


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THE  
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BY WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

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THE THIRD VOLUME.

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## OF THE

### THIRD VOLUME.

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CHAPTER XXI.

History of ATHENS, from the Conclusion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR and the Establishment of the SUPREME COUNCIL of THIRTY, commonly called The THIRTY TYRANTS, to the Restoration of the DEMOCRACY by THRASYBULUS.

SECTION I.

*Recapitulatory Synopsis of the Peloponnesian War. Deficiency of the Greeks in Political Science. Condition of Slaves meliorated by the Peloponnesian War. Character of the Athenian Democracy: Judicature; Revenue; Sycophancy; Theatrical Satire; Law of Treason.*

IN the long and complicated war which it has been the business of the preceding chapters to relate, the reader would in vain look for campaigns upon the extensive scale of Hannibal's in Italy, Cæsar's in various parts of the antient world, or many in modern Europe. It was not a war between two great states, but between two confederacies of small states, with intermingled territories. The objects of attack and defence were thus numerous and scattered. The Lacedæmonian

confederacy, strong in disciplined numbers, was deficient in pecuniary resources; while the very purpose of Athens, defensive war, restrained her operations to a correspondency with those of her enemies. Hence, in the account of Thucydides, digested scrupulously according to the order of events, the Peloponnesian war may appear, to superficial observation, an unconnected series of action, in which the enterprizes had often no very near relation to each other, or to the first and great object of the contending parties. In the foregoing narrative, it has always been in view to guard the reader against a mistake, into which some writers on the subject have fallen; yet, to enable him to follow, with greater facility, the clue of Grecian politics, through succeeding times, it may be advantageous here briefly to retrace the principal features of that multifarious series of events<sup>1</sup>.

The Peloponnesian war was truly a civil war: it was less a contest

\* Barthelemi, in the Grecian history which he has interwoven in his Voyage du jeune Anacharsis, after a concise account of the first campaign of the Peloponnesian war, proceeds thus: 'Les campagnes qui la suivirent n'offrent de même qu'une continuité d'actions particulières, de courses rapides, d'entreprises qui semblent étran-gères à l'objet qu'on se proposoit de part & d'autre. Comment des peuples si guerriers & si voisins, animés par une ancienne jalousie, & des haines récentes, ne songé-ent-ils qu'à se surprendre à s'éviter, à partager leurs forces, &, par une foule de diversions, sans éclat ou sans danger, à multiplier et prolonger les malheurs de la guerre? C'est parceque cette guerre ne devoit pas se conduire sur le même plan que les autres.' This solution of the difficulty can scarcely but excite a smile; and the more detailed explanation which the learned author proceeds to attempt, will not be found very satisfactory. But the cotemporary historian would have furnished him with a sober and very sufficient answer to his petulant question. It occurs in a speech of Pericles,

reported by Thucydides, in his first book; and the part most pointedly to the purpose is in the 141st chapter. Barthelemi's work is a rich mine of information concerning the interesting people he describes; but for its very merit it is important that its deficiencies and errors should be exposed. Barthelemi had imbibed the political principles of the French philosophy, and was warm in the cause of idéal liberty: but tho he passed much of his time in the house of a minister, the Duke of Choiseuil, he seems to have been no politician; he certainly had no clear insight into the complicated politics of Greece. His fellowcountryman Rollin, tho an academician, shows juster views of Grecian history. Had he avoided to interrupt and perplex his narrative with anecdotes, biography, and preaching, which might have been better thrown into an appendix, his book, instead of being esteemed fit only for boys, might have maintained its reputation as the best epitomé of Grecian history, for the earlier part, that has yet appeared. After losing the guidance of the cotemporary historians, indeed, he has been bewildered.

between



## SECT. I. SYNOPSIS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

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between Lacedæmon and Athens, than between the oligarchal and democratical interests, throughout the Grecian commonwealths; in every one of which was a party friendly to the public enemy; with whom it had a community of interest, not, as may happen in modern Europe, accidental, unprincipled, and passing, but fundamental and permanent; so that, with the success of that public enemy, not only the political welfare of the party, but the private welfare of its members, was intimately, and, for the most part, inseparably implicated. The apprehension excited, among the oligarchal states, by the growing preponderance of the Athenian democracy, rendered terrible by its spirit of conquest, its spirit of tyranny, and its particular disposition to overthrow and oppress the oligarchal interest, was the real source of the war<sup>2</sup>. The purpose of the Peloponnesians therefore, tho in offensive measures, was, not to conquer Athens, but only to reduce her to a state of inability to conquer them. For this end it was held sufficient, and it was deemed also indispensably necessary, to deprive her of that dominion over other Grecian states, which, by affording a superior revenue, enabled her to maintain the most formidable navy to that time known in the world, and to carry hostilities to distant countries, by land as well as by sea. The invasion of Attica, for two successive years, had this for its principal object; the siege of Plataea, and the unavailing attempt at naval exertion, equally followed with the same view. Meanwhile it was the purpose of Pericles to strengthen Athens, if possible, by alliance, but not by conquest. It sufficed to let her enemies weary and impoverish themselves with fruitless attack, and the consequences would be equal to victory: her power would be at least confirmed, and probably extended. And in these views he was favored by the circumstances of the Athenian dominion, and by the warfare of the age. For the Athenian dominion consisted mostly of islands and transmarine territories, secure through the su-

Ch. 13. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

<sup>2</sup> The alarm spread over Europe by a similar spirit, carried indeed to a greater extravagance, in the French democracy, may possibly be supposed to have furnished this idea; but it was derived purely from the Grecian cotemporary historians; and indeed the passage was written before the spirit of conquest and tyranny among the French had given the lie direct to their pretension of peaceful and equitable principles.

periority of the Athenian fleet; and tho a country could less easily be defended, against a superior invading force, with antient than with modern weapons, yet towns derived a security from fortifications, which, against the modern art of attack, no art of defence can give.

But what the Peloponnesian arms alone could not accomplish, the pestilence, coöperating with them, in some degree effected. The severity of the pressure upon Athens at home, encouraged the oligarchal, and checked the democratical interest in her forein dependencies. In some of them insued what, in modern phrase, we should call a change of administration; and instantly as the oligarchal became the prevailing party, revolt was ripe: with the first favoring opportunity the Athenian connection was renounced, and the Lacedæmonian adopted. Thus the operations of the war became distracted and complex, while the principal object remained simple and the same. The command of the sea nevertheless inabled the Athenians to vindicate their transmarine dominion; the extraordinary affair of Pylus put pledges into their hands which insured Attica against farther invasión; and thus, nearly five years after the death of Pericles, the purpose of that great statesman was accomplished, in the acquisition of means for making an honorable and advantageous peace. But unfortunately, in the want of his superintending wisdom, the popular will, bandied from orator to orator, and often subjected to the unworthiest, owned no principle but of ambition and avarice, inflamed by success; till, Brasidas obtaining the direction of the enemy's arms, and Cleon of their own, defeat restored among the Athenians the moderation which success had banished, and peace was made.

Such was the first series of action of the Peloponnesian war. The antient enmity of Lacedæmon and Argos, in concurrence with the rising ambition of Alcibiades, produced a second; abundantly complicated, tho within a narrow field. But still, reduced to its elements, it was a contest between oligarchy and democracy.

The circumstances of Sicily led to a third series. Here a new principle was the spring; and, here first, conquest upon a great scale came into view. Democracy here was opposed to democracy. But unlike those little democratical states, which could only support themselves under

## SECT. I. SYNOPSIS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

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under the protecting power of Athens, Syracuse was so powerful as to assert its own dominion over almost all the other Grecian cities of Sicily. Such a democracy was perhaps even more obnoxious to the domineering temper of the Athenian people, than the most absolute oligarchy or monarchy. Thus the jealousy and the ambition of the Athenian people were led readily to second the ambition of Alcibiades. But on the removal of the able projector, the magnificence of the project shrunk; and with the overthrow of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the principle upon which the Sicilian war was begun, totally lost its energy.

From the Sicilian war then resulted a fourth and concluding series of action; complicated in its circumstances, but in principle brought back to the original spring, the opposition of interest of the democratical and oligarchal parties throughout Greece. The prominent points of that series were, the revolt of the Athenian dependencies; war transferred to the Asiatic coast; the connection of Lacedæmon with Persia; sedition in Athens itself, with the short triumph of the oligarchal party there, more hostile to their fellowcountrymen of the opposite interest than to the common enemy; and thence that weakness and instability in all the powers of government, which superinduced the defeat of Aigospotami, and the capture of the city.

Able in war, skilful, perhaps to the utmost extent of human ability, in political intrigue and political negotiation, in leading fellow-citizens, in bargaining with strangers, the Greeks were unfortunately deficient in the more important science of framing that great machine which we call a Government; harmonizing the various ranks of men of which a nation must consist; providing, at the same time, security for property, and equal justice for those who have no property; establishing, for the well-disposed of every rank, an interest in the preservation of the constitution, and, for the unprincipled and turbulent, strong coercion to secure it against disturbance; reconciling the protection of private rights with the maintenance of public force, and making a general private interest in the support of the existing order of things the basis of patriotism, and the source of general concord

concord and public-spirit. In the preceding chapters we have traced the rise and downfall of the most celebrated democracy that has appeared in the world: we have seen the wonderful force of that form of government as a spring, which enabled so small a community to become such a formidable power, to acquire such extensive dominion, and to exhibit, within so short a period, so many exalted characters. But we have seen too its utter unfitness both to give security under equal law to its own people, and to rest in peace among neighboring states; its disposition to exercise the most oppressive tyranny against the most illustrious of its own citizens, and the most imperious and cruel despotism over those who were so unfortunate as to fall under its sovereignty in the condition of subjects; and we have seen that, tho it might have resisted the combination, which its injurious and alarming conduct excited, of the most powerful military confederacy with the wealthiest empire to that time known, yet the highest spirit in the people, with very uncommon abilities in the leaders, was unable to avert the ruin which such a government hath an eternal tendency to bring upon itself.

The benefit of instruction, and the amusement of interesting investigation, should reward the painful contemplation of the crimes, follies, and miseries of mankind, which it is the office of history to relate: any gratification arising from matter pleasing in itself, must be placed to the account of incidental gain. But, when occasionally we find, in the course of events, good beaming upon men, or evil alleviated, the satisfaction will be greater in proportion as the surrounding scene is dark, and the relief unexpected. We have had occasion to observe, that misfortune could scarcely befall a Grecian state, so imperfectly were the Grecian governments harmonized, but benefit, or at least the prospect of benefit, would result to some considerable portion of its members. We shall be more gratified to find that, with the various miseries which a war of twenty-seven years diffused among those called citizens of the Greek nation, it brought a very general alleviation of evil to, that more numerous portion of mankind, the Grecian slaves. When all neighboring republics were friendly, the slave looked around in vain for refuge from the cruelty of an inhuman master; but if they were hostile, it behoved equally the wealthy despot of many slaves, and

## SECT. I. CHARACTER OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY.

7

the poor tyrant of one, to beware how he set the wretch upon comparing the risk of desertion with the hope of a better service. The Grecian republics indeed were not all intirely without laws for the protection of that unfortunate portion of the human race: at Athens particularly, the wise and humane institutions of Solon provided for them a lot that other slaves might envy. Yet even at Athens they might be very harshly treated; and even there the war produced regulations to soften their condition. What the antient historians have left unnoticed (for slaves came little within their regard) we learn from the celebrated comic poet of the day. In the comedy, yet extant, called *The Clouds*, we find an old country-gentleman of Attica ludicrously execrating the war, because he was no longer permitted to beat his slaves.

Aristoph.  
Nub. v. 7.

Thus incidentally only we get information of the condition of those who formed the largest part of the population of the boasted free republics of Greece. Of the lot of their masters, the citizens, or however of those of Athens, in so many respects the first of the republics, our information is large; and coming from cotemporary writers, of various situations in life, various views and pursuits, and of various and opposite political interests, it is, in great proportion, amply authenticated. From this it will be advantageous, and even necessary, to endeavor to select and throw together here what may be wanting to elucidate the views, and account for the actions, of those to whom, on the surrender of the city to the Lacedæmonian arms, the supreme power was committed. Without such preparation, the conduct of men among the first of Greece in birth, talents, and education, might appear monstrous and irrational, and the story, however well attested, altogether too strange for belief.

We have already had occasion to observe, that Solon introduced, or left, in the Athenian constitution, a defect which had the most direct and irresistible tendency to its destruction. Carefully providing for the responsibility of ministers, he committed absolute sovereignty immediately to the multitude, who could be responsible to none. The same power delegated to representatives, who, at stated periods, should be responsible to the multitude, would not have been so hastily ruinous. He intended indeed that the councils of the Areiopagus

Ch. 5. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

pagus and of the Fourhundred (afterward Fivehundred) should balance the authority of the popular assembly; and they might have been effectual balances to a body representative of the people; but against sovereign power committed immediately to the people at large, no balance could avail. Interested demagogues inciting, restraint was soon overborne, and so the Athenian government became, what, in the very age, we find it was called, and the people seem to have been even pleased to hear it called, **A TYRANNY IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE**<sup>3</sup>.

We want information how Solón composed his courts of justice; but there seems reason to believe that, among the changes introduced by Cleisthenes and Ephialtes, not only his venerable tribunal of the Areiopagus, but the whole judicature of Athens suffered. The institution of wages for serving in the ten ordinary courts is attributed to Pericles. It was a mode of bribing the people. Three oboles, nearly fourpence sterling, were the daily pay of a dicast, whose office resembled that of our jurymen. The rich and the industrious avoided; the poor, the idle, the profligate thenceforward sought the office: it became their resource for a livelihood<sup>4</sup>. To extend gratification then among that sovereign order, the juries were made immoderately numerous. Five hundred was the ordinary number of each. In the ten courts, unless the demands of military service interfered, no less than six thousand citizens are said to have been employed, except on holidays, daily throughout the year; and, for a cause of extraordinary importance, the whole six thousand were sometimes assembled to compose the single tribunal called Heliaea. But the holidays themselves, which interrupted the business of the courts, afforded also a pretence and a mode for bribing the people. They were truly seasons of festival; in which the numerous carcasses of animals killed in sacrifice were distributed to the multitude. Demagogues therefore would omit no opportunity for

Aristot.  
Polit. l. 2.  
c. 12.

Aristoph.  
Vesp.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Τυραννίδα ἔχει τὴν ἀρχήν.* Thucyd. l. 2. c. 63, & l. 3. c. 37.

<sup>4</sup> 'I sold sausages,' says Agoracritus, in The Knights of Aristophanes, 'but I got the best part of my livelihood by judging

'causes.' V. 1239 & 1255. 'And if the archon should not order the court to sit,' says a boy in The Wasps, 'how are we to have victuals?' 'Alas!' answers his father, 'I fear we must go supperless.' V. 309.

ingratiating

ingratiating themselves at so easy a rate as by the proposal of a new festival; and thus the Athenian holidays were multiplied till they were twice the number of those of any other Grecian city. Still however they were far from equalling those of the Róman church in modern Europe, making, all together, no more than a sixth part of the year.

Xen. resp.  
Athen. c. 2.  
s. 9. & c. 3.  
s. 2. & 8.

In the deficiency therefore of subsistence provided under the name of Sacrifice, a lawsuit, or, still more, a criminal prosecution, became the delight of the Athenian people. Beside the certain pay, which was small, there was the hope of bribes, which might be large; while pride was gratified by the importance, which accrued to the meanest man who could call himself an Athenian citizen. Fine and confiscation, ordinary punishments of the Athenian law, conveyed the property of the wealthy to the treasury; to be thence distributed in various ways, theatrical exhibitions, processions, and feasts, for the gratification of the people, or wages on pretence of paying their services. Suits and prosecutions therefore, encouraged by the interest of the sovereign, became innumerable; and life and property were rendered insecure beyond what anything, seen in the most profligate of modern Europeän governments, at least of the times before the French revolution, would give to imagine under any government possible. The glorious security provided by the English law, which requires the solemn sanction of a grand jury to the merit of the accusation, before any man can be subjected even to trial, was unknown at Athens. It appears as if liberty was held there (so was the spirit of Solon's system perverted) to consist, not in the security of every one against injury from others, but in the power of every one to injure others. Any man might constitute himself accuser against any, and the king-archon was bound by his office to bring the accused to trial. When the cause came before the jury, no right of challenge, the second security of Englishmen, gave the accused Athenian means of guarding against partiality in his judges. The effect of partiality in some, it was indeed proposed to obviate by multitude, such that the majority should not be likely to concur in it: but the disadvantages of such a resource perhaps exceeded its benefits. In no conference among themselves could the informed and the wary, of so numerous a court, correct the prejudices and mis-

c. 3. s. 12.

judgement of the ignorant, careless, or impassioned, or obviate the effects of misused eloquence; nor was it possible to make so large a portion of the sovereign people responsible for the most irregular or flagitious decision. Punishment could not take place, and among the multitude shame was lost. Under this constitution of judicature, the most victorious and deserving general, the ablest and most upright magistrate, or the most inoffensive private citizen, might be brought to trial for his life at the pleasure of the most profligate of mankind. Even the allegation of a specific crime, a crime defined by law, was unnecessary. Constructive treason, any imputed disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, sufficed; and, as passion and prejudice, or the powers of oratory, or solicitation and bribery, moved, condemnation or acquittal were pronounced.

Lys. or. pro.  
Polystr.  
p. 664, & or.  
con. Ergocl.  
p. 320.

We have, from Aristophanes, a ludicrous picture, not perhaps greatly inflated, of the importance which the political and judicial system of Athens gave to every individual citizen; of the court paid in consequence to those, mostly men beyond the age of military service, who gave their time to the tribunals in the office of dicast, and of the usual pride and profligacy of such as could hold any leading influence there.

Vesp. v. 46.  
—569.

‘We are as great as kings,’ says an old dicast. ‘The principal men of the commonwealth watch our rising in the morning. Presently one of those who have imbeziled public money approaches me, bows humbly, and begs favor.’ “If ever you yourself,” he says, “in any office, or but in the management of a military mess, robbed your comrades, pity me!” He stood trembling before me as if I was a god.’ Allowing for something of caricature, still this is a picture from the life, of democratical probity, modesty, and magnanimity.

It may be held as an unfailing political maxim, that where the property of individuals is insecure, the PUBLIC REVENUE will be ill-administered. Perhaps Solon, little foreseeing that his commonwealth would want, did not desire that it should have, a great revenue. A sovereign people indeed would not easily be persuaded to pay taxes; but some provision for public expences would be necessary. Attica fortunately possessed, in the silvermines of Laureium, an advantage unknown in any other part of proper Greece. Those mines were public property; but

Xen. de  
vectig.



SECT. I. PUBLIC REVENUE.

but individuals were allowed to work them for their private benefit, paying only into the public treasury a twenty-fourth of the ore obtained. This was the great source of the regular public revenue of Athens. The sacred olive-trees, tho the income from them could be but small, were however looked to as a second branch. These, scattered among the lands of individuals in various parts of Attica, were consecrated, together with the ground immediately around them (perhaps originally by the policy of the government, for their security) to the goddess protectress of Athens; the fruit was sold by auction, under direction of the court of Areiopagus, and the price was paid into the treasury. A third branch of the Athenian revenue consisted in the rents of public lands and houses, mostly acquired from individuals by forfeiture.

Lys. or. de  
oleâ sacrâ.

But among the little states of Greece, the first purpose of a public revenue was generally less to supply public than private needs; less to support civil and military establishments, than to provide a maintenance for citizens without property, without industry, and perhaps without objects for industry. Solon however was anxious to promote industry among his people. He desired rather that they should earn their livelihood by labor than be maintained in idleness; and, not with the credulous inexperience and deficient foresight of some modern political speculators, supposing democracy naturally economical, he proposed to check its wildness and extravagance by committing, to his court of Areiopagus, a controlling power over all issues from the treasury. But the revolutions under Peisistratus, and still much more that under Cleisthenes, deranged his wise institutions: the passions of the multitude and the interest of demagogues met; and, before the Persian invasion, we find the whole revenue from the silvermines distributed among the people. This extravagance was remedied, as we have seen, by the extraordinary address of Themistocles; who, with the advantage of favoring circumstances, persuaded the Many to resign that revenue for public purposes, and hence acquired the means to make Athens the greatest maritime power to that time seen in the world.

Ch. 8. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

We are uninformed by what able statesman, or in what public exigency, the Athenians were persuaded to submit to a tax, in the manner of the modern customs, of a fiftieth of the value upon all goods imported,

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 65.  
and

and upon some exports. Early in the Peloponnesian war we find it familiar; as also a small toll, or a kind of excise-duty, on goods sold in the markets. The two, forming together a very light burthen, were the only regular and general taxes at any time paid by the Athenian people<sup>5</sup>.

The deficiency of a public revenue, arising from sources so scanty, was in some degree supplied by an imposition, in the manner of a poll-tax, on the metics, those numerous free residents in Attica who were not Athenian citizens. This however seems to have been not in its amount oppressive, any more than in its principle unreasonable. It was the consideration for the advantages which the residence of Athens and the protection of the Athenian government afforded. Through the superior population of that city, the extent of its dominion, and the protection for maritime communication which naval empire afforded to its subjects, trade could be carried on there upon a greater scale, and with more certain profit, than in any other situation in Greece. The metics were not Greeks only from various cities, but Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and other barbarians, and they seem to have been the greatest portion of the traders and manufacturers of Athens.

Xen. de vectigal. c. 2.  
s. 3.

But tho the regular taxes, which the Athenian people would consent to pay, for the support of that government of which they held in their own hands the immediate sovereignty, were so light, yet, irregular and partial taxes, in their principle inimical to equal freedom, and every way worthy of the most despotic government, were as the materials of storm in a lowering sky, threatening always all, but falling chiefly on the higher ranks of citizens. It seems likely to have been when the poorer Many were persuaded to make the patriotic surrender of their dividends from the silvermines for building a fleet,

<sup>5</sup> The articles of the Athenian revenue are thus enumerated by Aristophanes—*Ἐκαστοῦς, σφυρανεῖα, μέταλλ', ἀγορᾶς, λιμῆνας, μισθοῦς καὶ δημόσπρατα.* Vesp. v. 657. The amount he reckons two thousand talents, about five hundred thousand pounds sterling. The *Ἐκαστοῦς*, hundredths, appear to have been the same tax which Andocides

calls fiftieths. Perhaps it may have been doubled after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, to supply the deficiency of the public revenue arising from loss of dominion. For the other articles the curious reader may consult the scholiast on Aristophanes, and Xenophon on the Athenian republic, c. 1. s. 16—19.

that

that the wealthier Few undertook at their own charge to equip the ships when built. There was an apparent fairness and liberality, on both sides, in such a compromise. But as the balances of Solon's government were successively overthrown, and the popular will became the instrument of arbitrary power in the hands of the demagogue of the day, the practice, grown into law, for individuals to equip the fleet, degenerated into a source of grievous oppression. Regulated by no certain principle, the wealthier, or those reputed the wealthier citizens, were annually appointed by arbitrary nomination (in the Peloponnesian war to the number of four hundred) to be responsible from their private fortunes, some singly, some in partnership with others, for the equipment of a ship of war. Intrigue, and popular favor or popular displeasure, decided on whom the burthen should be light, and whom it should oppress. Yet whether from a natural sense of justice, or some remaining prejudice in favor of the old Athenian constitution, the person who equipped the triremé was generally allowed to command it, or to name the commander.

Xen. Ath.  
resp. c. 3.  
s. 4.

Another irregular tax, not unknown where single despots have ruled, with the improper name of free-gift, was frequently exacted by the despotic democracy of Athens. This, a tax also upon the higher ranks only, and perfectly arbitrary, could not fail to become partial and oppressive in extreme. Among taxes partaking of the nature of free-gifts, may also be reckoned the requisition for the rich to exhibit, at their own expence, theatrical entertainments, and other costly shows, for the amusement of the people; taxes severely felt by the higher ranks, tho' contributing nothing to the public revenue or the public force.

But Athens, in acquiring extensive dominion, acquired means to make others pay the principal expence of that force which was to maintain her dominion; and a democracy, least of all governments, would scruple any means of profit. The comic poet, one of the most informed and clear-sighted politicians, and however reprehensible in some points, very far from having been altogether the worst citizen of his age, has painted the popular temper of the day in a speech so breathing the purest spirit of democracy, that, tho' already noticed,

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Ch. 16. s. 2.  
of this Hist.  
Vesp. v. 705.

it may not be superfluous to repeat it here. 'A thousand cities,' it is observed by one of the characters in his comedy called *The Wasps*, 'pay tribute to Athens. Now if each was ordered to furnish subsistence for only twenty Athenians, twenty thousand of us might live in all ease and luxury, in a manner worthy of the dignity of the commonwealth and of the trophy of Marathon.' The mixture of aristocracy yet remaining in the Athenian constitution, prevented any actual attempt to carry a measure so congenial to what may perhaps not improperly be called the natural politics of the multitude. But in the empire which Athens exercised over so many transmarine cities, a vast field for peculation was open. New and greater objects then incited contending factions; and immoderate temptation occurred for those in authority, and those who sought authority, to put forward measures ultimately the most adverse to the public good, if they tended in the moment to gratify the Many. The principal powers of the court of Areiopagus, and especially its salutary controul over the treasury, were thus abolished; and when the commanding abilities of Pericles no longer checked popular extravagance, there followed the grossest dilapidation of the public money, the most tyrannical oppression of the allies, and the most profligate exercise of the purest despotism over the most respectable citizens. Fine and confiscation were looked to less for the purpose of justice than of revenue. The temptation to peculate, the insecurity of innocence, and the hope for crime to escape punishment, became such, that, amid the general depravity of Grecian governments, Athenian peculation grew proverbial; and it was at the same time made a question, whether it was advantageous for an individual to have property, and whether it was advantageous for the commonwealth to have a revenue. If we might believe Aristophanes, (who almost alone, among the poets of the day, dared direct his satire on the public stage to restrain the folly and correct the profligacy of the tyrant multitude) of two thousand talents, esteemed the annual amount of the Athenian revenue, except one-tenth, distributed among the people for serving the office of dicast, the whole was consumed in peculation. We shall of course impute exaggeration to this round assertion, put into the mouth of a comic character: yet; from the  
concurring

Xen. anab.  
l. 4. c. 6.  
s. 12.  
Xen. resp.  
Ath. &  
Sympos.

Aristoph.  
Vesp. v. 667.  
& seq.

concurring testimonies of Xenophon and Lysias (whose concurring testimonies afford the strongest proof, because they were of opposite parties) it seems not to have been very extravagant. Frequent capital punishments, with confiscation of all property, did not prevent the frequency of an alluring crime, where probity gave no security. Despotic governments, whether the power be in the hands of one or of a multitude, will have a near resemblance of character. The frequent use of the bowstring, in Turkey has not prevented the grossest peculation. We find indeed many marks of kindred between the Turkish despotism and the Athenian democracy. It appears to have been a point of policy in the latter, as in the former, to connive at peculation in its servants, to approve tacitly their oppression of its subjects; to wait patiently till the private fortune, thus iniquitously collected, became sufficiently considerable to be a public object, and then to bring the criminal, hitherto the apparent favorite, to judgment, and, condemning him to death or banishment, to enrich the treasury with his spoil.

Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 3.  
s. 3.

A treatise remains to us from Xenophon expressly on the improvement of the Athenian revenue. The title, with the author's name, cannot fail to excite the modern politician's curiosity; who will however probably find himself at the same time informed, disappointed, and surprized by the contents of the work. Xenophon abandoned Solon's hope of making the Athenian people support themselves by sober industry: were the thing ever practicable, he thought the season passed. His object therefore was to provide a revenue, less for public service than for maintaining the whole Athenian people, as the Lacedæmonians lived, in ease and idleness. He could devise no other remedy for domestic evils, arising from the necessary inquietude of sovereign beggars; no other means to soften that spirit of tyranny in the Athenian people, under which so many subject Grecian states had suffered the severest and most contumelious oppression, the consequences of which had at length brought Athens herself to the brink of annihilation<sup>6</sup>. Taxes therefore, to be paid by Athenian citizens,

come

<sup>6</sup> Zeunius of Leipzig, who has published a collection of Xenophon's smaller works, supposes the Treatise on the Revenue to have been written during the war which we

shall

come scarcely within his view. The Attic silvermines are his great object. The public income from these he would improve by a measure which, at this day, would not find universal approbation. The immoderate proportion of slaves already in the population of Attica, the property of individuals, he would increase by purchasing a number on the public account, to work the mines for public benefit. He then considers the taxes, the customs and market-tolls, and the capitation paid by the metics. This branch of the revenue he would improve by the more liberal policy of giving new privileges and increased security to free foreigners settling in Attica.

The modern reader, less versed in Grecian politics, will then scarcely observe without wonder, that while Xenophon is anxious to increase the number of foreign residents and slaves, the increase of Athenian citizens, the only secure and effective strength of a state, appears totally out of his consideration. But, from all the remaining writers of the age, we may gather, that the spirit of every Grecian government, whether oligarchy or democracy, was generally adverse to the increase of citizens. For every citizen having an interest in a certain public capital, increase of citizens was increase of partners, which would diminish every old proprietor's share. If the Athenian commonwealth had had only two or three thousand citizens, the lands of Attica, cultivated by slaves, with the added produce of the silvermines, might have made all wealthy. But wealth so ill protected, would have invited the rapacity of neighboring people. The combined consideration, therefore, of the means of subsistence and gratification, with the means of defence, would decide

shall find Athens, in confederacy with Lacedæmon, waging against the Thebans, when Epameinondas was their general. Note, c. 4. s. 40, of Zeunius's edition. That treatise sufficiently marks itself to have been written when Athens was engaged in war, and not so early as the Peloponnesian war; for the time before the occupying of Deceleia by the Lacedæmonians is mentioned in it, (c. 4. s. 25.) as what few living would remember. During which of the various troubles, with

which Greece was afterward afflicted, it may have had its date, is not at all clear; but evidently enough that conduct of the Athenian government, which produced the war called the Confederate, or Social war, furnished the immediate occasion, the stimulation to write it; and that conduct was little manifested, as in the sequel we shall have occasion to observe, till after the death of Epameinondas.

the

the degree of population to be desired in a Grecian republic. But unless danger was pressing, the general disposition was always averse to an increase. The rich disliked it, as any increase of their respective inhabitants in our parishes is commonly disliked, because there was a poor-law at Athens. The poor objected to it, in apprehension of its diminishing their chance of advantage from sacrifices, from treats to their ward, from pay for attendance on the tribunals, from that public allowance which was often given, not to those who best deserved or most needed it, but to those who could best make interest for it. Altogether, the idea of a common interest in a common stock, a fundamental principle of every Grecian republic, not only made the aversion to any increase of citizens popular, but gave the ablest politicians (all considering slaves indispensable) to imagine a necessity for limiting the number of citizens, and to a very scanty proportion. Plat. de rep.

A very remarkable project, which seems to have been original with Xenophon, next occurs; the establishment of a bank, by subscription<sup>7</sup>, open for all the Athenian people. The interest of money, it appears, was enormous at Athens; an unavoidable consequence of the wretched insecurity of person and property. Throughout modern Europe, land is, of all property, esteemed the safest source of income; but in Greece it was held that the surest return was from money lent at interest. For, in the multiplied division of Greece, into small republics with very narrow territories, the produce of land was continually liable to be carried off or destroyed by an invading enemy; but a monied fortune, according to Xenophon's observation, was safe within the city-walls. In proportion then to the interest of money, and the insecurity of all things, the profits of trade will always be high, and thus numbers would be induced to borrow even at a high interest. Xenophon therefore proposed, by lending from the public stock, and encouraging commercial adventure by just regulations, to raise a great revenue, and, by the same means, instead of oppressing, to enrich individuals. As a corollary then to his project, when the amount of the subscription, or Xen. de vectigal. c. 3. s. 9, 10. De vectig. s. 12, 13.

<sup>7</sup> The word *Ἀφορμή* appears to mean precisely a *subscription*. It occurs in the 6th, 9th, and 12th sections. The Greek index added to the Opuscula Xenophontis of Zeunius may also be consulted for it.

its profits, should allow, he proposed to improve the ports of Athens, to form wharfs and docks, to erect halls, exchanges, warehouses, market-houses, and inns, for all which tolls or rents should be paid, and to build ships to be let to merchants. Thus, while numbers of individuals were encouraged and enabled to employ themselves for their private benefit, the whole Athenian people would become one great banking company, from whose profits every member, it was expected, would derive at least an easy livelihood.

Such was Xenophon's project for improving, not so much the revenue of the Athenian state, as the condition of the Athenian people, and of all who were in any degree dependent upon them. By taking away the incitements of absolute want, by creating a strong interest in the preservation of peace without, and good government within, he hoped to make the lower ranks quiet and orderly, and the higher secure, and at the same time to obviate that oppression of allies and subjects, the evils of which had often reverted upon Athens herself. The scheme, whatsoever difficulties or disappointments might have occurred in the execution, appears worthy of Xenophon; but unfortunately, passing his life in exile, his exertions for the good of his country were confined to speculation.

The gross vices of the government and judicature gave birth to that evil which, with the name of SYCOPHANCY, so peculiarly infested Athens. The term originally signified information of the clandestine exportation of figs. Apparently to gratify the idle populace of the city, at the expence of the landholders, some demagogue had procured a law, forbidding the exportation of that plentiful production of the Attic soil. The absurdity of the prohibition, however, making the information particularly invidious, the term Sycophant grew into use as a general appellation for all vexatious informers. Such was the encouragement which the Athenian government and judicature afforded for these, that sycophancy became a profession, furnishing a livelihood for many. The sycophant courted the lower people, and was the terror and scourge of the rich. Intimation to a wealthy man that he would be denounced, as able to equip a trireme, or provide a dramatic entertainment, or give a supper to his ward, often sufficed to obtain money for



for preventing so serious an evil. But the sycophant's great engine of profit was accusation, whether true or false; tho false accusation, we are told, was often preferred, as generally more lucrative<sup>s</sup>. Those various public functions which the wealthy were not allowed to decline, magistracies, equipment of ships of war, and presidencies of choral festivals, made opportunities endless. On the expiration of office, the euthynë, a scrutiny before the council, must be undergone. Accusation was then in a manner invited; and if any, however unfounded, was offered, person and property were attached, and remained so till judgement was given. The sycophant was necessarily an Athenian citizen; for no other could denounce; but the evidence of strangers and slaves was admitted, and often preferred; because they might be examined by torture, which was sometimes carried to such inhuman severity that the sufferers died under it. But however little the accusation could be supported, it would always occasion trouble and expence; and any neglect of the fastidious-multitude would involve danger. Bribes were necessary to procure dispatch from the officers who directed the business of the courts: an Athenian jury would be solicited for favor, or it would pronounce condemnation; and not by the accusation of Xenophon only, but by the confession of Lysias, the great advocate for democracy, we are assured that, at Athens, equally protection for iniquity might, and justice must, be bought.

A resource which, in this wretched insecurity for innocence under the Athenian government, Socrates recommended and Xenophon approved, may show the extent of the evil. Criton, an Athenian of rank, complained to Socrates (Xenophon says he was present at the conversation) of the severity of their lot in Athens, who, as he expresses himself, desired to concern themselves only with their own affairs. 'I have a prosecution instituted against me,' he said, 'by persons whom I never injured, but who think I would rather pay some money than have much trouble.' 'Do not you keep dogs,'

Lys. pro  
Polystr.  
p. 158 vel  
663, & Δημ.  
καταλυσ.  
p. 171, vel  
762.

Xen. Athen.  
resp. c. 3.  
s. 4.

Lys. adv.  
Agorat.  
p. 135, vel  
488.

Xen. Athen.  
resp. c. 13.  
s. 2.

Xen. & Plat.  
apol. Socr.  
& Aristoph.  
Vesp.

Lys. adv.  
Philocr.  
p. 181, vel  
828 & al.

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 2.  
c. 9.

<sup>s</sup> Τούτων γὰρ (τῶν συκοφάντων) ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκότας εἰς αἰτίαν καθίσταται. ἐν τούτων γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα χρηματίζεν. Lys. Δημ. καταλυσ. ἀπολ. p.171. vel 762.

said Socrates, 'to guard your sheep against wolves?' 'Yes,' answered Criton. 'And could not you ingage the friendship of some able man in low circumstances, who, in return for benefits conferred, would make it his business in the same manner to guard you against sycophants?' A friend was fortunately found, able and faithful. As an advocate however, he could serve his benefactor little; because, in the Athenian courts, the accused was generally required to plead in person. His business was, like that of the sheepdog, to give security to the fold by attacking the wolf. When Criton was threatened with prosecution, he threatened the accusers; and as their profligacy offered opportunities which Criton's probity denied, in fear of the consequences, they not only stopped their proceedings against Criton, but paid his advocate for similar forbearance toward themselves.

Where such was the best resource that Socrates or Xenophon could devise, we may conceive how precarious was the condition of men of property in Athens. Under oligarchy, as we find one of the most zealous partizans of democracy confessing, those might be esteemed good citizens, who did not covet other men's goods; but, under democracy, no man was master of his own: property, person, everything must be devoted, not to the service only, but to the pleasure and fancy of the people. The wealthy were not allowed the choice of leaving Attica, and the constitution positively denied them the choice of quiet there. To execute the duties of magistracy, to equip a ship of war, to preside at a public feast, to direct a dramatic entertainment, and to furnish the whole cost, were equally required of all supposed of competent estate. Hence indeed some small mixture of aristocracy remained in the Athenian government. Wealth was the allowed key to office and influence; birth and great connections were not without weight; commands in the army and navy were seldom given but to men of birth, education, and considerable connections; and even the council and the college of archons, both indeed open to men without property, but not without passing the scrutiny of the dokimasia, formed some small check upon popular rashness and folly. Hence we find, at intervals, the Athenian affairs so ably conducted; and while tumult and destruc-

tion

Eys. Δημ.  
καταλυσ.  
ἀπολ. p. 173,  
vel 774.

Xen. sympos.  
c. 4. s. 30.

Xen. resp.  
Ath. c. 1.  
s. 3.

tion were preparing within the volcano, the outside bore an appearance so fair and flourishing?

The spirit of tyranny inherent in the Athenian constitution, and the disregard, upon principle, for property and the convenience and satisfaction of individuals, are very strikingly marked in a regulation which we find had the force of law. When an expensive office, and particularly when the equipment of a trireme, was assessed on any one, he might, for the time, avoid the burthen by indicating a richer man; and, if the superior wealth was denied, offering to exchange estates. The person so challenged had no alternative but to take upon himself the office, or accept the exchange. The satisfaction, thus, of an Englishman in considering his house and his field more securely his own, under the protection of the law, than a castle defended by its garrison, or a kingdom by its armies, was unknown in Attica. The attachment, therefore, of an Englishman to the country where such blessings are enjoyed, to the constitution which gives to enjoy them, and to the people who have a common interest in defending them, could not there easily find place. For men of rank and property, excepting the few who could make the popular will the instrument of their own ambition, to be satisfied with the Athenian government was impossible. It was as dangerous to be rich under the Athenian democracy as under the Turkish despotism; the same subterfuges were used to conceal wealth; the same bribery and flattery to preserve it; with this difference principally, that, in Athens, the flattery was grosser, in proportion to the low condition of the flattered, and their multitude; which so divided the shame, that, equally in receiving adulation and committing iniquity, no man blushed for himself.

Isocrat. de permut. & de pace.

Beside the various modes of vexation and oppression, to which the higher ranks were subject in their persons and properties, another remained by which their characters were affected. Satire against the people collectively, says Xenophon, the people will not allow; but per-

Xen. resp. Ath. c. 2. s. 18.

<sup>9</sup> Under Solon those of competent estates only were eligible to office. Afterward magistracies were given by lot. Isocr. Areiop. p. 108, 109. But Xenophon says all expen-

sive offices were still imposed on the rich—perhaps only choral presidencies and the command, or the charge of equipment, of ships of war.

sonal satire they incourage; well knowing that, while it is permitted to exhibit the wealthy, the noble, the powerful, to popular derision and indignation, the meaner will escape; or those only will become objects for the poet, who, by aiming at some preëminence, separate themselves from the common cause. To what excess that licence went, what gross ribaldry might delight, and what malicious calumny would not disgust an Athenian audience, the remaining comedies of Aristophanes, who could write equally for the highest and lowest ranks, who could be at the same time a consummate politician and a consummate buffoon, abundantly testify<sup>10</sup>. The calm dignity of a Pericles could bear this unmoved: the intriguing ambition of an Alcibiades, exciting poet against poet, and mob against mob, might even profit from it: but the wealthy and noble of more common and quiet characters, would often severely feel the apprehension, if it went no farther, of being exposed in effigy, by their proper names, to vulgar scorn upon the public stage, while, in witty dialogue, the most malignant turn was given to every the most-innocent or even meritorious action of their lives. Nor were character and public estimation only indangered; for that turn in the public mind might be prepared in the theater, and those prejudices against individuals excited, which afterward, in the agora or the tribunals, might produce decrees of confiscation, banishment, or capital condemnation.

In the dialogue remaining to us from Xenophon, intitled The Banquet, an eminent man, reduced by the war from wealth to indigence, is represented positively declaring that he felt his condition improved by the total loss of his property; ‘inasmuch,’ he says, ‘as cheerfulness and confidence are preferable to constant apprehension, freedom to slavery, being waited upon to waiting upon others, being held an

<sup>10</sup> Aristophanes ventured satire upon the people collectively; but it required his courage to dare and his abilities to succeed in such an attempt. With regard to his ribaldry, we may observe that something very like it seems to have suited the taste of readers of higher rank than the bulk of the Athenian audiences, in the age of Chaucer,

in our own country. In calumny, as abundant remaining testimony evinces, his contemporaries far exceeded him; and indeed in every point, vulgar and gross as his jokes often are, yet among the Athenian comedians he may be considered as a very gentlemanly poet.

‘ assured good subject to being an object of public suspicion. For,’  
 he continues, ‘ while I lived a rich man in this city, I had reason to  
 ‘ fear the attacks of housebreakers, which with my wealth might in-  
 ‘ danger my person. I was then under the necessity of courting the  
 ‘ sycophants, knowing it was in their power to do me mischief which  
 ‘ I could little return. Nevertheless I was continually receiving  
 ‘ orders from the people, to undertake some expence for the common-  
 ‘ wealth, and I was not allowed to go anywhere out of Attica. But  
 ‘ now I have lost all my forein property, and nothing accrues from my  
 ‘ Attic estate, and all my goods are sold, I sleep anywhere fearless ; I  
 ‘ am considered as faithful to the government ; I am never threatened  
 ‘ with prosecutions, but I have it in my power to make others fear ; as  
 ‘ a free man, I may stay in the country or go out of it, as I please ;  
 ‘ the rich rise from their seats for me as I approach, and make way for  
 ‘ me as I walk : I am now like a tyrant, whereas I was before an abso-  
 ‘ lute slave ; and whereas before I paid tribute to the people, now a  
 ‘ tribute from the public maintains me.’

This picture, tho from the pencil of Xenophon, will be likely to strike the modern reader as loaded, and somewhat extravagant. Occurring in a work of fancy, and not in historical narrative, the writer might claim perhaps some licence. Yet we find Isocrates describing the same thing so nearly in the same lines and colors, that their concurrence in the representation, with which also many other testimonies concur, must exclude all suspicion of any great extravagance.

Isocr. de  
 pace, p. 254,  
 256.

Under circumstances then such as those of the Athenian republic, the rich and the poor evidently could not live in any harmony. An irritation, incessantly working in the minds of the Few against the Many, would be irremediable, and, in equally unavoidable consequence, the Many would be tormented with an unceasing jealousy of the Few ; in its foundation sometimes reasonable, but generally in its manner illiberal, and often in its measure excessive. In fact, the balances of Solon’s constitution were no sooner overthrown, and sovereign power become absolute in the hands of those without property, or rather in the hands of any demagogue who could, for the moment, lead them, than the interest of all, who had property, placed them necessarily in the

the situation of conspirators against the existing government. Indeed, throughout Greece, the noble and wealthy, served by their slaves, not only as domestics, but as husbandmen and manufacturers, had little connection with the poorer Many, but to command them in the oligarchal states, and, in the democratical, to fear, flatter, solicit, and either deceive or be commanded by them. No common interest, or scarcely any, united the two descriptions of men; so that, for maintaining civil order and holding the state together, flattery and bribes alone could persuade the multitude, and the only alternative was violence. Hence that impossibility of lasting harmony, and that readiness for extreme discord which the Grecian republics so strikingly exhibit. What we are familiar with always appears obvious and easy; and hence, having ever before our eyes the equal freedom, security, and ease of all ranks among ourselves, we observe with wonder that the abilities and extensive experience of Xenophon could imagine no remedy for the evils of the Athenian constitution, or none in the practicability of which he had any hope, but in the subjection of the Many to arbitrary command, either under the Few or under One; and the genius of Plato, in earnest research after better political principles, could even in vision propose benefit only to a very small portion of mankind".

Xen. Ath. resp. c. 1. s. 1—9. c. 2. s. 19, 20. c. 3. s. 9, 10, 11. et Cyropæd. Plat. de rep.

Where the constitution is such that all ranks have a clear interest in its preservation, where every man's house is his castle, where the property of the rich, and the persons and honest earnings of the poor, are equally protected by law, and the hope of rising to a higher station is denied to none, there the law of TREASON may be mild. But no mild law, no common precaution, could give security to a constitution like the Athenian. The law of treason, accordingly, at Athens, was con-

" *Ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ γὰρ πόλει τὸ βέλτιστον ἔνουν ἐστὶ τῷ δήμῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κάκιστον ἐν ἐκάστῃ ἐστὶ πόλει ἔνουν τῷ δήμῳ· διὸ γὰρ ὅμοιοι τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἔννοι ἴσιν.* Xen. Athen. resp. c. 3, s. 10. Xenophon esteemed the evils of the Athenian constitution irremediable, because necessarily flowing from the sovereignty of the people, and to be checked only by putting such a curb on that sovereignty as, in the nature of things, would lead to its complete overthrow. He

seems to have supposed it impossible so to constitute a balanced government as to give it permanency: the people at large, he thought, must either command absolutely or obey implicitly. And for any experience that history to this day furnishes, perhaps he was right: perhaps a balanced government cannot be at once constituted: it must grow.

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ceived in the highest spirit of despotism; it was atrocious. Before the council-hall stood a column, on which was thus ingraved: 'Whoever shall overthrow the democracy, or hold any magistracy in Athens when the democracy shall be overthrown, may be lawfully killed by any one: the person killing him shall be held holy before the gods and meritorious among men; and shall be rewarded with the whole property of the person killed.' The same principle of committing public justice to the discretion of individuals was pushed yet farther in the following oath, which was required of every Athenian: 'I will kill with my own hand, if I am able, whoever shall overthrow the democracy; and if any hold office under any other government, I will esteem holy before the gods whoever shall kill him. Whoever may lose his life in killing or attempting to kill such person, I will befriend his children and their offspring, as I would Harmodius and Aristogiton. Whatever oath may be taken, adverse to the democratical authority, I abjure and hold as nothing.' Prayers and imprecations were added, for blessings on all who maintained this oath, and utter destruction to those and the race of those who should break it.

It is observed by Aristotle that democracy and tyranny are, of all governments, most hostile to each other, as, according to Hesiod's proverb, two of a trade never agree: for, he adds, absolute DEMOCRACY is TYRANNY<sup>12</sup>.

## SECTION II.

*First Measures of the Supreme Council of Thirty at Athens: Views of the Thirty: Critias; Theramenes; Violences of the Thirty: Death of Theramenes.*

SUCH was the state of the Athenian government nearly, from the death of Pericles, till it submitted to the victorious arms of the Peloponnesians. The fate then of a fallen city, deprived of command beyond its

<sup>12</sup> 'Εσθλῆται δ' ἂν πολιτικῆται Δῆμος μὲν Τυραννίδι, καθ' Ἡσίοδου, 'Ὡς κίραμῶν κίραμῶν, καὶ γὰρ ἡ Δημοκρατία ἢ τελευταία Τυραννίς ἐστὶ. Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 10.

own narrow territory, and allowed to exist only under the controul of a forein power, it might seem would scarcely invite much of our farther attention. But Athens, after all her losses and with all her failings, has peculiar claim upon the curiosity and respect of men. In her fallen state she retained the germ of the sublimest philosophy, of all science, and of every liberal art: Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato still lived within her walls; Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Conon, tho in exile, adorned the list of her citizens; and she could still be the prolific mother and the able preceptress of artists, poets, warriors, orators, statesmen and sages, who made their age the most brilliant in the annals of mankind, and through whom, when her political importance ceased, Athens continued, and may be said in some degree still to continue, to hold an empire among all the civilized nations of the earth<sup>13</sup>. Nor was her political importance yet so far beyond recovery, but that she became again a principal channel of Grecian history's multifarious stream.

After the view we have taken of the Athenian constitution, we shall not wonder if men of rank and property desired at any rate a change; nor can we impute it to any peculiar depravity, if they bore some antipathy toward the body of the lower people, from whom they suffered such oppression. Even the most moderate might look, not without some indignation, upon that imperious 'crowd of fullers, shoemakers, carpenters, braziers, dealers of all kinds,' I use the cotemporary philosopher's words, 'the great object of whose lives was to buy cheap and sell dear,' whose despotic will nevertheless dispensed public and private law, directed the administration of the commonwealth, sent out fleets and armies, disposed of the lives and fortunes of individuals at home, and decided by a vote the fate of whole cities abroad, 'while some of them, not worth a drachma,' they are again Xenophon's words, 'were ready to sell their country with all in it, that they might have a drachma.' Accordingly, when Athens was invested by the Peloponnesian forces, and no prospect of successful resistance remained,

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 3.  
c. 7. s. 6.

<sup>13</sup> Tully's eulogies of Athens are well known:—*Illas omnium doctrinarum inventrices Athenas. Cic. de Orat. l. 1. s. 4.*—*Unde humanitas, doctrina, religio, fruges, jurà, leges, ortæ atque in omnes terras dis-*

*tributæ putantur, Cic. or. pro L. Flacco, s. 26.* and that of Velleius Paterculus, *Adeò ut corpora gentis illius separata sint in alias civitates; ingenia vero solis Atheniensium muris clausa existimes. Vell. Pat. l. 1. c. 18.*

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## SECT. II. SUPREME COUNCIL OF THIRTY.

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many of those of higher rank saw, or thought they saw, means of mending their condition in the approaching wreck of the state. Through this opposition of interests among the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians proposed to hold Attica in subjection, without the expence of garrisons; and thus they were induced to grant terms; to leave the town with walls and a citadel; to restore the whole territory; and even out of the captive fleet to allow twelve ships of war to the vanquished. The Athenian people had never treated a conquered city so mildly. But the Lacedæmonians depended upon the aristocratical party among the Athenians themselves, as a faithful garrison, bound, by the most pressing interests, to hold all in subordination to Lacedæmon<sup>14</sup>.

On the surrender of the city, then, that vicious government which has been described, being dissolved, the supreme power of the Athenian state was committed to a Council, composed of Thirty Athenians, chosen by the conquerors out of the aristocratical party, and all of them formerly members of the Council of Fourhundred, established by Peisander. The first measures of this council were moderate and wise. Vested with full powers to new-model the whole fabric of the antient constitution at their pleasure, provided only nothing was done adverse to the superintending authority of Lacedæmon, they avoided all great and hasty changes which their situation did not indispensably require. The Laws, farther than what fell necessarily, with the abolition of the popular sovereignty and the commission of the supreme power to the Thirty, remained in force: all the antient magistracies, care being taken to fill them with friends of the Thirty, were retained: the civil administration therefore, under the Thirty instead of the Fivehundred, proceeded in the accustomed course. A new supreme court of judicature only was established, with the title of the Council.

B. C. 404.  
Ol. 94. 1.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 8.

\* The assertions of Lysias, in his orations against Eratosthenes and Agoratus, that the Lacedæmonians would have granted better terms, and that Theramenes prevented it, scarcely need the testimony of Xenophon to refute them. They are obviously meer ca-

lumnies; not proposed to the reason, but to the thoughtlessness and passion of the multitude to which they were addressed. Xenophon's account is confirmed in clear and direct terms by Isocrates, in his oration on peace, p. 220. ed. Auger.

Matters being so far arranged, orders were given for immediately apprehending all who, under the democracy, had exercised the abominable trade of sycophancy. The evils of that practice were so gross, so extensively dreaded, and, under popular sovereignty, so irremediable, that, when every one prosecuted by the Thirty was condemned by the obsequious council, and executed, none, says the cotemporary historian, not obnoxious to the charge, were dissatisfied with this arbitrary justice.

The wrongs, however, of the higher orders being so far avenged, the hope was generally entertained, that animosity would stop, and that the Thirty, proceeding with proper dispatch in their great business of legislation, would let the people know under what form of government, and subject to what laws, they were to live and might be safe. With this hope wellmeaning men in general were easy: indeed hope was rather high among them; for, tho successive demagogues had wretchedly degraded the antient Athenian constitution, yet, if there existed in Greece a good foundation for a good government, it seems to have been in the laws, customs and habits of Athens, derived from the institutions of Theseus and Solon. That excellent principle of the English constitution, the only one on which a free government can be firmly founded, that the aggregate of private good constitutes public good, and its corollary, that the rights of individuals, once established by law, should be ever held sacred, seems to have been a principle of Theseus's kingdom and Solon's republic. But a different principle obtained very generally among the Grecian Commonwealths, an ideäl public good, distinct from and often opposite to private good. It was carried into practice with best effect by Lycurgus, and can only be carried into practice with any good effect, where, as in Lacedæmon, a communion of interest was established for everything, and private property scarcely existed. The brilliant success of his singular system gave reputation to this principle, and party-leaders readily adopted it everywhere; for the good of their party was that to which alone they would allow the title of public good, and to this it was very convenient for them that every private interest should yield. The peaceful then and the quiet, who desired, not political power,  
but

but ease and security under civil order, were the only certain sufferers. The great defect of the constitutions of Theseus and Solon, was the want of another principle, spread extensively over modern Europe through the feudal system, tho' not an original part of that system, the principle of representation. The advantage of this is not merely that a great nation can do conveniently by its representatives, what even a small one cannot by its assembled numbers, but, farther, that responsibility may be attached to every constituted authority; by which alone, whatever the name or form of the government may be, real despotism can be obviated. In the want of this, the Grecian legislators were utterly at a loss to give secure liberty to the body of the people, without giving them despotic power. It may be held for certain that those are either not wise or not honest men, who pretend that political and legislative science is easy and obvious. The writings of the ablest of the Greeks, showing how deficient they were in it, abundantly show its difficulties; and the history of all nations will demonstrate by what slow steps and what accidental circumstances any perfection in government has been attained. The works of Plato and Xenophon should be read to form a just idea of the imperfection of the science in their time, and of their small ability to improve it; and then it may in some degree be conceived what were the difficulties under which, even had they had the purest intentions, the sincerest desire of public good, the Thirty must have had to encounter, in reforming the constitution of Athens.

But in addition to the difficulties always and everywhere existing, the peculiar circumstances of Athens at the time, obviating perhaps some considerable inconveniences, gave rise to many others. The controlling power of Lacedæmon would be necessarily invidious to those for whom they were to legislate; and yet much consideration for that controlling power would be, in their situation, unavoidable. Moreover the chance of future tranquility for Greece, concord within itself and power to resist other nations, depended absolutely upon friendly and intimate connection between Athens and Lacedæmon. Of the changes then which Athens had suffered, by the event of the war, some would be favorable to them, but some far otherwise. Pri-

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Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 2.  
c. 8. s. 1.

vate distresses among all ranks were numerous and great. The loss of property in the foreign territories of the commonwealth, had reduced several from affluence to want; and want such as to make them dependent upon what may be called the poor-law of Athens, even for subsistence. The abolition of means, formerly ready, for making interest of money at home, also annihilated income for many. The advantages of command then were no more for the higher ranks, nor the reward of service for the lower, nor the various profits of the equipment of fleets and armies for any: public revenue no longer flowed from numerous tributary states: neither the public treasury, nor the wealth of individuals, could, as formerly, provide gratifications for the people: the citizens of numerous subject republics were no longer amenable to Athenian tribunals: multitudes, accustomed to fight and to judge, and to feast at sacrifices, and to be amused, but not to work, were without income, without employment, and without victuals: the court and the flattery, and the pay and the bribes, to which the Athenian people were accustomed, had all ceased together.

c. 7. s. 2.

Such were the circumstances in which the council of Thirty entered, with absolute authority, upon the administration of the affairs of Athens. Whether by appointment of the Lacedæmonians, or by election of the council itself, Critias presided; a man, by every advantage of birth, fortune, connections, education and talents, pointed out for the arduous situation. His paternal great-grandfather was brother of the great lawgiver Solon; and, what should have been a more solid advantage, he had been himself a diligent hearer of Socrates. But the Athenian democracy, denying ease and security, not only incited ambition and avarice, but stimulated the pride of nobility and wealth. Xenophon describes Critias, whom he knew well as his fellow-disciple, vain of his illustrious birth and large inheritance, elated with the early possession of power and influence, and with the court and adulation insuing, and then soured by a banishment which he had suffered from a decree of the people. Thenceforward Critias conceived a vehement aversion to the popular cause, and his pride and ambition became stimulated by indignation and revenge.

Plat. Char-  
mid. p. 154,  
t. 2.

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 2. s. 12  
—25.

But, among the members of this council, the man most distinguished in high office and in party-measures, was Theramenes son of Agnon; whom we have already seen a leader in one revolution which abolished, and in another which restored the sovereignty of the popular assembly. He engaged now in this third revolution, under the patronage of Lacedæmon, with a disposition and views widely differing from those of Critias. His family, tho. noble, had been popular. His father, Agnon, founder of Amphipolis, had been a distinguished favorite of the people; and however Theramenes himself might, with all reasonable men, dislike the sovereignty of the multitude, yet possessing an inherited family interest among the people, and talents to cultivate it, he loved popularity. In reforming the government, therefore, it was not his purpose to oppress the people. He seems rather to have proposed to restore, under sanction of the stronger means now possessed by the Thirty, that mixed government, which, upon the overthrow of the Fourhundred, he had framed but could not support, and which we find so highly commended; but so little explained, by Thucydides. Ch. 19. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

The scheme of Critias, not altogether new in Greece, was however such as had not been executed, nor perhaps attempted, upon so extensive a scale. The habit of having all laborious offices performed by slaves, gave to conceive that the existence of the lower orders of freemen might be dispensed with; and made that possible and even obvious in Greece; which, in modern Europe, could neither be executed, nor scarcely imagined. Critias would allow no mixture of popular folly and insolence in power: he would remove as far as possible the danger of having the democratical law of treason restored, and put in execution against himself. He would abandon all hope of the glory of presiding over a powerful independent state, to have ease and affluence in a subordinate command. He proposed therefore, under the protecting authority of Lacedæmon, to be lord of Athens; he would make the city and its whole territory the private property of himself and a few associates; allowing no more of the Athenian people to remain within the country, than, with Lacedæmonian assistance, might be held in complete subserviency.

With these extravagant and nefarious views, which it could not  
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Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 11.

be prudent immediately to declare, Critias, in the outset, courted Theramenes, and there was, for a short time, the appearance of perfect harmony between them. Soon however differences arose, but still Critias maintained a show of deference for his colleague. Meanwhile among the rest of the Thirty he made his party secure. No eminence of character there moved his envy; no superior talents excited his apprehension; no firmness of principle thwarted his purposes. Concert then being established among them, the abilities, and yet more the popularity of Theramenes became suspicious to all. For security against their effects, it was resolved to solicit an armed force from Lacedæmon. Theramenes, not yet aware that he was himself the object, in vain remonstrated; the resolution passed, and Æschines and Aristoteles, two of the Thirty, were deputed to Sparta, authorized to engage for pay from the Athenian treasury for the troops desired. A force for holding Athens in obedience, and to be paid for doing so, was not likely to be denied. A body of Lacedæmonians was sent; and Callibius, their commander, with the title of Harmost, regulator, which the Lacedæmonians affected for those to whom they committed really the command, as governors, of Grecian cities, took his residence in the citadel of Athens, with his troops as its garrison.

Confident now of means to overbear opposition, Critias no longer kept measures with any, whether of the democratical or oligarchal interest, whom he suspected of inclination, with power, to thwart his designs; but he began to consider some of the oligarchal party, whom it was in the general policy of Lacedæmon to raise to power, as more dangerous opponents than any in the democratical interest, now sufficiently depressed. From the first arrival of the Lacedæmonians, he was sedulous in attention to the harmost; and by the show of much deference, obtained the effectual command of him. Under pretence, and perhaps in the belief, that the interest of Lacedæmon required, Callibius issued orders as Critias instigated, and the Lacedæmonian soldiers were employed to apprehend whom the Thirty denounced. Prosecution was no longer confined to sycophants, and men notoriously turbulent or infamous, but extended to characters the most irreproachable.

able. Some forms of legal process were observed, and those of the old constitution were mostly retained; but whomsoever the Thirty accused, the obsequious council never failed to condemn, and deliver to the executioner.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 12.

Such proceedings excited astonishment with alarm among all ranks. What could be the motive, and where the end of them, and what the form of government at length to be established, were the anxious subjects of general wonder and inquiry. Theramenes himself, surprized as dissatisfied, while Critias yet maintained a decent exterior toward him, remonstrated among his colleagues on the impolicy of their measures: 'Without some party among the people,' he said, 'no oligarchy could stand: but alarm and offence were now extended to all parties.' The admonition was taken, but not as Theramenes intended. Nothing the Thirty so much still feared as the popularity of Theramenes himself. To obviate its efficacy, they hastened the publication of a catalogue of three thousand citizens of their own selection, who should partake of the sovereign power in common assembly, and be competent for magistracy<sup>15</sup>. All other Athenians were reduced to the condition of subjects, not to the Three-thousand only, but the Thirty, whose sovereignty over them was declared absolute.

Xen. ibid.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 20.

Theramenes again remonstrated: 'Their faith was pledged, he said, ' by their former declarations, that all those, and only those, should ' share in the government, whose education might give the necessary ' knowlege, and whose property would afford means to allot leisure ' for its functions. Pay for attending the general assembly or the ' courts of justice, it had been agreed, should no longer be allowed. ' But three thousand men, as if there were some virtue in the number, ' had been arbitrarily chosen, without any attention to the proposed ' qualifications; and all other Athenians were as arbitrarily deprived ' of the rights of citizens. The imprudence was equal to the in- ' justice of the measure: violence only could support it; and the ' force of those who were to command was inferior to that of those ' who were to be held in subserviency.' This admonition also was

s. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Thus I think the phrase μετρίωνος τῶν πραγμάτων may best be interpreted.

taken, but, like the former, very differently from the monitor's intention. A review of arms was ordered; of the Threethousand in one place; of the other citizens in another. The avenues to the latter were occupied by the confidential adherents of the Thirty, supported by the Lacedæmonian troops. The arms of the citizens, not of the catalogue, were taken from them as they passed, and being carried to the temple of Minerva in the citadel, were committed to the care of the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Effectual opposition being thus obviated, the Thirty proceeded with a shamelessness in crime, for which, after all we have seen of crime in Grecian history, could he be suspected of partiality for the democratical cause, we should with difficulty believe the express testimony even of Xenophon. The credit of his account however, strong as his authority is, does not rest on his single authority. We find it supported by two other cotemporary writers; one his decided adversary in politics, the other no way his friend, Lysias and Plato. From their united evidence we learn, that the most abominable policy guided the measures now pursued. Revenge and avarice had their full sway: many suffered death for private enmities; many meerly for their wealth. Every eminent man was either to be destroyed or gained: but as means were wanting to attach a sufficient number by favors, the infernal expedient was practised of forcing men to a community of interest through a participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in the same guilt, and obnoxious to the same resentment, and thus theirs and that of the Thirty became a common cause<sup>16</sup>.

Amid numerous enormities, the death of three men, the most eminent of the commonwealth, and all notoriously attached to the oligarchal interest, particularly excited general wonder and alarm. Of Niceratus, son of the rich and worthy Nicias, who perished at Syracuse, it was said that he inherited the aristocratical spirit; neither father nor son, by any one action or word, having ever favored democracy. The able advice and powerful eloquence of Antiphon had

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 15.

Lys. con.  
Agorat.  
p. 133, vel  
470.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 18.

Lys. pro fil.  
Eucrat.  
p. 149, vel  
602.

Xen. ut sup.

<sup>16</sup> Οἷα δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταλλον, βουλάμενοι ὡς πλείους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτίων.  
Plat. apol. Socr. p. 32. t. 1.



SECT. II. GOVERNMENT OF THE THIRTY.

35

served so many individuals, while the free expenditure of his private fortune in public service, during the war, had acquired him such reputation for public spirit, that he was in favor with all parties, tho his whole political conduct had been directed to promote aristocracy. Leon of Salamis, amid the turbulence and crimes of his age and country, had been eminent for his blameless life. The monster Critias proposed to involve his master Socrates in the odium of the execution of so excellent a man. A message from the Thirty required the attendance of Socrates, with four others. Critias himself gave the order for them to go to Salamis, to apprehend Leon, and bring him to Athens. This order, knowing its purpose, and holding it contrary to law, Socrates disobeyed. The other four, less scrupulous or less courageous, performed it. To be apprehended and to be condemned were nearly the same thing; and Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon, were all delivered to the executioner.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 32.  
t. 1.

Numerous as the executions of men of property had been, the confiscation insuing did not suffice to supply the deficiencies of the public revenue, so curtailed by the event of the war, and to furnish the rewards claimed by the forward adherents of the Thirty. Money was wanting to pay the Lacedæmonian troops in the citadel. The metics were thought the best resource. Much of the commerce and manufactures of Athens was in their hands: many were wealthy; and the oppression, which had been successfully dared against the first of the Athenians, might be exercised, it was hoped, against aliens with less noise, and no hazard. Some symptoms of disaffection toward the ruling powers were made the pretence, and it was resolved to accuse eight of the richest, to whom, as a blind, were added two in indigent circumstances.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 15.

The orator Lysias, from whom we have the detail, was of the order of metics, and among the sufferers. His father, Cephalus, was a Syracusan, whom faction in his own city had driven to migrate, with a large fortune, to Attica, when the able administration of Pericles, in aid of what remained of Solon's laws, made Attica the most desirable residence in Greece. He had enjoyed the friendship of Pericles and of Socrates; and his house in Peiræus is the supposed scene of those dia-

Lys. con.  
Eratosth.

logues, so celebrated under the title of Plato's Republic. Lysias had gone a boy to Italy, with the historian Herodotus; when, under the patronage of Pericles, the colony of Thurium was settled on the ruins of Sybaris. There he had lived above thirty years, when, by the defeat in Sicily, the Athenian interest in those parts was overthrown, and Thurium was no longer a safe residence for men of property, who would not accept, or could not obtain, Lacedæmonian protection. Lysias, collecting whatever he could carry, returned to Athens; where, in partnership with Polemarchus his brother, a manufactory of shields, in which above a hundred slaves were employed, still gave him affluence.

He was, as he relates, entertaining some strangers at supper, when some of the Thirty entered, commanded the guests to withdraw, and himself to remain their prisoner. Committing him then to the care of Peison, one of their number, they proceeded to take account of his effects, of which the slaves were a principal part. He, meanwhile, fearing for his life, tampered with his keeper; and, for a bribe of a talent, obtained a promise of safety: but, to pay the money, being obliged to open a chest, in which were more than three talents in silver, above seven hundred pounds sterling, with Cyzicenes and Darics, the gold coins then most current in Greece<sup>17</sup>, to the amount of near five hundred pounds more, Peison seized the whole. Remonstrance was vain, but the admonition was salutary to Lysias. Watching opportunity, while the Thirty were still occupied in pillage, he found means to escape, and hastening to Peiræus, proceeded thence by sea to Megara. His brother, Polemarchus, less provident or less fortunate, being carried to the common prison, without trial, in pursuance of a simple order from the Thirty, was executed in the Athenian manner, by a draught of hemlock. Melobius, one of the Thirty, tore from his wife's ears the golden rings she wore. All the property of both the brothers was confiscated. The body of Polemarchus was not denied to his friends for burial; it would have been bootless impiety; but clothes for it, solicited from his large wardrobe, and an

<sup>17</sup> The Cyzicene, named from the city of Cyzices in the Propontis, was in value about a pound sterling; the Daric, a Persian coin, about fifteen shillings,

apartment in one of three houses of the family, for the preparation of the funeral, were refused.

Such are the circumstances related by Lysias himself. We shall receive the account with caution, as from an orator, famed for the talent of giving falsehood the air of truth, and, on this occasion, not merely pleading a cause, but the cause of his own revenge, and avowing his purpose to inflame the multitude who were to judge it<sup>18</sup>. The testimony of Xenophon however seems to show that the whole detail might be nearly true<sup>19</sup>. Had not the conduct of some of the Thirty been marked with peculiar atrocity in this transaction, had there not been something in it particularly shocking to the general feelings and prejudices of the Athenian people, Theramenes would scarcely have taken up the proceedings against metics, rather than those against citizens, for the ground of increased vehemence in opposition to his colleagues. He now arraigned their conduct in a manner that gave them serious alarm. It was evident that their safety and his were become incompatible, and they resolved that he should himself be the next prosecuted.

Dionys. Hal.  
vit. Lys.  
p. 196. t. 6.  
or. Gr.  
Reisk.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 16.

The council of Judicature, tho' thus far obsequious to the views of the Thirty, was not yet duly prepared to be the instrument of their purpose against Theramenes. Nevertheless they determined to make it their instrument for his destruction. Some of the members they could command: they endeavored to persuade some, to alarm others. Matters were arranged with those in whom they could best confide: the council was summoned: a body of men with concealed arms surrounded the hall: the Thirty attended, and Theramenes was in his place among them; when Critias, rising, in a set speech accused him

s. 17.

<sup>18</sup> Ὀργισθέντες μὲν, ἄδικον δὲ ἐπιθυμοῦντες. Which may be expressed faithfully, tho' paraphrastically, thus: Let the anger and indignation which you felt, when injuriously driven into banishment, now revive in your minds.

<sup>19</sup> Demosthenes (or. in Androt. & or. con. Timocr.) has said that, under the tyranny of the Thirty, no man was taken from his house. On this the learned Markland, in a note on the oration of Lysias against

Eratosthenes, observes, 'that Lysias is rather to be believed of what himself experienced; unless some distinction can be found.' The distinction seems obvious: Demosthenes probably meant to speak only of citizens; Lysias was not then a citizen. The matter is of consequence only that the faith of history be not unduly made questionable: more than enough will always remain uncertain.

of meditated treason against the existing government.\* Stating no facts amounting to treason by any known law, he argued rather as a conspirator to his accomplices, than a public accuser before a court of justice; contending, not on the ground of public law, but of convenience only to the party, that the accused should be capitally condemned.

Theramenes, eloquent, and practised in those difficult and dangerous situations, which require, with a firm mind, the readiest exertion of great powers, adapted his defence ably to the existing circumstances. To have asserted, as before a just judicature, the right and the duty of a public man, in his place in council, to declare his opinion on public matters (which almost alone had been imputed to him) he knew would be at least useless, and perhaps injurious. He therefore addressed himself rather to the fears and feelings, than to the conscience and justice of his judges; and he so demonstrated the expediency of the measures which he had always recommended, and not only the iniquity, but the danger of those pursued by Critias, that he disposed a majority of the council in his favor.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 2. c. 3.  
s. 18, 19.

s. 20.

The moment was critical. Critias was aware that his own ruin could now scarcely fail to follow the miscarriage of his purpose against Theramenes. After short communication with the Thirty, he went out and directed his armed attendants to show themselves. Returning then, he addressed the council thus: 'I esteem it a duty of my station' (he was president of the Thirty) 'to prevent those acting under me in the administration from being deceived and misled. I shall therefore take upon myself to do what the present emergency requires. The crowd, at your doors, have declared they will not rest under the acquittal of one, whose known purpose is the overthrow of the oligarchy. In the new code it is enacted, that the citizens of the catalogue shall be liable to capital punishment, only from the judgement of the council; but over all others the authority of the Thirty is absolute. I therefore, confident of your unanimous approbation, strike the name of Theramenes from the catalogue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death.'

To Athenians, familiar, under their democracy, with the most anomalous

SECT. II. DEATH OF THERAMENES.

lous and tyrannical measures of government, these proceedings were not astonishing and shocking, as they would be among those accustomed to the better political order of modern Europe, and especially of England: No opposition was made to them, either among the Thirty or by the council. Theramenes saw that his destruction was resolved, and instantly had recourse to what alone seemed to afford a chance for safety. He sprang to the altar (for, among the Greeks, every council-hall had its altar) and thence claimed the protection of a law so lately made, which Critias was proposing so grossly to violate. 'As for this altar,' he said, 'I know its sacredness will not protect me; but I will at least show that the impiety of those men is equal to their injustice. Yet I cannot but wonder that you, councillors, men of rank and high worth, will not assert your own cause: for the name of any of you may be erased from the catalogue with as little ceremony as mine.'

Xen. Hel.  
1. 2. c. 3.  
s. 21.

The herald of the Thirty had been dispatched to command the attendance of those high officers of justice called the Eleven, who were already gained to the views of Critias. They entered the council-hall with their usual attendants, while Theramenes was still speaking from the altar. Critias immediately told them that Theramenes had been condemned to death according to law; and commanded them to do what in consequence became their duty. In vain Theramenes alledged illegality and impiety. The council, awed by those around the hall, now known to be armed, was passive, while Satyrus, a man of ability, versed in high office and leading situations, but whom Xenophon describes as the most profligate as well as the most daring of the Eleven, set the example for laying hands on Theramenes, dragged him from the altar, and hurried him away to the prison. Boldly, or perhaps incautiously, as the nearest way, he passed through the agora. Theramenes, with exerted voice, endeavored to excite the people in his favour. Exasperated by this, 'If you speak again,' said Satyrus, 'I will make you groan.' 'And had I said nothing,' replied Theramenes, 'should I escape groaning?' The people, however, prepared to fear, and not to resist, made no stir. In the prison, the deadly potion being brought, Theramenes drank it with a serene countenance, and then, tinkling the reversed cup (the Grecian custom at banquets, in passing

Lys. or. con.  
Nicom.  
p. 347 & 350.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 2. c. 3.  
s. 21.

M. T. Cic.  
Tusc. 1. 1.  
s. 40.

the

the cup to another) as a remaining drop fell, 'This libation,' he said, 'is for the worthy Critias.' 'Such particulars,' says the cotemporary historian, 'are, I am aware, of little worth in themselves, yet what they prove of Theramenes I think deserving admiration, that neither readiness nor pleasantry forsook him, even with immediate death impending.'

## SECTION III.

*Farther Violences of the Thirty: Measures of Thrasybulus against the Thirty: Peiræus occupied by the Athenian Refugees under Thrasybulus: Death of Critias: The Thirty deposed and a Supreme Council of Ten elected: Interference of Lacedæmon: The Athenian Democracy restored.*

THE concurrent testimony of cotemporary writers of different parties, assures us that, under the democracy, after it became absolute, the principal road to the honors of the Athenian state was through bribery to the people, in various ways administered. A military officer soliciting a command, would to little purpose relate the length and variety of his service, or the wounds he had received in it, if his competitor had been more magnificent in theatrical exhibitions. An orator defending his client under criminal prosecution, considered the expences of that client for the people's amusement, of more importance to enumerate than any military or naval merits; or if he was conducting a criminal prosecution, he would not omit to detail the theatrical exhibitions with which his own family had entertained the people, in the hope, by so recommending himself, the more efficaciously to urge the condemnation of his enemy. Under every view then of the circumstances, it will appear evident that bribery, high bribery, would be absolutely necessary to the Thirty, for keeping the Threethousand of their catalogue firm to their party. To mark, on all occasions, the most pointed partiality for them, to give them the most decided præminence, and, on the other hand, to take the strongest precautions against those not of the catalogue,

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 4. init.

Lys. ἀπολογ.  
δωροδοκ.  
p. 161, vel  
697.

catalogue, was indispensable. But the necessity of bribing high would carry with it the necessity of increased violences and new crimes. The death of Theramenes had been a preparatory step. That able leader being removed, measures the most violent and injurious against the multitude, already deprived of arms, were no longer scrupled. Lands and country-houses were seized for the benefit of the Thirty and their adherents, and shortly an order was issued for all not of the catalogue to quit Athens. The greater part took refuge in Peiræus; but the jealousy of their oppressors did not allow them to remain long there. Fortunately the ruling party in the neighboring city of Megara, being democratical, was friendly to their cause; and some revolution, of which no satisfactory account remains, had so altered things in the larger and more powerful city of Thebes, long the most virulent enemy of democracy and of Athens, that there also a disposition favourable to them prevailed. Thebes, accordingly, and Megara became crowded with Athenian fugitives<sup>20</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4. s. 1.  
Lys. or. 25.  
Δῆμ. κατὰ λυσ.  
ἀπολογ.  
p. 173, vel  
776.

<sup>20</sup> If, in pursuing the course of Athenian affairs, the reader carries in his recollection the progress of the French revolution, he cannot fail to be struck with the many points of resemblance between the proceedings of the Thirty in Athens, with its Council of Judicature, and of the Committee of Public Welfare, in Paris, with its Revolutionary Tribunal; and the consideration is not unimportant to Grecian history, inasmuch as it restores evident probability to the accounts of enormities which, however well attested, the desuetude of modern times, in the order of things established in even the worst of European governments, had rendered, till new example arose, almost incredible. And here the similitude between what in France is called democracy, and what in Greece was esteemed an oligarchy, will become striking. Their character, as it stands marked by their conduct, has hardly a difference; and thus it may appear that, with allowance for that latitude of expression which poetry may claim, Pope is right where he has said,

For forms of government let fools contest;  
Whate'er is best administer'd is best.

The phrase, indeed, without a comment, is hazardous, yet it may be creditably explained thus: 'The form of a government, meerly as it gives a claim to this or that title, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, signifies little. That is really the best government which is so constituted, in whatever form, as most to insure a just administration.' But this cannot be absolute monarchy; for there all must depend upon the accidental character of the reigning prince: it cannot be democracy; for there the popular passion, which interested demagogues may in the moment excite, or the exertions, not even of the most numerous, but of the most turbulent and least scrupulous party, will decide everything: it cannot be oligarchy, or what is vulgarly called aristocracy; for there a part of the people has an interest separate from the rest: it can only be a government so mixed and balanced, that it may have strength to restrain popular folly and popular injustice, without being strong enough to support its own injustice or folly.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 2.

Among those whom the tyranny of the Thirty had early driven to seek safety in banishment, was Thrasybulus son of Lycus, already known for so many important services to his country. Thrasybulus, residing in Bœotia, was rather watching for movements within Athens favorable to his views, than hoping to see a multitude driven to join him in exile such as might form a force sufficient to assail the tyrants from without. Quickly he decided his plan. It was toward midwinter, and scarcely six months after the establishment of the Thirty, when with only about seventy heavy-armed, he seized Phylë, an Attic fortress near the Bœotian border.

Such an enterprize might bear, on first view, the appearance of imprudent haste and rash adventure. It gave little alarm to the Thirty, who trusted that they could easily prevent depredation on the neighboring lands, which alone they thought threatened, by marching immediately against the little garrison. Phylë was scarcely more than twelve miles from Athens. Reaching it therefore early in the day, they directly led their forces to assault, but with the ill success which, in that age, so commonly attended the attack of walls. In their hurry, for so small a distance, and against an enemy supposed little able to resist them, they had omitted to bring tents and camp-equipage. Nevertheless the weather being, for the season, fine, tho among the highlands, they resolved to remain before the place and immediately begin a contravallation. That same night a heavy fall of snow so distressed them, that next morning they withdrew hastily to Athens; and with so little conduct, that much of their baggage was taken by the activity of the pursuing enemy.

s. 3.

Had Thrasybulus assembled a numerous body for his outset, it might have excited an alarm ruinous to his purpose; and unless he could immediately have struck some great blow, subsistence would probably have failed him. But the season favored enterprize with a small force. It was not easy to keep the field with a large one against him; and in midwinter the Lacedæmonians would not, for a light cause, send troops from Peloponnesus. The Thirty, even after their miscarriage against Phylë, seem to have apprehended nothing from its garrison beyond excursion for plunder. To obviate this they sent the greater part of their Lacedæmonian troops, with a body of their own horse, to a station



SECT. III. CIVIL WAR AGAINST THE THIRTY.

near the place. But the credit of success having inabled Thrasybulus to increase his forces, he marched with seven hundred heavy-armed, surprised the camp of the Thirty at daybreak, killed a hundred and twenty of their heavy-armed, and put the rest to flight.

This unexpected stroke produced an effect on the minds of men far overproportioned to its real importance. The partizans of the Thirty were so alarmed, that the tyrants themselves doubted if they could be safe, even in Athens, till assistance might be obtained from Lacedæmon. Their resources then, in beginning distress, were congenial to their measures for the establishment of power. Should they, by any train of misfortunes, be reduced to quit Athens, Eleusis would be the most desirable refuge. It was, next to the capital, the largest town of Attica, favorably situated for receiving succour from Peloponnesus, and fortified; but many of the inhabitants were disaffected. This inconvenience therefore they resolved to obviate; and the cavalry, whom they considered as the most trustworthy of their troops, were the instruments chosen for the occasion. For the equestrian order, composed of the wealthiest families of the commonwealth, having been common sufferers from the oppression of popular tyranny, rejoiced in the prospect of an improvement of their condition by an alteration of the constitution. Thus predisposed to the Thirty, it had been the policy of those insidious tyrants to court that order, and they had succeeded in holding the largest part attached to their cause.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 5.

Aristoph.  
Equit.

At the head of the cavalry therefore, Critias went to Eleusis. All the Eleusinian people, of age to bear arms, were summoned, under pretence of a muster, for ascertaining their strength as a garrison for their town. Every man, as his name was intolled, was ordered to go through the gate leading to the shore. Without the wall the Athenian cavalry were posted, with some of the Thirty attending. These indicated the suspected, as they passed singly, and the servants of the cavalry (for a Grecian trooper was always attended by one or more servants afoot) seized and bound them. The scrutiny being completed, they were immediately marched away to Athens, and delivered into the custody of the Eleven.

These unfortunate men, together with some who, for the same crime of suspected disaffection, had been brought from Salamis, were suffi-

ciently at the mercy of Critias and his associates. But an infernal policy dictated farther ceremony. To strengthen the tie between himself and his chosen Threethousand, Critias would make these his accomplices in every crime, and sharers in the consequent enmity and abhorrence of men. On the following day therefore the Threethousand of the catalogue, together with the cavalry, were assembled in that splendid edifice, raised for far other purposes by the taste and magnificence of Pericles, the Odeion or music-theater; and, lest all should not be sufficiently zealous in the cause, or sufficiently obsequious to the Thirty, the Lacedæmonian garrison attended. Critias, according to the cotemporary historian, addressed the Athenians in these extraordinary terms: ‘ In the government which we have been establishing, your interest has been considered equally with our own. Sharing therefore its advantages, you will not refuse to share with us its dangers. Your common voice must ratify an order for the execution of the prisoners yesterday brought hither; that your security and your peril may rest on the same foundation with ours.’ Suffrages were given by ballot, as under the democracy; but openly, that it might be seen if any were untrue to the cause; and the prisoners from Eleusis and Salamis, together about three hundred, were all condemned together by one vote. And among the Athenians, says the cotemporary historian, there were some so intent upon the acquisition of wealth and power as to be even gratified with these proceedings.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 7.

s. 8.

s. 12.

It was not long after this massacre, so ineffectual was the horrid policy of Critias to secure his command over Attica, that Thrasybulus, with about a thousand heavy-armed, marching by night, entered the town of Peiræus, open since it was dismantled by the Lacedæmonians, and took possession of it without opposition. The Thirty led their whole force to attack him. The extent of Peiræus being too great for his scanty numbers to defend, he moved to the adjoining suburb of Munychia, which afforded also more advantageous ground. The Thirty did not delay their assault. Next to victory, death in battle was certainly the most desirable lot for Critias; and he was fortunate enough, beyond his desert, to obtain it. Hippomachus, another of the Thirty, was also killed. Hardly more than seventy of their followers had fallen, when the rest fled, and the victory of Thrasybulus was complete.

plete. His troops carried off the arms of the dead; but their clothes, a common object of plunder among the Greeks, were, in pious respect for deceased fellowcitizens, left untouched.

When the pursuit ceased, a truce for burial of the slain, was, in the usual form, solicited by the defeated and granted by the conquerors. Opportunity to communicate being thus open, numbers from both sides assembled in conversation. Among those from Peiræus was Cleonitus, herald of the mysteries, a man respected for his birth, connections, and abilities, as well as for the sacred office which he bore, and, what was particularly advantageous on the present occasion, indowed by nature with a voice singularly capable of prevailing over the murmur of talking numbers. Having procured silence, he addressed the throng in a conciliatory speech, in which, professing for himself and his party every disposition to friendly union with the Threethousand, he imputed to the Thirty alone the evils suffered on both sides. 'The Thirty,' he said, 'only to gratify an inordinate thirst of wealth and power, had destroyed as many Athenian citizens in eight months as all the Peloponnesians in ten years; and, when no obstacle existed to prevent their establishing a good government in peace, they had forced on this most shameful, cruel, wicked, and, to gods and men; hateful civil war. For himself and those with whom he acted, he protested that the death of those misled men, whose obsequies were about to be performed, was a subject of sincere grief not less than to their own party.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 13.

This speech, gaining anxious attention from the Many, alarmed their chiefs, who sedulously hurried them away. Next day the Thirty, for that remained their title, met, and, with faded hopes, consulted concerning their affairs, while the Threethousand were in altercation, in various parts of the town; those who had been forward in the late violences, urging opposition to the utmost against Thrasybulus and his adherents, while those who thought themselves less personally obnoxious, insisted on the necessity of an accommodation; unreservedly declaring they would no longer obey the Thirty, to their own destruction and that of the commonwealth. The result of the contention was a resolution, passed in the form of a decree, by which the Thirty were deposed; and

s. 14.

s. 15.

Lys. con.  
Eratosth.  
p. 125, vel  
422.

Id. p. 125,  
vel 419.

Lys. *ibid.*

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 3.  
s. 15.

s. 16.

and a council of Ten was appointed in their room, one from every ward, for the express purpose of negotiating an accommodation with those in Peiræus. Neither was resistance attempted by the fallen tyrants, nor violence used against them. Two of their number, Eratosthenes and Pheidon, were elected of the Ten; the others, weak as cruel, and neglected as worthless, retired to Eleusis.

Opposition to Critias had recommended Eratosthenes and Pheidon to the choice of the Threethousand, and a disposition adverse to the Thirty was also the supposed merit of their new colleagues. But no sooner were the Ten vested with the supreme authority than they betrayed the trust. Appointed for the express purpose of negotiation with Thrasylulus, they resolved not to do what would presently reduce them to the general level of Athenian citizens. To this determination they were perhaps instigated, but at least they were warmly supported in it, by Lysimachus, general of the cavalry, a most vehement enemy of democracy. The cavalry were almost universally disposed to the sentiments of their chief, and, a large proportion of the Threethousand being found still well inclined to the cause, the resolution was taken to oppose Thrasylulus, to maintain oligarchy, and, in reliance on support from Lacedæmon, to exert themselves for the present in defensive measures. The Threethousand being however far from unanimous, the cavalry took on themselves the principal care, both of preserving peace within the city, and giving security against the enemy without. The whole body constantly slept in the Odeion, with their horses at hand bridled, and their spears by them, that they might act instantly, as emergencies might require, either as cavalry or infantry; for beside unceasing apprehension of sedition within the city, attack from Peiræus was hourly expected.

Meanwhile citizens, metics, and former inhabitants of Athens of all denominations, who had fled from the tyranny of the Thirty, allured by the fame of the successes of Thrasylulus, flocked to join him. The greater part, disarmed, as we have already seen, by the policy of Critias, brought only their personal ability and zeal in the cause: but all were sedulous in providing themselves to the best of their skill and means; some making shields of wood, some of wicker; and, whether meerly

for

for uniformity and distinction, or that no visible weakness of the material might encourage the enemy, they whitened all. Fellowship in adversity, and unity of object under one able leader, promoted concord among them. About the tenth day from their first occupying Peiræus, in general assembly they solemnly pledged themselves to fidelity in the common cause, and then came to a liberal resolution, that the rights of citizenship should be common to all, even foreigners having right of hospitality, who should faithfully do the duty of soldiers, in the war in which they were engaged for the recovery of their country. They were now strong in heavy-armed; their light-armed were still more numerous, and they had about seventy horse. They commanded the country, so that they were at no loss for provisions, and it was resolved, with general approbation, to besiege the city.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 2. c. 4.  
s. 18.

Tho' the transient reign and hasty downfall of the Thirty might, on a first glance, give to suppose that their projects were as unaccountably rash and imprudent as grossly nefarious, yet they were, in reality, not so lightly founded. Critias had proposed, not to establish an independent dominion, but only to be lord of Attica, under the sovereignty of Lacedæmon; and he confided in the Threethousand heavy-armed of his catalogue, together with the greatest part of the Athenian cavalry, who were warm in his cause, only as force sufficient in emergencies, till support from Lacedæmon might be obtained. Attica, divided among three or four thousand families, would afford every man a maintenance. Every Athenian thus, like every Lacedæmonian, would be a gentleman; all the offices performed among the modern European nations by the lower classes of freemen, being supplied by slaves. An extraordinary concurrence of favoring incidents, with bold and well-concerted enterprise, had shaken this system almost in the outset. But, tho' Critias himself had fallen, and the people under him were ready for a revolution, yet his successors in power, who had been his opponents in council, found his plan so far inviting, that they adopted it almost intirely; while his opponents in arms, almost grasping the object of their wishes, were still very far from any clear prospect of obtaining permanent possession of it.

Thrasylulus had indeed so chosen his season, so avoided to excite  
alarm;

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 19.

alarm, was so rapid in his measures, and so favored by contingencies, that the revolution was on the point of taking place, before his opponents began to think any addition to their own strength wanting. At length nearly at the same time, from the Thirty in Eleusis, and from the Ten, in the name of the Threethousand, in Athens, ministers reached Lacedæmon. But with a government ill-formed for extensive dominion, Lacedæmon itself was at this time divided by faction. The support of oligarchy, however, was necessary to the existence of Lacedæmonian influence, in any foreign state, and all the standing principles of Spartan policy would urge it. The powerful interest of Lysander therefore, whose credit was deeply concerned in the maintenance of the Lacedæmonian authority in Athens, sufficed to obtain for him the appointment of commander-in-chief in Attica, with the title of harmost, and for Libys, his brother, the command of a squadron to coöperate with him. He desired no Lacedæmonian land-force, but he procured a loan from the treasury to the Athenian state, of a hundred talents, for paying troops, which he could easily hire among the other states of Peloponnesus. He passed immediately to Eleusis, where he was soon joined by his mercenaries, and he prepared to blockade Peiræus by land and sea.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 19.  
Lys. Isocrat.

Xen. *ibid.*

These were circumstances to which the Ten, from their first appointment, had looked forward; and the hopes of their party now became high again, while inevitable ruin seemed to threaten Thrasybûlus and his followers. Certainly no exertion of prudence and bravery, on their part, could inable their scanty number and deficient resources to withstand the power of Lacedæmon. But the state of parties in Lacedæmon itself, not likely to have been totally unknown to Thrasybulus, was probably among the encouragements to his enterprize; and indeed it seems more than possible that he had communication there, and reasonable dependence upon intrigue favorable to his views. Xenophon has apparently not said all that he knew or thought upon the subject; certainly he has not explained all that appears mysterious in it; and tho he generally writes freely, yet this is not the only occasion upon which he appears to have carefully avoided declaring what might involve the safety or the character of persons living when he wrote. The facts

facts however, which were of public notoriety then, are not dubious now. Pausanias, the reigning king of the Eurystheneid family, was of the party that envied or feared the power and influence of Lysander. But the ephoralty was the hinge on which the politics of Lacedæmon turned; whatever party could obtain a majority of the five ephors, commanded the administration for the year. The expectation that Lysander would make Attica, according to Xenophon's expression, his own, gave much uneasiness. An exertion was therefore made by the king's party; and, three of the ephors favoring, a decree of the general assembly was procured, which, without taking from Lysander the particular command, so lately conferred upon him, put the supreme direction of the business into the king's hands. It was resolved that the affair was important enough to require that the allies should be summoned. The general assembly then directed, that a Lacedæmonian army should march, that Pausanias should command, and that two of the ephors should attend him, as his council.

In pursuance of these resolutions, taken in the absence of Lysander, the contingent of forces was required from all the allies. The Bœotians and Corinthians, already jealous of Lacedæmon, found pretences to disobey: but all the other allies sent their proportions of troops, and Pausanias led a very powerful army into Attica. Lysander, with due submission to legal authority, joined him, and they incamped together in the plain called Halipedon, the seaside plain, before Peiræus. A message was immediately sent to Thrasybulus, requiring his followers to disperse. To this obedience was refused, and then Pausanias led his troops to an assault upon the place. He had however no intention that it should succeed, and of course it was ineffectual. Next day he examined the ground about the port, with the pretended purpose of forming a contravallation. His escort, consisting of Lacedæmonian infantry and Athenian cavalry, being molested by the enemy's light-armed, he ordered the cavalry to charge. The irregulars fled, and the cavalry, killing some, pursued as far as the theater in Peiræus, where they were met and checked by targeteers and heavy-armed. The Lacedæmonians following to support the Athenian horse, were so annoyed by the missile weapons of the targeteers, that they were compelled to retreat with loss, and two

polemarcs were among the killed. Thrasybulus then led on the whole of his heavy-armed, and Pausanias not without difficulty reached a hill, at the distance of half a mile, where he could defend himself while he sent for support. Having collected his forces, and formed his phalanx in very deep order, he drove back the enemy, with some slaughter, raised his trophy, and withdrew to his camp.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 24.

s. 25.

This action, critical as it had been, very exactly answered the end of Pausanias. He was anxious to establish the opinion of his serious desire to reduce the democratical Athenians by arms, while he carried his real purposes by secret negotiation. Quitting therefore his situation before Peiræus, he incamped under the walls of Athens, taking his own quarters in the celebrated Academia. He had probably, not less than

Lys. pro fil.  
Eucr. p. 604.

Lysander, his view to a commanding influence in Attica. He was connected by hereditary hospitality with the family of Nicias, of which the chief, Niceratus, the unfortunate son of the unfortunate general, had perished, as we have seen, under the Thirty. Pausanias, having communicated with the survivors of the family, directed them to come to him, numerous attended by their party, to give weight to a declaration of their wish for an accommodation with their fellowcountrymen in Peiræus. At the same time he invited Thrasybulus to send commissioners to treat with him, and intimated the terms which those commissioners should propose. He was readily obeyed by both; and with the advice and concurrent authority of the two ephors, his council, he gave passports for the commissioners from Peiræus, and for Cephisophon and Melitus<sup>21</sup>, as representatives of the moderate in Athens, to proceed to Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 26.

s. 27.

The Ten and their associates were alarmed at these missions. Their general assembly was summoned, and they procured a decree for sending ministers to Lacedæmon, on the part of the existing government of Athens. By these they urged, 'That as they had voluntarily placed their city and themselves under the protection, and to be disposed of at the pleasure, of the Lacedæmonians, nothing less ought to be required of those, who now held Munychia and Peiræus, than an uncon-

s. 28.

<sup>21</sup> Perhaps father of the accuser of Socrates, who was Melitus son of Melitus.



ditional surrender.' All the parties however were temperately heard by the ephors and the Spartan assembly; whose insuing decree directed 'That fifteen commissioners should be appointed, in conjunction with the king Pausanias, to settle, with the strictest impartiality and equity, the differences existing among the Athenian people.'

This resolution, generous, we should wish to consider it, tho evidently in no small degree a party measure, appears however to have been faithfully and liberally executed. All Athenians of all parties, the Thirty, and some few who had acted in the most invidious offices under them, only excepted, were restored to their rights as Athenian citizens<sup>22</sup>, an oath only being required of them, to keep the peace and be true to a universal amnesty. Humanity perhaps and prudence demanded the exception, as not less necessary to the safety of the excepted than to the general quiet. Eleusis was given them for their residence, and to be also the refuge of all who, with them, might fear to live under the restored commonwealth. Matters being so far settled, Pausanias led away the whole of the Peloponnesian forces, leaving the Athenians of the city at perfect liberty with regard to their future civil government.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 29.

The retreat of the Lacedæmonian army was the signal for Thrasybulus and his followers to march to Athens. In solemn procession, like the Roman triumph, they ascended into the citadel, and in their arms offered a thanksgiving sacrifice to Minerva. A general assembly was then held, to give the sanction of the popular will to the measures which the circumstances might require. Phormisius, tho one of the army from Peiræus, proposed that landowners only should have votes in the general assembly, and be competent for magistracy. The more prudent Thrasybulus saw that, tho the evils of the old government were great, this was not the proper remedy; nor would the times have borne it. More than five thousand citizens would so have been deprived of the privileges to which, under the old constitution, they were intitled; and would of consequence have sunk into a condition of little more security

Xen. Hel.  
l. 2. c. 4.  
s. 29. &

Lys. c. Agorat.  
p. 137, vel 499.

Lys. or. de non abolend. rep. & Dion. Hal. vit. Lys.

Xen. ut sup.

<sup>22</sup> Even the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten were not to be denied those rights, provided they would abide a judicial scrutiny of their conduct—*ἀς ἀν' ἰθὺς αὐθόνας δίδωται τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢς ἦσαν*. Audoc. de myst. p. 42.

for person and property than slaves. For so it was, in the want of any just idea of balanced government among the Greeks, that portion of the people which held the sovereign power was despotic, and the rest were their subjects, more depressed than the subjects of any single despot easily can be. In addressing the assembly therefore, after some expostulation to the oligarchal party, Thrasybulus strongly recommended, to the democratical, peaceful behavior, and the strictest observance of the oath of amnesty just taken. Stating then the inexpediency of risking new troubles, by attempting, at such a season, any innovation, he recommended the complete restoration of the constitution, as it stood before the appointment of the Thirty. The assembly decreed as he advised: all the magistracies were filled in regular form, and the government resumed its antient course.

Thus, by a series of conduct, as wise and moderate in civil business as able and daring in military, the latter a common merit among the Greeks, but the former very uncommon, Thrasybulus enjoyed the satisfaction while he lived, and through succeeding ages has had the glory, of being the restorer of the Athenian commonwealth, the second founder of Athens. Attica however was not yet united under one government: it was divided between a democratical republic, of which Athens, and an oligarchal, of which Eleusis, was the capital; an arrangement suiting the policy of Lacedæmon, as it facilitated the means of holding all in subjection. These means, nevertheless, were neglected. As the Lacedæmonians wrote no books, and foreigners had little access to their city, we are very deficiently informed of their domestic affairs. They seem however to have been at this time so warm in faction, the party of Pausanias overbearing, but hardly overbearing, that of Lysander, that they had little leisure for interfering in the affairs of neighboring states. Meanwhile the people of Athens were alarmed with information, that those in Eleusis were engaging mercenary troops. The vehemence of jealousy, natural to those who had so lately been suffering the evils of exile, and who expected no alternative but death or expatriation from the success of the supposed design, instantly possessed the public mind. The service of all able to bear arms was strictly required, and the whole strength of the city marched. The leaders in Eleusis, whose purpose

seems

B. C. 402.  
 Ol. 94.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
 Xen. Hel.  
 l. 2. c. 4.  
 s. 30.

seems to have been but suspected, trusting themselves to a conference, were massacred; but fortunately, so moderate was the popular fury, or such the influence of the chiefs to restrain it, perjury and bloodshed went no farther. Proposals of peace and complete amnesty were offered and accepted, and the refugees, mostly of the noblest and wealthiest families of Attica, were restored to the rights of Athenian citizens. The multitude, who had the power in their hands, as the cotemporary historian, not their partial friend, observes, remained faithful to their oaths, 'and the government,' he continues, 'is still carried on with harmony between them.' Thus at length, the Athenian commonwealth was completely restored, and all Attica reunited as its territory.

In the accounts remaining of these vicissitudes in the affairs of Athens, no mention occurs of Alcibiades: after his ineffectual interference to prevent the defeat of Aigospotami, he is not even named by the cotemporary historian. His fate, nevertheless, as it may best be gathered from imperfect accounts of later writers, is altogether too interesting not to require notice.

Alcibiades seems to have possessed, in the Thracian Chersonese, a large estate, even a princely command, and extensive influence; the estate apparently inherited from his ancestors; for avarice, and that low dishonesty which has the accumulation of wealth for its object, were not among his vices. When he was a second time driven, from the head of his country's forces, to seek safety in exile, his property, in the expectation of a great booty for the treasury, was strictly inquired after, and private interest, as we have seen, made such inquiries at Athens very severe. But tho, in issues from the treasury and collections from tributary states, the public money which had come into his hands very greatly exceeded what had ever fallen within the power of any former Athenian general, it was found that he had not used the opportunity for private profit.

Lys. pro  
Aristoph.  
p. 654.

In exile therefore, and after the overthrow of his country, with the consideration arising from property and power, Alcibiades enjoyed that which extraordinary abilities and magnanimous disinterestedness, displayed in great commands, would add. But as it often happens, in  
human

human affairs, that circumstances apparently most advantageous and desirable lead to misfortune; so the very credit of Alcibiades was the occasion that, tho in exile, the overthrow of his country involved his ruin. Athens was thought not in secure obedience to the Thirty or to Lacedæmon while Alcibiades lived; and, the authority or influence of that sovereign state pervading all the Grecian settlements, it was difficult to find a residence where he could be safe. Perhaps indeed his disposition too little allowed him to rest in quiet security. Finding himself however threatened on his estate in the Chersonese, he passed over into Bithynia. He had some confidence in the friendship, as well as in the tried honor, of the satrap of that country, Pharnabazus. But little contented with safety there, he conceived projects, not simply for restoring himself to his country, but for restoring his country to its former preëminence in Greece. His hopes were excited, and his views directed, by the well-known success of Themistocles at the Persian court; and, under the protection and with the recommendation of Pharnabazus, he proposed to go to Susa. Arrangements seem to have been in some forwardness for his purpose, when, in his residence in Bithynia, he was attacked by an armed multitude, whose provocation or whose instigators are not certainly indicated. Pharnabazus, the Lacedæmonians, and his own passions have all been accused; but the many well-attested proofs of the satrap's integrity, magnanimity, and honor, seemingly should exculpate him. The assailants, an armed multitude against a few domestics, feared to enter the house, but they set fire to it. Alcibiades then sallying sword in hand, none dared await his assault; but, from a distance, he was overwhelmed by a shower of darts and arrows. Nearly thus, according to all remaining accounts, fell that extraordinary man, before he had reached his fortieth year.

## CHAPTER XXII.

Illustrations, from the Orators and Philosophers, of the CIVIL HISTORY of ATHENS, and the Condition of the Athenian People, between the Ages of Pericles and Demosthenes; with a summary View of the Rise of PHILOSOPHY and LITERATURE in GREECE.

## SECTION I.

*Short political Quiet at Athens. Transcription of Solon's Laws. Violence of Party-strife renewed: Sycophancy revived: Rise of the Rhetoricians. Prosecutions; of the Son of Alcibiades; of the Nephews of Nicias; of a Citizen supposed to have appropriated Property forfeited to the Commonwealth; of those who prosecuted the Assassins of Phrynichus; of a Citizen for grubbing the Stump of a sacred Olive-tree.*

ON the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, there followed a suspension rather of the usual turbulence throughout Greece, than what, in modern Europe, would be esteemed a political calm; Attica only remaining, as we have seen, for some time, violently agitated. The state of the rest of the country, under the undisputed supremacy of Lacedæmon, tho' not particularly described by any ancient author, we shall gather from circumstances hereafter occurring to notice. Of the state of Athens, after the restoration of democracy, which Xenophon's short eulogy might give a modern reader to suppose all concord, tranquility, and happiness, we have from the cotemporary orators and philosophers large information. Hence indeed we derive almost all that we learn of Athenian history, and no un-instructive portion of it, till Athens became again implicated in the troubles which anew involved all Greece; amid which she so recovered strength and importance as again to take a leading part in them.

It is a strong testimony to the merit of Solon's laws, that, in all revolutions of the Athenian government, they never ceased to be highly respected. The legislative and executive powers, never well defined in any antient government, might receive changes, the judicial might pass to new tribunals; but no innovating demagogue dared make a direct attack upon Solon's legal system. Nevertheless there existed, for some ages, only one complete copy of his laws, which was kept with great care in the citadel, where all might have access to it, and transcribe any parts that were particularly wanted. Among the violent internal troubles, preceding the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, it seems to have been a measure of the better-minded men, for restoring the most valuable part of the old constitution, and providing new security for civil order, to procure a decree for a second copy of the whole code for public use. The important business, of making or superintending the transcription, was committed to Nicomachus, a man of rank, connected with the oligarchal party; and it was expected that the work should be completed in four months. But new troubles within, the pressure of an enemy without, and at length the capture of the city, interfered. Meanwhile Nicomachus, and those connected with him, found themselves possessed of power which they were unwilling to resign. Litigants and others, who wanted copies of any particular laws, could have them only through Nicomachus. The transcription of parts, for private purposes, unavoidably interrupted that of the whole for public use: and thus, independently of the political troubles, arose a pretence for delay, which would require reasonable allowance, while the extent of reasonable allowance, under these circumstances, could scarcely by any measure be estimated; and thus six years passed before the complete copy was delivered for public use.

Amid the disorders of conquest and revolution, meanwhile, circumstances, how far really injurious cannot be known, subjected the code however to suspicions, not to be completely obviated. Nicomachus was much connected with Satyrus, whom we have seen distinguishing himself, among the Eleven, as a zealous minister of the violences of the Thirty Tyrants. Nicomachus and Satyrus had before been together  
among

Lys. adv.  
Nicom.  
p. 836.

Id. p. 839.

Ch. 21. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

among the leaders of the oligarchal party, in opposition to Cleophon. They together joined the party of Critias; and thus, when, by the death of Theramenes, opposition to that party was quelled, the code of Solon was at its mercy.

Nevertheless, if we put together all that remains on the subject, it appears not likely that the code was very essentially injured. Lysias, as an advocate by profession, must himself have had a general knowledge of the laws, and he could not want opportunity for learning the opinions of the best informed about them; yet, when, in conducting the prosecution afterward instituted against Nicomachus, it was most his object to point out what had been destroyed or interpolated; he seems to have been unable even to name anything very material, except that forgery which he affirms to have occasioned the condemnation of Cleophon. All other alterations, made, as he says, principally under the Thirty, appear to have had no farther purpose than to authorize increased expence in public sacrifices. A public sacrifice was always a feast for the lower people. The object being then only to enable the Thirty to feed the Three-thousand of their catalogue at the public expence, the interpolations could hardly much affect the general system.

Lys. adv.  
Nicom.  
p. 849.

When therefore, on the expulsion of the Thirty, the democracy was restored, the inestimable advantage was experienced of possessing a system of law, which the people had been accustomed to revere, and the Athenian state became resettled at once on the code of Solon, as on a basis in whose firmness all had confidence. But, on the contrary, intolerable inconvenience had been experienced from the variety of laws added since his time; for many had been made only to answer the momentary purposes of faction; some oppressive in their tenor; some contradictory to others; insomuch that, in the end, the most cautious man could scarcely direct his conduct so as not to become obnoxious to legal punishment. Fortunately, the laws of Solon, together with a few unrepealed statutes of Draco, were sufficient, in the moment, for the purposes of civil life. It was therefore decreed, that all later laws should be suspended, till they had undergone a revision, and that those only which might be advantageously grafted on the old system, should be reinacted.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 39.  
& 52.

Thrasybulus, and those who with him guided the popular will, certainly deserve high honor for that political calm, short as it was, which Athens now enjoyed. Not the public measures only, but the public temper was marked with a wise moderation and a magnanimous liberality. Sycophancy was discouraged; party was nearly abolished; several of those who had acted with the Thirty, who had served under them in the cavalry, their guard and principal support, were admitted into the council, and allowed to aspire to the highest offices, civil and military. Harmony and internal quiet prevailed, such as, perhaps since the death of Pericles, had been unknown in Athens.

Lys. δοκιμαζ.  
 ἱστορογ.  
 p. 575. &  
 adv. Poliuch.  
 p. 609. &  
 Xen. Hel.  
 l. 2. c. 4.  
 s. 30.

While sobriety and moderation, the fruit of severe suffering, thus pervaded the public mind, a vain attempt was made by the patriotic leaders, without the hazard of great changes, to put legal restraint upon democratical despotism. A law was proposed and enacted, declaring that no decree, whether of the council or even of the general assembly, should be valid in opposition to the law, as it stood then established. But the restraint of law, in an unbalanced democracy, was a phantom, which party-leaders easily taught their favoring majority in the sovereign assembly to despise. The constitution, therefore, remaining unaltered, the former temper of the government soon returned, and all its inherent evils again broke out. Party-spirit resumed its violence, tyranny again marked the decrees of the assembly and the judgements of the tribunals, and even the amnesty, that solemn engagement to which the whole people had sworn, as the very foundation of order and quiet in the restored commonwealth, was, not openly indeed, but under various subterfuges, violated. If the interest of a party required the exclusion of some eminent man from the college of archons or from the council, nice distinctions were taken to prove the cases of such men exceptions to the general pardon, and to contend that the approbation of the council in the dokimasia should be withheld. Success in such an argument before the council, which went no farther than to exclusion from office, encouraged accusation on similar grounds in the ordinary courts, or before the assembled people, which might produce confiscation and banishment, or even death. Needy  
 and

Lys. pro.  
 Mantith.  
 & id. adv.  
 Evand. &  
 eon. Philon.



and profligate men caught at the opportunity, and sycophancy revived, with all its public evils and all its private horrors.

In a popular government, the art of public speaking cannot fail to be important, and in Athens it was more extensively so, as no man, who possessed anything, could, by the most upright conduct, be secure against prosecution, and as moreover it was expected of the prosecuted, tho' friends or council might assist, that they should nevertheless also speak for themselves. The importance of eloquence, in a court of justice, will also bear some proportion to the numbers which compose it. Eloquence will often operate powerfully upon an English jury of only twelve men; tho' the judge will check deception, inform ignorance, and correct misinformation; and the jury, in conference before they decide, discussing their own opinions, the recollection of the informed and wary may obviate the fascination of oratory upon the ignorant, the passionate, and the giddy. But in the Athenian courts, consisting of from five hundred to six thousand jurors, no conference could take place; no salutary influence of the wiser few could easily affect the mass; the decision must generally be that of ignorance and passion, operated upon, as might happen, by the powers of contending speakers. 'Exasperated by eloquence,' says Xenophon, 'they often condemn the innocent; moved to pity, or even to favor, by eloquence, they acquit and even honor the guilty.'

Xen. Apol.  
Socr. s. 4.

In this state of things, at Athens, it was unfortunate to want eloquence. A wealthy man, unable to speak for himself in public, was doubly an object for the sycophants. Hence the profession of the rhetorician, who composed orations to be spoken by others, arose and gained high credit. Eminent men, of superior abilities, attached themselves to it, whose compositions, as valuable models of an important art, were collected and transmitted to posterity; and much of the works of two of the most eminent, Lysias, whose name has already occurred for notice, and Isocrates, who soon after acquired celebrity, fortunately remain to us. In the Grecian annals of the cotemporary Athenian historian, we find, after the restoration of the democracy, a void in Athenian history. Those factious intrigues, those strifes in the tribunals and in the agora, which alone offered themselves, were apparently, in

his ideä, either too familiar to his contemporaries, or too hazardous for historical narrative. He has therefore referred his notice of them to those valuable dissertations which remain to us from him. These, with the works of the orators and rhetoricians, who often passed under the common title of orators, enable us in some degree to fill the void; not indeed with a series of connected events, but with facts which afford much illustration of the character of the Athenian constitution, and of the condition of the people under it.

Among the early objects of reviving sycophancy, we find Alcibiades, son of the extraordinary man of that name, who has already engaged so much of our attention, by Deinomache, daughter of Megacles, the noblest and wealthiest heiress of her time in Athens, to whom he was married in early youth. The younger Alcibiades, from deficiency, whether of talents, or activity, or opportunity, made no figure, in public life, proportionate to his father's fame. He is chiefly known to us through two orations, composed, on different occasions, by the two celebrated rhetoricians just mentioned, one in his accusation, the other in his defence. These however show that he was eminent enough to excite the attacks, not only of sycophancy but of faction.

The Athenian people had decreed a military expedition, on what occasion does not appear, and the generals were impowered (such was the tyrannical authority with which the despotic multitude not unfrequently intrusted its favorites) to name the citizens who should serve upon it. Party-interest, or party-resentment, or possibly some view to favor with the lower people only, prompting, several men of rank and property were called upon to serve as common foot-soldiers. Most of them, dreading the consequences of a despot's resentment, obeyed the injurious mandate; but young Alcibiades dared to refuse. Mounting his horse, he joined the cavalry, and said, there he was in his post; there he was ready for the duty which the constitution and the laws required of him.

The oration composed by Lysias, for the prosecution, will not impress the most favorable ideä of the rhetorician himself, or of the prosecutor for whom he wrote, or of the court to which the speech was addressed, or of the general administration of law at Athens, after the boasted restoration

Lys. con.  
Alcib.  
Lys. ibid.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 1. c. 1.  
s. 24.

## SECT. I. PROSECUTION OF THE SON OF ALCIBIADES.

61.

restoration of the commonwealth. Private revenge is a motive of the accuser, directly and repeatedly avowed; and not only the most illiberal personal abuse of the accused, but all that faction had ever, truly or falsely, imputed to his father, was urged to influence the tumultuary tribunal. The lost defence is not wanting to evince, that the accusation, which we must suppose so able a pleader well knew how to adapt most advantageously to the capacity and temper of the court, was weakly founded and malicious. The testimony, that such a composition affords, is in more than one view valuable. We might question the evidence of Xenophon to the insecurity of individuals at Athens, and the tyranny exercised over all possessing, or reputed to possess property; he was a sufferer from popular sovereignty; but the concurring testimony of Lysias, a sufferer from oligarchy, and thence a vehement advocate for popular power, completes the proof.

In the oration against Alcibiades, we find three penal laws quoted: one against cowardice in battle; another against omission of service with the infantry; and a third against presuming to act with the cavalry, without the previous approbation of the council, in the scrutiny called *dokimasia*. By a violent construction, the accuser endeavored to persuade the court that Alcibiades was obnoxious to the first of these laws; tho' not only his service with the cavalry was admitted, but no battle had taken place. 'But this is a case,' says the accuser, 'that has not occurred before since the restoration of the democracy. It behooves you therefore to act, not meerly as judges, but in some degree as legislators; not confining yourselves to a strict construction of the law as it stands, but rather deciding how the law should ever hereafter be understood. Alcibiades, regularly summoned for the infantry, having sought shelter in the less dangerous service of the cavalry, it is a duty you owe to justice and to your country to presume his cowardice, as if a battle had actually been fought and he had fled; and sentence ought to be pronounced accordingly.' The strong contrast of the principle, here inculcated, to that of the English jurisprudence, which requires the strictest construction of penal laws, cannot fail to strike the English reader; nor can he have examined Grecian history, in the genuine portraits given by cotemporary writers, without observing that

that it is in the character of democracy, far more than even of the most absolute monarchy, to be careless of the safety of individuals, where but a shadow of the interest of the sovereign interferes; and, in a democracy, the prevailing faction is the absolute sovereign. The accuser's own argument shows that Alcibiades could, by no fair construction, be deemed to have incurred the penalty of the first law. The case seems not to have been within the meaning even of the second; intended apparently to apply only to those who owed no military service but in the infantry. Upon the third a question arises, which we have not means to decide; but we may safely pronounce that either the case of Alcibiades was not within it, or the law was a dictate of the purest tyranny. For if, in any suspension of the *dokimasia*, those who had every requisite for the cavalry-service were legally compellable to serve in the infantry, what must have been the situation of leading men, in a party to which the general of the day, and a majority of the council were inimical? Any one or all of them might be banished, at the nomination of the general, in the situation of common foot-soldiers, to any part of the world to which the Athenian multitude might be persuaded to decree an expedition.

Alcibiades had the good fortune to escape condemnation; for in his behalf, the general himself came forward with his nine colleagues, declaring that, tho' Alcibiades had been regularly summoned to serve in the infantry, yet he had had their leave to act with the cavalry. But apparently the Athenian law did not, like the English, forbid a second prosecution for the same imputed crime. The accuser pursued his purpose, and a fragment of a second oration composed for him by Lysias remains to us, in which the most striking feature is the impudence with which the generals are called upon, with threats, to retract, and acknowledge as false, the evidence which they had given on oath to the court, in the face of the people.

Young Alcibiades, it has been said, inherited his father's fine person and his profligacy, without his talents. For the blemishes of his character, however, we shall not implicitly believe an avowed enemy, or a venal rhetorician, paid for giving a specious form to calumny. It is creditable for both father and son, that a rhetorician of far fairer reputation

reputation than Lysias, a real patriot and a scrupulously honest man, has been the eulogist of one and advocate of the other. A prosecution was instituted against the younger Alcibiades, to recover damages for a violence, pretended to have been, many years before, committed by his father, in forcibly taking from a person named Tisias, a pair of horses, which won for him the prize in the chariot-race at Olympia. Isocrates composed the speech, yet extant, which the younger Alcibiades spoke in his own defence. It is mostly apology for some parts, and panegyric of the rest, of his father's public conduct. What deserves our notice here is an animadversion upon the sycophants. 'You are now informed,' says Alcibiades to the court, 'by the testimony of many acquainted with the transaction, and among others by the ambassadors themselves of Argos, that the horses were not taken by violence from Tisias, but fairly bought, by my father, of the Argian commonwealth. Attacks however, like the present, are not new to me; and in all of them the insidious policy of the sycophants has been the same. Instituting an action on pretence of some private wrong, they constantly implicate in their plea some charge of public misdemeanor. They employ more time in calumniating my father, than in proving what they have sworn to as the foundation of their suit against me; and, as if in contempt of every principle of law and justice, for crimes committed, as they affirm, by him against you, they demand reparation from me to themselves.'

Those unversed in the Athenian pleadings may possibly not immediately see the force or the exact drift of the concluding observation. The multitude ordinarily composing an Athenian court of justice was so great, that the pleaders always addressed it as under the impulse of the same interests, and subject to the same feelings as the general assembly, and equally without responsibility. Impartiality was never supposed; the passions were always applied to; and it never failed to be contended, between the parties, which could most persuade the jurors that their interest was implicated with his, and that by deciding in his favor, they would be gainers<sup>1</sup>.

With

<sup>1</sup> The orators abundantly show the justice of Xenophon's assertion, *Ἐν τε τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὐ τοῦ δικαίου ἀλλοῖς μέλει μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμφέροντος.* Athen. resp. c. 1. s. 13. See particularly

With the son of Alcibiadés, we find under the persecution of revived sycophancy the nephews of his colleague in command and adversary in politics, the rich, benevolent, unfortunate Nicias. The family was unfortunate. Niceratus the son, and Eucrates the brother, of Nicias, had suffered death under the tyranny of the Thirty. What crime, under the restored democracy, was imputed to his nephews; the sons of Eucrates, for which they were threatened with confiscation of their property, the remaining fragment of their defence, written by Lysias, does not inform us. A decree had already been given against them, which is complained of as a direct violation of the amnesty. The services of their family to the commonwealth are urged in their favor; and occasion is taken, from the sufferings of Eucrates and Niceratus under the odious tyranny of the Thirty, to affirm, what however we learn, on the best authority, to have been false, that the whole family had always been attached to the democratical interest. With more truth perhaps, the orator insists that, as the three brothers, objects of the prosecution, were all supporting the burthensome command of triremes, and liable to every other expensive office, as well as to calls, unlimited, for occasional contributions to the treasury, their property was more valuable to the commonwealth in their own hands than if actually confiscated. Such are the principal heads of the defence. Of the final event of the prosecution we are no otherwise informed than by a report, little likely to have been strictly true, that, with one exception only, all the pleadings of Lysias were successful.

Lys. p. 606.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 2. c. 3.  
s. 18.

particularly the oration of Lysias for the estate of Aristophanes, p. 157, or 656—660.

The extravagant use made of public accusation, as the tool of private malice, profiting from the extravagance of democratical jealousy, has not escaped the animadversion of the comic poet of the day. ‘Run and tell Cleon,’ says the chorus in *The Wasps*, (v. 407.) ‘that here is a disaffected man, bent upon the commonwealth’s ruin. He asserts that litigation and prosecutions should be discouraged! Is not this abominable? Is it not manifest tyranny?’ An opponent of the faction of Cleon observes

upon this: (v. 486.) ‘Everything, with you, is tyranny and conspiracy. Even in the market everything is tyranny. If any one buys haddock in preference to sprats, the spratseller says he is laying out for the tyranny. If any one wants to have leeks thrown into the bargain, as sauce for mackerel, “What,” says the herbwoman, “are you looking for the tyranny? Do you think Athens will find you sauce for tri-bute?” A joke follows to the same purpose from Xanthias, the slave, too indelicate for translation.

An oration, written by Lysias, for a defendant against a prosecution instituted by the treasury, exhibits a far deeper scandal to the laws and constitution of Athens. Nicophemus and Aristophanes, father and son, served their country in high situations; whether really well or ill we know not; but they were introduced to the public favor which raised them, by Conon, whom we shall find one of the most illustrious characters in Athenian history. On some turn in the popular mind, some change in the administration, some machination of faction, unreported by ancient writers, they were imprisoned, secretly made away with, and not, as was usual in all common executions, even their bodies, restored to their friends for burial. This atrocious act, more strongly impressed with the purest character of despotism than any recorded even of the Thirty, whoever were the perpetrators, and however stimulated, received the fullest and most deliberate approbation and support of democratical authority. Confiscation of property followed the murder, as if the sufferers had been lawfully executed, in pursuance of the most regular conviction; and, the amount disappointing the expectation of the greedy Many, whether animosity, or the desire of plunder only, still incited, a prosecution was instituted against the brother of the widow of Aristophanes, as the nearest relation, to compel payment to the treasury of the supposed deficiency, on pretence that it must have been imbeziled by the family.

These facts indeed we have only from the defendant himself. But to authenticate them it seems sufficient, that a defendant in such circumstances could dare, or that an advocate such as Lysias could advise him, to state them before the Athenian people. The whole oration is in a style of humble supplication for justice, little to be expected, unless the passions of the despotic throng could be interested. 'A patient hearing,' says the accused, 'such as you have granted to my prosecutors, is what I most earnestly solicit.—Accusations of the most atrocious crimes have, it is well known, sometimes been supported only by such gross falsehood, so immediately detected, that the witnesses have carried out of court with them the detestation of all present. At other times the most iniquitous prosecution hath succeeded, and detection has followed, not till reparation to the injured was no

‘longer possible.’—The profession of apprehension that a part of the numerous court would be influenced by interested motives, is however not scrupled: ‘I know,’ says the accused again, ‘how difficult it will be effectually to refute the received opinion of the great riches of Nicophemus. The present scarcity of money in the city, and the wants of the treasury, which the forfeiture has been calculated upon to supply, will operate against me.’

If the possession of absolute power spoils individuals, it much more certainly spoils a multitude. An expression follows, in the oration we are considering, singularly marking the persuasion of the speaker, and of the able rhetorician who wrote for him, that, in addressing the Many of Athens, he was addressing a body impregnated with all the illiberal jealousy, all the haughtiness, and all the selfishness of tyranny. To illustrate a point he wanted to establish, he introduced the supposition ‘that the estate of Timotheus, son of Conon, the greatest, most irreproachable, and most popular character then in Athens, was to be confiscated: but,’ he adds, ‘the gods forbid that it should be so, UNLESS SOME SIGNAL BENEFIT TO THE COMMONWEALTH MIGHT FOLLOW.’ He feared to have offended by the supposition of an injurious indignity to the people’s favorite: he feared to have offended by the supposition that the people’s present interest ought not to be the first consideration upon all occasions; he dared not deprecate the grossest injustice to the most respectable individual, if benefit to the multitude might follow; and he thought it a necessary tribute of compliment to the Athenian multitude, to express, what the better nature of men the most uneducated, accustomed to enjoy real freedom, but not to abuse power, would revolt at as an insult, his opinion of their grasping selfishness, and his doubt of their liberality and justice.

A detail follows, of the public merits of the accused and his family; totally alien to the merits of the cause, but strongly marking the condition of men of property at Athens. It assists also to explain the assertion, before noticed, of Xenophon, so strange on first view to the modern reader, that, under the Athenian government, it was matter of

<sup>a</sup> The same thing is said by Andocides, in his defence of himself, p. 2, or 3 & 4.



question, whether it were better for an individual to have property or to be destitute, and whether it were better for the state to have a regular revenue, or to depend upon the voluntary, or forced, contributions of individuals for every exigency. ‘There are some,’ the accused proceeds to say, ‘who spend their estates in public service or public gratifications, that they may receive twofold through your favor. But my father neither solicited gainful, nor avoided expensive offices. He took the presidency successively of all the choral exhibitions. He was seven times trierarc<sup>3</sup>; and he paid many and large free-gifts to the treasury. He kept horses for public service; his equestrian rank indeed required it; but whether of a superior kind and in superior condition, their victories at the Isthmian and Nemean games may tell; where my father was crowned and the fame of Athens was proclaimed. He was besides liberal to his fellowcitizens individually. Some he assisted in giving marriage-portions to their daughters and sisters; some he redeemed from captivity; for some he furnished the expence of burial. He died in the office of trierarc, leaving scarcely two talents and a half to his family; and from so slender a fortune I now support the same burthensome honor. All that we have possessed has thus, you see, always been yours; what now remain to us is yours, and if we could acquire more, it would still be yours. Fairly weighing then what has been proved to you by undeniable evidence, it will be found that, justice apart, the public interest should lead you to decide in our favor; since the small relic of our fortune will be unquestionably more profitable to the commonwealth in our possession, than if conveyed to the treasury. Have mercy on us then, and, for the Olympian gods’ sake, let truth and justice bear out this great

<sup>3</sup> The exact value of this phrase seems not ascertained: whether he fitted out seven different triremes, or only supported the expence of the same command, renewed seven times.

<sup>4</sup> A merit was imputed to these victories, beyond what appears easy either to account for or to conceive. We learn from Plato, that an Athenian who won in the chariot or

horse-race at Olympia, was often rewarded for it with a maintenance in the prytaneium, (Plat. Apol. Sucr. p. 36. D.) and it seems to have been common, among the Grecian republics, to give an honorary pension to those of their citizens who gained a victory in any of the games, at Olympia, Delphi, the Isthmus, or Nemea.

' accusation. By pronouncing in our favor you will act at the same time uprightly, and for yourselves beneficially.'

Ch. 19. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

It will be remembered that the assassination of Phrynichus, an able commander, but an unprincipled politician, was a leading step to the overthrow of the oligarchy of the Fourhundred, and the restoration of democracy under Theramenes and Alcibiades; and it may deserve notice how the principle of that assassination, the ground of some strong measures of government immediately following, was avowed and gloried in, after the overthrow of the tyranny of the Thirty, and the restoration of democracy under Thrasybulus. Two, of those concerned in the murder, had been shortly apprehended by the friends of Phrynichus, and public justice did not refuse their confinement in prison. But instantly the opposite party was vehement in clamor, against this persecution, as they called it, of those who had deserved well in the popular cause: and they prevailed so far, that the prisoners, one a Megarian the other an Ætolian, not only were released, but presented with the privileges of Athenian citizens, and a grant of lands in Attica, to reward their democratical virtue. Their prosecutors, Aristarchus and Alexicles, Athenians, and of the highest rank, were prosecuted as friends of a traitor and enemies of the people. They had certainly been active in the oligarchal party: but the prosecution of assassins, in due course of law, was the offence to the sovereign Many that superinduced their ruin. They were condemned and executed, and even their bones were forbidden burial within the Attic territory.

Lycurg. or.  
con. Leocrat.  
p. 164, vel  
217.

Lys. or. con.  
Agorat.  
p. 136, 27,  
vel 492. &  
de oleâ sacrâ,  
p. 108, 33,  
vel 263.

If this violence of democratical despotism might ever demand excuse, it would be when the public mind, heated by recent injuries, was still agitated by the ferment of faction. But, after the restoration of democracy by Thrasybulus, and the wise measures then taken for promoting concord, which actually produced at least a comparative quiet, it might seem not unreasonable to expect, if ever it could be reasonably expected under democracy, that maxims more consistent with a wise policy, as well as with a just morality, might have gained ground. But, on the contrary, to have been an accomplice in the assassination of Phrynichus, was still deemed meritorious; so meritorious, that it might even cover the

the guilt of other murders, the criminality of which had no other palliative. We find a man, under capital prosecution, absolutely pleading it, as the merit which should save him; and the accuser so completely concurring with him in principle, that, far from denying the assassination to have been meritorious, he used his utmost endeavors to prove that the accused had no participation in it. Nor was this a passing doctrine, rising and falling in credit with circumstances of the times: the remaining works of succeeding orators fully evince its permanency, as a democratical principle.

Lys. con.  
Agorat.  
p. 136, 15,  
vel 491.

Lycurg. or.  
con. Leocrat.  
p. 164, vel  
217. & De-  
mosth. con.  
Aristocr.

Among circumstances marking the condition of landed men under the Athenian democracy, the prosecution of one for removing the decayed stump of an olive-tree, from his own ground, will deserve notice. The lands of individuals in Attica, as we have observed in treating of the Athenian revenue, was very commonly incumbered with olive-trees belonging to the commonwealth. For their security, which perhaps was, in early times, of public importance, policy had procured them the reputation of being sacred to Minerva, and placed them under the guardian care of the court of Areiopagus. Either to injure the tree, or to till or feed the soil immediately around, was highly penal. The fruit, gathered under the council's direction, was sold for public benefit, and the produce carried to the treasury. These trees however, thus protected from domestic injury, were liable to suffer from foreign enemies, who either did not know, or would little regard, their sacred character; and, in the several invasions of Attica by the Lacedæmonians, many estates, with whose cultivation the sacred olives had formerly very inconveniently interfered, were, through the calamities of war, delivered from the incumbrance.

Lys. or. de  
oleâ sacrâ,  
p. 110, vel  
283.

p. 282.

p. 108, 39,  
vel 264.

The Megarian, who has already been mentioned as an accomplice in the assassination of Phrynichus, and whose name was Apollodorus, had been rewarded for that deed, so meritorious in the estimation of the friends of democracy, with a part of the estate of the oligarchal leader Peisander, which had been forfeited when he fled from Athens, on the dissolution of the government of the Fourhundred. This public present the assassin had had the precaution or the good fortune to sell, before the establishment of the government of the

p. 263.

Ch. 19. s. 7.  
of this Hist.

Lys. de ol.  
sacrâ, p. 110.  
34, vel 183.

Thirty gave prevalence to other political principles, according to which his merit would be very differently estimated, and his estate, had he still held it, would probably have been taken from him. The land being offered for sale again by the purchaser, was bought by the wealthy and prudent proprietor of an adjoining estate, who managed so as to live quietly under the Thirty, without engaging so far in their measures as to be involved in their disgrace. Under the restored democracy, therefore, intitled to the benefit of the amnesty, if for anything he wanted it, and having never been deficient either in free-gifts to the treasury, or in any of those expensive offices, whether of public service or public amusement, which the wealthy were required to undertake, he hoped, as he says for himself, that, avoiding to trouble others, he might avoid being troubled.

p. 111, 6, vel.  
285.

EjUSD. or.  
mit.

EjUSD. p. 281.

p. 269.

Notwithstanding all these advantages and all these attentions, on the revival of sycophancy the ingenuity of its professors found a pretence to attack him. On his antient estate were many olive-trees, the property of the goddess, and many his own property; on the adjoining new purchase, not one of either sort remained. A prosecution for destroying a sacred olive-tree on that lately purchased land, formerly part of Peisander's estate, was instituted against him in the Areiopagus. His defence, written by Lysias, will impress no favorable idea on modern, at least on English readers, even of that celebrated court. Frivolous and vexatious prosecution, it appears, was not deterred by its respectable character: sycophants could, even there, find encouragement. In the action in question, the accusation first stated, that a fruit-bearing olive-tree had been destroyed. But evidence to this point having been vainly sought among the contractors for the commonwealth's fruit, the charge was altered, and it was stated that a decayed trunk only had been removed. This however, such sacredness did the superstition of that philosophical age impute to the sapless wood, was, in the acknowledgement of the accused himself, an enormous offence, the legal punishment for which was no less than banishment for life. The temptation to commit the crime, as the accused justly observes, bore no proportion to the penalty imposed, nor the hope of escape to the probability of detection. Neither house nor vineyard was near,

EjUSD. p. 290.

to make the destruction of a tree particularly desirable; but a high road passed hard by, and the act was of a kind not to be easily done but in presence of witnesses, either passengers or assistants. 'Here-  
 tofore,' says the accused, 'I might have taken offence at being  
 called fearfully cautious: yet I think my conduct has never been  
 marked with such imprudent boldness, as to warrant the supposi-  
 tion that I would put myself so in the power of my slaves, as un-  
 avoidably I must by the act of which I am accused. Slaves, it is  
 universally known, are always unfriendly to their masters. After,  
 therefore, giving them opportunity for such accusation against me,  
 I could no longer command mine, but they would command me.'  
 This does not offer the pleasantest picture of the state, either of slaves  
 or of masters at Athens. Nor is the ideä altogether improved by what  
 follows, tho the master in question must have had confidence in his  
 slaves, since he freely offered them for examination by torture. To  
 reconcile such inhumanity with such confidence appears difficult: yet  
 the slaves seem to have borne a better character for attachment than  
 their master would have impressed; and a high opinion seems to have  
 been entertained of their fortitude, since the prosecutor, without any  
 claim to finer feeling, refused their testimony, as subject to influence.

Lys. de ol.  
 sacrâ, p. 287.

This prosecution, it appears, rested on the single evidence of the  
 prosecutor. All his proposed witnesses failed; while many, farmers  
 who had rented the land, and others acquainted with it, swore po-  
 sitively that, since the accused had purchased the estate, no such  
 stump, as that stated in the inditement, had existed. Two motives for p. 291.  
 the prosecution are assigned by the accused; the hope of extorting  
 money; and the instigation of powerful men with political views.  
 It was not instituted till some years after the pretended commission  
 of the crime, and it seems to have been unsupported even by any pro-  
 bability; yet it appears that the accused was under no small appre-  
 hension, that even the venerable court of Areiopagus might be in-  
 fluenced to give an unjust decision against him.

SECTION II.

*Prosecution of Andocides for Impiety: Petition of Andocides for a Decree of Protection.*

It has been a favorite tenet among political writers, that republican government is fit only for small states. But small states are liable to suffer, more than large ones, from one evil inseparable from republican government, the contest of parties: for in proportion to the narrowness of its bounds and the scantiness of its population, the spirit of party will pervade a state with more untempered and more lasting violence. This was experienced in all the little Italian commonwealths of modern times. It has been seen in Geneva, in amount such as perhaps to warrant a doubt, if even the despotism with which France has extinguished it be a greater evil. All the Grecian republics felt it severely. But modern speculators in politics might have had opportunity, which the Greeks wanted, to observe, in the example of Britain, that extensive territory, with a numerous population, giving means for the violence of the spirit to be tempered, and the malignity softened, by diffusion, affords the fairest field, for an able legislator, to obviate the worst effects of what always must exist in free governments, while mankind have passions.

