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
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THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE:

EDITED AND ILLUSTRATED

BY

THOMAS WILLIAM LANCASTER, M.A.
FORMERLY FELLOW OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD.

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PREFACE.

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THE writings of ARISTOTLE have made him, for more than two thousand years, the admiration of GREEKS, ROMANS, ARABIANS, JEWS, and CHRISTIANS. Such is the remark of a gentleman, who applied to the study of these writings, the aids of a penetrating genius and recondite learning, and who has diffused over his illustration of them, the happiest influences of politeness, imagination, and taste. While the remark cannot be denied, the inference is hardly liable to dispute. "Such esteem," continues Mr. Harris, "could not have been the effect either of FASHION or of CHANCE^a."

If the case had no other recommendation, this alone would invite attention to the remains of Aristotle. For, whatever freedom of judgment may be claimed by such as have studied them; it would be no less than a bold eccentricity, to depreciate or to despise, without trial, books which so many ages and varieties of men have concurred to extol.

^a Philosophical Arrangements, page 39. ed. 1799.

Among these remains, there are certain considerations which connect with the present treatise a particular value.

Such value is, indeed, much affected by the altered condition of the world. Subjects, which formerly demanded the careful enquiries of philosophy, have since, by a light from heaven, been clearly unfolded to our view. The SOVEREIGN GOOD of man, and the RECTITUDE OF HUMAN CONDUCT, are now propounded by infallible discovery and authoritative command. But though, for this reason, the moral system of Aristotle wears a character, different from what it once had: it does not therefore appear, that it has lost its utility. The soil is not exhausted, if its FORMER uses of cultivation have in some measure ceased. For the true state of the case may be represented thus. In one respect, that is, with regard to ourselves, the value of this system is altogether DIFFERENT IN KIND, from that which belonged to it in pagan times: in another, it still maintains a PERMANENT CONNECTION with the interests of mankind.

For, among the proper modes of exercising our gratitude for the blessing of DIVINE REVELATION, may be reckoned, our endeavours to vindicate the truth of it. Now towards the advancement of this purpose, it will perhaps be admitted, that besides the most reverential study of the Divine oracles,

some advantage is derivable from extraneous testimony. The best use, it is conceived, may be made, of principles established by those, who had no notion that, in so doing, they were serving the cause of Christianity. For these principles are strong positions of defence, which may be maintained with greater confidence, because they have, as it were, been put into our hands by men neutral to our disputes. Nor can it be needful to vindicate a method of disputation, which was employed by St. Paul himself in his controversy with the philosophers of Athens.

Since every argument must be founded upon truths of prior acknowledgment, it must be a matter of the very greatest importance, of what nature are THOSE elementary principles, thus previously entertained, which are connected with the argument of RELIGION. It will thus be no slender recommendation of a philosophical theory, if, with regard to this particular, it aids, by a true guidance of the understanding, to substantiate a groundwork to the evidence of faith. Should this be done by a pagan, intent upon other purposes; unconcerned with our doctrine; and unacquainted with the question at issue between us and our adversaries: the work is more desirable: because the judgment, thus pronounced, carries with it all the weight of a most impartial verdict. This benefit is realized in the treatise before us. The principles of infidelity and

scepticism will be found, on many material points, not more repugnant to CHRISTIANITY, than they are to the doctrines, herein derived from a PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEMPLATION OF THE NATURE OF MAN.

The value of these speculations will be further enhanced, when we find that Aristotle, speaking as the interpreter of NATURE, discovers, in some important instances, a remarkable harmony with the prophets and authorized messengers of GOD. Such is the case of moral principles, herein deduced from PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION, and strikingly concurrent, at the same time, with DIVINE PRECEPTS. I would explain my meaning by examples. The Divine Law then, in its general regard to mankind, has ordained a Sabbath; and, in its special and political relation to a single people, has instituted festivals of joyful solemnity, of which it commanded the observance. Now it appears, in the philosophy of Aristotle, that the PURPOSE contemplated in such provisions, is declared ESSENTIAL to the WELFARE OF MAN^b. Again: the relative obligations of kindred appear, by the DECALOGUE, to flow, as from a primary source, out of the relation of parent and child: and it is to the same source, that the philosopher, while examining the rudiments of NATURE, has traced the derivation of those friendships which belong to the state of consanguinity^c. And thus,

^b See B. IV. c. vi. §. xvi.

^c See B. VIII. c. v. §. xx.

though the intimations of nature be ever so feeble, so scanty, and so inadequate to the necessities of man ; though her lessons be intelligible only to the philosopher, and not to the multitude who need instruction ; though her voice, even when audible, is nevertheless ineffectual, because it carries no authority and promulges no sanction ; and though all this will make us justly feel our need, of plainer and more diffusive communication : yet, inasmuch as both NATURE and REVELATION are emanations from the same DEITY ; to remark their harmony must be both instructive and profitable ; illustrative of the REASONABLENESS OF RELIGION, and therefore EVIDENTIAL of its TRUTH.

But the various benefits of these moral speculations cannot be fully entered into at this time. I will briefly notice, however, a few more points of conspicuous usefulness.

While we regard the present work as having been produced under circumstances, remote from any ACCREDITED communication of Divine truth ; we may find in it the plainest indications, of the WANT OF A REVELATION : and we shall also find, that, when examined by those to whom that communication has been afforded, it yields indications, equally plain, of the ADAPTATION OF CHRISTIANITY to SUPPLY that want. For the scheme of human happiness herein delineated, as it applies to man in

the best enjoyment of his native resources, is greatly and essentially defective: and its points of deficiency are plainly those, to which the Gospel has provided a full and infallible remedy.

With regard to the measures of rectitude in human conduct, while we assert the transcendently superior value, in its connection with human interests, of REVEALED OVER PHILOSOPHICAL morality: we may gather from the pages of Aristotle, a full conviction, that the laws, thus subservient and thus needful to the welfare of man, are such, that neither the obligation of them could be demonstrated, nor even the knowledge of them obtained, without Revelation.

With respect to this point, indeed, the work of Aristotle himself may serve, by its failures, to illustrate the necessity of his own precepts; enforcing the extreme caution to be exerted by a moral philosopher, in the choice of his FIRST PRINCIPLES. For it will appear, on the one hand, that where the TRUE first principles were accessible to him, his practical deductions are sound and beneficial: and, on the other, that his doctrines, in those particulars which demand an adjustment to REVEALED LAW, partake of the fundamental error, on which they were unavoidably constructed. To illustrate this by an example. If we find Aristotle requiring, as indispensable to happiness, a propitious fortune and a considerable measure of prosperity: it will appear,

that he reasoned consistently with the best knowledge which he had. If again, in the rules of our Christian duty, we are commanded, to rejoice always, even in the midst of tribulation, temptation, and the most painful exercise of patience: here also we find, that the precept, besides carrying in itself the force of obligation, is fully consistent with the measure of knowledge which has been afforded.

Of these remarks, it would hardly be consistent with the purpose of a prefatory discourse, if I were at this time to produce a full exemplification. But one more observation may possibly not be unacceptable to the reader: and it will at least help to shew, that the foregoing assertions have not been thrown out altogether at random.

There are various scriptural passages, which speak to this effect: that is to say, that a spirit of unreserved conformity to the Divine will, is a frame of mind, to which, if the faith of the Gospel be propounded, the power of discerning its truth shall not be denied. Now when we turn over the pages of Aristotle, who transcribes, not from revelation, but from nature: we find him teaching, that it is depravity which vitiates the mental discernment; that it is virtue only, which prevents the disorders of fancy relating to pleasure, to happiness, and to the principles of action; and that it is, as it were, the characteristic distinction, and the excellence, of

a virtuous man, that his judgment is a LIVING RULE AND CRITERION OF TRUTH^d. Do we not herein discover a striking harmony between Philosophy and Religion? And is not this of important use? Is not the unbiassed authority of Aristotle, a powerful repellent of the blasphemy, which would resolve the assurance of faith into a delusion and a dream? Scientific and learned men will sometimes refuse their assent to arguments, which produce a sure conviction in ordinary minds. This, as we believe, is owing to the difference of mental vision: which, in the one case, we consider to be depraved and paralysed; while it remains, in the other, vigorous and adequate to its functions. It is thus, that Revelation explains the case: and the same explanation, or one fully equivalent, is found in Aristotle. Can it then be said, that this is urged by weak men, as a colour to their own aberrations? Can it be otherwise than a just presumption in favour of a doctrine, that it offers fully to establish its credentials to that state of mind, which, by a great scholar of nature, himself wholly disengaged from the question, has been virtually pronounced to be the only state qualified to examine them? And, when the profession of this doctrine is found in connexion with virtues, far transcending the practical fruits of all other philosophy: how, according to the principles of Aristotle, can this be

^d See B. III. c. iii. §. iii. B. VI. c. viii. §. viii. &c.

explained? It can be regarded only as the decision of a mind, which views things ACCORDING TO THEIR REALITY, and determines agreeably to TRUTH.

But the present treatise, in order to a right computation of its value, has another title to our notice. The ethical doctrine of Aristotle ought to be viewed as occupying a province of its own: which, while it does not encroach upon the precincts of religion, will be fruitful, in a way peculiar to itself, of substantial and PERMANENT benefit.

If SYSTEMS OF MORALITY be viewed, as arising, in point of fitness and obligation, out of the ESSENTIAL NATURE AND RELATIONS of things, without regard to the precepts and disquisitions of particular philosophers: of such systems it will appear that there are two, the PERFECT and the IMPERFECT.

By the IMPERFECT, I understand, that which is wholly deducible from human nature, considered simply in itself, and apart from revealed knowledge. In this process are regarded only, the native faculties of the human being; the functions proper to his constitution; and the causes, whether springing up within himself, or acting upon him from without, by which the welfare of a creature, thus framed, is liable to influence. This system I call IMPERFECT: because it is plain, that if the happiness and the conduct of man be matters of a revealed law; such

a system, being framed on a partial view of the subject, will certainly be defective. And it will thus be understood, in what sense I designate as **PERFECT**, that which, without neglecting the work of the **IMPERFECT**, applies the discoveries of revealed truth for the supply of its vacuities, and the correction of errors which have been introduced into the representation of it.

Respecting the **IMPERFECT** system ; I need not expatiate on the great absurdity of its being considered, by Christians, as a competent rule of action. It is such an absurdity indeed, as the doctrine of Aristotle, though himself labouring in the exposition of that system, may suffice to expose. For he tells us, “ that the **FIRST PRINCIPLES** of ethical science, being derivable from various sources, must severally be investigated according to the nature which respectively belongs to them^e :” and the present case is one, in which the first principles are avowedly of **SUCH** a nature, that they can be known by revelation only. “ If,” as I formerly had occasion to remark, “ **THERE BE A MORAL GOVERNOR** of the world, there must be a **MORAL DUTY OWING TO HIM** : and that system of ethics which passes it over, must be glaringly **DEFECTIVE**. If it admit the **EXISTENCE** of a God, and pass over the **DUTY** ; it must be glaringly **INCONSISTENT**. Again : if the Christian Scriptures

^e See B. I. c. iii. §. ix.

be admitted to be TRUE ; it must be equally inconsistent in a system of ethics to pass over the MORAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH THEY DECLARE. Such omissions cannot be consistent on any other supposition, than that, which disbelieves the truth of the Christian religion^f.”

Still, however, there belongs to the imperfect system, an APPROPRIATE kind and measure of utility. This I will now, with more particular regard to the doctrine of Aristotle, endeavour to describe.

Let us then scrutinize the nature of man, considered in itself, so as to gather from the enquiry the best notions we can, of both the conduct, and the treatment, specifically adapted to him. From such examination there will accrue a species of benefit, entirely distinct from that, which consists in the moral guidance of a being accountable to his Maker. This benefit has been successfully pursued, by both Pagan and Christian moralists: and by both it has been pursued, according to the same method of investigation.

For it is in the way of DEDUCTION from ETHICAL principles thus obtained, that sound views of

^f The Alliance of Education and Civil Government. With Strictures on the University of London. Page 78.

POLITICAL philosophy must be framed^s. The treatment of man, in his CIVIL and SOCIAL character, must be adjusted to a proper estimate of his NATURE. It is thus, that LEGISLATORS must adapt their measures to the qualities of the material upon which they are to work. It is thus, that EDUCATION must train men to the proper aptitudes, for their office and station, and for the general purposes of life. It is thus, that POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS must be determined, by a respect to the powers and propensities of the being, whose welfare they seek, and whose cooperation they require. Such are A PART of the benefits of Moral Philosophy, and they are derivable peculiarly from the IMPERFECT system of it: inasmuch as this is the system conversant with examining, in the abstract and with a view to practical inferences and uses, the nature of man; and they belong to the PERFECT system, not peculiarly nor characteristically, but only by virtue of its

* Ἐπειδὴ προαιρούμεθα λέγειν ὑπὲρ ΗΘΙΚΩΝ, πρῶτον ἀν εἴη σκεπτόν, ΤΙΝΟΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΗΘΟΣ. ὡς μὲν οὖν συντόμως εἰπεῖν, ΔΟΚΕΙ ΟΥΚ ΑΛΛΗΣ Η ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΜΕΡΟΣ. ἔστι γὰρ οὐθὲν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πράττειν, ἀνευ τοῦ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι· λέγω δ' οἷον, σπουδαῖον. τὸ δὲ σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἔστι, τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. δεῖ ἄρα, εἴ τις μέλλει ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς πρακτικὸς εἶναι, τὸ ἦθος εἶναι σπουδαῖος. ΜΕΡΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΡΑ, ὩΣ ΕΟΙΚΕΝ, ΚΑΙ ΑΡΧΗ, Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΗΘΗ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΕΙΑ. ΤΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ. τὸ δ' ὅλον, καὶ τὴν ΕΠΩΝΥΜΙΑΝ δικαίως δοκεῖ ἂν μοι ἔχειν ἢ πραγματεία, οὐκ ΗΘΙΚΗΝ, ἀλλὰ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΝ. Aristot. Magna Moralia, b. i. c. 1.

enlarged comprehension, which embraces the same method of philosophical examination.

Such benefits the following treatise is adapted to confer: so true and salutary are its general views relating to the personal, the social, and the political welfare of man. If we only take in the full extent of its purpose, and of the POLITICAL DESIGN^h which professedly belongs to it; and if, when we regard the connexion, which it inculcates, between private morals and political welfare, our practical measures are adapted to the morality of the GOSPEL in substitution for that of an erroneous system: with these limitations it will, perhaps, in the estimation of competent judges, be considered as no exaggerated praise, if we pronounce it to be, the noblest exertion of human wisdom for the social happiness of mankind. Nor, with regard to some of the leading doctrines which it contains, and which, in the method of philosophical examination, it has substantiated by clear and convincing argument; will their value be in any degree over-rated, if it be said, that no civil community can

^h It is to be noted, that the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS and the POLITICS of Aristotle, though now presented to us as separate works, were designed by the author of them to form ONE treatise ON POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

permanently thrive under a practical disregard of them.

These remarks cannot derogate from that reverential esteem, which is due to the blessing of Divine truth. The art of CIVIL GOVERNMENT is not the subject, on which it is the main design of revelation to enlighten mankind : but yet it is conceived, that this art will be placed upon a true footing, when it is established upon a correct understanding of human nature. Should there, for instance, with reference to PLEASURE, to FRIENDSHIP, or to any of the various subjects comprehended within the scheme of ethics, be advanced any sound maxims of philosophical discovery : such maxims, in order to a due regulation of society, will require attention : nor will it follow, because they are maxims of PHILOSOPHICAL rather than of SCRIPTURAL discovery, that they may therefore be disregarded. The gift of revelation has not cancelled all the uses and advantages of reason.

While we take our laws of morality from the only admissible authority ; we may be permitted, in our political arrangements, to learn from a pagan, or from any one who can teach us, the intimate connexion between morality and social welfare, and the causes, by which this necessary foundation of national wealth, may be either maintained and

strengthened, or undermined and destroyed. With regard to these points, it is conceived, that the day has not yet arrived, in which the world may cease to profit by the wisdom of Aristotle.



Of a writing thus valuable, but confessedly obscure, it will surely be desirable to facilitate the comprehension: and an edition, published with that view, will properly require a notice of the methods adopted for that purpose.

The peculiar fate of Aristotle's writings is well known to have been such, as must exclude all reasonable hopes of restoring the purity of their text.

I need not repeat the story^s, of their earliest publication, after a long concealment, in a mutilated and interpolated form. The number of errors thus occasioned, was rapidly augmented. Damp, vermin, booksellers, and emendatory criticism, occur to us in history, as the several causes of depravation. Yet notwithstanding such accumulated disadvantage and injury; it appears that Aristotle was still, in the age of Augustus, recommended to imitation, by an eminent critic, as a model of **PERSPICUOUS**

^s Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 875. ed. Oxon. 1807.

and PLEASING language^h. The present state of his works then may well provoke the exclamation: QUANTUM MUTATUS AB ILLO! For the condition in which we find them is truly set forth by Giphanius: Difficile est resolvere libros Aristotelis, QUIA SUNT FRAGMENTA. Ciceronem et Platonem propter bonum ordinem explicare facilius: ταυτολογίαί innumerabiles in Aristoteleⁱ.

The circumstances of the case might naturally lead to the consequences which ensued. The work undertaken by Apellicon, the first editor of Aristotle, was in itself such, that it could have no reasonable prospect of satisfying any but the performer of it: and Apellicon himself has come down to us with the character of a man, particularly ill qualified for his office^k. If indeed the licence of conjectural emendation might, in any case, be warranted, it would be in his; by the desire of transforming a series of disjointed fragments, into connected and coherent treatises. But the work of reparation thus begun, would naturally be carried on by other

^h Παραληπτέον δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλη εἰς μίμησιν, τῆς τε περὶ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν δεινότητος, καὶ τῆς ΣΑΦΗΝΕΙΑΣ, καὶ τοῦ ἨΔΕΟΣ καὶ πολυμαθοῦς. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα παρὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς λαβεῖν. Dion. Hal. de Vett. Script. Censura, cap. iv.

ⁱ Commentarii in Eth. ad Nicom. pag. 583. ed. 1608.

^k Ὁ Ἀπιλλίκων, ΦΙΛΟΒΙΒΛΟΣ μᾶλλον ἢ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ. Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 875.

hands. For the genuine text was confessedly unattainable: and it can hardly be thought, that succeeding editors would venerate as infallible, the judgment of such a leader, and thus feel themselves precluded from the indulgence of vanity, or the exercise of talent. We learn, at least, that the copies of Aristotle, which were extant at an early period of the Christian era, evinced, by their flagrant discrepancies, a very wide departure from authenticity: and, while this fact appears from the confession of his early Greek commentators, we also find, that the practice of those commentators themselves did, by multiplying what are called EMENDATIONS, tend to an augmentation of the evil¹. From these causes it has come to pass, that the present state of his works is similar to that of a

¹ “ Hinc explicandum est, quod jam Graecorum Aristotelis interpretum temporibus, Alexandri Aphrodisei, Porphyrii, Themistii, Ammonii Hermeae filii, Simplicii, Joannis Philoponi et aliorum, apographa librorum Aristotelicorum tam erant corrupta et inter se discrepantia, ut illi jam de iis conferendis, et in locis, quibus sanus sensus non inesse videbatur, de lectione mutanda cogitarent. In commentariis maxime Simplicii, doctissimi interpretis, variae lectiones e pluribus codicibus excerptae obviae sunt, quae etiam a nostra lectione vulgata abeunt, uti ipsa textus Aristotelis lectio, cui commentarium ille subjecit. Quo etiam factum est, ut interpretes Graeci haud raro textum Aristotelis pro lubitu mutare, interpolare, eique de suo aliquid addere auderent, quae mutationes postea sine auctoris nomine in libros ad eorum exempla scriptos transierunt.” *Buhle's Preface to his edition of Aristotle*, p. xx.

portion of Origen's. They may afford general views of his doctrine: and the sentiments expressed in them, will, in most^m particulars, be reasonably viewed as those of Aristotle himself: but it is impossible, with regard to single passages, to make any confident and safe discrimination between his own words and those of another hand". Nor is this representation materially affected, if it shall appear, that SOME of his treatises went abroad during his life; so as to escape the general doom of subterranean mutilation. For these were FEW AND INCONSIDERABLE: it is not probable that the difference between them and the others, would long continue to be marked: and certainly, the distinction has not been handed down to us.

Should this statement appear in any degree over-

^m I think, not in ALL. For instance, respecting the state of the human soul after death; I can hardly believe that it was the intention of Aristotle, to envelope his opinions in such a cloud of obscurity and contradiction, as the present state of his writings presents to us on this subject.

" Summo labore et studio etiamsi omnes, qui supersunt, codices excusserit editor, tamen quia corruptelae origo jam a primis fatis repetenda est, quae Aristotelis manuscripta post ejus mortem experta sunt, ARISTOTELIS TEXTUI PRISTINAM INTEGRITATEM NEMO UNQUAM REDDET." *Buhle's Preface to his edition of Aristotle*, p. xvii. " Igitur fore, ut codicum ope et criticis curis ad pristinam integritatem scripta Aristotelica aliquando plane redigantur, desperandum est." *Ibid.* p. xxii.

charged ; it may be noted, that it was, even in the age of Strabo, a true representation. For it is thus that we find the case stated by that writer. “ The ancient Peripatetics,” says he, “ who succeeded Theophrastus, inasmuch as they possessed no writings whatever of Aristotle, except a few, and those chiefly of the exoterical class ; were not able to philosophize according to the truth of their master’s doctrine : but were obliged to content themselves with elaborate lucubrations upon detached questions belonging to it. It was the advantage of their successors, after the publication of his books, that they were able to philosophize and to propound the doctrine of Aristotle, better indeed than the former ; but still they were necessitated, by reason of the multitude of errors prevailing in the copies of his works, ΤΑ ΠΟΛΛΑ ΕΙΚΟΤΩΣ ΛΕΓΕΙΝ^ο, for the most part to frame their expositions of his doctrine according to CONJECTURE AND PROBABILITY.” I

^ο It must plainly appear from the context, that the phrase *εικότως λέγειν*, describes the probability of finding the true SENSE OF ARISTOTLE, not that of finding the ABSTRACT TRUTH of things.

Συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, ὅλας οὐκ ἔχουσι τὰ βιβλία, πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΙΚΩΣ, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν τοῖς δ’ ὕστερον, ἀφ’ οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν, καὶ Ἀριστοτελεῖν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μὲντοι τὰ πολλὰ ΕΙΚΟΤΩΣ λέγειν, ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΛΗΘΟΣ ΤΩΝ ἈΜΑΡΤΙΩΝ. Lib. xiii. p. 875. For *εικότως* some copies have *εικότα* : but the variation does not affect the foregoing statement.

need hardly suggest, that this uncertainty of Aristotle's text would, by obvious causes, be gradually and much augmented with the progress of time.

With a view to this state of facts, I have framed my edition on the following principles. Conjectural emendation, as being the chief source of our present confusion, and a certain cause of its future and infinite augmentation, has been wholly avoided: and it has been my great endeavour, without the ridiculous vanity of pretending to identify the very words of Aristotle, to gather, from the most considerate examination, the best insight to his meaning; and to select for the expression of it, out of the admissible materials which lay before me, those which, when considered in themselves, appeared to be most apt and unexceptionable. The TEXT which I have chosen for my groundwork, is that of Mr. Bekker's late edition: and from this I have made no other variation, than what has arisen from an occasional preference of the various readings, which he has obtained from an extensive collation of manuscripts: in which instances of preference, Mr. Bekker's own reading is noted in the margin. Of the obscurities of Aristotle, a considerable portion appear to me to be solved by this selection of VARIOUS READINGS.

Under the circumstances already explained, it seems to be the obvious duty of an editor, to keep

his eye attentively fixed upon what, according to his own views of rational and coherent meaning, may be the probable difference between the genuine and spurious portions of the text. He must otherwise be perplexing himself with vain endeavours, to fix a meaning where Aristotle had none; and to expound as his, words that he never employed. In the exercise of this duty, I have not scrupled, as often as I saw fit, to employ the marks which are used to denote passages of questionable authenticity^p. And I may perhaps, in some instances, have employed these marks, to denote passages, which I consider to be either dislocated, or too corrupt to afford any representation of the Author's mind.

In the style of Aristotle, as of other writers, there will often occur an obscurity to the eye, where there would be none to the ear. A sentence, if enunciated with proper distinction of emphasis, would readily convey its own meaning: while such meaning is obscured by a form, which imparts no prominence to any particular words. With a view to this consideration, I have marked, by a difference of character, those words which appear to carry with them a more particular stress; or which may serve to indicate the leading position which the Author seeks to convey; or which involve any remarkable

^p These passages are marked thus [v].

idiomatic usage, or modification of sense, mainly concerned in the developement of his meaning.

In the general arrangement of the work, my plan has been suggested by that of a learned editor of a portion of Aristotle's works, and by a recollection of the aid which his labours afforded to my early studies. The person of whom I speak is Buhle; and the advantages of his method consist, in splitting the text of the author into distinct paragraphs, and in prefixing a tabular view of the leading principles contained in each chapter. Of this plan I have sought to augment the usefulness, by making the leading principles, thus stated in a prefatory summary of each book, correspond by numerical signs with the sections to which they relate.

On the division of the CHAPTERS and SECTIONS, I would offer some further remarks. As it cannot be pretended, that the present arrangement of our modern editions, has the least claim to authority: it must plainly be a point, on which every man has an equal right of judgment. Now we cannot but see, how desirable it is, in the collocation of periods, to indicate, whether a sentence relates to a matter of previous, or of subsequent, notice; whether it serves to conclude one argument, or to introduce another; whether the author is deducing a consequence from what he has proved, or preparing a transition to some new subject. It is, I say, highly

desirable, that some guidance should thus be afforded to the mental process of an author, and to the relative connexion of his ideas. Yet it will be readily seen, that all injudicious attempts to do this, will be worse than none: the reader had better find his own way in the dark, than avail himself of a guide who will lead him wrong. Now I cannot imagine the case of any books whatever, to which, as to this particular, a revisionary process is more imperatively required, than it is to the popular editions of the present work. For so preposterous, in some instances, is the present arrangement of the text, that it seems as if the editor were studiously bent upon concealing his author's meaning, for the sake of exercising the reader's ingenuity with the task of finding it. On the ground of these considerations, I have ventured, in the arrangement of my author's text, to deviate considerably from preceding editors: and I would hope, that no considerable proportion of difficulties will again thus be obviated. At the same time, any inconvenience of reference which might thus arise, has been prevented, by noting in the margin the separation of the chapters which occurs in Mr. Bekker's edition.

A part of these remarks will equally apply to the subject of PUNCTUATION. For this also, while it is, in the present case, a matter uncontrolled by authority, carries with it the greatest influence towards either making, or disentangling, the per-

plexities of language. I have therefore bestowed considerable attention on fixing the adjustment of it: and I hope that the alterations thus made, will in many cases suffice, without the aid of comment, to remove the difficulty of an obscure passage.

While I acknowledge my obligations to Professor Buhle, for the assistance of his learning, and the valuable example of sound judgment afforded in his edition: it will not be irrelevant to the purpose of this introductory discourse, if I subjoin the following exposition of his sentiments on several important particulars to which I have adverted.

“ Duo potissimum ad crisin textus Aristotelici spectant, quae mihi maxime digna visa sunt, in quibus diligentissime versarer, primum ut et vulgarem librorum Aristotelis in CAPITA et SECTIONES distinctionem, et singulorum locorum INTERPUNCTIONEM mutarem; alterum, ut, quantum possem, INTERPOLATIONES, quibus nullus fere scriptor tam obsitus et depravatus est, quam Aristoteles, detegerem, manifestasque uncinis includerem. Quod primum attinet, ne temere id a me factum esse aliquis dicat, monendum est, librorum Aristotelis distributionem et in capita paragraphosque distinctionem non ab Aristotele, nec a proximis ejus aetati interpretibus, sed a recentioribus profectam esse. Non solum interpretes Graeci, sed codices

quoque Aristotelici hac in re mirum in modum variant; alii ex pluribus libris unum faciunt; alii rursus unum vulgo habitum in plures dispecunt; capita singulorum librorum et sectiones, quemadmodum in nostris editionibus sunt, plane ignorant. Recentiorum autem editorum propriam quisque et peculiarem libros distribuendi et in capita, paragraphosque dispecendi rationem amplexus est; ab Aldo Manutio discessere Conradus Gesnerus et Simon Grynaeus; ab his iterum Julius Pacius; a Julio Pacio, uti a Gesnero quoque, cui tamen in plerisque adstipulatur, Sylburgius, a Sylburgio denique in postremis Metaphysicorum libris Duvallius. Quidni igitur mihi liceat, paulo aliter librorum capita et sectiones constituere, cum praesertim vulgo in hoc peccatum esse viderem, et divulsa esse, quae nimis cohaerent, nec bene divelli possent, ita ut saepenumero *IPSA SEPARATIONE SENSUS OFFUSCARETUR*, qui, cohaerentia si cohaerere juberet, satis perspicuus esset? *INTERPUNCTIONIS innovatae non est quod causas multis exponam; esse hanc *TEXTUM EMENDANDI RATIONEM OPTIMAM* maximeque salutarem, in Aristotelis vero scriptis plane *NECESSARIAM*, unicuique, qui vulgatas Aristotelis editiones vel a limine tantum salutaverit, in oculos incurret¹."*

The present work may probably be followed by a

¹ Preface to Aristotle, p. xxvii—xxix.

volume of notes, relating to such particulars, in the language and doctrine of Aristotle, as may be thought to require further elucidation. But I must not omit this occasion of intimating, that it has been my uniform endeavour to anticipate, as far as possible, the need of such elucidation; by so constructing the introductory compendiums of each book, as to obviate the most remarkable difficulties which the student might be expected to find in them. In many cases it is hoped, that the obscurity of a passage is dispelled, by thus giving a distinct view of the point, which it is conceived that the author was mainly intent upon.

Oxford, March 6, 1834.

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BOOK I.

SUMMARY OF THE FIRST BOOK.

CHAP. I.

IN WHICH THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE IS STATED TO BE, AN ENQUIRY AFTER THE SOVEREIGN GOOD.

This chapter consists of three parts: the first of which opens the subject; the second describes the manner of treating it; and the third, the manner of studying it.

PART THE FIRST.

I. All human action pursues some good for its END. II. In the case of some arts, the end consists in the OPERATION OR ENERGY, that is, in the mere exercise of the art: in the case of others, it consists in a PRODUCTION effected by that exercise. III. Of the latter description of arts, the production is more valuable than the operation. IV. Some arts being ministerial to others, the ends of the latter will be more valuable than those of the former: in other words, the ulterior end is always more valuable than the subordinate. V. That end therefore to which all others are subordinate, being the ultimate end of all human action, will be the SOVEREIGN GOOD.

VI. The science of it must be greatly important. VII. That science is POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. VIII. The superiority of this science over all others is apparent, first, from its directive power over them; and secondly, from the subserviency of their ends to its end.

PART THE SECOND.

IX. The accuracy of this disquisition cannot be greater, than is proportioned to the nature of the subject.

PART THE THIRD.

X. The study of this disquisition, in order to be profitable, requires that the moral disposition of the enquirer should be adapted to the nature of the subject. XI. The benefit of it is likely to be obstructed by the inexperience of young persons, and by youthful passions.

 CHAP. II.

IN WHICH VARIOUS FALSE OPINIONS RELATING TO THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, ARE REJECTED.

This chapter consists of four parts. The first enumerates various opinions relating to the Sovereign Good. The second relates to the nature of the principles, to be employed in our reasonings upon it. The third briefly exposes the falsehood of several popular opinions concerning it. The fourth contains a more extended examination of a celebrated doctrine of Plato, relating to it.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The great question is proposed: WHAT IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD?

II. Respecting the NAME, all men are agreed, that it is HAPPINESS. III. Respecting the THING, there prevails a great variety of opinion.

PART THE SECOND.

IV. The nature of the principles which must necessarily form the basis of this enquiry. V. The necessity of a disposition to acquiesce in the use of such principles, and not to demand, as more satisfactory, others, which the case will not admit.

PART THE THIRD.

VI. It is thought, that the essence of happiness may be discovered on a view of THE VARIOUS MODES OF HUMAN LIFE.

VII. Of these there are three of principal note. But it is not found, 1. In the SENSUAL life. 2. Nor in the POLITICAL life. 3. The CONTEMPLATIVE life is reserved for consideration in the tenth book.

