

Dec. File

Box #

7117-A

894.628/7-147 -- 12-3147

NA → Mr. Borton

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 1, 1947

SUBJECT: Second Japanese Antarctic Whaling Expedition.

PARTICIPANTS: Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State  
Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

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NA (Mr. Fearey)  
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OFFICE  
THE SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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Mr. Lovett stated that, as a result of the conversation with Sir John Balfour, he felt General Hilldring should postpone speaking to the Secretary about the answer to the Australian note on whaling until further consideration had been given to the proposed reply to Australia. He felt that rather than turn down categorically their proposition that they operate a unit of the expedition, that they be told that we would be agreeable to their undertaking the operation of the expedition providing they would make available to us at no cost both all of the oil and whale meat which the Japanese would otherwise obtain from the expedition. Such an answer would place on them the burden of supplying the protein and whale oil which otherwise this Government would have to supply.

Mr. Borton told Mr. Lovett that he did not know what General Hilldring's reaction would be to his proposition but that he would take it up with him immediately.

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Mr. Borton: Send a copy for  
our files.  
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NA:HBorton:mls

894-24/147

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*File with Bureau of Communication with Sir John*  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : U: Mr. Lovett  
 FROM : NA: Mr. Borton

DATE: July 1, 1947

SUBJECT: Appointment with Mr. Balfour Tuesday, July 1, 3:00 P.M.

It is understood that Mr. Balfour, Counselor of the British Embassy, has requested an appointment today to discuss the projected SCAP-administered, Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition during the coming whaling season. While it is not known just what points Mr. Balfour intends to make, his general purpose is doubtless to follow up his Government's protest of June 17 (attached). Following is the background of the matter:

1) On May 4, 1947 SCAP requested permission to authorize a whaling expedition for the 1947-48 season similar to that carried out last year.

2) At almost the same time notes were received from the British, Australian and New Zealand Governments reminding this Government of its commitment last year to consult with other interested governments before authorizing any future Japanese whaling operations and expressing opposition to a second Antarctic whaling expedition. Arguments against such an expedition included statements that Japan's participation in the 1947-48 expedition would mean a reduction in the catches of nations party to the International Whaling Convention; the total quantity of whale production for world consumption would be reduced as a result of inefficient Japanese processing operations; Japan's past whaling record disregarded international conservation regulations; and the Japanese whale fleet is a security threat.

3) These notes and SCAP's request were given careful consideration in the Department and on May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring discussed the matter with representatives of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Norwegian Governments and informed them of our desire to proceed with an expedition this year.

4) On June 9 representatives of these Governments were handed aide-memoires (copy of aide-memoire to British Government attached), setting forth our reasons for approving an expedition, chiefly the facts that protein foods and oils from the expedition are essential components of Japanese diet and that the expedition would relieve the United States of supplying these items, and that no significant security threat was perceived in the continued possession by Japan

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- 2 -

of two whaling factory ships. At this meeting representatives of all four countries expressed bitter opposition to our proposed action and asked that their Governments be given an opportunity to file formal protests before authorization for the expedition was actually given.

5) The Supreme Commander, though informed of the decision of this Government to authorize the expedition, was requested to take no public action in the matter until June 17, to allow time for possible protests from the complaining Governments.

6) No formal protests were received prior to June 17 but a paper presented to the FEC by the British and supported by the Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and Netherlands representatives advocated prohibition of any future Japanese whaling during the occupation of Japan. On June 17 the British presented the attached note requesting that the expedition be withheld or canceled.

7) On June 19 General McCoy announced to the FEC in a formal statement that the United States Government, though greatly regretting inability to reach agreement on the paper, definitely could not approve the British paper. Simultaneously, SCAP was instructed to authorize the expedition.

8) Since that time, protests have been received from the Norwegians and the Australians, the latter suggesting they operate a Japanese whaling unit on behalf of Japan. An aide-mémoire, which it is expected that the Secretary will hand the Australian Ambassador tomorrow or the next day, has been prepared rejecting the Australian proposal. Our decision to authorize the expedition, and our alleged failure to fulfill our commitment to consult with the interested Governments, has evoked adverse press comment in Britain and Australia. A record of conversation between Mr. Clayton and Mr. Bevin on the subject may be found in London's telegram No. 3474, June 25, (attached).

Aside from mentioning the fact that the United States does not wish to have to bear the expense of supplying the food which would be lost to the occupation if the expedition were not to sail, you may wish to point out to Mr. Balfour, if he raises the matter of our having failed to carry on sufficient consultation with other Governments, that two weeks elapsed between the meeting with General Hilldring on May 27 and June 9 when this Government presented its aide-mémoire and that no protests were received during that period, nor during the following week when we requested SCAP to take no public action. No less than six weeks elapsed between the time when it first became known in Japan that a second whaling expedition was under consideration (a note presumably occasioned by this report was received from the British Government on April 30) and the receipt of the Embassy's protest of June 17.

It is

- 3 -

It is suggested that you make it clear to Mr. Balfour tactfully but firmly that the U.S. decision is a final one and that this Government perceives no advantage in further discussion of the matter.

HB

RA  
NA:RAFearey/pm

NA → Mr. Borton.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Memorandum of Conversation

A

DATE: July 1, 1947  
3:00 P.M.

SUBJECT: Second Japanese Antarctic Whaling Expedition.

PARTICIPANTS: Robert A. Lovett, Under Secretary of State  
Sir John Balfour, Counselor, British Embassy  
Harold A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy  
Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

COPIES TO: UK  
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NA (Mr. Fearey)  
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1947 JUL 2 PM 2  
OFFICE THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sir John Balfour called at his request to present a note on the subject of the second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition objecting to the action taken by the United States Government authorizing a second whaling expedition without what they consider proper prior consultation and believing that the decision of the whaling expedition should be left to the Far Eastern Commission. The British note concludes that it hopes General MacArthur's instructions can be countermanded and the question referred back for decision to the FEC and examination of alternative proposals made. The Under Secretary then pointed out that the problem seemed to divide itself into two aspects, namely, that of procedure and that revolving around the question as to whether or not the Japanese should be permitted to whale in the Antarctic. On the procedural question he stated that he regretted any difference of interpretation which might have been given to the action of this Government on May 27 when General Hilldring discussed the problem with representatives of the interested countries, the handing of our aide-memoire of June 9 to representatives of the same countries and final instruction to SCAP on June 16 concerning authorization of the expedition. Mr. Graves then stated that in discussing the question of whaling in the Far Eastern Commission they had been lead to believe that the United States would present a paper on whaling for consideration of the Commission. Mr. Borton then referred to an extract of

the minutes

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Mr Borton: find in copy file on file. [Signature]

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the minutes of Committee #2 of the Far Eastern Commission of April 4, 1947 which stated that "The United States Member referred to the unofficial proposal made at the 48th meeting that if the Commission would agree to accept a fishing policy based substantially on FEC-035, the United States would give favorable consideration to an FEC paper providing that whaling beyond the area contained in SCAPIN 1033 should be subject to FEC approval." Mr. Borton added that when such a statement was made it was not the intention of this Government to present the paper in question and that this may have been the cause for some of the misunderstanding.

Mr. Lovett then outlined the difficulties confronting the Department vis-à-vis Congress in any program which requires expenditure of U.S. funds for assistance abroad and pointed out that the Department would be in an untenable position if it did not support a whaling expedition this year whereby the Japanese would be able to provide themselves with the necessary protein and oil without expenditure to the United States Government.

In answer to a question as to whether enough Allied ships were available this year for catching the total maximum 16,000 blue whale units provided for in the whaling Convention, Mr. Graves answered that both the British and the Norwegians had begun construction of additional factory ships on the assumption that the consultations and Allied decisions mentioned in the note of this Government of October 4, 1946 would mean that no whaling expedition would take place this year. Mr. Lovett then remarked that if the British had acted on such an assumption they themselves were disregarding the significance of the phrase "Allied decision" and had themselves already decided there should be no expedition regardless of our views in the matter. Mr. Lovett further stated that he felt any action the British might have taken concerning the construction of additional ships should be considered as an ordinary business risk. So far as he could see the issue resolved itself into the simple question as to whether or not the Japanese would be allowed to whale. Mr. Graves stated that if they were allowed to whale in the place of the Japanese they would make available to Japan its normal whale oil requirements, but made no mention of whale meat nor would the proceeds from the other whale oil be available. Mr. Borton added that such an arrangement would not make available as credit in Japan the proceeds from the sale of the remainder of the whale oil. Mr. Lovett concluded by saying that he saw no solution to the problem unless agreement could be reached among the members of the whaling Convention to allow for a catch above the 16,000 blue whale units which, in all probability, would be equivalent to

the difference



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the difference between the 16,000 units and actual amount caught last year.

Sir John Balfour thanked the Under Secretary for his explanation of the position of this Government and requested that this note be given careful consideration.

HB

NA:HBorton:mls

# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS  
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FROM  
INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION  
LONDON

JUL 9 - 1947

DATED July 1947

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECD.: July 1947  
8:30 a.m.

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OFFICE OF  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
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Secretary of State

ACTION-ITP

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Washington

A-1478, July 1, 1947

Following questions and answers in regard to the second Japanese Whaling expedition to the Antarctic exchanged in House of Commons on June 30, 1947:-

Mr. T. Reid (Labor M.P. for Swindon) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Far Eastern Commission or the U.S. authorities in Japan control policy regarding Japanese whale fishing in the Antarctic; and what steps he is taking to protest against the second Japanese whaling expedition sanctioned by the U.S. authorities against the wishes of the Australian Government.

Mr. Harrison (Labor M.P. for Nottingham, East) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the protest made to the U.S. State Department, regarding permission being granted on two occasions for Japanese whaling expeditions to operate in the Antarctic by the U.S. authorities, have resulted in assurances that proper consultation with other Powers will take place before any further permits are issued.

Dr. Haden Guest (Labor M.P. for Islington, North) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that a second whaling expedition to the Antarctic has been authorized by the General Officer Commanding the Occupation Forces in Japan without prior consultation with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand; and what conditions have been imposed on Japanese whalers to prevent a destructive inroad into an important source

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A-1478  
July 1, 1947  
from London

Page 2.

of world fat supplies by indiscriminate slaughter of whales.

Mr. Mayhew (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs): "The U.S. Government did not consult with the other interested Governments, which include the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, before authorizing the second Japanese whaling expedition in the Antarctic. Our Ambassador in Washington is being instructed to re-open this question with the United States Government."

DOUGLAS

Copy to U.S. Political Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo  
Copy to Embassy, Canberra  
Copy to Legation, Wellington

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, July 1, 1947.

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No. 1146

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Rec'd DC/L  
July 17, 1947

ACTION:  
ITP-~~enc~~. SUBJECT: Authorization of Japanese Whaling Operations  
in the Antarctic in the 1947-1948 Season.

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(Dr. Deason)  
Smithsonian  
(Kellogg)  
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The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 1133, June 23, 1947, subject: "Allied Council for Japan; Second SCAP-Controlled Antarctic Whaling Expedition". There are enclosed five copies of SCAPIN 1737, dated June 21, 1947, subject: "Japanese Whaling Operations in the Antarctic in the 1947-1948 Season", a directive issued by this Headquarters and delivered to the Japanese Government at 8:55 a.m., local time, on June 22, 1947.

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M-O-O-O

Enclosure:

Five copies of Memorandum to the Japanese Government, June 22, 1947.

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Handed by Sir John  
Balpan to the Under  
Secretary, July 1, 1947.  
HPB

Ref. 9/-/47

N O T E

His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador has the honour to refer to his Note of the 17th June concerning the authorisation for a second Japanese Antarctic Whaling Expedition. The decision has caused His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considerable concern and Lord Inverchapel is instructed to urge the Secretary of State to reconsider the position, in order that there shall be an opportunity for further discussion between the interested Governments, which include, in addition to that of the United States, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

2. The desirability or otherwise of Japanese whaling activities, involving as it does, questions of security and of world stocks of food and whale oil, appears to His Majesty's Government to be essentially one in which such consultation is called for and where unilateral action is to be deplored. There was satisfaction that the United States Government shared this attitude when, in their Aide Memoire dated 4th October, 1946, the State Department expressed complete accord with the view that long-range consideration of the rights of Japan to conduct whaling operations was a matter for Allied discussion and decision. Lord Inverchapel was at the same time informed that no authorisation for any future Japanese whaling expeditions in the Antarctic or elsewhere would be given without prior consultation with the interested Governments.

