappropriate or inept. I ask only that the reader will understand the true meaning of what the lecturer desired to say." April 30, 1941, signed by yourself.

A. That is exactly what it says, but I never wrote such a thing.

Q. Is it true that you made a speech on that occasion?

A. Yes, it is true.

Q. Is it true that you made the speech without manuscript, extemporaneously?

A. In fact, I never thought of giving a lecture.

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Q. Then, so far as that statement is concerned, it is true, what it says there, that you made the speech without manuscript or without preparation?

A. Yes, and without I would say, thought of making speech beforehand, you know. That was occasion on which they welcomed me and I thought of addressing just ten or fifteen minutes, and I refused to make any speech, but they asked for a speech, pressed of me, and I at last extemporaneously made this speech.

Q. Well now, this pamphlet is supposed to contain the speeches you delivered, taken down in shorthand and subsequently written by this party. It has been translated and I will read it to you and you may follow it in the book there, if you will, please. As I go along if you notice any of the translation that you deem incorrect, will you call it to my attention?

A. That is a very good translator. The preface is exactly.

Q. "My Mission to the Axis." -- speech made by Yosuke Matsuoka on returning to my fatherland. "Four or five days ago I shouted for two hours before the employees of the South Manchurian Railroad at Dairen, so that my voice is somewhat hoarse." Now, did you speak before the employees of the South Manchurian Railroad, as stated here?

A. Yes.

Q. "Moreover, as I have had a nose cold since last night, I may not be able to speak as loud as I wish, but with the aid of the microphone I hope to give you a general outline of my thoughts for your reference.

"I am most grateful to you for holding this welcome meeting when all I have done is to have returned upon fulfilling my natural duties. Upon fulfilling them in a very poor and unfit manner. Also, OKUBO and ISHIWATA have just spoken words of welcome, but while a part of what they said can be said to have hit the mark, they praise me so much I am ashamed. I am a man who hates to deliberately abase myself or utter words of modesty before others. From the first, such people are always the ones who are not modest. They have a strong self-will. Many of them are hypocrites. I am 52 but generally speaking those whom the world considers wise men are false wise men, and are bad customers or what are known as bad eggs (applause.) I hate such people. That is why, when I deliberately speak modestly, it is because I really believe so.

"I think it quite natural that you should hold such a welcome meeting for me, though it is true I was simply carrying out my proper duties and though what I did was very little. What I did I did with all my heart. I myself sent a telegram to the Foreign Vice Minister, telling him that I absolutely refuse all others, all further welcome meetings, and asking him to refuse various quarters."

Did you send a telegram of that sort?

A. Yes.



Q. "But, feeling that it was all right to attend at least this meeting, I have come here today."

Do you recall that, and is that a good translation?

A. Yes, it is a very good translation.

Q. "As I have already told the nation by radio and newspaper what I wished to say on my return, I have nothing more to say. I think and feel just as I have already said. If, in my recent European tour, I have accomplished even a little of what the nation wished me to, I say that it is only the accumulated results of efforts of the nation in the past, and also of the force of the times. May, if I have been of any service, I am convinced it is all due to the august virtues of His Imperial Majesty (applause.)"

"Thinking in this manner, there is no reason for my receiving this welcome. Nevertheless, as I have just said, the little I could do I did with all my heart. As a man, I ate a lot of good things, I drank a lot of wine, even though I didn't want to. In my trip to Germany and Italy, I saw enough faces to make me sick. I had to eat western style food. Now, having returned, I want to eat Japanese style food, but at the same time I would like to see the faces of my fellow-nationals a bit. The greatest feast for me, since I return, is being able to see the faces of all the friends assembled here. In this sense I am grateful that you have come all the way to this hall."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it a good translation?

A. Yes, a good translation.

Q. And, to the best of your knowledge and believe now, that is what you said at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. "I have said with this, I have more or less completed the gist of all I wanted to say to my fellow-countrymen. If I stop at this point, saying that with this you have probably understood all I want to tell you. That is that. But, since you have taken the trouble to have come and since I have seen your faces, although I feel I may repeat in parts, I will give you a few opinions of what I saw and what I felt most strongly, for your reference."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.



Q. And do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Italy. -- I shall begin backwards by telling you of Italy, the last country I visited, then of Germany and lastly of Russia. I have spoken of Italy in the recent Diet session, when questions put by members gave me my opportunity. I think it was in February, at the time the people were anxious over the slight setback of the Italian Army in Greece and in North Africa. This was natural. It was natural for us to be anxious for an ally. It is natural for us to rejoice when the forces of our allies win, and at the same time it is natural for us to be anxious when things go somewhat wrong."

Do you recall that part of the speech?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a good translation?

A. A good translation.

Q. "So it was on that point that I replied you need not be too anxious. In the near future, I said, in fact I believe I said in a month, though it makes not much difference whether it was one month or two months. In short, my words were to the effect that it was certain the forces of our ally, Italy, would fully stage a comeback in the near future. All at once, as you know, at a time when some people in the world were very doubtful, in cooperation with the German forces, they (Italy) swept over the Balkan peninsula. In Greece, too, the actual fighting is now almost over, thus making us very happy. In North Africa, also, look at the wonderful rally that has been made.

"Seeing these things, her ally Japan, and her allies, the Japanese people feel great happiness. At the same time, this has made it perfectly clear that I was not speaking nonsense in the Diet, either to the representatives or to the House of Peers. I was not being a fortune teller. It is because there was a mutual understanding behind the scenes, and because I knew everything that I simply told you the conclusion."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having said that in this speech, concerning the successes of Italy?

A. Yes.



Q. Did you make this speech, that you call attention to here, before the Diet?

A. I think I made it. I think I made that forecast, because I think from my conversation with Indarri and General Ott, the Italian and German ambassadors in Tokyo.

Q. Was that the true situation with regard to Italy and her ally, Germany, with relation to the Balkans and Greece at that time?

A. I think so.

Q. So that, what is stated here is substantially true?

A. Yes. Well, of course, I was hearing, although I don't remember exactly, some opinions from military quarters, you know. I know very little about war, except what I heard from them.

Q. Well, you did deliver a reassuring speech in the Diet, concerning Italy, and you reiterated it here in this speech?

A. Yes. Although I don't recall it, I believe I did say something to that effect, because I say so here in the book.

Q. Well, you recall having said that at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. "Calmly Confident of Victory. -- When I went to Italy, it was before these events, so I ~~must~~ went with a slight feeling of anxiety whether the Italians might be depressed, but there was no evidence of such thing. Of course, no one is such a fool as to be happy when his country's armies are not making a good showing, but I could see that they were calm about it. They were saying 'Soon we shall make a comeback.' This was not merely with the lips. They were calm when I saw that Germany was cooperating with Italy, with all her heart, my conviction that what I said in the Diet will soon come to pass was all the more strengthened."

Do you remember making that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Here there is something I would especially like to tell you. I had always felt this in Berlin, when I talked with Fuehrer Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and army officers, but when I arrived in Rome, at important points in Italy there are actually Germany's military authorities and civil servants sent to help the Italians. I felt that from the Prime Minister down, the



feeling and attitude of the people towards the cooperation with Germany was truly beautiful."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you make that observation in Italy?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there German troops and officials there at that time, cooperating with the Italians?

A. Yes.

Q. "From the two great leaders, Hitler and Mussolini above, to the laborers below, which is what I would like to say, but as I myself did not personally see every one of them that would be a bit of a lie. However, I have been told of this by the members of our Embassy at Rome, the military and naval attaches, resident Japanese, and others."

And, is it true, according to this paragraph, Mr. Matsuoka, that you did have conversation with Fuehrer Hitler and von Ribbentrop, and army officers, about this matter?

A. I must have heard from them.

Q. Well, you say here in your speech, "I had already felt this in Berlin, when I talked with Fuehrer Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and army officers." Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you talk with those people about this?

A. Well, I heard from them that, well, Italy will improve in time.

Q. But you did discuss this matter with them?

A. No, it had nothing to do with me.

Q. Well, it says here, "When I talked with Fuehrer Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and army officers."

A. That means when I met them.

Q. Well, did you talk about it when you met them?



A. No, I was simply told by them. You know, in Japanese -- conversation, conference, and meeting all express in the same words.

Q. In this speech, here is what you said: "Here there is something I would especially like to tell you." Is that translated that way? "I had already felt this in Berlin, when I talked with Fuehrer Hitler, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and army officers, but when I arrived in Rome, at important points in Italy there are actually German military authorities and civil servants sent to help the Italians."

A. That means when I met them.

Q. Do you recall having any conversation about this with them, such as you are telling this audience?

A. Well, when they told me so, I naturally questioned them.

Q. And do you remember telling the audience, "At important points in Italy there are actually German military authorities and civil servants."

A. Yes.

Q. You remember that?

A. Yes. Of course, I had no chance to see myself, but that is what I was told in Rome.

Q. That is what you told these people here, in this speech.

A. Yes, that is what I told them later on I have heard.

Q. You say here, "I felt that from the Prime Minister down, the feeling and attitude of the people towards the cooperation with Germany was truly beautiful." Is that translated there like that?

A. Yes.

Q. "From the two great leaders, Hitler and Mussolini above, to the laborers below, which is what I would like to say, but as I myself did not personally see every one of them that would be a bit of a lie. However, I have been told of this by the members of our Embassy at Rome, the military and naval attaches, resident Japanese, and others."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, although I don't say "attache." Naval and military officers.



Q. "It is a beautiful relationship, Germany and Italy. They are as one, especially the relationship between Premier Mussolini and Hitler is water-tight." Do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "They are absolutely one. Seeing this state of affairs, I felt keenly that this is the way allied countries should be."

A. Yes.

Q. "The Germans do not grumble just because the Italian Army suffered slight setbacks. They sympathized with them; the Italians, were worried about them, the setbacks, just as if they were their own reverses, hoped for a recovery, and cooperated with their whole hearts. The Italians, also, when the German troops entered their country, welcomed them joyfully and embraced them."

Do you recall having said that, and is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Some may censure me for these words, and say 'What wild talk is this.' But wild talk or no, I speak the truth. Besides, what I have said is no wild talk, it is the honest fact. Those who believe that Germany and Italy can be alienated and that Italy can be plucked out of the war, are great fools. Whatever schemes England and other countries may plot, I hereby affirm that these two countries can never be estranged. I hope that the Japanese people also will be perfectly sure, at least as to this point."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "A People Without Ideals Will Fall. -- You may call this cooperation the result of the right thinking and action of the German and Italian authorities, but why should their way of doing things be so just and proper? Let us think a bit deeper on this point. What is it that gains them thus? A Buddha or a Christ might be capable of self-sacrificing benevolence, but it is not an easy thing for my country to do."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.



Q. "Human beings unconsciously...."

A. Please wait.

Q. Reading back again, "But it is not an easy thing for my country to do."

A. There is no "my country" about it.

Q. For any country to do.

A. Yes, for any country.

Q. "But it is not an easy thing for any country to do." Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Human beings unconsciously love themselves most. That is why Buddha teaches us to get rid of self. He would not teach us if there were no need to do so. Of course, this self-love is natural. But over and above this, both countries and both peoples share a very far-reaching ideal which looks forward a hundred years, or in Hitler's words, a thousand years. And they are making rapid progress towards realization of this ideal. This is why, in the final analysis, the Italians stick to Hitler. They are moved neither by immediate victories and defeat, nor by immediate advantages or disadvantages."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "The reason why I say these things to you is that when I returned from Geneva, and stumped the country all along in a movement for the dissolution of political parties, I was called lunatic and crazy, but from my point of view it was all the others who were off the track. At the time one of the principal points of my appeal to the youth of the country was 'A people without ideals will fall.' An individual or a nation, satisfied if he can only get good food to eat, will never amount to anything. In fine, I went around telling the youth of Japan that a nation without ideals will fall."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.



Q. "Friends, does our country today have a great ideal? Does she have a great conviction? We say it with our lips. It is easy to say it with our lips -- Hakko Ichiu, a 2600 year history. Do we truly believe in them? Is our entire nation practicing these things? That Germany and Italy are holding aloft a great ideal, reaching out for hundreds of years, nay for thousands of years, with Hitler and Mussolini as leaders, and every minute they are trying to carry out this ideal. I have returned home with the preception that this is the basic reason why slander and estrangement can never cause Germany and Italy to back down."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, but isn't it "conception" there?

Q. I will read this one sentence back, "I have returned home with the preception that this is the basic reason. . ."

A. No, "I have returned home with the conception" -- or seeing so.

Q. "That that is the basic reason why slander and estrangement can never cause Germany and Italy to back down."

A. Or, I think "observation" is the best translation. I returned home with this observation.

Q. "With the observation that this is the basic reason why slander and estrangement can never cause Germany and Italy to back down."?

A. Yes.

Q. "Now Germany. -- There are too many things I want to say about Germany. Even if I spoke for ten hours on this subject alone, I would not be half through. I am afraid my audience, also, would not have the courage to stay up all night long just to hear me, so I shall leave off this part, reserving my opinion for another occasion. I shall speak to you of only one thing. A thing which was already self-evident to me, but which because of my unworthiness and very low learning I was unable to grasp clearly until my recent visit. I wish to speak to you of this because I consider it a basic matter."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.