VIII. To these may be added the LUCRATIVE life: which however, in connexion with this subject, is entitled to little consideration.

PART THE FOURTH.

IX. It is enquired, whether, according to the doctrine of Plato, there be ONE ETERNAL FORM OF INTRINSIC AND UNIVERSAL GOOD, FROM WHICH EVERY PARTICULAR GOOD DERIVES ITS CHARACTER AND ESSENCE: the purpose of this enquiry being, to ascertain, whether the SOVEREIGN good be of this description, and whether a true notion of it may be obtained by A REFERENCE TO THIS ETERNAL FORM. The doctrine thus referred to is commonly denoted, THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.

X. This doctrine is objected to, because the PLATONIC IDEA is not, even according to the theory of Plato, connected with those things to which we apply the distinction of PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT: and yet in these things the attribute of GOOD is found to exist. XI. The property of good applies to ALL the TEN CATEGORIES: these cannot therefore be one universal good, abstracted from all distinctions of things. XII. If there were one universal good, there would be only one SCIENCE.

XIII. The Platonic DISTINCTION BETWEEN A THING, AND THE ESSENCE OF A THING, (as, for example, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ and ΑΤΤΟΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ,) is a distinction without a difference. XIV. The quality of ETERNAL, (which is essential to the Platonic Idea,) is not necessary towards making perfect the quality of GOOD.

XV. To the foregoing arguments, the following objection is supposed. The reasoning here pursued by Aristotle, overlooks the distinction between the two classes of INTRINSIC and RELATIVE good: whereas the doctrine of Plato applies exclusively to the FORMER of these classes. XVI. The argument, then, is pursued on an acknowledgment of this distinction. If we limit our regard to the former of these kinds, that is, to the INTRINSIC good: the description even of this, as it is found to exist in various things, is not uniform but various.

XVII. The quality, then, devoted by the term GOOD, is not uniform: and the term itself is not UNIVOCAL but ANALOGOUS.

XVIII. Further enquiry relating to this subject is deemed unnecessary: because the PLATONIC GOOD, even if it exist, is not, agreeably to the design of this treatise, practical and attainable.

XIX. Nor can the KNOWLEDGE of it be in any degree useful, in subserviency to those ends of human life which ARE attainable.

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH THE TRUE NOTION OF THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS ASCERTAINED AND FIXED.

This chapter consists of two parts. In the first, the definition of happiness is deduced, from a consideration of the nature of man. In the second, that definition is corroborated and vindicated, by testimonies derived from the prevailing opinions of mankind.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The great question is AGAIN proposed: WHAT IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD?

II. On a GENERAL view: The Sovereign Good is THE ULTIMATE END OF ALL PRACTICE. III. It is THAT WHICH IS ALWAYS DESIRED ON ITS OWN ACCOUNT, AND NEVER IN THE WAY OF SUBSERVIENCY TO ANY THING ELSE. IV. It is the same thing with ATTAPKEIA: a word which denotes such a condition, as renders life desirable, supplied in itself with all needful resources, and exempt from want.

V. The foregoing being only GENERAL characters: it is necessary, for practical utility, to frame a MORE EXACT description. Towards doing which the first step is, to enquire, WHAT IS THE PECULIAR FUNCTION OF MAN? VI. The peculiar function of man, is the OPERATION OF THE SOUL ACCORDING TO REASON: and the peculiar GOOD of man, is the OPERATION OF THE SOUL ACCORDING TO VIRTUE. This is HAPPINESS, or the SOVEREIGN GOOD. VII. Provided only that you add to it, A CONTINUANCE DURING THE WHOLE OF LIFE. Thus, the definition of happiness is this: THE OPERATION OF THE SOUL ACCORDING TO VIRTUE DURING THE WHOLE OF LIFE.

VIII. The admonition is repeated: That we are not to expect in this treatise greater accuracy than the subject admits of.

IX. The sources from which the first principles of ethical reasoning are derived: and the great importance of deducing them correctly.

PART THE SECOND.

X. It is to be enquired: Whether the foregoing definition of happiness agrees with PREVAILING OPINIONS AND COMMON REMARKS?

XI. It appears then, that it agrees with certain PHILOSOPHICAL opinions, which are both ancient, and generally assented to. XII. It derives some testimony of confirmation from a COMMON FORM OF SPEECH. XIII. It embraces ALL THOSE THINGS, WHICH ARE SEPARATELY considered desirable towards happiness. XIV. It agrees particularly with those, who regard VIRTUE as the great constituent of happiness. XV. As it also does with those, who regard PLEASURE in the same light. XVI. It agrees with that estimate of a virtuous practice, which is COMMONLY ENTERTAINED BY GOOD MEN. XVII. It derives some confirmation from those who regard, though erroneously, PROSPERITY, as the same thing with happiness. That is to say: if the grounds of that opinion be examined, they will yield support to the doctrine of Aristotle.

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH VARIOUS DETACHED QUESTIONS, RELATING TO
THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, ARE EXAMINED.

This chapter consists of four parts: which are employed in examining so many several questions relating to the Sovereign Good.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The question is proposed: IN WHAT WAY IS HAPPINESS DERIVED TO US?

II. By reason of its excellence, it might well claim to be considered as A DIVINE GIFT. III. But whether it be so or not; the mode of its derivation to us, is by VIRTUE, INSTRUCTION, AND PRACTICE. IV. The absurdity of supposing it to come to us by FORTUNE. V. The agreement of this view with principles formerly laid down in this treatise.

VI. It follows, as a consequence of this view, that there are some beings to whom happiness cannot belong.

PART THE SECOND.

VII. With reference to the foregoing definition of happiness, which embraces THE WHOLE OF LIFE; occasion is taken to examine a celebrated apophthegm of Solon: THAT NO MAN IS TO BE PRONOUNCED HAPPY AS LONG AS HE LIVES, BUT THAT WE MUST SUSPEND OUR JUDGMENT TILL WE KNOW THE MANNER OF HIS DEATH. IN

other words, the question proposed is this: HOW FAR THE STATE OF HAPPINESS IS LIABLE TO BE AFFECTED BY CHANGES OF FORTUNE.

VIII. Towards a right judgment on this subject, it is to be remarked, in the first place, that the words of Solon are capable of two constructions. But it cannot, with regard to either of these, be truly asserted of the dead, that they are happy.

IX. Towards a solution of the question, how far happiness may be affected by the vicissitudes of life; it is needful to remember, agreeably to principles formerly laid down, that THE LEADING AND EFFECTIVE CAUSE of happiness CONSISTS IN a virtuous practice, and that PROSPERITY is only a NEEDFUL CONCOMITANT to that state. X. This leading and effective cause is of all human things THE MOST INDESTRUCTIBLE: the state of the virtuous will therefore, in regard to THE CHIEF CONSTITUENT OF HAPPINESS, be so far EXEMPT FROM MUTATION: XI. And, though happiness be augmented or diminished by external things, THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF IT CAN NEVER BECOME EXTINCT. XII. It will also appear, that a man once happy (inasmuch as he is essentially virtuous) can never become WHOLLY MISERABLE. XIII. It is however admitted, that THE STATE OF HAPPINESS IS LIABLE TO BE DESTROYED BY EXTREME MISFORTUNE: YET NOT SO, AS TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE OF VARIATION FROM ANY SLIGHT EXTERNAL CAUSES.

XIV. The conclusion of the enquiry is this: WE MAY PRONOUNCE MEN HAPPY DURING THEIR LIVES; BUT ONLY IN A QUALIFIED SENSE, AND ACCORDING TO THE CONDITION OF HUMANITY.

PART THE THIRD.

XV. A question (suggested by the matter contained in the eighth section of this chapter) is introduced: namely, WHETHER THE CONDITION OF THE DEAD IS AFFECTED BY THAT OF THEIR SURVIVING FRIENDS?

XVI. With reference to this question, it is remarked in general, that the influence on our own happiness of external incidents in the fortune of our friends, will not be felt, except in relation to such incidents as, whether prosperous or adverse, are considerable and important. XVII. But all sensations of this kind, as they affect the dead, will be very slight and inconsiderable, in comparison with the sensations of the living. XVIII. To give evidence of this last position, Aristotle declines: because he considers it open to dispute, whether the dead are at all sensible of good and evil. XIX. He concludes, as a probable opinion, THAT THE DEAD ARE AFFECTED BY THE FORTUNES OF THEIR SURVIVING FRIENDS, BUT IN A DEGREE SO SLIGHT, THAT IT CANNOT GREATLY EITHER IMPROVE OR DETERIORATE THEIR CONDITION.

PART THE FOURTH.

XX. With respect to the QUALITY or VALUE of the Sovereign Good, the question is proposed: WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE CLASS OF THINGS WHICH ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF PRAISE, OR TO THAT OF THOSE WHICH ARE PROPER SUBJECTS OF ADMIRATION?

XXI. It is determined, that it does not belong to the former: XXII. But to the latter.



 CHAP. V.

IN WHICH THE ENQUIRY, CONFORMABLY TO THE PREVIOUS DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS, PROCEEDS TO INTRODUCE THE CONSIDERATION OF VIRTUE.

I. The previous definition of HAPPINESS, renders it necessary to enter on an enquiry respecting VIRTUE.

II. This enquiry dictates the propriety of examining, but only to a limited extent, THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN SOUL. III. The human soul is viewed as consisting of two parts, namely, the RATIONAL and the IRRATIONAL. IV. Again, the IRRATIONAL part is viewed as consisting of two subordinate parts. One of these is, THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE. This is wholly unconnected with virtue. V. The other of these two subordinate parts is, THE SEAT OF THE APPETITES AND PASSIONS. This has a connexion with virtue, and a relation of either OBEDIENCE or HOSTILITY to the RATIONAL part. (VI. If this latter should be considered as belonging to the rational part, then it will be proper to make a new division.)

VII. With relation to the two parts of the soul thus described, the VIRTUES are divided into two kinds, namely, the INTELLECTUAL and the MORAL: the former having a relation to the RATIONAL, and the latter to the IRRATIONAL part.

CHAP. I.

IN WHICH THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE IS STATED
TO BE, AN INQUIRY AFTER THE SOVEREIGN GOOD.

PART I.

THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY IS STATED.

- I. ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ I
πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι
δοκεῖ. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τὰγαθὸν, 'ΟΥ ΠΑΝΤ'
ΕΦΙΕΤΑΙ.
- 5 II. Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν. τὰ μὲν
γὰρ εἰσιν ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙ· τὰ δὲ, παρ' αὐτάς, ΕΡΓΑ τινά.
- III. Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν
τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα.
- IV. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν, καὶ τεχνῶν, καὶ
10 ἐπιστημῶν· πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη. ἰατρικῆς
μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς
δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν
τοιούτων ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν· (καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν
ἰππικὴν ἢ χάλινοποιικὴν, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἰππικῶν
15 ὀργάνων εἰσίν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις,
ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἄλλαι
ὑφ' ἐτέρας·) ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ, ΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟ- δι.
ΝΙΚΩΝ ΤΕΛΗ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ἜΣΤΙΝ ΑἰΡΕΤΩΤΕΡΑ ΤΩΝ ἸΠ'
ΑΥΤΑ. τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. (δια-
20 φέρει δ' οὐδὲν, τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτάς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν
πράξεων, ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι· καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν
λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.)

V. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, ὁ δὲ αὐτο
 ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΘΑ, Τ' ἌΛΛΑ ΔΕ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ· (καὶ μὴ πάντα
 δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα· πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπει-
 ρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν·) δῆλον
 ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ. 5

VI. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ
 μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπὴν, καὶ, καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν
 ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ δ'
 οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ, τί ποτ'
 ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. 10

VII. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ΤΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ
 ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΣ. τοιαύτη δ' ἡ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ φαίνεται.

VIII. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν
 ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μαθάνειν καὶ μέχρι
 τίνος αὕτη διατάσσει. ὀρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτά- 15
 τας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας· οἷον στρατη-
 γικὴν, οἰκονομικὴν, ῥητορικὴν. χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης
 ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔτι δὲ, νομο-
 θετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι· ΤΟ
 ΤΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΠΕΡΙΕΧΟΙ ἈΝ ΤΑ ΤῶΝ ἈΛΛῶΝ, ὧστε 20
 ΤΟΥΤ' ἈΝ Εἴη Τ' ἈΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΟΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστὶν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει· μεῖζόν γε
 καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς ΠΟΛΕΩΣ φαίνεται, καὶ λαβεῖν
 καὶ σώζειν. ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ· κάλ-
 λιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. 25

PART II.

THE DEGREE OF ACCURACY WHICH THE ENQUIRY WILL
 ADMIT.

IX. Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολι-
 τική τις οὔσα. λεγοῖτο δ' ἂν ἰκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν
 ὑποκειμένην ἴλην διασαφηνεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς
 οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ

οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις· τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ἧ πολιτικῆ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰ-
 5 γαθὰ, διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας, παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τᾶλθες ἐνδείκνυσθαι· καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐκ τοιού-
 10 των λέγοντας, τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι.

PART III.

THE MORAL DISPOSITIONS WHICH ARE NEEDFUL ON THE PART OF THE ENQUIRER.

X. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ΑΠΟΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων. ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΥ γὰρ ἐστίν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται. (παρα-
 15 πλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογῶντος ἀποδέχεσθαι, καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.) ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἂν γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος· ἀπλῶς δ', ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

20 XI. Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶν ΟΙΚΕΙΟΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΤΗΣ ὁ νέος. ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων· οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων, καὶ περὶ τούτων. ἔτι δὲ, τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν, ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς· ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις, ἀλλὰ
 25 πρᾶξις.

Διαφέρει δ' οὐθεν ΝΕΟΣ ΤΗΝ ἩΛΙΚΙΑΝ, ἢ ΤΟ ΗΘΟΣ ΝΕΑΡΟΣ. οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀγόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ

τοῖς ἀκρ. ἀκρατέσιν. τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιου-
 μένοις καὶ πράττουσι, πολυωφελῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ
 τούτων εἶδέναι.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν ΑΚΡΟΑΤΟΥ, καὶ ΠΩΣ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΕΟΝ,
 καὶ ΤΙ ΠΡΟΤΙΘΕΜΕΘΑ· πεφροϊμιάσθω τοσαῦτα. 5

CHAP. II.

IN WHICH VARIOUS FALSE OPINIONS RELATING TO THE
 SOVEREIGN GOOD ARE REJECTED.

PART I.

VARIOUS OPINIONS RELATING TO THE SOVEREIGN GOOD
 ARE ENUMERATED.

2 I. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες. Ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα
 γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται· τί
 ἐστίν, οὗ λέγομεν ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΝ ἐφίεσθαι; καὶ ΤΙ
 ΤΟ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΑΚΡΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΚΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ;

II. ΟΝΟΜΑΤΙ μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων 10
 ὁμολογεῖται. τὴν γὰρ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
 καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν· τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ
 πράττειν, ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

III. Περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἀμφι-
 σβητοῦσι, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀπο- 15
 διδῶσιν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν,
 οἷον ἡδονὴν, ἢ πλοῦτον, ἢ τιμὴν· ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλοι πολ-
 λάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον· (νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ
 ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον·) συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς
 ἄγνοϊαν, τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας 20
 θαυμάζουσι. ἔνιοι δ' ᾤοντο, παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα

ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καὶ ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσιδε
 πᾶσιν αἰτίον ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. ἀπάσας
 μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας, ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστὶν·
 ἱκανὸν δὲ, τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας
 ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον.

PART II.

THE NATURE OF THE PRINCIPLES TO BE EMPLOYED IN
 OUR REASONINGS UPON IT.

IV. ΜΗ ΛΑΘΑΝΕΤΩ Δ' ἡμᾶς, ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς. (εὖ
 γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐζήτηει, πότερον
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδός· ὥσπερ
 10 ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ, ἢ
 ἀνάπαλιν.) ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ.
 ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἀπᾶς.
 ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν ΓΝΩΡΙΜΩΝ.

V. Διο δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἤχθαι καλῶς, τὸν περὶ κα-
 15 λῶν, καὶ δικαίων, καὶ ὅλων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἀκουσό-
 μενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαί-
 νοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσεται τοῦ διότι. ὁ δὲ
 τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει, ἢ λάβει ἂν, ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως. ᾧ δὲ
 μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου·

20 Οὔτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ·
 Ἐπθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος, ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.
 Ὅς δὲ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοήῃ, μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
 Ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται· ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρηῆϊος ἀνῆρ.

PART III.

THE FALSEHOOD OF SEVERAL POPULAR OPINIONS
 RELATING TO IT, BRIEFLY EXPOSED.

VI. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. τὸ ὅτι
 25 γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰ-
 κᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ

καὶ φορτικώτατοι, τὴν ἩΔΟΝΗΝ διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγα-
πῶσι τὸν ΑΠΟΛΑΥΣΤΙΚΟΝ.

VII. Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προὔχοντες ὅ-
τε νῦν εἰρημένος, καὶ ὁ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ, καὶ τρίτος ὁ
ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ. 5

πολλοὶ
παντελῶς
ἀνδραποδά-
δεις φαίνον-
ται βοσκ.

1. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνδραποδάδεις φαίνον-
ται παντελῶς βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι. τυγ-
χάνουσι δὲ λόγου, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξου-
σίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλῳ.

2. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ, ΤΙΜΗΝ τοῦ γὰρ 10
πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. φαίνεται δ' ἐπι-
πολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ· τὰγαθὸν δὲ
οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσσφαιρέτον εἶναι μαντεύομεθα. ἔτι
δ', εἰοκασί τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς 15
ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τι-
μᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι, κατὰ γε τούτους, ἢ ΑΡΕΤΗ κρείτ-
των. τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολι-
τικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα 20
καὶ αὕτη. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι, καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα
τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις,
κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτω
ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυ-
λάττων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλως. ἰκανῶς γὰρ 25
ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν.

γὰρ καὶ.

3. Τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ. περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπί-
σκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα.

VIII. Ὁ δὲ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΣΤΗΣ, βίαιός τις ἐστίν, καὶ
ὁ ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν. χρή- 30
σιμον γὰρ ΑΛΛΟΥ ΧΑΡΙΝ. διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον
λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι. ΔΙ' ΑΥΤΑ γὰρ
ἀγαπᾶται. φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ

γὰρ καὶ.

λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω.

PART IV.

AN EXAMINATION OF A CELEBRATED DOCTRINE OF PLATO, RELATING TO IT.

IX. ΤΟ ΔΕ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΒΕΛΤΙΟΝ ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι 4
καὶ διαπορῆσαι, ΠΩΣ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ. (καίπερ προσάντους ^{See p. 15.}
5 τῆς ζήτησεως γινομένης, διὰ τὸ φίλους ἀνδρας εἰσα- ^{l. 1, 2.}
γαγεῖν ΤΑ ΕΙΔΗ. δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ ^{τῆς τοιαύ-}
δεῖν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ^{της.}
ἀναιρεῖν ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας. ἀμφοῖν ^{καὶ, July 1899}
γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοι, ὅσιον προτιμαῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.)

10 X. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν
ιδέας, EN ΟΙΣ ΤΟ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ὙΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΛΕ-
ΓΟΝ· (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ΑΡΙΘΜΩΝ ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον·)
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ, καὶ ἐν τῷ
ΠΟΙΩ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ. τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ
15 ΟΥΣΙΑ, πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ. παραφύαδι
γὰρ τοῦτ' εἴκει καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος. ὥστ'
ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ΚΟΙΝΗ ΤΙΣ ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΑ.

XI. Ἐτι, ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι·
(καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς·
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ, αἱ ἀρεταί· καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ, τὸ μέ-
τριον· καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ χρήσιμον· καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ,
καιρός· καὶ ἐν τόπῳ, δίαίτα· καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα·)
δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἐν. οὐ
γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' EN ΠΑΣΑΙΣ ΤΑΙΣ ΚΑΤΗΓΟΡΙΑΙΣ, ἀλλ'
25 EN ΜΙΑ ΜΟΝῃ.

XII. Ἐτι δ', ἐπεὶ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΙΑΝ ΙΔΕΑΝ ΜΙΑ ΚΑΙ
ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ· καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις
ἐπιστήμη. νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατη-
γορίαν. οἷον ΚΑΙΡΟΥ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικῇ, ἐν

νόσω δ' ἰατρική· καὶ τοῦ μετρίου, ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρική, ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική.

XIII. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν ΑΥΤΟΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ· εἶπερ ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώ-5 που. ἢ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν. εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδῖον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται· εἶπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. 10

(Πιθανώτερον δ' εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ ΣΥΣΤΟΙΧΙΑ τὸ ἔΝ. οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος.)

XV. Τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις ὑποφαί- 15 νεται, “ διὰ τὸ ΜΗ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ ΤΟΥΣ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΕΙΡΗΣΘΑΙ· λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' ἄΥΤΑ διακόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα· τὰ δὲ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ τούτων, ἢ ΦΥΛΑΚΤΙΚΑ πως, ἢ ΤΩΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΝ ΚΩΛΥΤΙΚΑ, διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι, καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. δῆλον 20 οὖν, ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ· καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἄΥΤΑ, θάτερα δὲ ΔΙΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ.”

XVI. ΧΩΡΙΣΑΝΤΕΣ ΟΥΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΩΝ ΤΑ ΚΑΘ' ἄΥΤΑ, σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται ΚΑΤΑ ΜΙΑΝ ΙΔΕ- 25 ΑΝ. καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἂν; ἢ ὍΣΑ ΚΑΙ ΜΟΝΟΥΜΕΝΑ ΔΙΩΚΕΤΑΙ, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν, καὶ ὄρᾶν, καὶ ἡδοαί τινες, καὶ τιμαί; (ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διάκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἂν.) ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; ὥστε ΜΑΤΑΙΟΝ ΕΣΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΙΔΟΣ. εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τῶν 30 καθ' αὐτὰ, ΤΟΝ ἴ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΝ ἄΠΑΣΙΝ ἄΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΜΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΔΕΗΣΕΙ· καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι

καὶ ψιμμουθίῳ, τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. τιμῆς δὲ, καὶ
 φρονήσεως, καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἘΤΕΡΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΝΤΕΣ ὍΙ
 ΛΟΓΟΙ ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθὰ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 KOINON TI KATA MIAN IDEAN.

5 XVII. Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε
 τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωμένοις. ἀλλ' ἄρα [γε] τῷ
 ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν; ἢ μᾶλ-
 λον ΚΑΤ' ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑΝ; ὡς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν
 ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ.

10 XVIII. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν.
 ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσο-
 φίας οἰκειότερον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ΤΗΣ ΙΔΕΑΣ. εἰ
 γὰρ καὶ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἕν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθόν,
 ἢ χαριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό· δῆλον, ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη
 15 ΠΡΑΚΤΟΝ οὐδὲ ΚΤΗΤΟΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩ. νῦν δὲ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ
 ΤΙ ΖΗΤΕΙΤΑΙ.

XIX. Τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν, βέλτιον εἶναι γνω-
 ρίζειν αὐτὸ ΠΡΟΣ τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν·
 οἷον γὰρ παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ΕΙΣΟ-
 20 ΜΕΘΑ καὶ τὰ ἑμῖν ἀγαθὰ· κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ΕΠΙΤΕΥΞΟ-
 ΜΕΘΑ αὐτῶν. πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ
 λόγος· ἔοικε δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις διαφανεῖν. πᾶσαι
 γὰρ, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεῆς ἐπιζητοῦ-
 σαι, παραλείπουσι τὴν ΓΝΩΣΙΝ αὐτοῦ· καίτοι βοή-
 25 θημα τηλικούτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ
 μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐκ εὐλογον. ἄπορον δὲ, [καὶ] τί
 ὠφεληθήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ
 τέχνην, εἰδὰς ΑΥΤΟ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ· ἢ πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ
 στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται, ὁ ΤΗΝ ΙΔΕΑΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ τεθεα-
 30 μένος. φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως
 ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ'
 ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH THE TRUE NOTION OF THE SOVEREIGN GOOD
IS ASCERTAINED AND FIXED.

PART I.

THE DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS DEDUCED FROM THE
NATURE OF MAN.

5 I. Πάλιν δ' ἐπανάλωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, ΤΙ ΠΟΤ' ἈΝ ΕΙΗ; φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ τέχνῃ. ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ, καὶ στρατηγικῇ, καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως.

II. Τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ 5
λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια,
ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν
ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο· ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει,
ΤΟ ΤΕΛΟΣ· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
πάντες. ὥστ' Εἰ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἄπαντῶν ἐστὶ 10
τέλος, τοῦτ' ἈΝ ΕΙΗ ΤΟ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ· εἰ δὲ
πλείω, ταῦτα μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν
ἀφίικται.

See C. I.
§. v.

III. Τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.
ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη· τούτων δ' αἰρού- 15
μεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον, αὐλοῦς, καὶ ὅλως
τὰ ὄργανα· δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ'
ἄριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. ὥστ' εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐν τι
μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ
πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. 20

Τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ ΚΑΘ' ἄΥΤΟ διωκτὸν
τοῦ ΔΙ' ἕΤΕΡΟΝ· καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν,
τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν· καὶ ἌΠΛΩΣ
δὴ τέλειον, ΤΟ ΚΑΘ' ἄΥΤΟ ἄΙΡΕΤΟΝ ΑΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΜΗΔΕ-
ΠΟΤΕ ΔΙ' ἄΛΛΟ. 25

See C. I.
§. v.

Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ.

ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε
 δι' ἄλλο· τιμὴν δὲ, καὶ ἡδονὴν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ πᾶσαν
 ἀρετὴν, αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' ἄΥΤΑ· (μηθεὶς γὰρ
 ἀποβαίνοντος, ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν) αἰρούμεθα,
 5 δὲ καὶ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ ΧΑΡΙΝ, διὰ τούτων ὑπο-
 λαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς
 αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο.

IV. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑΣ τὸ αὐτὸ
 συμβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκες εἶναι
 10 δοκεῖ. τὸ δ' ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΣ λέγομεν, οὐκ αὐτῶ μόνῳ τῷ
 ζῶντι βίον μονώτην· ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι, καὶ τέκνοις,
 καὶ γυναικί, καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις·
 ἐπειδὴ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ ἄνθρωπος. (τούτων δὲ λη-
 πτέος ὄρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς, καὶ
 15 τοὺς ἀπογόνους, καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους, εἰς ἄπει-
 ρον πρόεισιν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθίς ἐπισκεπτέον.)
 τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν, ὁ ΜΟΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ Αἰρετόν
 ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗΔΕΝΟΣ ΕΝΔΕΑ. τοιοῦτον δὲ
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἴομεθα εἶναι· ἔτι δὲ, ΠΑΝΤΩΝ Αἰρε-
 20 ΤΩΤΑΤΗΝ, ΜΗ ΣΥΝΑΡΙΘΜΟΥΜΕΝΗΝ. (συναριθμουμένην
 δὲ, δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν
 ἀγαθῶν· ὑΠΕΡΟΧΗ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστι-
 θέμενον· ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον ἀεὶ.) ΤΕ-
 ΛΕΙΟΝ ΔΗ ΤΙ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΣ, ἢ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟ-
 25 ΝΙΑ, ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΚΤΩΝ ΟΥΣΑ ΤΕΛΟΣ.

V. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον 6
 λέγειν, ὈΜΟΛΟΓΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ ΤΙ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ· ΠΟΘΕΙΤΑΙ Δ' *there is no*
 ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ, τί ἐστίν, ἔτι λεχθῆναι. τάχα δὲ
 γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', Εἰ ΛΗΦΘΕΙΗ ΤΟ ΕΡΓΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΝΘΡΩ-
 30 ΠΟΥ. ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῆ, καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῶ, καὶ
 παντὶ τεχνίτη, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις,
 ΕΝ Τῷ ΕΡΓῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὔ· οὕτω
 δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τι ἔργον ΑΥΤΟΥ.

VI. Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν, καὶ σκυτέως, ΕΣΤΙΝ ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις· ἀνθρώπου δ' ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ, καὶ χειρὸς, καὶ ποδὸς, καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων, φαίνεται τι ἔργον· οὕτω καὶ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ, παρὰ πάντα τὰ ταῦτα, θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι;

ΤΙ ΟΥΝ ΔΗ ΤΟΥΤ' ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ΠΟΤΕ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΖΗΝ κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς· ζητεῖται δὲ ΤΟ ΙΔΙΟΝ. ΑΦΟΡΙΣΤΕΟΝ ΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΘΡΕΠΤΙΚΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΞΗΤΙΚΗΝ ΖΩΗΝ.

10

Ἐπομένῃ δὲ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΙΚΗ τις ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινή, καὶ ἵππῳ, καὶ βοῖ, καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ.

Λείπεται δὴ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ ΤΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ· τούτου δὲ, τὸ μὲν ὡς ΕΠΙΠΕΙΘΕΣ ΛΟΓΩ, τὸ δ' ὡς ΕΧΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΝΟΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ. διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης, ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ΘΕΤΕΟΝ. κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ΕΡΓΟΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια ΚΑΤΑ λόγον, ἢ ΜΗ ἄνευ λόγου· τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φάμεν ἔργον εἶναι Τῷ ΓΕΝΕΙ ΤΟΥΔΕ καὶ ΤΟΥΔΕ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΥ, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ· (καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕΜΕΝΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ὙΠΕΡΟΧΗΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΕΡΓΟΝ· κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ. μὲν τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὔ· εἰ δ' οὕτως,) 25 ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ΖΩΗΝ ΤΙΝΑ, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου· ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΥ δ' ἀνδρὸς, ΕΥ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΣ· ἕκαστον δ' εὔ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· εἰ δ' οὕτω· τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ΨΥΧΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ γίνεται 30 ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ· εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΡΙΣΤΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΤΑΤΗΝ.

VII. Ἐτι δ' ΕΝ ΒΙῳ ΤΕΛΕΙῳ. μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα. οὕτω δὲ, οὐδὲ μα-

κάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα, οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰ γαθὸν ταύτη. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἴθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. ὁ δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ· καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρετῆς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις. παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.

to complete detail

10 VIII. Μεμνησθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρη^{See C. I.}
καὶ τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν.^{δ. x.}
ἀλλ' ἐν ἑκάστοις, κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην, καὶ
ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. καὶ γὰρ
τέκτων καὶ γεωμέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν
15 ὀρθήν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ, ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον·
ὁ δὲ, τί ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι· θεατῆς γὰρ τὰ ληθοῦς.
τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον·
ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίγνηται.

Οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν ΑΙΤΙΑΝ ἐν ἅπασιν.^{See C. II.}
20 ὁμοίως. ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν ἐν τισὶ τὸ ὅΤΙ δειχθῆναι καλῶς.^{δ. v.}
οἶον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. τὸ δ' ὅΤΙ πρῶτον καὶ
ἀρχή.

IX. Τῶν ἀρχῶν δ', αἱ μὲν ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ θεωροῦνται,^{See C. II.}
αἱ δ' ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΙ, αἱ δ' ΕΘΙΣΜΩ ΤΙΝΙ, καὶ ἄλλαι δ'^{part ii.}
25 ἄλλως. μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἑκάστας ἢ ΠΕΦΥ-
ΚΑΣΙΝ· καὶ σπουδαστέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς. με-
γάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. δοκεῖ
γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμισυ παντὸς εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ
συμφανῆ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς τῶν ζητουμένων.

PART II.

THE FOREGOING DEFINITION ATTESTED AND CONFIRMED
BY THE PREVAILING OPINIONS OF MANKIND.

8 X. Σκεπτόν δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ
ΣΥΜΠΕΡΑΣΜΑΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΞ ὄν ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἐκ τῶν ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΗΣ. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀλη-
θεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ
ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ [τάληθές]. 5

See §. vi. of
this chap.