Among the numerous prosecutions of this period, known by the remaining works of the Athenian orators, that of Andocides on a charge of impiety, for the variety and importance of the information it affords, will deserve particular notice. Two orations pronounced in that remarkable trial, and a third in consequence of it, remain to us; one, in accusation, composed by Lysias; the others, in defence, by the accused himself.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 14,  
vel 53, & 18,  
vel 72, 73.

Andocides was born of one of the most illustrious families of Athens. His ancestors had filled the first offices of the commonwealth, military and civil. His great-great-grandfather, Leogoras, was a leader of the party in opposition to the Peisistratids, and commanded the exiled people in a successful battle against the tyrants. His grandfather, Andocides,

Andocides, commanded a fleet, with reputation, in the Corinthian war which preceded the Peloponnesian<sup>5</sup>. His father, Leogoras, was first commissioner in a treaty for peace with Lacedæmon. Andocides himself was a youth, familiar through his birth and connections with men of highest rank in the republic, when he became implicated in that accusation of profaning the mysteries and mutilating the Mercuries, which first drove Alcibiades from his country.

Thucyd. I. 1. c. 51 & seq.  
Plut. vit. or.  
Andoc. de myst. p. 14, vel 53.

That extraordinary affair, so strange, it might be said childish, in itself, so important in its consequences, remains involved in deep obscurity; tho the use made of it by Lysias, in accusation, brought from Andocides, in his defence, what he has given as an explanation of it. Little satisfactory, however, as this explanation is concerning the mutilation of the statues, it affords illustration of the character of the Athenian government, for which it may be well worth while to revert, for a moment, to the circumstances of that period.

In the vehemence of popular alarm, excited by the party in opposition to Alcibiades, when witnesses to the profanation were sought, or pretended to be sought, on all sides, the first brought forward was a servant of Alcibiades himself, named Andromachus. On his evidence one man only was executed; but several others, aware that when the tyrant was enraged, no certain measure of justice was to be expected, fled, and were, in their absence, all condemned to death. Large rewards were held out to invite farther indication. No other

p. 2, vel 6.

<sup>5</sup> Were Plutarch and the scholiast of Thucydides to be believed, Andocides the orator was himself the commander. It is far from my desire that either should have less credit than he deserves; yet I perfectly agree with Taylor in the opinion of their error on this occasion, tho I would not give quite such harsh language, 'Ad hæc tamen,' says Taylor, 'non animos advertēbant οχ. Thucyd. 'neque mendax ille Plutarchus, qui vitas oratorum, dolis et erroribus consutas, olim 'conscribillavit.' Annot. ad Lys. or. con. Andoc. p. 107, vel 244.

Concerning the ancestors of Andocides we find a difference in our extant copies of his orations. Leogoras, opponent of the

Peisistratids, is mentioned, in the first oration, as his great-grandfather; in the second, as his father's great-grandfather. The difference is of no great historical importance, but the latter account seems best to agree with other reported circumstances of the family, and best to accommodate chronology. I should therefore suppose the pedigree, which, in the Greek manner of stating it, exactly resembled the Welsh; to have run thus: 1. Leogoras, opponent of the Peisistratids; 2. Leogoras of Leogoras; 3. Andocides of Leogoras, naval commander in the Corinthian war; 4. Leogoras of Andocides, commissioner for negotiating peace; 5. Andocides of Leogoras, the orator.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 7.

p. 8, vel. 18.

witnesses however offered; but it was understood that a metic, named Teucer, who had fled to Megara, could indicate much, and would return and declare all he knew, if he might be taken under the protection of the council of Fivehundred. That council engaging for his safety, he came and denounced twenty-eight persons, among whom were Plato, the scholar, and Melitus, perhaps father of the accuser, of Socrates. These, with some others, fled. Of those indicated, all taken were executed. We can only wonder that informers were so slow and scarce, when we learn that Andromachus, a servant, in reward of his forward zeal, received no less than ten thousand drachmas, about four hundred pounds sterling, and Teucer, a foreiner, who, as he bargained for personal safety, was less an object of popular generosity, one thousand drachmas, about forty pounds, for their information.

The democratical interest, it appears, was now divided. Alcibiades had risen upon the democratical interest; and while he remained in Athens, none, leaning on the same interest, could enter into competition with him. But his absence, and the alarm so successfully excited, gave opportunities; insomuch that Peisander, afterward founder of the oligarchy of the Fourhundred, now stood forward as one of the greatest favorites of the people. He was appointed, together with Charicles, as confidential commissioner of the people, to investigate this very mysterious and very alarming business. After short inquiry, they declared their opinion that it was a deep-laid plot to overthrow the democracy, and that the conspirators were numerous. On the publication of this declaration, in the distraction of party-interests, alarm so pervaded the lower people, uncertain whom they might trust, that the signal for the meeting of the council served as a signal for all to fly from the agora: it was completely deserted; every man doubting his neighbour, and fearing that he might himself be the next to be apprehended.

p. 19.

p. 22.

In the midst of this popular terror, another informing adventurer came forward. A man named Diocleides, being brought before the council, deposed that he knew the mutilators of the Mercuries to be no less than three hundred: forty-two he indicated by name, and among them he did not scruple to accuse Mantitheus and Aphep-  
sion,



SECT. II. MUTILATION OF MERCURIES.

75

sion, two of the councillors present. A proposition was immediately made by Peisander, the demagogue of the day, which could be tolerated only in a democracy or a divan, 'that the decree of Scamandrius, which forbade the torture of Athenian citizens, should be suspended, and that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be put upon the wheel; for day ought not to close,' he said, 'before every name were known.' Not the wild multitude, but the council, taken indeed by lot from the multitude, but men all first approved in the dokimasia, applauded this measure of pure tyranny. Mantitheus and Aphepsion betook themselves to the altar of the council-hall; and, by force of supplication, with difficulty obtained indulgence, so far as to avoid the torture, and to be allowed to give security for standing trial. But a government so tyrannical, overwhelming principle, urges and almost forces men to dishonorable actions. Mantitheus and Aphepsion were no sooner at liberty, than they mounted their horses and fled; leaving their bondsmen legally liable to that punishment which, in case only of their conviction, should have fallen on themselves<sup>6</sup>.

Whether put forward to answer any party purpose, or merely the self-*arising* fancy of the multitude, Diocleides, the accuser, became, or appeared to become, the popular favorite, and extravagantly the favorite. He was conducted by the people in a carriage to the prytaneium, crowned as the savior of the commonwealth, and entertained with a supper at the public expence. Meanwhile forty persons, whom he accused, were imprisoned. Andocides, Leogoras, father of Andocides, three cousin-germans, and seven more distant relations, among whom was Eucrates, brother of Nicias, were of the number. 'We were all bound,' said Andocides, speaking his defence; 'night came on, and the prison was locked; when, as intelligence of our mis-

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 23.

p. 24.

<sup>6</sup> In the extant copies of the oration it is said, that Mantitheus and Aphepsion fled to 'the enemy at Deceleia.' According to the account of Thucydides no enemy was then, or could be, at Deceleia. It cannot be supposed that Andocides could have mistaken about such a matter, or would venture an untruth, of which the knowledge and

memory of numbers present could convict him. But what has certainly happened in other cases, may possibly have happened in this; that some annotator, ignorant and officious, may have inserted words in the margin, with which following ignorant transcribers may have corrupted the text.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 25.

p. 26 & 31.

‘fortune was communicated, many women, the mother of one, the sister of another, the wife with the children of a third, came and vented their lamentations about the place.’ Amid this complicated scene of woe, this anxiety, within and without the prison, for what was next to happen, his relations imprisoned with him, knowing that he had lived in intimacy with some who had been executed, and with some who had fled, and apprehending more certain destruction from the blind jealousy of the tyrant multitude, than from anything that could be fairly stated against them, importuned him to offer himself for evidence, and declare all he knew. Andocides yielded to this persuasion, and accordingly was examined before the council. He had his information, as he affirmed, from Euphiletus and Melitus, who had been active in the mutilation of the Mercuries. All those already executed, and several who had fled, he said, had been justly impeached, and he indicated four, still in Athens, as accomplices. What however was the purpose of so apparently strange a wiliness as the mutilation of the statues, or what the temptation to it, is not in the least indicated by anything remaining from him. Tho he pretends to account for the odd circumstance, that the Mercury before his father’s door, alone of all in Athens, remained uninjured, yet even thus he throws no light on the object of the persons concerned. His confirmation of the evidence before given against those executed and those who had fled, together with the indication of four additional criminals, tho these all escaped the officers of justice, at once calmed the minds of the people, before mad with fear and suspicion. This, extraordinary as it appears, is so supported by Thucydides, that the fact seems not reasonably questionable. Perhaps the multitude wanted the testimony of an Athenian citizen and a man of rank, to calm their apprehensions, tho that of Teucer, a metic, and Andromachus, a freed-man, if he was not still a slave, had sufficed them for condemning many citizens of the first consideration to death. Not that this supposition will wholly explain the mystery. There was surely party intrigue connected with the deposition of Andocides; for the furious Peisander was at once appeased<sup>7</sup>;

<sup>7</sup> Εξελέγχοντες δὲ τὸ παράγμα ἢ τε Βουλή καὶ οἱ ζήτηται—p. 32. The ζήτηται, it will be remembered, were Charicles and Peisander.

and

and the miserable tool Diocleides, who had been held up almost as an idol to the multitude, was now hurled at once to perdition. Being brought again before the council, and confronted with Andocides, he acknowledged, if we may believe the orator, the falsehood of all the evidence he had before given. This, whether by the standing law of Athens, or by law established for the occasion, subjected him to capital punishment. The council promised him pardon, on condition of declaring his instigators. Diocleides seems to have been ready for any declaration that might save his life, and he named many; but all, getting timely information, escaped out of Attica. The people became furious, or those who led the people thought the death of Diocleides necessary to their own security; and, by a passionate decree, the unfortunate, but apparently worthless man was, without trial, sent to the executioner. Andocides and his father, and all imprisoned with them, were immediately released, and those fugitives, whose impeachment by Teucer was not confirmed by the evidence of Andocides, were recalled.

But the Andocides was thus delivered from confinement and the fear of death, yet he seems to have remained under the bar of the atimy, or exclusion from magistracy, and all posts of honor and command. He chose therefore to leave Athens; but the consideration of his family and connections, and his own talents, procured him an honorable and advantageous reception in Sicily, Italy, Peloponnesus, Thessaly, the Hellespont, and especially in Cyprus<sup>8</sup>. Considering the general disposition of later writers among the antients, who have been implicitly followed by the moderns, to revile Andocides, it is rather remarkable that the only eminent man in the countries he visited, who is said to have denied him favor, was Dionysius of Syracuse, whose character, blackened by some eminent writers, will be for future notice; and that Evagoras of Salamis in Cyprus, of reputation among

Lys. con.  
Andoc.  
p. 103, vel  
291.

<sup>8</sup> This, asserted by Andocides (De myst. his prosecutor. (Lys. con. Andoc. p. 103, p. 18, vel 72; & de re ditu, p. 21, vel. 80.) vel 200, & 107, vel 248.) seems confirmed even by the reproaches of

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 1,  
vel 2, &  
Lys. con.  
Andoc.  
p. 107, vel  
248. Plut.  
vit. Andoc.  
Andoc. de  
red. p. 21,  
vel 80.

p. 82.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 1,  
vel 2.

the most highly eulogized of the age, was his principal patron<sup>9</sup>. Toward the end of the Peloponnesian war, he returned to Athens; whether hoping for favor from the people, in consequence of a considerable service he had found means to do the Athenian fleet, when lying at Samos; or whether, as perhaps may be suspected, he rather depended upon interest with the party of the Fourhundred, then in possession of the government. We may however trust his account so far, that, instead of finding the expected favor, he suffered imprisonment, and narrowly escaped capital condemnation, from the party-violence of Peisander; whence he took occasion to assert that he was persecuted for attachment to the democratical cause. On regaining liberty, Cyprus became again his refuge. There he was living in affluence, of which, apparently, he owed much to the friendship and generosity of Evagoras, when the overthrow of the government of the Thirty at Athens produced the general amnesty, which seemed to afford opportunity for all Athenian exiles to return securely to their country. However, therefore, the friendship of Evagoras, and a considerable property in the fine island of Cyprus might soften banishment, Athens became again the inviting scene for a man of the connections and talents of Andocides; and, at the age of somewhat more than forty, he returned thither<sup>10</sup>.

p. 17, vel 64. It does not appear that any exception was immediately taken against his resuming every right of an Athenian citizen. On the contrary, if we may believe his own probable account, the very party by which he was disliked, and afterward persecuted, put him into the honorable but expensive, and therefore generally avoided offices, first of president of the Hephæsteia, games of Vulcan, at Athens, then of architheorus, minister representative of the Athenian commonwealth, suc-

<sup>9</sup> Lysias says (p. 226) that he was imprisoned by Evagoras, and escaped by flight. There is much appearance that this was calumny. On the contrary, that he received very great favor from Evagoras appears unquestionable.

<sup>10</sup> Taylor has fancied, and endeavored to

prove, that Lysias, in saying that Andocides was more than forty, meant to reckon the years, not from his birth, but from his age of eighteen, his first manhood. The learned and ingenious argument carries, to me, no degree of conviction.

cessively

cessively at the Isthmian and Olympian games, and afterward of treasurer of the sacred revenue<sup>11</sup>. Meanwhile he was active in public business; his eloquence procured him attention from the people; his great connections and great talents procured him consideration with the council. Forward, and perhaps little scrupulous in accusation, he disturbed the measures, checked the hopes, and excited the apprehensions of the party in opposition to that with which he was connected. His arguments before the council procured the rejection of one of them, in the dokimasia, as of objectionable character, and of course exclusion from the cavalry service, and from the higher civil offices. Hence arose great alarm, and a resolution to crush him, if their policy, in aid of their collected strength, could effect it<sup>12</sup>.

Lys. con. Andoc. p. 106, vel 230.

The first attempt was of a very extraordinary kind: at least so it appears to the modern reader. We have the account indeed only from Andocides himself; but this was pronounced before the Athenian people, when he apprehended oppression from a party more powerful than his own; and it contains such a detail of matters open to the knowledge of numbers, that he surely would not so have committed himself, if the truth of the tale had not been either generally known, or within his power to prove.

It was supposed, we find, of much efficacy toward obtaining the favor of any deity, to place upon the altar, as a supplication-offering, an olive-branch, wrapt in a woollen veil. But it was forbidden to do this, in the temple of Ceres, during the mysteries; whether because individuals should not draw the attention of the goddess from rites instituted to conciliate her favor to the commonwealth, or under what other idea, does not appear. Among the powerful enemies of Andocides was Callias, hereditary torch-bearer of the Eleusinian mysteries: an office whence his family derived the surname of Daduchus. He was son of Hipponicus, esteemed the richest man of his time in Greece, and descended from Callias Daduchus, said to have fought, habited in the

Andoc. de myst. p. 54.

<sup>11</sup> Perhaps the revenue (whence arising I know not) from which the expence of the Eleusinian mysteries, and the sacrifices, processions, and other appurtenant ceremonies was defrayed.

<sup>12</sup> From the accuser himself may be gathered the motives to the prosecution. Lys. con. Andoc. p. 106, vel 230.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 55.

sacred robe of his office, against the Persians at Marathon. "We were 'returned,' says Andocides, 'from Eleusis' (apparently he was then treasurer of the sacred revenue) 'when the king' (the second archon) 'going in regular form, to report the circumstances of the procession, 'was directed, by the prytanes, to make his report to the council, and 'require Cephisius and myself to attend in the Eleusinium; for there, 'according to the ordinance of Solon, the council sits on the morrow 'of the mysteries. We attended accordingly; and, the council being 'met, Callias, habited in the sacred robe, arose and declared, that a 'supplicatory bough was lying on the altar; placed there, as he was 'informed, by Andocides; and the laws of their ancestors, which had 'been satisfactorily explained to the people by his father Hipponicus, 'devoted the person, so offending, to death without trial.'

p. 58.

It is remarkable that the accused objected nothing to the principle of a law devoting a citizen to death without trial; or to the law itself, which seems to have been merely traditionary, and both in words and purpose very doubtful, or to the interpretation insisted on by the accuser, or to such authority as that referred to for the validity of the interpretation. Andocides, able and experienced, was aware that it was congenial to democracy to be careless of the rights of individuals; and, in his situation, he dared not question the right of the sovereign to send anybody at pleasure to the executioner. His defence was of another kind. He contended, in the first place, that the law, which should direct the decision of the council, was engraved on a pedestal within the temple; and the punishment for the offence in question was there clearly declared to be, not death, but a fine of a thousand drachmas, less than forty pounds sterling. He then admitted, which may seem not less strange to the modern reader, that, whether the profanation were intentional or unintentional, the punishment, being piacular, was equally to attach upon it. But the accuser had said that 'The goddesses themselves, desirous 'of the punishment of Andocides, instigated him to the profanation, of 'the consequence of which he was ignorant.' The defence of Andocides, against an attack so apparently difficult to ward, is truly curious. 'I maintain,' he said, 'that, if what my accusers affirm is true, the 'goddesses have shown themselves propitious to me. For had I placed 'the supplicatory offering, and confessed it, I should indeed have  
wrought

‘wrought my own destruction: but, having kept my counsel, when  
 ‘confession alone could convict me, for it is not pretended that there  
 ‘were witnesses to the fact, the goddesses may be supposed to have  
 ‘interested themselves in my preservation. Had they desired my de-  
 ‘struction, they would have prompted me to confess the profanation,  
 ‘which I certainly did not commit.’ It appears indeed that no evidence  
 to fix the fact upon Andocides could be produced, and he was acquitted.

This strange attempt in the council having failed, it was resolved  
 next to bring Andocides before a popular tribunal; and it would proba-  
 bly now be the more necessary to push measures against him, as he and  
 his party would be exasperated by that attempt, and encouraged by its  
 failure. No act of Andocides, since his return to Athens, gave any  
 opportunity. It was determined therefore to take advantage of the  
 indiscretion or the misfortune of his early youth, and, without regard to  
 the many wounds in the commonwealth, now happily healed, which it  
 might open again, to institute a capital accusation against him, on the  
 pretence that his case was an exception to the general amnesty.

Cephisius, apparently his colleague in the office of treasurer of the  
 sacred revenue, was the ostensible conductor of the prosecution; Lysias  
 composed the principal speech in accusation. The acts of criminality  
 stated in the inditement were, that Andocides had frequented the tem-  
 ples, sacrificed on the altars, and acted in civil affairs, as if in the legal  
 enjoyment of the perfect rights of an Athenian citizen, when the decree  
 of atimy, or deprivation of rights and honors, which had been passed  
 against him on occasion of the mutilation of the Mercuries, remained  
 unrepealed; and that, by false accusation, in which his own father was  
 involved, with other near relations, he had occasioned the execution  
 of innocent citizens. The punishment which the accuser insisted on,  
 according to the usual Athenian form, was subjoined, death.

The speech in accusation, written by Lysias, remains to us nearly  
 intire. It has been studiously adapted, by the ingenious and experi-  
 enced rhetorician, to the information and the temper of a mob-tribunal.  
 Little solicitous to convince reason, he has applied to the passions, and  
 especially to that of superstitious fear: a passion very prevalent among  
 the Greeks, and beyond all others likely to cloud and disturb reason.

Lys. con.  
Andoc.  
p. 104, vel  
209, & 105,  
vel 217, &  
106, vel 231.

His great object has been to persuade, that the impiety of Andocides, if not expiated by his death, would implicate the court and the whole commonwealth in his guilt; and that the greatest misfortunes, public and private, might be reasonably apprehended from the consequent anger of the gods.

Lys. con.  
Andoc. iuit.

The tale told at the outset of the speech, of a kind not to be omitted, is yet difficult to report<sup>12</sup>. The purport was to impress the court with a conviction of the reality, and the immediate impendence, of danger from the divine wrath. 'A horse,' says the orator, 'was tied to the rail of the temple of the goddesses (Ceres and Proserpine) with the pretended purpose that the owner, who had lost it, might reclaim it; but, in the night, it was stolen by the man who had brought it thither. This profanation escaped the law, but did not escape divine vengeance; for the sacrilegious criminal perished by a most dreadful death. All food emitted, to his sense, so offensive a smell, that, unable to eat, he died of hunger. The testimony of the hierophant to these facts has been heard by numbers now living.' While we wonder at such a tale, seriously told, in the age of Xenophon and Plato, in one of the principal courts of justice in Athens, we should recollect how lately the laws against witchcraft were in force among ourselves.

Lys. con.  
Andoc.  
p. 234.

The rhetorician then labored to prove that the case of Andocides was not within the meaning of the general amnesty. For the quiet of the commonwealth it would have been better that such proof should have been in no case attempted. All the rest of the reasoning, and most of the declamation, are founded upon a gross falsehood. It is impudently asserted, that the profanation of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the Mercuries by Andocides, not only were notorious, but confessed by himself. The peroration then runs thus: 'Give your attention, and let your imagination picture to you what this man has done. Clothed in a sacerdotal robe, in presence of the uninitiated, he acted the sacred ceremonies; exposed what ought not to be seen, and declared what ought not to be heard. The images of the gods, in whom we believe, whom we worship, and to whom, after careful puri-

<sup>12</sup> The beginning of the oration is wanting; but the tale, tho' setting out with a broken sentence, is completely clear.



' fication, we sacrifice and pray, he mutilated. To expiate this pol-  
 ' lution, the priestesses and priests, turning toward the setting sun,  
 ' the dwelling of the infernal gods, devoted with curses the sacrilegious  
 ' wretch, and shook their purple robes, in the manner prescribed by  
 ' that law which has been transmitted from earliest times. These deeds  
 ' he has confessed; yet in violation of your decree, which declared  
 ' him excluded from temples and sacred ceremonies, as impure and  
 ' piacular, he has returned to the city, sacrificed upon the altars,  
 ' mixed in those holy ceremonies which he had profaned, entered even  
 ' the temple of the goddesses, and washed his polluted hands in the  
 ' sacred ewer. Whom can it become to suffer such things? What  
 ' friend, what kinsman, but especially, what member of a court of  
 ' judicature will risk, by the most secret favor to such a man, to bring  
 ' the divine anger on himself? No: by avenging the gods, by put-  
 ' ting Andocides out of the world, you must purify the city; and let  
 ' the pollution of sacrilege, the poison of impiety, the offence to what-  
 ' ever is holy, be sent far from you<sup>13</sup>. It has been among the custom  
 ' of your ancestors to devote the impious to death; without the for-  
 ' mality of trial, by a simple decree. You do better to make a more  
 ' solemn example of them. But, knowing what becomes you, no per-  
 ' suasion ought to move you from the pious purpose. The criminal  
 ' will supplicate and intreat, but pity should be far from you. Not  
 ' who perish justly, but those only who perish unjustly, deserve com-  
 ' miseration.'

The speech of Andocides, in his defence, is a masterly and manly  
 composition, containing a clear detail of facts, strongly supported by  
 witnesses, and by appeals to the knowledge of the multitude composing  
 the court before which he pleaded; carrying a doubtful appearance,  
 and in some points little intelligible to the modern reader, only in what  
 regards the profanation of the mysteries, and the mutilation of the  
 Mercuries; every assertion concerning which is nevertheless still sup-  
 ported by evidence, oral or written. The confession, which his accuser  
 affirmed him to have made, is strongly and repeatedly denied, together

<sup>13</sup> Thus far the peroration is translated: what immediately follows is abbreviated: the three last sentences again are translated.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 15.  
& 17.

with the facts said to have been confessed. The improbable assertion, that the accused impeached his own father and other kinsmen, he so shows to have been a gross falsehood, that we can only wonder how such an attempt of the accuser could pass without censure from the court<sup>14</sup>.

After then mentioning the attempt, which has been already related, to procure his condemnation by the council without trial, he proceeds to some private history, curious in itself, but foreign to the cause, and brought forward only to show that the malice of Callias originated in circumstances highly discreditable to himself and honorable to Andocides; unless it was farther in view to point out an object which might draw away, from the latter, a part of that public indignation which he found pressing on him. Too long, too intricate, too much entering into detail of private life to be conveniently reported here, it must suffice to say of it, that it tends strongly to show to what a degree, in so small a state as Athens, party influence enabled men to scorn the laws, and how much more, than can easily be in extensive dominion, private interests had sway in public concerns<sup>15</sup>.

p. 65.

A tale, relating to a public business, follows, which must not be omitted. The tax of a fiftieth on imports and exports, was commonly farmed by auction, for three years. A spreading plane afforded convenient shade, under which the bidders commonly assembled. A company, with one named Argyrius at its head, had farmed this revenue at thirty talents yearly, between six and seven thousand pounds sterling. When their term expired, finding means, by interest and money, to obviate competition, they obtained a renewal at the same rent. Andocides, knowing the tax produced

<sup>14</sup> The clear detail, in the first oration, of a matter of such public notoriety, and which one should suppose matter of record, is of itself evidence; and it is corroborated by the mention again made of the same matter in the second oration, in which it must have been the high of imprudence for the accused to bring it forward again, were there any doubt of the truth.

<sup>15</sup> *Υίχονται μιν οὐν αἱ γάσεις οὐ περί μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μεγάλων*, is an observation of Aristotle, preliminary to a report of many instances of revolutions in Grecian states, originating from private quarrels. Aristot. Polit. l. 5. c. 4.

much more, made a regular offer to the council to advance upon the bargain. The auction was, in consequence, opened again, and closed finally with letting the tax to Andocides at thirty-six talents, being an advance of fourteen or fifteen hundred pounds sterling yearly. At this rent Andocides declares it was no disadvantageous contract. The use that he proposed to make of the mention of the transaction, on his trial, was to fix popular odium on his accusers, and particularly on Callias, as connected with Argyrius, and interested in the contract; to show that the motive to his prosecution was not public spirit, but private malice; to claim to be himself a useful and necessary man to the popular interest; and to endeavor farther to allure popular consideration, by promising, that, if he might, through justice done him, be at liberty to act in the popular cause, he would prevent such imposition on the public in future, or bring the delinquents to condign punishment.

Andoc. de  
myst. p. 67.

In the conclusion of his defence, Andocides endeavored to draw advantage from the popularity of his family, and the merit of his ancestors; for, with all the vehemence of democratical jealousy among the Athenian people, family eminence was still in estimation. 'If you destroy me,' he says, 'my family is extinct: and does the family of Andocides and Leogoras deserve so to perish? and is it not a reproach to the commonwealth that their house should be occupied, as during my exile it was, by Cleophon the musical-instrument-maker? that house, of which none of you, in passing, could say, that thence either public or private evil had come upon him: that house, which has furnished commanders of your forces, who have won many trophies, by land and by sea; magistrates who have filled all the highest offices of your government, through whose hands the public treasure has passed, and who never turned any to their own profit; a family who never had cause to complain of the people, nor the people of them; and of whom, from remotest antiquity, whence they trace themselves, never were any before brought into a situation to supplicate your mercy.

'If they are now all dead, let not their good deeds be forgotten. Rather let their persons be present to your imagination, soliciting your protection for me. For, alas, whom among the living can I bring

‘bring forward to move your commiseration? My father? no, he is no more. Brothers? I never had any. Children? I have none yet born’<sup>17</sup>. Be you therefore to me instead of a father, of brothers, of children. To you I betake myself: you I implore. Be advocates to yourselves in my favor; and, while, to supply the deficient population of the city, you are admitting Thessalians and Andrians to its rights, devote not to destruction your true citizens, whom, certainly more than strangers, it behoves to be good citizens, and who want neither the will nor the ability to be so.’

It was usual in the criminal courts of Athens, to try all expedients for impressing the passions of the numerous tribunal. Pitiabie sights were offered to the eyes, and pitiabie tones to the ears: aged parents, weeping wives, and helpless children were brought forward to assist or to obstruct justice, by the most affecting intreaties. Andocides, after having urged, in the best way his circumstances admitted, that degrading supplication which the tyrannous temper of the people made necessary, assumed a more dignified manner in calling forward a support that, with a court properly composed, should have been more efficacious. ‘Now,’ he says, ‘let those who have most approved themselves friends of the people and worthy of public favor, ascend the bema, and declare their opinion of me. Anytus and Cephalus, come up; and those of my fellowwardsmen who are appointed my advocates, Thrasyllus and the rest.’ These were men of the first consideration in Athens.

Plutarch, in his short life of Andocides, omits all information of the event of this trial, nor does he say when or how Andocides died. We learn however from a second oration of Andocides himself, that the first neither completely effected its purpose, nor intirely failed. The decision was against him, but not to the extent that his enemies had proposed. His life was not affected, for in the second oration we find no prayer for mercy: he laments only those unfortunate circumstances, which, without criminal intentions, had brought on him that reprobation of a majority of his fellowcountrymen, to which he must bow.

<sup>17</sup> This expression surely escaped Taylor, when he was intent upon proving Andocides, at the time of his trial, seventy years of age.

## SECT. II. PETITION FOR DECREE OF PROTECTION.

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But he was not without hope of even regaining all the advantages of popular favor. It had been found expedient, in the insecurity, especially of men in public situations, under the deficient protection of the Athenian law, to grant decrees of protection<sup>18</sup> to individuals, to enable or to encourage them to undertake or proceed in public service. Such privilege, under a decree of the people, Andocides himself had once enjoyed; and it would still have been in force but for a special repeal of it, which his political enemies had procured. His object now was to obtain a renewal of that decree of protection. The inducement, which he held out, was his knowledge of matters of the utmost importance to the public welfare, which he could not safely declare, without such security against oppression from his powerful enemies. Under engagement for secrecy, he had already communicated the information to the council, who were fully satisfied of the reality of its importance, and desirous that he should have the protection necessary to enable him to serve the commonwealth. We learn no farther what the matter to be indicated was, than may be gathered from the following passage of the speech: 'What I may previously declare,' says Andocides to the Athenian people, 'you shall now hear. You know it has been told you, that no corn is to be expected from Cyprus. Now I can undertake to say, that the men who have so informed you, and who, as far as depended upon them, have provided that it should be so, are mistaken. What has been the management, it is needless for you now to know: but thus much I wish you to be informed, that fourteen cornships are actually approaching Peræus; and the rest, already sailed from Cyprus, may be expected soon after them.'

Andoc. de  
reditu, p. 22,  
vel 86.

p. 20, vel 76,  
& 22, vel 84.

It appears that Athens, always in the unfortunate circumstance of depending upon uncertain supply by sea for its subsistence, was in want of corn; that the people, perhaps already oppressed by dearth, were uneasy under the apprehension of famine; and that Andocides meant to accuse some powerful men, his opponents in politics, of enhancing the public distress for their private profit, and to claim to himself the merit of defeating their purpose, by procuring relief for the people.

<sup>18</sup> Adm.

Of the event of this project of the orator we have no information. Plutarch, professing to relate the life of Andocides, mentions no circumstance of it after the trial for impiety.

What were the real merits or demerits, either of Andocides or of his prosecutors and political opponents, is not very decisively indicated by any memorials remaining of them. But, what is of more importance, we gain, from their united evidence, the most undeniable testimony to the gross evils inherent in the Athenian constitution; its irremediable unsteadiness, its gross tyranny, the immoderate temptation and the endless opportunities it afforded for knavish adventure in politics. What moreover deserves notice, we learn from them that a strong disposition to religious persecution prevailed among the Greeks of their age; insomuch that, where the supposed interests of religion interfered, all forms of justice to individuals were set at nought. In short, the remaining works of the Grecian orators bear the most unquestionable proof, that democracy, with the pretence of an establishment proposing nothing but the equal welfare of the people, is, beyond all others, a constitution for profligate adventurers, in various ways, to profit from, at the people's expence.

### SECTION III.

*Virtuous Age of Greece romantic: Deficiency of Grecian Morality.  
Summary View of the Origin and Progress of Grecian Philosophy.  
Religious Persecution. Sophists; Socrates.*

It may appear superfluous to repeat, that the business of history is neither panegyric nor satire, but to estimate justly and report faithfully the virtues and vices of men, who, individually or collectively, have been engaged in circumstances marking them for historical notice. Yet panegyric hath commonly been so mixed with certain portions of Grecian history, that an honest declaration of that truth, which a careful investigation will discover, may, on more than one occasion, with many readers, need apology. Authors under the Roman empire, and  
many

SECT. III. VIRTUOUS AGE OF GREECE.

many in modern Europe, of reputation to have engaged almost universal credit, have spoken in rapturous language of the virtuous age of Greece, and especially of Athens, as of something not only well known by fame, but undoubtedly once existing. When it existed, nevertheless, even in their imagination, seems impossible to fix, so that testimony overthrowing the supposition, shall not be obvious. For the age before Solon, memorials of men and things are too scanty to furnish ground for the character. For that extraordinary man's own age, our means for tracing the course of events, are still very deficient; but there remains from his own hand, preserved among the works of Demosthenes, a picture of the Athenian people. The profligacy of all ranks is there exhibited in strong colors: of their virtues nothing appears. Yet Solon seems to have had the merit of preparing what, if we may believe Thucydides and Plato, might best deserve the title of the virtuous age of Athens; for (may I venture on the authority of Thucydides and Plato to say it) the nearest approach to so advantageous a state of things appears to have been made under what declaimers, who lived many centuries after, have assumed to themselves to reprobate, as the tyranny of the Peisistratids.

Demosth.  
de legat.

But, in the age with which we are now engaged, the age of Plato, Xenophon, and philosophy, morality seems not only to have been not better practised, but even not better understood, than in Homer's time. That might made right, especially in public transactions, was a tenet very generally avowed; the incalculable mischiefs of which were checked only by the salutary superstition, which taught to respect the sanction of oaths, in the fear that immediate vengeance from the gods would follow the violation of it; as a personal affront to themselves. It appears however, in the remaining works of the great comic poet of the day, that this salutary superstition was in his time fast wearing away. The light of reason, improved by much communication of men among one another, had enabled the more quicksighted to discover, that temporal evil, of any kind obvious to common observation, fell no more upon false-swearers than upon the most scrupulous observers of their oaths. The perjured might suffer in secret, under those alarms of conscience which Homer's penetration has attributed to them; but experience had sufficiently taught to consider Hesiod's

Ch. 2. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 4.  
c. 2 & 4.  
Plat. Alcib. l.  
p. 117. t. 1.  
Protag.  
p. 357. & de  
rep. l. 2.  
p. 362. & de  
Leg. l. 10.  
p. 905. &  
seq.

denunciations as anile fables<sup>19</sup>. The mischief thus done by human reason, in the destruction of one of the greatest safeguards of society, human reason could not perhaps at all, but certainly could not readily, repair. It is evident from the writings of Xenophon and Plato, that, in their age, the boundaries of right and wrong, justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty, were little determined by any generally-received principle. There were those who contended that, in private as in public affairs, whatever was clearly for a man's advantage, he might reasonably do; and even sacrifice was performed and prayer addressed to the gods for success in wrong. When therefore that cloud of superstition, which produced a regard for the sanction of oaths, was dissipated by the increasing light of reason, an increased depravity would of course gain among the Grecian people. We learn indeed, from the best cotemporary testimony, that of Thucydides. that the fact was so; and hence occasion may have been taken by the orators of the next age, who seem first to have cherished and promulgated the notion, which in any other point of view appears purely romantic, to call the preceding times the VIRTUOUS AGE OF GREECE.

Yet while thus, not morality only, but, as we have before observed, politics, were defective among the Greeks, to a degree to excite wonder, science was in esteem, and had, in some branches, the foundation already laid of all that is now most valued in them. Grecian PHILOSOPHY is said to have had its origin from Thales, whom we have seen a leading man of Miletus in Ionia, at the time of that rebellion of the Asian Greeks against the Persian empire, which led to the invasion of Greece itself, and the glory of the Athenians at Marathôn. The learning, through which Thales became so distinguished among his fellow-countrymen, and so eminent in the republic of letters through all

<sup>19</sup> 'Men hid from the sight of the gods by clouds,' says one of the characters in the comedy of *The Birds*, 'commit perjuries undiscovered; but if the gods could manage an alliance with the Birds, then, should a man who had sworn by the crow and by Jupiter, break his oath, the crow would fly down slyly and pluck him an eye

out.' Aristoph. *Av.* v. 1607. The jokes which follow, about Jupiter dying and Hercules cooking, seem, like some other jokes of Aristophanes, to have had no other object than to bring the gods, or at least the notions of them which the established religion inculcated, into contempt.



ages, he is said to have acquired in Egypt. The circumstances of individuals, in the Grecian commonwealths, were indeed more favorable for the cultivation of science, than a transient view of the political state of the country might give to suppose. Few had large incomes; but numbers lived in leisure; mostly maintained by the labor of slaves; assembled in towns, and all communicating with all. Manners were thus formed; politeness was diffused; genius was invited to display itself; and minds capacious and active, but less daring or less turbulent, or more scrupulously honest, avoiding the thorny and miry paths of ambition, which required not only courage beyond the powers of the weak, but often compliances beyond the condescension of the liberal, would naturally turn themselves to the new modes of employment and of distinction, which the introduction of science offered. A lively imagination was among the national characteristics of the Greeks; and, from the earliest accounts of the nation, we find, that whenever new knowledge beamed, it was received with eager attention.

Thus, from the light acquired by Thales in Egypt, arose what has obtained the name of the Ionian school of philosophy. Thales is said to have been the first among the Greeks who calculated an eclipse of the sun; and hence perhaps we may best conjecture the extent of his science, and the kind of philosophy that he chiefly cultivated, or whence he principally derived his fame. Soon after him Pythagoras, driven by political troubles from his native Ionian island, Samos, diffused information, nearly similar, derived from the same source, among the Grecian towns of Italy. We have already had occasion to advert to the dubiousness of all accounts of Pythagoras, beyond the very little that Herodotus and Aristotle have recorded of him. Thales is Diog. Laert. said, as well as Pythagoras, to have mixed some valuable moral precepts with the instruction which he communicated on other sciences. Both however seem merely to have followed the example of the gnomic poets, the instructors and legislators of earliest ages, from Musæus and Orpheus, or those before them, downward to their own time. It does not appear that they attempted to reduce morality to a system; and therefore, tho they may have deserved highly as moral preachers, they

they seem hardly to have had any proper claim to the title of moral philosophers.

‘To do as you would be done by,’ seems, when once stated, so obvious a maxim for directing the conduct of men toward one another, and, when dispassionately considered, so incontrovertibly just a foundation for all moral philosophy, that we may wonder at any delay in its discovery, and any hesitation about its reception. Nevertheless self-love, perpetually instigating the desire to command others and to profit at their expence, operates so powerfully in the contrary direction, that Thales may deserve great credit for the rule-approaching, but far from reaching it, ‘Not to do to others, what, if done to us, we should ‘resent’<sup>20</sup>.’ But dry unconnected precepts, thwarting the passions and unalluring to the imagination, did not win attention like physical and metaphysical inquiries. The calculation of an eclipse of the sun led the mind to more amusing speculation, and left the passions free. The formation of the world, the nature of matter and of spirit, the laws of the heavenly bodies, were therefore subjects which, in the intervals of political strife, deeply engaged the minds of the Asian Greeks. But in the want of convenient materials and method, books were yet so rare that few could study in retirement. Knowledge was communicated in discourse; and the gymnasia and public porticoes, built for exercises of the body, became places of meeting for the culture of the mind.

The love of science is universally said to have been first communicated, among the Athenians, under the able and benign administration of the Peisistratids. But science itself was then in infancy, and its immediate growth in Athens was checked by the violence of political contest, which produced the insuing revolution, and kept low by the

Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 1. s. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Mr. Gibbon has considered the two rules as the same, or of equal value: ‘The golden rule of doing as you would be done by, a rule which,’ he says, ‘I read in a moral treatise of Isocrates (in Nicocle) four hundred years before the publication of the Gospel: *Ἄριστοι οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων μὴ ποιεῖτε*. Gibbon’s Rom.

‘Hist. c. 54. note 36.’ The difference between them appears however to me very great; one forbidding only evil-doing; the other, commanding universal charity. Xenophon, I remember somewhere, I believe in the *Cyropædia*, commending benevolence to enemies, has approached much nearer to the Christian doctrine.

long-subsisting fervor of party-spirit. The Persian invasions, quickly following, absorbed all attention, and the great political objects, which afterward engaged the general mind, left little leisure for speculative pursuits. It was not till the superior talents of Pericles had quieted the storms of war and faction, that science, which had in the interval received great improvement among the Asian Greeks, revived at Athens with new vigor. Anaxagoras of Clazomenë, the preceptor and friend of Pericles, bred in all the learning of the Ionian school, is said first to have introduced what might properly be called Philosophy there. To him is attributed the first conception of one eternal, almighty, and all-good Being; or, as he is said to have expressed himself, a perfect mind, independent of body, as the cause or creator of all things. The gods received in Greece, of course, were low in his estimation; the sun and moon, commonly reputed divinities, he held to be meer material substances, the sun a globe of stone, the moon an earth, nearly similar to ours. A doctrine so repugnant to the system on which depended the estimation of all the festivals, processions, sacrifices, and oracles, which so fascinated the vulgar mind, was not likely to be propagated without reprehension. Even the science which inabled to calculate an eclipse was offensive, inasmuch as it lowered the importance, and interferred with the profits, of priests, augurs, interpreters, and seers. An accusation of impiety was therefore instituted against Anaxagoras; the general voice went with the prosecutors; and all that the power and influence of Pericles could do for his valued friend, was to procure him means of escape from Attica.

Aristot. de animâ, l. 1. c. 2.  
Aristot. metaphys. l. 1. c. 4.

Plat. apol. Socr. p. 26. t. 1.  
Plut. vit. Pericl. Schol. in Nub. Aristoph. v. 338.

But while physical and metaphysical speculation engaged men of leisure, there was other learning that had more attraction for the ambitious and needy. To men indeed in general, living in an independent, and still more if in an imperial democracy, whatever might best inable them to sway the minds of their fellowcitizens, and, through such influence, raise themselves to commanding, dignified, and profitable public situations, would be the most interesting science. He who, knowing more than others, could also express himself better, would command attention in the public assemblies. That general education therefore, which gave the greatest advantage to talents for public speaking, a  
knowledge

knowledge of letters and language, of mathematics, of laws, of history, of men and manners, whatever might contribute to form what we call taste, which inables the possessor, by a kind of sentiment, without reflection, to give advantage to everything by the manner of speaking and acting, and still more to avoid whatever, either in itself or by the manner of putting it forward, can excite disgust or contempt, these would be in the highest request.

Yet there would be able men to whom, in the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, public situations would be little inviting: in some of the smaller states they were beneath a soaring ambition; in the larger, amid the competition of numbers, success would to many be hopeless; some men, possessing high mental faculties, might want strength of body or powers of elocution; and many would be excluded or deterred by unfortunate party-connections. From among all these, therefore, some, instead of putting themselves forward for public situations, sought the less splendid, but safer advantages, to be derived from communicating to others that science and that taste, which might inable them to become considerable as public men. Athens always was the great field for acquiring fame and profit in this line; yet those who first attained eminence in it were foreigners there, Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, formerly noticed as chief of an embassy from his own city to Athens, Prodicus of the little island of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. All these are said to have acquired very considerable riches by their profession. Their success therefore invited numbers to follow their example, and Greece, but far more especially Athens, shortly abounded with those who, under the name of sophists, professors of wisdom, undertook to teach every science. The scarcity and dearness of books gave high value to that learning, which a man with a well-stored mind, and a ready and clear elocution, could communicate. None, without eloquence, could undertake to be instructors; so that the sophists, in giving lessons of eloquence, were themselves the example. They frequented all places of public resort, the agora, the public walks, the gymnasia, and the porticoes; where they recommended themselves to notice by an ostentatious display of their abilities, in disputation among oneanother; or with whoever would converse with them.

Plat. Socr.  
apol. p. 19.

In the competition thus arising, men of specious rather than solid abilities would often gain the most extensive estimation. A certain dignity of character was generally affected, to which decency of manner was indispensably necessary; whence arose the opposition of the sophists to the comic poets: but if the doctrine of a licentious rather than a severe morality would recommend them to extensive favor, their efforts would be more directed to excuse and give a specious appearance to this, than to enforce the other. Many of them indeed would take either side of any question; political or moral; and it was generally their glory to make the worse appear the better cause.

The profession of sophist had not long flourished, and no Athenian had acquired fame in any branch of philosophy, when the singular talents, and singular manners and pursuits of Socrates son of Sophroniscus engaged public attention. The father was a statuary, and is not mentioned as very eminent in his profession; but, as a man, he seems to have been respected among the most eminent of the commonwealth: with Lysimachus, son of the great Aristeides, he lived in particular intimacy. Socrates inheriting a very scanty fortune, had a mind wholly intent upon the acquisition and communication of knowledge. The sublime principles of theology, taught by Anaxagoras, made an early impression upon his mind. They led him to consider what should be the duty, owed by man, to such a Being as Anaxagoras described his Creator; and it struck him that, if the providence of God interfered in the government of this world, the duty of man to man, little considered by poets or priests as any way connected with religion, and hitherto almost totally neglected by philosophers, must be a principal branch of the duty of man to God. It struck him farther, that with the gross defects which he saw in the religion, the morality, and the governments of Greece, tho' the favorite inquiries of the philosophers, concerning the nature of the Deity, the formation of the world, the laws of the heavenly bodies, might, while they amused, perhaps also enlarge and improve the minds of a few speculative men, yet the investigation of the social duties was infinitely more important, and might be infinitely more useful, to mankind in general. Indowed by nature with a most discriminating mind, and a singularly ready eloquence,

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Plat. Alcib. 1.  
p. 131. t. 2.

Plat. Laches,  
p. 180. t. 2.

he directed his utmost attention to that investigation; and when, by reflection, assisted and proved by conversation among the sophists and other able men, he had decided an opinion, he communicated it, not in the way of precept, but by proposing a question, and, in the course of interrogatory argument, leading his hearers to the just conclusion.

Mem. Socr.  
l. 1. c. 1.  
s. 10.

We are informed by his disciple Xenophon, how he passed his time. He was always in public. Early in the morning he went to the walks and the gymnasia: when the agora filled, he was there; and, in the afternoon, wherever he could find most company. Generally he was the principal speaker. The liveliness of his manner made his conversation amusing as well as instructive, and he denied its advantages to nobody. But he was nevertheless a most patient hearer; and preferred being the hearer whenever others were present, able and disposed to give valuable information to the company. He did not commonly refuse invitations, frequently received, to private entertainments: but he would undertake no private instruction; nor could any solicitation induce him to relieve his poverty, by accepting, like the sophists and rhetoricians, a reward for what he gave in public.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 31.  
Xen.

In the variety of his communication on social duties, he could not easily, and perhaps he did not desire intirely, to avoid either religious or political subjects; hazardous, both of them, under the jealous tyranny of democracy. It remains a question how far he was subject to superstition; but his honesty is so authenticated, that it seems fairer to impute to him some weakness in credulity, than any intention to deceive. If we may believe his own account, reported by his two principal disciples, he believed himself divinely impelled to the employment to which he devoted his life, inquiring and teaching the duty of man to man. A divine spirit, in his ideâ, constantly attended him; whose voice, distinctly heard, never expressly commanded what he was indisposed to do, but frequently forbad what he had intended. To unveil the nature of Deity was not among his pretensions. He only insisted on the perfect goodness and perfect wisdom of the Supreme God, the creator of all things, and the constant superintendence of his providence over the affairs of men. As included in these, he held that

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 28  
& 31, t. 1.  
Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 1. s. 3.

that everything done, said, or merely wished by men, was known to the Deity, and that it was impossible he could be pleased with evil. The unity of God, tho implied in many of his reported discourses, he would not in direct terms assert; rather carefully avoiding to dispute the existence of the multifarious gods acknowledged in Greece; but he strongly denied the weaknesses, vices, and crimes commonly imputed to them. So far however from proposing to innovate in forms of worship and religious ceremonies, so various in the different Grecian states, and sources of more doubt and contention than any other circumstances of the heathen religion, he held that men could not in these matters do wrong, if they followed the laws of their own country and the institutions of their forefathers. He was therefore regular in sacrifice, both upon the public altars and in his family. He seems to have been persuaded that the Deity, by various signs, revealed the future to men; in oracles, dreams, and all the various ways usually acknowledged by those conversant in the reputed science of augury. 'Where the wisdom of men cannot avail,' he said, 'we should endeavor to gain information from the gods; who will not refuse intelligible signs to those to whom they are propitious.' Accordingly he consulted oracles himself, and he recommended the same practice to others, in every doubt on important concerns.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 1. s. 19.

s. 2.

Plat. Eu-  
rhyth. &  
rep.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 3. s. 1.

l. 1. c. 1. s. 7,  
8, 9.

Xen. Anab.

The circumstances of the Athenian government, in his time, could not invite a man of Socrates's disposition to offer himself for political situations. He thought he might be infinitely more useful to his country in the singular line, it might indeed be called a public line, which he had chosen for himself. Not only he would not solicit office, but he would take no part in political contest. In the several revolutions which occurred, he was perfectly passive. But he would refuse nothing, on the contrary he would be active in everything, that he thought decidedly the duty of a citizen. When called upon to serve among the heavy-armed, he was exemplary in the duties of a private soldier; and as such he fought at Potidæa, Amphipolis, and Delium. We find him mentioned in civil office; at one time president of the general assembly, and at another a member of the council of Fivehundred. In each situation he distinguished

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 23.  
& 36.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 2 &  
5. Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 32.

himself by his unbending uprightness. When president, he resisted the violence of the assembled people, who voted a decree, in substance or in manner, contrary to the constitution. Neither threats, nor intreaties could move him to give it the necessary sanction of his office. As a member of the council, we have already seen him in the office of prytanis, at the trial of the six generals, when his persevering resistance to the injustice of popular tyranny was rendered useless, through the want of equal constancy in his colleagues, who yielded to the storm. Under the Thirty again, we have seen him, not in office indeed, but daring to refuse office, unworthy and illegal office, which the tyranny of the all-powerful Critias would have put upon him.

We are not informed when Socrates first became distinguished as a sophist; for in that description of men he was in his own day reckoned. When the wit of Aristophanes was directed against him in the theater, he was already among the most eminent, but his eminence seems to have been then recent. It was about the tenth or eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war, when he was six or seven and forty years of age, that after the manner of the old comedy, he was offered to public derision upon the stage, by his own name, as one of the persons of the drama, in the comedy of Aristophanes, called *The Clouds*, which is yet extant. Some antipathy, it appears, existed between the comic poets, collectively, and the sophists or philosophers. The licentiousness of the former could indeed scarcely escape the animadversion of the latter, who, on the contrary, favored the tragic poets, competitors with the comedians for public favor. Euripides and Aristophanes were particularly enemies; and Socrates not only lived in intimacy with Euripides, but is said to have assisted him in some of his tragedies. We are informed of no other cause for the injurious representation which the comic poet has given of Socrates<sup>21</sup>; whom he exhibits, in *The Clouds*, as a flagitious, yet ridiculous pretender to the occult

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Socr.  
init.

<sup>21</sup> The learned Brunck, in a Note on *The Clouds* of Aristophanes, contends that the poet bore really no ill-will to the philosopher. He draws his proof chiefly from the circumstance that in Plato's dialogue, intitled *The Banquet*, Socrates and Aristophanes are represented sitting, in no unfriendly way, at the same table, and in confirmation of it he adduces the celebrated panegyric epigram on Aristophanes, which has been commonly attributed to Plato. Aristoph. Brunck, p. 65. t. 2.

sciences,



sciences, conversing with the clouds as divinities, and teaching the principal youths of Athens to despise the received gods and to cozen men. The audience, accustomed to look on defamation with carelessness, and to hold as lawful and proper whatever might amuse the multitude, applauded the wit, and even gave general approbation to the piece: but the high estimation of the character of Socrates sufficed to prevent that complete success, which the poet had promised himself. The crown, which rewarded him whose drama most earned the public favor, and which Aristophanes had so often won, was on this occasion refused him.

Aristoph.  
Nub. v. 112  
& 246.  
v. 525.

Two or three and twenty years had elapsed since the first representation of *The Clouds*; the storms of conquest suffered from a foreign enemy, and of four revolutions in the civil government of the country, had passed; nearly three years had followed of that quiet, which the revolution under Thrasybulus produced; and the act of amnesty should have confirmed, when a young man, named Melitus, went to the king-archon, and, in the usual form, delivered an information against Socrates, and bound himself to prosecute. The information ran thus; ‘Melitus son of Melitus, of the borough of Pitthos, declares these upon oath against Socrates son of Sophroniscus, of the borough of Alopecé: Socrates is guilty of reviling the gods whom the city acknowledges, and of preaching other new gods: moreover he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty, death.’

Brunk. not.  
in Nub.  
Aristoph.  
init.

Plat. Euth.  
p. 2. t. 1. &  
Apol. Socr.  
p. 24.  
Xen. mem.  
Socr. init.  
Diog. Laert.  
vit. Socr.

Xenophon begins his Memorials of his revered master, with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn, to death, a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth. Ælian, tho for authority he can bear no comparison with Xenophon, has nevertheless, I think, given the solution. ‘Socrates,’ he says, ‘disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the evils of absolute monarchy.’<sup>22</sup> But tho the political circumstances of the times

<sup>22</sup> Σωκράτης δὲ τῆ μὲν Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας οὐκ ἠρεσκεῖτο τυραννικὴν γὰρ, καὶ μοναρχικὴν ἴσως τὴν δημοκρασίαν οὖσαν. Ælian. var. hist. l. 3. c. 17. And this is consonant to Aristotle's obser-

vation, quoted at the end of the first section of the twenty-first chapter, Ἡ Δημοκρατία ἡ τελειοτάτη Τυραννίς ἐστ.

made it necessary for cotemporary writers to speak with caution, yet both Xenophon and Plato have declared enough to show that the assertion of Ælian was well-founded; and farther proof, were it wanted, may be derived from another early writer, nearly cotemporary, and deeply versed in the politics of his age, the orator Æschines. Indeed, tho not stated in the inditement, yet it was urged against Socrates by his prosecutors before the court, that he was disaffected to the democracy; and in proof they affirmed it to be notorious that he had ridiculed, what the Athenian constitution prescribed, the appointment to magistracy by lot. 'Thus,' they said, 'he taught his numerous followers, youths of the principal families of the city, to despise the established government, and to be turbulent and seditious; and his success had been seen in the conduct of two, the most eminent, Alcibiades and Critias. Even the best things he converted to these ill purposes: from the most esteemed poets, and particularly from Homer, he selected passages to inforce his anti-democratical principles.'

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 2. s. 9.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 2. s. 56.  
et seq.

Socrates, it appears indeed, was not inclined to deny his disapprobation of the Athenian constitution. His defence itself, as it is reported by Plato, contains matter on which to found an accusation against him, of disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, such as, under the jealous tyranny of the Athenian democracy, would sometimes subject a man to the penalties of high treason. 'You well know,' he says, 'Athenians, that, had I ingaged in public business, I should long ago have perished, without procuring any advantage either to you or to myself. Let not the truth offend you: it is no peculiarity of your democracy, or of your national character: but, wherever the people is sovereign, no man who shall dare honestly to oppose injustice, frequent and extravagant injustice, can avoid destruction.'

Lys. or. pro  
Polyst.

Plat. apol.  
Socr.

Without this proof, indeed, we might reasonably believe, that, tho Socrates was a good and faithful subject of the Athenian government, and would promote no sedition, no political violence, yet he could not like the Athenian constitution<sup>23</sup>. He wished for wholesome changes

<sup>23</sup> His political principles seem most particularly declared in Plato's Crito.

by gentle means; and it seems even to have been a principal object of the labors to which he dedicated himself, to infuse principles into the rising generation that might bring about the desirable change insensibly. His scholars were chiefly sons of the wealthiest citizens, whose easy circumstances afforded leisure to attend him; and, some of these, zealously adopting his tenets, others merely pleased with the ingenuity of his arguments, and the liveliness of his manner, and desirous to emulate his triumphs over his opponents, were forward, after his example, to engage in disputation upon all the subjects on which he was accustomed to discourse. Thus employed, and thus followed, tho himself avoiding office and public business, those who governed or desired to govern the commonwealth through their influence among the Many, might perhaps not unreasonably consider him as one who was, or might become, a formidable adversary; nor might it be difficult to excite popular jealousy against him.

Melitus, who stood forward as his principal accuser, was, as Plato informs us, no way a man of any great consideration. His legal description gives some probability to the conjecture that his father was one of the commissioners sent to Lacedæmon, from the moderate party, who opposed the ten successors of the Thirty Tyrants, while Thrasybulus held Peiræus, and Pausanius was incamped before Athens. He was a poet, and stood forward as in a common cause of the poets, who esteemed the doctrine of Socrates injurious to their interest. Unsupported, his accusation would have been little formidable. But he seems to have been a meer instrument in the business. He was soon joined by Lycon, one of the most powerful speakers of his time. Lycon was the avowed patron of the rhetoricians, who, as well as the poets, thought their interest injured by the moral philosopher's doctrine. I know not that on any other occasion, in Grecian history, we have any account of this kind of party-interest operating; but from circumstances nearly analogous, in our own country, if we substitute for poets the clergy, and for rhetoricians the lawyers, we may gather what might be the party-spirit, and what the weight of influence of the rhetoricians and poets in Athens. With Lycon, Anytus, a man scarcely second to any in the commonwealth in rank and general estimation, who had held

Ch. 21. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

held high command with reputation in the Peloponnesian war, and had been the principal associate of Thrasybulus in the war against the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy, declared himself a supporter of the prosecution<sup>24</sup>. Nothing in the accusation could, by any known law of Athens, affect the life of the accused. In England, no man would be put upon trial on so vague a charge; no grand jury would listen to it. But in Athens, if the party was strong enough, it signified little what was the law. When Lycon and Anytus came forward, Socrates saw that his condemnation was already decided.

By the course of his life, however, and by the turn of his thoughts, for many years, he had so prepared himself for all events, that, far from alarmed at the probability of his condemnation, he rather rejoiced at it, as, at his age, a fortunate occurrence. He was persuaded of the soul's immortality, and of the superintending providence of an all-good Deity, whose favor he had always been assiduously endeavoring to deserve. Men fear death, he said, as if unquestionably the greatest evil; and yet no man knows that it may not be the greatest good. If indeed great joys were in prospect, he might and his friends for him, with somewhat more reason, regret the event; but at his years, and with his scanty fortune, tho he was happy enough, at seventy, still to preserve both body and mind in vigor, yet even his present gratifications must necessarily soon decay. To avoid therefore the evils of age, pain, sickness, decay of sight, decay of hearing, perhaps decay of understanding, by the easiest of deaths (for such the Athenian mode of execution, by a draught of hemlock, was reputed) cheered with the company of surrounding friends, could not be otherwise than a blessing.

Xenophon says that, by condescending to a little supplication, Socrates might easily have obtained his acquittal. No admonition or intreaty of his friends however could persuade him to such an unworthiness. On the contrary, when put upon his defence, he told the people that he did not plead for his own sake, but for theirs, wishing them to avoid

Plat. Phæd.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 29.

Xen. apol.  
Socr. s. 7,  
& 23, & 27.  
& Mem.  
Socr. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 6, &  
seq.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 4.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 30.

<sup>24</sup> Ἀντιόχου τῶν μεγίστων ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίου-  
μενοι. Xen. apol. Socr. s. 29. Anytus came  
forward as patron of the demiurgi. Plat. apol. Socr. p. 23. ε. What these were I find no information.

the guilt of an unjust condemnation. It was usual for accused persons to bewail their apprehended lot, with tears to supplicate favor, and, by exhibiting their children upon the bema, to endeavor to excite pity. He thought it, he said, more respectful to the court, as well as more becoming himself, to omit all this; however aware that their sentiments were likely so far to differ from his, that judgement would be given in anger for it.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. p. 34.

Condemnation pronounced wrought no change upon him. He again addressed the court, declared his innocence of the matters laid against him, and observed that, even if every charge had been completely proved, still all together did not, according to any known law, amount to a capital crime. 'But,' in conclusion he said, 'it is time to depart; I to die, you to live: but which for the greater good, God only knows.'

Xen. apol.  
Socr. p. 24.

p. 25.

Plat. apol.  
Socr. in fine.

It was usual at Athens for execution very soon to follow condemnation; commonly on the morrow. But it happened that the condemnation of Socrates took place on the eve of the day appointed for the sacred ceremony of crowning the galley, which carried the annual offerings to the gods worshipped at Delos; and immemorial tradition forbade all executions till the sacred vessel's return. Thus the death of Socrates was respited thirty days, while his friends had free access to him in the prison. During all that time he admirably supported his constancy. Means were concerted for his escape; the jailer was bribed, a vessel prepared, and a secure retreat in Thessaly provided. No arguments, no prayers, could persuade him to use the opportunity. He had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not furnish an example of the breach of it. To no purpose it was urged that he had been unjustly condemned: he had always held that wrong did not justify wrong. He waited with perfect composure the return of the sacred vessel, reasoned on the immortality of the soul, the advantage of virtue, the happiness derived from having made it through life his pursuit, and, with his friends about him, took the fatal cup and died.

Plat. Phæd.  
p. 58. l. 1.

Xen. mem.  
Socr. l. 4.

Plat. Crit.

Writers who, after Xenophon and Plato, have related the death of Socrates, seem to have held themselves bound to vie with those who preceded them, in giving pathos to the story. The purpose here has been

been

been rather to render it intelligible; to show its connexion with the political history of Athens; to derive from it illustration of the political history. The magnanimity of Socrates, the principal efficient of the pathos, surely deserves admiration; yet it is not that in which he has most outshone other men. The circumstances of lord Russel's fate were far more trying. Socrates, we may reasonably suppose, would have borne lord Russel's trial: but, with bishop Burnet for his eulogist, instead of Plato and Xenophon, he would not have had his present splendid fame. The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and the usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steddiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence, whence his supreme and almost only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality, little enough indeed seen in practice, nevertheless is become so familiar in theory, that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may from the writings of his cotemporaries and predecessors, how little conception was entertained of it before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and, when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that should be generally admitted by the reason of men. It is through the light which Socrates diffused by his doctrine, enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and the practice exhibited to highest advantage, in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Xenophon and Plato, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of man<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> The life and manners of Socrates remain reported with authority not to be found for any other character of heathen antiquity. Two men of the best ability and best reputation, who had lived familiarly with him, but whom circumstances afterward separated,

rated, and set in some degree at variance, have each described them in much detail. No deficiency of knowledge of their subject can be suspected; nothing can be reprehended, in either account, on the score of probability: clearly, without concert, they agree; and each bears the fullest testimony to the integrity of Socrates, and to the purity of his manners, purity beyond even the precepts of that age, as well as to the excellence of his doctrine. On the contrary, those foul aspersions upon his character, which remain scattered among later ancient writers, and which the learned and ingenious author of *The Observer* has, now in our days, thought it worth his while to seek, to collect, and to exhibit in groop, in a daylight which they had not before known, are reported neither on authority to bear any comparison with the single evidence of either Plato or Xenophon, much less with their united testimony, nor have they any probability to recommend them. They carry every appearance of having originated from the virulence of party-spirit, the spirit of that party which persecuted Socrates to death; and they have been propagated by writers in the profligate ages that followed, accommodating themselves to the taste of those ages, which their own profligacy, apparently, has led some of them to defend and to flatter. For the propensity to involve men, in former times, of best report, in the scandal of that gross immorality which disgraced the fall of Greece and of Rome, is conspicuous among some of the writers under the Roman empire.

The quarrel of the learned author of *The*

*Observer* with Socrates, has been taken up in revenge for the imputations, which some admirers of the philosopher, with more zeal than either candor or good sense, have thrown upon the comic poet Aristophanes. The story reported by *Ælian*, that Aristophanes was bribed by Anytus and Melitus to write the comedy of *The Clouds*, purposely to prepare the way for the impeachment of Socrates, which did not follow till after so many years and so many revolutions in the government, is evidently absurd and malicious; and yet it is not impossible but that comedy may have contributed to the popular prejudices, which enabled the enemies of Socrates to procure his condemnation. Xenophon and Plato have omitted to inform us either what incited Aristophanes so to traduce Socrates, or how the poet and the philosopher afterward became, as from Plato it appears they did become, familiar friends. Possibly Aristophanes, when he wrote *The Clouds*, was little acquainted with Socrates, and possibly bore him no particular malice. His object seems to have been to stigmatize generally the quibbling of the sophists, and to ridicule the trifling of the naturalists. Some of the principal jokes, such as measuring the flea's jump, and accounting for the gnat's noise, have no apparent relation to any doctrine or usual inquiry of Socrates; and possibly the philosopher may have been chosen for the hero of the piece only because he was more known to fame, more remarkable by his doctrine, by his manner, and, what might be a consideration for a comic poet, by his person, than any other public teacher.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

Transactions of the GREEKS in ASIA and THRACE, from the Conclusion of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR, in which Persia was the Ally of Lacedæmon, to the Renewal of WAR between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA.

## SECTION I.

*Increased Connection of Grecian Affairs with Persian. Succession of Artaxerxes Mnemon to the Persian Throne. Weakness of the Persian Government. Grecian Forces raised by Cyrus, brother of the King: Clearchus, Proxenus, Xenophon.*

**I**N the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, the affairs of Greece became, as we have seen, more than formerly implicated with those of Persia; and during the short calm which succeeded the long troubles of the former country, some events in the latter will require our attention. The detail will lead us far from Greece; but, beside involving information of Grecian affairs not found elsewhere, it has a very important connection with Grecian history, through the insight it affords into circumstances which prepared a revolution effected by Grecian arms, one of the greatest occurring in the annals of the world.

By the event of the Peloponnesian war, the Asian Greeks changed the dominion of Athens, not for that of Lacedæmon, the conquering Grecian power, but of a foreign, a barbarian master, the king of Persia, then the ally of Lacedæmon. Toward the end of the same year in which a conclusion was put to the war, by the taking of Athens, Darius king of Persia, the second of the name, died. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes, also the second of his name, and, for his extraordinary memory, distinguished among the Greeks by the addition of Mnemon, the Mindful. The old king, in his last illness, desirous to see once more his favorite son Cyrus, sent for him from his government.



government in Lydia. The prince, in obeying his father's requisition, travelled in the usual manner of the Eastern great, with a train amounting almost to an army; and to exhibit, in his guard, the new magnificence of troops so much heard of in the upper provinces, but never yet seen, he engaged, by large pay, the attendance of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, under the command of Xenias of Parrhasii in Arcadia. As a friend and counsellor, he took with him Tissaphernes, satrap of Caria.

On the decease of Darius, which followed shortly, a jealousy, scarcely separable from a despotic throne, but said to have been fomented by the unprincipled Tissaphernes, induced the new monarch to imprison his brother; whose death, it was supposed, in course would have followed, but for the powerful intercession of the queen-mother, Parysatis. Restored through her influence, not only to liberty, but to the great command intrusted to him by his indulgent father, Cyrus nevertheless resented highly the indignity he had suffered. He seems indeed to have owed little to his brother's kindness. Jealous of the known abilities and popular character of Cyrus, apprehensive of his revenge, and perhaps not unreasonably also of his ambition, Artaxerxes practised that wretched oriental policy, still familiar with the Turkish government in the same countries, of exciting civil war between the commanders of his provinces, to disable them for making war against the throne. Orontas, a person related to the royal family, governor of the citadel of Sardis, was encouraged by the monarch's councils, to rebel against that superior officer, under whose immediate authority, by those very councils, he was placed, and ostensibly still required to act. Cyrus subdued and forgave him. A second opportunity occurring, Orontas again rebelled; again found himself, notwithstanding the secret patronage of the court, unable to support his rebellion; and, soliciting pardon, obtained, from the generosity of Cyrus, not pardon only but favor. But according to report, to which Xenophon gave credit, the queen-mother herself, Parysatis, whether urged by the known enmity of Artaxerxes to Cyrus, or by whatever other cause, incited her younger son to seek the throne and life of the elder. Thus much however appears certain, that, very soon after his return into

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 1. s. 4.

c. 6. s. 1. 6, 7.

Asia Minor, Cyrus began preparations with that criminal view. For a pretence, it must be allowed, he seems not to have been totally without what the right of self-defence might afford; yet his principal motives evidently were ambition and revenge.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 6. s. 7. l. 2.  
c. 5. s. 2.

The disjointed, tottering, and crumbling state of that empire, which, under the first Darius, appeared so well compacted, and really was so powerful and flourishing; favored his views. Egypt, whose lasting revolt had been suppressed by the first Artaxerxes, was again in rebellion, and the fidelity of other distant provinces was more than suspected. Within his own extensive viceroyalty, the large province of Paphlagonia, governed by its own tributary prince, paid but a precarious obedience to the Persian throne; the Mysian and Peisidian mountaineers made open war against the more peaceable subjects of the plains; and the Lycaonians, possessing themselves of the fortified places, held even the level country in independency, and refused the accustomed tribute. A large part of Lesser Asia was thus in rebellion, more or less avowed. Hence, on one hand, the attention of the king's councils and the exertion of his troops were engaged; on the other, an undeniable pretence was ready for Cyrus to increase the military force under his immediate authority.

c. 6. s. 3.

1. 3. c. 2.  
s. 14.

Ch. 20. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

On his first arrival in the neighbourhood of the Grecian colonies, Cyrus, as we have seen, became partial to the Grecian character. The degeneracy, effeminacy, pride, servility, and falsehood, prevalent among the Assyrian and Median great, seem to have led the first Cyrus to establish as a maxim for the Persians, that to excel in drawing the bow, riding on horseback, and speaking truth, should be their characteristic, and the great object of Persian education. Born with a generous temper, and superior powers of body and mind, and excelling in the two former requisites, the younger Cyrus would be likely to conceive a proud value for the latter; and, at an early age, to abhor and despise the duplicity and baseness in which the Persian were no longer distinguished from the Median and Assyrian courtiers. With a mind capable of friendship, and naturally solicitous for the esteem of those like himself, the superior character of men bred in the schools of Lycurgus, Anaxagoras, and Socrates, and formed in the wars and  
political

political turbulence of the Grecian commonwealths, could not fail to strike him. His vanity would cooperate with his judgement in courting their good opinion; and, as his penetration discovered the use to be made of them, even his ambition would lead him to cultivate their friendship. Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 7. s. 3.

As soon as the design against his brother's throne was decided, Cyrus, with increased sedulity, extended his connections among the Greeks. They alone, among the nations of that time, knew how to train armies, so that thousands of men might act as one machine. Hence their heavy-armed had a power, in the shock of battle, that no number of more irregular troops, however brave, could resist. To men of character therefore, from any part of Greece, but especially from Peloponnesus, whose heavy-armed were of highest reputation, introduction to Cyrus was easy. The fame of his munificence and of his liberal manner invited; and many became connected with him by the pledge of hospitality, which, with the Persians, not less than among the Greeks, was held sacred. Through the long and extensive war lately concluded, Greece abounded with experienced officers, and with men of inferior rank, much practised in arms, and little in any peaceful way of livelihood. Opportunity was thus ready for raising a force of Grecian mercenaries, almost to any amount. What required circumspection was to avoid alarming the court of Susa; and this the defective principles and worse practice of the Persian administration made even easy.

The superintending command of Cyrus extended over all Lesser Asia within the river Halys. The large province, committed to his immediate government, was composed of Lydia, the Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. The Ionian cities had been reserved to the satrapy of Tissaphernes. But the prince's character was popular, the satrap's unpopular; insomuch that, finding their offered homage acceptable, all those cities, excepting Miletus, paid their appointed tribute to Cyrus, and no longer acknowledged the satrap's orders. To contest such matters by arms, was become so ordinary among the Persian governors, that raising troops for the purpose was little likely to give umbrage to the court; careless how the provinces were administered, Xen. Hel.  
Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 9. s. 5. c. 1.  
s. 6.  
provided

provided only the expected tribute came regularly to the treasury. Cyrus therefore directed his Grecian commanders, in the several towns, to enlist Greeks, especially Peloponnesians, as many as they could; with the pretence of strengthening his garrisons against the apprehended attempts of Tissaphernes. In Miletus, so the popularity of his character prevailed, a conspiracy was formed for revolting to him; but before it could be carried into effect, it was discovered; and, by the satrap's order, the ringleaders were executed, and many of their adherents banished. Cyrus not only protected the fugitives, but besieged Miletus by land and sea; and this new war furnished an additional pretence for levying troops.

Notwithstanding the character of frankness, honor, and strict regard for truth, which Cyrus generally supported, the candor of Xenophon, his friend and panegyrist, has not concealed from us that he could stoop to duplicity, when the great interests of his ambition instigated. So far from acknowledging any purpose of disobedience to the head of the empire, he condescended to request from that brother, against whose throne and life his preparations were already directed, the royal authority for adding Ionia to his immediate government. The request was granted; at the instance, it was said, of Parysatis, who preserved much influence with her elder son, while she incited the nefarious views of the younger against him. Concerning intrigues in the Persian court, however, we should perhaps allow our belief cautiously, even to Xenophon: but we may readily give him credit for that weakness of the government, which, he affirms, induced the king to be pleased, rather than offended, at the private war between his brother and the satrap; inasmuch as by consuming their means in the distant provinces, it might prevent disturbance from their ambition to the interior of the empire.

Among the many Greeks admitted to the conversation and to the table of Cyrus, was Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian; who, after serving in the armies of his own commonwealth, through the Peloponnesian war, found himself, at the age of fifty, still uneasy in rest. Looking all around for opportunity of military employment, he thought he had discovered it in the Thracian Chersonese, where the Greek settlers were

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 1. s. 8.

s. 9.

1. 1. c. 6. s. 2.

were harrassed by incursions of the neighboring barbarians; and he persevered in representation and solicitation to the ephors, till he obtained a commission for a command there. He hastened his departure; but at Corinth an order of recall overtook him. The disappointment was more than he could bear; he resolved to disobey the revered scy-talë; and proceeded, in defiance of it, to act in pursuance of his commission received. For this he was, in absence, condemned to death; a sentence operating to his banishment for life.

What fair hope now remained to Clearchus does not appear; but the need of military talents, continually and extensively occurring among the various warring commonwealths and scattered colonies of the Greeks, always offered some prospect for adventurers of any considerable military reputation; and, in the moment, a still more inviting field, possibly always in his view, appeared in the court of Cyrus. Thither he went, and, under a forbidding outside, a surly countenance, a harsh voice, and rough manners, the prince, discovering in him the character he wanted, after short intercourse made him a present of ten thousand darics, between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling.

Clearchus did not disappoint this magnificent generosity. Military command and military adventure were his supreme delight; and, in the circumstances of the age, a body of men under his orders was an estate. Employing therefore the whole of the prince's present in raising troops, he offered, as an individual adventurer, that protection to the Chersonesites, which, as a general of the Lacedæmonian forces, he had been commissioned to give, but which the Lacedæmonian government, tho claiming to be the protecting power of the Grecian name, had finally refused to afford. His service was accepted; and his success against the barbarians, together with the uncommon regularity and inoffensiveness of his troops in the friendly country, so gratified not the Chersonites only, but all the Hellespontine Greeks, that, while he generally found subsistence at the expence of the enemy, they provided large pay for his army by voluntary contribution. Hence, with a discipline severe sometimes to excess, he preserved the general attachment of those under him; and thus a body of troops was kept in the highest order, ready for the service of Cyrus.

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The circumstances of Thessaly afforded another opportunity. Aristippus, a Thessalian of eminence, probably banished by faction, had been admitted to the prince's familiarity. Returning afterward to his own country, and becoming head of his party, divisions were still such that civil war followed. Then Aristippus thought he might profit from that claim, which the ancient doctrine of hospitality gave him upon the generosity of Cyrus. He requested levy-money for two thousand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thousand and six months; only stipulating, that, without previous communication with him, no accommodation should be concluded with the adverse party. Thus another body of troops, unnoticed, was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban, of the first rank and highest connections, happy in his talents, cultivated under the celebrated Gorgias, of manners to win, and character to deserve esteem, dissatisfied with the state of things in his own city, passed, at the age of toward thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpose of seeking employment, honor, and fortune; and, in Xenophon's phrase, of so associating with men in the highest situations, that he might earn the means of doing, rather than lie under the necessity of receiving, favors. Recommended by such advantages, Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendship of Cyrus; who commissioned him to raise a Grecian force, for a purpose which the Persian court could not disapprove, the reduction of the rebellious Peisidians.

Anab. 1. 3.  
c. 1. s. 4-7.

Thus engaged in the prince's service, it became the care of Proxenus to obtain, in his foreign residence, the society of a friend, of disposition, acquirements, and pursuits congenial to his own. With this view he wrote to a young Athenian<sup>1</sup>, with whom he had long had intimacy, Xenophon son of Gryllus, a scholar of Socrates; warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince's favor, to which he engaged to introduce him. In the actual state of things at Athens, enough might occur to disgust honest ambition. Xenophon therefore, little satisfied with any prospect there, accepted his friend's invitation; and to these circumstances we owe his beautiful narrative of the insuing transactions, which remains, like the Iliad, the oldest and the model of its kind<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1, 2</sup> Two notes, whose purpose is to warrant the text, but which are not wanted to elucidate it, are, on account of their length, referred to the end of the chapter.

For a Grecian land-force, Cyrus contented himself with what might be procured by negotiation with individuals, and the allurements of pay. But he desired the coöperation of a Grecian fleet, which, in the existing circumstances of Greece, could be obtained only through favor of the Lacedæmonian government. By a confidential minister, therefore, dispatched to Lacedæmon, he claimed a friendly return for his assistance in the war with Athens. The ephors, publicly acknowledging the justness of his claim, sent orders to Samius, then commanding on the Asiatic station, to join the prince's fleet, and follow the directions of his admiral, Tamos, an Egyptian.

Xen. Hel.  
c. 1. s. 1.

## SECTION II.

*March of Cyrus to Babylonia: Battle of Cunaxa.*

PREPARATION being at length completed, and the advantageous season for action approaching, all the Ionian garrisons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias, the Arcadian, commander of the Grecian guard which had attended Cyrus into Upper Asia. The other Grecian troops were directed to join; some at Sardis, some at places farther eastward. A very large army of Persian subjects, or rather of various Asiatics not Greeks, whom the Greeks called collectively barbarians, was at the same time assembled. The pretence of these great preparations was to exterminate the rebellious Peisidians; and, in the moment, it sufficed for the troops. It could however no longer blind Tissaphernes; who, not chusing to trust others to report what he knew or suspected, set off, with all the speed that the way of travelling of an Eastern satrap would admit, with an escort of five hundred horse, to communicate personally with the king.

Xen. Anab.  
l. 1. c. 2.  
s. 4.

Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis, with the forces already collected, by Colossæ to Celænæ in Phrygia, a large and populous town, where he halted thirty days. There he was joined by the last division of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thousand heavy-armed, and two thousand targeteers. His Asiatics or barbarians

s. 5—9.  
B. C. 401.  
Ol. 94. 3.  
April.

were near a hundred thousand. Proceeding again eastward, he halted again at Peltæ. There he gave a very strong and gratifying mark of attention to the Greeks. It was the season of the Arcadian festival called Lyçæa, whence the Romans had their Lupercalia. The Arcadians of the army were desirous to celebrate the festival, with games and all religious rites, after the manner of their own country. Not only he allowed all opportunity for this, but he paid them the compliment himself to attend.

In his great undertaking indeed, every exertion of his talent for acquiring popularity was wanted. Either he had met with some great disappointment, of which we are uninformed, or he set out unprovided with the first requisite, money, to a degree far beyond what prudence could justify. Only fifty-two days had elapsed since the army moved from Sârdis, when the pay of the Grecian forces was three months in arrear, and he was without means to furnish it. Discontent of course arose, and grew, insomuch that the soldiers would urge their clamorous demands, even to his very door. Much good sense, some experience, and earnest meditation on great designs, had taught Cyrus to respect men, who must be instruments of those designs. Hence he had learned to check the impetuous passions, whose sallies had sometimes disgraced his earlier youth. He would himself often give a patient hearing to the soldiers: he would soothe them with expressions of sorrow for his present inability; he would cheer them with the prospect of better times, and with promises, in which his known generosity disposed them to confide; and he never failed to dismiss them hoping, and in some degree gratified.

It seems probable that Cyrus had been negotiating with Syennesis, who reigned over the rich maritime province of Cilicia, holding it, if we may use a modern term very nearly apposite, as a fief of the Persian empire. To pass from Lydia into Assyria, the immense ridge which under various names, Taurus, Caucasus, and others, extends from the south-western corner of Asia Minor to the Caspian sea, must necessarily be crossed; everywhere with much difficulty and danger to an army, if an enemy opposed; but the nearest way and the best was through Cilicia. It was therefore of much importance to Cyrus to gain Syennesis



Syennesis to his interest; or, if that could not be, to deter opposition from him. But the situation of the Cilician prince was critical. Acceding to the requisition of Cyrus, he hazarded the charge of concurring in rebellion against the great king; refusing it, he might be overwhelmed by the prince's army, before assistance from the king could arrive. Hence seem to have arisen the circumstances, of strange and mysterious appearance, which followed. Proceeding from Peltæ, the army incamped in the plain of Caystrus, near a large town, whence it was supplied with provisions; but, no pay forthcoming, the discontent of the Greeks became such, that their officers with difficulty kept them within any bounds. In this state of things, the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of Syennesis, with a strong escort of horse, part Cilician, part Greeks of Aspendüs, drew general attention; and shortly, to the surprize almost equally as to the gratification of the army, pay was issued for four months. The means were universally attributed to the Cilician princess. Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 2. s. 12.

Orders being given for resuming the march, the Greeks now proceeded cheerfully. Epyaxa, with her escort, accompanied the army, moving as the Persian prince moved, and incamping as he incamped; not without insult to her fame from the licentious mouths of the soldiers. At Tyriæum, to gratify her, it was said, Cyrus reviewed his forces. The barbarian troops first marched by. Then Cyrus in an open, Epyaxa in a covered carriage, passed along the Grecian line, which was formed four deep; the soldiers uniformly armed and clothed, with brazen helmets, scarlet tunics, greaves, and burnished shields. Taking a station in front, Cyrus sent orders to advance with protended spears. The trumpet immediately giving the signal, the phalanx moved, and gradually quickening pace, at length advanced running, shouting at the same time aloud, in the usual measured way of the Greeks, widely different from the irregular clamors of the barbarians. Twelve thousand men, uniformly armed, exactly formed, moving regularly, and shouting regularly, as if one machine, were a sight so new to the Asiatics as to excite alarm with astonishment. Epyaxa, for quicker flight, quitted her cumbrous carriage, and every sutler ran from the camp. The Greeks were amused and flattered, and Cyrus was not anxious to

conceal his satisfaction at the terror which they could thus easily excite among the Asiatics.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 2. s. 19.

In three days then the army arrived at Iconium, the last town of Phrygia. Here it was on the border of the rebellious provinces, the pretended object of the expedition. Its force was much greater than the rebels could undertake to encounter. During five days march through Lycaonia, the Greeks had permission to plunder, and they met with no opposition, or none worth their historian's notice. In Lycaonia the Cilician princess took leave of Cyrus, to go, by the nearest road across the mountains, into her own country. In compliment, real or pretended, her escort was augmented with a body of Greeks, under the orders of Menon, a young Thessalian, who held the immediate command of the troops raised by Aristippus. The circumstances altogether seem to indicate that the object of her extraordinary visit had been political; to divert the Persian prince from his purpose of passing through Cilicia; and that the hope, still entertained, of obtaining by negotiation what had been denied to the first solicitation, induced her to accompany his march so long. Cyrus however persevered in his intention, tho in uncertainty whether Syennesis would not oppose his passing the mountains. The more important object therefore, in detaching Menon, was to open a communication with the fleet under Tamos and Samius, which had been ordered to the Cilician coast, and, by a force within the country, possessing that communication, to make the passage of the mountains, in all events, more secure for the body of the army.

s. 20.

s. 20, 21.

Meanwhile the prince, moving still eastward through Cappadocia, in four days reached Dana, a large and populous town, whence a formed carriage-way, the best across the rugged ridge of Taurus, led directly to Tarsus, the Cilician capital; steep, however, in many parts, and commanded, so that a very small force might stop a large army. No intelligence had yet arrived from Menon, and report was circulated that Syennesis in person, with a powerful body of troops, had occupied the heights commanding the passage. During the halt, which these circumstances occasioned, two Persian officers of high rank were executed. Rumor went of a conspiracy; but the usual secrecy of a despotic administration denied all particulars to public knowledge.

After

After three days delay, the satisfactory intelligence arrived, that the passage of the mountains was open: that the detachment under Menon was already within the ridge; and, what had contributed not a little to deter the opposition meditated by Syennesis, that the fleet was on the coast. The highlands were accordingly traversed without opposition, and the army, proceeding in four days above eighty miles, through a well watered, highly cultivated, and very fruitful vale, bounded by lofty mountains, arrived at Tarsus.

With surprise and regret it was found, that this large and lately flourishing town had been plundered and was nearly deserted: even the prince's palace had been stripped; and Syennesis, with the principal inhabitants, had withdrawn to a strong hold on the neighboring mountains, to avoid farther injury from Menon. Cyrus had not penetrated this young man's character, through a fair exterior, so happily as that of the veteran Clearchus, under a forbidding aspect. Menon possessed very considerable talents, recommended by an elegant person and an engaging manner; but he had a most depraved mind, with an inordinate appetite for riches and pleasure, unrestrained by either fear or shame. In attributing this to him, says Xenophon, I give him but his well-known due. The alleged provocation, for his violences at Tarsus, was an attack among the defiles, in which a hundred Greeks had fallen. The loss had certainly been sustained; but the Cilicians averred that the intolerable rapines of Menon, as he traversed the country, had provoked the attack. Cyrus sent a message to Syennesis, requiring his attendance in Tarsus. The Cilician answered, 'That he never had appeared before a superior, nor would he now.' Epyaxa however interfering as mediatrix, Syennesis, after receiving solemn assurance of safety, obeyed the requisition. An exchange was then made of honors for money. Syennesis advanced a very large sum to Cyrus, and received, in return, says the historian, such gifts as are held honorable among princes; a horse with a golden bit; a chain of gold, bracelets, a golden battle-axe, a Persian robe, and a promise that his country should be no farther plundered, and, moreover, that stolen slaves, wherever found, should be restored to their owners; the only reparation, apparently, ever proposed for the plunder of the capital.

Anab. I. I.  
c. 2. s. 27.

Cyrus

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 3. s. 1.

Cyrus halted in Tarsus twenty days. In this leisure the Greeks observed among one another, that the Peisidian mountains were now left far behind them; that the pretence of war there had evidently been a fallacy; and many circumstances gave to suspect that the prince's real design was against his brother's throne. Of the generals, Clearchus only was in the secret; but the others were mostly ready to concur in a project which, with considerable danger indeed, held out the hope of immense reward. The soldiers however, for whom the allure-ment was not equal, were less disposed to the toil and the perils; and, when at length orders came for marching still eastward, they universally declared, it was for no such distant service they had engaged themselves, and they would go no farther. Clearchus immediately resorted to his usual rough means of compulsion; but they were no longer borne; the mutiny broke out with violence; stones were thrown, first at his sumpter horses, then at himself, and with difficulty he escaped alive.

s. 2-6.

Information of these circumstances gave Cyrus the deepest anxiety. He had already advanced too far to retreat with either honor or safety; and, deprived of his regular infantry, his force would be too inferior for any reasonable hope of success against the myriads of the great king. But the able and experienced Clearchus did not so cease to trust in his own ability to sway the minds of men. He desired a meeting of his people, as in civil assembly, and they came quietly together. Addressing them in terms tending only to reconciliation and the recovery of their confidence, they listened patiently. Protesting then that he would neither oppose nor desert them, he said if they thought him unworthy any longer to command, he would obey. Not only his own people declared their attachment, but more than two thousand others, of the body drawn from the Ionian garrisons; hitherto under the Arcadian Xenias, and the troops raised for the siege of Miletus, under Pasion of Megara, now, without regarding any longer the orders of those generals, arranged themselves under the command of Clearchus.

s. 7.

But, in resolving to proceed no farther with Cyrus, the means of returning to Ionia had been little considered by the soldiers; how the passage of the mountains was to be secured, and how, without pay, subsistence

subsistence was to be obtained. More meetings were held; various and contrary opinions were urged; and the perplexity was so skilfully managed by Clearchus and his confidential officers, that, disagreeing on every other proposal, it was at length universally resolved to send Clearchus himself, with some others, to demand of the prince on what service he meant to employ them. Cyrus, being duly prepared by private communication, received the deputation graciously, and, in answer, said, ‘that according to intelligence lately arrived, his enemy the satrap of Syria, Abrocomas, was incamped on the bank of the Euphrates, only twelve days march from Tarsus. If he found him there, he meant to take vengeance on him; if not, he would there consult with them what measure should next be taken.’”

Anab. l. 1.  
c. 3. s. 20.

This speech did not deceive the Greeks; but it might incourage, by showing them, as it strongly marks to posterity, the incoherent texture of the Persian government, when the purpose of private war against the governor of a great province, so near the center of the empire, might be boldly avowed by the governor of another province, still maintaining the pretence of allégiance to the throne. Their perplexity therefore not being in any degree relieved, if they persisted in their first resolution, they presently came to a determination, to profit as they might from the existing circumstances, and to use them for a pretence to demand an increase of pay, rather than, by deserting the prince’s service, to go without pay. Cyrus readily gratified them with the promise of an additional half daric monthly. Their former monthly pay was a daric, being nearly sixpence daily.

s. 21.

The march was now quietly resumed, and in five days the army reached Issus, a large and wealthy seaport, near the eastern limit of Cilicia. The fleet was already arrived there, consisting of twenty-five Phenician and thirty-five Grecian ships. The Egyptian Tamos commanded in chief. The Lacedæmonian admiral Pythagoras, who, according to the usual yearly change in the Lacedæmonian service, had superceded Samius, served under him. They brought an acceptable addition to the land-force, of seven hundred heavy-armed Greeks, commanded by Cheirisophus, a Lacedæmonian. Another reinforcement soon after arrived at Issus, small in itself, but, from the attending circumstances,

c. 2. s. 21.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 1.

circumstances, highly gratifying to Cyrus. It consisted of about four hundred Grecian heavy-armed, who had been in the service of Abrocomas, satrap of Syria: so far did the Greeks now wander in quest of military pay, and so extensively were their valor and discipline in request. But, whether the treatment they had met with disgusted, or the fame of the prince's liberality allured, all deserted the satrap, and offered themselves in a body to Cyrus; professing their readiness to march anywhere under his orders, tho it should be against the king himself.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 4. s. 4.

Less than twenty miles beyond Issus eastward, the ridge of Taurus meets the shore, so that a narrow way only, under lofty precipices against the sea, remains practicable for an army. Two fortresses commanded this pass; one on the Syrian side, garrisoned by the great king; the other on the Cilician side, held by the king of Cilicia; for so far the Cilician king was a sovereign. Opposition was expected here from Abrocomas, such as might prevent or very inconveniently delay the army's progress. Had such been found, it was proposed to transport the troops by sea to Phenicia. But the satrap, tho said to have had three hundred thousand men under his command, left the narrow unguarded, and the army entered Syria unresisted.

s. 5.

s. 6.

s. 7.

The next halt was at Myriandrus, a Phenician seaport of considerable trade. There the Grecian generals Pasion and Xenias, without giving any notice of their purpose, embarked aboard a merchant-ship, with their effects, and sailed for Greece. No cause for this desertion was known; unless it was that those of the troops formerly under their orders, which, on occasion of the mutiny at Tarsus, had seceded to Clearchus, remained still under that general, and that Cyrus had not interfered to require their return under obedience to their former commanders. The unceremonious departure of those generals excited alarm among some, and indignation among most of the Greeks; and it gave great uneasiness, with very just cause, to Cyrus. In the necessity of courting, at the same time, and in the same camp, the attachment of troops so differing in manners, sentiments, and prejudices, as the Greeks and Orientals, it would often be difficult to decide how to manage command, so as to offend neither the proud servility

servility of these, nor the turbulent independency of the others. To carry an equal and steady discipline, indeed, would be scarcely possible; but, in all his communication with the Greeks, Cyrus seems to have shown a superior mind, and not least upon the present occasion. Calling together the generals, he said, ‘ Pasion and Xenias had left him. It <sup>\*Anab.</sup> <sup>l. 1. c. 4.</sup> <sup>s. 8.</sup> would however be easy for his triremes to overtake their heavy vessel, and bring them back, if such could be his purpose. But they were free to go, with the consciousness which must attend them, that they deserved worse of him than he of them. Their wives and children, residing at Tralles, hostages at his command, should also be restored to them: for those who had once served him well, should never experience severity from him for meerly quitting his service.’

His conduct altogether, very grateful to the Greeks, infused new <sup>s. 9.</sup> alacrity among them, and a general readiness appeared for proceeding still eastward. A fortnight’s march then brought the army to the large town of Thapsacus on the Euphrates. There Cyrus declared to the <sup>s. 10, 11.</sup> Grecian generals that his purpose was against his brother the great king, and desired them to communicate the information to the soldiers, and endeavor to engage their willing service. Long as this had been suspected, the communication, now at length made, was not well received. The soldiers accused their commanders of concealing from them a <sup>s. 12.</sup> matter so interesting, which themselves had long known: tho in reality Clearchus alone had been intrusted with the secret. Among various murmurs, it was observed by some, that if they went on, they should deserve at least a gratuity equal to what those had received, who, under the command of Xenias, had attended Cyrus, when he went to visit the late king his father. These circumstances being reported to the <sup>s. 13.</sup> prince, he immediately promised a gratuity, considerably exceeding the demand, to the amount of sixteen pounds sterling for every soldier, on their arrival at Babylon, and their full pay besides, till they should reach Ionia again.

While some expressed themselves highly satisfied with so liberal a promise, from one unaccustomed to fall short of his promises, but others yet hesitated at the prospect of so hazardous an enterprize at such a distance from their own country, Menon had the address to persuade <sup>s. 14—17.</sup>

his people to earn the first favor of a generous prince, who, if they only were true to him and to themselves, would be soon by far the greatest monarch in the world. Before the general resolution of the army could be collected, he gave the word to march, and was obeyed. The Euphrates, whose occasional violence denied bridges, whose depth in that part very rarely admitted fording, and from whose banks all boats had been removed by the care of Abrocomas, happened to be then just fordable. Menon led through; his troops followed, and immediately began to incamp on the other side. An officer was presently dispatched to them with the prince's thanks, and assurance that it should be his care to deserve their thanks; with the emphatical expression added, that, if he failed, they should no longer call him Cyrus. The service was indeed very important, for the example was immediately decisive; the whole army crossed the river, and incamped on the left bank.

Anab. l. 1.  
c. 4. s. 18.  
c. 5. s. 1.

s. 4.

c. 5. s. 5, 6.

The Greeks being thus at length clearly engaged in war against the king, the army moved again, and in nine days reached the Mesopotamian desert; described by Xenophon, under the name of Arabia, level as the sea; not a tree to be seen; every shrub and herb, even to the very reeds, aromatic; but the principal produce wormwood. Five days this dreary country was traversed, to Corsota, a large deserted town on the river Mascas; and there provisions were distributed for the formidable march of near three hundred miles<sup>2</sup>, through a still more barren region, to the gate, as it was called, of the fruitful Mesopotamia. Thirteen days were employed in this passage, in which corn failed the men, and forage the cattle, insomuch that many of the latter died. Some relief was at length obtained from a large town on the other side of the Euphrates; but during the halt made for the purpose, a dissention arose among the Greeks, which threatened the most fatal consequences. In the fear of giving umbrage, Cyrus had allowed each Grecian general to retain the independent command of the troops which

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon has given the measure in parasangs; but they were computed only, and of course uncertain. According to the common allowance of four miles to a parasang, the distance would be more than three hun-

dred miles. Those who desire critical information concerning the geography of the Anabasis, will find advantage in consulting Forster's Dissertation annexed to Spelman's translation.



had been under his orders before they assembled; himself alone acting as immediate commander-in-chief of the Grecian forces. But a dispute arising between some of Menon's soldiers and those of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general took upon himself to judge it, and ordered one of Menon's men to be whipped. It is, I believe, the first instance recorded of such a military punishment among the Greeks; unless the chastisement of Thersites by Ulysses, reported in the Iliad, might be considered as such. On the same day, Clearchus, riding with a small escort through Menon's camp, was assaulted by the incensed comrades of the punished soldier, with such violence that his life was endangered. Escaping however to his own camp, his anger so overcame his prudence that he called his people to arms; and the fortunately ready intervention of Proxenus, with admonition and intreaty, judiciously supported by the sight of armed troops at hand, hardly restrained his fury. It gave time however for Cyrus himself to interfere, who hastened to the Grecian line, and addressed the generals with this remarkable admonition: 'Of the consequences of what you are about,' he said, 'I am sure you are not aware. If you fight with one-another, that very day I shall be cut off, and then your fate will not be distant. For this whole Asiatic army, if they see our affairs go ill, instantly will turn against us, and, in studious display of enmity to us, will even exceed the king's forces.' Clearchus felt the sensible, pathetic, and indearing rebuke, and quiet was restored in the Grecian camp.

The army marching again, had already entered the fruitful Mesopotamia, or Babylonia, when a letter was delivered to Cyrus, indicating a most dangerous treachery. Orontas, his kinsman, whom we have seen twice in arms against him, and still restored to favor and confidence, held a great command in the army. Apparently his extensive credit and influence, and, amid the general deficiency of the Persian officers, his superior military reputation, made his assistance so desirable and even necessary for the expedition, that much was knowingly hazarded to obtain it. The letter was from Orontas himself to the king, communicating intelligence, and promising service.

In this danger from his Persian followers, we see a reason for the prince's attachment to his Greeks, perhaps not less weighty than that

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 6. s. 4.

s. 6—9.

c. 6. s. 10.

s. 11.

arising from his knowledge of their superiority as soldiers. From the moment they were decidedly engaged in the enterprize, their interest was much more inseparably blended with his, than that of perhaps any of his Asiatics. Orontas, therefore, being arrested, and seven of the principal Persian officers summoned, as a military council, or court-martial, to the prince's tent, three thousand Greeks were ordered on guard around, and Clearchus was called in to assist at the deliberation. Cyrus himself explained the prisoner's crimes, and all that he said was allowed by Orontas to be true. If the proceedings of a Persian military tribunal were not decided by any very well-regulated system of distributive justice, we shall not wonder. But Cyrus seems to have been desirous to show, that not the unceremonious decision only of a despotic government, but the fixed rules of a free people, would condemn Orontas. He called upon Clearchus first to declare his opinion. The inattention of the Spartan general to any principle, such as the fame of his republic for equal law might give to expect from him, and the declaration of his decision, on the contrary, by a rule of meer convenience, so adapted to purposes of tyranny that it might serve as a complete code of criminal jurisprudence for a Turkish bashaw, may indeed excite surprize. 'I think,' said Clearchus, as the Athenian philosopher, without a comment, reports his speech, 'that the prisoner deserves death, and I advise that it be inflicted; that so the necessity of constantly watching secret enemies may not prevent exertions for the advantage of our friends.' But whatever we may think of Clearchus as a lawyer, he was undoubtedly a politician. His argument at once decided the court. Tho' some of the members were nearly related to the prisoner, all voted for his death. The prince himself pronounced condemnation; and Orontas was then conducted to the tent of Artapatas. As he passed, an instance of the decency of Persian manners excited the admiration of the Greeks: tho' the sentence had been made public, yet all the crowd showed him the same reverence as when in the height of his power and most in favor with the prince. After entering the tent of Artapatas, he was never more seen, nor was it ever known to the Greeks by what kind of execution he died, or how his body was disposed of. The other circumstances

were not denied to the public; and as Clearchus related to his friends what passed in the prince's tent, it comes to us from the pen of Xenophon with an authority seldom to be found for such transactions.

Anab. 1. 1.  
s. 5.

Treachery and sedition being thus checked, the army moved, and after three days march in Babylonia, it was expected on the morrow to meet the king's forces. The want of system in the command of the Grecian troops was now in some degree remedied. Cyrus directed that, for the order of battle, Clearchus should command the right wing, and Menon the left. Next morning, some deserters bringing accounts, supposed more certain, of the enemy's approach, Cyrus sent for the Greek generals and lochages, and spoke to them in these remarkable terms:

c. 7. s. 1.  
B. C. 401.  
Ol. 94. 4.  
Sept.

' It was not, as you will readily suppose, in any want of your numbers to swell my army, that I engaged you in my service, but in the belief that you were much superior to far greater numbers of barbarians. What therefore I have now to desire of you is, that you show yourselves worthy of that freedom which you inherit, and for which I esteem you fortunate; and I profess to you, that I should myself prefer that freedom to all I possess, or to much greater possessions, held at the arbitrary will of another.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 6. s. 2.

' For the battle we expect, it may be proper then to apprize you, that the enemy's multitude will appear formidable; that their shout of onset will be imposing; but, if you are firm against these, I am even ashamed to say what contemptible soldiers you will find my fellowcountrymen to be. You then only exerting yourselves as may be expected, I am confident of acquiring means equal to my wishes, to send those home the envy of their country, who may desire to return home; but I trust the far greater number of you will prefer the advantages which I shall have opportunity to offer in my service.'

s. 3, 4.

Gaulites, a Samian, replied to this speech, declaring plainly the doubts of the army, both of the prince's disposition and of his ability, whatever their services and his success might be, to perform such magnificent

c. 7. s. 5, 6,  
7.

nificent

nificent promises. But Gaulites was in the prince's confidence<sup>3</sup>; and Xenophon's account altogether gives reason to suppose that his reply was preconcerted. It gave opportunity however for Cyrus, in a second speech, to remove all distrust, and he dismissed those first called, and others afterward admitted, full of high-hopes for themselves, and zeal for his service, which were communicated through the army. The transaction altogether shows that Cyrus had studied the Grecian character carefully and successfully.

Anab. 1. 1.  
s. 11, 12, 13.

The Grecian forces being thus prepared (what passed in the Asiatic line, probably little known, is seldom noticed by Xenophon) the whole army marched in order of battle. Only five miles onward, a wide and deep trench, extending above forty miles, had been formed purposely to obstruct the prince's progress. The canals, little distant, connecting the Euphrates and the Tigris, gave opportunity to float it, so as to form a strong line of defence to the country beyond. After so much expence and labor, in so advantageous and important a situation, strong opposition to the passage of that trench was expected. The tracks, however only, of a multitude of retreating men and horses were found there. Upon this occasion a remarkable instance occurred of Persian respect for Grecian superstition; heightened however possibly by the existing urgency, which made the service of the Greeks so important.

c. 7. s. 14.

On the eleventh day before the arrival of the army at the trench, an Ambraciot soothsayer, named Silanus, sacrificing, had boldly asserted, as what his skill in divination enabled him to foretel, that, within ten days, the king would not fight. This being reported to Cyrus, whether pleased with the prognostic itself, or only seconding the encouragement

<sup>3</sup> Πιστός Κύρου.—Cyrus fidus.—A man of fidelity to Cyrus. Spelman.

Thus the translators. But the different sense I have given, being, I think, unquestionably warranted by the original, I have no doubt in preferring it. Yet it seems as if Spelman thought πιστός would bear no other sense than that expressed in his translation; for in another place he has given the same interpretation of the same word, where the context would lead to suppose it wholly un-

warrantable. 'Οι ἦσαν Κύρου πιστότατοι, is said, by the historian, of men in the very act of a signal treachery. (Anab. 1. 2. c. 5. s. 9.) This Spelman translates, 'who had shown the greatest fidelity to Cyrus.' It appears, I must own, to me not at all intended by the historian to give so honorable a testimony to such men, but on the contrary to show in a stronger light their base falsehood, by remarking that they had been much in the confidence of Cyrus.

it might infuse into others, especially the Greeks, he answered, 'Then he will not fight at all; and if the event justifies the prophecy, I will give the soothsayer ten talents.' Mindful of his word, he accordingly sent for Silanus, and gave him three thousand darics; being, in Persian money, the full amount of ten Attic talents, and more than two thousand pounds sterling.

But, whatever credit might be really given to the Ambraciot, the total desertion of a defence, formed with so much labor and cost, led Cyrus and his principal advisers to believe that the king meant to avoid a battle. Next day therefore order was less diligently kept, and in the following morning, the prince himself quitting his horse for his chariot, the whole army assumed the improvident carelessness of a peaceful march; many of the soldiers, as the sun got high, to relieve themselves in the oppressive heat, committing their heavy armour to the waggons and sumpter-horses. The proposed day's progress was nearly completed, when Patagyas, a Persian of rank, came urging his fainting horse's speed, and, as he passed, calling out, in Persian to the Asiatics, in Greek to the Greeks, 'that the king's army was approaching in order of battle.' Tumult pervaded the extensive line; all imagining the enemy would be upon them before they could be duly formed. Cyrus leaped from his chariot, armed himself, mounted his horse, and hastily issued his orders.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 7. s. 15.

c. 8. s. 1.

s. 2.

The disposition for battle was nevertheless completed, midday passed, and no enemy appeared. Soon however, as the historian who was present describes it, a dust was observed in the distance, like a white cloud; and, after some time, a darkness spreading over the plain. Presently then the glittering of the polished armour was seen, and shortly the spears and the ranks became discernible. Cyrus rode himself to view the king's disposition, and then, coming to the Grecian line, by his interpreter ordered Clearchus to direct his march to the enemy's center; 'for there,' he said, 'the king has his station; and nothing more is wanting to complete our business, than to defeat that part of their army.'

s. 5.

Cyrus, little experienced in military command, seems to have wanted able advisers. Probably the jealousy of the Asiatics would not readily

readily admit the association of Clearchus in their councils; and it was necessary for Cyrus, as far as possible, to avoid disgusting any of his followers. His Greeks were now about ten thousand four hundred heavy-armed, and two thousand four hundred targeteers: his Asiatics nearly a hundred thousand, in large proportion cavalry; and he had twenty chariots armed with sithes. The king's forces, according to the concurrent reports of deserters, likely however to be exaggerated, were nine hundred thousand; and his sithed chariots were a hundred and fifty. The Greeks held the right of the prince's army, with their right flank covered by the Euphrates. Clearchus, of a temper not readily to obey any orders against his own opinion, was perhaps displeased not to have been consulted about the disposition for battle. He knew however that the report might have amplified the king's numbers, they were certainly so superior to those of Cyrus, as to outflank him by more than half his army. He saw the safety of those under him, his own credit, and perhaps the best prospect of final success to the prince's cause, in keeping his flank still covered by the river. Resolved therefore not to part with so important an advantage, he avoided a direct refusal of obedience to the prince's command, by answering, in general terms, 'that he would take care all should go well.'<sup>4</sup>

Anáb. l. 1.  
c. 8. s. 9.

s. 10, 11.

Cyrus continued riding in front of the line, viewing every part; and as he again approached the Grecian phalanx, Xenophon rode toward him, and asked if he had any commands. 'Only,' said the prince, 'let the Greeks be informed that the sacrifices are all favorable.' At that instant a murmur through the Grecian ranks drew his attention, and he asked what it meant. Xenophon answered, that the officers were communicating a new word, given out for the occasion. 'What is it?' said Cyrus. 'Protecting Jupiter and Victory,' answered Xenophon. 'I accept the omen,' replied the prince, 'be it so;' and immediately rode away toward the center of his army.

<sup>4</sup> It is impossible to read Plutarch's criticism of the conduct of Clearchus (Plut. Artax. p. 1856.) without a smile at his presumptuous ignorance; or to observe his

eulogy of Xenophon, and at the same time his inattention to him, without some wonder at his extreme carelessness.

It was well known to the king's officers that no Asiatic infantry could withstand the Grecian phalanx, and that no Asiatic cavalry would dare to charge it. The proposed resource, in this decided inferiority of the troops, was to use the armed chariots as an artillery; and they were indeed formidable weapons, when their operations were duly guided<sup>5</sup>. The horses, to force their way through protended spears, bore defensive armour<sup>6</sup>: a parapet on the chariot protected the driver: sithes, projecting, downward under the axle-tree, and obliquely from each end, were adapted to make havoc of whatever came in their course.

Tissaphernes, as, of the king's general officers, most acquainted with the Grecian military practice, was appointed to the command of the wing opposed to the Greeks. He was already within half a mile of their line, when Cyrus left them. The Greeks, observing his approach, sang the pæan, advanced, and, quickening pace by degrees, at length ran in phalanx. The effect of this spirited movement was beyond expectation. The charge of the chariots, which alone would have been formidable, was obviated by it. For, the Persian infantry flying, without even discharging an effectual arrow, and the cavalry giving no support, the charioteers mostly quitted their carriages, and the rest drove away. A few of those tremendous wheeled weapons, deserted by their drivers, were borne by the frightened horses against the Grecian line, but none with any effect. Some, the horses stopping amazed, were taken, and some pushing on with that heedless fury which fright often inspires, passed through openings made for them by the ready discipline of the phalanx<sup>7</sup>. The greater part, turning after their own troops, enhanced the alarm and hastened the flight, not without

Anab. l. 1.  
c. 8. s. 12,  
13.

<sup>5</sup> So we learn from Xenophon's account of their effect on another occasion. Hel. l. 4. c. 1. s. 9.

<sup>6</sup> In the passage referred to in the foregoing note, we find mention of the defensive armour of the Persian sithed-chariot-horses, which does not occur in the account of the battle of Cunaxa; in which nevertheless troop-horses are mentioned

bearing defensive armour, so that it can scarcely be doubted but the chariot-horses would be at least equally protected.

<sup>7</sup> This is the sense that Spelman, by a judicious and apparently well founded correction, has given to the passage, which, in the printed copies of the Anabasis, is contradictory and absurd.

havoc of the disorderly bands. The Greeks, surprized at their easy victory, with a steady pace pursued.

Tissaphernes, not of a temper to set the example, generally so necessary to produce bold exertion among Asiatic troops, and disappointed of the effect of his chariots, on which he had wholly depended for success against the Grecian phalanx, nevertheless formed hopes to gain, with little risk, the credit of some success against the Greeks, through his knowlege of the formation of their armies. Avoiding the heavy-armed, with his cavalry he charged the targeteers. But these opening (for they were highly disciplined, and commanded by an able officer, Episthenes of Amphipolis) the horse went through, and suffered from javelins in passing, without returning a wound. The attempt was not repeated; and thus a great victory, in all appearance, was obtained by the Greeks, almost without a battle; for a very few bowshot wounds only had been received in the left of the phalanx<sup>3</sup>, and not a man was killed.

Anab. l. 1.  
c. 10. s. 5.

c. 8. s. 15.

The decision had been so rapid, that the center of the armies was not yet engaged. In some leisure, therefore, the success of the Greeks was observed by Cyrus and those about him, and so large a portion of the royal forces were seen to join in the flight, that warm hopes were excited among all, and the ready flattery of some complimented the prince as already king. Cyrus however had a mind greater than to be so misled. Attentive to all points, he had now satisfied himself that the king was in the center of his army, generally esteemed his regular post. This extended beyond the extreme of the prince's left, and had in no degree partaken of the disorder of the wing under Tissaphernes. It had been the advice anxiously urged to Cyrus by the Grecian generals, who knew that on his life all their hopes depended, not to risk his person in action. Whether through vain glory, or false shame, or any just consideration of the importance of his example to

c. 7. s. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Ἐπὶ τῷ ἑνωμένῳ τοξευθῆναι τις ἐλέγξο. Spelman has translated this as if Xenophon had meant precisely to say that only one man was wounded. It appears to me that Diodorus, who, tho a miserable historian, was

a good grammarian, and well knew his own language, has better given the true meaning of the phrase: Τῶν δὲ Ἑλλήνων φασὶν ἑναίρηθαι μὲν οὐδένα, τραυθῆναι δὲ ὀλίγους. l. 14. s. 25.



Asiatic troops, he resolved not to shun danger, but rather to lead the way to daring exertion. He was however waiting steddily for opportunity, when that large part of the king's line which outflanked him, wheeled to turn his flank. Cyrus then, with ready judgement, chose the moment of evolution to charge the guard of six thousand, which preceded the king. He routed them, and, according to report, he killed their commander, Artagerses, with his own hand. The king's immediate guard, and the king himself, were thus laid open to view. Stimulated by ambition and revenge at the sight, and flushed with success, he then forgot the duty of the general. While the greater part of his troops, heedless of order, pursued the fugitives, he with a small band made a furious charge, broke through to the king, rode at him with his javelin, and wounded him in the breast; but immediately received a wound in the face, and, being overpowered, was presently killed, with eight of his principal officers, who vainly exerted themselves in his defence. These circumstances, not within the means of Xenophon's personal knowlege, he has related on the authority of Ctesias, a Greek physican, then in the service of Artaxerxes, and employed to cure the wound received from Cyrus.

The prince's head and right hand, cut off and carried about, announced his fate to both armies. The right wing and center of the king's then advanced with alacrity. The left of the prince's, commanded by Ariæus, did not wait the assault. They fled, and all the Asiatic line followed the example; none stopping till they reached the preceding day's station. Their camp became the unresisting prey of the conqueror. A Milesian girl, of the prince's train, running almost naked from his pavilion, reached the Grecian camp; and was among the first to communicate alarm there. A Phocæan, who had been much in his favor, and who was admired for the extent of her knowlege and the elegance of her manners, even more than for her person, which still in declining youth was beautiful, remained the king's prisoner. The

<sup>p</sup> Their story may deserve this notice, not only as it assists to mark the manners of the times, but also as it assists to mark the means occurring to the Greeks for knowing what they have related of the Persians, which some modern writers have overboldly, and with little examination, controverted.

Milesian found protection from the bravery and skill in arms of the small number of her fellow-countrymen, left to guard their camp. It was presently attacked, and mostly plundered; for they were unequal to the defence of its extent; but at length they repulsed the pillagers with much slaughter.

Anab. 1.1.  
c.10. s.3.

Intelligence was carried, nearly at the same time, to the king, that the Greeks had routed and were pursuing his left wing, and to the Greeks, that the king's forces were plundering their camp. Success and pursuit were leading them away from each other. Both turned; but the king, instead of meeting the Greeks, passed them. The Greeks then changed their front, so that the river might secure their rear. Upon this the king also changed his front, as if to meet them. The Greeks advanced, with confidence increased by the experience of the day, and they were not deceived; for, from a greater distance than the wing under Tissaphernes, the Persians now fled their assault. The Greeks pursued. On a hill, overlooking a village not distant, a large body of the Persian cavalry checked its flight, and formed, as if resolved to maintain that advantageous ground. No Persian infantry then remained in sight; and while the Greeks halted to prepare for attacking the horse, these also fled and appeared no more.

s. 4, 6, 7.

s. 8, 9.

s. 10.

The sun was now setting, and the Greeks wondered that they had neither seen Cyrus, nor received orders from him; confident, nevertheless, that, as, with their small numbers unsupported, they remained so completely masters of the field, after so little effort, and with almost no loss, he could be employed only by the consequences of victory. After some consultation whether they should send for their tents and necessaries, they resolved rather to return to their camp. Reaching it about dark, they found it so far plundered and wasted, that, after having all passed the day without refreshment, most were obliged to go to rest fasting; but still with the satisfactory hope that victory had been on their side complete.

1.2. c.1.  
s.1.

## SECTION III.

*Return of the Greeks: Treaty with the King: March through Mesopotamia and Media: Circumvention of the Generals.*

AT daybreak the generals met; still wondering that neither orders were come from Cyrus, nor intelligence. It was presently resolved to march in quest of him. By sunrise all was ready for moving, when the arrival of two officers, of high rank in the prince's Asiatic army, occasioned by a pause; Glous, son of the Egyptian Tamos, admiral of the fleet; and Procles, descended from Demaratus, the banished king of Lacedæmon, who attended Xerxes into Greece, and whose family enjoyed hereditary emoluments and honors from the liberality of the Persian government. Now first the mortifying intelligence was communicated, that Cyrus was no more. It was added, that Ariæus had conducted the flying remains of the Asiatic army to the ground of the former incampment, where he would wait for the Greeks that day, but on the morrow would certainly proceed for Ionia.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 1. s. 2.

Xen. Anab.  
ibid. & Hel.  
1. 3. c. 1.  
s. 4.

Depressing as this was to the hopes of those who had thought fortune, far above any ordinary Grecian scale, already their own, from the bounty of a generous prince, raised by their services to the possession of almost countless wealth and boundless empire, still, looking to their own success, and to all appearances around, the Greeks would not immediately give up all their lofty expectations; and they thought they saw a resource in the situation of Ariæus himself, who had before him, on one side, the fear of an ignominious death for his rebellion; on the other the empire, which the superiority of the Grecian arms might give him. Menon, long connected by hospitality and familiar intercourse with Ariæus, offered himself for the negotiation; and Glous and Procles did not refuse to concur in it. At the desire of Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus was joined in the commission, and all presently departed together.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 1. s. 4.

Meanwhile the victorious Greeks were reduced to the necessity of killing

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 1. s. 6.

s. 14, 15.

killing their baggage-cattle for food, and breaking up the empty and now useless waggons for fire, for which however, with some satisfaction, they also collected Persian arrows, darts, and wooden shields, innumera- bly scattered over the field of battle. They were thus occu- pied, when, about the middle of the forenoon, arrived some persons, of whom one was a Greek, demanding, in the name of the king and of Tissaphernes, to speak with the generals. The Greek was soon known to be Phalinus, who held a very honorable situation under the satrap, to which a reputation for military science had recommended him. Their message imported, that the king required the Greeks to come and surrender their arms at his gate; and that on no other condition would he show them favor or mercy. Highly as their easy victory had given them to rate the power of their arms, this message threw a sudden damp on their spirits. They began to consider their total want of necessaries in their present situation, the length of hostile continent, the rivers, mountains, and deserts to be crossed to reach their own country, the uncertainty of assistance from Ariæus, and, wholly destitute as they were of cavalry, the extreme difficulty of collecting provisions in an enemy's country, and the danger of retreat, even from an enemy who might not dare to face them. Such circum- stances force away the veil with which, in ordinary situations, men are inabled, as prudence advises, to cover their sentiments. The Arca- dian Cleanor, eldest of the generals, could not repress his indignation. He sternly replied, they would die before they would surrender their arms. Some, on the contrary, showed signs of despondency; others cast about for new project. It was recollected that Egypt, in revolt, had been long resisting the Persian arms, and that some of the other distant provinces were rebellious: it was supposed the king might be glad of their service, and the greater part were inclined to offer it. The discussion was long. In the end, the necessity of decision and the impossibility of bringing opinions to agree, seem to have produced a general deference to the authority of Clearchus. Politic as bold, he answered, in the name of all, 'We want our arms: if the king desires our friendship, for his service; if he means enmity, for our own safety.' Phalinus promised to report this answer faithfully, and then said he was farther

farther directed to inform them that, while they remained in their present station, the king would consider a truce as existing with them; any movement he should esteem a measure of hostility. Clearchus took upon himself immediately to reply for all: 'Be it so.' 'How then,' said Phalippus, 'truce or war?' 'Truce,' said Clearchus, 'if we stay, and war if we move;' nor would he give a more decisive answer.

Soon after the departure of the king's deputies, Procles and Cheiriosophus returned, leaving Menon with Ariæus. They reported that Ariæus declined the offer of assistance for pretending to the Persian throne, alledging that his inferiority of birth to many among the Persians too effectually excluded him: but that he was desirous to have the Greeks accompany his march back to Ionia, and he would therefore wait for them in his present camp the insuing night, but would unfailingly proceed next morning. Sunset already approaching, quick decision was necessary. Some, vainly confident in their experience of superiority in the field, were now for pushing hostilities against the king. Clearchus, quick to repress equally rash or despondent counsel, evinced the folly of the proposal by telling them, 'that the king, as he knew by certain intelligence, had passed the Tigris, and they were totally without means to follow him. Want of provisions then denied their stay in their present station; and, in fact, choice of measures was out of question: nothing remained but to march back to Ionia; which, tho' hazardous and difficult, was not impossible. Besides, the sacrifices augured well to their return, and ill to every other measure.' This was a decisive argument. All yielded to it, and Clearchus took upon himself to issue orders for marching that evening. Neither commission nor election had given him authority over the other generals; but, in this hazardous crisis, all acquiesced under the evident superiority of his talents and experience.

The Greeks were now, according to Xenophon's account, by the line of march, reputed the shortest and best, which they had pursued to Mesopotamia, near two thousand miles from Ephesus in Ionia, whither they wished to return, as the Grecian city, if not absolutely the nearest, yet the nearest that would afford them ready means to proceed

all

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 2. s. 1.

s. 2.

c. 2. s. 3.

Apab. 1.1.  
c. 2. s. 4.

all to their several homes, and perhaps the nearest that could be reached without even greater difficulties of way. This march had employed them ninety-three days, exclusively of halting days<sup>10</sup>. The order for moving decided that they were at war with the king. If then deserters could hope for any kind reception, the considerations urging to desert might be powerful. Accordingly three hundred foot, with forty horse, all Thracians, commanded by a Thracian named Miltocythes, and originally engaged in the service under Clearchus, deserted as soon as it was dark.

s. 5.

The rest of the army joined Ariæus about midnight. Immediately the principal officers went to the Persian general's tent, where the principal Persian officers were also assembled. Circumstances did not admit long consultation. The Greeks must necessarily submit themselves to the guidance of the Persians. The important object was to establish mutual confidence and good faith. For this purpose recourse was had to oaths, rendered more solemn and impressive by sacrifice. A boar, a bull, a wolf, and a ram were the victims, in whose mingled blood the Grecian officers dipped their swords, the Persians their javelins, as they severally swore mutual fidelity and friendship. This ceremony being over, Ariæus observed that, to return the way they came, seventeen days march through the desert, unprovided as they were, was impossible. He proposed therefore a more circuitous road, but through a plentiful country, and to begin with forced marches. Thus, he said, danger from the immensity of the king's numbers would be obviated: for with a great force, he could not overtake them; with a small one he would not dare to attack them. The want of food then

<sup>10</sup> The learned author of the geographical dissertation annexed to Spelman's translation of the Anabasis, has supposed some exaggeration in Xenophon's account of the distance; not without appearance of reason, if the ordinary calculation of the Persian parasang is applicable universally. I cannot however admit the learned author to have been equally a good judge, with Xenophon, of the space that an army, like that of Cyrus, was capable of marching in a day, in the countries which he traversed. I should ra-

ther suppose the parasang of the Anabasis generally a computed measure, and often decided, as now in many parts of Europe, rather by the time ordinarily employed in travelling it, than by any calculation of space. That Xenophon did not pretend to nice accuracy, indeed, appears from his omission everywhere to notice fractions of so large a measure as that, which the Greeks called *parasanga*, the *farsang* of the modern cast.

being

being among the most pressing considerations, he promised a plentiful supply at some villages, which, if they moved at daybreak, they might reach by sunset.

The Greeks assenting, at daybreak the combined armies marched. In the afternoon circumstances were observed, very unexpectedly indicating that the king's forces were near. Ariæus was alarmed. Clearchus, always more confident in his ability to resist or deter, than to outmarch the king's troops, had nevertheless thought it prudent to avoid expressing any dissent from the measures proposed by Ariæus; yet, aware of the importance of supporting the opinion, univetsally spread, of the great superiority of the Grecian arms, he resolved carefully to avoid showing the least appearance of a desire to avoid action, and therefore continued his march directly to the villages. The king's officers however had judged better than to propose resistance to him there. The villages, deserted by their inhabitants; had been stripped of everything portable; so that the Greeks, after having passed the day fasting, were still without food.

Anab. 1. 1.  
c. 2. s. 8.

Men worn with fatigue, want, and disappointment, are prepared for alarm; and, in the night, a panic, and tumult, its consequence, pervaded the Grecian camp. Clearchus, after hasty inquiry into the circumstances, sent for his herald. A loud voice for proclaiming orders was, it appears, valued in Xenophon's days equally as in Homer's; and, by that quality, Tolmides, and Eleian, acquired fame under Clearchus, in the office in which Stentor became renowned under Agamemnon. The commanding voice of Tolmides having inforced silent attention, he proclaimed, in the name of the generals, that any person discovering who turned the ass among the arms<sup>11</sup>, should be rewarded with

<sup>11</sup> A technical phrase, used by Xenophon here, induced me to look to the translators and commentators, for confirmation or correction of the sense I attributed to it. Spelman disapproves, and I think justly, the translations of Leunclavius and Hutchinson; but I cannot accede to his interpretation; and even the other passages of Xenophon, which he quotes in confirmation, (Anab. 1. 2.

c. 4. s. 8. & 1. 3. c. 1. s. 3.) are to me additional and powerful proof that he is wrong. To corroborate my opinion I would farther refer to a third passage, 1. 3. c. 1. s. 22. What may, I think, clearly be gathered from all the passages put together, is, that there was a place, in the Grecian camp, allotted for the collected arms; and, in front of it a space analogous to the modern parade.

with a talent of silver, above two hundred pounds sterling. Nothing could either more readily, or more completely, convince the multitude that their alarm was vain and their generals watchful. Accordingly by this expedient, in its simplicity even ridiculous, yet well deserving notice for its singular fitness to produce the effect in the moment so important, the tumult was presently calmed, and the night passed in quiet.

Anab. I. 2.  
c. 2. s. 9.  
c. 3. s. 1, 2, 3.

At daybreak Clearchus called to arms, and the judiciousness of his bold measure, pushing on his march toward the king's forces, became soon evident. No vestige of an enemy was to be seen, and the sun was scarcely risen, when persons came, in the king's name, not, as on the preceding day, demanding the surrender of arms, but proposing negotiation on equal terms. Clearchus was in the moment viewing his parade. Versed in the Asiatic temper, he commanded that the Persians should wait his leisure; and, not till he had arranged his army so as to give it the most imposing appearance, admitted them to speak to him in front of his line. They said they came impowered to communicate between the king and the Grecian generals. 'Go then,' said Clearchus, 'and tell the king that we must fight before we treat; for we are without food; and among the Greeks it is held, that to propose negotiation is meer insult, from those who deny them food.'

s. 4.

Where the king was, the Greeks knew not, and they had no cavalry for exploring. The quick return however of the deputies, with an answer to the rough message, proved that he, or some great officer authorized to treat in his name, was not distant. They said that the king allowed the remonstrance of Clearchus to be just; by which apparently was meant, that it was consonant to the laws of hospitality, acknowledged among civilized nations, and which made indeed the best part of the antient law of nations. A truce was then solemnly con-

The large shields and long spears of the Greeks would occupy much more room than our firelocks, and an ass driven among them in the night, whether sentries or a guard were or were not set over them, might likely enough give origin to tumult and alarm.

Meerly turning the animal 'into the quarter 'of the heavy-armed men,' (as Spelman has, with at least unnecessary boldness, rendered the phrase *εις τα ὄπλα*) would not be in itself so likely to produce disturbance.

cluded,



cluded, and guides were appointed to conduct the Grecian army where it might be supplied. The country traversed was so divided by deep canals, that the army hardly could have forced its way. Some of these were passèd on permanent bridges; some on palm-trees cut for the occasion. It was indeed suspected to have been the purpose of the Persians to give every possible appearance of difficulty to the march. At length however the army reached a village, where its wants were supplied largely. Corn, dates, a wine drawn from the palm-tree, and a vinegar prepared from that wine, afforded most advantageous refreshment to those who, in that sultry climate, during three days, had, some fasted, and the rest eaten only the flesh of animals worn with the service of the baggage.

While the army halted here three days, everything, says Xenophon, seemed to promise peace and good faith. Nevertheless what he proceeds to report seems as if it might have warranted suspicion. Tissaphernes, with the brother of the reigning queen, and three other Persians of high rank, attended by a large train, came to confer with the generals. Communicating by interpreters, Tissaphernes said 'he was to demand, in the king's name, why the Greeks made war against him?' He professed, for himself, a regard for their nation, as a neighbour, accustomed to intercourse with them; and he recommended a conciliatory, by which he seems to have meant a submissive, answer; that might inable him to do them the good offices he wished, in the extreme difficulties in which he saw them involved.

The Grecian generals withdrew awhile for consultation, and then Clearchus reported the answer agreed upon. "In entering into the 'service of Cyrus,' he said, 'they had no thought of war against the king; but, on the contrary, supposed themselves serving him in serving the prince. Various policy had been used to allure them on into Assyria; and, when once engaged so far, choice was no longer in their power; not only gratitude for favors received, but the necessity of their situation bound them to the prince. Yet, whatever doubt might be entertained concerning their past views, it was evident they could now have no view to anything so desirable for them as to return peacefully home; prepared however always to revenge injuries,

‘injuries, and always desirous, to the best of their power, to requite  
‘kindnesses.’

The Persians departed to make their report; and on the third day Tissaphernes returned. If umbrage was taken at the unbending manner of Clearchus, it was not avowed. On the contrary, generosity and benignity, on the part of the Persian king, seemed marked in the treaty quickly concluded. It was agreed, ‘that the Greeks should be  
‘faithfully conducted home; that a market should be provided for  
‘them on the march; that, in failure of the market, they might take  
‘their own measures for supplying their reasonable wants; but, as  
‘in a friendly country, with the least possible injury to the inhabitants.’ Oaths were solemnly taken, and right hands mutually given, by Tissaphernes and the queen’s brother, on the king’s part, and by the generals and lochages, on the part of the Grecian army, in confirmation of this agreement. Tissaphernes then, in taking leave, informed the Greeks, that the king had conferred upon him the great command lately held by Cyrus. His journey would, on this account, he said, require the more preparation; but, with the least possible delay, he would rejoin them, and be himself the conductor of their march.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 3. s. 12.  
Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 1. s. 2.  
Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 5. s. 2.

Tho the faithlessness of Tissaphernes had been abundantly proved, yet the Greeks had confidence in his interest to cultivate their friendship, and in the honor of the Persian king; and they flattered themselves that, disappointed as their hopes of high fortune were, yet the dark prospect, which immediately succeeded, was intirely done away; that all the dangers of their expedition were ended; and that a secure return to their country and families, at least, would be their solace for past labors, perils, and apprehensions. It does not appear that, in the negotiation with the king, any notice was taken of Ariæus, tho he held his ground of incampment near that of the Greeks. But in the mean time he negotiated for himself; and so successfully as to obtain his own complete pardon and that of his followers. Xenophon has not informed us that any faith, plighted or implied, was broken, either by him or by the Greeks; but there seems to have been, on their part, at least a deficiency of attention to him. Of course he neglected

c. 4. s. 1, 2, 3.

them; insomuch that public report first brought information, uncertain information, that his pardon was obtained. What we gain from the direct testimony of Xenophon is, that a coolness, before unexperienced, from the Asiatic army toward the Grecian, followed the first rumors of that pardon; and that hence arose suspicion and much uneasiness among the Greeks, while, more than twenty days, they waited for Tissaphernes; insomuch that they urged their generals to stay no longer. Clearchus, himself unsatisfied, but provident of the distress they must incur, friendless, without guides, and deprived of the assistance of the cavalry under Ariæus, with difficulty persuaded them to acquiesce.

This brooding uneasiness was at length checked by the arrival of Tissaphernes, with Orontas, satrap of Armenia, who had lately married the king's daughter, each commanding a numerous army<sup>12</sup>. All then again resumed the appearance of friendship and good faith on the part of the principal Persian officers. The united armies immediately moved for Lower Asia: the Grecian market was always regularly and plentifully supplied, and nothing occurred on which to found complaint. Suspicion nevertheless held among the Greeks, and the appearance of it among the Asiatics. The Greeks had their peculiar guides allotted for the march: they usually incamped three or four miles from the Asiatics; and all communication between the two nations was managed with the precautions usually taken between avowed enemies. Meanwhile it was observed that the forces under Ariæus incamped without any separation from those under the king's officers, or any precaution against them. No doubt was then any longer entertained, that the report of his pardon was well founded, for it had not hitherto been confirmed, and hence the suspicion of the Greeks increased.

Anab. I. 2.  
C. 4. s. 4.

In three days the armies reached the Median wall, a prodigious fortified line, intended, like those of the Romans against the Picts, in

s. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Xenophon giving no information, we can only guess that Orontas may have been son of the person of the same name, executed in Syria for treachery to Cyrus; and that the satrapy of Armenia and the king's daughter may have been the recompence for the sufferings of the family.

our own island, or the far more stupendous work of the Chinese against the Tartars, to defend a whole country. It was built of brick, twenty feet in thickness, a hundred in height, and said to extend seventy miles. Animosity had now grown to such a height between the Greeks and Asiatics, that the foraging parties had more than once come to blows.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 4. s. 7.

In two days more, after crossing two vast canals, the armies arrived at Sitacë, a large town, within two miles of the Tigris. Clearchus, uneasy at the growing dissensions, had nevertheless considered them hitherto as the meer effusions of national animosity, and the indiscretion of individuals in inferior stations. Here first the measures of the Persian generals gave him some alarm. It was afterward discovered to have been their concerted purpose to excite alarm, but from a motive, not of enmity, but meerly of jealousy. Sitacë was situated in an island, singularly fruitful, highly cultivated, and so defended by the surrounding waters of the river and canals, that, as the numerous population consisted, in very large proportion, of unarmed slaves, if the Greeks, aware of its advantages, had chosen to establish themselves there, it was supposed they might have maintained the possession against the whole force of the empire. The Greeks however, having no such view, quietly crossed the Tigris next morning, under the guidance of their appointed conductors, on a bridge supported by thirty-seven boats. The apprehensions of the Persians being thus relieved, the suspicious conduct, to which they had given occasion, ceased.

s. 12, 13.

s. 15.

Nothing remarkable occurred then during a march of four days, in which the boundary of Mesopotamia was crossed, and the armies, entering Media, soon reached Opis, a large town, where a numerous army, collected for the war with Cyrus, was waiting under the command of a bastard brother of the king. Beyond Opis they presently entered a desert, through which the march was prosecuted six days without any cultivated land in sight. They arrived then at some villages belonging to Parysatis, the queen-mother, who, as the friend of Cyrus, seems to have been considered as the enemy of the king. Tis-saphernes

saphernes gratified the Greeks with permission to plunder her villages; expressly, however, reserving the slaves, perhaps the most valuable part of the moveable property, and excepting a few officers of the queen's, possibly the only description of inhabitants. A march then followed, of five days more, through a desert, with the Tigris always near on the left; after which, the armies reaching a more plentiful country, watered by the Zabatas, a halt of three days was allowed for refreshment.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 4. s. 16.

In this leisure, the mutual ill-will of the Greeks and Persians, more than ever showing itself, gave much uneasiness to Clearchus; who nevertheless, with the most attentive observation, could discover neither anything indicating that the Persian generals had any design against the Greeks, nor any probable cause for those pointed marks of jealousy among the Persians, without excepting the generals, which had principally occasioned the growing animosity of the Greeks against them. He was the more uneasy, because he was not without suspicion of treacherous conduct among some within his own army. Menon, intriguing, faithless, and ambitious in the highest degree, it was well known, ill brooked the superiority, which the other generals readily allowed to the talents, experience, and years of Clearchus, and to the dignity of the Lacedæmonian name. Some practices for withdrawing the affection and respect of the army from Clearchus were notorious. Under these circumstances, the intimacy of Menon with Ariæus excited jealousy; which was increased by the knowledge, that he had been introduced by Ariæus to Tissaphernes, what passed at the meeting remaining unknown.

c. 5. s. 1, 2.

