

Doc. 2054

(252)

Doc. # 2054

5

Vol. 54

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 5, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 10,036 to 10,287

NATIONAL { 4266  
4267  
4268

WARD & PAUL

(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

C O N T E N T S

<u>TESTIMONY OF:</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
SAFFORD, Captain Laurance Fry (Resumed)	10,037
BEATTY, Rear Admiral Frank E., United States Navy	10,225
DILLON, Major John H., United States Marine Corps	10,257

E X H I B I T S

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
142-C	10,037
142-D	10,136

- - -

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 54 (5)

--	--	--

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Tuesday, February 5, 1946

- - -

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Ferguson, and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;  
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.  
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

3 Is there something counsel wishes to put in the record?

4 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, we received yesterday, from  
5 the State Department, a letter dated February 4, 1946 en-  
6 closing paraphrases of three telegrams, two of which were  
7 received from London and one of which was received from The  
8 Hague, with further reference to the inquiry made as to  
9 whether any of the monitoring stations maintained by those  
10 governments had ever picked up the execute of the winds code.  
11 The response has been negative in each case.

12 We would like to add these documents, mimeographed  
13 copies of which have been distributed to the committee, as  
14 a part of the general exhibit relating to the winds message  
15 and mark them as Exhibit 142-C.

16 The Chairman: That will be done.

17 (The documents referred to were  
18 marked Exhibit No. 142-C.)

19 Mr. Masten: That is all we have.

20 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD

21 (Resumed)

22 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy, you may proceed.

23 Mr. Murphy: Captain, is it not your understanding  
24 that the Japanese were very security-minded, very secretive  
25 about their proceedings?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: The Japanese were secretive, but they  
3 had a very erroneous impression or evaluation of the security  
4 of the cipher systems which they were using for highly im-  
5 portant secret messages.

6 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, they did everything they  
7 could, did they not, to protect their secret?

8 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Murphy: And reading the correspondence of Nomura  
10 in Washington to Japan, were you of the opinion that Nomura  
11 knew that war was coming?

12 Captain Safford: I believe that Nomura knew that war  
13 was coming, 'but not just exactly when.

14 Mr. Murphy: Why would the Japanese want to tell London  
15 three days before and give them a signal of when they were  
16 going to start war, why would they be broadcasting that all  
17 over the earth three days ahead?

18 Captain Safford: I do not know why the Japanese did  
19 that.

20 Mr. Murphy: Rather unusual if they did? Don't you  
21 think so, in the light of your experience and your study  
22 of the Japanese that that would be most unusual?

23 Captain Safford: Not for the Japanese.

24 Mr. Murphy: That they would broadcast a message three  
25 days before as to what they were going to do?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LaCharity  
follows

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

Captain Safford: The Japanese frequently did things in their communications that seemed foolish to us.

Mr. Murphy: Well, did you expect the Japanese would be broadcasting the fact that war was going to start definitely in three days?

Captain Safford: I did not.

Mr. Murphy: The fact is they did broadcast on Sunday as to the English, didn't they, but after the attack was made at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Safford: After the attack at Pearl Harbor, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I would like to come back with you to your letter, if I may.

As I recall the last thing we went over yesterday would bring us down to question 29. Question 29:

"Were the JD files in the GZ custody or any message from these files ever submitted to #36 (Roberts Commission)?"

In that connection I would like to ask you, what is the GY log?

Captain Safford: That was a log kept by the watch officer. We had four officers standing 24-hour watches on the incoming messages particularly in purple which were given priority handling in the section.

Mr. Murphy: Well, it covered, did it not, or purported to cover, all important incoming messages?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: All important messages in the purple  
3 system which were of particular importance to the White  
4 House and to the State Department. Occasionally they would  
5 include other systems which were done by the man on watch  
6 in slack time.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, you still have the GY log, do you not?

8 Captain Safford: It is still in existence but not in  
9 my custody.

10 Mr. Murphy: I mean, the GY log covering December 4  
11 is available, is it not?

12 Captain Safford: That is correct.

13 Mr. Murphy: Shouldn't it show what messages came in  
14 on that day if it is still in existence?

15 Captain Safford: That does not show incoming messages.  
16 It only shows decodes that were made by the GY officer on  
17 watch and his yeoman.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, don't you think that if you had  
19 everybody in the Naval service and in the Army service and  
20 Communications looking for some special message that there  
21 would be something in the GY log about it if it came in?  
22 Wouldn't you expect that, as head of Communications?

23 Captain Safford: Not unless it was personally handled  
24 and decoded by that officer or his yeoman.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, somebody under you did just that,



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
didn't they, one of your men? You were in charge of all of them. One of your men did that, didn't they?

Captain Safford: The man on watch kept the log.

Mr. Murphy: It was one of your men, wasn't it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Have you ever ascertained whether or not there is an entry that would support you in any way, about this so-called winds execute?

Captain Safford: There is no entry in that log which would support me.

Mr. Murphy: Is there any other entry of any kind missing from the GY log?

Captain Safford: There is a very similar entry which is missing on December 7. That is in regard to the so-called hidden word code and the message in it. We have the message. I believe it has been introduced as evidence. But there is no mention of this particular message in the GY code.

Mr. Murphy: And you made a study of that, did you?

Captain Safford: I did.

Mr. Murphy: Who was the officer then that failed to make an entry, who was on watch? You made an inquiry. What are the circumstances? The details, please?

Captain Safford: The inquiry was not made for more than two years after the event. No action was taken by me.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Give us the details, please. Who failed  
3 to note what?

4 Captain Safford: Nobody failed to note anything.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, you have just told us that there  
6 was something not noted in the GY log and you made an inquiry.  
7 What were the circumstances and who was involved? This is  
8 one more person now. Who is the person this time? Who is it?

9 Captain Safford: The officer who was on watch at that  
10 time on the morning of December 7. I cannot tell you from  
11 memory.

12 Mr. Murphy: Well, you know it was Brotherhood, don't you?

13 Captain Safford: I thought it was Parren.

14 Mr. Murphy: Don't you know Brotherhood saw at 5:00 a.m.  
15 the 1:00 p.m. message?

16 Captain Safford: This message I am referring to came  
17 in somewhere around 10:00 o'clock and I believe that Parren  
18 was on watch. I think he followed Brotherhood.

19 Mr. Murphy: Didn't you make an inquiry? This is something  
20 immediately under you and your supervision. You say that  
21 there is an entry not in there on the 7th. I am going to  
22 go back with you to the 4th pretty soon, but I would like  
23 to clear up the 7th first.

24 Now, who was the person and if there anything sinister  
25 about that one?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: There is nothing sinister about that  
3 at all. It simply was not recorded.

4 Mr. Murphy: Who failed to record it, if you know?

5 Captain Safford: Parren was on watch, I believe, at  
6 the time.

7 Mr. Murphy: That is the best you can give us?

8 Captain Safford: That is the best I can give you.

9 Mr. Murphy: All right. We come to question 30.

10 Before I go to that, the 4th was the Army day for  
11 translating, wasn't it? That was an even day.

12 Captain Safford: The 4th was an Army day for translating.

13 Mr. Murphy: Why didn't they translate on the 4th? That  
14 was their day.

15 Captain Safford: I do not know why the Army did not  
16 translate that day.

17 Mr. Murphy: Well, you had an arrangement whereby the  
18 4th was the Army day, the 5th was the Navy day, the 6th was  
19 the Army day, and the 7th was the Navy day. I asked you  
20 yesterday about the failure to have a translator in the  
21 Navy. I am going to come back to the 4th. Why, if there  
22 had been a message come in, would it not be translated by  
23 the Army because it was their day?

24 Captain Safford: It would in the normal course of  
25 events.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26

Mr. Murphy: Well, what was there out of normal on December 4 and why wouldn't the Army handle it? You say this thing happened that day. Ordinarily the Army would handle it. Why didn't they? Can you tell us any reason why?

Captain Safford: Only because the Navy had started to handle it through Admiral Noyes telephoning it direct.

Mr. Murphy: On the night before?

Captain Safford: At the time.

Mr. Murphy: What time?

Captain Safford: Approximately 9:00 o'clock in the morning of December 4, 1941.

Mr. Murphy: Well, how would it get to Admiral Noyes if it was the Army day? Why wouldn't the Army get the message to translate?

Captain Safford: The original message was sent directly to Admiral Noyes by me in accordance with his orders.

Mr. Murphy: At what time on what day?

Captain Safford: About 9:00 a.m. on December 4, 1941.

Mr. Murphy: Now, how did you get it then if it was the Army day?

Captain Safford: It was intercepted by a Navy station, came in on the teletype to my office, and was delivered to me by hand.

Mr. Murphy: Wouldn't that be unusual, since the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Interpreter knew that the Army was to handle messages  
2 on that day? Why would it go to the Navy?  
3

4 Captain Safford:.. The interpreter knew nothing about  
5 those arrangements. We sent everything to the Navy Depart-  
6 ment. We sorted it out ourselves.

7 Mr. Murphy: You yourself before you knew what the  
8 message was and before you understood it decided that you  
9 were going to do some translating that day, I take it; is  
10 that right? Here is a message that comes in, here it is  
11 the Army's day to get those things to translate them, and  
12 here you are, according to yourself, and you were having  
13 these translations made when you don't know what is coming  
14 at all, on the day the Army is supposed to do it. How  
15 do you explain that?

16 Captain Safford: I was carrying out the instructions  
17 of my superior officer.

18 Mr. Murphy: What were those instructions? To disregard  
19 the arrangement you had made?

20 Captain Safford: As soon as that message came in to  
21 notify him immediately.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, there is a question more fundamental  
23 than that. Did you disregard the arrangements you had made  
24 with the Army that they would translate on one day and you  
25 on the other because you didn't know until it was translated

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 that that was the Army day to translate? What is your  
2 answer to that?

3 Captain Safford: It had already been translated when  
4 I saw it.

5 Mr. Murphy: You mean it was translated before you saw  
6 it. Who in the Navy was it that decided not to follow the  
7 rules and have the Army translate that day? Who did, before  
8 you saw it?

9 Captain Safford: The translation had been made by Kramer.

10 Mr. Murphy: But you can't explain to us why the regular  
11 procedure wasn't followed out on the 4th? If you know.

12 Captain Safford: On listening for the winds message  
13 the Navy translated everything that came in in plain language  
14 Japanese to see whether or not the winds message was there.  
15 The Army did the same thing on their circuits. We had  
16 been standing watches for about 7 days by that time. We  
17 were receiving a great many plain language and press broad-  
18 casts which we were looking over and every one but this  
19 particular message had had nothing in it and had been discarded.  
20 Kramer could not tell whether to discard or not until he  
21 had translated. It was all done at the same time.

22 Mr. Murphy: You decided not to follow the regular pro-  
23 cedure but to stay at it entirely yourself; is that right?

24 Captain Safford: That is correct.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Keefe: Will the gentleman yield so I may ask a question for clarification?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Mr. Keefe: You are not a translator, you are not a Japanese language expert, are you?

Captain Safford: I am not a translator, and I had no responsibility whatsoever over the translation section. My only authority rested in matters pertaining to my section.

If there was any arrangement to be worked out or any disagreement between GY, which is the decoding section, and GZ, which was the translation, I would be called in to settle it.

Hook  
Follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Keefe  
Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Keefe: You couldn't translate; you personally  
2 did not translate?

3 Captain Safford: I personally translated nothing.

4 Mr. Murphy: Now, you told us that two days ago, you  
5 didn't translate. One of your men told us that the 13 parts  
6 were garbled, that they had to get a new key, that there  
7 were many lines missing from it. But you were able to tell  
8 what were in those parts, weren't you, the parts you saw?

9 Captain Safford: That is right. But that was in  
10 English.

11 Mr. Murphy: You also told us time after time after  
12 time, that Kramer was under you; that is right, isn't it?

13 Captain Safford: He occupied space under me.

14 Mr. Murphy: Did you not tell us three or four or  
15 five or ten times in this record that Kramer was under you?  
16 Wasn't that the arrangement? Not in this hearing, but didn't  
17 you say so in the other hearings?