XI. Νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν
μὲν ἑκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ ΨΥΧΗΝ καὶ ΣΩΜΑ
τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα
ἀγαθὰ, τὰς δὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυ-
χικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν. ὥστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο 10
κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν, παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμο-
λογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. ὀρθῶς δὲ καὶ,
ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι τὸ ΤΕΛΟΣ.
οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν γίνεται, καὶ οὐ
τῶν ἑκτός. 15

See §. v. of
this chap.

XII. Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τὸ “ εὖ ζῆν” καὶ
τὸ “ εὖ πράττειν” τὸν εὐδαίμονα. σχεδὸν γὰρ εὐζωΐα
τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία.

9 XIII. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν
εὐδαιμονίαν ἌΠΛΗΘ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. τοῖς μὲν 20
γὰρ ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις
εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα, ἢ τούτων τι, ΜΕΘ' ἡδονῆς,
ἢ ΟΥΚ ΑΝΕΥ ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτός εὐετηρίαν
συμπααραλαμβάνουσιν. τούτων δὲ, τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ
παλαιοὶ λέγουσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἔνδοξοι ἄνδρες. 25
οὐδετέρους δὲ τούτων εὐλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις,
ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι, ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα, κατορθοῦν.

See §. vi. of
this chap.

XIV. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετὴν
τινα, συνωδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. ταύτης γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ

ΚΑΤ' ΑΥΤΗΝ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ. διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ μικρὸν, ἐν ΚΤΗΣΕΙ ἢ ΧΡΗΣΕΙ τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν, καὶ ἐν ἘΞΕΙ ἢ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἕξιν ἐνδέχεται μὴδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν, (οἷον τῶ καθεύδοντι ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἐξηρηγηκότι)· τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε. πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. ὥσπερ δ' Ὀλυμπίασιν, οὐχ ὅτι ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΑΤΟΙ στεφανοῦνται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ΑΓΩΝΙΖΟΜΕΝΟΙ (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν) οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῶ βίῳ 10 καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὅτι ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.

XV. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καθ' αὐτὸν ἠΔΥΣ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἠδεσθαι ΤΩΝ ΨΥΧΙΚΩΝ. ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἠδὺ, πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτιμοῦτος· οἷον, ἵππος μὲν τῶ 15 Φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῶ φιλοθεώρῳ. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶ φιλοδικαίῳ, καὶ ὅλως, τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῶ φιλαρέτῳ.

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἠδέα μάχεται, ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΦΥΣΕΙ ΤΟΙΑΥΤ' ΕΙΝΑΙ· τοῖς δὲ φιλοκαλοῖς ἐστὶν 20 ἠδέα, ΤΑ ΦΥΣΕΙ ἠΔΕΑ. τοιαῦτα δ' αἰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις. ὥστε καὶ τοῦτοῖς εἰσὶν ἠδεῖαι, καὶ ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΑΣ. οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἠδονῆς ὁ βίος αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ΠΕΡΙΑΠΤΟΥ ΤΙΝΟΣ, ἀλλ' ΕΧΕΙ ΤΗΝ ἠΔΟΝΗΝ ΕΝ ἘΑΥΤῳ. πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ, οὐδ' 25 ΕΣΤΙΝ ἀγαθὸς ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν. οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῶ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ' ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δ' οὕτω, ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΑΣ ἂΝ ΕΙΕΝ Αἰ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ 30 ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ ἠΔΕΙΑΙ.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί· καὶ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ, τούτων ἕκαστον· ΕΠΙΕΡ ΚΑΛΩΣ ΚΡΙΝΕΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤῶΝ ὁ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΣ. κρίνει δ', ὡς εἴπομεν.

ἌΡΙΣΤΟΝ ἄρα, καὶ ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΝ, καὶ ἠΔΙΣΤΟΝ, ἢ

εὐδαιμονία. καὶ οὐ διάρῖσται ταῦτα, κατὰ τὸ Δη-
λιακὸν ἐπίγραμμα·

κάλλιστον τὸ δίκαιότατον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν·
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ', οὗ τις ἔρα τὸ τυχεῖν.

ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίσταις ἐνεργείαις· 5
ταύτας δὲ, ἢ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμὲν εἶναι
ΤΗΝ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ.

XVII. Φαίνεται δ' ὁμως καὶ ΤΩΝ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ
See §. iv. of this chap. ΠΡΟΣΔΕΟΜΕΝΗ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ οὐ
ῥάδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ 10
μὲν γὰρ πράττεται, (καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων,) διὰ
φίλων, καὶ πλούτου, καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως. ἐνίων
δὲ τητῶμενοι, ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον· οἷον εὐγενείας,
εὐτεκνίας, κάλλους. οὐ πάνυ γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν
ιδεάν παναίσχης, ἢ δυσγενῆς, ἢ μονότης καὶ ἄτεκνος· 15
ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον, εἴ τῳ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν, ἢ
φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες τεθνήσκουσιν. καθάπερ οὖν εἴπομεν,
ἔοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας. ὅθεν
ΕΙΣ ΤΑΥΤΟ ΤΑΥΤΟΥΣΙΝ ΕΝΙΟΙ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΝ Τῆ
ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ[· ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν]. 20

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH VARIOUS DETACHED QUESTIONS, RELATING
TO THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, ARE EXAMINED.

PART I.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: IN WHAT WAY IS
HAPPINESS DERIVED TO US?

10 I. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν,
ἢ εοῖστον, ἢ ἀλλῶς πως ἀσκητὸν, ἢ κατὰ τινὰ
θεῖαν μοῖραν, ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται;

II. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δῶρημα
ἀνθρώποις, εὐλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον 25

εἶναι· καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, ὅσα βέλτιστον.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκει-
ότερον.

III. Φαίνεται δὲ, καὶ εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν,
5 ἀλλὰ ΔΙ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΝΑ ΜΑΘΗΣΙΝ Η ΑΣΚΗΣΙΝ
παραγίνεται· τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρε-
τῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται, καὶ
θεῖόν τι, καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον.
δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις
10 πρὸς ἀρετὴν, διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ
δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον, ἢ διὰ τύχην, εὐδαιμονεῖν· εὐ-
λογον ἔχειν ΟΥΤΩΣ.

IV. Εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ ΦΥΣΙΝ, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα
ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ,
15 καὶ πᾶσαν ΑΙΤΙΑΝ· καὶ μάλιστα, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην.
τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι ΤΥΧῃ, λίαν
πλημμελές ἂν εἴη.

V. Συμφανές δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ΛΟΓΟΥ τὸ ζητού-
μενον. εἴρηται γὰρ ΨΥΧΗΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ
20 ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰ μὲν ὕΠΑΡΧΕΙΝ See C. III.
ἀναγκαῖον· τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν §. iv.
ΟΡΓΑΝΙΚΩΣ. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ
ΤΟΙΣ ΕΝ ΑΡΧῃ. τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ See C. I. §.
ἐτίθεμεν· αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται, τοῦ vii. and viii.
25 ποιούς τινας, καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι, καὶ
πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν.

VI. Εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βούν, οὔτε ἵππον, οὔτε ἄλλο
τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν, εὐδαιμον λέγομεν. οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν
οἶόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην
30 δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν. οὐπω γὰρ
πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν. οἱ δὲ λε-
γόμενοι, ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΛΠΙΔΑ μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γὰρ,
ὥσπερ εἶπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου.

Πολλὰ γὰρ μεταβολὰὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύ-
 χαι κατὰ τὸν βίον· καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐ-
 θηνοῦντα, μεγάλας συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρας·
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡρωϊκοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται.
 τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις, χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτή- 5
 σαντα ἀθλίως, οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

PART II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: HOW FAR IS THE
 STATE OF HAPPINESS LIABLE TO BE AFFECTED BY
 CHANGES OF FORTUNE?

II VII. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον ΟΥΔΕΝΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ
 See G. III. ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΣΤΕΟΝ ἔΩΣ ΑΝ Ζῆ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ, χρεῶν
 §. vii. τέλος ὄραϊν;

VIII. Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετίον οὕτως, ἄρα γε καὶ ἔστιν 10
 εὐδαίμων ΤΟΤΕ, ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ ΑΠΟΘΑΝῆ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παν-
 τελῶς ἄτοπον· ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν, ΕΝ-
 ΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ τινὰ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν;

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, μηδὲ
 Σόλωνα τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι ΤΗΝΙΚΑΥΤΑ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ 15
 ΑΣΦΑΛΩΣ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΣΕΙΕΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ, ὧΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΗΔΗ
 ΤΩΝ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΥΣΤΥΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ· ἔχει
 μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισβήτησίν τινὰ. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι
 τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ
 ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ· οἶον, τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι, 20
 καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὄλως ἀπογόνων, εὐπραξίαι τε καὶ
 δυστυχίαι. ἀπορίαν γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα παρέχει. τῷ
 μὲν γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρας καὶ τε-
 λευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον, ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μετα-
 βολὰς συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν 25
 αὐτῶν ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν,
 τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας· δῆλον δ', ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστή-

ἀπορίαν δὲ.

τῷ γὰρ.

σεκ. εν.

μασι πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐν-
δέχεται. ἄτοπον δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συμμεταβάλλοι
καὶ ὁ τεθνεὼς, καὶ γίνοιτο, ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων, πάλιν δ'
ἄθλιος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδὲν, μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα
5 χρονον, συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐγγόνων τοῖς γονεῦσιν.

IX. Ἄλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπορηθέν.
τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθείη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον ἐξ
ἐκείνου.

Εἰ δὲ τὸ τέλος ὄραν δεῖ, καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν
10 ἕκαστον, οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἄλλ' ὅτι προτε-
ρον ἦν· πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων, μὴ
ἀληθεύσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ μὴ
βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μετα-
βολάς; καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπει-
15 ληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον, τὰς δὲ τύχας
πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς; δῆλον
γὰρ, ὡς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν αὐτὸν
εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις· χαμ-
αιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σαθρῶς
20 ἰδρυμένον· ἢ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν οὐδα-
μῶς ὀρθόν; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῦταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς· ἀλλὰ
προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ See C. III.
εἴπαμεν· κῦριαί δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείας
§. iv. and
§. v. of this
chapter.
30 γείαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου.
X. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῶ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν.
περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων
βεβαιότης, ὡς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς κατ' ἀρετὴν.
μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι. τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται, μονιμώταται·
διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν αὐ-
ταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους. (τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ, τοῦ
μὴ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην.) ὕπαρξει δὲ τὸ
ζητούμενον τῷ εὐδαιμονί, καὶ ἐστὶ διὰ βίον

ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ. αἰεὶ γὰρ, ἢ μάλιστα πάντων, πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμμελῶς, ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἀνευ ψόγου.

XI. Πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην, καὶ δια-5 φερόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι· τὰ μὲν ΜΙΚΡΑ τῶν εὐτυχημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς. τὰ δὲ ΜΕΓΑΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΑ, γιγνώμενα μὲν εὖ, μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει· (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ 10 ἢ χρῆσις αὐτῶν καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται.) ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίοντα θλίβει, καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· (λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΖΕΙ πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις.) ὅμως δὲ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΔΙΑΛΑΜΠΕΙ ΤΟ ΚΑΛΟΝ· ἐπειδὴν φέρη τις εὐκόλως πολλὰς 15 καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δὲ ἀναλγησίαν, ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ἂν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

XII. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ἐνέργειαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἴπομεν· οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. 20 τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα, πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αἰεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν. καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν, τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα· καὶ σκυτοτόμον, ἐκ τῶν δοθέν- 25 των σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. εἰ δ' οὕτως· ΑΘΛΙΟΣ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΔΕΠΟΤΕ ΓΕΝΟΙΤ' ΑΝ Ὁ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ.

XIII. Οὐ μὴν ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύ-30 χαις περιπέσῃ. οὐδὲ δὴ ΠΟΙΚΙΛΟΣ ΓΕ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΜΕΤΑΒΟΛΟΣ. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινήσεται ῥΑΔΙΩΣ, οὐδ' ὑπὸ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΧΟΝΤΩΝ ἀτυχημάτων· ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν. [ἐκ τε τῶν

τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαιμόνων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' εἶπερ, ἐν πολλῶ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος ἐπήβολος.]

XIV. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαιμόνα, ΤΟΝ ΚΑΤ' 5
 ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ΤΕΛΕΙΑΝ ΕΝΕΡΓΟΥΝΤΑ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΙΣ ἸΚΑΝΩΣ ΚΕΧΟΡΗΓΗΜΕΝΟΝ, ΜΗ ΤΟΝ ΤΥΧΟΝΤΑ ΧΡΟΝΟΝ, ΑΛΛΑ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ; ἢ προσθετέον, ΚΑΙ ΒΙΩΣΟΜΕΝΟΝ ὄΥΤΩ ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΝ; ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ 10
 τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν πάντῃ πάντως. εἰ δ' οὕτω· ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΥΣ ΕΡΟΥΜΕΝ ΤΩΝ ΖΩΝΤΩΝ ὍΙΣ ὙΠΑΡΧΕΙ [ΚΑΙ ὙΠΑΡΞΕΙ] ΤΑ ΛΕΧΘΕΝΤΑ, ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΥΣ Δ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ.
 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διαγρίσθω.

PART III.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER THE CONDITION OF THE DEAD IS AFFECTED BY THAT OF THEIR SURVIVING FRIENDS?

XV. Τὰς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας, καὶ τῶν φίλων 15
 ἀπάντων, τὸ μὲν μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι, λίαν ἀφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. See §. viii.
of this chap.

XVI. Πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων διαφορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικνουμένων, τῶν δ' ἥττον· καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακρὸν 20
 καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται· καθόλου δὲ λεχθέν καὶ τύπῳ, τάχ' ἂν ἰκανῶς ἔχοι. εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ΠΕΡΙ ἄΥΤΟΝ ἀτυχημάτων, τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βεβήθος καὶ ῥοπὴν πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν· οὕτω καὶ τὰ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΦΙΛΟΥΣ ἰμοίως ἀπαντας.

XVII. Διαφέρει δὲ τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαίνειν, πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πρᾶττεσθαι.

XVIII. ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΤΕΟΝ δὴ καὶ ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν. μάλλον δ' ἴσως, τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας, εἴ τινοσ ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν ἀντικειμένων.

XIX. Ἐοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ δίκνεῖται πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τοῦναντίον, ἀφαιρόν τι καὶ μικρὸν, ἢ ἄπλωσ ἢ ἐκεῖνοις, εἶναι. [εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοσοῦτόν γε καὶ τοιοῦτον,] ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας, μηδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. ΣΥΜΒΑΛΛΕΣΘΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΤΙ ΦΑΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ 10 ΚΕΚΜΗΚΟΣΙΝ ἌΙ ΕΥΠΡΑΞΙΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΩΝ· ὍΜΟΙΩΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ἌΙ ΔΥΣΠΡΑΞΙΑΙ· ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΘΗΛΙΚΑΥΤΑ, ὍΣΤΕ ΜΗΤΕ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΑΣ ΜΗ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΑΣ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, ΜΗΤ' ἌΛΛΟ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ ΜΗΔΕΝ.

PART IV.

AN EXAMINATION OF A QUESTION RELATING TO THE QUALITY OR VALUE OF THE SOVEREIGN GOOD.

12 XX. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων, ἐπισκεψάμεθα περὶ τῆς 15 εὐδαιμονίας, ΠΟΤΕΡΑ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΑΙΝΕΤΩΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΤΙΜΙΩΝ; δῆλον γὰρ, ὅτι τῶν γε ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ οὐκ ἔστιν.

XXI. Φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετόν, ΤΩ ΠΟΙΟΝ ΤΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ ΠΩΣ ΕΧΕΙΝ, ἐπαινεῖσθαι. τὸν γὰρ 20 δίκαιον, καὶ τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, καὶ ὅλας τὸν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα· καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρόν, καὶ τὸν δρομικόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, τῷ ποιόν τινα πεφυκέναι, καὶ ἔχειν πως, πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον. δῆλον δὲ τούτο, καὶ ἐκ τῶν 25 περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαίνων. γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται, πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους δι' ἀναφορᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπαμεν. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιούτων· δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν

ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ μῆζόν τι καὶ βέλ-
 τιον. καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται. τοὺς τε γὰρ θεοὺς ΜΑ-
 ΚΑΡΙΖΟΜΕΝ καὶ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΖΟΜΕΝ, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν
 5 ἀγαθῶν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ΕΠΙΧΑΙΝΕΙ, καθά-
 περ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὡς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον,
 ΜΑΚΑΡΙΖΕΙ. (δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξὸς καλῶς συνηγορεῖ-
 σαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαι-
 νεῖσθαι, τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὔσαν, μνηύειν ἄετο, ΟΤΙ ΚΡΕΙΤ-
 10 ΤΟΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΠΙΧΑΙΝΕΤΩΝ· τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν
 καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τᾶλλα ἀναφέ-
 ρεσθαι.) ὁ μὲν γὰρ ΕΠΙΧΑΙΝΟΣ τῆς ἀρετῆς· πρακτικοὶ
 γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης. τὰ δ' ΕΓΚΩΜΙΑ τῶν
 ἔργων, ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.
 15 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς
 περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις.

XXII. Ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι ΕΣΤΙΝ
 Η ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΤΙΜΙΩΝ καὶ τελείων. ἔοικε δ'
 οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ΑΡΧΗ· ταύτης γὰρ
 20 χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν. τὴν ἀρ-
 χὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τίμιόν τι καὶ
 θεῖον τίθεμεν.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH THE ENQUIRY, CONFORMABLY TO THE PRE-
 VIOUS DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS, PROCEEDS TO
 INTRODUCE THE CONSIDERATION OF VIRTUE.

I. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία “ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά 13
 τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν” περὶ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ἐπισκεπτέον. See C. III.
 25 τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟ-
 ΝΙΑΣ θεωρήσαιμεν.

Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΣ περὶ

See C. I.
§. viii.

ΤΑΥΤΗΝ μάλιστα πεπονῆσθαι. βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. παράδειγμα δὲ τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγένηται. εἰ δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις 5 αὕτη δῆλον, ὅτι ΓΕΝΟΙΤ' ΑΝ Ἡ ΖΗΤΗΣΙΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΕΞ ΑΡΧΗΣ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ.

Περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗΣ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γὰρ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν, καὶ ΤΗΝ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΝ ἀνθρωπίνην. ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν 10 ἀνθρωπίνην, ΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΜΑΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ “ΨΥΧΗΣ ἐνέργειαν” λέγομεν.

II. Εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει δῆλον, ὅτι ΔΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ ΠΩΣ ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΝ. ὥσπερ καὶ 15 τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅσα τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικῆ τῆς ἰατρικῆς. τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαριέντεσ, πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῶ πολιτικῶ περὶ ψυχῆς. θεωρητέον δὲ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ 20 ΧΑΡΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΦ' ὍΣΟΝ ἸΚΑΝΩΣ ΕΧΕΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΖΗΤΟΥΜΕΝΑ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐξακριβοῦν, ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.

III. Λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. 25 οἷον, τὸ μὲν ΑΛΟΓΟΝ αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝ. (ταῦτα δὲ πότερον ΔΙΩΡΙΣΤΑΙ, καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μορία, καὶ πᾶν τὸ μεριστόν· ἢ ΤΩ ΛΟΓΩ δύο ἐστὶν, ΑΧΩΡΙΣΤΑ ΠΕΦΥΚΟΤΑ, (καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερεία τὸ κυρτόν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον)· οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ 30 παρόν.)

IV. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἔοικε ΚΟΙΝῶ ΚΑΙ ΦΥΤΙΚῶ· λέγω δὲ, ΤΟ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΤΡΕΦΕΣΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΞΕΣΘΑΙ. τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν

ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θείη τις ἄν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμβρύοις· τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις. εὐλογώτερον γὰρ, ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

Ταύτης μὲν οὖν ΚΟΙΝΗ τις ἀρετὴ, καὶ ΟΥΚ ΑΝΘΡΩ-
 5 ΠΙΝΗ, φαίνεται. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν
 μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὕτη ὁ δ'
 ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥμιστα διάδηλοι καθ' ὕπνον. (ὅθεν
 φασίν, οὐδὲν διαφέρειν, τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ βίου, τοὺς εὐδαί-
 μονας τῶν ἀθλίων.) συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο εἰκότως. ΑΡ-
 10 ΓΙΑ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς, ἥ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ ΣΠΟΥ-
 ΔΑΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΥΔΗ· πλὴν εἴ πῃ κατὰ μικρὸν διικ-
 νοῦνται τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται
 τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.
 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλις· καὶ τὸ ΘΡΕΠΤΙΚΟΝ
 15 ἑατέον· ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἄμοιρον πέ-
 φυκεν.

V. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς
 ΑΛΟΓΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΜΕΤΕΧΟΥΣΑ ΜΕΝΤΟΙ Πῆ ΛΟΓΟΥ. τοῦ
 γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς ΤΟΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ, καὶ τῆς
 20 ψυχῆς ΤΟ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝ, ἐπαινοῦμεν (ὀρθῶς γὰρ, καὶ
 ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα, παρακαλεῖ) φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς
 καὶ ἄλλο τι, ΠΑΡΑ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὃ ΜΑΧΕΤΑΙ
 ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΤΕΙΝΕΙ Τῷ ΛΟΓῳ.

Ἄτεχνῶς γὰρ, καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα
 25 τοῦ σώματος μόρια, εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων
 κινήσαι, τούναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται·
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως. ἐπὶ τάναντία γὰρ αἰ-
 ὄρμαί τῶν ἀκρατῶν. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὄρω-
 ΜΕΝ τὸ παραφερόμενον· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ΟΥΧ ὀρᾶ-
 30 ΜΕΝ. ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον, καὶ ΕΝ Τῇ ΨΥΧῇ νομιστέον
 εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ
 ἀντιβαῖνον. (πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.)

Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ
 εἴπομεν· ΠΕΙΘΑΡΧΕΙ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς.

ἔτι δ', ἴσως ΕΥΗΚΟΠΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΣΤΙ Τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου· πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφανεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.

Φαίνεται δὴ καὶ ΤΟ ΑΛΟΓΟΝ διττόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΦΥΤΙΚΟΝ οὐδαμῶς κοινωεῖ λόγου· τὸ δ' ΕΠΙΘΥΜΗΤΙΚΟΝ καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν, μετέχει ΠΩΣ, ἢ κατήκοόν⁵ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. (οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμέν ΕΧΕΙΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ· καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.) ὅτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει, καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις, καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις τε καὶ παράκλησις. 10

VI. Εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΕΙΝ, διττόν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον· τὸ μὲν ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ἌΥΤῳ, τὸ δ' ὨΣΠΕΡ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΑΚΟΥΣΤΙΚΟΝ ΤΙ.

VII. Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΙΑ-15 ΦΟΡΑΝ ΤΑΥΤΗΝ· λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν, τὰς μὲν ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΑΣ, τὰς δὲ ΗΘΙΚΑΣ. σοφίαν μὲν, καὶ σύνεσιν, καὶ φρόνησιν, ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΑΣ· ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ, καὶ σωφροσύνην, ΗΘΙΚΑΣ.

Λέγοντες γὰρ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΗΘΟΥΣ, οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι 20 σοφὸς ἢ συνετός, ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων. ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ἜΞΙΝ· ΤΩΝ ἘΞΕΩΝ ΔΕ ΤΑΣ ΕΠΙΝΕΤΑΣ, ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

in regard to

BOOK II.

SUMMARY OF THE SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

ON MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL: AND FIRST, ON THE MANNER AND THE SIGNS OF ITS PRODUCTION.

This chapter, which introduces the consideration of MORAL virtue, consists of two parts. The first considers the manner in which it is produced and destroyed. The second lays down the criterion, by which we may decide respecting the attainment, or the absence, of it.

PART THE FIRST.

I. INTELLECTUAL virtue is derived from instruction, and MORAL virtue from CUSTOM. II. MORAL virtue is not implanted BY NATURE: III. Nor acquired CONTRARY TO NATURE. IV. But it results from THE PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE OF ACTS CONGENIAL TO IT. V. In this respect, the case of the MORAL VIRTUES and of the ARTS is the same. VI. This principle is attested by the practical recognition of all good legislators.

VII. Virtue is DESTROYED in the same mode in which it is acquired: namely, by the CUSTOM OF ACTION.

VIII. By the foregoing considerations is discovered, the great importance, in subserviency to happiness, of RIGHT EDUCATION.

IX. The necessity of enquiring into the nature of our MORAL ACTIONS, singly considered: which is, because our MORAL HABITS (to which class the moral VIRTUES belong) derive their formation from them.

X. In order then to constitute the goodness of our moral actions, it is laid down: That they must be AGREEABLE TO RIGHT REASON. But this consideration is postponed till the sixth book.

(XI. We are reminded, that on this subject, all general principles must be modified, by considerable limitations, and by a special regard to circumstances and occasions.)

XII. In relation then to the nature of our moral actions, this principle is laid down: THAT THE GOOD QUALITY OF THEM IS DESTROYED BY EXCESS AND DEFECT.

XIII. As our VIRTUES are derived from our MORAL OPERATIONS: so also, THE POWER OF OUR MORAL OPERATIONS is augmented by our VIRTUES.

PART THE SECOND.

XIV. The CRITERION of our HABITS presents itself, in THE PLEASURE OR PAIN attendant upon our ACTIONS. XV. This last principle is grounded upon the following: As every single virtue relates to its particular subject; so is it a character of MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL, that IT RELATES TO PLEASURE AND PAIN: a truth, which is substantiated by seven distinct considerations.

CHAP. II.

IN WHICH AN OBJECTION IS SUPPOSED, AGAINST THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE FOREGOING CHAPTER: AND AN ANSWER IS GIVEN TO IT.

I. The objection is supposed: "How is it that we BECOME virtuous, BY DOING virtuous acts? for if we do virtuous acts, we must be virtuous ALREADY." This objection is grounded on an analogy derived from the ARTS.

II. But the principle on which the objection is grounded, is not true. III. And the analogy does not hold good: for there exists, as to this particular, a difference between VIRTUE and ART. IV. Acts which, considered abstractedly in themselves, are agreeable to the rule of virtue, do not imply virtue already formed in the agent: and it is by the repetition of SUCH acts, that the habit of virtue is formed.

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH MORAL VIRTUE IS DESCRIBED AND DEFINED.

This chapter consists of four parts. In the first it is shewn, that MORAL VIRTUE IS A HABIT. In the second it is shewn, that that habit consists in a MEAN^a between two faulty extremes. In the third, the foregoing positions are fortified by an inductive demonstration. In the fourth is considered, the nature of the opposition subsisting, both between the mean and the extremes, and between the extremes towards each other.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The question is proposed: WHAT IS VIRTUE?

II. Towards the solution of this question, it is stated, that the endowments of the soul are of three kinds, namely, AFFECTIONS, FACULTIES, and HABITS: each of which is severally defined. III. It is shewn, that virtue is not an AFFECTION: IV. Nor a FACULTY: V. And therefore, that it is a HABIT.

PART THE SECOND.

VI. The question is proposed: WHAT KIND OF HABIT IS VIRTUE?

VII. Towards the solution of this question, it is affirmed, as a GENERAL principle, THAT THE VIRTUE OF MAN, LIKE THAT OF EVERY OTHER THING, IS THAT WHICH IMPARTS GOODNESS TO THE POSSESSOR OF IT, AND WHICH QUALIFIES HIM FOR HIS APPROPRIATE FUNCTION. Such is the habit of virtue. In order to a more particular delineation of it, the following principles are advanced.

VIII. All quantities and degrees of things are subject to an EXCESS, a DEFECT, and a MEDIUM. IX. The medium is of two kinds: the one of which is ABSOLUTE, and viewed only with reference to the THING; the other is RELATIVE, and viewed with reference to the

^a For the sake of clearness, though it be a distinction not required by the established use of words, the terms MEAN and MEDIUM will in future be employed, respectively, to correspond with Aristotle's use of *μεσότης* and *μέτρον*: the former term denoting the habit of mind, and the latter, the subject to which that habit relates.

AGENT. X. It is the RELATIVE MEDIUM which, by every practical science, in the peculiar province of knowledge which belongs to it, is the point aimed at. XI. From this, with other considerations, it is inferred, that the relative medium is the point aimed at by Moral Virtue, in the government of human passions and actions; which is ITS peculiar province. XII. This last position is further evinced by this consideration: That the medium is one definite point, which it is not easy, unless by habits duly formed, to reach; whereas excess and defect, the attributes of every vicious feeling and action, are infinite and numberless, and attainable by any casual or spontaneous impulse of nature: the point of DIFFICULTY will therefore, from a consideration of the intrinsic nature of virtue, be the APPROPRIATE MARK of it. XIII. From the foregoing principles is deduced the following definition of virtue: A HABIT OF MORAL DETERMINATION, CONSISTING IN A MEAN: WHICH MEAN IS RELATIVE TO THE AGENT, DEFINED BY REASON, AND DEFINED IN THE WAY IN WHICH A WISE MAN (Φ ΡΟΝΙΜΟΣ) WOULD DEFINE IT.

XIV. Though virtue, with regard to its SUBJECT, be a mean; with regard to its QUALITY AND VALUE it is an extreme: since nothing human can surpass its excellence.

XV. Vice is not susceptible of a mean, nor virtue of an extreme.

PART THE THIRD.

XVI. The foregoing general description of virtue, requires to be confirmed by an examination of particulars.

XVII. On going through the subject in detail, it appears, that every virtue is a mean, and that every vice consists in either excess or defect. XVIII. It also appears, that there is a mean of rectitude in the AFFECTIONS, as well as in the habits.

PART THE FOURTH.

XIX. The mean and the two extremes are each of them opposed to the other two. XX. The extremes are more opposed to each other than to the mean. XXI. There is sometimes a resemblance of the mean to one of the extremes. XXII. In some instances, the excess; in others, the defect; is most opposed to the mean. XXIII. Of this, two reasons are assigned.

CHAP. IV.

GENERAL RULES FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF MORAL
VIRTUE.

I. The difficulty of virtue being represented: II. III. IV. THREE GENERAL RULES are given for the attainment of it. II. First: Be more particularly careful to avoid THE MORE BLAMEABLE EXTREME. III. Secondly: Watch THE PROPENSION OF YOUR NATURE. IV. Thirdly: Be more especially guarded against THE SEDUCTION OF PLEASURE.

V. The impossibility of fixing a precise line of duty applicable to all particular cases: the right measure of action, in such cases, being a matter of PERCEPTION, rather than one capable of verbal description.

VI. Concluding admonition.

CHAP. I.

ON MORAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL : AND FIRST, ON THE
MANNER AND SIGNS OF ITS PRODUCTION.

PART I.

ON THE MANNER IN WHICH MORAL VIRTUE IS PRODUCED
AND DESTROYED.

I. ΔΙΤΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσῆς, τῆς μὲν I
διανοητικῆς, τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς· ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ, τὸ
πλεῖον, ΕΚ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ
τὴν αὐξήσιν· (διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου·) ἡ
5 δ' ἠθικὴ ΕΞ ΕΘΟΥΣ περιγίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ΤΟΥΝΟΜΑ
ἔσχηκε, μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ΕΘΟΥΣ.

II. Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν
ἀρετῶν ΦΥΣΕΙ ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται. ΟΥΘΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΙ
ΟΝΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΩΣ ΕΘΙΖΕΤΑΙ. οἷον· ὁ λίθος, φύσει κάτω
10 φερόμενος, οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθεῖ ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν
μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων· οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ,
κάτω οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν, τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων,
ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθεῖ.

III. ΟΥΤ' ΑΡΑ ΦΥΣΕΙ, ΟΥΤΕ ΠΑΡΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ, ΕΓΓΙΝΟΝ-
15 ΤΑΙ ΑΙ ΑΡΕΤΑΙ· ΑΛΛΑ ΠΕΦΥΚΟΣΙ ΜΕΝ ἩΜΙΝ ΔΕΞΑΣΘΑΙ
ΑΥΤΑΣ, ΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΜΕΝΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΕΘΟΥΣ.