Pressed by all these considerations, Clearchus resolved to desire himself a conference with Tissaphernes. The request was immediately granted. Clearchus was received with the utmost apparent cordiality. The satrap made the most specious profession of a desire, from political motives, to cultivate an interest with the Greeks. Clearchus gave him credit, and was altogether so satisfied with the explanation received, that his only remaining anxiety was to be assured of the secret enemy who had excited the late misunderstanding. Tissaphernes promised that, if all the Grecian generals and lochages would come

s. 4.

together

together to witness what passed, he would declare the calumniator. Clearchus assented: Tissaphernes asked him to supper. The circumstance of eating together was held, equally among the Greeks and Persians of old, as by the Arabs of modern times, to bind friendship by a sacred tie; and the evening passed with every appearance of mutual satisfaction.

Anah, l. 2.  
e. 5. s. 6.

c. 4. s. 3.

s. 7.

Next morning Clearchus assembled the principal Grecian officers, and related his communication with the satrap. Objections were strongly stated to his proposal, for risking all the generals and lochages together in the barbarian camp, on the faith of a man of such experienced perfidy as Tissaphernes. Clearchus however so vehemently urged it, expressing such confidence, not in the satrap's character, but in the interest of the Persian court to cultivate the friendship of the Greeks, and such suspicion of those who should fear to undergo that test of their fidelity to the common cause of the Grecian army, that at length he prevailed. Four of the generals, Menon, Proxenus, Agias, and Socrates, went with him, and twenty lochages, whom we may reckon of the rank of colonels, or, at least, of field officers. About two hundred inferior officers and soldiers, incited by curiosity, followed under pretence of marketing. On their arrival at Tissaphernes's tent, the generals were immediately admitted; the others waited without. A signal was observed, on which the generals were seized, those without the tent, who had followed them, were massacred, and a body of horse, issuing from the camp, extended the slaughter to all belonging to the Grecian army, free and slave, that could be found about the plain.

What passed in the Persian camp was totally unknown in the Grecian, when the violence of the horse, clearly seen; excited alarm and astonishment. An Arcadian, of those who had followed the generals, escaping severely wounded, first gave intelligence of what had passed about the tent of Tissaphernes. All then ran to arms, expecting immediate assault upon the camp. Fortunately that was too bold a measure for those who directed the Persian operations. A brother of Tissaphernes, with Ariæus, Artaozus, and Mithridates, three of the most confidential friends of Cyrus, escorted by only about  
three

three hundred horse, approached, and communicated a requisition for the remaining generals and lochages to come out and receive a message from the king. The Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus was accidentally absent with a foraging party. The Arcadians, Cleanor of Orchomenus, and Sophænetus of Stymphalus, alone of the generals remained within the camp. They obeyed the requisition so far as to go out; and Xenophon, anxious for news of his friend Proxenus, accompanied them; but they advanced cautiously, and stopped as soon as within hearing. Ariæus, then addressing them, said, 'that Clearchus, having been convicted of violating the treaty, to which he had sworn, had been justly punished with death; that Proxenus and Menon, who had informed against him, were treated with honor: but that the king required of the Greeks to surrender their arms, which were truly his, since they had belonged to Cyrus, his subject<sup>13</sup>.'

Cleanor, an honest old soldier, and no politician, without at all considering what the pressing interests of the moment required, uselessly vented his just indignation. 'Deceit,' he said, 'perjury, every crime and every baseness, from Tissaphernes might have been expected, but from the friends of Cyrus not.' Ariæus, in reply, insisted upon the discovered treachery of Clearchus. Xenophon, without command, and without a character in the army but that of the friend of Proxenus, seeing apparently that no person in authority was capable of managing the conference to any advantage, ventured, in such pressing circumstances, to speak. 'Proxenus and Menon,' he said, 'it was observed by Ariæus, had deserved highly of the Persians. Those generals therefore should be immediately sent back to the Grecian camp, and their advice would decide what the Greeks should do.' The Persians appeared at a loss for a reply to this proposition: they consulted long

<sup>13</sup> Τοῦ ἐκείνου δούλου. Spelman, translating this 'his subject,'\* has nevertheless said in a note, 'literally, his slave.' Verbal criticism is not generally the historian's business, but where an important political distinction is in question, it may come essentially within his duty. The Greek word appropriated to

signify strictly a slave, was ἄνδραποδον. Δούλος was of a more extensive signification, and we have no term exactly corresponding. It meant either a subject, or a servant; and as a slave is both a subject and a servant, slaves were included within its more extended meaning.

among themselves, and then without giving any answer, withdrew to their own camp.

Anab. 1. 2.  
c. 6. s. 1.

It seems to have been long unknown to the Greeks what was the fate of their generals : nor has Xenophon said how the account was at length obtained, which he has given as certain. But we have such assurance, of persons of their nation being employed, in various ways, about the Persian court, and in the service of the satraps, that the easy possibility of just intelligence reaching them is obvious. According to Xenophon's report, the generals were all conducted alive into the king's presence, and, except Menon, all soon after beheaded ; which among the Greeks and Persians, as with us, was esteemed the most honorable mode of execution. Menon was kept in wretched confinement a full year, and then executed as an ordinary malefactor.

s. 16.

This account of the conduct of the Persian government, resting on the authority of only one Grecian historian, may perhaps, to some, appear not to deserve full credit. But Xenophon is, in himself, no mean authority. Had his friend Proxenus survived, we might indeed have suspected him of some partiality. Had Clearchus survived, whom evidently he respected highly, we might have suspected him of some partiality. But, in fact, the more he could fix blame upon those who were gone, the more credit would attach to the principal survivors, and particularly to himself. In the progress of the narrative he strongly evinces his impartiality ; and we find throughout such a consonancy to well-attested facts, and well-attested characters, national and individual, that, tho possibly an honest Persian writer might have given a different color to some circumstances, the whole seems to have every claim to credit that such a narrative can in itself possess.

c. 4. s. 2.

If then we seek the motives for conduct so nefarious and so base in the Persian government, we may perhaps find them in the principles of oriental policy, still in viger in the same countries ; or we may find them in the words attributed by Xenophon to the Greek soldiers, in their first uneasiness under the delay of their return, while they waited for Tissaphernes, after the conclusion of the treaty with them in the king's name : ' It is reasonable,' they said, ' to suppose, that our destruction must be beyond all things the king's wish ; as a circumstance



#### SECT. IV. CIRCUMVENTION OF THE GENERALS.

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' stance more than all others likely to deter the Greeks from future  
' engagements, like ours, in conspiracy against his throne. It is in-  
' deed impossible he can be pleased that we should go to relate in  
' Greece, how our small force overcame his immense armies, at his very  
' gates, and returned in scorn of his power.' It would however be  
likely to occur, in the Persian councils, that to attack the Greeks and  
Ariæus united, must be hazardous; but to divide them would probably  
not be difficult. If Ariæus was to be punished, the Greeks must be  
gained; but if Ariæus might be pardoned, the Greeks might be  
destroyed. Possibly the interest that Ariæus possessed, or by intrigue  
found means to acquire, among men in power and confidence, more  
than any true policy, at length decided the resolution. But, from the  
moment that Ariæus obtained his pardon, the purpose of the Persian  
court seems to have been to lead the Greeks where the hazardous  
attempt to destroy them might be made with the least risk, especially  
to the capital and its immediate neighborhood.

#### SECTION IV.

*Return of the Greeks. Election of new Generals; Grecian Military  
Law: Passage of Mount Taurus; March through Armenia: Arrival  
at Trapezus.*

IN the Grecian army, collected from almost all the numerous little  
republics of the nation, the system of subordination was very incom-  
plete. Every general held the independent command of the troops  
himself had raised; and no order of succession was established; but  
vacancies, through all the ranks, were to be supplied by election.  
Eight officers had borne the title of general; but Clearchus only had  
possessed the qualifications. In him alone was united extensive expe-  
rience with great talents. Diligent in the care of an army, in quarters  
or in camp, and ready in every emergency of the field, he was truly  
a superior man: the rest Xenophon has not scrupled to declare unequal  
to their situation.

Anab. 1.2.  
c. 6. s.1—8.

c. 2. s.3.

Anab. 1. 3.  
c. 1. s. 3.

s. 4.

Called then by no positive duty, warranted by no acknowledged superiority, and diffident of themselves, the generals remaining in the camp took no lead, while dejection and dismay pervaded the army. On that evening, says the eyewitness historian, few attended the parade<sup>14</sup>, few fires were lighted, many touched no food, many would not even go to their tents, but threw themselves on the ground where they happened to be, to pass a sleepless night, ruminating on their disconsolate circumstances. Xenophon had, at this time, no rank in the army: he was, according to his own phrase, neither officer nor soldier. Having gone, at the invitation of Proxenus, from Athens to Sardis, on his arrival he found the army on the point of marching eastward. He was immediately introduced to Cyrus, who, with condescending civility, joined his Theban friend in pressing him to accompany them in the expedition, then pretended against the Peisidians. When, at length in Cilicia, the real object was no longer doubted, Xenophon was one of the many, as himself confesses, who wished, but were ashamed, to withdraw themselves; and he proceeded with the army, merely as a volunteer, the friend of Proxenus. The duty of a soldier was however not new to him; as, in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, he was of age for that service from which no Athenian was exempted. If he had never held command, he had however been diligent in study to prepare himself for it, and he had made large use of great opportunities for observation.

Under these circumstances Xenophon partook largely in the grief and anxiety excited in the army by the circumvention of the generals, and by the manifestation of determined hostility, hostility knowing neither measure nor mercy, on the part of the Persians. Without duty him-

<sup>14</sup> Ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ὄπλα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἦλθον. This is evidently a military technical phrase. It indicates that, in the ordinary practice of the Grecian service, the soldiers were assembled ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα, at least once a day. What the precise meaning of the phrase ἐπὶ τὰ ὄπλα was, we cannot know. It may have been a simple roll-call at the place where the arms were deposited: it may have been

an inspection of arms: but it seems evidently to have been something like the modern parade. The reader disposed to critical inquiry on the subject may compare the passage with those quoted in note 11 of the preceding section. He may also consult Spelman; whose version of the passage, however, and notes upon it, I must own I cannot approve.

self,

self, his attention was alive to observe what steps would be taken by the remaining generals; and with deep concern he saw, that, instead of exertion increased, in proportion to the pressure of the occasion, their remissness amounted almost to a dereliction of command. Attack was universally expected with daylight; and yet no council held, no orders given, preparation of no kind made. From the common interests of the army, his consideration then turned to that part of it with which he had been more particularly connected, and which, by the loss of his friend, remained without a head. Tho' holding no rank, he was, by no rule of Grecian service, excluded from aspiring to any rank. Circumstances not invited only, but pressed him to come forward: his youth alone deterred him. After much consideration and reconsideration, strongly impressed with the importance of decision, and still doubting, a dream at length determined him. His works indeed abound with testimonies to his respect for the forboding of dreams, and for the whole of the reputed science of augury. Roused then, according to his own report, by a dream, early in the night he sprang from his bed, and, in pursuance of the supposed admonition from a divine power, called together the lochages of the troops which had served under Proxenus. On their assembling, he observed to them what remissness pervaded the army, without excepting the remaining generals; what imminent and extreme danger threatened; and how urgent the necessity for immediately choosing a successor to their own lost commander. For himself, he said, hitherto without a character in the army, in the present emergency he was ready to do his best in any situation, whether in command or in obedience, in which they might think he would be most useful: but with regard to the prospect before them, it depended upon themselves to make it good or bad; and, however just the melancholy, in the moment pervading the army, he was confident that vigor and prudence united might bear them through all opposing difficulties. He then stated the grounds of his confidence, and, at the conclusion of his speech, the general wish was expressed, that Xenophon would take the command. One lochage only avowed his dissent; adding his opinion, that they ought at once to throw themselves on the king's mercy, as the only resource affording a reasonable hope. 'The king's mercy!' replied Xenophon indignantly, 'you may judge of it from the trans-

actions

Anab. 1. 3.  
c. 1. s. 9, 10.

s. 11—22.

‘actions of yesterday. Your own power to defend yourselves has never yet failed you. The man who can make so base a proposal, instead of holding command, should not be allowed even to bear arms: he is fit only to carry the baggage; he is a disgrace to the Grecian name.’ ‘He is no Greek,’ replied immediately an Arcadian lochage, Agasias of Stymphalus; ‘tho his speech is Bœotian, I have seen his ears bored like a Lydian’s.’ The spirit of the meeting was roused; the lochage’s ears were examined; they were found to be as Agasias said, and he was immediately deprived of his rank.

Beside what is more directly indicated, this remarkable transaction seems to offer, for the attentive observer, some curious information. How a Lacedæmonian army, or how an army of Athenian citizens was composed, is little marked by it; but birth, connections, and education, appear to have given great advantages in an army composed like that under Cyrus. Among the officers who served under Proxenus, evidently none had those advantages in a degree to enable them to aspire to the chief command. Neither Xenophon nor any early writer has said it, and yet it seems clearly to result from Xenophon’s account, that his rank, derived from birth and connections, at least approached that of his Theban friend. It seems very little likely that the superiority of his talents and education alone would have procured him that instantaneous elevation, by the common voice of the officers, from a situation of no command, to the command of them all. But where birth and connections are evidently superior, the superiority of talents and education are less invidious. Deference, which would not be readily paid to either an accidental, or a natural, or an artificial superiority alone, will be more willingly conceded to the three united.

The appointment, however, of a head, facilitated the means of united exertion to the officers of that division of the army; and this was an important step toward the restoration of order and energy through the whole. An immediate meeting of all the generals and lochages was desired, and, toward midnight, they assembled, in number about a hundred. Hieronymus of Elis, eldest lochage of the troops which had served under Proxenus, introduced Xenophon, as general elect of those troops; and as the meeting had originated from them, it was Xenophon’s part to open the business. He began, after some apology, with observing that,

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that, in the situation in which they stood, leaving the soldiers, without occupation, to ruminate upon what was alarming and disconsolate in their circumstances, could not but be in the highest degree dangerous: the animation necessary, to carry them through the difficulties before them, could be supported only by active employment. But the election of successors to the lost generals, he proceeded to say, should engage their first attention: till that was done, nothing could go forward with due regularity. He declared then his opinion, that confidence should be wholly refused to the Persians; and he concluded with explaining, in the same strain of encouraging eloquence, as before to the officers of Proxenus, his ground for hoping, that vigorous exertion, united with prudent caution, would carry them happily and gloriously through the dangers at present so threatening. When he ended, the Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus rising, said, 'He had before known no more of Xenophon than just that he was an Athenian; but he nevertheless intirely approved all the sentiments he had declared, and the propositions he had offered.' This was decisive for the meeting, and they proceeded immediately to the election of generals. What interest or what views guided the choice does not appear. Timasion of Dardanum, in Troas, was substituted for Clearchus; Philesius and Xanthicles, Achaians, for Menon and Socrates; the body before under Agias was committed to the orders of Cleanor; and Xenophon was confirmed in the succession to Proxenus.

Anab. 1.3.  
c. 1. s. 32.

At daybreak the troops were assembled, and Cheirisophus, Cleanor, and Xenophon successively addressed them. An accident, in itself even ridiculous, through the importance attributed to it by Grecian superstition, assisted not a little to infuse encouragement. Xenophon was speaking of that favor from the gods, which a righteous cause intitled them to hope for against a perjured enemy, when somebody sneezed. Immediately the general voice addressed ejaculations to protecting Jupiter, whose omen it was supposed to be<sup>15</sup>. A sacrifice to

c. 2. s. 1—5.

<sup>15</sup> We should scarcely have looked to Greece for the origin of the popular practice in England, of exclaiming 'God bless you!' when a person sneezes. Popular customs indeed, often very ancient, often very widely diffused, often similar and yet of different

origin, can seldom, with any certainty, be traced to their origin. Were it worth while however, it might perhaps be not difficult to shew a probability, that the custom of ejaculating a blessing on persons sneezing, came to England from Greece.

the

the god was then proposed; a universal shout declared approbation; and the whole army, in one chorus, sang the pæan.

Thus was a turn fortunately given, through the army, from dismay and despondency, to hope and cheerfulness. Among the arguments, which the generals then gladly seized to improve the happy impression, one, which the circumstances offered, spoke home to the minds of soldiers, commonly little provident of distant good or evil, but intent upon present wants and near enjoyments. The means of many to profit from that market which, according to treaty, had been hitherto provided, were nearly exhausted; and all these heard with joy, that their swords might supply the deficiency of their purses; that, in the rich country they were to traverse, they might thenceforward take, as from enemies, whatever they could master. Nevertheless it being highly expedient to lighten the march, as much as possible, at the instance of Xenophon they cheerfully submitted to burn their waggons and tents. They heard the same young general with careful attention, while he observed, that the enemy had just given them a lesson of the utmost importance, in showing that he dared not openly attack them, till he had deprived them of their generals. Thus he had manifested his conviction of the inestimable value of the Grecian discipline; and hence it followed, that it behooved the army to be more strictly obedient, as it certainly was the duty of the generals to be more watchfully careful than at any former time. It was then unanimously voted, that any disobedience to lawful commands should be instantly punished, and that it should be the bounden duty of all present, to support the commanding officer upon the spot, in the infliction of punishment. This vote, and the want of such a vote, concur with all other remaining testimony, to mark the deficiency of the Greek military penal law; which, at the same time, was very lax and very arbitrary.

It seems not to have been at all in view to appoint a commander-in-chief. Xenophon, evidently, felt the ascendancy which, eloquence, not least among his superior talents, gave him in the council of officers, or in the council of the army at large. As youngest among the generals, and still more perhaps, as an Athenian, he could not aspire to the ostensible command-in-chief; but by the lead which was

conceded

Anab. I. 3.  
c. 1. s. 13.  
& c. 2. s. 12.

c. 2.  
s. 17—20.

conceded to his abilities in council, he could in a great degree hold the effectual command. Others, conscious of deficiency, avoiding to urge their advice, he recommended, That the order of march should be a hollow square, with the baggage, now reduced to a small compass, in the center; that the leading division should be committed to Cheirisophus, in virtue of his dignity as a Lacedæmonian; that Timasion with himself, the two youngest generals, should command the rear, and the older generals the flanks. This was approved and ratified.

Order and energy being thus restored to the army, the waggons and tents, with whatever baggage could by any means be spared, were burnt, conformably to the resolution taken. All was then arranged for the march, and the army was on the point of moving, when Mithridates, approaching with an escort of only thirty horse, desired to speak with the generals. His discourse began with expressions of apprehension for himself, on account of his known attachment to Cyrus, and of friendship for the Greeks, undiminished by events; but the tenor of it soon showed that his purpose was to discover how far the Grecian generals were firm in any intention of opposition to the king, and to persuade them, if possible, quietly to surrender themselves. Suspicion being thus excited, and his attendants being carefully observed, there was seen among them a known confidant of Tissaphernes, upon which the conference was abruptly ended.

Time however had been thus so wasted, that it was midday before the Grecian army moved, and soon after Mithridates again appeared, at the head of about two hundred horse, and four hundred foot, all slingers or bowmen. He approached as if his purpose was friendly; but presently a discharge of arrows and stones demonstrated his perfidy. His cavalry carried bows, which they discharged equally retreating as standing; and the Cretan bows in the Grecian army were found so inferior in length of shot, as to be totally inefficacious. A pursuit, attempted by Xenophon, with the whole rear division, was equally bootless. At the end of three miles the Greeks reached a village, where they halted for the night. This had been their intention;

but the annoyance received, in so short a march, from so small a force, was such that despondency again pervaded the army.

Anab. 1. 3.  
c. 3.  
s. 9—12.

The attempt to pursue, which had no other effect than to retard the progress of the army, and prolong the enemy's opportunity, was severely blamed by Cheirisophus, and the other older generals. Xenophon acknowledg'd his error; 'whence however,' he said, 'advantage might be derived; for it marked the measures necessary for the future quiet of the march. Pursuit with the heavy-armed, and shots from the Cretan bows, had been found equally unavailing. But there were Rhodians in the army, many of them, he understood, expert slingers, whose slings, formed to throw leaden bullets, would carry twice as far as the Persian, accommodated for stones as large as the hand could grasp. There were also horses, some his own, some which had belonged to Clearchus, and many employed in carrying the baggage. If the fittest among all these were mounted, by men practised in the cavalry service, possibly the enemy might hereafter be less secure in flight.' In pursuance of this admonition, a body of two hundred slingers was formed that evening: and next morning fifty horse were equipped, and put under the command of Lycius, an Athenian.

s. 4.

During the night Nicarchus, an Arcadian lochage, deserted, and carried about twenty men with him. Allurement, which the conferences had afforded opportunity for the Persians to hold out, was supposed to have led to this. It was, in consequence resolved, by the generals, to allow no more conferences, nor even to admit a message from the enemy; in the persuasion, derived from the various acts of treachery experienced, that their best security depended upon thus giving war its most hideous aspect, and offering themselves for its most cruel operation.

e. 4. s. 1—3.

Halting then a day, to make the equipment of the cavalry and slingers more complete, they moved next morning earlier than usual. They had already crossed a bottom, where they had expected attack, when Mithridates appeared on the height behind them, with about a thousand horse, and four thousand slingers and bowmen. According  
to



to accounts, which Xenophon believed, he had promised Tissaphernes that, with this force, he would compel them to surrender. Why the Persians employed such small portions only of their numbers, in these first assaults upon the Greeks, not directly stated by Xenophon, may be gathered from circumstances, on various occasions related by him. The Grecian charge was so dreaded, that it would probably not have been easy to lead their greatest multitudes near enough to the phalanx, even to discharge missile weapons with effect, unless the means of hasty retreat were obvious; which numbers would themselves impede. The purpose therefore being, by desultory annoyance, without the risk of a battle, to bring the Greeks to surrender, trial had been first made with a very small force; and the success had probably been beyond expectation. The inferiority of the Greek missile weapons, the inability of the heavy-armed for rapid pursuit, and the power of a very small Persian force to give great annoyance, had been so experienced, that Mithridates, while he calculated his present numbers to be the best proportion for his purpose, might perhaps not unreasonably have supposed them equal to it. He had passed the bottom in pursuit of the Greeks, and was already within Persian bow-shot, when the newly-formed Grecian cavalry advanced against him. Contemptible as their numbers alone might have appeared, they were rendered formidable by the body of the targeteers following them running, and the whole heavy-armed phalanx moving steddily in support of these. The Persians took to inconsiderate flight; much slaughter was made of their infantry; and, what the Greeks seem to have esteemed a more important circumstance, eighteen horse, unable to disengage themselves from the bottom, were made prisoners. The march was then prosecuted without further disturbance during that day, and the army took its quarters for the night in a large deserted town, which Xenophon calls Larissa, surrounded by a brick wall, twenty-five feet thick and a hundred high, raised on a basement of stone<sup>15</sup>.

Anab. 1.3.  
c. 4. s. 4.

Next

<sup>15</sup> The name of a town in Media, written exactly like the name of the principal city in Thessaly, a name familiar in Greece, has excited surprize and inquiry. The conjecture of Bochart, approved by Le Clerc, Hutchinson and Spelman, is at least ingenious, and may be true. The name Larissa, tho' Greek in form, seems clearly not of Grecian

Anab. I. 3.  
c. 4. s. 6.

Next day, by a march of above twenty miles, the army reached another deserted town, surrounded by a still more extraordinary fortification. The wall, fifty feet thick, was a hundred and fifty high; of which the lower third was, at least, faced with squared stone; the rest was completed with brick. The circuit was above twenty miles; the name Mespila. Both these Median towns had been depopulated, since the transfer of the empire to the Persians<sup>16</sup>.

s. 7.

On the day following, appearances seemed to announce that, as the attempts with a small body, to bring the Greeks to surrender, had failed, it was resolved to exert against them the united strength of the formidable numbers, which the Persian power could so readily command. A very large army came in sight, consisting of the troops of Ariæus, of Orontas, and of the king's natural brother, with a detachment of the king's own army under Tissaphernes, and the whole of the satrap's large escort of cavalry. They followed the march, and pressing at the same time on the rear and both flanks of the army, they plied missile

Grecian origin. Strabo and Stephanus mention several towns, in different countries, which by the Greeks were called Larissa, but they take no notice of Larissa in Media. Bochart supposes that the town to which Xenophon has here attributed that name, was the town spoken of by Moses, in Genesis (c. 10. v. 12.) where he says, *Asher built Resen, between Nineveh and Calah; the same is a great city.* The situation, he observes, as well as the size, agrees, and the change in the name was obvious for men catching Assyrian sounds with Grecian ears; for if the Greeks asked, Of what town those were the ruins? an Assyrian would answer *Le Resen*, of Resen. Many of the Greek names about the Archipelago, have, in late ages, we know, been corrupted by a mistake exactly analogous.

Close to Larissa Xenophon describes a pyramid, very inferior in size to those remaining in Egypt, and differing much in proportions, being about one hundred feet square at the base, and two hundred high. The com-

paratively very small, but still really large and costly structure, the tomb of Caius Sextius, at Rome, approaches, in its proportions, to the character of the Median pyramid.

<sup>16</sup> The history of these countries is so uncertainly known, that the attempt were equally vain to reconcile Xenophon's account of Larissa and Mespila with that which he gives, in the *Cyrópædeia*, of the peaceful succession of Cyrus to the Median kingdom, in right of his mother, or to draw from it any proof in favor of Herodotus, who says that he acquired Media by conquest. I will however just observe, that it may have been of importance to the Median monarchs to support, at a great expence, these towns, fortified, with such astonishing labor, on the border of the desert against Assyria, while Assyria was the most formidable neighbour to Media; and, when all was brought under one empire by Cyrus, the discontinuance merely of the former attention, may have gone far to produce their fall.

weapons.

weapons. But the Greeks had the satisfaction to find, that they dared not charge with hand-arms<sup>17</sup>; that the Rhodian slings carried farther than most of the Persian bows; and that the Greek bowmen, by using the Scythian manner of drawing (which Xenophon has not explained) could give superior efficacy to their shots. Nor had this been experienced long, when Tissaphernes withdrew hastily to a safe distance, and his example was as a command to the whole army. The Persians, during the rest of the day, followed, without at all pressing the Greeks, and when these halted near some villages to incamp, they retired.

Anab. 1. 3.  
C. 4. s. 8.

The circumstances of this day seem to furnish the reason why the Persian generals chose, and judiciously chose, to send, at first, so small a portion of their numbers to harrass the Grecian march. The Persian discipline was so deficient, that increase of numbers did not give proportional increase of force. The thickened shower of missile weapons still fell with little effect among the loose order of the Greek light-armed; while these turned upon the Persians their own numberless arrows; and, in their crowded multitude, almost destitute of defensive armour, scarcely a shot failed of effect. s. 8—10.

Fortunately for the Greeks, the Persians had so expected, by force or terror, to stop their march, that scarcely any measures were taken for, what would most effectually have stopped them, the removal of necessaries. In villages through which they had already passed, prepared guts, fit for slings, had been found, and lead for bullets; and, in those where they now arrived, an abundant supply of corn. Halting there a day, they marched again on the morrow; when Tissaphernes again followed, watching opportunity of advantage, and endeavoring to harrass; but from so safe a distance, that little disturbance was given.

The remissness of the Persians afforded opportunity for the Greek generals to see, without in any considerable degree feeling, the defects of their own order of march. They had found it subject to dangerous hurry and derangement, when, in presence of the enemy, bridges, or s. 11—14.

<sup>17</sup> This is the able general Lloyd's term for what, as he observes, the French, whose quaint phrases have in such abundance been

awkwardly, ignorantly, and affectedly obtruded upon our military vocabulary, call *armes blanches*.

any narrows were to be passed; an inconvenience, which Xenophon's account shows to have arisen, in a great degree, from the deficiency of the Greek tactics of the age. The generals however took the best measure, perhaps that their circumstances would admit, for obviating ill consequences, by appointing a picket of six hundred men, formed in six divisions, whose office, on such occasions, was to protect the rear, and at other times to be ready for any emergency<sup>18</sup>.

In

<sup>18</sup> The passage of Xenophon, here thus abbreviated, has puzzled translators, and exercised the ingenuity of critics, literary and military. No interpretation of it that has fallen in my way, is at all satisfactory; but a correction of the text, proposed by Spelman, would remove the principal difficulty, with no more violence upon our present copies than the transposition of two words, λόχους and ἰσμοτίας, putting each in the other's place. This correction has all probability in its favor, and, without it, no ingenuity of the critics, in my opinion, has relieved, or can relieve, the sentence from gross absurdity.

In the passage altogether, which is interesting for the military reader, Xenophon has described, in concise and general terms, adapted to those to whom the tactics of the age were familiar, a series of complex evolutions; the reduction of the hollow square (composed of about ten thousand men, incumbered with their baggage in the center) to a column of various front, accommodated to the accidental circumstances of the narrow to be passed; the reformation of the column into a hollow square; and the movements of a detached body, appointed to protect the general movements. We learn from many passages of Thucydides and Xenophon, that the extension and reduction of the front of a body of heavy-armed infantry, formed in the usual way, in line or in phalanx, was frequently practised; and, tho we have no precise information how it was performed,

yet its being often done, without inconvenience, in the face of an enemy, sufficiently proves that the method was orderly and good. But it should seem that this method was not readily applicable to the hollow square. Xenophon's account most clearly shows that, when circumstances of the ground required the reduction of the front of the square, a regular method, at least such as the army in which he commanded, could immediately practise, was wanting. When the circumstances of the ground would no longer allow the leading face of the square to hold its front intire, the center led; and the wings, falling back irregularly, according as they felt the pressure of the impediment, followed as they could, till the narrow was passed, and then ran up again, still irregularly, as opportunity offered, to form in line with the center. For the flank faces the business was easy; they had only to incline inward, as they approached the narrow, so as to be either before or behind the baggage. The rear did exactly as the leading face; at least as far as the pursuing enemy would permit; but the evolution gave a pursuing enemy great opportunities. For the security of the Grecian heavy-armed, against either missile or hand weapons, depended much upon the 'array' (according to Milton's phrase) 'of serried shields,' which, in the course of such evolutions, would be long disordered, and the shield, for the time, almost a useless incumbrance.

With this previous explanation, and if Spelman's

In the next day's march, the fifth march, and the seventh day, after their separation from the Persians, the Greeks were cheered with the sight of mountain-tops, rising above the horizon of that hitherto apparently endless plain, over which they had been urging their wearisome way, under continual threats of attack from a pursuing cavalry, more numerous than their whole army. Ere long, hills appeared, so far projected from the mountain bases, that the army soon entered the winding of their vallies. But the Persian generals, aware that the opportunity for effective operation with their cavalry was gone, knew also the advantage to be derived from the highlands they were approaching. A large detachment of their foot-archers, men of the lowest rank, were sent forward to occupy the heights commanding the way; a guard of soldiers of superior degree attending, whose office was to enforce their exertion. Driven by stripes, and the fear of death from the imperious

Anab. 1.3.  
c. 4. s. 15.

s. 16—19.

Spelman's correction may be allowed, I am not without hope that the following translation of the passage in question may be found intelligible and just.

'The Greeks were now aware that the square is an inconvenient order of march, when an enemy follows. For when circumstances of the ground, or a bridge to be passed, compel to narrow the front, the wings, of necessity, bending, the heavy-armed are driven out of regular order; they march inconveniently; and being at the same time crowded, and their ranks and files disordered, they are incapable of efficacious action against an enemy. When the defile then is passed, and the wings open again to wheel into line, there is necessarily an interval in the center, which is a discouraging circumstance to the soldier when the enemy follows; so that whenever a bridge or other narrow is to be passed, all are eager to be foremost, and hence increase of opportunity for the enemy. To remedy these inconveniences, the generals formed a picket of six lochi, each of a hundred men, with proper offi-

cers. Whenever then occasion required that the wing should fall back, the picket had its post in the rear, to protect them during the movement; (occupying the hollow between them while any remained) or, (if the narrowness of the pass compelled the wings to close) keeping clear beyond them to the rear. When, as the ground then would allow, the wings wheeled up into line, the picket again filled the opening. If it was small, the picket was formed in column of enomoties; if larger, in column of pentecostyes; if larger still, in column of lochi, so as always to fill the interval. Thus there was no longer the former confusion in passing defiles or bridges; the lochages (not as Spelman has translated, of these several companies, but of the whole army) leading their divisions in orderly succession; and if a body of heavy-armed was wanted to act anywhere upon any occasion; (this I think to be clearly the meaning of *ἡ πρὸν δεῖσι τι τῆς φάλαγγος*, which Leunclavius has totally perverted by his translation, *si phalange opus esset*) these were ready.'

band

band behind them, the Persian archers pressed in such numbers, so close upon the Rhodian slingers and other Greek light-armed, as to compel them to retire within the square, and then they exceedingly galled the whole army. The deficiency however of spirit, discipline, and military science of the Persians, afforded opportunity to the Grecian generals soon to put an end to this annoyance. Tho so inferior in force, they might always dare to detach. They sent therefore a body of targeteers to a height commanding that occupied by the enemy, and the very sight sufficed: archers, and those appointed to enforce their exertion, fled together. The march was then continued uninterrupted to a village, where fortunately was found a supply of wheatmeal and wine, with large store of barley, collected for the stables of the governor of the province. For the sake of the wounded, they halted here three days; and, on this occasion first, we find mention of surgeons in the Grecian army: eight were, according to Xenophon's phrase, now appointed. It is indeed perhaps the first mention of army-surgeons, by any extant Grecian writer since Homer; who has attributed very high value to the services, and very high honors to the persons, of the sons of Æsculapius, in the early age of the Trojan war.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 4. s. 20.

A more level country succeeded the first hills; and here the enemy renewed their desultory assaults, so as, exceedingly to distress the Greeks, incumbered with their numerous wounded; insomuch that, after a short march, they halted at the first village. Encouraged thus, the Persian generals, who had never yet ventured to attack the Greeks in any station, resolved to attempt it here. Opportunity, indeed, must soon be seized, or the Greeks would be among mountains, where, tho not likely to find their own safety, they would be beyond the pursuit of that cavalry, without which the satraps and generals would not follow them. The credit therefore, which these had promised themselves, from carrying all the Grecian generals into the king's presence, would have been lost; and as so much seems to have been completely expected from them, censure and deprivation of command might follow; seldom, under a despotic government, unattended with deprivation of life, and ruin to the whole family. But they found (it is the observation of Xenophon) a wide difference between annoying a line of march and  
assaulting

assaulting a station. They advanced indeed no nearer than to attack with missile weapons. In such a feeble mode of attack, their numbers, little availing to themselves, gave greater opportunity to the enemy, and they were repulsed with such loss that the attempt was not repeated.

Nevertheless it behooved the Greek generals to take every measure for obviating, or evading, such annoyance to their march, as that which they had last suffered. They had now learnt that the enemy were vehemently fearful of nightly assault; for which (it is again Xenophon's remark) a Persian army indeed was very ill accommodated. For its principal force consisted in cavalry, whose horses were always tied at night, and commonly shackled<sup>19</sup>; so that, on any call to arms, the soldier had to take off the shackles, to loosen the halter, to saddle<sup>20</sup> and bridle the horse, and to put on his own corslet: things not all done with ready certainty, in darkness and under alarm. It was therefore the practice of the Persian generals, in pursuing the Greeks, always to withdraw early in the afternoon, and to incamp not less than seven or eight miles from them. The Greek generals therefore waited for the afternoon, before they would move; and, marching when they had assured themselves that the Persians were decidedly withdrawn for the night, they put such a distance between the armies that, during the next two days, they saw no enemy.

Anab. l. 3.  
c. 4. s. 21.

s. 22, 23.

The Persian generals, tho' totally indisposed to daring measures, nevertheless retained their anxiety to strike some blow, which might do them credit, before opportunity should be completely lost. Availing themselves of their knowledge of the country, they sent forward a con-

s. 24-30.

<sup>19</sup> The general want of tenacity in the soil, over the vast plains of Asia, refusing efficacy to the European method of Picketing, seems to have occasioned the common practice of Shackling.

<sup>20</sup> *Ἐπισάξαι*. It has been generally supposed that a cloth or rug was all that the Greeks and Romans used, to relieve the seat on a horse's back. Whether anything like that heavy, awkward implement, the modern

oriental saddle, was in use among the ancient Persians, must be now so difficult to determine, that, in the abundance of opportunity for noticing inaccuracies in D'Ablancourt's translation of the Anabasis, Spelman's censure on his use of the word *saddle*, in this passage, might well have been spared; especially as the word *housing*, which he has given instead, seems far from unobjectionable.

sidérable force; and, on the third day after the evening march, the Greeks were alarmed with the sight of a body of the enemy, on a height commanding the way they must pass, the army under Tissaphernes and Ariæus at the same time pressing on their rear. Quick decision was necessary. A body of targeteers, with three hundred chosen heavy-armed, under Xenophon, pushed for a summit commanding that occupied by the enemy. The Persian generals at the same time sent forward a detachment for the same purpose. Using the utmost exertion, the Greeks arrived first. The Persians on the lower height then immediately fled. Tissaphernes, finding his purpose thus baffled, presently changed the direction of his march; and the Greeks descended, unmolested, into a vale, washed by the Tigris, rich in pasture, and abounding with villages.

Apab. l. 3.  
c. 5. s. 1.

s. 2—4.

Hitherto the Persian generals had avoided all waste of the country, through which the Greeks directed their march. Here first, villages were seen in flames. The Persian cavalry, by a circuitous road, entered the vale about the same time with the Greeks, cut off some of them, straggling after plunder, and set fire to the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants. The Greeks however vindicated to themselves the possession of the villages at which they arrived first, with all their contents. Various valuable supplies were found in them, and much cattle in the adjoining fields; and the generals took occasion to encourage the troops with observing, that now the Persians evidently acknowledged their superiority, for they made war as if the country was no longer their own.

s. 5—12.

Nevertheless new and pressing difficulties occurred. Hitherto the march had been prosecuted along the great road, the principal communication from Babylon to the northern provinces, and never far from the course of the Tigris. A new face of country now presented itself; they were arrived at the foot of that vast ridge, which, under various names, stretches from the Ægean sea to the Caspian. The great northern road insinuated itself among the mountains. But two other great roads offered: one leading eastward to Ecbatana and Susa, the ordinary spring and summer residences of the great king; one westward, across the river, directly to Lydia and Ionia; being apparently



that by which Arctus had proposed to march, had he not succeeded in his negotiation for peace and pardon. This was the desirable road for the Greeks. But the river was so deep, that the longest spear, it was found, would not reach the bottom; and could boats have been collected, or rafts formed, a large body of cavalry seen on the farther bank, while the army under Tissaphernes watched their rear, would have made the passage next to impracticable. Mountain-precipices overhanging the eastern bank, denied even the attempt to seek a passage higher up. Under these circumstances, in a country of which the most slender report had never yet reached Greece, the generals had recourse to their prisoners. They were informed by these, that the mountains before them were held by the Cardoos<sup>21</sup>; a most fierce and warlike people; who, tho' surrounded by the dominions, had never owned the sovereignty of the great king: that an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men had once been sent to reduce them, and the current report was, that not one of the number had ever returned: that nevertheless they sometimes were, by compact, upon good terms with the neighboring satraps, who did not disdain to enter into treaty with them, and then communication was open between their country and the Persian provinces: that beyond their mountains lay Armenia, an extensive and very plentiful country, whence communication was ready to all quarters.

After every inquiry in their power, having weighed all circumstances, the Greek generals resolved to pursue the way into Armenia: The usual animosity of the Cardoos against the Persians, it was hoped would

<sup>21</sup> Καρδοοι. From this people the modern Curdies seem to have derived their blood, their name, and their character; for which Volney and other travellers may be consulted. The last syllable of the name has apparently been added by the Greeks, as necessary for the inflexions of their language. The  $\chi$  has been intended to represent an oriental guttural, alien to all English enunciation, and perhaps, like the French final  $n$ , rather a modification of the preceding vowel than a clearly distinct conso-

nant. Thus a south Welshman, in pronouncing the British word *Wyn*, begins with a guttural sound, most nearly represented in English orthography by the letter  $g$ , whence the word is written *Gwyn*; and a Spaniard, at least a Castilian, endeavoring to speak the English words *White*, *What*, *When*, pronounces nearly *Gwite*, *Gwat*, *Gwen*; which seems to have been also nearly the pronunciation of the old Lowland Scots, who often wrote *guh* for the English *wh*.

dispose them to friendship with the enemies of the Persians. At least, annoyance from the Persian cavalry would be obviated; and it was indeed little likely that Tissaphernes would, with any part of his army, venture to pursue among the mountains. In the latter speculation they were not deceived. Tissaphernes immediately turned his march; probably thinking that, next to having the heads of the Grecian generals to lay before the king, the certainty of their being engaged among the Cardoo highlands, was of all things most desirable for him: for, with little risk of contradiction, he might now make any report of his own prowess against them. Truth indeed, as the modern history of the East abundantly evinces, so hardly finds its way to a despotic throne, that the base circumvention of the Grecian generals may very possibly have been totally disguised, and those unfortunate men may have been presented to Artaxerxes as prisoners of war, honorably made, proofs of the meritorious exertion of his victorious forces<sup>22</sup>.

Anab. ii. 4.  
c. 1.

Much however as the Greeks had already given up of those conveniencies, for the long march to the Ionian shore, which they might have preserved, had the way been friendly, it became necessary now still farther to lighten their baggage. Slaves, a species of plunder unknown to modern European armies, were much coveted by the Grecian soldier. They required no cattle, like other plunder, to transport them; on the contrary, they served, as cattle, to transport other plunder. Since their breach with the Persians, the Greeks had collected numerous slaves, male and female. For the march over the mountains it was held requisite to abandon a large proportion of them. Accordingly the males were mostly dismissed, but discipline was not powerful enough to make the soldiers part with their women.

Advancing then among the mountains, they had the mortification to find every endeavor vain, for bringing the fierce Cardoos to any accommodation. Obligated to fight their way, they incountered, with little remission, during seven days, far greater difficulties and dangers than had been experienced in the plains, from the countless cavalry of

<sup>22</sup> Such a deception is perhaps more than to revile every administration of their own country; but in the East it would appear possible, much as many of them are disposed familiar.

the great king. Meanwhile, from the chill of autumnal rains, frequent and heavy among the highlands, they suffered the more, as it so quickly followed the heats of an Assyrian summer. The road, always through narrow defiles, often steep, was often commanded by precipices; whence, with no other weapons than rolling fragments of rock, a few men might stop an army. But the Cardoos had other weapons. They gave extraordinary efficacy to their bowshots, by a method of drawing, assisted by the foot, by which they discharged arrows three feet long, with such force as to pierce shields, and corslets. The Cretan bowmen learned, from their enemies, to improve their own practice, so as to be highly useful in this passage; but the Cardoo arrows were so above proportion for their bows, that they could use them only as darts. Nevertheless science and discipline, with superior defensive armour, enabled the Greeks everywhere to overbear opposition; and when they could reach the towns, which were numerous, and all unfortified, they found good houses and abundant provisions; for the Cardoos, in a rude style, lived well among their mountains. Anab. I. 4.  
c. 2. s. 14.

Compelled thus to fight their way, and to take by violence what they wanted, when at length they had completed the laborious and dangerous passage of the mountains, and the Armenian plain came in view, increased difficulty occurred. A deep and rapid river, washing the foot of the mountains, crossed the road. On the farther bank, a Persian army appeared, prepared to dispute the passage. It was commanded by the satrap Orontas, who, by another road, had reached his satrapy before them. The Cardoos, with sharpened animosity, having followed their march, were gathered on the heights behind, ready, at the favorable moment, to fall upon their rear. c. 3.

While the Greek generals were at the greatest loss to chuse among the difficulties before them, a more favorable ford than that lying in the direct course of the great road, was, by meer accident, discovered at no great distance, unguarded. Without hesitation they proceeded to profit from it, and the first division of the army had no sooner passed, than the Persians began to fly. It appears probable, that the satraps had promised themselves and their troops an easy victory, over the small remains of the Grecian army which might escape, if indeed

any

any should escape, the Cardoo arms. The sight of their numbers, not sensibly diminished, and the observation that the fierce highlanders feared to attack them, even with missile weapons, till more than half their force had crossed the river, seem to have occasioned the panic which urged the whole Persian army to fly; so profusely, that the very small body of the Grecian cavalry pursuing, supported only by the targeteers, took a considerable part of the baggage. The rear division of the Greeks, which the Cardoos, watching the favorable moment, at length attacked, was commanded by Xenophon; who, in relating his precautions to evade, and his efforts to check their assaults, confesses that their activity, boldness, and skill were highly distressing; and, tho' the loss altogether was not great, they did more execution than all the satrap's army.

The hazardous passage of the mountains and the river being thus fortunately effected; one enemy, very formidable among the highlands, but wanting discipline for action in a plain, being left behind, and the other which in the plain should have been formidable, flying before them, the Greeks prosecuted their march sixteen or eighteen miles uninterrupted, over a fine champain country, of gentle rise and fall, appearing singularly to invite habitation and cultivation, yet without a dwelling to be seen; all was waste through the inability or neglect of the Persian government to protect its subjects against the inroads of the Cardoos. In the evening they reached a large village, where, to their great advantage, farther proof of Persian supineness occurred. The satrap having a palace there, the place was less likely to be forgotten or neglected, and yet, as if purposely left for their present refreshment and future supply, they found provisions abounding.

Five days then they proceeded, expecting always opposition, but meeting none. On the sixth, arriving at the river Teleboas, which divides Eastern from Western Armenia, they saw the farther bank occupied by an army commanded by Teribazus, governor of the latter, who seemed prepared to dispute their entrance into his country. Soon however it became evident, that the hope of success in open contest with the Grecian heavy-armed, which had been abandoned in the center

center of the empire, under the monarch's eye, was not resumed in that distant province. A message of peace soon arrived from Teribazus, with a proposal that, if they would abstain from useless devastation within his government, not only their passage should be unmolested, but they should be allowed to take necessary provisions. Such a proposal was accepted gladly, and a treaty, of which it was the basis, was quickly concluded.

The march of the next three days was then as through a friendly country; tho Teribazus followed with his army, at no great distance, watching their motions. But, in a small variation of latitude, mounting gradually from the burning flats of Mesopotamia, little raised above the Indian ocean's tide, to the lofty plains, near which the Tigris and Euphrates have their sources, they experienced a violent change of climate; a change apparently unforeseen when, on the southern side of the mountains, they burned their tents. While they slept, unsheltered, on the ground, so heavy a snow fell as to bury men and cattle. Wood fortunately abounded, with which they made large fires. Olive oil, which in Greece was commonly used to relieve the inconveniencies, equally of excessive cold and excessive heat, the severe winters of Armenia denied; but oils of bitter almonds, sesame, and turpentine, supplied the deficiency; or, if these failed, the abundance of lard was a resource, which the Greeks did not spurn at, for copious unction of their whole bodies. In other points they were plentifully supplied; the Armenian villages abounding, not only with necessaries, but luxuries; not only with corn and meat, but variety of pulse, dried fruits, and wines old and flavored.

All circumstances considered, their condition seemed now even fortunate; when the necessity of dispensing with the regularity of a camp, for the sake of shelter among unfortified villages, produced an untoward change. The authority of the generals, scarcely sufficing always to enforce due order in the assembled army, could not enforce regular conduct in scattered quarters; and, against the faith of the treaty, some houses were, in meer wantonness, set on fire, at the time of marching in the morning, by those who had profited from their shelter during the night. This was probably among the circumstances which stimulated

Anab. I. 4.  
C. 4. s. 4.

s. 7.

s. 7.

Anab. 1. 4.  
c. 4. s. 11—  
13.

stimulated Teribazus, instead of longer following the Greeks, to advance before them, and occupy the heights commanding a defile which they must pass. A prisoner fortunately gave information of this circumstance, and a disposition was made for driving the Persians from the commanding ground. The Persians however fled, before assaùlt reached them, leaving their camp, with the pavilion of Teribazus, and all its furniture, the silver-footed bed, the table plate, and many of the household slaves, the easy prey of the victors. The regard for truth which Xenophon generally evinces, the candor with which he often declares the crimes of his fellowcountrymen, even those in which, as we shall find, he was compelled to take a leading part, justly intitle him to our general credit: yet it must be confessed that his narrative rather stammers here; and if Teribazus was perfidious, as Xenophon affirms, he certainly took his measures very ill.

Thus easily as they disposed of the Persian forces that would have opposed them, the Greeks now found new and most formidable difficulties to incounter. In Eastern Armenia, according to the information which Xenophon obtained, they had crossed the Tigris near its source. They now approached the head of the Euphrates; and while winter still advanced, and they still gradually ascended to a higher level of ground, a very disadvantageous change of country occurred.

c. 5. s. 1—4.

For three days march all was desert; the snow, generally six feet deep, had blotted out all roads: the northwind, always extremely sharp, often blew violently. Guides were procured from the villages without difficulty; but provisions failed, and wood became scarce. The Greeks, unpractised in such climates, seem not to have obtained information from the natives how to manage their fires, or to profit from the shelter which snow itself may afford. In traversing the snowy deserts of America, the first business, where it is proposed to halt for the night, is to clear a space for each fire, sufficient to contain the party that is to sleep around it. The snow then dissolves little, and the party rest on the ground, warmed by the fire, and sheltered from all wind. But the Greeks discovered the depth of the snow only by its melting, where they made their fires on it; and on the snow itself they laid themselves to rest, exposed to the bitter blast. Marching, and thus halting, they suffered

s. 5.

suffered nearly alike. Some lost their toes, some their eyes; many slaves, and even some of the soldiers, died of cold and hunger. The baggage-cattle of course suffered, and many perished. Anab. l. 4. c. 5. s. 9, 10.

In this extraordinary country, in the latitude of the finest climates, the rigor of an arctic winter drove the inhabitants to the resources, which are familiar in Siberia and Tartary. They formed their houses under-ground, where men and cattle herded together. Nevertheless the produce of the soil was not niggardly. The army, arriving at length at some villages, found provisions abounding; meat of various kinds, fowls, and wheaten bread. Wine, from the grape, either the climate, or the want of modern skill, denied; but the people consoled themselves with beer; which Xenophon commends, under the name of barley-wine; and altogether the change of condition was found so advantageous, that he speaks of this as a land of luxury. Fortunately for the Greeks, the inhabitants, secluded from communication, believed their confident assertion, that they were the king's troops, and treated them with the utmost kindness and respect. Here therefore they rested eight days, to prepare for new fatigue. s. 19—23. c. 6. s. 1a

During this halt, Xenophon resided in the house of the chief officer or magistrate of one of the villages, with whose behaviour he was much satisfied. When the army moved again, this man was taken as a guide, and his son as a hostage for his fidelity. The march then being prosecuted three days, and no habitation seen, while men and cattle suffered much, Cheirisophus, impatient, imputed to the guide the purpose of avoiding the villages; and refusing credit to his assertion, that the country necessarily to be traversed was uninhabited, in anger struck him. The man so felt the indignity, that, tho his son remained in the hands of the Greeks, he left them the following night, and was seen no more. Xenophon expresses himself much hurt by this Spartan brutality and its consequence. He adds however that it was the only occasion, during the whole march, on which he had any difference with Cheirisophus.

Fortunately the river Phasis was not far off, and for seven days its course directed the way<sup>23</sup>. Diverging then for two days, the army

<sup>23</sup> The learned author of the dissertation on the geography of the Anabasis, has supposed that the guide, who deserted, had purposely misled the Greeks, and that they

B. C. 400. Ol. 94. 3. January. Forster's Diss.

army reached the defiles leading, from the lofty plains of Armenia, to the lower country, spreading between the Caspian and Euxine seas. Here the warriors of three fierce tribes, the Phasians, Chalybs, and Taocs, none owning the great king's allegiance, were assembled to dispute the passage. Stratagem however, with superior arms and superior discipline, enabled the Greeks to force their way, with little loss. The defiles being passed, opposition ceased; and, in the plain beyond, villages were found, abundantly stored with provisions for present supply. But, in a march of five days afterward, no food could be obtained: the Taocs had removed everything to strong holds on the hills, and the Greeks were reduced to the sad necessity of adding slaughter to robbery for subsistence. It may indeed be feared that mild methods were not duly tried, for bringing the rude people to an accommodation. One of their strong holds was stormed; and such was the abhorrence, among the unfortunate families who held it, of falling into the power of the Greeks, that, when resistance was found vain, the women threw their own children down the steps, and then, with the men, precipitated themselves. An Arcadian lochage, Æneas of Stymphalus, endeavoring to stop one whose dress seemed to mark superior rank, was dragged down the precipice with him, and they perished together.

Anab. 1. 4.  
c. 7. s. 1—9.

s. 10—19.

The cattle, thus acquired, supported the Greeks in traversing, during seven days, the country of the Chalybs; a people distinguished, among the Asiatics, by their superior armour, adapted to close fight, and by their courage in using it. This people had removed everything from the villages, and it was not till after proceeding four days through the more level territory of the Scythinians, that the Greeks found a supply. After four days march again, they arrived at Gymnias, a large and wealthy city. It is remarkable that only one town of such a description, Opis, on the river Phycus in Media, has occurred in the whole length of way from the border of Mesopotamia to this place. We read only of villages; meaning apparently towns inhabited solely by husbandmen, with the few artificers necessary to husbandry. Here

s. 14.

continued long to wander out of their way. Xenophon furnishes no sufficient ground for such a supposition; and, on the contrary, the accounts of antient and modern travellers seem to explain sufficiently why an experi-

enced, intelligent, and faithful guide would prefer a circuitous road. That of Tournefort, quoted in the next note, suffices to vindicate the probability of Xenophon's narrative.

fortunately



fortunately was found a disposition to prefer peaceful accommodation to the chance of war. The chief, or governor, furnished the Greeks with a guide; and, by the same measure, relieved his people from guests whom they feared, and revenged them on neighbors whom they hated; for, the guide, in pursuance of his instructions, conducted the Greeks through a country which he encouraged them to plunder, and even urged them to burn and destroy.

This man had engaged, at the peril of his life, to lead the army, in five days, within sight of the Euxine sea, and he made his word good. From a hill, in the course of the fifth day's march, it was distinctly seen. The leading division immediately gave a shout of joy, which was presently repeated by those next in the line; while the rear, ignorant of what the growing tumult meant, apprehended an enemy in front, and danger more than common. Pressing, however, forward, to give the assistance that might be wanting, they presently distinguished the reiteration of the cheering words 'the sea! the sea!' Joy then filled every eye, congratulations flowed from every lip; and, in the tumult of gladness, without waiting for orders or regular permission, all sedulously employed themselves in collecting stones, with which a large barrow was quickly raised, as a monument of the happy event. Want of generous gratitude was not among the national vices of the Greeks. The guide was liberally rewarded. A horse, a silver cup, a Persian dress, were presented to him, with ten darics in money, and, at his particular request, many rings. He then pointed out a village at a distance, which would afford commodious quarters, gave directions for the way forward, through the country of the Macrons, and in the evening took his leave.

Anab. l. 4.  
c. 7. s. 16—  
18.

s. 19.

Next day a circumstance occurred, in another manner indicating the approach of the army to the sphere of Grecian communication and commerce. While the advanced guard were felling some trees, to facilitate the passage of a river, a body of the Macrons approached, to oppose it. Orders were not yet given for measures to force the way, when a targeteer of the Grecian army came to Xenophon, and told him ' he had overheard the enemy's conversation, and understood their language; in short, circumstances altogether gave him to believe theirs to be his native country; for, tho long since free, he had origi-

c. 8. s. 1—6.

'nally been imported to Athens as a slave. If, therefore, he might be permitted, he would speak to them.' The Macrons readily listened to a man speaking their own language; and, being told that the Greeks desired their friendship, and were enemies to the king of Persia, they instantly laid aside all appearance of animosity. A treaty, presently concluded, was ratified by the exchange of a Grecian for a Macron spear, and some invocations of their respective deities. The barbarians then assisted sedulously in felling trees and clearing the way, mixed without reserve in the Grecian camp, and, in a march of three days through their country, providing the best market it could readily afford, conducted the army to the Colchian mountains.

Treaty with the Colchians being either neglected or unavailing, an effort of some difficulty and hazard here became necessary. But against superior arms and discipline, directed by superior science, the numbers and bravery of barbarians, tho seconded by very advantageous ground, as usual failed; and, in two days more, the army reached the first great object of its wishes, a Grecian town, Trapezus, now vulgarly Trebizond, on the shore of the Euxine sea. At this place, a large and flourishing commercial settlement from Sinopë, itself a colony from Miletus, they found that friendly reception which, from those claiming the same ancestry, speaking the same language, acknowledging the same religion, tho unconnected in civil government, they had promised themselves. Here therefore, as for their first arrival in a territory intrinsically friendly, they performed sacrifices, vowed to the supposed guides of their march, Protecting Jupiter and Hercules. Games in the Grecian manner, were added; horseraces, footraces, wrestling, boxing and the pancratium. Thus they proposed at the same time to celebrate their own adventure, to entertain their kind hosts, and to show farther their respect and gratitude to the gods<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> The Greeks passed through Armenia in midwinter. Tournefort set out from Trebizond for Erzerum, the modern capital of Armenia, in the train of the bashaw of that place, toward midsummer. Even at that season the bashaw took a circuitous way, as the more commodious and less rugged. On the seventh of June nevertheless they passed over bare mountains, with snow on the ground; the cold severe; the fog so thick that they could not see one another four paces off; and even in the valley, in which they halted for the night, not a stick, nor even a cowslot, says Tournefort, was to be found to burn; even the bashaw could have no victuals dressed that day. From Trebizond thus far (a journey of five days) the country bore a near resemblance to the Alps

and

Anab. 1. 4.  
c. 8. s. 7—  
17.

February.  
Forster's  
Diss.

s. 18—21.

## SECTION V.

*Return of the Greeks. Transactions at Trapèzus, Cerasus, (beneficial Effect of Grecian Superstition) Cotyora, (Spirit of Grecian Military Discipline) Sinopè, Heracleia, Port-Calpè.*

IT was not éasy to persuade the multitude that, when once thus arrived on Grecian ground, any considerable dangers or difficulties could necessarily interfere with their progress to Greece. But their numbers, hitherto so important for their preservation, became now their hindrance. One or two, or perhaps a hundred of them, might readily have found conveyance by sea. But how, at Trapezus, vessels could be collected for transporting all, and how, in the interval, so large an addition to the population of a town, with so small a territory, and so distant from friendly and civilized countries, could be subsisted, were matters apparently not within calculation. On the contrary, to pass by land, to any point of the connected line of Grecian colonies, for a small party, was perhaps impossible; yet their united strength might probably command its way, tho' far through a

and Pyrenees. Even in descending the mountains, on the southern side, the way was through narrow, barren, woodless valleys, inspiring, according to Tournefort's expression, nothing but melancholy. It was not till the tenth or eleventh day's march, in that favorable season, with all the advantages that a bashaw, going in peace to take possession of his government, could command, that they arrived among fertile fields, in which various grains were cultivated; and not till the twelfth day that they reached Erzerum. Snow had fallen at Erzerum on the first of June. At midsummer, for an hour after sunrise, the cold was so sharp there as to benumb the hands and incapacitate them for writing, tho' the midday heat was inconvenient, even to a Languedocian. Not a tree nor a bush was to be seen around Erzerum: fir, brought a two or three days journey, was the only wood known for burn-

ing: the common fuel was cowdung; of the effect of which upon his victuals, and the smell everywhere, Tournefort vehemently complains. *Voy. au Levant, Lettre 18.*

According to the same respectable writer the shortest way from Erzerum to Trebizond, for a single man, in the favorable season, is only a five days journey. But his account, and all accounts, show it likely that the direct way, from the Armenian plains to Trapezus, would have been impracticable for the Grecian army, and that it was necessary to diverge eastward. Georgia, tho' to the north, has a much milder climate, and supplies Armenia with fruits. It seems therefore every way probable that the guide, ill-treated by Cheirisophus, executed his office faithfully and ably, while he remained with the army; conducting it by a circuitous, indeed, but the most advantageous, and, at that season, perhaps even the only way.

hostile

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 1. s. 2, 3.

hostile country, mountainous and difficult, with a few Grecian settlements only, at wide intervals, on the coast. The soldiers, however, alive to the impression of past fatigues and perils, were thoughtlessly eager for the passage by sea. 'I am tired,' said one, 'of eternally collecting my necessaries, walking, running, marching in rank and file, mounting guard, and fighting. With the sea before us, why should we not use the advantage, and proceed the rest of our way, like Ulysses, sleeping, to Greece<sup>25</sup>?' This improvident speech was received with general applause; and Cheirisophus, a well-meaning and zealous, but not an able officer, confirmed the impression, by exciting hope that he could give practicability to the proposal: 'Anaxibius,' he said, 'who, I am informed, now commands the Lacedæmonian fleet, is my friend, and if you will commission me, I think I can bring both transports to carry, and triremes to convoy you.' This was decisive; the soldiers, who, in the deficiency of established subordination, had been summoned by their generals to common debate upon the occasion, immediately voted that Cheirisophus should go without delay.

c. 1. s. 3.

Ch 15. s. 4,  
of this Hist.

It remained then for Xenophon, the other generals little assisting in difficult circumstances, to provide that the army should have subsistence, and to preserve in it that order and discipline, without which it would risk to become a nuisance to friends or a prey to enemies. Few had wherewithal to buy necessaries in the Trapezuntine market, nor could the Trapezuntines furnish a market equal to the demand. To rob the neighboring barbarians seemed the only resource; and under sanction of the common Grecian tenet, that, against those to whom they were bound by no compact, they were by no moral or religious law forbidden any violence, it was put in practice without scruple; at the proposal of Xenophon himself, and under regulations of his proposal. At first this nefarious expedient was successful; but repeated losses taught the barbarians to secure their property, and revenge themselves on the robbers. A maroding party, consisting of two lochi, was mostly cut off; Cleænetus, the commanding lochage, fell; and the slaughter was altogether greater perhaps than, in any one action, the army had yet suffered. Nothing was now any more to be found, within such a distance that

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 1. s. 11.

s. 12.

<sup>25</sup> Referring to Homer's description in the thirteenth book of the *Odyssey*, v. 116.

the expedition could be completed in a day; for the guides furnished by the Trapezuntines, instructed in the considerations necessary for the welfare of their town, avoided the nearer tribes, whose friendship had been cultivated or was desirable, and led the parties to the more distant, who were either hostile, or whose disposition the Trapezuntines little regarded. Thus, without advancing, the Greeks underwent the fatigues and dangers of a march through an enemy's country. Yet the necessity was urgent for continuing the practice, and giving it, if possible, increased efficacy. Intelligence therefore being obtained of a strong hold in the mountains, where the tribe esteemed the most warlike of the coast had collected their cattle, Xenophon put himself at the head of half the army, and, not without risk, equal to any undergone in the whole expedition, stormed it, and led off the booty.

Anab. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 1.  
c. 3. s. 2.

The store thus iniquitously acquired was however nearly exhausted, and where to procure another supply nobody could tell, while the return of Cheirisophus, and intelligence from him, remained equally in vain expected. Xenophon, always fearing that vessels for transporting so large an army could not be procured, had proposed sending requisitions to the Grecian towns on the coast, to repair the roads communicating between them, for the purpose of facilitating the march, if to march should at last become necessary; but the soldiers would not then hear of marching, or give their sanction to anything that might promote the purpose. Of his own authority, nevertheless, he sent to recommend the measure to the magistrates, urging the inconvenience that might arise from the delay of so large an army in their narrow territories; and general attention was paid to his recommendation. A proposal to press vessels for the transport-service had been better received by the army, and a penteconter, borrowed from the Trapezuntines for the purpose, was committed to Dexippus, a Lacedæmonian. But this man immediately betrayed the trust, sailed for the Hellespont, and left the deceived army to account to the Trapezuntines for the loss of their vessel. These nevertheless lent a triaconter, one of the smallest vessels used as ships of war by the Greeks, having only thirty oars. Polycrates, an Athenian, appointed commander, was diligent and successful; many vessels were pressed, and the cargoes, being landed at Trapezus, were preserved for the owners.

s. 3.

c. 1. s. 7, 8.

c. 3. s. 6, 9,  
10.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 3.

The evident necessity for moving was now become such that none any longer refused or hesitated. An estimate being made of what the vessels collected might carry, it was presently agreed that, under the two oldest generals, Philesius and Sophænetus, all who had passed their fortieth year should be indulged with conveyance by sea, together with the sick, the many women and children, and the heavy baggage; and that the rest should march by land. The road, through the fortunate precaution of Xenophon, was already prepared; the marching and the navigating divisions moved together, and, on the third day, met again at Cerasus, another settlement of the Sinopians, on the Euxine shore; the place to which Europe owes the cherry, the natural produce of the surrounding hills; first carried to Italy by Lucullus, the Roman conqueror of the country, above three hundred and thirty years after the expedition of Cyrus; thence, within little more than a century, naturalized in Britain, and still, wherever it has spread, bearing in its name the memorial of its origin.

Tournafort.  
Voy. au Levant.  
lett. 17.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 4.

On reassembling at Cerasus the army was mustered, and the heavy-armed were found to be still eight thousand six hundred, remaining out of about ten thousand. It is certainly matter for wonder, that no greater loss was suffered from the various enemies encountered; but what, with those who have the care of armies, infinitely more deserves consideration, is that, in such a service, without even ordinary conveniencies, without tents, without stores, passing through changes of climate the most violent, tho some had been frozen to death, scarcely any had perished by sickness<sup>26</sup>.

The

<sup>26</sup> Xenophon's summary detail, if it may be so called, of the loss, is remarkable: *Οὐ δὲ ἄλλοι, ἀπόλοιο ὑπὸ τε πολεμίων, καὶ χιόνος, καὶ ἢ τις νόσος*, as if he was hardly certain that any had died of sickness. The passage may perhaps be most nearly translated thus: *The rest perished by enemies and snow, and possibly a few by sickness.*

Since, by a wise and humane attention, the evil of that formerly dreadful scourge of the modern sea-service, the scurvy, has been obviated, the men employed in that service have been no more subject to mortality, or disability, from sickness, than

those in the healthiest occupation of civil life ashore. In land warfare, indeed, circumstances frequently arise, in which the health of the soldier cannot be provided for, as that of men ashipboard always may. But, seeing sickness so greatly more prevalent in one service than in the other, may it not deserve consideration what are the circumstances, among those likely to affect health, in which they do, but need not, differ; or need not in the degree to which they do? In looking to these then, two, much within the officer's power, are striking; the diet, and the clothing. The seaman's diet, when aboard,

The delay at Trapezus had given opportunity to dispose advantageously of the slaves, taken in the course of the march. It appears to have been a principal object of the traffic of these distant settlements, on barbarian shores, to supply Greece with slaves; and there seems too much reason to fear that, opportunity exciting cupidity, cattle and corn were not alone sought in the various excursions from Trapezus, but the wretched barbarians, when they could be caught, were themselves taken, and exposed in the Trapezuntine market. The spoil, which must have been mostly collected since the circumvention of the generals, was now of large amount, arising chiefly from the sale or ransom of prisoners. At Cerasus it was divided, and, according to custom, a tenth was committed to the generals, to be disposed of in offerings to the gods; principally to the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Diana.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 5—  
13.

As, in approaching Greece, apprehension of dangers and difficulties aboard, is provided for him, and he has scarcely any choice: the soldier is often much at liberty about both meat and drink. On the contrary, for clothing, the seaman manages for himself; chuses, among what he possesses, what he would, on different occasions, wear, and how he would wear it; in hot or in cold, in wet or in dry weather, in action or in rest. The soldier is denied almost all choice: the admonition of his feelings, arising from the state of his body at the time, given by beneficent nature purposely to direct him, he is forbidden to obey. Young and old, of one constitution and another, all are compelled to follow the same regulations. Pliant youth readily accommodates itself so far as to bear what is, at first, severely adverse to the feelings, and may remain injurious to the constitution; especially tight ligatures, and the heat produced by overthick, or overclose clothing, in hot weather; insomuch that, when the habit is fixed, it becomes even painful to dispense with the injurious pressure: which however surely cannot be advantageous preparation for winter duty, even in the mild climate of our own island, in its internal peace amid a warring world; and still far less for the winter campaigns of modern European warfare. If then, on severe

service, indulgence is allowed, the habit of the parade and field of exercise is adverse to a just use of it: if the desire is not done away, the knowledge, which should have been the result of experience is wanting. For the soldier to take advantageous care of himself in clothing, as the seaman does, he must have the seaman's practice in that care.

To return then to the point whence we set out, the Greeks appear to have been limited by no regulations, either for clothing, as the soldier with us, or for diet, as the seaman; tho, for one important circumstance of diet, they were limited by the fortunate ignorance, in their age, of spirituous liquors. In their case thus it might appear, that the opportunity of choice, advantageous for clothing, was not generally injurious for diet; and it would follow, that the denial of opportunity to consult feeling for clothing, may reasonably be suspected to be, in our service, the injurious circumstance. Of modern physicians, some have attributed much importance to clothing: others appear to have slighted the consideration of it. Those who have attended armies on service, diligently adverting to all circumstances, will best know how to estimate its value, and direct practice accordingly.

wore away, a carelessness, approaching to scorn, of discipline and subordination, grew: the generals were regarded only as attention to them was necessary either for profit or safety. The eve of departure from Cerasus, therefore, after a stay of ten days, was chosen by a profligate band, collected by a profligate lochage, for an attempt to plunder a village of friendly barbarians in the neighborhood. Measures however were so ill taken, that the outrage was successfully resisted, and the lochage himself killed, with many of his associates. But the barbarians, alarmed at their own success, sent three of their elders to Cerasus, to complain of the injury attempted against them, to deprecate revenge, apprehended for the unpremeditated slaughter made in their necessary defence, and to offer, what they knew Grecian prejudices made important, the bodies of the slain for burial. The marching division of the army was already gone, when they arrived; but, the Cerasuntines assuring them that the injurious attack had been the unapproved measure only of some worthless individuals, they would have followed by sea to the next Grecian town on the coast, rather than appear deficient in compliment and apology to the generals and army. Unfortunately the miscreants, who had fled from the victorious barbarians, were still in Cerasus. Learning what was going forward, and fearing just vengeance, their resource was to excite a tumult, in which the unfortunate elders were stoned to death; and, as an inflamed multitude is not guided by reason, passion took new objects, the generals themselves were alarmed, and some of the Cerasuntines perished before quiet could be restored.

These however were the actions of a profligate few, or an impassioned multitude, disowned and reprobated by the generals, and, in any moment of reflection, by the greater part of the army; whose principles of humanity and morality nevertheless, as we become more acquainted with them, will not rise in our estimation. Soon after quitting Cerasus, the marching division entered a country of uncommonly rugged mountains, occupied by an independent hord, the Mosyneeks, with complexions singularly fair, and manners singularly uncouth. The dissensions of this people among themselves principally facilitated the march; which one tribe had no sooner resolved to oppose, than another became disposed to favor. Thus, in a passage of eight days, the Greeks found means to obviate opposition. Equally unresisted, they crossed the still

loftier

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 7. s. 9—  
15.

c. 4. s. 1.

c. 5. s. 1.



loftier mountains of the Chalybs, subjects of the Mosyneeks, and employed by them in working the steel, the valuable produce of their rugged soil. Descending then into the more champain country of the Tibarenes, they were met by heralds, bearing presents, the pledges of hospitality. But peace here lost its charms. The generals themselves had observed from the heights, with longing eyes, that the villages of the Tibarenes were in assailable situations; and plunder, and gratification to the dishonest desires of their troops, were immediately proposed. The offered presents were therefore rejected; for acceptance would have engaged them in compact with the givers; and this would have engaged the gods in opposition to the robbery, for which, on the contrary, it was hoped to obtain divine approbation and favor. Sacrifice was accordingly resorted to, but the symptoms were adverse: more victims were immolated, but in vain. The augurs were unanimous in declaring, that the gods totally disapproved war with the Tibarenes.

Between two writers, so near together in all other points as Thucydides and Xenophon, the difference appears extraordinary, which we find in their manner of speaking of the religion of their age, and particularly of the reputed science of divination, which was so intimately connected with the religion. Thucydides, a man evidently of very serious and generally just thought on religious and moral subjects, never shows any faith in pretensions to prophecy, nor attributes any consequence to a sacrifice. On the contrary, Xenophon is continually holding out the importance of various ceremonies, especially sacrifice, and avowing implicit credit in that science which pretended, from the symptoms of victims, from dreams, and from various occurrences in nature, to learn the will of the gods, and to foretel future events. It is hazardous to undertake to say for another what he thought, which he has not said, on a subject on which he has said much; but some passages in the writings of Xenophon seem to afford ground for supposing, that the strong feeling he had of the want of some check upon the passions of men, which the religion and morality of his age did not offer, led him to value a superstition which might be employed for the most salutary purposes, and to carry the profession of his belief sometimes rather beyond the reality. On more than one occasion we find cause to suspect his influence among the prophets and augurs of the Cyreian army: and indeed if ever deceit, for preventing evil, might

be allowed, it would do credit to the scholar of Socrates, in the business of the Tibarenes; for, apparently, nothing but the advantage made of a salutary superstition could have preserved the property of that unoffending people from plunder, their persons from slavery, and probably many lives from slaughter. The augurs, not preaching any purer morality than the army professed, not holding, as any general rule, 'that unoffending men might not, without offence to the gods, be plundered, enslaved, or murdered,' but merely insisting, 'that the gods denied their approbation in the existing circumstances,' the presents of the Tibarenes were at length accepted. The army then proceeded peacefully through their country, and in two days arrived at Cotyora, a third Grecian colony from Sinopë, with a port on the Euxine sea.

B. C. 400.  
June.  
Forster's  
Diss.

Anab. l. 5.  
c. 5. s. 3. &  
seq.

Whether ill report had preceded them to Cotyora, or what else was the cause, they found there something very different from the hospitality expected, and hitherto experienced, from Grecian towns. Admission, even for their sick, was denied; a market, even without the walls, was refused. Plunder thus became a necessary resource; and the farms of the Cotyorites, and the villages of the neighboring Paphlagonians suffered. But the conduct of those who directed the counsels of the Cotyorites, in which the Sinopian superintendent held the lead, appears to have been remiss as it was illiberal. Without violence, as far as our information goes, the troops found opportunity to enter the town. Immediately possession was taken of the gates, to insure the freedom of future ingress and egress, and quarters were required for the sick; but the rest of the army remained incamped without the walls, and no farther force was put upon the people. Information quickly communicated to Sinopë, brought a deputation thence to the army, and a friendly accommodation followed. It was agreed that the sick should remain in quarters, that a market should be provided, and that vessels should be furnished for transporting the army to Heracleia, the next Grecian town beyond Sinopë, and the most easterly on the coast, independent of that city; Heracleia was a colony from Megara.

l. 6. c. 1.  
s. 1.

This arrangement fortunately prevented hostilities, threatened between Greeks and Greeks, but did not inable the soldiers without money to profit from the market provided. Tho the farms of the Cotyorites therefore were spared, plunder was continued among the Paphlagonian villages. But this was not tamely borne; not only stragglers from the camp

camp were cut off, but nightly alarm was sometimes extended to the camp itself. During the awkward leisure, while the transports were waited for, inquiry was made about the way by land through Paphlagonia: but accounts were far from encouraging to attempt the march. Westward of Heracleia a very lofty range of mountains, extending far inland, ends in precipices against the sea. One only practicable road, through most hazardous defiles, traversed this range. Spacious plains followed, but intersected by four large rivers, of which the Halys and Parthenius were not fordable. The country was united under one prince, who, with a hundred thousand men at his orders, his cavalry the best in Asia, had dared refuse obedience to the commands of the great king.

Anab. 1.5.  
c. 6. s. 3.

Such being the formidable obstacles to the passage by land, while means for procuring sufficient vessels for the transport by sea were yet doubtful, the successful example of those Greeks, who, from small beginnings, had raised flourishing colonies on the Euxine shores, engaged the consideration of Xenophon. What advantages would not be open for such a force as that of the Cyreian army, for by that name it became now distinguished, could its united exertions be directed to the establishment of a colony? Those whom home invited, might easily find their passage by sea; the far greater number would probably still desire, indeed their wants would urge them, to join in promising adventure; and could they any other way end so advantageously, or so honorably, an expedition of much glory, but hitherto of little profit, as by extending the Grecian name and dominion, in a new colony on the Euxine shore? Xenophon communicated his idea to the Ambraciot Silanus, the principal soothsayer of the army; but he was unfortunate in this communication. Silanus had preserved thus far, through all difficulties, the three thousand darics, presented to him by Cyrus for his fortunate prophecy, previous to their meeting with the king's army in Mesopotamia, and he was beyond all things anxious to get them safe into his own country. A project therefore, which tended directly to check the progress of the army toward Greece, alarmed him: he communicated it to those who, he thought, would most zealously oppose it; and a very mischievous ferment ensued. The principal movers were the general Timasion, and a Bœotian lochage, named Thorax. The earnest purpose of Timasion, an

s. 7, 8.

exile

exile from Dardanum in Troas, was to make the powerful army, in which he had been raised to so high a rank, instrumental to his restoration; and, to ingage the general view that way, he proposed the plunder of the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus, of which the fertile region of Troas was only a small part, as the object that should ingage attention. That, he said, would indeed reward the labors of the expedition, and send all wealthy to their several homes. Thorax had been competitor with Xenophon for the command formerly held by Proxenus, and had ever since been attentive to opportunities for opposing his successful rival, and lessening his credit with the army. These two men were sedulous in exciting alarm among the Heracleots and Sinopians, readily jealous of a new establishment in their neighborhood, so powerful as the Cyreian army might have made. Having assured themselves, as they thought, of support from those people, they made promises to the army, which they found themselves unable to perform. Then they became apprehensive of the army's indignation: they solicited accommodation with Xenophon, and themselves put forward a project for a settlement on the river Phasis in Colchis, at the eastern end of the Euxine, the scene of the celebrated fabulous adventure of the golden fleece. This again excited the jealousy of Neon, who commanded for Cheirisophus in his absence; and thus shortly the whole army became divided in views, and filled with most inconvenient jealousies.

In his account of this business, it has been clearly the purpose of Xenophon to apologize for himself. Circumstances apparently would not allow him to speak the whole truth; but the project of colonization, evidently enough, was not popular in the army. The soldiers desired to grow rich, by a more compendious method than tilling an uncultivated country, among barbarians; and, while their generals disagreed among themselves, they grew careless of their generals, and held their own assemblies, to consider of putting forward their own projects. Xenophon then took upon himself to call the army together. He explained his conduct and intentions, so as to give general satisfaction; and, encouraged by finding himself so far successful, he proceeded to urge to consideration the dangers and the disgraces already incurred, through deficiency of subordination. He related the transactions on their quitting Cerasus, the particulars of which were not generally known;

and he called their attention to the portentous pollutions there incurred and hazarded. ‘Greeks, their fellowsoldiers,’ he observed, ‘attempting a most unjustifiable outrage, had met a just fate. Barbarians, not only connected with them by friendly intercourse, but vested with the sacred character of heralds, had been wickedly murdered. That the corpses of their fellowsoldiers were at length obtained for burial, they owed to the moderation of the barbarians and their respect for religion, and to the kind interference of the injured Cerasuntines. Were enormities like these permitted, instead of returning glorious to Greece, amid the applauses and caresses of their fellowcountrymen, if indeed their misconduct did not first bring destruction on them, they would be avoided, repelled, and detested, wherever they went or were heard of.’

Moved by this strong remonstrance, the army resolved, That all the late transactions should be taken into consideration, and that a better order of things should be enforced by the punishment of passed irregularity. The lochages, as the intermediate order between the generals and the soldiers, were reckoned fittest to decide on the conduct of both, and the whole body of them was constituted a court-martial. After accusations against inferiors had been judged, the generals themselves were called to account. Sophænetus, Philesius, and Xanthicles had been, by a vote of the army, appointed commissioners for the care of the cargoes of the merchantships pressed at Trapezus; and goods had been missing. Sophænetus, for having refused the office, was fined ten mines, about thirty-five pounds; Philesius and Xanthicles, who had undertaken it, were fined twenty mines, about seventy pounds, each, the estimated value of the missing goods<sup>27</sup>. Accusation was then brought against Xenophon, for acting with injurious haughtiness in command, and particularly for beating some soldiers. He acknowledged striking several for disorderly conduct; quitting their ranks, to run forward for plunder; indangering

<sup>27</sup> This I think the sense of the passage, which has however some difficulty. The editors have indeed supposed an omission in transcription. But it does not appear to me that Xenophon has, like his translators, Latin and English, imputed peculation to Philesius and Xanthicles. He merely says that they were fined to the amount of the deficiency, without declaring whether that

deficiency was occasioned by their dishonesty, their negligence, or their inability. Indeed it would be a strange award, to punish the man who had merely avoided an office, and not to punish those who had been guilty of peculation in an office; for if they were fined only to the amount of goods they had fraudulently taken, they were not punished.

themselves

themselves and the whole army, by yielding to the impression of fatigue and cold, while the enemy was pressing on the rear. But he insisted that he had punished none excepting when the good of all, and even their own good, required: he had given blows of the fist (for that is his expression), to save them from strokes of the enemy's weapons<sup>28</sup>; and those who were now so forward to complain, he was confident would be mostly found such as Boiscus, the Thessalian boxer; who had been clamorous, on pretence of sickness, to have his shield carried for him, and now, unless report grossly belied him, had been waylaying and robbing many of the Cotyorites. If he had himself ever offended any of better character, they, he trusted, would recollect if any were indebted to him for benefits; if he had ever relieved any in cold, in want, in sickness, and in perils from the enemy; if, while he punished the disorderly, he was always ready, to the utmost of his power, to honor and reward the deserving. It sufficed to mention these things, and Xenophon was honorably acquitted.

Such detached and incidental information only, which, when collected, will give no system, is all that remains whence to gather an idea of Greek military law. In an army so formed as the Cyreian, we may suppose the system less perfect than under the government of Lacedæmon, or even of Athens. But we may perhaps, in Xenophon's account of this expedition, more than anywhere, discover the general spirit of the military system of the age. What we find principally striking is, that it was at the same time arbitrary and lax. We wonder to find those who, in civil government, were zealots for liberty, even to licentiousness, submit so readily, in military, to an undefined command. At the same time we may wonder, in a command so liable to interruption and controul from an undefined right of resistance to injury, to find regularity and subordination nevertheless generally existing. Two motives however we may observe, comparatively little felt in modern armies, powerfully and almost constantly operating upon the Greek; the hope of profit from the plunder of the enemy, and the fear of suffering from the enemy's revenge. Almost unceasing wars, within a narrow country, taught every Greek the value of military discipline. Alone he felt himself weak; in a phalanx he felt himself powerful;

<sup>28</sup> "Ἐπαισα πῦξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ πολεμίων παύσῃτο.

being

being weak, his lot would be death or slavery from the enemy: being strong, all the enemy's possessions would, in share, be his; a price even for the enemy's person, sold to slavery, would reward him for his submission to discipline. Discipline, in short, was preserved among the Greeks (the comparison appears degrading, but it is apposite) as among the smugglers with us; by a strong sense of a common interest in it. Strong acts of arbitrary power then are congenial and necessary to every simple government, whether monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy: Being therefore familiar to the Greeks in civil administration, they were easily borne in military.

The army waited forty-five days at Cotyora, for a sufficient number of vessels to take their whole number, and then proceeded for Sinopë, a flourishing Grecian town, very advantageously situated on the Paphlagonian coast; the mother-city of Cotyora, Cerasus, and Trapezus, which it held in dependency; itself a colony from Miletus. We cannot here but pay a tribute of admiration to the bold and successful adventure of a few Greeks, who, wandering thus far from the soft climate of Ionia, could wrest, from one of the most powerful vassals of the Persian empire, a seaport and territory in the middle of his coast, and thence still extend the Grecian name, in various settlements on barbarian shores, to such a distance. Arriving at Armenë, one of the ports of Sinopë, the army had the satisfaction to find Cheirisophus, with some triremes, on his way to meet them. On landing they were greeted with a present of meal and wine from the Sinopians; much for that people to give, but far below their wants. They had hoped to have these more amply provided for by Cheirisophus; but he brought them, from Anaxibius the Lacedæmonian admiral, only approbation and applause, with a promise that, as soon as they reached the shore of the Propontis, they should be taken into pay.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 5. s. 5.  
1. 6. c. 1.  
s. 8, 9.

Hitherto, to return home in safety had been the great object. Now, with a nearer view of its accomplishment, they began with more anxiety to consider how they should live at home; or how, before they yet returned, they might acquire means to live there in some credit and ease. Plunder was the mode, which the principles and circumstances of the age so recommended, that they thought they should be wanting to

themselves, if, before they separated, they did not use their united strength for the purpose. Where it should be exerted remained to be determined; and they began to consider that nothing was more necessary to success than unity of command. For a commander-in-chief, then, the general view was directed to Xenophon: many officers conferred with him in private; and, tho he declared his resolution to avoid the invidious honor, yet when the army assembled to decide on the subject, he was proposed, and the nomination supported by a very large majority. He nevertheless persisted in refusing what, he confesses, very much allured his ambition. The state of Greece, and the umbrage that would be taken by the Lacedæmonian government, deterred him; but the army would not be satisfied with such an excuse; and he was obliged to recur to his common resource, the superstition of the age. Confirming his asseveration with an oath, by all the gods and goddesses, he said he had consulted the deity in sacrifices, whether it would be better for the army and himself that the command-in-chief should be conferred upon him; and the divine will was declared in the negative, in so clear a manner, that the most inexperienced in augury could not mistake it.

Anab. 1. 6.  
c. 1. s. 21.

s. 22.

Unable to resist such an argument, the army then elected Cheirisophus; who appears to have been not of shining talents, but a prudent and worthy man. He declared, that had their choice fallen on another, he should have submitted. On the acceptance of Xenophon's refusal, nevertheless, he congratulated both them and Xenophon; whose appointment, he said, could scarcely have been otherwise than unfortunate, on account of the ill offices done him with the admiral Anaxibius, by the unprincipled Dexippus, who had deserted with the penteconter from Trapezus. He then freely acknowledged that he had found his own interest with Anaxibius not such as he had hoped. His best exertions however should not be wanting to serve them, in the honorable situation in which they had placed him, and he meant to sail the next day for Heracleia. Accordingly, after a stay of only five days at Sinopë, they embarked, and on the morrow reached Heracleia, a colony from Megara, flourishing in population and commerce. They were greeted, as at Sinopë, with a present, the pledge of hospitality from the Heracleots; and

s. 11.

c. 2. s. 1, 2.



and a present liberal and even magnificent for a state like theirs, a single city. It consisted of meal equal to that given by the Sinopians, a larger quantity of wine, and the valuable addition of twenty oxen and a hundred sheep.

It seems to have been the purpose of Cheirisophus to check the project of robbery and plunder, which had been cherished, and to conduct the army quietly to Byzantium, where he expected it would be immediately taken into Lacedæmonian pay. This however was not generally satisfactory; and some licentious spirits, foreseeing opposition to their views against the property of barbarians, and encouraged by a degree of contempt, which seems to have been general, for the abilities of Cheirisophus, began to conceive more criminal designs. More than

half the army were Arcadians or Achaians; and the generals, who had the particular command of those troops, not superior in abilities to Cheirisophus, were far inferior in estimation; as their cities were in political consequence inferior to his. Hence opportunity occurred for some worthless officers, by indulging licence, and flattering with promises, to gain a leading influence among the troops. All were assembled

Anab. 1. 6.  
c. 2. s. 6.

to deliberate whether to proceed by land or sea; a measure indicating that, either the authority committed to the commander-in-chief was very defective, or he doubted himself, and wanted talent for command. Lycon, an Achaian lochage, rose and said, 'It was matter of wonder to him, that the generals did not think of measures for providing subsistence: what had been just received as a present would not last three days: in his opinion demand should be made upon the Heracleots for not less than three thousand Cyzicenes.' The Cyzicene

s. 3.

was a gold coin, named from the Greek city of Cyzicus on the Propontis, in value about a guinea. This extortion seemed over modest to others, who were for requiring a month's pay, not less than ten thousand Cyzicenes. Presently it was voted that commissioners should be appointed to go into the city, and Cheirisophus and Xenophon were named. Military authority seems to have ceased: the commander-in-chief could merely excuse himself from obeying the orders of the army, become a popular assembly; and Xenophon interfered no farther than to join with Cheirisophus in a kind of protest, that no violence

s. 4.

Anab. 1. 6.  
c. 2. s. 5.

ought to be put upon a friendly Grecian city. Regardless of this protest, the troops appointed the Achaian Lycon, with two Arcadian officers, Callimachus and Agasias, to go as their deputies to the Heracleots. Lycon, according to report, was not sparing of threats to enforce the insolent demand. The Heracleots, with prudent calmness, answered, that they would consult upon it. The leisure, thus gained, they employed in bringing in their effects from the country, and they shut their gates and manned their walls.

s. 6.

s. 10.

The mutineer officers, disappointed by these measures, accused the generals of having caused the miscarriage, and persuaded the Arcadians and Achaians, to the number of four thousand five hundred, all heavy-armed, to separate themselves from the rest of the army. Electing then ten commanders, they negotiated with the Heracleots for transports to convey them forward: and, anxiety for riddance of such inmates promoting the business, they were quickly supplied. In all haste then they sailed, eager to be foremost in plundering the Bithynian Thracians.

s. 11.

c. 3. s. 1.

c. 2. s. 7.

Thus ended the command of Cheirisophus, about the seventh day from his elevation. Vessels to carry the remainder of the army being evidently not to be procured, Xenophon offered to march, still under the Lacedæmonian general, to the Propontis. But Cheirisophus, disgusted at what had happened, depressed, apparently, by sickness, and persuaded by some of his officers, who desired the exclusive advantage of vessels expected from Byzantium, declined the offer: he would take charge only of the small body particularly attached to him, consisting of about fourteen hundred Grecian heavy-armed, and the Thracian targeteers who had served under Clearchus, in number about seven hundred. There remained with Xenophon about seventeen hundred heavy-armed, three hundred targeteers, and forty horse, being the whole cavalry of the army.

s. 8—11.

s. 10.

c. 4. s. 1.

No Grecian town, no friendly people was to be found between Heracleia and the Bosphorus; a distance in a right line, of more than a hundred miles<sup>29</sup>, occupied by the Bithynians, a Thracian hord, the most inimical

<sup>29</sup> Τριῆρους μὲν ἔστιν εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἐκ Βυζαντίου πώπαις ἡμέρας μάλα μακρᾶς ἀλλοῦς. This

we should suppose could not be one hundred miles. Yet Arrian, in his Periplus, calls the distance

inimical to the Greeks, and the most skilled in war, of any barbarians of that continent. Cheirisophus proceeded along the coast to an unoccupied harbour, about midway, called Port-Calpë; thinking there to meet the expected vessels. No occurrence disturbed the march; but, presently after his arrival, a fever ended the general's days<sup>30</sup>.

Anab. 1.6.  
c. 3. s. 7.

c. 4. s. 8.  
c. 3. s. 7.

Xenophon took a more inland road; hoping by brisk progress, directly to Chalcedon, to arrive before the Bithynians could assemble, in any great numbers, to oppose him. But this hope was rendered vain by the diligence of the Arcadians, in the execution of their project for marauding. Having landed by night at Port-Calpë, they had proceeded immediately inland; and, dividing at daybreak, to fall at once upon several villages, they succeeded in their purpose of surprize: numbers of cattle were taken, and many slaves. Whether these were the slaves or the children of the Bithynians, the historian has not specified, but they were probably both; for abundant testimony, concerning the manners of the Greeks, gives to suppose that, upon such an occasion, free and bondmen, any that would fetch a price in the slavemarket, would be equally taken. Such being the ordinary Grecian practice, we shall little wonder if the Bithynians earned the character, which report gave them, of singular cruelty to any Greeks who, by shipwreck, or other accident, fell into their hands.

Ch. 18. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

c. 4. s. 1.

A hill had been agreed upon by the Arcadians, where to reassemble. But the Bithynians meanwhile collecting in force, pressed them so that, while some joined with their booty, and some without, one party was intirely cut off, and, of another, only eight men escaped. The ineou- A  
agement of success coöperating powerfully with the stimulation of re- C  
sentment, the numbers of the Bithynians increased rapidly; and the Arcadians, passing the night on the hill, found themselves in the morning surrounded and besieged. The Bithynian cavalry were numerous,

distance one thousand six hundred and seventy stadia, which, at eight stadia to the mile, is more than two hundred miles; but probably Arrian reckoned the winding of the coast, which might be more than double the direct distance.

<sup>30</sup> According to Spelman, it was a medicine that killed Cheirisophus; but I think the expression of Xenophon may be interpreted more favorably for the physician; and so Leunclavius, by his Latin version, appears to have thought.

the

the infantry all targeteers ; while the Arcadians, all heavy-armed, open to annoyance from missile weapons, could not return a wound ; and shortly they were excluded from their watering-place. Totally at a loss for measures, they proposed a treaty, and terms were agreed upon ; but, the Bithynians refusing to give hostages, the Arcadians feared to trust them, and, in extreme anxiety, they passed a second night on the hill.

Anab. 1.6.  
c. 3. s. 7.

s. 12.

Xenophon meanwhile, pressing the march of his heavy-armed, employed his small body of cavalry in ranging the country, to collect intelligence and obviate surprize ; and thus he obtained information of what had befallen the Arcadians. It was highly desirable, not only to relieve them, for the sake of many valuable officers and deserving soldiers, led unavoidably as the multitude had inclined, but to form a junction with them for the security of the farther march, which the alarm given to the country would make otherwise highly dangerous. In the deficiency of his force, therefore, Xenophon had recourse to stratagem. He directed his targeteers and horse, spreading from the heavy-armed, to set fire to everything combustible that fell in their way. Choosing his ground for the night on an eminence, whence the enemy's camp-fires were visible at the distance of about five miles, he caused numerous fires to be lighted, to give the appearance of extent to his camp, and, early in the night, all to be suddenly extinguished. Thus he hoped to incourage the Arcadians and alarm the Bithynians. At daybreak he marched, proposing, by a sudden assault, to pierce the Bithynian line, and join the Arcadians, who would coöperate on the other side. His stratagem took effect beyond his expectation : the Bithynians, fearful of nightly attack, withdrew silently. The Arcadians, finding themselves, with the dawn, at complete liberty, marched for Port-Calpè ; and when Xenophon's horse arrived at the hill, some old men and women only were remaining : with a few sheep and oxen, part of the booty taken, which, in the haste of the troops to move, had been neglected. Xenophon followed to Port-Calpè, where he found the Arcadians, together with the forces which had marched under Cheirisophus ; but that general was already dead.

Resting the next day, Xenophon prepared on the morrow<sup>31</sup>, with the accustomed ceremony of sacrifice, for an inroad into the country to collect provisions: and he trusted that the alarm, which he had excited among the Bithynians, would not yet be so far subsided, but that he might have leisure for burying the Arcadian slain. The symptoms of the victims being declared favorable, the Arcadians went out, under cover of his march, and themselves buried their dead; and in the evening all returned together to the camp. Misfortune and disgrace had now sufficiently excited disgust, among the Arcadians, toward those who had persuaded the secession, and prepared them for sober counsel. The older and more respectable of their officers, therefore, Agasias of Stymphalus, Hieronymus of Elis, and others, calling a meeting of the whole army, it was resolved, that the former order of united strength, under the former generals, should be restored, and that in future it should be death to propose a division of the army.

Anab. 1.6.  
c. 4. s. 6.

c. 4. s. 7. 8.

But the union and subordination were thus renewed, some very inconvenient jealousies and suspicions remained among the soldiers. It was imagined that the generals, especially Xenophon, bent upon founding a colony, were desirous of delaying and impeding the return to Greece. The coast, from Heracleia to the Bosphorus, was yet wholly unoccupied by Greeks. Port-Calpè lay nearly midway. There a peninsular rock, with precipitous sides, containing room for the habitation of ten thousand men, commanding a plentiful fountain, and a commodious harbour, was connected, by a narrow neck, with a great extent of fruitful country, abounding with well-inhabited villages, and bearing, even on the water's edge, a profusion of excellent shiptimber. The combination of advantages, for a military and commercial settlement, was uncommon. But the greater part of the soldiers, having families or friends in Greece, whom they had left, not through want at home, but some urged by a disposition for adventure, others allured by the

s. 2—10.

<sup>31</sup> Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο τῆς εἰς ταυτὸ συνέδου. —Something seems wanting here; but the meaning is sufficiently decided by the expression, soon following, ἡδὴ γὰρ ἦσαν περὶ πλάϊσι, whence it appears that Leunclavius has translated well, and Spelman ill. The day next

after the battle, in the Greek mode of expression, the *second day*, the Arcadians passed on the hill, the third they marched to Port-Calpè, the fourth they rested, and the fifth buried the slain.

fame of advantages gained in the service of Cyrus, were now, beyond all things, anxious to return. The real difficulties, however, still opposing, were not small. Could vessels have been procured, the passage to Byzantium was easy; but so much was not hoped for. Meanwhile they were without provisions; and to prevent them from collecting any from the country, and to check their march through it, the fierce and active Bithynians were now joined by the well-appointed cavalry of the satrap Pharnabazus. Under these circumstances, the generals desired to place the incumbrances of the army in the peninsular rock of Calpè, where a small guard would secure them, while the most active of the troops sought necessaries for all. But the obvious advantages of the port and the adjoining territory, strengthening the suspicion entertained, that the generals wanted to intrap them there, command and persuasion were equally ineffectual to induce the soldiers to pass the neck <sup>32</sup>.

Under these difficulties Xenophon recurred to his usual resource, the power of superstition over Grecian minds. We are equally with him, as with his master Socrates, at a loss to know what to think of their belief; but notwithstanding the seriousness with which Xenophon continually speaks of his confidence in augury, and the pains he has taken frequently, and especially upon the present occasion, to justify his conduct under the declared will of the gods, his own account nevertheless appears clearly to indicate policy in all his measures. This at least seems certain, that no confidence in any symptom of the victims ever induced him to neglect any part of the duty of a general. Calling the army, however, together, he pointed out the impossibility of proceeding by sea, the difficulties and dangers of the march by land, and the absolute necessity of moving, which nevertheless their pressing wants occasioned; and he concluded with proposing sacrifice, to learn whether the gods would favor their march. The Ambraciote Silanus having deserted the army at Heracleia, to pass, with his three thousand darics, by sea to Greece, the Arcadian Arexion, his successor in the dignity of chief prophet, presided at the sacred ceremony. He declared all the

Anab. 1.6.  
c.4. s.10.

<sup>32</sup> Spelman has satisfied himself here with translating unintelligibly, what, in the original, is indeed not by itself very clear, but seems sufficiently explained in the sequel.

symptoms

symptoms unfavorable, and the march was stopped for the day; while the soldiers, hungry and dissatisfied, did not scruple, some of them, to say that the prophet's declaration had been influenced by Xenophon.

Informed of this, Xenophon caused proclamation to be made, that sacrifice should be again offered on the morrow, when all prophets, if any were in the army, should attend; and any soldiers might be spectators. Many came; sacrifice was thrice repeated, and the symptoms always unfavorable. The disappointment was in some degree relieved by a report, said to have been communicated by a merchant-ship, passing along the coast, that Cleander, harmost of Byzantium, was coming, with triremes and transports. It was then more cheerfully resolved to wait the day; but still it was urged, that sacrifice should be offered, to know if the gods would approve an inroad, to collect provisions. Sacrifice, thrice again repeated, forbad this equally as the march. The soldiers thronged about Xenophon's tent, complaining of want of food: but he persisted in declaring he would undertake nothing with unfavorable omens.

On the next day sacrifice was again offered, and the anxious soldiers crowded around. The victims still forbidding, the generals agreed that the march was not to be undertaken. They however assembled the army, and Xenophon spoke for them: 'Probably,' he said; 'the enemy were now collected in force, and, for whatever purpose they moved, it might be necessary to fight: if therefore the baggage were deposited in the strong post in the peninsula, and they marched prepared for action, possibly the victims might favor the measure.' Here appears some explanation of the mystery of Xenophon's conduct. At least his expression amounts to a declaration, afterward explicitly made<sup>33</sup>, that he thought the gods commonly favored human prudence, and would not give the reward of wisdom and just precaution to folly and rashness, or of diligence and vigor to remissness and sloth. Pressed however as the soldiers were by hunger, their jealousy of the purpose of the generals prevailed; they exclaimed against moving into

<sup>33</sup> See forward, p. 195. and Xen. Anab. I. 6. c. 4. s. 2. 6 & 12.

the peninsula, and called for immediate sacrifice. Draft-oxen, alone to be found for victims, were immolated, but still the symptoms adverse.

Anab. 1.6.  
c. 4. s. 16, 17.

The want of food now became severe. Neon, an Asinæan (not a Lacedæmonian, but of those subjects of Lacedæmon who were included under the more comprehensive name of Laconians) had been raised to the rank of general, in the room of Cheirisophus. Desirous of gratifying in his new command, he offered to lead any who would put themselves under him, notwithstanding any foreboding in the sacrifices, to plunder some villages, to which an Heracleot, following the army, undertook to conduct. About two thousand turned out, with sacks, leathern bottles, and javelins. While dispersed among the villages for plunder, they were attacked by a body of the satrap's cavalry: full five hundred were killed; a few reached the camp; the rest assembling on a hill, defended themselves, but dared not move. In the whole expedition, so great a loss had not been suffered from an enemy.

s. 18—20.

On the first intelligence of the event, Xenophon assembled the army, and having sacrificed a draft-ox (it is to be presumed the symptoms were favorable, tho he has omitted to say it) he marched with all under thirty years of age, and brought off the distressed party. The Bithynians however followed, occupied the thickets about the camp, and, after dusk, suddenly attacking the outguards, killed some, and drove the rest within the line. Great alarm ensued through the army; and tho, by a proper disposition, immediate danger was soon obviated, no small despondency remained.

c. 5. s. 1.

Thus at length the minds of the soldiers were sufficiently tamed, to obey the orders or take the advice of their generals. Next morning they submitted to be conducted into the peninsula, and an intrenchment, strengthened with a pallisade, was made across the neck. Fortunately, on the same day, a vessel arrived from Heracleia, with corn, wine, and live cattle, or in the historian's phrase, victims<sup>34</sup>.

s. 2, 3.

Early on the morrow Xenophon rose to sacrifice, and not only the prognostics, from the very first victim, were favorable, but, as the

<sup>34</sup> ἱερίαια.



ceremony drew to a conclusion, the prophet Arexion saw an eagle portending good fortune.\* Immediately he exhorted Xenophon to march. The slaves, camp-followers, and baggage were left in the peninsula, with a guard, composed of all the soldiers who had exceeded their forty-fifth year, under the command of Neon: all the rest marched under Xenophon.

They had not proceeded two miles, when they fell in with some scattered bodies of those slain in the last excursion. It was their first care to bury these as they advanced. Arriving about midday near the villages, they collected some necessaries, but avoided dispersing for plunder; and suddenly the enemy appeared, Persian horse and Bithynian foot, upon some hills, not two miles off, in large force; checking their march upon discovering the Greeks, and forming in order of battle. Arexion immediately sacrificed, and the very first victim was favorable. Xenophon, knowing the temper of the enemy, thought it important immediately to march against them. While he was directing the reserve, the head of the column halted at a deep glen<sup>35</sup>, crossing the way. The general's hesitated to pass it, with the enemy so near; and the Arcadian Sophænetus, oldest of those present, gave his opinion decidedly against the risk. Xenophon however, confident that it was safer to attack such an enemy, cavalry and targeteers, than to retreat before them, insisted upon going forward: 'the victims had been all favorable,' he said, 'the omens all happy;' and this argument enabled him to prevail.

Having passed the glen, unmolested, apprehension changed into over-hardiness, and the targeteers ran forward, without orders. The Persian horse, with the crowd of Bithynian foot, met them with advantage of ground; put them to flight, followed toward the heavy-armed phalanx, which was advancing briskly, and approached with

<sup>35</sup> Νάπος. I do not hesitate to thank Spelman for his explanation of this word, for which Strabo affords clear authority in his ninth book,—Πρόκειται δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἡ Κίρρις, κ.τ.ε. p.640, vel.418. The Latin translators, satisfied with the word *saltus*, at least risk to mislead their readers. Xenophon has certainly meant to describe a valley, or glen; what in the provincial speech of the south of England is called a bottom, in that of the north a dene or a gill; and the action of the horse shows that it was without wood, or very scantily wooded.

an appearance of firmness. But when the trumpet sounded, the pæan was sung, and, with a shout, spears were presented, not waiting the charge, they turned and fled. Timasion, with the small body of Grecian horse, completely dispersed the left wing: but the right, pressed by no troops capable of rapid pursuit, collected again, and the phalanx was obliged to advance twice more to charge. Meanwhile the targeteers rallied, and exerting themselves against those whom the heavy-armed had thrown into confusion, the rout at length became complete; the enemy's horse flying from the Grecian foot, even down the steep sides of the glen, says the historian, as if horse were pursuing them. Raising their trophy then, the Greeks returned, and, about sunset, reached their camp.

Anab. l. 6.  
c. 6. s. 1—3.

The advantage of Xenophon's policy became quickly manifest. An army of Persians and Bithynians differed widely from itself, encouraged by success or dejected by defeat. Directing their care to remove their property, out of reach of those against whom they now despaired of defending it, they gave no more disturbance to the Greeks. Their families and more portable effects were carried up the country. Apparently the slaves employed in tillage, as well as the produce of tillage, were left; for parties sent daily from the Grecian army, brought in corn, wine, pulse, and figs. The historian has not specified that this booty was, in any part, contribution by compact, obviating the destruction of farms and villages; but such profitable-excursions could not be lasting, without some moderation and method in plunder. We find however absolute freebooting (perhaps only against the more distant or refractory townships) not only was allowed, but regulated by a common vote of the army; by which it was established that, when no military duty interfered, parties might marode on their private account: when the generals directed an expedition, the booty taken belonged to the common stock. But the expectation of a profitable trade now brought supplies from the Grecian towns on the coast; a circumstance probably foreseen by Xenophon, so that there was a constant and plentiful market. Thus the army waited patiently for Cleander, who was expected from Byzantium. Meanwhile rumor having circulated of an intention to establish a colony at Port-Calpè,

s. 2 & 15.

s. 2, 3.

not

not only the Greek merchants were looking to it for new sources of commerce, but the nearest Bithynian tribes sent a deputation to Xenophon, to know upon what terms they might be received into friendship and alliance.

## SECTION VI.

*Return of the Greeks. Political State of Greece. Arrival of the Lacedæmonian Governor of Byzantium at Port-Calpè: Respect for Lacedæmonian Officers. March of the Army to Chrysopolis: Arrival in Europe. Transactions at Byzantium. Despotism of Lacedæmonian Officers.*

THE expedition of Cyrus and return of the Greeks, thus far, may seem little connected with any great political interest of the Greek nation; and yet, for the pictures, which Xenophon's account of it furnishes, of the Grecian character, manners, religion, art of war, and military policy; for the information concerning Grecian colonies, maintaining themselves and flourishing, far from the mother-country, insulated among fierce and warlike barbarians; and perhaps yet more, for the insight into the character and circumstances of that vast empire, which had once nearly involved Greece in its growing vortex, and never ceased to be a formidable and interesting neighbor, they would claim much consideration in Grecian history. But what has preceded, is moreover an introduction hardly to be dispensed with for the sequel, where the connection with the deepest interests of Greece becomes intimate.

The Lacedæmonian government being at this time arbiter of the Greek nation, or, according to the phrase of antient writers, holding the empire of Greece, in the difficult management of that singular kind of imperial dominion, no consideration perhaps was more important to it than that of the relation in which it stood, or might stand, with the Persian empire. Having taken part with Cyrus, first obscurely, but afterward openly, the result of that prince's enterprize must necessarily be looked  
for

for with anxiety; and his defeat and death, with the complete overthrow of his cause, and triumph of the royal arms, could not fail to be in a considerable degree alarming. They were alarming as the power of the Persian empire, undistracted by rebellions, was of itself formidable; but they were still more so, as views adverse to the peace of Lacedæmon would be opened for that large part of the Greek nation itself, which bore the Lacedæmonian supremacy not without extreme reluctance.

Nor would the return of the Cyreian Greek army, or the Ten-thousand (the former name distinguishing it in its own day, the latter among posterity) be indifferent to the Lacedæmonian government. Considering how that army was composed, tho' two Lacedæmonians had successively held the principal authority, yet its approach, to parts now under the Lacedæmonian dominion and to Greece itself, with numbers so little diminished, and fame for its achievements great and singular, and views and disposition wholly unknown, would require some watching, as even an indispensable duty of a government, looked to for the general protection of the nation. But the Lacedæmonian government, powerful abroad, was, through the contest of parties, as we have seen in treating of Athenian affairs, distracted and unsteady at home. The expectation of many in the Cyreian army, and especially of the late general Cheirisophus, had been that, in consequence of the part taken in the cause of Cyrus, war could not fail between Lacedæmon and Persia; and hence the hope of being taken into the Lacedæmonian service, with revived prospect of fortune. But this appears to have depended upon the turn of politics at Lacedæmon, and especially upon the decision, whether Lysander's party, or that of Pausanias, should rule there. For, tho' direct information of the domestic politics of that state rarely reaches us, yet the sequel will considerably confirm, what preceding matters show probable, that Lysander's party could not persevere in the line taken, when the Lacedæmonian government determined to support the rebellion of Cyrus, which was clearly making war with the king; and that, on the contrary, the party of Pausanias, perhaps always opposing that measure, but certainly strengthened by its failure, which would bring discredit on their opponents, proposed

to strengthen themselves farther, and possibly also hoped to do their country the best service, by managing reconciliation; first with the western satraps, and then, through them, with the court of Susa itself. In this policy we find an important step had been already gained; for Pharnabazus, who ruled the northwestern provinces of Lesser Asia, was among the actual allies of Lacedæmon.

Xen. Anab.  
1. 7. init.

Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things, when Cleander, harmost of Byzantium, so long looked-for, at length arrived at Port-Calpè; but, instead of the expected fleet, he brought only two triremes, with not a single transport. Dexippus, the Lacedæmonian, who had deserted with the penteconter borrowed from the Trapezuntines, confident in his favor with Anaxibius and Cleander, and in the terror of the Lacedæmonian name, was restrained neither by fear nor shame from returning to the army he had so grossly injured; he came in Cleander's train. It happened that, when they landed, a large detachment was absent on an expedition; and some maroders, who thought the opportunity favorable for private plunder, were returning with a large number of sheep, stolen in the neighbourhood<sup>36</sup>. Falling in with Cleander, they feared they should lose their booty; but, knowing the character of Dexippus, they proposed to deliver the whole to him, to return them a part at his pleasure. Some other soldiers, accidentally witnesses of the transaction, remonstrating that the sheep were the common property of the army, Dexippus ordered them to disperse. The soldiers disregarding the commands of one so little intitled to respect, Dexippus hastened to Cleander, and telling his story uncontradicted, received an order, in consequence of which he arrested a soldier of the lochus of the Arcadian Agasias. The lochage accidentally passing, rescued the man, conceiving the interference of Dexippus to be grossly impertinent. A tumult ensued; the soldiers reviled Dexippus as a deserter and traitor: their passions warmed; they began to

Anab. 1. 6.  
c. 6. s. 5.

<sup>36</sup> Σπάρτινμα means here not *the army*, *exercitus*, simply, as Spelman and the Latin translators have turned it, but *agmen* or *exercitus qui in expeditionem educitur*, as Hederic has justly explained the word. The generals, it appears, were mostly present, while the

Σπάρτινμα was out. The ἕρος, mentioned in this passage seems to be the hill, one end of which formed the peninsula, and the other stretched into the plain country, as described by Xenophon in his account of Port-Calpè, 1. 6. c. 4. s. 3.

throw

Anab. 1. 6.  
c. 6. s. 6.

throw stones; and Cleander's seamen, and in the end Cleander himself, alarmed, ran toward the shore. Xenophon and the other generals presently interfering, stopped the tumult and apologized for it; but Cleander, previously instigated by Dexippus, and now vexed at the fear he had shown, threatened to depart immediately, to proclaim the army enemies to Lacedæmon, and to send directions that no Grecian city should receive them: nor would he accept any apology, less than the delivery of the soldier arrested, and the officer who released him.

s. 9.

To Greeks and freemen, who had been asserting the glory of the Grecian name, at a distance before unthought-of for Grecian arms, who had been defying the power of the greatest monarch in the world, in the very center of his vast empire, this, from the governor of a little colony of their fellowcountrymen, was a strange greeting, just as they were returning to their country, powerful they thought still while they held together, and respectable when they should separate. The generals, aware that the business might be serious, assembled the army. Some made light of Cleander and his threats: but Xenophon addressed the assembly thus: 'Fellowsoldiers, we are already approaching the Grecian cities, and you know that the Lacedæmonians pre-  
' side over Greece. Perhaps however you do not enough know that,  
' in every Grecian city, the will of any Lacedæmonian suffices for any  
' act of authority. Should Cleander then, who commands Byzantium,  
' report us to the other governors as a lawless band, refractory against  
' the authority of Lacedæmon, and, especially, should he find credit  
' with Anaxibius, the commander-in-chief, it would be equally difficult  
' for us to stay here or to go elsewhere. We must therefore necessarily  
' obey those, whatever they command, whom the cities whence we come  
' obey. I therefore (for I understand Dexippus accuses me of per-  
' suading and supporting Agasias) will exonerate you from the impu-  
' tation and its consequences, by submitting myself to judgement:  
' and I hold that all others accused ought equally to surrender them-  
' selves; that so you, justly expecting to receive credit and honor in  
' your country, may not, on your return to it, be deprived of the  
' common rights of Grecian citizens.'

s. 10, 11.

Agasias, always attached to Xenophon, warmly exculpated him, and  
declared

declared his readiness to surrender himself. He requested only that some officers might be appointed to assist in his justification; and the choice being allowed him, he desired the generals. Accordingly these, with Agasias, and the man rescued by Agasias, going to Cleander, declared they came, in pursuance of a common vote of the army, to offer themselves, and all that army, or any member of it, to be judged by him, and disposed of at his discretion<sup>37</sup>. It is difficult to conceive a more complete acknowledgement of despotic authority over the Greek nation, not in one sovereign, but in every Spartan in office. Agasias then presented himself as the person who had rescued the soldier; al-

Anab. 1.6.  
c. 6. s. 12.

s. 13—15.

Xenophon, again assembling the army, recommended that a deputation, in the name of all, should request from Cleander the liberation of the prisoners. It was accordingly voted, that the generals and loehages, with Dracontius a Spartan, and a few others selected for the occasion, should wait upon him. That formidable army, which had made the Persian monarch tremble on his throne, and traversed his empire in defiance of his force, then threw itself, by the voice of its favorite general, in these humble terms, on the mercy of a Lacedæmonian governor of a town in Thrace; out of his government, and supported, on the spot, by no greater force than the crews of two small ships: 'The accused,' said Xenophon, addressing Cleander, 'are in your power; and the army submits them and itself to your discretion. Nevertheless it is the desire and prayer of all, that they be not put to death, but restored to the army, with which their former merits have been great. Should this favor be obtained, the army promises, if you will take the command, to show itself orderly and obedient, and able, the gods willing, to defy any enemy. It is indeed their earnest wish to

s. 16.

s. 17.

<sup>37</sup> These are strong terms, but they are faithful to the original of Xenophon, *κρίσειν σεαυτὸν, καὶ τὸ στρατόν, ὅτι αὐτὸ βούληται*.

‘ serve under your immediate orders; that you may know, from experience, the comparative merits of Dexippus and all others, and reward every man according to his desert.’

Such submission (such servility it might perhaps on some occasions be called) at length satisfied Cleander. Wonder is apt to arise at testimonies like this, concerning what, in antient and modern times, has been so much eulogized as Grecian liberty. But however later authors may have extolled Greece as the favorite land of freedom, in the assertion and in the enjoyment of which it afforded example for all the world, yet we find this portrait harmonizing with every account, remaining from the incomparable writers who lived in the republican times: all show that the spirit of independency indeed ran high in Greece, and often produced actions most worthy of admiration; but substantial freedom was little found there. And if, from what actually was, we turn to the observations and schemes of the ablest speculative men of the same ages, we find Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, unable to propose how Greece should be free; which must be Xenophon’s apology for the politics, recommended in that work, so admired by the antients, his *Cyropaideia*. Fortunately for us, we derive from our forefathers incomparably better principles, with fair and glorious example of better practice.

Cleander, feeling enough his importance, as a Lacedæmonian in office, had however liberality, as well as talents. ‘ The conduct of the army,’ he said, ‘ sufficiently confuted the report of its disaffection to Lacedæmon. The accused should be immediately restored, and he would not refuse the honorable office, offered to him, of leading it to Greece.’ Immediately he entered into a connection of hospitality and friendship with Xenophon; but the sacrifices being, for three successive days, unpropitious to the march, he assembled the generals, remitted the command into their hands, and, promising the army the best reception in his power on its arrival at Byzantium, after mutual compliments paid, he departed by sea.

The army then, marching under the former generals, traversed Bithynia unmolested; but, finding no plunder in the direct way, turned, and collected large booty of slaves and cattle. On the sixth day they arrived

at



at Chrysopolis on the Bosphorus, overagainst Byzantium, where they were so among Grecian colonies, that they might reckon themselves almost arrived in Greece.

The apprehension, excited by the Cyreian army, emerging from barbarous countries, and approaching the western shore of Asia, was in some degree common to Greeks and Persians; and indeed the conduct of that army had afforded to both but too much ground. Pharnabazus especially was alarmed. Bithynia, one of the wilder provinces of his satrapy, having been already plundered, and his cavalry, assisting the people to protect their property, repeatedly fought and defeated, it was feared that the richer parts of his country might invite its next enterprize. As an ally of Lacedæmon, therefore, he applied to Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, pressing earnestly for the removal of the Cyreians out of Asia. It seems probable that to these circumstances we should look for the real considerations, which determined Cleander to avoid the command, after he had undertaken it, and leave the army to its own ways, for the march to the Bosphorus; and it may perhaps be suspected, that the indications in the sacrifices were but artificial auxiliaries to his purpose. Apparently not averse to the politics of Lysander, he would perhaps gladly have commanded such an army as the Cyreian for war against Persia. To conciliate therefore, rather than offend it, would be his purpose; and he might be willing that, even without him, it should commit the hostilities, probably projected before he left it, which would provoke war, provided he incurred no blame. But connection with the opposite party is rather indicated in the conduct of Anaxibius; tho' with principles so loose, that, where private gain was in view, party interests held no competition with it. In the present moment he seems to have reckoned that, to make the most of his high command, during the short remainder of its term, he should gratify the satrap. Accordingly, sending for the generals and lochages of the Cyreian army to Byzantium, he proposed its immediate passage to the European shore; offering pay for the whole, to commence on its arrival. This having been, now for some time, the object of the best hope for the greater part, was acceded to with general joy. Xenophon had declared his

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 2, 3.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 1. s. 5.

purpose to sail immediately for Athens; but at the request of Anaxibius he held his command for the passage to Byzantium. There at length, finding themselves once more on European ground, and supposing themselves established in the service of the republic that commanded Greece, they felicitated themselves, as if all difficulties were ended, and they were already at home.

s. 3, 9.

No pay however had yet been issued, when they were surprized with an order to assemble, out of the town, with arms and baggage, as for a march. Under much uneasiness, anxiety, and discontent, this order was slowly obeyed. Nearly all however were assembled, when Anaxibius came, and calling together the generals and lochages, directed them 'to proceed to the Chersonese, where Cyniscus,' he said, 'the Lacedæmonian governor, would receive them into pay; and provisions for the way they might take from the Thracian villages.' The generals, surprized, yet obedient, began making the necessary inquiries concerning the roads, and the state of the country to be passed. Meanwhile intelligence of the purpose, getting among the soldiers, set them instantly in fury. Snatching their arms, some ran back toward the gate, and, upon its being shut against them, with vehement complaints of ill treatment, threatened to force it; others, running to the shore, found an easy passage over the mole into the town, where some of their comrades were yet loitering. Joined by these they forced the gate, and the whole army rushed in.

s. 10.

The utmost alarm and terror pervaded Byzantium. The agora was instantly deserted. Some barricaded themselves in their houses, some fled aboard the ships; all apprehended the rapine and carnage usual in a place taken by storm. Anaxibius himself, running to the shore, passed in a fishing-boat to the citadel, and sent in haste to Chalcedon, for a reinforcement to the small garrison.

c. 1. s. 12.

The Cyreian generals themselves feared, that, in the circumstances which the dishonest and weak policy of the Spartan commander-in-chief had superinduced, they should hardly be able to restrain the army from outrage. Xenophon, who had still attended, at the particular request of Anaxibius, fearing for the town, for the army, and for his own character and safety, when he saw the gate forced, had pressed in with  
the

SECT. VI. TRANSACTIONS AT BYZANTIUM.

205.

the soldiers. Quickly he engaged their attention. Crowding about him, they said, ' Now, Xenophon, is the time to raise yourself and serve us: the army is at your devotion; and the city, and the fleet in the harbour, and all that both contain, are your own.' ' Right,' said Xenophon, ' but the first thing necessary is order among you. Form, as quickly as possible.' The Thracian square, where they happened to be, having space enough, he was instantly obeyed: the heavy-armed formed in column, fifty deep; the targeteers ran to the flanks. Having thus checked thoughtless violence in the outset, Xenophon, in a soothing speech, represented to the army ' the iniquity and dishonor of injuring the Byzantines, who had never injured them, and the impossibility of resisting the power of Lacedæmon, which had subdued Athens, and now commanded Greece;' and in conclusion he recommended, ' that a deputation be sent to Anaxibius, to assure him that they had returned into the town with no purpose of outrage, but certainly with the wish to obtain from him that assistance which he had promised: that should he still refuse it, they were ready to march away at his order; but they were desirous of demonstrating that their obedience was willing, and that to beguile them was unnecessary.' The army was persuaded, and the deputation was sent.

Anab. 1.7.  
s. 14, 15.

s. 16—20.

s. 21.

The circumstances, both of Greece and of the surrounding countries, offered numerous opportunities for adventurers, especially for military adventurers. There happened to be in Byzantium a Theban, named Cyratades, who professed the business of a general, ready to serve anywhere in the command of troops, for Greek cities or foreign nations. While the army was waiting, this man came and proposed himself for their leader, undertaking to conduct them to profitable enterprise in Thrace, and, in the interval, to provide them subsistence from his private means. The mention, at the same time, of pay and plunder had excited attention, when the officers, who were sent into the citadel, returned with a message from Anaxibius, assuring the army that they should have no cause to repent their moderation and obedience; that he would report to the Lacedæmonian government their good conduct, and would consider by what means he might immediately serve them. Soothed thus by Anaxibius, and upon the point of losing Xenophon,

s. 22.

who

who was still bent upon returning to Athens, officers and men acceded to the proposal of Cyratades. He promised that every necessary, for setting out on their proposed expedition, should be ready next morning, victuals, drink, victims, and a prophet, (it is Xenophon's list,) and upon this they quietly marched out of the town. They were no sooner gone, than Anaxibius caused the gates to be locked, and proclamation to be made, that if any soldiers of the Cyrcian army were any more found in Byzantium, they should be sold for slaves. Such was the treatment of this gallant army, on its first arrival in a European Greek city, from the commander-in-chief of the united forces of Greece.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 1. s. 24.

Xenophon (who had staid thus long at the particular request of Anaxibius) found himself, in return for his service in preserving the town from pillage and slaughter, banished, in common with the whole army, from its walls. Applying to Cleander, the governor, his host, he obtained, with some difficulty, permission to enter; but upon condition that he would sail with Anaxibius, who, on the approaching expiration of the term of his command, was to return to Greece.

s. 25.

Whether the policy of Anaxibius, or his own presumptuous folly, had urged Cyratades to an undertaking which could only involve him in immediate shame, (tho' it appears far more likely the former,) he was utterly unable to provide even one day's subsistence for the army. Its obedience therefore was instantly withdrawn from him, and the troops took quarters for themselves in the Thracian villages; under what compact, or with what violence, we are not informed. Xenophon only proceeds to observe, that, none of the generals having influence enough to unite the rest in any settled design, the army wasted in inaction. Many of the soldiers sold their arms; some got their passage for Greece; some settled themselves in the Grecian towns on the Propontis. Anaxibius rejoiced in this decay of that once-powerful and proud army; less as he feared injury to any Grecian settlement, or to the Lacedæmonian authority, than as he hoped to be paid for gratifying the Persian satrap.

c. 2. s. 1, 2.

Apparently the Lacedæmonian government remained yet balancing, what policy to follow toward Persia. But it seems likely that

Lysander's party had communicated with the Cyreians, and encouraged the hope of Lacedæmonian service for them, and war in Asia; whence the party of Pausanias, which still preponderated, would entertain the greater jealousy of them, and be more disposed to direct or approve the conduct of Anaxibius. That officer, quitting at length his command, took Xenophon with him for the voyage to Greece. He put into the port of Parium, near the northern entrance of the strait of the Hellespont, for the purpose of holding farther communication with Pharnabazus. But, without a character to win esteem, upon losing his power he could no longer command respect. The policy of Asiatic councils was now directed to cultivate the friendship of the superseding officers, Aristarchus, who had passed up the Propontis to take the government of Byzantium, and Polus, the new commander-in-chief, who was daily expected. The promise of Aristarchus was already engaged, that no disturbance should be given by the Cyreian army to the Bithynian satrapy. Anaxibius then, no longer able to profit from service to his own party, seems to have proposed to earn credit with the opposite party by a very strong measure. He proposed to Xenophon, to go to the army, and bring it over into Asia: offering a vessel for the passage, with orders, that horses should be furnished for his use, and obedience paid to his commands. Xenophon, knowing, as he says, that, however the generals were divided, the soldiers would universally rejoice in the opportunity to make war in the rich satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, undertook the business. Being received by the army with all the joy he expected, he led it immediately to Perinthus, there to embark for Asia.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 2. s. 5.

What really persuaded him to such a measure, his necessarily cautious account does not explain. Possibly he had expectation, or possibly false information, of a change in the government of Lacedæmon. The conduct of Cleander seems to indicate such expectation. As soon as the controuling authority of Anaxibius was removed from Byzantium, with a just regard for humanity, for the Greek nation, and for his friendship contracted with Xenophon, he had been kindly attentive to all Cyreian soldiers in the place and neighborhood, particularly directing quarters to be provided for the sick. On the contrary, one of  
the

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 2. s. 7.

the first measures of the new harmost of Byzantium, Aristarchus, was to order all Cyreian soldiers, that could be found in the town, to be arrested; and in strict pursuance of the tyrannical edict of Anaxibius, he sold four hundred for slaves. Hearing then of the march of the army to Perinthus, he went thither with two triremes, and forbid its passage to Asia. In vain Xenophon urged the authority of Anaxibius. From his own account seemingly he should have known that Anaxibius neither had authority, nor deserved influence. Aristarchus answered, that Anaxibius was no longer commander-in-chief; that he was himself governor there, and that he would sink any vessel attempting to transport troops to Asia. Next day he sent for the generals and lochages to attend him in Perinthus. They obeyed the summons; but, as they approached the town, intelligence was communicated to Xenophon, that if he entered the walls he would be arrested, and either suffer on the spot, or be delivered to Pharnabazus. Under pretence of a sacrifice, therefore, he returned to the camp. The rest proceeding, were not admitted to the presence of Aristarchus, but desired to attend again in the evening; and this confirmed Xenophon in the opinion, that the information given him was founded.

To cross into Asia, in opposition to the Lacedæmonian commanders, would be neither easy to effect, nor safe, if effected. In the Chersonese, whither Anaxibius had pointed their view, they would be as in a trap, under the power of the Lacedæmonian governor there; and having experienced Spartan fraud, they feared Spartan policy. Thus, in the midst of flourishing Grecian settlements, and almost in Greece, the Cyreians, threatened on all sides, found themselves more at a loss which way to turn, than when first deserted by their Persian allies, thousands of miles from home, in the middle of the hostile Persian empire.

## SECTION VII.

*Return of the Greeks. Circumstances of Thrace. Service of the Army with a Thracian Prince. Ingagement of the Army in the Lacedæmonian Service: Passage to Asia and march to join the Lacedæmonian Forces.*

THE political state of the world, that arrangement, which the wisdom of man can make, for establishing the rights and restraining the misconduct of his own species, may appear, in modern times, defective enough; but, as far as we can look into antiquity, we find a state of things less harmonized, and more precarious. Hence continual opportunity for profit to those who would make war their trade; and hence arose still a glimmering of hope for the Cyreians. The best market was generally found among the most polished and luxurious nations; and so, as civilization spread, the market was extended. Various circumstances, of late years, had led to increased intercourse of the Greeks with the Thracians, whence civilization gained among the latter. Long since, tho' spurning at all other trade, the Thracians would let their valor and skill in arms for hire: the progress then was easy to hiring, if need occurred, the service of others. A Thracian prince, Seuthes son of Mæsadæ, had solicited the service of the Cyreians. His immediate means of remuneration were small; but his promises, should success attend their exertions in his favor, were alluring. Seuthes was descended from Teres, that powerful chieftain, who, as we have formerly seen, united under his dominion all the Thracian clans, from the Ægean to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon; whose son and successor, Sitalces, married a Greek lady, and accepted the freedom of Athens; and whose grandson, Seuthes son of Sparadocus, the successor of Sitalces, married Stratonice, sister of Perdicas king of Macedonia. The advantage of such connections, being added to that of dominion superior in extent, revenue, and military force to any other then in Europe, it might be expected would bring civi-

Anab. 1. 7.

c. 1. s. 4.

c. 2. s. 6. 18.

s. 12.

Ch. 14. s. 2.

of this Hist.

Thucyd.

1. 2. c. 97.

zation into Thrace, and raise that country to a political importance equal to any then in the world. The splendor of the monarchy accordingly was increased by Seuthes son of Sparadocus; and no misfortune befel it of which Thucydides has left notice. But a nation is not so soon to be changed: the manners and prejudices of the Thracian people involved the princes in the national degradation, before the princes could effect any considerable improvement of the people. What were the convulsions, that produced the decline of the Odrysian power, we are not informed; but we learn from Xenophon that it had a rapid fall, and that the Thracians remained barbarians.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 2. s. 18.

When the Cyreian army returned from the east, Medocus reigned over the Odrysians; and, tho' very inferior to his predecessors, was still the principal potentate of Thrace. His usual residence was at the distance of twelve days journey, within land, from the Pröpontis. Mæsades had possessed a principality, apparently a subordinate principality, over three conquered tribes in the neighborhood of Byzantium; but, in the decay of the Odrysian power, had been expelled by them, and died soon after. The successful revoltors maintained themselves in a wild sort of republican freedom, while Seuthes, the infant son of Mæsades, was kindly entertained by his sovereign and kinsman Medocus. But the spirit of a Thracian could not brook inactive dependency. On attaining manhood, Seuthes requested of his protector that, instead of remaining a burthen upon his generosity, looking up to him like a dog (his expression reported from his own mouth by Xenophon) he might be allowed such force as could be spared him, to attempt the recovery of his inheritance. A small body, horse and foot, was granted; and, from that time, Seuthes, unable to subdue the people, had however supported himself and his followers, by plunder from his paternal principality<sup>39</sup>.

c. 3. s. 7.

E. 18.

Such

<sup>39</sup> The genealogy of a chieftain of three small tribes of barbarians cannot be, in itself, very important; but, for the sake of high authority wantonly attacked, and of the consistency of history, which is liable to gross injury from hasty and unexamined surmises,

especially of able commentators, I shall take some notice of that of Seuthes. With a mixture of rashness and carelessness, which one cannot but be surprized to find in him, Spelman would have Seuthes, mentioned by Xenophon as son of Mæsades, the same person

with



\*Such was the state of things when the Cyreian army arrived at Chrysolopolis. Before it crossed the strait, agents came from Seuthes to invite its service. The overtures, then rejected, but renewed when it

with the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides as son of Sparadocus. (See the second note of the sixth book, and the fifteenth note of the seventh book of his translation of the expedition of Cyrus.)

Among the Greeks, we know, as among the Welsh, the father's name served, in the want of a family name, to distinguish the individual from others of the same name, and was therefore, in describing persons, an object for careful attention. Sparadocus and Mæsadès have no such resemblance as could occasion the mistake of one name for the other, by either author or transcriber; and the connection of Thucydides, and the communication of Xenophon, with Thrace, were such, that deficient information cannot reasonably be imputed to either. Spelman has not undertaken to say which was mistaken; but, without the slightest reason alleged, his surmise necessarily attributes a mistake to one of them. If, instead of such able cotemporary authors, who had such uncommon means of information, he had attributed such an error, even by a meer guess, to such a writer as Diodorus, who, according to Doddwell's phrase, confounded history some hundred years after, he would have been more excusable; unless evidence as clear, as what in this case he ought to have been aware of, contradicted the supposition. For, setting aside the distinction of the father's name, generally decisive for identification among the Greeks, or supposing one only to have been properly a name, and the other a title (for sometimes the want of attention to such distinction perhaps may have produced some confusion of foreign names among Greek writers) still had Spelman taken the trouble to compare the history of the Seuthes mentioned by Thucydides, with that of the Seuthes under whom Xeno-

phon served, he would have seen that they could not be the same. Seuthes son of Sparadocus passed his youth with his uncle Sitalces; and, after long acting under him as his principal favorite, on his death succeeded to his extensive and powerful dominion. (Thucyd. 1. 2. c. 101.) That dominion consisted of the chieftainship of the conquering clan, the Odrysians; which was the ancient inheritance of his family, with the paramount sovereignty over all the other Thracian tribes, acquired by the conquests of Teres; and the revenue, at least, of this large dominion, as Thucydides assures us, Seuthes himself improved. During his youth, and after his accession, therefore, the Odrysian power was at its height. But Mæsadès, father of Xenophon's Seuthes, was prince only of three conquered tribes, the Melandèpts, Thyns and Thranipses, bordering on the Propontis, while Medocus reigned over the Odrysians. Xenophon expressly says it was in the decay of the Odrysian power, that Mæsadès was expelled by his subjects; and Seuthes, his son, was then under age, a meer boy; for so much not only is implied in the term *ἄρπαξ* (pupillus, as Leunclavius has rendered it) but fully confirmed by the phrase that follows, *ἔπει δὲ νεανίσκος ἐγερόμην*. This Seuthes was protected and educated by Medocus king of the Odrysians, and never himself pretended to the Odrysian throne, but was happy to recover his principality over the three tribes above-mentioned, more than twenty years after Seuthes son of Sparadocus had succeeded his uncle Sitalces in the monarchy of Thrace. All this being clearly stated by the two able cotemporary historians, without the least appearance of contradiction between them, Spelman's fancy, as unnecessary for any explanation, as unfounded on any authority, seems unaccountable.

was driven from Byzantium, were, through disagreement among the generals, again fruitless. But now, when, disappointed in all other views, while the season (for it was midwinter) denied the passage for such numbers to Greece, and the soldiers were without means for providing themselves in a friendly country, to go wherever an enemy to be plundered could be pointed out, seemed the only resource for subsistence. Xenophon therefore resolved to postpone his return to Athens, and endeavor to serve the army, by going himself to negotiate with Seuthes.

