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# 當代文獻

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中華民國三十六年三月遷初版

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# TRUMAN'S STATEMENT ON RECENT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND CHINA'S PRESENT SITUATION

Issued on December 18, 1946

## 杜魯門關於最近中美關係及中國目前局勢之聲明書

一九四六年十二月十八日發表

Last December, I made a *statement*<sup>1</sup> of this Government's views regarding China. We believed then and *do*<sup>2</sup> now that a united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and peace. It was made clear in Moscow last year that these views are shared by our allies, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. On December 27th, Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Bevin issued a *statement*<sup>3</sup> which said, in part:

"The three Foreign Secretaries exchanged views with regard to the situation in China. They were in agreement as to the need for a unified and democratic China under the National Government, for broad participation of democratic elements in all branches of the National Government, and for cessation of civil strife. They affirmed



去年十二月間，我曾發表聲明，闡述本政府對中國之觀點。目前和彼時正同，我們相信團結民主的中國對世界和平洵極重要，擴大國民政府基礎俾其足能代表中國人民，將加速中國走向此一目標的進展，且中國對其他聯合國家負有一種顯而易見的責任，即制止其國土內之軍事衝突，良以此項衝突乃世界穩定及和平之一大威脅也。去年三外長在莫斯科也曾闡明，說我們的盟友英蘇兩國也都同意這種觀點。去年十二月廿七日，貝爾納斯，莫洛托夫和貝文發表聲明，略稱：

「三外長已就中國局面交換意見，同意下列各點確信有一不可或缺之事：即在國民政府領導下的一個團結民主的中國。國民政府各部門廣泛容

their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.”

The policies of this Government were also made clear in my statement of last December. We recognized the National Government of the Republic of China as the legal Government. We undertook to assist the Chinese Government in the reoccupation of liberated areas and in disarming and repatriating the Japanese invaders. And finally, as China moved toward peace and unity along the lines mentioned, we were prepared to assist the Chinese economically and in other ways.

I asked General Marshall to go to China as my representative. We had agreed upon my statement of the U.S. Government's views and policies regarding China as his directive. He knew well in undertaking the mission that halting civil strife, broadening the base of Chinese Government and bringing about a united, democratic China were tasks for the Chinese themselves. He went as a great American to make his outstanding abilities available to the Chinese.

During the war, the United States entered into an agreement with the Chinese Government regarding the training and equipment of a special force of 39 divisions. That training ended on V-J Day and the transfer of the equipment had been largely completed when General Marshall arrived.

The United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics all committed themselves to the liberation of China, including the *return of Manchuria* to Chinese control. Our Government had agreed to assist the Chinese Government in

納民主人士，不干涉中國內政的政策。」

去年十二月我的聲明中也闡明本政府的政策。我們承認中華民國國民政府為合法的政府。我們決協助中國政府善後收復區和解除武裝並遣送日本侵略者。此外，中國若沿着上述的路綫走向和平和團結，我們且準備對中國作經濟上和其他方面的援助。

我敦請馬歇爾將軍代表我前往中國，我們同意以我所發表有關本政府對中國的觀點和政策的聲明為他的方針。他完全曉得怎樣進行他的任務，他深知停止內戰，擴大中國政府基礎和促成一團結民主中國是中國人民自身的工作。他以美國大國民的姿態前往中國，貢獻他的卓越的才能協助中國人民。

在戰時，中美兩國政府曾訂立協定，內容與訓練和配備一枝特殊的軍隊卅九師有關。這種訓練工作終於對日勝利日，馬歇爾將軍抵華時配備移轉的工作也大部完成。

美英蘇自任解放中國之責，包括歸還「滿洲」給中國在內。美政府同意協助中國政府收復自日軍手中解放出來的地區，其中包括滿洲，因為中

the reoccupation of areas liberated from the Japanese, including Manchuria, because of China's lack of shipping and transport planes. Three armies were moved by air and eleven by sea, to Central China, Formosa, North China and Manchuria. Most of these moves had been made or started when General Marshall arrived.

The disarming and evacuation of Japanese progressed slowly—too slowly. We regarded our commitment to assist the Chinese in this program as of overwhelming importance to the future peace of China and the whole Far East. Surrendered but undefeated Japanese armies and hordes of administrators, technicians, and Japanese merchants, totalling about 3,000,000 persons, had to be removed under the most difficult conditions. At the request of the Chinese Government, we had retained a considerable number of American troops in China, and immediately after V-J Day we landed a corps of Marines in North China. The principal task of these forces was to assist in the evacuation of Japanese. Only some 200,000 had been returned to Japan by the time General Marshall arrived.