IV. Ἔτι, ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς
ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ

τὰς ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ ἀποδίδομεν. ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰσθησέων
 δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν, ἢ πολλάκις
 ἀκοῦσαι, τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν· ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν,
 ΕΧΟΝΤΕΣ ΕΧΡΗΣΑΜΕΘΑ, ΟΥ ΧΡΗΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ ΕΣΧΟΜΕΝ.
 τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργησαντες προ-5
 τερον.

V. Ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν [ἄλλων] τεχνῶν. ἂ γὰρ
 δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνο-
 μεν. οἶον, οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται, καὶ
 κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ, τὰ μὲν δίκαια 10
 πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες,
 τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

See B. I. c.
 i. §. viii. and
 c. v. §. i.

VI. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλε-
 σιν. οἱ γὰρ νομοθεταί, τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες,
 ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς. καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομο- 15
 θέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν. ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὔ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν, ἁμαρ-
 τανουσίν· καὶ διαφέρει τοῦτ' ὅτι πολιτεία πολιτείας,
 ἀγαθὴ φάτης.

VII. Ἐτι, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ
 γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθειρεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 20
 τεχνῆ. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν, καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ
 κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ
 οἰκοδόμοι, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὔ
 οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 κακῶς, κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν· οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει 25
 τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐβινοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ
 κακοί. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει. πράττοντες
 γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώ-
 πους, γινόμεθα, οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι· πράτ-
 τοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς, καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖσθαι 30
 ἢ θαρρῆν, οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι, οἱ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς
 ὀρτάς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ

δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι· οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφονται, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. καὶ ἐνὶ δὴ λόγῳ· ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ὍΜΟΙΩΝ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΩΝ Αἱ ἔξεις ΓΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ.

5 VIII. Διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποίας ἀποδιδόναι. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. ΟΥ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ ΟΥΝ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΤΟ ὍΥΤΩΣ Η ὍΥΤΩΣ ΕΥΘΥΣ ΕΚ ΝΕΩΝ ΕΘΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ, ΑΛΛΑ ΠΑΜΠΟΛΥ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΔΕ, ΤΟ ΠΑΝ.

10 IX. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας 2
ἐνεκά ἐστιν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι· (οὐ γὰρ ἴν' εἰδῶμεν τι ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἴν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα· ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς·) ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶ σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, πῶς
15 πρακτέον αὐτάς. αὗται γὰρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποίας γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.

X. Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν, κοινόν, καὶ ὑποκείσθω. ῥηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει
20 πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς.

XI. (Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογήσθω· ὅτι πᾶς ὁ See B. I. c.
περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, λόγος τύπῳ, καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς, i. §. ix.
οφείλει λεγέσθαι. ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν,
“ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν
25 ταῖς πράξεσι, καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει” ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ
καθολοῦ λόγου· ἐτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές. οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
τέχνην, οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν, πίπτει· δεῖ
30 δ' αὐτοὺς αἰεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει, καὶ τῆς

κυβερνητικῆς. ἀλλὰ (καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου,) πειρατέον βοηθεῖν.)

XII. Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον· ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ΕΝΔΕΙΑΣ καὶ ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗΣ φθείρεσθαι, (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις ὅχι χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν. τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια, καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα, φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία, πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα, φθείρει τὴν ὑγείαν· τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα, καὶ ποιεῖ, 10 καὶ αὖξει, καὶ σώζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων, ΔΕΙΛΟΣ γίνεται· ὁ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων, ΘΡΑΣΥΣ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, ὁ μὲν 15 πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος, ΑΚΟΛΑΣΤΟΣ· ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων (ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι), ΑΝΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΣ τις. φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, ὑπὸ τῆς ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΕΛΛΕΙΨΕΩΣ· ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς ΜΕΣΟΤΗΤΟΣ σώζεται. 20

XIII. Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΙΣ, καὶ αἱ ΑΥΤΗ-ΣΕΙΣ, καὶ αἱ ΦΘΟΡΑΙ, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται· ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει· οἷον, ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος. ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ γὰρ ἐκ 25 τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΔΥΝΑΤΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ, ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν, γινόμεθα σώφρονες· καὶ γενόμενοι, μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. 30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας. ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ, γινόμεθα

ἀνδρεῖοι· καὶ γενόμενοι, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

PART II.

THE SIGNS BY WHICH THE VIRTUOUS OR VICIOUS
QUALITY OF OUR HABITS MAY BE KNOWN.

XIV. ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔΞΕΩΝ, τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ἢ ΛΥΠΗΝ τοῖς ΕΡΓΟΙΣ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῶ τούτων χαίρων, σώφρων· ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος, ἀκόλαστος. καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε, ἀνδρεῖος· ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος, δειλός.

XV. ΠΕΡΙ ἩΔΟΝΑΣ ΓΑΡ ΚΑΙ ΛΥΠΑΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ἡ
10 ἨΘΙΚΗ ΑΡΕΤΗ.

1. Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαίπας εὐθύς ἐκ νέων, (ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν,) ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ. ἢ γὰρ ὀρθῆ
15 παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. See §. viii.
of this chap.

2. Ἐτι δ', εἰ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη· παντὶ δὲ πάθει, καὶ πάσῃ πράξει, ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη· καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας.

20 3. Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων. ἰατρεῖαι γὰρ τινές εἰσιν· αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

4. Ἐτι, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν· πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ' οἷαν πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, 25 πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει· δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλαι γίνονται, τῶ δῖώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἢ ἄς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ, ἢ ὅς οὐ δεῖ, ἢ ὅσα χῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς, ΑΠΑ-

ΘΕΙΑΣ τινὰς καὶ ΗΡΕΜΙΑΣ. οὐκ εὖ δέ· ὅτι ἄπλωσ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι, ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ΤΩΝ ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚῆ· ἡ δὲ κακία, τούναντίον. 5

5. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἐστι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ [τριῶν τῶν εἰς] τὰς φυγὰς, ΚΑΛΟΥ, ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ, ἩΔΕΟΣ· καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, Αἰσχροῦ, βλαβεροῦ, λυπηροῦ· περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθός 10 κατ' οὐρανὸν ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικὸς· μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν. κοινὴ τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις· καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ τὸ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ ἡδὺ φαίνεται. ἔτι δ', ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται. διὸ χα- 15 λεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ.

6. Κανονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἦττον, ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν. 20 οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις, εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαιρείν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

7. Ἐτι δὲ, χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος· περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ, καὶ τέχνη γίνεται, καὶ ἀρετὴ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ 25 βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία, καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος, ἀγαθὸς ἔσται· ὁ δὲ κακῶς, κακός.

Ἐπιμνηστέον ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ 30 λύπας· καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὐξεται καὶ φθείρεται, μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων· καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ· εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. II.

IN WHICH AN OBJECTION IS SUPPOSED, AGAINST THE
LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE FOREGOING CHAPTER:
AND AN ANSWER IS GIVEN TO IT.

I. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, “ πῶς λέγομεν, ὅτι ΔΕΙ, 3
ΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΑΣ, δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ
δὲ σώφρονα, σώφρονας; εἰ γὰρ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΥΣΙ τὰ δί-
καια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα, ἤδη εἰσι δίκαιοι καὶ σώ-
5 φρονες· ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ,
γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί.”

II. Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται
γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι, καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης, καὶ
ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν
10 καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ, καὶ γραμματικῶς·
τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, [τὸ] κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικῇ.

III. Ἔτι, οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν
ἀρετῶν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ
ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα
15 γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα, οὐκ ἐὰν
ΑΥΤΑ ΠΩΣ ΕΧῆ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται,
ἀλλὰ καὶ, ἐὰν Ὁ ΠΡΑΤΤΩΝ ΠΩΣ ΕΧΩΝ ΠΡΑΤΤῆ·
πρῶτον μὲν, ἐὰν εἰδῶς· ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος· καὶ
προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, καὶ ἐὰν βε-
20 βαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ,
πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς [ἄλλας] ΤΕΧΝΑΣ ἔχειν, οὐ συναριθ-
μεῖται, πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ΑΡΕΤΑΣ,
τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ
μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται. ἄπερ ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΛ-
25 ΛΑΚΙΣ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ ΤΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΣΩΦΡΟΝΑ περι-
γίνεται.

IV. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἢ τοιαῦτα, οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστίν, οὐχ ὁ ΤΑΥΤΑ πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ὄΥΤΩ πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν. εὔ οὖν λέ-5 γεται, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ [τὰ] σώφρονα, ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα, οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες, οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν, 10 καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι· ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' οὐθέν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὔ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα, οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι· οὐδ' οὔτοι τὴν ψυχὴν, οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες. 15

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH MORAL VIRTUE IS DESCRIBED AND DEFINED.

PART I.

VIRTUE IS A HABIT.

4 I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον.

II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, ΠΑΘΗ, ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ, ἘΞΕΙΣ· τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν, ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργὴν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαρὰν, φιλίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, ἔλεον, 20 ὅλας ὅΙΣ ἘΠΕΤΑΙ ἩΔΟΝΗ ἢ ΛΥΠΗ· δυνάμεις δὲ, ΚΑΘ' ἌΣ ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΟΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΘΑ, οἷον, καθ' ἅς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι, ἢ λυπηθῆναι, ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ, ΚΑΘ' ἌΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΠΑΘΗ ΕΧΟΜΕΝ ΕΥ Η

ΚΑΚΩΣ. οἶον, πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τᾶλλα.

III. Πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ, οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι. ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα· καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη, οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα· (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος, οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος· οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπῶς ὀργιζόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς·) κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας, ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. ἔτι, ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως· αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινές, ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη ΚΙΝΕΙΣΘΑΙ λεγόμεθα· κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ ΔΙΑΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ πῶς.

IV. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν. οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῶ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς, οὔτε κακοί· οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. καὶ ἔτι, δυνατοὶ μὲν ἴσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει. εἶπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον.

V. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ, μήτε δυνάμεις· λείπεται ἔΞΕΙΣ αὐτὰς εἶναι.

Ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ ΓΕΝΕΙ ἢ ἀρετῇ, εἴρηται.

PART II.

THE HABIT OF VIRTUE CONSISTS IN A MEDIUM BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES.

VI. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ 5 καὶ ποία τις.

VII. Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι ΠΑΣΑ ΑΡΕΤΗ, ὍΥ ΑΝ Η ΑΡΕΤΗ, ΑΥΤΟ ΤΕ ΕΥ ΕΧΟΝ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΕΡΓΟΝ

ΑΥΤΟΥ ΕΤ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΩΣΙΝ. οἶον· ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ, τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρᾶμεν. ὁμοίως ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ, ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ, καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν, καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην, καὶ μεῖ-⁵ ναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἢ ΤΟΥ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ ΑΡΕΤΗ Εἴη ἂν, ἘΞΙΣ ΑΦ' ἢΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΑΦ' ἢΣ ΕΤ ΤΟ ἘΑΥΤΟΥ ΕΡΓΟΝ ΑΠΟΔΩΣΕΙ.

VIII. Πᾶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν.¹⁰ ἔτι δὲ, καὶ ἂδ' ἔσται φανερόν· εἰάν θεωρήσωμεν ΠΟΙΑ ΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἢ ΦΥΣΙΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ. ἐν παντί δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ, ἔστι λαβεῖν, τὸ μὲν ΠΛΕΙΟΝ, τὸ δ' ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ, τὸ δ' ἼΣΟΝ· καὶ ταῦτα, ἢ ΚΑΤ' ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΠΡΑΓΜΑ, ἢ ΠΡΟΣ ἢΜΑΣ. τὸ δ' ἴσον, ΜΕΣΟΝ ΤΙ ὙΠΕΡ-¹⁵ ΒΟΛΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΕΙΨΕΩΣ.

IX. Λέγω δὲ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ μέσον, ΤΟ ἼΣΟΝ ΑΠΕΧΟΝ ΑΦ' ἘΚΑΤΕΡΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΑΚΡΩΝ· ὅπερ ἔστιν ἐν καὶ ταυτόν πᾶσιν. ΠΡΟΣ ἢΜΑΣ δὲ, Ὁ ΜΗΤΕ ΠΛΕΟΝΑΖΕΙ ΜΗΤΕ ΕΛΛΕΙΠΕΙ· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἔν, οὐδὲ ταύ-²⁰ τὸν πᾶσιν. οἶον, εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ, τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΠΡΑΓΜΑ ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἔστι κατὰ τὴν ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΗΝ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑΝ. τὸ δὲ ΠΡΟΣ ἢΜΑΣ οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ²⁵ φαγεῖν πολὺ, δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μναῖς προστάξει. ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο, πολὺ Τῷ ΛΗΨΟΜΕΝῳ, ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης.

30

X. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ

τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται· μέσον δὲ, ΟΥ ΤΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ, ἀλλὰ ΤΟ ΠΡΟΣ ἩΜΑΣ.

XI. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα
 5 τὰ ἔργα· (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις, ὅτι “ οὗτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν, οὔτε προσθεῖναι.” ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἑλλείψεως ΦΘΕΙΡΟΥΣΗΣ τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος ΣΩΖΟΥΣΗΣ.) οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες, ἐργάζονται· ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα
 10 καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν (ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις). ΤΟΥ ΜΕΣΟΥ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ΣΤΟΧΑΣΤΙΚΗ. λέγω δὲ, τὴν ἠθικὴν. αὕτη γὰρ ἔστί ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΘΗ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ· ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν
 15 ὑπερβολή, καὶ ἑλλείψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον· καὶ φοβηθῆναι, καὶ θαρρῆσαι, καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι, καὶ ὀργισθῆναι, καὶ ἐλεῆσαι, καὶ ὄλως ἠσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι, ἔστι, καὶ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ καὶ ἧΤΤΟΝ, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω οὐκ ἔν· τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ, καὶ εὖ ὀίσις, καὶ πρὸς ὄυσις, καὶ ὄυ ἔνεκα, καὶ ὄσις, δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἀριστον·
 20 ὅπερ ἔστί τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ, ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ἑλλείψις, καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν. ἐν οἷς, ἢ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται, καὶ ἢ ἑλλείψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται·
 25 ταῦτα δ' ἀμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ τις ἄρα ἔστιν ἢ ἀρετῆ, στοχαστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

XII. Ἔτι, τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν ΠΟΛΛΑΧΩΣ ἔστιν· See B. I. c. ii. §. xiv.
 (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἰκάζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.) τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν, ΜΟΝΑΧΩΣ. διὸ καὶ, τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον, τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν· ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν, ΤΗΣ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΚΙΑΣ ἢ ὑπερβολῆ καὶ ἢ ἑλλείψεως, ΤΗΣ Δ' ἀρετῆς ἢ μεσότης.
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Ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

6 XIII. Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἕξις προαιρετικῆς, ἐν μεσοτήτι οὕσα, τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρισμένη λογῶ, καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ φρονιμὸς ὀρισεῖεν μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν, τῆς δὲ κατ' ἕλληψιν. καὶ ἔστι, τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν, τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος, ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὐρίσκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι.

XIV. Διὸ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸν λόγον 10 τὸν τι ἦν εἶναι λεγόντα, μεσότης ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀριστόν καὶ τὸ εὖ, ἀκρότης.

XV. Οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πράξις, οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος, τὴν μεσότητα. ἕνια γὰρ εὐθύς ἀνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος· οἷον, ἐπιχαιρε- 15 κακία, ἀναισχυντία, φθόνος· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων, μοιχεία, κλοπὴ, ἀνδροφονία. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ψεγεται, τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἰ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ 20 ἀμαρτάνειν. οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ, περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐν τῷ ἦν δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὡς, μοιχεύειν· ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς, τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτιοῦν τούτων, ἀμαρτάνειν ἔστιν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν, καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, καὶ δειλαίνειν, καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν, εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ 25 ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἕλληψιν. ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε, ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης, καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολῆ, καὶ ἕλληψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἕλληψις, διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον· οὕτως, οὐδὲ ἐκείνων 30 μεσότης, οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἕλληψις· ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν πράττηται, ἀμαρτάνεται. ὅλως γὰρ, οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς

καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἐστίν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλειψις.

PART III.

INDUCTIVE PROOF OF THE FOREGOING.

XVI. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, 7
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ
5 τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις, οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώ-
τεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι. περὶ γὰρ
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις· δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων
συμφωνεῖν. ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.

XVII. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑ
10 μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων, ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβία,
ἀνώνυμος· (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα)· ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ μὲν
θάρρειν ὑπερβάλλον, θρασύς· ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι
ὑπερβάλλον, τῷ δὲ θάρρειν ἐλλείπων, δειλός.

Περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας, (οὐ πάσας· ἦττον δὲ
15 καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας·) μεσότης μὲν ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ, ὑπερ-
βολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς
οὐ πάνυ γίνονται. διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν
οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔστωσαν δὲ, ἀναίσθητοι.

Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν, μεσότης μὲν
20 ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΤΗΣ· ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἐλλειψις, ἀσωτία
καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι
καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει
ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει· ὁ δ' ἀνελεύθερος
ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει.
25 (νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν,
ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον
περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται.)

Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί.
μεσότης μὲν ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΡΕΠΕΙΑ· (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς
30 διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ

περὶ μικρά·) ὑπερβολὴ δὲ, ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία· ἔλλειψις δὲ, μικροπρέπεια. διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα. πῆ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.

Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν, μεσότης μὲν ΜΕΓΑΛΟ- ὦ
ΨΥΧΙΑ· ὑπερβολὴ δὲ, χαυνότης τις λεγομένη· ἔλ-
λειψις δὲ, μικροψυχία.

Ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν· οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν 10 οὖσαν μεγάλην, ΑΥΤΗ ΠΕΡΙ ΜΙΚΡΑΝ ΟΥΣΑ. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ἥττον. λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι, φιλότιμος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων, ἀφιλότιμος· ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνάνυμος. ἀνάνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἢ τοῦ 15 φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χάρας. καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ, ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον· καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦ- 20 μεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται. νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑψηγημένον τρόπον.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολή, καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ μεσότης. σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνανύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν· τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες, τὴν μεσότητα ΠΡΑΟΤΗΤΑ 25 καλέσομεν. τῶν δ' ἄκρων, ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω· ἢ δὲ κακία, ὀργιλότης· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων, ἀόργητός τις· ἢ δ' ἔλλειψις, ἀοργησία.

Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσοτήτες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τίνα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' 30 ἀλλήλων. πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσι ΠΕΡΙ ΛΟΓΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΝ. διαφέρουσι δὲ, ὅτι ἢ μὲν ἔστι περὶ Τ' ἈΛΗΘΕΣ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἮΔΥ· τούτου δὲ, τὸ μὲν ἐν ΠΑΙΔΙΑ, τὸ δ' ἐν ΠΑΣΙ ΤΟΙΣ

KATA TON BION. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἵνα μάλλον κατίδωμεν, ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ, οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ, ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώ-
 5 νυμα. πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν, σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπα-
 ρακολουθήτου.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές, ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ, λεγέσθω ἡ δὲ προσποιήσις,
 10 ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον, ἀλαζονεία, καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν, ἀλαζών· ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, εἰρωνεία, καὶ εἴρων.

Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ, ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος, καὶ ἡ διάθεσις ΕΥΤΡΑΠΕΛΙΑ· ἡ δ' ὑπερ-
 βολή, βαμολοχία, καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτήν, βαμολόχος·
 15 ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων, ἀγροϊκός τις, καὶ ἡ ἕξις, ἀγροικία.

Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ, τὸ ἐν·τῶ βίῳ, ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδύς ἂν, φίλος, καὶ ἡ μεσότης, ΦΙΛΙΑ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος· εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδής,
 20 δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.

XVIII. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ΠΑΘΕΣΙ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, μεσότητες.

Ἡ γὰρ ΑΙΔΩΣ ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις, ὁ μὲν λέγεται
 25 μέσος· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπληξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων, ἢ ὁ μηδὲ ὄλως, ἀναίσχυντος. ὁ δὲ μέσος, αἰδήμων.

ΝΕΜΕΣΙΣ δὲ, μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονήν, τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαί-
 30 νουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν· ὁ δὲ φθονερός, ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον, ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται· ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν.

Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται. περὶ δὲ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι, περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν, πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

PART IV.

ON THE RELATION OF THE EXTREMES AND THE MEAN TO EACH OTHER.

8 XIX. Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν· δύο μὲν κακῶν, 5
τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς
δ' ἀρετῆς, τῆς μεσότητος· ΠΑΣΑΙ ΠΑΣΑΙΣ ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΝ-
ΤΑΙ ΠΩΣ. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι, καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλ-
λήλαις, ἐναντίαί εἰσιν· ἡ δὲ μέση, ταῖς ἄκραις. ὡς-
περ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον, πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλαττον μεῖζον, πρὸς 10
δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον· οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις, πρὸς
μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερ-
βολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν, ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά-
ξεσιν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος, πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλόν, θρασὺς
φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασύν, δειλός. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 15
ὁ σώφρων, πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον, ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς
δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον, ἀναίσθητος· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος, πρὸς
μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον, ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον,
ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπαθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι,
ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον. καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, ὁ 20
μὲν δειλός, θρασύν· ὁ δὲ θρασὺς, δειλόν. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.

XX. Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων
πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις ΠΡΟΣ ΑΛΛΗΛΑ, ἢ
ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΜΕΣΟΝ. πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφίστηκεν 25
ἀλλήλων, ἢ τοῦ μέσου· ὡς περ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ,
καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου, ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

XXI. Ἔτι, ΠΡΟΣ ΜΕΝ ΤΟ ΜΕΣΟΝ ΕΝΙΟΙΣ ΑΚΡΟΙΣ
ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται (ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν
ἀνδρείαν, καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίότητα) 30

ΤΟΙΣ ΔΕ ΑΚΡΟΙΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΑΛΛΗΛΑ, πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων, ENANTIA ὀρίζονται· ὥστε καὶ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ENANTIA, τὰ ΠΛΕΙΟΝ ΑΠΕΧΟΝΤΑ.

5 ΧΧΙΙ. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον, ἐφ' ᾧ μὲν, ἢ ἔλλειψις· ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ, ἢ ὑπερβολή. οἷον, ἀνδρεία μὲν, οὐχ ἢ θρασύτης, ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἢ δειλία, ἔλλειψις οὔσα· τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνη, οὐχ ἢ ἀναισθησία, ἔνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀκολασία, ὑπερ-
10 βολὴ οὔσα.

ΧΧΙΙΙ. Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει.

Μίαν μὲν, τὴν ΕΞ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ. τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ· οὐ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τὸναντίον, ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλ-
15 λον. οἷον· ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἢ δειλία· ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου, ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος.

20 Ἐτέρα δὲ, ΕΞ ἩΜΩΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ. πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον· αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς· διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν, ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον
25 ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἢ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἢ ἀκολασία, ὑπερβολὴ οὔσα, ἐναντιώτερα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνη.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἠθικὴ μεσότης καὶ 9
πῶς· καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερ-
30 βολὴν, τῆς δὲ καθ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ, διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν· ἰκανῶς εἴρηται.

CHAP. IV.

GENERAL RULES FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF MORAL VIRTUE.

See B. II.
c. iii. §. xii.

I. Διὸ καὶ ἜΡΓΩΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ. ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ, τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον. οἷον· κύκλου τὸ μέσον, οὐ παντὸς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότης. οὕτω δὲ καὶ, τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι, παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον· καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον, καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ' ᾧ, καὶ ὄσον, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, καὶ ὡς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον. διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαινετὸν, καὶ καλόν.

II. Διὸ, δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέτου, πρῶτον μὲν, ΑΠΟΧΩΡΕΙΝ ΤΟΥ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΥ. καθάπερ 10 καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ·

Τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
Νῆα.

Τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων, τὸ μὲν ἔστιν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἥττον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρας χαλεπὸν· 15 “κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον,” Φασι, “πλοῦν, τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν.” τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν.

III. ΣΚΟΠΕΙΝ ΔΕ ΔΕΙ, ΠΡΟΣ Ἄ ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΙ ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΟΡΟΙ ΕΣΜΕΝ. ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκα- 20 μεν. τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον, ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τούναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ. πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν, εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤζομεν. ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν. 25

IV. ΕΝ ΠΑΝΤΙ ΔΕ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΦΥΛΑΚΤΕΟΝ ΤΟ ἮΔΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ἮΔΟΝΗΝ. οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην,

αὐτὰ γὰρ θεοτέρου πλοῦν. ὁ μόνος ἴσος γὰρ οὐκ
ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐκ ἔστιν

τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν, καὶ ἐν
 πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν. οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν
 ἀποπεμπόμενοι, ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. ταῦτ' οὖν
 ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησό-
 5 μεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.

V. Χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς
 καθ' ἕκαστον. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον διορίσαι, πῶς, καὶ τίσι,
 καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις, καὶ πόσον χρόνον, ὀργιστέον. καὶ γὰρ
 ἡμεῖς, ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ
 10 πρᾶγους φαμέν· ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδράδεις
 ἀποκαλοῦμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαί-
 νων, οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 ἤττον· ὁ δὲ πλέον. οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ
 μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον, ψεκτός· οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ
 15 λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν.
 τὰ δὲ τριαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ EN Τῇ
 Αἰσθησει ἢ Κρισις.

VI. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δῆλον· ὅτι Ἡ Μεση
 Ἐξις ἐν Πασίν ἐπαινετη, ἀποκλίνειν δεῖ, ὅτε
 20 μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλ-
 λειψίν. οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου, καὶ τοῦ εὖ,
 τευζόμεθα.

BOOK III.

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SUMMARY OF THE THIRD BOOK.

CHAP. I.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ACTS.

I. The necessity of enquiring into the difference between VOLUNTARY and INVOLUNTARY acts.

II. INVOLUNTARY acts are THOSE, WHICH ARE EITHER COMPULSORY, OR DONE THROUGH IGNORANCE. These two kinds are distinctly considered.

III. COMPULSORY ACTS are THOSE, IN WHICH THE CAUSE IS EXTERNAL, AND WHOLLY UNCONNECTED WITH THE WILL OF THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED. IV. Some acts are of a MIXED nature, partaking of both the voluntary and involuntary. ABSOLUTELY speaking, they are involuntary; but WITH REFERENCE TO THE OCCASION, voluntary: and this last is the character, which, on a strict view of the subject, properly belongs to them. V. With regard to such occasions, it is sometimes difficult to determine what is the right conduct. VI. It is not allowable to reckon among compulsory acts those, to which we are prompted by some strong solicitation of pleasure, or by some noble purpose.

VII. With regard to ACTS DONE THROUGH IGNORANCE: It is not EVERY SUCH ACT that is to be considered involuntary. VIII. There is a difference between acts done IN ignorance, and acts done THROUGH ignorance. IX. THE IGNORANCE WHICH EXCULPATES, is an ignorance, NOT OF GENERALS, BUT OF PARTICULARS. X. These particulars are enumerated: and those of them, of which the ignorance goes to make up an involuntary act, are specified. XI. Over and above such ignorance, something further is required towards making an act INVOLUNTARY.

XII. From the foregoing principles is deduced the following definition: A VOLUNTARY ACT IS ONE, OF WHICH THE CAUSE IS IN THE AGENT, THAT AGENT KNOWING THE PARTICULARS CONNECTED WITH IT.

XIII. It is not allowable to reckon among involuntary acts, those, which are done from the impulse of ANGER and APPETITE.

CHAP. II.

ON THE MORAL DETERMINATION OF CHOICE.

I. The necessity of considering the nature of the MORAL DETERMINATION: called in Greek ΠΡΟΑΙΠΕΞΙΣ.

II. The moral determination is VOLUNTARY: but it does not apply to EVERY THING THAT IS VOLUNTARY. III. It is not the same with ANGER, or APPETITE. IV. Nor yet, with DESIRE. V. Nor yet, with OPINION. VI. Nor yet, with ANY PARTICULAR OPINION. VII. It is the VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE, APPLIED TO SUBJECTS OF PREVIOUS DELIBERATION.

VIII. This last position renders it necessary to consider, what are the SUBJECTS OF DELIBERATION. In order to which, a view is first taken, of the SUBJECTS EXCLUDED FROM DELIBERATION. IX. The subjects of deliberation are, things practicable to ourselves: but of these also, some are again excluded. X. The subjects of deliberation are, THINGS PRACTICABLE TO OURSELVES, BUT NOT UNIFORM AND CERTAIN IN THEIR ISSUE: and they are, not the ENDS of conduct, but the MEANS towards the end. The nature and process of deliberation are described. XI. The subjects of DELIBERATION, and of the MORAL DETERMINATION are the same: except that, subjects of deliberation are in an UNDETERMINED state, and, subjects of moral determination, in a DETERMINED state.

XII. From the foregoing principles is deduced the following definition of the Moral Determination: A DELIBERATIVE CHOICE EXERCISED UPON THINGS IN OUR POWER.

CHAP. III.

ON DESIRE.

I. The object of desire is not the MEANS, but the END. II. Considered in the abstract, it is that which is ESSENTIALLY GOOD: considered in relation to individuals, it is that which APPEARS TO ANY MAN TO BE GOOD. III. Thus, with a virtuous man, it will be, that which is essentially good: with a vicious man, that which happens to be congenial to his appetite.

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH IT IS MAINTAINED, THAT VIRTUE AND VICE
ARE BOTH IN OUR OWN POWER.

I. It is argued, that virtue and vice are both in our own power. II. The moral discipline of legislators yields a testimony to the truth of this inference. III. When the vices of men arise from their ignorance, that ignorance is wilful : inasmuch as it is occasioned by a wilful inattention. IV. Because virtue is in our own power : it does not therefore follow, that it is in a man's power to return from vice to virtue. V. The leading position of this chapter is supported by a testimony, derived from the common judgment of mankind in the expression of censure.

VI. An answer to the objection which is intended to exculpate vice, by alleging THE VARIATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT RESPECTING THE APPARENT GOOD : Such judgment, as the objection sets forth, being influenced by fancy, and fancy being determined by the natural temperament of our constitutions ; while this last is a thing not in our own power.

VII. Habits and actions are not voluntary in the same manner.

CHAP. V.

WHICH INTRODUCES AN EXAMINATION OF EACH OF THE
MORAL VIRTUES, SEPARATELY CONSIDERED. AND
FIRST, ON THE VIRTUE OF COURAGE.

I. Transition to the consideration in detail, of each of the moral virtues.

II. COURAGE is defined : A MEAN RELATING TO FEAR AND BOLDNESS.

III. ALL EVILS in general, are the objects of fear : but to some of them, courage has no relation. IV. The evils to which courage relates are, THE MOST DREADFUL ; and, especially, DEATH IN BATTLE, and the dangers of war.

V. This virtue does not consist in the total suppression of fear : but it requires, in relation to the objects of fear, that a man's feelings should be regulated by reason, and duly proportioned to the occasion and the object. VI. The extreme of fearlessness has no

name: that of boldness, is RASHNESS. VII. The character denoted by AAAZONEIA consists in the PRETENSION OF COURAGE, and is most commonly accompanied with ACTUAL COWARDICE. VIII. The extreme relating to fear, in excess, and to boldness, in defect, is COWARDICE: which is commonly allied to DESPAIR, as courage is to HOPE. IX. The MUTUAL RELATIONS of courage, rashness, and cowardice.