The connection of Neon, as an Asinæan, with Lacedæmon, had decided his politics. He had attached himself to Aristarchus, and, seceding now from the army, with about eight hundred men, he incamped apart. All the other generals approved the proposal of Xenophon, and each named a confidential officer to attend him. Adding Polycrates, an Athenian lochage, as his own assistant, Xenophon rode by night to a castle, where Seuthes was then residing; scarcely eight miles from the camp. As they approached, many fires were seen, but no people; and they imagined Seuthes had suddenly removed his residence. Presently however the hum of voices was heard, and communication of signals. An interpreter then advanced, and, after due explanation, an escort of two hundred targeteers came, and conducted Xenophon with his attendants to the castle. Everything around, it was observed, marked extreme precaution against surprize. By the distant fires, whatever approached was visible, while darkness involved the castle and its watch. The horses of a surrounding outguard of cavalry, fed only by day, were kept bridled and ready for instantly mounting all night. It was requested of Xenophon that only two of his attendants might enter with him. Such were the fears in which this prince habitually lived; the Thyn-Thracians, possessors of the country, his revolted subjects, being esteemed singularly expert and daring in nocturnal enterprize.

Xenophon then, with his two companions, being introduced to the prince, horns of wine, according to the Thracian custom, were presented with the first salutation. After some conversation, Xenophon desired that his other principal followers might be admitted; but, to obviate

obviate the prince's jealousy, directed that they should leave all weapons without. Seuthes however exclaiming that he mistrusted no Athenian, that, on the contrary, he considered all as his kinsmen and friends, the whole party was introduced. The prince's proposals were then declared. His purpose was to subdue the country, formerly subject to his father, which he said, with the Grecian army added to his own forces, he was confident would be easy. He offered, for monthly pay, a Cyzicene, about a guinea, to every soldier, two to the lochages, and four to the generals; which seems to have been a common proportion in the Grecian service. Protection, to those who might want it against the Lacedæmonians, he readily promised at the motion of Xenophon; and, as land was what a Thracian prince could perhaps of all things most cheaply give, he offered it in any quantity; but he also promised to make it valuable, by adding oxen for cultivation, and a fortified seaport, for securely exporting the produce. To Xenophon in particular he promised Bisante, his best town on the coast, with the offer of his daughter in marriage, and assurance that, if Xenophon had a daughter, he would buy her, according to the Thracian custom.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 2. s. 17.

s. 18—20.

The liberality of these promises seems so nearly to have approached extravagance, that it might not unreasonably have excited suspicion. If Xenophon however had any, he has not declared it. Right-hands were mutually given, and Xenophon with his followers returned to their camp before day. In the morning, Aristarchus again sent for the generals, but they refused to go. The army being assembled, the proposal of Seuthes was explained, and joyfully accepted: Neon and others from Aristarchus endeavored to dissuade; holding out promises of advantage from the Lacedæmonian government, for service in the Chersonese; but they were little heard.

c. 3. s. 1.

s. 2, 3.

Xenophon led, and the army marched. Before they had advanced four miles, Seuthes met them, and took the office of guide. In the afternoon they reached some villages, stored with provisions, where the soldiers were well supplied, while the generals and lochages supped with the prince. The detail of this entertainment, the most curious of its kind remaining from antiquity, shows, among the Thracians, considerable resemblance to customs, yet common, among the politest people

s. 4.

l. 6. c. 3.

s. 7—16.

people of the East; and, among the Greeks, not that correctness of manners, tho Xenophon himself is an exception, which might be expected. At sunset, when, after a plentiful repast, the cup had sufficiently circulated, the Greeks arose, alledging the necessity of posting their night-guards and giving out the word. Their knowledge of Thracian manners, and their observation of wine consumed, gave them to suppose that Seuthes would not rise sober; but, without any appearance of ebriety, he followed them, and proposed, by marching that night, to surprize the enemy, yet uninformed of his increased strength. Much plunder he hoped might be taken, and many prisoners; which, as the Grecian towns of the neighborhood afforded a ready market for slaves, might be turned to good account.

Anab. l. 6.  
c. 3. s. 17.

s. 18—20.

s. 21.

The Greeks approved, and at midnight the army marched. Not however till toward noon next day, they reached the summit of a mountain-ridge, covered with deep snow, and, descending unlooked-for into the plain beyond, they found the expected prey. About a thousand slaves were taken, with two thousand head of neat, and ten thousand of smaller cattle. Next morning Seuthes burnt all the villages, not leaving a house; proposing to bring the people to submission by the fear of losing their shelter and subsistence, in the severity of winter. The booty was sent to be sold at Perinthus, to provide pay for the army.

s. 28.

l. 7. c. 4.

s. 1.

s. 2.

In this country, in so southern a latitude, and only two days march from the sea, a heavy snow falling, the cold was so intense, that water froze as it was carried from the spring, and even the wine in the vessels became ice. The Greeks had not so profited from experience in Armenia and Pontus, but that, with their short cloaks and bare thighs, they suffered severely; and some, frostbitten, lost ears and noses. Then they discovered the advantage of the Thracian military dress, which at first had appeared uncouth: foxskin caps covering the ears, cloaks reaching below the knee, and warm covering for the horsemen's legs, protected Seuthes's troops against the inconveniencies of weather, to which their constitutions also were, by yearly practice, more hardened.

In such a season however the Thyns, who were driven from their villages to seek refuge among the mountains, could not but be distressed.

tressed. Finding themselves unable to resist the destruction, threatened to all their vallies, they sent proposals of submission, and requested Xenophon's mediation in their favor. A perfidious attack on the Grecian quarters followed, and particularly against Xenophon's. It was however successfully resisted, and the forces of Seuthes being greatly increased by Odrysian volunteers, the Thyns threw themselves on his mercy. The Thracian prince paid the compliment to Xenophon, to offer him any revenge he might chuse, for that perfidy which had been directed against his life. Xenophon answered, that, if he desired revenge, he should have it abundantly, in the change of the condition of the people, from independency to subjection under despotic authority<sup>40</sup>. Xenophon, it appears, knew how to value freedom; but was not nicely scrupulous of supporting the cause of despotism.

Seuthes having thus recovered his patrimony, found himself, within the short space of two months, from a wandering freebooter, become prince of a considerable territory. His army was increased, not only with the strength of the conquered people, but with numerous Odrysians, whom success allured to his standard. To the north of Byzantium, bordering on the Euxine sea, lived a Thracian hord, who had never owned the dominion of Mæsadés, but, having been formerly subdued by Teres, had since asserted independency. Seuthes marched against

<sup>40</sup> 'Εἰ δούλοισι δούλοισι ἴσονται ἀπὸ ἐλευθέρων.—' If these people were, instead of freemen, to become slaves.' Spelman. This does not convey to English readers the exact sense of the original. Δούλος was not confined to the strict meaning of *slave* with us, for which the Greeks used the term ἀνδράποδοι, but was applied to any who lived under a despotic government. Thus Xenophon makes Cyrus call himself δούλος, and that subjection to Lacedæmon, under which the Thirty proposed to govern Athens, is termed by Isocrates and Lysias δουλεία and δουλείειν. Isocr. Areiop. p. 140. v. 2. & Lys. περὶ τῆς Ευανδρ. δοκιμ. p. 177, vel 304. But

Lysias calls his manufacturer slaves ἀνδράποδα. Adv. Eratosth. p. 388. If we sometimes apply the term *slave* to the subjects of arbitrary governments, it is by a rhetorical licence, and not in the sober language of historical narrative: we do not consider a Chinese mandareen, a Turkish bashaw, or a Spanish grandee, as the same description of person with a West Indian slave; nor would the Greeks have called Cyrus ἀνδράποδον, tho he might call himself δούλος. Xenophon (de rep. Ath. c. 1. s. 11.) uses the expression of δουλείειν ἀνδράποδοις—meaning that the Athenian people were subservient to their slaves, not slaves to them.

these,

these, and quickly compelled them to become his tributaries. Turning then southward again, his Thracian numbers now considerably exceeding the Greeks, they together approached the Propontis and incamped near Selymbria. It is remarkable that, in this winter campaign, in so severe a climate, against an enemy much overpowered indeed, but singularly expert and enterprising in desultory war, not a Greek was lost.

Active and bold, characteristical qualities of a Thracian, Seuthes had no great understanding and no clear honor. Mean deception, however, and gross dishonesty seem to have been less his own purpose, than what he was led to by a profligate Greek, Heracleides of Maroneia, who had acquired his confidence, and was one of his principal counsellors before the Cyreian army entered into his service. This man, having succeeded in the endeavor to excite apprehension and dislike of Xenophon, instigated the prince, since he no longer wanted the service of the Grecian army, to refuse the arrear of pay, when a small part only, of what by agreement was due, had yet been issued. He failed in an endeavor to divide the generals; but discontent grew among the soldiers, while all Xenophon's applications, for the pay owing, were answered with evasion.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 5. s.9.

c. 6. s.1.

s. 7.

s. 29.

In this state of things, while, on one side, Seuthes was surrounded by his numerous Thracian forces, strong in cavalry, of which the Greeks were destitute, on the other, judging from past transactions, no degree of enmity was not to be apprehended from the all-powerful officers of Sparta, difficulty and danger seemed again accumulating against the unfortunate Cyreians, and particularly against Xenophon. An event, no longer expected, relieved them. The Lacedæmonian government had resolved upon war with Persia, and thus the Cyreian army, before an object of jealousy, now would be a valuable acquisition. Accordingly two Lacedæmonian officers, Charminus and Polyneices, came to Selymbria, authorized to engage them, at the same pay promised by Seuthes, to go to that most inviting of all fields for military service, the rich satrapy of Tissaphernes. The proposal was joyfully received; and the more, as beside other advantages, the commanding interference of Lacedæmon, it was now hoped, would obtain the arrear of pay due from the

Thracian

Thracian prince. But Seuthes was governed by a few interested counsellors: and it was not till the army was sent to live at free quarters, in some villages which he had given to one of the chief of them, that an interview, desired by Xenophon and long evaded, was at length obtained. An Odrysian, who assisted at the conference, with generous indignation declared his shame of that officer's conduct. His great sovereign Medocus, he said, he was sure would not approve such base dishonesty, nor give any support to those who could be guilty of it. Seuthes excused himself, disavowing knowledge of the circumstances, and laying the blame on his Greek counsellor Heracleides. Payment was then made, in the manner of the country. A single talent was all that could be obtained in money: six hundred oxen, four thousand sheep, and a hundred and twenty slaves, were given for the remainder due. The disposal of these, for the benefit of the army, was dexterously referred by Xenophon, as a compliment, to the Lacedæmonians Charminus and Polyneices, who incurred no small blame in the conduct of the invidious business.

Anab. 1. 7. 4  
c. 7. s. 6.

c. 6. s. 31.

s. 34.

The army then crossed to Lampsacus, where two Lacedæmonian officers arrived soon after, with pay, which was immediately issued for the march to insure. The plain of Troy, mount Ida, Antandrus, and the vale of Thebæ, were then traversed, in the way to Pergamus in the vale of Caicus. There a circumstance occurred, in itself, and in Xenophon's manner of relating it, strongly characterizing the times. Generally earnest in inculcating humanity and liberality, and studious to demonstrate his own disinterestedness, the soldier-philosopher nevertheless gives, without any apparent compunction, a detailed account of a nocturnal expedition, which he undertook with a few favorite officers, to surprize a wealthy Persian, with his family, in a castle at some distance in the vale. A Grecian family of rank, in Pergamus, had suggested the measure, apparently to share in the spoil. The prophet, employed to sacrifice on the occasion, declared, from the symptoms of the victims, that the gods approved and would favor the robbery. Resistance nevertheless was found so much more vigorous than expected, that the party was obliged to retreat, with many wounds, and considerable risk of being all cut off. A feigned movement, with the whole army, induced

s. 6.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 8. s. 12.  
s. 13.  
s. 3.

the Persian to leave his castle. The attempt being then renewed, the castle was taken, with his wife, children, slaves, horses, and all his effects. The capture was so considerable, that Xenophon's share enabled him, according to his own phrase, to confer benefits; tho' before so distressed as to be reduced to sell his horse, at Lampsacus, for fifty darics, about thirty-five guineas. The army returned to Pergamus, there to wait the orders of the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief.

NOTES from the End of the First Section of the Twenty-third Chapter.

\* It seems a whimsical circumstance that, among other writers, Spelman, the applauded translator, and Hutchinson, the able editor of the *Anabasis*, have concurred in the fancy to contradict or explain away their author's own account of his own age; and, without apparent purpose but to establish a calculation of their own, founded upon authority so dubious and so deficient, that, even were there nothing on the other side, it could scarcely prove anything. Lucian, in his *Treatise on Long Life*, says that Xenophon passed the age of ninety years; without adding when he was born or when he died. Diogenes Laertius says that he died in the first year of the hundred and fifth Olympiad; without adding at what age. Strabo (l. 9. p. 618.) has related that he fought at the battle of Delium, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. But Athenæus has shown, from Plato, that this could not be; and indeed the story altogether is so nearly absurd, that we may wonder rather that Strabo should have related it, than that Diogenes should have copied it from him. Diogenes is not famous for accuracy, any more than for judgement; so Spelman professes to rest on Lucian's account, which, he says, he sees no reason to disbelieve. I see no reason to disbelieve it either; because it really affirms no more than that Xenophon lived to the age of more than ninety; which is in itself possible, and contradicted by none. But Xenophon's own account, equally uncontradicted by all antient writers, appears

to me to deserve the first credit. He has indeed not stated his own age precisely; but he has marked it, I think clearly, within two or three years; and so the learned and ingenious friend of Spelman has thought, the author of the geographical dissertation annexed to his translation of the *Anabasis*. Spelman and Hutchinson, putting together the accounts of Lucian and Diogenes (for neither alone will at all serve their purpose) reckon Xenophon near fifty when he engaged with Cyrus: the author of the geographical dissertation supposes him only five-and-twenty. If Xenophon's own account of himself deserve any credit, and if it ought not to be tortured to a meaning to which it cannot without torture be brought, he was certainly under thirty. The matter is not important; but having taken the pains, perhaps more than it was worth, to examine it, I will not deny the reader who may have curiosity for it, the benefit, if he can draw any, from my trouble.

Among the first occasions on which the name of Xenophon occurs in the *Anabasis*, (l. 2. c. 1. s. 10.) he is addressed with the appellation of *Νεανώτης*, which Spelman observes, however ill it might apply to one near fifty, must be translated *Young man*. Now it happens that we have information, from Xenophon himself, to what age a man might properly be called *Νεός*. The question occurs in his *Memorials of Socrates* (l. 1. c. 2. s. 35.) and thirty is there named as its utmost term, and rather beyond the age



age to which it was ordinarily given. *Νεανίσκος* then, a diminutive from *Νέος*, would not be commonly applied to a more advanced age. As the titles *Νέος* and *Νεανίσκος* are, more than once in the *Anabasis*, given to Xenophon, this alone seems pretty strong proof that he was under thirty. But there is besides, in the *Anabasis*, what appears to me, complete confirmation of it; for Proxenus, it is there positively said, was about thirty, when he was put to death, or when the army was deprived of his services. Xenophon, when he first conceived the idea of offering himself for successor to Proxenus in command, was deterred by the consideration of his youth; which seems decisively to mark that he was younger than Proxenus, and consequently under thirty. This indeed is testimony so nearly direct, that it has evidently staggered Spelman; who nevertheless has been so resolved to abide by his deduction from Lucian and Diogenes, that rather than allow his author to give evidence against it, he has chosen to mis-translate him, and even to risk contradictions. *What age do I wait for?* is his very just version of Xenophon's words, when he was hesitating whether to offer himself for the command; words certainly bearing no very evident sense, if they did not imply that he apprehended objection would be taken to his youth. In answer then to this objection, Xenophon proceeds thus: *Ὅτι γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔτι προσεδέτερος ἔσομαι, ἐὰν τῆμερον προδῶ ἐμαυτὸν τοῖς πολεμίοις.* (*Anab.* l. 3. c. 1. s. 10.) *If I abandon myself to the enemy this day, (sq Spelman turns the passage,) I shall never live to see another.* It cannot be said, in excuse for the miserable insipidity of this version, that it is literal. A literal translation would here not only give the sense more exactly, but even more spiritedly: *I shall never be older, (replying to his own question, 'What age do I wait for?') if to-day I betray myself to the enemy; meaning, if through false delicacy, in consideration of my youth, I omit that exertion, by which I and the army with me might be saved from the enemy.*

Another passage soon follows, to the same purpose, of which Spelman has very ingeniously given a literal translation, with a sense completely dubious. When actually offering himself for the command, Xenophon apologizes for his youth thus: *Ἐἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς τάρτερό με ἠγάσθητε, οὐδὲν προσφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀκμάζειν ἠγοῦμαι ἔρπειν ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ τὰ κακὰ.* *If you appoint me to be your leader, (says Spelman's translation,) I shall not excuse myself by reason of my age, but think myself even in the vigor of it to repel an injury.* It is obvious, that this might come either from a man too old or from one too young for the office. To fix the sense, therefore, the reader is referred, by a note, to the translator's former notice of Xenophon's age. Spelman seems to have been so aware of the absurdity of stating, that fifty was an age either too early, or too advanced, for a man to undertake the office of general, that he chose rather to refer the reader to a former discussion, than to shock him with the direct mention, in this place, of the result of it. Leunclavius has translated the passage very differently, and I think very properly, thus: *Si me ducis munere fungi jubetis, ætatis excusatione nequaquam utar; sed adolescentiæ vigorem ad propulsandum mala mihi profuturum arbitror.* We find that Clearchus, who is represented as a general of most vigorous exertion, was fifty; and Cleonor was older. If Xenophon was near fifty, he would not have said 'What age do I wait for?' The whole of the apology for his age, whether as supposing him too old or too young, would have been absurd. But every mention of him with any implication of his age, throughout the *Anabasis*, shows him to have been much younger. A few weeks before his appointment to the command, he was addressed with the appellation of *Νεανίσκος, Youth.* After his appointment, we are informed, (*l. 3. c. 2. s. 25.*) that Timasion and he were the two youngest of the generals. If he was too old, how improper must the choice of the others have been! But, in the various actions that fol-

lowed, we always find him taking, and always mentioning it as becoming him, that more active duty, which in the Grecian service was appropriated to the youthful. Supposing him between twenty-five and thirty, the interpretation, where he speaks of himself, is always obvious, and all is consistent; but supposing him fifty, or near it, even the forced interpretation of Spelman is full of contradiction and absurdity.

If then I cannot commend the judgement, the accuracy, or the fairness of Spelman, in forming and supporting his opinion of Xenophon's age, I can still less be satisfied with the more direct and less qualified contradiction of his author, in the account which, in his introduction, he has given of the Lacedæmonian Cleærchus. Totally neglecting Xenophon's short but clear history of the principal circumstances of that general's life, he has trusted implicitly to the very different account of Diodorus Siculus, 'who, beside the character he has deservedly obtained,' he says, 'for fidelity and exactness, had the advantage of living many centuries nearer the transactions he recounts, than those who differ from him in chronology.' This seems really a curious reason for preferring the account of Diodorus, who lived full three centuries after Cleærchus, to that of Xenophon, who served under him, and cannot but have known intimately, if not Cleærchus himself, yet many who must have known him intimately. As to the character which Diodorus has deservedly obtained for fidelity and exactness, those who know him best, I fear, will be most inclined to join with the penetrating, judicious, and diligent Henry Dodwell, who, compelled, by the pursuit he was engaged in, to study him closely, and indignant at length at the incessancy of his vexatious inaccuracies, calls him *imperitus historiarum variarum epocharumque commissor Diodorus*. (Chron. Xenoph. ad ann. A. C. 396.)

It is an unpleasant task, which the writer of Grecian history cannot always decline,

to decry the general authority of those on whom he must sometimes rest for authority; if he would vindicate historical sincerity, it is indispensable. Plutarch, living more than four centuries after Xenophon, and more than one after Diodorus, has chosen to contradict the accounts of both. Instead of a condemned exile, as Xenophon, or a rebel, as Diodorus reports Cleærchus to have been, Plutarch affirms that he had a regular commission from the Lacedæmonian government to serve under Cyrus. (Plut. vit. Artaxer. p. 1854.) It is evident from the whole tenor of Xenophon's narrative, the only connected and consistent narrative remaining of the transactions of the age, that this could not be. Let those who, in respect for any reputation which Plutarch may have gained among literary men little conversant with the world, would put his authority in any competition with Xenophon's, but look to the puerility and absurdity of the account he has given of the communication between Cyrus and the Lacedæmonian government, previous to the expedition; and, if they desire a sample of his carelessness, let them compare his praise of Xenophon, in his account of the battle of Cunaxa, with his continual and unqualified contradictions of Xenophon.

<sup>2</sup> The account of the expedition of Cyrus and of the return of the Greeks, remaining to us with the title of *Κύρου Ἀνάβασις*, having passed, apparently without question, among the aptients, for the work of the Socratic Xenophon, from his own age downward, it cannot but seem strange that any doubt about it should have gained in modern times. Nevertheless such a doubt, excited by a passage in the work itself, having been cherished by men eminent among the learned, some notice of it may be necessary here.

In Xenophon's Grecian annals, the tenor of the narration required some account of the expedition of Cyrus and the return of the

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the Grecian army; but, instead of giving any, the author has referred his reader to an account which he attributes to Themistogenes of Syracuse. This at first sight will of-course give to suppose that an account written by a Syracusan, named Themistogenes, was then extant; but it can at no rate prove that the work now extant on the subject, which always passed among the antients for Xenophon's, was written, not by Xenophon, but by Themistogenes. It is however remarkable that, from the age of Xenophon to that of Suidas, no mention occurs, in any remaining work, of such an author as Themistogenes; while we find an extraordinary assemblage, of names the most eminent in literature, bearing testimony to the extant Anabasis as the work of Xenophon. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Strabo, Cicero, Laertius, Lucian, Ælian, Hesychius, Pollux, Harpocration, Ammonius, are enumerated by Hutchinson: to these, I think, should be added Demetrius Phalereus, or the author of the work attributed to him, Plutarch, and Longinus; and when, in an age comparatively modern, the collector Suidas chose to controvert this weight of evidence, he has offered no argument but a reference to the works of Xenophon, which all those authors had read and could understand at least as well as he.

Why then, it will of course occur to ask, did Xenophon, in his Grecian Annals, refer to the work of Themistogenes? Plutarch, in his treatise on the Glory of the Athenians, has accounted for it thus: 'Xenophon,' he says, 'was a subject of history for himself. But when he published his narrative of his own achievements in military command, he ascribed it to Themistogenes of Syracuse; giving away thus the literary reputation to arise from the work, that he might the better establish the credit of the facts related.'

This explanation, tho' I allow it credit as far as it goes, is, however, not by itself completely satisfactory. Nevertheless I think whoever reads the Anabasis, attending, at

the same time, to the general history of the age, may draw, from the two, what is wanting to complete it. He cannot fail to observe, that it has been a principal purpose of the author of the Anabasis to apologize for the conduct of Xenophon. In the latter part of the work, the narrative is constantly accompanied with a studied defence of his conduct; in which, both the circumstances that produced his banishment from Athens, and whatever might give umbrage or excite jealousy against him in Lacedæmon, have been carefully considered. But there are passages in the work, speeches of Xenophon himself on delicate occasions, particularly his communication with Cleænder the Lacedæmonian general, related in the sixth book, which could be known only from himself or from Cleænder. That these have not been forgeries of Themistogenes, is evident from the testimony of Xenophon himself, who refers to the work, which he ascribes to Themistogenes, with intire satisfaction.

One, then, of these three conclusions must follow: either, first, the narrative of Themistogenes, if such ever existed, had not in it that apology for Xenophon, which we find interwoven in the Anabasis transmitted to us as Xenophon's, and consequently was a different work; or, secondly, Themistogenes wrote under the direction of Xenophon; or, thirdly, Xenophon wrote the extant Anabasis, and, for reasons, which those acquainted with the circumstances of his life, and the history of the times, will have no difficulty to conceive may have been powerful, chose that, on its first publication, it should pass under another's name. The latter has been the belief of all antiquity; and, indeed, if it had not been fully known that the ascription of the Anabasis to Themistogenes was a fiction, the concurrence of all antiquity, in stripping that author of his just fame, so completely that, from Xenophon himself to Suidas, he is never once named as a writer of merit, in any work remaining to us, while, in so many, the Anabasis is mentioned

mentioned as the work of Xenophon, would be, if at all credible, certainly the most extraordinary circumstance in the history of letters.

For the political and military historian, the important result of what has here been

stated is, that, under every consideration, the facts reported in the *Anabasis* have the full authority of Xenophon. For myself, I will venture to add; I see no room for any kind of reasonable doubt but that Xenophon was the writer.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

History of LACEDÆMON from the Restoration of the ATHENIAN Democracy, and Affairs of the GREEKS in ASIA from the Renewal of War between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, to the Renewal of War within GREECE.

## SECTION I.

*War resolved by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron Commander-in-chief: joined by the Cyreian Greek forces. Liberality of the Persian Government. Dercyllidas Commander-in-chief: Truce with the satrap of Lydia, and War with the satrap of Bithynia. Mania satrapess of Æolia: Successes of Dercyllidas in Æolia. Winter operations in Bithynia. Protection given to the Chersonese. Prosperity of the Grecian Colonies. Ill-judged orders from Lacedæmon. Danger of the Grecian Colonies. Treaty concluded between Dercyllidas and Tissaphernes, for the complete Emancipation of the Asian Greeks from Persian dominion.*

WHEN the Lacedæmonians put an end to the Athenian empire, they vindicated to themselves the sovereignty of the islands and of the European cities; they placed their own governors, with the title of harmost, in Byzantium and in the Chersonese; but they neither claimed any dominion on the continent of Asia, nor asserted the freedom of the Grecian republics there: the allegiance of the Asian Greeks was transferred from the Athenian people to the Persian king; and, under him, to the satraps, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes.

We have seen that, among the Greeks of Asia, Cyrus was popular, and Tissaphernes unpopular; insomuch that, by a kind of rebellion against

against the satrap, the Ionians had attached themselves to the prince. The event therefore of the expedition against the king, and the appointment of Tissaphernes to the great command which Cyrus had held, could not but be highly alarming to them. But, on the other hand, the glorious retreat of the Greeks who had accompanied the prince, and the clear evidence, which their return in safety bore, to the superiority of the Grecian arms, afforded ground of encouragement. If the patronage of Lacedæmon could be obtained, whose councils commanded the united arms of Greece, little, it was hoped, would be to be apprehended from the satrap's vengeance. Refusing therefore to acknowledge his authority, the Ionians sent ministers to Lacedæmon to solicit protection.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3, c. 1, s. 3.

The Lacedæmonian government, less expecting friendship from the king and from Tissaphernes, on account of their connection with Cyrus, and valuing it less, as the fame of the actions of the Cyreian army taught to despise their enmity, resolved that the Ionians should be protected. Possibly circumstances at home might contribute to this determination. It might be desirable to employ a part of their people on foreign service; and for service against an enemy, so much famed for wealth, and so little for bravery and military skill, volunteers would be numerous among the poor commonwealths of Peloponnesus.

B. C. 400  
ending, or  
399 be-  
ginning.  
Ol. 95.1.

Four thousand men were required from the allies. Only one thousand were added from Lacedæmon; and they were all of those called neodamodes; who, owing their elevation, from the condition of slaves into the rank of citizens, to the necessities of war, were, on the return of peace, looked upon with so invidious an eye, that an occasion for sending them on foreign service would be acceptable, both to the government and to themselves. Cavalry was very desirable for war in Asia; but the utmost force that Peloponnesus could raise was very small; and the principal citizens of the wealthiest republics, who alone composed it, would not be the most willing partakers in distant adventure. Application was therefore made to Athens; where recent disorders, extreme political jealousy, and a total want of protection against any momentary caprice of the people, made the situation of men of rank and fortune so precarious, that the offer of pay for three hundred horse  
found

found ready acceptance there. Thimbron was appointed commander-in-chief in Asia, with the title of harmost.

Arriving in Ionia, with his European forces, early in spring, Thimbron B. C. 399. circulated a requisition for an apportionment of troops from every Cl. 95  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Grecian city in Asia, where, says Xenophon, at that time, all obeyed whatever a Lacedæmonian commanded. The Cyrcians, under Xenophon, had been already engaged for the service, and were marching to join the Lacedæmonian army. Meanwhile, tho' his force was considerable, Thimbron feared to traverse the open country, in presence of the Persian cavalry, and thought it well if he could afford some protection, against its ravages, to the country around posts which he could securely occupy. The junction of the Cyrcians however gave him a decided superiority; and many towns, before awed by the Persian power, with ready zeal then opened their gates to him.

Four persons, whose circumstances deserve notice, took this opportunity for embracing the Grecian cause; Eurysthenes and Procles, descendants of Demaratus, the exiled king of Lacedæmon who attended Xerxes into Greece, and Gorgion and Gongylus, descended from the Eretrian Gongylus, who, by his conduct also during the Persian invasion, had merited banishment from his country and favor with the Persian monarch. The towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, and Halisarnia, given to Demaratus, and Gambrium, Palaigambrium, Myrina, and Grynium, to Gongylus, remained the property of their posterity. These gifts, from the Persian king, seem to have had much of the nature of fiefs, in the Gothic kingdoms. It would have been a gratification, at least to our curiosity, had Xenophon been fuller in explanation on the subject. From their attachment to the cause of Cyrus, and consequent dread of the king's vengeance, apparently arose the revolt of those Grecian subjects of the Persian empire; which, otherwise, would mark gross ingratitude to a beneficent government. For the testimony here given by Xenophon, remarkably corresponding with all remaining from Herodotus and Thucydides, strongly confirms, what has been heretofore observed, that there was uncommon liberality

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1. s. 4.

\* In the Anabasis, Procles is called *ἀρχων*, chief, or lord, of Teuthrania. Anab. l. 2. c. 1. s. 3.

in the despotism of the Persian empire. Public faith was kept; property was not without security; it was not there, as under the present wonderfully barbarian government of the same fine country, a crime to be rich. • Large estates, given even to foreigners, passed to their late posterity; and, instead of the tyranny which now depopulates towns and provinces, and against which the remaining subjects recur to the patronage of some foreign ambassador, the Persian government so extended liberal protection to all, that Grecian cities could prefer the dominion of the Persian king to that of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian commonwealths, and flourish under it.

But, if the Persian government was generally mild and liberal, it had been, since the reign of Xerxes, always weak, and verging to dissolution. The Lacedæmonian general Thimbron, who, with comparatively a small force, had been making conquests against it, showed no considerable abilities in the field, and in camp and in quarters his discipline was very deficient. The allies suffered from the licentiousness of his army; and complaints, in consequence, were so urged at Lacedæmon, that, on the expiration of his year, he was sentenced to banishment.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1. s. 5,  
6.

B. C. 398.  
Ol. 95  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1. s. 6,  
7, 8.

Dercyllidas, who succeeded him, was more equal to a great and difficult command. Having already served in Asia, under Lysander, he knew the characters of the two satraps, who divided between them, in almost independent sovereignty, the dominion of the western provinces. The instructions of the ephors directed him to lead the army into Caria, the hereditary government of Tissaphernes. But the desire of revenging a disgrace he had formerly incurred, when harried by Apydus, in consequence of an accusation from Pharnabazus, assisted at least, according to the cotemporary historian, his friend, in determining him to act otherwise. He negotiated with Tissaphernes; and that dastardly satrap, ill-disposed toward Pharnabazus, and always readier for negotiation than battle, instead of exerting the great power, with which he was vested, for the general defence of the empire, bargained for a particular peace for his own provinces, and consented that the Grecian arms should, without opposition from him, be carried into the Bithynian satrapy. Dercyllidas, having thus provided for the safety of the rich fields



fields of Ionia, which would otherwise have been liable, in his absence, to suffer from the Persian cavalry, hastened his march northward; and, in the length of way from Caria to the borders of Æolia, he maintained an exactness of discipline that gained him the greater credit with the allies, as it was contrasted with the licentiousness, from which the country had suffered while Thimbron commanded.

The circumstances of Æolia might reasonably have invited the attention of the general, tho' revenge had not instigated. According to that liberal policy, more than once already noticed as ordinary among the Persians, Pharnabazus had appointed Zenis, a Greek of Dardanum, to be governor, or, according to Xenophon's phrase, satrap, of that fine country, so interesting, in earliest history, as the kingdom of Priam, and the seat of the Trojan war. Zenis died early, leaving a widow, Mania, also a Dardanian. This extraordinary woman solicited the succession to her late husband's command; and supported her solicitation with presents so agreeable to the satrap's fancy, and proofs so pregnant of her own talents and spirit, that she obtained her suit. Being accordingly vested with the government, she did not disappoint, but, on the contrary, far exceeded the satrap's expectation. - None of his governors collected and remitted the revenue more regularly; none accompanied the remittance with presents more acceptable; none, when he made his progress through his satrapy, received him with such elegant magnificence, or entertained him so agreeably. These were a woman's merits, but she united with them manly virtues. In the frequency of disaffection and revolt, among the Persian provinces, no disturbance happened under her government. She not only held all in due obedience, but, raising a body of Grecian mercenaries, she reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, which had hitherto resisted the Persian dominion. Herself attended the sieges, viewing the operations from her chariot, and by praises and presents, judiciously bestowed, she excited such emulation, that her army acquired repute superior to any other body of mercenaries in Asia. Pharnabazus requiring troops for suppressing the incursions of the rebellious Mysians and Pæsidians, she attended in person. In consequence of her able conduct and high reputation, he always treated

Xen. Hel.  
1.3. c.1.  
s. 8, 9.

s. 10.

her with great respect, and sometimes even desired her assistance in his council.

Mania was another Artemisia; and the weighty authority of Xenophon, for the history of the Dardanian satrapess, not a little supports the account given by Herodotus of the Halicarnassian queen. But, though Mania could govern provinces and conduct armies, yet, in the encouragement which the gross defects, both of Grecian and Persian government, offered for daring villainy, she could not secure herself against domestic treachery. She had scarcely passed her fortieth year, when she was murdered in her palace, by Meidias, who had married her daughter. But a single murder would not answer the execrable villain's purpose. Her son, a most promising youth of seventeen, was cut off. The assassin had then the impudence to ask, of the satrap, the succession to the government held by the deceased Mania, supporting his solicitation by large presents. But he seems to have founded his hopes on a knowledge, rather of the general temper and practice of the Persian great, than of the particular character of Pharnabazus; who, with a generous indignation, refused his presents, and declared he would not live unless he could revenge Mania. Meidias prepared to support himself by force or intrigue, as circumstances might direct. He had secured Gergis and Scepsis, fortified towns in which Mania's treasures were deposited: but the other towns of the province, with one consent, refusing to acknowledge his authority, adhered to Pharnabazus.

Dercyllidas arrived upon the borders in this critical conjuncture. The satrap was unprepared; the Lacedæmonian name was popular; and the towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colonæ, in one day opened their gates. A declaration was then circulated, that the purpose of Dercyllidas and the Lacedæmonian government was to give perfect independency to the Æolian cities; desiring only alliance defensive and offensive, with quarters for the army within their walls, whenever it might become requisite in that service, whose object was the common liberty of all Grecian people. The garrisons were mostly composed of Greeks; attached to Mania, but indifferent to the interest of Pharnabazus.

The

\* Καὶ γὰρ οἱ Φρουρῶντες Ἕλληνας ἐν ἀνταῖς (ταῖς πόλεσιν) ἐπεί ἡ Μανία ἀπέθανεν, οὐ πάνυ τι καλῶς περιέποιον.

Ch. 8. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 11.

s. 12.

s. 13.

The towns of Neandrus, Ilium, and Cocylus, acceded to the Spartan general's invitation. Hope of large reward for his fidelity induced the governor of Cebren to adhere to the satrap; but, upon the approach of the army, the people soon compelled him to surrender.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 14—16.

Dercyllidas then marched toward Scepsis. The assassin Meidias, fearful, at the same time, of the Spartan general, the Persian satrap, and the Scepsian citizens, conceived his best hope to lie in accommodation with the former. He proposed a conference, to which Dercyllidas consented; and, ten principal men, of different cities, being sent to him as hostages, he went to the Grecian camp. Desiring to know upon what conditions he might be admitted to friendship and alliance, Dercyllidas answered, upon condition of allowing freedom and independency to the towns in which he had garrisons. But the march to Scepsis was not interrupted. Dercyllidas entered the town unopposed, ordered the garrison to quit the citadel, and then assembling the people, directed them to assume the government, as became Greeks and freemen. He then proceeded to Gergis, taking Meidias with him. Intelligence of his liberality to the Scepsians had prepared his reception, and Meidias acquiesced. Acquitting himself then to that miscreant, by restoring all his private property, with liberal allowance for all his claims, he seized the wealth of Mania, as now belonging to the satrap, the common enemy; and it was his boast, a grateful boast to the army, that he had enriched the military chest with a twelvemonth's pay for eight thousand men.

s. 17.

Having thus, according to Xenophon's expression, in eight days, taken nine cities (that is, having recovered from the Persian dominion nine towns, accustomed each to its separate and independent government, except as it might be occasionally compelled to obey the commands of a master) it became the consideration of Dercyllidas, how to preserve their territories against the ravages of the Persian cavalry, without burthening the people by quartering his army among them.

c. 2. s. 1.

*μεγέλειον*.—Quia, post mortem Maniæ præsidarii Græci non admodum erga eos (cives urbium prædict.) rectè se gesserant. I have no scruple in giving the very different interpretation in the text. Smith, whose version

differs here from both, is far from compensating, in his Xenophon as in his Thucydides, for extreme inelegance, by a general exactness of literal translation.

Against

Against their walls he little feared the efforts of Persian arms. He was more apprehensive of the licentiousness, difficult to controul, of a republican army in quarters, and of complaints at Lacedæmon, like those which had driven his predecessor into exile. He sent proposals of truce therefore to Pharnabazus. That generous satrap, unassisted from the capital of the empire, and deserted and betrayed by the great neighboring officer, whose more peculiar duty it was to afford him assistance, readily accepted them. Xenophon indeed says, that he was little disturbed with the loss of Æolia; esteeming that province, under Lacedæmonian protection, while he had himself peace with Lacedæmon, rather a useful barrier against other enemies. What is meant by this we can only collect from what follows. The Bithynians, tho, as tributary subjects of the empire, he had assisted them against the Cyreian army, were always licentious, sometimes perhaps rebellious, and they frequently carried hostile depredation among the more peaceful and settled inhabitants of his satrapy. Among these people Dercyllidas resolved to take his winter quarters, as in a hostile territory, and Pharnabazus expressed no dissatisfaction.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 2.  
s. 2.

That country must be naturally very productive, in which, under the management of such a people as those Bithynians, who have been on a former occasion described, an army, powerful enough to overbear opposition, could supply itself by plunder through the winter, plentifully, and without risk. That the army of Dercyllidas did so, we are assured by Xenophon, who seems to have subsisted from that plunder, much to his own satisfaction. Such successful freebooting allured a body of Odrysians, subjects of Seuthes, from European Thrace. Two hundred horse and three hundred targeteers<sup>3</sup> came as allies of Lacedæmon to reinforce Dercyllidas. They took their station between two and three miles from the Grecian army, and throwing up a slight fortification, requested a Grecian guard for it, to inable them to marode in greater force. Dercyllidas allowing them two hundred heavy-armed, they exerted themselves in depredation with such skilful diligence; that shortly

<sup>3</sup> Error may perhaps reasonably be suspected in these numbers. They seem too scanty for what we shall find was effected; especially if we compare it with what the Cyreians suffered in the same country.

their

their camp was filled with booty, a large portion of which consisted of prisoners, whom they proposed to sell for slaves.

The Bithynians, unable or fearful to resist these plunderers, were however attentive to their motions; and, having observed the smallness of their camp, and learnt the amount of its guard, resolved to take opportunity of their absence for attacking it. Assembling accordingly in great numbers, horse and foot, and watching the march of the Odrysians to a sufficient distance, they made their assault. Their missile weapons so reached every part of the small inclosure, that the Greeks were unable to withstand them. Fifteen only made their way through the irregular assailants, and reached their own camp; the rest were killed. The Bithynians then broke into the Odrysian camp, recovered their prisoners and effects, killed all the tentkeepers\*, and retired so rapidly, that the Greek army, marching as soon as intelligence of the assault reached them, found nothing but naked corpses.

The funeral ceremony of their dead occupied the Odrysians on their return. It was graced with games, as among the Greeks of Homer's age; but the favorite game of the Odrysians, less known to the father of poetry, was the simple horserace. Large quantities of wine were also drunk over the graves; a practice spread, perhaps among the descendants of Odrysians, over the distant island of Britain, and preserved, to this day, equally among the bleak mountains of Scotland, farthest north, and on the soft hills of Wight, severed by the tide from the southern coast. Providing then for the future security of their camp, by pitching it close to the Grecian, the Odrysians no longer contented themselves with plunder, but carried revenge by fire and sword extensively through Bithynia.

In spring Dercyllidas led the army to Lampsacus. He had carried B. C. 397. command in a manner so superior to his predecessor, that, instead of Ol. 95  $\frac{1}{2}$ . complaint, report so favorable had been transmitted to Lacedæmon, that, against the general rule, he was continued a second year in his situation. In Lampsacus he found commissioners sent to notify that honor to him, and to communicate the commendations of the ephors

to the army; particularly for its regular and inoffensive conduct among the allied cities. They came also authorized to inspect the state both of the army and of the allies. Dercyllidas gladly forwarded them, to witness the peace and prosperity which Æolis and Ionia enjoyed under his superintendency, and to hear the grateful testimonies of a happy people to his ability, probity, and diligence.

Xen. Hel.  
I. 3. c. 2.  
s. 6.

Since he had been in Asia, Dercyllidas had fought no great battle, nor taken any town by assault; but, in an army which, under his predecessor, had been so lawless as to be a terror more to friends than enemies, he had restored exact discipline, and yet was the favorite of that army. With that army then he had awed the two great satraps, each commanding a province equal to a powerful kingdom, and both together acting under the mightiest empire in the world; so that, after having given independency and security to the long line of Ionian and Æolian colonies, he could direct his views another way for the benefit of the Grecian name.

s. 7, 8.  
Diod. I. 14.  
c. 39.

The Thracian Chersonese, once the principality of the renowned Miltiades, lately, in large proportion the property of another great and singular character, Alcibiades, and by its fertility, its many harbours, and its advantageous situation for trade, always a great object for industrious adventurers from Greece, was however always subject to dreadful incursions from the wild hords of Thracians, who made it their glory to live by rapine. Alcibiades, maintaining a military force for the defence of his property, and extending the advantage of its protection to the Grecian settlers generally, seems to have held a degree of dominion among them. Perhaps Clearchus, forbidden, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonian administration, but enabled, by the bounty of Cyrus, to become their next protector, aspired to similar dominion. Before the return of the Cyreian army, however, the Lacedæmonian administration had so far directed their attention to the Chersonese, as to have sent a governor thither, with their usual title of harmost; but, either he had been withdrawn, or the force intrusted to him, or his ability to use it, were deficient; for the Thracian inroads were renewed, and so successfully, that the Chersonesites, in a petition to Lacedæmon for protection, declared that, if it was not granted, they must abandon

the country. Dercyllidas, informed of this, before orders could come to himself from Lacedæmon, or another could be sent with the commission, resolved to execute the service. He sent to Pharnabazus a proposal for prolonging the existing truce, which was immediately accepted; and, having thus provided for the tranquility of Asia, he transported his army to the European shore. Immediately he visited the Thracian prince Seuthes, by whom he was very hospitably entertained; and having arranged, apparently to his satisfaction, those matters in which his commonwealth and that prince had a common concern, he marched to the Chersonese. There he employed his army, not in plunder and destruction, but in raising a rampart across the isthmus, to secure the peace of the rich country and industrious people within. The isthmus is only four miles over; the peninsula contained eleven considerable towns, many harbours, a large extent of rich land under various cultivation, arable, vineyard, fruit-plantations, spacious pastures adapted to every kind of cattle, and still considerable tracts which might be allotted to new colonists. The possessors of this valuable territory were unequal to its defence; because, for its cultivation, they used principally the industry of slaves, whom they dared not trust with arms. The work of Dercyllidas enabled them to become their own protectors. Begun in spring, it was completed before autumn<sup>5</sup>, and the army was reconveyed into Asia. Dercyllidas then made a progress through the Asiatic cities, to inspect the state of things, and had the satisfaction to find everywhere peace, prosperity, and general content.

Diod. l. 14. c. 39.

B. C. 397.  
Ol. 95.  
Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. s. 9.

A single exception will deserve notice, as it tends to illustrate the political circumstances of the country, and manners resulting from them. With governments so imperfect, and territories so narrow, as those of the Grecian republics, so liable to intestine commotion, so open to foreign attack, peace and civil order could be secure, only under the strong controul of a superintending power, lodged, fortunately for a time, in honest and able hands. Thus the condition of the Asian Greeks, in the confession of that honest eulogist of democracy, Herodotus, was improved by their reduction under the Persian empire, after

<sup>5</sup> Πρὸ ὁπώρας.

their rebellion against the first Darius. In the want of such a superintending power, faction had now expelled a number of Chians from their island. Men driven from their homes and possessions to vagrancy, beggary, and starving, sometimes in numbers amounting almost to half the free population of a republic, would be likely to resort to violent expedients. The first thing to look out for was subsistence; and while necessity drove, allurements sometimes invited, to marauding, as a profession. The Chian exiles seized Atarneus, a strong post on the continent, over against their island; and the produce of the rich Ionian fields, cultivated by unarmed slaves for unwarlike masters, became in large proportion theirs. When Dercyllidas came to the protection of the Ionians, the Chian exiles had collected provisions for eight months. He formed the blockade of their hold, too strong for the art of attack, of that age, to reduce by any other mode of siege. While their provisions served, they resisted; and then, by their submission, the tranquillity of Ionia and Æolia became complete.

But, while the cities of those provinces, prospering and happy, and administering each its own affairs, under the able and benign superintendency of Dercyllidas, enjoyed at least the present blessings of freedom, those of Caria had to complain, that their interests had been neglected, that they had been disappointed even of a promised relief, and that the treaty, concluded with Tissaphernes, was an express compact for their continuance in subjection to a foreign dominion. The sea being open to them, they could communicate with Lacedæmon, and they sent to request, that their situation might not be overlooked, by the vindicators of the liberties of Greece. If the Lacedæmonian arms were carried into Caria, they said, Tissaphernes, to save his own large property there, would readily grant the independency, so necessary to their happiness, and so desirable for the glory of the Grecian, and especially of the Lacedæmonian name. The ephors seem too lightly to have yielded to their arguments, without communication with their able commander, or with any others duly acquainted with the circumstances of Asia. They sent orders, for war to be carried into Caria; for the army under Dercyllidas to march thither; and for the fleet, then commanded by Phrax, to cooperate with it.

Xen. Hel.  
1.3. c. 2.  
s. 10.

B. C. 396.  
Ol. 95. 4.  
Spring.



The first effect of these ill-concerted measures appears to have been to produce, or at least to hasten, a union between the two satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; whose long variance had, in no small degree, contributed to those great successes, which the Greeks, with a force otherwise inadequate to a contention with the Persian empire, had been unable to obtain. Pharnabazus, unsupported by the court of Susa, and basely deserted, or worse than deserted, by Tissaphernes, his immediate superior in command, had acquiesced under the loss of Æolia. But, as soon as the threatened attack of Caria afforded a probability that Tissaphernes would be disposed to change his conduct, Pharnabazus went to wait upon him, and declared his readiness to coöperate zealously in measures for driving the Greeks out of Asia. This proposal, to which the jealousy and pusillanimity of Tissaphernes otherwise would scarcely have listened, was made acceptable by the indiscreet violence of the Spartan government. The two satraps went together into Caria, and, having arranged matters for the defence of that country, returned to take the command of an army which threatened Ionia with destruction.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 2.  
s. 11.

s. 11.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 40.

Dercyllidas was already marching for Caria, when information reached him, that all his hitherto-successful labors, for the welfare of the colonies, were upon the point of being rendered utterly vain. He consulted Pharax, and they ventured together to disobey their ill-judged instructions. Returning hastily northward, Dercyllidas met intelligence that the satraps had already entered the Ephesian territory. He was pushing his march through the rich vale of the Meander, in whose luxuriant soil the growth of corn commonly exceeds a man's height, when some of his advanced guard, mounting on some tombs by the road-side (for the road-side was the place of burial among Greeks as well as Romans) discovered the Persian army in order of battle. Immediately he gave orders for forming; but, while he attended the sacrifice, which the Lacedæmonians held indispensable before action, numbers of his Asian Greeks left their arms in the corn, and fled; and it became evident that his dependence must be upon his small force of European troops alone.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 2.  
s. 12.

B. C. 396.  
Ol. 95. 4.  
May ending,  
or June beginning.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 2.  
s. 13.

In these most alarming circumstances, the interested pusillanimity

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 2.  
s. 14.

s. 15.

of Tissaphernes relieved him. Pharnabazus was desirous of ingaging; but Tissaphernes, already more than half satisfied, since his property in Caria was no longer in immediate danger, would first try the effect of a conference. A herald was accordingly sent to the Grecian general Dercyllidas, anxious to prevent observation of the state of his army; advanced with a chosen escort. Such then being the circumstances, that both parties were desirous to avoid a battle, it was presently agreed, that the Greek army should march to Leucophrys, the Persian to Tralles, and that a place should be appointed where the generals should next day meet. The conference being held accordingly, Dercyllidas insisted on the simple proposition, 'that all Grecian cities should be independent.' To this the satraps consented, with the conditions, 'that the Grecian army should quit the king's territory,' (by which seems to have been meant Asia, including the Grecian colonies,) and 'that the Lacedæmonian governors should quit the Grecian towns.' Upon these terms a truce was concluded, to hold till the pleasure of the king and of the Lacedæmonian government could be known.

This was the first treaty, reported on any authentic or even probable testimony, by which, since the early times of the Lydian monarchy, it was provided, that the Asian Greeks should be completely emancipated from foreign dominion. All the Ionian and Æolian cities, it appears, had the immediate enjoyment of independency in peace. The Carian seem to have waited the confirmation of the treaty by the king of Persia and the Lacedæmonian government. But it was a quiet revolution: no great battle gave it splendor; none of those striking events attended, which invite the attention of the writer, in proportion as they are fitted to impress the fancy of the reader. It forms nevertheless a memorable and interesting era in Grecian history; and the fame of Dercyllidas, less brilliant, but far purer, than that of most of the great men of Greece, tho' being recorded by the pen of Xenophon, it is indeed secured against perishing, yet deserves to have been more generally and more pointedly noticed, than we find it, by writers whose theme has been Grecian history, or panegyric of the Grecian character.

We

\* — Πρώτην δὲ διὰ Θίμβρανος; ἴτα διὰ Δερκυλίδου πολεμῶντες (ὅι Λακεδαιμόνιοι) ἄδην δὲ στρατιοτες.

We have from Diodorus an account, which may deserve notice, of the manner in which the affairs of Lacedæmon were administered, in its colony of the Trachinian Heracleia. It was when Dercyllidas was sent to command in Asia, that the superintendency of Heracleia was committed to Herippidas. The colony had been, in the usual way of Grecian cities, distracted by faction. Herippidas summoned a general assembly, in which persons of all parties met; apparently in some confidence, that the representative of the presiding commonwealth of Greece would administer justice in mercy to all. But he took a more summary method, for restoring quiet, than could easily consist with justice. Surrounding the place of meeting with an armed force, he seized five hundred of those supposed adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest, or to the interest of that party in Lacedæmon with which he was connected, and they were all put to death. We shall give credit to report from Diodorus, always in proportion to its consonance with the accounts of writers of best judgement, cotemporary, or most nearly so, with the transactions; and his account here is but too much in consonance with all that we learn on best authority. After this military execution, upon an unresisting people, Herippidas marched against the rude inhabitants of the neighboring highlands of Cæta, who had rebelled against the Lacedæmonian sovereignty. He was so successful as to compel the whole free population to emigrate. They withdrew first into Thessaly, but afterward removed into Bœotia; invited by circumstances not specified to us, yet among which may be reckoned a disposition, in the leading party there, adverse to Lacedæmon, and the purpose of acquiring strength to resist Lacedæmon.

*πρακτικῶν ἀξιόλογοι.*—Plut. vit. Artax. p. 1867. of Dercyllidas; and modern historians seem to have neglected the informed and able cotemporary, who was a witness to the fact, to follow the speculator of some centuries after.

## SECTION II.

*War of Lacedæmon and Elis. Death of Agis, King of Lacedæmon, and Succession of Agesilaus. Sedition in Lacedæmon.*

FORMERLY the institutions of Lycurgus had sufficed to inforce, very generally among the Lacedæmonians, that modesty in command, which, united with dignity of manner, contempt of wealth, and superiority in military and political knowlege, induced the Grecian republics, conscious of the necessity, for general quiet, of admitting some superintending power, to yield a willing obedience to them. But in the long and wide course of the Peloponnesian war, communication with strangers, unavoidably much greater than the institutions of Lycurgus would approve, together with the necessity of raising and employing a public revenue, far greater than ever entered into the legislator's contemplation, had altered and corrupted Spartan manners; so that, when the war was at length concluded, so happily in their favor, they were no longer capable of bearing their high fortune. We have seen, in the account of Xenophon, their friend and panegyrist, what plenitude of power their officers, in transmarine commands, assumed, and with what haughty tyranny they exercised it. Unquestionably it must have been far other conduct that established that reputation of Lacedæmon, which had led united Greece to refuse obedience to any but a Lacedæmonian commander, even in naval war against the Persians, when Lacedæmon contributed so very small a proportion to the national fleet; which led the rich Sicilian cities to union under a Lacedæmonian general, bringing no force with him but the splendor of the Lacedæmonian name; which, at the Olympian and other national meetings, made, as Isocrates says, every Lacedæmonian more an object of general curiosity and admiration than the victors in the games; which in short established, through the Greek nation, a respect for the Lacedæmonian character, such as never perhaps was paid to that of any other people.

Of the circumstances which, so soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian

Ch. 8. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 18. s. 5—  
8. of this Hist.

Isocr. Ar-  
chid. p. 76.  
t. 2.

Peloponnesian war, introduced discord again among the Grecian cities, and excited opposition to Lacedæmon where it might least have been expected, our information is very defective: From the following occurrences only we gather, in some degree, the cause of that disgust and alienation, which we have already seen manifested in the conduct of Thebes and Corinth. Thebes claimed sovereignty over the other towns of Bœotia. Lacedæmon favored the claim of those towns to be independent of Thebes, with the purpose of holding them in dependence upon herself. Perhaps some haughty and ungracious interference of Lacedæmon, raising extensive dissatisfaction in Thebes, had afforded that advantage to the democratical leaders, which enabled them to gain the ascendant over the aristocratical party, always in some degree the Lacedæmonian party; so long the ruling party in that city. The success of the democratical party in Thebes would of course raise hope and energy in that of Corinth, which always held friendly communication with Argos. It seems to have been with the support of Argos and Thebes, that democracy gained ascendancy in Corinth; so that the two cities, which were the principal allies of Lacedæmon throughout the Peloponnesian war, became alienated, almost immediately after its conclusion.

Ch. 21. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

But Lacedæmon itself was distracted by faction, and its administration consequently unsteady; for so much is clearly indicated by the circumstances which led to the restoration of the Athenian democracy; and hence, while among the Asiatic cities, as Xenophon says, every one obeyed whatever any Lacedæmonian commanded, the cities of Greece more readily ventured resistance to the most formal orders of the Lacedæmonian government. It does not appear that any measures were immediately taken, in resentment, either for the protection afforded by Thebes to Athenian fugitives, of the party most inimical to Lacedæmon, or for the refusal of both Thebes and Corinth to obey requisitions, which the treaty of confederacy authorized. A nearer interest, or one which more affected the feelings of the Lacedæmonian people, drew their attention.

In that system, if it may be so called, by which the various members of the Greek nation were in some degree held together, we find a strange mixture

mixture of undefined, and sometimes repugnant claims, more or less generally admitted. While the Lacedæmonians presided, with authority far too little defined, over the political and military affairs of Greece, the Eleians asserted a prescriptive right to a kind of religious supremacy, also too little defined; universally allowed nevertheless, in a certain degree, but, like the Lacedæmonian supremacy, not always to the extent to which the claimants pretended. In the schism of Peloponnesus, which occurred during the Peloponnesian war, we have seen the imperial state of Lacedæmon summoned to the Eleian tribunal, as one of our corporations might be summoned to our courts at Westminster, a fine imposed, its citizens interdicted the common games and sacrifices of the nation, an opprobrious punishment publicly inflicted upon an aged and respectable Spartan, who, but by implication, offended against their decrees; and, finally, these measures supported by avowed hostilities, and alliance with the enemies of Sparta. The necessity of the times induced the Lacedæmonians to make peace, with these affronts unrevenged; but their smothered resentment had been revived and increased by what they esteemed a new indignity. Before the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, Agis king of Lacedæmon being sent, in pursuance of a supposed prophetic direction, to perform a sacrifice to Jupiter at Olympia, the Eleians had forbidden the ceremony; affirming that, according to antient law, no oracle should be consulted for success in wars between Greeks and Greeks, and they would allow no prayer for victory in such a war. There is a beneficence, a liberal and extended patriotism in this idea, so consonant to the spirit with which Iphitus is said to have founded the Olympian festival, and so opposite to the tenets afterward generally prevailing in Greece, that they seem to mark the law for antient and genuine. The Lacedæmonians however were not the less offended with the Eleians, for bringing forward, upon such an occasion, what, if those maxims only were considered, which prevailed through succeeding ages, it must be confessed would carry much the appearance of a complete novelty.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 2.  
s. 16.

s. 17.

The judgement passed against the Lacedæmonians and the fine imposed, the interdiction of the games, the punishment of Leichas, the confederacy

confederacy with Athens and Argos, the hostilities insuing, and finally the refusal of permission for sacrifice at Olympia, are stated by the cotemporary historian as the motives which disposed the Lacedæmonians to war. We gather from him however that others existed; the democratical party at this time governed Elis, and Elis held many towns of Eleia in subjection. The Lacedæmonians did not absolutely require oligarchy in every state of Greece; for they had lately permitted the restoration of democracy in Athens; and even their own government had a mixture of democracy: but they always beheld, with peculiar jealousy, dominion exercised by a democratical commonwealth. Urged then at the same time by resentment for past insults, and consideration of a present political interest, the ephors assembling the people, it was decreed 'That the Eleians should be chastened,' or, as the historian's word may be explained, 'should be compelled to a conduct better regulated by prudence and modesty'.<sup>7</sup>

B.C. 396.<sup>\*</sup>  
Ol. 95. 2.

In pursuance of this resolution, ministers were sent to Elis with a declaration 'That the Lacedæmonians deemed it just and proper that the towns, held in subjection by the Eleians, be restored to independency.' The Eleians, alledging the right of conquest, refused to resign their sovereignty; and upon this the ephors ordered the king, Agis, to march into their country. The usual ravage of Grecian armies was already begun, when an earthquake, imagined a divine admonition, alarming the aged prince and his superstitious people, they retired out of Eleia, and the troops were dismissed to their several homes.

Whether as marking the favor of the gods or the weakness of their enemies, this conduct greatly encouraged the Eleians. In either view it improved the hope of gaining to their cause many Grecian states,

<sup>7</sup> Σωφρονισμὸν αὐτοῦς.

<sup>\*</sup> Diodorus ascribes the beginning of the Eleian war to the third year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, B. C. 401. Dodwell places it in the fourth. But it appears to me that Dodwell is thus inconsistent with Xenophon, and even with himself. For the Eleian war was concluded early in the third year after

its commencement. The death of Agis followed in the same summer; and it does not appear, nor does Dodwell say, that there was any considerable interval before the determination in favor of Agesilaus, of whose succession he says, Hoc certe hujus Olympiadis xcv anno 4; that is, after midsummer, B. C. 397.

known to be disaffected toward Lacedæmon. But if the Lacedæmonian sovereignty was tyrannical, theirs apparently was not less so; and while they were cherishing the hope of foreign assistance, they did not take wiser precautions than other Grecian states, for securing the attachment of their subjects. In the next spring, Agis again entered Eleia with an army; to which all the allies contributed, except Corinth and Bœotia. Immediately Lepreum revolted to him; Macistus and Epitalium quickly followed the example; and these were imitated, as he advanced into the country, by Leprinë, Amphidolia, and Marganeæ. In this defection of their towns, the Eleians were utterly unable to face the Lacedæmonian army in the field. Agis proceeded, unopposed, to Olympia, and sacrificed, now unforbidden, on the altar of Jupiter. The territories of the revolting towns of course had been spared; but rapine and devastation marked the way from Olympia to Elis, whither the king next directed his march. Nor did the country suffer only from the conquering army. The opportunity of freebooting invited the neighboring Arcadians and Achaians; and slaves and cattle and corn were carried off to such an amount, that all the markets of Peloponnesus were glutted with Eleian plunder. It was supposed that Agis would not, rather than that he could not, take Elis itself, which was unfortified. After destroying many fair buildings of the outskirts, he proceeded to Cyllenë, the principal seaport of the Eleians, and ravage was extended from the mountains to the sea.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 2.  
s. 19.

s. 20.

Occasion has already frequently occurred to remark, that scarcely any misfortune could befall a Grecian state, which would not bring advantage, or at least the hope of advantage, to some considerable portion of its subjects. The aristocratical party in Elis, oppressed by the demagogue Thrasydæus, looked to the present sufferings of their country as the means of relief; but with no better consideration of any political or moral principle, than might have guided the wildest savages, or the most profligate among the lowest populace in civilized nations. They proposed to assassinate Thrasydæus, with a few of his confidential friends; and then, in the name of the commonwealth, to open a negotiation with Lacedæmon. The people, they trusted, deprived of their leader, and dreading the arms of the Lacedæmonians, would acquiesce;



acquiesce; and thus the principal power in the state would of course come into their hands. The plot failed through a mistake, by which another was murdered for Thrasydæus. The people, however, for some time, thought their favorite dead, and rested in silent dejection: but, while the conspirators were arming, and stationing their party, the demagogue awoke, where drunkenness and supervening sleep had, overnight, checked his way. The people immediately flocked about him; a battle followed, and the conspirators, overpowered, fled to the Lacedæmonian camp.

The conduct of the war was such as we have so often seen in Greece. When plunder no longer remained to employ the Lacedæmonian army profitably, Agis marched home, leaving only a garrison in Epitalium on the Alpheius; where he established the Eleian fugitives. Hence rapine was occasionally prosecuted through the autumn and winter. Elis could not, like Athens, support itself under the continual ravage of its territory. In spring therefore Thrasydæus opened a negotiation with Lacedæmon, and at once offered the independency of all the towns over which the Eleians claimed sovereignty by right of conquest; proposing only to keep Epeium, whose territory they had purchased from the inhabitants, for thirty talents, fairly paid. The Lacedæmonians however, considering, or affecting to consider, the purchase as forced, required that Epeium should be free like the rest. The disposition thus apparent in the Lacedæmonians to depress Elis, encouraged the villagers of the Pisan territory to assert their claim to the superintendancy of the Olympian temple, violently taken from their ancestors, as they contended, by the Eleians, when their city was destroyed. But, whatever might have been the antient right, the Lacedæmonian administration,\* thinking those uneducated pretenders unfit for an office of much solemnity and dignity in the eyes of all Greece, would not interfere. Upon the condition therefore that every town of Eleia should be, as a free republic, a separate member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, which was, in effect, to be subject to Lacedæmon, peace was made; and Elis, according to the decree before the war, humbled and chastened, was itself also restored to its place in that confederacy.

The imputation of impiety, under which, from the Eleians at least,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 2.  
s. 21.

B. C. 397.  
Ol. 95. 3.

s. 22.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 3. s. 1.

B. C. 397.  
Ol. 95. 4.  
After Mid-  
summer.

the Lacedæmonians began the war, perhaps urged them to a more ostentatious display of respect for the gods, at the end of it. Agis himself was deputed to offer, at Delphi, the tenth of the spoil. In his return, he was taken ill at Heræa, and he died soon after his arrival at Lacedæmon. In the magnificence of his funeral, the Lacedæmonians probably meant also to exhibit their own piety, as well as to testify their opinion of the deceased prince's merit. They failed however in their estimate of the prevailing prejudices of the Grecian people. Honor to the gods indeed, was supposed to be best shown, and religion principally to consist, in pompous processions and expensive spectacles; but general opinion condemned the splendor of the funeral of Agis, as greater than could become the most illustrious mortal.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 3. s. 2.  
Pluf. vit.  
Ages. init.

Circumstances occurring, since the Peloponnesian war, have not shown the Spartan constitution very well adapted to extensive empire; and those brought forward, by the death of Agis, will not give any very favorable impression of its interior system. Agis left a reputed son, Leotychides; whom however he had been known to disown; and even his queen Timæa was reported to have declared, that her adulterous commerce with Alcibiades had given birth to the child. Against the claim of this dubious prince, Agesilaus, half-brother of Agis, (the latter being son of Archidamus by Lamprido, the former by Eupolia,) had the support of Lysander, the conqueror of Athens, who stood at the head of a powerful party. Agesilaus, many years younger than Agis, and yet in the vigor of youth<sup>s</sup>, was lame. The partizans of Leotychides hence took occasion to urge, against his pretension, the authority of an antient oracle, which admonished the Lacedæmonians 'to beware of halting royalty.' This objection to his friend, Lysander answered by a different interpretation of the oracle. Such absurdity, he insisted, was not intended by the god, as to admonish men to provide that a man should never be lame; the purpose of the divine admonition was to guard the succession in the posterity of Hercules; and then only royalty would truly halt, when a man not of the royal line should ascend the throne. When we find a dis-

<sup>s</sup> Ἀγησίλαος τοίνυν ἔτι μὲν νέος ὡν ἔτυχε τῆς βασιλείας. Xen. Agesil. init.

cussion of such importance related by the pen of Xenophon, and when we know that two at least of the persons interested, Agesilaus and Lysander, were able and great men, we should impute perhaps to change of circumstances and manners, the difficulty we have to discover any dignity, almost any decency, or even common sense, in the proceedings. Leaving them, therefore, for readers whom curiosity may induce to consult the cotemporary historian, suffice it here to say, that, by the votes of the general assembly of the Lacedæmonians, it was decided that Agesilaus should reign.

Athens, in the age of which we are treating, is nearly as well known to us as our own country, two hundred years ago. The remaining works of historians, orators, lawyers, poets, and philosophers, give almost every information we could wish. But about Lacedæmon we are much in the dark. The Lacedæmonians wrote no books, published no speeches, discountenanced the residence of foreigners among them, and made secrecy in matters of government a maxim, not only of their policy, but of their religion. We know the Lacedæmonians therefore almost only in foreign command. With the prerogatives of their kings, which were principally exercised in foreign command, we are well acquainted; but of the proper authority of the ephors, of the senate, of the people, of the lesser assembly, composed apparently of the citizens of Lacedæmon only, of the greater assembly, in which all Laconians, by themselves or deputies, seem to have had voices, we learn little. Something of the state of parties becomes occasionally discovered, through its connection with foreign politics. But internal transactions, gradual revolutions in laws, manners, and politics, and those deviations from the system of Lycurgus, which length of time and great changes in the circumstances of the commonwealth had produced, conquests, foreign connections, extensive power, more extensive influence, the various communication of the people, in command and in negotiation, in war and in peace, the avowed introduction of public wealth for the maintenance of fleets and armies, the surreptitious acquisitions of individuals by the various means which foreign service afforded, and, what was not least in importance, the accumulation of property in the hands of individual citizens,

citizens; through inheritance from females; of all these matters we have but very obscure information. All accounts of the system of Lycurgus indicate, that he allowed no distinction of rank or privileges among his people, but from age or merit. But, in the course of centuries, a very material distinction had arisen. The families peculiarly named Spartans, and distinguished also by the title of PEERS<sup>10</sup>, had ingrossed almost the whole power of the commonwealth. The rest of the people, included under the general name of Lacedæmonians, or the still more extensive appellation of Lacons or Laconians, including the Perioeciæns, were never admitted to the higher offices, civil or military. So early as the age of Xerxes, we find a great distinction; for, in the army which fought under Pausanias, at the celebrated battle of Plataea, every Spartan was attended by seven Helots, every other Lacedæmonian by only one. The Spartans in that army were, according to Herodotus, five thousand, and the Lacedæmonians only an equal number. But, never admitting any new associates to their order, as Spartan families became extinct, their numbers lessened, and in Xenophon's time were so reduced that, in Sparta itself, they were but a small part of the population; or at least of the numbers occasionally assembled there.

Herod. 1.9.  
c. 29.

Xen. Hel.  
1.3. c. 3. s. 5.

It is however evident, from all accounts of Lacedæmonian affairs, that, from the age of Lycurgus till toward the period to which we are now arrived, the distinction of ranks in Lacedæmon was less invidious than in any other Grecian state: the whole body of the people was better amalgamated; and the factions, known by several names, yet marking nearly the same distinctions, the rich and the poor, the nobles and the commons, the Few and the Many, which divided every other Grecian republic, are there little heard of<sup>11</sup>. But it appears that even  
the

<sup>10</sup> Τῶν Ὀμοίων. Xen. Hel. 1.3. c. 3. s. 5.

<sup>11</sup> It by no means however follows that slaves, or those known of servile origin, were admitted, as Barthelemi pretends, (c. 42. p. 103. vol. 4. ed. 8<sup>o</sup>.) to the first honors of the state. The attention with which Barthelemi has studied the able writers of the

republican times, should have sufficed to make him distrust the assertion of so late an author as Ælian, made also in not the clearest terms, that Callicratidas, Gylippus and Lysander were of neodamode families. It very sufficiently appears, from the cotemporary writers, that none such could, in their  
age,

the ephors, a magistracy said to have been originally established to watch and protect the rights of the people at large, were always appointed from among the Spartans only. And it seems probable that, after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when, through the vast acquisition of power made by Lacedæmon, new and great temptations offered for coveting high office, while at the same time the services of the body of the people were less necessary to those in authority, the Spartans, or peers, began to set a wider distinction between themselves and others, to assume authority with less reserve, and exercise it with less discretion.

Agesilaus had not been a year on the throne, when the invidious distinctions, which had been growing in the Lacedæmonian state, and the impolitic conduct of those peculiarly called Spartans, gave rise to a plot for a complete change of government, for the accomplishment of which, kings, ephors, and senate, were to be assassinated. The leader, Cinadon, was a young man, already placed, by birth and talents, above the crowd, and indignant to be excluded, by arbitrary distinctions, from the possibility of still advancing himself. To engage those of his own rank in his views, it was his practice to desire them to count the Spartans in the full agora. They would be, beside the kings, the ephors, and the senate, perhaps forty, while the Lacedæmonians ruled by these, and denied the means of admission to high office, were more than four thousand. He desired them then to advert to the state of the towns and villages of Laconia; and in each they would find one

age, arrive at the high stations which they filled. The occasion has occurred to mention the matter in a former note, (ch. 20. sect. 2. note 3.) yet as Barthelemi's authority is esteemed high, it may not be superfluous to add here some observations. Herodotus has commemorated the first strangers, known to have been admitted to the privileges of Spartans; and it was not forty years after, that Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, occupied the exalted office of regent. Gylippus himself was chosen for the Sicilian command, not more for his abilities, than for his rank. His known dignity of Spartan

blood, was the very circumstance proposed to induce the deference of the Sicilians to his authority; and, for Lysander, Barthelemi himself has in another place taken the account of Plutarch, who says he was of a Heracleid family. (Anach. v. 4. p. 285.) Barthelemi is in general little careful to distinguish the different practices of distant ages, when the Grecian cities were in widely different circumstances; and he quotes, with far too much indifference, the highest and the lowest authorities, Thucydides, Xenophon, or Isocrates, and Hesy chius, Julius Pollux, or Suidas.

- Xen. Hel. 1.3. c.3. s.6. master, and many friends: apparently meaning one Spartan magistrate, with many Laconians, like themselves, excluded from Spartan honors. All the Helots, all the newly-admitted citizens, the lower people of the capital, and the people of the provincial towns universally, he proceeded, would be of their party; for all these, it was known, whenever the subject occurred in conversation, were unable to conceal their detestation of the Spartans.
- s. 8, 9, 10. This conspiracy being indicated by one of the associates, the ephors were so doubtful of the disposition of the people of Sparta itself, that they feared to apprehend Cinadon there: they feared to summon even the lesser assembly. Consulting only with some of the senators, they sent Cinadon, on pretence of public service, with a small command, to the frontiers. There he was arrested, and the names of his principal accomplices being drawn from him, their persons were secured, before any discovery was suspected. Cinadon, being questioned what was his object in the plot, answered, 'Not to be inferior to others in Lacedæmon.' He was executed, together with his principal accomplices, with torture and public ignominy. Sedition was thus daunted, and the Spartans, or peers, retained the enjoyment of their exclusive privileges. The means of Xenophon, through his intimacy with Agesilaus and many other Spartans of high rank, to obtain a knowledge of these circumstances, give an authenticity to his detail of them, which, in the scantiness of our information concerning the interior transactions of Sparta, make it highly valuable.
- s. 11.

## SECTION III

*Lacedæmonian government of subject-allies. Insult from Thebes. War renewed with Persia. First campaign of Agesilaus in Asia. Preparations for the second campaign. Battle of the Pactolus. Death of Tissaphernes. Weakness of the Persian government.*

- B. C. 397. DOMESTIC disturbance was thus fortunately obviated, when very serious alarm arose from a foreign quarter. A Syracusan, named Herodas, arrived
- Ol. 95. 4.  
Xen. Hel. 1.3. c.4. s.1.
- 1

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arrived at Lacedæmon from Phenicia, with intelligence of great preparations in the ports of that country. Many triremes were equipping, many building, many arriving from other maritime provinces of the Persian empire. Rumor went that a fleet of three hundred was to be formed; where to be employed nobody knew; but, among orders coming from various great officers, some were from Tissaphernes: whence suspicion arose, that Greece, or some of the Grecian settlements, were in view. Herodas, whom mercantile business only had led to Phenicia, anxious to communicate intelligence probably so important to the common welfare of the Greek nation, had taken his departure in the first ship.

This communication made much impression at Lacedæmon. No assurance had been received, that the treaty, concluded with Tissaphernes, by Dercyllidas, had been ratified by the king, or would be ratified. Indeed it could not be supposed very acceptable to him or to his council; and the satrap's faithlessness had been abundantly experienced. There was therefore ample reason to apprehend, that the Greek nation, and especially the Asiatic colonies, were the objects of the great armament preparing in the Phenician ports. For the colonies the danger was the greater, because, since the departure of Dercyllidas, all there had gone into disorder. Immediately on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, democratical government had been everywhere abolished by Lysander, who established, in every city, a council of only ten men, in whose hands he placed the supreme authority. If intire credit should be given to the invective of Athenian orators, it was a most oppressive and degrading tyranny that was universally exercised by those oligarchies. Some exaggeration in their pictures, however, we may reasonably suppose; and yet the tenor of Grecian history, and many facts reported by Xenophon, too well warrant the belief that, under such governments, unless when power committed to the liberality of a Dercyllidas controuled them, oppression, and gross oppression, would be not uncommon. The Spartan administration nevertheless did not refuse attention to the complaints of the people. Their measures show indeed more liberality than wisdom. Hastily undertaking to legislate for a country with which they were unacquainted, they directed everywhere

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 2, 7.

the abolition of the council of Ten, and, in general terms, the restoration of the old constitution. Every city was at once torn by the utmost violence of faction. Democracy, such as it had subsisted under the supremacy of Athens, was nowhere completely restored, but universal anarchy ensued.

Confusion thus pervading the subject states, and apprehension of an enemy, so powerful as the Persian empire, agitating Lacedæmon, a congress of the confederacy was summoned. Hostilities had of late years been frequent with one or other of the bordering satraps; but it was long since the force of the Persian empire, united under the direction of its head, had been exerted against Greece always divided within itself. These were circumstances in which such a man as Lysander would come forward advantageously. Taking a leading part in debate, he was successful in his endeavors to obviate alarm. ‘Of the superiority of the Greeks by sea,’ he said, ‘there could be no reasonable doubt; and, of what they were capable by land, against the Persian empire, the late return of the Cyreian army very sufficiently demonstrated. With regard to the disturbances among the Asian Greek cities, it was obvious, that a reversal of the measures, which had occasioned the present confusion, would of course restore the former order. He could not hesitate therefore to declare his opinion, that the large part of the Greek nation there, looking to Lacedæmon for protection, and, for the sake of protection, readily admitting her supremacy, a kind of outwork necessary to the security of Greece itself, ought to be protected.’ Since Leotychidas, who, with Xanthippus father of Pericles, defeated the army of Xerxes at Mycalë, a Spartan king had never crossed the Ægean. Agesilaus, incited by Lysander, now offered himself for the command. He required only thirty Spartans, with two thousand neodamode Lacedæmonians, and six thousand heavy-armed of the allies. His offer encouraged the assembly; the expedition was voted, and troops precisely as the king desired.

Xenophon reports of Agesilaus, that, by courting equally ephors, senate, and people, and seeming always anxious to defer to their authority, he obtained a more commanding influence, and more real power, than any of his predecessors for a long time had enjoyed. It seems to have

been



been in pursuance of this policy that he desired the attendance of thirty Spartans. Ten we have seen appointed to attend Agis, in an expedition against the Argians, as a controuling council; and this check upon the military authority of the kings, once established, would not be readily remitted. By desiring thirty instead of ten, Agesilaus seemed to pay a compliment to the body of the peers, while he really diminished the consequence of each individual of his council, and perhaps made it easier for himself to rule the whole.

He was not equally happy in his speculations in forein as in domestic politics; or perhaps he neglected them. An occurrence of a strange nature, far from clearly accounted for by the cotemporary historian his friend, foreboded ill to the peace of Greece, while he embarked for Asia. Geræstus in Eubœa was the appointed port, where the troops were to assemble. In his way thither, attended by a small escort only, he went to the port of Aulis in Bœotia; and, on account of the fame of that place for the sacrifice of Agamemnon, and the departure of the united forces of Greece for the Trojan war, he made a point of sacrificing there. He was already in the middle of the ceremony, when the Bœotarchs, at the head of a considerable force of horse, interfered, rudely scattered the offering from the altar, and peremptorily forbade the sacrifice. Agesilaus, surprized and incensed, but unable to resist, imprecated the vengeance of the gods upon the Bœotians for the impious violence. Possibly the Bœotians may have esteemed the attempt of the Spartan king an impious intrusion. Evidently he had been deficient in precaution, and they appear to have been brutal, either in insult or in resentment. In the moment nothing seems to have followed: Agesilaus proceeded to Geræstus, whence he conducted his armament safely to Ephesus: but the remoter consequences were, as we shall see, deeply unfortunate, to Bœotia and to Lacedæmon.

The arrival of the Spartan king, with a Grecian army, in Asia, could not but alarm the satraps there. Tissaphernes sent a deputation to inquire

Xen. Hel.  
i. 3. c. 7.  
s. 5.  
B.C. 396<sup>12</sup>  
Ol. 2<sup>2</sup>/<sub>8</sub>. 4.  
Novem. or  
Decem.

<sup>12</sup> We are frequently missing, in Xenophon, the convenient accuracy of Thucydides in marking times and seasons; and Dodwell has not been fortunate in his endeavors to explain

quire the cause of a measure, which so strongly implied a disposition not to abide by the treaty concluded with Dercyllidas. Agesilaus replied, that his purpose was not to disturb the peace of the king of Persia's dominions, but only to assure the independency of the Grecian cities in Asia. Tissaphernes answered, that he was himself still desirous of peace, upon the terms already settled; nor did he suppose the king averse; and he therefore desired time to send to Susa, before any hostilities should take place. Agesilaus, who seems not to have been commissioned by the Spartan government for any purpose of conquest, but only to enforce the honorable terms of peace already concluded upon, acceded to the satrap's proposal. Dercyllidas, who was among his officers, was sent with two others to the satrap's court, and a truce was concluded for three months. Tissaphernes, wholly unscrupulous, had no sooner sworn to the treaty, than he took measures for hastening the arrival of troops, which might enable him to break it. This became known to Agesilaus, who nevertheless resolved to abide strictly by the compact made.

Among the Thirty Spartans, who attended Agesilaus, was his friend

explain the difficulties, occurring about the period of the commands of Dercyllidas and Agesilaus. In assigning the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia to the conclusion of the year B. C. 396, he says,—*Hoc nempe arctè cohæret cum historiâ Dercyllidæ.* It certainly does not cohere. Under the administration of Dercyllidas, the Asian Greek cities singularly flourished in peace and concord. (Xen. Hel. 1.3. c.2. s.7 & 9.) But, before the expedition of Agesilaus was thought of, all was already confusion there, through the removal of the councils of Ten. (c.4. s.2 & 7.) Dodwell seems totally to have overlooked this latter circumstance; and so has attributed the congress at Sparta, which decreed the expedition of Agesilaus, to the same year B. C. 397, to which he has given the progress of Dercyllidas and of the Spartan ministers through the Asiatic cities, when they were found so peaceful and flourishing.

Having then attributed the resolution taken in Greece, for war with Asia under Agesilaus, to the year 397, he attributes the treaty of peace made by Dercyllidas to the following year B. C. 396, and the arrival of Agesilaus in Asia to the conclusion of the same year 396. Here, evidently, all is not consistent. I have however been unable, with the leisure I could give to the subject, and perhaps should be unable at any rate, to accommodate the dates of these transactions perfectly to one another, and to preceding and following events; and I have therefore thought it best, with this admonition to the reader, generally to give Dodwell's dates in the margin. The reader best acquainted with his labors, will probably be most ready to excuse my failure, in the investigation of a labyrinth, in which his learning, ingenuity, and diligence, directed to that as his principal object, have been bewildered.

Lysander.

Xen. Hel.  
& Ages.

1.3. c.4.  
s.6.

SECT. III. MEASURES OF AGESILAUS IN ASIA.

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Lysander. Agesilaus himself was yet little known among the Asian Greeks. The reputation therefore of Lysander, high while he held command among them, and since so greatly increased by the conquest of Athens, drew the attention of all. The violence of party, and the disordered state of the governments, gave occasion for various representation, remonstrance, solicitation, and intrigue. All were anxious to obtain the interest of Lysander with the king; and such was the consequent attendance upon him, that it appeared, says the historian, as if Lysander had been king, and Agesilaus a private person.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 7.  
& Plut. Ages.

The umbrage likely to be taken, at a superiority so pointedly attributed to him, was first manifested by his colleagues of the Thirty; satisfied with their situation of counsellors to the king, but ill bearing to be considered as attendants upon one of their own body. At their instigation, at length, Agesilaus began to show his dissatisfaction, by constantly denying the suits of those who came recommended by Lysander. Whether that officer had before been unbecomingly assuming, does not appear; but the affront, now put upon him, he bore with becoming moderation. Gently dismissing the crowd of followers, who used officiously to attend him, he told all who solicited his interest, that his interference would only injure their cause. With the united respect and frankness, due to a king and a friend, he then opened himself to Agesilaus; expressed his regret that he could no longer be useful in his present situation; requested that he might be sent on any duty, where he might equally avoid giving umbrage and incurring disgrace; and promised that, to the best of his ability, it should be faithfully performed.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 8.  
& Plut. Ages.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 9.

s. 10.

Agesilaus did not deny this petition; and Lysander, being sent to take the Hellespontine command, found an early opportunity to do a service highly acceptable to him. Spithridates, a Persian of rank, thought himself injured by Pharnabazus. The bond of connection between the government at Susa and the great men of the distant provinces, lax before the expedition of Cyrus, had been still weakened by that event. The address of Lysander therefore sufficed to persuade Spithridates to renounce a government which gave no security to its faithful servants, and pass over to the Greeks with his family and effects, and

and two hundred horse under his command. Leaving these under the protection of Lysander in Cyzicus, Spithridates proceeded, with his eldest son only, to wait upon Agesilaus in Ionia. The visit was, on many accounts, highly gratifying to that prince, and, among other things, for the information gained concerning the country under the government of Pharnabazus.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 11.  
B. C. 395.  
Ol. 96.  $\frac{2}{5}$ .

Xen. Hel.  
ibid. & Age-  
sil.

Tissaphernes only waited to be assured of the approach of the troops, particularly cavalry, which he expected from the interior provinces, and then sent a declaration to Agesilaus, 'that unless the European forces were immediately withdrawn from Asia, he and all who adhered to him, must expect the vengeance of the great king.' Not only the deputies from the Asiatic cities were alarmed, but the officers of the army, and even the Lacedæmonians, could not without uneasiness compare the smallness of their force with the numbers reported of the enemy. Agesilaus however was not unprepared for this demonstration of the satrap's falsehood. Receiving the communication with cheerfulness, he had the Persian ministers tell their master, 'that he thanked him for making the gods, avengers of perjury, enemies to the Persian and friends to the Grecian cause.' Instantly he dispatched notices for the Ionian, Æolian, and Hellespontine forces to join him; issued orders for the troops with him to prepare for marching; and to indicate that he meant not to await attack, but to carry the war where he knew the satrap's interested feelings would be most vulnerable, he sent requisitions for the towns on the way to Caria to prepare markets for the army.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 12.

Tissaphernes, informed of these dispositions, directed his measures, not to the prosecution of the great interests of the empire, but to the preservation of his own large property in Caria. That mountainous province being unfit for the action of horse, he sent thither almost the whole of his infantry. Descending then with his numerous cavalry into the vale of the Mæander, he hoped, with that alone, to trample in dust the Grecian army, before it could reach the highlands. Agesilaus was aware that, in the plain, he must suffer in contest with the Persian horse. As soon therefore as he was assured that his feint had fixed the attention of the satrap to the southward, he directed his own march the contrary way.

way. Thus he joined, more readily, and without opposition, the forces from the northern colonies, among whom were the Cyreian troops; and falling, wholly unexpected, upon the satrapy of Pharnabazus, the country was plundered without resistance, the towns yielded as he approached, and he enriched his army with a very great booty. Encouraged thus, he approached Dascylium, the satrap's residence; but there he experienced how formidable the Persian cavalry were still capable of being. His small force of horse, preceding the march of the infantry, met nearly an equal force of the enemy's horse. Immediately the Greeks formed in line; four deep. Unlike the desultory manner of the modern Asiatics, the Persians charged in column, only twelve in front. Every Grecian lance opposed to them was broken; and twelve men, with two horses, were instantly slain. The Greeks so felt their inferiority, that they immediately retreated. Fortunately the heavy-armed, under Agesilaus, were near enough to give them security. Modern tacticians generally hold the charge of cavalry in column absurd. The fact only is here given as it is related by the soldier-historian. The account however, it should be observed, is among the numerous instances of candid confession, which intitle Xenophon to our credit when he relates the successes of the Greeks, and diminish, tho certainly they cannot entirely remove, our regret, that we have no Persian accounts to confront with the Grecian.

Agesilaus, prudent as brave, saw quickly what was to be done. On the morrow after the action of the cavalry, the entrails of the victims in the sacrifice were found imperfect. This passed for an admonition from the gods to proceed no farther, and Agesilaus immediately directed his march back toward the coast; aware, says the historian, in phrase pretty strongly implying that the omen had been preconcerted, of the impossibility of acting in the plains without a sufficient force of horse. Fortunately winter was approaching, when annoyance to the Grecian territories, from the enemy's powerful cavalry, was less to be apprehended.

Against the insuing campaign, Agesilaus took measures for being better provided. Requisitions were sent for the wealthy, in every Grecian city of Asia, to prepare themselves for that service which the Grecian political

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
s. 20.

s. 14.

s. 15.

political institutions imposed, at the same time, as an honor and a tax. Those requisitions were however accompanied with notice, that instead of personal attendance, able substitutes, well mounted and well armed, would be accepted; and the levies were completed, says Xenophon, with a diligence and dispatch, as if every noble and wealthy Ionian thought he was hiring a man to die for him.

Xen. Hel.

l. 3. c. 4.

s. 16.

B. C. 394.

Ol. 96. 2.

Early in spring, Agesilaus assembled his whole force in Ephesus, and there bestowed an attention, more than was usual among the generals of that age, in preparing his troops for service. Commonly among the Greeks, the soldier's arms were what his means enabled, or his zeal in the cause and regard for his own safety, induced him to procure; his discipline was what the institutions of his commonwealth required of all its subjects; occasionally improved, through the same motives which excited care in the choice of arms. The man unprovided with the armour and unacquainted with the discipline of the heavy-armed, was cast among the ignobler crowd of the light-armed: his pay, if any, was inferior; he had no allowance for a servant; if a prisoner he was neglected; if killed, unnumbered. But, serving among the heavy-armed, in proportion as his armour was imperfect, and his personal skill deficient, his danger in action was greater. Agesilaus however would not trust the service of his country, and his own glory, to the various effect of such considerations upon the various tempers of men. Heavy-armed, middle-armed, bowmen, and cavalry were all severally called out to exercise: emulation was excited by the institution of prizes for those who excelled; arms were examined; artizans and traders were invited and encouraged; the agora of Ephesus was crowded with horses, and warlike implements of every kind; and the city, says the soldier-historian who was present, seemed a laboratory of war<sup>13</sup>.

Xen. Hel.

l. 3. c. 4.

s. 17.

s. 18.

Amid these military cares, the attention of Agesilaus to acts of religion contributed to infuse, at the same time, confidence and a spirit of order among his troops. It was his common practice to lead the way, from the field of exercise, to the temple of Diana; where those, who had gained prizes, offered their chaplets, the honorary part of their

<sup>13</sup> Πολέμου ἐργαστήριον.

reward,

reward, to the goddess. 'And what,' proceeds the historian, 'may not be hoped from an army, dutiful to the gods, diligent in military exercises, and zealous in subordination?'

Another measure of the Spartan prince, to excite confidence among his troops, consonant as doubtless it was to the manners esteemed best in that age, and accordingly mentioned by Xenophon, not only without reprobation, but among things praiseworthy, will be otherwise thought of by the better-taught humanity of modern times. Among the prisoners at Ephesus, taken in the Persian provinces, by those freebooters who, in the deficiency of law and government, made their livelihood by such violences<sup>14</sup>, were some of wealthy families and higher rank; accustomed, says the historian, to ride in carriages, and unaccustomed to toil. These Agesilaus ordered to be exposed naked, for public sale by the common crier. Unpractised in those naked exercises, in which the bodies of men of all ranks among the Greeks became imbrowned, their skins were white, their limbs delicate, they appeared incapable of activity or labor, and the Greek soldiers drew the conclusion, that they should have no more to apprehend in battle, from such men, than from so many women.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
s. 19.  
& Agesil.

According to the usual rotation in the Lacedæmonian service, when the first year of the command of Agesilaus was completed, Lysander and the rest of the Thirty returned home, and were succeeded in their situation by an equal number of other Spartans. Among these the king was to distribute the commands under him at his discretion. The cavalry accordingly he committed to Xenocles; the Lacedæmonian neodamodes to Scythes; to Herippidas, the Cyreians; and the Asian Greeks to Migdon. He then notified his intention to march directly into the richest of the enemy's country, in defence of which the utmost exertion was to be expected, and he therefore admonished all to be prepared in body and mind accordingly.

s. 20.  
B. C. 394.  
Ol. 96.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

The wily yet weak Tissaphernes was again deceived through his very fear of deception. Being informed of the notice given in public orders by the Spartan king, he thought it a feint, like that of the

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
s. 21.

<sup>14</sup> Ἰπὸ τῶν ληστῶν ἀλισκομένους.

former year; and, supposing Caria so much more certainly now the real as it was less the pretended object, he again sent his infantry thither, and again incamped with his formidable cavalry in the vale of Mæander. Agesilaus, in precise conformity to his declared intention, marched into the Sardian territory, and, three days unopposed, his army collected plunder on all sides.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
s. 22.

s. 23.

s. 24.

On the fourth day, the followers of the Grecian camp were dispersed for booty, about the rich banks of the Pactolus, when a body of Persian cavalry suddenly came upon them, and killed several. Agesilaus ordering his horse to their relief; the whole Persian army appeared, forming in order of battle. The ground was not favorable for engaging so superior a body of cavalry; but the whole Grecian force was collected, and the Persian infantry absent. Agesilaus therefore resolved to use the opportunity. He ordered his horse, with assurance of being supported, to charge: he commanded his middle-armed to follow running; and he led his phalanx with a brisk yet stedy pace after them. The Persians repelled<sup>15</sup> the Grecian cavalry; but the sight of the middle-armed, followed by the formidable array of the phalanx, dismayed them; they turned, and presently fled. Some, intangled in the course of the Pactolus, were killed or made prisoners. Against the rest the pursuit of the Greeks was little destructive: but it gave them possession of the Persian camp. The middle-armed, as would be likely, says the historian, immediately fell to plunder. But Agesilaus disappointed their rapacity, by surrounding the camp with his more regular troops; and, inclosing thus together friends and foes, he insured the just distribution of a very great booty. Many camels, an animal then little known in Greece, being carried thither by Agesilaus in his return, were much noticed among the trophies that distinguished this victory.

s. 25. &  
Agefil.

Intelligence of the event excited great alarm in Sardis, and vehement complaint against the satrap; who was in his palace there when the misfortune happened, which his presence with the army, and the animation he might have infused by sharing its dangers, it was held,

<sup>15</sup> So much, I think, is implied in the word *ἀνέκτρο*, used both in the Hellenics and in the Agesilaus.



ought to have prevented. The alarm was quickly inanced, and the complaint sharpened, by the appearance of the Grecian army before the walls, and by the plunder and destruction of everything around. The Spartan king endeavored to increase the disorder, by a proclamation, declaring himself the friend and protector of freedom, ready to contest in arms the right of any who claimed to hold Asia in subjection. It does not appear that any important desertion followed: but great alarm was communicated, even to the distant court of Persia; insomuch that the ruin of Tissaphernes was in consequence resolved upon. According to the manner nearly of the Turkish empire at this day, Tithraustes came to Sardis, commissioned from the king, at the same time to supersede and to behead him. Such was the end of that worthless satrap; who, in a long course of years, had such various transactions with the Greeks. His sovereigns, and their subjects committed to his government, both had undoubtedly enough to complain of him; yet, as far as the Greeks were interested in his character, his weakness and cowardice seem to have been more beneficial to them than his profligacy was injurious<sup>16</sup>.

The first act of the government of Tithraustes, after the execution of his predecessor, marks a weakness in the Persian empire, which, notwithstanding the many instances that have occurred, still appears surprizing. When, in the distant provinces, private interest or private animosity led the late satrap to measures directly opposite to what the service of his sovereign required, we see only a common consequence of weak government. But the new viceroy came immediately commissioned from the supreme council of the empire, and yet did not come to revenge the injuries of the Persian subjects; or repair the disgraces of the Persian arms, suffered in the invasion of the empire, by the forces of a little distant republic. He entered immediately into negotiation

<sup>16</sup> Cornelius Nepos, in his life of Conon, in contradiction to the best authorities, to report utter improbabilities. Indeed many of the lives ascribed to him bear much the appearance of juvenile exercises; the works of a youth of talents, in a course of Greek reading, practising Latin composition.

with Agesilaus; rather apologized for passed measures, laying the blame upon his predecessor: observed that justice was now executed upon that worthless officer; and protested that the king his master desired no other than that the Grecian cities in Asia should be free; paying the antient tribute or rent for their lands, which had always been confessedly held of his empire; and that, upon these conditions only, he expected that the European troops should be withdrawn. Agesilaus professed himself willing to treat, but without authority to conclude. Tithraustes desired that authority might be sent for, and, in the mean time, that hostilities against his satrapy at least might cease: 'Consider Pharnabazus,' he said, 'still as your enemy; and invade his territory; but for myself, I have a fair claim to be treated as the friend of the Greeks, having done them justice against him, who was the principal author of their wrongs.' This was submissive language from the lieutenant of the great king. What followed, however, still more marks the consciousness of utter inability, in the administration of the empire, to extend, from the capital to the distant provinces, the energy necessary to hold all united in just obedience and under due protection. Agesilaus did not scruple to require, as the price of truce with one satrapy, to be paid the expence of carrying war into another; and to this strange proposal the new satrap acceded: thirty talents, above six thousand pounds sterling, were paid, expressly to defray the expence of the Grecian army's march into the Bithynian satrapy.<sup>17</sup> Examples of a policy something similar perhaps may be found in the modern history of Turkey. Of the fact however we cannot reasonably doubt; for Xenophon, holding his command in the Cyreian troops, and intimate with Agesilaus, was in a situation certainly to know what he related; and his zeal for the glory of his friend and patron would not lead him, designedly, to exaggerate the satrap's folly, or the weakness of the Persian empire.

The views of Agesilaus, in the early part of his command, appear to have been moderate. He would have been contented with the glory

<sup>17</sup> The satrapy of Pharnabazus was variously called, the Bithynian, the Phrygian, the Hellespontine, or of Dascylis or Dascylium, the satrap's principal residence.

of giving independency to the Greeks of Asia, and peace to those of Europe. But experience of the ease with which greater advantages, and higher fame, might be acquired, seems to have excited his ambition. Possibly however he may have found good reason to believe, that moderation was not so safe, as on a transient view it might appear. He may have thought, and perhaps justly, that there could be no security for peace, but in the enemy's inability to make successful war. Possibly he may have known some cause, not likely to be lasting, for the new satrap's submissive conduct, apparently so unbecoming the officer of a great empire in so great a command; and he may have been influenced by the consideration, that, if Tithraustes was not as faithless as Tissaphernes, an early successor might be so. Meanwhile the success of his friends at home, in managing his political interests, was an encouragement to follow the path of ambition. A commission arrived putting the fleet under his command, equally with the landforces, and authorizing him to appoint the admiral. He proceeded immediately to use this new power, with a view not to peace, unless as it might follow farther success in war. He communicated to all the towns of the coast and islands his wish to have his naval force increased; leaving it to themselves to decide what ships they would add to their squadrons. Agesilaus was popular; the war was popular; to many it had been lucrative; and, the zeal of wealthy individuals yying with that of communities, the fleet was strengthened with a hundred and twenty new triremes. In the appointment of his admiral, Agesilaus allowed his partiality for a friend and relation to lead him to injudicious choice. Superseding Pharax, who had done considerable services, he committed the important command to Peisander, his queen's brother; a man of approved courage and clear honor, but unversed in naval affairs.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 4.  
s. 26.

s. 27.

## SECTION IV.

*Mission of Timocrates into Greece from the satrap of Lydia: Bribery of the democratical leaders in the Grecian republics: Enmity excited against Lacedæmon: War between Phocis and Locris leading to war between Lacedæmon and Thebes: Athens gained to the Theban alliance: Invasion of Bœotia: Death of Lysander: Prosecution and flight of Pausanias king of Lacedæmon.*

B. C. 394. THESE preparations, demonstrating that the Lacedæmonian king had neither peace, nor any little object, in view, alarmed Tithraustes. The military of the Persian empire was weak, but its wealth was still powerful. Means to be informed of the state of Greece, of the dissensions among its little republics, one with another and each within itself, of the violence of party in all, and, what was most important, of the extensive dislike to the Lacedæmonian supremacy, and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power, were open to the satrap. A Persian, versed enough in Grecian politics and Grecian manners, to manage an intriguing negotiation among the Grecian republics, was probably not to be found. Tithraustes therefore employed a Greek, Timocrates of Rhodes. The general purpose of his mission was to conciliate, to the Persian interest, the leading men of every republic where he could find opportunity, and excite them to active measures against Lacedæmon; directing his view particularly to those cities, where aversion toward Lacedæmon was known most to prevail. Among means, bribery was much depended upon; a political engine even then of great efficacy, tho it had not, as our moral poet has observed, that facility of operation which modern refinements in commerce have given it. Paper-credit was unknown: Timocrates was necessarily to be incumbered with gold<sup>18</sup>.

In

<sup>18</sup> Blest paper-credit! last and best supply!  
That lends Corruption lighter wings to fly!  
Gold, imp'd by thee, can compass hardest things;  
Can pocket states, can fetch and carry kings;

A single

In the poverty of the Grecian republics however, about twelve thousand pounds sterling, ably and faithfully distributed, was sufficient to make a great change in the political face of the country<sup>19</sup>. Xenophon has not scrupled to name the party-leaders, in Thebes, Corinth and Argos, who partook of it. The Athenians, if we may trust his impartiality in speaking of his fellowcountrymen, clear of that baseness, were led only by ambition, and the hope of recovering their lost preëminence in Greece, to desire a confederacy against Lacedæmon. Xen. Hel. 1. 3. c. 5. s. 2.

But, whatever the operations of secret intrigue might be, the result became quickly evident. The general assemblies in the several cities resounded with invectives against Lacedæmonian tyranny. ‘ Since the conclusion of the twenty-seven years war,’ it was asked, ‘ and the overthrow of the tyrannous dominion of Athens, what benefit has accrued to Greece from the transfer of empire to Lacedæmon? Of what command, what honor, what revenue have the allies been allowed to participate? those allies who so zealously shared all labors, all dangers, all expences? On the contrary, adding indignity to injury, have not the Lacedæmonians sent Helots, with their title of harmost, to govern Grecian republics, and conducted themselves, in all respects, as if they claimed to be masters of their free confederates?’ The apprehensions, the indignation, and the animosity of the Many were thus extensively excited. But a pretence for hostility was yet wanting; for the Lacedæmonian government, however its officers, or however itself might be occasionally oppressive, had scrupulously avoided any direct breach of those treaties, by which the Grecian re- ibid. s. 3.

A single leaf shall waft an army o'er,  
Or ship off senates to a distant shore;  
A leaf, like Sibyl's, scatter to and fro:  
Our fates and fortunes, as the wind shall blow;  
Pregnant with thousands flits the scrap unseen,  
And, silent, sells a king or buys a queen.

Pope's Moral Essays, ep. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Whether Xenophon was or was not exactly informed of the sum which Timocrates brought and distributed, tho it is reasonable to suppose he had some good ground for his positive assertion, he was however competent to judge whether the sum he has named was probably equal to the effect ascribed to it.

publics were united under its supremacy. And it is to be observed that those called Helots, to whom foreign command was committed, were not persons actually in the condition of slaves. They were indeed probably new citizens, those called neodamodes, raised from the condition of slaves; but of Grecian blood, as old and perhaps as pure as any in the country. This reproach however would assist the general effect. But the Thebans were the ingenious politicians who devised the provocation, which actually led to a renewal of the miseries of a general war in Greece; likely, through obvious circumstances to superinduce general ruin, or universal subjection, tho the foreign power then most formidable failed of the requisite energy, and it was beyond the ken of the clearest human foresight, to discover where the overwhelming might was at length to arise.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 5. s. 3.  
Diod. 1. 14.  
c. 82.

The borders of Phocis and the Opuntian Locris were in one part disputed<sup>20</sup>. Androcleidas, one of those popular leaders in Thebes, whom Xenophon has not scrupled to name as a partaker in the Persian gold, persuaded the Locrians to raise contributions on the doubtful land. The Phocians, precisely as Androcleidas expected and desired, immediately made reprisals. For this aggression, as the party affected to call it, against the allies of Thebes, it was then not difficult to excite the Theban multitude against the Phocians. Accordingly Phocis was invaded and plundered. Unable to contend with Thebes, and still more with Thebes and Locris united, the Phocians sent ministers to Lacedæmon, claiming that protection to which they were intitled, as members of the confederacy in which the greater part of Greece was united. The Spartans rejoiced in the fair pretence, thus afforded, for repressing by arms the injurious insolence of Thebes. The success of Agesilaus against the Persian empire elated them; no other commotion within Greece interfered; and the cause appeared so just, that they thought they might depend upon the willing support of the confederacy. War

Xen. Hel.  
1. 3. c. 5. s. 5;  
6, 7.

<sup>20</sup> ———— 'Οι ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προσηῶρες—  
πειθοῦσι Δόκτους τοῦς Ὀπουσίους ἐν τῆς ἀμφισθεν-  
τησίμου χάρας Φωκεῖσι τε καὶ ἰαυλοῖς χεῖματα  
τελέσσει.—*Thebanæ civitatîs principes—Locris*  
*Opuntîis persuadent ut ex agro inter Phocenses*

*et Thebanos controverso pecunias penderent.*  
It is clear, from what follows in the next section, that this is ill translated: *ιαυλοῖς* means, not the Thebans, but the Locrians.



on an appointed day, with the army from Peloponnesus. Pausanias failed him: he nevertheless approached the place; and obtaining a conference with the leading people, would have prevailed, there as at Orchomenus, had not the exertions of some Thebans present, tho' not without difficulty, prevented.

Xen. Hel.  
1.3. c. 5.  
s. 12.

Informed of the loss of one city and the danger of another, the Thebans marched in haste against Lysander. Whether that able general was surprized by their rapidity, or his past successes led him to confide too much in his own ability, in the zeal and discipline of his troops, and in the deficiency of the enemy, under the walls of Haliartus, which he was preparing to assault, he was overpowered and killed. His army fled; but quickly reaching the neighboring highlands, turned upon the pursuers, and with advantage of ground, and an artillery which that ground afforded, fragments of rock rolled down upon the compact body of the heavy-armed, while the heights gave superior effect also to other weapons, the enemy were at length compelled to retreat, with considerable loss.

Xen. ut sup.

The Thebans erected their trophy at that gate of Haliartus, near which they had been conquerors and Lysander had fallen; yet they were not a little dejected by the final event of the day. The morrow however showed how important the life of one man may be: Orchomenians, Malians, Ænians, Heraclæots, Cœtæans, and Phocians, tho' victorious, having lost the leader who united all, and in whom all confided, hastened to their several homes, and the army was no more. Then the Thebans were again elated, and their success appeared important. But when, soon after, Pausanias arrived in their territory, with his powerful army from Peloponnesus, alarm and dejection anew pervaded them. The arrival of the Athenian forces, on the following day, restored animation; and when it was observed that the measures of Pausanias indicated no ability, no vigor, then security and presumption afresh prevailed.

It has been observed, upon some occasion in modern times, that when a commander desires to avoid fighting, he calls a council of war; and this, in antient as in modern ages, might arise either from cowardice, or from a view to the interest of a party; nor would it, in antient,



antient, any more than in modern ages, be always easy to ascertain which was the prevailing motive. The business of recovering, for burial, the bodies of Lysander and those who fell with him, a rite which Grecian superstition made so important, necessarily engaged the attention of Pausanias. To consult whether a battle should be fought, or a truce solicited, not the polemarchs and lochages only, but all the pentecosters of the army were assembled. It was observed, that the army was very deficient of the strength proposed; Corinth had refused its troops, and the reinforcement expected with Lysander was dispersed; that the allies serving were not zealous in the cause; that the enemy was very superior in cavalry; and that even a victory would scarcely enable them to accomplish their purpose of recovering the bodies, lying within reach of missile weapons from the towers of Haliartus. It was accordingly resolved to solicit a truce. The Thebans, elated, refused to grant it, but upon condition that the army should immediately quit Bœotia. This humiliating condition was accepted, and then the dead were restored. Pausanias and those about him appeared satisfied: but, whatever might be their sentiments or their views, the army felt its disgrace; and the uneasiness was increased by the contumelious behavior of the Thebans, who, in attending its retreat, pursued with blows any who deviated from the strict line of the highway.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 5.  
s. 15.

s. 16.

s. 17.

The conduct of Pausanias would appear, at home, the more inexcusable, on being compared with that of Lysander; when it was observed what one did, in the command of a few troops of the northern allies, with what the other did not, at the head of a Peloponnesian army. Being capitally prosecuted, Pausanias fled to Tegea; and to avoid the consequence of the sentence, in his absence pronounced against him, he passed his remaining days in banishment.

s. 18.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 90.

We find attributed to Lysander, by the later antient writers, whom the modern have mostly followed, a conduct very different from that indicated by the cotemporary historian; in forein command a revolting haughtiness, an injurious and selfish tyranny; at home, a plot for a revolution, through which he proposed to become sovereign of Lacedæmon and of all Greece. His influence, it is said, was exerted, and his intrigues directed, to procure a decree of the Lacedæmonians

Corn. Nep.  
& Plut. v.

in general assembly, for abolishing the hereditary right to the throne in the posterity of Hercules, and laying open the succession to all Spartans, at the choice of the people; trusting in his own popularity for a certain preference. Considering the cotemporary historian's connection with Agesilaus and the family of Agésilaus, it must appear extraordinary that even the first imputation, if founded, and most unaccountable that the latter, should wholly have escaped that historian's notice. In gathering the conduct and characters of eminent men, from antient authors, we find occasion continually to beware how far party-spirit may have directed the cotemporary, and a deference to party-writers, the later pens; and, fortunately, not seldom the result itself furnishes assistance for detection. So here the sense, which the party in opposition to Lysander entertained, of his popularity at home, could hardly be more strongly shown, than by the imputation of such a purpose, as that ascribed to him, to be prosecuted in such a manner, which clearly implies corroboration of Xenophon's account of his popularity, both in Asia, and in northern Greece. Indeed the manner in which the friend of the king of Sparta and of his family, objects of the pretended plot, has borne testimony to Lysander's merits, is really creditable at the same time to Lysander, Agesilaus, and Xenophon; and the total failure of notice of such a plot, both in the Hellenics and the Agesilaus, seems enough to indicate that the tale originated in party invective only, to which both Agesilaus and Xenophon disdained to give any countenance.

## SECTION V.

*Plan of Agesilaus for dismembering the Persian empire: Alliance of the prince of Paphlagonia with Lacedæmon: Winter campaign in Bithynia: Conference between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus.*

B. C. 394. WHILE the flame of internal war was thus rekindled in Greece, and Ol. 96:  $\frac{2}{3}$ . Lacedæmon, ruled by the ephors, was rapidly losing her consideration

and influence there, Agesilaus had been successfully prosecuting a plan of operations against Persia, the best calculated of any known to have been ever formed, for promoting, not merely the interest of Lacedæmon, or even of Greece alone, but the common good of a very large portion of mankind. Stimulated, no doubt, by the love of glory, but allured by no vain, interested, destructive project of conquest, he proposed to dismember the Persian empire, leaving the separated parts free. The philosopher, his friend and historian, gives him the intire credit of this wise and liberal policy. None before Agésilaus, he says, ever thought of so depriving the Persian king of his provinces, as not to bring ruin upon the people. But the revolt of Cyrus, which had led Lacedæmon, lately the ally, to become the enemy of the king, had at the same time prepared matters for this great design, pointed out the means of execution, and demonstrated the probability of success. A shock had been given to the fidelity of the great vassals in the distant provinces; and the exigency which had compelled the Greeks, who accompanied Cyrus, to fight their way from the center to the extremity, had afforded sure ground for calculating the force necessary to attack it. The revolt of Spithridates was then an important point already gained: it gave not only hope of farther defection, but means to procure it. Cotys, or Corylas<sup>25</sup>, king of Paphlagonia, a tributary of the Persian empire, tho he had not concurred in the rebellion of Cyrus, yet, on receiving summons from the king to join the royal army with his forces, had refused obedience. Probably the fear of vengeance would make the Lacedæmonian alliance acceptable to him, and Spithridates undertook to manage the negotiation. Meanwhile Egýpt, long since in revolt, remained unsubdued.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 7. s. 7.

Xen. Hæl.  
l. 4. c. 1.  
s. 1. 2.

It does not appear that Agesilaus was aware of the intrigues which Tithraustes was carrying on in Greece, when, in pursuance of his engagement with him, early in autumn he quitted the Lydian and entered the Bithynian satrapy. No due preparation had been made by Pharnabazus to defend the country. In the field no opposition was attempted; and, as the Grecian army proceeded toward Paphlagonia, some towns volun-

B. C. 324.  
Ol. 96. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Cotys is the name we find in our copies of Xenophon's Hellenics; as well as of Diodorus and Plutarch, but, in our copies of Xenophon's Anabasis, it is written Corylas.

tarily surrendered, some were taken by assault, and waste and plunder were extended on all sides. The negotiation with Cotys meanwhile proceeded successfully. That prince met Agesilaus on the border of his territory, and concluded a treaty of alliance with the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. Agesilaus, much gratified with the event, at the same time to strengthen the union with Cotys, and to reward Spithridates, proposed a marriage, which was presently agreed upon, between the Paphlagonian prince and the Persian nobleman's daughter. But, in the deficiency of accommodations in the intervening country, the young lady could not travel into Paphlagonia from Cyzicus, where her father had left her, before the following spring. Agesilaus gratified all parties by ordering a trireme of his fleet, with a Spartan commander, to convey her to the Paphlagonian coast.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 1.  
s. 3-7.

s. 8.

We have had many occasions to observe how economically, in the scantiness of their public revenues, the Greeks commonly made war. For an army far from home, it was particularly desirable to find winter-quarters in the enemy's country. Having acquired the important reinforcement of a thousand Paphlagonian horse, beside two thousand targeteers, Agesilaus resolved to march to Dascylium, the capital of the Bithynian satrapy, and with the plunder of its rich territory to subsist and reward his army. The territory of Dascylium was the inherited property of Pharnabazus. His palace was sumptuous, and surrounded with every appendage of convenience and delight. Xenophon, himself both a sportsman and a farmer, particularly notices the inclosed parks and open chaces, abounding with game of every kind, the river stored with fish, the many large villages and well-cultivated farms, with a numerous population, unaccustomed to see or to apprehend an enemy. The satrap being without infantry which he could oppose to the Grecian phalanx, his own and his people's property became the prey of the invaders.

s. 8.

s. 9.

All the care and foresight of Agesilaus were however insufficient to guard against the effects of the contempt, naturally growing, for an enemy so apparently helpless; while Pharnabazus, without troops for steady defence, had however those with which he could strike a sudden blow; and he wanted neither activity nor spirit to direct and lead their exertions.

exertions. A body from the Grecian army, sent to collect provisions, was wandering carelessly after plunder, when the satrap came upon them, with a small body of horse and two sithé-armed chariots. The Greeks had notice of his approach; timely enough to assemble to the number of seven hundred. Pharnabazus, tho his cavalry were only four hundred, did not hesitate to attack them. At the battle of Cunáxa the charge of a hundred and fifty sithé-armed chariots had been directed against ten thousand Greeks in phalanx, without any effect. Two only now, probably under bolder guidance, threw seven hundred into confusion; and a vigorous charge of the cavalry immediately following, completed the rout. A hundred were killed; and flight would have saved few of the rest, had not Agesilaus, with the main body of the army, been fortunately near enough to give them protection.

This action, honorable to Pharnabazus and encouraging to his troops, was however scarcely a step toward relief from circumstances highly distressing. He was constantly watching, with his cavalry, to give protection to his property and people, against detachments and maroders from the Grecian army; but, through fear of nightly attack, which an army of cavalry was little fit to resist, he dared rest nowhere. Moving therefore daily, he was always anxious to keep it unknown where he meant at night to incamp or take his quarters. But precaution, which might have sufficed against the Greeks, did not suffice against the knowledge of the country, and the means for procuring intelligence, which Spithridates possessed. Within three days after the surprize and defeat of the Grecian detachment, Spithridates obtained information that the satrap was at Cava, a large village about twenty miles from the Grecian camp. He communicated with the Spartan Herippidas, who commanded the Cyreian troops; a man covetous of fame, and always eager for enterprize; and Herippidas requested of Agesilaus permission to attempt the surprize of the satrap in his quarters; desiring for the purpose two thousand heavy-armed, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, with that under Spithridates, and as many of the Greeks as would be volunteers on the occasion. Agesilaus consented: the preparatory sacrifice was performed, and the augur declared that success was portended. The detachment was ordered to assemble, at the close of evening.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 1.  
s. 11.

s. 10.

evening, in front of the camp. But darkness, and the want of those convenient and cheap materials for writing, with which, in modern times, the lowest officer so readily forms his roll, gave opportunity for evasion, and not half the proposed number of any of the troops appeared. Fear of derision nevertheless stimulating, Herippidas resolved to proceed, and Spithridates did not shrink from the undertaking.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 1.  
s. 11.

Marching accordingly, they reached Cava before day, and, with the first dawn, assaulted and presently carried the principal outguard. The whole Persian army instantly fled, and the camp was taken. Spithridates and the Paphlagonians were hasty in appropriating its contents. The satrap's baggage, a multitude of slaves, and numerous beasts of burthen, for accompanying the rapid marches of the cavalry with accommodations for the satrap and his train, fell into their hands. Herippidas, anxious to get credit for the amount of the capture, as well as to do justice to himself and his detachment, stationed his Greek troops so as to intercept those who bore and drove the plunder, and he put all in charge of the common prizesellers of the army<sup>22</sup>. This measure, in itself apparently right, he seems to have made wrong by the Spartan roughness, by the too little condescension for Asiatic prejudices, with which he carried it into execution. The Paphlagonians were disgusted, as if they had received a gross injury; and Spithridates so resented what he considered as a disgracing insult, that on the following night he left the army, and led away the Paphlagonians with him. Going to Sardis, he surrendered himself with them to Ariæus, in whom, as having himself borne arms against the king, they expected the readier disposition to excuse their desertion. No event, during his command in Asia, gave Agesilaus so much uneasiness.

s. 12.

The hope of an acquisition, however, that would much more than compensate the loss thus sustained, about the same time presented itself. Apollophanes, a Greek of Cyzicus, who had been long connected by hospitality with Pharnabazus, was at this time living as a guest with Agesilaus. He proposed to negotiate an interview between the satrap and the Lacedæmonian king, and he succeeded. A place was appointed

s. 13.

<sup>22</sup> Διαφροσάλαι.

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in the open air. Agesilaus, attended by his thirty Spartans, arrived first; and, finding some greensward, all, with Spartan simplicity, seated themselves on it. Presently Pharnabazus came, gorgeously habited, and attended by a numerous train, who proceeded sedulously to spread fine carpets and place soft cushions, after the Persian fashion. The sight of the Spartan king struck him with a generous shame: he ordered away all the apparatus of luxury, and, in emulation of the simplicity which he admired, would seat himself on the ground. The customary salutation having passed, Pharnabazus offered his right hand, which Agesilaus with his right hand received; after which the satrap, as the elder, says the historian, began the conference. Mentioning the alliance he formerly had with Lacedæmon, and the important services he had rendered that state in the war with Athens, he proceeded to say, 'None could accuse him of doubledealing, like Tissaphernes: yet his recompence was the destruction of his property, with such distress to himself, that he could not command a supper from his own estate, unless, like the dogs, he could pick up any crumbs left by the Greeks. If then,' he added, 'I am ignorant of what is just and sacred, I wish you to teach me how this can be consistent with generosity and gratitude.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 1.  
s. 14.

The Thirty felt the reproach<sup>23</sup> in respectful silence. Agesilaus, after some pause, answered: 'Nothing is better known, among the customs of the Greeks, than the sacred respect in which the laws of hospitality are held: yet, when war arises between Grecian states, our obligation to our country so supersedes what we owe to any individual, that we hold it a duty even to kill, if we meet them in battle, those to whom we are pledged in hospitality. Instantly therefore as the king of Persia became the enemy of our country, the duty became imposed upon us to treat as enemies whoever owns allegiance to him. With regard to yourself, as an individual, there is nothing we should more value than your friendship; but the means of our possessing it rest not with us but with you. Far be it from me to propose to you the change of subjection to Persia for subjection to Greece. Better things are before you: to own no subjection, to worship no master.'

s. 15.  
& Plut. Ages.

<sup>23</sup> This interpretation of Xenophon's words, in the Hellenics, is warranted by Plutarch, in his life of Agesilaus, v. 2. p. 1100. ed. H. Steph.

‘ Nor is it freedom with indigence (tho I esteem freedom beyond all riches) that I would recommend; but, on the contrary, to hold your present large and rich command in independency; and, forming alliance with us, to make additions to it by conquest, not to increase the king’s but your own dominion.’

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4, c. 1.  
s. 16.

Pharnabazus replied: ‘ I will answer you candidly. I do not reckon myself so bound to Artaxerxes, but that, were he to supersede me in the command I hold under him, and require me to obey another, I might be induced to renounce my subjection to him, and become your ally. But while he continues to trust me, you may depend upon it (and all men of honor I am confident will approve my conduct) I shall continue to defend the charge committed to me to the utmost of my ability.’ Struck with the satrap’s generous frankness, Agesilaus took his hand and said, ‘ With those noble sentiments, much I wish you could become our friend.’ Of this however be assured; my army shall quit your territory without delay; and while the war lasts, if there is another object for our arms, you and yours shall remain unmolested.’

s. 18.

The conference here ending, Pharnabazus mounted his horse. As he rode away, his son, running to Agesilaus, said, ‘ I pledge myself in hospitality to you.’ ‘ I accept the pledge,’ answered the king. ‘ Remember then,’ replied the youth, and presented a finely-wrought javelin. Looking around for something to return, Agesilaus observed furniture, of singular elegance, on a horse of one of his attendants. This he directed to be put upon the youth’s horse, who immediately mounted and pursued his father.

s. 19.

Such, equally among Persians and Greeks, were relics yet existing of the manners of the heroic ages. The progress of civilization and government indeed had not, among either people, superseded the need of the antient hospitality. Not long after, in the absence of Pharnabazus, his brother usurped for a time the satrapy; and his son, compelled to seek safety in flight, passing into Greece, was very kindly entertained by Agesilaus.

s. 20.

In conformity to his word given, Agesilaus immediately led his army out of Bithynia, where, however, according to his first purpose, he



had subsisted it nearly through the winter, at the satrap's expence. Moving westward, he incamped in the vale of Thebè; and, spring now approaching<sup>24</sup>, he sent requisitions for new levies, from all the Grecian settlements, to join him there. At the head of a very-powerful army, he proposed then to direct his march eastward, beyond the satrapies both of Tithraustes and of Pharnabazus. He had seen by how loose a tie the distant members of the empire were connected with the government in the capital. He knew, by the most unequivocal proof, from the return of the Cyreian Greeks, how weak the empire was, even at its center: he had already proved the superiority of his military force to anything likely to be opposed to him; and he concluded, that the country, in whatever extent he could put it behind him, would be, if not conquered for Lacedæmon or for Greece, yet effectually separated from Persia.

B. C. 399.  
Ol. 96. 3.

<sup>24</sup> Σχεδόν δέ τι καὶ ἔαρ ὑπέφαινον. Xen. Hel. l. 4, c. 1. s. 20. The first words of the same chapter mention the preceding autumn. Yet Dodwell has chosen to conclude his account of the year B. C. 394, with the assertion—*Ver ergo illud, cujus mentio apud Xen. in Asia non vidit Agesilaus.* Dodwell's fondness for investigation and disquisition seems to have led him to give more than a just attention, upon some occasions, to authors whom, on others, he reviles in very unqualified terms; and, at the same time, rather arrogantly to contradict the able cotempo-

rary historian, who cannot but have known whether it was spring or autumn, when he himself, accompanying Agesilaus, left Asia. But, in the necessity under which I find myself to declare sometimes my dissatisfaction with Dodwell, I desire always to acknowledge high obligation to him; and, if I sometimes leave, without complete correction, errors which I have thought it due from me to point out, I must, for excuse, beg leave to refer to a former note, the 15th of the 24th chapter.

## CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of GREECE, and Transactions of the GREEKS in ASIA, from the Establishment of the GENERAL CONFEDERACY against LACEDÆMON, to the TREATY between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, and the Reëstablishment of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER in GREECE, through the General PEACE dictated in the KING of PERSIA'S Name, commonly called the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS.

## SECTION I.

*Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon: Recall of Agesilaus from Asia: Proposed invasion of Laconia: Battle of Corinth: March of Agesilaus to Græce. Summary view of the history of Cyprus: Evagoras prince of Salamis: Connection of Salamis with Athens. Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon: Fleet under Conon: Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Agesilaus near Coroneia: Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and downfall of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Asia.*

B. C. 394.  
Ol. 96. 3.  
Xen. Hel.  
1. 4: c. 2. s. 1.  
Diod. 1. 14.  
c. 83.

**W**HILE the Lacedæmonian king was thus busied in preparation for enterprize in Asia, seeming to give fair promise of conquest the most glorious, and a revolution among the greatest, known in the annals of the world, a storm gathered within Greece, threatening to overwhelm Lacedæmon itself. The accession of Athens to the Bœotian alliance was but the beginning of a confederacy, more formidable than had yet been formed, of Grecian powers against a Grecian power. Athens led Argos into it, and Argos Corinth, now, under sway of the democratical party, closely connected with Argos. The influence of Athens and Corinth together then ingaged Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucadia, part of Thessaly, all Eubœa, and the populous towns of Chalcidicë in Thrace. Body, and form, and means of energy,

energy, were given to the confederacy by the establishment of a congress, of deputies from every state, at Corinth<sup>1</sup>. Instead of allowing, according to the old system, the dangerous supremacy of any one republic, it seems to have been proposed that such a congress of deputies, from all, should regulate the common concerns of the Greek nation. The idea was good, but the detail of the plan was deficient. A combination of numerous republics, not enforced by some one power pervading the whole, but dependent upon the varying interests of parties in the moment prevailing in each, was far too frail to be lasting; and, not committing even executive government to one person, or one simply constituted council, its energy would be very uncertain. It was nevertheless, in the moment, highly formidable to Lacedæmon. The alarm was heightened by the rumors circulated, of Persian money distributed among men of most influence in the hostile states, and the expectation, that, while Persia was pressed by the Lacedæmonian arms, that kind of assistance, which Persia could best give and the Greeks most needed, would not be wanting to the new confederacy. Not only the supremacy of Lacedæmon, so in appearance established over Greece by the event of the Peloponnesian war, was pressingly threatened, but, by the connection of two of the most powerful states of Peloponnesus itself with the hostile confederacy, even the security of Laconia was indangered. Nor had the superior abilities, which such a crisis required, been anywhere conspicuous in Sparta, since the loss of Lysander. Those, who now directed public affairs, tottered in their lofty situation: at the head of the politics of Greece, where they should have held the balance of surrounding nations, they were unable to hold that of their own commonwealth. Feeling urgently the need of both support and guidance, they dispatched a requisition for Agesilaus to return, with the utmost speed, to relieve his threatened country.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 2. s. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus here has a merit which I have pleasure in noticing. He has been fortunate in the selection of his author, whoever he was, from whom he has given a clear and succinct account of the forming of this confederacy, which Xenophon's Hellenics, evi-

dently in many respects an unfinished work, would not readily furnish; and yet the account of Diodorus not only is in perfect consonance with Xenophon's, but, in almost every particular, somewhere confirmed by it.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 1. s. 37.

Ibid. & Hel.  
1. 4. c. 2. s. 2.

Agesilaus was enjoying, in Asia, honors and power, and hope of glory, such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. Added to the great authority of a Lacedæmonian king in foreign command, his popularity, among the Asiatic Grecian cities, was beyond anything before known; for, having found them, says Xenophon, all miserably distracted by parties, he composed the differences of all, and established everywhere peace, and at least the present effect of concord, without executions or expulsions. He was then at the head of an army, such as no Greek had ever commanded out of Greece; and he had before him a field, the most inviting that human ambition could easily imagine. Nothing therefore could be more mortifying than the summons to quit this splendid situation, with all the alluring views attending, to return to the condition of a Lacedæmonian king at home, under the immediate controul of the ephors. It is implied, even by his panegyrist, that all his united patriotism and magnanimity were wanting, for the resolution to obey. Immediately, however, assembling the allies, he explained his country's and his own necessities, adding assurances that he should never forget his obligations to the Asian Greeks; and that, should the event in Europe be prosperous, he would not fail to return, and use his best ability in the prosecution of those measures, which might most conduce to their welfare. Affection for the chief whom they were going to lose, cooperating with the change from high hopes to the fear of a great reverse, threw the assembly into tears. They proceeded however immediately to a unanimous vote, that succours for Lacedæmon, from all the Asian Greek cities, should attend Agesilaus into Europe; and that, should the hoped-for success follow, these troops should return under his command, to prosecute the war in Asia.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 2. s. 3,  
4.

Two cares principally engaged Agesilaus, before his departure; to provide security for the Asian Greeks in his absence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpose, naming Euxenus to preside, with the title of harmost, he placed a body of four thousand men under his orders. With the latter view, he proposed prizes for the cities which should furnish the best troops, and for commanders of mercenaries, horse, heavy-armed, bowmen,

men, and targeteers, whose bands should be the best chosen, best appointed, and best disciplined. The prizes were mostly arms, elegantly wrought; but, for higher merit, or the merit of those of higher rank, there were some golden crowns; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large sum for the occasion, that the expence amounted to four talents, less than a thousand pounds sterling. Three Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Asiatic city, were named for judges; but the decision, or the declaration of it, was judiciously referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Chersonese.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian administration were, either to conduct a war against the powerful confederacy formed against them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Agesilaus seems to have been a necessary measure. The army, assembled by their enemies, was such as had not often been seen in wars within Greece. Argos furnished seven thousand heavy-armed; Athens had already recovered strength to send six thousand, and add six hundred horse; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris, made the whole of the army twenty-four thousand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry; to which was added a large body of the best light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all descriptions must have amounted to fifty thousand. The avowed purpose was to invade Laconia. ‘The Lacedæmonian state,’ said the Corinthian Xen. Heli. l. 4. c. 2. s. 10. Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, ‘resembles a river, s. 7. ‘which, near the source, is easily forded; but the farther it flows, s. 6. ‘other streams joining, the depth and power of the current increases. ‘Thus the Lacedæmonians always march from home with their own ‘troops only; but as they proceed, being reinforced from other cities, ‘their army swells and grows formidable. I hold it therefore advise- ‘able to attack them, if possible, in Lacedæmon itself; otherwise, the ‘nearer to Lacedæmon the better.’

Against so powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the smaller Grecian cities, and none beyond Peloponnesus. Marching themselves six thousand foot and six hundred horse, and being joined by the Mantineians and s. 9. Tegeans, whose numbers are not reported, they were farther reinforced by no more than seven thousand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epi-  
daurus.

daurus, Hermione, Trœzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Eleia. Aristodemus, of the blood royal, commanded, as regent, for the king, Agesipolis, yet a boy.

B. C. 394.  
Ol. 96  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 2. s. 7.

s. 11.

Circumstances commonly occur to render confederate armies less efficacious, in proportion to their strength, than those under a single authority. A dispute about the command-in-chief, with some difference of opinion about their order of battle, some of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, so as to meet the enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory sacrifices, there drops from Xenophon a remarkable confession, that those ceremonies were sometimes engines of policy. While the Bœotians, he says, held the left of their army, they were in no haste to engage; but, as soon as they had prevailed to have their situation in the line changed, so that the Athenians would be opposed to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves to the Achaians, then they declared that the symptoms of the victims were favorable. They saved themselves perhaps some slaughter by this disingenuous artifice. In the battle which ensued, the Achaians fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to those opposed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with considerable slaughter; and the superior discipline of the Lacedæmonians so prevailed against superior numbers, that, with the loss of only eight of their own body, they remained finally masters of the field; in which, if we may trust Xenophon's panegyric of Agesilaus, for what he has omitted to state in his general history, no less than ten thousand of the confederate army fell. Probably however, tho the Lacedæmonians themselves suffered little, their allies suffered much; for the victory seems to have been little farther decisive than to prevent the invasion of Peloponnesus.

Xen. Hel.  
. 4. c. 3. s. 1.

Dodwell.  
Chron. Xen.

Meanwhile Agesilaus was hastening his march from Asia. He crossed the Hellespont about the middle of July. At Amphipolis he met Dercyllidas, who had been sent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. Immediately he forwarded that able and popular officer into Asia, to communicate the grateful news among the Grecian cities there, and to prepare them for his early return, of which now there seemed fair promise.

Through

Through Thrace and Macedonia, the country was friendly, or feared to avow hostility. Thessaly, inimically disposed, and powerful through population and wealth, resulting from the natural productiveness of the soil, was however too ill-governed to give any systematical opposition. The defiles of the mountains against Macedonia, where a small force might efficaciously oppose a large one, seem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Larissa, Cranonë, Scotusa, and Pharsalus, in close alliance with the Bœotians, decided the rest, and, as the Lacedæmonian army crossed the plain, a body of horse, raised from the whole province, infested the march. It was singularly gratifying to Agesilaus, that, with his horse, promiscuously collected, and intirely formed by himself, supporting it judiciously with his infantry, he defeated and dispersed the Thessalian, the most celebrated cavalry of Greece.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 3. s. 2.

s. 3, 4.

On the day after this success, he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly, quite to the borders of Bœotia. But there news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and such as instantly almost to blot out his once bright prospect, which, as the historian, his friend and the companion of his march, shows, he had thus far been fondly cherishing, of conquest in Asia, and glory over the world. While the misconduct of the Lacedæmonian administration had excited a confederacy within Greece, which proposed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by superiority of landforce, and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia, a hostile navy had arisen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the sea. The train of circumstances which had produced this event, tho' memorials fail for a complete investigation of it, will require some attention.

We have seen Cyprus, at a very early age, from a Phenician, become a Grecian island, and Salamis the first Grecian city founded there. We have then observed the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Persian power, which the greatest kingdoms around them had been resisting in vain; and yet, not long after, a petty prince of Salamis, incited by the revolt of the Greeks of Asia Minor, and encouraged by the advantage of insular situation and the inexperience of the Persians in maritime

Ch. 5. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 6. s. 2.

Ch. 7. s. 2.

Ch. 8. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

affairs, rebelling against the Persian dominion, and extending his authority over almost all Cyprus. With the reduction of the Asian Greeks, however, Cyprus fell again under Persian sovereignty; and then probably the Phœnician interest in the island would receive countenance, in opposition to the Greek. Nevertheless a Grecian prince of Salamis sent his tributary squadron to swell the immense armament of Xerxes, intended for the conquest of Europe; and his brother was among the prisoners made by the confederated Greeks, in their first action with the Persian fleet.

Ch. 12. s. 2.

s. 4.

The ruin of the marine, the inertness of the court, and the distraction in the councils of Persia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other subjects of the empire, again to revolt; and the Persian, and the Greek, and the Phœnician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical interests in the island, would be likely to fall into various contest. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things which first invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus; when the Athenian navy, rising on the ruins of the Persian, was extending dominion for Athens on all sides, under the first administration of Pericles. This view, quickly diverted to other objects, was, however, after a change in the Athenian administration, resumed; and Cimon, as we have seen, died in command in Cyprus. The policy of Athens would of course propose to hold dominion, there as elsewhere, through support given to the democratical interest. But, after the death of Cimon, wars in Greece so engaged the Athenian government, as to prevent the extension of any considerable exertion to such a distance; and the Cyprian cities were mostly governed by their several princes or tyrants<sup>2</sup>, under the paramount sovereignty of Persia.