Q. "Control by the Power of the People Themselves. -- What is it? It is control but control is not such a simple creature as can be moved just by writing the word down on paper and drawing a plan. Truly, Germany originally began control by drawing plans on paper. If you say that that is what Japan is now doing, that may be so, but such to our regret there is no more time to be doing such a thing. If we begin to do today what Germany began twenty years ago, we shall be left behind. Unless we immediately carry out with great speed what Germany is doing today, we shall not be on time.

"What is this control? Hitler is not holding things down by force, nor do the police annoyingly interfere and drag off those engaged in black market operations. All the people, even to the laborers, gladly and naturally from the bottom of their hearts are exercising self-control. Control is not enforced by the bureaucrats, by the power of the authorities."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Comes from the bottom, is the control. Not from above.

Q. Is that not a good translation?

A. Oh, a fairly good translation.

Q. Do you recall this paragraph about control and the manner of control?

A. Yes.

Q. "Maximum Display of Individual Power. -- I once went to a modern munitions factory in Germany with Dr. Ley." Do you recall that?

A. Dr. Ley? Yes.

Q. And while you were there on this visit, you did visit this ammunition factory with Dr. Ley?

A. Yes.

Q. "Dr. Ley is the organization chief of the Nazi Party, and in reality he is the authority of a Labor Minister. Yes, he is the one that controls all the factories in the country by himself. This man ~~summit~~ told me that he took twenty years to make the factories of Germany what they are today. They did not appear all of a sudden, just because Mr. Hitler came to the scene. It took twenty years, but when I told Dr. Ley 'You are really doing a remarkable job,' he replied, 'No, I am a man of no account. All I am doing is to make what little effort I can to carry out Mr. Hitler's ideas.'"

Do you remember that conversation?

A. Yes.



Q. "He was not just being modest, he really seemed to believe so. This is only one example, but wherever I went they all said 'This was begun by an idea of Chancellor Hitler.' 'We did this because of Chancellor Hitler's ideas.'"

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Let me retell this visit to the factory, this visit with Dr. Ley. The factory district is very large and is on the outskirts of Berlin. It is the morning of our departure. The automobile doors open, the two of us get in and whiss off. One or two miles before arriving at the factory. Being still quite unfamiliar with the district, I think it has nothing to do with the factory, but Dr. Ley points his finger and says 'Look, these are the workers' apartments we have recently put up.'"

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes. Only in the translation it says morning. I said forenoon. That is a slight mistake. "It was the forenoon of starting for the place." These things don't matter.

Q. "To be sure, what seemed to be children and workers' wives are shouting and waving their handkerchiefs from the top of four, five and six stage buildings. I thought they were waving at me. As there is nothing else to do, I take off my hat and nod, but judging from their manner it merely seems that they were waving at Dr. Ley. It is a long time since they had seen Dr. Ley. He is all right. Wives, women and children rush out to welcome the doctor.

"When we come to the factory and all the black-faced, black-handed workers see Dr. Ley's face, they pounce on him to shake hands. They are highly surprised by the mere coming of Matsueka. One by one they take his hand in both of theirs."

A. & my coming they weren't surprised. At first I thought so. It was Dr. Ley.

Q. "One by one they took his hand in both of theirs." Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall making that statement?

A. Yes.



Q. "Isn't it a long time since I have seen you.' 'Where do you come from?' 'I come from Thoresia.' 'When did you come?' 'I came on so and so.' 'How much are you paid?' 'What is your job?' and so forth. The workers reply frankly and with healthy faces. Apparently they are displaying wonderful efficiency. I have seen the factories of the world, and I can more or less tell whether efficiency is high or low. This munitions factory employs 30,000 to 40,000 workers.

"At last when we start to go home, girls and all gather together from neighboring houses. They gather around Dr. Ley. I also, sucked into the crowd with no time to take off my gloves, shook hands with both my hands, so that my gloves became quite black. They are all like that. The laborers are not submitting to control with grumbles and the orders, they are all cooperating from their hearts. They are all controlling themselves.

"Now, as for Japan, I am not speaking ill of government officials. I myself am a government official, but I cannot help speaking the truth. I hope the younger officials will not feel upset by what I am going to say, but will recognize it as true. In short, we cannot spend twenty years in perfecting control. After spending one or two years in inspecting present conditions in Germany, for that is where the point is, I would like our country to accumulate control as Germany is doing. In short, the basis of control in Germany has as its object the maximum display of the powers of each individual."

Is that a good translation?

A. A good translation, but this original here I can't make out the sense of it.

Q. It is supposed to be your statement. Don't you recall it?

A. Yes, my statement, but this in taking down the stenographer may have made a mistake.

Q. What part do you say there is mistaken? How would you translate it?

A. I can't make sense of it.

Q. Do you recall in substance having said Japan can't wait for twenty years, and speaking to the younger officials, and all that sort of thing, as stated in here?

A. Oh yes, yes, but in here I can't make sense out.

Q. "An Expanse of German Economic Organization. -- Then what is the basis of this? Human beings cannot all be like Buddha or Confucius. We all have wants. Also, according to our different natures, we have different pressures. There are some who, like myself, would spend even the money they do not have, while others delight in holding up all the money they can find."

Is that a good translation?



A. Yes, yes.

Q. Do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "I am not praiseworthy, but neither is the other. At the same time you cannot disparage either of us. He who wants to play, let him play, but when we work for the state, let us show our efficiency with all our minds. To begin with, if we all begin like Buddha or Confucius, no one would be so crazy as to go to war."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Therefore there would be no need for control, but I believe 'we should become able to treat human beings as human beings.'"

"In this respect, Germany seems to have nothing to be desired. In Germany men are treated as men. When I was inspecting the workers' apartments, I suddenly said "Let me see your home or house," and jumped in. It was the home of an electrical worker who earned around 160 Marks, let us say Yen, a month. A housewife was there, and showed me the whole house, even to the bedrooms upstairs. It was tidy. There was not a speck of dust in sight. All was shiny. The two children were at school. Out of a salary of 160 Marks, this family of four paid 40 Marks for rent. That leaves 120 Marks. It was a house that could be rented for 40 Marks in Japan. A house like that would probably be let for about 100 Yen in Tokyo. This family with 120 Marks was leading a fine life. The children were splendidly educated. When I asked the housewife, 'Do you have at least a little money left over?' she replied, 'Why, even I know at least how to save money.' She seemed a bit out of temper and when I asked the interpreter for the reason. He replied that she was a bit angry because I had asked such a question. Each month she regularly put away what was necessary, and lived entirely bright and happy life on the rest."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall saying that?

A. Yes.



Q. "This is the scheme (or organization) of the economy or system. We must learn from this example. Man cannot display his efficiency with insufficient food and pale face. After all, unless we are a Buddha or a Confucius or a Christ, what we human beings love the most are our own selves, our wives, and our children. In other words, we love our family the best. Those who are really in charge of control, for instance those who want to control coal must first go to the coal mines and work at the bottoms of these mines with the miners for at least half a year. Those who want to control rice must go to the country and spend at least a year at a farmer's house and try planting rice together with the farmers. In Germany all those who have had these experiences are in various positions of importance."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "I had better leave off here, as time is getting short. Let me say just one more word. In Germany industrial power and everything else is led to display the maximum efficiency. They are led rather than controlled."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Moreover, all the people cooperate willingly. My final words to Dr. Ley, as I shook hands with him, were 'Germany will surely win. It is because of this -- this factory, it is these laborers, factory workers, and even their families, brought up to this pitch by the loving care of men of such passion. This is the basis of German victory.'"

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes. I said so in a kind of table speech on the way back.

Q. This is not the speech you made at Hibiya Hall?

A. Yes.



Q. In other words, you were praising Germany's accomplishments?

A. Yes, yes. I was very much moved.

Q. This was an ammunition plant, wasn't it?

A. Yes. I didn't know it until I went out. I requested the German authorities to show me some representative factories. Even before the war, traveling in your country, too, I always asked to be shown some good factories.

Q. Well, you were recommending the German principles of organizing industry to the Japanese people.

A. Yes, as I saw it.

Q. And this was immediately upon your return?

A. Yes.

Q. "Now I shall go back to Russia. The nation may have been somewhat surprised by the neutrality treaty, and because of this surprise some quarters seem to think it is a wonderful accomplishment, but it was an entirely natural process. (As I said at the beginning, I am not the type that can abase myself with words of modesty and pretend to have the dispassionate modesty of a man of noble virtue.) And it was the result of years of effort by various people, including the government and the ambassadors, to somehow adjust Soviet-Japanese relations.

"Of course, there were times when things went wrong. There were times when we almost seemed successful, only to meet with sudden failure. The present neutrality treaty is the crystallization of long years of effort made by these people in this direction. Therefore, I, Yosuke Matsuoka, do not consider this my own achievement, but at the same time if there are any who are dissatisfied with the treaty, I beg to be excused from being assassinated because of what they might consider my outrageous act. (applause.)

A. Yes, of course that is joke.

Q. Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "This was a job that had to be tackled by me. The praise for it is not mine, but neither should I bear sole responsibility for it. I simply put the period on a composition already written out. You may say it was outrageous to have placed a period, but I have never yet heard of a composition that went on for thirty pages without a period. One has to place a period somewhere. As I happened to be Foreign Minister, it seemed to be time to place the period and so it was done.



"But there is one thing I feel I can boast about a little bit, and that is the fact the period was placed in twelve or thirteen minutes. But the praise is not really mine. The second time I met Mr. Stalin he said "Let's do it," so I replied "Let's make a diplomatic blitzkrieg," and Mr. Stalin agreed. "Yes, let's," so that was that. The fact that within twelve or thirteen minutes the great problem laying between Japan and Russia should have been solved is due to Mr. Stalin. "There may be many other points on which we may have to argue a lot, but anyway let's do it." And bang, the thing was done. (applause.)

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "If there is any fact worthy of particular mention it is that the treaty was signed on April 13."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Only five months after Ambassador TATAKAWA's arrival at his post, and on the 13th anniversary of the death of Count SHINPEI GOTO, who was my great benefactor. I did not sign it on that date just because of that. The fact came to my attention later. But is a very strange coincidence. Fourteen years ago Count Goto, despite his advance age and the fear that he might die of illness on the way, personally went to adjust Soviet-Japanese relations, and every day before reaching Dairen he rose before dawn, then watch the rising sun, but the times were against him. He was finally forced to return unsuccessful."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall making that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Today, fourteen years later, it so happens that I, who was somewhat loved by him and who felt myself to have been his friend, have gone and signed the treaty. Signed it, moreover, on April 13, the thirteenth anniversary of Count Goto's death. No wonder one tends to become superstitious, but such is the fact."

Do you recall that?



A. Yes.

Q. Are you superstitious concerning number thirteen, Mr. Matsuoka?

A. No. Number thirteen is very lucky somehow. Your President Wilson thought, too, that somehow things happen very good on that number. My first boy, my first daughter were all born on the thirteenth. And somehow I leave for new post or arrive at new post on the thirteenth.

Q. I see. Here you say "No wonder one tends to become superstitious." You regard thirteen as lucky day, then?

A. Yes, but it was very funny. I don't recall the fact, but when I got to Dairen my friend who was closest man to Count Goto in his closing years, met me at the airbase and he reminded me that I happened to sign that thing on the very day, the thirteenth anniversary.

Q. Now, to talk about the direct cause of the treaty today. As I was going to say, it is the result of magnificent five months' efforts of Ambassador TATAKAWA. Nay, more than that, it is a reflection of Ambassador Tatakawa's character. The Russians got to understand that character -- an honest man who tells no lies. He is no ordinary diplomat. They got to know this; they got to know Ambassador Tatakawa. I went there, signed the name Yosuke Matsuoka on the foundation he had already built up, and received the praise for it. That is all.

"I am not saying this out of modesty. Without these foundations, do you really believe that I could have gone and made such a thing in just four or five days, no matter how wonderful I might be. Nay, if we go back further, it is a problem that has existed since Count Goto's day, when our country faced the great problem of having to do something about Soviet-Japanese relations. Whatever differences of opinion there might be in view of the change of the days from the old Imperial regime to a new Soviet Union, emerging from the revolution. Moreover, this problem will be the greatest of the future <sup>Asiatic</sup> problems. (applause.)

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "If we think we must fight Russia, we must fight with an iron determination. Not to fight, and at the same time not to shake hands, we cannot live, so great a problem in such an indefinite state. I have certainly not come home a Red, but at least I can assure you as to this point." (Footnote of translator. Note -- From "Nay" to "Asiatic problem" is one sentence in the original, but the construction of the sentence was very difficult to follow.)

Do you see that in there, Mr. Matsuoka?



A. Yes. The translator says?

Q. It was very difficult.

A. "Oh. "Hay, in four or five days such a thing can't be done" etc. No, instead of "nay", but "to go back it was indeed Baron Goto in former days of Imperial (I meant Russia.)"

Q. Is the sentence rather long and difficult of translation?

A. "Well then revolution and became Soviet Russia. What to do with the relations between Russia and Japan. Whatever opinion might differ in our country, we must do something, that is a great question for my country, and about the Asiatic questions from now on it is one of the great questions." I don't see any difficulty. He may have felt so. I said the sense is you must live as it drifts on. That is the idea I wanted. So next I said if we must fight Russia, let's fight, but if not, why we must do something. This is a big question, I said. Always Japan drifts along, so I spoke against it.

Q. Well, do you recall that statement?

A. Yes. Well, of course, the last part, of course that is joke. I don't come home being turned Red. But there was danger of my being executed because of this treaty.