18 Captain Safford: I thought that was clear. Kramer  
19 was attached to the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelli-  
20 gence, and they made out his fitness reports. For example,  
21 he was listed in the Naval Director under them. I was  
22 senior to him and to a certain extent Kramer had two bosses,  
23 an unfortunate arrangement, but as far as responsibility  
24 for any translation or distribution of material, that  
25

h1  
fls  
AL

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

1 was the responsibility of Captain McCollum as Kramer's  
2 Commanding Officer, and not mine.

3 Mr. Murphy: So he went to you first and you were  
4 the one that wanted McCollum notified; is that right?

5 Captain Safford: I was shown these things as a matter  
6 of courtesy.

7 Mr. Murphy: You were the one that wanted McCollum,  
8 his boss, notified?

9 Captain Safford: I did not say that.

10 Mr. Murphy: What did you say?

11 Well, I won't press that. I think I understand it  
12 clearly.

13 Now, here is Saturday, the day the war is going to  
14 start, according to you. You say the Army and Navy know  
15 it is going to start.

16 How do you account for the fact that the Army is quit-  
17 ting on Saturday noon on the day the war is going to start?  
18 You said everybody knew it.

19 Captain Safford: I cannot account for that.

20 Mr. Murphy: How can you account for the fact that your  
21 people are not working on Sunday, the next day, when the  
22 war is going to start?

23 Captain Safford: My own people were on a 24-hour basis,  
24 and had been for months.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

1 Mr. Murphy: There was not one translator in the  
2 Navy that day, was there, outside of Kramer?

3 Captain Safford: I cannot answer for the translators.

4 Mr. Murphy: In other words, you weren't so concerned  
5 about getting the message translated?

6 Captain Safford: It was not my responsibility, and  
7 I had no responsibility to issue any orders about trans-  
8 lators.

9 Mr. Murphy: Weren't you interested in protecting the  
10 American Navy? You said war was going to start that day.  
11 Do I understand you to say you were not responsible for  
12 anything at all that might help with willing the war?

13 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I don't think that the answer  
14 bears any such interpretation. I think it is an unfair  
15 question. The witness didn't testify to any such thing.  
16 The witness is entitled to some degree of fairness and fair  
17 play.

18 Mr. Murphy: I expected Mr. Keefe to be concerned,  
19 and I expect he will have more trouble all day. What is  
20 the objection?

21 Mr. Keefe: I object because the witness has testified  
22 that under the set-up he had no responsibility for trans-  
23 lators. You are trying to make it appear that he did have  
24 and had no interest in protecting the welfare of the nation.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

1 The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.  
2 That applies to the guests.

3 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I have sat here all during  
4 this hearing without hardly opening my mouth. I think  
5 it is unfair on the part of the Congressman to say he  
6 expects to be interrupted by me all the time. But there  
7 is a limit to fairness even with this witness.

8 Mr. Murphy: I think I understand what is happening,  
9 and I am not going to be taken off the track by either  
10 certain people in the audience or by the objection. I will  
11 proceed. I will get the facts regardless of any hindrances,  
12 sir.

13 The fact is, sir, that you were head of Communications,  
14 and you felt war was going to start on Sunday. The fact  
15 is also, is it not, that there was not one translator in  
16 your section, or in the Navy Department, who understood a  
17 word of Japanese on Sunday, December 7, on the day that you  
18 felt the war was going to start, were certain it was going  
19 to start?

20 Captain Safford: I cannot answer for Captain Kramer  
21 or Captain McCollum, or what arrangements they had made  
22 to handle Sunday. They will have to speak for themselves,  
23 and I believe they will have an adequate answer.

24 Mr. Murphy: The fact is you weren't concerned, were  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

you? Answer that question "yes" or "no," please. You showed no concern, did you, about this message that would tell, in effect, the time the war was going to start?

Captain Safford: I felt that message would be decoded and handled promptly, and in my opinion it was.

Mr. Murphy: You left at 4:30 on Saturday, and at least you never inquired as to what time this message would come in, or what it said, did you? You have told us you didn't? That is true, isn't it?

Captain Safford: That is true.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I come to Question No. 30:

"Were #5 (Admiral Wilkinson) #9 (McCollum) #10 (Kramer) or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136 --"

I believe I have covered this question, but I will read it:

"-- not to ever mention the events of #136 (December 6, 1941) and #137 (December 7, 1941) of the investigations conducted by #36 (Roberts Commission)? In this connection I am sending you #35 (Roberts Report) by ordinary ships mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence."

I believe I talked to you about that yesterday.

Now, I come to #31.

"Do you know when and how #53 first got the news of

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

#75 (Serial No. 901)(sets up No. 902) and No. 76 (Serial No. 902) (1-13) (the works), and what action he took."

I understand there you were talking about the 13 parts; is that right?

Shef  
fls  
10:40

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: That is correct.

3 Mr. Murphy: That is what you refer to as "the works"?

4 Captain Safford: That is correct.

5 Mr. Murphy: Was there any significance in that descrip-  
6 tion?

7 Captain Safford: That meant the bulk of the message and  
8 what we had up to midnight on the 6th.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, you called it "the works". There is a  
10 slang expression. "The works" means the real paper, the  
11 important paper, the important thing. Where was there any-  
12 thing there? You said your so-called winds execute was the  
13 works, as I understand it, or the tip-off.

14 Captain Safford: The winds message was the tip-off.

15 Mr. Murphy: You do not put any particular significance  
16 of "the works"?

17 Captain Safford: It was the bulk and contained the in-  
18 tent of the fourteenth part message and the first thirteen  
19 parts.

20 Mr. Murphy: I say you don't put any significance on the  
21 title? There is nothing unusual about the words "the works"?

22 Captain Safford: No, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: All right. Then the next question:

24 "(Sets up #902) and #76 (Serial #902 (1-13))" --  
25 you have it repeated there. That would be the fourteen part

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

message?

3

Captain Safford: That would be the fourteen part mes-

4

sage.

5

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

6

"No. 32. Same for #77 (Serial #902 (14) (The

7

Finale)) and #78 (Serial #907 1:00 p.m.)"

8

As I understand it, you were questioning Kramer then

9

about these two particular messages, the fourteen part mes-

10

sage and the one P.M. message?

11

Captain Safford: What he knew about the delivery, not

12

as to their significance.

13

Mr. Murphy: All right. (Reading)

14

"33. Re my #14 - I meant the conference on #137

15

(Dec. 7, 1941) between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53 (Gen-

16

eral Marshall) which resulted in #89. I did not know of

17

the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them."

18

What conferences were you delighted to learn of?

19

Captain Safford: These were conferences that Kramer

20

made some reference to in his letter earlier probably.

21

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, why were you so delighted about

22

that? I mean what brought delight to you?

23

Captain Safford: I thought it would bring new informa-

24

tion out.

25

Mr. Murphy: Had you been in conference with anybody

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 about your work in this case prior to sending this letter to  
3 Kra mer? Had you conferred with certain people?

4 Captain Safford: Only to ask them questions.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, will you tell us who you conferred  
6 with on your work?

7 Captain Safford: I did not confer with anybody on my  
8 work. I was doing that single-handed.

9 Mr. Murphy: Did you confer with anybody who was writ-  
10 ing articles in order to get particular publicity for the  
11 cause?

12 Captain Safford: I did not.

13 Mr. Murphy: Did you do anything for the cause except  
14 what you have told us here? What other letters did you write?

15 Captain Safford: I did nothing toward writing except  
16 this one letter and another one which was sent about the same  
17 date to Kramer and Kra mer did not reply to either.

18 Mr. Murphy: What was the other letter, the letter to  
19 Kramer?

20 Captain Safford: That is one to Kramer enclosing the  
21 magazine clipping and suggesting he see Admiral Halsey.

22 Mr. Murphy: Is that all?

23 Captain Safford: That has been introduced in evidence.  
24 That is all that I know of.

25 Mr. Murphy: What is it?



1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Captain Safford: That is all that I know of.

3 Mr. Murphy: You wrote other letters, didn't you?

4 Captain Safford: Not that I know of.

5 Mr. Murphy: How about Brotherhood? You wrote to him,  
6 didn't you?

7 Captain Safford: I did not ask Brotherhood to do any-  
8 thing. I merely asked him to give me some information.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, do you have a copy of that letter or  
10 did you destroy it?

11 Captain Safford: I don't think I have a copy of any of  
12 my letters.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, did you destroy the copy or did you  
14 make a copy? You did write to Brotherhood, didn't you?

15 Captain Safford: I wrote to Brotherhood.

16 Mr. Murphy: Who else?

17 Captain Safford: And I mentioned that in my testimony  
18 at the previous investigations.

19 Mr. Murphy: That is right, that is why I know it, I  
20 read your testimony. Who else did you write to, if anyone?

21 Captain Safford: I wrote to Welker, Captain Welker after  
22 V-J day.

23 Mr. Murphy: That is right; that is in your other testi-  
24 mony, too, isn't it, about Welker?

25 Captain Safford: I mentioned him but I had not written

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

to him before V-J day.

3

Mr. Murphy: Right. What did you write to Welker about?

4

Captain Safford: To ask him then if he could recall

5

anything concerning the winds message.

6

Mr. Murphy: What else?

7

Captain Safford: That is all.

8

Mr. Murphy: Who else did you write to?

9

Captain Safford: I also wrote to ship's clerk H. L.

10

Bryant who had served as Commander Kramer's confidential yeo-

11

man at the time. I wrote to him after V-J day.

12

Mr. Murphy: Do you have a copy of that letter?

13

Captain Safford: I do not know whether I have or not.

14

Mr. Murphy: Well, will you produce the copies of the

15

letters you have, sir, so the committee can see them, the

16

copies of the letters you wrote on this question?

17

Captain Safford: I will make search and produce those

18

letters, what I have, at the first opportunity.

19

Mr. Murphy: All right. In the meantime I will go on.

20

Then there is a parentheses:

21

"Message described in paragraph 50 (Page 9-XI) of

22

#35 (Roberts Commission)."

23

Now, what were you referring to there, if you know?

24

Captain Safford: I haven't a copy of that report handy.

25

Mr. Murphy: What is it?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: I do not have a copy of that report  
3 handy.

4 Mr. Murphy: Gentlemen, do you have a copy?

5 Captain Safford: No, I haven't.

6 Mr. Murphy: I am sorry, sir. I withdraw that. What  
7 happened to the copy you had yesterday? Did counsel take it  
8 back?

9 Captain Safford: I did not bring that with me. Of the  
10 Roberts report?

11 Mr. Murphy: Oh, no. Is it the Roberts report you want  
12 or is it the copy of the letter? You do have a copy of the  
13 letter here right before you, do you not?

14 Captain Safford: Oh, yes, I have that.

15 Mr. Murphy: Yes, but you do not have a copy of the Rob-  
16 erts report, do you?

17 Captain Safford: Of the Roberts report.

18 Mr. Murphy: Will you get that?

19 The Vice Chairman: Counsel is working on it.

20 Mr. Murphy: All right. While they are getting that I  
21 will go on. (Reading)

22 "No. 34. The one #2 (Mr. Hull) office."

23 What concern did your department have with that? How  
24 did that affect Communications?

25 Captain Safford: Kramer made the delivery at that time

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 and what time he made the delivery is information.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, was what time Kramer made delivery of  
4 concern to your office?

5 Captain Safford: Not officially, not to me.

6 Mr. Murphy: What is it, please? You said that was of  
7 concern to your office, what Kramer did?

8 Captain Safford: That was curiosity on my part.

9 Mr. Murphy: For what purpose?

10 Captain Safford: For knowing what happened.

11 Mr. Murphy: Well, for what purpose? You wanted to know  
12 for what purpose? You wanted to do something with the in-  
13 formation, didn't you?

14 Captain Safford: For possible use as evidence.

15 Mr. Murphy: By you?

16 Captain Safford: By me, if acceptable.

17 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, Number 35 (Reading):

18 "35. The one in #3 (Admiral Stark ) office?

19 "36. The one 'o/o Col. B.'"

20 What did you mean by that?

21 Captain Safford: I think it meant care of Colonel Brat-  
22 ton.

23 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

24 "37. The one between #3 (Admiral Stark) and #53  
25 General Marshall)"?