X. SUICIDE, for two reasons, is an act, not of courage, but of cowardice.

XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV. From REAL COURAGE, as now described, which is actuated by rectitude (TO KAAON), there are to be distinguished FIVE kinds of SPURIOUS COURAGE, which are actuated by other principles. XI. First, the POLITICAL courage. XII. Secondly, the courage of EXPERIENCE. XIII. Thirdly, the courage of ANGER. XIV. Fourthly, the courage of HOPE. XV. Fifthly, the courage of IGNORANCE.

XVI. Though courage is the proper medium relating to fear and boldness: yet FEAR is the disposition, in regulating which it is PRINCIPALLY concerned.

XXII. Mode in which PLEASURE and PAIN are severally connected with COURAGE, and with VIRTUE generally.



CHAP. VI.

ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE.

I. TEMPERANCE is defined: A MEAN RELATING TO PLEASURES AND PAINS.

II. The pleasures to which it relates are NOT THOSE OF THE SOUL. III. NOR ALL THOSE OF THE BODY. But to some of those thus excluded, it does relate ACCIDENTALLY. IV. The pleasures to which temperance relates are those, which are common to men and brutes; namely, the pleasures OF THE TASTE AND THE TOUCH. V. And THE LATTER more than the former. VI. A reason, collaterally suggested, for ascribing to intemperance a most debasing character. VII. Even of the pleasures derived from the TOUCH, there are some, with which temperance has no concern.

VIII. Of the human appetites, some are COMMON and some PECULIAR. IX. With regard to the former, there is but ONE BLAMEABLE POINT. X. With regard to the latter, there are SEVERAL: and it is in all these points, relating to both the former and the latter, that INTemperance discovers its appropriate character of EXCESS.

XI. Temperance is related to PAIN in a way, peculiar, and different from that in which COURAGE is related to it.

XII. With regard to the DEFECT in those particulars, relating to which temperance is the MEAN: it is a state of feeling which has no name, and scarcely even an existence. XIII. TEMPERANCE observes the MEDIUM as to all the various points, in which INTEMPERANCE incurs the fault of EXCESS.

XIV. Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice, and therefore more blamable. XV. In the case of cowardice, the habit is more voluntary than the act: in the case of intemperance, the act is more voluntary than the habit.

XVI. The nature of TEMPERANCE illustrated, from the origin of the Greek word denoting INTEMPERANCE.

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the
 problem. It is shown that the problem is equivalent to the problem of
 finding a function $f(x)$ which satisfies the conditions
 $f(x) = 0$ for $x < 0$ and $f(x) = 1$ for $x > 0$.
 It is shown that such a function exists and is unique.
 The second part of the paper is devoted to a detailed study of the
 properties of the function $f(x)$. It is shown that $f(x)$ is a
 continuous function of x and that it is differentiable at every
 point $x \neq 0$. It is also shown that $f(x)$ is not differentiable at
 $x = 0$. The third part of the paper is devoted to a study of the
 asymptotic behavior of $f(x)$ as $x \rightarrow \infty$. It is shown that
 $f(x) \rightarrow 1$ as $x \rightarrow \infty$ and that $f(x) \rightarrow 0$ as $x \rightarrow -\infty$.

consideration of the metric regions

CHAP. I.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ACTS.

I. ΤΗΣ ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις ἰ
οὔσης· καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἑκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων
γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε
δὲ καὶ ἑλέου· τὸ ἑΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ καὶ ΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ ἀναγκαῖον
5 ἴσως διορίσαι ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥΣΙ. χρέ-
σιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι, πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ
τὰς κολάσεις.

II. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι, ΤΑ ΒΙΑ ἢ ΔΙ' ΑΓΝΟΙΑΝ
ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ.

10 III. ΒΙΑΙΟΝ δὲ, ὅΥ ἢ ΑΡΧΗ ΕΞΩΘΕΝ, ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ
ΟΥΣΑ, ΕΝ ἢ ΜΗΔΕΝ ΣΥΜΒΑΛΛΕΤΑΙ Ὁ ΠΡΑΤΤΩΝ ἢ Ὁ
ΠΑΣΧΩΝ. οἷον, εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσει ποι· ἢ ἄνθρωποι,
κύριοι ὄντες.

IV. Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μειζόνων κακῶν πράτ-
15 τεται, ἢ διὰ καλόν τι· (οἷον, εἰ τύραννος προστάττοι
αἰσχροῦν τι πράττειν, κύριος ἂν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ
πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνή-
σκοιεν) ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει, πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν
ἢ ἑκούσια. τοιοῦτον δὲ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν
20 τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς. ἌΠΛΩΣ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀπο-
βάλλεται ἐκῶν· ΕΠΙ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑ Δ' ΑΥΤΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ

1. ΛΟΙΠΩΝ, ἅπαντες οἱ νῦν ἔχοντες. ΜΙΚΤΑΙ μὲν οὖν
 εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις· ΕΟΙΚΑΣΙ ΔΕ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ
 ἔκουσιοις. αἰρεταὶ γὰρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝ-
 ΤΑΙ· τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν ΚΑΙΡΟΝ
 ἐστίν· καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πρᾶτ-
 2. τει, λεκτέον· πρᾶττει δὲ ἐκάν. καὶ γὰρ Ἡ ΑΡΧΗ
 ΤΟΥ ΚΙΝΕΙΝ ΤΑ ΟΡΓΑΝΙΚΑ ΜΕΡΗ ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑΙΣ
 ΠΡΑΞΕΣΙΝ ΕΝ ΑΥΤῳ ΕΣΤΙΝ· ἂν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή,
 ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν καὶ μή. ἘΚΟΥΣΙΑ ΔΗ ΤΑ
 ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ· ἈΠΛΩΣ Δ' ἸΣΩΣ, ΑΚΟΥΣΙΑ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν 10
 ἔλοιτο ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΟ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν.

V. Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις, ἐνίοτε
 καὶ ΕΠΑΙΝΟΥΝΤΑΙ, ὅταν αἰσχρόν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν ὑπο-
 μένωσιν ἀντὶ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΛΩΝ· ἂν δ' ἀνάκαλιν,
 φέγονται. (τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ ΜΗΔΕΝΙ 15
 καλῷ, ἢ ΜΕΤΡΙῳ, Φαύλου.) ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν
 οὐ γίνεται, ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΗ δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξη
 τις ἢ μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ
 μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεῖναι. ἔνια δ' ἴσως ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΝ-
 ΑΓΚΑΣΘΗΝΑΙ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ 20
 δεινότερα. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκμαίωνα, γε-
 λοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι. ἔστι
 δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι, ΠΟΙΟΝ ΑΝΤΙ ΠΟΙΟΥ ἘΙ-
 ΡΕΤΕΟΝ, καὶ ΤΙ ΑΝΤΙ ΤΙΝΟΣ ὙΠΟΜΕΝΕΤΕΟΝ· ἔτι δὲ
 χαλεπώτερον, ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ 25
 τὸ πολὺ, ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα ΛΥΠΗΡΑ, ἃ δ'
 ἀναγκάζονται, ΑΙΣΧΡΑ. ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ φόγοι γί-
 νονται περὶ τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας, ἢ μή.

VI. Τὰ δὴ ΠΟΙΑ ΦΑΤΕΟΝ ΒΙΑΙΑ; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν,
 ὅπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ ὁ πρᾶττων μηδέν 30
 συμβάλληται; ἢ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι,
 νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετὰ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ
 πρᾶττοντι καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ
 ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. μᾶλλον δ' εἰκεν ἐκουσίοις. αἱ

γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα· ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια, ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ράδιον ἀποδοῦναι. 5
 πολλαὶ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἭΔΕΑ καὶ τὰ ΚΑΛΑ φαίη βίαια εἶναι·
 (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα·) ΠΑΝΤΑ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ὄΥΤΩ ΒΙΑΙΑ. τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. καὶ οἱ μὲν, βία καὶ ἄκοντες, λυπηρῶς· οἱ δὲ, διὰ τὸ ἠδὺ καὶ καλόν, μεθ' ἠδονῆς. ΓΕΛΟΙΟΝ ΔΗ ΤΟ ΑΙΤΙΑΣΘΑΙ ΤΑ ΕΚΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛΑ ΜΗ ἄΥΤΟΝ, ΕΥΘΗΡΑΤΟΝ ΟΝΤΑ 10
 ὙΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ, ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΚΑΛΩΝ ἘΑΥΤΟΝ, ΤΩΝ Δ' ΑΙΣΧΡΩΝ ΤΑ ἭΔΕΑ. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι ὄΥ ΕΞΘΕΝ Ἡ ΑΡΚΗ, ΜΗΔΕΝ ΣΥΜΒΑΛΛΟΜΕΝΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΒΙΑΣΘΕΝΤΟΣ·

VII. Τὸ δὲ δι' ἀγνοίαν οὐκ ἔκΟΥΣΙΟΝ ΜΕΝ ἄΠΑΝ 2
 15 ΕΣΤΙΝ ἈΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ ΔΕ, ΤΟ ΕΠΙΛΥΠΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΜΕΤΑΜΕΛΕΙΑ. ὁ γὰρ δι' ἀγνοίαν πράξας ὅτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ἦδει· οὐδ' αὖ ἈΚΩΝ, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. τοῦ δὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ, ἈΚΩΝ δοκεῖ. ὁ 20
 δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, (ἐπεὶ ἕτερος ἔστω,) ΟΥΧ ἘΚΩΝ. (ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.)

VIII. Ἐτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ ΔΙ' ΑΓΝΟΙΑΝ πράττειν, τοῦ ΑΓΝΟΥΝΤΑ ποιεῖν. ὁ γὰρ μεθύων, ἢ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐ δοκεῖ ΔΙ' ἀγνοίαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι 25
 τῶν εἰρημένων· οὐκ εἰδώς δὲ, ἀλλ' ΑΓΝΩΩΝ.

IX. Ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς, ἃ δειπράττειν καὶ ἂν ἀφεκτέον. καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀμαρτίαν, ἀδικοὶ, καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ, γίνονται. τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι, οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον. 30
 οὐ γὰρ Ἡ ΕΝ Τῇ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΙ ΑΓΝΟΙΑ Αἰτία τοῦ ΑΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ, ἀλλὰ τῆς ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑΣ· οὐδ' Ἡ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' Ἡ ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΑ, ἐν οἷς, καὶ περὶ ἃ, ἡ πράξις. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος

καὶ συγγνώμη. ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν, ἀκουσίως πράττει.

X. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτὰ, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί. ΤΙΣ τε δὴ, καὶ ΤΙ, καὶ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙ, ἢ ΕΝ ΤΙΝΙ, πράττει ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ΤΙΝΙ, οἷον ὀργάνῳ καὶ ἔνεκα ὅ τινος, οἷον σωτηρίας καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν ταῦτα, οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσῃ, μὴ μαινόμενος. δῆλον δ', ὡς οὐ[δὲ] ΤΟΝ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΑ. πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; ὁ δὲ πράττει, ἀγνοήσῃεν ἄν τις. οἷον λέγοντές φασιν, ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς· ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι 10 ἀπόρρητα ἦν, (ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά)· ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, (ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην). οἴθηθή δ' ἄν τις, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέμιον εἶναι, (ὥσπερ ἢ Μερόπη)· καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχαμμένον δόρυ· ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι. καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρία παίσας, 15 ἀποκτείνει ἄν. καὶ δεῖξαι βουλόμενος, (ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειρίζομενοι,) πατάξῃεν ἄν. περὶ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὐσης, ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις· ὁ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ τι ἀγνοήσας, ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι. καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις. ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ, ΕΝ ΟἷΣ 20 ἢ πρᾶξις καὶ ὄΥ ἔνεκα.

XI. Τοῦ δὴ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀγνοίαν ἀκουσίον λεγομένου· ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν ΛΥΠΗΡΑΝ εἶναι, καὶ ΕΝ ΜΕΤΑΜΕΛΕΙΑ.

3 XII. Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίον, τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν· 25 τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξῃεν ἄν εἶναι, ὄΥ ἢ ἀρχῇ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰδοτὶ τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα ἐν οἷς ἢ πράξις.

XIII. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι, 1 ΤΑ ΔΙΑ ΘΥΜΟΝ ἢ ΔΙ' ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΝ. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ, οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ 30 2 παῖδες. εἶτα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμόν; ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκου-

σίως, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον, ἐνός γε
 αἰτίου ὄντος; ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι, 3.
 ἂν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι. δεῖ δὲ, καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι,
 καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν οἷον, ὑγιείας καὶ μαθήσεως. δο-
 5 κεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια, λυπηρὰ εἶναι· τὰ δὲ κατ'
 ἐπιθυμίαν, ἡδέα. ἔτι δὲ, τί διαφέρει, τῶ ἀκούσια 4.
 εἶναι, τὰ κατὰ ΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΝ, ἢ ΘΥΜΟΝ, ἀμαρτηθέντα;
 φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ΑΜΦΩ· δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον ἀνθρώπικα 5.
 εἶναι, τὰ ἄλογα ΠΑΘΗ· αἱ δὲ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,
 10 ΑΠΟ ΘΥΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΣ. ἄτοπον δὲ, τὸ τιθέναι
 ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

CHAP. II.

ON THE MORAL DETERMINATION OF CHOICE.

I. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκούσιου καὶ τοῦ ἀκούσιου· 4
 περὶ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ ἔπεται διελθεῖν. οἰκειότατον γὰρ
 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ, καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν,
 15 ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ.

II. Ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ ἔΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ μὲν φαίνεται· οὐ
 ταύτῃ δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐΠΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΤΟ ἔΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ
 ἐκούσιου, καὶ παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ· προαι-
 ρέσεως δ' οὐ. καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης, ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν·
 20 κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ.

III. Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἢ θυμὸν, ἢ
 βούλησιν, ἢ τινα δόξαν· οὐκ εἰκόασιν ὀρθῶς λέ-
 γειν. οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων· 1
 ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ δὲ καὶ ΘΥΜΟΣ. καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής, ἐπιθυμῶν 2
 25 μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατής δ' ἀνά-
 παλιν, προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. καὶ 3
 προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται· ἐπιθυμία δ'
 ἐπιθυμία οὐ. καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία, ἡδέος καὶ ἐπι- 4

λύπου· ἢ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἠδέος. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἤττον. ἤκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

IV. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ γε· καίπερ σύνεργος φαινόμενον. προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων· καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοῖη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν· οἷον, ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν, ἢ ἀθλητὴν. προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ. ἔτι δ', ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἔστι μᾶλλον· ἢ δὲ προαίρεσις, τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. οἷον· ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧΝ ὑγιανοῦμεν· καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαρῆν, ΠΡΟΑΙΡΟΥΜΕΘΑ δὲ λέγειν, οὐχ ἀρμόζει. ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἢ προαίρεσις, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ εἶναι.

V. Οὐδὲ δὴ ΔΟΞΑ ἂν εἴη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἤττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα, ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαίρεται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ· ἢ προαίρεσις δὲ, τούτοις μᾶλλον. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, δόξη ταυτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς.

VI. Ἀλλ' οὐδέ ΤΙΝΙ. τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ, ΠΟΙΟΙ τινὲς ἐσμεν· τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν, οὐ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ΛΑΒΕΙΝ, ἢ ΦΥΓΕΙΝ, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· δοξάζομεν δὲ ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἢ τίτι συμφέρει, ἢ πῶς λαβεῖν δ' ἢ φυγεῖν, οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι ὈΥ ΔΕΙ, μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὈΡΘΩΣ· ἢ δὲ δόξα τῷ, ὡς ΑΛΗΘΩΣ. καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν, ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα· δοξάζομεν δὲ, ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ τε ἄριστα, καὶ ΔΟΞΑΖΕΙΝ. ἀλλ' ἔτι, δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ. εἰ

δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως, ἢ παρακολουθεῖ· οὐδὲν διαφέρει. οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταυτότὸν ἐστὶ δόξη τινί.

VII. Τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστίν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρη-
 5 μένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται· τὸ δ' ἐκούσιον
 οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἄρα γε ΤΟ ΠΡΟΒΕΒΟΥΛΕΥ-
 ΜΕΝΟΝ; ἢ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.
 ὑποσημαίνειν δ' εἴκει καὶ ΤΟΥΝΟΜΑ, ὡς ὃν ΠΡΟ' ΕΤΕ-
 ΡΩΝ ΑΙΡΕΤΟΝ.

- 10 VIII. ΒΟΥΛΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ πότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ 5
 πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν; ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή;
 (λεκτέον δ' ἴσως ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΟΝ, οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὔ βουλευ-
 σαιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος· ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ
 νοῦν ἔχων.) - περὶ δὲ τῶν Αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται·
 15 οἶον, περὶ τοῦ κόσμου· ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς
 πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ ΤΩΝ ΕΝ
 ΚΙΝΗΣΕΙ, ΑΕΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΤΤΑ ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΩΝ, εἴτε ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης, εἴτε καὶ φύσει, ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην·
 οἶον, τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. οὐδὲ περὶ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΟΤΕ
 20 ΑΛΛΩΣ· οἶον, αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. οὐδὲ περὶ ΤΩΝ
 ΑΠΟ ΤΥΧΗΣ· οἶον, θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ
 τῶν ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΚΩΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ. οἶον· πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα
 πολιτεύοιντο, οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται· οὐ
 γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐθέν δι' ἡμῶν.
 25 IX. Βουλεύόμεθα δὲ περὶ ΤΩΝ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ ΠΡΑ-
 ΚΤΩΝ. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν
 εἶναι, φύσις, καὶ ἀνάγκη, καὶ τύχη· ἔτι δὲ, νοῦς,
 καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
 βουλεύονται, περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. καὶ περὶ
 30 μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, οὐκ
 ἔστι βουλή· οἶον, περὶ γραμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ διστάζο-
 μεν πῶς γραπτέον.

Χ. Ἄλλ' ὅσα γίνεταί δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὄσαυτῶς
 Δ' αἰεὶ περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα. οἷον, περὶ τῶν κατὰ
 περὶ κυβερν. ἰατρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν καὶ κυβερνητικὴν μᾶλ-
 λον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσα ἤττον διηκρίβωται· καὶ ἔτι,
 περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς 5
 τέχνας, ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· (μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς
 διστάζομεν). τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὄσῃ ἐπι το
 πολυ, ἀηλοῖς δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν ὀίς
 ἀδιοριστον. συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ
 μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς 10
 διαγνῶναι.

Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν, ἀλλὰ περὶ
 τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται, εἰ
 ὑγιάσει· οὔτε ῥήτωρ, εἰ πείσει· οὔτε πολιτικός, εἰ
 εὐνομίαν ποιήσει· οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς, περὶ τοῦ 15
 τέλους. ἀλλὰ θεμενοὶ τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ δια
 τίνων ἐσται, σκοποῦσι.

Καὶ δια πλεονῶν μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι· δια
 τίνος ῥαῖστα καὶ καλλίστα, ἐπισκοποῦσι. δι' ἑνοῦ
 δ' ἐπιτελουμένου, πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται· κακείνο διὰ 20
 τίνος· ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ
 ἔγρεσει ἐσχάτον ἐστίν. ὃ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικε
 ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, ὥσπερ
 διάγραμμα.

Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζητήσεις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βού- 25
 λευσις, (οἷον αἱ μαθηματικάι) ἢ δὲ βούλευσις
 πᾶσα, ζήτησις. καὶ τὸ ἐσχάτον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει,
 πρῶτον εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.

Κὰν μὲν ἀδυνάτων ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται· (οἷον, εἰ
 χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι)· ἐὰν 30
 δὲ δυνατὸν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. δυνατὰ
 δὲ, ἅ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιντ' ἀν. τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν φίλων,
 δι' ἡμῶν πῶς ἐστίν· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Ζητεῖται

δ', ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς· ὅτε μὲν ΔΙ' ΟΥ, ὅτε δὲ ΠΩΣ, ἢ ΔΙΑ ΤΙΝΟΣ.

"Ἐοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ΑΡΧΗ 5 ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ· ἢ δὲ βουλή, περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρακτῶν· αἱ δὲ πράξεις, ἄλλων ἕνεκα.

Οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν, τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· οἷον, εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο, ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ. αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα. εἰ 10 δὲ αἰεὶ βουλεύσεται, εἰς ἄπειρον ἤξει.

XI. Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτὸ, πλὴν ΑΦΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ ἢδὴ τὸ προαιρετόν. τὸ γὰρ ΕΚ ΤΗΣ ΒΟΥΛΗΣ ΠΡΟΚΡΙΘΕΝ, προαιρετόν ἐστιν. παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν πᾶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνάγαγῃ 15 τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον. τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον. δῆλον, δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς Ὀμηρὸς ἐμιμεῖτο. οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς, ἃ προέλοιnton, ἀνήγγελλον τῶν δῆμων.

XII. Ὀντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ, ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΟΥ ΟΡΕΚ- 20 ΤΟΥ ΤΩΝ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ· καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη, ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΟΡΕΞΙΣ ΤΩΝ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ. ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες, ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω· καὶ περὶ 25 ποῖά ἐστί· καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

CHAP. III.

ON DESIRE.

6 I. Ἡ δὲ βΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ, ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστίν· εἴρηται.

II. Δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν, ΑΓΑΘΟΥ εἶναι· τοῖς δὲ, ΤΟΥ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΥ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ.

Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν “ τὸ βουλευτὸν ἀγαθὸν ” ὅ λέγουσι, μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὁ βουλεται ὁ μὴ ορθῶς αἰρουμένον· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ', εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν. τοῖς δ' αὖ “ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλευτὸν ” λέγουσι· ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΥΣΕΙ βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' ἑκάστῳ το δοκοῦν. ἄλλο 10 δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, τάναντία.

Εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φατέον, ἄπειρα μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν, βουλευτὸν εἶναι τ' ἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ, τὸ φαίνομενον;

III. Τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ, τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι· 15 τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ, τὸ τυχόν. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων· τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά ἐστι, τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα· τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις, ἕτερα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ, καὶ γλυκέα, καὶ θερμὰ, καὶ βαρῆα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα. ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ 20 ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται. ΚΑΘ' ἑκάστην γὰρ εἶναι ἰδία ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδῆα. καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος, τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἑκάστοις ὄρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ἄν. τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη, διὰ τὴν 25 ἡδονὴν εἴοικε γίνεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθόν, φαίνεται. αἰρουῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ, ὡς ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ λύπην, ὡς κακόν, φεύγουσιν.

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH IT IS MAINTAINED, THAT VIRTUE AND VICE
ARE BOTH IN OUR OWN POWER.

I. "Οντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν 7
δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος· αἱ περὶ ταῦτα
πράξεις, κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶεν ἄν, καὶ ἐκούσιοι· αἱ δὲ
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα. ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ
5 Ἡ ΑΡΕΤΗ, ὍΜΟΙΩΣ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΚΑΚΙΑ. ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ'
ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν· καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ
μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί. ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν, καλὸν ὄν, ἐφ'
ἡμῖν ἐστί· καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐσται, αἰσχρὸν
ὄν. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καλὸν ὄν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ
10 τὸ πράττειν, αἰσχρὸν ὄν, ἐφ' ἡμῖν. εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ
καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ
πράττειν· (τοῦτο δ' ἦν, τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι·)
ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ ΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΣΙ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΥΛΟΙΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ.

Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς "οὐδεὶς ἐκῶν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄκων
15 μάκαρ" εἰσὶν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ, τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ. μακάριος
μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων· ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς
γε νῦν εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητήτεον· καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον
οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι, οὐδὲ γεννητὴν, τῶν πράξεων,
ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ
20 ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐφ'
ἡμῖν· ὍΝ ΚΑΙ Αἱ ΑΡΧΑΙ ΕΝ ἩΜΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΑ ΕΦ'
ἩΜΙΝ ΚΑΙ ἘΚΟΥΣΙΑ.

II. Τούτοις δ' εἰσὶν μαρτυρεῖσθαι, καὶ ἰδία ὑφ'
ἐκάστων, καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν. κολάζουσι
25 γὰρ καὶ τιμαροῦνται τοὺς δρώντας μοχθηρὰ, ὅσοι
μὴ βία, ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἦΣ ΜΗ ΑΥΤΟΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΙ· τοὺς δὲ
τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέ-
ψοντες, τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. καίτοι, ὅσα μὴ ἐφ'

ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὄν τὸ πεισθῆναι, μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι, ἢ ἀλγεῖν, ἢ πεινῆν, ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθέν γὰρ ἦττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῶ τῶ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ΕΑΝ ΑΙΤΙΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΟΚΗ ΤΗΣ ΑΓΝΟΙΑΣ. οἷον· τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια. ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῶ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι· τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας, καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν ὡς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὄν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν. τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

III. Ἄλλ' ἴσως, ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ὧΣΤΕ ΜΗ ΕΠΙΜΕΛΗΘΗΝΑΙ. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι ΑΥΤΟΙ ΑΙΤΙΟΙ, ζῶντες ἀνειμένως. καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι· οἱ μὲν κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες. αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνεργεῖαι, τοιούτους ποιοῦσιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον, ἐκ τῶν μελετάντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξι. διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται· κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. ἔτι δ', ἄλογον, τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικὸν εἶναι, ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκολαστον.

IV. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις, πράττει ἐξ ἧν ἔσται ἀδικός· ἐκὰν ἀδικὸς ἂν εἴη. οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἀδικὸς ἂν, παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγίης. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὰν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῶ μὴ νοσεῖν· προεμένα δ' οὐκέτι. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ΑΦΕΝΤΙ λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῶ ΤΟ ΒΑΛΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΡΙΨΑΙ· ἢ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῶ. οὕτω δὲ, καὶ τῶ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῶ ἀκολάστῳ,

ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις ΜΗ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ' διὸ ἐπόν-
τες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ', οὐκέτι ἔξεστι ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ.

V. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί
εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος· οἷς καὶ ἐπιτι-
5 μῶμεν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ΔΙΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ αἰσχροῖς, οὐδεῖς
ἐπιτιμᾶ· τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν. οὐθεὶς
γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει, ἢ ἐκ νόσου, ἢ ἐκ
πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἴνοφλυ-
10 γίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας, πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι· τῶν
δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν, 'ΑΙ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ ἐπιτιμῶνται'
'ΑΙ ΔΕ ΜΗ ΕΦ' ἩΜΙΝ, οὐ. εἰ δ' οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν
εἶεν.

15 VI. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, “ ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ See c. iii.
Φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΣ οὐ κύριοι, §. iii. of this
ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος book.
ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ αὐτῷ.” εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς
'ΕΞΕΩΣ ἐστὶ πῶς αἴτιος· καὶ τῆς ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑΣ ἔσται
20 πῶς αὐτὸς αἴτιος.

Εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακὰ ποιεῖν, μὴ, οὐθεὶς.
ἀλλὰ δι' ἀγνοίαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ
τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι· ἢ δὲ τοῦ
τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ ἀνθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ ΦΥΝΑΙ δεῖ,
25 ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ'
ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται· καὶ ἔστιν ΕΥΦΥΗΣ, αὐτὸ
τοῦτο ὅτι καλῶς πέφυκεν· (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον, καὶ
εὐφυὲς ᾧ
τοῦτο καλῶς.
κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν,
μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ, τοιοῦτον ἔξει· τὸ δ' εὖ
ἔξει, καὶ τὸ
εὖ.
30 καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι, ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀλη-
θινῇ ἂν εἴῃ εὐφυῖα·) εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ· τί
μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν
γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος

φύσει, ἢ ὅπως δῆποτε, φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες, πράττουσιν ὅπως δῆποτε.

Εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἐκάστῳ φαίνεται οἰονδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν· εἴτε τὸ μὲν 5 ΤΕΛΟΣ Φυσικόν, Τῶ ΔΕ ΤΑ ΛΟΙΠΑ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ ἘΚΟΥΣΙΩΣ ΤΟΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ, ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν· οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη. ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ΤΕΛΕΙ. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκού- 10 σιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί· (καὶ γὰρ ΤῶΝ ἘΞΕΩΝ συναίτιός πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν· καὶ τῷ ΠΟΙΟΙ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΕἶΝΑΙ, τὸ τέλος ΤΟΙΟΝΔΕ τιθέμεθα·) καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν. ὁμοίως γάρ.

τό τε γένος
τύπου.

καὶ ὅτι.

Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν, τὸ 15 γένος, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ· ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν· καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις· ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ [καθ' αὐτάς]· καὶ ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι· καὶ οὕτως, ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος προστάξῃ.

VII. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ ἐκούσιοί εἰσι, 20 καὶ αἱ ἘΞΕΙΣ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. τῶν ἕξεων δὲ, τῆς ἀρχῆς· καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρώστων. ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν, οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρῆσασθαι· 25 διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

CHAP. V.

WHICH INTRODUCES THE CONSIDERATION OF EACH OF
THE MORAL VIRTUES, SEPARATELY CONSIDERED.
AND FIRST, ON THE VIRTUE OF COURAGE.

I. Ἀναλαμβάνοντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἴπωμεν τίνες 9
εἰσὶ, καὶ περὶ ποῖα, καὶ πῶς. ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον,
καὶ ΠΟΣΑΙ εἰσὶν.

II. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ΑΝΔΡΕΙΑΣ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
5 ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΦΟΒΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΑΡΡΗ, ἤδη καὶ
πρότερον εἴρηται.

III. Φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι ΤΑ ΦΟΒΕΡΑ ταῦτα
δ' ἔστιν, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ΤΑ ΚΑΚΑ. διὸ καὶ τὸν εἰπεῖν κακά.
φόβον ὀρίζονται, ΠΡΟΣΔΟΚΙΑΝ ΚΑΚΟΥ. φοβούμεθα
10 μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά· οἷον, ἀδοξίαν, πένιαν, νόσον,
ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον. ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀν-
δρεῖος εἶναι. ἔνια γὰρ καὶ ΔΕΙ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ
καλόν· τὸ δὲ μὴ, αἰσχροῦ οἷον, ἀδοξίαν. ὁ μὲν
γὰρ φοβούμενος, ἐπεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων· ὁ δὲ μὴ
15 φοβούμενος, ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀν-
δρεῖος, ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ. ἔχει γὰρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ
ἀνδρείῳ. ἄφοβος γὰρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πένιαν δ'
ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὄλως, ὅσα μὴ
ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα
20 ἄφοβος, ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ΚΑΘ' ΟΜΟΙΟ-
ΤΗΤΑ. ἔνιοι γὰρ, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ
ὄντες, ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν
εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας
καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται, ἢ φθόνον, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων,
25 δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θάρρει μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι,
ἀνδρεῖος.

IV. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ ΤΑ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ; οὐθεις γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ. πέρας γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν, εἶναι. δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΠΑΝΤΙ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· οἶον, εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ, ἢ ἐν νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν ΤΟΙΣ ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΙΣ; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΕΜῶ. ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαί, αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὲ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΛΟΝ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΑΔΕΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ὍΣΑ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΕΠΙΦΕΡΕΙ, ὙΠΟΓΥΙΑ ΟΝΤΑ. τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα, τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις, ἀδεῆς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. οὐχ οὔτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνωκάσι τὴν σωτηρίαν, καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν· οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται, ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκῆ, ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν. ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

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10 V. Τὸ δὲ ΦΟΒΕΡΟΝ οὐ πᾶσι μὲν πρὸ αὐτό. λέγομεν δὲ τι, καὶ ὙΠΕΡ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερόν, τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι. τὰ δὲ ΚΑΤ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ διαφέρει μεγέθει, καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, τὰ θαρράλεια. ὁ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἀνέκπληκτος ὧς ἀνθρώπος. φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ὡς δεῖ δὲ, καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος, ὑπομενεῖ, ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ ἜΝΕΚΑ. τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐστὶ δὲ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΚΑΙ ἥττον ΤΑΥΤΑ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ ἔτι, ΤΑ ΜΗ ΦΟΒΕΡΑ ὧς ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ φοβεῖσθαι. γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν, ἢ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἢ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρράλεια. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ, καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα, ὑπο-

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μένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν· ἀνδρείος. κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν *as the case*
 ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. τέλος δὲ
 πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· καὶ τῷ
 5 ἀνδρείῳ δὲ, ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ
 τέλος. ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. ΚΑΛΟΥ δὴ
 ἔνεκα, ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀνδρείαν.