Q. I thought you were being witty.

A. Well, but there was some danger. Witticism, it is true, but I was running that danger, too. Oh, there were many in Japan even at that time who were against concluding such a treaty.

Q. I notice you said here in your speech that it was rather a surprise.

A. Yes.

Q. And continuing to read, "On a Banquet in Honor of the Signing. -- Friends, there was a happy incident which I suppose you read of in the newspapers, which was a great surprise, even to me. After the treaty had been signed, and we were drinking a toast, Stalin, who was sitting next to me, said "I propose a toast to the long life of the Emperor of Japan and the people of Japan. Let us drink to their health." I was very surprised. Mr. Stalin, the great leader of the Soviet Union, stood and solemnly drank to the Emperor. If there are any Reds in Japan today, I should like to ask them what do you think of this? I was due to leave soon by train. Thinking I should not drink too much, I was restraining myself when Mr. Stalin came and filled my glass with champagne to the brim. So, saying if this is a toast to the Emperor, if that is so, I will drink as many times as you wish. I drank a quantity of toasts. Premier Molotov was a great drinker. There were many other hard drinkers, and I forget how many cups I drank. I just drank as many as I could. Then saying Syonarra, I left for home."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.



Q. And do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Mr. Stalin, succeeding Lenin, has done a great job. Good or bad, anyway he has accomplished it and is a man capable of controlling the 160 million inhabitants of Greater Russia and continuing in his job even to this day, but in spite of this, why as a very simple man. In just twelve or thirteen minutes he said HARASHAN and signed the treaty."

A. That is a Russian word. It is like OK in your words.

Q. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it true that this is what Stalin said?

A. Yes.

Q. In substance the statement is true?

A. Yes. I should say he said so exactly. I don't generally take wine, you know. Stalin takes some reddish something that he sips, and he takes that usually. But all at once somehow he appeared champagne and he gave me, and that was Russia. And he began to drink.

Q. It was quite an important occasion?

A. Yes. He came out to see me off, and such a thing was never done by Stalin. He didn't see even Hitler off, and I was surprised to see Stalin coming out to the station without hardly any bodyguard, and he came into my carriage himself and he inspected and told the Russian boys to take good care of myself, and he said goodbye and these different foreign ambassadors themselves were surprised.

Q. The next is entitled "Be Prompt as well as Prudent. Always cross a stone bridge after tapping it."

A. That is a Japanese saying.

Q. The editor's note here says "This is an allusion to a Japanese saying, as a man who crosses a stony stone bridge only after tapping it", meaning he is prudent to a fault or he makes assurances doubly sure..

A. But generally the other way around, you know. He takes great pains in laying down or testing the stone bridge, but he never crosses.



Q. In this allusion, were you making reference to yourself or Stalin's actions?

A. No, to so many people who test the stone bridge but never cross it.

Q. The next paragraph reads, "Here I would like to point out briefly this matter. In this unprecedented crisis, we can no longer afford to waste days and days in so-called 'careful deliberations.' Without coming to a decision, careful deliberations are welcomed. There is no such fool in the world as to say careful deliberations are unnecessary but there are too many people in the world who will not cross a stone bridge, even after tapping it. By all means tap the stone bridge, but when you are crossing it, cross it with the same determination you would have in jumping off a precipice."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Otherwise you will be left behind. Yes, I warn you, unless you look sharp, you will be left behind."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you mean by that?

A. That really I had in mind, you know, particularly there are so many people as I described, particularly the bureaucrats who just spend days discussing and discussing, and never do anything, and I was against such thing.

Q. "Let me turn back to my stay in Berlin. In the middle of my first conference with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Chancellor Hitler came to call him. The Foreign Minister left saying rather hesitantly "I beg to be excused for about fifteen minutes." So I replied not fifteen minutes, but two or three hours if you like."

Do you remember that conversation?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you have that conversation with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, as you stated here?

A. Yes.



Q. Continuing to read, "That was the time when the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia occurred. The Minister came back in fifteen or sixteen minutes, and said "Our course is decided." The Foreign Minister and other ministers concerned had assembled together under Mr. Hitler and had decided on the major and minor details to a T. His words were. . ."

A. To a T? What is T?

Q. I don't know. What does it show there? How would you translate it?

A. "Even small points have been decided." Even for me it is hard to find an appropriate word.

Q. What does it mean?

A. Exactly. And before that it said "the die is cast." Ribbentrop told me so.

Q. While you were there did this occur? Did this Minister leave the room, and was it concerning Yugoslavia?

A. Yes. He told me after he came back.

Q. "His words were to the effect that their course was decided. They thought they had continued their efforts to solve things diplomatically. The course now seemed difficult so that as there was nothing else to be done, they would attack. Once they began to attack there was no more problem."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. It was your understanding that he was speaking of Yugoslavia?

A. Yes.

Q. "Although the coup d'etat was not entirely unexpected to Germany, when it actually came the high officials gathered together and in two hours and a half, when -- the diplomatic fight was decided. I tell this to you for your reference. That is the way the world is moving. That is the way the world outside of Japan is moving."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you remember saying that?



A. Yes.

Q. And by that did you mean that Germany had moved rapidly in taking over Yugoslavia?

A. Not only Germany, but all the world except Japan was moving swiftly. Only in Japan, always procrastination. The Japanese, you know, discuss and don't decide one way or the other, so I advised them to decide quickly, one way or the other.

Q. Concerning what? What did you have in mind here?

A. Everything. They don't decide, as you are and General MacArthur is facing today in Japan. Unless he issues sharp orders, they don't move.

Q. Well, this conversation you were pointing out to the people was a conversation which you had with the German Foreign Minister concerning a coup d'etat with Yugoslavia. What was it about? Do you recall?

A. I think it was a coup d'etat at the capital, against the authority that existed.

Q. Was it German inspired?

A. No, no, no.

Q. Well, didn't it fall under the control of Germany?

A. No.

Q. What were they concerned about?

A. Hitler was saying, no not Hitler, von Ribbentrop, as I remember, he said he expected either British or Soviet Russians inspired and carried out that coup d'etat against Germany.

Q. Well, what action did Germany take?

A. Germany decided to attack, and carried it by force.

Q. And that was while you were there in Germany?

A. Yes. Just when I was passing the boundary line between Germany and Russia, I heard Ribbentrop broadcast that war was declared.

Q. That was also what you were referring to in the early part of your speech, when you referred to the fact that German and Italian armies had again taken the offensive, isn't that true?

A. No, I wasn't particularly referring to them.



Q. Hadn't the Italian armies become bogged down in Yugoslavia?

A. No, not at first. All of a sudden the Italians and Germans attacked.

Q. Then it did fall under German domination?

A. Then, after that.

Q. And you were pointing out to your audience and your people, this is how things are done in Germany and in the world.

A. Quickly, whereas in Japan it is always discussed and do nothing.

Q. The next title is "Evidence of the Soviet Union's Wonderful Progress." -- One other fact I wish to mention is that in Moscow (because it was only a stay of a few days, so there was no way of finding out many details, but the members of my suite studied and inspected the best they could) -- in Moscow I went to see a modern factory employing 20,000 workmen, which I had visited eight years ago. I was surprised at the great change from what it used to be eight years ago!

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Also I visited the Pioneers' Club. They are an organization to build up future leaders from their childhood. The members are selected from young primary and middle school children who are gathered together after school once in the afternoon and once in the evening, to mould them into future leaders of the state. The children have bright, happy faces, and are very eager. They learn how to dance, and on the other hand study at school lessons with all their heart. I even went to see a textile factory. The workers all had healthy faces. Probably there were some children ~~whom~~ whose fathers were killed by Stalin, whose fathers' blood would cry for revenge, but I gained the feeling that Mr. Stalin should be in no danger of assassination, even were he to stride along the streets of Moscow alone. When I left Moscow, much to my surprise, Mr. Stalin came to the station to see me off, but I saw that when he was returning, instead of going back by the platform, he said SYONARRA and walked slowly off on the tracks. There were two or three people behind him, but no signs of elaborate precautions. As I have said, in Russia they are even training from children to be leaders."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. That is true?

A. Yes.



Q. And is it a good translation?

A. Yes. No, he came after to the station, he didn't accompany me.

Q. To the station, and said goodbye there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you make the observation that there were no elaborate precautions taken?

A. Yes.

Q. "To do this they have employed amiable ideas. They are not the paper plans we see today. Their way of doing things shows a perfect discernment of human beings. At Moscow I visited the Scientific Research Institute and the Chemical Research Institute, and other institutions of similar nature."

Did you visit these places?

A. Yes.

Q. "They show remarkable progress and development, remarkable improvement. I visited Leningrad, the former Petrograd. The side streets of Petrograd were terribly dirty. Other people also told me they were in a terrible condition, but today, visiting the same city I left 29 years ago, I find a different city from the St. Petersburg of my youth."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "There no longer are such dirty places, even in the side streets. I could see evidence of great reform. Hearing these words, you may say I am praising Russia a good deal because of the Soviet champagne I drank, but friends, whether we have her as an enemy or an ally, we must really get to know a country as remarkable as this. We cannot look down on what I say as a pack of lies."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "Here, let me say something that came to my mind in this connection. One thing I felt very reassured about during this trip was the fact that neither the leaders of Germany nor the leaders of Italy are underestimating England. They are fighting her with the clear acknowledgment that the British have wonderfully increased their defensive power since the beginning of the war. That is the point on which I feel great reassurance as an ally."



Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "The problem of the need for adjusting Soviet-Japanese relations has been in my mind for thirty years. It is not something I suddenly began to say since becoming Foreign Minister. Russia knows this the best. I wanted to adjust the relations between our two countries as much as possible. I told this to them. I definitely told them 'I am absolutely opposed to your Communism.' Whereupon Mr. Stalin replied 'Ideology does not matter. We have opposing ideologies, but diplomatic relations are another thing.' If this was their idea, all right. I said 'Please have no mistake about this situation. I am not saying this behind someone's back. I am not a man that pretends to be a lion at home, that talks big when he is safely at home. Right in front of Stalin and Molotov I said 'Your country's communism will never succeed. I am absolutely opposed to it.' But diplomatic relations are a different matter. When I said 'Let us be as friendly as we can with each other, and sweep out all old problems' they replied 'We have made up our minds to do the same; and agreeing only on this point, the neutrality pact was signed.'"

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you now recall these quotations from the conversation, that they were said?

A. Yes.

Q. "Our Incomparable National Structure. -- Now, let me make a few concluding remarks. I have given you a rough outline of my trip. Touring these countries, Italy, Germany and Russia, I have safely returned after six weeks trip. Now, what about our people? Are our people inferior to these three people? I do not think so. Positively they are not inferior. The individual person himself is not inferior. I am convinced of this. They have something no other people in the world have. That is the FENG (Emperor). They have this conviction that the Fene is the order. Where is there a country that can compete with this?"

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.



Q. "By the way, I explained both to Mr. Stalin and to Mr. Hitler what the Tene is, and what Imperial rule means. I make this fact public because I feel there is no harm in doing so. It may be mentioned, with reference, that I had already talked about Emperor Meiji's august administration to Mussolini eight years ago."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you talk to Mussolini eight years ago about this ?

A. Yes.

Q. "So that this time I did not talk to him about it, but I also talked to the Pope about it. Our people say that they are truly grateful for the Emperor. When they open their mouths no one would seem to be as loyal as this. Do you really understand this? Do you know what the Imperial rule means? If you say you know, aren't you doing things that never should be done? Aren't you doing things that are wrong? Do you truly say that you know what the Emperor is and the Imperial way is?"

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Being Penetrated by the Quintessence of our National Structure. -- If there were young students and soldiers who were truly penetrated by this one point, Imperial Rule, and who felt to the core of their hearts that thought, that they themselves were unworthy creatures. It was only by the august virtues of his Imperial Majesty that they happened to be given the chance of becoming his hands and feet. There would be no need for control. Things would become animated from Tene. There would be nothing special to learn from Europe or America. I want you to know this fact. That is why I want to ask the nation about this. If there are any who, having received the Imperial command, feel what will the people do if he doesn't appear, that is impermissible.

"Such a man is a TAKAUJI ASHIKAGO (a warrior of the 14th century, considered as a model of disloyalty.) If he doesn't appear, what a big busybody such a person is. What difference, when governed by the Imperial virtue, does it make whether Yosuke Matsuoka was born in Japan or not. What profit or loss is there? As far as the basic nature of our people, our country need feel positively no inferiority toward them.

"Europe and America. -- Of course we have lots of faults. We have lots of faults but that is common to all men. After everything is subtracted, I am positive our basic nature is not inferior, but if you say "Then what about present conditions?" I regret to say present conditions are not satisfactory. Who can brace things up?"



Q. Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "Reorganize the Imperial Rule Assistance Organization as many times as you please. That will never do. It is not possible to brace things up from today without any reorganization."

"Now, what is the Teno? What is the Imperial Rule? 'To die by the side of the Emperor.' It is to live this great tradition."

Do you recall that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. What is the purpose of this statement to your audience?

A. To the nation I wanted that they should be humble themselves before Teno and that they should understand what I know Imperial Rule means. They really do not, I contended. They say so but are they really acting so? My main purpose was to be humble, and for instance Yosuke Matsuoka, I say, is nothing. Simply serve the emperor."

Q. "Furthermore, neither Germany nor Italy have this, to say nothing of the Soviet Union. Moreover, I feel that people like Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini pay respect to this all the more because they lack it in their own countries."

