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## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

## SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: KAWABE, Torashiro

Having been duly sworn in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I do hereby depose and say as follows:

1. I, KAWABE, Torashiro, was the senior member of the Second Section (in charge of operations) of the General Staff, Tokyo, from April, 1929 to January, 1932.

Referring to the series of telegram copies, contained in Def. Doc. # 2048 A-P, I affirm that B, D, F, L, M and N are correct copies of those telegrams which were drafted by my section (mostly by myself) and despatched to the Commander of Kwantung Army or his Chief of Staff under the name of the Chief of General Staff or the Vice-Chief of General Staff. The telegram embodied in E was received by the General Staff from the Kwantung Army and I remember that I read it at that time. C, G, H, I, J and K are copies of telegrams despatched from the War Ministry to the Kwantung Army. Although they dealt with matters not under the jurisdiction of the

General Staff, I was acquainted with the fact that these telegrams were dispatched at that time because of the business contact between the War Ministry and the General Staff.

2. I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from August, 1934, to March, 1936, and the Chief of the Second Section (in charge of intelligence) from August, 1935, within that period. Lieutenant-Colonel TANAKA, Ryukichi, was my subordinate, as a staff officer attached to the Second Section.

In December, 1935, General MINAMI arrived at his post as Commander of Kwantung Army and Ambassador plenipotentiary to Manchukuo. After his arrival, the General gave officers and men frequent instructions, the majority of which were drafted by me as a matter of duty. These instructions were made naturally to serve different purposes of respective occasions, but there were two ideas consistently running through all, namely, (1) respect for and assistance to independent Manchukuo, and (2) self-reflection and elimination of the vain feeling of Japanese superiority. I remember that whenever these two were contained in the draft of an instruction, I could obtain the signature of the Commander without hitch. Not only such was the sentiment of General MINAMI, but all of us working under him believed firmly in the fact that Manchukuo would secure her international status as a perfect independent country.

3. The Kwantung Army at that time held the maintenance of peace and order within Manchukuo as the primary duty under the Japan-

Manchukuo protocol. The troops were put in dispersed positions to the extreme, suffering the inadequacy from the military point of view for the defense against dangers from outside of Manchukuo. Hence, the disposition of the Army was even more inadequate for any offensive towards U.S.S.R. or China.

In May, 1935, War Minister HAYASHI came to Manchuria to inspect the condition of the Army there. Incidentally about that time, the so-called UMEZU-Ho Yin-Chin agreement was concluded in North China. Connecting with these events, various rumours were reported in foreign newspapers, but I regret to say that such reports were full of falsehood. For instance, I point out the following items in Exhibit # 2206 A.

(a) The article to the effect that War Minister HAYASHI reiterated in Mukden that the North China problem was to be handled by the Kwantung Army (New York Times, June 6, 1935) is entirely a fabrication. In view of distinct systems of command and duties of the Kwantung Army and the North China Army respectively, War Minister HAYASHI would absolutely never have made such a statement.

(b) The articles to the effect that General MINAMI issued secret instructions to the Kwantung Army to hold themselves ready to pour into China (Tribune, June 9, 1935; Sacramento Tribune, June 8, 1935; Oakland Tribune, June 9, 1935) are also false. Such instructions could not be given without a directive from the Central Supreme Command, a directive which, if any, would surely have been brought to my notice as a matter of function.

(c) The article to the effect that the Kwantung Army moved 5,000 troops from Mukden to Shanhaikwan (New York Times, June 13, 1935) is also false. The Kwantung Army was in such a condition at that time as it was inconceivable to concentrate so many troops at one spot.

(d) The article to the effect that the Army requested Prince Teh of Inner Mongolia to move his capital to a place 180 miles to the north of Pailingmiao (New York Herald Tribune, June 2, 1935) is also false.

(e) Besides the above-mentioned items and with regard to matters not directly connected with the Kwantung Army, I find many canards which are totally beyond my experience and knowledge of the Japanese army in general.

In addition to the above comments on reports of foreign sources, I must say in conclusion that during the time when I was a staff officer of the Kwantung Army there was no such fact as the Kwantung Army issued anything like an ultimatum to China or brought a similar pressure to bear upon her.

4. Referring to the testimony of Mr. TANAKA, Ryukichi, made at this Tribunal on July 8th last year, to the effect that during the tenure of office of General MINAMI as Commander of Kwantung Army two brigades were sent to the demilitarized zone, south of the Great Wall (C.R., pp. 2,118, 2,119), I state definitely that there was no such fact. As to his testimony to the effect that two

battalions of cavalry were sent to Chahar (C.R. p. 2,118), I have no recollection whatever of such a case. I can say that I have a memory, amounting to conviction, on the troop disposition which incapacitated the Kwantung Army at that time to send expeditiously any such unit of cavalry out of the border into the Chahar Province.

The only instance, which I remember as the case of a small unit of the Kwantung Army moving into the demilitarized zone of North China, occurred in the beginning of summer, 1935. A small unit (about one or two companies) of the 7th Division, which was operating against a strong bandit force near the frontier of Jehol, crossed into the demilitarized zone in pursuit, but withdrew immediately within borders.

5. In this connection, I should like to state a fact as an example of the Kwantung Army's attitude of non-interference towards North China questions. In November, 1935, when I was the Chief of the Second Section, two messengers of Tin Yen-ken came to see me at the headquarters and asked me to arrange an interview with Vice-Chief of Staff, ITAGAKI, for hearing opinions of the Kwantung Army authorities upon the promotion of the East Hopei autonomous regime. Instantly I replied to them that it was not for the Army authorities to entertain any opinion on such internal affairs of China, and flatly refused to introduce them to Lieut-Gen. ITAGAKI.

As they went away forthwith, I did not report the matter to him nor have I done so since.

On this 16th day of September, 1947,  
at Tokyo.

Deponent: /s/ KANABE, Torashiro (seal)

I, YOSHIDA, Masao, do hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in my presence on the same day and at the same place as above written.

Witness: /s/ YOSHIDA, Masao (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ KANABE, Torashiro (seal)