VI. Τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων, ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ,
 10 ἀνάνυμος· (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι πολλά
 ἐστὶν ἀνάνυμα·) εἴη δ' ἂν ΤΙΣ ΜΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἢ ΑΝΑΛ-
 ΓΗΤΟΣ, εἰ μὴθεν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ
 κύματα, καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. ὁ δὲ τῷ
 θαρρῆϊν ὑπερβάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ, ΘΡΑΣΥΣ.

VII. ΔΟΚΕΙ δὲ καὶ ΑΛΑΖΩΝ εἶναι [ὁ] θρασύς·
 καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ
 φοβερὰ ΕΧΕΙ, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ. ἐν
 οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ
 αὐτῶν ΘΡΑΣΥΔΕΙΛΟΙ. ἐν ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ γὰρ θρασυόμενοι,
 20 ΤΑ ΦΟΒΕΡΑ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν·

VIII. Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων, ΔΕΙΛΟΣ.
 καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοι-
 αῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. ἐλλείπει δὲ καὶ τῷ θαρρῆϊν.
 ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύκαις, ὑπερβάλλων μᾶλλον καταφανής
 25 ἐστίν. δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός. πάντα γὰρ φοβεῖ-
 ται. ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως. τὸ γὰρ θαρρῆϊν, εὐέλ-
 πιδος.

IX. Περὶ ταῦτά μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ τε δειλός, καὶ ὁ
 θρασύς, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος. διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
 30 αὐτά. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ
 δὲ μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὡς δεῖ. καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς, προπε-
 τεῖς· καὶ βουλόμενοι ΠΡΟ τῶν κινδύνων, ΕΝ αὐτοῖς δ'
in danger ἀφίστανται. οἱ δ' ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρό-
 τερον δ' ἡσύχιοι. Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία 11

μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρράλεια καὶ φοβερὰ, ἐν οἷς εἴ-
ρηται. καὶ ὅΤΙ ΚΑΛΟΝ, αἰρεῖται καὶ ὑπομένει ἢ,
ὅΤΙ Αἰσχρον τὸ μῆ.

Χ. Τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν φεύγοντα πένιαν, ἢ ἔρωτα, ἢ
τι λυπηρόν· οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δειλοῦ. μα- 5
λακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα· καὶ οὐχ ὅΤΙ
ΚΑΛΟΝ ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ ΦΕΥΓΩΝ ΚΑΚΟΝ. ἔστι μὲν
οὖν ἢ ἀνδρεία τοιοῦτόν τι.

ΧΙ. ΛΕΓΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι κατὰ πέντε τρό- 10
πους.

Πρῶτον μὲν, ἢ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν.
δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται,
διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια, καὶ τὰ ὀνειδή, καὶ
διὰ τὰς τιμὰς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρεϊότατοι δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι, παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι, καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐν- 15
τιμοὶ. τοιοῦτους δὲ καὶ Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ· οἷον, τὸν Διο-
μήδη καὶ τὸν Ἔκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχείην ἀναθήσει.

καὶ Διομήδης·

Ἔκτωρ γὰρ ποτε φήσει, ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων· 20
Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμεῖο.

ἰμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένη, ὅτι
δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται. δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ, καὶ διὰ καλοῦ
ὄρεξιν, (τιμῆς γάρ·) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδῶν, αἰσχροῦ
όντος. τάξαι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων 25
ἀναγκαζομένους, εἰς ταυτό. χεῖρους δ', ὅσα οὐ δι'
αἰδῶ, ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον, αὐτὸ δρῶσι· καὶ φεύγοντες,
οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν. ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ
οἱ κύριοι. ὥσπερ ὁ Ἔκτωρ·

ὄν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτάσσοιτα νοήσω,
οὐ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

30

καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες, καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι, τύπτοντες, τὸ αὐτὸ δρῶσι. καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων παρατάττοντες. πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ δι' ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν.

5 XII. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ΕΜΠΕΙΡΙΑ ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα, ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη, ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ, ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις· ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ', οἱ στρατιῶται. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου· ἂ μάλιστα
10 συνευράκασιν οὔτοι. ΦΑΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. εἶτα, ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν, μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας· δυνάμενοι χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις, καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες, ὅποια ἂν εἴη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν, κρᾶ-
15 τιστα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ἄπλισμένοι μάχονται, καὶ ἀθληταὶ ἰδιώταις. (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν, οὐχ οἱ ἀνδρείοτατοι, μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύοντες, καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες.) οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερ-
20 τείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς. πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύγουσι. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά, μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει. ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ, αἰσχροὺς τὸ φεύγειν, καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος. οἱ δὲ
25 καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνευον, ὡς κρείττους ὄντες· γνόντες δὲ, φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι. ὁ δ' ἀνδρεῖος οὐ τοιοῦτος.

XIII. Καὶ τὸν ΘΥΜΟΝ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν. ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυ-
30 μὸν (ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τράσαντας) φερόμενοι· ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι, θυμοειδεῖς. ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους. ὅθεν καὶ Ὁμηρος, “σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ” καὶ “μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε” καὶ “δριμύ δ' ἀνὰ ρίνας μένος” καὶ “ἔξεσεν
fieri

αἶμα." πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν, τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ ἔγερσιν καὶ ὄρμην. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι, διὰ τὸ ΚΑΛΟΝ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ, διὰ λύπην. διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι. ἐπεὶ, εἴαν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἢ, οὐ προσέρχονται· οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεῖα, διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνας καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὄρμᾶν οὐθέν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα. ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε, κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἴεν πεινῶντες. τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς. καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ δὲ, διὰ τὴν 10 ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. οὐ δὴ ἔστιν ἀνδρεῖα, τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνας ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἢ διὰ τὸν θυμὸν εἶναι καὶ, προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ, ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν 15 ἀλγοῦσι, τιμαρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί. οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα μαχόμενοι, ΜΑΧΙΜΟΙ μὲν, οὐκ ΑΝΔΡΕΙΟΙ δέ. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ΚΑΛΟΝ, οὐδ' ὡς ὁ λόγος· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος. παραπλήσιον δ' ἔχουσί τι.

XIV. Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ ΕΥΕΛΠΙΔΕΣ ὄντες, ἀνδρεῖοι. διὰ 20 γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι, θάρρουςιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὅτι ἄμφω θάρραλέοι. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι, διὰ τὰ προειρημένα θάρραλέοι· οἱ δὲ, διὰ τὸ οἶσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ μηθέν ἀντιπαθεῖν. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυ- 25 σκόμενοι. εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. ὅταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν. ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν, τὰ φοβερὰ ἀνθρώπων, ΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ, ὑπομένειν, ὅτι ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειοτέρου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τοῖς Αἰφνιδίοις Φοβοῖς ἄφοβον 30 καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις. ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον· ἢ καὶ, ὅτι ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς. τὰ προφανῆ μὲν γὰρ, κἂν ἐκ λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο· τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης, κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν.

XV. Ἄνδρεῖοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ ὅτι ἀγνοοῦντες. καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων· χεῖρους δ', ὅσα *estimate* ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνοι δέ. διὸ καὶ μένουσί τινα χρόνον· οἳ δ' ἠπατημένοι, εἴαν γνῶσιν ὅτι ἕτερον ἢ ὑποπτεύσασιν, φεύγουσιν. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον, περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυωνίοις. οἳ τε δὴ ἄνδρειοι εἴρηνται ποῖοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἄνδρειοι.

XVI. Περί θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὔσα, 12
10 οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά. ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταῦθ' ὡς δεῖ ἔχων, ἀνδρεῖος, μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θάρραλέα.

XVII. Τῷ δὲ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, 15 ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται. διὸ καὶ ἐπίλυτον ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται. χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ἢ τῶν ἠδέων ἀπέχεσθαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδὺ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι. οἷον καὶ τοῖς γυμ- 20 νικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται. τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδὺ, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί· τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινὸν, εἴπερ σάρκιοι, καὶ λυπηρὸν, καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος. διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὂν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ 25 τοιοῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται· ὑπομένει δὲ αὐτὰ, ὅτι καλόν, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχυρὸν τὸ μῆ. καὶ ὅσα ἂν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχη πᾶσαν, καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος ἢ· μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυ- 30 πηθήσεται. τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστρεφεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἥττον ἀνδρεῖος. ἴσως δὲ καὶ

μᾶλλον· ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ΚΑΛΟΝ ἀντ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἠδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ΕΦ' ὍΣΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΕΦΑΠΤΕΤΑΙ. στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως καλύει μὴ τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἥττον μὲν ὅ ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας. ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους· καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω. τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE.

13 I. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗΣ λέγωμεν. (δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί.) ὅτι μὲν οὖν ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ἩΔΟΝΑΣ ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν. ἥττον γὰρ, καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἐστὶ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ΛΥΠΑΣ. ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ΑΚΟΛΑΣΙΑ φαίνεται.

II. Περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. διηρήσθωσαν οὖν [καὶ] αἱ ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΑΙ καὶ αἱ ΨΥΧΙΚΑΙ, οἷον, Φιλοτιμία, Φιλομάθεια. ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ Φιλητικός ἐστίν, οὐθεν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. ὁμοίως δ', οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν. τοὺς γὰρ Φιλομούθους, καὶ διηγητικούς, καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας, ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' οὐ, λέγομεν.

διηρήσθωσαν
δὲ αἱ ψυχι-
καὶ καὶ αἱ
σωματικαί.

τις

οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν, ἢ φίλοις. περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

III. Οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας. οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς δια τῆς οὐρεως, (οἷον χρήμασι, καὶ σκήμασι, καὶ γραφῇ,) οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν. τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει, οὐ
 10 θεῖς ἀκόλαστους λέγει· οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ, σώφρονας. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν· πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβη-
 15 κοσ. τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων, ἢ ῥόδων, ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς, οὐ λέγομεν ἀκόλαστους· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, τοὺς μύρων καὶ ὄψων. χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ
 20 ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς. τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν, ἀκόλαστου. τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις,
 25 κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονή, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγαῶν αἰκύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἢ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν. οὐδ' ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδάδῃ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς
 30 ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρῶν, ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα· ἀλλ' ὅτι βορᾶν ἕξει.

IV. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δ' ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστίν, ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοι-
 30 νόνησι. ὅθεν ἀνδραποδάεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται. αὗται δ' εἰσὶν, ἀφῆ καὶ γεύσις.

V. Φαίνονται δὴ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθεν χρῆσθαι. τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστίν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν. ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δοκιμάζοντες,

καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες. οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἳ γε ἀκόλαστοι· ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς, καὶ ἐν σιτίοις, καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς, καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. διὸ καὶ ἠΰξαστό τις Φιλόξενος ὁ Ἐρύξιος, ὄψοφάγος ἂν, τὸν ὄφάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γενέσθαι ὡς ἠδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ.

τις ὄψοφάγος.

VI. Κοινοτάτη δὴ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία. καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δικαίως ἐπονείδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ ἢ ἀνθρωποὶ ἐσμεν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν, καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν, θηριῶδες.

VII. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἠδονῶν, ἀφήρηται· οἷον, αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι. οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκόλαστου ἀφῆ, ἀλλὰ 15 περὶ τινὰ μέρη.

VIII. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν, αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· αἱ δ' ἰδιοὶ καὶ ἐπίθετοι. οἷον, ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς, φυσικῆ. πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηραῶς ἢ ὑγραῶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν· καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ 20 νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων· τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦσδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ τῶν αὐτῶν. διὸ φαίνεται ἡμετερον εἶναι. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν. ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἠδέα· καὶ ἔνια πᾶσιν ἠδίω τῶν τυχόντων. 25

IX. Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι· καὶ ἐφ' ἓν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον. τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν, ἕως ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ· ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ πληθεῖ. ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, ἢ φυσικῆ ἐπιθυμίας. διὸ 30 λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι· ὡς παρὰ τὸ δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν ἀδραποδάδεις.

X. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν, πολλοὶ καὶ ΠΟΛΛΑΧΩΣ ἀμαρτάνουσιν. τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιοῦτων λε-
γομένων, ἢ τῶ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῶ μᾶλλον, ἢ
ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ, ἢ μὴ ὡς δεῖ· κατὰ πάντα δὴ, οἷδ' οἱ.
5 ἀκόλαστοι ὑπερβάλλουσιν. καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις,
οἷς οὐ δεῖ (μισητὰ γάρ) καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν
τοιούτων μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρου-
σιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολή, ὅτι
ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν· δῆλον.

10 XI. Περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας, οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς
ἀνδρείας, τῶ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σάφρων, ἀκόλαστος
δὲ τῶ μὴ ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, Τῶ ΛΥΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ
ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ἢ ΔΕΙ' ὍΤΙ ΤῶΝ ἨΔΕΩΝ ΟΥ ΤΥΓΧΑΝΕΙ' (καὶ
τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ αὐτῶ ἢ ἡδονή) ὁ δὲ σάφρων, Τῶ ΜΗ λύπην δεῖ.

15 ΛΥΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ Τῆ ΑΠΟΥΣΙΑ- ΤΟΥ ἨΔΕΟΣ. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπουσία καὶ
ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων, ἢ τῶν μάλ- ^{τῆ ἀπέχου-}
λιστα· καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας· ὥστε ἀντὶ 14
τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ, λυπεῖσθαι ^{λοπιῦται}
ἀποτυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν. μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ ^{καί.}
20 ἐπιθυμία. αὐτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε, τὸ δὲ ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι.

XII. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἤττον ἢ
δεῖ χαίροντες, οὐ πάνυ γίνονται. οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική
ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα
διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει, τοῖς δ' οὐ.
25 εἰ δὲ τῶ μηθέν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ, μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου·
πῶρῳ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ
τοιούτος ὀνόματος, διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

XIII. Ὁ δὲ σάφρων μίσως περὶ ταῦτ' ἔχει. οὔτε
γὰρ ἡδέται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
30 λον δυσχεραίνει· οὐθ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ· οὔτε σφόδρα
τοιούτῳ οὐδενί· οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπεῖται, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ·
ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ· οὐδ'

ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὐθέν. ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν, ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν, ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέζεται μετρίως καὶ ὡς δεῖ· καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων, μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων, ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν, ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχων, μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς⁵ ἀξίας. ὁ δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.

15 XIV. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία, τῆς δειλίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονὴν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην· ἂν τὸ μὲν αἰρετόν, τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι¹⁰ καὶ φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον. διὸ καὶ ἐπονιδιστότερον. καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά. πολλὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα· καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν, ἀνάπαλιν. 15

XV. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἡ ΔΕΙΛΙΑ εἶναι, ΤΟΙΣ ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ. αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος· ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὄπλα ρίπτειν, καὶ τᾶλλα ἀσχημονεῖν. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ βίαια εἶναι. τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν. τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα²⁰ στα, ἐκούσια. ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ. τὸ δ' ὅλον, ἦττον. οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

XVI. Τὸ δ' ΟΝΟΜΑ τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν. ἔχουσι γὰρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθέν πρὸς²⁵ τὰ νῦν διαφέρει. δῆλον δ', ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. οὐ κακῶς δ' ἔοικε μετετηνέχθαι. κεκολλάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ, τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρεγόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξήσιν ἔχον· τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα ἡ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ὁ παῖς. κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία,³⁰ καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος ὀρέξεις. εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθεὶς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει.

ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις· καὶ πανταχόθεν,
 τῷ ἀνοήτῳ. καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξει τὸ
 συγγενές. κὰν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ᾧσι, καὶ τὸν
 λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτάς,
 5 καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μῆθεν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. τὸ δὲ
 τοιοῦτον, ΕΥΠΕΙΘΕΣ λέγομεν καὶ ΚΕΚΟΛΑΣΜΕΝΟΝ.
 ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ, κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ
 παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, κατὰ
 τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν συμ-
 10 φανεῖν τῷ λόγῳ. σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν· καὶ
 ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ᾧν δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω
 δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

Ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

Difficult to understand his meaning.

The first part of the study is devoted to a general
 description of the ... and its ...
 The second part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...
 The third part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...
 The fourth part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...
 The fifth part is devoted to a detailed
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 The sixth part is devoted to a detailed
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 The seventh part is devoted to a detailed
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 The eighth part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...
 The ninth part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...
 The tenth part is devoted to a detailed
 description of the ... and its ...

BOOK IV.

SUMMARY OF THE FOURTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

ON THE VIRTUE OF LIBERALITY.

I. LIBERALITY is defined: A MEAN WHICH RELATES TO THE ACQUIRING AND EXPENDING OF WEALTH. But it has an aspect more to the EXPENDING, than to the ACQUIRING. II. Definition of WEALTH: THAT OF WHICH THE VALUE IS MEASURED BY MONEY. III. The two extremes of PRODIGALITY and ILLIBERALITY. IV. Reasons for saying, that liberality has an aspect to the expending, more than to the acquiring, of wealth. V. The general character of liberality. VI. The term properly regards the essential QUALITY OF THE HABIT, not the AMOUNT OF SUMS EXPENDED.

VII. It is the virtue of those who INHERIT, more frequently than that of those who ACQUIRE.

VIII. The reason why liberal men seldom grow rich.

IX. The reason why it is essential to liberality, to avoid improper expenditure. X. The conduct which is essential to a liberal man: it is equally regardful of propriety in acquiring and expending.

XI. The relation of this virtue to the two extremes opposed to it. XII. The extreme of the prodigal, is not so bad as that of the illiberal. XIII. Nevertheless the vice of the prodigal in expending, is often connected with that of the illiberal in acquiring. XIV. In what ways the expenditure of the prodigal, deviates from the rule of virtue, and from the proper character of liberality. XV. Incurable nature of illiberality.

XVI. The faulty extremes, in relation to acquiring and expending, do not always go together.

XVII. The vice of illiberality does not relate to very extensive and enormous violations of property. The vice thus incurred, is one

of a different name. XVIII. Various modes of dishonest gain, to which the term ILLIBERALITY properly applies.

XIX. Of the two EXTREMES, the DEFECT is, in this case, most opposed to the MEAN.

CHAP. II.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MAGNIFICENCE.

I. MAGNIFICENCE is defined: A MEAN RELATING TO WEALTH, BUT WITH RELATION TO THOSE OCCASIONS ONLY OF EXPENDITURE, WHICH ARE GRAND AND SUMPTUOUS. II. The DEFECT is in this case denoted by the term ΜΙΚΡΟΠΕΠΕΙΑ: the EXCESS, by ΒΑΝΑΤΣΙΑ, ΑΠΕΙΡΟΚΑΛΙΑ, and other terms.

III. The CHARACTER of the MAGNIFICENT PERSON is delineated. IV. The proper OCCASIONS of PUBLIC magnificence. V. The PERSONS to whom this virtue is suitable. VI. The proper OCCASIONS of PRIVATE magnificence. VII. The expenditure of the magnificent, will be not only GREAT, but also, PROPORTIONATE. That is: It will be regulated by a special regard to the difference of the various works or gifts, in which it may be concerned.

VIII. The characters belonging to the two EXTREMES opposed to this mean. IX. These two extremes, though vicious, are not deserving of very great blame.

CHAP. III.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MAGNANIMITY.

I. The MAGNANIMOUS MAN is defined to be: HE, WHO AIMS AT GREAT THINGS, BEING ALSO WORTHY OF THEM. II. The two EXTREMES opposed to this virtue, are those, of him, WHO AIMS AT GREAT THINGS, BEING UNWORTHY OF THEM (ΧΑΥΝΟΣ); and of him, WHO AIMS AT THINGS LESS THAN HE IS WORTHY OF (ΜΙΚΡΟΥΤΧΟΣ).

III. The chief object to which this virtue, and the two vicious extremes, relate, is HONOUR. IV. This virtue cannot exist, except in conjunction with others. V. This virtue is discriminative with

regard to the honours which it receives, and wholly regardless of dishonour. VI. It has some relation to WEALTH and POWER, as well as to honour.

VII. It is considered, how far a PROSPEROUS FORTUNE is connected with MAGNANIMITY.

VIII. The general CHARACTER of the MAGNANIMOUS MAN is delineated.

IX. The two extremes opposed to this virtue, are censurable, rather for error of judgment than for depravity. X. These extremes are described. XI. The DEFECT is more opposed to the mean than the EXCESS is.

CHAP. IV.

ON A NAMELESS VIRTUE RELATING TO HONOUR.

I. There is a virtue respecting HONOUR, which has the same relation to magnanimity, that liberality has to magnificence. II. The two EXTREMES are denoted by the words AMBITIOUS and UNAMBITIOUS: but the MEAN has no name, and the praise due to it is often expressed by the names of the extremes.

CHAP. V.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MEEKNESS.

I. MEEKNESS is defined: A MEAN RELATING TO ANGER. II. The DEFECT, relating to this virtue, is described. III. As is also, the EXCESS. IV. The EXCESS is more opposed to the MEAN, than the DEFECT is. V. It is impossible, with respect to this subject, to fix the exact measures of rectitude. VI. Sum of the chapter.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE VIRTUES RELATING TO SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

This chapter consists of four parts : of which the first three, respectively, are employed in the separate consideration of three several virtues ; and the fourth, points out the mutual connexion and relation of those virtues.

PART THE FIRST.

I. There is a virtue, relating to convivial and social intercourse, which consists in a well-regulated habit of DESIRING TO PLEASE. This virtue has no Greek name : but the true idea of it, may be not unfitly expressed by the word COMPLAISANCE. II. It is shewn, in what this virtue resembles FRIENDSHIP, and in what it differs from it. III. This virtue is described. IV. THE EXTREMES opposed to it, are described.

PART THE SECOND.

V. There is a virtue, nameless in Greek, but which it may perhaps be allowable to denote, the virtue of MODEST PRETENSION. It consists in propriety of conduct, relating to the profession, and to the acknowledgment, of a man's own merits and qualifications. VI. The MEAN in which this virtue consists, and the EXTREMES which are opposed to it. VII. This virtue relates only to those occasions, on which there is no motive of interest to deviate from truth : if there be such motive, it is not this, but a different virtue, of which the exercise is called for. VIII. The character of him, who, respecting this matter, observes the medium. IX. The character of the FALSE PRETENDER. X. The character of the UNPRETENDING man : that is, of him who dissembles or extenuates his own merits. XI. Of the EXTREMES, the EXCESS is most opposed to the MEAN.

PART THE THIRD.

XII. There is a virtue, which, for want of a term more exactly appropriate, we may denote, the virtue of URBANITY. It consists in the due government of wit, mirth, and familiar discourse, on occasions of social relaxation and convivial intercourse. XIII. The reason why the credit of this virtue is frequently given to BUFFOONERY.

XIV. The character of the MEAN, in which this virtue consists.
XV. And of the EXCESS opposed to it. XVI. And of the DEFECT
opposed to it.

PART THE FOURTH.

XVII. The points of agreement and of difference, belonging to
the three virtues thus described.



CHAP. VII.

ON SHAME.

I. The nature of SHAME, though not a virtue, nor even a habit, is
proper to be here considered. II. To what age shame is suitable.
III. Measure of praise connected with the occasions on which it
discovers itself.

IV. Shame is not the only disposition, of which, though not a
virtue, the ethical consideration is proper.

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the force and the progress of the work during the year. It also contains a list of the names of the officers who have been promoted during the year.

THE POLICE FORCE

The following table shows the number of officers in the force at the beginning and end of the year, and the number of officers who have been promoted during the year.

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CHAP. I.

ON THE VIRTUE OF LIBERALITY.

I. ΛΕΓΩΜΕΝ δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ. I
 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι, ἢ ΠΕΡΙ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ. ἐπαινεῖται
 γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς
 ὁ σάφρων, οὐδ' αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν· ἀλλὰ ΠΕΡΙ ΔΟΣΙΝ
 5 ΧΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΛΗΨΙΝ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ ΔΟΣΕΙ.

II. Χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα, ὅσων ἢ ἀξία
 ΝΟΜΙΣΜΑΤΙ ΜΕΤΡΕΙΤΑΙ.

III. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ΑΣΩΤΙΑ, καὶ ἡ ΑΝΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΑ,
 περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις. καὶ τὴν
 10 μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν αἰεὶ, τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ
 δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι. τὴν δ' ἀσωτίαν ἐπι-
 φέρομεν ἐνίοτε, συμπλέκοντες. τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς, καὶ καὶ οἷς.
 τοὺς εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς, ἀσωτοὺς καλοῦμεν.
 διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. πολλὰς γὰρ
 15 ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. οὐ δὲ ΟΙΚΕΙΩΣ προσαγορεύον-
 ται. βούλεται γὰρ ΑΣΩΤΟΣ εἶναι, ὁ ἐν τι κακὸν ἔχων,
 τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀσωτος γὰρ, ὁ δι' αὐτὸν ἀπολ-
 λύμενος. δοκεῖ δ' ἀπάλειά τις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ ἡ
 τῆς ΟΥΣΙΑΣ φθορά· ὡς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος.
 20 οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἀσωτίαν ἐκδεχόμεθα.

IV. Ὡν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἐστὶ τούτοις χρῆσθαι καὶ εὖ
 καὶ κακῶς. ὁ πλούτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων. ἐκάστῳ
 δ' ἄριστα χρῆται, ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν. καὶ
 πλούτῳ δὲ χρῆσεται ἄριστα, ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ

χρήματα ἀρετῆν· οὗτος δ' ἐστίν, ὁ ἐλευθέριος. ΧΡΗΣΙΣ
 δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων, ΔΑΠΑΝΗ καὶ ΔΟΣΙΣ· ἡ δὲ
 λῆψις καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ, ΚΤΗΣΙΣ μᾶλλον. διὸ μᾶλλον
 ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου, τὸ δίδοναι ὅσις δεῖ, ἢ λαμβάνειν
 ὅθεν δεῖ, καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. τῆς γὰρ 5
 ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν, ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν· καὶ τὰ
 καλὰ πράττειν μᾶλλον, ἢ τὰ αἰσχροῦ μὴ πράττειν.
 οὐκ ἄδηλον δ', ὅτι τῇ μὲν δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ
 τὸ καλὰ πράττειν· τῇ δὲ λήψει, τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ
 αἰσχροπραγεῖν. καὶ ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὐ τῷ μὴ 10
 λαμβάνοντι· καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος δὲ μᾶλλον. καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ
 μὴ λαβεῖν, τοῦ δοῦναι. τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον ἦττον προῖεν-
 ται, μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι τὸ ἀλλότριον. καὶ
 ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται, οἱ διδόντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβά-
 νοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦνται, ἀλλ' οὐχ 15
 ἦττον εἰς ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΝ. οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες, οὐδ' ἐπαι-
 νοῦνται πάνυ. φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα οἱ ἐλευ-
 θέριοι, τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς. ὠφέλιμοι γάρ· τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ
 δόσει.

2 V. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, καλαί, καὶ τοῦ 20
 καλοῦ ἕνεκα. καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δάσει, τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἕνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ, καὶ ὅσα, καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει· καὶ ταῦτα
 ἠδέως, ἢ ἀλύπως. τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἠδὲ ἢ ἄλυπον·
 ἠκίστα δὲ λυπηρόν. ὁ δὲ δίδους οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ 25
 καλοῦ ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν· οὐκ ἐλευ-
 θέριος, ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς.
 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα, τῆς καλῆς πρά-
 ξεως· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐλευθερίου. οὐδὲ λήφεται δὲ ὅθεν
 μὴ δεῖ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμῶντος τὰ χρήματα, 30
 ἢ τοιαύτη λῆψις. οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός. οὐ
 γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ ποιῶντος, εὐχερῶς εὐεργετεῖσθαι.
 ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήφεται· οἷον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων,
 (οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον,) ὅπως ἔχη δι-

δόναι. οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων· βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει ἵνα ἔχη δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ οὗ καλόν. ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα, καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ
5 δώσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν, ἐλευθερίου.

VI. ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΟΥΣΙΑΝ δ', ἡ ἐλευθεριότης λέγεται. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ δίδοντος ἕξει· αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν
10 οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. οὐθεν δὲ κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω δίδοντα, ἐὰν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῶ.

VII. Ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν. ἀπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας. καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί.
15

VIII. Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ράδιον τὸν ἐλευθέριον· μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα, μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δέ· καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι' αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς δοσεως. διὸ καὶ ἐγκαλεῖται τῇ τύχῃ, ὅτι οἱ
20 μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν. συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν, μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη. ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

IX. Οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ· οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· καὶ εἰς ταῦτα ἀναλώσας, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται· ἐλευθερίος ἐστίν, ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δαπανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ἄσωτος. διὸ τοὺς
30 τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἀσώτους. τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ράδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν.

X. Τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὴ, μεσότητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν· ὁ ἐλευθέριος καὶ δάσει, καὶ δαπανήσει, εἰς ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ, ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις· καὶ ταῦτα ἠδέως· καὶ λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ ἄμφω⁵ οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρω ὡς δεῖ. ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικῇ δόσει, ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψις· ἢ δὲ μὴ τοιαύτη, ἐναντία ἐστίν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι δῆλον ὡς οὐ. εἰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον, συμβαίνει αὐτῷ¹⁰ ἀναλίσκειν, λυπήσεται· μετρίως δὲ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ, καὶ ἠδῆσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι, ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. καὶ εὐκοινώητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα. δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα. καὶ μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος, εἴ τι δέον μὴ¹⁵ ἀνάλωσεν, ἢ λυπούμενος, εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε. καὶ ὃ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει. οὔτε γὰρ ἠδεύεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ· οὔτε λυπεῖται. ἔσται δὲ προἰούσι φανερώτερον.

20

XI. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν, ὅτι ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἢ ἄσωτία καὶ ἢ ἀνελευθερία· καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει· (καὶ τὴν δαπάνην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν). ἢ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτία, τῷ δίδοναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει· τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἐλλείπει. ἢ δ'²⁵ ἀνελευθερία, τῷ δίδοναι μὲν ἐλλείπει, τῷ λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει[, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς].

XII. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἄσωτίας, οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα, πᾶσι δίδοναι. ταχέως γὰρ ἐπιλείπει ἢ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας³⁰ δίδοντας· (οἷπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι). ἐπεὶ, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. εὐιάτός τε γὰρ ἐστὶ, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας· καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται

ἐλθεῖν. ἔχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου. καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει· οὐδέτερον δ' ὡς δεῖ, οὐδ' εὔ. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖη, ἢ πως ἄλλως μεταβάλοι· εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος. δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος. οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ, οὐδ' ἀγεννοῦς, τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα· ἡλιθίου δέ. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἄσωτος, πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι· διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολ-
 10 λούς, ὁ δὲ οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν.

XIII. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀσωτῶν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· καὶ εἰσὶ κατὰ τοῦτο, ἀνελευθέροι. ληπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται, διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ
 15 δύνασθαι. ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. ἅμα δὲ καὶ, διὰ τὸ μῆθεν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν, ὀλιγῶρας καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν. δίδοναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι· τὸ δὲ πῶς, ἢ πόθεν, οὐθεν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει.