General Marshall also faced a most unpropitious internal situation on his arrival in China. Communications throughout the country were badly disrupted due to destruction during the war and the civil conflicts which had broken out since. This disruption was preventing the restoration of Chinese economy, the distribution of relief supplies, and was rendering the evacuation of Japanese a slow and difficult process. The wartime destruction of factories and

國缺乏船隻和運輸機。美方協助輸送至華中，台灣，華北和「滿洲」的國軍計空運者三軍，海運者計一軍。這些部隊調動在馬歇爾將軍抵華前業已完成或開始。

解除武裝和遣送日軍的工作進展頗緩——太緩了。我們認為在這方面協助中國對中國及整個東亞未來的和平均極重要。投降但尚未被擊潰的日軍和中國境內的日籍行政人員，技術人員和商人計達三百萬人，這都要在困難的情形下設法遣送之。為徇中國政府之請，我們遂留駐若干美軍在中國，對日勝利日到臨之時，我們就立即派遣海軍陸戰隊登陸華北。該隊的主要任務為協助遣送日人，在馬歇爾將軍抵華之時，已遣送返國的日人只有廿萬人左右。

在他到達中國的時候，馬歇爾將軍也面遇極為不妙的內部情形。因為戰爭和從那時候起就發生的內戰關係，全國的交通都破壞得很厲害，這種破壞，阻止了中國經濟的復興和經濟物資的分配，並且使撤退日僑成爲一種遲緩和困難的程序。豐時工廠的摧

plants, the war-induced inflation in China, the Japanese action in shutting down the economy of occupied China immediately after V-J Day, and finally the destruction of communications combined to paralyze the economic life of the country, spreading untold hardship to millions, robbing the victory over the Japanese of significance to most Chinese and seriously aggravating all the tensions and discontents that existed in China.

Progress toward a solution of China's internal difficulties by the Chinese themselves was essential to the rapid and effective completion of most of the programs in which we had already pledged our assistance to the Chinese government. General Marshall's experience and wisdom were available to the Chinese in their efforts to reach such solutions.

Events moved rapidly upon General Marshall's arrival. With all parties availing themselves of his impartial advice, agreement for a country-wide truce was reached and announced on January 10th. The feature of this agreement was the establishment of a unique organization, the Executive Headquarters in Peiping. It was realized that due to poor communications and the bitter feelings on local fronts, generalized orders to cease fire and withdraw might have little chance of being carried out unless some authoritative executive agency, trusted by both sides, could function in any local situation.

The headquarters operated under the leadership of three commissioners—one American who served as chairman, one

毀，因戰爭而發生的通貨膨脹，對口勝利日之後，日方在佔領區，封鎖經濟之行動，以及促使全中國經濟生活陷於停頓的交通阻斷，把不可形容的痛苦帶給了千千萬萬的人民。剝奪了勝利對大多數中國人民的重要性，大大的增加中國內部的緊張局勢和爭執。

中國自行解決其國內困難加速完成該計劃極具重要性，在完成此項計劃方面，我們已有諾言，決定協助中國政府。馬歇爾將軍的經驗和睿智對中國解決其國內困難將有莫大助益。

馬歇爾將軍抵華後，局面急速變動。跟着各黨各派一致採納他的大公無私的忠告，全面停戰的協議遂於一月十日獲致並宣佈。該協議的特徵在於設立北平執行總部。各方僉信爲了交通不便和各地方前綫部隊感情的不融洽，停止衝突和退守原防的命令，可以執行的機會很少，除非雙方所信任的聯合執行性機構能在各地任何情形下執行任務。

該總部在三委員的領導下進行工作——一爲美籍人士，任主席，一爲

Chinese Government representative, and one representative of the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Walter S. Robertson, charge d'affaires of the American Embassy in China, served as chairman until his return to this country in the fall. In order to carry out its function in the field, Executive Headquarters formed a large number of truce teams, each headed by one American officer, one Chinese Government officer, and one Chinese Communist officer. They proceeded to all danger spots where fighting was going on or seemed impending and saw to the implementation of the truce teams, often under conditions imposing exceptional hardships and requiring courageous action. The degree of cooperation attained between Government and Communist officers in the headquarters and on the truce teams was a welcome proof that despite two decades of fighting, these two Chinese groups could work together.

Events moved forward with equal promise on the political front. On January 10th, the Political Consultative Conference began the sessions with representatives of the Kuomintang or Government Party, the Communist Party and several minor political parties participating. Within three weeks of direct discussion, these groups had come to a series of statesman-like agreements on outstanding political and military problems. The agreements provided for an interim government of a coalition type with representatives of all parties, for a revision of the draft constitution along democratic lines prior to its discussion and adoption by a National Assembly, and for reduction of

中國政府代表，另一則為中共代表。美駐華大使館參贊羅柏森氏充任主席以迄本年秋間返國時為止。該總部為在各地進行工作，又在各地普遍設立執行小組，每一小組由美方，政府及中共官員各一人主持，他們馳赴所有戰鬥正在進行或即將發生的危險地點，設法實現停戰令，他們常在極困苦和危險的情形下推展工作。總部和小組中的政府和中共官員的合作程度是大大明證，顯示國共爭執雖達廿年之久，兩黨仍不無合作的可能。

政治方面也有同樣的進展。一月十日之政治協商會議開幕，國共和若干小政黨代表均參加。在直接討論的三星期內，政協已獲致一連串富有政治風度的關於重要政治和軍事問題的協議。該協議規定組織一過渡性的聯合政府，邀請各黨各派參加，並規定在召開國民大會前沿着民主路線修正憲草，裁減國共雙方軍隊，以便將來

the Government and Communist armies and the eventual amalgamation into a small modernized truly national army responsible to the civilian Government.