3. That the United States Government, in spite of this expression of their views and of the assurance given, should have taken action to authorise a second expedition without prior consultation, cannot but react adversely upon the

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principle of Allied consultations. It is also, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, directly damaging to the approved machinery for Allied discussion and decision provided by the Far Eastern Commission for the control of Japan, since, at the time the Directive to General MacArthur was published, a United Kingdom paper proposing limitations upon Japanese whaling was already under consideration in the Commission and had received the approval of a majority of the delegations at the Committee stage. It is considered that this should have made it apparent that interested Governments had legitimate doubts as to the desirability of permitting the Japanese to whale, and were entitled to have their arguments heard. Lord Inverchapel wishes to mention, moreover, that an alternative proposal by the Australian Government for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices does not appear to have received any consideration.

4. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hope therefore that the instructions to General MacArthur can be countermanded and the question be referred back for decision by the Far Eastern Commission and for examination of alternative proposals.

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.,  
1st July, 1947.

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**AIDE-MÉMOIRE**

The Department of State has considered the British Embassy's notes of June 17 and July 1, 1947, in which it is stated to be the view of the British Government that the United States Government did not abide by its commitment to consult with other interested governments before authorizing a second SCAP-administered whaling expedition; that discussion of policy with regard to whaling and fishing in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission was adjourned in February, 1947, on the understanding that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, which was not subsequently done; that an alternative proposal by the Australian Government for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices did not appear to have received any consideration by this Government; and that because of these and other considerations the instructions to the Supreme Commander authorizing

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a second expedition should be countermanded and the question referred back for decision by the Far Eastern Commission and for examination of alternative proposals.

The British Government's opposition to a second Antarctic whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander was first made known to this Government in the Embassy's aide-mémoire of April 30 following reports in Japan that a second expedition was under consideration. The contents of this aide-mémoire had been thoroughly considered when on May 27 Assistant Secretary Hilldring consulted with representatives of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Norwegian Governments to obtain a full expression of those Governments' views regarding a second expedition, and to acquaint them with United States thinking on the subject at that time. After further careful consideration of the four Governments' views, aide-mémoire were handed their representatives on June 9 stating that it had been found advisable to authorize the expedition notwithstanding their objections, with which this Government could not concur, because of the expedition's importance

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to the reestablishment of a self-supporting economy for Japan. In order that the various Governments might have additional opportunity to present their views it was decided to withhold authorization of the expedition for another week, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Commander had informed the Department that the Japanese would need to know before May 15, one month previously, whether the expedition was to be permitted if they were to have adequate time to complete the necessary preparations. By June 17, when the first British protest was received, the United States position had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19.

It is the view of the United States Government on the basis of the above record of events extending from late April to June 20, when authorization for the expedition was finally given, that this Government fully complied with its commitment to consult with other interested governments, and that ample time was afforded for the presentation by those governments of their views in the matter.

- 4 -

matter and any counterproposals they might wish to make. It is a cause of some concern to the United States Government that in the light of these events, particularly the consultations in Assistant Secretary Hildring's office on May 27, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should have stated in the House of Commons on June 30 that "The United States Government did not consult with the other interested governments, which include the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, before authorizing the second Japanese whaling expedition in the Antarctic."

As regards the understanding in the Economic Committee of the Far Eastern Commission that the United States member would put forward fresh draft policies for Japanese fishing and whaling, respectively, the United States Government regrets that this assurance should have been given, even orally and informally, and the promised papers not subsequently submitted. Work on the papers was begun, but exchanges of view with the Supreme Commander and among the concerned agencies of

the Government

- 5 -

the Government required more time than had been expected, with the result that the United States position had not yet been determined when a message from the Supreme Commander requesting authorization for a second whaling expedition was received. It was never the intention of the United States Government, or of its representative in the Economic Committee, to forestall discussion of the matter in the Committee, or to deter members who disapproved of this Government's whaling policy filed with the Commission as PEG-035 to submit alternative proposals for consideration by the Commission.

Regarding the Australian Government's proposal for the conduct of an expedition under Australian and other Allied auspices, the United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its views on this proposal at any time during the six weeks intervening between the time when the interested Governments first became aware that a second expedition was under consideration and the time when the Australian Government's proposal was received on June 18. As earlier stated, the United States position had by that time reached a

definitive

- 6 -

definitive form in the statement prepared for reading by General McCoy the following day to the Far Eastern Commission. Nevertheless, in view of the Australian Government's proposal and of the British Embassy's notes of June 17 and July 1, 1947, the position of the United States Government was carefully reviewed by the highest officers <sup>of</sup> in the Department and further consultations held with the Supreme Commander in the matter. A reply, of which the concluding paragraphs are quoted below, was addressed to the Australian Embassy on July 9:

"The United States Government has been guided in its reply by the fact that the expedition last year under the Supreme Commander's control resulted in the acquisition of considerable quantities of foreign exchange through the sale abroad of part of the whale oil obtained on the expedition. These funds have been available for the purchase of other foods needed in Japan, permitting a significant reduction of the occupation burden on the American taxpayer, and would not be obtained by the United States from the 1947-48 expedition under the Australian proposal.

"As indicated in the United States Government's aide-memoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Government perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international

whaling

whaling regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan which is the policy of this Government. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Government does not feel free to accept the Australian Government's proposal contained in the Embassy's aide-memoire of June 23."

The United States position with regard to the projected second whaling expedition has been finally determined after full consideration of the British Government's and other interested governments' views and counterproposals. The United States Government accordingly regrets that it is unable to comply with the British Government's request that General MacArthur's instructions be countermanded and that the matter be referred back to the Far Eastern Commission.

Department of State,

Washington, July 23, 1947.

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# INCOMING AIRGRAM

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FROM: 1582  
Canberra, Australia

OFFICE  
OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
MESSAGE CENTER

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July 2, 1947

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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*[Handwritten Signature]*

A-90, July 2, 1947.

Following Australian Government Press Statement regarding Japanese Whaling in the Antarctic was released at Canberra June 27:

"Latest reports received at Canberra from Washington indicate that Australia received very strong support yesterday in the F.E.C. when the question of Antarctic whaling by the Japanese was debated and finally adjourned for one week. In particular, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France, China, India and Canada supported Australia's case against the unilateral action already announced by the United States authorities.

"The United States Representative emphasized that as the expedition does not have to leave Japan until October, there was plenty of time for further consideration. An adjournment was agreed to unanimously.

"Comment by Minister.

"Commenting on the situation, Dr. Evatt said: 'It is difficult to appreciate the reasons for the recent United States announcements, which announcements were made in contradiction of the recommendations of two F.E.C. Committees, one on 12th June, and another on 17th June, both to the effect that whaling by Japanese should be permitted only in recognised fishing waters adjacent to Japan itself.

"However, the apparent desire of the United States to review the position is very welcome.

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Whaling

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A-90 From Canberra

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July 2, 1947

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Whaling in the last expedition conducted by the Japanese, in gross disregard of all international conventions, was almost entirely in waters adjacent to Australian, French and New Zealand Antarctic territories. The second expedition was clearly intended to cover the same waters. Australia had therefore to assume responsibility in proposing that the F.S.C., which was already actively dealing with the question of policy, should make a pronouncement on it. The spontaneous and strong support received by Australia should lead to an immediate review of a policy which is justly opposed by so many of the Allied nations in the Pacific war."

BUTLER

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE

July 9, 1947

A-H

The Secretary has marked the attached note for General Hilldring. I assume that your office will take care of any necessary action.

S/S:RBReams

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**

DATE: July 3, 1947  
2:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Second Antarctic Whaling Expedition.

PARTICIPANTS: Norman J.O. Makin, Ambassador of Australia  
Alfred Stirling, Minister of Australia  
The Secretary  
J. H. Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State  
Hugh Borton, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

COPIES TO: ✓ S U  
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NA (Mr. Fearey)  
BC

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Ambassador Makin called at his request to express further the views of his Government in reference to the proposed second SCAP-sponsored Antarctic whaling expedition. Ambassador Makin requested that he be allowed to read some notes which he had made in order that he could express more clearly the thought of his Government and people in reference to the whaling expedition. Ambassador Makin then read the attached, adding only that Mr. Menzies, the minority leader in Parliament, had recently strongly supported Mr. Evatt's stand on whaling so that the Australian people took a united stand on the matter.

The Secretary replied that he was not prepared to answer Ambassador Makin today but that he would take his points into serious consideration.

The conversation terminated at 2:39 P.M.

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*James Hieldring*  
*SCU*

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

3rd July, 1947.

My Government have asked me to convey to you the very deep concern which they themselves feel and which is shared by the Australian people as a whole on the proposal of a further whaling expedition from Japan.

We feel that the decision to permit a second expedition to the Antarctic is wholly unwarranted in view of the offer which Australia has made to accept responsibility, either herself or in association with other interested nations, to undertake an expedition and provide the result of the catch for ultimate distribution in Japan by the Supreme Commander.

As regards expense we feel that this can easily be arranged to our mutual satisfaction so as to avoid any further burden upon the American taxpayer.

Furthermore we believe that the necessary arrangements can be made without involving any delay.

Our methods of whaling will undoubtedly guarantee a greater supply of oil from the catch of whales allowed.

We are not asking for the exclusion of the Japanese as a whole. There is the northern Pacific nearer their own country.

I draw your attention to the convertibility of these Japanese whaling ships for naval use. What concerns us is the potential threat to the security of our country. In the last 15 years the presence of Japanese ships and in particular the pearling fleets in the neighbourhood of Australia has been synonymous

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With the memory of the Japanese invasion of New Guinea and Timor, and the destruction of our northern port of Darwin fresh in mind, the Australian people can only regard the presence of Japanese ships whether whalers or pearlers or otherwise in the seas adjacent to Australia with the deepest resentment and apprehension.

A second visit of Japanese ships and Japanese crews following on that of last year will give great encouragement to the Japanese in a direction which we can only regard as most undesirable.

I would emphasise our concern that an enemy country should be considered in this way contrary to the interests of an Ally. We have suffered the treachery of this enemy as you have, and none understand that treachery better than the United States.

My people are deeply concerned because this question of the expedition appeared to have been settled unilaterally at the very moment when the matter was coming before the FEC.

My Government hope that the Government of the United States will be prepared to review this matter which from our point of view is one of major importance and which has deeply stirred the whole Australian people.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

|        |                                     |
|--------|-------------------------------------|
| Action | NA                                  |
| FE     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Info   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| UN     |                                     |
| CA     |                                     |
| NA     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| PI     |                                     |
| SEA    |                                     |

ACTION COPY

9-D

DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

SECRET

Action: FE  
 Info:  
 S/S  
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 DC/R

JUL 7 - 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Control 1633

Rec'd July 5, 1947 7:18 p.m.

FROM: Tokyo  
 TO: Secretary of State  
 NO: 183, July 5, 8 p.m.  
 US URGENT

*Informed by wire July 10 Australian proposal rejected. R.A.D. file*

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 JUL 6 1947  
 10:00 am  
 Department of State

FROM SCAP TO WDCSA (PASS TO GENERAL MARSHALL SECRETARY OF STATE) CITE C 58820

Reference WAR 81470 received 5 July subject Antarctic whaling.

One. Difficulty encountered by State Department this matter thoroughly appreciated here. Our concern has now gone beyond questions, important and compelling as they are, of food deficit and burden on American tax-payer. Australian distorted pronouncements and unwarranted criticisms have been so violent and so widely publicized in the Far East that, US decisions having been made and announced, question has resolved itself into one of upholding prestige of US in Japan and throughout Far East.

Two. Our detailed views as follows: With reference penultimate substantive paragraph URTEL we do not perceive that Australian proposal has any merit as indicated in our memorandum 19 June to Australian Mission quoted in our 163, 19 June to Department in part as follows: "On the basis of expert opinion it appears that the proposal is technically impracticable. It is assumed that it is the Australian concept that under the proposal Japanese whaling crews would man the vessels in question as the accommodations on the vessels are unsuitable to any but Japanese whalers accustomed to them. In such case, the principal

difference

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894.628/7-547

SECRET FILE

JUL 23 1947 FILED

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 JUL 25 1947  
 DC/R  
 NORTHEAST ASIAN OFFICE

SECRET

-2-#183, July 5, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

difference in the conduct of the expedition would be that it would be under Australian control rather than under Allied control as was the first Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. This headquarters can perceive no advantage to the operation of a Japanese manned and equipped expedition under Australian control rather than under SCAP control. On the contrary, it is believed that any such arrangement would violate the underlying principle of the occupation that it shall have the character of an Allied operation under the executive authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Furthermore, to attain the maximum results for a 1947 expedition, active preparations therefor should have been initiated by May 15.