The liberal policy however of the Persian government did not yet deny princely honors and power, in small dominions within its empire, even to Greeks. Toward the beginning<sup>3</sup> of the Peloponnesian war, a

<sup>2</sup> Κατὰ πόλεις ἑταρῶν ἢ δι' ἑκάστου. Strab. 1. 14. p. 684.

<sup>3</sup> The time is so far decided by the cir-

cumstance, mentioned by Isocrates, that it was before the birth of Evagoras, afterward prince of Salamis. Isocr. Evag. p. 282. t. 2.



Greek was reigning in Salamis. But the inhabitants of that city being a mixed people, opportunity was open for the ambition of Phenicians, who would be not unlikely to win favor with the satraps, or even with the court, against the Greeks. A Tyrian thus finding means to expel the Grecian prince, obtained the patronage of the Persian government in the dominion which he seized. After some years however a conspiracy, among his own people, ended his reign and life together. His successor, also a Tyrian, proposed to secure himself by the severities common in such revolutions. Numbers were banished, or fled to avoid greater evil; and the Tyrian's oppression was such that a large proportion, even of the Phenician citizens, became adverse to him. Among the fugitive Greeks was Evagoras, a youth who claimed descent from the antient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer. Informed of the state of things, this young man formed the bold resolution, with only about fifty fellow-sufferers in exile, devoted to his cause, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality. From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they passed to the Cyprian shore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a small gate, probably as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a severe conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people mostly kept aloof, they remained masters of the city, and Evagoras assumed the sovereignty.

Isocr. Evag.  
p. 286, 288,  
& 290.

This little revolution, in a distant island, became, through a chain of events out of all human foresight, a principal source of great revolutions in Greece. How Evagoras obtained the favor or obviated the resentment of Persia; whether he was ever acknowledged by the court; or by what satrap, careless of the administration of the head of the empire, he may have been patronized, we have no information. His character has been transmitted, in elegant panegyric, as among the most perfect known to history, but of his conduct little remains recorded. Evidently however his situation, in his new eminence, was precarious. Protection from the Persian court to its most faithful, or even its most favorite, distant vassals, was little to be depended upon. The welfare of a prince of Salamis must rest on his own energies, accommodated to circumstances more immediately about him; in his own city, in the

Isocr. Evag.

other cities of his island, in the nearest satrapies of the continent, and in the more powerful republics of the nation of which he boasted to be, and of which his city was a colony.

In this state of things it was a great advantage, for Evagoras, that friendly communication was of standing beyond memory between his city and Athens; whether maintained from the original founding of the colony, or produced by the necessities or advantages of commerce, and only assisted by the idea of fellowship in blood between the people. The facility however for supplies of corn which Cyprus could furnish was a benefit, resulting from alliance with its principal city, to which the Athenian Many would readily attribute value; and, on the other hand, alliance with the most powerful maritime state of the age was highly important for Evagoras. Hence an extraordinary intimacy grew between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis (for that was the title which Evagoras commonly bore among the Greeks) insomuch that the tyrant was associated among the Athenian citizens\*. Nevertheless while his able policy enabled him to hold the favor of the Athenian Many, he did not scruple to cherish those of their best citizens whom they expelled from their community. Exiles, from any part of Greece, but especially from Athens, bringing character and means of livelihood, or talents which might make them worth their livelihood, found certain favor at Salamis. So it appears from Isocrates; and we have corresponding testimony from Andocides, the companion in youth of Alcibiades, who experienced himself in banishment the friendly hospitality of Evagoras.

Isocr. Evag.  
p. 302.

Andoc. de  
myst. & de  
red.

Such nearly is the amount of what may be gathered concerning the state of the Salaminian principality, when, in the ruin of Athens, impending from the defeat of Aigospotami, Conon fled thither with eight triremes, saved from the general destruction of the fleet. Conon had previous acquaintance with Evagoras; and eight triremes at his orders, equipped and ably manned, would enable him, in seeking refuge,

\* It is remarkable enough that Isocrates, living under a democracy, and the eulogist of democracy, mentions it, to the praise of Evagoras, that he acquired the TYRANNY,

*Τύραννον αὐτὸν τῆς πόλεως κατέστησεν*, and presently after, that he required it righteously, *κτεσάμενος ἰστίως*.

to offer important service. Nor were naval force and military science all that he carried with him: versed in political business, he was moreover practised in communication with Persian satraps; whence he was peculiarly qualified for a service perhaps beyond all others important to Evagoras. Congenial character then and mutual need produced that friendship between Evagoras and Conon, which Isocrates has celebrated. The Athenian refugee became the most confidential minister of the Cyprian prince, or rather his associate in enterprize. Undertaking negotiation with Pharnabazus, he conciliated that satrap's friendship for Evagoras; which so availed him that he would procure without resentment from the court, or opposition from other satraps, to add several towns of his island to his dominion. Some he gained by negotiation and the credit of his just administration: but against some he used arms. Meanwhile he greatly improved the city of Salamis itself: forming a port and wharfs; inviting commerce and population, and providing security by new fortifications. To his territory at the same time he gave increased value by encouragement to cultivation, and he added to the public strength by building ships of war, and establishing discipline among his people<sup>5</sup>.

While Agesilaus was threatening the conquest of Asia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner from his generosity and mercy, a respite from the pressure upon himself, was nevertheless apprehensive that his satrapy, separated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon suggested that the progress of the Lacedæmonian arms, which seemed irresistible by land, would be most readily and efficaciously checked by a diversion by sea. A considerable fleet of Phœnician ships was at the satrap's

Isocr. Evag.  
p. 304, 306.

<sup>5</sup> Nepos and Diodorus report that Conon went to the Persian court, where he managed negotiation with great ability and success, according to one, for Pharnabazus, according to the other, for Evagoras. Whether those writers have taken some loose expressions of earlier authors concerning negotiation with Persia, as indicating that Conon went to the residence of the great king, Babylon or Susa, the omission of both the cotemporary historian, and the cotemporary orator, the panegyrist of Evagoras and Conon to make any mention of so remarkable and important a fact, cannot but excite at least a doubt if Conon went any further to negotiate than the court of the satrap Pharnabazus.

orders:

orders: Evagoras had a fleet which might coöperate with it; the Athenian interest, still considerable in the island and Asiatic Grecian cities, would favor the purpose; and Conon himself had consideration among those cities, and especially among their seamen. Even before Agesilaus left Asia, a project, founded on these suggestions, seems to have been in forwardness. Soon after his departure, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras and Conon, a fleet very superior to the Lacedæmonian was assembled; and the generous Pharnabazus formed the resolution, extraordinary for a Persian satrap, to take the nominal command in person, having the good sense apparently to leave the effective command to the superior abilities and experience of Conon. Near Cnidus they fell in with the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force against him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phenician, forming a second line. The Grecian force alone, according to report, tho Xenophon does not speak of it as certain<sup>6</sup>, outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line, alarmed at the view of the enemy's great superiority, presently fled. Peisander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian shore, the crew mostly escaped; but, refusing himself to quit his ship, he was killed aboard. The victory of Conon was complete: according to Diodorus fifty ships were taken<sup>7</sup>.

Such was the disastrous event, the news of which met Agesilaus on his arrival on the confines of Bœotia. The first information struck him with extreme anguish and dejection. Presently however the consideration occurring, how disadvantageous, in the existing circum-

<sup>6</sup> According to Diodorus, the whole force under Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, little exceeded ninety triremes, and the Lacedæmonian fleet was of eighty-five. We commonly find cotemporary, and especially military writers speaking with most diffidence of the strength of armies, and even of the strength of fleets, which is far more easily ascertained.

<sup>7</sup> Diodorus, or perhaps rather his transcriber, calls the Lacedæmonian commander Periarachus. Xenophon was too much in the way of things to be misinformed of the commander's name on so remarkable an occasion, and the correctness of his transcriber is confirmed by our copies of Plutarch. Vit. Agesil. p. 1102. t. 2. H. Steph.

stances,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4.  
s. 6.

Xen. ut sup.  
Isocr. Evag.  
p. 306.

Diod. l. 14.  
p. 441.

SECT. I. MEASURES OF AGESILAUS.

stances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himself to check all appearance of his feelings. His army consisted mostly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no necessity, so by no very firm principle, to partake in expected distress. With such an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the most powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To support, or, if possible, raise, the confidence and zeal of his troops, tho by a device whose efficacy would be of short duration, might be of great importance. He therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated, that Peisander had gained a complete victory, tho at the expence of his life; and, to give sanction to the story, he caused the ceremony of the evangelian sacrifice to be performed, and distributed the offered oxen among the soldiers.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 3.  
s. 9.

Resuming then his march, in the vale of Coroneia he met the confederate army, consisting of the flower of the Bœotian, Athenian, Argian, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable assemblage, he had been attentive to acquire such addition to his own strength as opportunity offered for. He had gained some from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Bœotian border, he was joined by the strength of Phocis, and of the Bœotian Orchomenus, always inimical to Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian mora sent from Peloponnesus purposely to reinforce him, and half a mora which had been in garrison in Orchomenus. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal: but the Asiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the spirit of the institutions of Lycurgus, that Agesilaus, otherwise simple, even as a Spartan, in his dress and manner, paid much attention to 'the pomp and circumstance of war,' as our great dramatic poet phrases it; aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the soldier to be satisfied with himself, and binds his fancy to the service he is engaged in. Scarlet or crimson appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Agesilaus appeared, in Xenophon's phrase, all brass and scarlet.

s. 8.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 9 &  
10.

According to the usual manner of war among the Greeks, when the

armies approached, a battle soon followed. Both quitted advantageous ground; Agesilaus moving from the bank of the Cephissus, and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Perfect silence was observed by both armies, till within nearly a furlong<sup>o</sup> of each other, when the confederates gave the military shout, and advanced running. At a somewhat smaller distance the opposite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Agesilaus took post, instantly overthrew the Argians on the left of the confederate army, who, scarcely waiting the assault, fled toward Helicon.\* The Cyreians supported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Asia, and were so emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellespontines, from whom less was expected, that, all coming to push of spear together, they compelled the center of the confederate army to retreat. The victory seemed so decided, that some of the Asiatics were for paying Agesilaus the usual compliment of crowning on the occasion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them. The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their assault, not against the whole, but a chosen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. To such a formation their able leaders had recourse now; resolving upon the bold attempt to pierce the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praises the bravery, evidently not without meaning some reflection on the judgement of Agesilaus, who chose to engage them, he says, front to front, when, if he had opened his line and given them passage, their flanks and rear would have been exposed to him<sup>s</sup>. A most fierce conflict ensued. Shield pressed against shield, stroke was returned for stroke; amid wounds and death no clamor was heard; neither says the

Xen. Hel.  
1.4. c.3. s.9,  
10.

s. 11.

Ch. 16. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
1.3. c.4.  
s. 12.

\* So even in his Agesilaus: c.2. s.12.

historian who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete silence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons? The perseverance, the discipline, and the skill in arms of the Thebans were such, and such the force of their solid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line; and reached the highlands of Helicon; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were mostly put to the sword:

In this obstinate action Agesilaus was severely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field, when a party of horse came to ask orders concerning about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful, amid his suffering, of respect due to the deity, he commanded that liberty should be granted them to pass unhurt, whithersoever they pleased. In the philosopher historian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied, that among the Greeks, in such circumstances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind; and, even in Agesilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity but to superstition; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear, unless it were rather the desire of inculcating the fear, of his resentment for any want of respectful attention to himself. When pursuit ended, the victorious army anxiously employed itself in dragging the enemy's slain within its own lines: a remarkable testimony, from the same great writer, to the prevalence still, in a degree that may surprize us, of that barbarism in war, which in Homer's description is striking, tho in his age less a matter for wonder.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 4.  
s. 13.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 15.

Next morning early, the troops were ordered to parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Agesilaus himself being unable to attend, the polemarch Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raising the trophy; which was performed with all the music of the army playing, and every circumstance of pomp, that might most inspire, among the soldiery, alacrity and self-satisfaction. Why then no measures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently should have laid open, is

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 3.  
s. 14.

• It is implied in the account of Xenophon, that he was present, tho, perhaps for political reasons, he avoids speaking of himself. Plutarch expressly says that he was in the action—*παρῆν ἑνὸς τῆς Ἀθηναίων συναγωγῆς ἀμύνης*. Agesil. v. 2. p. 1106

not shown. The Thebans sending, in usual form, for permission to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than, for that purpose alone, could be wanted. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country friendly or neutral, to perform a ceremony, to which Grecian superstition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the spoil collected by Agesilaus in his Asiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps something more than twenty thousand pounds.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 3.  
s. 15, 16.

After this second triumphal rite, the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighboring hostile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object however seems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might serve the soldiers instead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheless what they best could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which, in returning into Phocis, were necessarily to be repassed, they gave such annoyance, that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a select body in pursuit of them. Intangled among the mountains, he was himself killed, and the whole party would have been cut off, but for the precaution of the officers left with the command of the main body, who brought seasonable relief. Agesilaus, still from his wounds unfit for fatigue, passed by sea to Lyconia, and the army was distributed in quarters.

c. 4. s. 1.

If any other writer gave any authority for the supposition, we might suspect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coroneia was written under the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, and that the victory was less complete than he has described it<sup>10</sup>. Yet we are not without information of circumstances which may have given occasion to the line of conduct which he pursued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Asiatic Greece. The small islands

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch is warm in zeal for the fame of his fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, yet he admits the victory of Agesilaus; and indeed it seems pretty evident that he had no account to follow but Xenophon's, or none

more to his purpose; unless for some circumstances little important, for which he quotes no authority, and which are of very doubtful aspect.



SECT. I. SUCCESSES OF PHARNABAZUS AND CONON.

of Cos and Nisyra obeyed the first summons of the victors. The news alone sufficed to diffuse instant ferment over the rich and populous island of Chios. The democratical party took arms; the Lacedæmonian troops were expelled; and a message was sent to Conon, proposing a renewal of the old alliance with Athens. In Lesbos, the powerful city of Mitylenë, and, on the continent, Erythræ, with the still more important city of Ephesus, followed the example. Pharnabazus and Conon did not neglect encouragement to a disposition so favorable. Coasting northward, they sent, as they passed, to the Greek cities, both of the continent and the islands, requiring that the Lacedæmonian governors should be sent away, but promising, at the same time, that no citadels should be fortified to awe them, nor any violence put upon their municipal government. The liberal characters of the Persian satrap and the Athenian admiral procuring credit to the promises, the requisition was obeyed with alacrity; and the fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, seemingly so established by the event of the Peloponnesian war, and since so extended by the ability of the commanding officers in Asia, was in large proportion almost instantly overthrown. Most of the principal officers, and many inferior men, in the numerous Asiatic troops under Agesilaus, would be deeply interested in this revolution. The principal sources of pay for all would cease; and hence the plain of Coroneia seems to have been the last field of fame for the Cyreians. We find no mention of them afterwards from Xenophon: apparent proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant, not such as he could have any satisfaction in reporting. Probably they dispersed, some to their homes, some to seek new service, and never more assembled.

Diod. l. 14, c. 85.

Xen. Hel. l. 4, c. 8. s. 1, 2.

One superior man, Dercyllidas, preserved yet a relic of the Lacedæmonian empire in Asia. He was in Abydus, when Pharnabazus and Conon passed along the coast; and the Abydenes, attached by his popular manners, and confident in his integrity and ability, were to be shaken neither by threats nor promises. Abydus became in consequence the refuge of the expelled governors and their partizans. Strength thus collected, and credit gained, inabled Dercyllidas to prevent a meditated revolt in the neighboring city of Sestus, on the European shore. But

s. 4, 5.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 8. s. 6.

he could not preserve the other towns of the Chersonese, or give security to the colonists, who had settled in that fruitful country under the authority of the Lacedæmonian government. All were compelled to abandon their lands; and it was only within the walls of Sestus and Abydus that he could give present security to their persons and effects, with some faint hope of a settlement somewhere, at some future time, under Lacedæmonian protection. The satrap and the Athenian admiral endeavored, by threats, by waste of lands, and by interception of maritime commerce, to bring Abydus to submission; but winter approaching, and the Abydenes continuing firm, they gave up the point, and directed their attention to increase their naval force for the operations of the following spring.

## SECTION II.

*Evils of the Grecian political system. Seditious of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Successes of the Lacedæmonian general Praxitas, near Corinth.*

THE event of the Peloponnesian war, which placed the Lacedæmonian state decidedly at the head of the affairs of Greece, gave also, in the moment, a decided superiority to the aristocratical cause throughout the nation. But in the very establishment of that reign of aristocracy, the materials of a new revolution seem to have been prepared. Almost immediately the democratical interest gained the superiority in Thebes, where, for a long course of years, it had been held in subjection. Silent, and unnoticed by historians, as that revolution in Thebes has been, it was nevertheless the leading step to some of the most important occurrences in Grecian history. The establishment of democracy there, gave the first means for the restoration of democracy, which quickly followed, in Athens. Corinth had long been closely connected with Thebes; and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power, not only tightened the bonds of friendship, but led both states to a connection with Athens, to which they had lately been such virulent enemies. Argos, always democratical, and the most antient,

most

most constant, and most determined of all the enemies of Lacedæmon, had for those very reasons commonly been the ally of Athens, and had always held communication with the democratical parties in Thebes and Corinth: so that, when Thebes and Corinth became democratical, the political connection of Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and Argos was, in a manner, already formed. Thus, within a very short time after the triumph of the aristocratical interest, which the event of the Peloponnesian war produced, democracy was again approaching to preponderancy among the Grecian republics:

We have already had too many occasions to observe, that, while Greece afforded the most sublime instances of virtue in individuals, extensive patriotism, political virtue pervading a people, was not more common there than elsewhere; but, on the contrary, political crimes, most atrocious crimes, abounded; the unavoidable consequences of a political system, in which, through want of a just gradation of ranks, and amalgamation of interests, one portion of the people was, by political necessity, the enemy of another, and party-spirit was stimulated by those all-involving interests and dangers, which allowed none either to chuse privacy, or to be, in a public situation, assured of the next day's fate. Notwithstanding that well-poized constitution and equal law, or, in the expressive language of Greece, that eunomy of the Corinthian state, which Pindar has apparently, with justice, celebrated, Corinth was not secure against those effects of sedition, under which, during ages of her own prosperity, she had seen so many other Grecian cities suffering the direst calamities. Indeed no small state, the territory of a single city, can have the security of a large one, like the modern European kingdoms, against sedition within, any more than against war from without. In extensive territory, distance gives leisure and opportunity for virtue and prudence, in one part, to obviate the measures of villainy or madness in another. But, in a small state, a spark excited, if not extinguished in a moment, will, in the next moment, involve all in flame. Hence arose a supposed necessity, a most unfortunate necessity could it be real, for not only indulgence, but encouragement, to individuals to assume public justice into their own hands, and assassination became dignified with the title of tyrannicide:

a resource

Pindar.  
Ol. 13.  
Ch. 5. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

a resource in its nature so repugnant to all civil security, that, if it be allowed upon principle, any momentary good which it may possibly produce, cannot fail to be followed by far greater and more lasting evil.

The Corinthian constitution, tho evidently one of the best of Greece, if the ease of its subjects, and security of person and property be the test of merit, neither excited the attention of foreigners, like the Lacedæmonian, by its pointed singularities, nor was blazoned, like the Athenian, through the superior talents of its own historians and orators. Corinth figured as an important member of the Grecian political system, but its particular history little engaged curiosity; and thus we remain uninformed of, what may have deserved to be known, the circumstances of that revolution, by which the supreme power passed from the aristocracy, which had held it so long, and generally exercised it so ably. It seems very soon to have followed the revolution of the same kind in Thebes; the particulars of which are equally unknown to us. Possibly a general jealousy of Lacedæmon may have forced the leading men to consent to a connection of the republic with the democratical states of Argos, Thebes, and Athens; and then that connection itself would tend to give the democratical party the superiority against them.

Events adverse for the public are always favorable for the party in opposition to the existing administration. The defeat at Coroneia would shake the democratical leaders in Coriuth. A momentary relief would then come to them from the dismissal of the army of Agesilaus, which ensued. But presently new difficulties occurred. Sicyon remaining attached to Lacedæmon, a Lacedæmonian force was stationed there, with the double purpose, of protecting the place and its territory, and keeping the war distant from Laconia. On the other hand, possession of the isthmus being a great point for both parties, troops were sent from Athens, Bœotia, and Argos, to assist the Corinthians in holding it. Thus the Corinthian territory became the seat of a winter war, which not a little pressed the Corinthian people, while their allies were quiet in their homes. Under these circumstances, it became easy for the aristocratical chiefs to persuade the multitude that they had been misled; that their true interest would have kept them steady in their

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4. s. 1.

old alliance, the alliance of their forefathers, with Lacedæmon. Such is the nature of confederacies: each member, as it becomes pressed, grows regardless of the common good, and attentive only to its own.

The democratical leaders were aware of their danger, and not scrupulous about means of prevention. Xenophon, upon this occasion, does not spare his fellowcountrymen; he accuses the Athenian administration, together with the Bœotian and Argian, of being accomplices in the horrid plot. A time appropriated to religious solemnity, when it is esteemed decent, says the historian, to avoid the execution even of condemned malefactors, the last day of the Eucleian festival, was chosen for a massacre; because then, all the people of all ranks being assembled in places of public resort, the business might be more readily and completely performed. A signal was given, and, in the agora, the execution began. Many were put to death before they had the least apprehension of danger; some in circle conversing, some engaged with the spectacles of the theater, some even sitting in the office of judges. The rest fled to the nearest altars and images of the gods; but the assailing party, regardless of those salutary laws of superstition, which even philosophy would approve, as a check upon ruthless violence, killed them even in the most sacred places; so that, amid the carnage, a scene of impiety and scandal was exhibited, uncommon even in the fury of Greek sedition.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4. s. 2.  
B. C. 394. 17  
Ol. 96. 3.  
End of Autumn, or beginning of Winter.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4. s. 3.

Those who fell, in this massacre, were mostly elders, of the principal families. Pasimelus, one of the chiefs of the youth, having some suspicion of what was intended, had assembled the younger of the aristocratical party in another part of the city. Surprized there by the outcry, and presently farther alarmed by the sight of some flying toward them for refuge, all ran to the Acrocorinthus; and overthrowing a body of Argians, who, with a few Corinthians, opposed them, got possession of the fortress. Fortune could scarcely have given them a more desirable possession: yet an accident, the most insignificant, induced them presently to abandon it. They were consulting on measures to be taken,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4. s. 4.

s. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Xenophon has by no means clearly marked this date. The mention of a Corinthian festival has principally furnished the clue, for the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, in the investigation of it.

when,

when, from a column, near them, the capital fell; and, the cause of the accident not being obvious, it was taken for a portentous prodigy. Recourse was immediately had to sacrifice; and the augurs, from observation of the entrails, declared it advisable to quit the place. Political wisdom evidently was not upon this occasion the moving spring. A Themistocles, a Lysander, perhaps a Xenophon, would have proved the augurs mistaken. Utterly at a loss what to do and where to go, the fugitives, obedient to the expounders of occult science, hastened down the mountain, without any other hope than to find safety in exile. Dismay had sped them beyond the Corinthian border, when the lamentations of their mothers, the persuasions of their friends, and assurances of personal safety, given upon oath by some of the chiefs of the democratical party, induced them to return into the city.

The democratical leaders had now taken measures, which they thought might suffice, without more murder, to establish the interest of their party. They had united their state in one commonwealth with Argos; thrown down the boundary-stones which marked the separation of the territories, abolished the Corinthian assemblies and every characteristic of a distinct government, annulled even the name of Corinthians, and declared by law, solemnly decreed and proclaimed, that the two people were thenceforward to be all Argians. This is a singular phenomenon in Grecian history. A league between two cities, so close as to establish a kind of fraternity, we may have observed elsewhere<sup>12</sup>: the removal of the people of one town to establish them as citizens of another, we have also seen practised; but a union, such that one was lost in the other, or even that two should form but one state, with one republican government common to both, has not before occurred. To judge of the merit of the plan, our information of particulars is too defective; nor have we the opinion of Xenophon delivered in a manner at all satisfactory. Justly indignant at the crimes of those who carried the measure, feeling perhaps for persons known to him, who perished by it, and not totally free from the prejudices of party, as a political

<sup>12</sup> Such a league, we learn, existed between the neighboring cities of Chalcis and Eretria, in Eubœa; and something of the same kind between towns so far distant from each other as the Asiatic and the Italian and Sicilian Greek.

project he has altogether slighted it; and it was too transitory to afford proof of its merit in practice.

The returned fugitives found their persons indeed safe, but their condition very much lowered. Their opponents held the sovereign power<sup>13</sup>: they were themselves lost, in a city which, says the historian, was no longer Corinth but Argos. They were allowed the privileges of Argian citizens, or rather they were obliged to become members of the Argian commonwealth; a privilege which they were very far from desiring; for with it they found themselves of less consideration, in their altered country, than many foreigners. In the true spirit of Grecian patriotism, narrow but ardent, they thought life, continues the historian, contemptible upon such terms; and they resolved (for, tho' frightened by the falling of a stone, they were brave men) that, at any risk, their country, which had been Corinth from earliest times, should still be Corinth<sup>14</sup>. In the true spirit of Grecian love of liberty, they resolved that Corinth should again be free. Personal freedom, as far as appears, themselves with all Corinthian citizens enjoyed; but Xenophon, swayed by party-prejudice, seems to have thought, with them, that association, in civil rights, with the people of another free commonwealth, was a freedom not to be indured. To purify the city from the pollution of murderers, another of their resolutions, would have been of less questionable rectitude, had the means by which they proposed to accomplish it been unexceptionable. With all these ideas together, their minds were highly heated; insomuch that, in their doubt of being able to accomplish their purpose, they could find gratification in the thought, as the cotemporary historian assures us, that, 'should their best endeavors fail, yet, in pursuit of the greatest blessings, they should obtain the most glorious of deaths.'

Thus prepared for bold exertion, Pasimelus and Alcimenes, young men of the first consideration in their party, undertook to communicate Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 4. s. 7.

<sup>13</sup> The expression of Xenophon is remarkable, ὄργανοι δὲ τοῦ τυραννέουσι, κ. τ. λ. and the whole passage is in terms not to be exactly rendered in modern language.

Κόρινθον αὐθιγαί, κ. τ. λ. It is difficult, in rendering this passage in modern language, to avoid an air of ridicule, which however Xenophon has certainly not intended.

<sup>14</sup> ——— ἢννι αὐθιγαί, ὡσπερ ἢν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς,

with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sicyon. To avoid observation and inquiry from the guards at the gates, they made their way out of the city by a gully, the course of a winter torrent, which interrupted the continuity of the wall; and they proposed to Praxitas to introduce a body of troops within that fortification, which, like the famous long walls of Athens, secured the communication of Corinth with its port of Lechæum. For the execution of their purpose, they chose a night on which they were intrusted, by the existing administration of their country, with the guard of one of the gates of the long walls. Praxitas, at the head of a Lacedæmonian mora, with the whole strength of Sicyon and about a hundred and fifty Corinthian refugees, entered without opposition. Expecting however to be quickly attacked by superior numbers, he set immediately to raise works, which might inable him to maintain his ground till reinforcement could reach him: for, on one side, Corinth was filled with a military people, strengthened by a body of mercenaries; and, on the other, Lechæum was held by a Bœotian garrison; nor was it doubted but the force of Argos would hasten to relieve the new member of the Argian commonwealth.

That day, however, and the next, Praxitas held his situation unmolested; but, on the following morning, a body of Argians being arrived, Corinth poured out its force to attack him. We learn from Thucydides, that, in his time, the general reputation of the Peloponnesian troops was superior to that of any others known. This reputation, it appears, was not lost, when Cyrus raised his army to march against Artaxerxes. In the wars however which arose within Greece, after the conclusion of that distinguished by the name of the Peloponnesian, we find very great difference among the Peloponnesian troops; a difference which could arise only from the different attention given to military discipline and military exercises, and the different manner in which such attention was enforced by the political institutions of the several republics. The Sicyonians, long allies of Lacedæmon, and continually serving with the Lacedæmonian forces, could not want means to know the Lacedæmonian discipline; yet their military was nevertheless held in contempt; and, in the battle within the  
long



long walls of Corinth, they proved the justice of the general opinion. Being attacked by the Argians, they yielded to the first onset; and, flying through their own intrenched camp, excepting those who fell by the swords of the pursuing enemy, they were stopped only by the sea. Pasimachus, who commanded a small force of Lacedæmonian cavalry, was witness to this defeat. Either the nature of the ground forbade, or, through his ignorance of a service less cultivated by the Lacedæmonians, he saw no opportunity for bringing horse into action; and yet, indignant at the defeat of his friends, he resolved to act. Dismounting, he persuaded, for it seems he could not command, some of his cavalry to follow him. The method of our dragoons not being within their practice, they fastened their horses to some trees which happened to be near, and, the small shields they carried on horseback not being fit for engaging with heavy-armed infantry, they supplied themselves with those of the slain and flying Sicyonians. Thus accoutred, they marched against the Argians, who, seeing the Sicyonian mark, an *ess*, on their shields, little regarded their approach. Pasimachus, observing this, is reported to have said, using the common Lacedæmonian oath, ‘By the twin-gods, Argians, these *esses* shall deceive you.’ With the valor of a true Spartan soldier, but not with the just discretion of an officer, rushing then to the assault of numbers too superior, he was killed with most of his band<sup>25</sup>.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed, having defeated the Corinthians and mercenaries, and committed pursuit to the Corinthian refugees, turned to engage the Argians. These, who so despised the Sicyonians, were so alarmed, in the midst of victory, by the approach of the Lacedæmonians, that to regain communication with the city, as the means of support and shelter, they lost all other consideration.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4.  
s. 10.

<sup>25</sup> The speech of Pasimachus, in the original, forces itself the more upon notice by something of a whimsical effect, arising from the Lacedæmonian dialect, in which it is reported: *Ναὶ τὰ σὺν, Ἀργεῖοι, ψεύσει ὑμῖν τὰ σήματα ταῦτα.* Beside the general peculiarities of the Doric dialect, the Lacedæmonians, as appears fully

in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, commonly pronounced  $\Sigma$  for  $\Theta$ . The effect altogether would perhaps be most nearly imitated in English, by giving the speech in the Lowland Scottish dialect, and adding the change of S for Th: ‘By se twain-gods, Aurgians, sese *esses*,’ &c.

Hastening to pass that dreaded enemy, they exposed their right flank; of all things, in the antient practice of war, the most dangerous; because the shield, so important for the soldier's protection, became inefficient. The Lacedæmonians did not neglect the advantageous opportunity. The Argians, suffering in their defenceless flank, still pushed for the city-gate; but before they could reach it, were met by the Corinthian refugees, returning from pursuit. This checked their way, and completed their consternation. The Corinthians in the city, fearing to open a gate, afforded them no other refuge than by ladders let down from the walls. The slaughter ensuing was such that, says the historian, as corn, or billets, or stones, are often seen, so the bodies lay in heaps. Praxitas then led his victorious troops to the assault of Lechæum, and added the Bœotian garrison there to the number slain.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4.  
s. 12.

s. 13.

The success of the Lacedæmonian arms was thus complete, and the dead, with the usual ceremonies, already restored, when the forces of the Peloponnesian allies of Lacedæmon arrived. Praxitas employed them in making a breach in the Corinthian long walls, sufficient for the convenient passage of an army; he then assaulted and took Sidus and Crommyon on the isthmus, and he fortified Epieicia. Placing garrisons in all those places, by which he secured the command of the isthmus, he dismissed the rest of his army, and returned himself to Lacedæmon.

### SECTION III.

*Invasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Restoration of the long walls of Athens. Seafight in the Corinthian gulph.*

By the victories of Corinth and Coroneia the force of the formidable confederacy, formed against Lacedæmon, had been broken; and, by the recent successes of Praxitas, the command of the isthmus being recovered, means were again open for carrying war against the enemies of Lacedæmon beyond the peninsula. Instead therefore of any longer dreading

invasion at home, Lacedæmon should have been again formidable to her enemies. But that policy, by which she had profited in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, was now turned against herself; the wealth of Persia supported her foes; the command of the sea was already gone; and her armies, which should have carried her vengeance against her most distant foes, were necessary at home, and yet unequal, to the protection of her own coast.

Whatever personal esteem Pharnabazus might have for Agesilaus, he was highly exasperated against the Lacedæmonian government. Of a temper to feel the disgrace of the condition of a fugitive, to which, in the sight of all his dependants, and to the knowledge of the Persian court, he had been reduced, he was anxious to recover his honor, not less than he had been to vindicate his property. During winter therefore he was diligent in adding to the number of his ships, and in raising a force of Grecian mercenaries; the only troops that could be effectually opposed to Greeks; and he resolved to carry war, in person, to the coast of Laconia, where no Persian had ever yet appeared in arms.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 6, 7.

In pursuance of this resolution, imbarcking, in spring, with the Athenian Conon for his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the Ægean; and, from the Ionian shore to Melos, all submitted to him. Proceeding then directly to the Laconian coast, he had the satisfaction to make good his landing on it, near Pheræ, and to ravage unresisted the country around. Reimbarcking before the Lacedæmonians could come in force against him, he repeated his debarkations, in various parts, for plunder, and always with success. Under the able advice of Conon, he did not loiter on a coast where rocks and tempests and want were to be apprehended, not less than an enemy, whom he well knew to be formidable. He crossed to the island of Cythera, which, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, had been conquered by the unfortunate Nicias. Being without strong places, it yielded without resistance; and, in the idea that it might be made a useful acquisition, a garrison was placed there, under Nicophebus, an Athenian. The satrap then directed his course to the Corinthian isthmus, where the congress of the confederacy was assembled. There he had opportunity to communicate

B. C. 393.  
Ol. 96. 3.

municate

municate with the leading men, with whom he concerted measures for the prosecution of the war against Lacedæmon; and, leaving a sum of money for its support, returned with his fleet to Asia.

While the impression of satisfaction with his successful expedition, in which he had earned a glory so new to a Persian satrap, was fresh upon the mind of Pharnabazus, Conon took the favoring opportunity for obtaining some most important advantages for his country. A man of courage and honor, the satrap was no deep politician. He felt keenly the injuries he had suffered from the overbearing power of Lacedæmon, commanding at once the naval and military force of Greece: but the expence of maintaining the fleet, by which he had delivered, and in some degree revenged, himself, pressed upon his treasury. It was therefore a grateful proposal, which Conon made, to transfer a large share of that burthen to the Athenian commonwealth; urging, however, that to enable Athens to bear it, two things were necessary; first, that the tribute from the islands, by which Athens had formerly maintained her navy, should be restored, the combined fleet enforcing regular payment; and then, that her long walls, so essential to her security against the overbearing ambition of Lacedæmon, should be rebuilt. The liberality of Pharnabazus granted all that Conon demanded. He allowed the fleet to be employed in reëstablishing the claim of Athens to contributions for the support of her navy; he allowed the crews to be employed in working upon the long walls; he gave a large sum of money toward the expence, and he sent masons and mechanics to assist in the work. Neighboring states, which had the democratical interest at heart, added their voluntary aid; and it is remarkable that, among the most zealous and liberal, were the Bœotians, lately the most vehement enemies of Athens, remorselessly urgent for its destruction. But so it was, among the warring interests of parties, in the little republics of Greece: walls, connecting the capital with its ports, were esteemed the bulwark of the democratical, and the bane of the oligarchal cause. From the moment, therefore, when the revolution in Bœotian politics took place, whereby the democratical became the ruling interest, it became

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 9, 10.  
Diod. l. 14.

### SECT. III. RETURN OF CONON TO ATHENS.

303

became most the object of the leading men to restore; what their predecessors in administration thought they had the greatest interest in destroying.

Thus Conon, thirteen years after his flight from his country's ruin, had the singular good fortune and glory to return, with the present of a fleet and fortifications, in short, of dignity, power, and dominion in his hand. The gratitude of the Athenian people was shown in honors, we are told, of the highest kind, conferred upon Conon, and his friend and patron the virtuous tyrant of Salamis; of which, however, we find nothing specified but their portraits in marble, placed by the side of the statue of the Preserving Jupiter; in memorial, says the cotemporary rhetorician, of the greatness of their services, and of their friendship for one-another. Of any gratitude shown by the Athenian people to the generous satrap, we have no information. Possibly the prejudices of the age would not allow them, of the same kind, to a barbarian, of whatever merit, as to Evagoras; who, tho a tyrant, was a Greek, and an Athenian citizen.

Isocr. Evag.  
enc. t. 2.  
p. 306.

While the satrap's money thus laid anew the foundation of naval power for the Athenian commonwealth, it inabled the Corinthians to maintain a fleet for the security of their own gulph. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, utterly unable to oppose the fleet which, under Conon, commanded the eastern seas, equipped however a squadron to dispute the western with the Corinthians, and give protection to the Achaians and others, their allies in those parts. Coming to action with the Corinthian fleet, the Lacedæmonian admiral, Polemarchus, was killed, and Pollis, the next officer, wounded; but Teantias, brother of Agesilaus, arriving with a reinforcement, the Corinthians avoided farther action, and the Lacedæmonians commanded the gulph.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 11.

## SECTION IV

*Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Causes of failing energy of Lacedæmon. Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus. Antalcidas ambassador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the satrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Isthmian games. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther successes of Iphicrates.*

THE Athenians, tho' their forces had shared in the loss of two great battles, and in one of them had suffered considerably, nevertheless held their country still unhurt by the war. But, the Lacedæmonians commanding both the isthmus and the gulph of Corinth, the passage to Attica was easy to them; and while the restoration of the long walls would of course excite their jealousy, the ravage of Laconia by Conon could not but have excited a desire of revengé. It was therefore much an object for the Athenians to keep the Lacedæmonians employed within their own peninsula. After the victories of Agesilaus and Praxitas, it might indeed appear rash to send a landforce to make war in Peloponnesus; but Athens, fertile in great talents, had a general formed for the peculiar circumstances of the existing occasion.

Iphicrates was the author of a system of tactics, new among the Greeks. The phalanx, almost irresistible where it could exert its force, was cumbersome in evolution, unfit for mountainous or woody countries, incapable of rapid motion, either in pursuit or retreat. Its character is marked in a saying reported of Iphicrates: Comparing an army with the human body, the general, he said, was as the head, the light-armed as the hands, the cavalry as the feet, and the phalanx as the chest and shoulders. Of course he considered the Peloponnesian army, notwithstanding the general superiority of the heavy-armed, as extremely defective; for its light-armed were meer untrained or ill-trained slaves; and the cavalry generally deficient, both in number and in discipline. Indeed, among the Greeks, cavalry was of little use but  
in

in pursuit, except against the light-armed; no body of horse daring to charge a phalanx; and hence the cavalry was compared to the feet. Under this view of things, Iphicrates directed his attention to improve what he called the hands of the army. Athens had always had bowmen superior to the Peloponnesian, and had often profited from that superiority. Iphicrates conceived that great advantage might be drawn from an improved discipline of the middle-armed, or targeteers, who, to the agility of the light-armed, might unite some degree of the force of the phalanx. Indeed how much practice was necessary to excellence, in any of the three styles of discipline, we may gather in some degree from Xenophon; where he observes that even a Spartan would not, with target and dart, engage a Thracian armed in the same manner, any more than the Thracian would, with shield and spear, engage any Greek practised in the discipline of the heavy-armed.

Xen. Mem.  
Socr.

Circumstances which brought forward for historical notice the little republic of Phlius, hitherto obscure among the complicated politics and wars of Greece, opened also the first field of fame for Iphicrates and his new system. Phlius was a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, when the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party were expelled. According to the general course of things in Greece, it was to be expected that Phlius would then renounce the Lacedæmonian alliance, and engage in the new confederacy of Bœotia, Athens, and Argos. But an inveterate hatred, a kind of horror of the Argians, pervaded all parties in Phlius: insomuch that it was resolved, with all the forbidding circumstances attending, to endeavor to preserve the connection of the commonwealth with Lacedæmon. In other times probably, spurning at the proposal, the Lacedæmonian government would have commanded those who ruled in Phlius to restore the exiles: but, in the existing situation of affairs, Lacedæmon no longer held her former imperious tone; and, tho' the Phliasians carried their avowal of jealousy so far as to refuse, in any case, to admit Lacedæmonian troops within their walls, their offered friendship was not slighted.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 4.  
s. 15.

The preference, given by a democratical party, to the Lacedæmonian alliance, was a disappointment to the democratical confederacy, that excited revenge; and the central situation of Phlius, between Argolis,

Corinthia, Sicyonia, and Arcadia, gave that little state an importance that urged attention. Accordingly Iphicrates led his targeteers into Phliasia, and marked his way with ravage. His purpose was to provoke pursuit, and lead the Phliasians into an ambuscade. He succeeded; and so large a proportion of their small force of heavy-armed fell, that the survivors thought themselves unequal, not only to the protection of their fields, but even to the defence of their walls. Pressed then by distress and danger, they were induced so far to remit their former jealousy, as to request from Lacedæmon a protecting force, and even to put their citadel into the power of a Spartan governor. The trust was executed with fidelity, and even with scrupulous delicacy; for, when the Phliasians, after arranging their affairs, thought themselves again equal to their own protection, the Lacedæmonian government, in withdrawing the garrison, avoided even to mention a restoration of the exiles. The conduct was liberal and wise; worthy of Agesilaus, if he was the mover; but we cannot give the Lacedæmonian administration quite so much credit for it, as if they had been less under the pressure of difficult circumstances.

Xen. Hel.  
1.4. c. 4.  
s. 16.

After his success in Phliasia, Iphicrates overran great part of Arcadia; and, such was the new terror of his targeteers, that even the Arcadian heavy-armed feared to quit their towns. The Lacedæmonians however were not to be so daunted. Iphicrates falling in with a body of them, his targeteers, according to their usual method, after throwing their javelins, retreated to avoid stationary action. But the Lacedæmonians pursuing, such was the practised vigor of some of their younger men, with their full armor, they overtook and killed some of the targeteers, and made some prisoners. After this experience, it was with difficulty that the targeteers could be led within dart's throw of any Lacedæmonian forces. Iphicrates nevertheless taught them still to support their reputation against other troops; insomuch that, near Lechæum, he defeated a body of Mantincian heavy-armed. Thus, says the cotemporary historian, the Lacedæmonians, who held the targeteers in contempt, found reason to hold their own allies in still greater contempt; and it became a common sarcasm among them, that the allies were afraid of the targeteers, as children of hobgoblins.

s. 17.

Notwithstanding



Notwithstanding the employment thus found for the Lacedæmonians by Iphicrates, the Athenians were still uneasy under the apprehension of a renewal of those evils, which had been experienced in the frequent invasions of their country, during the Peloponnesian war. They were therefore anxious to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the command of the isthmus, and with this view it was resolved to restore the long walls of Corinth. Accordingly the whole force of the commonwealth marched to support a body of workmen, so numerous that the restoration of the western wall was completed in a few days. A good defence being thus gained on the side of Sicyon, the enemy's principal garrison in those parts, they proceeded with the eastern wall more leisurely.

In tracing, with the able cotemporary historian, the events which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia and his victory in Bœotia, some wonder is apt to arise at the little exertion or little means, at the confined action and narrow views, of that seemingly formidable commonwealth, which, after the Peloponnesian war, completely commanded Greece, and not only threatened Persia, but was actually carrying conquest far into Asia. To her landforce no misfortune had happened. On the contrary, a victory had checked the exertions of her enemies in Greece, before Agesilaus returned. He brought to her assistance a powerful army of veterans, formed in various service, and gained a victory on his arrival. This was followed by success under Praxitas, which secured the way for carrying invasion into the territories of any of the hostile republics. No use appears to have been made of these advantages. One defeat at sea had deprived Lacedæmon of her transmarine dominion, and three victories by land did not give her quiet within her own peninsula. From the course of Xenophon's narrative, however, may be gathered that, for this apparent inertness and real inefficiency, two powerful causes existed; the diminution of pecuniary resources, through the loss of the Asiatic dominion, and the disaffection of the Laconian subjects to the Spartan government. Means failed for putting the Asiatic army any more in action, and the measures of government for external exertion were cramped by the necessity of watching the disposition to revolt at home. On both subjects Xenophon, on account of his connection with the Spartan government, has

spoken always with delicacy and reserve, yet he has not wholly omitted to throw light on them.

Humbled then and distressed, pressed by land and by sea, abroad and at home, and at a loss for measures, while the Athenians were recovering extensive dominion, the Lacedæmonians turned their thoughts to a reconciliation with Persia. They had experienced the advantage of the Persian alliance, when they possessed it; they now felt its pressure against them; and they perceived that, contemptible as the military of the empire was become, yet, in the divided state of Greece, the Persian king, or even a satrap, by the force of money alone, employing Greeks against Greeks, could decide the balance between their republics. They had moreover had large opportunity to know, that the councils of the Persian empire had scarcely more energy than its arms; so that, in the looseness of the connection of the distant members, with the head, and with one another, means for negotiation and intrigue were almost always open. In the present moment, Pharnabazus was highly incensed against them, and his resentment had afforded opportunity for the able admiral and minister of Athens to attach him to the Athenian interest. But the new satrap of Lydia, Teribazus, had no cause of personal animosity, perhaps no principle of political enmity toward them; and, to judge from past experience, the very attachment of one satrap to the Athenian, might incline the other to the Lacedæmonian cause.

B. C. 393.

Ol. 96. 2.  
Xen. Hel.  
I. 4. c. 8.  
s. 12. 14.  
s. 13.

These considerations urging, Antalcidas was sent ambassador to Sardis. The Athenians, alarmed at this, sent also an embassy, at the head of which was Conon, accompanied by ministers from Bœotia, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas represented 'that the support, given by Pharnabazus to the Athenians, went far beyond ' what a just consideration of the interest of the Persian empire ' would allow: that, on the contrary, the terms of peace which, ' on the part of Lacedæmon, he was commissioned to propose, could ' not fail of being agreeable to the king. The Lacedæmonians ' would no longer dispute the king's sovereignty over the Grecian ' cities in Asia; and, for the islands and the European Greek cities, ' they only desired complete independency. If then no sove-  
' reignty

reinty of one Grecian city over another were allowed; it would be impossible for any to carry hostilities with any efficacy against the king; so that the expence of maintaining a fleet for the Athenians, and of making war upon the Lacedæmonians might be equally spared.

Teribazus was pleased with this proposal, but the Athenian, Bœotian, and Argian ministers could not be brought to consent to a peace upon such terms. Under the stipulation for the independency of all Grecian states, the Athenians feared to lose the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus, their antient possession; the Thebans their command over the Bœotian cities; and the Argians their new connection with Corinth. As far therefore as peace was the object, the négociation failed. But Antalcidas nevertheless carried a great point for his country, for he gained Teribazus. Scrupling to conclude an alliance with Lacedæmon, without express authority from his court, the satrap however secretly furnished money for the equipment of a Lacedæmonian fleet; imprisoned Conon on pretence of injurious conduct toward the king; and went himself to Susa, to solicit authority for the measures he desired to pursue.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 15.

While Antalcidas was thus successfully negotiating at Sardis, the Lacedæmonian administration, stimulated by the depredations of Iphicrates in various parts of Peloponnesus, and alarmed by the restoration of the long walls of Corinth, resolved at length to put Agesilaus again at the head of an army, and appoint his brother Teleutias to coöperate with him in naval command. Quickly all Argolis was ravaged; and, the attention of the confederates being thus called to that country, Agesilaus suddenly crossed the mountains, while Teleutias conducted a squadron of twelve ships up the Saronic gulph, and the unfinished long walls, and the Corinthian naval arsenal, were taken. The expedition was ably conducted, and the success important; but the blow was not followed: the forces of the allies were dismissed, and Agesilaus led the Lacedæmonians home to celebrate the Hyacinthian festival.

Xen. ibid.  
& Agesil.  
c. 2. s. 17.

In the whole conduct of this war we find nothing like that greatness of design, which might have been expected if Agesilaus could have directed measures. It was evidently a war of the ephors, and the king

was

B. C. 392. was merely the general, acting under their orders. In the ensuing spring he was directed again to put himself at the head of the army<sup>16</sup>. The refugee Corinthians had communicated information, that Corinth was principally subsisted from a stock of cattle, collected at an obscure port within the Corinthian territory, on the Saronic gulph, of the same name with the celebrated harbour of Athens, Peiræus. To deprive the enemy of that supply, was thought an object for an expedition, which the king should command. After events more adapted to engage and fill the mind, these little transactions are apt to appear uninteresting. They are nevertheless important, as they are connected with great revolutions that followed, links in the great chain of events; and sometimes as they afford information, the clearest, and the most impressive, of the religion, politics, warfare, and manners, of this interesting age.

The time selected for the expedition was that of the Isthmian games; which, in the Peloponnesian war, we have seen, diffused a temporary peace around them; insomuch that, amid designs and preparations on both sides avowedly the most hostile, the Athenians could safely trust their persons in the power of the Corinthians, then the most virulent of their enemies. But the same superstition, which at that time insured the observation of the armistice, now provoked to interrupt the sacred season with hostility. Corinth, by fiction of policy being now Argos, Corinthians and Argians indifferently, but all with the name of Argians, presided at the ceremony, and performed the prescribed sacrifice to Neptune. This the Corinthian refugees held to be a portentous pollution. They claimed themselves to be the Corinthian commonwealth, the exclusive privilege and exclusive duty of whose members it was to officiate in that solemnity. The Lacedæmonians approving their claim, Agesilaus led his army directly to the isthmus. The Argians were not prepared against attack, nor even against surprize. They fled on the first alarm; yet not so timely, but, as they hurried along the road by Cenchrea, they were seen by the Lacedæmonians

<sup>16</sup> Neither season nor year is specified here by Xenophon; but the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, indignant at the evident confusion of Diodorus, has endeavored to ascertain the dates from the mention of the Isthmian festival in the Hellenics of Xenophon, and of the Hyacinthian in the Agesilaus.

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from the heights above, and might have been overtaken; but Agesilaus would not allow pursuit. So little indeed was the approach of an enemy apprehended, that the victim was left ready slain, and the preparations complete, for the feast which should have followed. Agesilaus put his Corinthian friends in possession of these, and remained three days, while the sacrifices and games were performed under their presidency. Xenophon mentions, as a circumstance interesting to the Greeks, that after his departure the Argians caused the solemnity to be repeated in all its parts; so that some of the games were twice performed, and the same conquerors in some of them were twice proclaimed.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 2.

On the fourth day, Agesilaus led his army to Peiræus. There he found a large force, so strongly posted, with Iphicrates commanding, that in doubt of the success of an assault, he recurred to stratagem. Spreading a report that Corinth was to be betrayed to him, he decamped suddenly and directed his march thither. The Corinthian administration were so little secure of their own people that, in great alarm, they sent for Iphicrates to come and save Corinth; and that active general, ready at the call, with his light targeteers, passed the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed in the night. Agesilaus, informed of this, returned at daybreak to Peiræus, and occupied the commanding heights; upon which the troops remaining there, together with all the men, women, and slaves of the place, took sanctuary in a neighboring temple of Juno, and soon after surrendered themselves to the mercy of Agesilaus. His generosity was not conspicuous upon the occasion: those who were accused as accomplices in the massacre at Corinth were given up to the refugees: the rest, men, women, goods, everything included in the capture, were sold.

s. 3.

s. 9.

s. 5.

The terror of the arms of Agesilaus, probably however not unassisted by some intelligence or some apprehension of the success of Antalcidas in negotiation, brought ministers to the Lacedæmonian camp from several of the hostile states, and particularly the Bæotian, to know upon what terms peace might be expected. These ministers were waiting the king's leisure, while, with designed ostentation, he was reviewing his captives and other booty, when a messenger arrived, with intelligence

s. 6.

intelligence

intelligence of a disaster to the Lacedæmonian arms, which unfortunately checked both their desire of peace, and his means to command it.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 11.

It was a custom from very early ages, and supposed of divine origin, that the Laconians of the town of Amyclæa, on whatsoever public service employed abroad, should return home to sing the pæan at the Hyacinthian festival. The season being at hand, Agesilaus, in marching for Peiræus, had left all the Amyclæans of the army in Lechæum; directing the polemarch, who commanded the garrison there, to provide for the security of their return to Laconia. The polemarch, zealous in the execution of what was esteemed a sacred duty, committed the defence of Lechæum to the troops of the allies, while, with a mora of Lacedæmonian infantry, consisting of about six hundred men, and another of cavalry, probably a much smaller number, he marched to escort the Amyclæans. He took the road to Sicyon, not as the direct way to Lacedæmon, but as the readiest to get beyond danger from the enemy in Corinth, and to have a friendly line of country afterward to traverse, with a fresh escort, if it should be necessary. Having passed Corinth without molestation, and proceeded within four miles of Sicyon, he committed the Amyclæans to the charge of the cavalry, directing the commanding officer<sup>17</sup> to accompany them as far as they should themselves desire, and then press his way back to overtake the infantry in their return to Lechæum. He knew that the force in Corinth was large; but the late successes of the Lacedæmonian arms had inspired confidence, and he thought none would dare to attack a body of Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.

s. 12.

Unfortunately that very stratagem which gave Agesilaus easy possession of Peiræus, had considerably increased the force in Corinth, and at the same time sent thither a general not likely to miss an opportunity for striking a blow. Iphicrates was there with his targeteers, and Callias son of Hipponicus, chief of the Daduchian family<sup>18</sup>, commanded a body of Athenian heavy-armed. They observed the pole-

<sup>17</sup> His Athenian military title would have been *Hipparch*; but the Lacedæmonian was

*Hipparmost*; which assists to prove that *Harmost* may properly be rendered *Commander*, or *Governor*.

<sup>18</sup> See Ch. 22. s. 2. of this Hist.

marc returning, without cavalry and without light troops, and they led out their forces. Having preconcerted measures, Callias kept aloof, while the targeteers hung on the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonian column, directing their missile weapons at the undefended parts of the heavy-armed soldier's body. The polemarc continued his march under the annoyance, till several were wounded and some fell. He then ordered those within ten years after boyhood, perhaps those under four and twenty, to assault and pursue<sup>19</sup>. This, a common expedient of the Grecian heavy-armed, when unsupported by cavalry or light troops, had succeeded, as we have seen, once, even against Iphicrates: but, to such an officer, every loss was a profitable lesson, and the expedient succeeded no more. His targeteers, superior both in arms and discipline to any before known, evaded the pursuit of the Spartan youth, incumbered with their heavy armour, turned upon them if they scattered, overtook them when they retreated, wounded many, killed some, and compelled the rest to rejoin the main body, upon which then, more daringly than before, they renewed their attacks. The polemarc was thus provoked to order all under thirty to assault. In retreating again, more fell than after the former charge. Already the most active and daring soldiers were mostly killed or wounded, when the horse joined. These were ordered to charge, and the younger men of the infantry with them. The cavalry service appears to have been ill-cultivated among the Lacedæmonians. Xenophon blames the conduct of their horse on this day. Instead of pushing the pursuit of the retreating targeteers, they carefully kept even front with their infantry, halted when they halted, and retreated when they retreated. Immediately as they turned the targeteers turned, and horse and foot together suffered from their missile weapons. Another charge was then made; but in the same manner, and with no better success. As their numbers were thus reduced, their efforts slackened, and those

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
c. 15.

<sup>19</sup> τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἑξῆς. The exact value of this expression, which occurs more than once in Xenophon, is not satisfactorily ascertained. According to Plutarch, the Lacedæmonian ἑξῆς, boyhood, seems to have

ended at the age of twelve years, after which, to the age of nineteen, the Lacedæmonian youths were called Eirens. Thus the pursuers would have been those only between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 5.  
s. 17.

of the enemy grew more spirited. Distressed and at a loss, at length, for measures, they halted on a small eminence, about two furlongs from the sea, and two miles from Lechæum. Thence, while suffering from missile weapons, and unable to return a blow, they saw, on one side, boats from Lechæum intended to relieve them, on the other, the Athenian heavy-armed approaching to attack them. Upon this they took to flight. The horse escaped to Lechæum. Of the infantry, who mostly made for the sea, scarcely any survived<sup>20</sup>.

Agesilaus, upon being informed of this disaster, seized his spear, and, not waiting to communicate with the enemy's ministers, who were attending, assembled all his officers. Having given his orders, he marched immediately, with a chosen body, leaving the rest to follow, after refreshment taken. He had already entered the vale of Lechæum, when messengers met him, with information that the bodies of the slain were in the possession of their friends. Upon this he returned to Peiræus, and next day, says the historian, with a simplicity which may excite a smile, he sold the prisoners.

This misfortune, to the Lacedæmonian arms, had an effect approaching that of the capture of Sphactéria, in the Peloponnesian war. It did not indeed give an equal advantage to the enemy, because no prisoners were made. The loss in slain was very inferior even to what many of the little Grecian republics had often suffered; but it made great impression upon the Lacedæmonians, because, says the historian, they were unaccustomed to such blows; and, as Plutarch well remarks, for readers less familiar with the ideas of the times, it was an unheard-of disaster, and esteemed a portentous event, that heavy-armed should be defeated by targeteers, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries. A deep grief therefore, as the cotemporary historian proceeds to inform us, pervaded the army: only, according to their great lawgiver's precept, the sons, fathers, and brothers of the slain, as sharers in glory earned

s. 10:  
Plut. Ages.

<sup>20</sup> Xenophon here says the killed, in all, were about two hundred and fifty. He had before said that the infantry were, in all, six hundred, and that those carried off by the shield-bearers (*ὑπασπισταί*) before the first assault upon the targeteers, were all that were really saved; *μόνοι τῆς μόρας τῆ ἀληθεία σωθέντων*. It looks as if two hundred and fifty were the number admitted by the Lacedæmonians, but that the historian knew the real number to have been greater.

through



through their family misfortune, ostentatiously exhibited a joy, which, among other people, might have been esteemed indecent on the occasion. The reputation accruing to Iphicrates was great throughout Greece, and the enemies of Lacedæmon were not a little encouraged. The Bœotian ministers, attending in the camp of Agesilaus, being sent for to declare the object of their mission, did not even mention peace, but only requested free passage to communicate with their troops in Corinth. Agesilaus knew that what they now wanted was to get information of the amount of the late success. Next day therefore, marching toward Corinth, he took them in his train, and allowed them a view of the trophy raised by their friends, which he would not permit his own troops to remove; but if olive, vine, or other valuable tree had escaped former ravage, he ordered it to be destroyed. Having made them spectators of this insult, to show that he could still command the country, he sent them, not into Corinth, but across the sea to Creusis, to relate in Bœotia all they had seen.

Corn. Nep.  
v. Iphicr.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5. s. 9.

s. 10.

Here however ended his exertion. Placing a complete mora in Lechæum, and taking with him the small relics of the mora which had suffered, he marched for Lacedæmon. His anxiety to conceal from the friendly towns, in which he was to take quarters by the way, the amount of a loss apparently so little considerable, is remarkable. He was careful to enter them all as late in the evening, and quit them as early in the morning, as with any convenience might be; and, finding the soldiers hurt with expectation that the Mantineians would take a malignant joy in their disaster, tho he moved from Orchomenus at daybreak, and did not reach Mantinea till dark, he would not halt there, but still proceeded to the next town.

s. 18.

Xenophon has not informed us whether this retreat of the army was a measure of Agesilaus, or of the ephors, or what necessity induced it. If not necessary, it appears an imprudent measure. Iphicrates presently took Sidus, Crommyon, and Œnoë; the two former garrisoned by Praxitas, the latter by Agesilaus himself. Thus all the territory northward and eastward was recovered for the Corinthians of the city, and command of the isthmus no longer remained to the Lacedæmonians. For the rest of the year operations were reduced to excursions for plunder,

s. 19.

chiefly by those Corinthians, of the Lacedæmonian party, who had taken refuge in Sicyon. Not daring, since the misfortune of the Lacedæmonian mora, to move far by land, they directed their little expeditions by water, whithersoever, on the territory of their city, they had best hope of seizing, with least danger, any small booty that might contribute to their subsistence.

## SECTION V.

*Unsteadiness of the Persian government: War renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus; into Argolis under Agesipolis.*

DURING all this year the great fleet collected by Pharnabazus and B. C. 392. Conon seems to have remained inactive. Possibly, since the negotia-  
Ol. 87. 4. tion of Antalcidas, the imprisonment of Conon, and the resolution of Teribazus to apply in person to the court of Susa, the Hellespontine satrap may have been cautious of taking a decided part: perhaps he may have been without an officer to whose ability or fidelity he would trust such a command. There was however evidently no steady policy in the Persian councils: nothing of that great design for establishing a commanding influence in Greece, which later writers have fancied in them. Struthas, who, in the absence of Teribazus, was appointed to the Lydian satrapy, instigated by consideration of the injuries the king's territories had borne from the Lacedæmonians (possibly his own property had suffered, or his family had been insulted) warmly favored the confederacy now at war with them.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 17.

Xen. Hel.  
ut sup. &  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 100.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 8. &  
c. 2. s. 6.  
& l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 22.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 17.

The Lacedæmonian administration, in consequence, renewed hostilities against Persia; by what good policy prompted it is difficult to discover. The reëppointment of Thimbron, to a command in which he had already shown himself deficient, strengthens the probability that the Lacedæmonian councils were at this time ill-directed; and the slighting manner in which Xenophon repeatedly mentions that officer, enough marks that he was not chosen by Agesilaus. Thimbron had some success in plundering the Persian possessions, in the rich vale  
of

of Mæander; but he did not establish a better reputation for military ability than in his former command. Courage he possessed: but, tho a Spartan, he was a man of pleasure; indulgent to his soldiers, careless of those for whose protection he and his soldiers were sent. Courage may be even mischievous in a general with deficient abilities. It led Thimbron to extravagant contempt of an enemy not incapable of profiting from his error. Struthas, having observed the hasty and careless manner in which he often led small bodies to action or pursuit, sent a few horse to plunder the Grecian possessions in the neighborhood. Thimbron was sitting at table, with the celebrated musician Thersander, when intelligence came, that the enemy he despised was thus insulting him. Immediately he rose; and Thersander, expert in martial exercises, and an emulator of Spartan prowess, followed him. In his usual manner, without any previous care to have troops in readiness, he hastened, with the first he could collect, to chastize the plunderers. Struthas presently appeared, with a large body of horse in good order: the Greeks were overpowered, and Thimbron and Thersander killed. The rest of the Grecian army, advancing too late to support their improvident general, were then charged and broken. A few saved themselves in the neighboring friendly towns; but the greater part fell by the swords of the conquering Persians.

Xen.-Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 22.

This serious check stopped, for a time, the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Meanwhile, in Europe, some accidental circumstances, and not any great design, led, or rather forced them, to carry their arms beyond Peloponnesus.

Such was the unfortunate implication of interests, in the Grecian political system, that, unable ever or anywhere to give peace, which was its object, that system had a constant tendency to spread the flames of war. Calydon, a principal town of Ætolia, had renounced its connection with the body of the Ætolian people, and made itself a member of the Achaian people, on the other side of the Corinthian gulph. We find here again something like that fiction of policy, by which we have lately observed Corinth become a part of Argos. The Achaians however found the acquisition inconvenient; for, to preserve it, they were obliged

c. 6. s. 1.

obliged to keep a body of forces in Calydon, and sustain a war with the Ætoli-ans.

Ch. 15. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

We have formerly seen the Acarnanians, after a course of successful warfare, generous at the same time and prudent in granting terms of peace to their defeated neighbors. From that period they had passed more than fifty years in so fortunate an obscurity, as to offer, for the historian's notice, neither crime nor misfortune. They were now led again to step forward on the field of fame. The Ætoli-ans, anxious to recover Calydon, and unable with their own force, solicited and obtained the good offices of their allies of Acarnania. The Acarnanians had alliance with the Athenians and Bœotians, who readily contributed assistance against allies of Lacedæmon. Thus the Achæians became so pressed, as to be unable to preserve Calydon, unless they also could obtain assistance. They applied of course to Lacedæmon; but they found the Lacedæmonian administration little disposed to send a force beyond Peloponnesus. Thinking themselves ill-used, they remonstrated warmly. 'Wherever the Lacedæmonians required their services,' they said, 'they always marched on the first summons; and, without reciprocal assistance in need, they could no longer abide by a confederacy, the terms of which were so unequal. Instead of any more sending forces to serve in the Lacedæmonian armies, they must necessarily employ their whole strength against their own particular enemies, or make a separate peace upon the best terms they could obtain.'

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 6. s. 2.

s. 3, 4.

This remonstrance had the desired effect; and the abilities of Agesilaus were in consequence to be employed in a war, whose object was, that the people of the obscure town of Calydon should be members of that branch of the Greek nation called Achæians, and no longer of that called Ætoli-ans: He led into Acarnania two moras of Lacedæmonians, with the whole strength of Achæia, and the contingents of all the other allies. No force that the Acarnanians could raise, was able to oppose him in the field. Terms of peace, which he offered, being refused, he made complete destruction of the country, as he went, but he advanced only ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians were thus encouraged to bring their cattle, which had been driven far among the mountains,

back again toward their best pastures, and to return themselves to the tillage of great part of their lands. Agesilaus obtaining intelligence that almost the whole stock of the country, with numerous attending slaves, was collected on the borders of a lake, about twenty miles from his camp, by a hasty march, came upon it by surprize, and took almost all. Xen. Hel. 1. 4. c. 6. s. 6.

The proposed business of the next day was to give rest to his troops, while he sold his captives to the slave-merchants, the common attendants of a Grecian army. Meanwhile the Acarnanians assembled in great numbers, on the heights around his camp. Less practised than the Peloponnesians, in the discipline of the heavy-armed, the Acarnanians were remarkable, through Greece, for their expertness in the use of missile weapons; and they so annoyed the army of Agesilaus, within its lines, that they compelled him, when evening was already approaching, to move his camp to ground less commanded. After this experience, he was anxious, on the following day, to regain the plain. But he found the heights commanding his way occupied; and the activity of his younger soldiers was in vain exerted to repel or deter the assaults, made or threatened from them. His small body of cavalry was equally inefficient, on ground so hilly and rough. Thus, through the usual deficiency of a Peloponnesian army in light troops, he was in no small danger from an enemy, who, in any number, would not stand the assault of almost the smallest detachment that he could send against them. Fortunately he discovered a better passage, which, tho guarded by the Acarnanian heavy-armed, he resolved to force; and, not without difficulty, principally arising from the annoyance of missile weapons, he succeeded. s. 7. s. 11.

Regaining thus, at length, the plain, he extended ravage on all sides. To gratify the Achaians he assaulted some towns, but without success. Autumn then advancing, he proposed to quit the country. The Achaians, dissatisfied that not a single town had been gained, either by force or persuasion, urged him to stay, so long at least as to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their winter grain. Such, in the deficiency of means for the attack of walls, was, yet in that age, among the modes of reducing an enemy to terms. Agesilaus however replied, that

‘ that they mistook their interest; for he intended to return next summer; and the enemy’s solicitude for peace would be exactly proportioned to their fear of the destruction of a plentiful harvest.’

To regain Peloponnesus then for winter quarters, was a business not without difficulty and danger. The command of the isthmus was lost, as we have seen, by the retreat of Agesilaus himself, in the autumn of the former year, after his success at the Corinthian Peiræus, and the unfortunate action which took place at the same time near Lechæum. An Athenian squadron, commanding the western seas, watched the passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus. No alternative remained but to march through the hostile country of Ætolia; a country so strong by nature, that, says the historian, neither a great nor a small force can traverse it, against the goodwill of the warlike inhabitants. Agesilaus was skilful and fortunate enough to induce them to acquiesce, by holding out the hope of recovering Naupactus, so long held by the Messenians.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 6.  
s. 14.

B. C. 390.  
Ol. 97.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 7.  
s. 1.

In the following spring the army was reassembled. The Acarnanians, informed of this, began to consider, says the historian, that as they had no seaports, through which to obtain supplies, the destruction of their harvest would produce all the evils of a blockade of their towns. They sent therefore ministers to Lacedæmon, and a treaty was concluded, which established peace for them with the Achaïans; and, with the Lacedæmonians, that kind of alliance, familiar among the Greeks, by which the forces of the inferior people were to march at the command of the superior. The Acarnanians, however, being not likely to be zealous allies, the principal point gained, by success in this little war, was the prevention of the secession of Achaïa from the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

s. 2. 5.

This however was the more important, as an enemy already existed, within Peloponnesus, so powerful as to make it dangerous for the Lacedæmonians to send any large proportion of their forces beyond the peninsula: Attica and Bœotia had been secure through their alliance with Argos. It was resolved therefore now to carry an expedition into Argolis itself; and the young king Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, just of age, and highly ambitious of distinction, was appointed to the command.

The

The army was ready to march, and the border-passing sacrifice had been declared propitious, when a herald arrived from Argos with a proposal of truce. The superstition of the young king, or of his council, was alarmed; insomuch that he went to Olympia, to learn, from the oracle of Jupiter, if he might religiously refuse a truce insidiously proposed: for it was notorious that no sincere desire of peace had prompted the Argians, but the meer purpose of averting an invasion, which, with their single strength, they could not oppose, and of which intelligence had reached them too late to call in their allies. The god signified that the truce, iniquitously offered, might be religiously refused. Not even thus satisfied, Agesipolis proceeded to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, 'If he was of the same opinion with his father?' Such, precisely, is the philosopher-historian's expression. But this transaction, whatever may appear ridiculous in it, shows the value of that union in religion, which obtained through the Greek nation. It was a beneficent superstition, that could occasion but a pause about prosecuting the ravages of war, and generally insure opportunity for treating about peace.

Apollo however confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Agesipolis then hastened to Phlius, where he found his army assembled, and he marched immediately, by the way of Nemea, into the vale of Argos. On the first evening, during the usual libations after supper, an earthquake was felt. The Lacedæmonians, taking it as a favorable omen, sang the pæan to Neptune, the supposed author of earthquakes; but the allies were alarmed; and, in justification of their fears, they observed that Agis, upon a similar occasion, had withdrawn his army from Eleia. Agesipolis, however, ably refuted their construction of the omen: 'Had they been but about to enter the enemy's territory,' he said, 'the earthquake would have indicated the god's prohibition of the measure: being already entered, it declared his approbation.'

Xen. Hef.  
l. 4. c. 7.  
s. 3.

Ch. 24. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

The terrors of the army being thus quieted, a sacrifice was performed to Neptune, and then ravage was carried to the very gates of Argos; which the Argians feared to open even to admit a body of Bœotian horse coming to their assistance; who would have been destroyed, as they stuck, in the historian's phrase, like bats under the battlements, had not the Cretan bowmen of the Lacedæmonian army been acciden-

tally absent. After plunder and destruction widely spread, the symptoms in a sacrifice deterred the proposed fortifying of a post in the country, and Agesipolis, returning home with his booty, dismissed his army.

## SECTION VI.

*Affairs of Rhodes. Diphridas commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Teleutias. An Athenian fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus: Asiatic and Thracian dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. Anaxibius commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: Defeat and death of Anaxibius.*

B. C. 391. THE destruction of the army under Timbron, while the abilities of Ol. 97.  $\frac{1}{2}$ , Agesilaus were confined to the Acarnanian war, had checked the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Sedition, arising from the incompatibility of interest of the wealthy and the poor, that great mover of Grecian domestic politics, again drew the attention of the government thither, and Asia was an inviting field for those who could obtain commands.

That civil order, or, in one word of his own close and expressive language, better painting his object, that eunomy, which Strabo admired in the island of Rhodes, when, in common with all surrounding countries, it held its government under patronage of the Roman empire, did not at this time flourish there. The rich and the poor could not agree upon a form of government, which might enable them to hold their fine island in independency, tho' no foreign power offered them violence. Incapable of coalescing, and each beyond all things decided against submission to the other, each solicited subjection to a foreign authority. After the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the Many had for some time rested under the government of the Few, everywhere patronized by the conquering people. But, when the Lacedæmonian interest in Asia was suddenly overthrown, when Athens again became a name among



among the Grecian powers, and an Athenian admiral commanded the seas, whether from ambition of chiefs or sufferings of the people, or both together, civil contest arose; the democratical party forming connection with Athens, obtained the superiority; and all the men of higher rank were expelled. Lacedæmon, of course, became their refuge. The Lacedæmonian administration thought it important to prevent such an accession, as that of all Rhodes, to the Athenian dominion; and so little was apprehended from the fleet lately so formidable under Conon, that eight triremes were supposed sufficient for the purpose. But the intelligence, on which this judgement was formed, appears to have been very defective; for the Rhodians themselves possessed twice the number of ships of war; so that the Lacedæmonian squadron, having reached the port of Cnidus, in want of an object to which its strength was equal, remained mostly there.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 20.

B. C. 391.  
Ol. 97. 7.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 21.

When it was resolved, at Lacedæmon, to keep a squadron on the Asiatic station, it was resolved also to send an officer to take the command by land in Asia Minor, who might collect the broken relics of Thimbron's army, preserve the towns yet disposed to the Lacedæmonian interest, and prosecute war against Struthas. This command was committed to Diphridas; who, tho' unsupported by any force from Peloponnesus, yet by his activity in business, civil and military, with assistance from the pleasantness of his manners, restored, in a considerable degree, the Lacedæmonian affairs in Asia. In several towns the Lacedæmonian interest was revived or confirmed, and a fortunate incident gave means for raising an efficient military force: Tigranes, with his wife, the daughter of Struthas, was made prisoner; and a large sum being raised by their ransom, Diphridas used it to raise a body of mercenaries, which he found means also to maintain.

s. 22.

In the following year, the Lacedæmonian administration, earnest to recover Rhodes, ordered Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, to pass, with his squadron, from the Corinthian gulph to Asia, and take the command-in-chief. Thus reinforced, the Asiatic fleet consisted of twenty-

B. C. 390.<sup>20</sup>  
Ol. 97. 7.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 23.

<sup>20</sup> This and the preceding are Dodwell's dates, made out from circumstances in Xenophon's narrative.

seven ships, with which Teleutias was proceeding from the station at Cnidus to Rhodes, when he fell in with an Athenian squadron of ten, and took all. Xenophon remarks an inconsistency in the measures of both parties on this occasion. The Athenians, in actual alliance with Persia, or, at least, with the western satraps, had sent that squadron to assist Evagoras king of Cyprus, against Persia; and the Lacedæmonians, at actual war with Persia, intercepted that squadron going to fight against their enemies. But what seems principally to deserve notice, is the evidence afforded of the weakness and distraction of the Persian councils, in consequence of which that vast empire submitted to insults, on all sides, from the little Grecian republics. If they sought its alliance, they sought it through insults and injuries; and, in the actual enjoyment of great advantages from its alliance obtained, still they did not refrain from insults and injuries.

The usual activity of the Athenians was excited by the loss of their ships, and by the apprehension that the Lacedæmonians might recover the dominion of the sea. A fleet of forty triremes was committed to the orders of Thrasybulus. That able and experienced officer, pressing his way to Rhodes, found Teleutias there. The Rhodian refugees held a post in the island, which he had fortified for them. With some assistance from him they had ventured a battle, but were defeated, and the democratical party commanded the country. Thrasybulus therefore, finding them thus able to support themselves, and having tried in vain to bring Teleutias to action, proceeded to the Hellespont. Hostilities had arisen between Amadocus, or Medocus<sup>21</sup>, paramount sovereign of the Odrysian Thracians, and Seuthes, the prince restored, through the assistance of the Cyreian Greeks, to the command of the country bordering on the Propontis. He effected a reconciliation between them, and, by forming an alliance with both for the Athenian commonwealth, he added considerably to the importance of the Athenian patronage for the Grecian towns on the Thracian coast. He proceeded then to Byzantium, and restored the collection

Xen. Hel.  
1. 4. c. 8.  
s. 25.

<sup>21</sup> In the Hellenics we find the name written Amadocus, in the Anabasis always Medocus, which is the orthography that Diodorus has followed, 1. 4. c. 95.

of the toll, formerly imposed by the Athenians, of a tenth of the value of the cargo of all vessels passing the Bosphorus<sup>22</sup>. Seemingly this should not have been a measure very agreeable to the Byzantines, who might naturally enough think themselves best intitled to such a tax collected there; but, among the Greeks, when party-views interfered, the general interest of the commonwealth was little considered. Thrasybulus abolished the oligarchal government, established in Byzantium by the Lacedæmonians, and restored democracy. With the democratical party therefore, thus become the ruling party, the Athenian name was highly popular; and in the first moments of joy, anything was borne from their benefactors. If indeed a general judgement is to be formed from the accounts given even by Xenophon, the friend and admirer of Lacedæmon, of the conduct of some of the Lacedæmonian governors upon some occasions, it was not wonderful that popularity should attach in the moment to any change<sup>23</sup>. Thrasybulus had similar success at Chalcedon. The other Grecian towns, on the Asiatic shore, were already in the interest of Athens, as the ally of Persia, or of the satrap in whose province they lay, excepting only Abydus, where at present nothing invited his endeavors.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 27.

His next attention therefore was given to the large and rich island of Lesbos; large among the islands of the Ægean, but scanty to form a state sufficing for its own protection. The Lesbians nevertheless had no notion of coalescing under one government. Four, five, or six towns affected each its separate sovereignty. Mitylenë, the most popu-

<sup>22</sup> Ἀπίδοιο τὴν δικάστην τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων.—Decumam, e Ponto navigantibus impositam, publicanis vendit. —Decimas eorum quæ e Ponto veherentur, ἀπίδοιο, ἔδωκεν, scilicet, publicanis. Hesy chius: ἀπίδοιο, ἐδίδουκε. Ἐξιδόναι, autem, apud Herodotum, idem quod μισθῶσαι. Tho I have not on all occasions perfect faith in Hesy chius, for explanations relating to the age of Xenophon, yet I believe these may be nearly right. I should however have been glad of more explanation on the subject from Xenophon himself. He indeed mentions the

thing again in other words, rather confirming these interpretations, presently after. — ἡ δικάστη τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου περιπαλιῶν ἐστὶν ἐν Βυζαντίῳ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων. s. 31.—venditam ab Atheniensibus esse rerum e Ponto vectarum decumam.

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch mentions it as a popular saying in Greece, (viz. Agesil. v. 2. p. 1107.) that the Lacedæmonians collectively, (δημοσίᾳ) were the better men, but the Athenians individually (ἰδίᾳ.) It was with individuals in command that the colonies had mostly to do.

lous and powerful, was attached to the Athenian interest; all the others to the Lacedæmonian; and in Methymnë, the next in power to Mitylenë, a Lacedæmonian harmost resided. But refugees from all were unceasingly watching opportunities for restoring themselves. On these circumstances Thrasybulus founded the project of bringing the whole island into the interest, and, in effect, under the dominion of Athens. He was well received in Mitylenë; and, by holding out the hope that all Lesbos might be reduced under their dominion, he engaged the Mitylenæans to march with him against Methymnë. The refugees from the other towns were induced to join him, by the hope, otherwise desperate, of restoration to their country. The Lacedæmonian governor, venturing an action with him, was defeated and killed. Some of the towns then surrendered, and the plunder of the lands of the rest served for present pay to the victorious army.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 30.

The dominion, or the influence, which Athens formerly held over that large part of the Greek nation which was settled in the islands, on the Asiatic coast, and on the Hellespontine shores as far as the Euxine, was now in great proportion recovered. Abydus, yet held by Dercylidas, and the few Ionian towns that Diphridas had been able to preserve to the Lacedæmonian interest, were the principal exceptions. After these important services done, it remained still for Thrasybulus to accomplish what was the particular object of his instructions, in leading the armament from Athens. Having therefore passed the winter in Lesbos<sup>24</sup>, he was anxious in spring to get to Rhodes as early as possible, but to get there prepared in the most effectual manner to meet such a commander as Teleutias. Money, which the treasury of his republic could not supply, must be obtained to support his armament. On that curious subject, the collection of tax or tribute from those numerous self-governed towns, over which the patronage of Athens extended, or the fear of its arms operated, tho' it frequently

B.C. 389.  
Ol. 97.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .

<sup>24</sup> We find Xenophon still deficient in Athens to about midsummer of the year marking dates; but the laborious ingenuity of Dodwell has again here, I think, been successful. Contrary to Diodorus he has assigned the departure of Thrasybulus from B.C. 390; his departure from Lesbos, in which he agrees with Diodorus, to spring B.C. 389.

occurs to mention, we do not find, among antient writers, the explanation that might be wished. Thrasybulus, after receiving money from many other towns, proceeded to Aspendus on the river Eurymedon, the scene of the celebrated double victory of Cimon over the Persians. The Aspendians had already paid a contribution; when some irregularities, committed by the troops, so exasperated them, that they attacked the Athenian naval camp by night, and Thrasybulus was killed in his tent.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 100.

Such was the end of a man of no common merit, tried on various occasions; in seditions among fellowcitizens, in commands against common enemies, and proved, in them all, for honesty and true patriotism, at least after Aristides and Cimon, the most unequivocal character among the numerous superior men that Athens had to that time produced. But, in Athens, no character could escape the licentious calumny of those who made accusation a trade; and, among the remaining orations of Lysias, we find Thrasybulus involved in a charge of peculation. Certainly the mode used by the Athenians, of extorting revenue with an armed force, gave the tax-gathering generals great opportunity for sinister practices: but then it opened unbounded opportunity for calumnious imputation, difficult for the clearest probity to refute; because, to prove honesty, a negative must be proved. Xenophon appears to have had no partiality for Thrasybulus: in party indeed they were rather opposite; but, in relating his death, he speaks his panegyric: ‘Such,’ he says, ‘was the end of Thrasybulus, a man of the highest estimation<sup>25</sup>’; a concise, yet perhaps a completer eulogy than, in all his remaining works, we find bestowed upon any other political character, excepting only his particular friend and patron Agesilaus.

To the loss of this great man was added that of Conon, of whose

<sup>25</sup> So I think the import of the Greek phrase may most fairly be given in our language,—*μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι*—which the Latin translator has rendered perhaps as nearly as the Latin language would admit,—*maximâ virtute viri*. Cornelius Nepos’s eulogy of Thrasybulus seems the same ex-

pression amplified in translation: *Si per se virtus sine fortuna ponderanda sit, dubitò an hunc (Thrasybulum) primum omnium ponam. Illi sine dubio, neminem præfero; fide, constantia, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore.*

Isocr. Paneg.  
p. 270. t. 1.  
Lys. pro. bon.  
Aristoph.  
p. 155, vel  
638.

Xen. Hef.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 31.

§. 32.

s. 33.

fate we have nothing certain after his imprisonment by Teribazus; but it seems most probable that he escaped from confinement, reached the island of Cyprus, where he had large property, and died there<sup>26</sup>.

As no others perhaps could have raised Athens, from ruin, to that degree of strength and splendor, which she had already recovered, so none possessed the means of Thrasybulus and Conon, whether by abilities and experience, or by interest and influence among Grecian states and foreign powers, still to promote her progress to empire. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless were alarmed at what had been already done, and especially at the recovery of the command of the Bosphorus, and of the toll collected there. Dercyllidas, who had remained in his government of Abydus, without a force sufficient for effectual operation against Thrasybulus, was, perhaps, while the affairs of Greece required the presence of Agesilaus, the fittest man that Sparta could furnish for the Asiatic command. But the interest of Anaxibius prevailed with the ephors. He sailed with only three triremes and no troops, but he was furnished with levy money for a thousand men.

To supply the lost abilities of Thrasybulus and Conon, Iphicrates now stood foremost among the Athenian officers. It is an important, tho, for the modern reader, an over concise passage of Xenophon, in which he mentions that Iphicrates, while commanding in Peloponnesus,

<sup>26</sup> The biographer Nepos says that, according to some reports, Conon was carried into the king's presence, and was put to death, or died, in Upper Asia; but that, according to the historian Dion, in his opinion the best authority for Persian affairs, he escaped from confinement. It is something remarkable that none of the extant cotemporary writers mention the death of so illustrious a man. Xenophon relates his imprisonment, and there leaves him. A licentious Latin translation seems to have led some to quote Isocrates as asserting that he was put to death by the Persians — Κόωνα μὲν — ἐπὶ θανάτου συλλαβῆν ἐτόλμησαν. (Paneg. p. 268. t. 1.) which, apparently for the sake of a rounder period than an exact version would readily have allowed, is rendered by

Auger, *Cononem comprehensum interficere quasi sunt*. The meaning appears to me to be no more than that they seized him with the purpose of putting him to death; and as the completion of the purpose is not expressed, it seems implied that it did not follow. From Lysias we learn that the large property of Conon in Cyprus was disposed of, after his death, in conformity to a written will which he left, (Lys. pro bon. Aristoph. p. 155, vel 638.) and it seems in some degree implied, in the same passage, that he died there. The omission of all mention of his death, after noticing his imprisonment, seems to mark that Xenophon knew nothing of his having been put to death by the Persians, and it is not likely that he would have remained uninformed of such a circumstance.

put to death some Corinthians, for their zeal for the connection with Argos; a violence of which the united republics took no farther notice than to dismiss him and his troops, with the pretence of having no farther need of them.

The appointment of a new commander from Lacedæmon, with an increased force, to act in the Hellespont, induced the Athenians to send Iphicrates thither, with eight triremes and twelve hundred targeteers. Desultory expeditions, for the collection of booty, for some time employed both generals. A proposal to revolt at length coming to Anaxibius from a party in Antandrus, he led thither the greater part of his force, consisting of Abydenes, mercenaries, and the Lacedæmonian governors, with their followers, who had taken refuge in Abydus with Dercyllidas. Iphicrates, informed of this movement, crossed the Hellespont in the night, landed on the Asiatic shore, and directing his march toward Cremastæ, on the highlands of Ida, where, says Xenophon, were the goldmines of the Antandrians, he took a station commodious for intercepting the Lacedæmonians on their return. His squadron hastened back to Sestus, and, at daybreak, according to orders given, moved up the Hellespont toward the Propontis. It was seen, from the Asiatic shore, holding that course, and the feint completely deceived Anaxibius; who, in the persuasion that Iphicrates was gone on some expedition to the northward, marched in full security. He no sooner saw the Athenian infantry, so well was the ambuscade planned, than he saw his own defeat inevitable. With the ready and firm conciseness of a Spartan, addressing his people, he said, 'It will be proper for me to die here: hasten you to save yourselves, before the enemy is upon you.' Taking then his shield from his shield-bearer, and, being joined by twelve of the expelled Lacedæmonian governors, they fought on the spot till all were killed. This testimony, to the remaining vigor of the institutions of Lycurgus, is the more remarkable, as Xenophon, in doing justice to the bravery of Anaxibius, appears to have been very far from having had either personal regard for him, or esteem for his character<sup>27</sup>. The rest of the army, flying,

<sup>27</sup> Dercyllidas appears to have been much thought him ill used by the appointment of the friend of Xenophon, who seems to have Anaxibius to supersede him. By Anaxibius

flying, was pursued, with considerable slaughter, to the very walls of Abydos.

## SECTION VII.

*Freebooting war of the Æginetans against Attica: Siege of Ægina. Lacedæmonian public revenue. Connection of Athens with Cyprus. Teleutias commander on the Grecian coast: Antalcidas commander in Asia, and again ambassador from Lacedæmon to the satrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian government, in the king of Persia's name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas.*

B. C. 387. WHILE Athens was recovering empire beyond the Ægean, she was suffering at home those evils of predatory war, to which, in the scantiness of their territories, the most powerful of the Grecian republics were always liable. Hitherto commercial intercourse between Athens and Ægina, tho' Ægina was of the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not been interrupted; the Lacedæmonians themselves, in the desire of finding opportunity to divide the formidable confederacy that opposed them, having been cautious of carrying hostility directly against Attica. But since a naval war was begun, in which the Athenians of course took the lead, such caution was laid aside; the Æginetans were encouraged to infest the Attic trade and pillage the coast, and Ægina became again 'the eyesore of Peiræus.'

s. 2. Distressed by this annoyance, the Athenians sent Pamphilus, with ten triremes and a body of heavy-armed, to besiege Ægina. Teleutias happened to be in the neighborhood, collecting tribute among the islands. For, notwithstanding their professions of total disinterestedness during the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians had now avowedly, and indeed not without necessity, abandoned that system, and followed

himself, when he had before the command in the Hellespont, Xenophon had been, as we have seen, extremely ill-treated. It is observable that he mentions the impiety of Anaxibius, shown in his contempt of augury, as among the causes of his catastrophe.

the



the example of Athens in raising a public revenue. According to Diodorus, after the Peloponnesian war, they collected a thousand talents, perhaps near two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, yearly, which he seems to have considered as a great exaction. On the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet the Athenian squadron retired, but the siege of Ægina by land was still continued. The season of the annual change of commanders occurring soon after, Hierax, the successor of Teleutias in the command-in-chief, led the greater part of the fleet to Rhodes, leaving only twelve triremes under Gorgopas, who, with that small force, so blockaded the Athenian troops, that they suffered and risked more than the Æginetans, whom they were besieging. An exertion of the Athenian government relieved them, by reconveying them to Attica. But, immediately as the Æginetans were thus set at liberty, depredation was renewed on the Attic shores, with increased sedulity and vigor. A squadron of thirteen triremes was therefore appointed, under the command of Eunomus, to guard the coast. By a surprize in the night, ably conducted, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the rest to seek shelter in the harbour of Peiræus.

Diod. l. 14.  
p. 400.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 3.

s. 5.

s. 8. 9.

We cannot refuse our admiration to the activity and spirit of enterprise of the Athenian government, which, amid these distresses at home, could direct its attention to the eastern end of the Mediterranean, and, while Attica was so pressed, could resolve to send succours to a distant ally, a meritorious ally indeed, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. We find, among antient and modern writers (tho the cotemporary historian is not in the number) lofty eulogy on the mutual friendship, the magnanimous friendship, of the Athenian people and Evagoras; uninterrupted in various fortune, and in a length of years. Declamation, rather than reason, seems to have been thought fittest to give credit to such mutual sentiments, tho the connection certainly subsisted, between a despôt and a multitude. But political connections have commonly their real source in mutual wants; and we are not wholly without information of those which produced, and maintained, the friendship between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis<sup>28</sup>. Athens had

<sup>28</sup> Valuable information no doubt may be gathered from that oration of Isocrates, intitled

had a population which the scanty produce of its own barren and narrow territory with cultivation committed, of late years, almost intirely to slaves, could not feed. Its nearest resource was Eubœa; its greatest the shores of the Euxine. But, in wars so frequent and almost continual among the Greeks, the hazard for heavy trading-ships, of threading the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, and then winding their way among the islands of the Ægean, was so great, that supplies from that plentiful country would be precarious, and other resources desirable. From Cyprus the navigation to Athens might be open, when that from the Euxine was precluded; and a cotemporary orator informs us of one occasion, when Athens, pressed by dearth and apprehension of famine, looked principally to Cyprus for relief. Probably the service to the Athenian people, which procured Evagoras the honor of being admitted to the freedom of the city, consisted in supplying them with corn, in the last years of the Peloponnesian war. Such a benefit would be likely to make impression on the Many; to win their favor, and ingage their attachment, even to a tyrant; while their leaders, more particularly connected with him, would know how to esteem the connection which inabled them to minister to the wants of the Many, their tools and masters. On the other hand, for Salamis, Athens was a valuable market; and to Evagoras, pressed by the controll of Persia, at the discretion of its satraps, sometimes threatening his safety, always checking his ambition, every alliance, founded on mutual interest, and especially that of a maritime power like Athens, would be highly valuable.

Induced by such considerations, with perhaps others less indicated by antient writers, the Athenian government resolved that a considerable force should pass to Cyprus, and the advantageous choice was made of Chabrias, one of the first military characters of his active age

titled The Encomium of Evagoras, which is said to have been written for the funeral of the Salaminian prince. It is however not by taking ingenious panegyric in the lump, but by sifting it, by comparing it with information remaining from other, especially co-

temporary, writers, by observing its connection with the course of events, and its consistency with known facts, and with the temper of mankind and of the age, that the truly valuable is to be discovered and ascertained.

for

Andoc. de  
reditu.  
Ch. 22. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 10—13.

for the command. But that Attica might be safe while a large part of its force was on distant service, the armament was directed first to the repression of the annoyance suffered from Ægina. Chabrias landed on that island; an action ensued; Gorgopas was killed, and such slaughter was made of his troops and seamen, that, for some time, the Attic coast and navigation, in the cotemporary historian's expression, were unmolested as in peace.

The Lacedæmonian revenue, notwithstanding the tribute collected, was evidently scanty for the expence of a naval war; a deficiency to which, apparently in a great degree, must be attributed the narrow and desultory exertion by land. After the blow in Ægina, the surviving crews refused to obey the orders of Eteonicus, who succeeded Gorgopas in the command, because he had no pay for them. The resource of the Lacedæmonian government was in the personal character of Teleutias.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 1.  
s. 13.

Not raised to fame by any achievement of extraordinary splendor, Teleutias had the merit of attaching, in a singular degree, the affection and esteem of those who served under him. On his arrival to take the command from Eteonicus, joy pervaded the armament. Assembling the soldiers and seamen, 'I bring no pay with me,' he said, 'but, God willing, and you assisting, I will endeavor that you shall not want. You know that, when I commanded before, my door was always open to any who desired to speak with me, and so it shall be now. When you have plenty, you shall find me well supplied; but when you see me bearing cold and heat and watching, you must expect in these also to have your share. You have, I know, deserved the reputation of brave men. It will be your business now to increase that reputation. We must labor together that we may enjoy together; and what is more gratifying than to procure our subsistence by our arms, without flattering any man, Greek or barbarian, for pay? Plenty at the enemy's expence is at the same time wealth and glory.' He was answered with a universal shout, 'Command, and we will obey!'

s. 3, 4.

Teleutias resolved immediately to use this ready zeal. He ordered all aboard in the evening, with one day's provision; and crossing the gulph, to within a mile of the harbour of Peiræus, waited for daybreak. With his small squadron, only twelve triremes, he then pushed into the port.

s. 16, 17, 18.

port. A force more than sufficient to overwhelm him was there; but not a ship in a state for action. The surprize was as complete as he had foreseen or could wish. Such triremes as fell readily within his reach he rendered unserviceable; many laden merchant-ships he towed away; and some of his crews, leaping ashore, surrounded some seafaring and mercantile men, and forced them aboard, prisoners. Alarm spread rapidly among the inhabitants: those within doors ran out to inquire what the disturbance was; those without, as where defence (not the business meerly of a garrison) was the near interest of all, hastened in for their arms; while some ran to the city to communicate the intelligence; and shortly all Athens, horse and foot, came down, in the apprehension that the port was already in the enemy's possession.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 19.

s. 20.

Meanwhile Teleutias, sending away his prizes, under convoy of four triremes, for Ægina, with the rest of his squadron coasted Attica southward. Numerous fishing vessels, with some passage-boats, from the islands, concluding that a squadron from Peiræus must be Athenian, fell into his hands, without attempting flight. At Sunium he captured several trading-ships, some laden with corn, some with other merchandize. Directing then his course to Ægina, and there selling his prizes, he gave his crews a month's pay in advance, and quickly his complements, which he had found deficient, were filled with volunteers; and he had a squadron as zealous in the service and orderly as it had lately been backward and mutinous.

s. 21.

But when a naval force, without which their own territory must always be insecure, could not be maintained and brought into action without the singular ability and popularity, and perhaps too the good fortune, of a Teleutias; when, after great victories by land, they had scarcely advanced a step against their enemies, even in Europe; and, in Asia and the islands, the extensive command which devolved to them by the extinction of the empire of Athens, was nearly passed away; the Lacedæmonians were aware that their resources were unequal to break a league of half Greece against them, assisted with money from Persia: they found that a war to pull down the once widely dreaded power of Athens, and a war to maintain their own power, now become little less invidious, were very differently considered by those

SECT. VII. ANTALCIDAS AMBASSADOR TO THE PERSIANS.

whose support was necessary to them; and that, after recalling their able and successful commander from Asia, not only their authority among the Grecian states of their alliance, but even the safety of their own territory, was precarious.

Under this pressure, looking around for means of relief, there were circumstances affording hope that negotiation with Persia might be attempted with advantage, and the resolution was taken to make the trial. Teribazus, who had shown a disposition so friendly to them, was returned to the chief command in Asia Minor; and the hostile Pharnabazus, honored with the gift of the king's daughter in marriage, was gone from his satrapy to the capital. At the same time, in consequence of successful negotiation at Syracuse and among the Italian states, a powerful reinforcement to the fleet was expected; which might enable Lacedæmon to treat upon more equal terms, than if excluded from the seas, and sinking under her enemies arms. Antalcidas, who had successfully conducted the former negotiation with Teribazus, was the person who stood forward for the management of the business, or whom the administration, and, apparently, the public voice called for. Beside his interest in Lacedæmon, which appears to have been powerful, not only the favor he had acquired with Teribazus, but his connection of hospitality with Ariobarzanès, who governed the Hellepontine satrapy in the absence of Pharnabazus, strongly recommended him; and he was appointed, at the same time, commander-in-chief in Asia, and ambassador to the Persian government:

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 25.

s. 6 & 22.  
B. C. 388.  
Ol. 97. 2.  
1.

Arriving at Ephesus in autumn, Antalcidas sent the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes, under his vice-admiral Nicolochus, to oppose Iphicrates in the Hellespont. He went himself immediately to wait upon Teribazus, whom he found not only disposed, to Lacedæmon and to himself, in the same friendly manner as before, but furnished with authority from his court to engage in every offensive alliance, for the purpose of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace, which had been settled in the Persian cabinet<sup>29</sup>. Returning then to Ephesus,

B. C. 388.  
Ol. 98. 1.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1. s. 6.  
& 22.

<sup>29</sup> ———— *ξύμμαχῶν βασιλεία, ἡ μὴ ἐθέλοιεν τὸς εἰλεγειν.* Upon a comparison of this passage with that where Teribazus was last before

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 1.  
s. 7 & 22.

Ephesus, the satrap accompanied him<sup>20</sup>. There intelligence came to them that Iphicrates, having collected all the scattered naval force of the Athenians in the neighborhood of the Hellespont, to the number of thirty-two triremes, blockaded Nicolochus in the harbour of Abydus; and it was to be feared that the squadron, daily expected from Syracuse and Italy to assist the Lacedæmonians, would be intercepted. Upon this Antalcidas hastened by land to Abydus. By a stratagem he took eight triremes, coming from the Thracian coast to reinforce Iphicrates. He was soon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy. Collecting then the naval force of all the Ionian towns, over which the influence of Teribazus extended, and, through the friendship of Ariobarzanes, receiving some even from the Æolian, which would rather have gone to reinforce the enemy, had Pharnabazus remained in the satrapy, he was at the head of a fleet of above eighty triremes. The Athenians were utterly unable to contend with this force: the Lacedæmonians commanded the seas; and the Athenian authority, trade, and revenue, in the Hellenpontine countries, ceased.

s. 26.

Antalcidas, possessing means thus for conquest, persevered nevertheless in his purpose of making peace; and the temper of the principal belligerent republics, which had felt severely the pressure of war, at this time favored his purpose. The Athenians, seeing the command of the sea decidedly gone from them, and the king, from theirs, become the enemy's ally, fearing a second siege of Athens itself, and in the mean time unable to protect their territory against the ravage even of Æginetan privateers, were earnest for peace. Even the Lacedæmonians, employed, in some towns, in guarding against the danger of foreign assault; in others in the more irksome service of obviating sedition and preventing revolt; a whole mora in Lechæum and another in Orchomenus, while Corinth

before mentioned, the meaning of the historian appears. I think clearly that given in the text: but the incomplete connection and deficient explanation in many parts of the Grecian annals, show that the work never had the author's finishing hand.

<sup>20</sup> Ὁ δὲ Ἀνταλκίδης κατέβη μὲν μὴ ἀ Τηρέβαζον.

The historian has omitted to mention whether Antalcidas went to wait upon Teribazus. The Latin translator seems to have understood it to be in Upper Asia; but I rather think the word κατέβη means no more than that Teribazus came down to the coast with Antalcidas, probably from Sardis.

was a constant and most harrassing object of contest; tired of continual calls to these and similar duties, were little allured by the prospect of conquest beyond the Ægean. Still more the Argians, distressed by repeated ravage of their rich territory, more exposed than any others of the confederacy to a repetition of the evil, and without a fleet to revenge, or transmarine possessions whence to supply themselves, had more than others occasion for peace. The Bœotians only remained, less solicitous to put an end to a war, from which latterly they had less suffered, but which they could not support alone.

The proposal however for peace was not made in a manner the most creditable to Lacedæmon, or likely to be very gratifying to the Greek nation. It came from Teribazus, in the form of a requisition, for a congress of ministers from all the belligerent republics, which might be disposed to accede to terms of peace, to be offered by the king. Nevertheless all sent their ministers. The congress being opened, Teribazus produced a rescript from the king, showed the royal signet, and then read thus: 'Artaxerxes the king holds it just, That all cities on the continent of Asia belong to his dominion, together with the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus; and that all other Grecian cities, little and great, be independent, except that the islands of Lemnus, Imbrus and Scirus remain, as of old, under the dominion of Athens. If any refuse these terms, against such I will join in war with those who accept them, and give my assistance, by land and by sea, with ships and with money<sup>31</sup>.'

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 1.  
s. 27.

B.C. 386<sup>11</sup>.  
Ol. 98. 2.  
Spring.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 1.  
s. 28.

However strange this dictatorial address, from a Persian governor to the Greek nation, may appear to those whose ideas of the Grecian spirit of independency have been drawn from declaimers under the Roman empire, yet, from cotemporary writers, it does not seem that the general mind was greatly shocked by it. Evidently however the Greeks

<sup>31</sup> Polybius (1. 1. p. 7.) and Strabo (1. 6. p. 287-) say, that the peace of Antalcidas was made in the 19th year after the battle of Aigospotami; and this has been the canon to which Dodwell has accommodated his dates.

<sup>32</sup> The change from the third to the first

person here copied from the Greek, has probably been preserved from the Persian.

Clazomenæ was separated by so very narrow a strait, that it was generally considered as a city of the Ionic main: it has been specified here apparently to obviate cavilling.

had no reason to fear, and did not fear, the Persian military power. Persia was incomparably weaker than in the reign of Xerxes, and Greece united would have been stronger. Perhaps indeed there never existed, at any period, a nation so superior in military force to the rest of the world, as that assemblage of little military commonwealths at this time was, could they have been firmly united. But, tho incapable of stedly union, they had felt severely the inconveniencies of discord, and of that unfailling source of discord, the separate independency of every city. Nothing but the fear of greater, and indeed of the greatest evils, could have produced the submissive attachment of the smaller republics to Athens or Lacedæmon; while even those commanding cities found perpetual uneasiness, from an authority which they could neither quietly hold nor safely abdicate. When the military power of Persia then ceased to be feared; when, on the contrary, the Grecian military were sought by the Persian satraps, and employment in the Persian service became familiar to Grecian troops; when friendly intercourse and the pledge of hospitality became common between Greeks of rank and the Persian great; but especially after the high favor with which Cyrus had distinguished the Greeks, and when the event of his expedition had so clearly shown, that the Persian king was to be feared only on account of his wealth, which inabled Greeks to subdue Greeks, but no longer inabled Persia, without Grecian assistance, to be formidable to Greece, the Persian king might be considered as no unnatural mediator in the destructive quarrels of the Greeks among themselves. Accustomed to the authority of men nearer their own level, officers of the Lacedæmonian or Athenian governments, they little felt the indignity of submission to the mandate of the great potentate of Asia.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 29.

Thus prepared then, all the belligerent republics, upon being applied to by their respective ministers at the congress, immediately acceded to the terms proposed. Even the Thebans did not, as far as appears, profess to make any difficulty. Their great object was, not the freedom of Greece, but the establishment of their own power over all the Bœotian towns. They required, therefore, that the oath of the Theban ministers should be taken as the complete representatives of Bœotia.



A remarkable controversy ensued. Agesilaus, says the historian his friend, declared he would not accept their oath, unless made in exact conformity to the king's rescript, which required the independency of every Grecian city, little and great. The Theban ministers said 'that no such requisition had been received at Thebes.' "Go then," said Agesilaus, 'and ask. But at the same time tell your employers that, unless they comply, Thebes will be excluded from the benefit of the peace.' The ministers went accordingly: but Agesilaus, in his animosity against the Thebans, would immediately employ coercive measures, and his influence decided the ephors. Orders were issued for the army to assemble, Lacedæmonians and allies, at Tegea; and the king himself, after a propitious border-passing sacrifice, hastened thither. Before he was ready to march, however, the Theban ministers returned, with a declaration of the acquiescence of their commonwealth; and accordingly Thebes was admitted to the general terms of peace, and the Bœotian towns were restored to independency.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 30.

The Corinthians and Argians, after having separately sworn to the peace<sup>31</sup>, were still for preserving the union of the two republics; but this could not be done, so powerful still was the adverse party in Corinth, without keeping a body of Argian troops there. Agesilaus threatened immediate hostility, against both Corinth and Argos, if these were not withdrawn. A reluctant obedience was paid to his requisition thus enforced. Upon the departure of the Argians, all those Corinthians, who, since the Argian connection, had been living in banishment, returned to their country; those who had been most active in promoting that connection, together with the more notorious of those who had been concerned in the massacre which preceded it, aware that Corinth was no longer a place of safety for them, emigrated; and Corinth and Argos became, as formerly, distinct republics. Thus peace was established throughout Greece; armies were dismissed, fleets laid up; and friendly and commercial intercourse became open, among all the republics of the nation; at least as far as the political circum-

s. 31.

<sup>31</sup> This is not directly said, but seems clearly enough implied in the concise expression of Xenophon.

stances of the country would allow, numerous citizens of every republic, being in exile, and faction yet remaining within all.

Agesilaus, it is evident, approved the treaty of Antalcidas; and, in one of the most studied of the political tracts of Isocrates, in which he has most urgently contended for the general freedom of Greece, we find it not only approved, as a proper measure at the time, but recommended as a model for following occasions. 'Nothing,' he says, 'can be juster, nothing more advantageous for Athens<sup>34</sup>.' On another occasion indeed, when stimulation against Lacedæmon was among his objects, he has taken the abandoning of the Asian Greeks, to subjection under Persia, as ground for vehement invective. And indeed throughout Greece, wherever there was a disposition adverse to Lacedæmon, or the purpose of exciting such, this appears to have been a favorite topic for reproach; whence perhaps Xenophon, who, in his general history, has given an account of the peace of Antalcidas as if he concurred in sentiment with his patron Agesilaus about it, in his panegyric of Agésilaus has wholly avoided the subject. That concession was indeed a surrender of the proudest and fairest claim of glory that Lacedæmon perhaps ever acquired. Yet it seems not justly to be imputed as a peculiar crime or dishonor to Antalcidas. A similar, or rather a more disgraceful dereliction of the cause of the Asian Greeks, occurred on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. They had been found under the protection (so half Greece would have termed it, but at worst under the dominion) of a Grecian people; they were left to the mercy of barbarians, in subjection to the Persian empire. But, on the present occasion, the Lacedæmonians had to alledge, that not they, but their enemies, had betrayed the common cause of the nation, by producing the necessity for recalling Agesilaus from his glorious exertions, which had rescued the Asian Greeks from foreign dominion, and given them independency<sup>35</sup>.

A deep

<sup>34</sup> Putarch, in his life of Agesilaus (p. 1111.) says that Antalcidas was the political enemy of Agesilaus; but the contrary appears sufficiently evident from Xenophon, and, were confirmation wanting, we have it from Plutarch himself; for, ac-

ording even to his account, Agesilaus justified the treaty in argument, and supported it by deed. P. 1112. ed. H. Steph. In his life of Artaxerxes he is very futile on the subject of this treaty.

<sup>35</sup> One cannot but smile at the grave assertion,

Isocr. de Pace, p. 172. t. 2. ed. Auger.

Isocr. Panathen, p. 496. t. 2.

A deep policy has, by some writers, without any apparent foundation, been attributed to the Persian court in this transaction. Considering the interest of Lacedæmon as distinct from the common interest of Greece, Antalcidas certainly served his country very ably. Simple and concise as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear directly calculated to promote the interest of Lacedæmon, but (except as far as dominion in Asia may have been an object of ambition) they answered the principal purposes of Lacedæmon completely. To break the growing power of Thebes, by emancipating the Bœotian towns, and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the great objects of the war, and were the immediate effects of the peace; for the more ready and quiet production of which Athens was bribed with permission, contrary to the general spirit of the treaty, to retain the dominion of its three islands. Accordingly it is observed by Xenophon, that the Lacedæmonians established their credit and influence in Greece much more completely, and put their commonwealth altogether in a much more splendid situation, by the peace which had its name from Antalcidas, than by that which had concluded the Peloponnesian war; and it is remarkable that he attributes the advantage to their having presided in the business (modern language will scarcely render his expression more exactly) under a commission from the Persian king<sup>36</sup>. So much, however, if we may trust Plutarch for the anecdote, was Agesilaus persuaded that the interest of Lacedæmon was well considered in the treaty, that, when somebody, reviling the peace of Antalcidas, said that Lacedæmon was gone over to the Persian interest: 'Rather,' he answered, 'Persia to the Lacedæmonian;' and so, in truth, it seems to have been.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 1.  
s. 33.

Plut. Agesil.  
t. 2. p. 1112.

sertion of Diodorus, that the abandoning of the Asian Greeks was what hurt the Athenians and Thebans on this occasion. Diod. l. 14. c. 111. The Asian, like the European, Greeks were divided between the aristocratical party and the democratical. Perhaps both would do as well under Persian

as Lacedæmonian supremacy. The aristocratical would have been sure to suffer under Theban or Athenian.

<sup>36</sup> ——— οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυδέστερον ἐγένοντο ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ἀροφάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως κατεπιμφοδίσσης εἰρήνης, κ. τ. ε.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS till the Depression of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER, and the Elevation of THEBES to Supremacy among the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, by the Battle of LEUCTRA.

## SECTION I.

*Despotism of Lacedæmon : Punishment of Mantinea : Restoration of Phliasian exiles.*

THE real disgrace of the peace of Antalcidas, and apparently too the clamor against it, arose principally from the insuing conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Trouble and misfortune had not yet taught them moderation. No thought was entertained of attaching the Greek nation by a just and generous conduct; by any fair communication of rights and privileges; by any establishment, pervading all the republics, that might insure justice to the subordinate against the imperial state, or to the subjects of each against their respective administrations. A maxim of Agesilaus is mentioned by Xenophon, that Lacedæmon always would be powerful enough if the Greeks were prudent; that is, if they duly regarded their own interest<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps the maxim might be inverted: Greece might have been powerful had Lacedæmon been prudent. But the very first measure of its government, remarkable enough to claim the notice of history, was even impudently arbitrary. Having enforced the acceptance of peace, among all the republics of the nation, according to their own construction of the king of Persia's rescript, they proceeded to take into consideration the state of their confederacy. Some of those called their allies had been held to their engagements by fear only: it was well

Xen. Hæl.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 1.

B. C. 386.  
O. l. 98. 3.

<sup>1</sup> ——— ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τότε, ἔταν οἱ Ἕλληνας συμφρονῶσιν. Xen. Agesil. c. 7. s. 3.

known that their wishes were rather for the success of the enemy. These, after deliberation on the subject, it was resolved to punish, and, by strong measures of coercion, to prevent future defection.

They began then with showing, in the instance of Mantinea, that it might sometimes be safer to be the enemy than the ally of Lacedæmon. It was imputed to the Mantineians, that, during the war, they had sent supplies of corn to the Argians; that, on pretence of a truce, they had sometimes omitted to send their proportion of troops to the army; that their troops, when with the army, served ill: that, in short, it was well known the Mantineians always repined at the success, and rejoiced in the misfortunes of the Lacedæmonian arms. On all these accounts it was required that the Mantineians should themselves destroy the fortifications of their city; and declaration was formally made to them, that nothing less would be accepted, in proof that the various acts of treason, in the war, were not acts of the commonwealth; with admonition added, that, in the current year, the Thirty-years truce, between Mantinea and Lacedæmon, would expire. The value of this admonition we can only gather from what we find scattered, among the early Greek writers, concerning Grecian ideas of natural justice; by which we learn that the condition of the *Ecspondi*, those to whom we are bound by no express compact, if they were the weaker party, was indeed terrible.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 2.

s. 1, 2.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 5.

Ch. 15. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

The Mantineians refusing obedience to the despotic injunction, war was immediately denounced against them. But Agesilaus, tho' unable apparently to prevent the measure, was so little satisfied with it, that, on pretence of his personal obligation to the Mantineians, for services done to the king his father, Archidamus, in the Messnian rebellion, he requested of the general assembly<sup>a</sup> to excuse him from the command. Those services to the king must have been equally services to the commonwealth; but, while the excuse was admitted, the resolution against Mantinea was prosecuted. Agesipolis also was not without cause of forbearance toward Mantinea, for services to his father, Pausanias; who was still living there, and indebted particularly to the

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 3.

<sup>a</sup> Ἐδύθη τῶς ἀρχαῖς.

chiefs of the democratical party, which now governed the city, for his best comforts in banishment. It was probably some confidence in their interest with the reigning kings of Lacedæmon, that imboldened the Mantineians to resist the mandates of those whom Thebes and Argos had not dared to resist. Agesipolis, however, obeyed the decree, which directed him to take the command of the expedition against them.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 2.  
s. 4.

The usual ravage of Grecian armies was spread over the Mantineian territory, without producing the obedience required. Agesipolis therefore proceeded to encompass the town with a contravallation. The work was already far advanced, when he was informed that the town was so provided, through the uncommon abundance of the preceding harvest, that there could be no hope of quickly reducing it by famine. Fearing therefore the various inconveniencies, both to Lacedæmon and the allies, of a protracted blockade, he recurred to a mode of siege, for which the peculiar circumstances of the place offered opportunity. A very plentiful stream, the Ophis, flowed through it. Stopping the current below, he flooded the town; and the foundations, not of the houses only, but of the fortifications also, formed of unburnt bricks, were shortly sapped. Every effort of the Mantineians was inefficacious to check the threatened ruin. They proposed to capitulate, but the offer to demolish their already tottering fortifications was not now accepted. It was required that the city should be abandoned, and that the people should separate to their several boroughs, whence their forefathers had assembled, to make Mantinea the common capital of their little territory. The expected horrors of a storm, or of the lot, so dreadful among the Greeks, of prisoners at discretion, enforced the acceptance of this severe condition.

Xen. ibid.  
& Pausan.  
1. 8. c. 3.

Ch. 4. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 2.  
s. 6.

The chiefs of the democratical party, and especially those whose disposition to the Argian connection was most notorious, dreading the sanguinary animosity of their fellowcitizens of the opposite party, still more than the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, were apprehensive that the sanctity of the capitulation, enforced only by sacrifice and oath, would be but a weak protection for them; and the historian has evidently thought their fear not unfounded. The influence, however,

## SECT. I. PUNISHMENT OF MANTINEIA.

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ever, of the banished king, Pausanias, was so exerted with his son, that the desired tho wretched resource of exile was secured to them. In taking possession of the town, the Lacedæmonian troops lined the street leading to the gate, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out: 'and tho,' says the historian, 'they had spears in their hands and enmity enough in their hearts, yet they were restrained from offering injury, much more easily than the best of the Mantineians:' meaning the nobility, or oligarchal leaders: 'a great instance of subordination,' he continues, 'and which ought not to pass unnoticed.' When Xenophon could speak so, it is evident that the Greeks were as incapable of coalescing in a just and well-regulated free government, as the French at the time of their revolution.

Not the fortifications only, but the houses of Mantineia were then demolished. The removal was at first very grievous to the people, as most were under the necessity of building new habitations. Those, however, who had any landed property, soon became satisfied with the change: finding, as Xenophon observes, convenience in living near their estates, and being delivered, by the establishment of aristocracy, from the vexation of demagogues. The Mantineian commonwealth became thus, under the name of alliance, completely a province to Lacedæmon. The men of property, depending upon Lacedæmonian protection, both for their authority and for the best security to their possessions, were of course attached to the Lacedæmonian cause; while the lower people, the power of intriguing orators to direct their passions in one overbearing current, being checked by their separation, and their minds being in consequence less occupied by politics, obeyed more readily and cheerfully the requisitions of the Lacedæmonian officers, whenever their military service was required.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 2.  
s. 7.

The affairs of Mantineia being so settled, those of Phlius were taken into consideration. A petition had been presented, from the exiles of that little republic, who seem to have had a fair claim to attention and protection from the Lacedæmonian government. A representation was accordingly sent to Phlius, stating, that the exiles were not only friends of Lacedæmon, but guiltless toward their own commonwealth; and it was therefore hoped that coercive measures

s. 8, 9, 10.

would be needless, to procure their restoration. Those who ruled Phlius were strongly disposed to resist; but the numerous friends of the exiles, together with some men (such, says Xenophon, as are found in most cities) ready for any change, deterred them. It was therefore decreed, 'That the exiles should be reâdmitted; that their

B. C. 385. ' property should be restored to them; that those who had bought any  
Ol. 98. 3. ' part of it, from the public, should be reimbursed by the public;  
' that any dispute arising, about anything claimed, should be decided  
' by due course of law.'

## SECTION II.

*Uncommon tranquility in Greece. New political phenomenon in Greece: Inconvenience of the Grecian political system: Growing power of Olynthus: War resolved against Olynthus by the Congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy.*

AFTER the dispersion of the Mantineians, and the composure of the affairs of Phlius, there followed an uncommon suspension of crimes and calamities in Greece; insomuch that, during more than two years, nothing occurred for the historian's notice. This quiet was at length interrupted by the arrival of ministers, at Lacedæmon, from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace; whose business the ephors deemed so important, as to require that a congress of the confederacy should be summoned.

The circumstances were indeed new in Grecian politics. That territory on the Thracian coast, which acquired the name of the Chalcidic, had been settled in very early times, as we have formerly seen, by colonies from Greece; invited perhaps not more by the fertility of the soil and the ease with which they could possess themselves of it, than by the extent of maritime situation, which its three peninsulas afforded.

<sup>3</sup> This is Dodwell's date. But he seems to have crowded too many transactions into the latter part of this year B. C. 382. Apparently the embassy from Thrace must have taken place very early in 382, if not rather before the close of 383.



within a narrow compass, whence they could readily support each other by sea, and were less open to assault from any overbearing power by land.

Of the numerous commercial towns, which arose in this region, each, in the Grecian manner, a separate republic, Olynthus was the most considerable. By what fortunate circumstances led, or by what superior politicians guided, we are uninformed, the Olynthians had adopted the unusual policy of associating the citizens of some small neighboring towns in all their civil and political rights. The advantage of this wise and liberal system being soon experienced by all parties, some of the larger towns were led to the same association. With strength and credit, ambition grew in Olynthus; and it was proposed to draw the Macedonian cities from allegiance to their king Amyntas. In the weakness and instability of the Macedonian government, worn by a long series of civil broils, and now pressed in war by the Illyrians, some of the nearer were quickly gained; example induced others, more distant, to accede; and, when the Aeanthians set out on their mission, Pella, the largest town of Macedonia, had joined the growing commonwealth, and Amyntas was nearly expelled from his kingdom.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 11.  
Diod. l. 14.  
c. 93.

In the whole course of Grecian history, with exception for the apparent good principle of the governments of the heroic ages, nothing in politics had occurred so worthy of imitation throughout Greece, as the Olynthian system. What precisely was the form of the Olynthian government, we have no information. From circumstances however we gather that it was a mixed republic; constituted on a more liberal plan, and better balanced, than any other noticed by antient writers. Throughout the Grecian states, an excessive jealousy, prevailing for centuries, had produced a strange alienation of Greeks from Greeks. In Homer's age, intermarriage was common, from one end of the country to the other. But the narrow distrustful spirit, equally of oligarchy and democracy, which had superseded the tempered monarchies of elder times, had by degrees insulated almost every township; insomuch that each was a distinct little nation, separated from all others by legal interdictions, not common among great nations, even

Xen. Hel.  
ut sup.  
p. 301.

of different race and different language. Intermarriage was forbidden, and none were allowed to possess lands within the territory of another state. Thus, excepting some communion in religious rites, the same formalities of hospitality, which might bind a Greek with a barbarian, almost alone could connect him with Greeks of the next town or village.

But such is the force of habit and prejudice, that, among the Greeks, there was a prevailing partiality for this sullen, unsocial, illiberal, unprofitable independency; originating from the low passions of jealousy and fear, yet rendered in some degree perhaps necessary, by the moral impossibility of uniting, in an unmixed constitution, strength of government with security for freedom. The liberal and beneficial policy of the Olynthians, associating numerous townships into one republic, and allowing intermarriage and intermixed possessions, was mentioned by the Acathians, and considered by the Lacedæmonians, as a portentous innovation\*. Unfortunately the Lacedæmonians, by those very institutions which had made them great, were denied the advantage of the liberal policy of Olynthus. They must give up what had most contributed to make their state the most powerful in Greece, and their name one of the most glorious in the world, or remain for ever distinct from all other people. This, if anything, must be their excuse for the apparent exclusion of every idea of a liberal and extended policy, in their conduct after the peace of Antalcidas. The professed basis of that peace was the independency of every Grecian state; yet the separate treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and every city of its confederacy overthrew that independency; for the antient compact, that the allies should follow in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead, was required of all. The narrow policy of holding the body of the people in subjection, by supporting everywhere a favored party, source of immoderate tyranny and innumerable crimes, was followed with regard to all. Of the larger commonwealths, Thebes, Argos, and Athens, which were not easily to be so held in subjection, suspicion and jealousy were endless and little disguised; and as, with them, in the actual

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 3.  
s. 5.

\* Πράγμα φερόμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.

## SECT. II. GROWING POWER OF OLYNTHUS.

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state of things, no connection truly friendly could exist, so none was thought of.

Under these circumstances, the people of those larger commonwealths considered the restored, and increased, preponderancy of Lacedæmon with dissatisfaction and apprehension, from which, of course, it would be their endeavor to relieve themselves. Accordingly, the new power of the Olynthian commonwealth attracting their attention, as its government was in some degree congenial with theirs, the speculation of their politicians was directed to draw it to their party. With this view the Athenians and Bœotians had sent ministers to Olynthus; and, before the Acanthian ministers left Thrace, a decree of the Olynthian people was already passed for sending ministers to Thebes and Athens.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 12.

Circumstances were thus in train for constituting a confederacy formidable to Lacedæmon. But, prosperity commonly exciting arrogance, the conduct of the Olynthians, in general ably directed, may nevertheless not always have been kept within the bounds of a wise and just moderation: While they were still prosecuting their views in Macedonia, they invited the Apolloniats and Acanthians to join their confederacy; but they added a threat of war, in case of refusal. It is however possible that, while the known inclination of the body of the Apolloniat and Acanthian people to their cause invited to this measure, the hostile disposition of the oligarchal, which was the ruling party, may have provoked to it; so that it may have been neither unjust, unwise, or unnecessary, tho' it was unfortunate. It drove the men in power, in Acanthus and Apollonia, to make that application to Lacedæmon, which has been mentioned; foreseeing that, unless they could obtain support, such as Lacedæmon alone, among the Grecian states likely to befriend them, could give, it would be impossible for them to hold their power. Their ministers were therefore instructed to show, that Lacedæmon was nearly interested in the preservation of the independency of their cities. 'It is a great point with you,' they said to the congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, 'that the Bœotians should not coalesce into one state. It cannot therefore be indifferent to you, that a much more powerful state than Bœotia is forming. Beside a large force of heavy-

Ibid.

heavy-armed<sup>5</sup>; and targeteers yet more numerous, the cavalry of the Olynthians, should we join them, would be more than a thousand. They are masters of Potidæa, which commands Pallênê; so that the whole force of that rich and populous peninsula must shortly fall under their power. The independent Thracians of their neighborhood already court them, and, if completely brought under their authority, will add not a little to their strength. They have then but to stretch their hands, and the goldmines of mount Pangæus will be theirs. The fruitfulness of their territory nourishes a great and increasing population; timber abounds in it; their ports are numerous, and their flourishing commerce already furnishes a considerable revenue; so that nothing is wanting for the creation of a powerful marine. It is with this state then that the Athenians and Thebans are going to form alliance. Nevertheless its strength, great as it already is, may yet easily be broken: because some of the towns, unwilling associates, will readily revolt when they see support ready. But when intermarriages and intermixt possessions, allowed by decrees already passed, shall have confirmed the connection between the various parts, and all have not only learned to confide in their united strength, but experienced its advantages, it may then indeed be difficult to dissolve this formidable coalition.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 13.

The Acanthian minister having thus stated the circumstances, the Lacedæmonians paid the compliment to the deputies of the allies, to desire that they would first give their opinions, what, in the existing emergency, the welfare of Peloponnesus and of the confederacy required.

<sup>5</sup> According to our copies, the text of Xenophon states the Olynthian heavy-armed at eight hundred only; and editors and commentators, as far as I have seen, mention no suspicion of error in transcription. It will however be evident to any who will consider the circumstances, that eight hundred cannot have been the number intended by the author. The manner in which he speaks in general terms of the power of the Olynthians, compared with other Grecian people, particularly the Bœotians, (Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.)

might alone prove so much. But we find (§. 17.) that two thousand Lacedæmonians, with the added people of Potidæa, could wage war against them, according to the historian's expression, only as an inferior force against a superior; and afterward (s. 27 & seq.) that the Olynthians could oppose in the field ten thousand Peloponnesians, with perhaps a larger number of their allies. It appears therefore scarcely to be doubted but that for *δύτακσίαν* should be read *δύτακισχύ-  
ναι*.

A majority,

A majority, instigated by those who sought favor with the Lacedæmonian administration, declared for sending an army into Thrace. Accordingly ten thousand men were voted. It was then proposed and carried, that any state of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, at the rate of an Æginetan triobolus (nearly a groat sterling) daily for every heavy-armed foot-soldier; and four times that sum for every trooper; and that if any state of the confederacy refused or neglected to send troops or money, according to its apportionment, it should be lawful for the Lacedæmonians to levy on it a fine, to the amount of a stater (a pound sterling) daily, for every man deficient. We have seen the use of mercenary troops, or, in the modern phrase, standing armies, gradually gaining among the Greeks. This is the first mention we meet with of a regular composition for personal service; so extensively and so formally allowed. But, whether for raising troops or money, a power of coercion, however in itself necessary, committed to the discretion of the Lacedæmonian government, without controul, shows a strange deficiency in the political connection of the republics, composing the confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided, and strongly marks how much some better order of things, such as the Olynthians seem to have been endeavoring to establish, was wanted throughout Greece.

These matters however being so decided, the Acanthians declared their opinion, that the force proposed would be equal to the object: but, as the assembling of the contingents of the allies, and the levies of mercenaries, required time, it would tend much, they said, to forward the purpose of the confederacy, if a Lacedæmonian general were immediately sent, with such troops as might march with the least delay. The fear of a connection between Athens, Thebes, and Olynthus, seems to have instigated the Lacedæmonian administration, and Eudamidas was ordered immediately to proceed for Thrace, with two thousand Laconians; while his brother, Phœbidas, remained to collect and conduct the troops which were to follow. The arrival of Eudamidas indeed was critical. Tho in the field he could not face the enemy, yet the small force he brought, and the credit of the Lacedæmonian name, enabled him so to support the party adverse to the Olynthian connection; that

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Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 14.

s. 15.

s. 16.

he preserved several towns, upon the point of acceding to the growing republic; and Potidæa, which immediately opened its gates to him, was a very important acquisition.

## SECTION. III.

*Sedition of Thebes: Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian party and subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Ismenias, polemarch of Thebes. Teleutias commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Defeat and death of Teleutias.*

B. C. 382. WHILE Eudamidas, by his successful activity in the duty imposed upon him by his country, began the ruin of a political project which all Greece should have emulated, Phœbidas, with mistaken zeal, quitting the line of his instructions, gave fire to a train of evils, of a length and complication beyond human foresight then to discover or imagine. In his march northward he incamped under the walls of Thebes. The Theban military had been, for some time, advancing toward a perfection that might vie with the Lacedæmonian; but the civil government was still as ill constituted, as most in Greece. Faction was violent; and the parties so nearly balanced, that Ismenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarch, the principal magistracy. Ismenias, vehement in aversion to the Lacedæmonians, avoided communication with Phœbidas. On the contrary Leontiades, whose party, long oppressed, emerging only since the peace, and still hopeless of superiority but through connection with Lacedæmon, was assiduously attentive to him. Some advantage was expected, some influence on the minds of the people, from the neighborhood of the Peloponnesian army: but the party of Ismenias still so swayed the general assembly, that a decree was carried, forbidding any Theban to engage in the expedition against the Olynthians.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 17.

s. 18.

In struggles of faction, among the Grecian republics, the precise line of conduct for virtue to hold, and the precise time at which to stop, were often difficult to determine; because, as we have seen among the French republicans

republicans of the present day, civil justice was little to be hoped for but through the possession of political power; self-defence was seldom complete till the opposing party was prostrate. So unfortunately situated, the Grecian party-leaders may often demand our pity, while they incur our blame. Leontiades was in danger of losing, with his own power, all security of person and property for his adherents; the banishment of many was the least among the evils to be apprehended. Under this pressure, he proposed to Phœbidas to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes. Thus his party might be enabled to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might command what proportion of the Theban forces should march with him into Thrace.

Phœbidas was a man of ardent temper and weak understanding. The acquisition of Thebes appeared an object so much greater than that for which, with such solicitude, the Lacedæmonian administration had intrusted him with so great a command, that he was dazzled by the traitorous proposal; and, for the imagined importance of the end, he overlooked the iniquity of the means. Measures being concerted, he broke up his camp, and began his march northward. It was the season of one of the festivals of Ceres, in which, according to antient custom, the Cadmeia was given up to the women, for the celebration of the ceremony called Thesmophoria, and the council sat in the portico of the agora. In the noontide heat, when, in summer, the streets were most unfrequented, having seen that everything favored his purpose, Leontiades urged his horse's speed to overtake Phœbidas, and conducting him, with a select body, directly into the citadel, put the key into his hands. Going then himself to the council, 'The Lacedæmonians,' he said, 'were in possession of the citadel; but no alarm need be taken, for they disavowed all intention of hostility.' His own office of polemarch, however, authorizing him to apprehend all persons suspected of treason, he commanded the attending guards to take Ismenias into custody.

A sufficient number of counsellors of the party of Leontiades were present, the guard was picked for the purpose, and the surprize was complete. Some of the opposite party, fearing immediate death, in-

stantly quitted the city: some ventured home to prepare for departure. But, when it was known that Ismenias was actually imprisoned in the Cadmeia, four hundred fled for Athens<sup>6</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 23.

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party of Leontiades, a new polemarc was chosen in the room of Ismenias, and then Leontiades hastened to Lacedæmon. He found there the ephors and people indignant at the presumption of Phœbidas, in taking a measure of such importance, beyond the line of his commission: but he found a friend to Phœbidas and to his own cause in Agesilaus, whose magnanimity and probity seem, on this occasion, to have been in some degree overborne by his hatred toward the democratical party in Thebes. ‘If the conduct of your general,’ said the king, ‘has been injurious to the commonwealth, let him be punished; but, if beneficial, it will stand justified by the principles of your constitution, and by all former practice, which warrant, for men in such a command, the exercise of a discretionary power.’

<sup>6</sup> My valuable guide Dodwell, with whom I am always sorry to differ, has been induced to dispute Xenophon’s accuracy in marking the season of this remarkable event. Θέρους δι’ ἄλλοις καὶ μεσημβρίας, ἀλείτη ἢ ἐρημία ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις. This expression, as Dodwell justly observes, marks midsummer; but he continues, the Thesmophoria, mentioned just before, mark midwinter, or, however, a season not earlier than the beginning of November; and Plutarch, in his Life of Pelopidas, bears testimony to the coincidence of the seizure of the Cadmeia with the Thesmophoria. Therefore he concludes, ‘De viarum in meridie solitudinem, propter æstatem, vel interpretatione aliqua leniendus est, Xenophon, vel plane non credendus. Fieri potest ut aliqua aliqua causa viæ fuerint infrequentes, quam ille de θεραῖς intellexerit.’

Many parts of the Hellenics bear marks of hasty writing, of having wanted the finishing hand of the author; but no deficiency appears in the narrative of this transaction, in which the honor of his friend Agesilaus,

and his own quiet and safety, became implicated. Here only he has related it: in his panegyric of that prince, all mention of it has been studiously omitted. For myself therefore I cannot, in compliment to Diodorus and Plutarch, or in respect for the possibly mistaken season of the Thesmophoria, suppose that Xenophon has mistated the season of a transaction in which he was so much interested, and which passed almost under his eye. The sequel of the narrative moreover is perfectly consistent with what he has said about the season, and utterly inconsistent with Dodwell’s supposition. For various important transactions passed, after the seizure of the Cadmeia, before Teleutias marched for Thrace: the historian expressly says that Teleutias did not hurry his march; and yet he arrived time enough to execute many military operations, before, in the historian’s phrase, the summer was over; the summer, according to Dodwell himself, of the same year in which the Cadmeia was seized.

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The way being thus advantageously prepared for him, Leontiades addressed the assembled Lacedæmonian people<sup>7</sup>. He touched upon various circumstances, marking the inveterate enmity which the democratical party in Thebes bore toward Lacedæmon, and concluded with the alliance lately made with the Olynthians, at the moment when it was known the Lacedæmonians were marching against them. He mentioned the solicitude with which the Lacedæmonians had always observed, and endeavored to thwart, the measures of Thebes for holding Bœotia in subjection; 'and in regard to this,' he said, 'your business is now done for you: Thebes need no longer be an object of your jealousy. Give that attention only to our interest, which we shall give to yours, and a small scytalè will suffice to insure obedience to all your commands.'

Xen. Hel.  
I. 5. c. 2.  
s. 24.

This allurement was too powerful for Lacedæmonian virtue. It was decreed, that the Theban citadel should continue to be held by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and that, not Phœbidas, but Ismenias should be brought to trial. Three judges appointed by Lacedæmon, and one by every other city of the confederacy, formed the partial tribunal. Ismenias was accused of 'seeking forein connections; pledging himself, with views injurious to Greece, in hospitality to the Persian king; being a principal author of the late troubles in Greece;' and to these general charges was added one of a specific nature, 'that he had partaken of the money sent by the Persian king.' He refuted all; but being nevertheless unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and pernicious designs, he was condemned and executed<sup>8</sup>.

s. 25.

That

<sup>7</sup> Τῶν ἐγκλήτων. Consilii publici cœtum. Probably it should be, as we find it in other places, ἐκλήτων, those who formed the ἐκκλησία.

<sup>8</sup> Ὁ δὲ ἀπελογίῃτο μὲν πρὸς πάντας ὃν μέλοι εὐρεῖσθε γὰρ τὸ μὴ οὐ μεγαλοπράγμων τε καὶ κακοπράγμων εἶναι. Purgabat ille quidem se de his omnibus, verum persuadere non poterat ut non res arduas et perniciosas tentasse existimaretur. The Latin *purgabat* is perhaps stronger than the phrase in the original,

standing singly, would justify; but the context seems to warrant it.