In March, General Marshall returned to this country. He reported on the important step the Chinese had made toward peace and unity in arriving at these agreements. He also pointed out that these agreements could not be satisfactorily implemented and given substance unless China's economic disintegration were checked and particularly unless the transportation system could be put in working order. Political unity could not be built on economic chaos. This Government had already authorized certain minor credits to the Chinese Government in an effort to meet emergency rehabilitation needs, as it was doing for other war-devastated countries throughout the world. A total of approximately US\$66,000,000 was involved in six specific projects, chiefly for the purchase of raw cotton, and for ships and railroad repair material. But these emergency measures were inadequate. Following the important forward step made by the Chinese in the agreements as reported by General Marshall, the Export-Import Bank *earmarked*<sup>5</sup> a total of US\$500,000,000 for possible additional credits on a project-by-project basis to Chinese Government agencies and private enterprises. Agreement to extend actual credits for such projects would obviously have to be based upon this Government's policy, as announced December 15, 1945. So far, this US\$500,000,000 remains earmarked, but unexpended.

合併成一小規模的現代化的名符其實的國軍，對代表人民的政府負責。

三月間，馬歇爾將軍回到美國。他報告這些協定成立後，中國人民對於和平與團結所獲得的重要進展。他也指出：除非中國的經濟崩解立即中止，而尤其是運輸系統的恢復活動，這些協定無法順利的付諸實施。政治的團結是不能在紊亂的經濟上面建立起來的。本國政府已經批准以若干小數貸款借與中國政府，以便適合緊急的善後需要，這種行動，和美國在世界其他戰爭蹂躪區所採取的相同。借款共六千六百萬美元，是用於六種計劃，主要的是購買棉花，船隻和修理鐵路材料。但是這些緊急若干步驟並不充分。根據馬歇爾的報告，在中國方面依照協定獲得重要進步之後，進出口銀行另外指定五萬萬美元，充作可能的另一筆貸款，依照逐一計劃原則，指定作中國政府機構和私人企業之用。至於此項借款實際上能否撥給，顯將依據一九四五年十二月十五日日本國政府所闡明的政策。截至現在為止，這一筆五萬萬美元借款，依舊指定，但未撥出。



While comprehensive large-scale aid has been delayed, this Government has completed its wartime lend-lease commitments to China. Lend-lease assistance was extended to China to assist her in fighting the Japanese, and later to fulfill our promise to assist in re-occupying the country from the Japanese. Assistance took the form of goods and equipment and of services. Almost half the total made available to China consisted of services, such as those involved in air and water transportation of troops.

A considerable quantity of civilian goods has also been made available by our agreement with China for the disposal of surplus property which enabled us to liquidate a sizable indebtedness and to dispose of large quantities of surplus material. During the war, the Chinese Government furnished Chinese currency to the U.S. Army for use in building its installations, feeding the troops, and other expenses. By the end of the war, this indebtedness amounted to something like 150,000,000,000 Chinese dollars. Progressive currency inflation in China rendered it impossible to determine the exact value of the sum in U.S. currency.

China agreed to buy all surplus property owned by the United States in China and on 17 Pacific islands and bases, with certain exceptions. Six months of negotiations preceded the agreement finally signed in August. It was imperative that this matter be concluded in the Pacific, as had already been done in Europe, especially in view of the rapid deterioration of the material in open storage under tropical conditions and

在廣大的援助被阻緩的時候，本政府已履行其對中國的戰時租借諾言。租借式的援助給予中國，幫助牠向日人作戰，並且在以後完成協助中國收復日本佔領區的諾言。援助計有貨物，配備和服務數類，其中一半是服務性質的例如空運和海運軍隊。

依據我們和中國所成立的協議，清理剩餘物資的結果，已備就大批的民用物資。這一來已使我們清償了許多賬目而且處理了很多的剩餘物資。在戰爭期內中國政府以國幣供給美軍，從事建造設備，供養軍隊，和其他用途。戰爭結束時，這方面的債務達一五〇，〇〇〇，〇〇〇，〇〇〇中國國幣。因為不斷的中國通貨膨脹，我們無從準確的決定這數字以美元計算的價值。

中國同意購買中國境內和太平洋十七島嶼並基地全部美剩餘物資，僅有若干例外。購買剩餘物資的協定終於八月間訂立，談判該協定前後共歷時六月。太平洋方面結束這種工作誠是迫切的事，尤其是在熱帶性氣候下

the urgent need for the partial alleviation of the acute economic distress of the Chinese people which, it was hoped, this transaction would permit. Aircraft, all non-demilitarized combat material, and fixed installations outside China were excluded. Thus, no weapons which could be used in fighting a civil war were made available through this agreement.

The Chinese Government cancelled all but US\$300,000,000 of our indebtedness for the Chinese currency, and promised to make available the equivalent of US\$35,000,000 for use in paying U.S. governmental expenses in China and acquiring and improving buildings and properties for our diplomatic and consular establishments. An additional sum of US\$20,000,000 is also designated for the fulfillment of a cultural and educational program.

Before General Marshall arrived in China for the second time, in April, there was evidence that the truce agreement was being disregarded. The sincere and unflagging efforts of Executive Headquarters and its truce terms have succeeded in many instances in preventing or ending local engagements and thus saved thousands of lives. But fresh outbreaks of civil strife continued to occur, reaching a crisis of violence in Manchuria with the capture of Changchun by the Communists and where the presence of truce teams had not been fully agreed to by the National Government.