"The delay which would be involved in seeking Allied agreement to turn over Japanese whaling vessels to the Australian Government and in organizing any such expedition would obviate any possibility of obtaining from the forthcoming whaling season the needed food to assist the United States in supplying the deficit in this country. If in consequence of such agreement it were desired to use non-Japanese crews, the making of necessary alterations in the vessels would itself preclude any expedition during the forthcoming season."

Australian statements that ships to be manned by Australians "and operated more efficiently than by Japanese," and the "supplies at least as adequate as those which would be obtained from proposed Japanese expedition" are based on unjustified assumptions and do not conform to experience and results which might reasonably be expected from Australian crews and officers entirely lacking in whaling experience.

Three. As regards final paragraph URTEL it is our opinion that if

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-3-#183, July 5, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

opinion that if Australia were willing to approve any SCAP-sponsored expedition, their complaints in regard to security and other aspects against full scale expedition would be completely vitiated. Technical reasons cited above (A) would make it impracticable to turn over remainder of equipment to Australians to operate in forthcoming season, (B) would mean giving Australians preference over other Allies which are presenting claims for Jap factory ships and auxiliaries and (C) would violate accepted principle of allocation of Japanese commercial shipping as matter for peace settlement. SCAP is without authority to allocate to any country Jap commercial vessels and ultimate fate of Jap whaling vessels will depend in first instance on Allied determination at Peace Conference of future of Jap whaling.

Four. Australian contention that Australian people are up in arms is not accepted here. Not only have some Australian papers stated editorially that project is sound but local Australian officials other than MacMahon Ball have privately characterized Australian politicians sound and fury as tempest in teapot. It is the opinion here of those closely familiar with Australian political scene, that Australian protests flow from policy of endeavoring by loud assertion to bring Australia to place of effective predominance in the Far East. This in turn stems from internal Australian politics and political maneuvers of Australian officials who have made so much ill-considered public clamor in this matter. In the eyes of the Japanese people and other peoples in the Far East the carrying through of the second expedition has been blown up by the Australians into a matter of the prestige of the US and of SCAP; that is, having made a decision that is entirely just, humanitarian and practical, whether US and SCAP can or cannot be overridden by the unreasonable demands of officials of a small nation which desires Jap whaling vessels for own venal commercial interests. (It will be recalled that Australian minister in China went so far as to issue statement to the Chinese people in the matter.)

Five. Question

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-4-#183, July 5, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

Five Question of security interlaced with references to past Jap treachery et cetera which the Australians seem to have adopted as emotional foundation of their complaints is one which does not actually exist. It was correctly stated in this headquarters press release 22 June: "As SCAP-controlled Japanese-manned ships operating to repatriate 5½ million Japanese prisoners of war and civilians have during the past 18 months entered numerous Allied ports in the West and Southwest Pacific without incident, it is believed that no problem of security is involved in this second whaling expedition." Sydney was one of such ports. Furthermore, while the Antarctic Ocean is not an Australian lake, appeasement of the Australians in this particular matter will undoubtedly support them in making factual their implied contention that freedom of the seas and use by others, of those international waters is subject to Australian approval.

Six. Instructions to the Japanese Government in the matter have already been given and active preparations for the expedition have begun. The Jap Government and newly elected Diet have tendered formal expressions of gratitude for assistance to their problems which has been provided by the authorization. Due to its importance in the food deficit, authorization of the expedition has been featured most prominently by Japanese press and has provided very desirable and needed boost to Japanese morale to help carry them through the critical food situation. Reversal would have exceedingly unfortunate repercussions.

Seven. There seems to us to be involved also a simple question of right and wrong. This is the question whether we should uphold a decision that is based entirely on considerations of right. I have in mind not only the merits of the matter, which have been previously discussed, but also the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration, notably:

(Eleven) Japan

SECRET



SECRET

-5-#183, July 5, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

"(Eleven) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the execution of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."

This principle was recently reaffirmed by Far Eastern Commission in its basic-post-surrender policy for Japan:

One. ~~Two.~~ D. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials should be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations will be permitted."

The foregoing also follows the fourth basic principle laid down in the Atlantic Charter as follows:

"They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." This principle is also one of those incorporated in the Declaration by the United Nations.

Eight. Any compromise of these principles or any appeasement of the Australians will without question seriously undermined American prestige in this part of the world. Appeasement will have most adverse effects on the occupation which has been so successfully carried forward by the prestige of the United States.

Moreover, such

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-6-#183, July 5, 8 p.m., from Tokyo

Moreover, such appeasement would prejudice our position at the Peace conference not only because it would crown Australia's unfair methods with success and encourage them to further utilization of such methods but would also point way to the Japs to seek selfish ends through the medium of loud complaint.

ATCHESON

RSP:PAL

SECRET

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PREPARING OFFICE WILL  
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE  
CLASSIFICATION OF THE  
MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department:

Charge to

Department of State

**SECRET**  
Washington

**SECRET**  
JUL 7 1947 1636

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, TOKYO  
INFO WAR DEPT, CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

258

*8 pm*

*894.628/6-2947  
K2894.659*

894.628/7-747

First para press release quoted DEPTTEL 255 July 3 should read

as follows: QUOTE The Australian Govt on May 29 expressed its concern  
over a reported decision by the Supreme Commander to transfer responsi-  
bility for the management of the Anguar phosphate industry to the  
Japanese Govt under his control, and over the presence of Japanese  
laborers in an area close to Australian fisheries. END QUOTE

*894.659*

Remainder release correctly given except that word QUOTE designated  
END QUOTE in third sentence should be QUOTE designed END QUOTE.

*Marshall*  
*(mb)*

CS/A

DISTRIBUTION  
DESIRED  
(OFFICES ONLY)

AH:GWLewis:dmd 7/7/47

FE  
Mr. Fearey

A-H

Anal  
Rev  
Dist

*ap*  
*4/1*  
JUL 7 1947 P.M.

ACCEPTANCE DESK

JUL 7 PM 8 06

DCT

**SECRET**

*894.628/7-747*

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

JULY 2, 1947  
NO. 545ANGUAR ISLAND PHOSPHATE INDUSTRY

At his press conference today, Secretary Marshall made the following statement:

"The Australian Government on May 29 expressed its concern over a reported decision by the Supreme Commander to transfer responsibility for the management of the Anguar phosphate industry to the Japanese laborers in an area close to Australian fisheries. In fact the operation is, and will remain, under the close supervision of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. All Japanese will be returned to Japan on completion of the project, which is designated to alleviate the fertilizer shortage in Japan and so reduce the burden of Japanese food supplies on the United States. The Supreme Commander has been informed of the Australian Government's concern and, in answer to our request, has provided full information in the matter."

\* \* \*

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255  
to Tope

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER  
*Collect*

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM 2512

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

## Department of State

Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to

RESTRICTED

JUL 10 1947

*7 pm*

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, TOKYO  
INFO WAR DEPT, CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

*264*

Australian proposal operate Japanese whaling unit on behalf Japan rejected in note delivered Australian Embassy July 9. Concluding paragraph read:

QUOTE As indicated in the United States Government's aide-memoire of June 9 to the Australian Embassy, this Govt perceives no security threat to any nation in a second whaling expedition under the control of the Supreme Commander. In the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international whaling regulations will not be fully observed, there appears to be no justification for the abandonment of the second expedition. The United States regards the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan which is the policy of this Govt. It is regretted that under the circumstances the United States Govt does not feel free to accept the

894.628/7-1047

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

June 23. UNQUOTE.

NA:RAFEAREY:pm 7/10/47  
AH:GWLewis:dmd 7/10/47

*Marshall*

RAFE  
JKSec.

(cleared with Mr. Penfield RAF)

CS/V  
894.628/7-1047

JUL 10 1947 F.M.

2371

**RESTRICTED**

**DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SCAP**

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*FM 894.628/7-10-47*

DOE - ITT  
Anal. *ar*  
Rev.  
Col.  
Dis. *RAF HOB*  
NA:RAFearney/pn  
7/10/47

**RESTRICTED**

FE

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RESTRICTED

## DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SCAP

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RESTRICTED

NA:RAFearey/pm  
7/10/47

RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED

NA:RAFearey/pm  
7/10/47



**RESTRICTED****DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SCAP**

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**RESTRICTED**

NA:RAFearey/pm  
7/10/47

**RESTRICTED****DRAFT TELEGRAM TO SCAP**

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**RESTRICTED**

NA:RAFearey/pa  
7/10/47

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Whaling*  
*NA*  
**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : NA - Mr. Borton ✓ FE - Mr. Vincent  
 : A-H - Mr. Hilldring BC DATE: July 18, 1947

FROM : NA - Mrs. Dunning

SUBJECT: Discussion between General McCoy and  
 Ambassador Makin at the meeting of the  
 Far Eastern Commission on July 17, 1947.

The highpoint of this meeting was the verbal battle between the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission, General McCoy and the Australian representative, Ambassador Makin over the question of the FEC paper on Japanese whaling. General McCoy suggested that consideration of the paper be postponed in view of the continuing diplomatic exchanges on the subject. At this point, Ambassador Makin stated that a vote should be taken as soon as possible on the paper since diplomatic negotiations were at an end. General McCoy took exception to this statement and stated that he did not like the insinuation on the part of the Australian Ambassador that the US Government was deliberately procrastinating on this question. Mr. Makin stated that he did not see how any such inferences could be drawn from his statement. General McCoy referred him to previous statements in the record and stated that in view of the fact that diplomatic exchanges were continuing with Norway, the United Kingdom and other countries concerned, that it was dishonest to accuse the US of deliberate procrastination. Mr. Makin stated that he was making a formal protest to the Commission concerning General McCoy's accusations. General McCoy then referred Mr. Makin to the Australian Premier's statement of last week that the discussion about the question of Japanese whaling was making a mountain out of a molehill.



NA: ALDunning: ggg

*894-638/7-1847*

No. 259/47



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23rd July, 1947.

854.628/7-2347

(1)

The Australian Ambassador presents  
 his compliments to The Honourable The Secretary  
 of State and has the honour to forward herewith  
 a detailed report prepared by the official  
 Australian observer on the operations of the  
 Japanese Mother Ship "Hashidate Maru" and  
 attendant chasers, during Japanese Antarctic  
 whaling operations, 1946/47.

September 26, 1947

CS/A

The Honourable The Secretary of State,  
 Department of State,  
 Washington, D. C.

DOE - [unclear]

Anal. *AD*  
 Rev. *epm*  
 Oct. *HW*  
 Dist.

894.628/7-2347

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Australia and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of July 23, 1947, transmitting a copy of a report prepared by the official Australian observer on the operations of the Japanese mother ship "Hashidate Maru" and attendant chasers during the 1946-47 Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition.

The Ambassador's courtesy in making this report available to the Department of State is greatly appreciated.

*ad.*  
*gwr*  
*[Signature]*

Department of State,

Washington, September 26, 1947.

SEP - 3 1947  
NA:RAFearey/pm  
9/25/47

*[Stamp]*  
*[Signature]*

894.628/7-2347

CS/A

894.628/7-2347

DO NOT DETACH THIS FORM.

RECORD COPY

FILE NO.

894.628/7-2547  
DESP. 1188 FROM TOKYO

THE ATTACHED COPY OF A DESPATCH HAS BEEN DESIGNATED THE RECORD COPY TO REPLACE THE ORIGINAL ACTION COPY WHICH WAS NOT RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL RECORDS BY THE ACTION OFFICE.

THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R FOR FILING.

---o0o---

MAR 11 1943

**FILED**

OC/L

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

AUG 8 - 1947

Rec'd  
Aug. 1, 1947  
12:18 pm

Tokyo, July 25, 1947.

RESTRICTEDACTION:  
ITP

No. 1188

INFO:  
OCD  
DCR  
OE  
FE  
EURSUBJECT: Australian Observer's Report Concerning 1946/47  
Japanese Whaling Operations.WAR  
NAVY  
CIG  
FISH&WILDLIFE  
(Dr. Deason)  
SMITHSONIAN  
(Dr. Kellogg)

The Political Adviser for Japan has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 1137 of June 27, 1947, concerning Japanese whaling statistics, and to previous correspondence in the premises. There is enclosed one copy of a report entitled "Japanese Whaling Operations 1946/47" published in May 1947 by the Department of Commerce and Agriculture, Commonwealth of Australia. It is regretted that the Australian Mission in Japan has been able to supply this Mission with only one copy of the report.

A-O-O-O

The Natural Resources Section of this Headquarters has commented upon this report as follows:

"The basic data referred to by Mr. Coonan in subject report are substantially in agreement with the report submitted by Lt. McCracken, Natural Resources Section, SCAP representative on the 1946-47 whaling expedition to the Antarctic. In several parts of the report, however, the interpretation and statements made by Mr. Coonan tend to give a misleading impression of some of the operations during the expedition.