"My recent trip to Europe is nothing. It is entirely natural. Look, if soldiers do not go to the battlefield, what is the use of having soldiers? Why does a Foreign Minister feel it a necessity of state to go to a place like Europe? Simply because it is his duty. It is nothing for the people to say 'Thank you for having gone.' Friends, that shows that they have a mistaken idea. I only went because my predecessors were lazy and didn't want to go. That is why you are simply giving this Matsuoka the greenhorn his chance to make a name. It is nothing. There is no need to repeat it."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.



A. Wait -- do you say "greenhorn"? What does it mean?

Q. Well, you used it there. What do you think it means?

A. I used in the original, the Chinese saying that you make him name.

Q. Greenhorn, as I understand it, is a person who isn't too witty, too smart.

A. No such thing here.

Q. A person uneducated and untrained.

A. Nothing like that in here.

Q. Let's read that one sentence again: "I only went because my predecessors were lazy and didn't want to go. That is why you are simply giving this Matsuoka the greenhorn his chance to make a name." Now, right here, what did you call it?

A. That is very hard to translate. A Chinese saying. Matsuoka is nothing, but you simply luckily made him to get the name. It is a small matter, anyway.

Q. You recall having made the statement, nevertheless?

A. Yes.

Q. "When, a few years ago, I wandered all around the country to talk to the youth of Japan, I did so with the resolve of a man giving up the world to become a monk, and despite the fact that I was called lunatic, off the track, and madman, but the reason for my doing so was, in short, because I foresaw the events of today. It was because I felt 'This will not do' that I toured the country for a year and eight months. Even today, conditions are unsatisfactory. We are truly facing a crisis unprecedented in world history. The words crisis and emergency are used so often nowadays that the people have gotten accustomed to it, which is still worse. The three peoples of Germany, Italy and Russia, have really grasped this idea, and have worked seriously to prepare for it, and are fighting as well.

"Do our people have this consciousness from the top to the bottom? It is easy to say so with our lips, but I have returned with a feeling that somehow it has not been carried out in practice."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.



Q. "If you say I have no right to remain in the government after saying such things, I shall resign this day. Nay, if the Emperor should lose confidence in me, I should resign that very minute. Aside from this, if you believe it better for me to stay, if you think it all right that a crazy sort of person like myself should stay in the government and shout around, all right.

"I am a man who says a good deal -- whatever he wants to say, and who often goes off the track. Whether I am the one who goes off the track or whether it is you people who call me off the track. But anyway, this is a fruitless argument. If you say it is all right, I shall stay."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall this paragraph, and do you remember this statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "In conclusion, ~~xxxx~~ though I have little ability as a Japanese subject, it is a completely natural thing for me to say. There is one thing I intend to do, and that is to do it with an Imperial heart, even though what I do is very little."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. "The Broadmindedness of a Great Nation. -- In conclusion, we have a national structure."

A. Oh, by the way. These things -- of course the man who published this put in. I didn't put in at all.

Q. Well, I haven't read them to you either, have I?

A. Yes, the headings.

Q. You mean the titles of the various subjects? They inserted them from what you had to say.

A. Yes.

Q. You don't claim it changes the substance of what you said any?

A. No.

Q. "In conclusion, we have a national structure to be grateful for, a national structure no other country has. A structure of scholars is of little importance. I asked for practice. Let us be penetrated by the national structure, and feel that a race headed by an Emperor is worthy to be grateful for. The Japanese is not such a bad race after all. If we are penetrated by this, and hold fast to



it, we can meet any country. Really we Japanese, though we are lions at home and have a habit of bragging, are not awake to our country's power in the world. We have not truly grasped the basis of that power. Unworthy as I am, at least I have grasped this. Touring Europe, I have felt where is the need for us to defer to any other country. Where is there a nation with such a power in the world political situation."

A. "Such a nation", it says?

Q. "Where is there a nation with such power in the world political situation."

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes, but in the beginning of this place, where it says "In conclusion, etc." I think this is an error, a misprint or in taking it down the stenographer made a mistake.

Q. Where is that? "In conclusion, we have a national structure to be grateful for." Is that wrong?

A. I think instead of "grateful" it ought to be "I wish to truly know the construction of the country -- the Japanese construction." It is anyhow of small significance.

Q. "That is why we become weak at times. As a whole, those who cannot become weak are not really strong. Do you believe that a nation who could tremble and do their best to be weak, capable of doing big things? Even among individuals it is a small man who believes "he is a lion, he will feel you." Let us be broadminded. Never mind if we are fooled. 'If you think you can feel me, try it.' That is how one can get to wrestle with the other. The famous WW wrestler RAIDEN TAMEKAWA used to start to fight when his opponent called on him to raise both arms and let the opponent grasp him under both arms. Cannot you understand why?"

A. That is "armpits."

Q. Do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes.

Q. "Unless he had the realization that he was strong, he would not have allowed so strong an opponent to grasp him under both arms. When Japan is penetrated by this spirit, she also can do this. There is no need for anxiety."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.



Q. And do you recall having said that?

A. Yes.

Q. "I have spoken on these various topics <sup>way</sup> by/of thanks for your welcome. Coming home from a long trip, and thus seeing your faces, I have felt very happy and have talked of things as they have come to my mind, without any order, and hope they will be of some reference value to our nation."

Is that a good translation?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall having made that statement?

A. Yes. And I think they left out my remarks about America and Great Britain. I feel that I added that both America and Great Britain too are making, although I haven't had chance to visit them, I said, I suppose they are making great efforts now. I said somewhere in the closing part that. But it was chiefly my report about what I saw and felt in my visit to Europe.

Q. Here is a translator's note here. He says "this speech, as the speaker himself says, was spoken without prepared notes. The style is the familiar style used in ordinary conversation among friends, and as the speaker thought as he spoke, some sentences are rather difficult to translate literally."

A. Yes, that is why.

Q. For example, page 6, a literal translation -- "Suddenly as you know the Italian Army in cooperation with the German Army when it seemed some people in the world were rather doubtful, but as you know they swept through over the Balkan peninsula and in Greece also a very happy thing has happened which is the end of the actual fighting." That is a literal translation of that.

A. Well sometimes very incomplete, my way of speaking, and using Yamaguchi Prefecture colloquialism, which is not understood by Tokyo people.

I gave on the evening that I got back to Tokyo a broadcast. That was my first word and I think this was then next. If you haven't any more to question me, then will you have the patience to listen a short while to my words?

You know, the other day you seemed to have an impression, or at least it so appeared to me, that the Soviet Russia and Japan neutrality pact was concluded by me very hastily. From what you read today, I think you get a fair idea that it was not so, but let me give you just a short history. It brings us back to some twenty years ago, to the closing years of that great statesman the late Count GOTO, who worked assiduously and always for peace between America and Japan, and peace between Russia -- not Soviet Russia alone, but Russia -- and Japan. In these endeavors of that great man, I was a rather close adviser, and sometimes even collaborated in his closing years. He went out himself to



Moscow, in his late years, to adjust the fishery question and other questions, and if possible to conclude something like the neutrality pact, but he was unsuccessful and he came back quite disappointed. I was then Vice President of the South Manchurian Railway, and I met him at Dairen. I gave him a welcome home dinner, to the late Count Goto. Now, I say this -- how earnest he was. I stood up and made a short table speech, and said that Prince Site is dead. Count Okuma is dead. And Goto's name was the only international name today which is of any importance the world over, so I wish that Count Goto would take care of himself and live long. Count Goto stood up to reply to my toast, but he sobbed so badly he couldn't make any reply. I wish to say that to show only how earnest he was, and he was very well known to Dr. Bard of your country, you know. Then, I think we go back fifteen years, when Yoshizawa he stopped at Moscow, on his way from Paris to Tokyo, to assume the post of Foreign Minister. He was then our ambassador at Paris.

"I think he spoke with Litvinoff, I think it was, and he tacked on this neutrality pact. Then, I think Mr. Shiota was our ambassador at Moscow, and then that is how many years ago? Thirteen or fourteen years ago. I was sent out to Geneva. I stopped at Moscow then, I stayed about five days or a week because this Geneva conference was postponed. I called on Mr. Karahan -- he was put to death, you know, by the Russian Government later -- he was Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, as we say in our country. And Mr. Litvinoff, then the Foreign Commissar, and I discussed with him about non-aggression treaty or neutrality pact. It was Russia who proposed to the Japanese Government a neutrality pact draft, some time before I left Tokyo for Geneva, and we discussed about it.

Q. That is some thirteen years beforehand.

A. Some thirteen or fourteen before. And then I went to Geneva. At that time, you know, it was not the Japanese Government but the Russian Government proposed and some days afterwards Mr. Litvinoff came to Geneva, but before -- just, I think before he left Moscow or after I got to Geneva. I do not recollect exactly, but about that time Count UCHIDA then the Foreign Minister of Japan, replied to Soviet Russia that public opinion in Japan was not yet united on that point, and so Japan could not enter into the neutrality pact, and I was so dismayed, you know, that the Japanese Government refused this.

They had a very good chance, you know, particularly when Soviet Russia proposed, and so I saw Litvinoff in Geneva. I think that refusal came afterward, because when I saw Litvinoff at Geneva, I also discussed with him about the neutrality pact and then I learned that the Japanese Government refused the proposal. And I wanted to see Litvinoff again at Geneva, and by inquiry I found out that Mr. Litvinoff left Geneva night before. I forgot his name, but the correspondent of Fass who was in Tokyo I was rather intimate with, he was then at Geneva, and I asked him to telephone to Mr. Litvinoff at Berlin because he told me that in all probability Litvinoff was staying still at Berlin, and to tell Mr. Litvinoff not to be disappointed, that when I got back to Tokyo I will do my best to bring about the conclusion of the non-aggression treaty or neutrality pact. And he told me that afterwards, that my words were conveyed to Mr. Litvinoff. Well, and then upon my return to Tokyo I tried my best but I could



not get him, and so I still recall that when this letter arrived, Counsellor of the Russian Embassy called on me at my private residence, I asked him to convey my words to Mr. Litvinoff, that I felt ashamed that I still could not achieve what I promised Mr. Litvinoff, but I was still continuing my effort. And to apologize for failure still to fulfill my promise to Mr. Litvinoff. And then when I was setting out, the Japanese Government, I think, was negotiating for the neutrality pact or non-aggression treaty under different ambassadors, including Mr. Togo, you know, and Mr. Ota too, our ambassador before Togo, and in sending out General TATAKAWA. I said now continuing these negotiations, and then try your best to solve all the outstanding questions. If you can succeed in doing so, so much better, but if you could succeed not, I will come out when I can find leisure to do so. That is, to lead Japan.

And I gave a letter of introduction to Mr. Reinhart, your ambassador at Moscow, and Mr. Tatakawa to become a friend with Mr. Reinhart and cooperate with him. Well, Tatakawa, as I said, in that pamphlet there, you know, really became a great friend of Mr. Molotov, and they were on best terms, and he was getting fishery treaty which was also negotiated for many years, and commercial treaty etc, and then neutrality pact. It was coming to very near getting it, but he couldn't get it. So I made up my mind to avail myself of my visit to Europe and to make effort to bring the neutrality pact to conclusion.

In the last stage I added a few words. I negotiated with Mr. Molotov, I think three times. At one time for two years. But I was thoroughly disappointed and I despaired of getting the neutrality pact, and so I said goodbye to Mr. Molotov and I thanked him for the courtesy shown me on my trip, and asked him to continue the negotiations with General Tatakawa, after I had left Moscow. And then I asked him that I would like very much to see Stalin in person, but Stalin seldom sees any foreigners in these days, and so I said it was not necessary for me to do so, so I asked Molotov to thank for me for the courtesy for my trip, and I said goodbye the afternoon of the 11th. I said goodbye and I went back. And then, the 11th, 12th, or 13th, my Siberian train was fixed, and of course with the intention to go back, and it was not I who hurriedly concluded. I got despaired but on the evening of the 12th, Molotov telephoned to our Embassy there and said that Mr. Stalin would like to see me the next day, at whatever hour was convenient to me. Well, that was very courteous for Stalin, you know.

I was then at the Hotel d'Europe, drinking beer. That was about eleven o'clock at night, and I told this man, he was counsellor of our Embassy, to reply to Mr. Molotov that I would call on Stalin at three o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. And I presented myself, and in those days Stalin was not Prime Minister, you know. It was Molotov, and Stalin politically was nobody. He walked into Mr. Molotov's room and we started to talk, and I was surprised to find out that as I said -- this interpreting, it takes about three times as long, you know, translating Russian into Japanese and Japanese into Russian -- so really it took about twelve or thirteen minutes, as I said.

Q. Your contention, then, is that at his invitation it was concluded finally?

A. Yes.



Q. But the fact still remains that it was after you had concluded the Tripartite Alliance with Germany.

A. Yes, but this dates back some twenty years.

Q. I know, but this thirteen minutes you are talking about -- it was at Stalin's invitation that you concluded this non-aggression treaty. That was within two or three months of the attack by Germany.

A. Yes. And you were inquiring about the term five years. As I recall, I think I first contended for ten years, and Molotov requested to shorten to five. I yielded, and the term was determined. And anyhow, in a treaty like that, it is either five or ten years, usually.

Q. Well, didn't you believe at that time that Russia had something in the way of intelligence reports that Germany was about to attack Russia?