XIV. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσίν. οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ. ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε, οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, τούτους πλουσίους ποι-
 20 οῦσι. καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἦθη, οὐδὲν ἂν δοῖεν. τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν, ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι, πολλὰ. διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσίν οἱ πολλοί. εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες, καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας δαπανηροὶ εἰσι· καὶ, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῆν, πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουσιν.

XV. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος, ἀπαιδαγωγῆτος γε-
 30 νόμενος, εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει. τυχῶν δ' ἐπιμελείας, εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἂν. ἢ δ' ἀνελευθερία ΑΝΙΑΤΟΣ ἐστίν. δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας, καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία, ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. καὶ συμφύεστερον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας. οἱ γὰρ πολλοί, φιλοχρήματα

μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολὺ, καὶ πολυειδές ἐστιν.

XVI. Πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευθερίας εἶναι. ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὕσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως, καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως· οὐ πᾶσιν ὈΛΟΚΑΗΡΟΣ 5 παραγίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χαρίζεται· καὶ οἱ μὲν τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσι, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις, οἷον Φειδωλοὶ, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες· πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι, τῶν δ' ἀλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται, οὐδὲ βούλονται 10 λαμβάνειν. οἱ μὲν, διὰ τινα ἐπιείκειαν, καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι, ἢ Φασί γε, διὰ τοῦτο φυλάττειν· ἵνα μὴ ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρᾶξαι. τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης, καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος. ἀνόμασται δ', ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθ- 15 ἐνὶ ἄν δοῦναι. οἱ δ' αὖ, διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων· “ ὥς οὐ ράδιον, τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ ἐτέρους μή.” ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς, τὸ μῆτε λαμβάνειν μῆτε δίδοναι. οἱ δ' αὖ, κατὰ τὴν λῆψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι, τῷ πάντοθεν λαμ- 20 βάνειν καὶ πᾶν. οἷον· οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους ἐργατίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ, καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι· καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῶ· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι, ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅποσον οὐ δεῖ. κοινὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχυροκέρδεια φαίνεται. πάντες γὰρ 25 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν.

ὅθεν δὲ.

XVII. Τοὺς γὰρ τὰ ΜΕΓΑΛΑ μὴ ὅθεν δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ ἂ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους (οἷον, τοὺς τυράννους, πόλεις πορθεύοντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας) ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς μᾶλλον, καὶ ἀσεβεῖς, καὶ 30 ἀδίκους.

XVIII. Ὁ μέντοι κυβευτῆς, καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ

[ο] ληστής, τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσίν. αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ.
 κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν, ἀμφότεροι πραγματευονται καὶ
 ὀνειδή ὑπομένουσιν· καὶ οἱ μὲν, κινδύνους τοὺς μεγί-
 5 στοὺς ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος· οἱ δ', ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων κερ-
 δαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ δίδοναι. ἀμφότεροι δὴ, ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
 κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι, αἰσχροκερδεῖς. καὶ πᾶσαι δὴ
 αἰ τοιαῦται λήψεις ἀνελεύθεροι.

XIX. Εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθεριότητι, ἀνελευθερία
 ENANTION λέγεται. μείζον τε γὰρ ἐστὶ κακὸν τῆς
 10 ἀσωτίας. καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ἢ
 κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος, καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων
 κακιῶν· τσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω.

CHAP. II.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MAGNIFICENCE.

I. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι, καὶ περὶ ΜΕΓΑ- 4
 15 ΔΟΠΡΕΠΕΙΑΣ διελθεῖν. δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ ΠΕΡΙ
 ΧΡΗΜΑΤΑ τις ἀρετὴ εἶναι. οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευ-
 θεριότης, διατείνει περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πρά-
 ξεις, ἀλλὰ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ΔΑΠΑΝΗΡΑΣ ΜΟΝΟΝ· ἐν τούτοις
 δ', ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ. καθάπερ
 20 γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, EN ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ ΠΡΕ-
 ΠΟΥΣΑ ΔΑΠΑΝΗ ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ μέγεθος, ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ. οὐ
 γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχῳ καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.
 τὸ πρόπον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ, καὶ περὶ ᾧ. ὁ δ'
 ἐν μικροῖς, ἢ ἐν μετρίοις, κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν, οὐ
 25 λέγεται μεγαλοπρεπής· (οἷον, τὸ “πολλάκι δόσκον
 ἀλήτην”) ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ με-
 γαλοπρεπής, ἐλευθέριος· ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος, οὐθεν μᾶλ-
 λον μεγαλοπρεπής.

II. Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως, ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις ΜΙΚΡΟΠΡΕΠΕΙΑ καλεῖται. ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή, ΒΑΝΑΤΣΙΑ, καὶ ΑΠΕΙΡΟΚΑΛΙΑ, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται· οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, λαμπρυνόμεναι. ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐ- 5 τῶν ἐροῦμεν.

III. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν. τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι, καὶ δαπανῆσαι μεγάλα ἐμμελῶς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶπομεν· ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν. αἱ δὲ τοῦ 10 μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι, μεγάλαί καὶ πρέπουσαι. τοιαῦτα δὴ καὶ τὰ ἔργα. οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα δαπάνημα, καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου· ἢ καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοι- 15 αῦτα ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ ἕνεκα. κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς. καὶ ἔτι, ἠδέως καὶ προετικῶς. ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία, μικροπρεπές. καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον, σκέψαιτ' ἂν, μᾶλλον ἢ, πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν 20 μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, οἷον μέγεθος· περὶ ταυτὰ τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὔσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης, τὸ ἔργον ποιήσει μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ 25 κτήματος καὶ ἔργου. κτῆμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσός· ἔργον δὲ, τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστή· τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπές θαυμαστόν. καὶ ἔστιν ἔργου ἀρετὴ, μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει. 30

5 IV. Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων, οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον, τὰ περὶ θεοῦ ἀναθήματα, καὶ κατασκευαῖ, καὶ θυσίαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, ὅσα περὶ πᾶν τὸ

δαιμόνιον. καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν οἶον, εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἴονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς, ἢ τριηραρχεῖν, ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν.

V. Ἐν ἅπασιν δ', ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ πρὸς τὸν 5 πρᾶττοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ, τίς ἂν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων. ἀξία γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι· καὶ μὴ μόνον τῶ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶ ποιῶντι, πρέπειν. διὸ, πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλοπρεπῆς. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀφ' ἧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόντως. ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος. 10 παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ τὸ δέον· κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ, τὸ ὀρθῶς. πρέπει δὲ καὶ, οἷς τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει, δι' αὐτῶν, ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων, ἢ ἂν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν· καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις· καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς. καὶ ἐν 15 τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἢ μεγαλοπρέπεια, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότερα.

VI. Τῶν δὲ ἰδιῶν, ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἶον γάμος, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον· καὶ εἰ περὶ τι πᾶσα ἢ πόλις 20 σπουδάζει, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι· καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχᾶς καὶ ἀποστολᾶς· καὶ δωρεᾶς καὶ ἀντιδωρεᾶς. οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλοπρεπῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα, τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. μεγαλοπρεποῦς δὲ, καὶ οἶκον κατασκευ- 25 ἄσασθαι πρεπόντως τῶ πλούτῳ. κόσμος γὰρ τις καὶ οὗτος. καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν, ὅσα πολυχρόνια τῶν ἔργων. κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπειν. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῶν καὶ τάφῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν 30 δαπανημάτων, ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῶ γένει· καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν, τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα· ἐνταῦθα δὲ, τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

VII. Καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἐργῷ μέγα, τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανηματι. (σφαῖρα μὲν γὰρ, ἢ λήκυθος, ἢ

καλλίστη, ἔχει μεγαλοπρέπειαν παιδικουῦ δάρου· ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμῆ, μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον.) διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν ποιῆ γένοι, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ εὐυπέμβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος. 5

6 VIII. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ ΒΑΝΑΥΣΟΣ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει· ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων, πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος· οἷον, ἐρανοιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν· 10 καὶ καμωδοῖς χορηγῶν, ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων· ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει, ΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΟΥ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι. καὶ οὗ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλωῶσαι, ὀλίγα 15 δαπανῶν· οὗ δ' ὀλίγα, πολλὰ. ὁ δὲ ΜΙΚΡΟΠΡΕΠΗΣ περὶ πάντα ἐλλείψει. καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας, ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ. καὶ ὅτι ἂν ποιῆ, μέλλων καὶ σκοπῶν, πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλώσαι. καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος. καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. 20

IX. Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι. οὐ μὴν ὀνειδῆ γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

CHAP. III.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MAGNANIMITY.

7 I. Ἡ δὲ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥΨΥΧΙΑ περὶ μεγάλα μὲν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἔοικεν εἶναι. περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον 25 λάβωμεν· (διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν, τὴν ἔΞΙΝ, ἢ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΤΑ τὴν ἔΞΙΝ, σκοπεῖν.) δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι, ὁ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ ἄΥΤΟΝ ΑΞΙΩΝ ΑΞΙΟΣ ΩΝ. ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ'

ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν, ἡλίθιος· τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρη-
 μένος. ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος, καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν,
 σάφρων· μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὐ. ἐν ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ γὰρ ἡ με-
 5 γαλοψυχία. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ
 σώματι· οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ
 δ' οὐ.

II. Ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν, ἀνάξιος ἂν,
 ΧΑΥΝΟΣ. ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος, οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος. ὁ
 10 δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος, ΜΙΚΡΟΨΥΧΟΣ· ἑάν τε μεγάλων,
 ἑάν τε μετρίων, ἑάν τε καὶ, μικρῶν ἄξιος ἂν, ἔτι
 ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ
 μεγάλων ἄξιος. τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν
 ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, τῷ μὲν μεγέθει,
 15 ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ· μέσος. τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν
 αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν.

III. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ἂν,
 καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων· περὶ ἔν μάλιστα ἂν
 εἶη. (ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά.)
 20 μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θεΐημεν, ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμο-
 μεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ
 ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ ΤΙΜΗ. μέ-
 γιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙΜΑΣ
 ΔΗ ΚΑΙ ΑΤΙΜΙΑΣ, ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. καὶ
 25 ἄνευ δὲ λόγου, φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τι-
 μὴν εἶναι. τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ' οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν
 ἑαυτούς· κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει,
 καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου
 ἀξίωμα. ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει,
 30 οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

IV. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων
 ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἶη. μείζονος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων
 ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα
 μεγαλόψυχον, δεῖ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ εἶναι. καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν

εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου, τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ μέγα. οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασεύσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν. τίνας γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ, ἃ οὐθέν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι, πάντα γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος, μὴ 5 ἀγαθὸς ἂν. οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος, φαῦλος ἂν. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴν, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν. μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. διὰ τοῦτο, χαλε- 10 πὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε, ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

V. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς ΜΕΓΑΛΑΙΣ, καὶ ἸΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΝ, μετρίως ἡσθήσεται· ὡς τῶν 15 οἰκείων τυγχάνων, ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων. ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμὴ. οὐ μὲν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε, τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῶ ἀπονέμειν. τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων, καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς, πάντα ὀλιγαρήσει. οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. 20 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς.

VI. Οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ, καὶ περὶ ΠΛΟΥΤΟΝ, καὶ ΔΥΝΑΣΤΕΙΑΝ, καὶ πᾶσαν ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΝ καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως 25 ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται. καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν, περιχαρῆς ἔσται· οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν, περίλυπος. οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς μέγιστον οἶ. αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ, τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. ἃ δὴ καὶ 30 ἢ τιμὴ μικρὸν ἐστὶ, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι.

8 VII. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ ΕΥΤΥΧΗΜΑΤΑ συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται

τιμῆς, καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες, ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες. ἐν
 ὑπεροχῇ γάρ. τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν, ἐντιμότε-
 ρον. διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ.
 τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ', ὁ ἀγαθὸς
 5 μόνος τιμητέος. ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξι-
 οῦται τιμῆς. οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ
 ἔχοντες, οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν, οὔτε
 ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται. (ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς
 παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα.) ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὕβρι-
 10 σται [καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ] γίγνονται.
 ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐ-
 τυχήματα. οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν· ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ
 δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃσι πράττουσιν. μιμουῦνται γὰρ τὸν
 15 μεγαλόψυχον, οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες. τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν
 οἷς δύνανται. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι,
 καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων.

VIII. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος ΔΙΚΑΙΩΣ καταφρονεῖ·
 (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς.) οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ, ΤΥΧΟΝΤΩΣ. οὐκ
 20 ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος, οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος, διὰ τὸ ὀλί-
 γα τιμᾶν· μεγαλοκίνδυνος δέ· καὶ, ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ,
 ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. καὶ
 οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν· εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντεuer-
 25 γητικὸς πλειόνων. οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας,
 καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθῶς. δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν
 οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, ἢ δ' ἂν πάθωσιν, οὐ. ἐλάττων
 γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ, τοῦ ποιήσαντος· βούλεται δ' ὑπερ-
 ἔχειν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἠδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς. διὸ
 30 καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Δί·
 οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂ πεπόν-
 θεσαν εὖ. μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι,
 ἢ μόγις· ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως. καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς
 ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις, μέγαν εἶναι· πρὸς δὲ τοὺς

μέσους, μέτριον. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν, χαλεπὸν καὶ
 σεμνόν· τῶν δὲ, ῥάδιον. καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνε-
 σθαι, οὐκ ἀγεννές· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς, φορτικόν· ὥσ-
 περ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔν-
 τιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἢ οὐ πρῶτεύουσιν ἄλλοι. καὶ ἀργὸν ὅ
 εἶναι καὶ μελλητην, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ
 ἔργον. καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ
 ὀνομαστῶν. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ, καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ
 φανερόφιλον. τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν, φοβουμένου. καὶ
 μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας, μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης. καὶ λέ- 10
 γειν καὶ πρᾶττειν φανερώς. παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ
 τὸ καταφρονεῖν. διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ
 δι' εἰρωνεῖαν· εἰρῶνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον. δουλικὸν
 γὰρ. διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες, θητικοί· καὶ οἱ τα- 15
 πεινοὶ, κόλακες. οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός. οὐθεν γὰρ μέγα
 αὐτῷ ἐστίν. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος. οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύ-
 χου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακὰ, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ
 αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ, οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου. οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆ- 20
 ται, μέλει αὐτῷ· οὐθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται.
 οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν. διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος,
 οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. καὶ περὶ ἀναγ-
 καίων, ἢ μικρῶν, ἢκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός.
 σπουδάζοντος γὰρ, οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. καὶ οἷος 25
 κερκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα, τῶν καρ-
 πίων καὶ ἀφελίμων. αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον· καὶ
 κινήσεις δὲ βραδεῖα, τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι,
 καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος. οὐ γὰρ σπεν-
 στικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ 30
 μὴθεν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὄξυφωμία, καὶ ἢ τα-
 χυτῆς διὰ τούτων. τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος.

9 IX. Ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων, μικρόψυχος· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ-

λων, χαῦνος. οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὔτοι. οὐ γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν, ἡμαρτημένοι δέ.

X. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος, ἄξιός ἂν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ἂν ἄξιός ἐστι. καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν. ὠρέγετο γὰρ ἂν ἂν ἄξιός ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. οὐ μὴν ἡλίθιοί γε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκηροί. ἢ τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χεῖρους ποιεῖν. ἕκαστοι γὰρ ἐφίενται
10 τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν· ἀφίστανται δὲ, καὶ τῶν πράξεων τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι, καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς. ὡς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες, τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα
15 ἐξελέγχονται. καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται, καὶ σχήματι, καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερὰ εἶναι αὐτῶν. καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθσόμενοι.

XI. Ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ, ἡ μικρο-
20 ψυχία μᾶλλον τῆς χαυνότητος. καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον, καὶ χεῖρόν ἐστιν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην ὥσπερ εἴρηται.

CHAP. IV.

ON A NAMELESS VIRTUE RELATING TO HONOUR.

I. Ἐοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετὴ τις, 10
25 (καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη,) ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παρὰ πλεονεξίας ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. ἀμφω γὰρ αὐταὶ τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. ὥσπερ δ' ἐν

λήψει καὶ δώσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ, καὶ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ ἔλλειψις· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῆς ὀρέξει, τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ. τὸν τε γὰρ ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΟΝ ψέγομεν, ὡς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ, τῆς τιμῆς ἐφιέμενον· τὸν τε 5 ΑΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΟΝ, ὡς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι.

II. Ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν, ὡς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον· τὸν δὲ ἀφιλότιμον, ὡς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἶπομεν. 10 δῆλον δ' ὅτι (πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιοῦτου λεγομένου) οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον· ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν, ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ, ψέγοντες δ', ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. ἀνωύμου δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὡς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα. 15 ἐν οἷς δ' ἐστὶν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις· καὶ τὸ μέσον. ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ἥττον· ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ, ὡς δεῖ. ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἢ ἕξις αὕτη, ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ ΟΥΣΙΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΙΜΗΝ ΑΝΩΝΥΜΟΣ. φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν, ἀφιλοτιμία· πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφι- 20 λοτιμίαν, φιλοτιμία· πρὸς ἀμφοτέρω δὲ, ἀμφοτέρω παῶς. ἔοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

CHAP. V.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MEEKNESS.

11 I. ΠΡΑΟΤΗΣ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν, ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΟΡΓΑΣ. 25 ἀνωύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων· ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἀποκλίνουσαν, ἀνωύμον οὔσαν. ἢ δ' ὑπερβολῇ, ΟΡΓΙΑΟΤΗΣ τις λέγοιτ' ἄν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πά-

θος ἐστὶν ὀργή· τὰ δ' ἐμποιοῦντα, πολλὰ καὶ διαφέ-
 ροντα. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ, ὀργιζόμενος,
 ἔτι δὲ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον· ἐπαινεί-
 5 ται. πρᾶος δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ ἢ πραότης ἐπαινεί-
 ται. βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος, ἀτάραχος εἶναι, καὶ μὴ
 ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους· ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ,
 οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον,
 χαλεπαίνειν. ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν
 ἔλλειψιν. οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικός ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 10 λον συγγνωμονικός.

II. Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ΑΟΡΓΗΣΙΑ ΤΙΣ ἐστὶν, εἴθ'
 ὅτι δὴ ποτε· φέγεται. οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζόμενοι ἐφ'
 οἷς δεῖ, ἠλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ, μὴδ'
 ὅτε, μὴδ' οἷς δεῖ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι, οὐδὲ
 15 λυπεῖσθαι· μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε, οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυητικός.
 τὸ δὲ προσηλακίζομενον ἀνέχεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους
 περιῶν· ἀνδραποδῶδες.

III. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται. καὶ
 γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ,
 20 καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον. οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῶ
 αὐτῶ ὑπάρχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτ' εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ
 κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι· καὶ ὀλοκλήρον ἢ, ἀφό-
 ρητον γίνεται. οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι, ταχέως μὲν ὀργί-
 ζονται, καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μάλ-
 25 λον ἢ δεῖ· παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον
 ἔχουσι· συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι
 τὴν ὀργὴν, ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόασιν ἢ φανεροί· εἰσι διὰ
 τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἴτ' ἀποπαύονται. ὑπερβολὴ δ', εἰσὶν
 οἱ ἀκρόχοιοι, ὀξεῖς, καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι, καὶ ἐπὶ
 30 παντί. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα. οἱ δὲ πικροί, δυσδιάλυτοι,
 καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται. κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν
 θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ. ἢ γὰρ
 τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἠδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμ-
 ποιοῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου, τὸ βάρος ἔχουσι.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι, οὐδὲ συμπεῖθει αὐτοὺς οὐδεῖς· ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν, χρόνου δεῖ. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις. χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς, ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ πλείω 5 χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλλαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως.

IV. Τῇ πραότητι δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν. καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται (ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι) καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χα- 10 λεποὶ χεῖρους.

See B. II.
c. iv. §. v.

V. Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον. οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς, καὶ τίσι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις, καὶ πόσον χρόνον, ὀργιστέον· καὶ τὸ, μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ τις, ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. ὁ μὲν 15 γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν, καὶ πράους φαμέν· καὶ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις, ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. ὁ δὲ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων, ψεκτός· οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ 20 ἀποδοῦναι. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσις.

VI. Ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον· ὅτι ἡ μὲν μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· αἱ δ' ὑπερ- 25 βολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταί· καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμεναι, ἡρέμα· ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ, μᾶλλον· ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ, σφόδρα. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE VIRTUES RELATING TO SOCIAL INTERCOURSE.

PART I.

ON THE VIRTUE OF COMPLAISANCE.

I. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀμιλίαις, καὶ τῷ συζῆν, καὶ λόγων 12
καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν· οἱ μὲν ἈΡΕΣΚΟΙ δοκοῦσιν
εἶναι· οἱ πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν
ἀντιτείνοντες, ἀλλ' οἴομενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγ-
5 χάνουσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ', ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις, πρὸς πάντα
ἀντιτείνοντες, καὶ τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν φροντίζοντες·
ΔΥΣΚΟΛΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΥΣΕΡΙΔΕΣ καλοῦνται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ
εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταί εἰσιν, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ ὅτι ἡ
μέση τούτων ἐπαινετή· καθ' ἣν, ἀποδέξεται ἂν δεῖ καὶ
10 ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ. ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀπο-
δέδοται αὐτῇ τι.

II. Ἐοικε δὲ μάλιστα ΦΙΛΙΑ. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ἐστίν
ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσσην ἕξιν, οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν
ἐπιεικῆ φίλον, ΤΟ ΣΤΕΡΓΕΙΝ προσλαβόντα. διαφέρει
15 δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν
οἷς ὀμιλεῖ. οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν, ἀποδέχεται
ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ· ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

III. Ὅμοίως γὰρ, πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους,
καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις, αὐτὸ ποιήσει· πλὴν καὶ
20 ἐν ἐκάστοις, ὩΣ ἌΡΜΟΖΕΙ. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει,
συνήθων καὶ ὀθνεῖων φροντίζειν· οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. καθόλου
μὲν οὖν εἴρηται, ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὀμιλήσει. ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς
ΤΟ ΚΑΛΟΝ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, ΣΤΟΧΑΣΕΤΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ
ΔΥΠΕΙΝ, ἢ ΣΥΝΗΔΥΝΕΙΝ. ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς
25 καὶ λύπας εἶναι, τὰς ἐν ταῖς ὀμιλίαις γινομένας.
τούτων δ', ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν

συνηδύνειν· δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. καὶ τῷ ποιοῦντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρη, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικρὰν, ἢ βλάβην· ἢ δ' ἐναντίωσις, μικρὰν λύπην· οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. διαφερόντως δ' ὀμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι, καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι· καὶ ἄλλων, ἢ ἥττον γναρίμοις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφοράς· ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον· καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος· τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, εἰς ἣ μείζω, συνεπόμενος· λέγω δὲ, τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. 10 καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης, μικρὰ λυπήσει. ὁ μὲν οὖν ΜΕΣΟΣ τοιοῦτός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνόμασται δέ.

IV. Τοῦ δὲ συνηδύοντος· ὁ μὲν τοῦ ἡδύς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος, μὴ δὲ ἄλλο τι, ΑΡΕΣΚΟΣ· ὁ δ', ὅπως 15 ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χεῖρήματα, καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων, ΚΟΛΑΞ. ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων, εἴρηται ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. ἀντικειῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

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PART II.

ON THE VIRTUE OF MODEST PRETENSION.

13 V. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἡ ΤΗΣ ΑΛΑΖΟΝΕΙΑΣ ΜΕΣΟΤΗΣ. ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. (οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν. μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες. καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύομεν ἂν, ἐπὶ 25 πάντων οὕτως ἔχον συνιδόντες.) ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν, οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὀμιλοῦντες, εἴρηται. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων, εἴπαμεν, ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις, καὶ πράξεσι, καὶ τῷ προσοποιήματι.

VI. Δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ΑΛΑΖΩΝ, προσπειητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ μείζονα ἢ ὑπάρχει. ὁ δὲ ΕΙΡΩΝ ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν. ὁ δὲ ΜΕΣΟΣ, αὐθέκαστος τις ἂν, ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογᾶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω.

VII. Ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα, καὶ ἕνεκά τινος ποιεῖν, καὶ μηθενός. ἕκαστος δ' οἷός ἐστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει, καὶ οὔτω ζῆ, εἰ μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττη. καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ, τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος, φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν· τὸ δ' ἀληθές, καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. οὔτω δὲ, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς, μέσος ἂν, ἐπαινετός. οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέρω μὲν ψεκτοὶ, μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. περὶ ἑκατέρου δ' εἴπαμεν· πρότερον δὲ, περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν. οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει· (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς) ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς, μηθενὸς τοιοῦτου διαφέροντος, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει, ΤΩ ΤΗΝ ἜΞΙΝ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΣ ΕἶΝΑΙ.

VIII. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐπεικὴς εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς διαφέρει, ἔτι μᾶλλον. ὡς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβήσεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠυλαβεῖτο. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἐπαινετός. ἐπὶ τὸ ἐλάττω δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, ἀποκλίνει. ἐμμελέστερον γὰρ φαίνεται, διὰ τὸ ἐπαχθεῖς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι.

IX. Ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων προσποιούμενος, μηθενὸς ἕνεκα, φαύλω μὲν ἔοικεν· (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει) μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται, μᾶλλον ἢ κακός. εἰ δ' ἕνεκά τινος· ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς, οὐ λίαν ψεκτός· ὡς ἀλαζών· ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύριον, ὡς ὁ ἀλ.

ἀσχημονέστερος. (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ, καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι, ἀλαζών ἐστίν. ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης· ὁ μὲν, τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ, δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ κέρδους.) οἱ μὲν οὖν ΔΟΞΗΣ χάριν ἀλαζο-
νευόμενοι· τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιῶνται, ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός. οἱ δὲ ΚΕΡΔΟΥΣ ἄν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας, καὶ ἂ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα· οἷον, μάντιν, σοφόν, ἢ ἰατρὸν. διὰ τοῦτο, οἱ πλεῖστοι προσποιῶνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἀλαζονεύονται. ἐστὶ γὰρ 10
ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα.

X. Οἱ δ' εἰρωνες, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες, χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται. οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται· οἷον 15
καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. οἱ δὲ καὶ τὰ μικρὰ, καὶ τὰ φανερὰ μὴ προσποιούμενοι, ΒΑΥΚΟΠΑΝΟΥΡΓΟΙ λέγονται, καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν. καὶ ἐνίοτε, ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται· οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακόνων ἐσθῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολή, καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις, ἀλαζονικόν. οἱ 20
δὲ μετρίως χρῶμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ, καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδᾶν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρανευόμενοι· χαριέντες φαίνονται.

XI. Ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζών φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ. χείρων γάρ. 25

PART III.

ON THE VIRTUE OF URBANITY.

14 XII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδιᾶς· δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι ὀμιλία τις ἐμμελής, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὡς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀκούειν. διοίσει δὲ καὶ, τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις

λέγειν, ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν. δῆλον δ', ὡς καὶ περὶ ταῦτ', ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. οἱ μὲν οὖν τῶ γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες, ΒΩΜΟΛΟΧΟΙ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ φορτικοί· γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ
 5 γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι, ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχήμονα, καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον. οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰπόντες μὴθὲν γελοῖον, τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνοντες· ΑΓΡΙΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΣΚΛΗΡΟΙ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες,
 10 ΕΥΤΡΑΠΕΛΟΙ προσαγορεύονται, οἷον ΕΥΤΡΟΠΟΙ. τοῦ γὰρ ΗΘΟΥΣ, αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι· ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ἦθη.

XIII. Ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου· καὶ τῶν
 15 πλείστων χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ, καὶ τῶ σκώπτειν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσα- καὶ οἱ. γορεύονται, ὡς χαριέντες. ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρόν· ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων δῆλον.

XIV. Τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἕξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδεξιότης
 20 ἐστίν. τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ, τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν, οἷα τῶ ἐπιεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει. ἔστι γὰρ τινα πρέποντα τῶ τοιούτῳ λέγειν, ἐν παι-
 διᾷς μέρει, καὶ ἀκούειν. καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιᾷ, διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους· καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ πεπαι-
 25 δευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν, τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρόν ταῦτα πρὸς εὐσχημο-
 σύνην. πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὀριστέον, τῶ
 30 λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκού-
 οντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἄριστον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ, μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ΑΚΟΥΣΕΤΑΙ. ἂ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ. οὐ δὴ πᾶν ποιήσει. τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα,

λοιδότημά τί ἐστίν· οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἕνια λοιδορεῖν
 κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως, καὶ σκώπτειν. ὁ δὲ χαρίζεις
 καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ἂν ἑαυτῶ. τοι-
 οὔτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος ἐστίν, εἴτ' ΕΠΙΔΕΞΙΟΣ εἴτ' ΕΥ-
 ΤΡΑΠΕΛΟΣ λέγεται. 5

XV. Ὁ δὲ βωμολόχος ἦτταν ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου·
 καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ, οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ
 γέλωτα ποιήσει· καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων, ἂν οὔθεν ἂν
 εἴποι ὁ χαρίζεις, ἕνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι.

XVI. Ὁ δ' ἄγριος, εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὀμιλίας 10
 ἀχρεῖος. οὔθεν γὰρ συμβαλλόμενος, πᾶσι δυσχε-
 ραίνει. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαυσις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ, ἐν τῷ
 βίῳ εἶναι ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ.

PART IV.

COMPARISON OF THE THREE FOREGOING VIRTUES.

XVII. Τρεῖς οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσό-
 τητες. εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων 15
 κοινωμίας. διαφέρουσι δ', ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΝ
 ἐστίν· αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἨΔΥ. τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν· ἡ
 μὲν ἐν ταῖς ΠΑΙΔΙΑΣ, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον
 βίον ὈΜΙΛΙΑΣ.

CHAP. VII.

ON SHAME.

See B. II.
 c. iii. §. xviii.

I. Περὶ δὲ ΑΙΔΟΥΣ ὡς τινος ΑΡΕΤΗΣ, οὐ προσήκει 20
 λέγειν. ΠΑΘΕΙ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν, ἢ ἘΞΕΙ. ὀρίζεται
 γοῦν, ΦΟΒΟΣ ΤΙΣ ΑΔΟΞΙΑΣ. ἀποτελεῖται δὲ, τῷ περὶ
 τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον. ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ
 οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι· οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ἄχρη-

ᾧσιν. σαματικά δὴ φαίνεται πως εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα· ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθος μᾶλλον, ἢ ἕξωσ εἶναι.


II. Οὐ πάση δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ ΝΕΑ. οἴομεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι, διὰ τὸ, πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν ΝΕΩΝ τοὺς αἰδήμονας· ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΟΝ δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν, ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός. οὐθὲν γὰρ οἴομεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. 10 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοῦς ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις. οὐ γὰρ πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχυρὰ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν· οὐθὲν διαφέρει. οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα· ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον.

15 III. Φαύλου δὲ, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσχυρῶν. τὸ δ' οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥστ', εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, αἰσχύνεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἶεσθαι ἐπιεικῆ εἶναι· ἄτοπον. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ, ἢ αἰδῶς· ἐκὰν δὲ, ὁ ἐπιεικῆς οὐδέποτε πράξει τὰ 20 φαῦλα. εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδῶς, ΕΞ ὙΠΟΘΕΣΕΩΣ ἐπιεικῆς. εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν. οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον, καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσχυρὰ πράττειν· οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπιεικῆς.