A change in the course of events in the political field was equally disappointing. Negotiations between the Government and the Communists have been resumed again

，露天貨倉中的物資每易損壞，且中國人民亦極需要此項剩餘物資。中國境外的美方飛機，所有未解除武裝的作戰物資和固定的設備均不在購買之列。因此，該協定當不致使任何武器流為內戰之用。

除三萬萬美元外，中國政府註銷全部我們挪用其國幣的債務，並同意劃撥等於三千五百萬美元之款項充為美政府在中國境內之用度和取得或改善我們外交使領方面所需要之建築物和資產之用。並另撥二千萬美元充為實施文化教育計劃之用。

在四月間馬歇爾將軍二度抵華之前，種種跡象顯示休戰協定已被藐視。執行總部及其小組的誠摯與不屈不撓的努力結果使多處地方性衝突停止，無數生命亦因之得免於難。然而新衝突仍不斷發生，共軍佔領長春後，東北亦因而陷入混亂的危機中，國民政府又未完全同意派遣執行小組到長春去。

政治方面的情形也為之一變，同樣使人失望。國共雙方的談判一而再

and again, but they have as often broke down. Although hope for final success has never disappeared completely, the agreements made in January and February have not been implemented, and the various Chinese groups have not since that time been able to achieve the degree of agreement reached at the Political Consultative Conference.

There has been encouraging progress in other fields, particularly the elimination of Japanese from China. The Chinese Government was responsible under an Allied agreement for the disarmament of all Japanese military personnel and for the repatriation of all Japanese civilians and military personnel from China, Formosa and French Indo-China north of the 16th degree of latitude. Our Government agreed to assist the Chinese in this task. The scope of the job was tremendous. There were about 3,000,000 Japanese, nearly one-half of the army or navy personnel, to be evacuated. Water and rail transportation had been destroyed or was immobilized. Port facilities were badly damaged and overcrowded with relief and other supplies. The Japanese had to be disarmed, concentrated and then transported to the nearest available port. In some instances, this involved long distances. At the ports, they had to be individually searched and put through a health inspection. All had to be inoculated. Segregation camps had to be established at the ports to cope with the incidence of epidemic diseases, such as Asiatic cholera. Finally, 3,000,000 persons had to be moved by ship to Japan.

地重開，然又常告決裂。談判最後成功的希望雖未完全消失，但一月和二月間所獲致的協議都未見實現，若干中國黨派亦未能及時實行政協協議。

在其他方面，也有令人興奮的進步，尤其是肅清在華的日本人。依照盟國協議，中國應負責解除所有日方軍事人員的武器，並且遣送中國，台灣，緯度十六度以北越南日方居民和軍事人員返國。我們的政府允許在這任務方面，援助中國。這項工作的範圍極廣。等待撤退的日人一共有三百萬之多，其中一半是海陸軍人員。海上和鐵路運輸被毀或是陷於停頓。港口的設備損傷也重，而且擁有過多的救濟和其他物資。日人必須被解除武裝，集中然後送至最近的港口。在若干事實中，這裏面的距離有的是很遙遠的。在港口那裏，日人都逐一受搜查和體格檢驗。而且都要施打防疫針。隔離醫院先後在港口成立，以便應付傳染病，如亞洲霍亂等。最後三百萬人都要由海路運回日本。

American forces helped in the disarmament of Japanese units. Executive Headquarters and its truce teams were able to make the complicated arrangements necessary to transfer the Japanese across lines and through areas involved in civil conflict on their way to ports of embarkation. American units also participated in the inspections at the port, while American medical units supervised all inoculation and other medical work. Finally, American and Japanese ships under the Seventh Fleet transported this enormous number of persons to reception ports in Japan.

At the end of last year, approximately 200,000 Japanese had been repatriated. They were leaving Chinese ports at a rate of about 2,500 a day. By March of this year, rapidly increased efforts on the part of the American forces and the Chinese authorities involved had increased this rate to more than 20,000 a day. By November, 2,986,438 Japanese had been evacuated and the program was considered completed. Except for indeterminate numbers in certain parts of Manchuria, only war criminals and technicians retained on an emergency basis by the Chinese Government remain. That this tremendous undertaking has been accomplished despite conflict, disrupted communications and other difficulties will remain an outstanding example of successful American-Chinese cooperation toward a common goal.

Much has been said of the presence of U.S. armed forces in China during the past year. Last fall, these forces were relatively large. They had to be. No one could

美國軍隊幫助解除日軍武裝的工作。執行總部和它的小組完成複雜的程序，使日軍能夠通過並從內戰區域移至登船港口。美方隊伍並且參加在港口方面的檢查工作。而美方醫藥單位則指導一切注射和其他醫藥工作。最後，隸屬第七艦隊的美國和日本船隻，把這很大的人數運到日本的港口。

去年末，約有二十萬日人被遣送回國。他們離開中國港口者，每日約二千五百人。今年三月，因為美軍和中國當局的迅速和擴大的努力，日人離華的速率，增至每日二萬餘人。到十一月為止，二，九八六，四三八日人已被遣送返國，而此項計劃也就被認為告一段落。除了在滿洲若干地點以外數字不明的日人外，所留下的日人祇是中國政府所保留的一些戰犯和技術人員。在內戰，交通破壞和其他困難情形下，這偉大的任務終於完成，將永成中美為共同目標而合作的卓越例子。

各方對去年美軍駐華多有微言。去年秋間，駐華美軍為數相當多。當時應該相當多。誰都不敢預測中國境

prophecy in advance how well the Japanese forces in China would observe the surrender terms. We had to provide forces adequate to assist the Chinese in the event of trouble. When it became obvious that the armed Japanese would not be a problem beyond the capabilities of the Chinese armies to handle, redeployment was begun at once.