A. I don't know. I never talked about it.

Q. You talked with Hitler and Ribbentrop, didn't you?

A. Yes, talked -- but I never had anything from Hitler. Ribbentrop said relations were becoming rather dangerous.

Q. So it is fair to assume that it was motivated by this danger, that made it necessary to conclude the pact.

A. Well -- -- maybe so, I suppose.



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INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 27 March 1946, 1400 - 1630 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Lt. Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator  
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.  
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. This afternoon I would like to show you a copy of the official announcement concerning Foreign Relations for the 16th Year of Showa (1941), Board of Information, and ask you if you know what that book is, if you recognize it. Can you identify that book?

A. It is printed in English.

Q. It is in English and also Japanese.

A. No, I don't recall. I have never seen this English translation. We seldom see these reports given out to the public.

Q. Well, for the purpose of the record, it indicates that it is a publication by the Board of Information of the Japanese Government for the year 1941.

A. Maybe so.

Q. That is what it says on the cover, isn't it.

A. Board of Information. I know the Foreign Office publishes some of these publications from time to time.

Q. I will ask you if you recognize, if you can tell us after glancing at this what this writing is here on the first page, commencing here.

A. This is Imperial Rescript.

Q. Concerning the declaration of war, isn't it, on the U. S.?

A. Yes, this is declaration of war.

Q. Can you tell what date that is, Mr. Matsuoka?

A. 8 December, 16th year of Showa -- that is 1941.

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Q. I want to cover a few of the important things in here. You were Foreign Minister on 6 January 1941, weren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, according to this official publication, there was "An Interview between Mr. Hajime Matsuniya, Japanese Ambassador, and Mr. Rene Robin, chief of the French Delegation, held at the official residence of the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs from 3 to 6:30 o'clock this afternoon, at which they continued the exchange of concrete views concerning general economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China."

Do you recall any of that?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall that about that period there were some matters about your Foreign Office, involving Japan and French Indo-China?

A. Yes.

Q. On Page 1, item II is a statement of the President of the Board of Information concerning the seizure of money belonging to Japanese by British authorities in Bermuda Island." Do you remember that?

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. According to this statement here, "With regard to the incident occurring on the 23rd of last month in which the British authorities in Bermuda Island seized money belonging to Mr. Kitamura and eight other Japanese passengers on the United States vessel, the Japanese Government promptly made investigations of actual facts of the case. As they have become clear, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, made this afternoon at the Foreign Office a strong protest to the British Ambassador in Tokyo, Sir Robert L. Craigie, pointing out that the measures taken by the British authorities in Bermuda Island are clearly an abuse of the belligerent rights and an illegal act infringing the legitimate rights of free movement of the subjects of Japan which is a neutral country. The Foreign Minister demanded in this connection that the British Government promptly take satisfactory steps for the settlement of the case."

Do you recall anything about that?

A. Bermuda is some islands off the coast of America? Yes, now I recall, although I don't recall the name of the person or persons, and I reported this -- either I or the Vice Minister.

Q. Reading Article V from the same book, page 2:



"V. Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet MODUS VIVENDI on Fisheries, January 21, 1941. A MODUS VIVENDI was signed at midnight of the 20th of this month at Moscow by the Japanese Ambassador, General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Viacheslav Molotov. The substance of the agreement is as follows:

- "1. The existing Japanese-Soviet Fishery Convention will remain in force as it is to the end of this year.
- "2. The MODUS VIVENDI is to be replaced by a new Fishery Convention to be concluded during this year. The said MODUS VIVENDI was not concluded at the time of negotiations conducted in the latter part of last year because of the Soviet proposal with respect to the method of payment for rental of leased fishery lots, which would increase enormously the burden on fishing concerns. The Soviet Government, however, have agreed to withdraw this proposal, resulting in an amicable settlement of the question on the basis of additional payment by Japan for this year of the amount which is equivalent to twenty percent of the rental of leased fishery lots and of global tax."

Do you recall that?

A. While I do not recall the contents thoroughly, I recall that such an instrument was signed at Moscow.

Q. And it is dated here January 21, so it would seem from this reading of the official document of the Board of Information, that some settlement had been made with the Russian Government concerning its fishing rights.

A. Yes, because we could not conclude a fishery treaty. It is different, it is more a point.

Q. On that point, of course, in January 1941 this settlement had been made, concerning these fishery rights.

A. Yes, a temporary settlement.

Q. So that when you say, in making this non-aggression treaty with Russia that it grew out of fishery rights in that territory, do you claim that this modifies that in any way?

A. That is what I expected. This neutrality pact doesn't grow out of all this individual question, but with the intention of being able to put political relations on better footing, gradually to solve these questions, and that fishery convention was simply to tide over the difficulty that season, and before and after our ambassador at Moscow was continuing the negotiations on fishery treaty. We called treaty for some years -- five or ten years. That is simply to tide over one season because we couldn't.



Q. Well, this was for a period of one year.

A. Yes, just that year.

Q. And the so-called non-aggression pact was concluded in April, wasn't it?

A. Yes, April.

Q. And this happened in January, didn't it?

A. Yes, I think that is right.

Q. So far as this document is concerned, it would appear to any ordinary person reading it that a settlement had been made between the Russian government and the Japanese government, concerning these fishery rights, for a period of one year.

A. Temporarily. After that agreement was reached, our Ambassador was continuing to negotiate about fishery treaty for five or ten years.

Q. I see. Rather than one year?

A. Yes.

Q. This states here that the ~~XXXXX~~ "Soviet Government, however, have agreed to withdraw this proposal, resulting in an amicable settlement of the question on the basis of additional payment by Japan for this year of the amount which is equivalent to twenty percent of the rental of leased fishery lots and of global tax." That seems to be the basis of a reasonable settlement, doesn't it?

A. Just for one season, and still what we call fishery treaty was in abeyance.

Q. Now, was your attempt to obtain a non-aggression pact with Russia, was that in progress at the time this was made? That is, 21 January 1941?

A. Oh yes, for years.

Q. Your ambassador at Russia was under instructions in January 1941 to attempt to obtain this non-aggression treaty?

A. Yes.

Q. You are sure about that?

A. Yes, I am sure. It was continued from Mr. Togo's time. And commercial treaty we didn't have then yet, you know, and we were negotiating about it, and then our concessions in North Sakhaline, and still continuing.



Q. Now, reading Article 6 on page 3:

"VI. Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Acceptance by the Governments of Thailand and France of the Proposal by the Japanese Government for Mediation in the Border Dispute Between Thailand and French Indo-China. January 24, 1941.

"The proposal of the Japanese Government for the cessation of hostilities and their mediation of the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China has been accepted by the Governments of Thailand and France.

"As the relations between Thailand and French Indo-China became increasingly tense since the rise of the movement in Thailand for the recovery of her lost territories, the Japanese Government, out of consideration for the peace and tranquility of Greater East Asia and the co-existence and co-prosperity of the peoples of this region, have entertained a hope that such a question would be peacefully settled without recourse to arms and have taken the necessary steps. Unfortunately, however, an armed conflict subsequently broke out. In the early part of December, the Japanese Government informally proposed to the French Government, through the latter's Ambassador at Tokyo, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, that they were prepared to mediate for the settlement of the dispute. The situation, however, has not only failed to take a favorable turn for a settlement but has become so serious that it was deemed a matter for grave concern as to its future course since the hostilities between the two countries have recently become increasingly extended.

"The Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, therefore, made formal proposal of the Japanese Government on January 20 to the Governments of France and Thailand regarding an immediate cessation of the hostilities and a mediation of the dispute, to which the two Governments, respectively, have replied their acceptance."

Now, was there a border dispute between the governments of Thailand and France, and did the Japanese government act as a mediator in the settlement of this border dispute in January 1941?

A. No.

Q. Now, in January 1941, the French Vichy government was then the government of France, isn't that true?

A. Yes, we looked to it as the French government.

Q. Now, quoting just from this last paragraph of Article VI, "The Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, therefore, made a formal proposal of the Japanese Government on January 20 to the Governments of France and Thailand regarding an immediate cessation of the hostilities and a mediation of the dispute, to which the two Governments, respectively, have replied their acceptance."

Do you recall that?



A. Yes.

Q. Now, wasn't it in that settlement that one of the parties of the dispute received a good deal of territory that was in dispute?

A. Yes. I don't know what you mean by great deal, but some parts Thailand lost to France.

Q. Thailand had lost to France. And in this settlement, which was concluded here, did France return that land to Thailand?

A. Not all.

Q. Any portion of it?

A. Yes.

Q. A considerable amount?

A. I think considerable.

Q. Now, at that time was there any of the Japanese military forces in Thailand?

A. No.

Q. Was there any knowledge, to you, that the Japanese military forces were anticipating any move toward Thailand, or moving into Thailand?

A. No.

Q. Now, Article VII states:

"Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning Japanese Delegation for the Armistice Conference Between Thailand and French Indo-China. January 29, 1941.

"It has been decided that the armistice negotiations regarding the Thailand-French Indo-China border dispute be held aboard a Japanese warship on the high seas off Saigon. The Japanese Government have notified the Governments of the two countries that Japan will send the following delegates to the said conference:

"Counsel-General Yasushi Hayashi; Consul-General Fujio Minota; Consul-General Shunsuke Asada; Major General Raichiro Sumita; Colonel Hiroshi Tamura; Captain Shinichi Terikoshi (Navy); Captain Kenyo Nakado (Navy)."

Do you recall that?

A. I don't recall the date.



Q. According to the record here, "Japan will send the following delegates to the said conference: ---" These persons represented Japan as a delegation to the armament conference between Thailand and Indo-China. Do you recall that?

A. I think, while I don't recall the names, military, naval and Foreign Office people were appointed as a committee to locate the boundary as determined by mediation. Those men had no part in the mediation settlement conducted in Tokyo.

Q. That was conducted in Tokyo?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, according to this, they represented the armament conference of January 29.

A. Maybe so.

Q. I will read the body of it again, which may be a little more enlightening:

"It has been decided that the armistice negotiations regarding the Thailand-French Indo-China border dispute be held aboard a Japanese warship on the high seas off Saigon. The Japanese Government have notified the Governments of the two countries that Japan will send the following delegates to the said conference: ---"

A. Oh, that is to stop the war.

Q. Between whom?

A. Between Thailand and Indo-China.

Q. On January 31, Article VIII announces the Announcement of the Board of Information concerning the Armistice Agreement between Thailand and French Indo-China, January 31, 1941.

A. About that time.

Q. Next, Article IX -- "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Examination of the Respective Credentials of the French and Thai Plenipotentiaries." Next, Number X -- "Joint Communique of Japan, France and Thailand concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute, February 7, 1941."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, about that time.



Q. Articles 10, 11, 12, and 13, all have to do with the French-Thailand and French-Indo-China-Thailand dealings, and the dates are running from February 7 to February 12. Do you recall that these matters were under consideration in the Foreign Office at that time?

A. Yes, although I don't remember the date.

Q. Concerning the settlement of this dispute, did the Japanese government, or your office representing the Japanese Government, make any representations to the Germany Government requesting the use of their offices in Vichy France, concerning certain Japanese rights of mediation in this French-Indo-China and Thailand dispute?

A. Japan's rights to Mediate?

Q. Yes.

A. To Germany?

Q. Through Germany.

A. Although I do not recall, I may have asked the German government to use its influence with the Vichy Government to respond to our offer to mediate.

Q. It is possible that you might have done so?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it also probable, or are you not clear on that point?

A. It is probable.

Q. Now, Number 14, which is dated February 18 1941, is a "Statement of the Spokesman of the Board of Information Concerning Alarming Reports with Reference to the East Asiatic Situation, February 18, 1941."

I will read that Article XIV in its entirety, to refresh your recollection:

"Various alarming reports have reached Japan purporting to give an impression that the situation in East Asia has become radically tense. We are surprised to learn that some foreign countries felt undue concern regarding the alleged tension in the situation in East Asia, and want to emphasize that so far as we can see there is no ground for entertaining alarming views on the East Asiatic situation.

"We want to repeat that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is peaceful. We can not help feeling, therefore, a certain amount of anxiety, if not misgivings, as to the war-like preparations of the British and American Governments to meet supposed contingencies in the Pacific and the South Seas. The press reports, concerning these movements on the part of American sources and elsewhere, are causing increasing misgivings, resulting in the contention



advanced in some quarters in Japan that Japan should lose no time to take necessary steps to meet the worst eventuality in these regions. If the American Government could only be persuaded to restrict their activities in this respect to the Western Hemisphere and avoid causing anxiety unnecessarily in the mind of Japanese people, the situation would indeed be greatly mitigated.

"We are utterly unable to see any good purpose to be served by prolonging war, whatever the motive may be. The present situation demands statesmanship of a high order. Such statesmanship, we trust, will not be waiting in the British Empire or elsewhere.

"In concluding, we want to make it clear that Japan is fully prepared to act as a mediator or to take whatever action calculated to recover normal conditions, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere in the world. Leading Powers have great responsibility of restoring world peace and civilization; and such responsibility can only be fulfilled by a wise and generous statesmanship willing to listen to other's claims and contentions."

Now, according to this document, that was issued February 18 1941. Do you recall that a government statement was issued along that line?

A. While I am not certain about the date, I do recall that at least the latter half seems to be what I said in my memorandum to Captain Eden.

Q. Now, if such an official government statement was issued February 18 1941, it does indicate here that the government itself was concerned about matters contained in that statement, isn't that true?