"Reference fifth and sixth paragraphs, page 4, subject report. The impression is that the complete backbone and both sides of the ribs were frequently discarded. Actually, detailed records show bones were discarded on only eighteen days and that the total loss of oil from such discarding was less than 80 metric tons, compared to a total production of 12,172 metric tons for both factory ships. These records also show that the discarding of this quantity of bones made it possible to process additional whales which yielded approximately 720 metric tons of meat and 260 metric tons of oil. By this action net gains of 180 metric tons of oil and 720 metric tons of meat were realized, with no loss of whale oil.

"Reference page 20, subject report, it is stated that 2,652 tons of whale bone were discarded, resulting in the loss of 1,326 tons of oil. This figure differs

greatly

894.628/7-2547

Tokyo's No. 1188  
July 25, 1947.

-2-

greatly from the figure of 80 metric tons of oil lost, as stated in preceding paragraph. The figures shown on page 20 are derived figures, based on the assumption that the percentage of oil recovered from whale bones is 50 percent. The actual extraction figure obtained by the Japanese on the expedition is much below the figure given by Mr. Coonan, as indicated by the records of the expedition.

"Reference eighth paragraph, page 5, subject report, which states that 7,000 tons of whale products were gained by discarding bones. This figure is based on a statement claimed to have been made by the manager. Figures obtained by the SCAP representative from the whaling company, however, indicated that the gains were approximately 180 metric tons of oil and 720 metric tons of meat.

"Reference eighth paragraph, page 4. It is claimed that oil production per blue whale unit was 9.57 tons, as compared to 17-19 tons for pre-war expeditions. This comparison is not a valid one, since 2,949 tons of blubber were shipped to Japan for consumption. Considering this blubber in adjusting the production of oil, a yield of 14.6 tons of oil for blue whale unit is obtained. A total production per blue whale unit of oil, meat and other products was 37 metric tons. This figure indicates a much higher utilization of the whales than that for any pre-war expedition. This discussion in this paragraph applies to the Hashidate-Maru fleet, where Mr. Coonan was an observer. The figure of 2,949 tons of blubber is considerably less than that shown in the subject report since in that report were included considerable quantities of products which have very low oil content and are therefore not ordinarily processed. However, in the subject report, the figure for oil is considerably too low when compared to the amount of blubber obtained, so that the estimated yield from products shipped to Japan is approximately the same as that calculated by the SCAP observers record. The Japanese estimate that under best conditions, the amount of oil they obtained per blue whale unit would be approximately that obtained on Nissin-Maru on the 1946-47 expedition -- 17.5 tons. This figure is considerably less than the 19-20 tons reported for Norwegian expeditions. If the Japanese processed all meat as well as all blubber they would obtain a unit of approximately 19.4 tons, which figure is equal to the Norwegian figure. No precise comparison is possible without taking into account: (1) the month during which operations were carried on, and (2) the size of the whales captured, since late season operations and large whales will result in a higher yield of blue whale units.

Reference



Tokyo's No. 1188  
July 25, 1947

-3-

"Reference seventh paragraph, page 5, which gives the impression that the Japanese are not concerned about oil production. This inference is incorrect because the whale oil is needed in Japan as well as elsewhere, but diversion of considerable proportion of the expedition's production was approved because of the critical need of other countries and the high value of whale oil. In place of the whale oil, a much greater amount of cheaper oil can be imported to supply Japanese needs.

"Reference page six, "reference liver", suggesting that the liver was not used. Actually, it was salted and brought into Japan for further processing ashore. Rendering aboard ship is preferable but not essential. Due to the shortage of time available for outfitting the vessel, it was impossible to assemble and install adequate liver processing equipment.

"Reference next to the last paragraph, page 20, indicating the belief that the only purpose of a whaling expedition is to obtain whale oil. This view appears to be extremely biased and one-sided, since direct consumption of meat and blubber will result in better utilization than immediate processing, discarding the residue, and conversion of the oil into various food items.

"Reference conclusions, page 23. A number of contradictory statements are noted:

a. In the first paragraph, it is stated that only ordinary skill and intelligence are required for men in key positions on an Antarctic whaling expedition. Mr. Coonan states that he had no difficulty in scoring a hit with the harpoon gun, but he also admitted that the whale had already been made fast by the first harpoon line.

b. In the second paragraph, he remarks that there is nothing unique about the position of a whaling fleet master, except that "it requires a thorough knowledge of the Antarctic and ice conditions". Whether such knowledge makes a man in any way unique is a matter of opinion.

c. In the third paragraph, he states that the manager must have experience in all phases of whaling industry, including catchers, factory equipment, and flensing. It appears that such skill and knowledge could be considered ordinary.

d. Natural Resources Section agrees that the Australians could be trained to undertake all operations involved in an Antarctic Expedition. However, to reach a level of average efficiency compared to other nations

which

Tokyo's No. 1188  
July 25, 1947.

-4-

which have long participated in Antarctic whaling, might reasonably require at least several years' training on the part of the Australians. The initial participation of the Australians in the proposed 1947-48 expedition could not be expected to be at a relatively high level of efficiency because it would be the first year of operations for them; hence production might possibly be below that which could be accomplished by an expedition completely manned by Japanese with the advantage of 8 years' experience in Antarctic whaling. Any decrease in potential production would be, of course, highly objectionable to the many interests involved, especially at a time when the food and oil requirements of Japan and other nations require the maximum production from the most efficient utilization of equipment and manpower."

Enclosure:

One copy of report,  
"Japanese Whaling Operations  
1946/47", May 1947, published  
by Department of Commerce and  
Agriculture, Australian Common-  
wealth.

Copies to:

American Embassy, London,  
American Embassy, Canberra  
American Legation, Wellington

Original and ozalid to Department

RHBushner:hp

780

*AN*  
*857.628*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Norway and, with reference to the Norwegian Embassy's note of July 25, 1947, <sup>*note*</sup> respecting the Norwegian Government's desire to assign a Norwegian inspector to accompany the SCAP-administered Antarctic whaling expedition during the 1947-48 whaling season, reaffirms that the assignment of Allied inspectors will be welcomed as on the previous expedition. The Supreme Commander is being informed of the Norwegian Government's desire to assign an inspector and to work out necessary details through the Norwegian diplomatic representative at Tokyo.

894.628/7-2547

CS/A

894.628/7-25  
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|-------|------------|
| Anal. | <i>AP</i>  |
| Rev.  | <i>cur</i> |
| Dist. | <i>SPR</i> |

A true copy of the above report

Department of State,

Washington, August 4, 1947.

*100*  
*100*

*RAZ*  
NA:RAFearey:sg  
7-31-47  
*gja* *MB*

FE  
*Jev*

NOE  
*HPZ*

*VHH*  
A-H

60 BEAVER STREET  
NEW YORK 4, N.Y.

July 26, 1947  
(PERSONAL)

Mr. Robert A. Lovett  
Under Secretary of State  
New State Department Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lovett: WHALE OIL TRANSPORT FROM JAPAN TO GERMANY

In accord with your request during telephone conversation yesterday morning, the situation, based on information from the Office of Chief of Transportation, War Department, is recited as follows:

*XN*  
*894.85*

The U. S. military Governments of Germany and Japan have arranged for the transfer of 7100 tons of whale oil now in Japan and urgently needed in Germany for edible food products. The military Government of Japan (SCAP) has a moderate size suitable whaling tanker under SCAJAP flag and Japanese crew ready in Japan for immediate loading of the whale oil. General MacArthur's headquarters propose the use of this vessel for transport of the whale oil. If not so used, the vessel will be idle until her next whaling expedition in November.

Approval for whale oil transport was denied by the War Department because of State Department disapproval on grounds that operation of a SCAJAP flag vessel with Japanese crew to areas other than nearby Far East areas might create problems or unfavorable criticism and reaction in some quarters.

Efforts during the last two months to obtain a medium size clean tanker under any flag (except SCAJAP) have revealed that no such vessel is or will be available in Far Eastern waters.

The only other alternative would be the use of a 13,000 ton Maritime Commission tanker regularly employed in carrying fuel oil. Such a tanker, the American SS "COXCOMB HILL", is due at Guam August 7 for discharge. The agents, operating the vessel for Maritime Commission account, state that if the Army must use the vessel for whale oil, the decision by Army and ANPB must be made by Monday, July 28.

DO NOT DESTROY  
*[Handwritten signature]*  
*[Handwritten initials]*

894.628/7-2647  
*[Handwritten mark]*

CS/A

894.628/7.2647

60 BEAVER STREET  
NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

Mr. Robert A. Lovett

-2-

July 26, 1947

If used for whale oil, this tanker would require to ballast to Japan and be cleaned very carefully to avoid contamination of the whale oil. Not only would considerable time be required for cleaning, but doubts are expressed that such cleaning would ensure non-contamination. Although the 7100 tons of whale oil would occupy only one half her cargo capacity on the long voyage to Germany, full freight on a full cargo would be payable - more than \$300,000.

There is a worldwide shortage of commissioned tankers for current fuel requirements. The use of the "COXCOMB HILL" instead of the SCAJAP whaling tanker makes no practical shipping sense, nor any economic sense. It therefore appears that justification would require to be based upon the highest grounds of political policy.

It has been suggested that several Army officers placed aboard the SCAJAP whaling tanker during the voyage could at any scheduled or emergency time or port clarify the status of the vessel with any authorities and explain the special purpose of the voyage, the itinerary of which could be detailed prior to commencement.

Prompt action to preclude a possible error appears pressing.

Very truly yours,

*Dudley B. Donald*

Dudley B. Donald

DBD/o

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : U - Mr. Lovett;  
 FROM : TRC - Walter A. Radius *WR*  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: July 31, 1947

Mr. Wood passed the attached letter on to me and I have been working on this matter and wish to report that some progress is being made although it is difficult to ascertain a number of the facts.

The State Department did not actually disapprove the operation of a SCAJAP flag vessel as indicated in the letter but rather told the War Department that in view of the problems concerned, the matter should be cleared with the British at least before they went ahead. The War Department is holding up on this pending the outcome of discussions I have had with the British in cooperation with FE. The British Shipping Attaché agrees that the use of a T-2 tanker for this purpose would be unjustified at the present time in view of the critical world petroleum situation and the shortage of tankers.

A third alternative which may be satisfactory to both the British and the War Department and which would avoid possible adverse repercussions would be to ship the whale oil in deep tanks in foreign cargo liners.

I shall report further developments as they occur.

## Attachment:

Letr. dated 7/26/47  
 from Dudley B. Donald.

cc - A-T - Mr. Wood  
 SD - Mr. Falck

1947 AUG 1 3 52 PM

OFFICE  
 THE SECRETARY  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRC:WAR:cb

FW 894.628/9-2647

August 4, 1947

Dear Mr. Donald:

I have inquired about the situation reported to me in your letter of July 26, 1947 regarding the transportation of whale oil from Japan. It is actively under consideration in the Department, and I hope a satisfactory solution will be found soon.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Mr. Dudley B. Donald,  
60 Beaver Street,  
New York 4, New York.

S/S  
AUG 5 1947

894.628/7-2647

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A true copy of the signed original  
*[Signature]*

SEA

SEP 12 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 207

To the

Officer in Charge of the American Mission,  
Bangkok.

The Secretary of State refers to the Department's telegram 435 of August 5 and a second outgoing telegram on the subject of the current negotiations between the Siamese Government and the Newmont Mining Corporation for a tin concession on the Island of Koh Pangan in Siam. There are enclosed herewith, for the information and files of the Embassy, a copy of a letter of August 1 to Mr. Landon in the Department from Mr. Franz Schneider, Executive Vice-President of the Newmont Mining Corporation, enclosing copies of a letter written by Mr. Weed of Anaconda to Mahlon Miller of July 30, 1947 and the proposed contract with the Siamese Government.

The Department would appreciate being advised of any developments in these negotiations, and would be interested in any additional information that might become available as to the attitude of the Siamese Government with regard to the participation by that Government in foreign mining companies granted concessions in Siam.

892.6354/8-147

CS/V

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| Col  | E.B. |

Enclosures:

1. From Newmont Mining Corporation, August 1, 1947.
2. From Anaconda Copper Mining Company, July 30, 1947.
3. Contract, July 30, 1947.

2 true copies of the original original

SEP 17 1947

892.6354/8-147

WVK VDK  
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8-20-47

Cleared with  
ITP  
Mr. Schaezel

ED  
Mr. Tyson

clon  
CP  
Mr. O'Donnell

892.6354/8-147  
SEA



COPY

NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION  
14 Wall Street  
New York 5, N. Y.