The chief responsibility of our forces was that of assisting in the evacuation of the Japanese. This task was prolonged by local circumstances. Provision of the American personnel for the Executive Headquarters and its truce teams had required fairly large number of men, particularly since the all-important network of radio and other communications was provided entirely by the United States. The Executive Headquarters is located at Peiping, 100 miles from the sea and in an area where there was the possibility of local fighting. Hence, another responsibility was to protect the line of supply to and from the headquarters. Another duty our forces undertook immediately upon the Japanese surrender was to provide the necessary protection so that coal from the great mines northeast of Tientsin could reach the sea for shipment to supply the cities and railroads of Central China. This coal was essential to prevent the collapse of this industrial area. Our Marines were withdrawn from this duty last September. Other units of our forces were engaged in searching for the bodies or graves of American soldiers who had died fighting the Japanese in China. Still others were required to guard U.S. installations and stores of equipment, and to process these

內日軍服從投降條約將到什麼程度。

我們應在時艱聲中派軍協助中國。當

事實顯示中國軍隊已能對付投降日軍

時，駐華美軍就立即開始復員。

美軍的主要職責為協助撤退日人

。這種工作因各地環境問題而延長。

執行總部和休戰小組也需要大批美籍

人士，尤其是因為重要的無線電和其

他交通工作幾乎全是美方維持。執行

總部設在北平，距離海岸僅一百哩，

該城且時有發生地方衝突事件的可能

性。因此，美方之另一責任就是保護

執行總部的供應綫。日軍投降後美軍

的另一任務為提供必須之保護，俾使

天津東北方之大煤礦所產之煤能抵達

海口，以便供應華中各城市和鐵路

綫。這些煤是防止華中工業區崩潰所

必需的。我們的海軍陸戰隊於九月完

成這種任務。其他美軍的任務則為尋

覓對日作戰期間在中國陣亡美軍的遺

體和墳墓。尙有其他美軍則須守衛美

方的設備和配備儲藏庫，並設法運回

for return to this country or sale as surplus property.

At peak strength a year ago, we had some 113,000 soldiers, sailors and Marines in China. Today, this number is being reduced to less than 12,000, including some directly concerned with the operations of Executive Headquarters, and will be further reduced to the number required to supply and secure the American personnel of Executive Headquarters and the airfield and stores at Tsingtao.

Thus, during the past year we have successfully assisted in the repatriation of the Japanese and have subsequently been able to bring most of our own troops home. We have afforded appropriate assistance in the reoccupation of the country from the Japanese. We have undertaken some emergency measures of economic assistance to prevent the collapse of China's economy and have liquidated our own wartime financial account with China.

It is a matter of deep regret that China has not yet been able to achieve unity by peaceful methods. Because he knows how serious the problem is, and how important it is to reach a solution, General Marshall has remained at his post even though active negotiations have been broken off by the Communist Party. We are ready to help China as she moves toward peace and genuine democratic government.

The views expressed a year ago by this Government are valid today. The plan for political unification agreed to last February is sound. The plan for military unification of last February has been made difficult of

或以剩餘物資出售之。

一年前駐華美軍的最高實力為十一萬三千名。今日，此項數字已開始減至不及一萬二千名，其中包括直接和執行總部有關的美軍二千名，此項數字將更事減少，直至執行部和青島美軍維持供應和安全所需要最低數字為止。

是以，在過去一年內，我們在協助中國遣送日人方面已有很多成就，因而可能撤退大部駐軍返國。我們在協助中國接收收復區方面也盡了相當的力量。我們會採取若干經濟協助的緊急步驟，以防止中國經濟崩潰，且已清理了我們自身在中國的戰時金融帳目。

中國迄今未能用和平方法完成團結誠是一大憾事。因為馬歇爾將軍明白問題的嚴重性和獲致解決方案的重要性，甚至在談判已由中共中斷的情形下，他仍堅守他的崗位。我們將繼續協助中國走向和平和真正民主的政府去。

一年前本政府所表示的觀點今日仍不失其真實性。二月間所同意的政治統一計劃是完善的。四月以來的戰鬥已使二月間的軍事統一計劃難於實

implementation by the progress of the fighting since last April, but the general principles involved are fundamentally sound.

China is a sovereign nation. We recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find a peaceful solution. We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.

As ways and means are presented for constructive aid to China, we will give them careful and sympathetic consideration. An example of such aid is the recent agricultural mission to China under Dean Hutchison of the University of California sent at the request of the Chinese Government. A joint Chinese-American agriculture collaboration commission was formed which included the Hutchison mission. It spent over four months studying rural problems. Its recommendations are now available to the Chinese Government, and so also is any feasible aid we can give in implementing those recommendations. When conditions in China improve, we are prepared to consider aid in carrying out other projects, unrelated to civil strife, which would encourage economic reconstruction and reform in China and which, in so doing, would promote a general revival of commercial relations between American and Chinese businessmen.