Witness Safford

Questions by; Mr. Murphy

1  
2           What concern of yours could that have? I mean why would  
3 you want that, a meeting between the Chief of Staff of the  
4 Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. Why would you over  
5 in Communications want that? Did it have anything at all to  
6 do with your work for the Navy?

7           Captain Safford: That was beyond anything under my au-  
8 thority.

9           Mr. Murphy: For what purpose?

10          Captain Safford: For possible use as evidence.

11          Mr. Murphy: Well, surely Admiral Kimmel did not know  
12 you were doing all this, did he?

13          Captain Safford: Admiral Kimmel did not know I was  
14 doing this.

15          Mr. Murphy: Did you ever contact him, good, bad or in-  
16 different, since Pearl Harbor?

17          Captain Safford: I contacted Admiral Kimmel --

18          Mr. Murphy: When?

19          Captain Safford: (Continuing) --- about a month after  
20 this letter was written.

21          Mr. Murphy: When? Now, that would be in February of  
22 1944, is that right?

23          Captain Safford: On the 21st of February 1944.

24          Mr. Murphy: Do you have a copy of that letter?

25          Captain Safford: I did not write a letter.

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: How did you do it?

3 Captain Safford: I was in New York and I went to his  
4 office and saw him personally.

5 Mr. Murphy: Who else did you see at that time, - his  
6 counsel?

7 Captain Safford: His couhnel was not there.

8 Mr. Murphy: Well, who else was there?

9 Captain Safford: Just Admiral Kimmel.

10 Mr. Murphy: Did you ever talk to his counsel?

11 Captain Safford: I did not talk to Admiral Kimmel's  
12 counsel until after the Navy investigation.

13 Mr. Murphy: When did you first talk to his counsel, -  
14 Mr. Rugg I mean? I don't mean any sinister inference. I  
15 just want to know when you talked to him.

16 Captain Safford: After the Navy investigation was com-  
17 pleted.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, about when? About when, just your  
19 best judgment.

20 Captain Safford: I believe it was August or possibly  
21 September 1944.

22 Mr. Murphy: August or September of 1944?

23 Captain Safford: 1944.

24 Mr. Murphy: Did you make a special trip to New York to  
25 go to Admiral Kimmel's office in New York?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Captain Safford: No. I was up there with my wife.

Mr. Murphy: What is it?

Captain Safford: I was up there on a little leave.

Mr. Murphy: Well, was that your reason for going to New York?

Captain Safford: I took advantage of the trip to see -- to look up Admiral Kimmel and see if he was in and would wish to talk to me. I took the initiative, not Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy: Well, I mean is that why you went to New York or was that a thought after you got there? Do you understand me? I don't want to --

Captain Safford: I went up on personal reasons with Mrs. Safford who wanted to go, wanted to take me up, and as long as I was up there I thought I would go in and see Admiral Kimmel if I could locate him in his office.

Mr. Murphy: And you then told him what you were doing, did you?

Captain Safford: No, I did not tell him what I was doing, - or everything I was doing.

Mr. Murphy: Did you tell him about the letters you were writing?

Captain Safford: No.

Mr. Murphy: Did you tell him about this plan that you had sent to Kramer about how he was to arrange things?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

Captain Safford: No.

3

Mr. Murphy: Did you talk to anybody else in New York

4

State --

5

Captain Safford: No.

6

Mr. Murphy: (Continuing) -- or give them any informa-

7

tion?

8

Captain Safford: Nobody.

9

Mr. Murphy: You are sure, no one else in New York State?

10

Captain Safford: Positive.

11

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I come to No. 38:

12

"How much does #9 (McCollum) know"?

13

What did you mean there? Know about what?

14

Captain Safford: About one of these details.

15

Mr. Murphy: Details? Which one? I mean what particu-

16

lar subject?

17

Captain Safford: With --

18

Mr. Murphy: On any particular item? And if so, which

19

one?

20

Captain Safford: I cannot remember just what I meant

21

by something I wrote two years ago.

22

Mr. Murphy: All right. And then the next one:

23

"Will #9 (McCollum) come through willingly?"

24

What did you mean by "come through"?

25

Captain Safford: Testify.



1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: You mean take your side, the side you were  
3 taking, or what?

4 Captain Safford: No.

5 Mr. Murphy: Just testify?

6 Captain Safford: Just testify willingly.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, you had some doubt about whether he  
8 would testify as to the truth under oath, did you?

9 Captain Safford: Not that.

10 Mr. Murphy: Well, what did you have in mind, whether he  
11 would have a good memory or a bad memory? You say "come  
12 through willingly."

13 Captain Safford: Whether he would be hesitant or not.

14 Mr. Murphy: Hesitant about telling the truth?

15 Captain Safford: About volunteering.

16 Senator Lucas: What was the last answer, please?

17 (Answer read.)

18 Mr. Murphy: Then I come to Number 40:

19 "What is your estimate of #5 (Admiral Wilkinson)  
20 in this respect?"

21 And you were then wondering from Kramer whether he would  
22 come through, is that right?

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

25 "No. 41. Will he talk for #42? (Admiral Halsey)"

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 You meant if Admiral Halsey were to question him would  
3 he answer questions, is that it?

4 Captain Safford: Correct.

5 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

6 "No. 42. What about #6 (Admiral Turner)?"

7 Captain Safford: The same thing.

8 Mr. Murphy: Well, didn't you feel that Admiral Turner  
9 was involved in these charges that you had made about a con-  
10 spiracy? Wasn't he on Admiral Stark's staff?

11 Captain Safford: He was.

12 Mr. Murphy: Well, haven't you charged him with being  
13 one of the group that framed Kimmel, - Admiral Turner? He is  
14 one of the staff. Isn't he within the group that you charged  
15 with framing Kimmel?

16 Captain Safford: I did not know that Admiral Turner  
17 had anything to do with this at that time.

18 Mr. Murphy: Well, wasn't Kelly Turner Chief of War  
19 Plans and wasn't Kelly Turner the one who would not send the  
20 message after McCollum and Wilkinson discussed it and you  
21 looked it over?

22 Captain Safford: I knew nothing about that whatsoever,  
23 about Admiral Turner ever having seen that message.

24 Mr. Murphy: Well, wasn't Admiral Turner the head of War  
25 Plans on Admiral Stark's staff?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3 Captain Safford: Admiral Turner was the head of War  
4 Plans.

5 Mr. Murphy: Yes. And haven't you charged the whole  
6 staff and didn't you think you had overwhelming evidence  
7 against them? Let me not misquote you. Let me get your exact  
8 words:

9 "Having overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV."

10 Now, the fellow who is head of War Plans is a pretty  
11 important fellow on OPNAV, isn't he?

12 Captain Safford: He is.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, how do you square this about? You  
14 have overwhelming proof of the guilt of OPNAV and here you  
15 are trying to get a conference and apparently feeling that  
16 was all right with the Chief of War Plans of OPNAV. Are those  
17 two inconsistent?

18 Captain Safford: They are inconsistent.

19 Mr. Murphy: Well, did you include Kelly Turner and the  
20 Chief in your charge of frameup?

21 Captain Safford: I did not.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, who did you charge then? Now, he is  
23 one of OPNAV that is out. Who do you include?

24 Captain Safford: I did not know where it lay.

25 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

26 Captain Safford: I did not know where it lay.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, you said two days ago that you  
3 felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary  
4 Knox who was then dead when you wrote that letter, wasn't he?

5 Captain Safford: Yes.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now, what in the world did Secretary Knox  
7 do that he needed counsel for the defense?

8 Captain Safford: Nothing.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, why did you originate it? It has  
10 gone out to the papers of the country that you said that you  
11 felt that Sonnett was counsel for the defense for Secretary  
12 Knox who was then dead. That has been in all the papers, I  
13 suppose, in the country and you said it.

14 Captain Safford: That was the man I gathered at that  
15 time.

16 Mr. Murphy: What basis was there for such a statement,  
17 for Frank Knox needing counsel for the defense after he has  
18 gone beyond? What did you mean by that? There has been a  
19 lot of talk about a smear campaign in one or two witness'  
20 testimony here and I am wondering what you mean now by re-  
21 ferring to Secretary Knox in that way? You felt Sonnett was  
22 counsel for the defense for Secretary Knox. Sonnett is a  
23 fellow officer in the Navy, isn't he?

24 Captain Safford: He is.

25 Mr. Murphy: An officer of the United States Navy, isn't

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 he? Sir?

3 Captain Safford: He is.

4 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now, what did you mean by saying that  
5 an officer of the United States Navy was counsel for the  
6 Secretary of the Navy who had previously died, counsel for  
7 the defense?

8 Captain Safford: It had seemed he had conducted a long  
9 unofficial examination in conversations with me and my im-  
10 pression was that he seemed more interested in protecting --  
11 in looking after anything which might tend to be prejudicial  
12 to Secretary Knox rather than to get at the meat of things.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, at that time and up to that time did  
14 anybody ever accuse Secretary Knox of anything?

15 Captain Safford: He had never been.

16 Mr. Murphy: But you felt that he needed a defense, did  
17 you?

18 Captain Safford: No, but the defense was working.

19 Mr. Murphy: For Knox. Sonnett was working a defense  
20 for Knox. Why did he have to be defended? What did he do?

21 Captain Safford: Nothing.

22 Mr. Murphy: But you felt that it was the right thing to  
23 do, to write in your letter, in your memoranda that if Sonnett  
24 was counsel for one other -- the one other I will come to  
25 later -- was counsel for Secretary Knox, you felt that was the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 important thing, did you not, that was the important thing  
3 to do?

4 Captain Safford: I wrote it.

5 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now, then, did you and Admiral Stark  
6 ever have any trouble?

7 Captain Safford: Never.

8 Mr. Murphy: Well, when was it you first turned against  
9 him? You have turned against him, haven't you? You feel  
10 he is guilty of a crime, don't you? You said he could not  
11 be trusted, didn't you? You said he was guilty of a frame-up.

12 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, there are three questions  
13 now.

14 Mr. Keefe: There are four questions.

15 Mr. Murphy: All right.

16 Senator Lucas: I would like to have one at a time, so  
17 far as I am concerned.

18 Mr. Murphy: I will ask one question then. Strike out  
19 the other three.

20 You felt that Secretary Knox -- rather, that Admiral  
21 Stark was guilty of a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel, did you not?

22 Captain Safford: I said that in a private letter.

23 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

24 Captain Safford: I said that in a private letter.

25 Mr. Murphy: Well, sir, you always speak the truth pri-

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 vately or publicly, don't you?

3 Captain Safford: You try to.

4 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

5 Captain Safford: You try to.

6 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Well, now, was it or was it not your  
7 feeling when you said that you felt that Admiral Stark was  
8 guilty of a frame-up?

9 Captain Safford: May I have the question again to be  
10 certain I have got it straight?

11 (Question read.)

12 Mr. Murphy: Will you answer the question, sir?

13 Captain Safford: Yes.

14 The Vice Chairman: Your answer is "Yes", Captain?

15 Captain Safford: No. I said I would answer the question.

16 The Vice Chairman: All right.

17 Captain Safford: I beg your pardon; I am sorry.

18 Mr. Murphy: Take your time. I will wait.

19 Captain Safford: I want a chance to get that straight.

20 Mr. Murphy: I don't want to ask you these questions but  
21 my job here is to get the facts. I don't want to embarrass  
22 you at all, I would rather not be here, but being here I am  
23 obliged to get the facts.

24 Captain Safford: It was not my feeling at the time and  
25 if I wronged Admiral Stark I regret it.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: Well, do you now feel that he cannot be  
3 trusted? You so stated in your letter. Now, has there been  
4 anything since the time you wrote the letter and now to change  
5 your opinion?

6 Captain Safford: That question of trust, may I explain,  
7 I meant by that that I thought everybody was to prejudiced  
8 against Admiral Kimmel at that time that they would not do  
9 things fairly. That was with the exception of a few, I might  
10 say, close friends of Admiral Kimmel's. It did not mean trust  
11 in the ordinary sense of the word.

12 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you did state as an officer  
13 of the United States Navy that the leading officers, the com-  
14 manding officers of the Navy were guilty of a frameup and that,  
15 in your judgment, a frameup is about as vile and low a thing  
16 as can be done to a human being, isn't it, or by a human be-  
17 ing?

18 Captain Safford: It is.

19 Mr. Murphy: And do you feel now, sir, today, that Ad-  
20 miral Stark and the members of his staff did bring about a  
21 fra meup of Admiral Kimmel?

22 (No response.)

23 Mr. Murphy: I won't press you upon that point.

24 Captain Safford: All right, thank you.

25 Mr. Murphy: You have answered a good many others.



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Now, I would like to come to the next question under  
3 "Comment." (Reading)

4 "With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and 10  
5 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494 (PL code  
6 mag.) of which we have copies of the original and its  
7 translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received  
8 on #137. (Dec. 7, 1941)."

9 Now, as I understand it there you make the statement in  
10 your letter that the message of December 7, 1941 referred by  
11 inference to Circular No. 2494. Is that right?

12 Captain Safford: I thought that he was describing that  
13 message.

14 Mr. Murphy: You say:

15 "I was asking about #74 (General Intelligence Broad-  
16 cast containing false 'Weather Report') which was broad-  
17 cast at 0430 (EST) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec.  
18 5, 1941). (Not sure of exact date)."

19 Now, up to that minute in that paragraph you are talking  
20 about a false weather broadcast, isn't that right?

21 Captain Safford: A false weather report.

22 Mr. Murphy: A false weather report?

23 Captain Safford: In a general intelligence broadcast.

24 Mr. Murphy: Right. (Reading)

25 "It was unheard by 'S', 'H', and 'C', who listened

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 for it. (I have this from the Station 'S' files, plus  
3 statements of #19 (Wright) and '23 (Mason).) This mes-  
4 s-age (in Morse) included the words 'Higashi no kazeame.  
5 Nishi no kaze hare. (Negative form of kita no kaze  
6 Kumori.)' The warning was not sent in the manner pre-  
7 scribed by #72 (Circular '2353 ( Sets up #74) or #73  
8 (Circular 2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The  
9 GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and  
10 you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and  
11 so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (E) were waiting in  
12 my office when I came in that morning and said, 'Here  
13 it is.' We had been waiting a week for it and Station  
14 'S' had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by tele-  
15 type."

16 Captain Safford: That is what I thought.

17 Mr. Murphy: Now, from whom? Teletype from whom?

18 Captain Safford: Station "M", from station "M" which is  
19 Cheltenham and statio<sup>n</sup> "W" which is Winter Harbor.

20 Mr. Murphy: So that at that time you did know that there  
21 was a message came in, a false weather report from either  
22 Cheltenham or Winter Harbor?

23 Captain Safford: Yes.

24 Mr. Murphy: And that is what you were talking about?

25 Captain Safford: That is what we were talking about.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: "It was unheard by 'S'." That would be  
3 Bainbridge Island station, wouldn't it?

4 Captain Safford: That is correct.

5 Mr. Murphy: "H". What would "H" be?

6 Captain Safford: Heeia, or Pearl Harbor.

7 Mr. Murphy: And "C" Corregidor?

8 Captain Safford: Corregidor.

9 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

10 "Who listened for it. (I have this from the Station  
11 'S' files."

12 Now, if you had Station S's files, that was Bainbridge  
13 Island, did you at that time try to get the other stations'  
14 files?

15 Captain Safford: We asked for the other stations' files  
16 at the same time.

17 Mr. Murphy: And the inference here from your own testi-  
18 mony was that you felt those files had been improperly de-  
19 stroyed?

20 Captain Safford: That those files could not be located.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, what was your testimony on that  
22 before? You gave a very good reason for that before, didn't  
23 you? I am referring to your testimony before the Hewitt Board  
24 where you explained the reason for certain records of Chelten-  
25 ham and Winter Harbor being missing.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Will you get that testimony if you have it there?

3 Captain Safford: On what page, please.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, you talked three different times. I  
5 will get it for you in a minute. You told Admiral Hewitt the  
6 reason for both of those not being located. The Cheltenham  
7 station was moved from Cheltenham up to Massachusetts, wasn't  
8 it?

9 Captain Safford: On what page is that, sir?

10 Mr. Murphy: I did not come to it yet but I am asking  
11 you now wasn't the Cheltenham station moved to Massachusetts?

12 Captain Safford: The regular receiving activity took over  
13 the whole station and the rest, the intelligence unit was  
14 moved over to Chatham, Massachusetts.

15 Mr. Murphy: I am referring to page 120. I will come  
16 back to that; that is another thing. That is about Cheltenham  
17 but that is not what we are looking for. Page 122:

18 "Captain Safford: This search was made in November  
19 or December 1943 and again in the spring of 1944. I  
20 cannot place that any closer. After we got notice that  
21 Admiral Hart would conduct his investigation the logs  
22 of Winter Harbor, Maine were destroyed in the spring of  
23 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything  
24 for about six months back. Cheltenham's logs were de-  
25 stroyed when the intercept unit left Cheltenham and moved

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

u up to Chatham, Massachusetts, which was some time earlier than that. I cannot say offhand what happened to the logs of the other two stations, but I can produce nothing."

At that time you felt there was nothing sinister or improper, didn't you, about Cheltenham?

Captain Safford: May I comment on that?

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

Captain Safford: I did not verify my testimony and there was one word left out, I know, which changes the sense of things because it is not true.

Mr. Murphy: What is that word?

Captain Safford: There is an "except." "The logs of Winter Harbor were destroyed in the spring of 1943 simply to make room. They destroyed everything except for about six months back."

Mr. Murphy: Well, now, what word do you insert there?

Captain Safford: "Except".

Mr. Murphy: They destroyed everything except for about six months back?

Captain Safford: You said "For about six months back."

Mr. Murphy: I see. Well, at that time did you feel that it was as a result of the conspiracy by people in the Navy to get the records destroyed?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Captain Safford: I am not referring there to the logs of the stations. The third copy which the station itself kept. We had finally asked about that just to see if they could throw any light on the thing.

Mr. Murphy: Well, would they possibly, since the station did not know what you were looking for and since you had about 20 to 25 messages in there, I suppose, each day, from Cheltenham, did you?

Captain Safford: We had everything intercepted by it arranged in chronological order, the time of intercept.

Mr. Murphy: You mean they kept copies of these messages at these outlying radio stations of things that we were trying so hard to protect, they kept copies of them?

Captain Safford: They kept copies.

Mr. Murphy: And if another government wanted to get a copy of magic at any time all they would have to do is find out what was being done and go into one of these outlying radio stations and they could find a complete file, is that right?

Captain Safford: They only had a copy of the message that went through the air.

Mr. Murphy: But they did keep a complete file of everything they ever received, a record? Did they or not?

Captain Safford: They were required by our instructions

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 to retain their third copy until the Navy Department had ac-  
3 knowledged receipts of the other two copies. Then they had  
4 permission to burn or retain for a short time at discretion.  
5 They often found the back logs there useful in helping them  
6 with their work, research, and so forth.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, do you now feel that anyone at Chel-  
8 tenham participated in this plan that you speak of to destroy  
9 the copy of the alleged winds code about which you speak?

10 Captain Safford: No one at the stations. I was merely  
11 trying to show when it was brought up the effort that we had  
12 made to run down to see if there was any copy in existence.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, let us proceed. (Reading)

14 "I have this from the Station 'S' files, plus  
15 statements of #19 (Wright)".

16 Now, who would Wright be?

17 Captain Safford: He is now a Captain; W. A. Wright.

18 Mr. Murphy: What statement did you have from him?

19 Captain Safford: He told me that they had listened for  
20 the winds message at Heeia.

21 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

22 "And #23 (Mason)."

23 That would be at Corregidor?

24 Captain Safford: He had listened at Corregidor and I  
25 thought he had listened personally there and had not heard it.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

3 "This message (in Morse) included the words" --  
4 by the way, a false weather broadcast now, according to  
5 this, was Morse telegraph, wasn't it, or Morse code?

6 Captain Safford: I always said it was Morse.

7 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

8 Captain Safford: I always said it was Morse.

9 Mr. Murphy: I thought you said the other day that the  
10 only place -- or in your statement don't you say something  
11 about that was the only station they could get Morse and the  
12 others were listening for voice? Now, if I am wrong in that  
13 I suggest that we get your statement. Will counsel find that  
14 particular part there where he is discussing the Morse code  
15 there? I will come back to that, Captain, when we find it.

16 "This message (in Morse) included the words 'Higashi  
17 no kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare, (Negative form of Kita  
18 no kaze Kumori.)' The warning was not sent in the manner  
19 prescribed by #72 (Circular 2353)".

20 Now, when Mr. Richardson was questioning you the other  
21 day you said this alleged intercept that you were speaking  
22 about did not follow the regular manner, didn't you, that you  
23 saw the words in the middle, or did you say that it had words  
24 in the middle and at the end?

25 Captain Safford: I said that I saw the words in the



1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 middle and could not say whether or not they also appeared  
3 at the end.

4 Mr. Murphy: Well, you say:

5 "The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed  
6 by #72 (Circular 2353 (Sets up #74) or #73 (Circular  
7 #2354 (Sets up #74), but was a mixture. The GY watch  
8 officer was not sure of it so he called you" --  
9 by "you" meaning he called Kramer?

10 Captain Safford: Kramer.

11 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

12 "-- and you came in early and verified it. Murray  
13 recalls it, so do I."

14 So that you do recall the false weather report, do you?

15 Captain Safford: I recall the false weather report in  
16 a general intelligence broadcast.

17 Mr. Murphy: Yes, and at what time? On the night of  
18 December 3rd or the early morning of December 4, isn't that  
19 right?

20 Captain Safford: It was the early morning of December  
21 4th that I saw it.

22 Mr. Murphy: Right. (Reading)

23 "Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or  
24 Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that  
25 morning and said, "Here it is."

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Now, this is the morning of December 4th you are speaking  
3 about in your letter and before this committee? On the morn-  
4 ing of December 4th you saw the real intercept, didn't you?

5 Captain Safford: I am talking about the real intercept.

6 Mr. Murphy: You are talking about the real intercept  
7 here?

8 Captain Safford: We are talking about the same thing.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, here you call it a false weather  
10 broadcast.

11 Captain Safford: The true winds message was a false  
12 weather broadcast in the middle of a general intelligence bul-  
13 letin and possibly repeated at the end.

14 Mr. Murphy: Sir, all through these hearings a certain  
15 false weather broadcast had been referred to as meaning the  
16 one that came in and Kramer threw in a waste basket.

17 Captain Safford: That was always referred to as the  
18 false winds message, which was a true weather broadcast.

19 Mr. Murphy: Well, let me go on. I think that will come  
20 out in a line or two. (Reading)

21 "Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or  
22 Brotherhood were waiting in my office when I came in that  
23 morning and said, 'Here it is.'"

24 Now, then, if you are speaking about the real bona fide  
25 intercept that is what you are speaking about here, isn't it?

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Captain Safford: That is what I am speaking about now.

3 Mr. Murphy: That would mean that Brotherhood should know  
4 about it, that you did know about it and that Murray knew about  
5 is, isn't that right?

6 Captain Safford: That is what I thought and I had so  
7 understood at the time I wrote this letter.

8 Mr. Murphy: You know that they both have testified that  
9 they know nothing about any such things?

10 Captain Safford: I understand they have since testified  
11 to the contrary.

12 Mr. Murphy: To the contrary? Did they ever testify as  
13 you say they would? They testified contrary, you mean, to  
14 what you thought they would?

15 Captain Safford: To what I thought.

16 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

17 "We had been waiting a week for it and Station 'S'  
18 had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype."

19 Captain Safford: That is for the long messages.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now, reading on:

21 "As a result of #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast  
22 containing false 'Weather Report') #9 (McCollum) prepared  
23 #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9  
24 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5,  
25 1941), but never released) - which was a very long mes-

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2       sage ending up with the translation and significance of  
3       the warning in #74 (General Intelligence Broadcast con-  
4       taining false 'Weather Report'). I read the message in  
5       #7's (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the dis-  
6       cussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Ad-  
7       miral Wilkinson)."

8       Now, you say then that this so-called winds intercept  
9       would be there before the three of you, wouldn't it, at that  
10      time? I mean the winds intercept that you are speaking of  
11      here, that was there before you at that time, wasn't it, that  
12      intercept?