August 1, 1947

Dear Dr. Landon:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of yesterday afternoon, I am enclosing copies of the letter written by Mr. Weed of Anaconda to Mahlon Miller, under date of July 30, 1947, the outline of the proposed contract accompanying that letter, and a copy of the cablegram sent today to Mr. Miller in care of Ambassador Stanton.

I appreciate greatly the consideration you have given this matter, and your willingness to communicate to Ambassador Stanton your feelings in the matter.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Franz Schneider  
Executive Vice-President

FS:tss  
encs.

Dr. K. P. Landon,  
Chief, Southeast Asia Division,  
New State Department Building,  
Washington, D. C.

COPY

ANACONDA COPPER MINING COMPANY  
25 Broadway  
New York 4, N. Y.

July 30, 1947

Mr. Mahlon Miller  
c/o American Legation  
Bangkok, Siam

Dear Mr. Miller:

I have recently returned from a trip to South America and this accounts for the fact that some of your letters have not been answered.

Since my return, I have discussed with Mr. Searls our future exploration and examination work in Siam, based on the information received in your letters. We have come to the conclusion that the only thing that we have seen which may later be of interest is the tin occurrence on Koh Pangan Island. We do not feel that this property is a bonanza but it might work out to be the basis of a small tin operation, providing more gravel is found than indicated to date and that the grade remains satisfactory.

The weakness of the Siamese Government and the troubles in which they are involved lead us to believe that it will be a long time before they can materially assist us in any explorations in their country. Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that it is time to make a definite move in this matter in order to determine the Government's position.

Attached you will find an outline of a proposed contract with the Siamese Government covering Koh Pangan Island. We believe you should present this outline, with such further detail as you consider should be included, to the proper people in the Government and state that we wish action on it immediately. This outline does not deal specifically with all of the points raised in your letter No. 8 of August 30, 1946, upon some of which I made comment in my letter of the following October 23rd. It is only expected that it and the points brought out in your letter No. 8 will serve as a basis for a contract to be drawn up by Debsriharis, or such other lawyer as you employ to pass on the title. If they advise that they cannot do anything promptly, it is our opinion that you should then tell them there is no point in your remaining in Siam any longer, and that you are returning to the United States.

120 892.6354 / 8-147

Mr. Mahlon Miller

-2-

July 30, 1947

In that event and if they wish to take the matter up with us again, we would be glad to reconsider it then, but we do not intend to wait any longer now for action by them. We shall telegraph to Ambassador Stanton along the lines of your letter of July 18th to DeWitt Smith, to reach him about the time this letter arrives in Siam.

It is also our understanding that the northern part of Siam has not been opened to date and that it will be a long time before it will be. This is based on your letters. Therefore, the only opportunity for doing anything in Siam is in the tin business and probably Koh Pangan Island is as good a bet as any.

This will probably seem to you a rather crude approach to the Government but it must be evident that they are either unable to assist us or they have no intentions of doing anything except talk.

I have before me your letter No. 33 in which it was suggested that the Siamese Government become a partner in any enterprise which we might undertake in Siam on a 50-50 basis. We are not in accord with this; in fact, we object very strongly to having the Government a partner in any way. It might be advisable to have some Siamese nationals as partners, provided they were willing to pay their share of the costs.

You will note that in the draft of the contract I have left blank in paragraph 2 the amount of money to be spent each year. It is our suggestion that this be approximately \$25,000 per year, but this must be left for negotiation. You will also note that the royalty payment is left out in Paragraph 4. Our suggestion for this is 10 to 15%.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very truly yours,

/s/ C. E. Weed

(COPY)

July 30, 1947

1. Government of Siam to grant to a U.S. Corporation a "Mining Lease" covering the Island of Koh Pangan. Lease to give Corporation exclusive right to prospect for and mine, at Corporation's option, any or all metals and minerals. Lease to be for a period of ten years with renewal privileges for successive ten year periods.
2. The first three years of original ten year period to be consumed in prospecting work which is to start as soon as possible after lease is issued. During these three years Corporation is to spend a minimum sum of US\$ \_\_\_\_\_ each year in doing prospecting work with right to withdraw at any time without further obligation.
3. At end of third year, Corporation will advise Government of Siam regarding any or all areas which Corporation proposes to further develop or equip for mining operations.
4. Corporation will pay Government of Siam, as royalty, \_\_\_\_\_% of the net proceeds received by the Corporation, C.I.F. Siam for all metals or minerals recovered from ores or concentrates produced from its operations situated on Koh Pangan Island.
5. The royalty payments will be made in U.S. dollars.
6. The royalty payments are to be considered in lieu of any and all taxes, including Export and Income taxes, that the Siamese Government, including all of its subdivisions, now levies or may levy on mining enterprises.

-2-

This condition must be met at least until capital expenditure has been repaid.

7. The Corporation shall have the unrestricted right to export and sell all of the products of its mines. The Corporation shall have the right to choose the locality and the mode of transportation by which its products shall be shipped from Siam.

8. The Siamese Government will permit the entry into Siam, duty free, <sup>of</sup> all supplies and equipment required for the prospecting work or to develop and equip any and all mines for operation.

9. The Corporation is to have absolute discretion in choosing personnel for managing and directing its operations and shall have the right to bring into Siam any foreign nationals it may wish to employ in managerial, technical, accounting or supervisory capacities.

10. The Corporation shall have the unrestricted right to exchange its U.S. dollars into such amounts of ticals as it may from time to time require to meet its payrolls and other local expenditures in Siam. Such transactions shall be made at the official rate of exchange as established currently by Siamese Government exchange transactions at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

11. The Corporation shall have the right to withdraw from this agreement at any time by giving thirty days' notice.

*Ann. by Wav 85172  
(27 Aug 47)*

# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
AUG 11 1947  
DIRECTOR  
Department of State

FROM 1217

LONDON

DATED August 5, 1947

RECD. Aug. 11, 1947  
10:40 AM

DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

AUG 11 1947 *MB*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Washington

A-1697 August 5, 1947

1. During informal conversation on August 2, 1947, MacDermot, Head, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office, said to an Embassy Officer that the U.K. Foreign Office still adhered to its view that there should be no further Japanese whaling. He went on to say that Australia and New Zealand still desired to press the issue to a vote in the Far Eastern Commission, but that the U.K. was persisting in its efforts to keep Australia and New Zealand from pursuing that course of action. MacDermot stressed that while the U.K. did not agree with the U.S. position on Japanese whaling, the U.K. was convinced that the U.S. would carry out its threat to invoke the veto if the issue came to a vote in the FEC, and that the Foreign Office thought the issue not of sufficient importance to risk a fundamental U.S.-U.K. schism.

2. MacDermot said that the U.K. Foreign Office now considers that it would be the best procedure, in the circumstances, to let the issue lie dormant pending the Japanese peace conference when it would no doubt come up and be settled.

3. In the course of the conversation, MacDermot agreed that even though there would be allied supervision of Japanese whaling operations, the facilities of the Japanese whaling vessels were so antiquated that there was bound to be substantial wastage. MacDermot added that although there were allied supervisors on last Japanese whaling expedition, they had been unable to prevent substantial wastage. In this connection, he

PERMANENT RECORD COPY.—This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.

894.628/8-547

L.L.L.

SEP 16 1947  
EMBASSY OFFICE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG. 5, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

A-1697 FROM London

by the Japanese, adding that the concerned departments of the U.K. Government were making an investigation with a view to determining whether charges should be brought against the U.K. supervisor.

CLARK

Copy to U.S. Pol. Adviser, SCAP, Tokyo  
Copy to American Embassy, Canberra

RFD:umright/drk

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
telephone  
**Memorandum of Conversation**

*Handwritten initials*

DATE: August 20, 1947

SUBJECT: Letter from W. C. Herrington

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Deason, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior  
IR - Mr. Castleman - Fisheries and Wildlife Branch.

*Handwritten: We'll file*

894.628/8-2047

COPIES TO: IR - ~~Mr. Flory~~  
IR - ~~Mr. Himbert~~

1-1403

In a telephone conversation with Dr. Deason on August 20, 1947 I asked if he would mind mentioning a couple of points of interest to us in his reply to the personal letter he received from Mr. Herrington.

I suggested that he might, with regard to the extension of Japanese fishing areas discussed in Herrington's letter, mention the fact that the matter of a fishery policy for the Mandated islands is under consideration here and that something definite should be forthcoming soon.

I also suggested that he might ask Herrington for a further explanation of his point 2 "Placing a lid on further expansion of the Japanese fishing fleet" explaining that this is a matter of great interest in view of its possible implications with regard to the Peace Treaty and post occupation policy.

I asked Dr. Deason if, since this was personal correspondence, it might not be better for him to include these points as part of his own reply. He said that he was also interested in these points and that he would be pleased to include them in his reply. He said that he is going to the Philippines soon (October?) and that either Herrington might come to Manila or that if this was not possible he might go to Tokyo for a short visit.

CS / V

894.628-8/8-2047

*lb*  
IR:ECastleman:bmd  
8/22/47

Stamp area with handwritten initials and numbers: *ll*, *297*

FILED  
MAY 19 1948



Dr. Hilary J. Deason, In Charge  
Office of Foreign Activities  
Fish and Wildlife Service  
Washington 25, D. C.

30 June 1947

Personal

Dear Jack:

It is far past time that I should report in to you on developments in the Japanese theater. The only extenuating circumstance I can plead is that I have been so busy treading water in an attempt to keep from drowning amongst the numerous pressing demands over here that I have sadly neglected my correspondence. Also we have been plagued by a serious dearth of secretarial assistance. Some of these conditions now are improving and I hope we are beginning to climb on top of the eight ball instead of sitting consistently behind it.

Some time ago Mr. Bowman from the State Department visited Tokyo and we had some discussions concerning plans in this theater for activities which would have international implications. He suggested that Bill Flory would be interested in receiving some informal information concerning these plans since it would make it possible for him to anticipate developments and provide better coordination of activities.

After some discussion here the powers that be decided that it would not be appropriate to take up these matters informally with State Department personnel in Washington. Instead, they ruled that they should be handled through the Diplomatic Section of SCAP. I have not yet had time to prepare such a formal prospectus of contemplated actions, but I am going to mention some of the potentialities in this confidential letter to you and let you be guided by your own discretion.

As you know, the Harrison Committee and world events themselves, are placing a tremendous pressure on us to increase the production of the Japanese fisheries. From the information we have it appears that production from the present authorized fishing areas has about reached its peak and that further increase in intensity of exploitation will result in a decreasing yield, possibly after a very brief increase in production. The principle possibilities for increase in production, therefore, lay in extension of the present authorized fishing areas. The possibilities here include Kamchatka, the Sea of Okhotsk, the Bering Sea, Karafutu, the Yellow Sea, and the South Pacific. Since the possibility of obtaining agreement from the Allied Council on any extension of area is believed to be negligible, we are attempting to handle all of these problems through bi-lateral agreements with the countries directly concerned. Russia has been approached by SCAP Diplomatic Section on proposals relating to Jap operations about Kamchatka, the Okhotsk Sea, and the Kurile Islands. No reply has been received and we do not anticipate that anything will be achieved in this theater. We have under way plans for continued negotiations with China and Korea to allow for extension of fishing operations into the Yellow Sea. We are also preparing a case for extending the fishing area to the south Pacific in the regions of some of the mandated islands now administered by the Navy where the Japanese formerly fished for tuna and no fishing operations now are taking place. We

Dr. Deason

- 2 -

30 June 1947

are not planning to make any attempt to extend fishing into the Bering Sea.

The only real possibilities I see for expansion are into the Yellow Sea where China and Korea appear to be favorably inclined, and into the South Pacific, where we would be dealing primarily with the United States Navy.

I would be interested to have your reactions to the above and also any comments which Mr. Flery might have.

Outside of fishing areas, we are presently engaged in the following activities, among others:

1. Obtaining adequate supplies of nets, ropes, and fuel oil to maintain the present rate of production.
2. Placing a lid on further expansion of the Japanese fishing fleet.
3. The reform of fishing rights and monopolistic controls in the fishing industry.
4. Reorganization and redirection of Japanese research and education in the field of fisheries to give more attention to fish population management.
5. Development of improved fishing statistics for Japan.
6. Compiling and publishing as much information as possible, on Japanese fishery resources, fishing methods, and technological procedure.