Plutarch says (vit. Pelopid.) that, not contented with this formal murder of Ismenias, the Lacedæmonians ridded themselves of another chief of the same party by assassination. Plutarch is seldom anxious for consistency, and it seems not likely that the same administration should, at the same time, have proceeded against one chief with so much formality, and against

That Xenophon, as an honest man, altogether disapproved these proceedings is evident. In his panegyric of Agesilaus, he has avoided all mention of them. In his Grecian Annals, while he has clearly felt for the honor of his friend and patron, the impartiality of his concise narrative is highly creditable to himself. Yet if we compare this revolution with others, innumerable among the Grecian republics, we shall find in it the merit at least of being remarkably bloodless. Its disgrace was, that it gave Lacedæmon influence, amounting to dominion, over Thebes, tho' scarcely dominion so absolute as the Theban people had before exercised over the other Bœotians, or as France, early in its revolutionary course, exercised over the Dutch; who, with a French general commanding a French army in Amsterdam, amuse themselves with the names of republic and liberty. Even in the trial of Ismenias there seems to have been more attention to preserve the appearance of a regard for justice, and a respect for the Grecian people, than was always observed upon similar occasions. It is our familiarity with the peculiar advantages of the law and the practice of our own country, that makes deficiencies, elsewhere ordinary, appear to us strange irregularities. If we compare the law of treason in England, when most severe, or the whole of the law for the security of person and property, when, under the Plantagenet reigns, our constitution was least defined, with what we learn of the same law in those called the best times of Greece, the difference will appear truly prodigious. It will seem as if, like philosophy and the fine arts in one country, equal law and wholesome polity were of indigenous growth in the other, healthy and vigorous without cultivation, and flourishing among all sorts of weeds, in spite of tempests and adverse seasons.

Thebes then being reduced to a state of complete dependency, nothing seemed wanting to the lasting firmness of the Lacedæmonian supremacy over Greece, but to crush the growing commonwealth of Olynthus; and to this point, now with increased earnestness, the admini-

the other with so little, when apparently contradicts the fact, and Grecian history is they might equally have chosen their method but too full of crimes related on less ques- against either. But Xenophon's account, tionable authority. which appears candid throughout, virtually

stration.

stration directed its attention. It might possibly be in contemplation next, to resume the prosecution of that plan of conquest in Asia, which had been interrupted principally by the measures of the party in Thebes, of which Ismenias had been chief. Xenophon has not expressly said that the conduct of Agesilaus was influenced by such a view: but he mentions, as to his honor, that his enmity to Persia was maintained through life, and that he refused with disdain the philanthropic connection of hospitality, offered him, apparently through a proxy, by the Persian king. What were the measures which he directed, what those to which he simply consented, and what, if any, those which he could not prevent, we are not precisely informed; but the tenor of Xenophon's narrative, as well as a variety of the circumstances reported, mark that he had large influence at this time in the Lacedæmonian councils. His brother Teleutias, was appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace. The slowness and negligence of the allies in obeying the requisition for troops for the Thracian war, tho inforced by a vote of the congress of the confederacy, may have given the Lacedæmonians to apprehend the decay of their authority, and thus may have contributed to instigate the unjust measures taken in the Theban business. Several cities had not yet sent the full number assessed upon them. The popular name of Teleutias assisted the exertions of the ephors; whose scytables were sent around; and the new Theban administration, zealous in showing their respect to the brother of Agesilaus, were diligent in preparing their apportionment, horse and foot.

The precaution of Teleutias indicates the strength of the Olynthian commonwealth. Tho the season was far advanced, he would not hasten his march; less anxious to arrive early than with an army the most powerful that could be collected. Meanwhile he sent to Amyntas king of Macedonia, and Derdas prince of Elymia; urging the former, if he would recover his kingdom, to raise mercenary troops and subsidize neighboring princes; and admonishing the latter, that the same growing power, which had nearly overwhelmed the greater Macedonian realm, would not long leave the smaller in peace and independency, if measures were not taken to check its ambition. His care and diligence thus seconding his

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 27.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 7. s. 7.  
c. 8. s. 3.

s. 28.  
B. C. 382.  
Ol. 99. 3.  
Autumn.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 29.

his influence, he assembled in Potidæa a very powerful army, which he led directly to Olynthus.

s. 30.

Without conquest, without a battle noticed in history; the Olynthians, by the wisdom and liberality of their policy, had formed a commonwealth so powerful, that they did not fear to meet in the field the greatest army ever sent by the Peloponnesian confederacy so far from their peninsula, reinforced by troops, still much more numerous, of the most warlike nations of the continent north of Greece. The only cavalry, which Teleutias appears to have led from the southern provinces, were Laconian and Bœotian. In his order of battle he placed these, together with some received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of superior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias seems to have proposed a compliment to that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himself the immediate command.

s. 31.

A battle quickly ensued; and the cavalry of the right wing being first charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was presently dismounted and severely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confusion spread among the nearest infantry, and there was imminent danger that a complete defeat would have followed, when Derdas, arriving with his cavalry, encouraged the dismayed phalanx to stand. Teleutias at the same time making a movement with the Peloponnesian infantry to support him, the Olynthians, in danger of being surrounded, retired in haste, and suffered in their retreat. Their infantry then also withdrew within their walls. Teleutias erected his trophy, for a victory just sufficing to deter the enemy from molesting his retreat from their territory, which he wasted as he went. The advanced season forbade any farther enterprize; and it was necessary to find quarters for the Peloponnesian army in the friendly towns, while the Macedonian, and other troops of the country, were dismissed to their several homes.

s. 32.

s. 33.

B. C. 381.  
Ol. 99. 3.

During the winter the Olynthians made frequent, and often successful incursions upon the lands of the towns in alliance with Lacedæmon. In the beginning of spring, a body of their cavalry, after

plunder

plunder of the territory, approaching with improvident carelessness, the town of Apollonia, received a severe check from the activity and bravery of Derdas, who, unknown to them, had arrived there, that very day, with his Macedonian horse. Thenceforward they confined themselves more within their walls, and ventured upon the cultivation but of a very small part of their lands. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 3. s. 1, 2.

According to the usual mode of war among the Greeks, Teleutias waited for the season when ravage, being most injurious, would be most likely to provoke the enemy to a general engagement, or would best forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While, with these views, he lay incamped near the walls of Olynthus, he observed a body of cavalry, from the town, crossing the river which ran by it, and very leisurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldness, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horse, turning, very quietly repassed the river: the targeteers followed confidently, as if pursuing a broken enemy. The horse, when so many only had crossed the river as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding. s. 3. s. 4.

Teleutias, with manners so popular, and generally so amiable, was nevertheless of a temper too hasty to preserve, on all occasions, the cool recollection so important in military command. Irritated by what he saw, he seized his spear, put himself at the head of his heavy-armed, and, with some passion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to pursue the enemy without remission. The incautious order was zealously obeyed. The Olynthians retiring within their walls, the Peloponnesians did not stop, till, from the towers, they received a shower of missile weapons. In the necessity of warding-off these with their shields, as they hastily retreated, confusion arose. The able leaders of the Olynthians used the critical moment. Their horse again rushed out of the gates; the targeteers and then the heavy-armed followed. The impression was such, that the Peloponnesian phalanx was already in disorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himself was killed; those about him then gave way, and presently the whole army fled. Pursued, as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, s. 5 & 7. s. 5. s. 6.

Apollonia, a large proportion, and almost the whole effective force of so great an army, was destroyed<sup>3</sup>.

## SECTION IV.

*Agesipolis commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon: Agesilaus commander against Phlius: Delphion demagogue of Phlius: Surrender of Phlius. Death of Agesipolis: Polybiades commander-in-chief against Olynthus: Reduction of Olynthus.*

It now seemed as if the political phenomenon, arising on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia, might, by the terror of arms, have spread political wisdom over the southern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmonian government in the least yielded under the severe blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the consequence of its unfitness to coalesce with other states might have been a rapid downfall, and perhaps complete ruin. But the necessity for exertion was seen by the administration, and able men were not wanting to direct it. The commander-in-chief was committed to the king, Agesipolis; a youth, of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Agesilaus in Asia. The character of Agesipolis being popular, many volunteers offered. We gather from Xenophon, that, in this age, the few remaining families, distinguished by the name of Spartans, went on foreign service only in the rank of officers. The volunteers, he mentions to have been of three descriptions; the Laconian towns furnished some, and they were of the best families of those towns; some were bastards of Spartan families, educated in the best discipline of the city, and these were remarked for their fine figures: the rest were strangers, or men not acknowledged among either Spartans or Laconians, yet distinguished by a name which seems to imply that they were maintained by the

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 8.

s. 9.

<sup>3</sup> — ὅτι περὶ ὄφελος ἦν τοῦ τοιάντου στρατεύματος.

public<sup>10</sup>. Volunteers from the allies moreover were numerous, and the Thessalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief also, warranting the earnestness of the Lacedæmonian government in the cause, inspirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furnished by the cities of the confederacy, to supply the loss in the battle of Olynthus; but it is implied that most, if not all of them, paid compositions in money; and that the new levies were intirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Agesipolis for the largeness and readiness of its contribution.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 10.

The apparent zeal however of those who ruled Phlius was found to have a sinister motive. They proposed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at gross injustice toward their fellowcitizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who red and speculated when Trajan ruled half a hemisphere, do not paint the internal state of divided and independent Greece, like a few small touches, from the life, by the cotemporary historians. With the view therefore to acquire a just ideâ of it, the affairs of Phlius will deserve that we should interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

The tyranny of that superintending power, which the Greeks had imagined the best resource for holding together a confederacy of republics, too small to subsist each by its own strength, we have seen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an instance, not less remarkable, of oppression from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the superintending power. The Phliasian exiles, restored, as we have seen, at the requisition of Lacedæmon, and intitled, by a decree of their own general assembly, to recover all their property, in vain sought justice from Phliasian tribunals; for the Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons holding that property, or connected with those who held it. Among the Grecian republics it

Sec. 1. of this  
Chap.

<sup>10</sup> Τῶν περιόικων καλοὶ ἀργαῖοι, καὶ ξένοι τῶν τροφίμων καλουμένοι, καὶ νόθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐμεδέεις τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

In the scantiness of our information con-

cerning the political economy of Lacedæmon, we must glean as we can. I am unable to give any better explanation of this remarkable passage than that ventured in the text.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 11.

B. C. 381.  
Ol. 99. 4.  
Autumn.

was not unusual to refer a case of such a kind to the tribunal of some neighboring republic; but the Phliasian government would listen to no proposal for an impartial decision. This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured persons to seek redress from Lacedæmon. But there were circumstances which encouraged those who ruled in Phlius to disregard this. It was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at once absent from Sparta. Agesipolis was now far advanced on his march toward Thrace; and, in the confidence that Agesilaus would not move, and of course no vigorous measures would be taken, the Phliasian chiefs resolved that, to those from whom they differed in party, it was unnecessary to be just. Instead therefore of being disposed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, imposing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliasian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 13.

We should admire the spirit of this decree, if it was not so immediately connected with gross injustice: we should approve its wisdom, had it been founded upon any practicable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the result only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not instantly interfere with vigor, was ill-conceived. The ephors resolved, that the injurious insolence of the Phliasians should be restrained by arms; and Agesilaus undertook the command. Among those who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redress, were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hospitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father, and that of Procles, who had the same connection with Agesilaus himself.

s. 14.

B. C. 381.  
Ol. 99. 4.  
Autumn.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 15.

No delay was made: the border-passing sacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious; Agesilaus was ready to enter Phlipsis, when an embassy met him, deprecating hostilities, and offering money. He answered 'that he was not coming to injure any, but only to relieve the injured.' 'They professed themselves ready to do whatever could be required.' 'Professions,' he told them, 'could find no credit, when deceit had already been practised.' Upon being asked then what pledge he required, he answered, 'the same with which Lacedæmon had formerly

' been.



‘ been trusted, without injury to Phlius: they must give him possession of their citadel.’ This being refused, he prosecuted his march, and without delay surrounded Phlius with a contravallation.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 3.  
s. 16.

All the Lacedæmonians, however, were not satisfied with these measures. It was observed by many, even in the army, that, however those who ruled Phlius might be tyrannical sovereigns, they had been valuable allies; and, whatever might be the plea of generosity or justice, it was no good policy, for the sake of comparatively a few families, to make Lacedæmon eternally odious to a city, which had five thousand men, able, and, till now, ready, to bear arms in its service. Agesilaus skilfully obviated this growing discontent. The Phliasian refugees were not without friends in the city. Such encouragement was held out for desertion, that, in a short time, those serving in the besieging army were more than a thousand, distinguished, among the troops, for being well-armed, able-bodied, exact in subordination, and zealous in service; insomuch that the late murmurs were changed for the observation, that these were such allies as Lacedæmon wanted.

s. 17.

But, in Phlius, a system of order, economy, and forbearance, usual where due military subordination is established, but contrary to all common experience among the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, disappointed the expectation of the besiegers. The blockade had already exceeded the time calculated for the consumption of the provisions in the place. But one of those extraordinary characters, of which Greece was fruitful, and which its political circumstances were peculiarly adapted to bring forward, had at this time the lead among the Phliasiens. In the instance of Delphion, says Xenophon, was seen the ascendant which daring courage may obtain over the minds of the multitude. He was a man of high rank in his city, but his dependence was upon about three hundred followers. With these at his devotion, he so awed the whole people, that a clear majority in the general assembly, desirous of capitulating, dared not come to a vote upon it. Under a government called a democracy, he imprisoned at his pleasure, on suspicion, or pretended suspicion, of disaffection to the popular cause. His despotism, however, was not wanton or useless. He alone could

s. 21.

s. 22.

could enforce a strict military discipline; and, by an unwearied personal activity, he did enforce it. Constantly attending himself, he compelled the citizens to regular attendance in their turn for guard; never failing to go the rounds, he insured watchfulness and fidelity on guard. Nor was he thus daring only toward the multitude, his sovereign; he showed himself worthy of command, by daring against the enemy. In many sallies, at the head of his three hundred, he was successful against the posts of the besiegers. When, notwithstanding the short allowance, which had been established by a vote of the general assembly, famine began to press, his warrant sufficed for searching every house for corn. All resources at length failing, he gave the word, and a herald was sent to Agesilaus, requesting a truce, that ministers might carry to Lacedæmon a decree of the Phliasian people, for surrendering the city to the pleasure of the Lacedæmonian government<sup>11</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 23.

s. 24.

Agesilaus seems to have felt that, by this message, it was intended to put a slight upon him. He nevertheless immediately granted the truce, and his influence at Lacedæmon sufficed to procure, that the Phliasian ministers should be sent back to treat with him, as plenipotentiary for the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. It does not appear that Delphion was a man of great views, or that, from the first, he had any well-founded hope of final success. He seems rather to have been a man fond of action and enterprize, with daring courage and moderate abilities; ready in emergencies, but incapable of extensive conceptions; fitter to command Phlius, and Phlius besieged, than to direct the affairs of a great nation, or of any but in time of turbulence. For daring enterprize, upon a narrow scale, his talents were extraordinary. After the granting of the truce, the Lacedæmonians strengthened their guards, and kept a stricter watch to prevent egress from the town. Nevertheless, attended by one faithful slave, who had given frequent proof of his courage and address in pilfering the besiegers' arms<sup>12</sup>, Delphion escaped by night.

<sup>11</sup> Τοῖς τέλει τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

<sup>12</sup> Στιγματίας τις ὃς πολλὰ ἐφέλιπε ὄπλα τῶν πολιοκένων. The fact, if related by an author, not a military man, might be doubted: from

Xenophon it cannot. The explanation I leave to military men, who have given their attention to the ancient art and practice of war.

The

#### SECT. IV. SURRENDER OF PHLIUS. DEATH OF AGESIPOLIS.

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The conditions which Agesilaus required may seem, in modern times, not mild; but, due regard being had to the manners and circumstances of his age, and to the responsible situation in which he stood, they will be found strongly marked with that spirit of liberality which was generally conspicuous in him. If precedents had been desired, they might have been found, for sending commissioners from Lacedæmon, to decide arbitrarily between the two parties of the Phliasian people; to banish, and even condemn to death at discretion. Agesilaus committed the business to a tribunal composed of a hundred Phliansians; fifty only of those who had been driven into exile, and an equal number friendly to the opposite party, or so far esteemed so that they had remained in the city. After deciding who should suffer death as authors of the late civil war, and who should live to compose the future Phliasian commonwealth, they were to model at their discretion the constitution and the laws, by which that commonwealth should be governed. Upon these conditions, in the twentieth month of the blockade, the town was surrendered; and, to enforce order till the new constitution should be settled, a Lacedæmonian garrison was placed in it.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 25.

While Agesilaus was employed in this petty kind of domestic war, within Peloponnesus, Agesipolis had begun to show the vigor and ability expected of him in his foreign command. He wasted the Olynthian territory, he took Toronë by storm; but, in the middle of the summer heats, he was seized with an inflammatory fever, which presently threatened to be fatal. The science of medicine, notwithstanding the deserved fame of Hippocrates, appears not yet to have been generally diffused among the Grecian republics. A little before his illness, Agesipolis had visited the temple of Bacchus, at Aphyteus, famous for the beauty and coolness of its shady bowers and limpid waters. A strong desire seized him to revisit them, in the imagination that they would afford a relief which his medical attendants could not give. He was accordingly conveyed to Aphyteus, but died soon after, without the temple; the superstition, which taught the Greeks to fear the anger of the deity, for permitting the pollution of death within the hallowed building, apparently denying to the suffering prince the repose and shelter

s. 18—20.

shelter which he so much wanted. Neither attention nor expence, however, was spared, after his decease, to honor his memory, and show respect to his rank. His body, according to the Spartan ceremonial, was preserved in honey, and in that state carried the long and difficult journey to Lacedæmon, there to have the funeral rites performed, which custom had established for the burial of the kings.

Agesipolis seems to have been a real loss to his country. Tho' aiming, and with fair prospect of success, to rival Agesilaus in military fame, no jealousy subsisted between them. He treated his elder colleague, on all occasions, with the respect due to superior age and high character. He received in return unfeigned friendship from Agesilaus; whose liberal mind considered him less as a rival, than, in public affairs, a valuable assistant, and in private a desirable companion.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 26.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 23.

The successor of Agesipolis in the Thracian command, Polybiades, was but too successful in restraining the liberal and beneficent policy of Olynthus within the narrow limits of a single city. In undertaking to withstand the power of Lacedæmon, the Olynthians had depended upon the support of Athens and Bœotia. But the unexpected revolution in Thebes had given the force of Bœotia to their enemies, and deterred the interference of Athens. Possibly, after their great success against Teleutias, their affairs may have been conducted with less prudence than when they were but rising to power. They may have lost some of their ablest leaders; or prosperity, inflating the popular mind, may have given advantage to turbulent demagogues; and interested intrigue or popular caprice may have overborne wise counsel. Xenophon has left us no particulars; he has not even named one of their leading men. We hear of no battle fought, no town taken; Polybiades was master of the country; the Olynthians could receive no relief by sea; famine pressed, and they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon to sue for peace. It was granted upon the usual terms of subordinate alliance; that the friends and enemies of Lacedæmon should be respectively such to Olynthus, and that the Olynthians should serve in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead.

B.C. 379.  
Ol. 100.1.  
Spring.

## SECTION V.

*Apparent confirmation and real instability of the Lacedæmonian supremacy in Greece. Conspiracy and revolution in Thebes.*

THUS Lacedæmon acquired the glory of crushing finally the wisest and noblest project for a republican government, upon a broad foundation, perhaps ever attempted in Greece. Such at least the Olynthian union appears, in the slight sketch, a meer shadow, without a decided outline, which remains to us from Xenophon. Possibly it may have had great defects with which we are not made acquainted; and indeed if a government had ever been seen in Greece, with all the merit which his account, not intended for panegyric, indicates, unbalanced by very gross defects, we should still more wonder at, and still less excuse, the excessive deficiency of the political ideas, transmitted to posterity, in the writings of such men as Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. It is indeed remarkable, that the celebrated panegyric oration of Isocrates, in which, while his great object was to persuade the Greeks to peace among themselves, he could propose no means but union in war against Persia, then at peace with them, was spoken or published while the Lacedæmonian arms were employed in the destruction of the Olynthian constitution. Could Lacedæmon have adopted a policy so liberal as, in its general outline, the Olynthian appears to have been, could she have united herself with such a republic, and used her extensive influence to promote the scheme, a state might have been formed, of a firmness to resist all external violence, and capable of dissolution only from that internal corruption, to which the Author of nature has willed that everything human shall be liable. But, as we have already observed, those very institutions, by which Lacedæmon had now flourished for centuries, and for the smallness of her means, was become wonderfully great, those very institutions made it impossible for her to become so great. To coalesce was beyond her nature: her great lawgiver's system, admirable for its purpose, had no such purpose.

Isocr. paneg-  
p. 250. t. 2.

purpose in view: she could be great, and even safe, only by keeping those around her divided. This was now done. The reviving empire of Athens was broken: Bœotia was split into many states; Corinth and Argos were separated; the Olynthian union was dissolved; the renovation of existence, given to the obscure kingdom of Macedonia, harmonized with the plan of division; those of the allies, who had dared to show an adverse disposition, had been punished; and thus, as the cotemporary historian has observed, the authority of Lacedæmon, over Greece, seemed more firmly established than at any former period.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 27.

But the Lacedæmonian authority, over Greece, was not of a nature to be permanent: too weak for command; too proud for influence. We have seen, in the authentic testimony of Xenophon to what the Cyreian army experienced, the haughty despotism of the Lacedæmonian commanders, at a distance from home. Tho we find such conduct sometimes severely punished, proof that the Lacedæmonian administration was aware of evils likely to arise from it, yet that the restraint was very uncertain, is sufficiently evident. Within Greece the administration was better able to check the indiscreet or interested tyranny of its officers. But it could not equally restrain the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party in the dependent republics, by whom those republics were held in submission to Lacedæmon. To men so necessary, great indulgence would be indispensable: to support them, without inquiry, or even notoriously against right, might appear sometimes of political necessity. Hence discontent, vehement discontent, was ceaseless, sedition ever working, and revolt ready.

c. 4. s. 1.

Evident however as it is that the foundation of the Lacedæmonian power was slippery in extreme, still, when we consider the value of the advantage it possessed in the abilities and virtues of Agesilaus, we cannot behold, without astonishment, the minuteness of the force, and the trivial character of the circumstances, which began its overthrow, in the very moment when it appeared most established. Xenophon ascribes all to the just vengeance of the deity; honestly declaring the infamy of the conduct of Lacedæmon, tho his friend and patron was implicated, in holding the citadel of Thebes by violence, directly against the most solemn oaths, under the sanction of which, among  
the

the articles of confederation, the independency of every Grecian city was warranted. The new government of Thebes was necessarily odious to the great body of the Theban people, and indeed to every honest Theban citizen. But fear, which restrained action, taught also to conceal sentiments; and thus a government of violence, whether the form of the tyranny be monarchal, oligarchal, or democratical, is always risking to defeat its own purposes.

Among the revolutions of the Theban commonwealth, that part of the constitution seems to have remained unaltered, by which the principal executive power, civil and military together, that power which had formerly been held by hereditary princes, was committed to annual magistrates, intitled polemarchs, chief-warriors. Archias and Philippus held the high office, when Phyllidas, their secretary and confidential minister, was called on some business to Athens. Phyllidas there found a Theban of rank, named Mellon, with whom he had formerly been intimate, living in exile, to which the revolution had driven him. Their past opposition in politics did not prevent Mellon and Phyllidas from communicating again as private friends; and, Mellon's curiosity leading him to inquire about men and things in Thebes, to his surprize he found the secretary highly dissatisfied with the existing government there. More explanation thence taking place, the result was a plot for overthrowing the existing government, and restoring democracy. Phyllidas returning to Thebes, and measures being prepared, Mellon, with only six associates, passed by night from Attica into the Theban territory. Lying concealed during the following day, they approached the city as evening closed, and entered with the last of that crowd of husbandmen, returning from their daily toil, who, in a country politically constituted like the greater part of Greece, dared not inhabit detached cottages or open villages. Proceeding unmolested, they were received in the house of Charon, a party to the plot, where they staid the night, and the following day.

Just preceding the expiration of the annual magistracies was the season, according to antient custom, of a festival of Venus at Thebes. The polemarchs, Archias and Philippus, were men of pleasure. Their secretary, Phyllidas, possibly a warm patriot, was certainly not a man

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 2.

s. 3.  
B. C. 379.  
Ol. 100. 2.  
Nov. or  
Dec.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 4.  
Plut. v.  
Pelopid.

of nice honor or strict honesty. According to report, which Xenophon thought worthy of notice, he was trusted by the polemarchs as a confidential minister to their private pleasures; and he had undertaken, favored by the licence of the festival, to bring the most beautiful women of the best families of Thebes to their revel. Through his privilege of unlimited access, when the polemarchs and their company were far gone in intoxication, he introduced the conspirators, three habited as ladies, the others as their female attendants. The dismissal of male attendants was procured, on pretence of delicacy toward the ladies. As far, at least, as this story tends to reveal the manners of the age, we may give it credit, as it is told by Xenophon; tho, he says, according to some the conspirators were introduced as ordinary visitors<sup>13</sup>. What we learn with certainty is, that the polemarchs were on that night assassinated.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 5, 6.

s. 7.

This important beginning being successfully made, Leontiades, author of the late revolution, was the next object of the conspirators. Phyllidas, in whom Leontiades, as well as the polemarchs, fully confided, conducted them to his house. Pretence of business from the polemarchs gained him immediate admission to an inner apartment, whither Leontiades had retired from supper, and where his wife was sitting by him, busied in those works of the distaff or needle, in which the Grecian ladies principally employed themselves. Leontiades was killed upon the spot, and silence was imposed upon the lady, with the threat of death to every person in the house, unless, as soon as the assassins went out, the doors were locked, and afterward kept close.

s. 8.

The leaders of their opponents being thus dispatched, the conspirators proceeded to the state-prison, where some of their friends were

<sup>13</sup> Concerning a matter in which private history was so much involved with public, and party interest with both, various stories, some true, some false, and some partly true partly false, were likely to be circulated. Xenophon, who lived at the time, yet long outlived the time, and was in a situation to be better informed than almost any

other could be, has related some things with confidence; others as less certain. Plutarch, who wrote some centuries after, has differed from Xenophon in regard to some particulars, added to him many, declared no authority, except Xenophon's, and expressed no doubt. His purpose was to tell a good story, of which Pelopidas was to be the hero.

confined.



confined. Phyllidas, pretending an order from the polemarchs, obtained admission there also. The keeper was instantly put to death; and the prisoners, being released, were directed where to find arms, and whither to repair with them.

The conspirators so confided in the general hatred of the existing government, that, without farther preparation, they caused summons to be proclaimed, for all the citizens, equally the knights, and those inrolled in the heavy-armed, to assemble in arms; adding the information, 'that the tyrants were no more!' Diffidence however kept all within during night. Meanwhile messengers were dispatched to the refugees on the Attic borders, and to Athens itself; for it was known that two of the annual generals of Athens were warm in the cause. When day broke, what had passed becoming notorious, the citizens, horse and foot, assembled in arms, and arranged themselves with the conspirators.

The first alarm, which reached the Lacedæmonian governor in the citadel, was from the nightly proclamation. Immediately he sent to Plataea and Thespiæ for reinforcement to his scanty garrison. A detachment marched from Plataea; but the Theban horse met and routed it. As the victorious cavalry reëntered the city, the refugees from the borders, and a body of Athenian auxiliaries, arrived. With this addition of strength, it was resolved, without delay, to assail the citadel. The Lacedæmonians saw the preparation, and heard large reward proclaimed for who should first mount. Thinking then their numbers unequal to resist all Thebes, apparently united and zealous, they proposed to surrender the fortress, upon condition that they might depart in safety, with their arms. To this the Thebans gladly consented, and the capitulation was ratified with libations and oaths. Their march out of the place was watched, with a jealousy justified by preceding circumstances. But when there were seen among them some of those Thebans who had been active in the late government, then the virulence of the Greek sedition broke forth: the victims were dragged from their protection, and none so taken escaped death<sup>14</sup>.

But

<sup>14</sup> Ἐξήκοντων μίλοι, ἑσούς ἐπίγειον τῶν ἰχθύων ὅλης συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπίκτιναν. Xenophon has

But the state of Greece, a kind of hotbed of crimes, gave occasion also for the exercise of virtues. The Athenian auxiliaries, who looked upon the Thebans of the Lacedæmonian interest, not with the rancorous hatred of party opponents, but with the more liberal enmity of foreign foes, exerted themselves generously for them; and by favoring their concealment, saved many. They could not however save some more helpless and innocent objects of the horrid revenge or base fear of the Thebans: the children of those who had been executed were put to death.

Among the revolutions, of which Greece was so fruitful, for justice of cause, boldness of undertaking, ability of plot and arrangement, and daring vigor in execution, the delivery of Thebes has been justly celebrated. Perhaps moderation in assassination should be added to its eulogy; for the execution of those who were at merey, and the murder of the children, who could have deserved no ill, did not take place till the revolution was completed; and, we may hope, should be ascribed, not to deliberate design in the leaders, but to the wild fury of popular passion, which they could not restrain. The better-taught judgement, however, of modern times will not, with the philosophic Plutarch, give its unmixed applause to the means employed, and extol the revolution of Thebes as a model, to be justly compared with that effected at Athens, by Thrasybulus, through open

not specified them by any name but that of enemies; but what he mentions afterward of the treatment of their families, were it otherwise dubious, would ascertain that the executed were Thebans, and not Lacedæmonians.

It has been owing apparently to the general irregularity and uncertainty of Grecian criminal law, that the Greek language, so superior to all others in accuracy for most purposes, is so inferior to our own, in words for distinguishing the various degrees of criminality, which may attend the act of putting a man to death. Hence we have sometimes difficulty to gather, from the expressions of historians, what degree of

turpitude we should impute to the actions which they relate. *Ἀποκτείνω*, the common word for *to kill*, is equally used to express the foulest murder, or putting to death after just trial, in the most legal manner, by the hands of the public executioner (as in this chapter of Xenophon, s. 13.) The additions *δικαίως*, *ἀδίκως*, *βίαιως*, *ἀκρίτως*, *ἐκ προνοίας*, and perhaps others, are sometimes used to mark a distinction, but often omitted. Xenophon's expression on this occasion, *συλλαμβάνοντες ἀπίκτεναν*, rather, I think, implies that some legal forms were observed; and yet we have difficulty to reconcile this with the treatment of the children of the sufferers.

war, unsullied by assassination and perfidy<sup>15</sup>. Xenophon, in his Agesilaus, has not ill defined that deception which may be allowable in politics and war. Agesilaus, he says, held, that 'to deceive those who mistrust us is wise; those who trust us, wicked'<sup>16</sup>.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 11. s. 4.

<sup>15</sup> He calls the two revolutions of Athens and Thebes, *μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα τῶν πράξεων*. Plut. Pelop. p. 513, 514.

<sup>16</sup> The necessity has frequently occurred, by no means a pleasant necessity, to speak slightly of Plutarch's authority. If any reader, swayed by the merit, altogether, of Plutarch's works, or by the respect in which he has been extensively held, may think I have been extreme in depreciating his judgement or his accuracy as an historian, I should wish that his account of the Theban revolution might be compared with Xenophon's. The life of Pelopidas, as his fellowcountryman, was a favorite subject with Plutarch, and the exploit, by which Thebes was delivered from the Lacedæmonian dominion, a very favorite part of it. On this favorite subject, an ill-judging zeal, the zeal of a closet-philosopher, unversed in active life, to make his hero keep the stage with effect, has led him, I must own it appears to me, into strange puerilities. He exhibits Pelopidas babbling publicly, when evidently the most cautious secrecy was requisite. He describes him engaged in furious combat; under circumstances tending strongly to confirm Xenophon's account, according to which the business was so much better managed, that nothing more was necessary than to poniard an unarmed man, surprized in the security of domestic privacy. He attributes then to the sage Epameinondas an indiscretion truly wonderful. While, according to his account, the eloquence of Pelopidas incited the exiles, Epameinondas, by an ingenious device, prepared the minds of the citizens, at home, to join in the proposed scheme of revolution. In the places of public exercise, he incouraged the Theban youth to venture upon wrestling and boxing

with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison. To their surprize, they found themselves far superior to their antagonists: they were of course elated with unexpected success; and thence Epameinondas took occasion to reproach them with the baseness of their submission to a people so inferior. It might be supposed, from this story, that Epameinondas meant to admonish the Lacedæmonians to strengthen their garrison, and keep stricter watch.

It is among the real merits of Plutarch, which I have before taken occasion to observe, that he not unfrequently names his authors. Now it is remarkable that, in his account of the Theban revolution, the only author he quotes is Xenophon; from whom, indeed, evidently the best part of his account has been taken. As a cotemporary historian, much interested in the political events of the time, Xenophon had his partialities, and they were not in favor of Pelopidas or Epameinondas. On the contrary the Lacedæmonians were his friends, and very particularly Agesilaus. Nevertheless his simple concise narrative does far more honor to the authors of the Theban revolution than Plutarch's studied panegyric. Without any mention of secrecy, he shews that extraordinary secrecy was observed. Without any mention of courage or magnanimity, he exhibits, in the conduct of the conspirators, the daring prudence of so many Cæsars or Cromwells. While he thus does justice to those who, as public men, were his enemies, he acknowledges so candidly the faults of his friends, that even Plutarch could accuse them of nothing more. Among the advantages then of Xenophon, in the comparison, the reader of taste will admire that elegant simplicity, that perspicuous conciseness.

## SECTION VI.

*Motives, at Lacedæmon, for lenient conduct toward Thebes. Command in war against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon storm. Change in Athenian politics, adverse to Thebes.*

It was incumbent upon the Lacedæmonian government to punish the Theban rebellion and support its authority over Greece, or at once to resign that invidious authority, which perhaps could not be resigned with safety. Tho' midwinter, therefore, it was resolved that an army should immediately march. In the same spirit, severity was exerted against the late governor of the Cadmeia, who suffered death for surrendering his trust.

There is something of mystery in the conduct of Agesilaus toward the Thebans, and not less of the Thebans toward Agesilaus; which the philosopher historian, who acted in the military and political transactions of the time, seems to have left studiously veiled. The gross affront put upon Agesilaus, previously to his sailing for Asia, when sacrificing in the Theban territory, is not accounted for. The cause of that deep-laid scheme of enmity to Lacedæmon, which occasioned the recall of Agesilaus, is equally unexplained. Why Agesilaus, when he had gained a great victory over the Thebans near Coroneia, did not pursue the advantage, but, on the contrary, led his army immediately out of their territory, remains an enigma. After this, that Agesilaus bore a hatred to the Thebans, which he suffered sometimes to sway his political conduct, the candor of Xenophon has led him to

conciseness, which modern writers cannot too diligently emulate, but which, even were Xenophon the writer, no modern language could equal.

Plutarch, in his tract intitled, little enough to its purpose, On the dæmon or genius of Socrates, has enlarged the story of the delivery of Thebes into a kind of novel, giving

much dialogue together with the deeds: It is an ingenious and amusing little work, and interesting for the information interspersed, concerning the philosophical theology of Plutarch's day; but it bears no symptom of historical authority, beyond the gleanings from Xenophon.

SECT. VI. MOTIVES OF THE LACEDÆMONIAN GOVERNMENT.

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avow. The partiality of Plutarch, himself a Bœotian, would countenance an imputation, which seems however to have had no better origin than the ordinary malice of party-spirit in Greece, that Agesilaus instigated the seizing of the Cadmeia. That, however, he supported the measure, when taken, in a manner not creditable to his character, Xenophon himself has shown. Yet when, in consequence of the revolution which followed, war was denounced against Thebes, and an army was ordered to march, he declined the command.

But much of what historians have not expressly declared, may be gathered from what they have made known. The pointed enmity of Thebes, toward Agesilaus and Lacedæmon, arose from a revolution in that city, by which, soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the power passed from the oligarchal party to the democratical. The new leaders could not hope to hold their power, unless they could engage their commonwealth to break the Lacedæmonian connection; and a gross affront to a popular king might be very efficacious for their purpose. But, as the other party was still considerable, and the principal landowners were among its members, Agesilaus, after the battle gained on his return from Asia, might withdraw his army from the Theban territory, to favor the lands, not of his enemies, but of his friends; and he might hope that his moderation, after victory, might soften the enmity of one party, while the credit of that victory would promote the influence of the other. If the oligarchy could be quietly restored in Thebes, his purpose would be better answered than by any success in arms; and means might thus, more than by any other measures, be promoted, for his return, with his army, to prosecute his favorite plan of conquest in Asia.

Patriotism upon a narrow scale, or attachment to a particular commonwealth, (tho it was oftener only to a party in that commonwealth) was common among the Greeks; but even the pretension to patriotism including all Greece, was rare<sup>17</sup>. Xenophon ascribes to Agesilaus that nobler patriotism: which seems indeed to have been an inheritance from his father Archidamus, communicated to both the kings his sons; tho

Xen. Ages.  
c. 7. s. 4, 5, 6.

<sup>17</sup> The Greek term *φιλόπατρις* was nearly synonymous with *φιλόπολις*. To express the more liberal patriotism, extending to the whole nation, the Greeks used the term *φιλέλλην*.

the

Xen. ut sup.  
& Plut.  
Ages.

the inferior abilities of Agis gave less brilliancy to the fair portion. If we add the Athenian Cimon, it will be difficult to find another Grecian commander who has any clear claim to the eulogy. These however seem intitled to it, and we must therefore confine to the time when Agesilaus reigned, the praise which Xenophon makes peculiarly his. What other general, he asks, has been known to decline taking a town, when he thought the plunder in his power, or to hold it a misfortune to conquer, when Greeks were his enemies? But Agesilaus, when, on his march from Asia, intelligence met him of the great victory obtained near Corinth, where, with the loss of only eight Lacedæmonians, more than ten thousand of the Theban confederacy were slain, instead of showing satisfaction, 'Unhappy Greece!' he exclaimed; 'your children thus destroyed, in quarrels among themselves, were enough to have obtained glorious victory over any number of barbarians.' When afterward, as he lay near Corinth, the refugees pointed out a plan for easily storming the city, he would not allow the attempt: 'To chastise a Grecian people,' he said, 'may be necessary; to extirpate or enslave them cannot<sup>18</sup>.'

But the great purpose of Agesilaus, universal peace in Greece, and a union of the whole nation against the barbarians, was singularly thwarted by the prevalence of the democratical party in Thebes;<sup>19</sup> and this consideration, with perhaps some added stimulation from personal affronts, appears so far to have warped the general rectitude of his mind, as to have led him to support the treachery of Phœbidas, in seizing the Theban citadel. When however he observed those Thebans, who, through the insuing revolution, acquired the lead in the government of their city, conducting themselves with no moderation<sup>19</sup>; when, on the contrary, after the counter-revolution effected by Mellon and Pelopidas, the whole Theban people seemed united in the opposite interest; he would no longer stand forward in a cause which he found so odious, and which a considerable party, even in Lacedæmon, reprobated. He

<sup>18</sup> Xenophon has himself reported that Agis would not take Elis when in his power. (Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. s. 19. & Ch. 24. s. 2. of this Hist.) Hence it is clear that the peculiarity of the eulogy must be confined to the time when Agesilaus reigned.

<sup>19</sup> Τύραννοι is a title which Xenophon more than once gives them (s. 9 & 13).

avoided

avoided taking any part in the debate on measures to be pursued; and, when it was resolved that an army should immediately march, he claimed the privilege of his age for declining the command<sup>20</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 13.

Cleombrotus, who had succeeded Agesipolis in the throne of the Eurystheneid family, seems, with the ephors, and the whole administration of Lacedæmon, to have imbibed a share of the moderation of Agesilaus. But had no step been taken in favor of the Lacedæmonian, or oligarchal party, in the Bœotian towns, its complete ruin, with the severest sufferings to individuals, to many individuals who deserved highly of Lacedæmon, must have followed. Already, in Thebes, the return of the emigrated, of one party, had been the signal for the leading men, of the other, to seek personal safety, by quitting whatever else was most dear to them<sup>21</sup>. Tho' midwinter, therefore, and very severe weather, the resolution for the immediate march of an army for Bœotia was persisted in, and Cleombrotus was directed to take the command. The readiest passage of the mountains, north of the isthmus<sup>22</sup>, was occupied by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus however found the Plataean road open, by which he passed into the Theban territory, and incamped at Cynoscephalæ. There he remained sixteen days, and then withdrew to Thespiæ. The purpose of the expedition seems to have been merely to give that protection, which the Lacedæmonians owed to the Bœotian towns, against the new government of Thebes; and, for this, it was thought sufficient now to leave a third of the army, under the command of Sphodrias, with a sum of money for raising a body of mercenaries. Cleombrotus therefore led the rest back toward Peloponnesus; all, says the historian, while

B. C. 378.  
Ol. 100. 2.  
January.  
Dodw.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 15.

s. 16.

<sup>20</sup> τῆς προσελευνίας ἀφ' ἧς. The uncertain value of this expression has been already noticed. Dodwell (Chron. Xen. ad ann. A. C. 378. p. 55.) supposes προσελευνία ἀφ' ἧς, fifty-seven or fifty-eight, and that Agesilaus was already sixty-three. At that rate he must have been forty-five at his accession to the throne, when he was, according to Xenophon, (Ages. c. 1. s. 6.) ἔτι μὲν νέος, still a youth. I should rather suppose him under

thirty-five at his accession, and between fifty-two and fifty-five when his age excused him from foreign service. The excuse was common to the king and the private soldier.

<sup>21</sup> This familiar circumstance, among the Greeks, it was sufficient for Xenophon to express by the single word *ἐπιπρόσθεν*.

<sup>22</sup> The way by Eleuthera; for which Dodwell proposes, apparently with reason, to read Erythræ.

they reflected how carefully every injury to the Theban territory had been avoided, wholly doubting whether it was to be war or peace.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 17.

In passing the mountain-barrier against the isthmus, the army was assailed by an uncommon storm. Between the town of Creusis and the Corinthian gulph, its violence was such, that many asses, laden with the baggage, were tumbled down the precipices; shields were blown into the sea, and, in the impossibility, with their complete armour, to withstand its fury, most of the soldiers resorted to the expedient of depositing their shields among the crags, and loading them with stones. With difficulty, each making his way as he could, they arrived, in the evening, at Aigostheni in the Megaric territory. Tho' this was no ordinary tempest, yet the account of it, given by Xenophon, may assist us to the cause why, in a climate whose summer heats we are apt to suppose more intolerable than the roughness of the waning or early year, winter operations were so generally avoided. Such an event never failed to alarm Grecian superstition. Some thought the displeasure of the gods announced at the conduct of Lacedæmon toward Thebes: others supposed ill-fortune to the youthful general portended. Following events, with the recollection of the òmen, brought, it was imagined, its explanation. As soon as the weather became moderate, the abandoned arms were collected; and, the march being then prosecuted into Peloponnesus, the troops were, as usual, dismissed.

s. 18.

s. 19.

Altho, in this expedition, so little was done to the vulgar eye, its consequences were important. Those in Athens, desirous of peace, or averse to the Theban connection, represented with effect to the people, that the Corinthian territory was no longer the seat of war: already they had seen the Peloponnesian army pass by Attica into Bœotia; and before next harvest they might expect the ravage of Attica itself. The ungenerous fear of the tyrannous multitude was so excited, that, of the two generals who had favored the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, one was condemned and executed; the other saved his life by flight.



## SECTION VII.

*Motives of the Theban leaders for persevering in opposition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epameinondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian general Sphodrias: Weak concession of Agesilaus: Renewal of alliance between Athens and Thebes. Agesilaus commander against Thebes. State of the smaller Republics of Greece. The Thebaid ravaged: Winter campaign. Second invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus: Sedition at Thespie.*

THE great change, which had taken place in the politics of Athens, was highly alarming to the ruling party in Thebes. Unsupported they could not hope long to resist the power of Lacedæmon; and, whatever indications might have appeared of moderation, and a peaceful disposition, in the Lacedæmonian government, yet no peace with Lacedæmon could come unattended with the ruin of the chiefs of the party, assassins of the late polemarchs, and objects of the revenge of living numbers, whom they had driven into banishment. But among them were men of talents, such as Thebes had not before offered to the world's notice. Of these Pelopidas and Epameinondas were becoming eminent. Both of distinguished families, both of the democratical party, they contracted an early friendship, tho otherwise their circumstances and their dispositions differed. Pelopidas was rich, Epameinondas poor: Pelopidas delighted to pass his time in action; war, hunting, and the palæstra: Epameinondas in study and the schools of the philosophers<sup>23</sup>. The warm temper of Pelopidas urged him to put himself forward in public business: Epameinondas thought it a duty to qualify himself for his country's service; but then claimed indulgence for his inclination to retirement and study, till circumstances might require his exertion. The activity of Pelopidas made it impossible that he could be an indifferent character in any public commotion. When therefore the party of Leontiades, with the assistance of the Lacedæmonian army under

B. C. 378.  
Ol. 100.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Diod. 1. 15.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam.  
& Pelop.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelop. &  
Ages.

<sup>23</sup> Pythagoreus ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam (instituit) haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Græciæ. Cic. de Orat. 3. 34.

Phœbidas, obtained the supreme power in the commonwealth, Pelopidas had been among those who were driven to seek their safety by flight; while Epameinondas, considered only as a philosopher, remained undisturbed in Thebes. Pelopidas was, according to Plutarch, both in council and in action, foremost among the associates of Mellon, in the insuing revolution: Epameinondas joined in it only with the body of the Theban people. When the revolution was effected, Pelopidas was raised, with Mellon and Charon, to the office of Bœotarc; a title assumed by the first magistrates of Thebes, instead of their antient title of polemarc, or conjointly with it; in assertion of the claim of the Theban people to a superintending authority over all the cities of Bœotia, which the Lacedæmonians, under the pretence of vindicating the freedom of those cities, but really to insure their own command over them, had always strenuously opposed.

Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 20.

s. 21.

s. 22, 23.

The intrigue, which set Athens again at variance with Lacedæmon, was, according to Plutarch, devised and managed by Pelopidas. Xenophon gives it to Theban policy, without specifying the author: Bribery was the inducement, at least suspected, for Sphodrias, the Lacedæmonian general in Thespiæ, to take measures not to be otherwise easily accounted for. Marching in the afternoon, he entered Attica by night, with the purpose, or the pretended purpose, to be before dawn at Peiræus, which had then no gates, and to take it by surprize. At Thria day broke upon him, and he returned; but instead of endeavoring to conceal his hostile intention, he plundered houses, and drove off cattle.

Before day intelligence reached Athens, that a large army was approaching. Alarm spread rapidly, and the whole people took arms. Three Lacedæmonian ministers, then in the city, were arrested. Astonished, themselves, at the fact related to them, they however soon convinced the principal Athenians, that, whatever the plot might be, they could be no parties to it; and, declaring their confidence that Sphodrias not only could have no authority for his injurious conduct, but that his high rank and great connections would not screen him from due punishment for it, they were presently released. So far their assertions were soon confirmed, that Sphodrias was summoned home, and a capital prosecution was instituted against him.

Xenophon has labored, not to justify the insuing conduct of Agesilaus, but to win excuse for it. Cleonymus, son of Sphodrias, a youth of great merit, was the intimate friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, a youth also of great merit. Archidamus was distressed by his friend's distress; and Agesilaus, feeling for both of them, allowed his feeling to overbear his judgement. Against his own opinion of what was just and honorable, and against his country's clearest interest, he exerted himself in favor of Sphodrias. It appears that trials of men in high public situations, at Sparta equally as at Athens, were before either the assembled people, or a court nearly as numerous as the ordinary popular assemblies. Of course opportunity was open for intrigue, and interest decided the judgement. Sphodrias nevertheless feared to return home; yet his trial, according to the general practice of Grecian courts, proceeded as if he were present. It was apparently in consequence of the notoriety of his guilt, that his friends chose to rest his defence principally on the plea of his former merits; but the influence of Agesilaus gave such efficacy to this plea that he was acquitted. Xenophon, anxious for the credit of his friend and patron, has nevertheless evinced his superior regard for truth, by avowing that the decision was very generally considered as singularly iniquitous.

The remoter consequences of this disreputable transaction were beyond human foresight; but the strong probability, amounting almost to certain necessity, of what immediately followed, should not have escaped so experienced a politician as Agesilaus. Indignation pervaded the Athenian people; and it was no longer possible for those leading men in Athens, who desired to maintain the Lacedæmonian connection, to refute the orators of the Bœotian party, who asserted, that the Lacedæmonians not less evidently approved, and had encouraged, the treacherous project against Peiræus, than the not less abominable, but more successful treachery, by which Thebes had been actually subjected to Lacedæmon. After the manner of democracies, not understanding convinced, but passion excited, like the reflux of a strong surf, bore all violently the way contrary to that which it had lately impelled; and a majority of the same rash multitude which, a little before, had condemned its generals to death for promoting the delivery of Thebes from  
the

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 4.  
s. 24—33.

the Lacedæmonian yoke, now, with equally hasty and unteasonable zeal, engaged in war with Lacedæmon to support the measure. War, defensive and offensive, became the popular care. Peiræus was secured with gates, ships were built, and want of zeal in the Bœotian cause was considered as want of fidelity to the Athenian commonwealth.

Having thus, by partiality for a guilty individual, brought a formidable addition to the before pressing weight of war against his country, Agesilaus could no longer deny himself to the public voice; which loudly called for his known ability and large experience to command the army, in preference to the untried talents of his youthful collegue. Thebes remained the great object of hostility: but, with Athens now adverse, it was no longer easy for an army to pass from Peloponnesus into Bœotia; and command of the road over the intervening mountains must by some means be secured.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 4.  
s. 35.

It is only incidentally that we get any information concerning those numerous inferior republics, which composed the far larger portion of the Greek nation: when it occurs, it is of course valuable. To the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens great objects of ambition offered; and, if numbers suffered in the contest so excited, numbers would participate in the joyful hope, at least, of one time finding large recompence. Meanwhile the body of the Lacedæmonian people might live in security and a dignified ease, after the manner prescribed by the peculiar institutions under which they were bred: and, for the Athenian, all the arts and every science combined to produce gratifications; for the wealthy every kind of gratification, at their own expence, except security of person, property, and character; and, for the poorest, luxuries at the public expence, such as no others enjoyed, with quiet and peace of mind, if not always in their power, yet less liable to disturbance than among those whose private riches might draw popular envy. But, for the bulk of the Greek nation, the citizens of those numerous little republics, to whom the higher rewards of ambition were totally denied, our information hitherto has not represented their lot as generally enviable; and what we proceed to learn will be gratifying, only as it may teach us to bless Providence for our own.

A war;

A war, unconnected with the greater concerns of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, already existed within Bœotia. In that empire, which some of the Grecian republics exercised over others, and the Lacedæmonian, for a long time, over all, we see something of the principle of some despotic governments of modern Europe; allowing the people, as a recompence for deprivation of other liberty, that of assassinating one another. The little, almost unheard-of, municipality of the Cleitorians waged war with their neighbors the Orchomenians. Unequal to their enemies in native military force, they had however pecuniary resources which inabled them to supply the deficiency: they took into their pay a body of those troops, the use of which had, as we have seen, long been increasing in Greece; vagabonds from various republics, who made war a trade, and were ready to ingage in any service for the best hire. Thus hostilities went forward, unregarded by any superintending authority, till a particular interest of Lacedæmon required that the broil should stop; and then a mandate from Sparta sufficed to still the storm. Agesilaus saw, prepared by this little war, the means of securing for his army the passage from Peloponnesus, over the mountains, into the Bœotian plain. He demanded the service of the Cleitorian mercenaries for the purpose. The Cleitorians, desirous to gratify the king and people of Lacedæmon, were only anxious that, while their mercenaries were employed in the Lacedæmonian service, their lands, which they were themselves unable to protect, might not be ravaged. For this Agesilaus undertook to provide; and he did it effectually, by sending his orders to the Orchomenians to abstain from hostility, while Lacedæmon might have occasion for the Cleitorian troops. It seems there was an existing decree of the congress of the confederacy, forbidding war between the confederated republics, while an expedition in the common cause was going forward; and, under the sanction of this decree, Agesilaus threatened the Orchomenians with the first vengeance of the arms of that confederacy, of which their city was a member, if they disobeyed his order. The Orchomenians prudently acquiesced, and the Cleitorian mercenaries occupied the passes.

Bœotia being thus laid open to the Lacedæmonian arms, it remained

for

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 36, 37.

s. 38—41.

for those able men, who led the Theban councils, to devise how, with unequal forces, they might best protect the small but rich territory of their city. They fortified the whole frontier; and still their numbers were unequal to the defence always and everywhere. Agesilaus, able and indefatigable, penetrating their lines, plundered, burnt, and wasted to the city-walls. The consummate skill of the Athenian general Chabrias, to whom the Thebans deferred on that occasion, baffled his endeavors to force a general action; but the common object of a Grecian campaign was accomplished. Agesilaus then placed a force in Thespiæ, under the command of Phœbidas, to protect the allies of Lacedæmon in northern Greece, during the winter, and, returning into Peloponnesus, dismissed the rest of his army.

The patronage of a man distinguished, like Phœbidas, by that treachery which had reduced Thebes under subjection to Lacedæmon, we should not consider as creditable; but we are so little informed of Spartan domestic politics, that ground fails us even for conjecture, how far his appointment was the work of Agesilaus. Phœbidas, however, tho an unprincipled politician, seems to have been an active and able officer. The Thebans, like the Dorian Peloponnesians, descended from the same Æolian stock, valuing themselves upon their heavy-armed phalanx, disdained the missile weapons and desultory action of most of the northern Greeks; whom they considered as, in their warfare, little above barbarians. But the Lacedæmonians, by severe experience in their wars with Athens, had at length learnt the use of light infantry; and tho the force left under Phœbidas consisted mostly of targeteers, he did not content himself with defensive war, but so harrassed the enemy's territory with predatory inroads, that the whole force of Thebes was collected to repress the troublesome and destructive intrusion. The Theban army invaded the Thesopian territory: Phœbidas, avoiding general action, gave nevertheless such annoyance by desultory attacks, with his light troops, on the enemy's flanks and rear, that he made both phalanx and cavalry retire in disorderly haste; and so without previous circumspection and decision, that the cavalry were stopped by a deep glen crossing the way. This however, which, in the ordinary course of events, should have been the ruin of

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 32, 33.  
p. 474.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Chab.

Xen. ut sup.  
Diod. l. 15.  
s. 34.

the defeated, proved, in the chance of war, that of the victorious party. The Theban cavalry being forced into action again, it happened that, in the first charge, Phœbidas was killed; and here, as on former occasions we have been led to observe, it appeared of what consequence the life of one man might be. The mercenaries all fled; the few Lacedæmonians of the army were overpowered: approaching night prevented great slaughter, but the consequences were those of a complete victory. The Thebans thenceforward commanded the country: their allies and partizans were encouraged, their adversaries dejected: instead of any longer suffering in their own territory, they plundered the lands of all around them: they were indeed unable to take a single town; but the lower people of many deserted to them in numbers; and the Lacedæmonian party was so weakened, throughout Bœotia, that, almost everywhere, support was wanting to check sedition and prevent revolt. These circumstances being reported at Lacedæmon, a mora was sent, under the orders of a polemarch, who took his headquarters in Thespiæ.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 46.

The Peloponnesian army was again assembled in spring, reinforced by a body of horse from that distant new member of the confederacy Olynthus, and Agesilaus again took the command. By early precaution he secured the passes of Cithæron, and entered, without opposition, the Bœotian plain. The Thebans remained on the defensive within their lines; but even those lines, by movements ably planned and rapidly executed, Agesilaus passed unopposed. Fearful of a battle, the enemy attended his motions, with little effect, while he extended ravage beyond Thebes, as far as the Tanagræan lands. When all the inimical Bœotian territory had been wasted, returning to Thespiæ, he found that little city torn by the common rancor of faction in Greece. One party, claiming to be more eminently the Lacedæmonian party, urged the moderate petition, that their opponents, tho' professing themselves friends also of Lacedæmon, yet, for their less ardent zeal in the cause, might be put to death. It could not be easy to bring men, so violent in variance, to live within the same town in cordial friendship. Agesilaus however effected, at least, the semblance of a reconciliation; and, for better security, required solemn

B. C. 377.  
Ol. 100. 3.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 47—54.

s. 55.

oaths from both sides for, what the interest of both strongly demanded, but passion, more imperious, had opposed, the preservation of the peace of their little commonwealth. After this good deed, he returned into Peloponnesus, and the army was dismissed.

## SECTION VIII.

*Distress and exertions of Thebes: Naval assistance obtained from Athens; Timotheus commander. Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and successes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens: Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: Successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates.*

B. C. 377. THAT mode of offensive war, which had compelled the flourishing and formidable commonwealth of Olynthus to receive laws from Lacedæmon, now began severely to press upon Thebes. For two successive years neither harvest, nor those fruits which, in the hotter climates, are scarcely less important than harvest, had been gathered by the Thebans from their territory; and the surrounding states, best able to afford supplies, acknowledged the Lacedæmonian empire. Bœotia, tho its extent, from the Eubœan channel to the Corinthian gulph, gave it the advantage of two seas, nevertheless was low in the scale of Grecian maritime power. The supremacy of Thebes was unfavorable to maritime exertion, its proper territory being wholly inland; yet Thebes, whether through just or usurped dominion, at this time commanded ports and possessed ships of war. In the distress, therefore, arising from the pressure of the Lacedæmonian arms, it was resolved, before any concession should be made, to endeavor to procure supplies by sea.

Two triremes were accordingly appointed to attend commissioners, to whom ten talents, about two thousand pounds sterling, were intrusted, to purchase corn at Oreus in Eubœa. The people of Oreus were known to be friendly, but they were restrained by a Lacedæmonian garrison in their citadel. The Theban commissioners therefore went



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to Pagasæ, on the opposite Thessalian coast; hoping thence to manage their business with the requisite secrecy. The Lacedæmonian governor nevertheless receiving information of their measures, allowed them quietly to complete their purchase, and then, watching their departure, intercepted both ships, at such a distance from shore that none of the crews escaped. The result however was far more beneficial to the Thebans than if their commissioners had met with unchecked success. For the prisoners, being placed in the citadel of Oreus, were so deficiently guarded, that they found opportunity to rise and overpower the garrison. The townspeople, relieved thus from the terror of the commanding fortress, disclaimed subjection to Lacedæmon; and, through the rest of autumn, and all the following winter, Thebes was abundantly supplied from Eubœa.

The disposition to yield, which want had begun to excite among the Thebans, being thus obviated, it remained for the Lacedæmonians, with the returning season, to repeat the invasion of Bœotia. An accidental injury to a blood-vessel, ill-treated by an unskilful surgeon, had brought upon Agesilaus a severe illness, which disabled him for military command. Cleombrotus was therefore again placed at the head of the army. With the usual deficiency of our information, concerning the domestic politics of Lacedæmon, it remains unexplained to us why that inexperienced prince profited neither from the advice, nor the example, of his able colleague, to secure the passes into Bœotia. Not till he arrived at the foot of the mountains, he sent forward his targeteers; and they were repulsed by the Athenian and Theban troops, which had preoccupied the commanding heights. Without another effort he returned then into Peloponnesus, and dismissed his army.

B. C. 376.  
Ol. 100. 4.  
Spring.  
Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 4.  
s. 58.

Impatience and discontent pervaded the congress of the confederacy, which soon after met in Lacedæmon. It was observed, that the yearly calls for forein service bore hard upon the citizens of the allied republics, and yet no progress was made. Management and exertion were certainly deficient, or so great a force would have produced greater effects. A proper use of the unemployed navy, far superior in strength to the enemy's, might have contributed to shorten the duration of the evil. Not only troops might have been securely transported

s. 60.

into Bœotia, and the disgrace of an unsuccessful attempt to force the passage of the mountains avoided, but Athens, dependent upon transmarine supplies for so large a part of her subsistence, might have been reduced by famine. In consequence of such remonstrances, a fleet of sixty triremes was equipped, and, under the command of Pollis, took stations at Ægina, Ceos, and Andrus. This measure had the proposed effect. The corn-ships, bound for Athens, commonly made Geræstus in Eubœa. There getting information of the disposition of the enemy's fleet, they dared not proceed; so that, in Athens, want began to be apprehended.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 61.

s. 61.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 34.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Chab.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 62, 63.

But the race of great men in Athens was not yet extinct. Chabrias, esteemed the most scientific officer of the age, was placed at the head of the fleet. Near Naxos he met and defeated Pollis, and thus again the seas were open for the Athenian trade. Preparation meanwhile was making for transporting a powerful army, from Peloponnesus across the Corinthian gulph, to carry war into Bœotia. But the consequence of the weak compliance of Agesilaus, in compassion for a deserving son and a guilty friend, the compassion amiable in the individual, but the compliance highly blameable in the public man, fell now severely upon Lacedæmon. Thebes applied to Athens, its ally, for naval protection, and a fleet of sixty triremes was sent, under the command of Timotheus son of Conon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus, and alarm the coast. The Peloponnesian forces were in consequence detained at home, for the defence of their respective territories, and the Thebans, on the contrary, had leisure for offensive measures; whence their able leaders profited so well, that the great object of their party, what might best enable them, in all events to resist Lacedæmon, what, of course, it had been the great purpose of the Lacedæmonians to prevent, was completely accomplished. With the coöperation, everywhere, of the democratical party, every town of Bœotia was brought, with the name of alliance, under real subjection to Thebes.

s. 63. &  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 6.

l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 64.

The Athenian fleet, meanwhile, commanding the sea, when it had saved Bœotia from invasion, invaded Corcyra; and, a friendly party there assisting, the whole island was brought over to the Athenian cause. Timotheus however would allow none of the usual severities  
against

against the overpowered party; no selling into slavery, no banishment; but, by his liberal conduct, composing differences, he produced a general attachment to himself, and to the Athenian name <sup>24</sup>.

The Lacedæmonians always saw with particular jealousy any interference of Athens in the western seas. Immediately therefore they exerted themselves to assert their command there, and a fleet of fifty-five triremes was put under the orders of Nicolochus. More distinguished for daring courage, than for talents or naval experience, Nicolochus scorned, in fleets so numerous, to weigh the difference of five ships. Without waiting for a reinforcement, expected from Ambracia, he hastened to meet Timotheus, and he was defeated. Nevertheless; the Ambraciot squadron soon after joining him, he again proposed action. Timotheus, however, being joined by a squadron from Corcyra, which made his fleet more than seventy triremes, even the rashness of Nicolochus then avoided to renew the trial of arms.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 5. c. 4.  
s. 65, 66.

During this unsuccessful exertion of Lacedæmon at sea, new emergencies arose, pressingly requiring new exertion by land. The Thebans, after reducing all Bœotia under their obedience or influence, carried their arms into Phocis; and ministers arrived from that country, representing, that it must be lost to the Lacedæmonian alliance, unless speedily and powerfully relieved. Those who held the sway in Lacedæmon deemed it, and apparently with reason, of great importance not to allow the new power of Thebes thus to spread. It was therefore resolved to send an army, larger than the former, for the protection of the northern allies. But, while the Peloponnesian shores were everywhere threatenèd, it was judgèd prudent to avoid requiring the usual proportion of the confederates; whose governments and people would naturally be anxious to keep their utmost force at home, for the protection of their own lands. At the risk of Laconia itself, there-

1. 6. c. 1.  
s. 1.

<sup>24</sup> The circumstance that Timotheus was a pupil of Isocrates, has led to a short but pithy panegyric of him from Cicero: 'Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum, Cononis, præstantissimi imperatoris, filium, summum ipsum imperatorem, hominemque doctissimum (instituit.)' M. T.

Cic. de Orat. l. 3. s. 34. To the same general purpose Diodorus, (b. 15. c. 36.) Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ταχέως καὶ βραχίως ἐπέλεξε, πείθει μὲν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμει, κινῶν δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν καὶ στρατηγίαν διότι οὐκ ἐν μόνον παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι μεγάλης ἐνέχυρου ἀποδοχῆς.

Xen. Hel.  
i. 6. c. 2.  
s. 1.

fore, it was determined to send a larger proportion of Lacedæmonians; with the hope, by this attention to the wishes and feelings of the allies, and mark of confidence in their bravery and fidelity, to conciliate attachment. Unfortunately Agesilaus was still unable to take the command, which was therefore committed to Cleombrotus. The army, without opposition, crossed the Corinthian gulph, and the Thebans presently evacuated Phocis; but they occupied the strong posts on the border, apparently determined to dispute the entrance of the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia.

Ibid.

While things were thus critically situated, the Athenian fleet threatening the whole circuit of the Peloponnesian coast, relief came to Lacedæmon from a quarter whence it was not expected. Dissatisfaction with their new political connection had spread among the Athenians. While they were consuming their public treasure, burthening themselves with imposts, and suffering depredation from Æginetan corsairs, the Thebans had refused, possibly being little able, to contribute to the expence of that fleet, which had given the great turn in their favor; which had saved Bœotia from invasion, perhaps Thebes from ruin, and afforded the opportunity through which Thebes was now mistress of Bœotia. Those leading men in Athens, who were desirous of peace, took advantage from this turn in the public mind, and ministers were sent to Lacedæmon. No complex interests occurring for discussion, peace was quickly concluded; and orders were sent from Athens, for Timotheus to stop the operations of his victorious fleet, and return home.

s. 7, 8.

Unfortunately a matter, in a great degree accidental, and of which the modern eye with difficulty discovers the importance, presently unsettled all that appeared so happily accommodated. Timotheus, in his way home, put some Zacynthian exiles ashore on their island; of which the Zacynthians in power complained to Lacedæmon, as a gross injury. This concise statement, from the cotemporary historian, will not be wholly unintelligible to those who have thus far followed Grecian history. The Athenians however, conscious of offence or not, so little expected that it would occasion a renewal of hostilities, that they had already laid up their fleet and dismissed their crews, when a vote passed

the Lacedæmonian assembly, declaring, that the Athenians had acted injuriously, and that reparation should be sought by arms. It seems as if an interchange of character had taken place between the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments. Great certainly was the merit of those leaders of the Athenian councils, who could make circumspection and moderation distinguish the proceedings of a democracy, while, notwithstanding the general authority and general prudence of Agesilaus, the measures of the elderhood of Sparta were subject to the influence of passion. An earnestness appeared, as if the dearest interests of Lacedæmon were threatened. Requisitions were sent to all the maritime allies; and from Corinth, with its colonies, Leucas and Ambracia, Elis, the Achaian cities, Zacynthus, and the independent Argolic states Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionë, and Haliæ; a fleet was collected of sixty triremes. In doubt, still, of the sufficiency of the force to be obtained within Greece, ministers were sent to Dionysius, whose power or influence directed the politics of Syracuse and the greater part of Sicily, representing how incompatible it was with his interest that the Athenians should command Corcyra, and requesting assistance against them.

Xen. Hel.  
1.6. c. 2.  
s. 2.

s. 3.

Here the cotemporary historian discovers to us a motive for the conduct of the Lacedæmonian government, superior to the meer consideration of the interest of a friendly party in Zacynthus. The means which the connection with Corcyra gave to Athens, for maintaining a fleet and holding a commanding influence in the western seas, always an object of the highest jealousy to Lacedæmon, made any attempt to extend the Athenian interest there, at the expence of the Lacedæmonian, peculiarly offensive and alarming. But, if, in the silence of Xenophon, the probable report of Diodorus may be taken, there was a farther allurement and incentive. The oligarchal party in Corcyra, at a crisis with the démocratical, then in power, applied to Lacedæmon for assistance; and the recent transaction of Timotheus in Zacynthus, might seem in some degree to justify the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Corcyra. Measures however were taken with a haste, and in a style of violence, forbidding friendly discussion. Immediately against Athens, indeed, war was not declared,

D od. 1. 15:  
c. 46  
p. 480.

Xen. Hel.  
 ut sup.

nor any hostility directed; but Mnasippus, appointed to command the fleet, was instructed, generally, 'to take care of the Lacedæmonian interest in the western sea,' and particularly, 'to reduce Corcyra.'

1.6. c. 2.  
 s. 4.

We have seen that unfortunate island, toward the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, singularly a scene of bloodshed and desolation, from the rage of its own citizens against one another. Taught by their sufferings, the survivors had settled into orderly government; and their experience seems to have been transmitted, by report, as an advantageous inheritance to their children; for Corcyra was at this time remarkable for its high cultivation, and the splendor of its country houses; the security of an insular commonwealth allowing and encouraging improvements there, which, on the continent, and in most even of the larger islands, divided into several states, the constant danger of hostile neighbors forbid. While the Corcyræans were yet unaware of the purpose of Lacedæmon, all the fury of Grecian war was let loose upon their devoted land; for Mnasippus was not of a temper to go beyond the ordinary practice of his age in mercy to an enemy. The cattle in the fields, the numerous slaves employed in husbandry, and, beside the common plunder of the crops, large store of wine in capacious cellars, here appendages of the farms, tho on the continent only found in towns, became the prey of the invaders. The troops, in consequence, mostly mercenaries, elsewhere accustomed to coarse fare, learnt here, says the historian, to be fastidious; insomuch that, for their common drink, they demanded old and flavored wines. Plunder and waste having been extended over the island, Mnasippus formed the blockade of the city, by land and sea.

s. 5.

The Athenian government, in the same spirit of moderation in which it had stopped the course of successful hostilities for the sake of an equitable peace, appears now to have remained calm under provocation, and slow to resent the ill-judged aggression of Lacedæmon. Nothing had been done in consequence of the affronting decree of the Lacedæmonian government, and the hostile measures following, when deputies arrived from the besieged Corcyræans, imploring the Athenian people, with every added argument that could be drawn from their own interest, to relieve their injured, distressed, and highly valuable allies.

s. 6.

allies. 'What a loss,' they said, 'would Corcyra be to the Athenians, what an acquisition to their enemies! No republic of the confederacy could furnish equal naval force, or equal pecuniary contribution. How important then the situation of Corcyra, for awing the western Greeks, for commanding the Corinthian gulph, for attacking the Laconian shores, and, above all, for interrupting the communication of Peloponnesus with Sicily and Italy, where the Grecian towns had been mostly united, by Dionysius, under the leading government of Syracuse, the ally of Lacedæmon!' These were the considerations which had excited the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians, and given spring to their measures against Corcyra; and, thus seasonably put forward, they now excited the solicitude of the Athenians for its preservation. A body of six hundred targeteers was immediately sent, which, eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city of Corcyra by night, to reinforce its garrison; and a fleet of sixty triremes was to follow, under the orders of Timotheus, to raise the siege.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 7.

But the fleet remained to be manned; and Timotheus, knowing the enemy's fleet to be of equal or superior force, and already practised in service, was solicitous for crews of the best seamen. With a squadron therefore he went among the islands to collect them. But the usual impatience of the Athenian people was now excited; the dilatory caution of Timotheus was condemned; and, before he could complete his levies, Iphicrates was appointed to supersede him in the command.

s. 8.

In compliance with the manifest inclination of an absolute sovereign, no measures could be too strong. Iphicrates profited from circumstances so adapted to the promotion of his immediate object. He acted as the favorite vicegerent of a despot. He pressed men; he was strict in compelling those, the wealthiest of the Athenians, on whom popular sovereignty imposed the burdensome duty of fitting out triremes, to be diligent in their part of the business; he obtained a decree for adding to his force any ships of the republic cruising near the Attic coast<sup>25</sup>, and

<sup>25</sup> Μάλα βέβαιος τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιηράρχαις ἀνάγκαις ἀρστέλαβε δὲ παρὰ τῶν

and particularly the sacred ships Paralus and Salaminia. Thus he increased his fleet to seventy triremes, with which he hastened his departure; and, in the passage itself around Peloponnesus, a passage requiring time, with the rowing and coasting navigation of the antients, he found or made opportunity to give the requisite practice to his crews, and instruct them in whatever was most necessary for action.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 15—17.

s. 9.

The haste of the Athenian people had not been wholly unreasonable; for the Corcyreans were severely pressed by famine; insomuch that, when Mnasippus had declared, by proclamation, that he would sell for slaves any who in future, on pretence of desertion, should come from the town, still they deserted. Mnasippus caused them to be scourged and sent back again; and many, of servile condition, whom the Corcyreans would not readmit, perished of hunger.

Whatever public benefits may arise from private vices, it may be doubted if any vice was ever ultimately beneficial to the individual, unless sometimes, among things that happen against all calculation, prodigality; but no vice is equally apt to defeat its own purpose as avarice. When the extreme distress of the besieged became clearly proved to Mnasippus, he considered the public business, intrusted to him, as done, and the season come for putting the finishing stroke to a scheme of private gain. His army was composed, in large proportion, of mercenaries; for the cities of the confederacy, averse to a transmarine service, had mostly paid the compensation for avoiding it. Two months pay was now due, when he dismissed some of his mercenaries unpaid, and still procrastinated settlement with the others.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Ἀθηναίων καὶ ἢ πρὸς τὰς ναῦς περὶ τὴν Ἀθηνῶν ἕπαισι.—*Celeriter admodum naves complebat, ac trirēmium præfectos vel invites cogebat: præterea sumebat secum naves omnes quæcunque oram Atticæ legebant.* I have endeavored to render this passage as nearly as in modern language may be. The Latin translator has, I think, missed the meaning throughout, and particularly of the phrase *περὶ τὴν Ἀθηνῶν ἕπαισι*. διὰ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>26</sup> Καὶ τοὺς μὲν τινὰς ἀλλῶν ἀπομισθοῦς ἐπιποιήσαι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις καὶ δυοῖν ἕδωκε μισθοῖς ἀφείλε τὸν μισθόν. *Quippe nonnullis eorum adimebat stipendia, nonnullis, quos secum retinebat, duum mensium stipendium debebat.* That the Latin translator has given the right sense appears not dubious, tho the Greek phrases seem either military of the day, or perhaps corrupted in transcription.



SECT. VIII. CONTEST FOR CORCYRA.

395

Discontent pervaded the army: the guards were negligent and disorderly; the soldiers off duty wandered about the country.

The change was observed by the Corcyræans. They sallied, killed some of the besiegers, and made some prisoners. Mnasippus, alarmed at this new boldness, called all to arms, but was ill obeyed. Illiberal severity, then exercised toward his officers, produced zealous obedience neither among them nor among the soldiers. With his troops, however, at length collected, he drove the Corcyræans back to their walls: but there they made a stand; while, from the tombs, which Greek as well as Roman custom placed by the road-side without their towns, the light-armed discharged missile weapons with advantage. Meantime, under direction of the able Athenian general Stesicles, more troops, rushing from the town by another gate, advanced toward the besiegers' flank. These attempting an evolution, to form a face of sufficient extent for receiving the new attack, were thrown into confusion by the supervening enemy; and being unable to recover their order, fled. No relief could come from the right, engaged toward its own front. Progressively therefore from the left, the line joined in the flight; and Mnasippus, among whose vices was no want of Spartan courage, left at last with a very few, was overpowered and killed. The conquerors then pursued; and, but for the apprehension of a military force among the servants, sutlers, and others, whose numbers appeared formidable, the camp might have been taken. Report then arriying of an Athenian armament approaching under Iphicrates, the remainder of the besiegers embarked and withdrew to Leucas; so precipitately, that not only large stores of corn and wine were left to supply the pressing wants of the Corcyræans, together with numerous slaves, to repair the loss by desertion and famine, but even the sick of the army were abandoned to their mercy.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 2.  
s. 10—12.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 47.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 2.  
s. 13, 14.

Iphicrates was yet on the Laconian coast, when report of the fate of Mnasippus met him<sup>27</sup>. According to the common manner of the coasting navigation of the time, when the progress of a fleet of ships of

s. 19.

<sup>27</sup> In that age Messenia was commonly included under the name of Laconia, or the Laconic territory.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 17, 18.

war resembled an army's march, he halted and landed, even on the Laconian shore; for meals. Trading vessels, loftier and deeper, and navigated, in proportion to their burthen, by far fewer hands, could far better keep the open sea. Expecting action immediately on reaching his destination, Iphicrates would not be incumbered with the mainsails<sup>28</sup> of his triremes, but left them in the arsenal at Peiræus. For practice to his crews, he chose to make his way mostly with oars, the ready use of which was so important in the antient manner of action. With a fair breeze, however, he allowed his crews to rest: in adverse winds, not too violent, he made them row by reliefs. How little indeed the antient triremes were adapted for sailing, may be gathered from the circumstance that; tho' large enough to carry from two to three hundred men, the mast was not fixed, but raised only when the sail was to be used. Iphicrates set his masts, while his crews were ashore, for advantage to the look-out of his scouts. In serene weather, instead of lying incamped ashore, which was the common practice, he proceeded by night. Coasting and halting; thus, he made as quick a passage as, with the navigation of the time, was common. His last halt, on the Peloponnesian shore, was in the mouth of the Alpheius, where he passed a night. Thence he crossed to Cephallenia; and, getting there satisfactory information of transactions in Corcyra, he remitted somewhat of that fatiguing preparation for action, in which he had hitherto required the exertion of his crews.

s. 20.

s. 19.

s. 21—23.

His own attention to his country's service, however, was not remitted. The original object of the expedition no longer pressing, he employed his leisure so well, that he brought Cephallenia, divided as we have seen, once, and probably still, between four republics, under obedience to Athens. Then he proceeded to Corcyra, and there he received intelligence of the approach of ten triremes sent by Dionysius of Syracuse, to join the Lacedæmonian fleet. Anxious to intercept these, he went

<sup>28</sup> *Ἰσθία*, *vela magna*, which might be the mainsails, in contradistinction to the foresails; or largersails, in contradistinction to smaller, used on the same mast; as now is usual with the latteen-sail vessels of the Mediterranean, and our luggers; and our cutters have their great, middle, and stoffin jibs. The information remaining to us concerning the antient ships of war, is, in almost every point, very defective.

himself

himself to examine the heights, where a look-out might be most advantageously kept; and selecting twenty triremes, he gave strict orders for the crews to be ready at a moment's warning. His not requiring them, on such an occasion, to remain aboard, indicates, perhaps beyond anything that has even yet occurred, the deficient accommodation of the antient ships of war. This deficiency seems to have put nine ships of the Syracusan squadron into his hands. Eager for relief, after the long run, as, with the antient navigation, it was reckoned, from Sicily, the Syracusans landed on the first shore they approached. One ship only, commanded by a Rhodian, who, apprehensive of attack, had hastened his people aboard, escaped. The other nine were taken; the vessels on the beach, the crews ashore.

The numerous prisoners, made on this occasion, were ransomed; sureties for payment being found among the Corcyraeans themselves; who, political enemies, as they now were, did not forget their derivation from one common origin, and their long connection, in religious rites, in commercial intercourse, and in hereditary friendship with the Syracusans. This ray of liberality pleasingly inlivens the gloom which Grecian morals generally cast over Grecian history. But the gleam does not come unmingled; and the cloud to darken the cheerful prospect arises from a quarter whence it should be least expected. Every other prisoner was redeemed at a stipulated price; but for the commander of the squadron, Anippus, so immoderate a sum was demanded, in failure of which he was threatened with sale into slavery<sup>29</sup>, that, in despair, disappointing the avarice which oppressed him, he killed himself.

Xenophon, however, from whom we have the account, thought very highly of Iphicrates, at least as an officer. 'Among the many occasions,' he says, 'on which Iphicrates commanded, I admire not least his conduct in the expedition to Corcyra; and, among other things,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
c. 27.

<sup>29</sup> Τὸν δ' ἐφύλαττον (ὁ Ἰφικράτης) ὡς ἢ παραζάμενος πάμπολλα χεῖματα, ἢ ὡς πωμήσων. *Illum enim custodiebat, ut vel ab eo ingentem auri summam exigeret, vel hominem venderet.* The Latin translator, according to the too common method of translators, has very care-

fully imitated, instead of explaining, all that is dubious in the original. I am inclined to suppose some small error in the copy, yet the context, I think, pretty sufficiently warrants the version I have given.

for this, that, on his first appointment, he desired, for colleagues, two men of superior talents, not his political friends<sup>30</sup>; Callistratus, the most popular speaker, and Chabrias, the most renowned general of the age. If he had reasonable hope of faithful assistance from such men, there can be no doubt but he did wisely. If, on the contrary, he expected from them the malignity of party opponents, it surely marked a magnanimous confidence in himself, that he could be detected in want neither of courage, nor of ability<sup>31</sup>, nor of diligence.

Under the Athenian government it was, indeed, difficult to say what conduct would best give security to men in high office, except that flattery to the people and the bribery of public entertainments were always indispensable. The expence of the fleet under Iphicrates was heavy. The force was greater than had been first voted for the service. Whatever might obviate demands upon the treasury would be in his favor. If there is an excuse, or a palliation, for his conduct toward the unfortunate Syracusan, we must find it here. The illiberality of the sovereign people of Athens, the shame of which was lost among the multitude of partakers, would sometimes impose severe duties upon their officers. If then such men as Chabrias and Callistratus could not advise how to carry on the public service, without severity to an individual prisoner, their inability would certainly tell toward the justification of Iphicrates. On the other hand, if they could not but say that he had taken every measure to supply the armament, without calling upon the treasury, such testimony would go far to justify the demand, when it became unavoidable. For the subsistence of his rowers, in the intermission of naval operation, a resource was used, for which he and his advisers will have credit; tho it is not the first occasion on which we find mention of it in Grecian history: they were employed in husbandry for the Corcyræans; who were glad of hired

Ch. 20. s. 4.  
of this Hist.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 25.

<sup>30</sup> Ὁυ μάλᾳ ἐπιτήδειον ὄντα, is Xenophon's phrase, speaking of Callistratus, which the translator has rendered, I think in complete mistake, *hominem gerendis rebus non admodum idoneum.*

<sup>31</sup> Καταρρήθμων seems to mark the weakness of the mind including want of courage with want of ability.

labor,

labor, to assist their diminished stocks of slaves, in restoring their wasted farms and vineyards.

Meanwhile Iphicrates used his small force of heavy-armed, with his larger body of targeteers, to put forward the great object of his expedition, the extension of the Athenian command. The peacefulness of past times, in Acarnania, had given way to the political divisions, so prevalent through the rest of Greece. By assisting the friendly party, in those towns where it was pressed by its opponents, and using actual hostilities against one only, Iphicrates confirmed or restored the Athenian interest in that province. Assembling then his fleet again, and adding to it the naval strength of Corcyra, he sailed with ninety triremes; a force that no fleet in the power of the Lacedæmonian confederacy to raise, could resist. His purpose was to direct operations against Peloponnesus itself; not without hope that some cities there, only upon seeing the means he possessed to protect them in revolt, would desert the Lacedæmonian cause; while others, more stedly to their engagements, might be forced to submission.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 26.

## SECTION IX.

*Tyranny of Thebes in success: Dissatisfaction of Athens: General Peace negotiated by Athens: Refusal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty.*

THE ordinary temper of mankind, it has been of old observed, is more formed to bear adversity with dignity than prosperity with moderation; and it seems not less true, tho' seldomer said, that power and glory, but especially the sudden change from humiliation and misery to power and glory, too much for most individuals to support with propriety, still more certainly intoxicates a community. Later writers have celebrated the magnanimous disinterestedness of Pelopidas, and the philosophical selfdenial and clear integrity of Epameinondas. Unfortunately, the able cotemporary historian, intimately connected with their adversaries, and of course not their friend, has been careless of informing us what

M. T. Cic.  
Corn. Nep.  
v. Epam.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

part

part they took in the Theban councils. Nevertheless the independent spirit and daring courage of the Theban people, even in his account, we admire; but liberality, moderation, justice, wherever we search, are as little to be found, in their proceedings, as in those of either the Lacedæmonian aristocracy, or the Athenian democracy, when their tyranny has been most complained of by cotemporaries, and reprobated by posterity. The supremacy, asserted by the Theban people over all Bœotia, everywhere abhorred by the aristocratical party, carried oppression sometimes to excess even against the democratical, by which it had risen. The whole people of the little states of Platæa and Thespiæ were expelled. Numerous as the distressing circumstances unavoidably attending banishment must be, yet, through the division of Greece into parties, if subsistence did not fail, personal security could generally be found somewhere. But the unhappy Platæans and Thespians whither could they go? oppressed by that party to which they had always been among the firmest adherents. Lacedæmon, the enemy of their oppressors, was their hereditary enemy. With Athens indeed they had friendly connection; old and inherited connection; but Athens was now allied with Thebes, whence their persecution came. Their best hope nevertheless was in Athens, and thither, as suppliants, they directed their steps<sup>32</sup>.

It is in the nature of democracy to be both tyrannical and ambitious; but, like single despots, democracies will not always approve the tyranny, and still less the ambition, of other democracies. The overbearing haughtiness of Thebes, in her new prosperity, had already disgusted the Athenians. The invasion of Phocis, the antient ally of Athens, they much resented. The excessive violence used toward the Thespians and Platæans, the Platæans among their oldest and most constant confederates, at one time almost incorporated among the Athenian people, gave still more offence. Both Platæans and Thespians, therefore, found at Athens a ready and kind attention. With their situation, that of all Greece was taken into serious consideration by

Xen. Hel.  
1.6. c. 3.  
s. 1.  
Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 28. t. 2.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 46.

<sup>32</sup> Diodorus, in this part of the history, has mentioned several circumstances not noticed by Xenophon; but his narrative is so confused, and so continually marks deficient judgement, that little satisfactory can be gathered from him.

the Athenian government. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians had been provoking: the prospect of success against them, while the Athenian fleet, triumphant, commanded the seas, was alluring: but the very successes of that fleet had tended to raise Thebes to the power, which now was becoming an object of jealousy at Athens, the more, as Thebes was a nearer neighbor than Lacedæmon.

It is often extremely difficult to ascertain the real springs of political measures in a free government, because of the variety of jarring interests influencing the individuals who compose the political body, and of the dependency of public measures upon the accidental preponderance of this or that private interest. There is much appearance of a wise moderation in the Athenian government on this occasion; and indeed it seems unquestionable that the affairs of Athens were at this time generally directed by able men. Among them Iphicrates certainly was eminent; but Iphicrates did not carry the princely influence of a Pericles. At the head of a triumphant armament, he found his situation uneasy and perilous. When opposition from enemies was nearly overborne, that from fellowcitizens became only more alarming. The conduct of Iphicrates was wise; but his moderation, his ready concession to the wishes of those who desired to check the progress of his glory, is accounted for by circumstances reported by the cotemporary historian. A supply of money was becoming indispensable for the maintenance of his fleet; the application for which, at Athens, when the treasury could not furnish it, was always highly hazardous. If it was granted, which could not be depended upon, oppression of the rich, and discontent, more or less, of all ranks, was liable to follow. This gave opportunity for a strong opposition from interested men, who coveted the leading situations in the commonwealth. It was at the same time known that Lacedæmon was negotiating with Persia, by its able and formerly successful minister Antalcidas. A view to some, at least, among these circumstances, probably had induced Iphicrates to desire the orator Callistratus for his colleague in command. Callistratus thus became jointly responsible with him for the success of measures. Were the armament in want, it was incumbent upon Callistratus, not less than upon Iphicrates, to provide for its supply.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 3.  
s. 3.

s. 6.

If new emergencies arose, it was incumbent upon Callistratus to devise means of warding the danger insuing. The liberality of Iphicrates then seems to have led Callistratus, before his opponent, to become his partizan. Want of money pressing, Callistratus offered himself for negotiator with the Athenian people; pledging himself, if his colleague would be satisfied with the alternative, either to procure a vote for the money wanted, or to put forward negotiation for a peace, which would obviate the want. Iphicrates approved, and Callistratus went to Athens.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 3.  
s. 2.

The commander-in-chief of the armament being thus induced to concede to the wish for peace, which at home began to prevail extensively, it was decreed, in an assembly of the people, according to the historian's phrase, 'that peace should be made.' On first view, such a decree must always appear the produce of wildness in the people, or of faction misleading their voice. The inferior party in a war certainly cannot chuse when peace shall be made. But Athens was at this time fortunately in a situation to hold the balance of Greece; and it was therefore wisely resolved there to open negotiations, for the purpose of producing a peace beneficial to the nation. In the conduct of the business, a just attention to the rights of allies was observed. Ministers were first dispatched to Thebes, to invite a concurrence in negotiation, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta.

s. 5.

Whatever hope was entertained of success, from the pending negotiation with Persia, the Lacedæmonians were, in the moment, too severely pressed, not to be desirous of peace upon any moderate terms. At the requisition of Athens, therefore, ministers from all the belligerent republics were assembled in Lacedæmon. The congress being met, the Athenian ministers first addressed it: 'No lasting satisfaction,' they said, 'no confidence could obtain among the Greeks, if the former terms of alliance with Lacedæmon continued to be required, and if the former measures of its government were still pursued. The pretended object was universal independency; yet it was stipulated, that the citizens of the allied states should march whithersoever the Lacedæmonians should lead; and thus often they were compelled to make war upon their best friends.



SECT. IX. GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATED BY ATHENS.

403.

‘ Nor was this, however inconsistent with independency, the worst  
 ‘ circumstance of their lot; for the Lacedæmonians, arbitrarily inter-  
 ‘ fering in the internal government of the republics, committed the  
 ‘ supreme power to what hands they thought proper; and, giving  
 ‘ it here to a council of ten, there to a council of thirty, it was  
 ‘ always evidently their care, less that these should govern justly,  
 ‘ than that they should hold their respective states in the most  
 ‘ complete subserviency to Lacedæmon;’ ‘ so that,’ said the orator,  
 ‘ you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than in free governments.’

The existing circumstances gave weight to this remonstrance, and the Lacedæmonians agreed, that universal independency for Grecian cities should be the basis of the treaty to be negotiated. It followed of course that all those Lacedæmonian superintendants or governors, placed in so many cities with the title of harmost, were to be withdrawn. It was then covenanted, that armies should be disbanded and fleets laid up; and that, if any Grecian state acted contrary to these stipulations, it should be lawful for all to assist those on whom any injury fell from the breach of them; but that the universal independency, which formed the fundamental article of the treaty, should not be infringed, by any compulsion to join in hostilities.

Xen. Hel.  
 l. 6. c. 3.  
 s. 7.

The ready accession of the Lacedæmonians, to terms by which they gave up that supremacy, which they had so long, not only affected, but enjoyed, and which had so extensively been allowed as their prescriptive right, seems to have surprized the Theban ministers; and, with the general satisfaction, which it was so well adapted to produce, in some degree forced them into a concurrence, which they had not intended, and which their instructions did not warrant. For the ruling party in Thebes, aware that, not their power only, but perhaps their existence, depended on it, were resolved not to forego that command, which they had acquired over the other cities of Bœotia. Borne away, nevertheless, by the torrent of united opinions and wishes, the Theban ministers joined in the sacrifice, and in the solemn oath, which bound all to the treaty.

• That breach, however, of their instructions, which, in the moment, perhaps, they were scarcely able to avoid, on the very next day they

endeavored to remedy; and a privilege,\* which the Lacedæmonians, amid their apparent moderation and real concessions, had reserved to themselves, afforded the pretence. The Athenians and their allies, by their respective ministers, had severally sworn to the observance of the treaty; but the Lacedæmonian representatives alone took the oath, expressly for themselves and their allies. No ministers from the allies of Thebes appear to have been present, and the Theban ministers had taken the oath in the name of the Thebans only. They now demanded that, for the Theban name, the Bœotian might be substituted. Agesilaus opposed this: he would allow no such alteration, he said; but if the Thebans desired to be intirely excluded from the treaty, their name might be erased.

In this dispute were involved consequences not to be estimated by human foresight. Xenophon's penetrating and anxious eye however discerned them, tho' indistinctly, as yet under many folds. Unfortunately for so interesting a period of the history, his connection with Agesilaus, and the dependency, in which circumstances had placed him, upon the Lacedæmonian government, made him unavoidably a party-man: not so far that we find any reason to suppose he has related any untruth, but so as often to give cause for wishing that he had more related the whole truth; for the accounts of later writers, panegyrist of the illustrious Thebans who opposed Agesilaus, are utterly unsatisfactory. Xenophon has not named the Theban ambassadors at the congress. Diodorus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch, concur in reporting that Epameinondas was at the head of them, and, by his eloquence, in invective against the Lacedæmonians, shook the attachment of their allies. But it is commonly by private communication, rather than by public harangue, except where negotiation must be managed with a popular assembly, that such points are carried. We may indeed gather, from Xenophon, that the able conductors of the Theban affairs had probable ground for depending on a disposition, in some of the republics, so far at least favorable to Thebes, as a jealousy, still entertained, of Lacedæmon might make them so. But in the moment nothing of the kind seems to have appeared openly. The congress declared its approbation of the opinion of Agesilaus; and, when

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 3.  
s. 8.

Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 38.  
Plut. Agesil.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 4.  
s. 15.

1. 6. c. 3.  
s. 9.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 50.

when the Theban ministers, whether hampered by their instructions, or decided by their own party-views, persevered in renunciation of the treaty, unless the alteration of names were admitted, the Athenians, as Xenophon assures us, considered Thebes as undone; and the Theban ministers, aware of the magnitude of danger to their country from its opposition to united Greece, departed in much dejection<sup>31</sup>.

SECTION X.

*Independency of the Boeotian towns; asserted by the Lacedæmonians; resisted by the Thebans: Battle of Leuctra:*

IN Athens, at this time, the general wish was for peace; and, no leading influence of an ambitious demagogue opposing, the conditions of the treaty concluded were readily and even scrupulously executed. Athenian garrisons were everywhere withdrawn: orders were dispatched for the immediate return of Iphicrates, with that fleet which nothing in the Grecian seas could oppose; and whatever had been taken, after the ceremony of swearing to the treaty, was punctually restored. The Lacedæmonians were not less exact in recalling all those superintending officers, who, with the title of harmost, had governed Grecian cities; and they withdrew all their troops from the territories of those called their allies, except the army under Cleombrotus in Phocis, which they left without orders. Cleombrotus, fearful of censure, for acting or not acting, sent home for instructions. The Lacedæmonian assembly was convened; and, in result, orders were sent, for the king to pro-

B. C. 371.  
Oli. 102. 1/2.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 1.

s. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Plutarch, when he has a mind to tell the truth, generally gives his authority: when he paints from his own fancy, which seems to have been very frequent with him, he is honest enough not to pretend that he has any name to vouch for the fidelity of his picture. I do not recollect that he has ever quoted authority for any of his numerous and direct contradictions of Xenophon; nor that he ever, on such an occasion, has men-

tioned the name of Xenophon, whom, on the contrary, on many occasions, he has commended highly. He has painted this embassy in colors apparently quite his own. His style of historical painting has that facility for the painter, that it imposes no necessity for the picture to harmonize with the general course of history; and of this he has abundantly availed himself.

secute hostilities against Thebes, unless the independency of the Bœotian towns were immediately admitted.

Those who guided the Theban councils had taken their resolution, and they persevered in it. Pelopidas, and still more Epameinondas, who at this time principally directed those councils, were unquestionably superior men; and perhaps it should be imputed to unfortunate necessity, to the circumstances of Thebes, and to the vices in the political system of Greece, if they did not fairly earn the praise of pure political virtue and enlarged patriotism, which their panegyrists, antient and modern, have been fond of attributing to them. They were engaged with a party. On the support of that party depended the means for themselves and their friends to exist in Thebes. The subjection of the Bœotian towns was necessary, as we have observed, to the power, and perhaps to the existence of that party; at least to its existence in Bœotia; and possibly the extermination of the unfortunate Platæans and Thespians (a fact uncontradicted, and little palliated, by their panegyrists) may have been necessary to the security of that sovereignty of Thebes over Bœotia, on which the welfare and safety, not of themselves only, but of all their party, so much depended. Evidently, however, not that Greece should be free, but that Thebes should be powerful, and that they should lead in Thebes, and give law to Greece, were the objects to which all their measures directly tended.

Pressed, nevertheless, as they certainly were, by unfortunate necessities, these able men did not engage their country in the unequal contest, in which the peace made by Lacedæmon with the rest of Greece left it implicated, without reasonable ground of hope that, by diligent exertion of their talents, they might so profit from existing circumstances, as to make the balance equal, or even bring the preponderancy in their favor. Tho, Thebes alone excepted, all the republics of the nation were now in league with Lacedæmon, yet neither the late enemies, nor even the antient allies of that state, they knew, were cordially attached to it. In every city there was a party more or less friendly to the Theban cause, if for no other reason than because it was adverse to the Lacedæmonian. This spirit of party pervaded, to a considerable extent, even the army now upon the point of invading

Bœotia.

M. T. Cic.  
Corn. Nep.  
Plut.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 4.  
s. 5.

Bœotia. The king, moreover, who commanded that army, they knew was little respected in it. That, in former campaigns, he had shown no vigor, was notorious; and, among those under him, most zealous for the prosecution of the measures which he was commissioned to promote, there were some who did not scruple to assert, what the example of former kings of Lacedæmon might render credible, that he treacherously favored the Thebans.

Decided then by these complex considerations, the Theban leaders held the force of Bœotia together, and occupied the defile by which it was supposed the Lacedæmonian king would propose to enter their country. But, by a conduct apparently able, Cleombrotus rendered their measure vain. Instead of marching eastward, directly for the Bœotian plain, he moved southward; and, by an unfrequented mountain-road, coming unexpectedly upon Creusis, a Bœotian port on the Corinthian gulph, he took the town, with twelve triremes lying in the harbour. The passage hence across the mountains being open, he proceeded unopposed into the Thespian territory, and incamped near Leuctra.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 4.  
s. 3.

Disappointed thus in the hope of balancing their inferiority of force by advantage of ground for defence, the Thebans had to apprehend all the pressure of war upon their country, which had been experienced in the invasions under Agesilaus. For the fidelity of the Bœotian towns, they knew, was precarious; to prevent the ravage of their fields, any of them would surrender without siege; and the first blockade to be formed would be that of Thebes itself. With the pressure of want then, which must sooner or later follow, a turn in the disposition even of the Theban people would be to be apprehended: the opponents of the ruling party might regain an overbearing influence; and most of the present leaders, as the cotemporary historian says, having tried the evils of banishment, thought it better to die fighting, than again become fugitives.

Urged by such motives, Epameinondas and Pelopidas resolved upon the bold measure, which, for ages, had been held among the Greeks as a forlorn hope, to engage the Lacedæmonians in the field, with inferior forces. But, having taken their resolution, they were ingenious and indefatigable

indefatigable in devising and practising whatever might promote its success. That powerful engine, superstition, was not neglected. A saying, whether already popular, or invented for the occasion, was circulated in rumor as antient and oracular, 'that a Lacedæmonian army should be defeated at the virgins' tomb;' a monument near the Theban camp, where, according to old report, some virgins, violated by Lacedæmonians, had destroyed themselves. To increase the effect for the popular mind, the monument was ornamented with ceremonious solemnity. Intelligence was then carried to the army, that all the temple doors in Thebes had opened spontaneously, and that the priestesses had declared the omen to portend victory to the Thebans. This was followed by information, that the arms in the temple of Hercules had disappeared; whence it was affirmed to be evident, that the god would assist the Thebans in the approaching battle.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 7.

While the Theban leaders were thus employing all means to animate their people, the deficient activity, or deficient courage, of the Lacedæmonian king, wanted incitement from those under his command. His friends, and those, not all perhaps properly his friends, who were leading men among his party in the army, uneasy at the reports circulating against him, anxiously urged him to refute the calumny by a vigorous conduct, and they advised him immediately to seek and fight the enemy. In no proper season or circumstances, then, the council of war was held, which finally determined on the battle and its order: it was after the midday meal, when the free circulation of wine had excited that animation, which seems to have been otherwise deficient. The ground between the two armies was a plain, and therefore it was resolved to place the cavalry in front of the phalanx.

s. 8.

July 8.  
Dodw.

Never of reputation, like the infantry, it was at this time particularly ill-conditioned. The purchase and maintenance of the horses, imposed as a tax upon the wealthy, had been a duty ill-executed; for the method even invited negligence. Not till the moment of exigency, when the men, whose turn it was for service, were already assembled, the horses were called for. The men least able in body, and least desirous of distinguishing themselves, were generally selected, or procured themselves to be named, for the cavalry; and such horses,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 11.

with

with such arms, accoutrements, and furniture, as were in the moment produced by those required to provide them, they were to take, and immediately proceed on service.

To these defective troops every circumstance invited the Theban generals immediately to oppose their cavalry; always esteemed superior to most in Greece, and, at this time, not only carefully appointed and highly trained, but of considerable practice in service. Accordingly they, like the Lacedæmonians, placed their cavalry in front of their phalanx. With the cavalry therefore the action began. The Lacedæmonian horse were quickly routed, and in their flight disturbed the order of their own infantry. The Theban phalanx, formed in column fifty deep, then, according to the preconcerted plan, charged the Lacedæmonian line, formed only twelve deep, in that part where the king had his station. The assault was repelled, but Cleombrotus received a mortal wound. He was carried alive out of the action, but died soon after.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 10. 12.

s. 13.

The able generals of the Thebans quickly restored order and animation to their troops; the impulse of the column was renewed, and one of the bloodiest actions ever known in Greece followed. Generally those killed in battle, while contest lasted, were few: defensive armour prevented rapid slaughter, till, an impression being made, and flight insuing, the shield and the breastplate lost their efficacy. But here equality of skill, force, and perseverance, made the contest doubtful while numbers fell. On the Lacedæmonian side, Deinon, one of the polemarchs commanding next under the king, Sphodrias, whose corruption had brought the enmity of Athens upon his country, and his worthier son Cleonymus, the friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, were killed. Then the whole right wing, unable any longer to withstand the pressure of the Theban column, retired; and shortly, as the Theban generals had foreseen, the left, less pressed, retired nevertheless also, to avoid attack in flank. Without total loss of order, but not wholly without the carnage incident to flight, both reached their camp, and formed behind its intrenchment.

s. 14.

s. 12.

This, and the advantage of the situation, a rising ground, stopped the pursuing victors: and then, the Lacedæmonians, resting on their

arms, and looking on one another with astonishment, would, many of them, scarcely believe the transaction in which they had been partakers; for, within the reach of tradition, and, as it was believed, since the days of Lycurgus, a Lacedæmonian army had never before been defeated by inferior numbers; insomuch that throughout Greece it was generally reckoned next to impossible. Some therefore insisted that still the enemy should not be permitted to raise their trophy; that no truce should be solicited for the burial of the dead; that the bodies should be recovered arms in hand. But the surviving polemarchs, having learnt that, of seven hundred Spartans, scarcely three hundred remained alive; that, of those Lacedæmonians who had not the honor of the Spartan name, near a thousand had been killed<sup>35</sup>; that the allies, who had suffered less, were nevertheless totally averse to fresh action, and some of them so disaffected, as even to rejoice in the disaster, justly thought the most careful circumspection requisite, and rashness in enterprize to be utterly avoided. They called therefore a council of war; and upon a deliberate review of circumstances, the necessity of soliciting a truce, for the burial of the slain, was admitted by all. The herald therefore was sent, and the truce was obtained.

Then the Thebans erected their trophy; a trophy esteemed, under all its circumstances, the most glorious, and likely to be, in its consequences, among the most important, ever won in a battle of Greeks with Greeks. The Lacedæmonian commanders seem to have had no view to anything better than to defend themselves, in their present

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 15.

<sup>35</sup> It is not, I will own, to me very clear, from the text of Xenophon, whether the four hundred Spartans killed were or were not intended to be included in the expression τῶν συμπάντων Λακεδαιμονίων, and I have not been fortunate enough to find any assistance from translators or commentators. The phrase altogether would lead one to suppose they were intended to be included, were not that construction rendered improbable, by the most authentic accounts of the proportion of Spartans to the other Lacedæmonians, on all other occasions, in the Lacedæmonian armies. In the Agesilaus

(c. 3. s. 24.) Xenophon seems to assert that the number of Spartans killed at Leuctra was equal to that of the survivors, not in the army only, but all the survivors.

According to Diodorus the Bœotians were only six thousand, and he says they were joined by fifteen hundred foot and five hundred horse from Thessaly. It seems not very consistent with the far more authoritative account of Xenophon, that any such Thessalian force should have been at Leuctra; but the Bœotian may probably have been greater than Diodorus has stated.



station, till succour might arrive from home. But the Theban generals, circumspect as enterprizing, would not venture assault upon their numbers and discipline, in a situation giving such advantage against the weapons of antiquity. They looked around to the opportunities, opened by an event so out of the expectation of all Greece, as that of the late battle. They hoped for extensive success in negotiation, through the credit so commonly following unlooked-for success in arms. They trusted that they might prevent the approach of relief from Peloponnesus; and, by meerly intercepting supplies, they thought to compel the Lacedæmonian army to unconditional surrender.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Elevation of THEBES, by the Battle of LEUCTRA, to the Failure of the Attempt to extend the THEBAN SUPREMACY OVER GREECE, through Support from PERSIA.

## SECTION I.

*Reception of news of the Battle of Leuctra, at Lacedæmon, at Athens. Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly; Polydamas of Pharsalus: Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly: Power and great views of Jason: Mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: Magnificent preparation of Jason for the Pythian festival: Death and successors of Jason: Fall of the Thessalian power.*

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 4.  
s. 16.  
B. C. 371.  
Ol. 102.  $\frac{1}{2}$ .  
10 July.  
Dodw.

**I**NTELLIGENCE of the fatal blow at Léuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much real magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern, which the institutions of Lycurgus commanded. It happened to be the last day of the festival called the Naked Games; and the chorus of men was on the stage, before the assembled people, when the officer charged with the dispatches arrived. The ephors were present, as their official duty required, and to them the dispatches were delivered. Without interrupting the entertainment, they communicated the names of the slain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women should avoid that clamorous lamentation, which was usual, and bear the calamity in silence. On the morrow all the relations of the slain appeared as usual in public, with a deportment of festivity and triumph, while the few kinsmen of the survivors, who showed themselves abroad, carefully marked, in their appearance, humiliation and dejection.

It was a large proportion of the best strength of the commonwealth that, after so great a loss in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to be calculated. Every exertion therefore was to be made to save it. Of six moras, into which, for military purposes, the Lacedæmonian people were divided, the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood (such was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen<sup>1</sup>), had marched under Cleombrotus; those however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with those of the absent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no longer allowing exception for those in office. The command, Agesilaus being not yet sufficiently Xen. Hel. I. 6. c. 4. s. 17. recovered to take it, was committed to his son Archidamus. Requisitions were at the same time hastened off for the assistance of the allies; and the Lacedæmonian interest, or the interest adverse to the pretensions and apprehended purposes of Thebes, so prevailed in Tegea, Mansinea, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achaian towns, that the contingent of troops, from all those places, was forwarded with alacrity. s. 18.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to pay a compliment that might promote their interest in Athens, had hastened thither information of their splendid success. But the impression made by this communication was not favorable to their views: on the contrary, it showed that the jealousy, formerly entertained so generally among the Athenians toward Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the incessant quarrels among the Grecian republics, source indeed of lasting glory to some, brought however, with their decision, neither lasting power nor lasting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new discord, had a constant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. The Grecian statesmen, quick, penetrating, and every way able, but circumscribed in means, and led by circumstances to take a deep interest in petty politics, and give their minds eagerly to narrow views, appear not to have had leisure to look abroad, so as to advert to the ready possibility of some potentate arising, capable of crushing all their

<sup>1</sup> This expression has been already noticed in Note 19. Ch. 25. Sect. 4. of this History.

divided

divided republics together. The cotemporary historian indeed, in the quiet of his banishment, speculating, not with view confined by little and local interests, nor with the crude ideās of a closet-politician, but with the extended ken of one who, in the poet's phrase, 'had seen the cities, and observed the manners and the policy of many men,' was aware, not only that this might be, but that the formidable phenomenon already existed.

Hom. Odys.  
init.

Relief to Lacedæmon, in its pressing danger, came, not from its own exertion, not from the interest which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion, with which Lacedæmon had oppressed them, but from a power newly risen, or revived, in a corner of the country, whence, for centuries, Greece had not been accustomed to apprehend anything formidable. JASON, of Pheræ in Thessaly, was one of those extraordinary men, in whom superior powers of mind and body sometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero, had he lived with Achilles; and, as a politician, he could have contended with Themistocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Thessaly; and he appears to have acquired there a powerful popularity. Little informed however of the early part of his life, we find him mentioned as general of the Pheræans about six years before the battle of Leuctra, and commanding a force sent to assist Neagenes, chief of Histiaæa in Eubœa. In the contests of faction, in Thessaly, it was become common to employ mercenary troops. Jason excelled in diligence in training such troops, in courage and skill in commanding them, and in the arts by which he attached them to his interest.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 1.  
s. 4.  
Diod. l. 15.

c. 30.

Xen. Anab.  
l. 1. c. 6.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 1.  
s. 2.

Of the state of Thessaly, at this time, altogether, we may form some judgement from what the cotemporary historian has related of Pharsalus, one of its most considerable cities. The leaders of the factions, by which Pharsalus was torn, at length, weary of ruinous contest, came to an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellowcitizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Thessaly for high birth, large possessions, and that splendid hospitality for which the Thessalians were distinguished, but more singularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharsalians committed the command of their citadel, and the exclusive management of their

their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In so extraordinary and invidious an office, Polydamas had the talents and the goodfortune to succeed in everything, except in opposing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jason. Tyrant, according to one party, chief of the patriots, as the other would call him, in his own city, Pheræ, Jason had proceeded to bring most of the Thessalian cities, some by policy, some by arms, under that kind of subjection, which so commonly in Greece was intitled confederacy. The strength of Pharsalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, was exerted to protect them. But Pharsalus itself was threatened, when Jason sent a proposal for a conference with the chief, which was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his intention to reduce Pharsalus, and the towns dependant upon Pharsalus, to dependency upon himself; but declared that it was his wish to effect this rather by negotiation than by violence, and with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. It was in the power of Polydamas, he said, to persuade the Pharsalians; but, that it was not in his power to defend them, the result of all his recent efforts sufficiently showed. For himself, he was resolved to hold the first situation in Greece; the second he offered to Polydamas. What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, Polydamas as well as himself could estimate. The cavalry of all Thessaly, which would be united under them, was not less than six thousand strong: the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thousand; the numerous inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, subjects of the Thessalian cities, were excellent targeteers. In addition to this force then, he had six thousand mercenaries in his pay; a body such as, for choice of men, and perfection of discipline, no commonwealth of Greece possessed. Some estimate might be formed of his means, from his success in bringing under his dominion or patronage the Thessalian cities, of which Pharsalus had been the patronizing power: his military force had been made conspicuous in the reduction of the Maracs, the Dolopians, and the powerful Alectas, chief of Epirus, who all owned subjection to him. The Bœotians, with all the states of their confederacy, were his allies, and ready to admit him for their leader in the war against Lacedæmon, from whose overbearing power they apprehended

‘ apprehended oppression; and the Athenians, it was well known,  
 ‘ were desirous of his alliance. But connection with Athens did not  
 ‘ suit his views; for the Athenians affected to be the first maritime  
 ‘ power of Greece, and he meant to make Thessaly the first maritime  
 ‘ power of Greece; which he thought even easier than to acquire  
 ‘ imperial preëminence on land, which was nevertheless his purpose.  
 ‘ The three necessaries to naval power were timber, hands, and  
 ‘ revenue. With the former, Athens was supplied from Macedonia,  
 ‘ which lay much more conveniently for the supply of Thessaly. With  
 ‘ the second their Penestian subjects were a resource, to which Athens  
 ‘ had nothing equal.’ (The Penestians were a conquered people, reduced  
 to a kind of vassalage under the Thessalians, for whom they performed  
 menial and laborious offices, but were not held in a slavery so severe  
 and degrading as the Helots of Laconia, for we find them admitted to  
 that military service, the cavalry, which was generally reckoned,  
 among the Greeks, to assort only with rank above the lowest citizens.)  
 ‘ For revenue then, not only their country was incomparably richer,  
 ‘ but, instead of deriving a foreign revenue from a few little scattered  
 ‘ islands, whenever Thessaly was united under one chief, all the sur-  
 ‘ rounding tribes of their continent had paid them tribute.’

Demosth.  
 ἀπὸ συνταξ.  
 p. 173. ed.  
 Reiske.

It had been a practice of the Thessalian republics, always acknowleg-  
 ing some common bonds of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occa-  
 sions, a common military commander, a captain-general of the Thessalian  
 nation, with the title of Tagus\*. To this high rank and great com-  
 mand Jason aspired, and the approbation of the Pharsalian govern-  
 ment, it appears, was necessary. But he was far from so confining  
 his views. Even the command of all Greece did not suffice for his  
 ambition. ‘ That all Greece might be reduced under their dominion;’  
 he observed to Polydamas, ‘ appeared probable from what he had  
 ‘ already stated: but he conceived the conquest of the Persian empire

\* The Thessalian title Tagus seems to have been the same word with the Teutonic *Toga*, a *Leader*; and perhaps the Latin *Dux* has been only another variety of it; whence the verb *duco*, as, in the Greek, *ταγίσω* from *ταγός*. *Heretoga*, literally *Armyleader*, was the Anglosaxon word for a *General*, and, in the coarser language of modern Germany, our title of *Duke* is expressed by the word *Hertog*.

‘ to be a still easier achievement; the practical proof, afforded by the  
 ‘ return of the Cyreian Greeks, and by the great progress made, with  
 ‘ a very small force, by Agesilaus, leaving this no longer a matter of  
 ‘ meer speculation.’

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the justness of Jason’s reasoning; but alledged his own connection with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an objection that appeared to him insuperable. Jason, commending his fidelity to his engagements, freely consented that he should go to Lacedæmon, and state his circumstances; and, if he could not obtain succour which might give him reasonable hope of successful resistance, then he would stand clearly excused, both to his allies and to his fellowcitizens, in accepting the proposal made to him. The communication of this extraordinary transaction, by Polydamas, to the Lacedæmonian government, afforded the cotemporary historian the means of becoming acquainted with it. The Lacedæmo-  
Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 1. s. 5.  
 nians, pressed at that time by a land war, against which they could scarcely protect their allies, while the hostile fleet of Athens commanded the seas, after three days debate on the difficult proposition, liberally acknowledged their inability to give certain protection to Polydamas and the Pharsalians against Jason, and therefore left it to them to consult their own interest.

Polydamas, returning then into Thessaly, requested and obtained s. 6. from Jason, that he should hold, under his own peculiar command, the citadel of Pharsalus, which had been, in a manner so honorable to him, intrusted to his charge. For security of his fidelity to his new engagements, he surrendered his children as hostages. The Pharsalians, persuaded to acquiesce, were admitted to terms of peace and friendship by Jason, who was then elected, without opposition, tagus of Thessaly.

The first object of Jason, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowledging him its constitutional military commander, could furnish; and it was found to s. 7. amount to more than eight thousand horse, full twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers enough, in the cotemporary historian’s phrase, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue,

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 1.  
s. 7.  
& Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 60.

which might inable him to give energy to this force. Jason was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he desired to have willing subjects. He required therefore from the dependent states, around Thessaly, only that tribute which had been formerly assessed, under the tagus Scopas.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 4.  
s. 20.

At the time of the battle of Leuctra, Jason was already this formidable potentate, and he was then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans sent to the Athenian people an account of that splendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence also to the tagus of Thessaly; and they added a request for his coopération, toward the complete overthrow of the tyranny, so long exercised by the Lacedæmonians, over the Greek nation. The circumstances were altogether such as Jason was not likely to look upon with indifference.

s. 21.

Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himself at the head of his mercenaries, who were his standing army, and, taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. A war then existed between the Thessalians and Phocians, of that extreme enmity, sometimes regularly declared among the Greeks, in which all communication, even by heralds, was interdicted; and of course no quarter was regularly allowed, nor could any step toward an accommodation easily be taken. Nevertheless, with his escort so hastily assembled, he ventured to traverse their country; and entering some of the towns before even intelligence of his approach had reached them, and getting far forward before anywhere numbers could be collected capable of opposing him, he reached Bœotia without loss; showing, as the cotemporary historian observes, how much dispatch may often do more than force.

s. 24.

s. 22—25.

Jason, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hospitality, with Lacedæmon. Pleased with the humiliation of his hosts, he was not desirous that his allies should become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp, therefore, demurring to the proposal of the Theban generals, for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counsellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly succeeded so far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians hastened to use the opportunity for reaching a place of safety. They decamped in the evening; and trusting more, says Xenophon, to concealment and speed, than to

Theban



Theban faith, for their secure march across the plain, they reached Cithæron before dawn; and, still not free from alarm, in pressing their rugged way across the mountains, they did not halt till they came to Aigostheni in the Megaric territory. There they were joined by Archidamus, with the troops sent from Lacedæmon for their relief. By their safe arrival, however, in a friendly territory, the great object of the expedition being accomplished, Archidamus returned to Corinth, dismissed the allies, and led the Lacedæmonians home<sup>3</sup>.

Jason, after having thus acted as arbiter of Greece, hastened his return to Thessaly. In his way through the hostile province of Phocis, with leisure to exercise his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted strength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whose suburbs and territory he wasted, killing many of the people. The Lacedæmonian colony of Heracleia was then to be passed. He had served Lacedæmon at Leuctra, because he thought it for his interest, and he would, without scruple or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in its colony of Heracleia, because the prosperity of that colony would obstruct his views. Heracleia was most critically situated, for commanding the only easily practicable communication between the countries northward and southward. He therefore demolished the fortifications; evidently not fearing, says Xenophon, that, by laying the passage open, he should indanger his own country, but providing that none, by holding the command of the pass, should prevent him from marching into the southern provinces, whenever he might desire it.

Decidedly now the greatest potentate of Greece; powerful, not by his own strength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all sides his alliance was courted, Jason proposed to display his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded all republics, owning the authority of the tagus of Thessaly, to feed oxen, sheep, goats, and swine, for the sacrifices; and he proposed the reward

<sup>2</sup> This simple narrative of Xenophon, certainly not flattering to his friends, would earn credit, without the authority of his name. The account, given by Diodorus, of the junction of the force under Archidamus

with the retreating army, and of their separation afterward for shame, is among the stories to be found in his work, beneath serious criticism.

of a golden crown for the state which should produce the finest ox, to lead the herd for the god. By a very easy impost on them severally, he collected more than a thousand oxen, and ten thousand smaller cattle. He appointed a day, a little before the festival, for assembling the military force of Thessaly; and the expectation in Greece was, that he would assume to himself the presidency. Apprehension arose that he might seize the treasure of Delphi; insomuch that the Delphians consulted their oracle, for directions from the god for their conduct on the occasion. The answer, according to report, was similar to what had been given to their forefathers, when Xerxes invaded Greece, 'that the care of the treasure would be the god's own concern.'

Xen. Hel.  
1.6. c.4.  
s. 30.

Ch. 8. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hel.  
1.6. c.4.  
s. 31, 32.  
Diod. 1.15.  
c. 60.  
B. C. 370.  
Ol. 102.  $\frac{3}{4}$ .  
May.

Before the period for the splendid display arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, sitting to give audience to any who might have occasion to speak to him, was assassinated by seven youths, who approached with the pretence of stating a matter in dispute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the spot, and another as he was mounting his horse; but the rest so profited from the confusion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumstances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their escape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage proposed from it, we are not informed. No symptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the historian; but what he mentions to have followed, marks, at the same time, the popularity of Jason among the Thessalians, and the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceased, Polydorus and Polyphron, were appointed jointly to succeed to the dignity of tagus: the assassins could find no refuge in Thessaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honor: proof, says the cotemporary historian, how vehemently it was apprehended that Jason would succeed in his purpose, of making himself sovereign of the country. Such was the unfortunate state of Greece: in the weakness of its little republics, men were compelled to approve means the most nefarious, where other prospect failed, by which their

fears were relieved, and present safety procured. Thus assassination became so generally creditable, or at least so little uncreditable, that hope of safety, through speed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.

## SECTION II.

*Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian supremacy. Congress at Athens: Cessation of jealousy of Persia: Opposition of Elis to the proposal for the universal independency of Grecian cities. Irritating conduct of the democratical party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. Evils resulting from the separate independency of cities. Liberal project of the Tegeans for a union of the Arcadian cities illiberally executed: Violent interference of the Mantineians: Arbitrary assumption of authority by the Lacedæmonians: Union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded.*

THE event of the battle of Leuctra made a great impression throughout Greece. In many republics joy prevailed, at the glorious success of a rising, lately an oppressed, people, against those who had long been looked upon, by one party, at least, through the nation, as common oppressors; and many individuals, and some states, before cautious of avowing friendliness to the Theban cause, were now ready to join in war against Lacedæmon. But others, of more circumspection and better foresight, were aware that, under the political circumstances of Greece, in raising a new state to præminence, they were only raising new oppressors. In Peloponnesus a more general jealousy arose, of the acquisition of imperial sway by a state beyond the peninsula; and wherever the aristocratical interest prevailed, an apprehension of democratical tyranny struck with horror. Under Lacedæmonian supremacy, the Peloponnesian states, collectively, had held a superiority among those of the Grecian name; which must be lost, if Thebes became the leading power of Greece. Communication therefore being held among  
the

the Peloponnesian cities, it was resolved, that the supremacy of Lacedæmon should be supported; and that the troops of all the confederated republics should be bound, as formerly, to attend the call of the Lacedæmonian government, and march wherever the Lacedæmonians should lead.

In the contest of Thebes with Lacedæmon, the leaders of the Athenian councils, generally able and moderate men, seem always to have had in view to hold the balance between them, and to avoid a decided connection with either. When, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans urged the utter overthrow of Lacedæmon, with the pretence that the common welfare of Greece required it, the Athenians, justly jealous of the growing power of Thebes, refused to concur; but when advantage was taken of the pause of hostility, which the mediation of Jason procured, to renew, among the Peloponnesian states, that union of military force under Lacedæmonian authority, which would restore to Lacedæmon its former means of oppression, a jealousy, no less just, arose, of the revival of Lacedæmonian empire. The Athenian government then resolved upon a measure becoming the dignity of their city, and, as those judging with the ordinary measure of human foresight might not unreasonably suppose, most likely to promote the quiet and welfare of Greece; inviting a congress of deputies, from all the states, which had been parties to the peace of Antalcidas, to assemble in Athens.

We can however scarcely, without some wonder, observe the easy manner in which the able historian of these times repeatedly mentions the peace of Antalcidas, by the description of 'the peace which the KING prescribed,' or 'the terms which the KING commanded'.<sup>4</sup> Not only he so speaks of it in his own person, but the same description is attributed by him to speakers before the congress of the Grecian states; and it occurs even in a decree of the Athenian people, which he has reported. In vain then shall we look for explanation of this phenomenon from later antient authors. Of whatever concerns the politics of the republican times, the writers under the Roman empire,

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 3.  
s. 5, 6.  
c. 5. s. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Βασιλεὺς προσέταξε. Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 5. Βασιλεὺς ἐγγράψε. s. 6. Βασιλεὺς κατέπεμψε. c. 5. s. 1. & s. 2.

Greek as well as Latin, have perverted much, and elucidated very little. A collation however of the extant works of cotemporaries, orators, philosophers, and sometimes the comic poet, with the historian, will often furnish light, and always the surest, wherever any may be wanting, for the generally very perspicuous narrative, which Xenophon, writing for those familiar with the circumstances of the times, has, in some few parts, left obscure for late posterity.

It is evident that all dread of the Persian power, any farther than as Persian wealth might inable one party, in a divided nation, to overbear another, had long ceased among the Greeks; and that, since the return of the Cyreians, but, still more, since the expedition of Agesilaus, the hope of conquering Persia had superseded the fear of conquest from that decaying empire<sup>5</sup>. But the want of a mediator in the endless differences of their numerous little republics, was constantly and pressingly felt; and when the king of Persia, who, from his superiority in wealth and extent of dominion, was commonly called the great king, or often simply the king, ceased to repel as an object of terror, none would be so likely to attract as an object of respect. It is remarkable that the peace of Antalcidas, so reprobated by declaimers of aftertimes as the reproach of Greece, the first great symptom of her degeneracy, was received by a large majority of the republics, as a kind of charter of Grecian freedom, and as such is mentioned by Xenophon; a charter to secure them against oppression, not from the Persian king, but from their fellowcountrymen<sup>6</sup>. The congress, desired by the Athenians, met: no officer of the great king's attended: no symptom of Persian influence appeared: but the Athenians proposed, and the congress approved, an oath to be taken by the several deputies, in the name of their respective republics, which remains reported by Xenophon, thus:

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 1.  
s. 4.  
Isocr. ad  
Phil. or. t. 1.  
p. 386.  
& Panath.  
t. 2. p. 496.  
Polyb. l. 3.  
p. 162.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 2.

‘ I will abide by the terms of the peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any state, partaking in this oath, shall be attacked, I will assist it with all my

<sup>5</sup> Μη Ἀνταλκίδας ἔλθῃ ἔχων χρήματα παρὰ βασιλέως — (Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. s. 6.) was Isocrates recommending adherence to the συνθήκας γενομένης μὲν πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, de Pace, p. 178. t. 2. ed Auger. the fear of the opponents of Lacedæmon.

<sup>6</sup> In this view of the business we find

‘ strength.’

‘strength.’ This congress seems to have been composed of deputies from nearly every state of Greece; and, among them, the Eleian alone, insisting that Elis should retain its sovereignty over the people of Marganæ, Scillus, and Triphylia, objected to the Athenian proposal: the rest, even the Lacedæmonians, acceded to it, with expression of much satisfaction.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 3.

It is obvious that, under that supremacy of Lacedæmon, which a strong party through the Peloponnesian cities was desirous of supporting, Greece could not be truly free. Yet events immediately following the formal abolition of that supremacy, by the treaty of Athens, sufficiently account for the politics of that party, as they evince that, when delivered from the sovereignty of one state over the rest, Greece was still incapable of supporting freedom. The detail, as it is reported by the same able writer from whom we have the account of the expedition of Cyrus, if it should not, like the detail of that expedition, interest the imagination, will however offer political lessons of superior value; and the circumstances will require the more attention, as they were the immediate causes of that political decrepitude, in which the Grecian republics ceased to have importance among the affairs of nations, long before they fell all an easy prey to a foreign power.

We have seen that, very soon after the conclusion of the treaty called the peace of Antalcidas, or the king’s peace, the Lacedæmonians, whose measure that treaty really was, by a violence very contrary to its tenor, compelled the Mantineians to abandon their town, and separate themselves in villages. To those of higher rank, in general, this was not totally disagreeable; because, whatever inconveniencies it might bring, and whatever obstruction to a soaring ambition, it secured them against an odious subjection to the capricious despotism of the assembled multitude, and made that political power, which the Lacedæmonians allowed them, safe in their hands. But, the treaty of Athens again declaring, for every Grecian state, its right of separate independency, and warranting that right, the leaders of the democratical party, among the Mantineians, thought the moment favorable for attempting to regain their former superiority. With this view they proposed the reëstablishment of the capital of their little state, with the

the restoration of their common assembly; and they encouraged their adherents, by observing, that the late treaty would secure them against the imperious interference of Lacedæmon, which was a party to that treaty. The proposal became extensively popular; and, in general assembly, it was decreed, that the families from the old capital should reassemble there, and that the place should be immediately fortified.

Xen. Hæl.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 3.

This gave great uneasiness in Lacedæmon. The party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest would command in Mantinea; the friends of Lacedæmon would be oppressed; and the measure would appear, in the eyes of all Greece, to be taken in contempt of Lacedæmon: but, by the treaty just concluded, any forcible interference was too directly forbidden, to be, without offence to all Greece, attempted. It happened that Agesilaus had extensive personal interest, and family interest, in Mantinea<sup>s</sup>. Under the existing difficulties, therefore, it appeared the best resource, that the king himself should go to Mantinea, and manage negotiation with its people.

s. 4.

For a prince who, at the head of armies, had been the avenger of his country against the Persian empire, had not only secured European Greece, but had extended protection to all the Greeks of Asia, and spread terror among the enemies of the Grecian name, even to the great king upon his distant throne, it must have been a humiliating office to go, as minister from the government of his country, to solicit the people of a little neighboring state, accustomed to receive his commands. Probably, in the existing situation of his country and of Greece, he saw the importance of the object too strongly to desire to avoid the mission; but the expression of the historian, his friend and panegyrist, implies that he was liable to be commanded on it: the Lacedæmonians; says Xenophon, sent Agesilaus as their ambassador to the Mantineians.

The republicans of Greece, like some in modern times, we find were liable to be strangely deceived by the names of liberty and sovereignty. The leaders of that party, calling itself democratical, which now ruled Mantinea, fearing the popularity of Agesilaus, would not allow the people, nominally their sovereign, to receive him in general assembly,

<sup>s</sup> He was πατρικός φίλος there, a friend by inheritance.

and hear his proposals. They compelled him to confine his communication to themselves. Any very satisfactory result he could little expect; but, in the hope of saving appearances for Lacedæmon, without having recourse to arms, he promised that, if the Mantineians would only stop the immediate prosecution of their fortifications, he would engage for the consent of the Lacedæmonian government to all they desired. Tho' they must have seen urgent danger to the commonwealth in the refusal, yet the Mantineian leaders, encouraged by support from some neighboring states, and perhaps foreseeing injury to the cause of their party from any concession, gave, for their final answer, 'that the decree passed by the Mantineian people could not be rescinded.' Already, from some of the Arcadian states, workmen were arrived to assist them, and the Eleians had sent three talents in silver, toward defraying the expence. Completely therefore disappointed of the object of his humiliating mission, Agesilaus left Mantinea: highly irritated, as the historian his friend confesses; but nevertheless holding his opinion, that, to resort to arms would be to violate the treaty, so lately concluded, warranting independency to every Grecian state, and must therefore be avoided.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 5.

s. 29.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 40 & 58.

The evils of a general war thus yet but hovered over Greece; tho' after what had passed, they were little likely to remain long suspended. But, in a country so constituted, the suspension of general war did not bring general tranquillity. On the contrary, the prohibition of external interference, by the late treaty, to which the Lacedæmonian king and government so scrupulously deferred, was as the word for sedition to begin action, within each little republic. It was under the sanction of a general peace, warranting universal independency, that confiscations, expulsions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of assassination and massacre, most abounded. In Argos, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Phialeia, Tegea, the circumstances were remarkable enough to demand the historian's notice. In Tegea principally they became implicated with the thread of Grecian history, which it will be advantageous at present to pursue.

The success of the democratical chiefs of Mantinea, in recovering preponderance to their party and the principal power to themselves, by



SECT. II. CONTEST OF FACTION IN PELOPONNESUS.

a measure which had the credit of restoring vigor and importance to their little country, excited the attention of those of Tegea<sup>9</sup>. But Tegea, under an aristocratical administration, having a single and united government, no proposal of innovation, confined to the narrow bounds of the Tegean dominion, seemed likely to answer their purpose. They put forward therefore the bold project of uniting all Arcadia: 'Thus alone,' they said, 'the peace of Arcadia could be established, and thus alone Arcadia could have its just weight and respect among the Grecian powers.'

This proposal, in itself teeming with public and private benefits, could be objectionable only for the manner of carrying it into execution. But it was the measure of a party; whose object would be very incompletely attained, if it did not raise the interest of that party upon the ruin of those actually holding the power in Tegea. By these therefore it was opposed; and Stasippus, a man of superior character, at the head of them, exerted himself so effectually, that the sovereign assembly rejected the innovation, and determined that the antient constitution of Arcadia should be preserved unaltered.

In the usual violence of Grecian faction, the progress was generally ready from civil controversy to civil war: for the former so commonly involved banishment, and even death, that the step beyond was often thought scarcely a step toward greater danger. Proxenus, therefore, and Callibius, leaders of the democratical party, did not scruple to resolve upon contest in arms, rather than yield their purpose. Their hope was in force of numbers; the people, they thought, would be with them: and they had moreover confidence, that the democratical party, now ruling Mantinea, would not be scrupulous, like Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonian administration, but would support, against any treaty, a measure in a neighboring state, in which their own party-interest was implicated. In the former hope they were deceived; for being driven, through discovery of their purpose, to take arms

Xen. Hel.  
1.6. c.5.  
s.7.

<sup>9</sup> The party is not here specified by Xenophon, but circumstances clearly show it to have been the democratical; and this is afterward directly indicated: — *νομισαδεις*, says the

historian, speaking of that party, *is συνέλθοις ὁ δῆμος, πάλαι ἂν τῷ πλείονει κρατῆσαι*. Xen. Hel. 1.6. c.5. s.7.

prematurely, the adherents, which the liberal administration of Stasippus had conciliated, were found to equal them in numbers; and, in a conflict which followed, within the town, they had the advantage, and Proxenus was killed. Stasippus, according to the honorable testimony of the cotemporary historian, averse to the slaughter of fellow-citizens, checked pursuit. What followed unfortunately proved the imprudence of this liberality and humanity; and would of course prompt, on another such occasion, conduct that would be grossly illiberal and inhuman, where better manners are established, and yet, among the Greeks, was so often necessary to self-preservation, that it might hardly deserve to be called inhuman or even illiberal. The defeated fled to the gate leading toward Mantinea; and there, finding themselves not pursued as they had expected, they halted, and entered into conference with the victors. Their chiefs, as soon as they had found their measures for taking arms discovered, had sent to Mantinea, only twelve miles off, for assistance, and they now sent again to hasten that assistance. Managing then to prolong the conference, till the Mantineian forces arrived, they opened the gate to receive them. Stasippus perceived the treachery, in time only to withdraw by the opposite gate; so closely pursued, that he stopped at a temple of Diana, from whose sacredness he hoped for personal security. His enemies however, disposed to respect neither real nor imaginary duties, mounted on the walls, unroofed the building, and assailed those within with missile weapons. Unable to defend themselves, Stasippus and those with him surrendered at discretion. They were immediately bound, put into waggons, and so carried to Tegea: and, being quickly brought before a tribunal created for the occasion, in which Mantineians of the opposite party were allowed to sit, they were condemned, and presently executed. About eight hundred Tegeans then, thinking themselves unsafe in their own city, fled to Lacedæmon. Such, within a few months after the establishment of a general peace, upon the ground of universal independency, was the inauspicious beginning of a new war, which quickly involved all Greece.

The Mantineians had now clearly put themselves in the wrong: they had broken the treaty of Athens, by their interference in the affairs of

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Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 9.

s. 10.

the Tegeans; and it was not reasonably to be expected of the Lacedæmonians, it would have been neither becoming nor right, to leave the atrocious crime, by which their friends in Tegea had suffered, unnoticed, and the survivors of those friends, who had taken refuge in Lacedæmon, unassisted. But the precise line of conduct, proper and prudent for Lacedæmon, under the existing circumstances, to hold, was perhaps not easy to determine; and that which the Lacedæmonian government took, seems to have been neither right nor prudent. Unable yet to resolve upon parting with that imperial authority, which they had so long exercised among the Grecian states, they did not make it so much their object to protect and reinstate the oppressed Tegeans, as to use the pretence for revenging themselves on the Mantineians. Apparently a congress of all Greece ought to have been called, such as that lately held in Athens; but they chose rather to take the law into their own hands. Without consulting, as far as appears, any other state, they decreed an expedition, assembled the force of Laconia, and appointed Agesilaus to command.