13      Captain Safford: I beg your pardon?

14      Mr. Murphy: The intercept of the winds message which  
15      you testified about in your statement, which you said came in  
16      on December 4th, if it existed was in the room then with you  
17      when you were talking to Wilkinson and Noyes?

18      Captain Safford: It was not.

19      Mr. Murphy: Where was it?

20      Captain Safford: I do not know.

21      Mr. Murphy: Well, do you think they knew about it at  
22      that time?

23      Captain Safford: I did.

24      Mr. Murphy: You know they both testified they did not,  
25      don't you?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3 Captain Safford: I believe so.

4 Mr. Murphy: Yes. Now, then (Reading)

5 "I took for granted that #90 "---

6 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield for a moment  
7 before he gets away from this last point?

8 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

9 Senator Lucas: Do I understand, Captain, now you are  
10 talking, - under the heading "Comment" you are talking all the  
11 way through to what you point as the intercepted winds mes-  
12 sage?

13 Captain Safford: The intercepted winds message. That  
14 other message, the false one, had completely gone from my memo-  
15 ry at that time. I had no recollection that we had ever re-  
16 ceived anything but our winds message.

17 Senator Lucas: Yes. Now, that statement that the Con-  
18 gressman just read, which says, "I read the message in  
19 seven's office", - is that Admiral Wilkinson?

20 Captain Safford: Admiral Noyes.

21 Mr. Murphy: Let me just ask one question there. Cap-  
22 tain, you now say that the false winds message was the true  
23 winds message, is that what you say? It was the one that  
24 you were expecting to come by broadcast? I so understood you.  
25 Now, I don't want to confuse you. You go ahead and clear it  
26 up.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: What I have later termed the true winds  
3 message was a false weather report included in and as part of  
4 a general intelligence broadcast or Japanese language, -  
5 where a Japanese language broadcast was made, or a general  
6 intelligence broadcast, however you want to phrase that one.

7 Mr. Murphy: I understand. Excuse me, Senator. Go ahead.

8 Senator Lucas: And the words: "I read the message in  
9 #7's (Admiral Noyes) office and was witness to the dis-  
10 cussion of it between #7 (Admiral Noyes) and #5 (Admiral  
11 Wilkinson and Captain McCollum"

12 As I recall, on yesterday when I examined you on that  
13 point I thought you told me that you sent the message direct  
14 to Admiral Noyes and that you did not see the message any more  
15 until some time when you were investigating with Kramer in  
16 going over the files for Admiral Noyes. Am I wrong in that?  
17 If I am, you correct me.

18 Captain Safford: The original message, the original  
19 intercept with the translation in Kramer's handwriting at the  
20 bottom was sent up to Admiral Noyes' office immediately and I  
21 never saw that message again ever.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, now, what message are you talking  
23 about here in your letter to Kramer when you said, "I read  
24 the message in seven's office"? What message is that you  
25 are talking about?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Captain Safford: I am referring to another message of warning to Admiral Kimmel and I believe there are other addressees who are not important and which Admiral Wilkinson took in with him and showed to Admiral Noyes on that occasion. This is about three, very close to three P.M. on the afternoon of December 4, 1941 and I was permitted to read the message a page at a time. After Admiral Noyes had finished reading a page he would give it to me. I read the whole message once.

Senator Lucas: That is correct. I am wrong and you are right. That was the message that McCollum prepared?

Captain Safford: Yes, ostensibly -- I mean which indicated by telephone number or something, as well as subject, that it had been originated in the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence. McCollum was not there. It was just the three of us, Admiral Wilkinson, or Captain then, Admiral Noyes and myself, in Admiral Noyes' office.

Senator Lucas: That is correct. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, going on. (Reading)

"I took for granted that #90 (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135) (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released) would be sent and did not know otherwise until # 132 (Dec. 2, 1941) (plus 2 years). I believe that I told you about this message and stated that it had been

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from  
3 #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) to #137 (Dec. 7, 1941)."

4 In other words, you were living during that time feeling  
5 that the McCollum dispatch had been sent out?

6 Captain Safford: Had been sent; that is correct, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: Now, did you know that there was some con-  
8 versation subsequent to your departure when the person who  
9 wanted the message sent was shown the "This is a war warn-  
10 ing"? You did not know about that conversation?

11 Captain Safford: I knew nothing about that whatsoever.

12 Mr. Murphy: And the fact that there had been a war warn-  
13 ing message sent out on the 27th of November, you did not know  
14 that?

15 Captain Safford: I believe I had seen, - I had been  
16 permitted to see the "This is a war warning" message of Novem-  
17 ber 27th by the Navy Department/<sup>in</sup>the code room. I believe Ad-  
18 miral Noyes authorized me to go in and look at that message.

19 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

20 "I learned from #19 (Wright) that #9 (McCollum)  
21 knew #90 (Message to #31 originated by #9 (McCollum)  
22 on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) (or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never  
23 released) had not been sent (#19 (Wright) was informed  
24 by #9 (McCollum) at #92 (Pearl Harbor))."

25 What do you mean by that, that Wright was informed?



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 That it was never sent, is that what you mean?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Some "More Questions":

5 "Do you recall #74? (General Intelligence Broadcast  
6 containing false 'Weather Report')."

7 Now, do I understand that you are both telling Kramer  
8 what he should recall and then you ask him if he does recall  
9 it, is that it?

10 Captain Safford: I was describing it and asked him if  
11 he recalled what I described.

12 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

13 "No. 44. Did you know any or all of the circum-  
14 stances of #90. (Message to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) origin-  
15 ated by #9 (McCollum) on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135  
16 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never released.). How much, and when  
17 did you learn it?"

18 You are asking him then if he recalls what you told him  
19 up above, is that right?

20 Captain Safford: I am asking him if it is correct that  
21 I had told him about that message. I thought I had but I was  
22 not certain of it.

23 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

24 "45. When did #9 (McCollum) learn that #90 (Mes-  
25 sages to #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum)

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 on #134 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never  
3 released) had not been released?"

4 You are asking Kramer what he knew about McCollum's  
5 knowledge there, is that it, or were you asking him to ask  
6 McCollum?

7 Captain Safford: I was asking what he knew. He saw  
8 McCollum every day and he might have known something.

9 Mr. Murphy: That is right.

10 Captain Safford: I asked him what he knew.

11 Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

12 "46. Do you know who blocked #90 (Message to  
13 #31 (Admiral Kimmel) originated by #9 (McCollum) on #134  
14 (Dec. 4, 1941) or #135 (Dec. 5, 1941) but never re-  
15 leased ) Or refused to release it? (#5 (Admiral Wilkin-  
16 son) was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had  
17 the authority to release it himself.)

18 "47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?"

19 "One final word -- I do not know how well you know  
20 #18 (Rocheport) I have known him for 18 years. He can  
21 be trusted and will come through for us."

22 Now, what could he come through with you?

23 Shef--  
24 Shack  
25 fls

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Captain Safford: He had served out there, and I had  
3 known him for a long time and knew that he was not preju-  
4 diced against Admiral Kimmel.

5 Mr. Murphy: When you said, "He can be trusted and  
6 will come through for us," you meant you and Kimmel at  
7 that time, or did you mean you and Kramer?

8 Captain Safford: I did not refer to Admiral Kimmel  
9 at that time.

10 Mr. Murphy: You said, "--can be trusted, and will  
11 come through for us." You meant you and Kramer?

12 Captain Safford: Me and Kramer.

13 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now what could be come through  
14 with? Don't you know that Rochefort testified he never  
15 heard of a winds execute message?

16 Captain Safford: I knew that he had not.

17 Mr. Murphy: Then what could you expect him to come  
18 through with, if you knew he had not heard of it? When  
19 did you find out he had not heard of the winds execute  
20 message?

21 Captain Safford: We knew by inference on the 4th of  
22 December that they had not heard it because we received no  
23 report from either Pearl Harbor or from Corregidor, that  
24 they had heard it. We had every reason to believe if they  
25 had heard it, they would send it in to us, but they did

Shack  
fls  
of  
hl

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

1 not.

2 Mr. Murphy: You knew on the 4th of December that  
3 they did not hear it at Pearl Harbor?

4 Captain Safford: We knew on the 4th that they did  
5 not report it.

6 Mr. Murphy: Right.

7 Captain Safford: And by inference that they had not  
8 heard it.

9 Mr. Murphy: Right.

10 Captain Safford: But we did not get a specific report  
11 from them, which I could recall, that they had monitored for  
12 the message. We took for granted that they had. It was  
13 probably submitted and not recalled by me. But I did not  
14 know for certain until two years later, until about the  
15 time Wright came and told me they had listened for it, but  
16 had not heard it.

17 Mr. Murphy: You knew on the 4th of December, didn't  
18 you, or felt certain that Rochefort had not heard it,  
19 because of the way you said it came over?

20 Captain Safford: Yes.

21 Mr. Murphy: Why would this telegram go out? You remember  
22 I asked you about the one going out in the 5th asking them  
23 to get information from Rochefort. My understanding was  
24 that they sent to Hawaii to find out if they had heard any-

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 thing because they had not heard anything in Washington,  
2 and I understood you to say yesterday they had tried to  
3 find the details from Rochefort after you had it already  
4 in. How do you explain that?

5 Captain Safford: I would rather let the people who  
6 sent the telegram explain that rather than myself.

7 Mr. Murphy: That is a rather puzzling circumstance,  
8 isn't it, that on December 5th a message was going to  
9 Hawaii to Rochefort, or to G-2 there, asking him to con-  
10 tact Rochefort, apparently to find out what he knew about  
11 the weather broadcast 24 hours at least, or close thereto,  
12 after you say it had already been in Washington; is that  
13 right?

14 Captain Safford: Right.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, who was it that ever decided,  
16 if there ever had been an execute message, that war would  
17 come two days to Saturday and three days to Sunday? Where  
18 does that come up? Is that good Navy strategy, or is that  
19 your own plan, or what is it? You say in your statement,  
20 "Two days to Saturday and three days to Sunday."

21 I am only a layman. I do not understand those things.  
22 What do you mean by that?

23 Captain Safford: It had been generally believed for  
24 a long time that if Japan did declare war without previous  
25

h3

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4

1 warning, it would come on a week-end or national holiday.

2 A warning message to that effect had been sent out several  
3 months before.

4 Mr. Murphy: Did you know Admiral Kimmel testified  
5 he never heard of such a warning?

6 Captain Safford: I did not know that.

7 Mr. Murphy: He said he never heard of it, because it  
8 went back to Admiral Bloch. That was back in April, wasn't  
9 it?

10 Captain Safford: That was back in April.

11 Mr. Murphy: In February or March there as that Peruvian  
12 message about the attack on Pearl Harbor, wasn't there? Did  
13 you hear of it?

14 Captain Safford: I never heard of it.

15 Mr. Murphy: You never heard of it, not until now?

16 Captain Safford: Not up until this time that I recall.

17 Mr. Murphy: There was a message sent to Pearl Harbor  
18 that came from Tokyo, from Ambassador Grew, that someone  
19 had heard the Peruvian Minister to say there would be an  
20 attack on Pearl Harbor. You never heard of that?

21 Captain Safford: No, I never heard of that.

22 Mr. Murphy: How did you arrive at this week-end busi-  
23 ness? Was that inference, was it the feeling generally in  
24 the Navy that the attack would come on Saturday or Sunday,  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

1 or on a holiday?

2 Captain Safford: I believe that any time there was  
3 a discussion of war, the feeling was expressed by officers  
4 who were experienced that the Japanese would probably begin  
5 their war the way Hitler had begun his war in Europe over  
6 a week-end so as to take the maximum advantage of the dis-  
7 organization of the Government they were attacking by  
8 having their offices closed, and taking some time to get  
9 back into stride again.

10 Mr. Murphy: You feel, do you not, that General Marshall,  
11 Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner, General Gerow, and General  
12 Smith of the Army, all knew, after they got this so-called  
13 message of Thursday, that war was coming Saturday or Sun-  
14 day, did you feel that?

15 Captain Safford: I thought they did at the time.

16 Mr. Murphy: And you felt it too?

17 Captain Safford: I thought so too.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I would like to go to your  
19 message to the committee, and you have on the back page,  
20 a chart. Who drew that chart?