At present, we are very much in need of competent personnel for three important positions: Head of the Resources Branch, P-6; Head of the Facilities Branch, P-5; and a really good Technologist, P-5. I have some correspondence with Andy Anderson which indicates that there are some good prospects for Facilities Branch Head and Technologist jobs, but I have no good prospects at present for the Resources Head. This branch covers the work on compilation and publication of data on Japanese fisheries, analysis of the Japanese research and educational system, and the setting up of improved facilities for collection and analysis of statistics. Any prospects you can suggest?

I understand Andy is back in Washington, so if you have time you might discuss this with him. Developments in Washington reorganization convince me more than ever that bureaucrats have queer standards in respect to personnel actions. Give my best to Hetty and remember me to the others about.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) Bill

W. C. Herrington

WCH:vs

Delivered personally  
by Mr. [unclear] on  
Aug. 20, 1947  
JMA

Ref: 9/ /47

A I D E M E M O I R E



DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

AUG 27 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

have considered the State Department's aide memoire of the 23rd July describing the procedure followed by the United States Government in authorising a second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition but they regret that they cannot agree that the course taken by the United States Government was consistent with the undertaking given in the State Department's aide memoire of the 4th October, 1946, to consult the other interested before authorising any further expeditions.

2. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom still have the subject under consideration but in the meanwhile they would be grateful if the United States Government would give them assurances that:-

(a) no further Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions whatever will be authorised without the concurrence of the Far Eastern Commission until a decision on Japanese whaling has been reached by the Peace Conference,

(b) adequate steps will be taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to ensure that all international whaling regulations are scrupulously observed by the second Japanese Antarctic whaling expedition and Allied observers will be permitted to accompany the expedition to supervise its compliance with those regulations;

/ (c)

894.628/8-2047

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INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION  
action taken by  
JAN 27 1948  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- 2 -

(c) all supplies of whale oil obtained by the expedition will be made available for allocation by the International Emergency Food Council.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C. *Jb.*

20th August, 1947.

# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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3160

FROM  
LONDON

DATED August 15, 1947  
 RECD. Aug. 28, 1947  
 8:12 a.m.  
 AUG 26 1947



CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State

Washington

A-1804, August 15, 1947

1. Reference Embassy's airgram A-1697, August 5, 1947, and previous on Japanese whaling.

2. In course of an informal discussion August 15, 1947, MacDermot, Head, Japan and Pacific Department, Foreign Office, stated to Embassy officer that about a week ago the UK Government had telegraphed to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand stating that while it shared their position on the second Japanese whaling expedition it thought the matter was not one of any great consequence and that it would be just as well if the three Governments dropped their dispute with the US Government over the issue.

3. MacDermot went on to say that New Zealand had replied at once that it was agreeable to the UK proposal. The Australian reply had come in later, and while replete with argumentative contentions, it had ended up with an implicit and grudging acceptance of the UK suggestion.

4. MacDermot summed up by remarking that the whaling question now seemed a rather dead issue, and that we should in future probably hear very little of it either in the Far Eastern Commission or by way of diplomatic approach.

CLARE

PERMANENT RECORD COPY.—This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.  
 Copy to Embassy, Canberra  
 Copy to Legation, Wellington

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 LIAISON OFFICE  
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SEP 17 1947

L.L.

*DC/R*

**AIDE-MÉMOIRE**

The Department of State desires to refer to the British Embassy's aide-mémoire of August 20, 1947, in which it is stated that the British Government would be grateful if the United States would provide certain assurances regarding the forthcoming Japanese-manned Antarctic whaling expedition and regarding the manner of authorization of any further such expeditions prior to the peace settlement.

The Government of the United States reaffirms its assurance that adequate steps, including the assignment of SCAP representatives, will be taken by the Supreme Commander during the 1947-48 whaling expedition to ensure scrupulous observance of all pertinent international whaling regulations, and that Allied observers will be welcomed as before. The British Government is further assured that all supplies of whale oil obtained by the expedition will be made available for allocation by the International Emergency Food Council.

**The Government**

894.628/8-2047

CS/A

*894.628/8-2047*

DCR - ITP Unit

Anal. *Gem*

Adv. *[Signature]*

Cont. *[Signature]*

Dist. *[Signature]*

The Government of the United States regrets, however, that it cannot provide the requested assurance that no further Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions will be authorized prior to the peace settlement without the concurrence of the Far Eastern Commission. The United States Government must take account of the possibility that the considerations which necessitated authorization of the forthcoming expedition will be present in equally pressing form next year, and believes that the Supreme Commander's freedom of action to meet the situation presented at that time should be preserved. The British Government and other interested governments will be immediately advised should the Supreme Commander contemplate authorization of an expedition next year, and such views as they may care to submit in the matter will be forwarded to him for his careful consideration.

Department of State,

Washington, October 8, 1947.

*JRM* RA 3  
 NA:RA Fearey/hhc  
 9/18/47

FE  
*JLH*  
 IR  
 (Cleared with Mr. Flory.)

A true copy of the signed original.

*RJM*  
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SEP 8 1947

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

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The Government



- 2 -

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Department of State,

Washington, October 8, 1947.

NA:RA Fearey/hhc  
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(Cleared with  
Mr. Flory.)

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**AIDE-MÉMOIRE**

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The Government

- 2 -

The Government of the United States regrets, however, that it cannot provide the requested assurance that no further Japanese Antarctic whaling expeditions will be authorized prior to the peace settlement without the concurrence of the Far Eastern Commission. The United States Government must take account of the possibility that the considerations which necessitated authorization of the forthcoming expedition will be present in equally pressing form next year, and believes that the Supreme Commander's freedom of action to meet the situation presented at that time should be preserved. The British Government and other interested governments will be immediately advised should the Supreme Commander contemplate authorization of an expedition next year, and such views as they may care to submit in the matter will be forwarded to him for his careful consideration.

Department of State,

Washington, October 8, 1947.


NA:RA Fearey/nhc  
9/18/47

FE

IR  
(Cleared with  
Mr. Flory.)

OE

A-S



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SD - Mr. Falck:  
FROM : TRC - Walter A. Radius  
SUBJECT:

*Fell*  
*war*

DATE: August 7, 1947

FW 894.628/8-2547

I've not yet heard from Mr. Cross of the British Embassy regarding the whale oil shipments from Japan to Germany. However, if this matter should be raised in my absence, the following people are concerned with it:

- Mr. Fearey, NA -3763
- Major Frazer, Civil Affairs Division, (86-4890)  
War Department
- Mr. Lewis Jones, Transportation Division,  
War Department

I've told Fred Cross this matter is urgent and that, unless the British are able to indicate that this movement can be handled in cargo liners, it will probably be necessary to use the Japanese whale oil tanker in view of the critical T-2 tanker position and the unwillingness of Mr. Jones in the Transportation Division of the War Department to take the risk of shipping this oil in a petroleum tanker.

8/8  
Cross phoned that reply emphatically opposes use of Jap ship. Expecting further reply re use of cargo liners.

8/19 Cross  
British liners can handle 3500 T. Ref to  
Nov. Balance Dec. Feb.

FILED  
MAR - 9 1947

CS/V

FW 894.628/8-2547

TRC:WAR:cb

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~Mr. Baick~~ *[Handwritten initials]*  
FROM : Mr. Clancy

DATE: 8/18/47

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Mr. Cross, Shipping Attaché, British Embassy.

FW 894.628/8-2547

Mr. Cross called with regard to the sale of the C-1 MAV-1. He had a rather long story to tell of which the following are the main points:

1) Under the Lend Leases Agreement the British had an option to purchase the C-1 MAV-1 on lend-lease to them if they made application to the Maritime Commission by March 27, 1947. However, they failed to take advantage of this option except for one ship but filed late applications after March 27 for an additional three.

2) These three ships were due for redelivery to the United States in June and are now actually in this country. However, in view of the British application for their purchase it was agreed that the crews would be maintained and the ships actually stay in British hands until the application is approved by the Maritime Commission.

3) The Commission stated that they could not approve these applications without reexamination of the whole C-1 MAV-1 picture and requested a report on the outstanding applications for these ships. In the meantime the British are having considerable trouble with the Lascar crews which they have aboard these ships and whose service contracts are running out.

4) Mr. Cross stated that he believed that it would be helpful if we used our good offices to assure that these three ships were actually sold to the United Kingdom, especially since he understands that in the present priority list <sup>drawn</sup> up by the Commission, Brazil, Finland and Holland all take ~~precedence~~ <sup>precedence</sup> over the U.K. He added that in view of the Ship Sales Act section charging the Maritime Commission to take in account ~~the~~ wartime losses in allocating desirable ships for sale abroad, it seemed rather peculiar that Finland should take precedence over the U.K.

CS/N

FW 894.628/8-2547

I made no comments on what he had to say but told him that I would check with the Commission to determine what action the Commission is taking on the matter and would call him early next week.

*[Handwritten initials]*  
SD:PJHClancy:jh

|                |            |
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MAR - 3 1947  
FILED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: Aug. 28, 1947

TO : Mr. Powell:

FROM :

SUBJECT:

This is ok with Col. Harris. He would appreciate your letting Mr. Cross know that the British can go ahead.

Col. Harris also wanted to express his appreciation to you for your help on the matter.

*Cross informed by phone*

*HW 894.628/7.10.47*

TRC - Mr Powell

you may want to  
see this in view of your  
conversations with Col. Harris

KA

FW 894.628  
1-25-47

*SD. Mr. Fatche*



BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

25th August, 1947.

*rec 894.628/8-2647  
XR 894.85*

894.628/8-2547

My dear Mr. Radius:

I write to confirm the information which I have already verbally communicated to State Department about the movement of whale oil from Japan to Northwest Germany.

At our meeting in your room the position was left for me to inquire whether the Ministry of Transport could arrange for this whale oil to be carried in the deep tanks of cargo liners. I am pleased to say that British lines can arrange to lift approximately 3,500 tons during the period September through November and in addition, can lift the balance during the period December 1947 to February 1948. London inform me that they have consulted the Food and Agriculture Division, Berlin, who are agreeable to phasing the reception of the whale oil over the periods referred to.

In the light of our various conversations on this subject, may I assume please that we can tell London that they can go ahead with the necessary and detailed arrangements.

Yours sincerely,

*F. V. Cross*  
F. V. Cross.  
Shipping Attache.

Mr. Walter Radius,  
Department of State,  
Room 208, Old State Department Bldg  
Washington, D. C.

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MAR - 9 1948  
FILED

CS/V

*894.628/8-2547*



U - Mr. Lovett;

July 31, 1947

TRC - Walter A. Radius

Mr. Wood passed the attached letter on to me and I have been working on this matter and wish to report that some progress is being made although it is difficult to ascertain a number of the facts.

The State Department did not actually disapprove the operation of a SCAJAP flag vessel as indicated in the letter but rather told the War Department that in view of the problems concerned, the matter should be cleared with the British at least before they went ahead. The War Department is holding up on this pending the outcome of discussions I have had with the British in cooperation with FE. The British Shipping Attaché agrees that the use of a T-2 tanker for this purpose would be unjustified at the present time in view of the critical world petroleum situation and the shortage of tankers.

A third alternative which may be satisfactory to both the British and the War Department and which would avoid possible adverse repercussions would be to ship the whale oil in deep tanks in foreign cargo liners.

I shall report further developments as they occur.

Attachment:

Letr. dated 7/26/47  
from Dudley B. Donald.

cc - A-T - Mr. Wood  
SD - Mr. Falck

TRC;WAR;cb

COPY

60 Beaver Street  
New York 4, N.Y.

July 26, 1947  
(PERSONAL)

Mr. Robert A. Lovett  
Under Secretary of State  
New State Department Building  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Lovett: WHALE OIL TRANSPORT FROM JAPAN TO GERMANY

In accord with your request during telephone conversation yesterday morning, the situation, based on information from the Office of Chief of Transportation, War Department, is recited as follows:

The U. S. military Governments of Germany and Japan have arranged for the transfer of 7100 tons of whale oil now in Japan and urgently needed in Germany for edible food products. The military Government of Japan (SCAP) has a moderate size suitable whaling tanker under SCAJAP flag and Japanese crew ready in Japan for immediate loading of the whale oil. General MacArthur's headquarters propose the use of this vessel for transport of the whale oil. If not so used, the vessel will be idle until her next whaling expedition in November.

Approval for whale oil transport was denied by the War Department because of State Department disapproval on grounds that operation of a SCAJAP flag vessel with Japanese crew to areas other than nearby Far East areas might create problems or unfavorable criticism and reaction in some quarters.

Efforts during the last two months to obtain a medium size clean tanker under any flag (except SCAJAP) have revealed that no such vessel is or will be available in Far Eastern waters.