Meanwhile the democratical Tegean leaders, profiting diligently and ably from their success so nefariously obtained, and warmly supported by Mantinea, had accomplished their great and valuable project for a union of the Arcadian people<sup>10</sup>. The measure became extensively popular. Orchomenus only of the Arcadian cities, instigated by inveterate enmity to Mantinea, and probably fearful of oppression from the influence which Mantinea would acquire, persevered in refusal to accede to it. In most of the others, a preponderant party concurred, with warm zeal, in founding a new city; to be, with the name of Megalopolis, Great town, the common capital, the place of assembly for the general council, of the Arcadian people.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 11.  
Diod. l. 15.  
Pausan. l. 8.  
c. 27 & 33.

<sup>10</sup> According to Pausanias, whom Barthlemi, little, apparently, in the habit of weighing historical evidence, has implicitly followed, Epameinondas was the projector and patron, both of the restoration of Mantinea and of the foundation of Megalopolis. If he was so, it will appear, from the sequel,

that his political foresight failed him on those occasions. We may however better take the cotemporary historian's account; who, political opponent as he was to Epameinondas, is really his best panegyrist. Ill-judging or careless zeal will often injure the cause it means to favor.

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The Orchomenians, in thus separating themselves from their fellow-countrymen, did not hope to be allowed the quiet enjoyment of that independency, which they claimed as their right, transmitted from earliest times, and especially warranted by the late treaty. To support themselves therefore in the resolution they had taken, they engaged a body of mercenaries, which had been in the service of Corinth. This alarmed the Mantineians, who suspected the purpose of Orchomenus to be no longer defence but attack. While then the force of the rest of the confederated Arcadians assembled at Asea, to protect the country at large against the attack threatened from Lacedæmon, the Mantineians remained at home, for the particular defence of their own territory, against the apprehended malice of the Orchomenians. Such was the uneasy state of jealousy in which the Greeks, in their days of liberty, mostly lived, even in the short intervals of rest from internal sedition; every township fearful of violence from the next.

This miserable restlessness, being rendered, by the political circumstances of Greece, habitual through the nation, would inhanche the difficulty of, what in no circumstances could be easy, bringing a number of states to concur in a wise, liberal, and generally beneficial plan of union. We are little informed of the constitution of united Arcadia; but we find party-purposes much, and perhaps unavoidably, considered in forming it; for the union, probably, could not otherwise have been effected at all. The federal congresses, which we have seen already familiar in Greece, offered an example of something approaching that principle of representation, which the merit and fame of the English constitution have brought into universal estimation, among the politicians of modern Europe. But that valuable principle would have ill suited the means, however it might accord with the wishes, of those whose support was from a democratical party. Their sovereign assembly therefore (judging, in the deficiency of accounts of it, from its title, which may be translated either the Ten-thousand or the Numberless<sup>11</sup>) was composed of the whole free population of Arcadia, or

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<sup>11</sup> Leunclavius translates the title of the general assembly of united Arcadia, *Decies mille*, Ten thousand. (Xen. Hel. 1.7. c. 4. s. 2.) Amasæus, whose version of Pausanias

Kuhnus

as much of it as could be brought together. The situation chosen for the new capital was not central, to give the greatest facility for meeting from all parts, but on the southern border, where, according to Diodorus, the leading men had the surest interest, and could most readily collect those whom they might influence in the decision of public measures. The facility which its neighborhood to the borders of Messenia and Laconia afforded, for supporting the one and attacking the other, induced the Theban leaders, principal patrons of the undertaking, to favor the choice. Otherwise, being in the vale through which the Alpheius runs, and not far from that river, it may perhaps have united more conveniencies than could be readily found elsewhere, in so mountainous a country. The office of this numerous assembly was to direct, in chief, the military and political concerns of all Arcadia; while apparently every town, for its civil government, retained its former separate sovereignty.

SECTION III.

*Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus : Superior conduct of the Theban leaders : Invasion of Laconia by the army of the Theban confederacy, under Epameinondas : Resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedæmon : Retreat of Epameinondas from Peloponnesus : Restoration of the Messenians : Distress of Sparta.*

It was already winter when Agesilaus entered Arcadia with the Lacedæmonian army, reinforced only by the contingents of the little towns of Lepreum and Heræa. The combined forces of Arcadia and Elis avoided a battle with him. Part of the Mantineian territory was plundered; and, in the skirmishing, attempted for its protection, the Lacedæmonian troops had generally the advantage. But Agesilaus in vain endeavored to force the enemy to a general action. Pressed, therefore,

B. C. 370.  
Ol. 102. 3.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 12 & 20.

Kuhnius has adopted, evidently embarrassed on the occasion, calls the place of its meeting, *Curia infinitæ propè Arcadum multitudini destinata.* Pausan. l. 8. c. 32. The Greek is *ἡ πόλις*.

by

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 5.  
s. 21.

by the season, and, in some degree, satisfied with having a little raised the spirits of the Lacedæmonians, by a display of their superiority in the enemy's country, he returned into Laconia, and dismissed his forces.

s. 23.

The leaders of the Theban councils were politicians, far superior to those who conducted the Lacedæmonian government. They had not neglected opportunities for extending the influence of Thebes among neighboring states: they had made diligent use of that which the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Arcadia, or which the ready means open to them, through the deficiency of communication in Greece, to misrepresent that interference, afforded, for animating the long existing jealousy against Lacedæmon. The Phocians owned subjection to Thebes; a circumstance which the general weakness only of the surrounding states, together with the general violence of party-spirit, could have brought them to indure. Assembling then the Bœotian and Phocian forces by their own authority, they so well managed negotiation as to obtain the willing assistance of the Locrians, of both provinces of the name, of the Acarnanians, the Heracleots, the Malians, and of all the Eubœan towns. Deficient in funds for supplying those wants, to which so large an army as they collected, tho consisting of troops accustomed to supply themselves, would be liable in a winter campaign, they borrowed from the Eleians ten talents, perhaps something more than two thousand pounds. Epameinondas was appointed to the command-in-chief.

s. 19.

s. 22.

The Lacedæmonian government, it appears, had either no intelligence of these great preparations, or no suspicion that anything important could follow during winter. Even the Arcadians did not expect it. Their forces were kept together only for the purpose of revenge against the little commonwealth of Heræa, whose territory they plundered and wasted. The Eleians alone had had that confidential communication with the Theban leaders, which induced them to wait in arms, in firm reliance on the approach of the Theban army.

Epameinondas did not disappoint their opinion of his activity and perseverance in enterprize. But, in entering Peloponnesus by Corinthia, he showed a want, either of that wise moderation and strict justice, which his general character, as delivered from antiquity, would give

us to expect, or perhaps rather of that authority, which a man of such a character would have exerted, had he possessed it, to restrain the wickedness and folly of those committed to his command. The Corinthians, professing neutrality, had conducted themselves with cautious inoffensiveness toward all the belligerent commonwealths; yet, because they would not take arms against Lacedæmon, their antient ally, to support the aggression of Mantinea against Tegea, the army under Epameinondas exerted its power in vengeance: lands wasted, trees felled, and houses burnt, marked its destructive march.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 37.

The Arcadians were still busied in similar exertion against the Heræan territory, when intelligence reached them of the arrival of Epameinondas at Mantinea. Immediately they quitted the business of devastation, and hastened to join him. The Theban leaders, learning that the Lacedæmonian army had evacuated Arcadia, and was dismissed, in the usual way of the Greeks, for the winter, considered the purpose of their own winter-expedition as accomplished. The independency of Mantinea on Lacedæmonian command being secured, the friendly party in Tegea established in power, the disaffection of the little republic of Heræa punished, and the Theban interest in Peloponnesus altogether upon a good footing, they proposed to return home, and allow the usual season of rest also for their forces. But the internal weakness of Lacedæmon, less perceived by the more distant, began already to be justly estimated by the bordering states. The Eleians and Arcadians represented to the Thebans, ‘that the sedition of Cinadon, which, without foreign assistance, had threatened the overthrow of the Spartan government, was smothered, not extinguished, by his punishment; that, even if all the subjects of Sparta were faithful, still the excellent discipline of the Thebans, with the numbers of their allies, would make their army clearly superior to any force the Lacedæmonians could bring into the field: but that, in fact, the spirit of revolt in Laconia wanted only promise of protection; extreme discontent pervaded all under the highest rank of Lacedæmonian subjects; and, if they marched immediately into the country, the Lacedæmonian government would be unable to collect a force that could attempt opposition to them.’

s. 22.

s. 23.

s. 23. 25.

Diod. l. 15. p. 499.  
Plut. vit. Pepsid. p. 529. t. 1. & Agesil. p. 1120. t. 2.  
Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 24, 25.

The numbers now assembled, ready to join in the invasion of Laconia (if late writers may be believed for such a matter, where cotemporaries are silent) were no less than seventy thousand; of whom, according to Plutarch, forty thousand were heavy-armed. Nevertheless the Theban generals objected the natural strength of the Lacedæmonian border, the principal passes of which they knew were guarded, and the usual advantages of those who fight within their own territory against strangers. They were still hesitating, when deserters successively came in from different parts; all urging the invasion of their country, offering themselves for conductors, and agreeing in the assertion that, not only a disposition to revolt pervaded Laconia, but a large part of the people had already refused obedience to the summons for military service.

B. C. 369.  
Ol. 102. 3.  
January.  
Dodw.

Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 5. s. 26.

s. 27.  
Ch. 20. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

These representations at length induced the Theban generals to accede to the wishes of their allies. The frontier of Laconia, against Arcadia and Argolis, is of that kind of rugged mountainous country, in which roads can scarcely be formed, but where streams have first found a course, and then, in the line they have taken, gradually softened its roughness. The best way from Arcadia was by Ion, in the district called Skiritis, near one of the sources of the Eurotas: another, but more difficult pass, led to Caryæ, on the brook Cænus, whose waters soon joined that river. It was resolved to penetrate at once by both these ways. The Peloponnesians undertook to force that by Ion, tho' known to be guarded by a considerable body, consisting of Lacedæmonian neodamodes and refugee Tegeans, under the command of Ischolaus, a Spartan. The road by Caryæ was assigned to the Thebans; more difficult in itself, but unguarded. The Arcadians were successful against Ischolaus; who, with more courage than judgement, chusing ill his ground for opposing superior numbers, was surrounded, overpowered, and killed, with most of those under him. The Thebans, conducted by some deserters of the country, zealous in revolt, met the Arcadians near Caryæ. Descending then the mountains together, they burnt Sellasia, in the vale of the Eurotas, remarkable as the place where the haughty interdictions of the Lacedæmonian government, in its prosperity, had sometimes met the ministers of other states. The

invading



SECT. III: INVASION OF LACONIA BY EPAMEINONDAS.

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invæling army now found nothing to forbid its progress; which it held along the left bank of the river, plundering and burning as it went. On the second day from Caryæ, it arrived at the bridge conducting immediately to Sparta. That city stood at a small distance from the river, on the right bank. The passage was strongly guarded, and the generals avoided the hazardous attempt to force it. Pillage and flames were spread among the numerous houses on the side where nothing opposed; to the booty from which Xenophon attributes a value, marking a deviation from the antient Spartan simplicity, the ready consequence of conquests, foreign commands, and the circulation of a public-revenue.

Nor was it now any longer the time when the Spartan ladies could take and use arms like the men. Among the smaller Grecian states, the sight of an enemy, often recurring, became less terrible through familiarity. But, at Lacedæmon, for centuries, it had almost ceased to be supposed that an enemy could ever be seen there. To the Spartan ladies now, the sight even of the smoke, says the cotemporary historian, from the buildings fired by the invaders, was intolerable. Not only however the consternation of the fearful and inconsiderate, but the reasonable apprehension of the best informed and firmest, was very great. When those distinguished by the name of Spartans, who had arrogated all the powers of government, distrustful of others, endeavored to occupy the most accessible parts of the unwalled city, they found themselves in a manner lost in its extent. Distressed by the defection of some of their subjects, and uncertain of the fidelity of others, they had recourse to their slaves. Proclamation was made, that able-bodied Helots, who would take arms, and faithfully exert themselves in defence of the country, should be rewarded with freedom. More than six thousand were inrolled; and then the administration became fearful of the strength which itself had thus created. Soon however auxiliaries arrived, from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermionë, and Haliæ. The interest which bound these to the Lacedæmonian cause being thought secure, the first vehemence of alarm subsided.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 28.

s. 29.

l. 7. c. 2.  
s. 2.

Meanwhile at Amyclæ, some way below Sparta, the enemy had

s. 30.

crossed the Eurotas, and turned their march toward the city, still marking the way with plunder and devastation. Their cavalry, composed of the united force of Elis, Thebes, Phocis, and Locris, with some Thessalian, powerful for a Grecian army, advanced as far as the hippodrome, or horsecourse, and the temple of Neptune, close to Sparta. The Lacedæmonian horse, advancing against it, were comparatively so small a force as to appear contemptible: but a body of infantry, which had been concealed in the temple of the Tyndarids, issuing, and showing itself prepared to support the horse, the confederate cavalry retired; and the very superior numbers of the confederate infantry (so far the force of the Lacedæmonian fame prevailed) in some alarm, at the same time retreated. Agésilaus however would not allow pursuit. Aply disposing his troops in commanding situations, which the neighborhood of the city afforded, he always threatened, but always avoided action. The confederates withdrew, but to no great distance, and incamped.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6, c. 5.  
s. 31.

It seems implied, in the account of Xenophon, that reputation, rather than strength, at this time saved Sparta. All accounts indeed mark that the numbers of the invaders far exceeded any ordinary force of Grecian armies. But that flood and hurricane of war, as another cōtemporary author has called it, which the abilities of Epameinondas had been able to excite, and direct to a certain point, the abilities even of Epameinondas could not always duly command. Among his Bœotians he had never allowed any irregularity. He fortified his camp, and placed his guards and outposts, always as if in presence of a superior enemy. But he could enforce no such order among the Arcadians; whose practice was, when they had taken their ground, to lodge their arms, and wander for pillage. Unable directly to restrain their passion for plunder, Epameinondas was reduced to endeavor to give it the best direction. In a council of war, it was resolved, that to attempt anything farther against the city would be too hazardous. The march was therefore turned again down the course of the Eurotas; and, through the whole length of the vale to the sea, the unfortified towns and villages were pillaged and burnt. The army arrived, unresisted,

s. 32.

Xen. ut sup.  
& vit. Ages.  
Theopomp.  
apud Plut.  
vit. Ages.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
s. 30.

s. 32.

at

at Gythium, the principal, or perhaps only naval arsenal of Lacedæmon, and that important place was invested. Numerous Læonian revolters, who joined by the way, assisted in the assaults which, for three days, were repeated against it, but without success.

Intelligence of the extreme danger of Lacedæmon, quickly conveyed to Athens, excited a strong sensation there; not from any popular friendship for Lacedæmon, but from apprehension for the common independency of Athens and of Greece, threatened by the growing predominance of Thebes. The council deemed the crisis important, and summoned the general assembly. Party-strife seems to have been at this time more than commonly moderate among the Athenians; and no man had that commanding influence, which could decisively guide the public mind; in the way of wisdom, like Pericles, or in the way of rashness and folly, like Cleon. Five ministers from Lacedæmon were allowed to speak first. Their purpose being to gain the utmost assistance from Athens, they endeavored to demonstrate, that the friendly connection between Athens and Lacedæmon, which the Lacedæmonians were desirous of cultivating, would produce great advantages to both parties. The Athenians saw the advantages, but they doubted the friendly disposition. A murmur went through the assembly: ‘In the present pressure of circumstances, professions,’ it was observed, ‘would of course be fair; but, in a return of prosperity, the conduct of the Lacedæmonians would be the same as formerly.’ ‘Yet,’ it was said, on the other side, ‘at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans would have subverted Athens, the better disposition of Lacedæmon saved it.’ This, urged to recollection by the Lacedæmonian ministers, made a powerful impression; and jealousy of Thebes went far to supply the want of confidence in Lacedæmon. Nevertheless the assembly was still divided; some insisting that, ‘the Mantineians being aggressors, the Athenians could do no otherwise than assist Lacedæmon, if they would not be false to the treaty they had sworn to; while others, vehement in the democratical cause, contended, that the interference of the Mantineians, in support of the democratical party in Tegea, against the oppression of Stasippus, had been right and just.’

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 5.  
s. 33.  
Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 54.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 5.  
s. 34.

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The deficiency, or, at least, the uncertainty of political principle, which the disputation, thus reported, without a comment, by so able a cotemporary as Xenophon, shows to have been general in Greece<sup>12</sup>, appears, at this day, wonderful. The argument of the friends of the democratical cause, if allowed, would have justified the interference of Lacedæmon, or of Thebes, in every contest of faction, in every republic of Greece, in Athens itself; and the argument of those on the other side seems to have been directed, not to establish the general principle, that no commonwealth had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another, but only the particular case, that the interference with arms, which the Mantineians had exercised in Tegea, was forbidden by the terms of the late treaty. After much discussion, it was not an Athenian, but the Corinthian and Phliasian ministers, who, by urging a particular fact, which interested the feelings of the Athenian multitude, decided the vote. ‘Whether the Lacedæmonians or the Mantineians,’ the Corinthian Cleiteles said, ‘in the instance in question have been aggressors, may be a matter of dispute not easily settled.’ But that, since the general peace, the Corinthians have committed hostility against no state, is sufficiently known. Nevertheless the Thebans, in crossing our territory, have plundered and wasted it, as if an enemy’s; carrying off goods and cattle, burning houses, and felling cultivated trees. Can you then, without perjury, refuse us that assistance to which the treaty intitles the injured? The assembly became agitated; murmur was vehement; but the general voice went, that the observation of Cleiteles was pertinent and just.

The Phliasian minister proceeded to profit from the effect produced by the Corinthian’s speech. ‘It was obvious,’ he said, ‘that, if the Thebans could once incapacitate Lacedæmon, Athens would be their next object; because Athens then alone, of all the Grecian republics, would remain powerful enough to attempt resistance to their ambition, which evidently aspired to the dominion of Greece.’ This being urged amid much flattery, adapted to the popular temper, was decisive. The multitude called impatiently for the question, and would hear no

<sup>12</sup> That it was so, if Xenophon left any doubt about it, is confirmed by Isocrates, in his Archidamus.

other speakers. By the vote which followed, the utmost strength of the commonwealth was to be exerted in assistance of Lacedæmon, and Iphicrates was appointed to the command. Xen. Hel. 1. 6. c. 5. s. 39.

The support, powerful as it promised to be, which was thus preparing for Lacedæmon, might have been too late to be effectual, if disregard of union, and neglect of discipline, growing with success, had not rendered it impossible for the able leader of the confederate army to command the exertion of the allies, or even to calculate the force that he could command. The Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians, in numbers, went off with unasked leave, to bear home the booty they had taken. Provisions meanwhile became scarce for the troops remaining; the season pressed, and Epameinondas found it advisable to withdraw hastily out of Laconia. s. 40.

Iphicrates was already in Arcadia, and opportunity was favorable for reducing the Theban army to great difficulty. But, through some party view, apparently, of which we have no information, he was not zealous in the command which he had undertaken. He had been much blamed for wasting time in Corinth, before he proceeded into Arcadia. Without attempting any annoyance to the Theban army, in its way through that difficult country, he withdrew again to Corinth. It was supposed that his purpose was to dispute the passage of the isthmus and of the mountains, which he might have made highly hazardous, or perhaps have completely prevented: but his measures rather indicated intention to allow that free way which Epameinondas found. Xenophon, on former occasions the eulogist of Iphicrates, blames his conduct here in strong terms.

This invasion, wasteful but transient, such as Attica had several times suffered from its Peloponnesian enemies, was fatal to the power of Lacedæmon. When the foreign foe was gone, rebellion still pervaded the country. A large part of those Laconians, distinguished by the name of Pericæcians, and all the Helots, remained in revolt. The able leaders of Thebes took advantage of these circumstances, to imitate and extend the policy of the Athenians, in the Peloponnesian war. They invited, from all parts, the relics of the Messenian race, to return

to

to their former country, and take their place, once more, among the people of Greece. The chief body of them was that which, formerly, under Athenian protection, had held Naupactus in Ætolia, but, after the conquest of Athens, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians. Some of these had found refuge among their kinsmen of Rhegium in Italy and Messena in Sicily; but the greater part had accepted an invitation from the Grecian colony of the Evesperitans in Africa, then pressed in war by the neighboring barbarians. This long unfortunuate race now eagerly obeyed the call of the Thebans to return to the country of their forefathers, the fairest acquisition of the Heracleids, the most desirable territory in Peloponnesus, or perhaps in Greece. Epameinondas was patron of the new city of Messena, built at the foot of mount Ithomë, famous in the antient wars with Lacedæmon, on whose summit was raised the citadel; but it seems probable that the Argian general Epiteles was the commander upon the spot, who protected the works. The returned Messenians did not spurn at association with rebelling Helots, and other slaves; all, or mostly, of Grecian origin, and many of Messenian blood.

Strab. l. 7.  
& Plut. Ages.  
p. 1124. t. 2.

Of the particulars, however, of this very interesting restoration, we have little satisfactory; Xenophon, in delicacy, apparently, to his Lacedæmonian friends, having studiously avoided even the mention of them, tho wanted for connection and elucidation of the rest of his narrative. But he could not conceal that Messenia was torn from Lacedæmon; and, for the rest, his testimony, dropped in a word here and there, confirms the concurring accounts of later writers, that it was restored to the descendants, or those reputed descendants, of the antient Dorian Messenians, with some mixture of other adventurers, for all whom, united, the Messenian name prevailed. The Asinæans and Nauplians, Dorians from Argolis, formerly established, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonians on the Messenian coast, having been among those subjects of Sparta who revolted, or favored the revolt, were allowed to retain their settlements, and admitted to political association with the restored people. Pausanias, zealous to prove that the returning emigrants were really Messenians, remarks that even their

Pausan.  
l. 4. c. 26.

c. 28.

speech

### SECT. III. RESTORATION OF MESSENA.

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speech was not altered by their peregrination; for, still in his time, after more than five hundred years, the Doric dialect was spoken in Messenia, in greater purity than in any other part of Peloponnesus.

Thus the province of Messenia, amounting to half their territory, was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians; a possession however, of which, while they held it, their institutions seem to have denied them any very profitable use, unless it may be reckoned such to oppose a waste against invasion. But the retreat of the Theban army did not leave them masters even of all Laconia. The district called Skiritis, in that tract of lofty and rugged mountains, among which the Eurotas and the Alpheius, the largest rivers of Peloponnesus, have their sources, continued in rebellion. The important town of Sellasia, at the upper end of the Spartan vale, on the great northern road, by which support might best come from eastern Arcadia and Argos, was held by the revolters. Pallenē<sup>13</sup>, in the western fork of the vale, up which, by the course of the Eurotas, the other principal northern way led, through Skiritis to western Arcadia and Elis, still held for Lacedæmon. But soon after the retreat of the invading army, while perplexity occurred on all sides for the Spartan government, the able general of the Arcadian forces, Lycomedes of Mantinea, returning unexpectedly, carried it by a sudden assault, and put those within to the sword.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.4.  
s. 21.

Diod. 1.15.  
p. 492.

### SECTION IV.

*Bad arrangement of military command by the popular assembly of Athens: Second invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epameinondas. Lycomedes of Mantinea: Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban interest: Military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis.*

IN the existing pressure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the states whose interest yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian cause, it was of great

<sup>13</sup> This Lacedæmonian town must be distinguished from the Achaian city of the same name, for which it has, by some modern writers, been mistaken.

B. C. 368.  
Ol. 102, 4.  
February.  
Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.1.  
s.1.

importance for them to hold, and, if possible, improve their connection with Athens.\* Ministers were therefore sent thither, fully empowered to agree upon the system of command, and the plan of operations, for the next campaign. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time swayed, apparently, by wise and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponnesians, that it would be, all circumstances considered, most for the interest of the confederacy, and most equitable, that the Athenians should direct operations by sea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephisodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favor, by opposing this arrangement. When the proposal of the council was laid before the general assembly (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate state of Solon's constitution, all the measures of executive government were to have their ratification) Cephisodotus persuaded the ill-judging multitude, that they were imposed upon. In the Lacedæmonian squadron, he said, the trierarchs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed, but the body of the crews would be Helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command scarcely any but slaves, and the outcast of nations, in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the best men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the sea and of the land forces must be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument; and the assembly voted, that the command, both by sea and by land, should be alternately five days with the Athenians and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this decision of the petulant crowd, singularly adapted to cripple exertion, both by sea and land, the Lacedæmonians, pressed by circumstances, thought it prudent to acquiesce.

B. C. 368.  
Ol. 102, 4.  
Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.1.  
s.4.  
s.5, 6.

In spring an army was assembled at Corinth, to prevent the passage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponnesus. But the superior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They surprized an outpost. Still they were at a loss to force their way over the rough ground in descending the Oneian mountains. But, from the treachery or the weakness of the Lacedæmonian polemarch commanding, they obtained



SECT. IV. SECOND INVASION OF PELOPONNESUS.

443.

obtained a truce, under favor of which they safely joined the forces of their Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians. This junction being thus happily effected, they found themselves far superior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without opposition they punished the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian interest, by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians submitting themselves to the able direction of the Athenian general Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulsed with some slaughter. The abilities of Chabrias however were unequal, against so great a superiority of force, to prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponnesus seemed open to the Thebans; when the pressure of the Thessalian arms, under the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, upon their northern allies, and apprehension of its extending to Bœotia itself, called the Thebans suddenly out of the peninsula, and then all the Peloponnesians of the confederacy parted to their several homes <sup>14</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 7, 8.

s. 9, 10, 11.  
Diod. l. 15.

This dissolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a most fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leisure it afforded seems to have been wanted, for composing the troubles within Laconia. Offensive operations were left to the auxiliaries, sent by Dionysius then ruling in Syracuse; a body remarkable enough, both in itself and for its actions, to deserve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greek, so excellent, that, tho scarcely exceeding fifty horsemen, they had given more annoyance to the enemy, while wasting the Corinthian lands, than all the rest of the army. After the other troops, on both sides, were withdrawn, this transmarine force alone undertook the invasion of Sicyonia; defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by assault. Gratified then with glory and plunder, they embarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuse.

<sup>14</sup> Xenophon, in relating the retreat of the Thebans, and the dispersion of the rest of the army, has not at all accounted for it. That the Thessalian war was the principal cause, may however be gathered from a comparison of the accounts of Diodorus and

Plutarch, with what Xenophon says in the former book of the Hellenics, (c. 4. s. 35.); and the incidental mention of that war by Polybius, (l. 8. p. 512.) affords valuable confirmation to this deduction from the other writers.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 12.

Isocr. Ar-  
chid.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban councils, profiting from the animosity so extensively prevailing against Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the supremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that so many states could, by any management, be long retained in patient submission to so new a superiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many instances, to a zealous, and sometimes extending to a general, loyalty toward the superior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps singular in the history of mankind. But that deference was paid to a superiority, not suddenly obtained, but growing from the extraordinary institutions under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a superior people, obviously fittest, in the divided and tumultuary state of the Greek nation, to command in war, and to arbitrate in peace: whence, even still in these times, when the political power of Lacedæmon was so declining, the estimation of the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was yet such, that at the Olympian and other national meetings, a Lacedæmonian was an object of curiosity and admiration for strangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The superiority of Athens also, tho' in few instances, or for a short time only, supported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon enjoyed, accruing suddenly indeed, yet resulted from long preparation. Legislation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary succession of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual superiority, which the people of other republics saw and felt. But Thebes, without any advantage of antient prejudice in favor of her pretensions, without any public institutions to be admired, recently emerged from political subjection, possessing indeed a large and disciplined population, which might infuse some terror, was however become so suddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and principally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other state of the confederacy, where military force was not very inferior, a similar blaze of character should occur, that state would presently feel itself equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connection involving an admission of her superiority.

Such a character had been, for some time, rising among the Arcadians, in Lycomedes of Mantinea; a man inferior to none of his country in birth, superior to most in property, and who had already distinguished himself, in council, as a principal promoter of the Arcadian union, and in arms, at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already saw, what afterward became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly subordinate to the ambition of making Thebes supreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he resolved to oppose. In the general assembly therefore of the Arcadian states, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he represented, 'That Peloponnesus, among all its various present inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the rest were really strangers. Nor were the Arcadians the most ancient only, they were the most powerful of the Grecian tribes; they were the most numerous, and they excelled in strength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal request. The Lacedæmonians knew their value: they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own interest, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but insist upon equality in command. They had formerly raised Lacedæmon; they were now raising Thebes; and shortly they would find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 12.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 492.

Flattering thus alternately, and stimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them; and the natural consequence of the submission of the multitude's caprices to an able man's controul resulted: the Arcadians were successful, and their successes were brilliant. The Argians invaded Epidauria. The renowned Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies; an assembly was held; the interest of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, against great disadvantage of ground, brought off the Argians without loss. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia; the territory of Asinè was ravaged, and the Lacedæmonian polemarc Geranor, who commanded there,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 13.

s. 14.

there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incursions, in the common way of Grecian warfare, followed; and when any object invited, neither night, says the cotemporary historian, nor weather, nor distance, nor difficulty of way, deterred; insomuch that the Arcadians acquired the reputation of being the best soldiers of their time.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.1.  
s. 15.

Disposed as the Arcadians showed themselves no longer to admit the superiority of Thebes, their strength, their discipline, and their successful activity in arms, tho' exerted in the cause of the confederacy, could scarcely fail to excite some jealousy and apprehension in the Theban government. No direct breach ensued, but friendship cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppressed; always an extensive description of men, and sometimes of states, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a sovereignty over the people of several towns of Eleia, and of the whole district called Triphylia, on the border against Messenia.

Diod. 1.15.

In a strong situation in Triphylia, called Lasion, to assist in curbing the inhabitants, they had allowed some Arcadian exiles to establish themselves. This, for a time, answered its purpose: but, as the Arcadians of Lasion were, like the Tryphilians, only subjects of the Eleians and not fellowcitizens, and as the sovereignty of people over people, seldom unoppressive, cannot fail to be humiliating, they at length made common cause with their neighboring fellow-subjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scilluntines, in opposition to the Eleian government. For support they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia: they claimed to be Arcadians; and by a petition addressed to the new united government, they desired to be taken under its protection. At the same time the Eleians were pressing for assistance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns, which the Lacedæmonians had restored to independency. The Arcadians slighted this application, and declared, by a public resolution, that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinsmen should be free. Elis became in consequence still more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.1.  
s. 16.

## SECTION V.

*Congress at Delphi, assembled at the instance of a minister of the satrap of Bithynia. The Tearless Battle, won by Archidamus son of Agesilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly, under Pelopidas. Embassies from the principal Grecian republics to the Persian court. Able and successful conduct of Pelopidas, ambassador from Thebes: Congress at Thebes: Attempt of Thebes to acquire the supremacy of Greece, through the support of Persia, defeated.*

THE growing schism, in the opposing confederacy, promised great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, tho, through vices in their civil constitution, and ill management in their administration, the Lacedæmonians had lost the best half of their territory, their negotiations abroad still carried weight, and were conducted ably and successfully. It was at the critical time, when the political system in Greece, to which the rise of Thebes had given birth, began to be shaken, and new troubles seemed ready to break out, that Philiscus, a Greek of Abydos, arrived, as minister from the satrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes; professedly charged to mediate, in the king of Persia's name, a general peace among the Grecian republics. Following circumstances proved, and even the cotemporary historian, tho avoiding the direct avowal, has shown, that this new interference of Persia, in Grecian affairs, was produced by Lacedæmonian intrigue. It seems, however, not to have given any considerable umbrage to the Greek nation. Philiscus proposed a congress at Delphi; and deputies from Thebes, and from the states of the Theban confederacy, readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Persia, as the historian, not their friend, testifies, influenced the Thebans: for, Philiscus requiring, as an indispensable article, that Messenia should return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they positively refused peace, but upon condition that Messenia should be free.

Xen. Hell.  
l. 7. - c. 1.  
s. 17.

This resolution being firmly demonstrated, the negotiation quickly ended,

ended, and both sides prepared for war. Philiscus then gave ample proof of his disposition to the Lacedæmonian cause, by employing a large sum of money, intrusted to him by the satrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian service. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionysius of Syracuse, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army; and, while the Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought, under the command of Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia were defeated, with slaughter, if Diodorus might be believed, of more than ten thousand men, and, as all the historians report, without the loss of a single Spartan. After a series of calamities, the intelligence of this extraordinary success made such impression at Lacedæmon, that tears of joy, says the cotemporary historian, beginning with Agesilaus himself, fell from the elders and ephors, and finally from the whole people<sup>15</sup>. Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheless, as no tear of sorrow resulted, this action became celebrated with the title of the Tearless battle.

The war with Thessaly now pressed upon Thebes. Nevertheless the amount of the power and influence to which that city had arrived, not through any merit of her constitution, as Polybius has observed, but wholly by the uncommon abilities of her leading men, and to which, beyond all expectation of her most promising days, she had been, from the most adverse circumstances, so rapidly raised, is strongly marked by the pressure she was not only able to bear, but to retort with efficacy upon her enemies. Still urging Lacedæmon, by her confederates and dependants in Peloponnesus, she not only could afford protection to her northern subjects and allies, against the successor of the most formidable potentate of the age, but she could aim at dominion, or influence, which would answer the purpose of dominion, among the populous

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus, whether from his own invention, or the store of some writer, older, but not wiser, not more a politician or a soldier, than himself, has added much to Xenophon's account of this campaign of Archidamus; dilating indeed more than is consistent with

the compressed scheme of his history. It is not likely that either Xenophon's information upon the subject, or his inclination to relate whatever would do honor to the son of Agesilaus, were deficient.

and

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 18.

s. 19—22.

Diod. l. 15.  
p. 495.

Plut. vit.  
Ages.

Polyb. l. 2.  
p. 127. &  
l. 6. p. 487.

l. 8. p. 112.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 492.

and wealthy, but ill-constituted cities of Thessaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Phæra, occasioned a necessity for measures of protection and defence, the disposition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among those over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandizement. Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army; under a commission to act there at his discretion; for the advantage, not of the Thessalians, who had solicited protection, but of the Bœotian people, who pretended to be common protectors: a kind of commission which it has been usual in all ages, for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the most corrupt courts, from which such commissions may have issued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pélopidas penetrated to Larissa; and, with the coöperation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garrison. He extended negotiation then into Macedonia; and concluded a treaty with Alexander, king of that country; who desired alliance with Thebes, the better to resist the oppression, which he felt or feared from the naval power and ambitious policy of Athens, continually exerted to extend dominion or influence over every town on every shore of the Ægean. His younger brother, Philip, then a boy, afterward the great Philip, father of the greater Alexander, is said to have accompanied Pelopidas in his return to Thebes; whether for advantage of education, and to extend friendly connection, or, as late writers have affirmed, as a hostage to insure the performance of stipulated conditions.

Diod. 1. 15.  
p. 492.  
Plut. et Corn.  
Nep. vit.  
Pelop.

Pelopidas returning to his command in Thessaly, his usual success failed him. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, venturing, as voluntary negotiator for his country, within the power of the profligate tagus, he was seized and imprisoned. But Polybius imputes his misfortune to positive imprudence, and an expression of Demosthenes would imply that he was made prisoner in battle<sup>16</sup>. Nor were the exertions of the Theban government to avenge him fortunate. The Bœotarcs, who had ventured far into Thessaly, with an army said to have been eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, not finding the

<sup>16</sup> Ἀιχμάλωτον. Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 660. A. Reiske.

Diod. ut sup.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.  
Pausan. 1. 9.  
c. 15.

support expected from the Thessalian people, were reduced to retreat before the greater force of the tagus; and in traversing the Thessalian plain, pursued by a superior cavalry, they suffered severely. It is attributed to the ability of Epameinondas, serving in an inferior station, but called forth, by the voices of the soldiers, to supply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not intirely cut off. Negotiation, supported probably by arms, yet not without some concession, procured at length the release of Pelopidas.

The troubles in Thessaly engaged the attention of the Athenians, who

<sup>17</sup> We have precisely three words only from Xenophon, about the war of Thebes with Thessaly. Deeply interested in the transactions in Peloponnesus, where all passed almost under his eye, his attention seems to have been fixed there; and possibly satisfactory information of affairs in Thessaly may not readily have occurred to him. We are thus reduced to depend upon later writers for the circumstances of that war, which was materially connected with the thread of Grecian history. If Plutarch then should be believed, the force of the Theban arms was exceeded only by the liberality and magnanimity of the Theban policy; the success was so complete, that apparently nothing but the most exalted and uncommon disinterestedness prevented the Thebans from remaining masters of Thessaly; and Pelopidas showed heroism and wisdom equally and uniformly great, except that, rather than admit any inferiority in the Theban arms, the biographer has chosen to mark some rashness, some extravagance of passion, in his hero, on the occasion of his death. But the tale altogether has so much of the romantic, the bombast, and even the puerile, with some contradiction of well authenticated facts, and some stories bearing their own contradiction, that sober judgement, disgusted, might incline to reject all in a lump, and conclude that; as Xenophon has passed all by, there was nothing worth historical no-

tice. It will be the duty of the modern writer of history however to look farther; and we find testimony from an early and very respectable author, that will require attention. It has been incidentally only that Polybius has been led to mention Pelopidas. He gives no particulars, but he speaks of it as a matter well known in his time, 'that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences' to Thebes, and, especially, great loss of reputation: *ἔβλαψε μὲν Θεβαίους μὲγάλα, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἁλίων προσηγοριήμην διξάν.* Polyb. 1. 8. p. 512. Xenophon's three words, tho less strong, are perfectly consonant to this. They occur in his account of Alexander of Phœæ, who, he says, was *χαλεπὸς Θεβαίους πόλεμος* (Hel. 1. 6; c. 4. s. 35.) 'an enemy who altogether pressed hard upon Thebes.' Fortunately then, for this part of the history, where Xenophon so fails us; and Plutarch, straining at panegyric for his fellowcountrymen the Bœotians, is so extravagant, we find Diodorus rational, Pausanias has also given some circumstances of the transactions of the Thebans in Thessaly; but the account of Diodorus is the only one in which connection has been attempted; and, tho inclining to partiality for the Theban heroes, yet, under correction of Xenophon and Polybius, apparently it may be trusted.

Diodorus attributes the first expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly to the third year of

the



SECT. V. PELOPIDAS AMBASSADOR TO PERSIA.

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who had old and extensive connections among its cities. Lacedæmon therefore being now greatly relieved by the victory of Archidamus, by the dissention growing in the Theban confederacy, and by the distraction of the Theban arms in the northern war, it was proposed to send, to the support of their Thessalian friends, those forces which, of late, had gone yearly into Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian minister, however, represented so strongly the pressure of the rebellion in Laconia, still supported by the most powerful states of the peninsula, and so urgently solicited the continuance of coöperation from the Athenian army, that about a thousand foot and thirty triremes only were sent to Thessaly, (the seaforce perhaps no more than ordinarily was stationed there) and the former assistance to Lacedæmon was not intermitted <sup>18</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 17.

The cordial support of Athens, the force of mercenaries to be added by Philiscus, the growing aversion, among the Arcadians, to the Theban cause, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the pressure of the Thessalian arms upon the Theban confederacy, together seemed likely to restore a decisive superiority to Lacedæmon, at least within her peninsula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils observed, that the first, and perhaps the most powerful efficient of this change in circumstances, had been negotiation with Persia; and they resolved to direct their attention also to Persia, and try if they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation, still more effectually than by arms. A minister from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually resident at the Persian court. Upon this ground a congress

s. 23.

the hundred and second olympiad, presently after the invasion of Laconia; the imprisonment of Pelopidas to the first year of the hundred and third olympiad; the unfortunate expedition, in which Epameinondas saved the army, to the same year; and the liberation of Pelopidas to the year following. The first date agrees with Xenophon, the last not.

under the command of Autocles, to the assistance of the tagus of Thessaly against the Thebans. Tho not usually giving Diodorus credit for great exactness, I nevertheless do not consider this as inconsistent, either with the general assertion of Xenophon, that Alexander was a troublesome enemy to the Athenians, or with his more particular account, of the intention, not pursued, to send their principal land-force into Thessaly.

<sup>18</sup> According to Diodorus: the Athenians sent a thousand foot and thirty triremes;

of the confederacy was summoned, and, in pursuance of a common resolution, Pelopidas was sent to Susa, on the part of Thebes, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the measure, sent their ministers also, Timagoras and Leon.

The choice of the Thebans on this occasion was fortunate; that of the Athenians not so. A man at the head of a party, like Pelopidas, will of course be zealous in the interest of that party; it is his own interest. With a man not a leader, a private interest may have more weight than the share he considers as his own in the party-interest. But, among the Grecian commonwealths, the variety of public interests, and the variety of party interests, was such, that, without the interference of individual interests, which nevertheless always might occur in political negotiation, circumstances the strangest, and apparently most unaccountable, were continually liable to arise. Pelopidas slighted the Arcadian minister, Antiochus; perhaps the more readily to gain the Athenian Timagoras; with whose coöperation, he succeeded completely in the great object of his mission. He was treated by the Persian court with distinguishing honor.\* The slight, even to contempt, which he showed toward the Arcadian minister, sufficed to bring the marked contempt of the court upon that minister and his country<sup>9</sup>. A Persian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a rescript from the king, in which the terms of his friendship were declared. It required 'that the Lacedæmonians should allow the independency of Messenia; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet; that war should be made upon them if they refused; and that, if any Grecian city denied its contingent for such war, the first hostilities should be directed against that city: that those who accepted these terms would be considered as friends of the king, those who refused them as enemies.'

If we compare the style and spirit of this rescript, and the manner in which it was offered to united Greece, with the terms and circum-

<sup>9</sup> Antiochus had been victor in the pan- test for honor; unless we should consider cratium; (Xen. Hel. l. 7, c. 1. s. 23.) so that the contempt shown him, by Pelopidas, it should seem men of rank and education, as in part founded on his low rank and even at this day, engaged in that rough con- manners.

SECT. V. CONGRESS AT THEBES.

458.

stances of the peace of Antalcidas, we shall hardly discover what has been the ground of distinction between them; why one has been so much reprobated, while the other, little indeed applauded, has in a manner been thrown out of observation, by the imposing abundance of panegyric, which the consent of antient and modern writers has bestowed on the magnanimous patriotism of Pelopidas, and of his great associate, in politics as in arms, Epameinondas. But we may perhaps be led to think, that political principle has been out of view, both in the panegyric and in the reproach; that the merit of individuals has considerably swayed the general mind; yet that the great distinction has rested on party-spirit. If, however, leaving the political principles of Pelopidas in that obscurity, which we seem without means very satisfactorily to illuminate, we look to his political abilities, we shall see them exhibited in their fairest light, in real splendor, not by his professed panegyrists, but by the candid cotemporary historian, not his friend. They are evident in the success of his Persian negotiation, to which that historian has borne full testimony; and that negotiation must unquestionably have been a business abounding with difficulties, and requiring much discernment, to conduct, and bring to so advantageous a conclusion.

But the Thebans seem to have been too much elated by their success, in this extraordinary and very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold through their political conduct; whether their able chiefs now erred, or rather popular presumption, in the badness of their constitution, to which Polybius bears testimony, was not to be restrained. They assumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their summons, for a congress of deputies from the several republics to meet in Thebes, were generally obeyed. The Persian, who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's rescript in his hand; which was read and interpreted to the congress, while the king's seal, appendant, was ostentatiously displayed. The Thebans proposed, as the condition of friendship with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies should immediately swear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their respective cities. Readily however as the congress had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come so prepared to take the law from Thebes.

Polyb. 1.6.  
p. 487.  
Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c. 1.  
s. 27.

Thebes. - A majority of them joined in the reply, 'that they were sent to hear propositions, not to swear to whatever might be proposed. If oaths were expected, the Thebans must inform their several governments of the purport.'

The conduct of Pelopidas toward Arcadia and its minister at the Persian court, unaccounted for by Xenophon, has scarcely been the result of meer caprice or resentment, but probably of some political view; whether, as before observed, to gain the Athenian minister, or to obviate some suspicions or prejudices of the Persians. It was however certainly productive of political inconveniencies. Antiochus, however deficient in qualifications for minister at a polished court, was not without some just feeling of the indignity put upon him: at his departure, he had refused the customary presents from the Persian court; and when, on his return, he gave an account of his embassy, in that assembly of the Arcadian nation in Megalopolis, whose very title, the Ten-thousand, or the Numberless, marks its tumultuary composition, he made light of the Persian empire and all that it contained: 'Bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and porters,' he said, abounded there; but men, fit to fight with the Greeks, tho' looking diligently, he could see none. Nor did he believe even in the boasted riches of the empire; for, concluding with a joke adapted to impress the multitude he was addressing, 'the so much celebrated golden plane-tree, he was sure, would not give shelter to a grasshopper.'

This being added to former stimulation, the Arcadian deputies were chosen under an impression not favorable to the Theban cause. The powerful and popular Lycomedes, the first who had stood forward in avowed opposition to the Theban pretensions, was the Mantineian representative. Not simply objecting to the proposed oath, Lycomedes insisted, 'that Thebes was not the place in which the congress should have been assembled.' The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of resentment, that he was promoting discord in the confederacy, he declared his resolution to hold his seat in the congress no longer; and the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all went home together. The result seems to have been, that the congress broke up without coming to any resolution.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 28.

Disappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet resolve to abandon their project of arrogating that supremacy over the Greek nation, which Lacedæmon had so long held; long indeed by the voluntary concession of a large majority of it. They sent requisitions separately to every city to accede to the terms proposed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, says the cotemporary historian, would bring all severally to compliance. The Corinthians however setting the example of a firm refusal, with the added observation, 'that they wanted no alliance, no interchange of oaths with the king,' it was followed by most of the cities. And thus, continues Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans, to acquire the empire of Greece, finally failed<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, in relating the Persian embassy, has labored, with some ingenuity, to draw attention aside from whatever, in his hero's conduct, was most repugnant to the claim for him of being a Grecian, and not merely a Theban, patriot. He has however been either honest or idle enough not specifically to contradict any of the particulars reported by Xenophon, which show that the object of Pelopidas was to make Thebes mistress of Greece. He has omitted all mention of the congress of Thebes, and the general opposition to Pelopidas there; an opposition evidently arising from the cause stated by Polybius for the failure of all

attempts to unite the Grecian republics: διὰ τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἐνεμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἰδιωτικῆς δυναστείας χάριν ἕκαστον ποιῆσαι τὴν σπουδὴν—because the views and exertions of each were directed to promote, not the common freedom, but its own power. Polyb. 1. 2. p. 125. Concerning so remarkable a transaction, we should have been glad even of such reports as Diodorus might have preserved, to compare with the account of Xenophon: but, perhaps because he found nothing that would support eulogy to his country, he has omitted all notice of it in its proper place, and has barely mentioned it in a following summary panegyric of Pelopidas.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Failure of the Attempt to establish the SUPREMACY of THEBES over the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, through the Support of PERSIA, till the Depression together of the ARISTOCRATICAL and DEMOCRATICAL Interests, and the Dissolution of the antient System of GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, through the Event of the Battle of MANTINEIA.

## SECTION I.

*Difficult circumstances of the Theban administration. Affairs of Achaia: Advantageous constitution of Achaia, and advantageous character of its people: Interference of Thebes: Generous policy of Epameinondas: Impolitic illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. Miseries, virtues, and enjoyments of the people of the smaller republics, exemplified in the history of Phlius.*

IF we refuse to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure, for her first successful struggle against the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epameinondas himself with us, who would take no part in the revolution, till the business of conspiracy, treachery, and assassination were over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obstinacy, with which the Thebans afterward persisted in asserting dominion over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when proposed upon a condition which might seem, on first view, all that true Grecian patriotism could desire, universal independency. For where was to be found the sanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great interest, pervading the country, was overborne and lost  
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in the multitude of narrow, yet pressing interests, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No sooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been established, than a revolution would have been made, or attempted, in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among those towns, how long might Thebes itself have been secure against a second subjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far then as these considerations may apologize for the refusal of accession to the treaty of Athens, so far it may also justify the Persian embassy; tho' scarcely the haughtiness, which success in that negotiation seems to have inspired. But what should have been the farther conduct of Thebes, to secure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of surrounding states, or how to insure quiet among those states, without the possession and the use of power to controll them, is not so easy to determine. For the business of the honest statesman, amid the seldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of interested neighbors without, is not so easy and obvious as presumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to suppose, and informed knavery often, with interested purposes, to affirm. How ill Greece was at this time prepared for internal quiet, what follows will but concur, with all that has preceded of its history, to show.

ACHAIA was more divided, and perhaps more equally divided, into little village-republics, without a preponderating town, than any other province of Peloponnesus. Hence, if its people were not among themselves quieter and happier, yet their disturbances, less expanding among their neighbors, less attracted the notice of historians. While the Lacedæmonian influence prevailed in Peloponnesus, the little Achaian states were mostly aristocratical republics. In the preponderance ac-

Ch. 12, s. 3,  
& 5. of this  
Hist.

quired by Athens, under the successive able and liberal administrations of Themistocles, Aristeides, Cimon, and Pericles, support from that imperial democracy made the democratical the ruling party in Achaia, and brought Achaia into dependence upon Athens. . By the conditions, afterward, of the Thirty-years truce, to which the combination of enemies and defection of subjects compelled the Athenians to submit,

all interference of Athens being forbidden, aristocracy and the Lacedæmonian interest revived together. They were however not so completely restored, but that, when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Pellenë alone joining the general confederacy of the Peloponnesian states against Athens, the rest of the Achaian towns maintained a neutrality, till the destructive defeat of the Athenians in Sicily gave a decided preponderance to Lacedæmon.

Ch. 14. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Polyb. 1. 2.  
p. 127.

From that time Achaia seems to have remained moderately quiet, under aristocratical, or perhaps a mixed government: for there seems ground for supposing that a better connection between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, a truer aristocracy, with less of oligarchy, whether from advantage of law, or of custom and circumstances, was established among the little towns of Achaia, than in most other parts of Greece. The general character of the Achaians, for probity, at the same time, stood singularly high among the Greeks, while their power was invidious to none; insomuch that, after the battle of Leuctra, the Lacedæmonian and Theban governments agreed to refer a matter in dispute (what it was we are uninformed) to their arbitration: In the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, as far as we have yet traced it, they seem to have maintained an exact neutrality; except that, in the extreme danger of Sparta itself, in the invasion of Laconia under Epameinondas, the Pellenians, always more attached than the rest to the Lacedæmonian interest, sent their mite of assistance to their dis-

Xen. Hel.  
1. 6. c. 5.  
s. 29,  
Thucyd. 1. 2.  
c. 9.

\* Polybius says that the merit of the Achaian laws, as they stood in his age, was derived from times of great antiquity; (Polyb. Hist. 1. 2.) which might be believed on less authority than that of Polybius, because it is not common for a system, totally new, to acquire stability and flourish at once, like the Achaian, in the time of its confederacy. He calls the Achaian governments democratical; meaning probably no more than that they had a mixture of democracy, sufficient to insure isonomy, equal law, to the Many: for Xenophon clearly informs us that by the old constitutions of the Achaian towns, preserved to his time, (Hel. 1. 7. c. 1. s. 32.) the wealthier and higher people held the principal share in the government. But it appears evident that Polybius, with certainly the best opportunities of information, could learn little of the history of Achaia; so that what we gain from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, may be considered as everything most material, of what was known to antiquity, till that bright period, which none of those writers lived to see, but which fell directly under the view of Polybius, and of which his detail is of high value.

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SECT. I. INTERFERENCE OF THEBES IN ACHAIA.

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tressed friends. But the elevation of a new patron for democracy, preponderant among the powers of Greece, not by sea, as Athens formerly, but by land, and which, as experience had shown, could extend its arm with effect into Peloponnesus, appears to have excited new ambition in the democratical leaders; for even among the Achaians parties existed. The democratical party in Achaia communicated with Thebes; and the Theban leaders, in the dilemma in which their failure in the late congress had left them, received the communication with eager attention. Disappointed, and, in some degree, disgraced, in the eyes of all Greece, here appeared a point to which the exertion of the confederacy might be directed, with the plausible pretence of supporting the democratical cause, and the cause of Grecian independency, by delivering Achaia from subjection to Lacedæmon. In the want of such an object, or in the neglect of it, their influence over the confederacy would risk a rapid decay. The establishment, then, of their influence in Achaia, would form a check, which they greatly desired, upon the new refractoriness of some of their Peloponnesian allies, especially the Arcadians. It was therefore resolved, at Thebes, that the army of the confederacy should march into Achaia, and Epameinondas was appointed to the command.

Xen. Hel. 1.7. c. 1. s. 29, Diod. 1. 15. p. 496. B. C. 366. Ol. 103. 3. Dodw.

On the other side, to prevent this expected invasion of Peloponnesus, the passes of mount Oncion, on the isthmus, were occupied by two bodies of troops; one under a Lacedæmonian, the other under an Athenian officer: but the alliances of Thebes, within the peninsula, afforded opportunities for rendering such precaution vain. In consequence of negligence, at least attributed to both the commanders, the Argian general, Peisias, found means to establish two thousand men on a commanding height, which enabled Epameinondas to enter Peloponnesus without material molestation. He was quickly joined by the Peloponnesian allies, and all together directed their march toward Achaia.

Xen. Hel. 1.7. c. 1. s. 30.

Meanwhile the principal men of that country, after deliberation on

\* Dodwell gives the Achaian business to the year 366, and the Phliasian to the preceding year, 367. They seem to have been

going forward about the same time, occupying part of both years.

their critical circumstances, resolved, instead of either attempting a vain resistance, or betaking themselves to the wretched resource of flight, to trust the liberal character of Epameinondas, and meet him with a declaration of their readiness to commit their fortune into his hands. He did not deceive their opinion of him: Exerting his influence, and perhaps stretching his power, he prevented banishment, yet preserved the constitution of every city inviolate; and, only requiring pledges that they would be faithful to the Theban confederacy, and follow in-arms wheresoever the Thebans should lead, he conducted his army home<sup>3</sup>.

Diod. l. 15.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

Diod. l. 15.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 31.

Pelopidas; we are told, so held his interest with the Theban people, that, from the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians till his death, he was constantly in the office of Bæotarc, by yearly election. The magnanimity and stedly virtue of Epameinondas could not so condescend to popular folly and depravity, as to hold popular favor, or even to avoid sometimes disgrace, at least with that occasional majority of the multitude, which wielded, in the moment, the absolute sovereignty of Thebes. His indulgence toward the principal families of Achaia, highly disappointing to their opponents, who had depended upon succeeding to the honors, and profiting from the estates, of fugitives, was unsatisfactory to the high democratical party, throughout the confederacy. The Arcadians especially, predisposed to blame the measures of Theban councils, joined with the Achaian malcontents in complaining aloud, 'that the interest of Lacedæmon, rather than of their own confederacy, was considered in the settlement of Achaia.' Clamor from without so assisting party within Thebes, the interest of Epameinondas did not suffice for the support of his own measure. The Theban people, calling themselves champions of the liberty of Greece, decreed, that regulators should be sent to the Achaian cities. Under

<sup>3</sup> The story is told in the original in these few words: Πελοπίδων δ' αὖτις τὰς βελτίων ἐν τῆς Ἀχαιῶν, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδίσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείας μεταστῆσαι, ἀλλὰ σιγᾷ λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἢ μὴ συμμάχους ἴσασθαι, καὶ ἀκολούθησιν ὅσην αἱ

Θηβαίων ἠγάθηαι καὶ ἑνὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν οὐκ αἰσῶν. I have endeavored to give a faithful interpretation of this passage in the text. A meer version, without dilating in some parts, could scarcely be made at the same time faithful and intelligible.

the superintendance of the regulators, the Many drove the principal men of every Achaian town into banishment, and changed the governments to pure democracy.

It soon appeared that the measure of Epameinondas had been a measure of true policy, not less than of justice and humanity; and that the popular measure superseding it was as unprofitable as tyrannical; disadvantageous to Thebes, to the confederacy at large, and, in the end, still more to the Many in the Achaian towns, whose benefit was more particularly its pretended object. The exiles were numerous, and held still some influence in every town. Uniting, and directing their whole force against each separately, they recovered all. No longer then moderate, as before, in their politics, they engaged warmly in the Lacedæmonian interest. What their domestic adversaries suffered, the historian has not informed us; but he says that considerable inconvenience followed to the Arcadians; annoyed now, on their northern border, by the active and zealous enmity of Achaia, while on the southern they were pressed, or constantly threatened, by the force of Lacedæmon\*.

Under these circumstances the Achaians owed their security principally to the troubles in neighboring states, engaging the attention of Thebes, and employing the arms of her Peloponnesian allies. The situation of PHLIUS, bordering on Arcadia and Argolis, and in the road from the isthmus to Lacedæmon, made the acquisition of that little city much an object for the confederacy. It was not the less so on account of the remarkable fidelity with which, since the last revolution, when Delphion fled, its people had adhered, under all fortunes, to their engagements with Lacedæmon, and of the spirit, and success with which, on many trying occasions, they had exerted themselves, as well in support of their allies, as in defence of themselves. Their zealous

\* I have been the more desirous that the learned reader should have ready opportunity to judge of the faithfulness of my interpretation of the passage of Xenophon, given in the preceding note, because, I think, that passage, with its sequel, does altogether singular credit both to Xenophon and to Epameinondas; inasmuch that, I will own, I doubt if the labored panegyric of Plutarch, were his life of Epameinondas extant, would so strongly paint the real merit of his hero, to the penetrating and judicious, as this simple and compressed narrative from a political enemy.

activity,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 2.  
s. 3.  
s. 4.

activity, in the extreme danger of Sparta, when invaded by Epameinondas, was warmly acknowledged by the Lacedæmonians. In revenge, on the other hand, for this, the Argians, in returning from that expedition, directed the usual ravage of Grecian armies particularly against Phliasia. The Phliasians, utterly unequal to meet them in the field, nevertheless, with only sixty horse, pursuing them, so completely routed the rear-guard as to raise their trophy, in sight of the Argian army.

s. 4—9.

It was the common misfortune of Phlius, as we have heretofore seen, with almost all Grecian republics, and the unavoidable consequence of sedition and revolution, to have emigrant citizens more vehemently inimical than any strangers. The miserable insecurity of those little republics is strongly marked in what the cotemporary historian proceeds to relate. While the Thebans were the second time invading Peloponnesus, the Eleians and Arcadians, marching through Nemea to join them, were persuaded by the Phliasian exiles, that the appearance only of support from the army would enable them to recover their city. The exiles and others, accordingly, to the number of six hundred, prepared with scaling ladders, arrived, by night, under the very walls of Phlius, undiscovered, and waited there. The march of the supporting army, however, was observed from an outpost at Tricranum, and indicated to those in the city by signals. But in the city were some who held intelligence with the exiles. These hastened to give the concerted token for scaling; and the citadel, ill-guarded, was taken almost without resistance. Alarm rapidly pervaded the town, and the people ran to arms. The exiles, hoping to profit from the first confusion, sallied from the citadel into the town. They were however repulsed, and, as they retreated again into the citadel, the pursuers entered with them. But the Eleian, Arcadian, and Argian forces had by this time surrounded the town, and proceeded immediately to scale the walls. The threatening horrors of a storm seemed now beyond the strength of those within to avert; but, by a series of exertions, the most spirited, persevering, and well-directed, they at length repulsed the assailants in every direction. Without remission then, applying their whole strength to the recovery of their citadel, they effected it. This was no sooner done,

done, than their cavalry boldly sallied. The enemy, baffled in all points, and probably weak in cavalry, were so fearful of the threatened annoyance to their retreat, that, in their haste, they left their ladders, their slain, and even some wounded; mostly those lamed by leaping from the walls. Extreme danger, thus fortunately, quickly, and for the moment completely, surmounted, produced emotions, among the Phliansians, stronger than perhaps any known in the more generous warfare of modern ages; unless where, recently, France has gone beyond all antient example in illiberality and ferocity. The spectacle, it appears, was striking, even in those days; the men shaking hands while they circulated congratulations; the women busy with cups, ministering to their refreshment, and shedding tears of joy; and at length (if it may be allowed so literally to translate the strong expression) all actually seized with a weeping laughter<sup>s</sup>.

In the following year the united forces of Arcadia and Argos invaded Phliasia, to revenge their defeat by ravage of the country, and not without hope of so distressing the town as to reduce it to capitulate. The long and severe pressure of a strong democratical party seems to have urged the aristocratical Phliansians to cultivate the cavalry service; so that, among the Peloponnesians, they appear to have excelled in it. A small body of Athenian horse had joined the Phliansian; and together, supported by a small chosen body of foot, they attacked the Argians and Arcadians, broken in crossing a river, and with such success as considerably to check the intended waste of their fields.

But the unfortunate Phliansians, after the Thebans became masters of Achaia, were so surrounded by enemies, that all their energy, and all their success could not inable them to procure subsistence from their fields. Yet they still persevered, and still were successful. The Theban commander in Achaia entered their country at the head of his own troops, with the force of Sicyon and Pellenë, strengthened with two thousand mercenaries. The Phliansians, finding opportunity to attack the Sicyonians and Pellenians separately, defeated them with such slaughter, that the expedition was pursued no farther. Xenophon has

<sup>s</sup> Πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀσπίδας τῆτε γὰρ τῶν ὀπί κλαυμάτωσιν ἔρχετο. Xen. Hel. 1.7. c.2. s.9.

thought

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 2.  
s. 16.

thought it a matter for particular notice and warm eulogy, that a Pellenian, connected by public hospitality with Phlius, being made prisoner, was released without ransom; tho the wants and poverty of the Phliasians were at that time pressing. Deprived of the produce of their own lands, they found means to obtain occasional supplies; sometimes by rapine from their enemies, sometimes by purchase from Corinth; but both through many difficulties and dangers: with difficulty raising the price for their purchases; sometimes by collection among themselves, sometimes by borrowing; and then, on account of the peril of the convoy, with difficulty finding pledges, even for the necessary beasts of burthen.

s. 18.

In extreme distress, at length, they were so fortunate as to obtain the assistance of the Athenian general Chares, commanding a body of mercenaries at Corinth<sup>6</sup>. Beyond the direct line of his commission, he joined them in protecting a convoy. With such an auxiliary force, they arrived at Phlius unopposed; and then they requested Chares to give them his farther protection in carrying their useless mouths to Pellenē: for already the revolution in Achaia had taken place, which restored the government of that little city to the party with which the Phliasians had old and intimate connection. He consented, and they arrived there also unmolested. The market of a place so friendly, and with which they had not, for a long time, been able to communicate, engaged their attention. They knew that, if they incumbered themselves with a convoy, they should certainly be attacked in their return. Nevertheless they provided themselves to the utmost that their credit, and the Pellenian stores, would inable them; and, Chares still giving his willing assistance, they fought their way home successfully, and carried in their convoy undiminished. This seems to have been that action of the Nemean glen, in which, as we shall find occasion to observe hereafter, credit was earned by Æschines, an Athenian youth, afterward of so much celebrity as an orator.

s. 19.

The small population of Phlius; or the small number of those whom the ruling party could trust with arms, little allowed reliefs in these

<sup>6</sup> *Ξίρους*, s. 20. and *μικροφόροι*, s. 21.

arduous duties. But their activity supplied the want of number. They had scarcely taken a few hours rest by daylight, after a night of great fatigue, when they proposed to Chares a new enterprize. To check their convoys in future, equally from Corinth and Pellenë, and to extend waste over their territory with more safety, more certainty, and more constancy, the enemy were fortifying a post at Thyamia, on the Phliasian border against Sicyonia. Chares consenting, they moved so as, by a rapid march, to reach the place a little before sunset; and they found equally the workmen and the protecting force, in the cotemporary historian's description, some cooking, some baking, some preparing their beds: all completely surprized, all instantly fled. The Phliasians and their allies then profited from the preparation made. Having stationed their guards, they supped, made libations, as thanks-offerings for their success, sang the pæan of victory, and went to rest. Immediately, however, as their success was ascertained, they sent a messenger to Corinth with the news; and the Corinthian administration, not waiting for daylight, hastened, with the most friendly zeal, to press carriages and dispatch them, laden with provisions, to Phlius. Meanwhile the indefatigable Phliasians applied themselves diligently to complete the fortification of Thyamia; and thus made that, intended for their annoyance and destruction, a post for protecting their territory, and securing the communication with Corinth. Convoys passed then daily, and Phlius was abundantly supplied.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 2.  
s. 20.

s. 22.

s. 23.

The testimony of Xenophon, which he has had evident pleasure in giving, to the merits of the Phliasians, will deserve our credit, tho he was their political partizan; yet the sincerity of history will require our recollection, that a very strong interest, supported by very strong prejudices, and by the remembrance of past sufferings, bound the Phliasians to the line of conduct by which they earned so much honor, instigated their activity, and in a manner compelled them to firmness. About seven and twenty years had passed since the party, now ruling Phlius, then suffering in exile, vainly petitioned Lacedæmon for assistance toward their restoration. Not till near ten years after, finding a more favorable opportunity, they had succeeded so far as to obtain, through the influence of Lacedæmon, reädmission to residence in the city, and

Ch. 25. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 26. s. 1.  
of this Hist.  
s. 4.

a promise of restoration of their property. But that promise was not fulfilled: justice was denied them by their fellowcitizens; their residence was highly uneasy and precarious; some were compelled to a second flight; and it cost Lacedæmon a troublesome war to give them complete reëstablishment. When this was effected, the most active of the democratical party, or those who, with the watchful Delphion, escaped death, took their turn in flight. Under such circumstances, with the Theban confederacy triumphant, there could be no hope of peace for those who held the city, without the condition, that the democratical exiles should be restored; whence would follow the predominance of the democratical party, under the patronage of a democratical confederacy; and what would then be the situation of its political opponents is obvious to conjecture. But Xenophon, in the course of his long observation of the troubles of Greece, would have had frequent occasion to see that all men, single or in body, are not capable of that firm perseverance, and active exertion, which their own interest, in difficult and dangerous circumstances, may require; and that those who faint, in pursuit of their own good, may appear unfaithful to their friends, without intending infidelity. Thus, while they incur our blame, they may also claim our pity. But hence he would justly conclude, that men who, amid the greatest difficulties, and most threatening dangers, are true at the same time to themselves and to their friends; failing in nothing that their own interest, their engagements to others, or a sense of justice, generosity, and honor demands; who, in short, in honesty actively pursue the best policy, deserve admiration and applause; and thus the Phliasians seem to have earned his eulogy, which has perpetuated the renown of their little commonwealth.



## SECTION II.

*Affairs of Sicyon: Euphron tyrant of Sicyon: Liberal despotism of Æneas, general of Arcadia: Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban Civil Jurisprudence, illustrated: Public honors to the memory of Euphron.*

DURING these transactions of the Phliasians, which, by ingaging the attention of the Theban confederacy, contributed to the quiet of Achaia, the affairs of Sicyon, more urging the attention of the Theban government, had still more powerfully the same effect. Sicyon, a Dorian state; frequently at war with the more powerful Dorian state of Corinth, on its eastern border, contracted connections with the Achaian towns, its western neighbors, such as to produce a transfusion of the Achaian institutions into the Sicyonian government. At the time of the battle of Leuctra, the Sicyonian constitution, after the Achaian

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 1.  
s. 32.

model, was a balanced aristocracy. While the Lacedæmonians yet held their full influence in Peloponnesus, Euphron, an able but unprincipled man, acting as their agent for the management of their interest in Sicyon, was first in power there: but, in their inability afterward so to extend their views and exertions, Sicyon, yielding to the pressure of circumstances, became connected with the Theban confederacy, and Euphron lost his præminence. Anxious, beyond all things, to regain it, and careless about the honesty of his means, he represented to the leading men of Argos and Arcadia, that, if the families of property were allowed to hold their rank and influence, Sicyon would, on the first opportunity, become again the ally of Lacedæmon; but, were democracy established, it would be secured in its present connection; and, with due support from them, he would ingage that a simple vote of the people should effect the change. The proposal, profligate as it was from Euphron, involving the ruin of those with whom he had been most connected, nevertheless suiting the views of the Argian and

Arcadian leaders, they sent the support desired. Euphron then convened the Sicyonian people; and, in presence of the Argian and Arcadian auxiliaries, he proposed, and it was at once voted, 'that the government should be changed to a democracy, with perfect equality for all citizens.' Election, under awe of the same foreign force, placed Euphron, with four others, at the head of the native military, and raised Adeas, son of Euphron, to the command of a body of mercenaries in the republic's service.

These leading points being carried, Euphron proceeded presently to show how much more glaring is the temptation, and how much readier the means, to become a complete tyrant in a democracy, or under democratical patronage, than in any other political circumstances. His mercenary army was to be his principal instrument. He directed his attention, therefore, first to secure its attachment, then to increase its numbers. For both purposes, the indispensable efficient was money. To acquire money therefore he scrupled nothing. With command of money, he trusted, that he could find support in any measure. The public treasury and ordinary revenue of the state being very unequal to his need, he made no difficulty of risking, what generally excited violent popular indignation, to take the sacred treasures from the temples, and convert to his use the revenues appropriated to sacred purposes. These being still insufficient, he had recourse to oppression of individuals. He encouraged accusations of Laconism, as attachment to the Lacedæmonian party was termed, that party of which himself had been chief. Thus the property of many of the wealthiest families, through confiscation, came into his disposal. When, after a short but rapid course of violences, by the attachment of dependents and the removal of adversaries, he thought himself strong enough, he proceeded to direct his measures against those who might become rivals. Procuring the death of some of his colleagues, and the exile of others, he got all power into his own hands, and became truly tyrant of Sicyon. During these measures within his own little state, he directed his attention ably, upon similar principles, to the republics with which it had political connection; and he obviated interference of the confederacy,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 34.

## SECT. II. EUPHRON TYRANT OF SICYON.

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confederacy, partly by money, and partly by the ready and effective service of his troops, whenever and wherever required<sup>7</sup>.

Where a people had not, for a long time, experienced, from a foreign enemy; any severe pressure, or very alarming danger, democratical jealousy would sometimes pervade the military system, and make all democratical; as among the Syracusans at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily: but wherever frequent wars have occurred, democratical jealousy itself has soon felt the necessity of remitting its severity, so far as to allow, for military matters, some degree of monarchical authority. The Arcadians, therefore, whose experience of war, while a divided people, was large, and whose union was effected during a war involving nearly all Greece, in forming their united government, committed the military establishment of their democratical townships, under the controul of their Numberless assembly, to the authority of one commander-in-chief for the nation. Æneas of Stymphalus, being raised to that great office, saw, with a just indignation, the tyranny of Euphron; and, nothing forbidding an arbitrary use of the ill-defined power with which he was vested, he resolved to exert it for a generous purpose. Leading the Arcadian army to Sicyon, where none resisted an ally in his high situation, he marched directly into the citadel. Imitating then the liberal policy of Epameinondas, he called together the principal men in the town, and sent for all who, without a regular sentence, had been forced or frightened into banishment. Apparently the inconveniencies, resulting from the reversal of the measures of Epameinondas in Achaia, had brought the narrow policy of his opponents into disrepute, and enabled the Arcadian general, with the concurrence probably of Epameinondas, to follow a more generous system. Euphron, therefore, shrinking before him, had however resources in his abilities, and in his daring profligacy. Withdrawing from the city, he communicated with the Corinthian government, and managed to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the port of Sicyon. On the

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 3.  
s. 1.

s. 2, 3.

<sup>7</sup> It were endless to point out all the several circumstances of resemblance in the French, and in the worst times of some of the Greek republics; but almost the whole of this history of Euphron might seem, in-

stead of having been written two thousand three hundred years ago, an account of transactions (at the time of first editing this volume) within the last three years.

merit of this service he then founded an endeavor to apologize to the Lacedæmonian government for his past conduct, and to regain its confidence. But the Lacedæmonians, tho ready to profit from his services, were slow to give him the credit he desired; and, in the mean time, new opportunity arose to invite the attention of his active and versatile mind, bound by no scruples.

Xen. Hel.  
L7. c. 3.  
s. 4.

The Arcadian general, apparently little a politician, satisfied with having expelled the tyrant, left the Sicyonians to settle their own affairs; not however in perfect independency; for, to secure their fidelity to the confederacy, the command of their citadel (so the Theban authority prevailed in Peloponnesus) was committed to a Theban harmost. But a cordial and lasting coalition, between the aristocratical and democratical parties, was seldom effected in a Grecian republic, and did not take place in Sicyon. Their differences prevented measures for the recovery of the port. Meanwhile Euphron, versed in the ways of engaging mercenary troops, procured some from Athens, and then offered his assistance to the democratical faction in Sicyon. That faction, to whom the liberality of Æneas and the leading men of the confederacy, had denied that partial support, to which they thought their democratical merit intitled them, did not scruple to submit themselves again to so unprincipled a leader. Euphron was received into the city, and the force he brought with him sufficed to give his democratical friends, for the moment, a clear superiority over their opponents. But thus, making the Lacedæmonians again his decided enemies, he risked to incur the vengeance also of the Theban confederacy. Intrigue and corruption were his resources. Equally daring and ingenious in his profligacy, with the greatest force of money he could collect, he went himself to Thebes.

s. 5.

Those Sicyonians, who had been recalled from banishment by the generous despotism of the Arcadian general, informed of Euphron's journey, and of the preparation he had made for it, were in high alarm. To obviate the consequences, some of them went directly to Thebes. But their alarm was greatly increased when they saw how well Euphron was received, and to what intimate communication admitted, by some of the Thebans in power. In the vehemence of their fear then, of

being again subjected to his tyranny, they were ready to dare anything. In the citadel, while the council was sitting there, and, apparently, without a prospect of making their escape, they assassinated him. They were immediately apprehended, and carried before the council, which was the principal criminal tribunal of Thebes.

It cannot but be matter of just curiosity to know what were the principles and practice of criminal law in Thebes, in the age of Epameinondas, when Thebes, after Athens and Lacedæmon, was aspiring at the supremacy of Greece; and the picture preserved to us, by the masterly hand of the cotemporary historian, is highly curious. A principal magistrate delivered the charge against the assassins, thus:

‘ Citizens, we institute a capital accusation against these men, for  
‘ the murder of Euphron. Unjust and impious deeds, which good men  
‘ avoid and abhor, even the wicked perpetrate, commonly, in some  
‘ anxiety for concealment; but the audaciousness and profligacy of  
‘ these men has been such, that, almost in presence of us the chief  
‘ magistrates, and of you, to whom it belongs to absolve or condemn,  
‘ they have assumed to themselves to put a man to death. If they  
‘ then escape capital punishment, what stranger will hereafter with any  
‘ confidence enter your city? Where is the jurisdiction of your state,  
‘ if any stranger is allowed, at his pleasure, to kill another, before it  
‘ is declared what has been the object of either, in coming hither?  
‘ We therefore prosecute these men as offenders, in the highest degree,  
‘ against divine and human laws, and singularly guilty of contempt of  
‘ the jurisdiction of the state. It depends upon you, after hearing  
‘ them, to pronounce their doom.’

The Sicyonians denied the charge; except one, who, in taking the whole blame, boldly claimed merit for the deed: ‘ To condemn your  
‘ jurisdiction, Thebans,’ he said, ‘ for one who knows he is at your  
‘ mercy, is impossible. In what confidence, then, I killed this man,  
‘ I will declare to you: It was, first, that I thought it just; and then, that  
‘ I trusted you would judge of it justly. For I knew that yourselves,  
‘ when you arrested Archias and Hypates, for crimes similar to those  
‘ of Euphron, did not wait for the formality of a trial, but used the  
‘ means in your power for inflicting instant punishment; holding,  
‘ that

‘ that men eminently wicked, notoriously traitors, and usurpers of  
 ‘ sovereign authority, are condemned to death by the common sentence  
 ‘ of mankind.’

He proceeded then to state the crimes of Euphron against gods and men: stripping the temples of Sicyon, rich in dedicated gold and silver<sup>8</sup>: betraying the Lacedæmonians, betraying the confederacy, tyrannizing over his fellowcitizens, raising slaves to honorable situations, and, as his interest instigated, putting to death, banishing, or ruining by confiscation, the worthiest of the people: ‘ after this,’ continued the accused, ‘ introducing the Athenians, the most determined of your  
 ‘ enemies; with their coöperation opposing your harmost in arms, and  
 ‘ unable so to carry his purpose, finally coming here prepared with  
 ‘ money.—Had he come in arms and I had killed him, you would have  
 ‘ thanked me. Coming then with money, to procure by corruption  
 ‘ your favor<sup>9</sup>, that he might again be master of our city, how for  
 ‘ striking the blow of justice against him, can you justly con-  
 ‘ demn me? The violence of an open enemy, injurious indeed, is not  
 ‘ necessarily unjust; but bribery is intrinsically unjust, injurious, and  
 ‘ disgracing.

‘ If nevertheless, being my enemy, Euphron had been your friend,  
 ‘ I would not pretend to justify killing him in your city: but so grossly  
 ‘ a traitor as he was to you, how could he be more my enemy than  
 ‘ yours? He came hither, it may said, freely. But if, before he en-  
 ‘ tered your territory, putting him to death would have been merito-  
 ‘ rious, how, when he came with the purpose of adding to his former  
 ‘ crimes, can it be maintained that he has not suffered justly? Where,  
 ‘ among the Greeks, are not traitors, deserters, and tyrants, held as  
 ‘ outlaws; rejected from divine protection, and out of all compact  
 ‘ with men<sup>10</sup>?

<sup>8</sup> Αναθήματα.

<sup>9</sup> This may seem a strong expression, for one in the prisoner's situation to use, but it certainly does not go beyond the original, Ὅς δὲ χρήματα ἔλθεσσι πωρασσεύμενος, ὡς τοῦτοις ἡμῶς διαφθερῶν. κ. τ. ε.

<sup>10</sup> Πῶ ἔχον Ἕλλησι σπονδὰς ἀποδεῖξαι ἢ προδοταίς, ἢ πάλιν ἐνδομοῦλοις, ἢ τυράννοις; For

fuller explanation of the phrase σπονδὰς ἀποδεῖξαι, the reader, desirous of it, may see the fourth section of the fifteenth chapter of this History, toward the conclusion; and for confirmation of that explanation, the fifth section of the twenty-third chapter, toward the middle.

‘ You have yourselves decided, by a decree, that fugitives may be  
‘ apprehended, throughout the confederacy, and carried to their proper  
‘ city. Can it then be contended, that the exile who returns, un-  
‘ authorized by a common decree of the confederate states, may not  
‘ justly be put to death? I affirm that, if you condemn me, you will  
‘ avenge the most injurious of all your enemies; and, on the contrary,  
‘ if you determine that I have done well, you will clearly participate  
‘ in justice, done to yourselves, and to all your allies.’

We have already had too many occasions to observe the familiarity of the Greeks with assassination: a crime which the better policy, scarcely less than the better religion and morality, of modern times, had taught utterly to abhor, till a singularly profligate faction in France, with the impudently arrogated title of philosophers, lately attempted to give new vogue to the atrocious baseness. If palliation can be for such a crime (for excuse cannot) it must arise from political circumstances as unfortunate as those of Greece; among whose diminutive states, eternally struggling for an ill-understood civil freedom, and an impossible political independency, political difficulties were always existing, political necessities often arising, which a state of extensive dominion, with large population, cannot know. To those difficulties and necessities, apparently, should be attributed, in a great degree, the striking imperfections of the Grecian administration of justice. Political dangers were forever too closely pressing around, to allow a strict adherence to fixed law and regular proceeding. The little republic was continually in circumstances, in which the senate of more powerful Rome would commit absolute authority to the consuls, by charging them to guard against detriment to the commonwealth. It is obvious how political interests would be likely to interfere with the judgement on the death of Euphron. Epameinondas himself, to support his system of liberal policy toward the states engaged, or likely to engage, in the Theban confederacy, might find it necessary to concur, if not in declaring approbation of the murder of Euphron, yet in screening the assassin. Nevertheless we cannot without some wonder observe the extreme deficiency of principle, and confusion of principle; both what could with advantage be applied to the regulation

of the conduct of independent states toward each other, and what might direct the dispensation of justice, within any state, to its own people, which are striking in these speeches reported by Xenophon; speeches intended by him, if not for an exact representation of what was actually said by the persons to whom they are attributed, yet certainly for what was proper, or at least probable, to have been said. Avoiding however, as usual, to give any opinion of his own upon the subject, he proceeds to state the result, 'that the Theban council declared Euphron to have suffered justly.'

Xen. Hel.  
I. 7. c. 3.  
s. 8.

That there should remain, in Sicyon, men disposed to do the memory of Euphron honor, those who have been accustomed to observe the ways in which political party interest is put forward, will not be surprized. It was the business of those, with whom he had been principally connected, to obviate the probable acquisition of ascendancy by the party which opposed him; and it was with this view that they held out Euphron to the people as the martyr of the popular cause. They sent to Thebes, requesting his body, which was not denied them; they buried it with public pomp, in the agora; which was among the highest marks of respect for deceased worth; the general custom of the Greeks, as of the Romans, forbidding burial within the walls of a town; and they procured a decree for lasting honors to his memory. What has passed in France, in our own time, will assist to make such transactions more readily and extensively intelligible, and to give means for a just estimate of the value of such public honors. The cotemporary historian, commonly confining himself strictly to statement of fact, makes this reflection here: 'Thus', he says, 'apparently most men appreciate political merit, by their private advantages or sufferings, resulting from political measures.'



## SECTION III.

*Affairs of Athens: Athenian exiles: Progress of change in Grecian politics adverse to Theban supremacy: Alliance of Arcadia with Athens: Insecurity of person in Greece: Alienation of Corinth from Athens: New pressure upon Lacedæmon: Magnanimity of Lacedæmon: Uprightness of Corinth: Partial Peace: Injustice of Argos.*

THE affairs of Athens, from the restoration of the democracy, now seven and thirty years<sup>11</sup>, appear to have been administered with general prudence. The rarity of the mention of them, in the cotemporary Athenian historian's general account of Grecian affairs, implies that, compared at least with other Grecian states, regularity and quiet prevailed there. The steady support which the Athenian government gave to the falling power of Lacedæmon, and the steady yet moderate opposition to the new ambition of Thebes, are positive indications that the popular will was wisely guided, against antient prejudice, to the true interest of the commonwealth; and the preservation of peace to the Attic territory, while an enemy on its border threatened the most distant parts of Greece, and the acquisition of new glory to the Athenian arms by supporting the allies of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus against such an enemy, evince ability and energy in the administration. Nevertheless, under the Athenian constitution, with the Athenian system of jurisprudence, the Athenian law of treason, and sycophancy flourishing, civil quiet could be but imperfect and precarious. Many Athenians accordingly were at this time suffering in exile; and so familiar, among the Grecian republics, was the flight or banishment of numerous bodies of citizens, that, when unattended with extreme violence, they seem to have been thought scarcely matter for historical notice. Xenophon has mentioned the exiles but incidentally, leaving us wholly uninformed

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.4.  
s. 1.

<sup>11</sup> From B. C. 403 to 366.

of the time, the cause, and every circumstance of this new schism of the Athenian people. For the modern reader some information on the subject seems wanting, toward a clear understanding of this part of Grecian history; and a collation of the antient writers, from whom we have memorials of the times, will furnish what may be useful.

In the embassy from the principal Grecian states to the Persian court, we have seen the Athenian minister, Timocrates, lending himself to Pelopidas; to put forward the Theban interest. Timocrates, as the stories reported of him by Plutarch indicate, was a vain weak man, dazzled by the splendor of the Persian court, delighted with Asiatic pomp and luxury, and fond of displaying presents, such as it remains yet the custom of Asiatic courts to make, tho' at the risk of exciting among his fellowcountrymen, according to their different tempers and degrees of information, suspicion, envy, or contempt. Formed, however, as he seems to have been, to become the tool of the able Theban, yet it is not likely that, with a colleague protesting against his conduct, he could have been led so to coöperate with the man whom he was particularly commissioned to oppose, if some old party-views had not prepared him, and if the expectation of support from a party did not encourage him. He might however, very possibly, both wander from the views, and miscalculate the strength, of his party; whence, on his return, Leon accusing him of neglecting and betraying the interests of the commonwealth, he was brought to trial, condemned and executed.

Plut. vit.  
Pelop.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c. 1.  
s. 26.

Ch. 21 & 22  
of this Hist.  
Isocr. de  
Page, p. 254.  
v. 2.

There remained yet in Athens, as various passages of Lysias and Isocrates testify, a relic of the old aristocratical party of the Four-hundred. In the actual confusion then of interests among the Grecian republics, while the Athenian democracy was allied with the aristocratical confederacy of Lacedæmon, against the democratical confederacy of Thebes, if the aristocratical opposition in Athens had communication with the Theban leaders, the complication was not stranger than we have seen, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, during the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. But that the inherent tyranny of the Athenian democracy pressed severely upon men of property in general, is shown by the most unequivocal testimony of the same  
great

great orators, the ablest advocates of the democratical cause. A few leading men, as Isocrates complains, grew rich from the public spoil; while, in the impossibility for any to live in ease and security, the city was filled with lamentation and complaint. The indigent multitude, living by the assemblies and the courts of justice, delighted in accusations, prosecutions, and the whole business of sycophancy; encouraged by the men in power, who held their power from that multitude; while men of property were so oppressed with arbitrary orders, sometimes for military service, sometimes for civil office, frequently for contributions to the treasury, and, on any complaint of severity, vexed with demands for exchange of property, that their condition was altogether more uneasy than that of men who never possessed anything.

This sketch of the state of Athens, given to the public in an oration addressed to the Athenian people, between twenty and thirty years after the time of which we are treating, but by one fifty years of age, as it speaks of no new state of things, but rather of inveterate evils, may account for the circumstance, that many Athenian citizens were in exile. Those unfortunate men then combining, made themselves masters of the town and port of Oropus, in Attica, on the border of Bœotia. Those who directed the administration of the commonwealth were greatly alarmed. Fearful probably of disaffection, they did not think it sufficient to assemble the whole force within Attica, to make war upon the refugees, but they sent for Chares, with the troops he commanded in Peloponnesus. This afforded an opportunity for the Sicyonians, which they did not neglect. The force under Chares, and the abilities and activity of the commander, had been the principal support of the Lacedæmonian cause in the north of Peloponnesus. As soon as these were withdrawn, the Arcadians, no longer fearing for their own country, readily gave assistance requested by the Sicyonians, who thus presently recovered their port. Meanwhile the Athenians, unable to obtain any assistance from their allies, little confident in their own means for attacking a fortified place, within ready reach of support from Thebes, and perhaps yet more fearful of a party within  
than

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 1.  
B. C. 366.  
Ol. 103. 2.

than of an enemy without, came to terms, which are remarkable; it was agreed, that Oropus should be held by the Thebans, in trust, till the matters in dispute, whether between the Athenians of the city and the exiles, or between the Athenian and Theban governments, should be decided by a fair arbitration<sup>12</sup>.

While the supremacy of Greece was yielded, by general consent, to Lacedæmon, or disputed only by Athens, it was scarcely possible for a citizen of any other state to acquire any considerable eminence in the nation. But the depression, successively of Athens and Lacedæmon, made an opening, which Thebes had not so completely filled as to preclude competition. On the contrary, the sudden and totally unexpected elevation of a new candidate for empire among the republics, appears to have excited emulation. Lycomedes of Mantinea, a man of large and liberal views, attentive to the circumstances of the surrounding states, obtained assurance that dissatisfaction was growing among the Athenians, in consequence of their not finding that ready return of assistance, to which they thought their exertions for their allies intitled them. Tho Athens was still the confederate, and Arcadia the enemy, of Lacedæmon, he conceived it possible that a connection might be formed between Arcadia and Athens, advantageous to both, and perhaps extensively advantageous to Greece. He obtained a decree from the assembly of the Tenthousand, or the Numberless, authorizing negotiation for the purpose, and he resolved to be himself the negotiator. The proposal was received at Athens, not without surprize; and warmly exclaimed against by many, as contrary to the existing engagements with Lacedæmon: but when it was represented how greatly the connection of Arcadia with Athens would tend to obviate the interference of Thebes in Peloponnesus, insomuch that it appeared to promise no less advan-

<sup>12</sup> Τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις, ὁδοὶς τῶν συμμάχων ἐδοθήσθην, ἀλλ' ἀνεχώρησαν, Θεβαίους παρακαταδίμενοι τὸν Ὀροπὸν, μέχρι δίκης. This passage seems to me to want something. All the translators have agreed to turn it nearly alike, none very intelligibly, and none noticing any difficulty. I have not much doubt

of the explanation I have ventured to give; but I want the information, a want I have before had occasion to mention, what the δίκη could be, which might be reasonably trusted for an equitable decision of a matter in dispute between, either two independent states, or two factions of the same state.

tage to the Lacedæmonians than to the Athenians themselves, the objections mostly ceased, and a treaty of alliance was concluded. It was stipulated that, if Arcadia should be attacked, Athens should send a body of cavalry to its assistance, but that this auxiliary force should not be bound to march with the Arcadians into Laconia. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 4. s. 6.

Lycomedes, in returning from Athens, unfortunately landed at a port of Peloponnesus which happened to be, at that time, full of Arcadian refugees. His death is mentioned, by the cotemporary historian, as what, in such circumstances, followed of course. Tho we cease to wonder at this, after observing the circumstances of the death of Euphron, yet it is a remarkable instance, to add to so many before occurring, of the excessive deficiency of provision for personal security in Greece. The treaty with Athens survived; but the views of the able negotiator, how far of a noble patriotism, how far of selfish ambition, his premature death has left uncertain, mostly seem to have perished with him. To judge however from the scanty mention of him, by the historian, his political adversary, Lycomedes, with the best ability and the best inclination, unless exception should be made for Epameinondas, seems to have been by far in the most favorable circumstances for extending peace and good policy in Greece, of any man of his time. s. 1.

After the death of Lycomedes, Grecian politics continued, for some time, to hold the bent which he had principally given them; but the intuitive eye, watching all points in all the republics, and the ably guiding hand were wanting. Soon after the accommodation, so unexpectedly effected between Athens and Arcadia, an indiscreet speech in the Athenian assembly alienated Corinth. The situation of Corinth, most advantageous in peace, was most unfortunate whenever war was general in Greece. Its territory, the thoroughfare between the northern and southern provinces, could not fail to suffer frequently, and to be in danger always. As the Grecian confederacies now stood, Corinth, cut off from Lacedæmon by the intervention of Arcadia, Eleia, and Argolis, could receive ready and effectual support only from Athens; and thence had been accustomed so to rely upon Athenian auxiliaries, as to have incurred, unawares, the danger of becoming dependent upon Athens.

Athens. One of those imprudent orators, by whom, in the Grecian democracies, the policy of wiser statesmen would be constantly liable to be frustrated, speaking to the Athenian people, extolled the wisdom of the Arcadian alliance; and then proceeded to advise the sovereign assembly, that its generals should be instructed to hold Corinth also safe for the Athenian people<sup>13</sup>. This expression, reported at Corinth, alarmed the Corinthians. Immediately exerting themselves to furnish sufficient garrisons of their own people, they relieved the Athenian troops in all the stations within their territory. Careful then to obviate just complaint, they assembled them in the city, and proclaimed by the public heralds, that if any Athenian was aggrieved, he should give his name to the proper magistrate, and justice should be done him. In this conjuncture Chares arrived at Cenchreae with the Athenian fleet; and Xenophon's cautious account may give to suspect, that the Corinthians were not without reason jealous of the purpose. They thanked Chares for his readiness to assist them, but refused to admit his fleet into their port. Settling then, with careful punctuality, all accounts with the Athenian troops, they dismissed them. Thus the commanding influence, which Athens had for some time held in Corinth, ceased.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 5.

a. 6.

In thus guarding however against treachery from an ally, the Corinthians were aware that they were exposing themselves to the common enemy, to whom, on account of the pass it commanded, their country was so great an object. Their first resource was to strengthen their military with a force of mercenaries, horse and foot; and this sufficed, in the moment, not only to secure their own, but to inable them to extend annoyance into the hostile territories adjoining. Still they were aware that, if the force of the Theban confederacy should be collected against them, without support from Athens, upon which they could no longer rely, they must be overpowered. They managed therefore, by private communication, to sound the Theban government, and they had the satisfaction to receive, in direct terms, encouragement to send ministers to Thebes. They requested to be allowed first to

<sup>13</sup> Ὅπως καὶ ἡ Κόρινθος σῶα ἦ τῷ ἔθνεϊ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

communicate

communicate with their allies; that those who were desirous of peace might be parties; and to this also the Thebans consented.

Then they sent ministers to Lacedæmon. 'They were bound,' they said, 'by interest, by inclination, by old and hereditary friendship, as well as by oaths, to the Lacedæmonian alliance; to which they should anxiously desire to adhere, if the Lacedæmonians themselves could show how they might finally resist the confederacy, which had been so long and so severely pressing upon them. But, if ruin threatened, not Corinth only, but Lacedæmon, then their first wish must be, that Lacedæmon would join them in making peace, upon the best terms that could be obtained; their second, that they might be released from their obligations, so far as to be allowed, without offence to gods or men, to make peace for themselves; and this they desired, not for their own sakes only, but with the consideration that their destruction would bring no benefit to their allies, whereas, if preserved, they might still, on some future occasion, be useful to Lacedæmon.' The determination of the Lacedæmonians, if not prudent, was generous. They not only allowed, but advised the Corinthians to make peace; and they declared, 'that those of their other allies, who were unwilling to continue the war, should be released from their engagements to them: but, for themselves, leaving the event to God, they would persevere in arms, and never submit to be deprived of Messenia, their inheritance received from their fathers.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 8.

s. 9.

The Corinthian ministers returning, with this answer, negotiation was immediately opened with Thebes. Alliance defensive and offensive was proposed by the Thebans; but this the Corinthians refused: it would be, they said, but a change of war; their object was a just and permanent peace. Admiring their resolution, says Xenophon, under the dangers which pressed them, to refuse taking a part against their friends and benefactors, the Thebans granted their desire. Peace was made with them, in the name of the confederacy, upon condition that both parties should hold their antient territories, as before the war. These terms were extended to the Phliasians and Epidaurians; and all parties swore to the treaty, with the usual solemnities. The Phliasians

s. 10.

then immediately evacuated Thyamia in Sicyonia, expecting that Tricranum<sup>14</sup>, in their own territory, then held by Phliasian exiles, under the protection of Argos, should be restored to them. But the Argians, having ineffectually solicited the consent of the Phliasian government for the exiles to retain the place, claimed it as a part of Argolis, and placed a garrison of their own troops in it. The Phliasi-ans in vain called for that legal discussion, and judicial decision, of which we often hear between state and state in Greece, without any satisfactory information what it was; but the Argians persevered in using the power they possessed, to maintain the decision they had themselves already made.

#### SECTION IV.

*Considerations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded: Disposition of Athens: narrow views of the Grecian politicians: Advantage of the measures of Agesilaus: Progress of dissent among the Peloponnesian confederates of Thebes: War of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from sedition; cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Thessaly; death of Pelopidas.*

IN thus freely allowing their Peloponnesian allies to seek security by a separate treaty, and at the same time persevering themselves in refusal to surrender Messenia, which was the condition of peace required by the Theban confederacy, the Lacedæmonians were guided by a policy, certainly magnanimous, but perhaps not less wise and truly prudent. In the inability of Lacedæmon to protect, the obligations of sacrifices and oaths would probably not have stood long against the pressure of the Theban arms; and, in the mean time, a forced service, tho' it may promote a prosperous, would not be likely to give any very efficacious support to a falling cause. But, for themselves, had the Lacedæmonians yielded to the requisition of Thebes,

<sup>14</sup> The name is also found written Tricranium and Tricranum.



had they purchased peace by the surrender of half their territory, the relief would have been utterly precarious. The argument, tho we are shocked with it, which Isocrates has attributed to Archidamus, we must allow to be forcible; that the establishment of the Messenians and Helots in freedom, in the neighborhood of Lacedæmon, would be the more dangerous and the more intolerable, as their former treatment had exceeded in severity that of other slaves. . But threatened and distressed as Lacedæmon was, her situation was less desperate than it had been. Peloponnesus had now some experience of the Theban connection. Infinite civil disturbances had arisen; civil order, that might insure domestic quiet, had followed nowhere; and there was evidently nowhere any general satisfaction in any change which it had produced. In Arcadia an avowed jealousy of Thebes prevailed, and symptoms of schism in the confederacy appeared in more than one part. Of all the advantages, likely to result from these circumstances, Lacedæmon would deprive herself, without any fair hope that submission would procure lasting quiet.

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 76. v. 2.

p. 54—60.

Lacedæmon, moreover, was not yet without powerful allies. The younger Dionysius, who had succeeded to his deceased father's situation in Syracuse, was disposed to maintain his father's engagements. In Athens, according to the cotemporary Athenian orator, without any general disposition truly friendly to Lacedæmon, there was, what might answer the purpose for the Lacedæmonians, a disposition, in just attention to the interest of Athens, to oppose the advancement of Thebes. The zealous advocate for universal peace among the Greeks, Isocrates, was one of the many Athenians who saw, with anxiety, the avowed ambition of Thebes, supported by growing power, and conducted by consummate talents. His extant oration, in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, to the Lacedæmonian assembly, has been really a political pamphlet, admirably adapted to its purpose; which was, at the same time, to encourage the Lacedæmonians in resistance to Thebes, to confirm the Athenians in the Lacedæmonian connection, and to reconcile the Greeks, in general, to the claim of Lacedæmon to the territory of Messenia. In that composition, which has earned the particular com-

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 12.

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 54.

Isocr. de  
Pace et ad  
Philipp. &  
al.

Dionys. Hal. mendment of an elegant and judicious critic of the Augustan age, a deficiency, tho frequently obvious among the Greek political writers, is nevertheless striking, and worthy of notice: no principle of extensive welfare, no liberal view to the common good of Greece, is put forward; but, on the contrary, the Lacedæmonians are encouraged in that narrow patriotism, whose great object was the exclusive power and happiness of their own commonwealth; recommended however by the observation, that, under the acknowledged supremacy of Lacedæmon, civil order and general happiness had been conspicuous in Peloponnesus, and almost peculiar to it; whereas anarchy and discord, public evils and private, many and extreme, had followed the change for the patronage of Thebes.

Isocr. Archid. p. 76, & 82. p. 56.

The caution of Xenophon, enforced by his particular circumstances, has left us very scanty information of the state of parties in Lacedæmon, during all that disastrous period which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia. We gather, however, that Agesilaus could not always direct measures; and some expressions of Isocrates imply that for some time he did not hold a leading influence. The Theban invasion seems to have restored it to him. His ability then defended Sparta, his liberality assisted to feed the auxiliaries, for which the public treasury was unequal; while the misfortunes of the country were attributed to the mismanagement of others, who had held the ministry; and the victory, obtained afterward under the command of his son Archidamus, over the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, would tend powerfully to confirm the renovated power of his party.

Isocr. Archid. sub fine.

Xen. Agesil. c. 2. s. 24, 25. Plut. vit. Agesil.

Events, soon following, showed the justness of the views, which decided Agesilaus and his friends to advise perseverance in war, rather than submission to humiliating and oppressive terms, for a precarious peace. By the separate treaty, the nominal strength of Lacedæmon was indeed reduced; but the allies, whose coöperation was lost, were so exposed by situation, and so unequal to their own defence, that it might be questioned if their security, in neutrality, was not more advantageous to Lacedæmon, than their coöperation, under the perpetual want of protection. The need also of assistance from them was lessened, by the dissention growing between the most powerful allies of Thebes,

those who, by local circumstances, most pressed upon Lacedæmon. When the season for action came on, the usual succours arrived from Syracuse; the Lacedæmonians assembled their forces, and, no interruption occurring from the Theban confederacy, they recovered the important town of Sellasia, which since the Theban invasion had been held by the revolters.

B. C. 365.<sup>15</sup>  
Ol. 103. 4.  
Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 12.

The first movements of the allies of Thebes, in Peloponnesus, were against one another. In Elis, at this time governed by the aristocratic party, a democratical opposition was patronized by the Arcadians. Irritated anew by this, while anger at the loss of their dependencies in Triphylia, through the violent interference of the Arcadians, was yet fresh, they resolved to recur to arms; and, attacking the Triphylian town of Lasion, formerly theirs, but now a tributary dependence of Arcadia, they made themselves masters of it. When passion urged the Eleian aristocracy to a measure of violence, which appears to have been highly imprudent, we shall less wonder if the Arcadian Numberless assembly, no longer directed by the wisdom of Lycomedes, gave way also to passion; so that all consideration of the great interests, not of Greece only but of the confederacy, was lost under the existing provocation; and it was thought enough, for prudence, that the strength of Arcadia sufficed for revenge. The strength of Arcadia, accordingly without delay collected, invaded Eleia. The Eleians met it, with inferior numbers; and, ill-advisedly coming to action, with disadvantage also of ground, were defeated with considerable slaughter. The towns of the Eleian highlands then, excepting only Thraustus, yielded to the summons of the Arcadian generals, while they directed their march toward Olympia. No resistance was found there. A garrison was placed in the precinct of the temple of Saturn, which, with an intrenchment thrown around, commanded the Olympian mountain: the neighboring town of Marganeæ was gained, by the voluntary act of the prevailing party among the inhabitants. The Arcadian army proceeded then to Elis, and its advanced guard entered that unfortified town, and penetrated as far as the agora. Being

s. 15.

s. 12.

B. C. 365.  
Ol. 103. 4.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 13.

s. 14.

<sup>15</sup> I cannot understand Dodwell's reason for assigning this event, against the order of Xenophon's narrative, to the beginning of the former campaign, B. C. 366.

however

however there charged by the collected Eleian cavalry, supported by infantry, it was driven out again with some slaughter.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 15, 16.

The distress of their country, in the usual way of faction, gave joy to the democratical leaders in Elis, who looked to it as the means of power and party-triumph to themselves. Under the encouragement it afforded, they opened a traitorous correspondence with the enemy, and obtaining the terms they desired, with a promise of support, they seized the citadel. The aristocratical party, however, exerting themselves instantly and vigorously, recovered the fortress; and then the leaders of the democratical party, with about four hundred of their followers, fled. Received as friends by the Arcadians, and encouraged by them, they seized Pylus, a town of Eleia under mount Pholoë, less than ten miles from Elis<sup>16</sup>. A settlement thus acquired, and the patronage of a conquering army, gave such credit to their cause, that numbers quitted the threatened city to join them.

Under these circumstances, the Eleians in possession would probably not have been able long, with their single strength, to support themselves. But the prudent governments of the bordering province of Achaia saw their own danger in the fall of Elis, and the preponderance which Arcadia was acquiring in Peloponnesus. The distraction of the confederacy, and especially the violence of the Arcadians against their allies, operated in favor of the Lacedæmonian interest, and already the little commonwealth of Pellenë, being under aristocratical government, had ventured to renew its antient connection with Lacedæmon<sup>17</sup>. The other Achaian cities, professing a desire to avoid hostility with Arcadia, declared however their purpose to protect Elis, and immediately sent troops to give efficacy to their resolution. The Arcadians, their first vengeance against the Eleians being satisfied, yielded to an argu-

<sup>16</sup> There were three principal places of the name of Pylus in Peloponnesus; the Eleian, here spoken of, the Triphylian, which, according to Strabo, was Nestor's residence, and the Messenian, which became remarkable in the Peloponnesian war.

<sup>17</sup> Ἦδη γὰρ πάλιν προσεκεχώρηκασιν οἱ Πιελῆναις εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίαν. Xen.

Hel. l. 7. c. 5. s. 17. Xenophon has, I think, not explained whether the return to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, here spoken of, was after the change occasioned by the march of Epameinondas into Achaia, or after the partial peace, made by the treaty of Thebes, to which the Pellenians may have been parties.

ment so well enforced. - Desisting from farther attempts against the city, they however ravaged the country, and leaving the democratical Eleians established in Pylus, a measure with which the Achæians did not interfere, they withdrew home. The return of Elis to its antient connection with Lacedæmon, then became matter of course.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 19.

While the able leaders of the Theban councils were perplexed, with regard to their interests in Peloponnesus, by the violence of the dissensions among their confederates, their attention was called to the circumstances of Thessaly; and, still more urgently, to matters arising in Bœotia, and in Thebes itself. Orchomenus, the second city of Bœotia, in importance, had been the last to acknowledge the sovereignty of Thebes; and the aristocratical, the most powerful party there, bore that sovereignty with extreme reluctance and dissatisfaction. In Thebes itself, where aristocracy had so long predominated, an aristocratical party was still numerous, but the chiefs were in exile. These founded their hope of restoration on the political sentiments prevailing in Orchomenus, and spreading, in a smaller degree, among those of higher rank in other Bœotian towns. Communication was had among them, and a plot was formed for a revolution.

Diod. l. 15.  
p. 498.

It was the practice of the Theban government occasionally to order reviews of the whole cavalry of Bœotia. The conspirators were mostly of those serving in the cavalry, who in Orchomenus alone were three hundred. The time appointed for a review was chosen for the execution of the plot; but, in the difficulty of due caution, where numbers are to be engaged, some, faithless or disaffected, were let into the secret, who disclosed it to the Bœotars. We are without direct information who now guided the Theban councils; but, amid the abominable cruelty of the vengeance taken, that able policy appears, which commonly distinguished the measures of the Theban government under Pelopidas and Epameinondas. The conspirators of the smaller towns were pardoned; the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. An inveterate hatred, traced even to the heroic ages, is said to have subsisted between the Thebans and Orchomenians. The death of the guilty cavalry therefore did not satisfy popular animosity. \* At the same time that capital condemnation

was.

was pronounced against these, it was decreed that the town of Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold to slavery. Force only could carry into execution such a decree. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, already deprived of its leaders and its cavalry, and, becoming masters of the town, put to death all the men, and sold the women and children<sup>18</sup>.

The danger, which had threatened the existing government of Thebes, being, by this dreadful execution, averted, the leading men had leisure to direct their views around: and, while the distractions among their Peloponnesian allies repelled, circumstances in other quarters invited their interference. The aversion among the Thessalian cities to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, notwithstanding the ill success of the Thebans in that country, kept alive a Theban party there. New oppression from Alexander had excited new resistance to his authority; but his abilities and activity enabled him to overbear his opponents. In their distress, they applied to Thebes for assistance; and for commander they requested Pelopidas, whose military talents and popular manners, when formerly commanding in their country, had procured him general favor and esteem. The supreme assembly of Bœotia was summoned: it was decreed that the Thessalian cities should be supported; and Pelopidas led an army of seven thousand men through the straits of Thermopylæ. Alexander, with a more numerous army, on advantageous ground, awaited his attack, which Pelopidas, perhaps too much trusting in the superiority of the Bœotian heavy-armed, rashly made. Pelopidas himself fell. If Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch might be believed, his army nevertheless obtained a complete victory; but the concise account of Alexander by Xenophon,

Diod. l. 15.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Pelop.

<sup>18</sup> According to Pausanias (l. 9. c. 15. p. 740.) this transaction took place while Pelopidas and Epameinondas were absent; the former prisoner in Thessaly, the other marching to his relief. According to Diodorus, it was three years after the release of Pelopidas. Mistakes indeed abound in the chronology of Diodorus; but Diodorus was a chronologer, and meant to be exact. Pausanias was an antiquarian; generally, as

Dodwell has well observed, much more accurate than Diodorus, but unversed in politics, ill-versed in history, and inattentive to the course of political events.

Xenophon, intent upon transactions in Peloponnesus, in which he was deeply interested, and where everything passed, in a manner, under his eye, has omitted notice of these transactions in Bœotia and in Thessaly.

and.

and the incidental mention of the transactions of Pelopidas in Thessaly by Polybius, imply something so different, that allowance, evidently, must be made for exaggeration, in the panegyric of the biographers, and the report of the later historian. A dubious victory, however, a drawn battle, with a large Bœotian force remaining in the country, may have afforded great relief to the party which had taken arms against the tagus; and then, wherever that party predominated, those honors to the memory of the slain general, which Nepos has reported, statues, and golden crowns, and lands to his family (the estates probably of those whom the party expelled or desired to expel) would follow in the common course of party measures.

Pelopidas appears to have been a man of an active, enterprising, bold, and generous spirit, very popular manners, and good, but not extraordinary abilities. Scarcely equal to the lead of councils, or perhaps of armies, in the great and arduous circumstances in which his exertion had contributed much to place his country, he was, nevertheless, by his talents and his virtues, a most valuable assistant to Epameinondas; with whom he seems to have lived in perfect friendship, above envy and jealousy. His death was therefore a great loss, to his friends, to his country, and to those allies who depended upon his country for support<sup>19</sup>.

According to Diodorus, after the death of Pelopidas, the Thebans

<sup>19</sup> We may apparently, trust the positive assertion of Nepos and Plutarch, supported by the less explicit testimony of Diodorus, that Pelopidas was one of the leaders, and he would of course be among the most active of them, in the conspiracy by which Thebes was recovered from the Lacedæmonians; tho in the detailed account of that remarkable transaction by the cōtemporary historian, and even in the account given at some length by Diodorus, the name of Pelopidas never occurs. It is in summing up his praises only, where he relates his death, that Diodorus mentions the universal acceptance of the report, which gave the first merit in that business to Pelopidas;

and even there he does not say what part Pelopidas took in the business, but rather shows that he had no certain information of it: *Ἐν γὰρ τῇ τῶν Φυγάδων καταλήψει, καθ' ἣν ἀνεκτήσατο τὴν Καδμείαν, ἀμολογημένως ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ (τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ) τὸ κρωλεῖον τοῦ κρωλεθώματος ἀπονομῆσαι.* This is the whole of his testimony. Yet Plutarch, near two centuries after him, and near five after Xenophon, without stating any authority, has not scrupled to describe the single combat; and the complex contests, of Pelopidas, in the course of a series of nocturnal assassinations, as if he had been present as a quiet spectator, in a theater, where they were represented before him.

gained a second great victory in Thessaly, and Plutarch relates that Alexander was completely subdued. Xenophon and Polybius forbid intire credit to this; yet there seems reason for supposing that the affairs of Thebes in Thessaly continued to be ably conducted. The result, as we learn from Xenophon, was a treaty of peace and alliance with the tagus, and an accomodation, under the mediation of Thebes, between the tagus and the Thessalian cities, which appear to have been altogether creditable and advantageous.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 4.

### SECTION V.

*Invasion of Eleia by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or select Militia: - Liberality in Grecian law of war. Interference of the Arcadians in the presidency of the Olympian festival; battle of Olympia.*

B. C. 364. LACEDÆMON, and the Lacedæmonian cause in Greece, seemed now reviving from threatened dissolution. But leisure was still wanted, to repress or compose revolt, and restore civil order, in the antient territory of Sparta, when a new invasion of Eleia by the Arcadians, and a new defeat of the Eleians in battle, compelled attention, from the Lacedæmonian government, to the distress and danger of its first returning ally. Archidamus was therefore placed at the head of an army, with which he invaded Arcadia. He took the town of Cromnus, and putting three lochi in garrison there, led the rest of his army home.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 19.

As far as immediate relief to the Eleians only was in view, this measure appears to have been well conceived; but the foresight, not of the statesman only, but of the general also, should have extended farther. The Arcadians, feeling all the expected uneasiness at the establishment of a hostile post within their country, withdrew their troops from Eleia; and, collecting their whole force at Cromnus, hastily surrounded it with a contravallation and circumvallation. The Lacedæmonians, not till their garrison was already blockaded, in much alarm for it, reassembled their army, and committed the command again to Archidamus.

The



The same deficiency of weapons and art of attack, which compelled the Arcadians to the slow method of blockade against a weakly fortified place with a small garrison, deterred Archidamus from assault upon the Arcadian lines. His object was to allure or provoke the besiegers to quit them; and with this view he carried ravage through the rebellious Lacedæmonian province of Skiritis, and, as far as he could, into Arcadia. But the Arcadian generals were not to be so diverted from their purpose: within their lines they kept their army secure, and the blockade close.

Archidamus now saw that, to relieve Cromnus, he must force the lines. The circumvallation, inclosing part of a hill, was commanded by the summit. If he could possess himself of the summit, he thought the Arcadians could not long hold their situation beneath. With this view, he was winding his march round the hill, when his advanced guard, composed of targeteers and cavalry, seeing the chosen body of Arcadians, called the Eparites, without their lines, attacked them. The Eparites seem to have been an establishment made by those able men who formed the union of Arcadia. They were a select militia, composed of citizens from every republic of the union, who were to be always ready for the general service. The desultory assault of the Lacedæmonians was received, by this well-trained body, without moving. It was renewed upon them, and then they advanced against the assailants. Archidamus turned to support his targeteers, leading his heavy-armed along the carriage-road, in a narrow column of march. In this weak order he was attacked by the Arcadians, formed in phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, who, apparently, should not have swerved from their first object to make this attack, were unable to withstand the firmer order of the Arcadians: Archidamus himself was severely wounded in the thigh: Chilon, his sister's husband, and not less than thirty other Spartans, mostly of the highest rank, were killed. Quickly however the Lacedæmonians reached advantageous ground, on which, notwithstanding the pressure upon them, their ready discipline enabled them to form; and then the Arcadians halted. But it appeared that the transgression of those precepts, of their great lawgiver, which forbade lasting war, and frequent wars with the same enemy, had already been carried too far. Not the

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 22.

s. 34.

c. 23.

s. 24.

Thebans only, but the Arcadians also, began to vie with them in discipline; and that persuasion of their superiority to all mankind, which had assisted formerly to render the Lacedæmonians invincible, was gone by. They were now superior in number, but disheartened by their prince's wound, and the death of those around him; while the Arcadians were encouraged by the consideration, always important, that they had been successful assailants upon a retreating enemy. The action was on the point of being renewed, when one of the Lacedæmonian elders, perhaps aware of deficiency in the commanders, exclaimed, 'To what purpose are we going to fight? Why should not a truce rather here end the contest?' The proposal of a truce, under such circumstances, always implied acknowledgement of defeat; yet it was approved by the other Lacedæmonians. The Arcadians readily consented: withdrawing to the ground where they had made their first assault, they erected their trophy there, and left the Lacedæmonians to perform, at leisure, the funeral obsequies of their slain.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 25.

Where battle begun might so be stopped (and it is not from a closet-speculator, of some centuries after, that we have these curious particulars, but a cotemporary, versed in the din of war and the crash of armies) it might be not unreasonably supposed that opportunity for any negotiation, and a disposition to any just accommodation, would be ready. Why then was not negotiation instantly begun; first for the surrender of Cromnus, with safety for the garrison; and then for solid peace? Nothing like either, as far as appears, was thought of. Civilization and reflection, amid much practice in war, had led the Greeks, tho' not to the generosity of modern European warfare, yet to customs adapted to humanize hostility, in some degree, and lessen its horrors: but the circumstances, altogether, of their political system, and the habits which it superinduced, impressed much the idea that warfare was the natural state of man; to be regulated, not obviated, by policy and humanity<sup>16</sup>. The Lacedæmonians, after due rites to their

<sup>16</sup> This appears in all the projects, for obviating the eternal quarrels of the improving government, of Plato, Aristotle, Greeks among themselves, by directing hostility against foreign nations.

dead,

dead, withdrew in quiet, under cover of the truce; but, soon after, returning by night, attacked the Arcadian lines, and, on one point, forced them. With numbers however, adapted to surprise, but too small to withstand the collected strength of the besieging army, hasty retreat was necessary; and those only of the garrison were relieved, who could instantly rush out and join them: the escape of somewhat more than a hundred was prevented by the besiegers.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 27.

Then appeared, in all its extent, the impolicy of a measure so alarming and irritating to the Arcadians, as the establishment of a Lacedæmonian garrison in their country. Their ill disposition toward Thebes, and especially their jealousy of Theban interference in Peloponnesus, which had contributed, perhaps, beyond anything, to the relief of Lacedæmon from passed dangers, and afforded the best ground of hope for its future security and prosperity, now gave way to their anxiety for riddance from so annoying and threatening an inconvenience. The deficiency of the art of attack of the age, when a garrison of a hundred men might defy an army, made all auxiliaries acceptable. For, to prosecute with certain effect the tedious business of a blockade, the force was to be proportioned, not to that within the place attacked, but to that which, from without, might, at any time during the long operation, attack the besiegers. The assistance of all allies was therefore called for, and the guard of the lines was divided between Arcadian, Argian, Theban, and Messenian forces. Farther attempts to relieve the place were thus deterred, and the little garrison was at length starved into a surrender.

The detention of the Arcadian forces, at Cromnus, afforded opportunity for the Eleians to direct their whole strength against their apostate fellowcitizens in Pylus. These, venturing a battle, were defeated, and about two hundred were made prisoners. The Eleian citizens, among them, were all put to death: the rest were sold for slaves. Siege being then laid to Pylus and Marganeæ, both were taken.

The season of the festival of the hundred and fourth Olympiad now approached, while an Arcadian garrison commanded Olympia, and the neighboring country, adhering to the Arcadian interest, remained in what the Eleians esteemed rebellion against them. The Arcadians, having

s. 23.

having freed themselves from the annoyance of a Lacedæmonian garrison within their country, did not immediately propose any new aggression against the Eleians, but they resolved not to surrender Olympia to them for the purposes of the festival. A shock was thus hazarded to the prejudices, and an interruption to the enjoyments of the Greek nation, which might have excited extensive enmity; but means for obviating this, to a considerable degree, were found in the disputed title of the Eleians to the presidency, tho' they had been uninterruptedly exercising it so many years. The Arcadians would not assume that presidency, in their own name; they affected to restore the sacred right to the Pisæans, who had never ceased to claim it, against what they termed the Eleian usurpation: and thus was obtained the support of some of the most powerful states of Greece; perhaps dissatisfied, as we have seen Lacedæmon formerly, with the manner in which the Eleians may, on some occasions, have exercised the power conceded to them at the Olympian meeting. The Argians sent two thousand heavy-armed to assist in maintaining the presidency of the Pisæans; and even the Athenians, in favor of their new allies of Arcadia, against Elis, the confederate of Lacedæmon, while Lacedæmon was still the confederate of Athens (so the interests of the Grecian republics became complicated) sent five hundred horse, which, among Peloponnesian armies, would be a very considerable body.

On the other hand, the Eleians, esteeming their right of presidency at the Olympian festival a most valuable inheritance, derived from their forefathers, resolved to spare no exertion in asserting it. They engaged the Achæians in their interest; and, waiting then till the time when the concourse would be formed (for such was the public confidence in the sacred estimation of the place and season, that persons led by curiosity or business had flocked, nearly as usual, from every settlement of the Greek nation) they marched to Olympia.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 30.

The Eleians, tho' engaged in frequent wars, were held in the lowest estimation, among the Greeks, as a military people; looked upon with a degree of contempt, not only by the Arcadians, Argians, and Athenians, but by their own allies the Achæians. The Arcadians therefore, the more confident in their present strength, on account of their late successes,

successes, took no measures for preventing, or even observing the approach of an enemy. They were attending the exhibition of the games, in all leisure; the horserace was over; the pentathlon, or contest of five exercises, was going forward; the athletes, who had already run, were proceeding to wrestle; no longer in the course, says Xenophon, who is likely to have been present, but between the course and the altar; when the alarm was given, that the Eleians were already on the verge of the Altis, the inclosure consecrated to the purposes of the celebrity. The Arcadians then hurried into order of battle, on the bank of the brook Cladaüs, which, washing one side of the Altis, presently joins the Alpheius. The Eleians, advancing in good order, on each side of the Cladaüs, broke the Arcadian phalanx with the first shock, and then were equally successful against the Argians, hastening to support it. The disordered troops retreated, and the Eleians pursued among the public and sacred buildings, to the space between the council-hall, the temple of Vesta, and the adjoining theater. There the advantage afforded for defence, and for the use of missile weapons, by those solid and lofty edifices, enabled the defeated to stand, and the victors suffered some loss before they withdrew to their camp.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c. 4.  
s. 29.

The Arcadians and their allies, however, it appeared, felt themselves very effectually defeated. No longer thinking of opposing the Eleians in the field, they were all night employed in forming defences; the scaffolding and sheds, raised for the accommodation of persons attending the celebrity, furnishing materials for a palisade<sup>29</sup>. By morning, they had so fortified the avenues, and so disposed troops on the temple-tops, that the Eleians, on a view of the opposition prepared for them, prudently abstained from farther assault. Xenophon has declared his astonishment at what they had already done. After mentioning the previous disrepute of their military character, he expresses himself thus: 'On this occasion the Eleians showed themselves soldiers, such as the deity, giving courage by inspiration, might make in a day; but the

<sup>29</sup> It appears from this circumstance that ordinary contest quite so much at their ease as Diodorus has represented. the spectators and men of business, at the Olympian meeting, did not view this extra-

‘art of men, employed on those not naturally brave, could not in a long time form.’

But the poverty of the Grecian states, the disproportion of their public revenue to their military force (except when Athens or Lacedæmon received tribute from many subject republics) generally prevented any regular plan of a campaign, and often denied what should have been the immediate fruit of victory. The Eleians, not strong enough to carry Olympia by assault, not rich enough to subsist long from home, at a loss in any way to push the advantage gained, returned to Elis.

#### SECTION VI.

*Sacrilegious robbery of the Olympian treasury, by the democratical administration of Arcadia: Opposition of Mantinéeia to the sacrilege: Support solicited from Thebes by the perpetrators: Remonstrance against interference from Thebes by the Arcadian sovereign assembly: Congress at Tegea: Violence of the Theban commissioner; supported by Epameinondas: Reunion of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon.*

B. C. 364. Ol. 104. 1. By the retreat of the victorious Eleians, the Arcadians were left at liberty to chuse their measures. The force of Arcadia might perhaps have sufficed for revenge, but that Arcadia, like Elis, wanted pecuniary resources. The Eparites, none probably so poor as not to possess a slave, could generally subsist from their private means, while the defence of their own country, or a hasty expedition only, into a neighboring province, was required of them. But already they began to be pressed by their detention at Olympia; far from their homes, and yet surrounded by a friendly territory; which put plunder at a distance; uneasy, at the same time, under their late defeat, which would not dispose them to bear, with increased patience, the inconveniencies of want. If, to relieve them, Olympia was left without an Arcadian force, the considerable acquisitions made, through the first successes in the war, would be

at once lost; and the Pisæans, Triphylians, all those, on pretence of protecting whom the war had been undertaken, must be exposed to the vengeance of the Eleians. These considerations pressed upon the democratical chiefs, now at the head of the Arcadian affairs, while a strong aristocratical opposition still existed in their country. Shame, anger, revenge, interest, ambition, fear, the fear of all those evils, usually, in the Grecian republics, following the loss of popularity and its attendant power, instigated, and the Olympian treasury was before them. The temptation altogether was greater than they could resist. Careless, perhaps, about the punishments which, in vulgar opinion, would certainly follow from the vengeance of the gods, they resolved to brave those, most severely denounced, for the crime of sacrilege, throughout Greece, by the laws of men; trusting to the means, which the crime itself would furnish, for their security. They expected assuredly to gain the Eparites; whose support would enable them to overbear opposition within their own country; and they had great confidence in the efficacy of the riches, which they should make their own, for negotiation without.

The amount altogether of the plunder, which, under this resolution, may have been committed upon the sacred treasury of Olympia, perhaps was never publicly known; but the source of a pay, established, and regularly issued, for the Eparites, under authority of the administration of a confederacy of democracies, not to be concealed, appears indeed to have been boldly avowed. Powerful however as the means were, which the democratical chiefs had laid their hands upon, for obviating opposition and complaint, they could not prevent the use of the opportunity, which their measure afforded, to their political opponents, for exciting honest indignation, and alarming popular superstition. In Mantinea the aristocratical appears to have been the prevailing party. There a decided opposition to the measure was presently resolved upon, by those at the head of affairs; and it was conducted with a temperate firmness, which made it formidable. A deputation was sent, in the name of the municipal government of Mantinea, to those who directed the administration of the union, declaring, 'that the Mantineians, ' desirous to support, with their best means, the interest of the united

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c.4.  
s. 33.

‘ Arcadian people, would however avoid implication in the guilt of sacrilege : that they had therefore remitted a sum of money, collected among themselves, equal to their share of the pay at present wanted for the Eparites ; and against all sacrilegious use of the Olympian treasure, they utterly protested.’

But the democratical chiefs, who, in considering the different dangers before them, had perhaps thought it safer to commit the crime, than either to abandon the direction of public affairs, or struggle, in the management of them, against the difficulties of public penury, were not now disposed to retreat. Supposing their party sure in the Numberless assembly, they cited the leading men of Mantinea<sup>23</sup> before that body, to answer for their conduct, as a treasonable opposition to the authority of the united Arcadian government. This citation, the Mantineians, doubting the independency or the impartiality of a majority in the assembly, avoided to obey. It is indeed a curious complication of tyranny and weakness, of public corruption and private insecurity, that is displayed in the cotemporary historian’s account of the measures of that new united government, which had been proposed to the Arcadians as the perfection of democracy. The assembly proceeded to, what was indeed ordinary in Greek jurisprudence, condemnation of the contumacious Mantineians, as if they had been tried and regularly convicted, and a body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them. But the Mantineians, who had resolved to disobey a legal summonce, were prepared also to resist force: they shut the gates of their town, and refused admittance to those who came with the authority, or at least in the name, of the sovereign assembly of Arcadia.

Civil war thus was, in effect, declared. The opposition of the Mantineians could in truth be justified only by what might justify resistance to any established government. Sound political principle, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, was little found in Greece; but superstition, commonly powerful, operated, perhaps on this occasion, in concurrence with the best political principle, in favor of the Mantineian chiefs. The aristocratical party, throughout Arcadia, would

<sup>23</sup> Τοὺς ἀριστάτας ἀνέειπεν.



of course be with them. At the same time doubt, shame, fear, began to spread among those inclined to the democratical cause; fear of the divine vengeance, and fear of the reproaches and enmity of all Greece; insomuch that many of them also declared against the obnoxious measure. The dreadful idea of involving themselves and their families, to latest posterity, in guilt with gods and men, had a growing effect, which the bold authors of the crime could not repress; and shortly a majority of the Numberless, or the Ten-thousand, repented, so far as to come to a resolution, 'that no farther trespass upon the ' sacred treasury should be allowed.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 34.

This resolution, moderate as it might seem, reduced the authors of the sacrilege, hitherto leaders of the Arcadian politics, at once to a situation of extreme peril, by depriving them of that source of power to which they had looked for safety. They could no longer hold their influence over the Eparites; many of whom were unable, and many others little willing, to serve, out of their own country, on their private means. The stoppage of a pay, which was become a public condition of their service, affording a pretence, many went home. By the laws of the union, apparently, the towns for which they had served were to supply their places. Men of principal property had hitherto avoided inrollment among the Eparites. But they had now seen the danger of trusting to those who had little or nothing, what would enable them to take all; and to avoid, says the cotemporary historian, being subjected by the Eparites, they resolved to be Eparites. This was another blow to the democratical leaders. No prosecution was yet instituted, or, as far as appears, threatened against them; but, losing thus their influence in the army, after having lost their majority in the sovereign assembly, everything was to be apprehended for those implicated in a crime which, by the laws of all Greece, was capital, and the punishment generally to be inflicted without trial. One resource remained. Thebes, or at least those who now ruled the Theban councils, had a great interest in supporting them; as their downfall would be, in course, followed by a renewal of the antiënt connection of Arcadia with Lacedæmon. That proud independency, which the Arcadians had made their glory, and that jealousy of Theban interference, which they had

been taught to esteem their essential policy, were no longer considerations for the democratical leaders: they applied urgently and expressly for a Theban army to march into Peloponnesus: 'If it was delayed,' they said, 'Lacedæmonian influence would quickly again rule Arcadia.'

How far this measure was necessary to their safety, we can only conjecture; forming our judgment by what we find to have been common in Grecian political contests; but, that their power was gone, that their views of ambition were frustrated, unless they could obtain support from Thebes, the cotemporary historian has clearly shown. The aristocratical party had so gained ground, that a majority in the multitudinous sovereign assembly of Arcadia went with it; not in opposition to the sacrilege only, but generally; a circumstance in itself speaking not a little in favor of the aristocratical leaders. The application of the democratical chiefs to Thebes, and its favorable reception there, becoming known, was taken into consideration. The democratical party seems to have been still too powerful, in the yet but half-formed union of the republics, to be effectually restrained by the sovereign assembly; but, under authority of that assembly, ministers were sent to remonstrate, at Thebes, against the proposed march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by the Arcadian government. This measure being taken, the Eleian war and the circumstances of Olympia became the next subjects for debate. In the discussion of these it was observed, 'That the charge and presidency of the temple neither of right belonged to the Arcadians, nor were to be coveted by them; that the restoration of both to the Eleians would be most consonant to justice and religion, and most acceptable to the god; that, in truth, no cause for continuing the war with Elis existed;' and thus it was decreed by the assembly. The Eleians gladly consented to a negotiation for peace upon such grounds; a truce was instantly concluded; and deputies from all the Arcadian cities assembling in Tegea, received there, in regular form, ministers from Elis.

In this critical moment, when the fate of Greece, for all futurity, was on the balance, the wisdom, the magnanimity, the enlarged patriotism of a Lycomedes, singularly wanted among the Arcadians, were unfortunately not found; or, if existing anywhere, without his active

active exertion and commanding influence, they were inefficacious. The efforts of the aristocratical leaders could not prevent the insulting appearance of a Theban at the congress, attended by a body of three hundred Bœotian heavy-armed. Swearing, with sacrifice and solemn ceremony, to the observance of the truce, was the first business of the meeting. In this the Theban readily concurred, and objection was made on no part. Banquets were then prepared, the pœan of peace resounded, a thoughtless joy pervaded all; those leading men excepted, who had been principals in the sacrilege at Olympia. They could not withdraw their consideration from the disappointment of their ambition, by the very measure which gave occasion for the general joy, or from the prosecution, to which they had made themselves legally liable, and the persecuting manner in which, too commonly in the Grecian republics, measures were carried against a defeated party. The Theban came commissioned to give them such support as circumstances might allow. Communicating with him, they found him full of that patriotism, which could throw a veil over honor, revile justice, and contemn oaths, when the interest of his country, or of his party in it, required. Some of the Eparites were yet devoted to them. Supported by these, and by the Bœotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties around, to seize, in the midst of the general festivity, the leading men of every Arcadian city. The number thus apprehended, was such, that, the public prison not holding all, the townhouse was also filled with them. Many, nevertheless, escaped; some over the town-walls; some by favor of those who guarded the gates: for, in this business, says the cotemporary historian, the animosity, usual in Grecian sedition, actuated none but those who feared capital prosecution; and among those who fled were most of the principal Mantineians, whom it had been particularly the object of the conspirators to secure.

Intelligence of this transaction quickly reaching Mantinea, distant only twelve miles, was thence hastened over Arcadia, with admonition added for all the towns to be upon their guard against what might follow. Herald's were then sent to Tegea, bearing a requisition for the liberty of the Mantineians detained there, accompanied by a remonstrance,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 4.  
s. 36.

strance, insisting that no Arcadian should be executed, or even imprisoned, without trial, in due course of law; and offering, if any were accused of treason against the union, security from the Mantineian state for their appearance before the great assembly of the nation. It might seem as if something of the spirit of Lycomedes, some idea of just government and true civil freedom, and of the proper manner of asserting them, existed still in Mantinea, and only there.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 4.  
s. 39.

The Theban, to whose authority, it appears, the Arcadian conspirators deferred, seems to have been disconcerted by the spirited prudence of the Mantineians. Fearful of the consequences of the violence to which he had been persuaded, he set all his prisoners at liberty; and, next day, assembling as many Arcadians of the different towns as were at hand and would come at his invitation, he apologized for what he had done; misled, as he pretended, by false intelligence of a plot for delivering Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and of a Lacedæmonian army approaching. The excuse found little credit, but the apology was accepted, so far that he was allowed to depart quietly. The matter however was then taken into serious consideration, by those who directed the Arcadian councils; and the result seems to have been not precisely what prudence would have dictated, to those whose object was to preserve the peace and independency of Arcadia, which had been so endangered, without being yet materially injured: they sent ministers to Thebes, to accuse the author of the late violence, and to insist that his crime should be punished with death.

s. 40.

Epameinondas was then in the high office of general, commander-in-chief; which, in the Theban as in the Athenian democracy, seems to have conferred, for its period, a kingly power; far less regularly controlled, by any constitutional checks, than the authority of the Lacedæmonian kings; and, when an overbearing party in the tumultuary sovereign assembly favored, it was, like the power of an Asiatic vizier, the favorite of his despot, uncontrolled. To the general the Arcadians were to address themselves. We do not find Xenophon often vouching for words, spoken by his cotemporaries, with that unqualified assurance, with which some, who wrote four or five hundred years after him, have undertaken to give them. On this occasion, the only one on which

any

any censure upon his political enemy, Epameinondas, appears even implied, he relates what that great man said; but his caution in so doing deserves notice. Affirming nothing from himself, he states the report, which the Arcadian ministers, on their return, made to their government: 'Epameinondas told them,' they said, 'that the Theban commissioner, at Tegea, had done far better when he seized the principal Arcadians, than when he released them: for, the Thebans having engaged in the war only to serve Arcadia, any negotiation for peace, without communication with Thebes, was treason against the confederacy. Be assured therefore,' he added, 'we will march into Arcadia; and, with our numerous friends there, who have been faithful to the common cause, we will prosecute the war<sup>24</sup>.'

The communication of this report put Peloponnesus in a ferment. All the independent interests, if an apposite modern phrase may be allowed, were indignant, yet at the same time alarmed, at the presumption of Thebes, to command war for them, within their own peninsula, when they desired peace; and to march an army into their country, to enforce such commands. The governments of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia, united in these sentiments. They sent, in common, to Athens; still connected in that alliance with Arcadia which was the last political work of Lycomedes, in some confidence that the Athenians would feel themselves bound by interest, not less than by treaty,

<sup>24</sup> Diodorus has given a strange inconsistent account of the affairs of Arcadia and Elis, which led to the fourth expedition of Epameinondas into Peloponnesus. Not the leading men of the united administration of Arcadia, according to him, but the Mantineaian chiefs alone purloined the sacred treasure of Olympia; for no public purpose, but for private lucre; and it was they who, to prevent leisure for inquiry into their conduct, fomented the Eleian war. That the chiefs of the united administration had the Olympic treasury in their power, appears from his own narrative; but how the Mantineaian separately could command it, he neither informs us, nor seems to have stopped to consider; and he appears totally to have forgotten, what he had just before related, that it was through the previous existence of war with Elis that any of them could lay their hands upon the Olympic treasury. Possibly he had not ready opportunity to consult Xenophon's clear detail, when he enriched his book with this string of absurdities; which seems too gross to have had vogue when the facts were recent, but may have been recommended afterward, by the vehemence of party dispute, to some author (perhaps Dionysiodorus or Anaxis, Bœotian writers of Grecian history, mentioned at the close of his fifteenth book) whose work may have fallen too temptingly in his way.

to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Peloponnesus; and they were not dissatisfied. They sent with not less confidence to Lacedæmon, tho hitherto the enemy of Arcadia, but already engaged anew in friendly connection with Achaia and Elis. The humiliation of Lacedæmon is strongly marked by what followed. A proposal which, in the early days of Agesilaus, would have been scorned and resented, was now, tho far from adapted to promote the common object, readily accepted. It was agreed that the combined troops, when within the territory of any state of this new confederacy, should be commanded in chief by the general of that state, under direction of its government.