We believe that our hopes for China

施，惟該計劃內的一般原則都很完善。

中國是個主權完整的國家。我們承認這個事實，我們也承認中國國民政府。我們繼續希望該政府將覓得一和平解決方案。我們無意干涉中國國內事務。我們的立場是顯而易見的。在避免被捲入內爭聲中，我們得維持我們協助中國人民爭取國家和平和經濟復興的政策。

我們對於給予中國的創造性援助的方法和工具都加以審慎而且同情的考慮。最近農業代表團赴華就是這種援助的一例。美訪華農業團由加利福利亞大學霍企遜院長率領。中國並組織一中美農業合作聯合委員會，霍企遜代表團即為該委會的一部份。該團研究中國農業問題約四月餘。該團的建議已提供與中國政府，我們並準備協助中國實施該建議。當中國的情形改進後，我們已準備考慮協助實施其他無關內爭的計劃。這種計劃將鼓勵中國經濟重建和改革，從而增進中美商務關係。

我們相信我們對中國的希望和

are identical with what the Chinese people themselves most earnestly desire. We shall, therefore, continue our positive and realistic policy toward China which is based on full respect for her national sovereignty and on our traditional friendship for the Chinese people and is designed to promote international peace.

國人民自身的最殷切願望完全符合。以是，我們將持續我們的積極而且切合實際的對華政策，這種政策仍基於完全尊重它的國家主權和我們對中國人民的傳統友誼，這種政策的目標並在於促進國際和平。

### NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. 見「當代文獻」第四卷合訂本第五十二面或第四卷第三分冊「杜魯門總統關於美國對中國政策之聲明」。
2. “do” 代表 “believe”。
3. 見「當代文獻」第四卷合訂本第五十八，六十九面，「三外長會議公報全文」。
4. 見「當代文獻」第二卷合訂本滬一版第三百六十六面，或滬二版第二十二面，「中美英三大盟國領袖開羅會議聲明書」。
5. “earmarked”，『指定專作——之用』。A large amount of the fund is earmarked for relief work, 此基金大部分指定充救濟之用。



# GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL'S STATEMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON CHINA'S PRESENT SITUATION

*Made before leaving China for the U.S. to succeed Byrnes as U.S. Secretary of State and released by the U.S. State Department on January 7, 1947*

## 馬歇爾將軍離華前對美國人士報告 中國目前局勢

一九四七年一月七日由美國務院發表

The President has recently given a summary of the developments in China during the past year and the position of the American Government toward China. Circumstances now dictate that I should supplement this with impressions gained *at first hand*.<sup>1</sup>

In this intricate and confused situation, I shall merely endeavor here to touch on some of the more important considerations—as they appeared to me—during my connection with the negotiations to bring about peace in China and a stable democratic form of government.

In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a Communist form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are

總統最近曾發表過去一年內中國一切發展之綜合報告，以及美國政府對華之立場。目下之環境使余對於此事，應以親自獲得之印象，有所補充。

在本人進行談判以便促成中國和平與民主政府之時期內，若干問題，乃余所認為比較重要者，際此複雜而混亂之局勢中，余僅將述及各該比較重要之問題。

第一，和平最大之障礙，厥為國共兩方彼此完全以猜疑相對。

一方面，政府領袖堅決反對組織一共產主義式之政府。另一方面，共產黨人則坦白聲明，謂彼等係馬克斯

Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a Communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.

The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government of the type *endorsed*<sup>23</sup> by the Political Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose only a destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the Government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new government and intended, by coercion of military force and the action of secret police to obliterate the Communist party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation. They each sought only to take counsel of their own fears. They both, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each other's situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. This complication was exaggerated to an explosive degree by the confused reports of fighting on the distant and tremendous fronts of hostile military contact. Patrol clashes were deliberately magnified into large offensive actions. The distortion of the facts was utilized by both sides to heap condemnation on the other. It was only through the reports of American officers in the field teams

主義者，雖則首先將經由英美型之民主方式政府，但仍企求在中國建立一共產主義式之政府。

政府領袖認為：中共願意參加去年一月間政治協商會所贊同之政府，此種表示，純出於破壞性之意旨。余相信：中共人士深感政府方面並無履行行政協決議組設新政府之誠意，中共人士並認為政府且以軍事力量之威脅及秘密警察之行動存心消滅共產黨。除此項深刻之相互不信任外，國共雙方且有一顯而易見之錯誤，此即忽視在談判中此項疑懼對於對方考慮若干建議或反對理由時之影響。雙方均各考量自身之疑懼。因此，雙方對於對方之立場均存偏見，且對每一建議或可能性，均具戒心。遙遠及廣大軍事衝突前綫所傳來之混亂新聞，復使此項錯誤愈見深重。斥候衝突每被故意歪曲為大規模攻勢行動。雙方均利用曲解以中傷對方。余亦只得仰賴執行總部所屬小組中之美籍官員之報告略

from Executive Headquarters that I could get even a partial idea of what was actually happening and the incidents were too numerous and the distances too great for the American personnel to cover all of the ground. I must comment here on the superb courage of the officers of our Army and Marines in struggling against almost insurmountable and maddening obstacles to bring some measure of peace to China.

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effect the Kuomintang Party, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been *under the cover of* political or party action but since the party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the Government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young

窺事實真相，而且事件次數極多，所佔之地區亦極廣大，以致美方人士遂有顧此失彼之感。余對美軍及海軍陸戰隊排除極大障礙爭取中國和平之卓絕英勇，謹此加以述及。

余以為最近談判決裂最重要之因素如下：在國民政府實際上亦即國民黨方面，最有勢力之集團對於余促成真正聯合政府之一切努力，幾無不加以反對。此種反對，往往以政治或黨的行動為掩護，但國民黨即是政府，故其行動雖非直接，而其勢殊不可侮。彼等公然坦白宣稱：中共之合作實為不可想像之事，惟有武力政策方能解決問題。此一集團包括軍事政治各領袖。

在中共方面，余相信內有激烈份子，亦有自由份子。但有不少人竭力反對此種見解，以為中共黨紀嚴厲，在一黨內決不容有如此不同之觀點。但在余看來，共產黨方面確有自由份

men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who would put the interest of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist ideology in the immediate future. The *dyed-in-the-wool*<sup>4</sup> Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end, as for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Kuomintang Party and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspicions.