The only other alternative would be the use of a 16,000 ton Maritime Commission tanker regularly employed in carrying fuel oil. Such a tanker, the American SS "COXCOMB HILL", is due at Guam August 7 for discharge. The agents, operating the vessel for Maritime Commission account, state that if the Army must use the vessel for whale oil, the decision by Army and ANPB must be made by Monday, July 28.

- 2 -

Mr. Robert A. Lovett

July 26, 1947

If used for whale oil, this tanker would require to ballast to Japan and be cleaned very carefully to avoid contamination of the whale oil. Not only would considerable time be required for cleaning, but doubts are expressed that such cleaning would ensure non-contamination. Although the 7100 tons of whale oil would occupy only one half her cargo capacity on the long voyage to Germany, full freight on a full cargo would be payable - more than \$300,000.

There is a worldwide shortage of commissioned tankers for current fuel requirements. The use of the "COXCOMB HILL" instead of the SCAJAP whaling tanker makes no practical shipping sense, nor any economic sense. It therefore appears that justification would require to be based upon the highest grounds of political policy.

It has been suggested that several Army officers placed aboard the SCAJAP whaling tanker during the voyage could at any scheduled or emergency time or port clarify the status of the vessel with any authorities and explain the special purpose of the voyage, the itinerary of which could be detailed prior to commencement.

Prompt action to preclude a possible error appears pressing.

Very truly yours,

Dudley B. Donald

DED/o

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A-H - Mr. Lewis

FROM : OE - Mr. Whitman - 3019

SUBJECT: FEC action on fishing policy

DATE:  
August 26, 1947

We are attempting to find a compromise formula on restriction of the Japanese fishing area which will attain majority support and put the Australians and the USSR, who are advocating sole FEC jurisdiction over any extension of the fishing area, in the minority.

One suggestion which has been explored is to define "near" which is the crucial word in the original U. S. paper: "Japanese fishing should not be permitted near areas under Allied jurisdiction without prior permission from the country concerned". At one time the U. S. tentatively suggested that "near" be defined as 50 miles. The Netherlands has made a counter proposal of 150 miles. Substantively this makes no change in SCAP's situation since it is recognized that by any interpretation of the present policy no additional valuable fishing grounds can be attained without consultation. However, IR now objects to stating a specific figure because it might become a precedent as a definition of a security area and return to plague us in treaty negotiations. As an alternative method of assuring any country that SCAP will not unilaterally effect their security interests by extending the area, IR has suggested that the policy provide that:

"Any country concerned, may, if in its opinion security considerations warrant, inform the Supreme Commander of its interpretation of the word 'near', as employed in the above-mentioned paragraph of FEC-035, with regard to its own coasts.

"If any differences exist between the Supreme Commander and any country with regard to such country's interpretation of 'near', discussions should be held between the Supreme Commander and such country with a view to reaching agreement. Until agreement is reached the Supreme Commander shall continue to operate under the provisions of paragraph (b) Policy Directive FEC-035 as heretofore."

If you see no objection to this proposal I will proceed to sound out other countries as to its acceptability.

cc: NA  
CAD - Col. Fahey.

OE:RHWhitman:emh

*Not: Whitman  
advised orally  
9/3/47 of A.S.  
concurrent thru  
Dayton gwh*

*894-628 / 8-26-47*

*OK*

*R. L. Whitman*

# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS AIRGRAM TELEGRAPH BRANCH

RO

887

1947 SEP 9 PM 2 30

From: American Embassy  
Oslo, Norway

Dated: September 2, 1947

Rec'd: sept. 8, 2:06 p.m.

MESSAGE CENTER  
UNCLASSIFIED

2

Secretary of State

A

ACTION:ITP

Washington.

INFO:

DC/R

A-333, September 2, 1947.

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DC/L

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CIG

FC

The International Hvalfangststatistikk, (International Statistics of Whaling) has asked the Embassy to obtain the following information concerning operations of Japanese whaling companies at Bonin Island during 1946-47:

- 1) Number of each kind of whale quoted.
- 2) Production of whale oil.
- 3) " " sperm oil.
- 4) " " other by-products.
- 5) Number and names of each floating factory, land station and catchers which have been in operation in 1946 and 1947.

The same organization has also requested that information be obtained from Japanese whaling companies concerning the length of each kind of whale quoted, its sex, fetus, etc., and other pertinent data which may be available.

As International Hvalfangststatistikk is engaged in the preparation of statistics covering the summer of 1946, it wishes to receive the information as soon as possible. Accordingly, the Department is requested to expedite the handling of this inquiry and the transmittal of the data obtained.

|     |   |
|-----|---|
| IR  |   |
| ITP | ✓ |
| JP  | ✓ |
| HH  |   |
| IR  | ✓ |
| FE  |   |
|     |   |
|     |   |

*By Com*  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 OCT 8 1947  
 DC/IR  
 LITSON OFFICE

BAY

OCT 29 1947

HH

File No. 826.8

PERMANENT RECORD COPY.—This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNCLASSIFIED

894.628/9-247

*Draft cable requesting info sent to AS for transmittal to SCAP via War 9/11/47*

*Data to be sent directly to SCAP for Norway - info*

SEP 12 1947  
*Copy in State*  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE *copy*

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

**OUTGOING AIRGRAM**

**Department of State**

UNCLASSIFIED

*DC/8  
File*

*for DC/8 Files*

NO. A-232

Washington,  
Nov 5, 1947

TIME \_\_\_\_\_

339

339

AEMBASSY,  
OSLO.

*ma 7  
894.628/9-247*

894.628/9-247

The Dept has been informed by SCAP that the information requested in the Embassy's Airgram A-333 of September 2, 1947 has been transmitted directly via radio to the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics, Sandefjord, Norway.

*Marshall  
(WES 7)*

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

*CR*  
NOV 4 1947 P.M.

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| Encl. | <i>WSS</i> |
| Rev.  | <i>gr</i>  |
| Det.  | <i>mm</i>  |

CS/A 894.628/9-247

*ark*  
IR:ECastleman:mbm 11/3/47

*OE*  
cleared by phone with Mr. Page  
*lb*

*NOE*  
cleared by phone with Mr. Green  
*lb*

*AS*  
cleared by phone with Mr. Lewis  
*lb*

Dec. File

Box #

7 1 1 7 A

LAW OFFICES OF  
ARCH E. EKDALE  
& GORDON P. SHALLENBERGER  
614 SOUTH PACIFIC AVENUE  
SAN PEDRO, CALIF.  
TERMINAL 2-0216



COPY DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

SEP 10 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2 September 1947

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION

SEP 24 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

United States Maritime Commission  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Operations Bureau

Gentlemen:

It is requested that this inquiry be kept confidential for reasons which will hereinafter appear. This inquiry is made on behalf of the America Corporation, a California corporation, with all of its issued and outstanding stock in the name of the writer, his partner and his secretary; however, each of the three hold said stock, in trust, for the benefit of three well-known and old-time tuna fish canneries of Southern California, whose credit ratings are all 1-A, as listed by Dunn & Bradstreet. The net worth of the three canneries would easily total \$2,000,000.

The America Corporation was formed to pioneer the exploration and development of new tuna-fish areas in the South Pacific. The premises upon which it was formed are as follows:

The policy of the United States of America as enumerated by the State Department and the Fish & Wildlife Service, and as implied between the War and Navy Departments, and as understood by this corporation, is to develop in some tangible way the resources of the South Pacific Islands previously mandated to Japan so that this country may continue to possess and control them. It is the policy of this corporation not to take any action which would deviate from what it believes to be the policy of the United States.

To implement the venture, the corporation has employed Reginald H. Fiedler, formerly one of the chiefs of the Fish & Wildlife Service, Department of Interior, and who, during the war, was a Colonel and Chief of the Division having to do with the administration and operation of the Japanese Fisheries on and after V-J Day. Mr. Fiedler has recently retired from the Army, and joined this corporation on or about the 1st day of July, 1947.

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894.628/9-247

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894.628/9-247

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SEP 16 1947

FILED



-2-

2 September 1947

Application was made to the State Department and other interested agencies to authorize Mr. Fiedler to go to Japan. Authority was granted and Mr. Fiedler is now in Japan. One of the plans which he took with him, as devised by this corporation, was to approach the four large concerns which are the backbone of the Japanese fishing enterprises with the idea of inducing the Japanese to fish in the South Pacific Islands Area and sell their catches to this corporation - this corporation, as its part of said venture, to supply refer ships able to follow the fleet and take their catches, in that the so-called Japanese ice boats are not brine refrigerated. It is proposed that this be done on condition that American fishermen would be authorized to attend on board the Japanese vessels as observers in order to acquire the "know-how" to fish the area. The methods used by the Japanese in that area are unique and substantially different from the methods employed aboard so-called American high-seas tuna clippers. It would be impossible for private capital to use American fishermen to pioneer fishing in the South Pacific unless the so-called "know-how" was first acquired from the Japanese.

We have received a cablegram from Mr. Fiedler indicating that one of the large Japanese firms, to wit, Taiyo, desires to enter into a contractual undertaking with this corporation, subject to the approval of the Japanese Board of Trade and SCAP, whereby this corporation would furnish two refer ships to accompany the Japanese in their coming Antarctic whaling operations. The Japanese, so far as is known to this corporation, are the only people conducting whaling operations who actually use the whale meat for human consumption, but they do not have the facilities to take back to Japan a substantial portion of the whale meat obtained. They wish to augment their food supply by taking back to Japan all the whale meat possible.

It has occurred to this corporation that if it chartered two of the so-called Knot Class Vessels, described as Cl-M-AV1's, and officered them by citizens of this country, but crewed by Japanese, the two mentioned ships could, during the months of November to March when fishing for tuna is not too profitable in the South Pacific, freeze whale meat for sale and consumption in Japan, and during the months of May to August act as mother ships in the South Pacific, taking the fresh catches of a fleet of tuna boats, freezing them, storing them and bring the frozen fish to the United States

-3-

2 September 1947

for further processing as canned tuna. At the present time there is a scarcity of canned tuna in the United States and the price is, to express it mildly, quite high! It is anticipated that two such ships could handle in the neighborhood of 7,500 tons of frozen tuna. The products when landed in the United States would be worth in the neighborhood of \$290 to \$310 per ton.

Such a venture would be tapping a source of supply not now utilized, but it is understood by this corporation, and it is common knowledge, that factory ships, or freezer ships, of other countries have signified their intention of trying to fish the same areas under the above plan of operation. While Japanese personnel would be used for the fishing of this area, the operation would, nevertheless, be under the direction of citizens of this country and could and properly would be classified as part of the American Fisheries. The policy of the Government as described above would be met - fishermen from this country would be taught how to fish the area, and the "know-how" acquired by this country as to what specific types of freezer ships would be most advantageous. Such experience would prove to be invaluable, and such a venture would enable the United States to begin exploitation of the principal resources of that area this year, thereby establishing something in the nature of a prior right under International Law.

Please understand that the entire venture is one of pioneering the exploitation of the fishery resources of the South West Pacific, which heretofore has been used only by the Japanese with methods of fishing devised by them and up to this time held secret from the rest of the world. It is not the intention of the America Corporation to monopolize its knowledge acquired from such an undertaking, nor to in any way corner or attempt to corner the importable surplus of tuna from this or other sources. The catches of tuna will be properly apportioned among those American producers wishing to process the fish.

As this venture is one of pioneering, it is probable that this corporation cannot afford, at least for the present, to pay the prevailing charter rates for the mentioned ships. Please therefore consider this a confidential preliminary inquiry to determine (1) the availability of two of the mention Knot, Cl-M-AV1's for charter, their condition, when

-4-

2 September 1947

and where they were last surveyed and where on the East Coast they are located, (2) whether it is in the interest of the Government to approve the venture or oppose it, and (3) what the probable rate of charter hire would be for a year's chartering, with right in the Charterer of renewal for one year, the vessels to be manned by American officers, but crewed with Japanese, and the ships to be used in the Antarctic during the season described, and the South Pacific for the remainder of the season, namely, a round voyage from Japan and one or more round voyages to and from the United States.

This venture might probably be described as an endeavor of private capital, with a slight assist from the Government, to research and pioneer a new fishery, a thing usually done at Government expense. The single contribution of the Government in this case would be a charter rate commensurate with the risk taken by this corporation, and not measured by the Commission's rate for use of vessels in established trades.

If it is possible to charter the mentioned ships on a basis commensurate with the risk undertaken by this corporation, the corporation will forthwith file an appropriate application with the Maritime Commission for charter of the ships, and will supply the Commission with financial statements of the three principals of this corporation, as well as with a written undertaking of the three principals guaranteeing the commitment of the America Corporation.