A. Yes.

Q. And the principally interested parties in that, that the Government has pointed to, are America and England. Isn't that true?

A. Pointed out there, but I placed not much importance.

Q. This statement says, "We can not help feeling, therefore, a certain amount of anxiety, if not misgivings, as to the war-like preparations of the British and American Governments to meet supposed contingencies in the Pacific and the South Seas."

A. That part of the publication of the Information Bureau, I do not recall.

Q. But if the Information Bureau, a branch of the Japanese government, made such a statement, it indicates that it was a serious matter, doesn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. So that, even in that period of time, February 18 1941, this office saw fit to call attention, in language of that type, to actions of the British and American governments, on information that had reached their attention?



A. Yes, yes, I believe so, but

Q. Now, the Tripartite Pact was still in effect on that date?

A. Yes.

Q. And Germany and Italy had joined forces in the Balkan areas in that period of time, hadn't they?

A. No. While I do not recall,

Q. What about Greece, Yugoslavia, and the Mediterranean area?

A. I think they had their forces in North Africa, but not in Greece.

Q. In North Africa?

A. Not in Greece or Yugoslavia.

Q. But there is nothing in this government statement here that points to the warlike actions of Germany and Italy, is there?

A. Not in that statement.

Q. No. Have you ever, while Foreign Minister, condemned the aggressive warfare of Germany or Italy?

A. No.

Q. You never did?

A. No, I never did.

Q. Now, if this was made in February 1941, that would be approximately one month before you departed on your trip to Germany, Italy and Russia?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, on February 20 1941, according to this document, Article XV is an "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning Trade Negotiations Between Japan and the Soviet Union, February 20, 1941:

"In accordance with an agreement of views reached a short time ago between the Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Viacheslav M. Molotov, conversations on trade between the two countries were held for the first time in Moscow on February 17. The meeting was attended by Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Counsellor Fumao Miyakawa and Secretary Akira Oye, representing Japan; and by Commissar of Foreign Trade, Mr. A. I. Nikoyan,



Assistant Commissar of Foreign Trade, Mr. U. M. Kaganovich, Director of the Eastern Division of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, Mr. P. N. Komykin and one another, representing the Soviet Union."

Does that refresh your recollection as to any such meeting having taken place in Russia?

A. Yes, commercial treaty.

Q. Now that had nothing to do with the so-called non-aggression pact, did it? That is, I mean this reference here, this Article XV, which I read, which calls attention to trade negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, does not mean negotiation for the non-aggression pact?

A. That was going on at the same time

Q. But it is not one and the same instrument, is it?

A. It had to be considered together to solve all these outstanding questions or differences between the two countries. The toughest one was the commercial treaty.

Q. But according to this article, this was a separate undertaking to which Japan sent separate representatives as well as Russia.

A. Oh yes.

Q. The next Article XVI, "Joint Communiqué of Japan, France and Thailand Concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute, February 24 1941."

Do you recall that that was under discussion at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. The last paragraph of that I will read:

"The fourth informal meeting was held today, from 5:00 o'clock to 6:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at the official residence of the Foreign Minister. The meeting was attended by Messrs. Yosuke Matsuoka and Hajime Matsuniya, the Mediators, the Secretarygeneral Mr. Otetsugu Saito and several assistants to the Mediators, for Japan; Messrs. Arsene-Henry and Rene Robin, the Delegates, and three assistants, for France; and Prince Varavaidyakara Varavara, Messrs. Phya Sri Sena and Phra Silpa Sastrakon, the Delegates, and two assistants, for Thailand; and the conversations were held in an amicable atmosphere."

Was that at your home on February 24, for the settlement of Thailand-Indo-China dispute?



A. Does it say official residence?

Q. Yes, official residence.

A. Yes. We had it at the official residence.

Q. Prince Varavaldyakara Varavarn -- was he the Thailand representative?

A. Yes.

Q. In other words, this matter was still under consideration at that time?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Article XVII, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Participation of Bulgaria in the Three Power Pact." Dated March 1 1941. Do you recall that?

A. Yes, always understood not exactly about date, you know.

Q. It is dated March 1 1941, and that is before you departed for Europe. I will read it:

"Bulgaria having recently decided to participate in the Three Power Pact concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, a Protocol concerning the Bulgarian participation was signed at Vienna, on March 1, by the Japanese Plenipotentiary, Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima, the German Plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, and the Italian Plenipotentiary, Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, representing the three Powers, and by the Bulgarian Plenipotentiary, Prime Minister Bogdan Silov.

"The contents of the Protocol are similar to those of the Protocol signed at the time of participation of Hungary and others last year.

"Bulgaria's participation in the Three Power Pact has been expected to take place sooner or later since last year. At the same time when the Balkan situation is tense, as at present, it is of important significance that Bulgaria has at last completely joined the Axis group of nations -- a matter to be heartily congratulated upon.

"The friendship between Japan and Bulgaria has steadily increased in cordiality since the establishment, the year before last, of the Japanese Legation at the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, and, needless to say, it will become still more closer through the present participation of Bulgaria in the Tripartite Pact. " March 1 1941.

Do you recall that?



A. Yes, that was at the request of the German government, and with an express understanding between Germany and Japan that Japan thereby would incur no obligation whatever.

Q. That Japan would incur no obligation.

A. No obligation whatever. That was to mean that it was an entirely German affair and a European matter, and we don't care to meddle. And it was, I think, Oshima, was instructed to sign an referendum. That comes to Japan and then put before the Privy Council, and if OK'd by the Privy Council, then

Q. Oh, I see. Now the next article is No. 18, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Interview Between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, and the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsene-Henry." March 2, 1941. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. According to this statement, it says, "French Ambassador, Mr. Arsene-Henry, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, at 11:30 o'clock, this morning (March 2nd), and having handed the French reply to the Japanese plan of mediation, the Ambassador left at 12:30 o'clock."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. In this reply was he representing the Vichy Government? Is that right?

A. No, we were looking to him in a vague way as a French representative. He was known to be a DeGaulist.

Q. But at the time he delivered this to you, was he a representative of the Vichy French government?

A. Yes.

Q. But you suspected that he was a DeGaulist?

A. Well, that had nothing to do with us.

Q. Well, France accepted your plan of mediation, didn't they?

A. Yes.

Q. They didn't have much other choice, did they? France was a beaten nation at that time, wasn't it?

A. Yes, but could choose Great Britain or some other nation.



Q. But standing on her own, she was under the domination of the Germany Army at the time and unable to choose for herself.

A. Not exactly, not the Vichy government.

Q. That is the Government that made the Armistice with Germany, isn't it?

A. Yes. Vichy was outside.

Q. It was with Vichy that you dealt?

A. Yes, and Marshall Petain was sometimes pretty much acting independently of Germany.

Q. He was?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, Article XIX, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Interview Between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, and the French Ambassador, Mr. Arsene-Henry," March 4 1941. I will read it to you:

"The French Ambassador, Mr. Arsene-Henry, called on the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, at the Foreign Office at 5:30 o'clock this afternoon (March 4), and held an important conversation with the latter with reference to the Japanese plan of mediation for the settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China border dispute and left at 6:10 o'clock."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes, I recall.

Q. Article XX, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Visit of the French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, to the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka," March 6, 1941. According to this, it was another conversation having to do with Indo China border dispute. Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. Article XXI also has to do with a "Joint Communique of Japan, France and Thailand concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute," March 6, 1941. Article XXII, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute," March 6, 1941.

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.



Q. Article XXIII, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute," March 6, 1941:

"The Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, requested the French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, to call on him at 8:00 o'clock this evening (March 6) and resumed the conversation which was held at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon. The Ambassador left at 8:00 o'clock. The negotiation on the question is still progressing."

Article XXIV, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Mediation Conference for the Settlement of the Thai-French Indo-China Border Dispute," March 7, 1941.

Article XXV, "Joint Communiqué of Japan, France and Thailand Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation," March 11, 1941.

Article XXVI, "Statement of the Foreign Office Concerning the Conclusion of the Mediation," March 11 1941. Apparently quite a lengthy statement was given. Do you want me to read it?

A. No, that must have taken place although I don't recall the details. And then the next day I left Tokyo for Europe. That is March 12.

Q. Article XXXI, "Announcement of the Foreign Office Concerning the Trip to Europe of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka," March 11, 1941.

"Foreign Minister Mr. Matsuoka will shortly visit Germany and Italy to exchange personal felicitations with and meet the leaders of Germany and Italy in connection with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. The views regarding the intended trip were exchanged among the three Governments at the time of the conclusion of the ~~Tripartite Pact~~ Treaty but the duties of the Foreign Minister have so far prevented him from acting thereon.

"The Minister will incidentally avail himself of the opportunity to make a personal observation, on the spot, of the situation in Europe.

"MEMBERS OF THE SUITE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER MR. YOSUKE MATSUOKA IN HIS TRIP TO EUROPE:

Foreign Office

Tamao Sakamoto, Director of the Bureau of European and Asiatic Affairs."

Do you recall him being along?

A. Yes.

Q. Is he still alive, do you know?

A. He is dead. He died at Berne, Switzerland.



Q. While you were on this trip?

A. No, many years after, while he was Minister.

Q. "Toshikazu Kase, Secretary to the Foreign Minister." That was your secretary. Was he along?

A. Yes.

Q. Is he still alive, do you know?

A. Yes.

Q. "Shinsaku Hogen, Secretary in the Foreign Office." Was he in the party?

A. Yes, who spoke German fluently. That is the man I was referring to.

Q. Is he still alive, do you know?

A. I believe he is still in Moscow, though I don't know.

Q. Your last knowledge as to his whereabouts was in Moscow?

A. Yes, secretary in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow.

Q. "Shinichi Hasegawa, Research Secretary in the Foreign Office." Was he in the party?

A. While I don't remember him, why if it is there he must have been.

Q. You don't recall him particularly, though?

A. No.

Q. "Yoshio Noguchi, Secretary-interpreter." Do you recall him?

A. Yes, he was the Russian interpreter.

Q. Russian interpreter, but Hogen would be the German interpreter?

A. Yes.

Q. "Shirokichi Kusano, Chancellor in the Foreign Office." I may not be pronouncing these too well. Do you recall him?

A. No, I don't recall his name, but there were two or three clerks.



Q. There is another chancellor in the Foreign Office here, too --Mitsugoro Funakoshi.

A. There were actually those two.

Q. "Toshikazu Nakanishi, Extra Secretary to the Foreign Office." Was he along? Do you recall him?

A. Yes.

Q. "Kinkazu Saionji, Extra Secretary to the Foreign Office."

A. Yes.

Q. "War Ministry: Yatsuji Nagai, Colonel."

A. Yes.

Q. "Navy Ministry: Shigeru Fujii, Commander." Do you recall him?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, why were the military members of the party along?

A. Well, we almost always, you know, take one each.

Q. Did they hold any separate conferences in Germany under your instructions?

A. Not any that I know of.

Q. You didn't instruct them to?

A. No.

Q. While you were talking with Hitler or Ribbentrop, was Hogen present?

A. No.

Q. Who did the interpreting for you?

A. A German interpreter by the name of Dr. Schmidt, I think.

Q. Yes, I think our records show that there was a man by the name of Schmidt. Now, Article XXXII, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Understanding Between Japan and Venezuela for the Acceleration of Their Trade," March 18 1941.

A. Of Venezuela? I don't recall it. That was done by the Chief of the Commercial Bureau, I think. I may have placed my stamp without knowing the contents.



Q. Well, of course, Venezuela was an oil producing nation, wasn't it? Could it be that your office, the commercial part of your office, was attempting to increase the importation of oil products from Venezuela?

A. I don't know. What treaty it is, I don't recall.

Q. It doesn't seem to be a treaty so much as an understanding. I will read it:

"The understanding between Japan and Venezuela by which Japan undertook since July 1 1939 to purchase as much of Venezuelan products as possible and Venezuela agreed not to adopt unreasonably restrictive measures against Japanese goods for reason of unequilibrium of trade between the two countries expired at the end of February of this year. The Japanese Government have conducted, in view of importance of Venezuela as market for our exports, negotiations with the Venezuelan Government through our representatives there for the conclusion of a new understanding for similar purpose. As the result, a understanding was reached on March 11 by which the two countries will adjust their trade relations for a year beginning March 11, on the basis of the understanding concluded on July 1, 1939."

A. That doesn't refresh my memory at all.

Q. Number XXIII is "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Participation of Jugoslavia in the Three Power Pact," March 25, 1941. A statement of the Foreign Office. Reading the last paragraph of Number XXIII:

"Since 1924, Japan has maintained friendly relations with Jugoslavia by appointing her Minister to Rumania concurrently as her Minister to Jugoslavia, but at present, on account of the absence of our Minister to Rumania, the Japanese Minister to Hungary is in charge of the matters pertaining to the relations between Japan and Jugoslavia. Needless to say, the cordial relations between Japan and Jugoslavia will become increasingly closer through the latter's participation in the Three Power Pact."

That is the statement.

A. It may have been the statement, but just the same, the same understanding as I said in reference to some other country.

Q. Now on April 13, according to Article XXIV, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Pact of Neutrality Between Japan and the Soviet Union." April 13, 1941:

"The Japanese Representatives, namely, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, and the Ambassador, Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Representative, namely, the President of the People's Council and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Viacheslav Molotov, signed at Moscow at



two o'clock this afternoon, April 13, the Pact of Neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union.

"A gist of the Pact is as follows:

"The Japanese Empire and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prompted by their desire of strengthening the peaceful and friendly relations subsisting between the two countries have decided to conclude a Pact of Neutrality and have mutually agreed as follows:

"ARTICLE 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and to respect each other's territorial integrity and inviolability.

"ARTICLE 2. In case either one of the High Contracting Parties becomes an object of military action by one or more third Powers, the other Party shall observe neutrality throughout the entire period of such a conflict.

"ARTICLE 3. The present Pact shall be enforced from the day of the completion of its ratifications by both High Contracting Parties and it shall be valid for the period of five years. In case either one of the High Contracting Parties does not make notice of its abrogation a year before the expiration of the said period, the Pact shall be regarded as having automatically been prolonged for the next five years.

"ARTICLE 4. The present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible. An exchange of ratifications shall take place in Tokyo as soon as possible.

"Simultaneously with the signature of the Pact, the Governments of Japan and the Soviet Union issued a Joint Declaration to the following effect:

"The Government of the Japanese Empire and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in order to assure the peaceful and friendly relations subsisting between them on the basis of the spirit of the Neutrality Pact concluded between the two countries, respect, on the part of the Japanese Empire, the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia, and on the part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Empire of Manchukuo."

Do you recall that some time ago, while there was a five-year agreement, at the end of four years there had to be some notice between the parties to renew it?

A. No, that is not so. To terminate it.

Q. No, according to this they had to give one year's notice before the end of the five year period -- notice of its abrogation.

A. Yes.



Q. Now, Russia did serve notice on the Japanese Government?

A. Yes, I heard so. I was in sickbed then.

Q. Now, "The present Pact shall be ratified as soon as possible."

A. Still in force, you know. One year's notice doesn't abrogate the treaty itself. It is that the pact it must be in force until the 13th of this month.

Q. Number XXXV, "Statement of the Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye."  
I will read it in its entirety:

"April 13, 1941. -- The Japanese Government some time ago made public both at home and abroad their unalterable determination, by concluding the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy, to prevent a world-wide spread of war and to secure the peace of Greater East Asia with that Pact as the axis of the country's foreign policy. It goes without saying that, in order to realize such a purpose, it is essential that Japan and the Soviet Union, which are neighbours in the Far East, should strengthen their peaceful and friendly relations on a lasting basis, reinforcing thereby the spirit of the said Pact of Alliance. With this conviction, the Government have for some time been conducting negotiations with the Soviet Government with a view to bringing about a fundamental adjustment of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union. With the present visit to Moscow of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, as a turning point, the conversations between the two Governments have made rapid progress, resulting in the signature today, April 13, of the Pact of Neutrality between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka and Ambassador Lieutenant-General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Viacheslav Molotov, which has just been announced. At the same time, the Joint Declaration by the two countries has been issued through which Japan respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of the People's Republic of Mongolia and the Soviet Union respects the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo, thereby expecting to bring tranquillity to the Manchukuo-Soviet and Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian borders.

"It is my belief that the present Pact has an epoch-making significance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union and that it will greatly contribute toward the promotion of world peace. I have no doubt that the Pact will serve as a basis for rapid solution in a concrete manner of various pending questions between the two countries."

Do you recall that statement by the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye?

A. No, I don't recall it, but I think the sense of it.

Q. If you notice, as I read it here, he assigned this reason: "The Japanese Government some time ago made public both at home and abroad their unalterable determination, by concluding the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy, to prevent a world-wide spread of war and to secure the peace of Greater East Asia with that Pact as the axis of the country's foreign policy." Now,



how does that tie in -- why do you think he makes that statement concerning the conclusion of the pact with Russia?

A. Because, as I said before, I think I said repeatedly at the time the Three Party Pact was concluded, we already -- Prime Minister and myself -- had in mind to come into closer relations with Soviet Russia.

Q. Here is what he says about it: "It goes without saying that, in order to realize such a purpose" -- and I take it he refers back to the Triparty Pact being the axis of your country's foreign policy -- "it is essential that Japan and the Soviet Union, which are neighbours in the Far East, should strengthen their peaceful and friendly relations on a lasting basis, reinforcing thereby the spirit of the said Pact of Alliance." According to him, he is reinforcing the spirit of the pact of alliance, namely, the Triparty Pact.

A. Yes.

Q. So he assigns that reason for it. Do you think that was correct?

A. Yes, and I was correct too, because this Triparty Pact was concluded for limiting the theater of war, and to bring about peace. He meant that.

Q. Well, this is of course exactly what he says here: "It goes without saying that, in order to realize such a purpose, it is essential that Japan and the Soviet Union, which are neighbours" -- now when he says it is essential to realize such a purpose, he means the purpose of your foreign policy as it is woven about the Triparty Pact.

A. Yes.

Q. And he says it is necessary and vital that there should be a peaceful strengthening of "friendly relations on a lasting basis, reinforcing thereby the spirit of the said Pact of Alliance. With this conviction, the Government have for some time been conducting negotiations with the Soviet Government with a view to bringing about a fundamental adjustment of Japan's relations with the Soviet Union."

Yesterday in our conversation you take this desire all the way back to Prince Goto's time, whereas the Prime Minister says here, it is in relation to the Triparty Pact that it becomes necessary that such a treaty be concluded.

A. Maybe Konoze didn't know about Goto.

Q. You mean he didn't know this attempt had been going on for years before?

A. It may be he doesn't know it. The reason I gave you a short history of the neutrality pact yesterday was that very few Japanese know its history.

Q. Now on April 18 there is an announcement, Number XXXVI, "Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the Visit to Japan of the German Economic and Goodwill Mission." Do you recall that?



A. In April I was not here. I came back to Tokyo the 22nd.

Q. In any event, the Foreign Office announced the arrival of this so-called German economic and goodwill mission to Japan. They were:

Mr. Helmuth Wohlthat, Director of the Division for Four Year Plan and Superintendent of the Netherlands Bank.  
Dr. Voss, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Trade Bureau, Foreign Office.  
Dr. Joachim von Spindler, Chief of the Section for Far Eastern Affairs, Ministry of Economics.  
Mr. Buchwald, Member of the Section for Far Eastern Affairs, Ministry of Economics.  
Mr. Nelson, Chief of the Section for Far Eastern Affairs, Ministry of Food.  
Mr. Rosenbruch, Representative of the Reichsbank.

A. I don't know all these men, but the man you first named, he called on me once after my return to Tokyo.

Q. Shortly after your return?

A. Yes. I met him, that man, once while I was in Manchuria before.

Q. Yes?

A. He was a business man then. He came to Manchuria.

Q. He apparently was representing there the Government of Germany on this trip, wasn't he?

A. Yes, in that trip.

Q. What was their purpose in sending this mission here at the time? Had this any connection with the purpose and intent of the Tripartite Pact, and the exchange of economic and other information?

A. No, not necessarily. Particularly that man was named first, he was concerned about soybeans in Manchuria.

Q. The "Statement of the Foreign Minister Upon Arrival in Tokyo," April 22, 1941, Article XXXVII. I will read you that:

"Here I am back in Tokyo again. My journey to Germany and Italy took some six weeks. I had a series of extremely useful conversations with the leaders of the countries with whom I have formed personal acquaintanceship. I realize fully the truth of the proverbial saying that to see one is better than to hear a hundred times, for I feel I can now speak with better authority on the situation in Western Europe, having ascertained on the spot many a doubtful point through my own ascertained (misprint in book -- repetition of one line) in the conduct of our foreign relations. I have also become acquainted with the eminent leaders of the Soviet Government including Monsieur Stalin with whom



I have had two frank and friendly conversations. In fact, it was he who made the prompt decision at the last stage of negotiations regarding the recently concluded Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. This is only one of the many examples of how great leaders of the powers are today disposing quickly the affairs of state involving sometimes the fate of their nations when international situation is so full of swift and surprising changes. Vacillation and hesitation are, indeed, fatal.

"We, too, must be quick in action in order to cope with the momentous need of the times. We should not confuse deliberation with procrastination just as the Tripartite Pact does not affect the relations of the Three Powers vis-a-vis the Soviets so that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the declaration affect in the least the Tripartite Pact which remains the immutable basis of our foreign policy. On the contrary, the Neutrality Pact is a reinforcement in a sense of the Tripartite Pact. There has, of course, been no misunderstanding or misapprehension among the three allied Governments in connection with the Neutrality Pact. Nothing proves this better than the fact that both Germany and Italy are sincerely welcoming the conclusion of the Pact. The Pact is an eloquent indication of the improvement in our relations with the Soviets and together with the Tripartite Pact, Sino-Japanese Treaty of last year and the recent mediation in the France-Thailand dispute, it stands as a fit symbol of the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, which inspires the foreign policy of Japan, the aim of which is universal peace and good neighbourliness.

"Finally, if my European journey contributed ever so little to the cause of our nation, it is above all, due to the Gracious Influence of our Imperial House and also to the great power of our country -- the Japanese Empire."

Do you recall that speech?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, now I notice in this speech, particularly in your statement, "We should not confuse deliberation with procrastination just as the Tripartite Pact does not affect the relations of the Three Powers vis-a-vis the Soviets so that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the declaration affect in the least the Tripartite Pact which remains the immutable basis of our foreign policy."

Now, I take it by that you meant that the Tripartite Pact was exactly what you said, "the immutable basis of our foreign policy" -- the Japanese foreign policy at that time.

A. Yes.

Q. Now, down here you make reference to Hakko Ichiu. Now, what relation has Hakko Ichiu got to do with the immutable basis of the Tripartite Pact being that basis of your foreign policy?

A. By the very preamble of the Tripartite Pact, Hakko Ichiu was made a basis of that immutable fact.



Q. So that Hakko Ichiu and the preamble to the Tripartite Pact are one and the same in your understanding? The purpose and intent is one and the same?

A. Yes, and I was determined to carry out Hakko Ichiu all over the world.

Q. Quoting further, "On the contrary, the Neutrality Pact is a reinforcement in a sense of the Tripartite Pact." Do you remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. And that is exactly what it was intended for, isn't it?

A. Yes, in other words one more link for world peace.

Q. Well, you have said here, "a reinforcement in a sense of the Tripartite Pact."

A. Yes, that is one more link.

Q. But you meant what you said here, didn't you? "On the contrary, the Neutrality Pact is a reinforcement in a sense of the Tripartite Pact."?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, that has a definite meaning, doesn't it, Mr. Matsuoka?

A. Yes, but in order to make it more interlingual I must say one more link in world peace.

Q. Now, you did not say it here.

A. But I meant it.

Q. Well, let me finish my question. You did not say here it was for better commercial relations between Russia and Japan, you said "a reinforcement in a sense of the Tripartite Pact." So, principally, it is true that the non-aggression pact was intended for that purpose, to wit: reinforcement of the Tripartite Pact. And further, you state: "Nothing proves this better than the fact that both Germany and Italy are sincerely welcoming the conclusion of the Pact." Do you recall stating that?

A. Yes.

Q. Well, did they welcome the conclusion of it?

A. Yes, yes, I believe so. Ribbentrop personally said if I succeeded in getting it, of course.

Q. Well, you took pains in this speech immediately upon arriving, to explain to the Japanese people that the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Russia



had in no way changed the effect of the Tripartite Pact so far as Germany and Japan were concerned. It was still the immutable basis of the foreign policy.

A. Yes.

Q. And further, rather than to weaken, it was to reinforce the Tripartite Pact.

A. That was my opinion. I said something in relation in the same broadcast in relation to the Pacific and America, did I not?

Q. It doesn't state so here.

A. Then they deleted it for some purpose. I referred to the Pacific problem too, and those who won't see peace, and why I can't convince them to believe my way, but this does not prevent us from entering into an understanding with America about the Pacific.

Q. But in any event, you announced that the Tripartite Pact was the immutable basis of your foreign policy. Is that true?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, keeping that in mind, do you think that a statement subsequently, that so far as the Pacific was concerned, and the U. S., in its relations to Japan, in the light of your statement here that the basis of your foreign policy was the Tripartite Pact -- did you see any way to alleviate and contribute to world peace?

A. I thought so.

Q. Was there anything about the Tripartite Alliance that would have invited the U. S. to a settlement? Wasn't the Tripartite Pact, supported by the so-called non-aggression pact with Russia, a strong indication to the U. S. that you had formed alliances with Germany and Italy, supported by the non-aggression pact with Russia, of such strength and power that you intended to carry out your plans under this treaty and disregard the wishes of America?

A. It doesn't appear to me that way. On the contrary, I could gradually convince America of my intentions of improving world peace and thus bring about an understanding of peace and settlement of the Pacific and the China problem.

Q. But you have announced that "the immutable basis of our foreign policy is the Tripartite Pact." Isn't that right?

A. Yes.

Q. You did not say that the Tripartite Pact and its existence, and the non-aggression pact, or any other treaties, do not preclude a peaceful settlement of the matters involving the U. S., did you?



A. No, but at the same time I had the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact to begin with, that it was a peace instrument, and will contribute to world peace. That is September 27.

Q. Now, between the date of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, September 27 1940, and this date in April of 1941, April 22, how much more of Europe had Germany and Italy taken by aggressive warfare? Do you recall?