However, a very harmful and immensely provocative phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans. It has been difficult to remain silent in the

子集團在內，尤其一般青年，彼等因痛恨當地政府之腐敗而傾向共產黨，但彼等重視中國人民之利益，更甚於立即建立共產思想之魯莽措施。至於澈底派之共產黨徒，則不惜任何激烈之手段以求達到其目的，例如破壞交通，以便破壞中國之經濟而造成有利於推翻政府之局面，至於人民所受之直接痛苦，則在所不計。彼等完全不信任國民黨之領袖，彼等似乎相信：凡政府所提出之建議，無一非用以打倒共產黨者。去年二三月間顯然受人鼓動之羣衆暴動——其中若干次發生之地點離余從事談判之地僅數村之隔——予共產黨以良好之藉口，使其猜疑成爲合理。

中共程序中之極有害及煽動性之階段則爲宣傳文字。余願告示美國人民：此種宣傳已全然不顧真理及事實經過，對吾人政府之政策及意志極盡故意曲解及詆毀之能事，且種種事實均足證明此項宣傳之主要目標欺騙中國及世界人民，激發彼等對美國痛恨心理。對於此項公然詆毀及全然不顧

midst of such public abuse and wholesale disregard of facts, but a denial would merely lead to the necessity of daily denials; an intolerable course of action for an American official. In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding the Anping incident which resulted in the death of three Marines and the wounding of twelve others were almost pure fabrication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged ambush of a Marine convoy with supplies for the maintenance of Executive Headquarters and some UNRRA supplies, as a defense against a Marine assault. The investigation of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and maneuvers to disguise the true and privately admitted facts of the case.

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by the Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang Party, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently and no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. At the same time in

事實之行動，吾人實難保持緘默，然而一次否認後，則非每日均有否認不可，此又為美國官員絕難容忍之一種工作。秉公言之，國民政府新聞公佈機構雖無中共宣傳之罪惡性質，亦有諸多錯誤之報導。中共對於安平事件所發表之聲明尤其純屬杜撰，安平事件之結果為海軍陸戰隊士兵死者三名，負傷十二名，此項事件係出自有計劃之埋伏截擊，被襲者為輸送執行總部供應品及若干聯總物資之海軍陸戰隊運輸隊，中共方面之報導則謂此項事件係由防禦海軍陸戰隊襲擊而起。對於此項事件之調查工作，亦屬故事遷延，以便掩飾此項事件之真實及私自承認的事實。

雙方之極端份子曾使獲致解決之誠意工作一再挫折。一年前政治協商會所獲致之協議係自由而且遠大之憲章，此項憲章遠為中國奠定一和平及復興基礎。惟國民黨中之不妥協人士，意欲保持其自身對中國之封建控制，顯無秉承政協決議之誠意。余雖以軍人之地位發言，然而余對軍事之支配力量亦復引以為憾。軍事之支配力量已使中國政府之力量愈益薄弱。同

pondering the situation in China, one must have clearly in mind not the workings of small Communist groups or committees to which we are accustomed in America, but rather of millions of people and an army of more than a million men.

I have never been *in a position*<sup>5</sup> to be certain of the development of attitude in the innermost Chinese Communist circles. Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Communist Party has pursued in recent months indicated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise. It has been impossible even to get them to sit down at a conference table with Government representatives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists have broken off negotiations by their last offer which demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly and a return to the military positions of January 13th which the Government could not be expected to accept.

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irreconcilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists, by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest, are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government; accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications—regardless of the cost in suffering to

時，詳察中國形勢之人士必須牢記，並非少數共黨集團或委員會之工作——此種工作，亦為我人在美國所司空見慣者——而係萬萬人民及一百餘萬軍人之動態。

余從未能確定中共內部態度之演進。最近數月中，中共所追隨之路線，顯示彼等不願促成公允之妥協，此為最確定者。即欲促使中共代表與政府代表會談假定問題，亦屬不可能。中共現已提出最後要求，而促使談判中斷。彼等要求解散國民大會並恢復一月十三日之軍事地位，此為政府所不能接受者。

在政府中佔有優勢之反動派與不妥協的共黨之間——余必須聲明在二月間共產黨並無此種不妥協之表示——現已有一種問題：此即如何使和平安樂賜予飽受痛苦而目前不發言之中國人民是也。政府中反動派之顯然以為不論其行動如何，必能獲得美國之幫助。共產黨則不願為國家利益而妥協，彼等以為經濟崩潰將使政府倒台，並深信沿鐵路交通的廣泛游擊戰，將加速政府之倒台，而將中國人民所受之痛苦，置諸不顧。

the Chinese people.

The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government. In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted. Soon the Government in China will undergo major reorganization *pending*<sup>6</sup> the coming into force of the constitution following elections to be completed before Christmas Day 1947. *Now that*<sup>7</sup> the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government.