#### S E C T I O N VII.

*Principles of Grecian politics. Fourth expedition of the Thebans, under Epameinondas, into Peloponnesus; second invasion of Laconia; battle of Mantinea.*

WE may, perhaps, on first view, rather wonder at the former submission of the Grecian republics to the Lacedæmonian supremacy, than at the assertion now of the right of equality. But it will readily occur that this right of equality, however justly claimed, could not be exercised, when a powerful enemy pressed, without risking great inconvenience to the common cause. Republics, therefore, like individuals, when fear, revenge, or ambition instigated, often conceded their equality for the advantage of military subordination. Hence arose temptation and opportunities for leading and ambitious men, which prevented the possibility of lasting peace in Greece, and must prevent it wherever a democracy may exist, strong enough to contend with neighbouring powers. Where gradation of rank is established, and means of rising are open, ambition, undoubtedly for wise purposes, implanted in the mind of man, has some opportunity for gratification, even in a settled government in peace; but a democracy, in peace is, for the ambitious man, a blank: war or civil disturbance are necessary.

sary to him ; and, when war or sedition are once afloat, no government so teems with opportunities, none offers so wide a field for ambition, as democracy. Hence the most ambitious men are commonly zealous for democracy : by far the largest portion of successful usurpers have begun their career as favorites of the multitude : and hence the perpetual wars of Greece, and the perpetual seditions. We have seen what insecurity, public and private, what continual apprehension, what almost continual violences resulted. In a country so constituted, should any commonwealth, acquiring strength to controul others, exercise it so as to check mischievous ambition, and enforce any tolerable civil order, popularity would of course accrue to it, as far as such benefits were extended. Thus, at the time of the Persian invasions, the attachment of the greater part of Greece to Lacedæmon was like that of a clan to an individual chief, or a nation to its hereditary king, to the admitted right of succession in whose family it had owed ages of internal peace. At the same time the rest of Greece, as all the older writers testify, looked to subjection even under the Persian monarch, as likely to avert more evils than it would bring. When the superintending power then of Lacedæmon, through abuse, became intolerable, still the other republics felt the necessity of a head. Thus Athens rose ; and, when the power abused by Athens became also intolerable, it only reverted to Lacedæmon, to be again abused. Nevertheless so was the necessity of a superintending authority felt, among the jarring republics, that, when a few extraordinary men had raised Thebes, from bondage under Lacedæmon, to dominion over Bœotia, her new power of giving protection was no sooner observed, than it drew the regard of neighboring states ; and Thebes appears to have been, in considerable extent, invited to aspire to the empire of Greece. But, tho the smaller republics, in general, saw such a rising power with more hope than jealousy, yet the larger, which themselves aspired at supremacy, viewed it through a different medium. Since the battle of Cnidus and the return of Conon, Athens had been alternately advancing and losing ground, but altogether gradually advancing, in strength and in dominion. No aristocracy, oligarchy, or monarchy would so in all points meet

and thwart her interest as an imperial democracy. It was thus the same principle which formerly animated Syracuse against Athens, that now determined the Athenians to persevere, in alliance with Lacedæmon, for the purpose of opposing the ambition and the growing power of Thebes.

It is however remarkable that, in this war, in which Athens and Thebes were engaged on opposite sides, we hear of no ravage of the Attic fields by the powerful armies of Bœotia, nor of any attempt against Bœotia in the occasional absence of its forces. Both states sent troops to act against each other, at a distance from the territories of both, in Peloponnesus; both remaining quiet at home, as if by compact: perhaps compact, if not formally expressed, yet really understood, and upheld by a mutual sense of its convenience. The fact has been noticed by Demosthenes, that, during the Theban war, the Attic territory enjoyed perfect peace<sup>†</sup>. But the genius of Epameinondas, intent upon raising his city, and reckoning the depression of the formerly overbearing landforce of Lacedæmon the first thing necessary, would avoid needless implication with Athens by land, while nevertheless, conceiving the bold project of making Thebes a maritime power, he would contest with Athens the command of the sea. That empire, to which, while the strength of Lacedæmon was so fully employed in the war with Thebes, Athens had been silently rising again, the Athenian democracy again exercised tyrannically; and the discontent among those called its allies, especially the rich islands of Rhodes and Chios, and the important town of Byzantium, invited the attention of Epameinondas. He collected a naval force so unexpectedly; and conducted it so ably, that Laches, who commanded the Athenian fleet on the Asiatic station, tho' an officer of reputation, was unable to make head against him; and the states of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, renouncing the Athenian confederacy, engaged in alliance with Thebes. But, successful as he thus was in one expedition, well timed and rapidly executed, yet he could not maintain the advantage. Within the same year, according to Diodorus, Timotheus, commander-in-chief of the sea and land forces of Athens, relieved Cyzicus in the

Isoc. or. ad Philipp.

B. C. 363.  
Ol. 104. 2.

<sup>†</sup> I think in the oration on the Crown.



Propontis, when besieged, if not by Epameinondas in person, yet by the armament which had been acting under him, and took the important towns of Toronë and Potidæa on the Thracian coast; nor do we hear of any farther naval enterprize of the Thebans.

Antiquity has so consented in unqualified eulogy of Epameinondas, that it might be hazardous, for a modern, to question the integrity of his views and the propriety of his conduct, if the passions which, evidently and confessedly, in some degree instigated him, ambition and the love of glory, were not themselves somewhat differently estimated in the antient and in the modern moral balance, and if political right and wrong were not also, in antient and in modern times, distinguished by different criteria. The violence of his interference in the affairs of Arcadia, against the established government of the country, in support of a faction disgraced by a profligate act, seems not to be justified upon any principle that will now be admitted. Motives however, of considerable weight, for his resolution to march into Peloponnesus evidently existed. It appears clearly enough, tho not directly said by Xenophon, that Lacedæmonian intrigue had contributed to the revolution in Arcadia; beginning with Mantinea, and finally pervading the united government. Nevertheless this, apparently, should have been opposed by negotiation, and would hardly justify hostile invasion: Thebes was not attacked, nor any regular ally of Thebes. But the Messenians, whom the Thebans had undertaken to protect in their recovered country, were, through the reviving influence of Lacedæmon in Peloponnesus, certainly in great danger. If then Epameinondas can be vindicated from the appearance of some wantonness of ambition, the right, if such it was, and the duty, which he had created for himself, of protecting the Messenians, are what may most obviously be alledged for him. But another, at least probable motive for his famous and fatal expedition, may deserve notice. That inherent restlessness in the Grecian political system, which made it incapable of lasting peace, is acknowledged by all the ablest writers of the republican times. Thebes was the head of a great military confederacy; and Epameinondas, at the head of the affairs of Thebes, was not in an easy situation. Very probably he was reduced to make a

virtue, as he could, of necessity, by undertaking the direction of the effervescence, which he could not still<sup>25</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 5.  
s. 4.

The force that he was able to assemble, zealous to serve under him, might alone have inflamed the ambition of an ordinary man. The Eubœan towns were now united in that confederacy with Thebes, which bound their men of military age to march at the order of the imperial people. Numerous Thessalian auxiliaries came; from the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, and from the cities which had opposed the tagus; for they were now at peace with one another, and equally in alliance with Thebes. Locris was completely subject to Thebes<sup>26</sup>. Phocis, boldly asserting independency, refused obedience to the requisition for its troops: 'The terms of our alliance,' said the Phocians, 'require us to assist the Thebans, if attacked, but not to march with them to attack others.'

s. 6.

Leaving this contumacy for future consideration, Epameinondas, to prevent opportunity for checking his way to his great object, hastened to pass the isthmus. At Nemea he halted; hoping thence to intercept the force expected from Athens, to join the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; but, after some stay, finding himself disappointed by the foresight of the Athenian government, who sent their troops by sea to the Laconian coast, he proceeded to Tegea. Here his Peloponnesian allies met him. Argos, commonly zealous in opposition to Lacedæmon, was at this time free enough from sedition to send forth its strength. The revived state of Messenia was of course warm in the

<sup>25</sup> Barthelemi has done little, and even attempted little, toward any illustration of the politics, or political history, of Greece. In his abundant reading he has given his attention much to the panegyrists of Epameinondas, and it has been a favorite purpose of his own to panegyrize Epameinondas. Nevertheless he describes him as a meer Theban patriot; not even attempting to show that his views extended to the general freedom and wellbeing of Greece. He uses the licence, which the plan of his work affords, for omitting all notice of the very

remarkable circumstances which led to the last Theban invasion of Peloponnesus; and, taking up his hero already with his army in heart of Arcadia, he avows, without reserve or apology, that the purpose of the expedition was to decide, 'si c'étoit au Thebains ou aux Lacedæmoniens de donner des loix aux autres peuples.' Anacharsis, ch. 13. p. 264. t. 2. ed. oct.

<sup>26</sup> Of this we are informed by Xenophon on a former occasion; and therefore perhaps he has omitted to name Locris here.

SECT. VII. FOURTH INVASION OF PELOPONNESUS.

Theban interest; and scarcely less so those Arcadian states which, by rebellion against the united government of their nation, had embraced it. These were principally Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Palantium, with some interspersed village-republics, through weakness and situation, dependent on these. The army, altogether, according to Diodorus, consisted of more than thirty thousand infantry, and about three thousand horse. The army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, considerably inferior, assembled about the same time in Mantinea. Arcadia was divided, but the greater part joined in the Lacedæmonian alliance; so that the troops of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, formed its principal force. The Lacedæmonians sent their cavalry and a body of mercenaries, with a small body only of their native infantry, keeping the greater part for emergencies, at home.

Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 5. s. 1 & 9.

Epameinondas remained some time, with his whole army, inactive within the walls of Tegea<sup>27</sup>; a measure of which Xenophon declares his approbation, in terms which seem to mark that, in its day, it had not escaped censure. In the want indeed of a cotemporary historian the friend of the Theban general, tho' with later authors he has been a favorite object of panegyric, yet we find his candid enemy, Xenophon, really his best eulogist. 'That this expedition was fortunate,' says that writer, 'I would not affirm; but, for what human prudence and courage might accomplish, in my opinion Epameinondas failed in nothing. I commend him for keeping his army within the walls of Tegea. He deprived the enemy thus, not only of opportunity to attack him, but of opportunity to observe what might indicate his purposes. Means of preparation nevertheless for himself were readier; and the enemy's motions were open to his observation, equally as if he were incamped without. I commend him also, because, tho' commanding the stronger army, he refrained from attack, while the enemy held advantage of ground.' The inactivity however, which Xenophon thus approves, could be advantageous only for a limited

s. 8.

<sup>27</sup> Τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐν τῷ τείχει τῶν Τεγεατῶν ἐποιήσατο. The word στρατόπεδος, commonly translated, and indeed commonly meaning, a camp, was however not confined to that sense, but was used sometimes for what we call quarters. This is fully shown by an expression of Xenophon soon following: καὶ αἱ τελεπιδιοσάμενοι εἰς τείχεσσι ἐν ταῖς ἐκείναις. Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 5. s. 15.

time.

time. The influence arising from the general confidence in the ability and spirit of Epameinondas, would indeed enable him to persevere in it longer than a commander of inferior name; but, in rest and confinement, discontent would grow, even among his troops, collected from various states; his reputation would suffer, and then his command would become precarious. Meanwhile of some advantages, which he had been expecting, he found himself disappointed: none of the hostile or neutral states would be induced, through any terror of his superiority, or any hope for advantage from the change, to join the Theban cause.

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 5.  
s. 9.

Apparently the wisest conduct, of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, would have been to persevere in precisely that disposition of their force, which had principally occasioned the Theban general's inactivity. The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed remaining at home, for the security of their own country, the army assembled at Mantinea had taken a position near that town, so strong as to deter attack, and so advantageous, for covering the Mantineian territory, that Epameinondas, with the very superior force he commanded, had thought it prudent to abstain from the usual work of ravage. But, in such circumstances, rest itself begets uneasiness.\* The allies feared only the more destructive explosion from the unexpected quiescence of so great a force, under so renowned a commander. They could not be satisfied to have the Lacedæmonians remain at home, for the protection of their own country, less immediately threatened, while they, with unequal numbers, should bear the brunt of a war so much more than commonly formidable. They were in consequence so urgent in petition and remonstrance, that the Lacedæmonian government thought it necessary to concede, and all the best remaining strength of the state marched under the orders of Agesilaus.

This measure relieved Epameinondas. Intelligence no sooner reached him, that Agesilaus had left Sparta, and was already at Pellenë, than he formed his plan and proceeded instantly to the execution. Orders were issued for the troops to take their evening meal and march. The better road to Sparta, and perhaps,\* from Tegea, the shorter, by Sellasia, was open; and so deficient was the lookout of the Lacedæmonians,

monians, that, but for the providential intelligence, so Xenophon calls it<sup>28</sup>, brought to Agesilaus by a Cretan, Sparta would have been taken, he says, like a birdsnest, destitute of defenders. Agesilaus hastened his return, so that he arrived before Epameinondas. His force, the whole Lacedæmonian cavalry and part of the infantry being at Mantinea, was very scanty for the defence of a loosely-built unfortified town, against the approaching army. But, for the antient art of war, every house was a fortification; every eminence gave great advantage for the antient missile weapons. From a housetop the bowman, slinger, and dartman, himself secure, could aim his strokes at those below with superior effect.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 10.

Epameinondas, upon his arrival, disappointed of his hope of surprising the place, observed the able disposition for defence made by Agesilaus, and determined his plan of attack accordingly. Making no attempt against the more open parts, where immediate assault was expected, he sent a detachment, which, by a circuitous march, seized a height commanding the town. 'It may be said,' says Xenophon, 'that the deity interfered: it may be said that nothing can withstand the desperate: certainly,' he proceeds, 'it appears extraordinary, that, when Archidamus, with less than a hundred men, advancing over very difficult ground, attacked that height, the Thebans, those men breathing fire, those conquerors of the Lacedæmonians, with advantage of numbers, and with every advantage, did not even wait the assault, but turned; and some of the prime of their army were slain.' The Lacedæmonians, elated with such success, pursued intemperately, and lost some men: but Archidamus kept possession of the important post he had carried, raised his trophy, and received the enemy's solicitation for the bodies of the dead, of which he remained master; which, on account of the usual impression on the soldiers, on both sides, was, in the circumstances in which the Lacedæmonians stood, a very important advantage.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 11.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 499.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam. &  
Ages. Plut.  
vit. Ages.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 12.

s. 13.

Plutarch has reported an anecdote of this attack upon Sparta, which, tho somewhat apparently extravagant, has been too much noticed to be passed unmentioned. Isadas, son of Phœbidas, a youth of a sin-

<sup>28</sup> Κρης δεινὴ τινὶ μοίρᾳ προσελθούσῃ.

gularly fine person, just appointed, in the way of the Greeks, after bathing, on alarm sounded, snatching a spear in one hand, a sword in the other, ran out naked, pressed to the foremost rank of the Lacedæmonian troops, and did extraordinary execution among the enemy, without receiving a wound: whether, says the writer, some god preserved him, or the idea that he was more than human appalled the enemy. For the merit of his deed he was rewarded with the honor of being publicly crowned by the ephors: for the irregularity of it, he was fined a thousand draehmas, about forty pounds sterling. Plutarch seems to attribute this adventure to the engagement in which the trophy was won by Archidamus; with which it seems utterly inconsistent. With more appearance of probability it might be referred to the assault, not specified by Xenophon, but in which, according to Polybius, the besieging army penetrated as far as the agora of Sparta<sup>29</sup>.

Polyb. 1.9.  
P. 547.

It appears however to have been the success of Archidamus, in carrying the commanding post, that deprived Epameinondas of the hope of rapid progress against the city; and, unprovided as he was, in a hostile country, hemmed in by mountains, he deemed it inexpedient to wait till the army from Mantinea, already marching to the relief of Lacedæmon, should arrive. Fertile in resources, he founded, on the failure of one stroke, a plan for another. It was the season of harvest; and the Mantineians, who, while he lay in Tegea, had confined their slaves

<sup>29</sup> Isadas, according to the well imagined conjecture of Mr. James Byres, has been intended in that admirable statue in the villa Borghese at Rome, commonly, but enough without reasonable foundation, called the fighting gladiator; the only work extant, of the first-rate Greek sculpture, in which the human form is represented in strong action; unless the Laocoon in the Vatican should be arranged in the same class of design, or the Wrestlers, in the tribune of the gallery at Florence, may be admitted into the same class of merit. The character of the countenance of the figure in the villa Borghese is Grecian and heroic. The difference of the features of the dying gladiator, rightly so called, in the Capitol, is striking; the expression is very fine; the work is altogether admirable, and the more so because it marks precisely the character it has been intended to represent; not a Greek, for the face is not Grecian; not a hero, for the expression, tho' showing sternness and fortitude, shows the fortitude of a mind depressed by slavery, and without elevation of thought. Such at least is the impression which it readily conveys to those to whom the forms of Grecian sculpture are familiar. Since this note was first published, these statues, I fear, have been removed from the places indicated.

and cattle within their walls, would endeavor to profit from his absence for getting in their crop. Hastening therefore his return, in expectation to find the produce ready for carrying, with the slaves and cattle in the fields, he proposed to make all the prey of his army.

After a march of thirty miles, over a lofty mountain barrier, he allowed his infantry some rest in Tegea; but he sent his horse immediately forward, into the Mantineian territory. All the laboring slaves, as he foresaw, all the cattle, and many of the Mantineian people, within and beyond the military age, were in the fields. The approach of the Theban cavalry being observed and announced, all was alarm in Mantinea, and throughout its narrow territory. Fortunately a body of Athenian horse was just arrived, but fatigued with a forced march of two days, of extraordinary length, along a mountainous road. They had left Eleusis only the preceding day, rested for the night at the isthmus, and, on the morrow, in fear, apparently, of being intercepted, pressed their way on, by Cleonæ to Mantinea, without halting. They had just taken their quarters, and men and horses were yet without refreshment, when the Mantineians came to them with the most earnest solicitations for assistance and protection, on which they represented their existence as depending. The Athenians, ashamed, says the historian, weary as they were, being present in such circumstances, to be useless, and anxious to maintain their country's glory, instantly remounted, to engage a very superior force of the cavalry of Thebes and Thessaly, the most renowned of Greece. They came quickly to action, and brave men, he proceeds, fell on both sides; but the advantage was wholly with the Athenians: they carried off all their own slain; they restored some of the enemy's, the boasted criterion always of victory, under a solicited truce; and, what was a more essential, and indeed a most important advantage, they gave complete protection to the Mantineians, and enabled them to save all their property<sup>30</sup>.

Xen. Hel:  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 15.

Difficulties now pressed upon Epameinondas. The confederacy of little military republics, which had put so great a force, the best part

<sup>30</sup> Xenophon has not named the Athenian commander: Diodorus calls him Hegelochus: a man, he says, before of high reputation among the Athenian military.

of their population, under his command, had no public revenues equal to the maintenance of those numbers in the field, far from home. The term of expeditions, which they might undertake, was limited by necessity of circumstances. Magazines, such as attend the motions of modern armies, were not even thought of. Already the troops under Epameinondas had suffered want, and that want must go on increasing. But the term of his expedition was not left to his discretion, or to be decided by contingencies; it was absolutely limited by the controuling authority, whether of the Theban government, or of a congress of the confederacy, we are uninformed. It was now near expiring, and the troops of the northern states must be led home<sup>31</sup>. Defeated in his attempt upon Sparta, and in that which followed it, upon the Mantinea territory, his reputation could not fail to suffer, notwithstanding the abilities really displayed, if, with an army so superior to the enemy, and so much greater than was commonly seen in Greece, his campaign were marked only by disappointments. He had moreover to consider, that his expedition was the immediate occasion of the union of Athens, Elis, Achaia, and the best part of Arcadia, with Lacedæmon, in opposition to Thebes, or at least of the actual energy of that union. Were he then to withdraw without victory, those Arcadians, whose cause had been the pretence for the Thebans to interfere in arms in Peloponnesus, must be immediately overwhelmed; and the revived state of Messenia, for whose protection Thebes, but especially Epameinondas, was pledged, would be at the enemy's mercy. A victory was perhaps necessary, not only to avert ruin from those whom he had bound himself to protect, but to make his own return to his country, not creditable only but even safe. A battle therefore was indispensable; and if he fell, says Xenophon, it was a satisfactory

Xen. Hel.  
1. 7. c. 5.  
s. 19.  
s. 18.

<sup>31</sup> ——— Ὀλίγων μὲν ἡμερῶν ἀνάγκη ἕσσοιο ἀπίεσαι, διὰ τὸ ἐξήκειν τῇ σπαρτίᾳ τὸν χρόνον. This is among the passages of Xenophon for which we want assistance, which, it should seem, we might not unreasonably expect from the later antient writers who have treated of the actions of Epameinondas;

but, among many tales, and much panegyric, we find little that deserves the name of history, or that affords any illustration of history. As far as I have ventured explanation, I think I am warranted by what may be gathered from Xenophon himself.



reflection for him that his fall would be glorious, in the endeavor to give Thebes the empire of Greece.

‘ That these should be his sentiments,’ proceeds the historian, continuing the eulogy of his enemy, ‘ I think not very wonderful; they are common to men smitten with the love of glory : but, to have so prepared his troops, collected from various states, that they would decline no fatigue; yield to no danger, in want be patient, and in all circumstances orderly and zealous in duty; this I think truly worthy of admiration.’ Epameinondas declared, in public orders, his resolution to engage the enemy, and the utmost alacrity was manifested by the army. The cavalry diligently brightened their helmets; the infantry were seen busy, sharpening their spears and swords, and burnishing their shields; some of the Arcadian heavy-armed desired to be inrolled in the Theban band of clubmen; a circumstance which seems singularly to mark the popularity of the Theban name, when Epameinondas commanded. What the band of clubmen was we are not informed: possibly an institution of less utility for the weapon, from which it was denominated, than for the enthusiasm it inspired, in emulation of Hercules, whom the Thebans proudly called at the same time their god and their fellowcountryman.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c. 5.  
s. 19.

General zeal thus quickly making preparation complete, Epameinondas, at an early hour of the morning, formed his order of battle, and marched, by his left; not directly toward Mantinea, but to the nearest root of mount Mænalus; the western boundary of the vale, in which both Mantinea and Tegea stood. There, on strong ground, within sight of the enemy, he extended his phalax, and grounded arms<sup>32</sup>, as if going to incamp.

s. 21.  
s. 22.

According to those terms, to which the pressure of adversity had

<sup>32</sup> Ἐθετο τὰ ὄπλα. It is not always possible to find terms in modern language for expressing exactly the circumstances of ancient warfare. In the Grecian service, what principally loaded the footsoldier of the phalanx was his large shield. To relieve him from the pressure of its weight was of course

expedient, whenever it might be safely done. The spear also was weighty, but it might be planted on the ground, and still ready for instant use. To ground the shield required more caution, and seems to have been more particularly implied in the phrase *διόθαι τὰ ὄπλα*.

reduced the Lacedæmonians to submit, the army of their confederacy, being in the Mantineian territory, was to be commanded, in chief, by Mantineian generals, under direction of the Mantineian administration. In the want of the abilities of a Lycomedes, which might have made some amends for the inherent inconveniencies of such a regulation, the presence of Agesilaus, tho' not possessing the nominal command-in-chief, might have been advantageous: some deference might have been paid to his rank and long experience, at least when danger pressed. But Epameinondas seems to have derived that advantage from his expedition against Sparta, that Agesilaus, and a large part of the troops, before destined to reinforce the army in Arcadia, were retained to protect Laconia against any new attack. Who commanded now in Arcadia, we are not informed: their deficiencies only are reported to us. Apparently the circumstances which imposed upon Epameinondas the necessity of seeking a battle, should have decided them by all means to avoid it. Nevertheless they were prepared, with a very inferior force, two-thirds only of his numbers, according to Diodorus, to contend with his superior talents. His measures, indicating intention to incamp, completely deceived them. After having formed their order of battle, with the view to meet him, concluding that his purpose was not to fight that day, they allowed that order to be in a great degree dissolved, and the preparation of the soldier's mind for action, highly important in Xenophon's idea, to be relaxed and dissipated.

Epameinondas observed the effect his feint had produced, and proceeded to profit from it: he issued orders to resume arms and march. We have seen it the practice of the Thebans to form their phalanx of extraordinary depth, even to fifty in file; trusting to the effect of breaking the enemy's front, at the risk of suffering themselves in flank. By this method they had formerly gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, and by this method Epameinondas himself had succeeded, in the glorious day of Leuctra, against the Lacedæmonians. His superiority in numbers enabled him now, in taking the advantage, to obviate the hazard of that method. Resolving to direct his principal effort against the enemy's right, he formed his line in the ordinary manner

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manner of the Greeks. His Theban column of attack was a separate body, which he placed in front of his left wing. Following the same principle in the disposition of his cavalry, he divided it on the flanks of his infantry; but meaning that the cavalry of his left should be the charging body, he gave it a strength that might insure its superiority, leaving the horse on his right comparatively weak. These therefore he directed to some advantageous ground, with orders not to move from it, unless opportunity of evident advantage should offer; and he provided support for them, in case of need, from a body of infantry.

While, in this advantageous arrangement, Epameinondas led directly toward the enemy, their generals, tho they had allowed order nearly to cease in their army, had not provided for holding it in their choice to avoid a battle. His approach, therefore, produced, with universal alarm, a universal hurry among their forces. Some, says the cotemporary historian, were forming, some running to the ground where they should form, some bridling their horses; some putting on their breastplates, and all seeming more like men expecting to suffer than preparing to act. Order however was restored before attack could begin upon them: the Arcadians held the right, as the post of honor, which, by treaty, they claimed within their own country; the Lacedæmonians were posted next to them; the cavalry were divided on the flanks.

Diod. l. 15.

The battle began with the cavalry. That of the Lacedæmonian side was without those light-armed foot, practised to act with horse, whose weapons, galling from a distance, prepared for the effect of a charge. The Theban abounded with these; and being moreover very superior in number, they presently overthrew their opponents. The Theban column of infantry then joined action; but, tho carefully composed of the best troops, with Epameinondas leading, it found strong resistance from the Lacedæmonian and Arcadian foot. Its persevering force, however, at length broke the opposing ranks, and then the effect was what the able projector expected. That which had the reputation of being the firmest part of the enemy's line being put to flight, the contagion spread among the inferior troops, and all the infantry gave way.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 23.

It

B. C. 362.  
Ol. 100.  $\frac{2}{4}$ .

It seemed now as if victory must be, on the Theban side, as complete as superior force, directed by superior judgement, could make it. But we have had repeated occasion to observe how much of the fate of multitudes may depend on one man. Leading the charge of his column, just as success appeared decided, tho' the Lacedæmonians, with their phalanx broken, were still resisting, Epameinondas received a wound in his breast and fell. The disaster engaged the attention of those around; and, with the information of it, rapidly spreading, confusion and dismay pervaded the army. Succession of command seems not to have been duly provided for. The various multitude having no equal confidence in any other officer, authority, extending over the whole, in a great degree ceased; or, if any proper regulation had been made, it was overborne by the impulse of hesitation and consternation; which so prevailed, that scarcely an attempt was made to profit from the victory actually gained. The heavy-armed stood on the ground on which they had fought, vindicating the possession of the dead and wounded, but not moving a step in pursuit. The cavalry turned from those they had put to flight; and, without a blow against the enemy's retreating infantry, slipped by them, to rejoin their own phalanx, as if themselves defeated. The light-armed and targeteers, alone presuming on victory, crossed the field toward the left, without expecting attack or looking for support. The Athenian horse, no longer kept in check by the able disposition made for the purpose, charged and put them mostly to the sword. Epameinondas lived to be informed that his army was victorious, but fainted, it is said, on the extraction of the broken end of the weapon, left in the wound, and died soon after<sup>33</sup>.

Xen. Hel.  
1.7. c. 5.  
s. 25.

Under

<sup>33</sup> Xenophon simply mentions that Epameinondas fell in the battle. Diodorus, after a puerile detail of feats, like those of Achilles in the *Iliad*, or rather of Virgil's hero in the *Æneid*, is more circumstantial than any other writer about his death. He mentions no authority for those things said and done, between three and four centuries before him, which Nepos, in his own age, and Plutarch and Pausanias, after him, evidently did not quite believe; yet his story has been generally given as authentic by modern writers. Plutarch, in his *Life of Agesilaus*, has quoted earlier authors; a circumstance which may, more than any other, excite regret for the loss of his *Life of Epameinondas*. For those circumstances, reported by Diodorus, which, being probable in themselves, are in any degree confirmed by Nepos and Plutarch, neither of whom has copied him,

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Under these circumstances of the battle, both sides claimed the victory; each army raised its trophy, undisturbed by the other; each remained in possession of some of the enemy's dead; and neither would immediately solicit the bodies. But the slain of the Lacedæmonian side seem to have been not only more numerous, but of higher rank, cavalry and heavy-armed; whereas those of the Thèban side, remaining in the enemy's power, were mostly light-armed, or targeteers. Shortly therefore the Lacedæmonians, yielding to what was esteemed a most serious duty, sent their herald, with the usual solicitation; and, after this acknowledgement, the Thebans also sent their herald to make the same request.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
s. 27.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 503.

'Universal expectation,' says the cotemporary historian, 'was strangely deceived by this event of so great a battle. \*Almost all Greece being met in arms, there was nobody who did not suppose that the victors would in future command, and the defeated must obey. But God,' he continues, 'decided otherwise. Each party claimed the victory, and neither gained any advantage: territory, town, or dominion was acquired by neither; but indecision, and trouble, and confusion, more than even before that battle, pervaded Greece.' Tired then with the sad tale of his country's woes, which, in the vain hope of better times, he had now, from early youth to advanced age, been solicitously observing, he concludes his historical narrative: 'Thus far,' he says, 'suffice it for me to have related: following events, perhaps, will interest some other writer.'

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 2.  
s. 26, 27.

him, or which afford probable illustration narrative, reasonable credit will be allowed.  
of the cotemporary historian's concise nar-

## SECTION VIII.

*General Pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: Troubles in Arcadia; Interference of Thebes: Views of Agesilaus. Affairs of the East: War of Evagoras with Persia: Rebellion of the Persian maritime provinces. Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt: Death of Agesilaus: Distraction together of the Aristocratical and Democratical interests in Greece, and Dissolution of the antient system of Grecian confederacy.*

Diod. l. 19.  
c. 89. p. 504.  
Plut. vit.  
Agesil.

IT is a most critical moment at which we lose the invaluable guidance of Xenophon, in the maze of Grecian affairs. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, the fermentation, in which the indecisive battle of Mantinea left things, was presently stilled by a general peace; to the terms of which Lacedæmon alone refused accession. How the adverse republics were brought to a temper for pacification, those writers, little curious about such matters, leave unfold; but a collation of the memorials of the times will afford, in a great degree, the information to be desired. We have already learnt from Xenophon, that the term limited for the service of the Theban, and other northern forces, was near expiring, when the battle was fought; and we have had numerous occasions to see how usual it was for the armies of the Grecian confederacies, without a peace, without even a truce, to separate after a battle. It seems then certain that, when the credit and abilities of Epameinondas were gone, the Theban influence instantly sunk, and the bonds which held the Theban confederacy together were so slackened, that it verged rapidly toward dissolution. That fear therefore, of the preponderance of Thebes, which had united the opposing republics, soon dissipated: and, some of them, especially Athens, driven, by the dread of a rival democracy, to connect itself with the opponents of that interest of which it had been formerly the head, became now rather apprehensive of the superiority which might return to Lacedæmon and the aristocratical cause. Under these circumstances opportunity.

Demosth. or.  
pro Megalop.

opportunity for negotiation would be obvious. The states of the Theban confederacy persevered then in insisting upon the independency of Messenia. Those of the Lacedæmonian, Lacedæmon itself only excepted, holding themselves no longer interested, as before, to oppose this, some perhaps gladly, and the rest after no long controversy, consented. Thus peace appears to have been concluded; Lacedæmon alone remaining at war, nominally, with all the republics of the Theban confederacy.

This relic of war, however, was of no very threatening aspect; if, by the terms of the treaty between the other states of the two confederacies, the armies on both sides were, as Diodorus affirms, to be dissolved, and the troops to return to their several homes. Nevertheless the fear of exciting united energy anew, among the inimical states, appears to have prevented any immediate effort of the Lacedæmonians against Messenia. The first insuing transactions in Greece, noticed by the compiler whom we must now follow, which he attributes to the year after that of the battle of Mantinea, indicate a prevailing disposition, in the leading republics, to rest under the existing state of things; tho the uneasiness of a large number of unfortunate, and perhaps many injured men, urged them still to seek commotion. On the union of Arcadia, the inhabitants of several villages had been compelled, as we have formerly seen, to quit their residences, and migrate to the new capital, Megalopolis. Dissatisfied with the change, they now claimed, under that article of the treaty of peace, which required the return of all the troops, on both sides, to their respective homes, to go themselves and reoccupy their antient country residences. The leading men in Megalopolis vehemently opposed this. We might be at a loss for the motives of each party, had we not seen a solution of the difficulty in Xenophon's account of the dispersion and reassembling of the Mantineians. Those of the inhabitants of Megalopolis, on whom the violence had been put, or the chief of them, were landed men, accustomed to live independently upon their estates, nearly as the smaller barons in the feudal times of western Europe<sup>24</sup>; of course attached to the

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 94. p. 507.

B. C. 364.  
Ol. 104. 3.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 94.  
p. 507.

Ch. 26. s. 1, &  
Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

<sup>24</sup> Something of the same kind is said to subsist, with many relics of heroic manners, among the Mainotes, in the Peloponnesian mountains, at this day; whose chiefs, living

the aristocratical interest. The uneasiness of such men, on being separated from their property, to become members of the multitude in a town, and there observed with jealousy by that multitude, instigated by leaders their political enemies, may be easily conceived. They addressed solicitations to Mantinea, Elis, and all the aristocratical republics, to support them in their construction of the late treaty. Upon this the democratical chiefs applied to Thebes. Energy, with a disposition to pursue the policy of their late illustrious general, so remained in the councils there, that Pammenes, a principal friend of Epameinondas, was sent, at the head of three thousand heavy-armed, into Arcadia. None then stirring in favor of the unfortunate country-gentlemen, as we should call them in England, they were compelled to submit to the commands imposed upon them; and the more effectually to obviate a renewal of their attempt to secede from the city, their country residences were destroyed<sup>35</sup>.

In this state of things, the situation of the aged king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, who had begun to reign when Lacedæmon was arbitress of Greece, and had himself gone far to make her arbitress of Asia, could

in castle-fashioned houses, lodge the stranger; hospitably received, as in Homer's time, under the sounding portal, *ἢν ἀΐδουσαν ἐπὶ δούρῳ*. *Odys.* 1.3. v.399.

<sup>35</sup> According to our editions of Diodorus, the application of the Megalopolitans was to Athens, and Pammenes was an Athenian general, and the three thousand heavy-armed under him were Athenian. Wesseling however has expressed a suspicion of this passage; 'Demiror,' he says, 'Demosthenem, or de Megalopolit. nihil horum attingerè.' Thus admonished by Wesseling to look into that oration, it has appeared to me fully implied that, to the time when it was delivered, the Athenian government never had interfered in the affairs of the Megalopolitans. Nor anywhere, but in this passage of Diodorus, do we find the name of Pammenes as an Athenian general. But Pammenes, the Theban general and statesman, is mentioned; not by Diodorus only, as a man of great eminence, but also by Pausanias and

Plutarch, and by Pausanias especially as having held the command-in-chief on an occasion when the affairs of Megalopolis were settled, and the security of that new establishment provided for. Considering then the circumstances of Greece at the time, and in times immediately preceding and following, as far as they are made known to us, there seems no room for doubt but Thebes, rather than Athens, would be the state to which the Megalopolitans would apply for support, and the state most likely to be able and ready to give it. From Thebes indeed it would be almost matter of course, but from Athens little likely to come. Altogether then it appears so indicated that the name *Ἀθηναίων* has crept into this passage of our copies of Diodorus, through the ignorance or carelessness of transcribers, for *Θηβαίων*, that I have thought myself warranted, stating thus my grounds, to prefer the reading for which Wesseling has furnished the suggestion.



not but be highly uneasy. Plutarch has ineptly enough censured him for not resting on his humiliated throne. Rest, in any security, is little likely to have been in his choice; and Plutarch's apology for him, subjoined to the censure, appears far better founded than the censure itself: 'He thought it,' says the biographer, 'unworthy of him, even at his age, to sit down in Sparta, waiting for death, and doing nothing for the public.' In truth a Spartan king could do little for the public, at home, in peace, unless the public good might require his interference in political intrigue, and his influence might make such interference effectual, to controul the ephors. Agesilaus however, notwithstanding the misfortunes of his reign, which adverse circumstances, and extraordinary talents among the enemies of his country produced, appears to have had extensive estimation in his own and the following age, as a wise man and an able politician<sup>36</sup>. At this time his party was prevalent in Lacedæmon; and, tho' approaching his eightieth year, his constitution of body was still vigorous, and his mind still enterprizing. Still therefore himself the life and soul of the Lacedæmonian administration, he directed his views to raise his fallen country. And especially it seems to have been his anxious purpose to recover Messenia. Military strength was not yet so much wanting to Lacedæmon, as revenue to give energy to that strength. Every method, therefore, that the circumstances of the times would allow, was taken for raising money. According to Plutarch, loans from individuals seem to have been the principal resource; and the credit of Agesilaus what chiefly gave this any efficacy. To soothe and reconcile the Periæcians, those Laconians of the provincial towns, whom the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans had alienated, would of course be an important object; and it was probably a measure of policy, with this point in view, and not of base resentment, as Plutarch would have it, to grant hereditary honors and privileges to Anticrates, a Laconian, who was said to have given Epameinondas his mortal wound. Possibly it may not have been very clearly

Xen. Agesil.  
c. 2. s. 28.

Xen. Agesil.  
Plut. vit.  
Agesil.

<sup>36</sup> Thus Isocrates, when it was his purpose *ἵνα Λακεδαιμονίων φρονιμώτατος*. Or. ad Philip. p. 364. ed. Auger.  
reputation for wisdom: *Ἀγισίλαος ἡ δόξα*.

ascertained by whom, or how, in the tumult of close action, with confusion already begun in the Lacedæmonian line, that wound was given; but, among the different reports transmitted to us, what Plutarch has preserved deserves notice: 'The historian Dioscorides,' he says, 'relates, that the Laconian Anticrates struck Epameinondas with a spear; but the descendants of Anticrates bear still, among the Lacedæmonians, the surname of Machairion, from the machaira (a small sword) with which, as they affirm, he gave the fatal blow; and the hereditary exemption from taxes, granted on the occasion, is at this day enjoyed by Callicrates, the head of the family.'

Matters were thus preparing, in Lacedæmon, for the Messenian war, and the great mind of Agesilaus was bent upon wearing out its last energy in that narrow field, to which the pressure of adverse circumstances had reduced and still urged his attention, when events occurred in the East, seeming to offer prospect of a nobler kind. Egypt had been so long in revolt, so far successful against the Persian empire, that the largest part of that rich country, or perhaps the whole, was nearly settled into an independent monarchy. But the Egyptian kings (for so they are called by all the Grecian writers, tho' rebels in the contemplation of the Persian court) were watchful of opportunities for advantageous foreign connections, and for means of providing diversion for the Persian arms. Success, in one province, afforded encouragement for those who held command in others, toward the extremities of the empire, to assert independency. Of these none was more invited, by situation and circumstances, than the friend of the Athenian people, Evagoras tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus; whom we have seen acquiring his dominion as a hero, and administering it as a patriot, but still holding it in tributary vassalage under the Persian monarch. The great object of Evagoras was to unite the extensive island of Cyprus under his authority. The people of three principal towns, Amathus, Citium, and Soli, or at least a powerful party in each, opposed this. If they enjoyed liberty in any security, in their municipal governments under Persian protection, their opposition may have been not unreasonable; for, tho' the administration of Evagoras was just and liberal, and anxiously directed to the cultivation

of popularity, yet it was, even according to the cotemporary Athenian rhetorician, his panegyrist, completely despotic; the prince not only chose his counsellors, and appointed all magistrates, but made laws, and exercised judicial powers; so that he was master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects. Isocrates, if indeed he was author of the oration to Nicocles, has not scrupled to say that this was not only a better government than oligarchy or democracy, but the best of governments. The administration may indeed easily have been preferable to that of many of the Grecian republics; and thus men of property were induced to migrate from various parts, to live under the benign administration of Evagoras. But the Solians, Citians, and Amathusians, nevertheless considering, that the character of such a government depended upon the life of one man, and the chance of what his successor might be, were unwilling to change existing advantages, under a despotic scepter seldom interfering with them, for the precarious benefits to be derived from the merit of an absolute prince within their island. Evagoras nevertheless persisted in measures, whether by his own arms, or by supporting a party favorable to his views, for bringing those people under his dominion; and the adverse party, otherwise unable to resist, solicited protection from Persia.

The danger of losing the command of Cyprus, so critically situated for intercepting the most important maritime communication of the empire, alarmed the Persian court; and it was resolved to repress the growing power of the Salaminian prince by force, if he refused obedience to commands. Evagoras however had prepared himself, by other means than the scanty resources which Cyprus afforded, for supporting his measures, and prosecuting his views. He had formed a close connection with the wealthy king of Egypt, Acoris; he had great interest among the Asiatic Grecian towns, and he had carried successful intrigue among the Persian provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. Hecatomnus, who is styled, not satrap, but prince or lord of Caria, a powerful vassal of the empire, apparently of Grecian lineage, wishing for opportunity to follow his example, secretly assisted him with money: Cilicia, and great part of Phenicia, were ripe for revolt. Knowing then the usual slowness of the Persian councils, he resolved

not

Isocrat. ad  
Nicoclem.  
p. 66 & 68.  
t. 1.

p. 110 & 112.  
t. 1.

B. C.

about 381

OK 382.

Ol. 100<sup>37</sup>.

not to wait till the force of the empire should be collected to attack him in Cyprus, but endeavor to raise business for its arms that might prevent such attack. His successes at first seemed to justify the boldness of his plan. Cilicia joining him, he carried the war immediately into Phenicia; ravaged and plundered the adverse part of that rich province, and took Tyre by storm.

Isocr. Evag.  
p. 310. t. 2.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 460.

Whether these actions were really more brilliant than the plan altogether was judicious, whether they did not compel the slothful government of Persia to an exertion of its preponderant force, which by quieter measures might have been avoided, our information is too deficient to enable us fairly to decide. At length, however, an army to the amount, according to Diodorus, of three hundred thousand horse and foot, and a fleet of three hundred triremes, were collected for the Cyprian war. Evagoras's fleet, only ninety triremes, of which twenty were Phenician, venturing a battle, was defeated. Driven then to the defence of his island, his landforce was little able to withstand the numbers that, with the sea open, could be poured in upon him. After resistance ably protracted beyond expectation, besieged in Salamis, disappointed in the amount of support received from the king of Egypt, on the verge of utter ruin, he was relieved by intrigue among the Persian officers. Teribazus, the commander-in-chief, accused by Orontas, the general next under him, of misconduct and disaffection, was removed. Political necessity then urged Orontas, advanced to the chief command, to put an early end to a war, which had already cost the Persian court, according to Isocrates, more than ten millions sterling<sup>38</sup>; and, doubting the power of his arms, he proposed a treaty. Evagoras thus, tho' compelled to surrender all his acquisitions, preserved the dominion of Salamis; holding it indeed as a dependence of the empire, and paying a specified yearly tribute, but allowed, by compact, the proud privilege to communicate with his sovereign as a king with a king<sup>39</sup>. This dominion and dignity

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<sup>37</sup> This date is thus nearly ascertained by two passages in the panegyric oration of Isocrates, p. 250 & 274. t. 2.

<sup>38</sup> Πέντε ἢ ἑξαμυριάς μισθία τετρακκισία. Isocr. Evag. p. 308. t. 2.

<sup>39</sup> We have observed, in Xenophon's accounts, something very like feudal vassalage, in the tenure of principalities and lordships under the Persian empire. Diodorus's words express the same thing, as nearly perhaps as

he held till his death, and transmitted as an inheritance to his family. His eldest son, says the cotemporary Athenian orator, was styled king; and the titles of prince and princess distinguished his younger sons and his daughters<sup>40</sup>. It is by three extant tracts of that respectable writer, addressed to Nicocles, eldest son and successor of Evagoras, who seems to have maintained his father's connection of alliance and citizenship with the Athenian people, that we derive our principal information concerning Evagoras, and the important transactions in which he had so great a share<sup>41</sup>.

Thus Cyprus was preserved to the Persian empire. But, in reducing one rebellion, another, far more extensive and dangerous, was prepared. Gaos, who commanded the fleet, was son-in-law of Teribazus. Apprehensive that he should be involved in his father's ruin, he revolted, and joined Acoris in Egypt. In the deficiency of the Persian government at this time, in proportion as the fidelity of its officers was liable to be ill rewarded, treason and rebellion were little scrupled among them: its frequent weakness in pardoning encouraged offence, while its misdirected severity took away the just confidence of integrity; and war allowed, or even encouraged, between the governors of its provinces, was ever ready to be turned against the throne itself. Some years after the reduction of Cyprus, according to Diodorus, about the time of the battle of Mantinea, a rebellion of all the western maritime provinces

Ch. 23. s. 1  
& 2. &  
Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this Hist.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
c. 90. p. 504.  
B. C. 363.  
Ol. 104. 7.

it could easily be expressed in the words, and according to the ideas, of a people, among whom the thing had not obtained. The terms required of Evagoras by Teribazus were, that, reigning in Salamis only, *τελῆ τῶν Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν φόρον ἄρισμένον, καὶ ποιῆ τὸ προσλατόμενον, ὡς διῦλος δεσπότης*. The terms granted by Orontas, *βασιλεύει τῆς Σαλαμῖνος, καὶ τὸν ἄρισμένον δίδουσι φόρον, καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν, καὶ ὑπακούειν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ προσλατόντι*.

<sup>40</sup> *Τῶν ἐξ ἁλοῦ γενομένων θυδένῃ κατέλιπεν ἰδιωτικοῖς ὀνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα καλούμενον, τοὺς δ' ἀναγίας, τὰς δ' ἀνάσσας*. Isocr. Evag. p. 318. t. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Diodorus, according to our copies of him, affirms that Evagoras was assassinated

by a eunuch, named Nicocles, who obtained possession of his kingdom: but the annotators have supposed error in the transcription of that passage, tho they would support it, as far as regards the assassination of Evagoras, from a passage in Aristotle's Politics, (b. 5. c. 10.) which possibly some readers may think as doubtful as the passage which it is proposed to correct by it. Indeed the suspicion may appear not wholly unfounded, and the known incorrectness with which Aristotle's works have been transmitted may tend at least to excuse it, that the true reading stated the eunuch to have been killed by Evagoras, instead of Evagoras by the eunuch.

broke

Strab. l. 14.  
p. 656.

broke out, in which Orontas himself engaged, with several other great officers of the empire. Among the leaders, beside Orontas, who was satrap of Mysia, were Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Autophradates, of Lydia, and Mausolus, who had succeeded his father Hecatomnus in the principality of Caria; and the historian names, as people joining in it, the Lycians, Peisidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phenicians, and all the Asian Greeks. Matters had been concerted with Tachos, now king of Egypt, who was to give his utmost assistance. But through the faithlessness of the chiefs toward one another, what was immediately most formidable in this rebellion quickly subsided. Orontas, elected general of the confederacy, immediately betrayed it; and, in consequence, all Lesser Asia again yielded obedience to the Persian king. Reomithres, appointed to command fifty ships, and intrusted with a large sum of money to cooperate with Tachos, purchased his own pardon with a part of the money, all the ships, and the heads of many of his associates. This treachery enabled the king's officers quickly to recover Syria<sup>42</sup>.

Diod. l. 15.  
p. 471.

Xen. Agés.  
c. 2, s. 29.

Then Tachos became apprehensive that the concentrated strength of the Persian empire would be exerted against himself. Long before the time of the younger Cyrus, we have seen Grecian mercenary troops in extensive request in the eastern countries; and the retreat of the Cyreian Greeks, and the successes afterward of Agesilaus in Asia, would tend to increase the opinion of their value. The Athenian general Chabrias, among the first in reputation of this active age, had been at one time engaged in the service of Acoris, predecessor of Tachos. With Lacedæmon Tachos himself had alliance, not without some claim of gratitude for assistance afforded. In the general pacification which had followed an extensive and lasting war in Greece, troops of superior

<sup>42</sup> That these were not improbable circumstances, tho we have them only from Diodorus, may be gathered from what Xenophon relates of Persian affairs, in his account of the expedition of Cyrus. Nevertheless the omission of all mention of them, in his Panegyric of Agesilaus, may excite a doubt if the revolt was quite so extensive, or at

least so complete, as the account of Diodorus has represented it. Xenophon however mentions the flight of the king of Egypt to Sidon, which marks revolt there; and Isocrates shows that a disposition to revolt was extensive among the maritime provinces. We shall, in the sequel, find it also lasting.

SECT. VIII. EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS TO EGYPT.

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value; and commanders of experience, might probably be readily obtained. Tachos applied to Lacedæmon for a general, making large offers to Agesilaus, if he would himself undertake the command-in-chief of his numerous army; and he engaged Chabrias to command his fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred triremes. Among the numbers whom the cessation of war in Greece had left without employment and without income, a large body of troops was easily raised.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 28.  
Diod. 1. 15.  
p. 506.

It may seem, on first view, an extravagant resolution, for a prince of the age of Agesilaus, to undertake the command of forces for a foreign sovereign, at such a distance from his own country: but if we consider the situation of a king of Lacedæmon, in peace, at home, it will not appear so wonderful that, retaining strength and activity, it should be his choice. His views indeed, as they are reported by Xenophon, were extensive, and seem to carry some indication of an intention not to return to Greece; where his part of the divided royalty of Lacedæmon, little inviting for him, might well be administered by his son, Archidamus. Agesilaus, says the philosopher, his friend, was pleased with the proposal from Tachos, because he thought, by the same expedition, he might requite the Egyptian for benefits conferred on Lacedæmon; he might once more rescue the Asian Greeks from the Persian dominion; and he should have the satisfaction of revenge against the Persian king, whose support to the enemies, while he called himself still the ally of Lacedæmon, was the cause of the loss of Messenia. The Lacedæmonian government approved the measure; induced apparently by the prospect, that means to be furnished by the friendship of the king of Egypt, and perhaps increased by the spoil of Persian provinces, might lead to the recovery of Messenia; an inducement possibly still assisted by the hope afforded, to powerful families, of partaking in the spoil; for, according to the practice on former occasions, thirty Spartans were either appointed by the government, or chosen by Agesilaus, for his counsellors and attendants on the expedition, not, probably, without expectation of sharing its rewards.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 29.

Plut. vit.  
Ages.

Whether the age and infirmities of the king Artaxerxes, or what else impeded the exertions of the Persian government, the measures

against Egypt were slow, and little vigorous. Tachos therefore resolved, instead of waiting for invasion, still to prosecute, as far as circumstances would allow, the plan concerted with the discontented in the maritime provinces, and carry the war into Phenicia and Syria. But, with the relief of his fears, a change took place in his disposition toward his supporters. Instead of the command-in-chief of all his forces, by the promise of which he had engaged Agesilaus in his service, he allowed that prince only the subordinate command of the Grecian mercenaries: and, committing the fleet to Chabrias, he assumed the nominal command-in-chief himself. What followed, barely touched upon by Xenophon, is variously, and very imperfectly and confusedly, reported by later writers<sup>43</sup>. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus submitted to attend the Egyptian prince into Syria, and, together with Chabrias, bore long, tho' impatiently, his ignorance, petulance, and neglect. Notwithstanding however the charges of Grecian writers against him, we may conceive it very possible that some good, and even necessary, policy may in part at least have directed the conduct of Tachos. Nevertheless what very shortly followed marks some great deficiency. While he was meditating conquest in Syria, two competitors for his throne arose in Egypt; and presently he was so deserted by his people, that he took refuge in Sidon. Agesilaus and Chabrias then, courted on all sides, made no difficulty of abandoning Tachos. Between the other two claimants, even Xenophon's expression implies that they were decided by the more advantageous offer<sup>44</sup>. Nectanabis, a near kinsman of Tachos, had been the first to revolt. But his opponent, if we may judge from the support he received from the Egyptian people, had the fairer pretensions. A hundred thousand men presently attended his standard. Perhaps that very support was his ruin. It led him to hold himself high, and to neglect the Greeks, or treat them with haughtiness. Agesilaus and Chabrias were thus

<sup>43</sup> For the circumstances of the Egyptian war, very slightly touched upon by Xenophon, and evidently ill related by Diodorus, apparently we may best trust Plutarch. His account, the most particular remaining to

us, is the most coherent, and most consistent with Xenophon's.

<sup>44</sup> One was, according to Xenophon's phrase, *μισόλλην*, literally a *Greekhater*; the other *φιλόλλην*, a *Greekllover*.

decided



decided to join Nectanabis; a man possessing apparently neither ability nor courage, tho otherwise not without virtue. Little able either to estimate the value of Grecian troops, or to face danger with them, he superinduced great danger by impeding their exertions. The pressure of his opponent's superiority, however at length, compelled him to yield himself wholly to the guidance of Agesilaus and Chabrias. Grecian valor and discipline and science then prevailed against the irregular multitude of the enemy, and Nectanabis was seated on the Egyptian throne. The reward to the Lacedæmonian king and the Athenian admiral, from a prince who, by the testimony of the Greek historians, showed himself not wanting in probity or generosity, might perhaps best be estimated by what has been obtained, in modern times, by merit, on parallel occasions, with the princes of Hindostan. Cotemporary and later writers agree that it was large <sup>45</sup>.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 30.  
Plut. vit.  
Ages.  
p. 1130. t. 2.

Tho Agesilaus was thus finally successful in Egypt, yet all the alluring prospects in Asia, which seem principally to have led him to ingage in that distant expedition, were completely closed by the unforeseen turn which things had taken. His view therefore reverted to Greece; and it became again the great object of his indefatigable mind, to recover yet, before he died, that better half of what had been, for two centuries, the territory of Lacedæmon, and ravished from it since he had been Lacedæmon's king. In midwinter he sailed; anxious, says Xenophon, that no part of the following summer should be unemployed against the enemies of his country: but, sickening on the voyage, he put into a port of the Cyrenaic territory, and died there <sup>46</sup>. His

Xen. Ages.  
c. 11. s. 16.  
Plut. vit.  
Ages.

<sup>45</sup> It appears difficult to account for the numerous instances in which we find Diodorus differing from Xenophon about the names, as well as the actions, of Xenophon's cotemporaries. According to him, it was Tachos himself that Agesilaus and Chabrias restored to the Egyptian throne, instead of placing his competitor Nectanabis upon it. If we could suppose for a moment, that it was possible Xenophon could be so grossly misinformed, yet Plutarch's account, more detailed than that of Diodorus, would suffice

to restore his credit. Books, when Diodorus wrote, were dear, cumbersome, and troublesome to consult; and hence, perhaps, compilers, who consulted many, might sometimes be tempted to trust too much to memory, in giving form to their materials.

<sup>46</sup> According to Plutarch, Agesilaus lived eighty-four years, of which he reigned forty-one. Xenophon, tho personally acquainted with him, does not undertake to be so precise: he says Agesilaus was about eighty, ἀμφὶ τὰ ὀγδοήκοντα, when he went to Egypt;

body, embalmed in wax, it is said, because honey, according to the established ceremonial for the Lacedæmonian kings, could not be immediately procured, was carried to Sparta, and, with the usual regal honors, there intombed.

Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, whom we have already seen often commanding the armies, succeeded to his father's share of the divided throne of Lacedæmon. That prince had, on many trying occasions, earned the glory of personal valor; but he seems to have possessed with it rather the quiet prudence of Archidamus, his grandfather, than the enterprizing abilities of Agesilaus. Nor was this alone what checked the prosecution of the purposes of the late king. The defection of the Perioecian Laconians, and the incouragement offered for the flight of the numerous slaves, on whose labor Lacedæmon depended for subsistence, had induced the necessity of employing mercenary forces: The corrections which Agesilaus had formed in his Asiatic command, furnished means to assist the deficient treasury of the state, in supporting these. We learn incidentally, from Xenophon, that the powerful prince of Caria, Mausolus, secretly an enemy, tho' vassal of the Persian king, was among the wealthy friends who afforded him pecuniary support. After his death these means would probably fail. The riches however which he left, the fruit apparently of the Egyptian expedition, seem to have been considerable. All the aristocratical republics of Peloponnesus, moreover, Elis, Phlius, the Achaian cities, and some of the Arcadian, were deeply interested in the support of Lacedæmon. But the ruling parties in Argos, and more than half Arcadia, with some smaller states, reckoned their means for existence, in their several countries, to depend on the maintenance of the restored commonwealth of Messenia. Beyond the peninsula, Thebes was ever ready in the same cause, and Athens was a very uncertain ally to Lacedæmon. Under these circumstances, apparently, it behooved the Lacedæmonian government to direct its utmost endeavors toward the preservation of its own peace, and of the general political quiet of Greece; and, in peace, to direct its views toward the conciliation of the Perioecian Laconians, and the preservation and increase of its diminished stock of slaves, by whom the agriculture was carried on, through which

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 27.

Lacedæmon existed. Thus the Messenian country was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians; and the Messenian state, tho not acknowledged by Lacedæmon, became effectually reëstablished, as an independent member of the Greek nation.

The preëminence, the empire, as it was often called, which Lacedæmon so long held in Greece, had been, some time since, abolished, by those treaties, to which Lacedæmon was a party, conceding equality with her, in military command, to all the states of her confederacy. It was now, by the loss of the best half of her territory, and the establishment of a democratical commonwealth there, effectually destroyed. A great change was thus made in the system of Grecian politics. A leading state no longer existed in Peloponnesus; a head of the aristocratical interest no longer existed in Greece. With the fall of Thebes, at the same time, whose extraordinary sudden elevation had checked the progress of Athens toward a recovery of empire through a leading influence among the democratical states, the democratical interest remained also divided and without a head. The constitution of Greece at large, before bad, by these changes became worse; the antient system of confederacy was dissolved, and no new system arose: a jealousy, just as far as it was directed to obviate an overbearing superiority, but, in its extreme, adverse to all system, order, and peace, became the prevailing political passion. Hostilities indeed, upon any considerable scale, were, through general lassitude and weakness, suspended. Thus, tho Lacedæmon gained opportunity to breathe, and recover herself within her remaining narrow territory, yet 'indecision, and trouble, and confusion,' in Xenophon's phrase, already noticed, 'were widely spread over the nation.'

## SECTION IX.

*Illustration of the state of Greece: Seditions, in Argos, Phialeia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly: Prosperity, of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic cities: Circumstances promoting the cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce: Prosperity of Athens: Memorials of Xenophon.*

IN pursuing history through the most interesting age of the Grecian republics; that age in which their political importance, among the affairs of nations, was greatest; while, among themselves, the display of great abilities and great characters innobled often the contest, with small forces, for small objects; and the perfection of science, art, and fine taste, made them, for all posterity, objects of attention, respect, and admiration; we have the advantage of the guidance of two cotemporary writers, of very superior abilities, and very superior opportunities of information. Nevertheless, those writers both composing their histories in banishment, suffered from democratical policy, we might fear to be misled by some bias thence arising, if the concurrent voice of antiquity did not speak to the extraordinary impartiality of one; and if, beside the high character of the other, supported by the internal evidence of his narrative, testimony strongly confirming what, in that narrative, most presses upon his political opponents, did not remain to us from cotemporaries, some adverse to his politics, and some adverse to himself. Occasion has already occurred to observe, that Xenophon, deeply interested in the political events of his age, and directing his principal attention to those, which particularly affected either Athens or Lacedæmon, has omitted notice of transactions, among the inferior republics, of some importance toward the modern reader's knowledge of the state of the country at large. Where Xenophon fails us, the account of Diodorus will seldom be quite satisfactory; yet some details, which he has preserved, will deserve notice, for confirmation of what Xenophon has reported, most adverse to republican principles and practice, whether

whether democratical or oligarchal, and for what they add toward a completion of the general picture of the country.

In the contest for the sovereignty of Greece, when Lacedæmon, by the overbearing confederacy of the democratical interest against her, was humbled; when Thebes, from oppression and servitude, rose at once to a degree of imperial preëminence; when, afterward, Arcadia would first contest that preëminence with Thebes, and then assert equality with Lacedæmon; we may wonder where was the antient pride of Argos, and why her power, formerly so considerable, and her energy in opposition to Lacedæmon, commonly so ready, scarcely has occurred to historical notice. In the silence of Xenophon, on this subject, the information which we find from Diodorus is valuable.

Diodorus refers to the second year of the hundred and second olympiad, a sedition, with executions insuing, such as, he says, were never elsewhere known among the Greeks. The manner, he proceeds, was thus. The form of the Argian government being democratical, some ambitious men proposed to raise themselves to power, by exciting the multitude against those of principal authority, influence, and estimation, in the commonwealth. These had ruled, hitherto, through popular favor. But the opposition drove them to contrary politics; and, at length, finding their situation uneasy and alarming in extreme, they resolved upon the hazardous expedient of attempting a revolution, and establishing oligarchy. Before, however, they could prepare their plot for execution, suspicion of it arose among the popular party, and the most suspected were seized and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conspiracy then, aware of the hasty, unscrupulous and unmerciful temper of popular sovereignty, to avoid greater misery, instantly destroyed themselves.

The death of these men however, and the insuing confiscation of their property, rather excited than satisfied the cruel jealousy and avarice of the multitude. One of those under the rack having named thirty others, as privy to the conspiracy, the popular assembly, sovereign, judge, and party, without form of trial, sent all to the executioner, and ordered their property to the public treasury. The popular leaders then resolved not to lose any of the advantages, which

this

B. C. 371.  
Diod. l. 15.  
c. 57. p. 487.

this temper in the people seemed to offer them. That a conspiracy for subverting the democracy had existed, being now notorious, it followed, at least as a probability, that numbers were more or less implicated in the guilt. To excite suspicion among the people, against almost any, was thus easy: suspicion sufficed to procure condemnation; and accusations were extended, till more than twelve hundred of the principal Argian citizens were executed. At length the accusers became alarmed at their own success. The people called for more accusations and more confiscation. The demagogues knew no longer either how to feed or how to still the popular fury. In the prevailing disposition to suspect, their hesitation appeared suspicious. The turn among the multitude was observed, by those who still feared the progress of accusation, and they were diligent in improving the opportunity. The people, habituated to blood, nevertheless the farther they went in fury, became the more fearful of revenge. In this temper they were easily persuaded that the accusers were betraying them; and, with the same haste and informality, with which such numbers, at their instigation, had suffered, the demagogues were themselves all condemned and executed. Then, proceeds the historian, little commonly sedulous to account for what he relates most extraordinary, the people became calm, and the former quiet and harmony in the city were restored. A circumstance, however, which he has reported, appears authentically to mark, not only the manner of the popular justice, on this occasion, but also the excess of the popular vengeance. Among the numerous seditions of Argos, this, for its enormity, obtained the distinction of a name; it was called the Scytalism, staff-work or bludgeoning.

Whatever then may have been the harmony which, according to the historian, was so instantly restored upon the execution of the demagogues, yet a government, only liable to such excess of disorder, would be little capable of taking the lead of the affairs of a great confederacy. Still more then, in the weakness superinduced by its destructive political dissensions, it would be likely to yield itself to the guidance of the able directors of the Theban councils, and submit its forces, in common with those of the other commonwealths of the alliance, to be commanded in chief by the great general of the Theban people.

SECT. IX. DISPOSITION OF THE PELOPONNESIAN CITIES.

It is a truly curious account, free from inconsistency and the marvellous, that remains to us from Diodorus, of the consequences of that peace, by which independency, under the patronage of Thebes supported by Persia, was assured to all Grecian cities. The most important particulars, unmentioned by Xenophon, sufficiently accord with the tenor of Xenophon's narrative; and the whole deserves notice the more, because, contrary to Xenophon, all Diodorus's partiality was for the cause of Thebes and democracy.

The establishment of the sovereignty of the people in every city <sup>47</sup>, says Diod. l. 15. the historian, produced great disturbances and numerous seditions; c. 40. p. 477. especially in Peloponnesus. For, the people there having been mostly accustomed to oligarchal government, their new democratical authority was exercised with eager but unskilful zeal <sup>48</sup>. Many of the most respectable men, in various cities, were driven into banishment; many through calumnious and interested accusations, were executed; confiscated property, divided among the people, was as a reward held out to incite hasty and unjust condemnation. To obviate these evils, sedition soon grew busy; and, to avoid them, emigration abounded <sup>49</sup>. The pressure fell much upon those who had held the administration of their respective towns under Lacedæmonian patronage. For, as these had generally carried their authority with some haughtiness, the multitude no sooner acquired power, than they exercised it under the instigation of resentment. This passion of course became mutual; and if those, who had been injured and oppressed, recovered power, little contented with justice, they would use it for revenge.

Of this disposition, the first, and a very remarkable instance, occurred in the sedition of the little Areadian city of Phialeia. A number of its principal people, driven away, whether by sentence of banishment, or whether by fear of a worse condemnation, or perhaps of massacre, seized a strong

<sup>47</sup> Μετὰ τὴν συγχωρηθεῖσαν τοῖς δήμοις αὐτονομίαν —

<sup>48</sup> Ἀπειραγᾶθος.

<sup>49</sup> This translation of a passage written eighteen hundred years ago, and applying to times four hundred years before, so exactly describes what has just been occurring in

France, that it may almost be necessary to desire the reader to look at the original, for proof that it is not a forgery. What follows wants only the change of a name or two to make it apply equally to the French as to the Grecian revolution.

post within the Phialeian territory. Before any effectual measure was taken to dislodge them, the season of the Dionysia; the festival of Bacchus, occurred. We have already had occasion to observe instances of the attachment of the Greeks, passionate at the same time and scrupulous, to those festive ceremonies of what they called religion. The Phialeian people, newly become sovereign, would not be debarred of their sacred joys, or restrained in them. They were collected in the theater, intent upon its amusements, when the exiles entered the town, and carried massacre among them almost unresisted. According to the historian's account, their purpose would appear merely revenge; but probably they had a view also to plunder. To hold the place, however, when they had mastered it, was totally out of their thought: against the powerful confederacy, of which Thebes was the triumphant head, and the democracy of Phialeia a member, it was too much beyond hope. Little beneficial therefore to themselves, this bloody deed brought great inconvenience upon many of their friends, who had been allowed hitherto a residence in the city. Fearing that revenge, unable to reach the juster objects, might fall upon them if they remained, all fled, with the exiles, to Lacedæmon.

Nearly about the same time, among the Corinthians, the democratical was the fugitive party. The new prevalence of the democratical cause, under Theban supremacy, encouraged these to hope, that they might not only revenge themselves on their opponents, but establish themselves in their stead. A number of them, who had taken refuge in the Argolic territory, communicated with some still residing in Corinth, and a plot was concerted for a revolution. To put this forward, many of the exiles returned into the city, hoping to remain unobserved: but, suspicion arising among those who held the government, measures were taken so effectually preventing their escape, that, in despair, they killed one another. Then those evils, which the friends of the Phialeian exiles avoided, by flying with their conquering comrades, fell upon the friends of the Corinthians, who failed in their plot. Accusations were numerous; many were in consequence executed; and many, happy to find opportunity for flight, saved themselves only by a miserable emigration.



In the democratical government of Megara, an oligarchal party attempted a revolution. Numerous executions followed the failure, and many more were avoided only by flight. In Phlius it was the democratical party that was compelled to fly. The democratical Phliasians, like the oligarchal Phialeians, seized a strong post within the territory of their city: but, finding no such opportunity against the vigilant aristocracy of Phlius, as the wildness of democratical sovereignty in Phialeia had afforded, they engaged a body of those mercenary troops, which seem now to have been always ready, in Greece, to accept pay, or to earn plunder, in any service. Thus strengthened, they annoyed their adversaries in the city greatly: in one action they killed more than three hundred. But, ere long, they experienced the danger of trusting troops unconnected with them by any certain and permanent interest. Opportunity was found to corrupt their mercenaries. In a following battle they were deserted by them, and in consequence were defeated, with such slaughter, that the miserable remnant, unable any longer to hold the post in Phlasiā (probably Tricarānum, mentioned by Xenophon to have been occupied by Phliasian exiles) withdrew to Argos.

In a few general words only Diodorus notices the sedition in Sicyon, of which an account has already been given in some detail from Xenophon; and then, concluding his review, 'such,' he says, 'was the calamitous state of Peloponnesus.'

From this account of the consequences of the general peace, which followed the battle of Leuctra, and the embassy of Pelopidas into Persia, we may form some conjecture what were the indecision and trouble and confusion, indicated only in those three words by Xenophon, which, notwithstanding the pacification, followed the battle of Mantinea. After then comparing the pictures remaining to us from the cotemporary historian, deeply interested in the aristocratical cause, with those of the compiler who, between three and four centuries after, adopted the prejudices of the opposite party, and observing how they support one another, the sketch of a cotemporary orator, tho' intended to serve a political purpose, may appear no unfair summing-up of the state of things in Peloponnesus. 'The multitude in Peloponnesus,' says Isocrates, speaking in the name of Archidamus

Isocr. Archid.

prince of Lacedæmon, 'and all those whom we distinguish by the name

' name of common people, tho they heedlessly enough engaged in the  
 ' Theban cause, will I think, in future, be more cautious. For nothing,  
 ' of what they expected, has followed from the revolution, which they  
 ' have been so eager to promote. Instead of greater freedom, they  
 ' have acquired only a worse servitude; for, instead of the best of  
 ' their fellowcitizens, they are now subjected to the worst. Instead of  
 ' independency, they have established a dreadful lawlessness. Accus-  
 ' tomed formerly to march with the Lacedæmonians against others,  
 ' they now see others marching against them: Seditions, which formerly  
 ' they only heard of, in distant parts, they now experience almost  
 ' daily at home. Calamities are so various and extensive, that to  
 ' decide who suffer most is impossible. Not a city remains uninjured  
 ' by its neighbors: lands are ravaged, towns plundered, private  
 ' houses desolated; and those governments are overthrown, and those  
 ' laws abolished, under which they were formerly the happiest of the  
 ' Greeks. Mistrust and hatred, hence, are so become popular passions,  
 ' that no enmity can exceed what exists between fellowcitizens.  
 ' Where formerly was general plenty, and a concord promoting general  
 ' enjoymnt, now the rich would rather throw their wealth into the sea,  
 ' than give to the numerous poor; while these would be much less  
 ' delighted in finding a treasure, than in stripping the rich of their  
 ' property. Holy sacrifice is no longer regarded, but murders are  
 ' committed even on the altars: and there are more exiles now from  
 ' single cities, than formerly from all Peloponnesus.

While such was the state of the southern peninsula, which, when  
 united under the supremacy of Lacedæmon, had taken the lead among  
 the political concerns of the nation, so that Peloponnesian was a name  
 of eminence among the Greeks, that northern province, which possessed,  
 in the greatest degree, the natural advantages adapted to give political  
 importance, and which lately, under the guidance of one extraordinary  
 man, had actually acquired a threatening superiority, fell again into  
 no enviable situation. The tyrant tagus of Thessaly, Alexander of  
 Pheræ, after a reign of eleven years, was assassinated, through a plot  
 in which his wife was engaged. Her eldest brother, Tisiphonus, a  
 principal in the conspiracy, succeeded to the supreme executive power,  
 and

and held it still, when Xenophon put the finishing hand to his Grecian Annals<sup>50</sup>. The delivery of his country from the tyranny of Alexander, tho by a base midnight murder, gave Tisiphonus a gleam of popularity among his fellowcountrymen: for the advantage of the deed they overlooked its foulness. But a country where all conception of what can give stability to law and just government is so wanting, that assassination may find public applause, in the supposition that assassination only can obviate tyranny, will never long be free. Tisiphonus, raised to the dignity of tagus, was allowed to rule, like Alexander and Jason, by an army of mercenaries; because, with its defective constitution, only so, probably, authority could be carried through Thessaly. In such circumstances, not the virtue only, but the ability of Jason would be requisite to exercise sovereignty, so as either to conciliate or to deserve popularity. Tisiphonus wanted either the ability, or the virtue, or both. Opposition to him, repressed by military power, was punished by numerous executions and banishments; and still opposition was ready, wherever it might dare to show itself. Some of the towns obeyed the tagus; some resisted him. Indecision and trouble and confusion seem to have pervaded Thessaly, which had a constitutional chief, not less than Peloponnesus, left without a leading or connecting power: and thus those, whose territorial advantages, as an able cotemporary writer observes, should have made them the most powerful of the Greeks, became abroad insignificant and at home wretched.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 36, 37.  
Diod. l. 15.  
p. 517.

Isoer. de  
Pace, p. 248.  
t. 2.

It may afford some consolation, in contemplating human affairs, that the pressure of evils, in one part of the world, not uncommonly produces a flow of prosperity in others. If, amid extensive confusion, security, in civilized society, can be found anywhere, the favored spot

<sup>50</sup> Plutarch says that Thebè, wife of Alexander, was daughter of Jason. (Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 534. t. 1.) Xenophon and Diodorus both mention the wife of Alexander, sister of Tisiphonus, as a principal in the conspiracy; Xenophon with very particular circumstances, and Diodorus by the name of Thebè; (Diod. l. 15. p. 517.) both equally

mention Tisiphonus, brother of Thebè, as successor to Alexander in the dignity of tagus, but neither speaks of them as children of Jason. This omission, by the earlier writers, affords strong presumption that Plutarch wrote, as too frequently was his way, carelessly.

will especially attract those, whose ability to be useful, giving them value, will make them welcome; and thus sometimes, in the wreck of nations, all that is most valuable among men becomes concentrated. The spots where, in such circumstances, security will most be found, will generally be among those least favored by nature, for the ordinary purposes of life. Thus, in the middle ages, the marshes of Venice, the mountains of Genoa, and the scarcely accessible cliffs of Amalfi, attracted whatever remained of most worth from the wreck of the Roman empire<sup>51</sup>; and, in those earlier times of which we have been treating: amid the complicated troubles of Greece, Megara, situated, like Genoa, on a mountainous coast of the continent, and Cos, a small distant island, flourished singularly. The Megarians, as Isocrates says of them, 'possessing really neither land nor port, and whose mountains are destitute even of mines, nevertheless through the laborious cultivation of their rocks, and by a diligence in manufacture and commerce, which overbore disadvantages of situation, profiting on the contrary from that situation, to preserve the peace of their narrow territory, amid warring neighbors, had the wealthiest families

Isocr. de  
Pace. p. 248.  
t. 2.  
Xen. Mem.  
Socr. 1. 1.  
c. 7. s. 6.

<sup>51</sup> Venice and Genoa, with their local inconveniencies, have local advantages, beyond that of meer security, which have assisted to extend their prosperity through civilized ages; but the local inconveniencies of Amalfi are such that they repelled, as soon as the security, derived from inaccessibility, was no longer wanted: 'Oppressed,' in Gibbon's phrase, 'by the arms of the Normans, and sacked by the jealousy of Pisa,' (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 56.) Amalfi never recovered from the blow. Describing, with his usual liveliness of manner, the extraordinary prosperity of Amalfi, Gibbon has omitted notice of its local peculiarities, to which it was so much indebted for its prosperity. Only thirty miles from Naples, and seven from Salerno, there is scarcely any intercourse with Amalfi but by sea. In summer the road over the mountains, whose snows supply Naples with the ice, which the habits of the people, of all ranks, have made almost as necessary as bread, is barely practicable for a mule; and in winter generally, it is said, impracticable, or to be attempted only by an able walker. In the town itself winter is scarcely known: no north or east wind can blow upon it: but the reverberated heat of the summer-sun is such, that a particular construction of the dwellings, adapted to exclude the beam and produce a draft of air, is required to enable even the natives to breathe. Since the ruins of Pastum have been pointed out to public notice, the picturesque beauties of the coast, forming the northern boundary of the bay of Salerno; a coast which Salvator studied, have engaged the attention of travellers and students in landscape-painting; and hence Amalfi has become more known, among English travellers, than it was formerly, or perhaps is now, to most Neapolitans.

of Greece<sup>52</sup>. It was in like manner, among the general troubles, and apparently in consequence of them, that the new town of Cos was founded, in the island of the same name, and rapidly became very considerable. The island, scarcely twenty miles long and five wide, fortunate in soil and climate, had the advantage of being united in one republic; but not without experiencing the common bane of the Grecian republics, sedition. It was distracted by parties, when an earthquake overthrew great part of the principal town. Able men, at the head of the party then holding the administration, took advantage of this event for a bold undertaking. Instead of restoring the old town, called Astypalaia, they removed, with all their adherents, to a new one, which they founded on a more advantageous part of their coast, and to which they would give no other name than that of the island<sup>53</sup>. They provided for its security by strong fortifications, raised at great expence; and they improved the advantages, which nature had afforded, for a commodious port. By the opportunities thus furnished for commerce, and by the benefits of a wise administration, a large population was collected, private fortunes grew; public means became considerable; and the new city of Cos, not indeed among the largest, became however one of the most flourishing, and was esteemed the best built and handsomest, of Greece<sup>54</sup>.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 76. p. 496.  
Strab. l. 14.  
p. 656.  
B. C. 365.  
Ol. 103. 3.  
Diod.

<sup>52</sup> Xenophon informs us that the great source of the wealth of Megara was a manufacture of coarse cloth, *Ἐξαρμυδοποιία*. The Megarian citizens were master manufacturers; the journeymen were slaves, bought barbarians. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. s. 6.

<sup>53</sup> It appears however doubtful whether the name Astypalaia, synonymous with the English Alton, Aldborough, old town, was in use before the founding of the new town.

<sup>54</sup> The Count de Choiseuil Gouffier, in his Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce, describes Cos, in the year 1776, thus: 'The town of Cos is on the shore; its port is commodious: the whole coast is covered with orange and citron trees, which give it a most delightful appearance; the public

place is singularly pleasant; a prodigious plane-tree, in the center, with its branches overspreads the whole. Bending under their own weight, these might suffer, without the attention of the inhabitants, who regard the tree with a kind of religious reverence. In these countries everything offers traces of antient grandeur; and so the props, which support the decrepid limbs of this respected tree, are magnificent columns of marble and granite. An abundant fountain adds to the charms of this place, always frequented by the inhabitants, who resort to it to transact their affairs, and to enjoy its shelter against the heat of the climate.'

Megara and Cos, seemingly the most remarkable, were however by no means the only instances of flourishing communities, among the troubles by which the Greek nation was convulsed, in the course of the half century following the Peloponnesian war. In Peloponnesus itself, Sicyon, notwithstanding its passing disturbances, was a school of the fine arts; and, among the islands, Rhodes appears to have set the advantageous example whence Cos profited. Three principal towns there, Ialysus, Lindus, and Cameira, had, from before Homer's time, held their separate political establishments. Toward the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, they coalesced into one government; for the seat of which a new city was founded, in a very advantageous situation, upon a fine natural harbour. An Athenian architect, who had gained reputation by his works at Peiræus, was engaged to form the plan, design the walls, gates, and other public buildings, and superintend the execution. To obviate invidious distinctions, no other name was given to the new capital than that of the island itself; a measure, among others, the example of which was followed by the Coans. The distraction of the oligarchal and democratical interests, with the insuing depression of the leading republics, tho' adverse to the common power of the nation, and its means of opposition to a common enemy, and preventive of all civil quiet, through the greater part of proper Greece, seems however to have been favorable to the peace and prosperity of some of the distant colonies. When neither the higher people could any longer hope for support from Lacedæmon, in the exercise of an oppressive oligarchy, nor the lower were stimulated by Athenian politics to disturb all government not subservient to Athens, the Rhodian constitution settled into a liberal aristocracy. This probably was not instantaneously established, in the full perfection which Strabo ascribes to it, nor was it undisturbed in its growth; but, in the end, the men of higher rank and fortune learnt so to govern, that the lower people, through a constant employment of their industry, a careful attention to their wants, a strict and impartial administration of justice, were happy, quiet, and zealously attached to their country and laws. An extraordinary prosperity followed, and lasted for ages.

For

Strab. l. 14.  
p. 652—654.  
Diod. l. 13.  
B. C. 408.  
Ol. 93. 1:

Strab. ut ant.

For a complete picture of Greece, in this age, if memorials remained to direct the pencil, a considerable extension of bright colors and fair forms, no doubt, should find place among the gloomy tints and horrid shapes, that have been transmitted as the principal constituents. But as in landscape, stormy skies, and rugged mountains, and pathless rocks, and wasteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and every work of man in ruin, most engage the notice of the painter, and offer the readiest hold for the touches of his art, so in the political world, war, and sedition, and revolution, destruction of armies, massacre of citizens, and wreck of governments, force themselves upon the attention of the annalist, and are carefully reported to posterity; while the growth of commerce, and arts, and science, all that gives splendor to empire, elegance to society, and livelihood to millions, like the extended capital and the boundless champain, illumined by the sun's midday glare, pleases, dazzles, bewilders, offers a maze of delightful objects, charms rather than fixes the attention, and, giving no prominences, no contrast, no strongly characterized parts, leaves the writer, as the painter, unable to choose out of an expanse and a variety, whose magnificent whole is far too great for the limited stretch of literary or picturesk design.

Nevertheless, among the playful sketches and incidental remarks of antient authors, we find testimony to the prosperity of some of the extensive settlements of the Grecian people. The western colonies are objects for separate consideration. Confining our attention here to the eastern, we may observe that Cnidus, on the Carian coast, appears to have shared in the prosperity of the neighboring island of Cos. The Cnidian Venus, by Praxiteles, which description remaining seems to mark as the model of more than one antient statue preserved to us, tho that known by the name of the Medicean, first in merit, is singular in fame, was through all antiquity esteemed among the most admirable efforts of the art of sculpture<sup>55</sup>. It seems to follow, were other testi-

Plin. l. 36.  
c. 5. Lucian  
Amor.

<sup>55</sup> A statue of similar design was in the museum in the Capitol, at Rome; larger than the Medicean, and of less winning delicacy, but altogether of very considerable merit. What may have happened to it under French rule I know not.

mony wanting; that the community was flourishing, which could adorn its temples with the most finished works of artists the most eminent known to fame. In quiet, under Persian sovereignty, prosperity seems to have been extensive among the Grecian towns on the Asiatic shore. Halicarnassus, the seat of the Carian-princes, for its flourishing state, might deserve to be better known to us; and the Ionian and Æolic cities, allowed the management of their own affairs in peace, while they paid the settled tribute to the Persian government, and only forbidden war and disturbance, produced philosophers, and artists, and wealthy merchants, tho' they offered no statesmen or generals for the notice of history.

Diod. 1. 15.  
p. 404, 405.

\*The political circumstances of Greece, even the minute division of territory, among all the troubles they produced, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of science and the fine arts. \*Eloquence was so important, in every state, that no study, by which it might be improved, could be indifferent. In democratical governments it was all-powerful; and even in the oligarchal, not only for debate among the Few who ruled, but for persuasion also among the Many, whose obedience was to be insured, and whose willing service often to be engaged, it was of great moment. Hence perhaps principally arose the habit of study among the Greeks, and the passion for philosophy. The customs then, and the circumstances of the country, required, in every town, at least three public buildings; a temple, for religious ceremonies; a theatre, for public amusement; both sometimes used also for public business; and a gymnasium, or place of public exercise, where, in shelter against summer heat and winter storms, the youth, within the confinement of a fortified town, might keep themselves in constant preparation for military service, for which, with the weapons of ancient warfare, strength, activity, and personal skill were so important<sup>56</sup>. In the larger towns these buildings, especially the temples, were multiplied; and baths, and the stoä, portico, or shelter for walking and

<sup>56</sup> Γυμνάσια, καὶ θεῶν ναοὺς, καὶ τ' ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς βίον ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων ὑπομνήματα. Diod. 1. 5. Diodorus commonly retains ideas of writers of the republican times, and so seems

to have been led to give the gymnasium the first place among the requisites of civilized life.



public conversation, were added. The common property of the people, and accommodated to their favorite enjoyments, it was the pride of every little community to have these buildings of a solidity to withstand time, and of a beauty to engage admiration. When they were to be raised or repaired, no purse was to be shut. The celebrated temple of Diana at Ephesus, one of the most magnificent among the Greek settlements, being destroyed by fire, little after the time of which we have been treating, every fortune was to be pressed, whether by voluntary contribution, or a tax enforced by authority, that it might be restored with superior splendor: even the jewels and golden ornaments of the womens' dress were required, or given, to assist the expence.

Strab. l. 14.  
p. 640.

Hence principally the encouragement to the architect, and to the painter and sculptor, who were to adorn the architecture. The progress, thus, of science, arts, and fine taste, among the troubles of the republican times, of which we have large information, is far less wonderful than their rise in former ages of obscurity. How a Homer was enabled to acquire that judgement, for the correction of his fancy; whence Aristotle has pronounced him the model of all eloquence; how the simple form of the Doric temple, cleared from Egyptian and Asiatic sophistication, became the source of pure taste for all the architecture of the nation; chastening still the artist's fancy, when in aftertimes he was required to vary forms, for the various purposes of civilized and luxurious life, and to add the richest ornaments; and how that chastity and greatness of design became endemial, which are striking in some of the medals, of times beyond the oldest historians, these are objects of wonder among which conjecture is bewildered.

But, on the continent of European Greece, in the height of its troubles, arts, commerce, and science were not confined to the narrow limits of inferior towns, Megara and Sicyon. A wider field was yet open to them, in which, not only they might expatiate in some security, but find even peculiar advantages. Megara, and Sicyon, and Cos, and Cnidus bore the characteristics more of civil communities than of political powers. \* Leaving to others the care of the great interests of the Greek nation, which they could little influence, their adminis-

trations gave their attention to preserve the peace of their own little states, as they could, and, in that peace, to cultivate commerce and the arts. Wise, and perhaps necessary, in their political impotence, such dependence upon events would have been, for Athens, a weak policy. The obvious danger, of losing more through acquiescence than would be hazarded by exertion, impelled her to take an active part in the common affairs of Greece. Liable thus, unavoidably, to some degree of political turbulence, nevertheless the administration, generally directed by able yet moderate men, preserved peace, as we have seen, within Attica, while the Athenian arms were seldom unemployed abroad; and, notwithstanding the vices of the Athenian civil constitution, yet, in comparison with many other parts of Greece, person and property in Attica might be esteemed secure. To these then being added the advantages of an extent of territory, narrow indeed, yet far superior to that of most Grecian republics; of a powerful navy; and of that very political importance which forbade perfect quiet; Athens became the great resort of science, arts, and commerce. Peiræus, as Isocrates informs us, was the center of the trade of the age: he calls it the center of Greece; and, for maritime communication, it might be not improperly so called. Commodities, he says, scarcely to be obtained elsewhere of one kind in each place, were found in abundance, of every kind, in Peiræus. Eloquence, then, from the nature of the government, and from the manner of administering the law, was cultivated, as a qualification almost necessary to civilized life; and philosophy engaged earnest attention as a conductor to eloquence. Athens was the place in Greece where means most occurred for the acquisition of wealth, where commerce had most expanse, where the government offered most opportunities, where even learning was a road to riches; and, tho' great fortune could hardly be held there in quiet and security, yet it might be spent with splendor. Wealth and science were attended of course by the arts, to which science assisted to give the embellishment of fine taste. Thus architecture, sculpture, and painting continued to receive improvements, during all the turbulence which followed the Peloponnesian war; and it was during that period that Plato wrote and taught, Lysias and

Isoc. Paneg.  
p. 186. t. 2.

Isocrates

Isocrates pleaded, and Aristotle and Demosthenes were studying, in Athens.

It is impossible for the compiler of Grecian history, not to feel a particular interest in the fortunes of another Athenian of that age, the soldier-philosopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century, among those transactions in which he was himself an actor; and the supposition will naturally follow, that the reader will not be wholly unimpressed with a similar sentiment. Fortunately the memorials remaining to us, tho' very inadequate to the gratification of a just curiosity, will however, as far as they go, perfectly coincide with the purpose of Grecian history, affording no unimportant addition to our proposed illustration of the actual state of Greece.

Whether an illustrious man was born in a high or a low situation in society, however otherwise indifferent, cannot be intirely so toward a knowlege of the character, either of the man, or of the times in which he lived; and especially in Greece, where the opposition between the higher and lower orders formed the prominent point in the character of the national politics, from times before connected history, till those when the country ceases to be an object for history. But, concerning the ancestry of Xenophon, antient writers have left no farther information, than that he was son of Gryllus, an Athenian, of that division of the Attic people, which composed the Erchian or Echrian borough, of the Ægeid ward. Various indications however concur in tendency to denote, that his family was of some consideration, and that he was born rather to affluence than poverty. The scholars of Socrates were mostly of the principal families of Athens; so much Xenophon himself informs us; and he was a scholar of Socrates, bred apparently without a profession. His early intimacy with Proxenus, who appears to have been of an eminent family in Thebes, implies a probability at least that he was of connections not greatly inferior in his own country<sup>57</sup>.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.  
l. 1. c. 1.  
s. 11. l. 2.  
c. 6. s. 9. &  
l. 3. c. 1. s. 4.

<sup>57</sup> Proxenus, generally marked by Xenophon only as a Bœotian, is distinguished in one passage of the Anabasis as a Theban. (Anab. 1. 2. c. 1. s. 8.) He alone, of the Grecian generals in the service of Cyrus, is

styled a friend of the prince, φίλος, (Anab. l. 1. c. 1. s. 11.) one admitted to familiar communication; the others are called ξένοι, guests received at his table.

The

The same circumstance, together with his earnestness to leave Athens, just after the restoration of the democracy, as his friend had left Thebes apparently because prospects were not pleasant for him under the prevalence of the democratical party there, marks that his connection with the aristocratical interest, probably inherited, was at least very early formed. The confidence then with which Proxenus promised him introduction to Cyrus, and the attention paid him by that prince; his election, after the loss of both those patrons, to a great military command, from no previous military rank, by those who possessed the best claims of previous rank to that very situation; the respect with which, unprotected by his country, he was treated by Spartan officers in the highest foreign commands, by the king, Agesilaus, and finally by the Lacedæmonian aristocracy; all these circumstances, tho perhaps each singly might be referred to another cause, seem collectively to afford strong presumptive evidence that he was not originally distinguished for his merit alone, but that his birth and connections had assisted to introduce and give him consideration.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.  
l. 4.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

B. C. 402.  
Ol. 94.  $\frac{2}{3}$ .

Xen. Anab.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 4, 5, 6.

Xenophon, we are told, was eminently favored by nature with elegance of countenance and person. He was blest, as we learn from himself, with active strength, and a constitution of a firmness fitting him for a soldier's life in any climate. The superior qualifications of his mind had apparently been already observed by Socrates, when, meeting him in a narrow way (if we may credit Laertius for the story) the philosopher stopped him by putting his stick across, and abruptly asked 'Whence comes every good to man?' Answer being made to his satisfaction, he asked again, 'How then are men made honest and good?' This producing hesitation, Socrates added, 'Follow me then and learn.' When Xenophon was invited by Proxenus to the court of Sardis, then about his six or seven and twentieth year, it is evident, from his own account, that he considered Socrates as his best friend and most valuable adviser. He did not fail therefore to consult him upon that occasion. Both were aware that to engage in the service of Cyrus, the ally of Lacedæmon, and esteemed the enemy of Athens, or at least of the democracy, would afford opportunity, not unlikely to be used, for exciting popular resentment against him. Socrates

therefore

therefore advised, as in a case of both difficulty and importance, to consult the Delphian oracle. What confidence the philosopher really had in oracles, as we have formerly observed, seems difficult to judge: but, as a forbidding response would probably divert his young friend from a hazardous purpose, and an encouraging one would give to that purpose a sanction, which the public religion acknowledged and the law respected, the advice appears to have been unquestionably wise. Both the doubt, however, and the advice given upon it, seem strongly to confirm the supposition, before stated, that Xenophon was rich and of considerable connections. For restrictions upon foreign travel attached only upon those of some eminence; popular jealousy was little to be apprehended by the needy and obscure; and the Delphian oracle seems to have been accessible only to the rich, and favorable almost only to the profuse. Xenophon went to Delphi; but, bent, with all the ardor of youth, upon new and great prospects, and urged, apparently, by uneasiness under the existing administration of his country, instead of asking the oracle, Whether he should go to Sardis? he asked, To which of the gods he should sacrifice and pray for success in his projected journey? The answer favored him with direct information, which he reported to Socrates; who, he says, dissatisfied with the evasion of his advice, but nevertheless considering the response as amounting to a command to go, recommended, 'to do as the god directed.'

Xen. Symp.  
c. 4. s. 30.

The expence of the journey to Sardis, of residence at a court of much more than the Lydian satrap's usual splendor, and of accompanying the army afterward on its long march into Upper Asia, Xenophon appears to have borne from his private fortune, unassisted by emolument from any appointment. Nevertheless that he lived upon a high footing, and made even more than common figure, is fully indicated. Without the pretensions of either military rank or civil office, he was in a situation to communicate personally with the Persian prince. This is shown, in the narrative, before he left Sardis, and again, more particularly, on the day of the battle of Cunaxa. When, after the circumvention of the generals, a body of cavalry was to be formed, his horses are mentioned in a manner implying that they were more numerous than those of any officer of the Grecian forces, Clearchus only perhaps

Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this list.

perhaps excepted. These considerations then may assist to account for his elevation, at his early age, at once to the rank of general, over all the officers holding commands in the body under Proxenus, and by their election.

B. C. 401.  
or 400.  
Ol. 94. 4.  
or 95. 1.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 1. s. 3.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

B. C. 399.  
Ol. 95. 1.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 7. s. 35.

It was while Xenophon was in Asia, or about the time of his return, that Socrates, whose loss he has so affectionately lamented, and whose worth he has so ably recorded, was condemned and executed. The administration, we may be assured, was not friendly to Xenophon, under which such an event could have place. A decree of banishment was proposed against him, and carried; at what point of time is not ascertained, but it seems to have been within two years after the death of Socrates. In reporting the arrival of the troops, under his command, in sight of European ground, he takes occasion to mention his own earnestness to return immediately to Athens. We have seen how, first, the request, and afterward the adverse conduct, of the Lacedæmonian commander on the Hellespontine station, Anaxibius, interposed delays; and how, at length, attachment to his ill-used little army, concurring perhaps with some view of private advantage, induced Xenophon to forego his purpose for a time, and, in midwinter, engage in the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes. In the following spring the opportunity so fortunately occurred, for the troops to engage in the Lacedæmonian service, for the war then resolved against Persia. On this occasion he again declares his purpose of returning directly to Athens; adding, that the decree of banishment was not yet passed against him. The earnest request however, he says, of some among his officers whom he most esteemed, that he would retain the command till he had in person delivered them over to the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, Thimbron, induced him again to delay his voyage.

It has been evidently among Xenophon's purposes, in his account of the return of the Greeks, to obviate the imputation of having improperly amassed private wealth: an imputation seldom failing to be urged, with or without foundation, in accusations of offences against the commonwealth, at Athens. In relating the entertainment given by Seuthes, immediately on engaging the service of the Cyreians, Xenophon has taken occasion to mention his poverty. It was usual, it seems, for  
these

those received at the table of Thracian princes, to carry presents with them. Timasion of Dardanum, from his store of Asiatic spoil, offered a silver cup and a Persian carpet<sup>58</sup>, the latter valued at forty pounds sterling. Xenophon, who had brought from Asia only one slave-servant, and the meer necessary for his return to Athens, made a gratifying speech, which seems to have been favorably received instead of a present. His stipulated pay, then, of about four guineas monthly, for his short service with Seuthes, would certainly not make him rich. When the Grecian troops passed into the Lacedæmonian service, while it was still his purpose to return to Athens, the Thracian prince repeated his former liberal offer of the lordship of the port of Bisanthë, and a territory around, and stock for its cultivation; with confirmation of the grant, and assurance of support in it, by giving him his daughter in marriage, if he would remain with only a thousand men; pressing the proposal with the observation, that he would be safer so than in returning to his country. Nor was this what could occasion hesitation as a novelty; for, under the late empire of Athens, many Athenians had possessed castles and estates in Thrace<sup>59</sup>, and some had married into the families of Thracian princes. Among these the connections and possessions of Miltiades and Alcibiades in the Chersonese, and of Agnon and Thucydides on the Strymon, have been objects for historical notice. Xenophon declares his positive refusal of the proposals of Seuthes, without assigning his reasons; which perhaps it might have been difficult to state, so as to avoid offence either to the Lacedæmonian or to the Athenian government.

Anab. l. 7.  
c. 7. s. 20.  
c. 2. s. 20.

In relating his arrival with the army at Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, he speaks again of his poverty, and then he repeats, for the last time, the mention of his purpose to return home; whence it seems probable that intelligence of the decree of banishment reached him not long after. His account of these matters is strongly marked with caution, against offence to the two really despotic governments of Athens and Lacedæmon; on one of which he must be necessarily dependent, and the controul of neither could he intirely avoid. It

<sup>58</sup> Ταπίδας βαρβαρικῆς. Spelman has made an apology for his translation, *Persian carpets*, which it seems hardly to have wanted.

<sup>59</sup> Καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ χώρᾳ ἴσως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τεῖχῃ λαμβάνειν; ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἔλαβον, καὶ χώραν. Anab. l. 7. c. 3. s. 9.

is nevertheless strongly marked with candor. Evidently, in the outset of his expedition, he was fond of expense and show: and, after he was elected general, careless of saving, generous rather to profusion, and ambitious of popularity, he considered present expense as opening future means. But the decree, barring his return to his country, probably depriving him of property, certainly cutting off many hopes, made an alteration, necessarily almost total, in his views for his future life. Then it became a matter of urgency to consider, less how he might be great, than how he might subsist. With alteration of his economy, if he retained his military situation, opportunity was apparently before him. His preparation then to account for the acquisition of wealth, by means without moral reproach, in the common estimation of the times, and, not only allowed by the religion, but specially warranted, as he asserts, by the declared favor of the gods of his country, yet for which he seems nevertheless with some anxiety to apologize, will deserve notice.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 8. s. 1.

s. 2.

At Lampsacus he met a friend whom he had known in Attica, Eucleides; a Phliasian by birth, and by profession a prophet, whose father, Cleagoras, had earned renown as a painter, by his work called the Dreams, in the Lyceium at Athens<sup>60</sup>. Eucleides could not believe Xenophon's declaration, tho affirmed with an oath, that one who had been in so great a command, where others, with inferior advantages, as Timasion of Dardanum and the soothsayer Silanus, had acquired considerable wealth, could be under any necessity to sell his horse for an immediate supply. The present of hospitality however from the Lampsakene state, usually made to those in high public situations, inabled Xenophon to offer sacrifice. Eucleides attended the ceremony; and, after inspecting the entrails of the victims, declared that he had no longer any doubt of the offerer's poverty. 'And I see it probable,' he said, 'that this will continue: for, if opportunities of gain occur, some obstacle will intervene; and, if no other, you will be yourself the

<sup>60</sup> Spelman has observed that no notice is found, in any other antient author, of this painter, or of his works here mentioned; tho Pausanias has left a description of the Lyceium, and from Pliny we have accounts

of earlier paintings. Possibly the works of Eucleides may have been removed to Antioch or to Rome, or, among the misfortunes of Athens, they may have been destroyed, before the age of those writers.

'obstacle.'



‘obstacle.’ Xenophon allowed that this was likely. ‘But moreover,’ continued Eucleides, ‘Jupiter Meilichius is adverse to you. Have you sacrificed to him, as I was accustomed to do with you at Athens?’ He replied, that he had not sacrificed to that god since he had left home. ‘Then,’ said Eucleides, ‘do it, and benefit will follow<sup>61</sup>.’

On the morrow Xenophon proceeded with the army to Ophrynum; and there, according to the antient Attic rites, he sacrificed, scorching hogs whole, and the symptoms were propitious<sup>62</sup>. On the same day the Lacedæmonian commissioners came thither to pay the troops. They entertained Xenophon at their table; and, learning that the horse he sold had been a favorite, they redeemed it for him, and would take no compensation.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 8. s. 3.

After this the army proceeded, as already has been related in its place, across the Trojan plain, and over mount Ida, to Antandrus; along the coast of the gulph then to the plain of Thebè, and by Atramyttium, Certonium, and Atarneus, to Pergamus on the river Caicus. Pergamus, afterward the seat of a kingdom, was at this time the residence of those Grecian families, descended from Demaratus king of Lacedæmon, and Gongylus of Eretria in Eubœa, which have been already noticed as holding hereditary lordships, derived from the bounty of the Persian monarchs<sup>63</sup>. Both had engaged with Cyrus in rebellion against the reigning king, and therefore both would see with joy the prospect of Lacedæmonian protection. Xenophon was entertained in the house of Hellas, mother of Gorgion and Gongylus, then chiefs of the Eretrian family. From her he had information that Asidates, a wealthy Persian, lord of the higher part of the rich vale of the Caicus,

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

Ch. 24. s. 1.

Anab. 1.7.  
c. 8. s. 4, 5.

<sup>61</sup> We want information of the import of many of the titles of the Greek deities. Meilichius seems to have meant the character of the supreme god as the kind father of men, in opposition to that of the avenger of sin.

<sup>62</sup> Spelman has observed that, according to Thucydides, l. 1. c. 126. as explained by his scholiast, these were probably cakes, formed in the shape of hogs.

<sup>63</sup> In the Hellenics (b. 3. c. 1. s. 4.) Per-

gamus, as well as Teuthrania and Alisarnia, otherwise called Elisarne, is mentioned as the lordship of the family of Demaratus. It appears, in the Anabasis, that the family of Gongylus resided there; perhaps because it was the most considerable town in that part of the country. The fief, if it may be so expressed, of the family of Gongylus, was composed of the townships of Gambrium, Palaigambrium, Grynium, and Myrina.

was, with his family, in his castle there: three hundred men, she told him, might suffice to make all prisoners, whose ransoms, together with the effects to be found, would form a very large booty; and, if he would undertake it, a near kinsman, with others of her friends, should be his guides. This adventure, cursorily heretofore mentioned, as belonging less to the general history, than to the memorials of Xenophon and a representation of the manners and character of the age, may deserve more detail here.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

The proposed measure then appearing, to human reason, practicable and promising, how far the gods would favor it was to be inquired through sacrifice. An Eleian prophet, Agasias, officiated; and the kinsman of Hellas, and another of her most confidential friends, Daphnagoras, attended with Xenophon. The appearances of the victims were highly favorable; and the priest declared, in direct terms, according to Xenophon's expression, 'that the man might be taken.' The expedition accordingly was resolved upon. Xenophon selected, from his own army, only the lochages whom he most desired to favor: the rest of the party apparently was composed of the Pergamenian lady's peoplè. But, due secrecy not having been observed, when they set forward, full six hundred obtruded themselves to follow; discipline, when booty was in prospect, being probably difficult to enforce. The lochages however, supposing the prey certain, and unwilling to have so many sharers, pushed on with the guides, so that, in the darkness of supervening night, they left the greater part of the interlopers at a loss to find their way.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 8. s. 6.

s. 7.

About midnight the party arrived at the castle; and, depending upon the capture of Asidates himself, with the riches within, they suffered the slaves, with much valuable booty without, to escape. But the castle was stronger than had been supposed; the circuit large, the walls eight bricks thick, and lofty, with projecting towers, and the defenders numerous and able. By daybreak however a perforation was completed; but the solid wall above remaining firm, nothing resulted but a wound to the foremost of the assailants, through the thigh, with a large spit; and soon, as dawn advanced, the well-directed arrows from the parapet and flanking towers, made it dangerous even to approach the wall.

s. 8.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile firesignals and cries had communicated alarm around, and numerous succours approached; some Persian cavalry, some middle-armed foot, and some even Grecian heavy-armed in the Persian king's pay<sup>64</sup>.

In this, a private adventure, rather than a military expedition, established order seems to have been very deficient, till, the multitude of the enemy gathering, and danger pressing, fear enforced subordination, and able command became acceptable. It was now less an object to carry off booty than to retire in safety: but the leaders were apprehensive of encouragement to the enemy, and discouragement to their own people, should they, by abandoning the prey, give their retreat the character of flight. Forming therefore a hollow square, with the oxen, sheep, and slaves in the middle, in that order they directed their march homeward. Nevertheless they were so pursued with bowshots and slings, that it was with great difficulty they crossed the Caicus; and, before the annoyance ceased, near half their number was wounded. Probably indeed all might have been cut off, but for the support spiritedly led from Pergamus by young Gongylus; who, against his mother's inclination, marched to their relief, while Procles also showed himself, with his troops, from Alisarnia and Teuthrania. Thus they brought in about two hundred slaves, with cattle, according to Xenophon's expression, just enough for a sacrifice; meaning apparently a meal for the party and their friends.

With the manner of this privateering, or pirating expedition, Xenophon appears to have been utterly unsatisfied; but he expresses no disapprobation of the object. On the contrary, he resolved upon a second attempt, which should be under his own conduct. On the very next day he was careful to have the preparatory rites of sacrifice duly performed; and then, moving at night with his whole army, he made a long stretch into Lydia, meaning to deceive the Persian into the supposition that, the hostile force which alone was formidable to him being far off, his caution might be remitted. But Asidates, receiving information that Xenophon had consulted the pleasure of his gods about a second expedition, to be made with his whole strength, hastened

<sup>64</sup> Thus I think the *ἑκλήτρας φρουρὰς* must be understood.

to leave the castle, apparently before intelligence could reach him of the Grecian army's march; and, directing his way up the country, he incamped in some villages near Parthenium. The result is related by Xenophon in very few words. Perhaps he made his forced march not more to deceive Asidates, than to avoid a repetition of inconvenient interference from his own troops, and probably he provided for intelligence of all the Persian's motions. With a select party he made the surprize complete. The unfortunate Asidates was taken in his camp, with his wife, children, horses, and all his effects; 'and thus,' says Xenophon, 'the indications in the first sacrifice were accomplished.' The army then returned to Pergamus, and great credit appears to have been given to Xenophon for his conduct. According to his own expression, 'he had no longer occasion to complain of the god,' apparently meaning Jupiter Meilichius, 'for the whole army, generals, lochages, and soldiers, and even the Lacedæmonians present, vied in selecting horses, cattle, and the best of everything for his share of the booty; so that, instead of wanting assistance, he was thenceforward in circumstances to confer benefits.'

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 8. s. 13.

With this account of his own acquisition of fortune, Xenophon concludes his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus and its consequences; the arrival of Thimbron, presently after, to take the command-in-chief, putting an end to all separate and independent operations of the Cyreians. In his Grecian Annals, in which their service afterward, under the several Lacedæmonian commanders in Lesser Asia, is reported, he makes no mention of himself. But in five or six campaigns, mostly successful, in the richest provinces of that rich country, tho under the controul, not of the commander-in-chief only, but of a Lacedæmonian officer specially appointed to the Cyreians, who would of course share in all legal plunder before him, yet, even in subordinate command, at the head of that body, the opportunities of adding, and, in the common estimation of the times, creditably adding, to his private wealth, would be large. Had the successes of Agesilaus produced any advantageous arrangement of affairs in Lesser Asia, promising to be lasting, perhaps Xenophon might have chosen to settle there, even were the return to Athens open to him. But the recall of that prince,

B. C. 394.  
Ol. 96. 3.

SECT. IX. MEMORIALS OF XENOPHON.

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with the requisition for the Cyreian troops to march into Greece, made a great and anxious change for him. He was rich; but, without a country, he was incumbered with his riches, both those his private property, and those committed to him in trust by the troops he had commanded. It is from the account, which he has been solicitous to give to the public, of the execution of that trust, that we have our chief information concerning his following fortunes, and with it some pictures of the times of singular value.

We have seen that when the prizemoney, acquired by the Cyreian Greeks in Upper Asia, was, in their return, divided at Cerasus, a tenth was set aside for the gods, and committed to the generals for dedication. The deities, selected to be honored on the occasion, were the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis, or, in her Latin name, Diana. Tho it has been evidently a principal purpose, of Xenophon's narrative of the expedition of Cyrus, to apologize for himself to his country, yet there we find his free confession, that, being banished, he resolved to follow Agesilaus when he returned to Greece, and risk the dangers of the war against that confederacy, of which Athens was a member. The dedication remained then still to be made; and, in the deficiency of means for remitting large sums, and the hazard of keeping them, especially for one in the employment of a soldier and the condition of an exile, his difficulties are likely to have been considerable.

Ch. 23. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 7.

But the commission for the dedication put him in possession of what was, in the circumstances of the times and in his circumstances, an inestimable advantage: it opened a favorable introduction to the priesthood of the two principal temples of the Greek nation, in Europe and in Asia. None were so rich, and, unless that of Jupiter at Olympia should be excepted, none so extensively venerated, as those of Apollo at Delphi and Diana at Ephesus. On his departure therefore he divided his wealth. Part, as the sum to be consecrated to Apollo, he carried with him; and, when, after the victory of Coroneia, Agesilaus made the magnificent dedication of the tenth of his Asiatic spoil at Delphi, Xenophon deposited his humbler offering in the treasury of the Athenian people there, inscribing it, as he tells us, with his own

Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Anab. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 6.

name.

name and that of his deceased friend Proxenus. The other part, probably equal, or perhaps larger, as the portion of the Ephesian Diana, he committed to the integrity of Megabyzus, sacristan or treasurer of the temple of that goddess at Ephesus. The worship of Artemis or Diana, with the title of the Ephesian, was, it seems, not confined to Ephesus, nor was the dedication to her necessarily to be made there. He therefore enjoined Megabyzus to remit the deposit to him in Greece, should he survive the dangers of the expedition he was going upon, but otherwise to dedicate it himself, in whatever way he might judge most acceptable to the goddess.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

After the campaign in Bœotia, Xenophon is said to have accompanied Agesilaus to Lacedæmon. The victory attended that prince in Greece; yet, as we have seen, his recall from Asia was followed by the almost immediate and intire overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire there, through loss of command of the intermediate sea. That revenue, by which alone Lacedæmon had been enabled to maintain a large force of mercenaries, and to wage distant war, then ceased; and hence, with the campaign in Bœotia, Xenophon's military life seems to have ended.

But Lacedæmon could hardly be made a pleasant residence for a stranger, even by the friendship of a king, and that king Agesilaus. Jealousy of strangers was peculiarly a principle of the constitution; and the kings, liable themselves, even in private life, to severe controul always, could never calculate the amount or the kind of new embarrassment to arise for them with every yearly change of the ephors. Protection and patronage, however, which the spirit of the Lacedæmonian government, denying to strangers within Laconia, prescribed for them everywhere else, were liberally given to Xenophon.

Ch. 24. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

Opportunity arose from the circumstances of the province of Triphylia, between the river Alpheius and the border of Messenia; whose people, claimed as subjects by the Eleians, had been restored to a nominal independency by the arms of Lacedæmon. Scillus, one of its towns, ruined by the Eleians for rebellion, was rebuilt and repopled under Lacedæmonian auspices, and, according to Pausanias, given to Xenophon as a kind of lordship, to hold under Lacedæmonian sovereignty. There however he settled, under Lacedæmonian patron-

Xen. Anab.  
J. 5. c. 3.  
s. 11.  
Pausan.  
l. 5. c. 6.

age,

age, having already a family. His sons are mentioned by himself: of his wife we learn, from his biographer, only her name, Philesia. Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.

Soon after he was established at Scillus, the faithful sacristan of the Ephesian Diana, using the season of the Olympian festival for a visit there, restored the sum committed to his charge. Then Xenophon made an extensive purchase of land, near Scillus, in the name of an estate for the goddess; having previously taken the very remarkable precaution to procure an oracular response from Delphi, pointing out, with the authority of Apollo, the very land that should be purchased for Diana <sup>59</sup>. Of this estate, and his management of it, he has left us the following account. Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. s. 8.

‘ A brook flows through the estate, of the same name with that which runs near the temple of the Ephesian Diana at Ephesus: both are called Selenus <sup>60</sup>; both abound with fishes, and both have shellfish <sup>61</sup>. But the estate of the goddess near Scillus abounds also with beasts of chase of various kinds. From the sacred stock then Xenophon built a temple and an altar; and he constantly set apart s. 10. a tenth of the produce of the land for a sacrifice to the goddess, with a festival in which all the towns-people, and the men and women of the neighbouring villages, partake. The goddess entertains with meal, bread, wine, confectionary, the meat of victims from the sacred pastures, and the produce of the chase <sup>62</sup>. For the sons of Xenophon, and the youth of the town, with any of the older men s. 11. who chuse it, make a general hunting for the festival; not only upon the sacred grounds, but extending the chase, across the Alpheius, over the neighbouring mountain Pholoë, on the border of Arcadia; and they take wild boars, roes, and deer. Strab. l. 8. p. 357. Pausan. l. 8. c. 24. Xen. ut ant.

‘ The place <sup>63</sup> lies in the way from Olympia to Lacedæmon, about s. 12. twenty furlongs from the temple of Jupiter in Olympia. The sacred

<sup>59</sup> Χαρίων ἀναΐται πρὸς Θεῶν, ὅπου ἀνείλεν ὁ Θεός. Xen. Anab. l. 5. c. 3. s. 8.

<sup>60</sup> According to our copies, Xenophon wrote this name Σελληνοῦς, Strabo Σελινοῦς, Pausanias Σελινοῦς.

<sup>61</sup> Perhaps Crawfish.

<sup>62</sup> Xenophon adds ἀργύρια, a word to which I am unable to assign a probable meaning, and the translators have omitted all notice of it.

<sup>63</sup> Ὁ τόπος.

land<sup>64</sup> has variety of hill, dale, and woods; with plentiful pasture for swine, goats, sheep, and horses; so that the saddle and draft cattle, of those who come to the festival, share, in their way, amply in the cheer. The temple is surrounded by a grove of cultivated trees, furnishing the fruits of every season. Its form, comparing small things with great, is the same with that at Ephesus; and the image of the goddess also resembles the Ephesian, as a statue of cypress-wood may resemble a statue of gold. Near the temple is a pillar, inscribed thus: 'This is the sacred land of Diana. Whoever holds it and gathers from it, let him sacrifice the tenth yearly, and, from the remainder, maintain the temple. Who fails thus to do will incur the deity's animadversion.'

In this very curious detail, evidently, with much said, the direct mention of much implied has been prudentially avoided. We have already had frequent occasion to notice, in Xenophon's writings, respect for the religion of his age, uniformly and zealously expressed; and we have observed ground for supposing, that much of his esteem for it arose from observation of the means it afforded, to the officer and to the statesman, in the want of other sanction, for enforcing duties, military, civil, and moral. At the same time we have seen instances of both his humanity, and his skill, in directing superstition to purposes the most charitable, and with effect very extensively beneficial. How much some resource was wanting, in the deficiency of civil establishments among the Grecian republics, for giving security to private property, has also, in no small degree, fallen within our observation. In Greece, as Xenophon informs us, land was not esteemed, as with us, the surest foundation of private income, but rather any moveable effects that might have protection within the walls of a town. In Athens then property would be safer than perhaps anywhere else in Greece, unless in Lacedæmon. But how precarious it was in Athens may be gathered from the high rate of usury, in the most flourishing times there. Twelve for the hundred yearly was the lowest

Ch. 21. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

<sup>64</sup> "Ἐν δ' ἐν τῇ ἱερῇ τόπῳ. Neither Xenophon nor Pausanias has marked the distance of the sacred-place from the town of Scillus, which, in all our maps, is, apparently, too near the coast, and too far from Olympia.



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usual interest for money; and the cautious lender commonly required monthly payment. Thirty for the hundred was ordinarily given by those who borrowed for commercial adventure; and, on account of the insecurity of contracts, the lender frequently embarked himself, with his money, or the goods bought with it, to be ready to take his principal again with the interest, in the first moment that the borrower should have means of payment. Among commonwealths more subject to foreign oppression, or to sedition breaking out into action, to calculate a rate of interest, at all commensurate with the lender's insecurity, evidently must have been impossible.

In this state of things, with disadvantages enhanced by his condition of an exile, it behooved Xenophon to find means, if he could, for placing in some safety, for himself and his family, the property he had had the good fortune to amass and preserve. In very early times the temples, among the Greeks, and perhaps other nations, had been resorted to for the safe-keeping of treasure; the common dread of violating their sacredness constituting a considerable protection for all within their precincts. Generally treasure so placed seems to have been in some degree, or at least in some portion, dedicated to the deity; yet not so as to deny all future use for civil purposes. Probably weaker states, and individuals, were obliged, or might find it expedient, to pay higher for the good offices of the priesthood, while an imperial state might command them. When the Athenians had established their empire over the maritime republics of Greece; so far as to exact a regular tribute from them, the temple of Apollo at Delos was chosen for the common treasury; but the money was deposited there professedly for profane purposes, and to be drawn out at the pleasure of the Athenian government. When a few years after, the congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Lacedæmon, to consider of means for maintaining war with Athens, it was proposed to borrow, from the treasuries of Olympia and Delphi, wealth deposited there for no specific and no common purpose. Farther, concerning these sacred depositories of wealth, remaining information scarcely goes, except as Xenophon's account of himself indicates how they

Ch. 3. s. 2.  
and c. 7. s. 2.  
of this Hist.  
Herod. 1. 5.  
c. 36.

Thucyd. 1.  
c. 96.

c. 121.

might be made useful for purposes of private life. Evidently he used the treasures of Diana at Ephesus, and Apollo at Delphi, as banks. The advantage of having such means ready, equally in Greece and in Ionia, was so peculiarly adapted to Xenophon's circumstances, that it may countenance the supposition of his having suggested the double dedication which the army voted. For as dedication to Diana was not restricted to Ephesus or Asia, so neither would that to Apollo be limited to Delphi or Europe; and had Xenophon's meditated colony on the Euxine shore been established, or had the successes of Lacedæmon against Persia been less transient, possibly, instead of carrying the worship of the Ephesian Diana into Peloponnesus, he might have extended that of the Delphian Apollo on the eastern side of the Ægean. When Agesilaus left Asia, neither his hopes of conquest, nor perhaps Xenophon's views to settlement there, were immediately abandoned. It was Conon's naval victory off Cnidus that confined the arms of the one, and decided the residence of the other, within the limits of Greece.

Then it became necessary for Xenophon to collect his property, or at least to bring it within ready reach; and, if it might be possible, in his unfortunate condition of an exile, and, in times threatening more than common turbulence in that turbulent country, to provide with it an income of some security, for himself and his family, so that, if he must depend upon a foreign government for protection, still he need not depend upon it for subsistence. To assure then to himself and to his posterity a permanence of landed property, such as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps hardly anywhere in Greece to be hoped for, he recurred to religion for assistance. Using the opportunity afforded by the commission from the troops he had commanded in Asia, he procured the estimation of sacredness for any extent of land, by making himself and his heirs nominally trustees for the goddess, of what was very effectually their own estate, burdened only with a certain quit-rent and certain services. For, by the conditions expressed in his inscription, they were bound to employ a tenth only of the produce in sacrifice and public festival: and whatever, of the other nine tenths, was more than requisite to maintain the temple

and

and its appendages, would be at their disposal. If then he paid largely to obtain the sacred security, he might probably well afford to do so; because in the proportion that landed property was otherwise insecure, it would of course be cheap. The oracular response from Apollo, directing the circumstances of the purchase, a very strong matter in itself, tho dropping in a manner incidentally in the report of the transaction, was probably desired for two purposes: it would amount to a declaration of the god's satisfaction with the management of the sum which had been lodged in his treasury, how after disposed of we are uninformed, while it gave the most unquestionable authority for the purchase of lands in Peloponnesus for the Ephesian Diana, the exact propriety of which might otherwise perhaps have been open to dispute. It furnishes, moreover, the clearest indication that Xenophon was upon good terms with the Delphian, as well as with the Ephesian priesthood.

The superstition of the middle ages, as much as it has been a subject of indiscriminate invective, nevertheless had its evils not untempered with beneficial effects. When law was unequal to personal protection, the asylum of a monastery, generally open, and in almost all circumstances inviolable, was of high value. But the religious tenets of those days, calculated for the appropriation of temporal advantages exclusively to the clergy, were no way applicable to the security of family-property. Even the baron's chapel, to be safe, must be within his castle-wall. In this point the superstition of Greece was more beneficial: Xenophon's chapel diffused a mystical protection over his castle and his whole estate.

The advantages then of the situation of Scillus, for Xenophon, seem to have been many, and some of them very important. He was there under the immediate protection of the Lacedæmonian government, and yet he was beyond the sphere of its Lycurgian rule, its censorial inspection, and its more importunate jealousy. Separated by lofty mountains from the countries most likely to be the seats of war, and far out of any expected line of march of contending armies, he was yet, by his neighbourhood to Olympia, in the way of communication with all parts, with every distant member of the Greek nation. Every  
fourth

fourth year Greece was in a manner assembled in his immediate neighbourhood; and in case of pressing danger, arising from any unforeseen turn in Grecian affairs, the sanctity of the Olympian altars, at hand, might be a valuable refuge. Dependent then as he was upon Lacedæmon, yet far removed from the great seats of contention of oligarchy and democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece enjoyed great fortune with so many of the advantages of independency. The circumstances of the country itself, moreover, seem to have been, for a man of his turn, singularly pleasant. According to antient accounts, (modern are yet wanting) all the various beauties of landscape appear to have met in the neighbourhood of Scillus. Immediately about the town and the adjacent temple, with their little river Selenus, inclosed between the hilly woodlands, Diana's property, and the barren crags of Typæum, whence, according to the Olympian law, or report perhaps intended to have the preventive effect of law, it is said, women intruding at the games were to be precipitated, we may conceive the finest classical compositions of the Poussins. Up the course of the Alpheius and its tributary streams, toward Erymanthus and the other loftier Arcadian mountains, the sublimest wildness of Titian and Salvator could not fail to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its splendid buildings among its sacred groves, the course of the Alpheius downward, the sandy plain, stretching toward Pylus, Nestor's antient seat, diversified with its pinasters<sup>65</sup>, the sea in distance one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other, would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur, and the mind-filling expanse of Claud<sup>66</sup>.

In

<sup>65</sup> Πίνος ἄγπλιος. Pausan. l. 5. c. 6. The tree commonly called *Pinaster* (for its quick growth and picturesk beauty deserving the attention of our planters, tho, like that beautiful tree the oriental plane, on account of some unaccommodating qualities for their purpose, disliked by our nurserymen) is distinguished by our botanists by the name of *Pinus sylvestris*.

<sup>66</sup> Chandler visited Olympia in the unhealthy season, in haste and in fear. Like some of the most beautiful and interesting parts of Italy, the wooded hills about the lake of Bolsena, and the rocky coast of Baia, of which otherwise it may be still truly said, in the words of Horace,

Nullus in orbe locus Baiis præluet amœnis,

SECT. IX. MEMORIALS OF XENOPHON.

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In this delightful retreat Xenophon is said to have written most of his works; of which all of principal note remain to us. Here, while he meditated on the past, or viewed, in secure distance, the passing storms, which gave occasion for most of the graver, the immediate circumstances of his own happy situation would at intervals lead to the lighter; those on his amusements, field-sports, the management of horses and agriculture; agriculture only incidentally treated, tho evidently a favorite topic. In most parts of Greece, soil and climate did much for the cultivator; but, among the ravages of war and sedition, frequently occurring, ever threatening, the exertions of art would be hasty and little systematical. The fair lot of the countryman, the loved subject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet, under the wide shelter of the Roman empire, was hardly a matter even for imagination amid the insecurity of the Grecian republics<sup>67</sup>. It may be worth while to compare, with his enchanting description of plenty poured from the earth, arms remote, and justice reigning, the portraiture which Xenophon has left us of the husbandman's life, not indeed at Scillus, but in two separate districts of the largest and most fruitful province of Greece. It occurs in the description of an entertainment given by the officers of the Cyreian army, while incamped near Cotyora, to the ministers of Corylas, prince of Paphlagonia. Among both Greeks and barbarians, as among the eastern nations at this day, the meal was commonly succeeded by dances and pantomimes. After a pantomimical dance, performed to the music of the

Plut. de Exil.  
p. 1070. &  
1074.  
t. 2. ed.  
H. Steph.  
Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Anab. l. 6.  
init.

it seems the western coast of Peloponnesus is at this day, in the autumnal season, proverbially unhealthy. Chandl. Trav. in Greece.

If Mr. Hawkins, who has had far greater opportunities, should be induced to publish an account of his travels, the world will be better informed concerning that interesting

country. The Arcadian mountains, and especially their western steeps, remained, when he visited them, still finely wooded. The rest of Greece, where Herodotus and Thucydides mention extensive woods, have been laid nearly bare, like the once wooded borders of England and Scotland.

<sup>67</sup> O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint,  
Agricolas! quibus ipsa, procul discordibus armis,  
Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus,  
&c.

VIRG. Georg. l. 2. v. 460.

flute,

flute, by two Thracians armed, in the manner of their country, as targeteers, some Ænians and Magnetes, people of the southern and northern borders of Thessaly, stepped forward, and, in the full armour of the phalanx<sup>68</sup>, exhibited the dance called the Carpæan. 'The manner of it,' says Xenophon, was thus: 'Flutes playing, and time being observed in all motions, one advances, as a husbandman. Grounding his arms, he sows, and drives his oxen, often looking around as if in fear. Another approaches as a robber. The husbandman seeing him, runs to his arms, and a combat insues. The robber prevails, binds the husbandman, and drives off the cattle. Then the dance is varied; the husbandman is victorious, binds the robber's hands behind him, yokes him with the oxen, and drives all off together.'

Strab. l. 7.  
p. 330. & l. 8.  
p. 429.

l. 8. p. 427.

p. 427.

The Magnetes inhabited the dales of Pelion, along the Ægean shore, and the northern bank of the Peneius, under the heights of Olympus, against Macedonia. The Ænians held the upper part of the valley of the Spercheius, and the northern roots of Cæta, to the border of Ætolia. They boasted the purest blood of Grecian race; but neither this proud claim, nor their title to support from the Thessalian confederacy, nor the valor and skill in arms of every husbandman among them, exercised in the daily care even of his draft-cattle and his seed-corn, nor the strength of their highland fastnesses, in the end availed them. Among the wars of their more powerful western neighbours, the Ætolians, Acarnanians, and Epirots, according to the geographer, the Ænians were extirpated. Of their neighbours, on the southern side of the ridge of Octa, the Dorians, a remnant just sufficed to keep the name from perishing.

In Laconia, Eleia, Attica, and some other parts of Greece, the situation of the husbandman certainly was less unfortunate. To plow in arms was not commonly necessary; the plowman and his cattle were at least not liable to attack from the solitary robber. Yet, if we consider the state of the country altogether, we shall hardly wonder if what remains, from the Greeks of the republican times, upon agricul-

<sup>68</sup> Ἐς τοῖς ὄπλοις.

ture, is not among the most valuable of their writings, and if it affords little instruction for the cultivator under any mild government, long established, only moderately well administered, and able, by its own strength, or its political connections, to keep foreign enemies at a distance.

More than twenty years Xenophon seems to have resided at Scillus, personally undisturbed, tho' observing often, doubtless with much anxiety, the various turns of the contention between the democratical and aristocratical interests in Greece, excited anew by the injurious haughtiness of Lacedæmon, so soon after her complete triumph over the democratical opposition. But the battle of Leuctra made a great and unfortunate change for him. Then the Eleians, hitherto repressed by an overbearing power, gave vent to their indignation and their ambition; and, when a general peace was proposed by the Athenians, upon the terms that all Grecian people should be independent, they alone dissented, with a declaration of their resolution to assert their sovereignty over the Triphylians. Mindful of the gross evils, which can scarcely fail in the subjection of people to people, the Triphylians resisted; and they solicited from Arcadia that protection, which Lacedæmon could no longer with the former certainty give. War followed between Arcadia and Elis; violence and confusion superseded law and order, more or less during seven or eight years, in that before peaceful and happy part of Greece; and at length, as we have seen, the sacred precinct itself of Olympia became a field of battle.

Disturbance to Xenophon's quiet could not fail among these troubles; in which, however, he seems to have avoided taking a part. According to the biographer, but at what time is not said, he sent his family to Lepreum; he went himself to Elis, apparently to solicit, plead, or negotiate; and finally, with his family, he removed to Corinth. It would be a very advantageous circumstance for him, after the violent contention of the Eleians, that the aristocratical party remained completely masters; and this would be greatly improved by, what presently followed, the renewal of alliance between Elis and Lacedæmon. These facts, authenticated by himself, give probability to the report of his journey to Elis; and both together have a confirming consonance to what is

B. C. 371.

Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

B. C. 386.

Ch. 27. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

B. C. 365.

B. C. 364.

Ch. 28. s. 5.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Ch. 28. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Pausan. 1. 5.  
c. 6.

related by Pausanias, that the Eleians recovered Scillus; that, a prosecution being instituted against Xenophon, before the Olympian council, for interference with their dominion under claim of authority from a foreign power, he was either acquitted or pardoned; and that, under protection of the Eleian government, as before of the Lacedæmonian, he was allowed to continue his residence at Scillus, and to preserve his property<sup>69</sup>.

B. C. 369.  
Ol. 102  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

When, about two years after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, abandoning the Theban alliance, took a decided part with Lacedæmon, there remained apparently no political motive to prevent Xenophon's restoration to his country. Then therefore probably it was that, according to the account preserved by Laërtius, the same orator, Eubulus, who, in the vehemence, perhaps, of youthful politics, had proposed the decree for his banishment, with the maturer judgement and softened temper of thirty added years, moved in the Athenian assembly, with equal success, for its reversal. Such a residence however, as Xenophon himself has described Athens, for eminent and wealthy men, we shall not wonder if, after an absence of more than thirty years, at the age of near sixty, he was not very eager to return to it: Corinth was more commodiously situated for communication with his property at Scillus, or negotiation concerning it.

But, tho' he avoided needlessly to expose his own elderhood, and the property that was to support his family, to the unbridled intemperance of a misruling multitude<sup>70</sup>, yet he desired that his sons should not omit those duties of Athenian citizens, which, of their age, the Attic law required. Both are said to have fought in the Athenian cavalry, on the great day of Mantinea, where the elder, Gryllus, earned a glorious death: the younger, Diodorus, survived.

For himself, in his declining age, Corinth probably might be a residence preferable to Scillus. That his connection with that city, and at least his occasional residence there, were of some duration, is implied in an epigram, preserved by Laërtius, apparently selected from many relating

<sup>69</sup> This seems fully implied in the expressions—*τυχῆσθαι δὲ παρὰ Ἑλλήνων συγγνώμης, ἀδίκως ἢ Σκιλλοῦντι δικῆσαι.*

<sup>70</sup> *Civium ardor prava jubentium.* Hor. Od. 3. 1. 3.



to him. It runs thus: 'Tho, Xenophon, the Athenians banished you, for the friendship with which you were distinguished by Cyrus, yet hospitable Corinth received you. There you were kindly treated; there you found satisfaction; and there finally you resolved to reside<sup>71</sup>.' Occasionally perhaps visiting his estate in Triphylia, but mostly under the liberal aristocracy of Corinth, he seems to have passed, in a dignified ease, the remainder of a life, by all accounts long, and, according to the report of Lucian, protracted beyond his ninetieth year<sup>72</sup>.

Lucian de  
Macrob.

The estimation in which, living as well as afterward, Xenophon was extensively held, is marked by some pleasing testimonies. The death of Gryllus gave occasion to many. Epitaphs and panegyrics upon that young man, as Laertius reports from Aristotle, principally intended as compliments to his father, were numerous. The Mantineian state rewarded his merit with more costly honors: an equestrian statue of him, placed near the theater in Mantinea, remained in the time of

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Pausan. l. 8.  
c. 9. & 11.

<sup>71</sup> Εἰ καὶ σὲ Ξενοφῶν, Κραναῖ Κερροπὸς τε πολίται  
Φεύγειν καλέγγιον τῶν φίλων χάριν Κύρου,  
Ἄλλὰ Κόρινθος ἔδεικτο φιλοξενος, ἣ σὺ φιληδῶν  
Ὀπίως ἀρίστη, κείθι καὶ μένει ἔγνωσ.

<sup>72</sup>I will own myself not inclined to give any credit to the date assigned, in our copies of Diogenes Laertius, as the term of Xenophon's life, namely the first year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, about two years only after the battle of Mantinea. Bartholemi, in a note to his fifty-ninth chapter of the Travels of Anacharsis, observing that the battle of Mantinea was fought in the year before Christ 362, about which I believe there is no difference, adds that *Xenophon's history* goes five years farther, to the year before Christ 357. What he has meant by the phrase *Xenophon's history*, he has not explained. Xenophon's narrative in his Grecian annals ends with the battle of Mantinea. His panegyric of Agesilaus goes farther, including the death of that prince; the time of which is not precisely ascertained, but is generally set (perhaps a year or more too early) within two years after the battle of

Mantinea. This however alone I think sufficient to invalidate the date of Xenophon's death, as it stands in our copies of Diogenes. But in the Grecian annals a fact is stated, the succession of Tisiphonus to the tyranny of Pheræ in Thessaly (HæL. I. 6. c. 4. s. 37.) which according to Diodorus, and to Xenophon too, in Dodwell's reckoning, happened in the fourth year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, the year before Christ 357, just five years after the battle of Mantinea, and perhaps Bartholemæi has had this obscurely in his mind, unwilling for the trouble of farther looking after it. Xenophon's mention of the succession of Tisiphonus does not imply its recency, but rather the contrary: 'Tisiphonus,' he adds, 'still held the government.' Hence the inference seems reasonable that Xenophon lived a considerable time after the accession of Tisiphonus, in the year before Christ 357.

Pausanias,

Pausanias, who travelled through Greece between four and five hundred years after. Even to that time the fame of Gryllus was cherished among the Mantineian people. They attributed to him the first merit in the great battle in which he fell; the second to Cephisodorus, who commanded the Athenian cavalry; and the third only to their own highly respected fellow-citizen Podarés. Among the Athenians, already in Xenophon's age, the practice was growing, in paying compliments, and in everything, to run into extravagance. The Attic cavalry, having been the only victorious part of the army of their confederacy at the battle of Mantinea, had a fair claim to public honor. A picture of the battle was therefore placed in the Cerameicus, which Pausanias mentions as remaining perfect when he visited Athens. In this picture it was resolved to honor the memory of Gryllus; and, whether with fair picturesk licence may perhaps be disputed, but against all authority in history, Gryllus was represented giving the mortal wound to Epameinondas<sup>72</sup>. Pausanias also found the memory of Xenophon's residence preserved by tradition among the Triphylians, and cherished among the most informed of the Eleians. Scillus was then again in ruin; but the temple of Diana remained; and, near it, a monument of marble, which Pausanias knew to be from the quarries of mount Pentelicus in Attica, with a figure, which the neighbouring inhabitants asserted to be of Xenophon.

Pausan.  
l. 5. c. 6.

<sup>72</sup> — Pictoribus atque poetis

Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.

Hor. de art. poet. v. 10.


According to all accounts of Gryllus he that the Athenian cavalry was not engaged fought in the Athenian cavalry. Xenophon, till after Epameinondas had received his in his narrative of the battle, makes no death-blow. mention of his son; but he marks clearly

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END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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