21 Captain Safford: That chart was drawn in my office.

22 Mr. Murphy: By whom?

23 Captain Safford: By Lieutenant Stenback and myself.  
24 The actual drawing was done by Lieutenant Stenback, who is  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

h6

in the room assisting me. I am responsible for the date supplies.

Mr. Murphy: That was done by Admiral Stenback?

Captain Safford: Lieutenant Stenback.

Mr. Murphy: Lieutenant Stenback who is in the room with you, and just to the rear, at the table, with another lieutenant from the Navy who was also, I assume, assisting you?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: He drew this chart?

Captain Safford: He drew this chart.

Mr. Murphy: What was the basis for it? I see noted on here "prepared January 25, 1946." I see here "Attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7," and some other things.

What is it meant to convey?

c4

Captain Safford: It is trying to put down in one place all data concerning distances, day and night, which has a great effect on receivability conditions of shortwave radio, time of the day, and anything which was on record and available which would plot in the receivability conditions of Bainbridge Island, and also the FCC station at Portland, Oregon, from a few odds and ends of information we had, and Cheltenham, Maryland, with particular reference to the JAP 1330 GCT schedule on the 4th of



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

December, 1941.

Mr. Murphy: Are the FCC intercepts on here?

Captain Safford: The only ones that I have any personal knowledge of.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, the FCC intercepts that we have in evidence here aren't on here, are they?

Captain Safford: They are on there, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Where? Where do you see the one that turned out to be the false weather report?

Captain Safford: There (indicating).

Mr. Murphy: I show you the exhibit which is attached to your statement.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And I ask you if you will mark with an "X" the FCC intercept which is shown on page 3(b) of Exhibit 142.

Captain Safford: May I see that?

Mr. Murphy: This one here (indicating).

That says it is a weather message from Station JW3, transmitted approximately 2200 gmt, December 4, 1941.

Captain Safford: There is an "X".

Mr. Murphy: All right. The witness makes an "X" in pencil.

Now, then, I show you page 3(c), a weather message from

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h8

1 the Tokyo station JW3 transmitted at approximately 2130  
2 gmt, December 5, 1941, and ask you if you will put an "X"  
3 on your chart to show that one.

4 Captain Safford: Here is a second one right here  
5 (indicating). We will make a small "x".

6 Mr. Murphy: You mean it was received on the same day  
7 at the same time?

8 Captain Safford: It was received on the 5th. This  
9 one (indicating) is an hour earlier in time. This chart  
10 here, in order to get enough data, was made during the  
11 entire period. We monitored all of these intercepts that  
12 we have any record on. This is Greenwich time.

13 Mr. Murphy: Is there anything in any chart before us  
14 that would indicate to anyone that these two messages are  
15 in it until you now put an "X" in there?

16 Captain Safford: The FCC intercepts are indicated  
17 with an "X" and the dates were noted, and they were correctly  
18 plotted as to time and frequency.

19 Mr. Murphy: Where do you find the dates noted?

20 Captain Safford: With a small letter "x".

21 Mr. Murphy: I see. December 4?

22 Captain Safford: December 4 and December 5.

23 Mr. Murphy: The "December" is obliterated.

24 Captain Safford: December 5 and December 4 are marked  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h9

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

there (indicating).

Mr. Keefe: Is it there, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Murphy: I do not know, but I am assured it is.

Captain Safford: It is there.

Mr. Richardson: It is there.

Mr. Murphy: Yes; it is "December 5" and "December 4"  
with two small "x's".

Captain Safford: I just wanted this unobliterated.

AL  
fls

W. S. SUTTON HEAD - JAS 6 GRA 4

Shack (5) am  
 Follows  
 Hook  
 AL-1

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: You better get a copy so you can have it  
 2 marked.

3 As I understand it, sir, where you have put the two  
 4 x's there are two small x's on there, very small.

5 Captain Safford: Yes, already plotted.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now there was a message which Captain Kramer  
 7 was supposed to have thrown in the waste basket. Is that  
 8 on there, and the time that that was received, the one they  
 9 thought was a proper message and then he threw it in the  
 10 waste basket? Which one would it be? Will you mark that  
 11 one with an "A"?

12 Captain Safford: It would be one of these probably  
 13 indicated by the little bits of dots here, but I could  
 14 not specify which one. Those were all press broadcasts and  
 15 it could be any one of those which came in the night.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now is the intercept of December 7, rela-  
 17 tions with England being strained, on that chart?

18 Captain Safford: That would be shown in one of these  
 19 long spaces here (indicating).

20 Mr. Murphy: Is it indicated by you in any way so  
 21 anyone examining that chart would ever find it? Is there  
 22 any notation or any reference to it?

23 Captain Safford: That message was not specifically  
 24 noted.  
 25

Shack (5) am  
 Follows  
 Hook  
 AL-1

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: You better get a copy so you can have it  
 2 marked.

3 As I understand it, sir, where you have put the two  
 4 x's there are two small x's on there, very small.

5 Captain Safford: Yes, already plotted.

6 Mr. Murphy: Now there was a message which Captain Kramer  
 7 was supposed to have thrown in the waste basket. Is that  
 8 on there, and the time that that was received, the one they  
 9 thought was a proper message and then he threw it in the  
 10 waste basket? Which one would it be? Will you mark that  
 11 one with an "A"?

12 Captain Safford: It would be one of these probably  
 13 indicated by the little bits of dots here, but I could  
 14 not specify which one. Those were all press broadcasts and  
 15 it could be any one of those which came in the night.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now is the intercept of December 7, rela-  
 17 tions with England being strained, on that chart?

18 Captain Safford: That would be shown in one of these  
 19 long spaces here (indicating).

20 Mr. Murphy: Is it indicated by you in any way so  
 21 anyone examining that chart would ever find it? Is there  
 22 any notation or any reference to it?

23 Captain Safford: That message was not specifically  
 24 noted.  
 25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: Right. Is there anything on that chart  
2 that would show the hidden words messages and their receipt?

3 Captain Safford: Not specifically.

4 Mr. Murphy: Is there anything at all that anyone would  
5 find if they were to read that chart, without your explana-  
6 tion or without something added to it, about hidden words?

7 Captain Safford: It included all the other Tokyo trans-  
8 missions which could be heard at Bainbridge Island in this  
9 range of frequencies.

10 Mr. Murphy: What station was radio station JW-3?  
11 Where was that located?

12 Captain Safford: That was in Japan.

13 Mr. Murphy: JW-3 was in Japan?

14 Captain Safford: Yes. That is in Japan, near Tokyo.

15 Mr. Murphy: And JW-3 on the second one would be the  
16 same one?

17 Captain Safford: Would be the same one.

18 Mr. Murphy: That would be at Tokyo. Then there is  
19 nothing on here to show what station received those messages  
20 in America, is there, on these Exhibits 3(b) and 3(c)?

21 Captain Safford: They were received from the FCC  
22 monitoring station at Portland, Oregon. It is not on this,  
23 but it is on the letter of transmittal, and I have it here.  
24 the FCC intercept, Portland, Oregon.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: All right, thank you. Now I just want  
3 to clear one thing up and I am through with the letter.

4 You referred in that letter to paragraph 50, as I re-  
5 member it, in the Roberts Report. Do you have a copy of it  
6 there now?

7 Captain Safford: I have the report.

8 Mr. Murphy: Was that paragraph 50 you spoke of, the  
9 message described in paragraph 50, page IX-XI?

10 Captain Safford: Yes.

11 Mr. Murphy: That reads as follows:

12 "About noon Eastern Standard Time, 6:30 a.m. Honolulu  
13 Time, December 7, an additional warning message indicating  
14 an almost immediate breaking of relations between the United  
15 States and Japan was discussed by the Chief of Staff after  
16 conference with the Chief of Naval Operations for the in-  
17 formation of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every  
18 effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the  
19 briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the  
20 control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent  
21 message was delayed until after the attack."

22 Now, as I understand it, you were asked what you knew  
23 about that particular transaction.

24 Captain Safford: I believe so. What is the question  
25 number, please, that that referred to?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Murphy  
Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 Mr. Murphy: It is that little asterisk under 33,  
3 Captain.

4 Captain Safford: That is correct.

5 Mr. Murphy: I think it is clear. It is clear to me  
6 what you mean. You understood what you meant, did you not?

7 Captain Safford: Yes.

8 Mr. Murphy: Captain, I promised yesterday that I would  
9 get the Clark Report. The Clark Report is here. I am not  
10 going to question you in detail about it, but I think you  
11 will find in the Clark Report that is before you that this  
12 Friedman about whom you spoke yesterday denied there was  
13 any basis whatever for any allegation about General Marshall  
14 ordering certain papers destroyed.

15 With that I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Vice Chairman: Are you through?

17 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster would be next.  
19 He is not present.

20 Congressman Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, the methods of transmittal  
22 that were used in the 14-parts message was that code or  
23 cipher?

24 Captain Safford: That would technically be called a  
25 cipher, but we use the word "code" loosely to mean both.



Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1           Mr. Gearhart: But technically speaking, the method  
2 they used was the cipher method in transmitting that long  
3 14-parts message?

4           Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5           Mr. Gearhart: Now a cipher can be analyzed and broken  
6 down by expert study, a study by experts?

7           Captain Safford: In some cases.

8           Mr. Gearhart: That is, if it is not too good a cipher?

9           Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

10           Mr. Gearhart: Now in this instance the 14 parts com-  
11 prised a very long document, did they not?

12           Captain Safford: Very long indeed.

13           Mr. Gearhart: Now if we had a very long document in  
14 a cipher and were immediately thereafter supplied with its  
15 translation into English, and it was a cipher, the probabilities  
16 are that cipher experts would break down that cipher and be  
17 able to interpret future messages very quickly?

18           Captain Safford: That all depends upon the system used.

19           Mr. Gearhart: Some are harder than others, but if you  
20 have a long cipher extending over pages and then you have  
21 its translation into plain, simple English, and you lay  
22 them down side by side, that is a pretty good lead to an expert  
23 in breaking that cipher, isn't it?

24           Captain Safford: It is a help, on the ciphers that can  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 be broken, but it is no help on the ciphers that cannot be  
3 broken.

4 Senator Lucas: Captain, I still have a little trouble  
5 hearing you.

6 Captain Safford: I am sorry, Senator.

7 Mr. Gearhart: The point I was leading up to, I got the  
8 impression that the Japanese changed that cipher immediately  
9 afterwards. Is that correct?

10 Captain Safford: After when?

11 Mr. Gearhart: After December 7, or after the message  
12 was delivered, I guess that was on December 7, at 1:00 o'clock,  
13 wasn't it?

14 Captain Safford: The cipher key was changed every day  
15 at midnight, Tokyo time, as a matter of routine, or standard  
16 practice, but that cipher system remained in effect long  
17 after December 7, 1941. I do not know just how long.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Was not that a very strange thing, in  
19 view of the fact they had delivered a message when they knew  
20 we had intercepted their cipher as well, or were reasonably  
21 certain of it?

22 Captain Safford: The Japanese on previous occasions  
23 had given the U.S. Government numerous notes in English  
24 which had to be translated to our government, and they kept  
25 on using the same old machine. I cannot speak for the Japanese,

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 but it was apparent to us that they thought their cipher  
2 was as secure as the U.S. high-grade cipher actually was.

3 Mr. Gearhart: There were so many very strange performances  
4 on the part of the Japanese it is kind of hard for us to  
5 decide what is rational and what is not.

6 For instance, the gentleman from Pennsylvania became  
7 very excited about the fact that they had sent, as you con-  
8 tended, on December 4 a message that said they were contem-  
9 plating military action in two or three days. Why would  
10 they send a war warning to any place? Well, if that were  
11 foolish, absurd, out-of-line, then how ridiculous becomes  
12 the sending of the winds execute on the 7th or 8th? As  
13 between the two which is the more absurd?  
14

15 Captain Safford: We did not understand it. It was  
16 just a fact.

17 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, sending the winds execute  
18 on the 7th or 8th, after it had already been on all the  
19 civilian radios, and after it had been in the newspapers,  
20 makes that action still more absurd, does it not, than any-  
21 thing they could have done in the way of advanced warning  
22 theretofore?

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Now you have testified, haven't you,  
25 that the message of the 4th was sent in Morse code, that is

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 by the dot and dash method?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: You also testified you are convinced  
5 that that was a directional broadcast?

6 Captain Safford: The Japanese told us it was going to  
7 be a directional broadcast, or supposed to survey certain  
8 area where they would use the frequency suited to reach that  
9 area at that time of day and season of the year.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And being a directional broadcast directed  
11 towards Europe, because of climatic conditions and other  
12 scientific phenomenon that message could also be received  
13 on the East Coast of the United States?

14 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: And being directed to Europe and being  
16 directed to the East Coast, the same scientific phenomenon  
17 caused it not to be heard on the West Coast of the United  
18 States, is that correct?

19 Captain Safford: That is correct.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Now about the interpretation. Technically  
21 speaking, the literal translation would indicate that rela-  
22 tions with the United States were dangerous, is that not  
23 correct?

24 Captain Safford: That is a literal translation of that  
25 part referring to the United States.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Mr. Gearhart: It was understood by you, and by the other officers with whom you immediately discussed it, as indicating relations with the United States meant war, that "dangerous" meant war?

Captain Safford: The importance given to that message before we intercepted it by my superior officers, and also the senior officers in the War Department and their worry for fear it might have been sent out before the 20th of November when we started to listen for it, or the fear we might have failed to catch it, made me believe that it meant much more than the mere diplomatic relations becoming serious.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

hl  
fls  
AL

1 Mr. Gearhart: And when it did arrive, you naturally  
2 interpreted it in the light of other information that you  
3 had already had called to your attention?

4 Captain Safford: There was considerable information  
5 available at that time, and immediately prior thereto,  
6 which indicated that Japan was considering war against  
7 England and against America, and was definitely maintaining  
8 peaceful relations with Russia, as a matter of policy.

9 There was other information which indicated that the  
10 actual outbreak of war was going to occur in the rather  
11 near future. But this had seemed more important than any  
12 of those other messages individually, because this seemed  
13 to be a commitment of the Japanese Government to some  
14 course of action, whereas the other messages were more  
15 hints, or you might say statements of intent.

16 Mr. Gearhart: The very fact that the Japanese Govern-  
17 ment considered it important to notify all of its nationals  
18 all over the world, that were in the diplomatic and military  
19 activities, that they would convey to him in a false weather  
20 report, a pronounced deterioration of relations, indicated  
21 that they would not do so unless there was a very important  
22 idea to convey?

23 Captain Safford: Unless there was compelling reason.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Some compelling reason.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h2

1           Then, when you interpreted this winds warning, and  
2 the giving of the code to the Japanese nationals as import-  
3 ant, you had to interpret the deadline message which had  
4 passed over your desk as adding importance to that fact?  
5 Is that not true?

6           Captain Safford: The importance of the winds message  
7 built up up to the point of its actual receipt.

8           Mr. Gearhart: That is right. The importance of the  
9 winds message was built up by other messages which were  
10 going over your desk, with which you were familiar?

11           Captain Safford: Yes.

12           Mr. Gearhart: One of those was the so-called deadline  
13 message advising you that on the 29th something automati-  
14 cally would begin to happen, you did not mean that they  
15 were not to do something of no consequence, but something  
16 of very great consequence, following the 29th day of  
17 November, 1941, isn't that correct?

18           Captain Safford: That was very definitely implied.

19           Mr. Gearhart: Then another series of messages had  
20 a very emphatic impression upon you, and those were the  
21 messages that had to do with the instructions to the  
22 Japanese nationals beyond the borders of Japan, to destroy  
23 their codes; is that not correct?

24           Captain Safford : Yes, but that did not seem anywhere  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h3

c9

1 near as important as the winds message, although it came  
2 in two or three days earlier. It was one of the things  
3 that built up the winds message in importance.

4 Mr. Gearhart: That is right. That is what I am  
5 trying to bring out, that these other messages built up  
6 the importance of the winds message, and winds execute,  
7 that you were waiting for?

8 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Gearhart: And also in addition to that, you knew  
10 that other persons were impressed by this series of mes-  
11 sages that were coming in, because it was brought to your  
12 attention, was it not, that the United States directed her  
13 consular agents and embassies in the Far East to destroy  
14 their codes?

15 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: So there was only one interpretation  
17 that you could possibly give to the Japanese phrase "Reja-  
18 tions with the United States dangerous," that that would  
19 mean when you received it, that relations with the United  
20 States had resulted in war?

21 Captain Safford: Correct.

22 Mr. Gearhart: And you have testified that when you  
23 were finally allowed to search the records, if you ever  
24 were, you found that all records, and reference to this  
25

Larry fls.  
12M

REPRODUCED FROM THE ORIGINAL RECORDS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



Witness Safford                      Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h4

1     code had been destroyed, or had disappeared from the  
2     files?

3             Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

4             Mr. Gearhart: Have you been permitted the privilege  
5     of looking at file 7001 since you left the office that  
6     you were then connected with?

7             Captain Safford: I was loaned that file in 1944, and  
8     permitted to look myself. I also questioned Harrison  
9     who had been the custodian at that time in December 1941,  
10    and he said he knew nothing whatsoever about it at all.

11            Mr. Gearhart: You know the members of this committee  
12    have been denied the right to look at that 7001 file, so  
13    you aren't the only one who have been denied the privilege.

14            Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I challenge that state-  
15    ment.

16            Mr. Gearhart: The Senator hasn't forgotten the motion  
17    that was made?

18            Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I challenge that state-  
19    ment. I will go down with the Congressman this afternoon  
20    if he wants to look at 7001. The committee has the right  
21    to appoint a subcommittee to go down and look at that  
22    file.

23            Senator Ferguson: It seems that the memory of the Senator  
24    is very short. You made a motion to that effect, and the  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h5

1 vote was 6 to 4 denying us the right to go down and  
2 look at the file.

3 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, that was to prevent  
4 individual members from snooping and sniping and going  
5 on a fishing expedition into all of the files down there.

6 Mr. Gearhart: I might say that the Senator from  
7 Illinois has indicated that he is willing to go snooping  
8 and sniping with me this afternoon in violation of the  
9 motion.

10 Senator Lucas: The motion that prevailed was that  
11 a subcommittee could go down and look at the files and  
12 the chairman appointed that subcommittee. If the Congress-  
13 man from California is not satisfied as to what counsel  
14 has told him, and what the Navy Department has told him  
15 about 7001, I will be delighted as a member of the sub-  
16 committee to go and look at that file.

17 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman --

18 The Vice Chairman: Just a moment. Can't we get  
19 along with the witness and decide these matters later?  
20 This witness doesn't know anything about what the committee  
21 has done. I hope we can proceed with the Captain. We  
22 have detained him here for a long time. Let's get along  
23 with his testimony. He couldn't know about what the committee  
24 has decided to do or not to do.  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, just one thing --

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I agree with the Chairman that the witness does not know what the committee did, but I now ask that 7001 of the Navy be brought here in open session so that we can question this witness about it and all data relating to that file.

The Vice Chairman: Counsel will observe that request.

Senator Ferguson: I want to have it when I examine the witness.

Mr. Gearhart: And I would like to have 7000 and 7002 also brought, so that we can have some idea of the sequence.

Mr. Richardson: There is a photostatic copy available of the file.

Senator Ferguson: I would like to see that now.

Mr. Masten: That is all part of Exhibit 142.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that Exhibit 142 shows all of these numbers, and it has been in the committee's hands, each individual, for about one week.

The Vice Chairman: Proceed.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I want to make one further statement. If the photostatic copies are not sufficient, in the opinion of the Senator from Michigan and the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h7

1 Congressman from California, I will be delighted to go  
2 down and have them look at the originals. If they cannot  
3 trust the Navy Department to give us true photostatic  
4 copies of what is in 7001, then I am willing, as a member  
5 of the subcommittee to go into the Navy Department files  
6 and take a look.

7 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I know of no subcom-  
8 mittee being appointed, but I want to call attention to  
9 what has been handed to me as a photostatic copy of the  
10 file.

11 This is one sheet. At the top in red stamp is  
12 TOP SECRET - ULTRA. Then in pencil in parentheses, the  
13 letters Y-P-E-D. Then there is typewritten JD-1:7001.  
14 Typewritten number cancelled.

15 Now, at the bottom in writing, in ink, 7001; in  
16 stamp TOP SECRET-ULTRA.

17 Now that is the thing that is given to the committee  
18 as the file. I would take it that merely indicates that  
19 there is no evidence now in the Navy Department that there  
20 is a file 7001, but that the number for that file is  
21 cancelled.

22 That is what I am handed. Is that correct, counsel?

23 Mr. Kaufman: I don't think so.

24 Senator Ferguson: Then will you explain that sheet of  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h8

1 paper? I assumed there was a file with that number on  
2 it, and nothing in it.

3 Now, what is that sheet?

4 Mr. Kaufman: I think that is one of the binding  
5 sheets, and it is part of the rest of the exhibit, and  
6 the photostats. It is part of that volume of file.

7 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand all the others  
8 papers in this binder is the file 7001 JD-1? Is that  
9 right, Commander Baecher?

10 Commander Baecher: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: What is right then, that just the  
12 number is cancelled and there is no file down there?

13 Commander Baecher: That is a sheet of paper in the  
14 file such as any other sheet on which would be written  
15 the message with the number.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, is there a file?

17 Commander Baecher: There is.

18 Mr. Richardson: The file is the sheet of paper -- or  
19 it is bound sheets of paper -- that cover a long period  
20 of time. This is one sheet of paper in the file. We have  
21 offered in one of our exhibits here all of the sheets of  
22 paper which precede that sheet and all of the sheets of  
23 paper which follow that sheet, for the purpose of showing  
24 the nature of the whole file. If you go down to look at  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h9

1 this specific file, you will just get a blank sheet of  
2 paper which says on it "File cancelled."

3 Senator Ferguson: Just what I read?

4 Mr. Richardson: Just what you read, that is right.

5 The question here, Mr. Chairman, is, as I understand  
6 it, that that sheet of paper is in effect a substitute  
7 for a true sheet of paper which might have contained the  
8 winds execute message that this witness is talking about.

9 Of course, we know nothing about it except that sheet  
10 of paper. We have offered Exhibit 142, all of the preceding  
11 sheets, and what they are about, which are on the 2nd of  
12 December and the 3rd day of December, in this file, in this  
13 bound volume of sheets of paper, as I understand it.

14 Then we have shown that in the next page, which would  
15 be 7002, we again pick up the second and third of December,  
16 for the purpose of indicating, at least by analysis, that  
17 a sheet of paper in the place where this 7001 cancellation  
18 is, couldn't have referred to a document on December 4,  
19 because you don't reach December 4 until further pages in  
20 advance.

21 Then we have also in Exhibit No. 142, submitted the  
22 subject matter that is involved in the earlier sheets and in  
23 the later sheets, to show the subject matter had no relation  
24 whatever to the subject of the winds code.

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h10

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Now, then, that is purely a mechanical method of recital in order to see if there can be spelled out what 7001 originally was.

We also show in Exhibit 142, a number of other messages other sheets of paper, which appear in this general compilation, that are marked cancelled at different portions of the year, to show that a cancellation of a sheet is not an unheard of proceeding.

AL  
fls

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O 354-4

aCharity (3) am  
 follows  
 Hook  
 AL-1

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Now, that is all physically that you could see if you  
 2 went and looked at this file, and whatever inference the  
 3 Senator of the committee may draw from that constituted the  
 4 only answer that can be made to the fact that in that file  
 5 is a blanked sheet 7001 that is marked cancelled.

6 Senator Lucas: What date was that?

7 Mr. Richardson: That would be in a group of sheets  
 8 that run on December 2 and December 3.

9 Senator Ferguson: Counsel, I would like to call attention  
 10 to some of these others as being cancelled. I have examined  
 11 this and have read it carefully and I think that every one  
 12 of them that are cancelled, every number that is cancelled  
 13 is initialled and the date is put on when it is initialled  
 14 as being cancelled by a person, he initials the cancellation,  
 15 but on this particular one "No. cancelled" there is nothing  
 16 on it except what I have read.

17 Now, I would like to have the file brought to this  
 18 committee room so that the witness may be examined in relation  
 19 to what other papers there are and so that the committee  
 20 may see once for all this file and that we can settle this  
 21 matter of a number.

22 The Vice Chairman: Permit me to inquire of counsel,  
 23 is there any reason why the responsible official of the  
 24 Navy Department who is the custodian of this file could not  
 25



AL-2

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 appear here with the file with the understanding that it  
2 will be examined here and returned to him and taken back  
3 to the Navy Department?

4 Commander Bechner: May I discuss that with counsel, sir?

5 The Vice Chairman: All right. Discuss that with counsel  
6 and we will get a report on it.

7 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman --

8 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I will not yield further.  
9 I have only a few more questions.

10 The Vice Chairman: Go ahead, Mr. Gearhart.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, this file 7001 was preceded by  
12 a file of 7002, was it not?

13 Captain Safford: Correct.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Can you explain to us what the system  
15 is in giving numbers to files of this kind? Do they repre-  
16 sent subjects or do they represent chronological successions  
17 in respect to time transactions?

18 Captain Safford: Approximately chronological but  
19 the dates have often got mixed up. You will find many places  
20 in the file where messages were inserted out of turn, out  
21 of their order of translation. I think Captain Kramer can  
22 give a better answer to that than myself because his office  
23 actually filed and put the numbers on them.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Generally speaking they are chronological  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 in respect to time?

2 Captain Safford: Generally.

3 Mr. Gearhart: But because some papers are retained on  
4 the desks of different officers a day or so sometimes papers  
5 get into the file that are subsequent in point of time of  
6 action, that occasionally happened?

7 Captain Safford: May I explain it this way --

8 Mr. Gearhart: Will you please explain it.

9 Captain Safford: The least important messages in the  
10 minor systems often were out of turn, delayed two or three  
11 days behind the more important messages. I think that is  
12 most likely the reason for the mix-up.

13 Mr. Gearhart: In whose charge were these files?

14 Captain Safford: They were in Captain Kramer's.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Was this a file of Captain Kramer's  
16 office or was it a file of the Navy Department generally  
17 speaking?

18 Captain Safford: It was entirely separate from any  
19 Navy Department files. These translations of intercepts  
20 were not permitted in the Navy Department files. This is a  
21 special file kept in -- all the files were in Captain Kramer's  
22 safe.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Then the file itself was in use for some  
24 time if the numbers had gotten as high as 7000. Did they  
25 start from one?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
Senator Ferguson

(4)

1 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, they started from 1 at  
2 the beginning of the calendar year 1941 and worked up a  
3 little about 8,000 by the 31st of December 1941.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Now, from your observation of the file  
5 was the file 7,001 in a proper position to have contained  
6 the messages you have described?

7 Captain Safford: There was this, you might call it  
8 guide card, or dummy, between 7,000 and 7,002. All the  
9 papers were in the proper chronological order. In fact,  
10 I went through the whole month of December to be certain  
11 that that particular message might not be correctly numbered  
12 but inserted out of turn and it was not there. I did not  
13 look outside of the month of December 1941 for it.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Then 7,001 is a file that might have  
15 contained the message you have testified to, the winds  
16 execute?

17 Captain Safford: It could have.

18 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

19 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will  
20 inquire, Captain.

21 Senator Ferguson: Captain, I wish you would look at  
22 this paper. It was handed to me as this cancelled file.  
23 I want to call your attention to it. The page before.  
24 This is at the bottom of the page. Translated 12-3-41. In  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 parenthesis 5. That is at the bottom of the page. That  
2 is the message before. And on the page following it is  
3 "Translated 12-3-41". In parenthesis "A". Now, if those  
4 two papers when that file arrives here are in that file,  
5 would that indicate that messages coming in or translated  
6 on the 3rd would be in that file or could be in that file?  
7 Will you look at just what I am talking about, please.

8 (A document was handed to Captain Safford.)

9 Senator Ferguson: Look at the bottom of the two pages,  
10 the one in front of it and the one in back of it.

11 Captain Safford: Yes. Now will you repeat the question.

12 Senator Ferguson: The question is, the page before  
13 this cancelled number and the page after being dated as  
14 translated the 3rd of December would that indicate that  
15 this so-called winds message that you are talking about  
16 could have been in that JD-1: 7001 file?

17 Captain Safford: It could be because there was only  
18 one day out.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, in your department -- yours  
20 was the Communications Section, was it not?

21 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Was that a file and a file number  
23 in the Communications Section or in what section was this  
24 file?  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Captain Safford: It was in a file of the Translation  
2 Section which was a part of the Far Eastern Section of  
3 Naval Intelligence which had office space immediately ad-  
4 jacent to the rooms occupied by the section under my command  
5 and for which I was entirely and fully responsible.

6 Senator Ferguson: Do I understand that the Communications  
7 Section itself did not have files, they relied upon the  
8 Intelligence Section which had the office next door and the  
9 Translation Section for their filing; is that correct?

10 Captain Kramer: Not in the case of these diplomatic  
11 messages. We had no files whatsoever of our own with the  
12 exception that we did have a complete file of the intercepted  
13 messages as they came in. Not the translations.

14 Senator Ferguson: Is that the one that is missing, is  
15 that the file 7001 that is missing or cancelled -- it doesn't  
16 appear to be missing, it is just marked on that "cancelled".

17 Captain Safford: That belonged to Commander Kramer's  
18 file or the Naval Intelligence file.

19 Senator Ferguson: Do you know of your own knowledge  
20 who had the right to cancel a file and not to initial it?

21 Captain Safford: To my knowledge nobody had that right.

22 Senator Ferguson: When did you first look for file  
23 7001 -- do I have to use the JD, is that part of that number?

24 Captain Safford: J is "Jap-Dip", and "1" means 1941.  
25

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Then I should refer to what?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever look for that file?

5 Captain Safford: I looked throughout all of the messages  
6 for the month of December 1941 personally. It had been  
7 looked for before and then I asked permission to make a  
8 personal search. It was not there.

9 Senator Ferguson: And when did you do that personal  
10 search of yours?

11 Captain Safford: Before I testified before Admiral Hart.  
12 I cannot recall the date. I had known it couldn't be located,  
13 the guide card, for a long time, but the personal search to  
14 see that it might not be mislaid in the wrong order was  
15 made just before I testified I believe before Admiral Hart.

16 Senator Ferguson: Who had custody of and who was in  
17 charge of files which included JD-1: 7001? Who would be  
18 the custodian and in charge of files that contained that  
19 number?

20 Captain Safford: In December 1941?

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

22 Captain Safford: The individual custodian was  
23 Lieutenant Commander H. S. Harrison, U.S. Naval Reserve.

24 Senator Ferguson: And he was in what section?

25 Captain Safford: He was attached, we might call it on

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 temporary duty, in Opnav 20-GZ, under Commander Kramer,  
3 assisting him. He was not a language officer.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, who followed Kramer and Harrison  
5 to your knowledge?

6 Captain Safford: There was a general change of organiza-  
7 tion in early 1942 and I am not familiar with the details  
8 of it.

9 Senator Ferguson: You are not familiar with that?

10 Captain Safford: No, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: How long did you keep your position  
12 that you had on the 7th?

13 Captain Safford: Until the 15th of February 1942.

14 Senator Ferguson: Were there any charges ever placed  
15 against you in the Navy Department?

16 Captain Safford: No, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Were you removed from that position  
18 for any reason that you know of?

19 Captain Safford: For no reason that was ever explained  
20 to me. They split the organization up into several component  
21 parts and I was given the part which was considered by  
22 Admiral Noyes, I believe, to be the most important, our  
23 own codes and ciphers, because we were better off at that  
24 time, for two or three months, in the solution of foreign  
25 codes and ciphers, than we were in the production of our own.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 We had just made it and we were on the ragged edge as re -  
2 gards distribution and production for the increasing demands  
3 of war.

4 Senator Ferguson: Then the fact that you left your  
5 position in February of 1942 was due to a change in the  
6 organization set-up, and you went to a position in the same  
7 organization excepting one part of it, is that correct?

8 Captain Safford: The organization under me from 1936  
9 until 1941 had included the design and production of our  
10 own codes and ciphers. That was another subsection, which  
11 has never been mentioned here because it has nothing to do  
12 with this investigation. I took that over when it was split  
13 up. There were further changes made at some unknown time  
14 and a lot of responsibilities which had been under Naval  
15 Intelligence at that time were transferred to Naval  
16 Communications and I am not close enough to it to possibly  
17 speak with any degree of accuracy.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you remain in a very responsible  
19 position in relation to codes, ciphers and messages as far  
20 as our war effort was concerned?

21 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: And how long did you remain in that  
23 highly responsible position?

24 Captain Safford: There was a further subdivision  
25



Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2 about I believe September 1942 whereby the production was  
3 separated from the pure research and development of new  
4 and superior systems and I took the research over at that  
5 time. I think it was generally conceded I was the best  
6 officer qualified in the Navy to do that particular type of  
7 work. And another officer who served under me took over  
8 the production.

9  
10 Senator Ferguson: Now, was that a highly important  
11 position in our war effort?

12  
13 Captain Safford: It was highly important and highly  
14 specialized.

15  
16 Senator Ferguson: And how long did you remain in that  
17 position?

18  
19 Captain Safford: I am still in that position.

20  
21 Senator Ferguson: You are still in that position?

22  
23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24  
25 Senator Ferguson: Now, has anyone brought any charges  
in any way against you in relation to your neglect up to  
and including the 7th of December 1941?

26  
27 Captain Safford: No, sir.

28  
29 Senator Ferguson: Have you ever been charged with any  
neglect or let's say malfeasance and nonfeasance?

30  
31 Captain Safford: No, sir.

32  
33 Senator Ferguson: Or misfeasance?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was there ever an investigation made as to your office as to why you didn't get that 1:00 o'clock message which came in and was known from 5 to 6 o'clock to the White House, to General Marshall or Admiral Stark?

Captain Safford: The nearest thing to that came in a statement from Admiral Noyes. He said the Roberts Commission "has given your outfit a clean bill of health".

Senator Ferguson: That is the only thing?

Captain Safford: Or words to that effect. That is the only thing that remotely relates to an investigation.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1           Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it you never  
2 received any criticism for not being down on Sunday morning?

3           Captain Safford: No, sir.

4           Senator Ferguson: What was your day off, as we call  
5 it? When was your leave day, as you call it in the Navy?

6           Captain Safford: Sunday was my regular day off.

7           Senator Ferguson: That was your regular day off?

8           Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

9           Senator Ferguson: Was your office alerted to war  
10 on Saturday and Sunday?

11          Captain Safford: Yes, it was.

12          Senator Ferguson: Do you know why? Did you ever  
13 make an investigation as to why this message of one o'clock  
14 delivery and the 14-part -- the 14th part of the 14-part  
15 message was not decoded and translated -- as I understand  
16 it it was in English so it didn't need translation -- but  
17 polished up and taken to the respective men prior to the  
18 time it was taken?

19          Captain Safford: That particular one o'clock message  
20 turned out to be Japanese when it was decoded. I was made  
21 an investigation. I asked the officers concerned. Brother-  
22 hood knew what it meant, or thought he knew what it meant,  
23 and he called Kramer on the telephone and then he sent  
24 the message over to the Army to be translated.  
25

hl  
fls  
AL

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h2

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Senator Ferguson: I didn't get the name of the man who was telephoned.

Captain Safford: Captain Kramer.

Senator Ferguson: Here is what I am trying to get at. If you were on a war basis, if you were fully alerted, you anticipated trouble that morning, why didn't we get more speed in your office and every other office in Washington, as far as you were concerned? Why did we have these lapses of time when we were all alerted to war?

Captain Safford: The message was decoded very promptly.

Sunday, December 7, was one of those days on which we were fortunate enough to acquire the key to the purple machine before it became effective and was ever used. The same thing had been true of the day before, for the 6th. We had acquired the key in advance. I believe we sent one of those -- I am speaking by guesswork now --

Senator Ferguson: I don't want you to guess. We can't act up here on guesses, and we want to keep guesses out.

Captain Safford: We had sent those keys out more than 28 hours in advance. We had believed we furnished them to the Army. I am not positive of that. The Army had them anyhow, and therefore we were in a position to read those messages off, or we thought we were just as fast as the Japanese could do it, except for the question of translation