A. As I recall, except Yugoslavia and the putsch in Greece, I think others about the same, the other part.

Q. Well now, when you made this statement, as Foreign Minister of Japan you knew that Germany and Italy had been carrying on an aggressive warfare at that time, isn't that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew, as Foreign Minister of Japan, that the U. S. opposed that process of Hitler and Germany, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. So, by the same simple token, to announce that your foreign policy was the immutable basis -- that it was immutably based upon the Tripartite Pact, lends a bit of inconsistency to your afterwards explanation that you had a plan by which you could have settled the dispute in this area with the U. S.

A. There was no inconsistency from the start in my mind, and I hoped to convince America to come to peaceful understanding with Japan after all.

Q. You knew, as Foreign Minister at that time, that the U. S. had already then become heavily committed to Great Britain and other democracies, so-called, of the world, by Lend-Lease and other methods of supply of armaments, didn't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And it must have been apparent to one of such an intelligent mind that the policy of America concerning Hitler and the persons of the Tripartite Pact, the express purpose of the pact which says in Article 1 and Article 2 that each would have the right to divide the world in its sphere, each to its liking, it must have been apparent to you at that time that the so-called Tripartite Pact was the very essence of offensiveness to the U. S.

A. No. I thought the U. S. had common sense enough to understand our point of view.

Q. It was, nevertheless, the written vehicle by which Germany, Italy and Japan had agreed that various spheres in the world would be supported one by the other, and for each other.



A. It was to be carried out just as in the preamble.

Q. On the same day, April 22, you had already been notified that serious representations had been made to your government and were under consideration by members of the Japanese government, between the U. S. and Japan concerning the then serious situation in the Pacific area.

A. I didn't regard it as exactly serious.

Q. Were you not informed in an automobile ride from the airport that the U. S. had served upon the Japanese government, and that there had also been an anticipated exchange of notes having to do with very basic things concerning the maintenance of peace in the Pacific?

A. Well, I could not still make out very much of it.

Q. But notwithstanding that, about the tenth sentence of your speech here, on returning from this trip, you said "the Tripartite Pact ... remains the immutable basis of our foreign policy."

A. Yes, and then they deleted, for what reason I don't know, but I referred to the possibility of agreement on the Pacific.

Q. Did you send any message to the U. S. concerning your plan?

A. My plan? No. But Mr. Grew, I think, knew that I was calling the Tripartite Pact a peace instrument, instead of a war alliance.

Q. Well, if it was the basis of your foreign policy, and it led to war, how then can you call it a peace instrument?

A. Well, I never intended to go to war. That is opposite everything. That -- I am honest, you know, in saying I never dreamed in my life that Japan would ever start a war with America. I was afraid America some day starting the war. And to this day I do not understand.

Q. Article XLII, on page 40, dated May 9, 1941, "Communique of Japanese-German-Italian Mixed Commission concerning the Meeting of the General Commission under the Tripartite Pact." I will read it:

"The General Commission under the Tripartite Pact held its meeting at 4:30 p. m. May 9th, at the official residence of the Foreign Minister, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Mr. Matsuoka. Their Excellencies General Ott and Monsieur Indelli took part in the meeting. Question relating to the cooperation among the three Powers under the Tripartite Pact, including economic matters, were brought up and fully discussed. It was agreed that the Commission shall sit as often as possible with the assistance of the Military and Economic Commissions and continue its work in close cooperation with the Commissions established in Berlin and Rome."

Do you recall that meeting?



A. I recall it was a short conference and chiefly it was at General Ott's request to make the Foreign Minister and German and French embassies in Tokyo to supervise such committee being founded to which army authorities were all through objecting that they didn't like to have the Foreign Minister or ambassadors to supervise military matters, but General Ott he contended and at last the army authorities agreed, because I explained after that conference that no Foreign Minister would supervise and decide on any military matters without asking the opinions of the military and navals.

Q. At any event, you held this meeting at your home, and those people were present?

A. Yes, there were only three.

Q. This was held 9 May 1941?

A. Maybe about that time.

Q. If the records show that that was the case, would you say that was correct?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. At that time it had already come to your attention some week or so previous that these representations to the Japanese Government by the U. S., concerning the settlement of the Far Eastern situation, were pending, isn't that true?

A. Of what Far Eastern situation?

Q. The representations which this representative of yours told you about in the automobile ride from the airport, that the U. S. had made representations as the basis for some settlement with the Japanese people.

A. I do not recall.

Q. You said you heard about them, but when they were talked about at eleven o'clock that night, you said you were ill and had to go to bed.

A. About negotiations? Oh yes.

Q. But notwithstanding that representation, you saw fit to hold this meeting with this commission from the members of the Tripartite Pact, concerning the commission which the Tripartite Pact had provided for, which was an exchange of military as well as economic matters between the nations?

A. Yes, and at that conference I think it was General Ott who contended that the organization should be established as quickly as possible, but as I told you before, the committee was not established while I was in the government.

Q. I think we will have to conclude for this afternoon.



Certificate of Interpreter

I, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Clara B. Knapp hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*Clara B. Knapp*

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) John D. Shea, Capt, USNR,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 27th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) MARUOKA, Yosuko,  
and according to \_\_\_\_\_, Interpreter,  
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sakyo, Japan  
Place \_\_\_\_\_

1 April 1946  
Date \_\_\_\_\_



4192

INTERROGATION OF

MATSUOKA, Yosuke

Date and Time: 28 March 1946, 1400 - 1630 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : MATSUOKA, Yosuke  
Cmdr. John D. Shea, USNR, Interrogator  
Miss Clara B. Knapp, Stenographer

Interrogation conducted in English.  
Questions by Cmdr. Shea.

Q. I will show you a booklet which is marked Proj. No. 214, and below that No. 1, for the purpose of identification, and just alongside the stamp of identification are the words "Materials on Tripartite Pact." I will show you this document, Mr. Matsuoka, and ask you to examine it and see if you can determine what it is. Now, with reference to the English there, will you read that too, please, and see if that seems to be a translation of the Japanese just previously scanned. Do you want me to read you the English and see whether or not that is a translation?

A. Oh, I can read it. Yes, this is a fairly good translation.

Q. Now, just for the purpose of identifying the book, I would like to have you continue on over now to the next section of the book, in the Japanese writing, and see if you identify that as a Minute Book of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Council, concerning the Tripartite Pact, at 11:20 A.M., 26 September 1940, in the East Hall of the Imperial Palace, written by Matsumoto, Chief of the Treaty Bureau. Is that identified as that?

A. This is a Foreign Office paper. I suppose so.

Q. I mean does that appear to be identified that way?

A. Although I have never seen the record compiled in the Privy Council.

Q. Well, do you find anywhere there, as you turn the page, that statement, and right afterwards a list of names of persons present? Commencing somewhere just before page 208. 205 -- what does that say there on that page?

A. That gives the date, written by Matsumoto, Chief of the Treaty Bureau.

Q. Does it give the date 26 September 1940, in the East Hall of the Imperial Palace?

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A. Yes.

Q. Now, does it give after that a list of names, for example Hara, President of the Privy Council, Suzuki, Vice President, and all the counsellors except KANEKO and TANAKA were present. Does it say that?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, will you turn over somewhat to the end of the book, and you will find there the English typewritten marked Protocol, the first sheet. Does that seem to be a compilation made of the official Japanese office or Document Department, does it? I mean the whole book.

A. It looks like it.

Q. Now, will you turn back, please, to the first part of the book. Now, those two which you examined carefully in comparison as to a translation, you say they are a good translation. That is the one marked "Strictly Confidential, entitled "Some of the Salient Points in the informal Conversations between Matsuka and Stahmer, with the German Ambassador Assisting." That seems to be the translation of the Japanese?

A. Some points are wrong. For instance, that in itself speaks that it was compiled for the Privy Council, if Italy came in, but in our conversation first between Stahmer and myself there is no Italy mentioned at all, as I told you the other day. I was surprised when word from Ribbentrop came regarding Italy.

Q. I will read you this and ask you if that is a good translation:

"1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

Do you recall that part?

A. Oh yes. Let me say here, the conversation went on as I told you the other day, but here it states

Q. The order in which it is set down is different?

A. Yes.

Q. The substance is correct?

A. Yes, it was compiled afterwards.

Q. It apparently wasn't taken down in shorthand and transcribed, but taken down afterwards as a summary.



- A. And neither was Matsumoto present.
- Q. This doesn't say he was.
- A. I simply state that nobody was present but myself and Stahmer and General Ott.
- Q. Well, who then made these notes for you?
- A. I think maybe I spoke here and well, there.
- Q. Did you dictate or did you give the substance of it to someone in your office?
- A. No, I don't dictate. Matsumoto asked from time to time what I told him or he may have heard from Vice Minister or somebody.
- Q. Well, it is apparent this is marked "Strictly Confidential." It is done in Japanese and in English.
- A. In English?
- Q. Isn't it?
- A. Isn't that translation made by your men?
- Q. No this is the original shape in which the document was delivered to us.
- A. I have just said I never in my life see a document compiled by Privy Council, so I do not know, but I suppose. Seldom do we compile in English translation.
- Q. But in any event, this doesn't seem to be compiled by the Privy Council, the one concerning "Strictly Confidential". It seems to be bound in the document with the others, but could have been done at another time?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I will continue to give you the outline, and see if that was said:
- "2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England."
- Do you recall that?
- A. I don't recall, but Stahmer may have said something like that.
- Q. "She does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England." You don't recall that he said that?



A. While I don't recall in my several conversations with Mr. Stahmer, I was satisfied that Germany was not looking for military assistance from Japan.

Q. "No. 3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U. S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U. S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance."

Do you recall that substance of the discussion?

A. I recall that both Germany and Japan will do best not to come to clash with America.

Q. Well, what about the suggestion that Japan was to play the role of restraining and preventing the U. S. from entering the war? Was that part of the term?

A. That is what I say, that while I do not recall the conversation to that exact, we agreed in the main that both of us try our best to prevent America from joining the European war.

Q. "No. 4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U. S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U. S. cannot eventually be avoided." Do you recall that he made that statement?

A. Not be avoided between Japan and the U. S.? While I don't recall, yet Stahmer might have said that, and I simply remarked maybe so.

Q. It is possible that he said that?

A. It is possible, yes.

Q. You don't recall it now?

A. No.

Q. "No. 5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent, America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future."

Do you recall that conversation?

A. Yes, the sense of it, except that nothing was said about Italy at that stage.

Q. Nothing was said about Italy?

A. Not at that stage of conversation. I think Matsumoto made it up to include Italy afterwards.



Q. "No. 6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U. S. and the world at large at this juncture, that alone can only be of a powerful and effective deterrent on the U. S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger."

Do you recall that?

A. The sense of it, except again including Italy. Nothing was said about Italy.

Q. "No. 7. Germany hopes Japan will also size up the situation, and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will act quickly and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U. S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing."

Do you recall that?

A. No, I don't recall, but I recall myself saying something to the effect that danger between Japan and the U.S.A. to come to blows must always be borne in mind, and we must always be prepared well, and on my part personally that I will devote all my life to prevent it.

Q. "No. 8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U. S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (Matsuoka remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a ~~xxxx~~ sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granted that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants.)"

Do you recall that?

A. I don't recall, but the sense of it I do recall.

Q. For example your remarks, such as "Matsuoka remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis," etc., etc. Do you recall that?

A. It is likely that I said so, because whenever anyone touched on the military questions, always I said it is none of my business and must be left to the military and naval men.

Q. "No. 9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects the political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature, and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally"



she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. "No. 10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle on the path, may be settled without such difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good, contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements."

Do you recall that?

A. Oh, my question about the relations between Soviet Russia and Germany? I think Stahmer said so and an honest broker. I never used that word. I used "good offices."

Q. This is Stahmer speaking, apparently. He says "Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan..."

A. I never heard that word used.

Q. Did Stahmer or Ott suggest that Germany would use their good offices in the question of rapprochement between Japan and Russia?

A. I asked for it, and they answered in the affirmative.

Q. "No. 11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will, on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U. S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible."

Do you recall that?

A. Yes.

Q. "No. 12. Germany, in asking Japan to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the word and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxons including America. The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (Matsuoka emphasized this phrase). Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved."



Do you recall that?

A. With some alterations. We had no Italy in there, and I don't recall whether Stahmer said so or not, but anyhow it was my opinion that the general struggle between Germany and England would, in one form or another, be of long duration. I recall such a remark.

Q. Did General Ott or Mr. Stahmer share that opinion with you?

A. That is what I said. I don't recall that.

Q. Whether they agreed with that or not?

A. I think they must have agreed.

Q. I mean in a conversation, if you had stated that, and it is apparent that it was a logical subject for the conversation, if you had stated that, they may have given some intimation, some statement whether they agreed or disagreed. Do you recall now?

A. That is what I say. While I do not recall, it seems natural that they agreed with my opinion.

Q. "No. 13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the German Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The German Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither Stahmer nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter."

About Italy -- that clears up your point doesn't it?

A. No, neither Stahmer or the German Ambassador ever referred to Italy until our negotiations were practically ended. Just for signing. All of a sudden, General Ott carried the words of von Ribbentrop.

Q. "Neither Stahmer nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter." Do you recall his saying that?

A. Yes, I asked him myself point blank whether Stahmer, what about this name of the Soviet Russian people, or not.

Q. I see. Concerning this alliance?

A. Yes, concerning this alliance.

Q. "No. 14. Stahmer's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop."

Do you recall that?