A copy of this letter is going forward to the State Department and to the Department of Interior, Attention Fish & Wildlife Service, in order that they, if they deem it appropriate, may express their ideas to the Commission in support or opposition to the suggested plan.

Will it be possible for you to submit this matter to the Commission at an early date? The Japanese concern suggests that the ships be made available for arrival in Japan early in October.

We again urge that this matter be kept confidential, and that we be advised at an early date of whether the Commission would

-5-

2 September 1947

favorably entertain the idea, in which event, a representative of this corporation can be forthwith dispatched to Washington.

Yours very truly,

AMERICA CORPORATION

By \_\_\_\_\_

Arch E. Ekdale, President

AEE/aef

cc: State Department  
Department of Interior, Attention Fish & Wildlife Service

IR

DC/R Please index and return to  
IR - Fisheries and Wildlife

de/r

NOV 22 1947

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 241

To the

Officer in Charge of the American Mission,  
Oslo.

file 894.628/9-247  
ITP

The Acting Secretary of State transmits herewith one copy each of the general report on Japanese coastal whaling in 1946 and the report on whaling around Bonin Island in 1946. These reports are from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as required under the provisions of existing international whaling agreements and as requested in the Embassy's airgram A-333 of September 2, 1947.

These reports should be forwarded by the Embassy to the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics at Sandefjord.

894.628/9-247

Enclosures:

1. General Report on Coastal Whaling in 1946.
2. Report of Whaling in Season 1946 Around Bonin Island.

|                |     |
|----------------|-----|
| DOR - ITP Unit |     |
| Anal.          | fk  |
| Rev.           | gvr |
| Cat.           | CE  |

A true copy of the signed original.

CS/A

MED

NOV 21 1947 P.M.

Smithsonian  
Cleared by phone with Dr. Kellogg

NA lb

Cleared by phone with Mr. Feary

Antonia (F + WS)

Cleared by phone with Mr. Kellogg lb

NOE

Cleared by telephone with Mr. Green

IR:ECastleman:bp 11/19/47

894.628/9-247

MESF

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*T-599*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : <sup>A-S</sup> NA

*file*

DATE: September 16, 1947

FROM : OE - Mr. Whitman

SUBJECT: Cable to POLAD re Japanese fishers.

The attached cable has been prepared by JK and IR. The considerations are as follows:

1. The nearness of the Japanese peace treaty discussions, where Japanese fisheries will be a major topic, suggests there should be a minimum of international controversy at that time with regard to Japanese fishing.
2. There has been considerable pressure at the FEC for a revision of policy so as to contain Japanese fishing within present boundaries. Such a revision would reduce the discretion of SCAP. It is desirable that this policy revision not come to a vote by the FEC. Proposals made by SCAP and rejected by USSR might stimulate policy revision pressure. Experience thus far suggests the USSR would probably reject SCAP proposals.
3. Off-Kamchatka fishing rights for Japan would probably mean more salmon imports into the U.S. By itself, this consideration is not conclusive. It is, however, a point to be considered when judging various factors in this situation and the possible advantages of SCAP making proposals.
4. If Sebald has reason to believe the USSR would accede to Off-Kamchatka proposals, and if the Japanese are prepared to take full advantage of agreements expanding the fishing area, then it may be desirable for SCAP to open negotiations. The cable so provides. It asks, in such event, that the Department receive more information before conclusion of negotiations.

FW 894.628/9-447

CS/A FILED FW 894.628/9-447

OCT 3 1947

SECRET FILE

*R. H. Whitman*

|     |                    |
|-----|--------------------|
|     | DCR - ITP Unit     |
| al. | <i>[Signature]</i> |
|     | <i>[Signature]</i> |
|     | <i>[Signature]</i> |
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OE: DO Bowman: bcb  
9/16/47

FORM DS-322  
7-18-46

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

INDICATE

Collect

Charge Department:

Charge to

Department of State

Washington

SECRET

SECRET

5949

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

TOKYO

INFO:WAR DEPARTMENT CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR THE POLITICAL ADVISER

381

Reur 235 Sept 4.

72H  
894.628/9-447  
SFE

SEP 25 1947

7 pm

894.628/9-447

In view such considerations as nearness Japanese peace treaty discussions, possible repercussions from threat of increased US importation Japanese marine products, especially salmon, and FEC policy discussions, Dept inclined believe SCAP proposals now might make more difficult foreign acceptance US views respecting Japanese fisheries. If, however, your estimate of situation suggests off-Kamchatka proposal might be acceded to, and if Japanese prepared with equipment and labor force to maximize advantages of agreement, Dept has no objection exploratory conversations there. In latter event transmit outline of objectives and your estimate of situation prior to conclusion negotiations.

CS/A

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

DO-100 UNIT  
ACTING  
WAA  
IR

LOVETT

PNW

OE:DOBowman:beb

(Cleared by Flory)

A-S

CR CLEARANCE

SEP 25 347 P.M.

SECRET FILE

894.628/9-447

3006

*T-599*  
*Bowman*

Form DS-302  
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

SECRET

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Action: OFD

Info:

U-B

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FC

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Control 998

Office of  
Financial & Development Policy

Received September 4, 1947  
10:01 a.m.

*SEP 4 1947*

FROM: Tokyo

TO: Secretary of State  
Department of State

NO: 235, September 4

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| ES  |     | ✓   |
| GA  |     | 1   |
| JK  | ✓   | 3   |
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FROM SCAP TOKYO JAPAN FROM POLAD TO WDSCA PASS TO  
SECSTATE FOR DEAN BOWMAN NO. C 35277

Regarding proposed northward extension Japanese fish-  
ing operations including off-Kamchatka discussed with  
you here in May, would appreciate indication Department's  
present views whether matter should be prepared for  
proposal to concerned powers.

SEBALD

RB:CTC

*RB*  
*W. H. ...*  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
LIAISON OFFICE  
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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF OCCUPIED AREAS  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Tokyo, September 12, 1947.

OCT 8 1947

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES DIVISION

SEP 29 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERNATIONAL TRADE  
POLICY

UNCLASSIFIED

No. 1273

1947 SEP 30 AM 10 51

MESSAGE CENTER

SUBJECT: Whaling Vessels of the 1947/48 Antarctic Whaling Operations.

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The Counselor of Mission has the honor to refer to this Mission's Airgram No. 35, March 20, 1947 containing statistics regarding whaling vessels of the Antarctic Whaling Expedition of 1946/47.

There is enclosed a copy of a memorandum of September 5, 1947 from this Headquarters to the United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan providing information requested by the latter concerning the name, gross tonnage and type of each vessel which is expected to join in the 1947/48 antarctic whaling operations.

With reference to paragraph two of the memorandum, it is now understood that the Settsu Maru, a transport (saltery ship) of 9,670 tons will also accompany the expedition.

War  
Navy  
CID  
Fish + Wild Life  
(Dr. Pearson)  
Smithsonian  
(Dr. Kellogg)

U.S. FACILITIES BRANCH

Enclosure:   
Copy of GHQ, SCAP Memorandum to the United Kingdom Liaison Mission, September 5, 1947.

Original and hectograph to the Department.

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Encl. No. 1 to  
Tokyo's 1273,  
September 12, 1947.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 900.217 (5 Sep 47)MR/Fi

HGS/WCH/ed  
APO 500  
5 September 47

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head of United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Japan.

SUBJECT: Details of Vessels to be Used in 1947-48 Japanese  
Antarctic Whaling Expedition

1. Names and details on gross tonnage and type of each vessel planned for use by the Japanese in 1947-48 Antarctic whaling operations are as follows:

| Type of Vessel                | Name of Vessel      | Gross Tonnage |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| Factory Ship                  | Hashidate Maru      | 10,799        |
| " "                           | Hieshin Maru No. 1  | 11,781        |
| Catcher Boat                  | Koyo-Maru           | 364           |
| " "                           | Koyo-Maru No. 2     | 370           |
| " "                           | Koyo-Maru No. 3     | 370           |
| " "                           | Koyo-Maru No. 5     | 370           |
| " "                           | Shonan-Maru No. 8   | 356           |
| " "                           | Kyo-Maru No. 5      | 374           |
| " "                           | Kyo-Maru No. 6      | 375           |
| " "                           | Fumi-Maru No. 2     | 304           |
| " "                           | Fumi-Maru No. 3     | 312           |
| " "                           | Fumi-Maru No. 5     | 385           |
| " "                           | Fumi-Maru No. 6     | 304           |
| " "                           | Seki-Maru No. 3     | 298           |
| Transport (Saltery Ship)      | Tenyo-Maru          | 10,269        |
| " (" and Refrigerator Ship)   | Tedetsu-Maru        | 9,977         |
| " "                           | Tenyo-Maru No. 2    | 10,000        |
| Transport (Refrigerator Ship) | Chikusen-Maru       | 1,162         |
| " " "                         | Segami-Maru         | 990           |
| " " "                         | Banshu-Maru         | 983           |
| " " "                         | Banshu-Maru No. 32  | 782           |
| " " "                         | Banshu-Maru No. 35  | 993           |
| " " "                         | Banshu-Maru No. 36  | 998           |
| " " "                         | Banshu-Maru No. 38  | 998           |
| Oil Tanker                    | Yamamisu-Maru No. 5 | 9,965         |
| " "                           | San Diego-Maru      | 7,268         |

2. One additional transport vessel will be used to transport salted meat. The name of the vessel is not yet known but the gross tonnage will probably be between 7,000 and 10,000 gross tons. When a firm decision is made the additional information will be forwarded.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

R. M. LEVY  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

*RmyR.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: July 15, 1947  
4:30 P.M.

SUBJECT: Australian Whaling Proposal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. H. W. Bullock, Second Secretary, Australian Embassy  
Mr. Fearey, NA

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Mr. Bullock called at his request on instructions from Ambassador Makin to present "at the working level" certain comments by his Government on the U.S. aide-mémoire delivered to the Australian Embassy on July 9 rejecting the Australian Government's proposal to operate a Japanese whaling unit on behalf of Japan.

Mr. Bullock called attention to the statement in the U.S. note that

"The United States Government would have been ready fully and promptly to state its views on this proposal at any time during the previous six weeks, but its position by June 18, when the proposal was placed before the responsible officers of the Department, had reached a definitive form in the statement already prepared and approved for reading by General McCoy to the Far Eastern Commission on June 19."

Mr. Bullock stated that his Government found this statement inconsistent with that made by General McCoy to the FEC on June 26 that

"I am informed that the expedition does not leave Japan until October, so that there is plenty of time

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time for the diplomatic protests and negotiations now reported to me to go on for a period,"

and that the Australian Government because of this statement had failed to press its proposal in the FEC as strongly as it otherwise might before receiving the U.S. rejection.

Mr. Fearey replied that he saw nothing inconsistent in the two statements. The responsible officers of the Department received the Australian proposal on June 18 after the U.S. had taken a definitive position in the matter and communicated that position to General McCoy. On receiving the Australian proposal the highest officers of the Department had nevertheless re-examined the entire matter in the light of the proposal and had transmitted the proposal to SCAP for his opinion. While the matter was being reconsidered, and while the British and New Zealand protests supporting the Australian proposal remained unanswered by this Government, General McCoy was entirely right in stating on June 26 that the matter was still a subject of discussion and negotiations among the concerned Governments and that action by the FEC could well wait, and indeed must wait, until these negotiations had been completed, which might not be for some time. The Australian member was in no way placed at a disadvantage by the statement as the Australian proposal was at that very time receiving full consideration by the U.S. Government and nothing the Australian Ambassador or Government could have done could have increased the measure of that consideration.

Mr. Fearey pointed out that the Australian Government scarcely had cause for complaint in the fact that the U.S. Government had entirely reconsidered its "definitive position", as announced by General McCoy on June 19, after receiving the Australian proposal. The above quoted passage from our aide-memoire of July 9 meant simply, as stated, that the Government would have been happy to consider the Australian proposal at any time during the six weeks before it was actually submitted, while the last two sentences of the aide-memoire were intended to make it clear that the proposal would have had to have been rejected for the reasons there stated no matter when received. The record seemed to show that the U.S. position had been entirely consistent, and that we had given the Australian proposal full consideration, notwithstanding the late date at which it had been received, by reviewing our entire position in the light of the proposal.

Mr. Bullock appeared personally to accept this reasoning and stated he would convey the reply to Ambassador Makin and to his Government. He stated that having made the above point his Government planned no further notes or protests regarding the expedition, but would take any further steps it had in mind in the FEC.

NA:RAFearey/pm

RAF

*Northeast Asian  
affairs division*