The first step will be the reorganization of the State Council and the executive branch of government to carry on administration pending the enforcement of the constitution. The manner in which this is done and the amount of representation ac-

據余觀察所及，此項情勢之挽救，惟有使政府中之自由份子與少數黨派擔任領袖，少數黨派為優秀人物之集合，惟仍缺乏政治權力以實施控制之影響。余相信：在蔣委員長領導之下，此等團體如能順利推行工作，必可經由良好之政府而達到團結之目標。事實上，國民大會業已制訂一民主之憲法，其中主要部份均與去年一月各黨各派政治協商會議決定之原則相符合。不幸共黨未能認為可以參加此次之大會，而該會通過之憲法則似已包括彼等主要之要求在內。中國政府不久即將進行重要之改組，而一九四七年聖誕節前將可完成選舉然後實施憲法。目前民主中國之形式既已由新訂之憲法奠定，其實際步驟，自將成爲一種試煉矣。至於真誠歡迎各黨各派積極負擔政府責任，從事充實民主中國形式一點，政府確能做到何種程度，則猶在未定之天。

第一步將爲改組國府委員會與政府之行政部門，以待憲法之實施。實行改組之方法以及對自由份子與非國

corded to liberals and to non-Kuomintang members will be significant. It is also to be hoped that during this interim period the door will remain open for Communists or other groups to participate if they see fit to assume their share of responsibility for the future of China.

It has been stated officially and *categorically*<sup>8</sup> that the period of political tutelage under the Kuomintang is at an end. If the termination of one-party rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease to receive financial support from the Government.

I have spoken very frankly because in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the United States to even a partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.

民黨黨員之代表席數，將有重大之關係。吾人並希望在此過渡時期內，共產黨或其他集團仍有機會得以參加政府，共同負擔起中國前途之責任。

國民黨治下之訓政時期已告結束，此點早已正式明白聲明在案。一黨之統治若果真正終止，則國民黨即應終止收受政府之財政接濟。

余所言皆坦白無諱，蓋非如此不能希望美國人民明瞭此複雜之問題。余在談判進行時期內，已發表此種見解，余以為大多數有關係之國人均已知之。余今公開發表，乃因此為余之職責所在，向對於遠東局勢一切發展深切關心之美國人，提出余對於此種局勢及一切可能性之估計。

## NOTES AND ANNOTATIONS

1. "at first hand", 『直接』, 『親自』。I got the information at first hand, 余直接獲得此一情報。 2. "endorse (或 indorse)", 『贊成』, 『支持』。All the people of China endorse the new constitution, 全中國人民贊成新憲法。 3. "under the cover of-", 『藉——作掩護』。The enemy retreated under the cover of heavy artillery fire, 敵人藉砲火作掩護而遁去。(又 "under cover of", 不用 "the", 作『乘』, 『藉口』。The enemy marched under cover of night, 敵人乘夜行軍。He did this under cover of charity, 彼以慈善為口實而為此)。 4. "dyed-in-the-wool", (未紡織先染色俾能耐久, 轉為)『牢固』, 『澈底』。He is a dyed-in-the-wool conservative, 彼為一牢不可破之保守派人物。 5. "in a position", 『力能』。He is not in a position to help you, 彼處境不能為汝助。 6. "pending", 『俟——(決定)後』。This will be done pending his approval, 俟彼贊同後此事即實行。 7. "now that" = "Since", 『既然』。 8. "Categorically", 『明白』, 『積極』。He categorically denied this rumour, 彼明白否認此一謠言。



# 當代文獻

## 合訂本內容摘要

### 第一卷合訂本

定價十五元

本合訂本包括第二次世界大戰初期及第二戰場開闢以後，有關我國與國際及國際間之重要文件。

1 我政府對軸心國宣戰布告。2 羅斯福，邱吉爾，赫爾，斯達林，希特勒重要演詞。3 大西洋憲章，蘇美軍事商洽，羅邱會談，英蘇同盟條約，北非登岸，第二戰場開闢，卡港會議聯合公報，珍珠港被襲報告等國際性要件。4 中美租借協定，英美放棄治外法權，中美新約。5 關於印度問題要件。

### 第二卷合訂本

定價十二元四角

本合訂本包括第二次世界大戰歐洲戰爭結束前後及有關戰後中國與其他列強關係，及國際合作之重要文獻。

1 莫斯科，開羅，德黑蘭等會議聲明書。2 太平洋戰事之末期軍事觀察。3 關於聯合國安全機構及戰後之國際間經濟，金融，善後救濟之文件。4 我國對美及對國際方面之政治，經濟，商業關係。5 盟軍改歐登陸始末。

### 第三卷合訂本

定價十四元

本合訂本內有盟軍對歐勝利以至日本投降前之重要文獻。

1 德國投降，歐洲善後各種文獻。2 迫使日本投降文件。3 克利米亞，波茨坦等會議公報。4 關於舊金山聯合國機構之重要演詞。5 聯合國憲章，世界法院組織法。6 美國動員局局長關於美國對日作戰之軍事，經濟，復員詳細報告書。

### 第四卷合訂本

定價十元九角

本合訂本包含日本投降以後中，美，英，蘇對國際問題之立場有關之文獻。

1 日本投降及中，美對日政策。2 外長會議中之各國立場。3 美，英，蘇之外交政策。4 中蘇友好條約及有關處理東北日產重要文件。5 關於中美關係之文件。6 外長會議公報，原子能會議公報。7 邱吉爾與斯達林間接舌戰。