25 IV. Οὐκ ἐστὶ δ' οὐδ' ἡ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ ἀρετῆ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή. δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἴπωμεν.

BOOK V.

SUMMARY OF THE FIFTH BOOK.



CHAP. I.

ON THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE: AND FIRST, ON THE DIVISION OF IT INTO TWO KINDS, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.

I. A GENERAL NOTION of JUSTICE is given.

II. III. In order to a FULLER EXPLICATION of it, TWO AXIOMS are premised. II. The first is: That a HABIT may often be known by its CONTRARY. III. The second is: That if the NAME OF A HABIT have SEVERAL SIGNIFICATIONS, the NAME OF THE CONTRARY HABIT will most commonly have SEVERAL CORRESPONDING SIGNIFICATIONS. IV. Agreeably to these axioms, the nature of JUSTICE is deduced from its CONTRARY: and TWO SIGNIFICATIONS are fixed of the term JUSTICE, corresponding with TWO SIGNIFICATIONS of the term INJUSTICE.

V. ONE SENSE of the word is that, according to which Justice EMBRACES EVERY RELATIVE VIRTUE. VI. The PRAISES of this kind of Justice. VII. From the strict notion of UNIVERSAL VIRTUE, it differs, only in its SOCIAL AND RELATIVE ASPECT.

VIII. But there is A DIFFERENT SENSE of the word. This is illustrated by three considerations. IX. This latter is RELATED to the former, as A PART TO THE WHOLE. The former therefore is to be called, the UNIVERSAL justice; and the latter, the PARTICULAR.

X. On the DEFINITION AND DISTINCTION of the ACTS of UNIVERSAL justice: and on the EFFICIENT CAUSES of it.

CHAP. II.

ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF THE PARTICULAR JUSTICE.

I. The PARTICULAR justice is divided into two kinds, the DISTRIBUTIVE and the CORRECTIVE. II. The CORRECTIVE justice is again divided into two kinds, corresponding with the difference of the kinds of transactions to which it applies: of which transactions some are VOLUNTARY, and others INVOLUNTARY.

CHAP. III.

ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

I. Every JUST ACT is a MEDIUM. II. It is essential to every act of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, that it should be AGREEABLE TO PROPORTION. III. The RULE of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE is the principle of GEOMETRICAL PROPORTION.

CHAP. IV.

ON CORRECTIVE JUSTICE.

I. CORRECTIVE justice proceeds upon the RULE of ARITHMETICAL PROPORTION. II. Reason for saying this. III. Explanation of it. IV. Definition of the CORRECTIVE ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ. V. The process of corrective justice explained. VI. Origin of the juridical terms, ΖΗΜΙΑ and ΚΕΡΔΟΣ.

CHAP. V.

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCATATION.

I. The principle of RECIPROCATATION does not accord with either of the foregoing kinds of justice. II. Nevertheless, it is the proper principle to regulate matters of TRADE: but this must be a reciprocatation, not of EQUALITY but of PROPORTION. III. Example of this.

IV. The necessity, in order to a PROPORTIONATE RECIPROCATATION, of a MEDIUM to be used as a COMMON MEASURE. V. Origin and

use of MONEY. VI. Reciprocation of proportion is effected, when the commodities are EQUALIZED, or so treated, that they are rendered CAPABLE OF EXCHANGE, AS IF THEY WERE EQUAL: which is done by means of MONEY. VII. Which is attended with this farther advantage: that the receiver of MONEY, if the exchange be not IMMEDIATELY needful to him, has a SECURITY that he may effect it WHEN HE PLEASES: thus receiving, in lieu of a commodity which has NO PRESENT UTILITY to him, a commodity of PERMANENT UTILITY. It is in this way that money becomes, as it is expressed in the fifth section, ὙΠΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ ΤΗΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΣ, a SUBSTITUTE FOR (PRESENT) UTILITY. VIII. For, though cases will arise in which even MONEY will be affected IN THE SAME WAY with other commodities, that is, in which it will HAVE NO PRESENT UTILITY: still, in its design and office, its utility is MORE permanent than that of OTHER COMMODITIES. IX. The necessity of MONEY to the PURPOSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY. X. Exemplification of the subject.

CHAP. VI.

IN WHAT RESPECT JUSTICE, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
OTHER VIRTUES, IS A MEAN.

I. Justice is a MEAN, in a way different from that, in which other virtues are so. II. DEFINITIONS of justice and injustice. III. Injustice is an EXCESS or a DEFECT, in a way different from that, in which other vices are so.

CHAP. VII.

ON THE QUALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACTIONS,
WHICH ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE
INJUSTICE IN THE AGENT.

I. The question is proposed: Since some acts may be injurious with respect to the sufferer, and yet not proceed from injustice on the part of the agent: WHAT IS THE CHARACTER OF THOSE INJURIES WHICH IMPLY INJUSTICE IN THE AGENT? II.—VI. Of the examination of this question, the first part regards the QUALITY OF THE

ACTION, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF: VII.—X. And the second, CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE AGENT.

II. Towards a solution of this question, it is found necessary to distinguish THAT JUSTICE, which is so **ἈΠΛΩΣ**, that is, which is ABSOLUTELY AND PROPERLY so called; from ANOTHER JUSTICE, to which the term is IMPROPERLY TRANSFERRED, **ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ ΚΑΙ ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ**. (See c. xi. §. vi. of this book.) The FORMER is the same with the POLITICAL JUSTICE: and it is this only, by the transgression of which the GUILT OF INJUSTICE can be incurred. III. The LATTER is found in various FORMS of DOMESTIC RELATION. To this JUSTICE, it is argued, that the term injustice, in its proper use, has no reference. IV. Injustice, being thus restricted to denote violations of the POLITICAL justice, will be found to exist, in relation to both the two kinds into which this latter is divided; namely, the NATURAL, and the INSTITUTED, justice. These two kinds are here severally defined. V. The opinion is stated, of those who maintain, that there is NO NATURAL justice, but that all human rights are founded only upon human law and institution. VI. The contrary of this opinion is maintained.

VII. In passing on to the second part of the examination; it is found necessary, in the first place, to distinguish the senses of the several words, **ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑ**, **ΑΔΙΚΟΝ**, **ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ**, **ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ**, and **ΔΙΚΑΙ- ΠΡΑΓΗΜΑ**. VIII. It is asserted, that an act, though UNJUST in itself, is not an INJURY, unless it be VOLUNTARY; and also, that an act, though JUST in itself, does not carry along with it the virtue of JUSTICE, unless it be VOLUNTARY. IX. The modes are specified, in which the actions of men, with regard to their moral quality, are affected by VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY AGENCY. X. The distinctions and gradations are pointed out, of the moral quality of those actions (**ΒΑΒΑΒΑΙ**), by which a man is affected with damage. These actions are classed after the following manner: First, MISFORTUNES; Secondly, ERRORS; Thirdly, INJURIES; Fourthly, THAT KIND of injury which carries with it the guilt of INJUSTICE AND DEPRAVITY.

XI. The question proposed, then, is decided thus: Injuries implying injustice in the agent, are those only WHICH PROCEED, **ΕΚ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ**, FROM THE MORAL DETERMINATION. These are, those belonging to the LAST of the above-named four classes.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHICH ARE PROPOSED, VARIOUS MINOR QUESTIONS
RELATING TO JUSTICE.

I. The question is proposed: CAN A MAN BE INJURED WITH HIS OWN CONSENT? IV. It is decided in the NEGATIVE.

II. The question is proposed: CAN A MAN EXPERIENCE JUSTICE AGAINST HIS OWN CONSENT? It is decided in the AFFIRMATIVE.

III. The question is proposed: DOES EVERY MAN WHO SUFFERS WHAT IS UNJUST, EXPERIENCE INJUSTICE? It is answered in the NEGATIVE.

V. Two questions are here proposed: the latter of which is examined in the last chapter of this book. The question here examined is: whether, in a CASE OF UNJUST ADJUDICATION, the INJUSTICE lies with the JUDGE, or with the PARTY WHO PROFITS BY THE JUDGMENT. VII. It is decided, that the injustice, if any be incurred, LIES WITH THE JUDGE, not with the party. VI. It is shewn, that this determination of the question does not, under any circumstances, involve the consequence, that it is possible for a man to injure himself.



CHAP. IX.

IN WHICH IT IS ARGUED, THAT JUSTICE IS A VIRTUE
OF DIFFICULT ACQUIREMENT.

I. The DIFFICULTY OF JUSTICE discovers itself, in the difficulty of attaining that DISPOSITION OF MIND which is needful to the acts of justice. II. As it also does, in the JUDGMENT AND KNOWLEDGE which are required in order to a due performance of those acts. IV. As it also does, (in a way which is common to all the moral virtues, namely,) in its AIMING AT A MEDIUM, WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT TO REACH, and in guarding against extremes, into which nature is prone to glide. III. This section appears to be directed against a sophistical doctrine, which argued that, because just men are liable to incur unjust actions, therefore injustice might become the attribute of the just.

CHAP. X.

ON THE RELATION OF EQUITY TO JUSTICE.

I. A difficulty is stated relating to the moral quality of EQUITY : “ If EQUITY be, as seems admitted, different from justice, and better than JUSTICE : HOW THEN CAN BOTH BE VIRTUOUS ? If they are both virtuous : THEY MUST BE THE SAME THING.”

II. In reply, the following distinction is made. Equity is not DIFFERENT FROM justice : nor is it BETTER THAN justice : but it is a BETTER KIND OF justice. It is also truly said to be a CORRECTIVE OF JUSTICE : but in this case is not meant ALL justice, or NATURAL JUSTICE ; but only THAT KIND of justice, which is CONCERNED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF POSITIVE AND INSTITUTED LAW.

III. The principle of equity is rendered NECESSARY, by the ESSENTIAL IMPERFECTIONS OF HUMAN LAW. IV. The character of the equitable person delineated.



CHAP. XI.

IN WHICH ARE MAINTAINED, VARIOUS MINOR POSITIONS RELATING TO JUSTICE.

I. The question is proposed: IS IT POSSIBLE THAT A MAN MAY INJURE HIMSELF ?

II. With reference to the UNIVERSAL justice, the NEGATIVE of this question is maintained. III. As it is also, with reference to the PARTICULAR injustice. IV. And further, on grounds which apply IN COMMON TO THE TWO KINDS.

V. It is shewn, that the DOING is worse than the SUFFERING of injustice.

VI. Lastly, the question started at the beginning of the chapter, is resumed, and considered with reference to THAT JUSTICE, which Aristotle declares to be improperly and metaphorically so named, and which he had before described. (See chap. vii. §. ii.) With reference to this use of the word JUSTICE; it is admitted, that A MAN MAY INJURE HIMSELF.

CHAP. I.

ON THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE: AND FIRST, ON THE
DIVISION OF IT INTO TWO KINDS, UNIVERSAL AND
PARTICULAR.

I. ΠΕΡΙ δὲ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ καὶ ΑΔΙΚΙΑΣ σκεπτόμενον, I
περὶ ποίας τε τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι πράξεις· καὶ ΠΟΙΑ
μεσότης ἐστὶν ἢ δικαιοσύνη· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, τίνων
μέσον. ἢ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῖν ἔστω, κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν
5 μέθοδον τοῖς προειρημένοις. ὁρῶμεν δὴ πάντας, τὴν
τοιαύτην ἔξιν βουλομένους λέγειν δικαιοσύνην· ΑΦ'
ἮΣ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΙ ΤΩΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΝ ΕΙΣΙ, ΚΑΙ ΑΦ' ἮΣ ΔΙ-
ΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΟΥΣΙ, ΚΑΙ ΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΑΙ ΤΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ. τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας· ΑΦ' ἮΣ ΑΔΙΚΟΥΣΙ ΚΑΙ
10 ΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΑΙ ΤΑ ΑΔΙΚΑ. διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν, πρῶτον, ὡς ἐν
τύπῳ, ὑποκείσθω ταῦτα.

II. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον, ἐπὶ τε τῶν
ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΩΝ καὶ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΝ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἘΞΕΩΝ. δύν-
αμις μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, δοκεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ αὐτῇ
15 εἶναι· ἔξις δ' ἢ ἐναντία, τῶν ἐναντίων οὔ. οἷον· ἀπὸ
τῆς ὑγείας οὐ πρᾶττεται τὰ ἐναντία, ἀλλὰ τὰ
ὑγιεινὰ μόνον. λέγομεν γὰρ ὑγιεινῶς βαδίζειν, ὅταν
βαδίζῃ ὡς ἂν ὁ ὑγιαίνων. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν, ΓΝΩ-
ΡΙΖΕΤΑΙ ἢ ἐναντία ἔξις ἀπὸ τῆς ΕΝΑΝΤΙΑΣ· πολλάκις
20 δὲ, αἱ ἔξεις ἀπὸ τῶν ὙΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΩΝ. εἴαν τε γὰρ ἢ
εὐεξία ἢ φανερά, καὶ ἢ καχεξία φανερά γίνεται· καὶ
ἐκ τῶν εὐεκτικῶν, ἢ εὐεξία· καὶ ἐκ ταύτης, τὰ εὐ-
εκτικά. εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ εὐεξία, πυκνότης σαρκός·

ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὴν καχεξίαν εἶναι, μανότητα σαρκὸς, καὶ τὸ εὐεκτικόν, τὸ ποιητικὸν πυκνότητος ἐν σαρκί.

III. Ἀκολουθεῖ δ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐὰν θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ θάτερα πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι οἶον, εἰ τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. ἔοικε δὲ 5 ΠΛΕΟΝΑΧΩΣ ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ, ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ἀδικία. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σύνεγγυς εἶναι τὴν ὁμανυμίαν αὐτῶν, λανθάνει, καὶ οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρρω, δῆλη μᾶλλον. (ἢ γὰρ διαφορὰ πολλή, ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΙΔΕΑΝ οἶον, ὅτι καλεῖται κλεισὶ ὁμανύμας, ἢ τε ὑπὸ τὸν ἀρχέρα 10 τῶν ζώων, καὶ ἢ τὰς θύρας κλείουσιν.) εἰλήφθω δὴ ὁ ἄδικος ΠΟΣΑΧΩΣ λέγεται.

IV. Δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε ΠΑΡΑΝΟΜΟΣ ἄδικος εἶναι, καὶ καὶ ὁ ἄνομος. ὁ ΠΛΕΟΝΕΚΤΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΙΣΟΣ· ὥστε δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται, ὅ τε ΝΟΜΙΜΟΣ, καὶ ὁ ΙΣΟΣ. τὸ μὲν δὲ 15 καιὸν ἄρα, τὸ ΝΟΜΙΜΟΝ, καὶ τὸ ΙΣΟΝ· τὸ δ' ἄδικον, τὸ ΠΑΡΑΝΟΜΟΝ, καὶ τὸ ΑΝΙΣΟΝ.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ΠΛΕΟΝΕΚΤΗΣ ὁ ἄδικος· περὶ τὰγαθὰ ἔσται, ΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΑ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσα εὐτυχία καὶ ἀτυχία. (ἂ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἰεὶ ἀγαθὰ, τινὶ δ' οὐκ 20 αἰεὶ. οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα εὐχονται καὶ διώκουσιν. δεῖ δ' οὐ· ἀλλ' εὐχεσθαι μὲν, τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ.)

Ὁ δ' ἄδικος ΟΥΚ ΑΙΕΙ ΤΟ ΠΛΕΟΝ αἰρεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΤΟ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν. ἀλλ' ὅτι 25 δοκεῖ καὶ τὸ ΜΕΙΟΝ ΚΑΚΟΝ, ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΠΩΣ εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ πλεονεξία· διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ΠΛΕΟΝΕΚΤΗΣ εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ΑΝΙΣΟΣ· τοῦτο γὰρ περιέχει καὶ κοινόν.

3 V. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν, ὁ δὲ νόμιμος 30 δίκαιος· δῆλον, ὅτι ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΑ ΝΟΜΙΜΑ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΩΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ. τὰ τε γὰρ ἄριστά ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς, νόμιμά ἐστι· καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φημέν.

οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι, ἢ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν· ἢ τοῖς ἀρίστοις· ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, κατ' ἀρετὴν, ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον. ὥστε, ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, δίκαια λέγομεν, ΤΑ

5 ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ ΚΑΙ ΦΥΛΑΚΤΙΚΑ ΤΗΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΟΡΙΩΝ ΑΤΤΗΣ, Τῆ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚῆ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ. προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος, καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἶον, μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν, μηδὲ φεύγειν, μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὄπλα· καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἶον, μὴ
10 μοιχεύειν, μηδ' ὑβρίζειν· καὶ τὰ τοῦ πρᾶου, οἶον, μὴ τύπτειν, μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας, τὰ μὲν κελεύων, τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων· ὀρθῶς μὲν, ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χειρὸν δ', ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ΑΡΕΤΗ
15 ΜΕΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΕΛΕΙΑ· ἄλλ' ΟΥΧ ἈΠΛΩΣ, ἈΛΛΑ ΠΡΟΣ ἘΤΕΡΟΝ.

VI. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, πολλάκις ΚΡΑΤΙΣΤΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὐθ' ἑῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν,
20 “ ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετῆ ἔνι.” καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετῆ· ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστίν. τελεία δ' ἐστίν· ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτόν. πολλοὶ γάρ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις,
25 τῇ ἀρετῇ δύναται χρῆσθαι· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον, ἀδυνατοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος· ὅτι “ ἀρχὴ ἀνδρα δείξει.” πρὸς ἕτερον γάρ, καὶ ἐν κοινωσίᾳ ἤδη, ὁ ἀρχων. διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, καὶ ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΝ ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη, μόνη
30 τῶν ἀρετῶν· ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἀρχοντι ἢ κοινωῶ. κάκιστος μὲν οὖν, ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ· ἀριστος δ', οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτόν,

τῆ ἀρετῆ, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

VII. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐ μέρος ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ὅλη ἀρετὴ ἐστίν· οὐδ' ἡ ἐναντία ἀδικία, μέρος κακίας, ἀλλ' ὅλη κακία. τί δὲ διαφέρει ἡ ἀρετὴ, 5 καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὕτη· δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὕτη, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό· ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἕτερον, δικαιοσύνη, ἡ δὲ τοιαύδε ἕξις, ἀπλῶς ἀρετή.

4 VIII. Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε, τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς 10 δικαιοσύνην. ἔστι γὰρ τις, ὡς φαμέν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος.

1. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν. κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας, ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν. οἷον, ὁ ρίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα, διὰ δειλίαν· ἢ 15 κακῶς εἰπὼν, διὰ χαλεπότητα· ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι, δι' ἀνελευθερίαν. ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῆ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας· κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινὰ, (ψέγομεν γὰρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία, ὡς 20 μέρος τῆς ὅλης· καὶ ἀδικόν τι, ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου, τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον.

2. Ἔτι, εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει, καὶ προσλαμβάνων· ὁ δὲ, προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν· οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι 25 μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικός, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ. δῆλον ἄρα, ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν.

3. Ἔτι, περὶ μὲν τᾶλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα, γίνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινὰ μοχθηρίαν αἰεί. οἷον· εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν· εἰ ἐγκατέλιπε τὸν 30 παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν· εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπ' ὀργήν· εἰ δ' ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν.

"Ὡστε φανερόν, ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἄλλη, ἐν μέρει· συνώνυμος, ὅτι ὁ ὀρισμὸς EN TΩ ΑΥΤΩ ΓΕΝΕΙ. ἄμφω γὰρ EN TΩ ΠΡΟΣ ἕτερον ἔχουσι τὴν δύναμιν. ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν, περὶ τιμὴν, ἢ χρήματα, ἢ σωτηρίαν, ἢ εἴ τινι ἔχοιμεν ἐνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν ταῦτα πάντα, καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ κέρδους· ἢ δὲ, περὶ ἅπαντα περὶ ὅσα ὁ σπουδαῖος.

IX. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ δικαιοσύναι πλείους, καὶ ὅτι ἔστι τις καὶ ἕτερα παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν· δῆλον. τίς δὲ, καὶ ὅποια τις· ληπτέον.

Διῶρισται δὴ τὸ ἀδικον, τό τε παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον, τό τε νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ΠΑΡΑΝΟΜΟΝ, ἢ πρότερον εἰρημένη ἀδικία ἐστίν.

15 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἄνισον καὶ τὸ παράνομον [πλέον] οὐ τὸ πλέον οὐ ταῦτον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον· (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄνισον ἅπαν παράνομον, τὸ δὲ παράνομον οὐκ ἅπαν ἄνισον) [καὶ τὸ πλέον ἅπαν ἄνισον, τὸ δ' ἄνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον·] καὶ τὸ ἀδικον καὶ ἡ ἀδικία οὐ ταῦτα, 20 ἀλλ' ἕτερα [ἐκείνων]· τὰ μὲν ὡς μέρος, τὰ δ' ὡς ὅλα· ΜΕΡΟΣ δ' ΑΥΤΗ ἡ ἀδικία ΤΗΣ ὅλης ἀδικίας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, τῆς δικαιοσύνης. ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει δικαιοσύνης, καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν μέρει ἀδικίας, λεκτέον· καὶ τοῦ δίκαιου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου 25 ὡσαύτως.

X. Ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην ἀρετὴν τεταγμένη δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀδικία· ἢ μὲν τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς οὕσα ΧΡΗΣΙΣ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἢ δὲ τῆς κακίας· ἀφείσθω.

Καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀδικον τὸ κατὰ ταύτας, 30 φανερόν ὡς ΔΙΟΡΙΣΤΕΟΝ· σχεδὸν γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν νομίμων, τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς προσταττόμενά· κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν κωλύει, ὁ νόμος. τὰ δὲ

ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΑ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ, τῶν νομίμων ὅσα
 νενομοθέτῃται περὶ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΚΟΙΝΟΝ.
 περὶ δὲ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΣ, (καθ' ἣν
 ἀπλῶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός ἐστι,) πότερον τῆς πολιτικῆς
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἐτέρας· ὕστερον διοριστέον. οὐ γὰρ ἴσως 5
 ταυτὸν ἀνδρὶ τ' ἀγαθῷ, [εἶναι] καὶ πολίτη παντί.

CHAP. II.

ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF THE PARTICULAR JUSTICE.

I. Τῆς δὲ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ, καὶ τοῦ
 κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου· ἔν μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος, ΤΟ ΕΝ ΤΑΙΣ
 ΔΙΑΝΟΜΑΙΣ τιμῆς, ἢ χρημάτων, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα
 μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνούσι τῆς πολιτείας. (ἐν τούτοις 10
 γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον, ἕτερον ἐτέρου.) ἔν
 δὲ, τὸ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΝΑΛΛΑΓΜΑΣΙ ΔΙΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΝ.

II. Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο. τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμά-
 των τὰ μὲν ἔΚΟΥΣΙΑ ἐστὶ, τὰ δ' ἀΚΟΥΣΙΑ. ἐκούσια
 μὲν, τὰ τοιάδε· οἶον πρᾶσις, ἀνὴ, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, 15
 χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις. ἐκούσια δὲ λέ-
 γεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκού-
 σιος. τῶν δ' ἀκουσίων, τὰ μὲν ΛΑΘΡΑΙΑ· οἶον
 κλοπὴ, μοιχεία, Φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλα-
 πατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία· τὰ δὲ ΒΙΑΙΑ· 20
 οἶον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἀρπαγὴ, πήρωσις,
 κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

CHAP. III.

ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE.

I. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἀδικος ἀνίσος, καὶ τὸ ἀδικόν ὁ ἀνίσον· δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀνίσου. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, τὸ ἴσον. ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλεόν καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. εἰ οὖν τὸ ἀδικόν ἀνίσον· τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον. (ὅπερ καὶ ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν.) ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον· τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ΜΕΣΟΝ ΤΙ ἂν εἴη.

II. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον (μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον) εἶναι, καὶ πρὸς 10 τι, καὶ τισίν· καὶ ἥ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν· (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ, πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον·) ἥ δ' ἴσον, δυοῖν· ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, ἴσον ἐστὶ. τισίν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον, EN ELAXISTOIS EINAI TETTAPSEIN. οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστὶ· καὶ ἐν οἷς τὰ πράγματα, δύο. καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστὶ 15 ἰσότης, ΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ EN ΟΙΣ. ὡς γὰρ ἐπεῖνα ἔχει, οὕτω ἔχει τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω. κἀκεῖνα ἔχει. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν. ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα· ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα, ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα, ἔχωσι καὶ νέμονται.

Ἔτι, EK TOY KAT' AΞIAN τοῦτο δῆλον. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς, ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες ΚΑΤ' ΑΞΙΑΝ τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι. τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοί, ἐλευθερίαν· οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοί πλοῦτον, οἱ δ', εὐγένειαν· οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοί, ἀρετήν.

Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ἀναλόγον τι. [τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ.]

Ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λογῶν, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσι ἐλαχίστοις. (ἡ μὲν οὖν διηρημένη ὅτι ἐν τέτταρσι, δῆλον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ συνεχής. τῶ γὰρ ἐνὶ ὡς

δυσὶ χρῆται, καὶ δις λέγει· οἶον, ὡς ἡ τοῦ α πρὸς τὴν τοῦ β, οὕτως καὶ ἡ τοῦ β πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γ. δις οὖν ἡ τοῦ β εἴρηται. ὥστ' εἰὰν ἡ τοῦ β τεθῆ δις, τέτταρα ἔσται τὰ ἀνάλογα.) ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις. καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. διήρηται 5 γὰρ ὁμοίως, οἷς τε καὶ ἄ.

III. Ἔσται ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α ὄρος πρὸς τὸν β, οὕτως ὁ γ πρὸς τὸν δ. καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἄρα, ὡς ὁ α πρὸς τὸν γ, ὁ β πρὸς τὸν δ. ὥστε καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον. ὅπερ ἡ νομὴ συνδυάζει. κὰν οὕτως συντεθῆ, δικάϊως 10 7 συνδυάζει. ἡ ἄρα τοῦ α ὄρου τῷ γ, καὶ ἡ τοῦ β τῷ δ σύζευξις, ΤΟ ΕΝ ΔΙΑΝΟΜῃ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ἔστι. καὶ ΜΕΣΟΝ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτ' ἔστι ΤΟΥ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ. τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον μέσον· τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ἀνάλογον.

Καλοῦσι δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ἀναλογίαν ΓΕΩΜΕΤΡΙ- 15 ΚΗΝ οἱ μαθηματικοί. ἐν γὰρ τῇ γεωμετρικῇ συμβαίνει, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πρὸς τὸ ὅλον ὅπερ ἐκάτερον πρὸς ἐκάτερον. ἔστι δ' οὐ συνεχῆς αὕτη ἡ ἀναλογία. οὐ γὰρ γίνεται εἰς ἀριθμῶν ὄρος, ᾧ καὶ ὅ.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν δίκαιον, ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ· τὸ δ' 20 ἄδικον, ΤΟ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ. γίνεται ἄρα τὸ μὲν πλεόν, τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων συμβαίνει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικῶν πλεόν ἔχει, ὁ δ' ἀδικούμενος ἔλαττον, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ ἀνάπαλιν. ἐν ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ λόγῳ γίνεται, τὸ ἔλαττον 25 κακὸν πρὸς τὸ μείζον κακόν. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον κακόν, μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν τοῦ μείζονος· τὸ δ' αἰρετὸν, ἀγαθόν· καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον, μείζον.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἔστιν.

CHAP. IV.

ON CORRECTIVE JUSTICE.

I. Τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν, τὸ ΔΙΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΝ· ὃ γίνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι, καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΔΙΑΝΕΜΗΤΙΚΟΝ δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν, αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην. καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν, ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ, παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστίν. τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς σὺναλλαγμασι δίκαιον, ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον τι, καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον, ἄνισον· ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν.

II. Οὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικῆς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν, ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ· οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικῆς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλαβοῦς τὴν διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος. καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις, εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ, ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται· καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔβλαψεν, ὁ δ' εἰ βλάψιν· δὲ βέβλαπται.

III. Ὡστε τὸ ἀδίκον τοῦτο, ἄνισον ὄν, ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής. καὶ γὰρ, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῆ, ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ, ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ· διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἀνίσαν. ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. (λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισὶν οἰκειὸν ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι· καὶ ἡ ζημία, τῷ παθόντι. ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος· καλεῖται τὸ μὲν, ζημία, τὸ δὲ, κέρδος.) ἄστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος, τὸ ἴσον μέσον. τὸ δὲ κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία· τὸ μὲν πλεόν, τὸ δ' ἐλάττον,

ἐναντίας. τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δ' ἐλάττον, ΚΕΡΔΟΣ· τὸ δ' ἐναντίον, ΖΗΜΙΑ· ὧν ἦν μέσον, τὸ ἴσον. ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον.

IV. "Ὡστε τὸ ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΤΙΚΟΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ἂν εἴη, το ΜΕΣΟΝ ΖΗΜΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΕΡΔΟΥΣ. 5

V. Διὸ καὶ, ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν, ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν καταφεύγουσιν. τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὸν δικαστὴν ἰέναι, ἰέναι ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ὁ γὰρ δικαστὴς βούλεται εἶναι, οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον. καὶ ζητοῦσι δικαστὴν μέσον· καὶ καλοῦσιν ἐνιοὶ μεσιδίους· ὡς, εἰν τοῦ 10 μέσου τύχασι, τοῦ δικαίου τευζόμενοι. μέσον ἄρα τι τὸ δίκαιον, εἶπερ καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς. ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς ἐπανισοῖ, καὶ, ὥσπερ γραμμῆς εἰς ἄνισα τετμημένης, ᾧ τὸ μείζον τμήμα τῆς ἡμισείας ὑπερέχει, τοῦτ' ἀφεῖλε καὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι τμήματι προσέθηκεν. ὅταν 15 δὲ δίχα διαιρεθῇ τὸ ὅλον· τότε φασὶν ἔχειν τὰ αὐτῶν, ὅταν λάβωσι τὸ ἴσον. τὸ δ' ἴσον, ΜΕΣΟΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΜΕΙΖΟΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝΟΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΡΙΘΜΗΤΙΚΗΝ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑΝ.

Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀνομάζεται δίκαιον, ὅτι ΔΙΧΑ 20 ἐστὶν· ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις εἴποι ΔΙΧΑΙΟΝ· καὶ ὁ δικαστὴς, ΔΙΧΑΣΤΗΣ. ἐπὰν γὰρ δύο ἴσων, ἀφαιρεθῇ ἀπὸ θατέρου, πρὸς θάτερον δὲ προστεθῇ· δυσὶ τούτοις ὑπερέχει θάτερον. εἰ γὰρ ἀφηρέθη μὲν, μὴ προσετέθη δέ· ἐνὶ ἂν μόνον ὑπερεῖχεν. τοῦ μέσου ἄρα, ἐνί· καὶ τὸ 25 μέσον, ἀφ' οὔ ἀφηρέθη, ἐνί. τούτῳ ἄρα γνωρισθῶμεν, τί τε ἀφελεῖν δεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλέον ἔχοντος, καὶ τί προσθεῖναι τῷ ἐλάττον ἔχοντι. ᾧ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μέσον ὑπερέχει, τοῦτο προσθεῖναι δεῖ τῷ ἐλάττον ἔχοντι· ᾧ δ' ὑπερέχεται, ἀφελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγίστου. 30

Ἴσαι αἱ ἐφ' ὧν ΑΑ, ΒΒ, ΓΓ, ἀλλήλαις. ἀπὸ τῆς ΑΑ ἀφηρέσθω τὸ ΑΕ, καὶ προσκείσθω τῇ ΓΓ τὸ ἐφ' ὧν ΓΔ. ὥστε ὅλη ἡ ΔΓΓ τῆς ΕΑ ὑπερέχει, τῷ ΓΔ καὶ τῷ ΓΖ. τῆς ἄρα ΒΒ, τῷ ΓΔ. [ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ

τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τοῦτο. ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον, καὶ οἷον· καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο, καὶ τοσοