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continued belligerent attitude. If your forces wish to keep you this outbreak from spreading, first immediately order the troops near the Marco Polo Bridge and Papaoshan to retreat to Changsintien by tomorrow noon and that part of the 37th division in Peipin to move from the walled city of Peipin to the western district of Yungting River by noon of the 28th through the northern districts of the Peipin - Hankow Railways. They must be accompanied by the other troops of the 37th division who are in Hsiyan. Thereafter you must begin the gradual transportation of these troops toward Paoting.

If your forces do not act upon our advice, we shall consider your forces as lacking in sincerity, and we shall, therefore, be forced to take suitable action. In that event your forces will be charged with responsibility for anything that occurs."

I cannot relate the note which was, issued after the Kwang-anmen incident, since I have no record, but I remember that, by and large, <sup>they</sup> urged a reply to the above related note within a time limit.

This resolution to wage war was not directed against China as a whole, but against only the 37th division, which was the most characteristically anti-Japanese of the units in the 29th Army. This was simply because of the fact that the army had truly intended to limit its activities even when operations were started. Especially, since the withdrawal of the 37th division had been demanded as shown in the aforesaid notification, it was but natural for the Japanese army to conclude that she had a right to leave other divisions at Tientsin and in the neighborhood of

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peking. This determination of the army was reported to the Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters agreed to this and issued an order for the commencement of a movement.

In the order, however, there was a clause which instructed the army "not to go beyond the line along the river Yungting-ho". By this clause the army understood that the Central Headquarters had not abandoned the hope of settling the question at the spot.

16. I should now like to tell the reasons for the non-expansion policy of the army and also to discuss the attitude of the Central Headquarters.

The reasons for which the army had taken the non-expansion policy might be stated briefly as follows: It was considered improper to change the great policy of the state which had been to bring about good relations between Japan and China, simply because of a military conflict at a certain locality. Moreover, the Japanese Army stationed in China never thought of going into war with that country, and, consequently had no preparation for such a war. Again, we considered that if we opened war against China, it would grow into a racial conflict and that the conflict might be a prolonged war, due to the vastness of the Chinese territory. So, we determined to avoid a war with China as long as possible. Fortunately, the leaders of the Chinese Army, the other party of our negotiation, also had a "non-expansion" principle, and we believed that we would be able to reach a peaceful agreement, I have already mentioned in fragments the fact that various measures were taken by Central Headquarters just in the same manner to prevent the expansion<sup>s</sup>.

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of the affair. In particular, commander KAGETSU, on his arrival there to assume his new post, gave instructions to persist in the "non-expansion" policy. Again, Chief of the General Affairs Section of the General Staff NAKAJIMA, and Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry SHIBAYAMA were sent to the front to obtain full understanding of the non-expansion policy of the Central Headquarters, on the part of the entire army, at the front.

17. I shall relate a strange event which happened while the Japanese and the Chinese forces were face to face at the front. After the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, there were persons who often discharged guns from the flank to tempt the Chinese to open fire illegally which both the Japanese and the Chinese forces were in a state of mutual suspense. It was repeated almost every evening. I heard rumors that it was probably done by Chinese students or by Communist elements. I think there existed a third party's intrigue to provoke a conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese forces.

18. I should like to add one thing to what witness Chin Te-chun has told about the establishment for the sake of the strengthening of military power. Mr. Chin Te-chun misunderstood the facts. One infantry battalion was stationed in Iengtai. However, our barracks were in railway property belonging to a railway station, and, since the area was small and inconvenient for sanitation as well as for drilling, we asked to borrow some land in the neighbourhood as a new <sup>site</sup> for our barracks. However, the authorities of the Hopei-chahar Regime shirked their responsibility under the pretext

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that Chinese nations' opposed the move. Therefore we asked a few Chinese natives and discovered that their answer was favorable to us. Accordingly, we negotiated with the Chinese authorities, but the authorities ordered the Head of the Yuanping-hsien to compel the natives to write a document opposing us.

Definite denial was not given to this request and as time went on the matter was left as it was. The conversation between Mr. Chin and myself written in Mr. Chin's oral statement is a pure fabrication. I met Mr. Sung Che-yuan once only to urge him.

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On this 25th day of March 1947

At TOKYO

DEPONENT HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)

I, ONO, Kisaku hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At TOKYO

Witness: (Signed) ONO, Kisaku (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing:

HASHIMOTO, Gun (Seal)

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Translation Certificate

I, Charles D. Sheldon of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon

Tokyo, Japan

Date 11 April 1947

(AFFIDAVIT OF HASHIMOTO, GUN)

PROGRESS REPORT

April 3, 1947

DOHIMARA's Witness:

Hashimoto, Gun

Completed: Items 1 to 8.

Partially completed: Item 9.

Judge Judson T. Y. Nyi

Dr. Daniel S. Ao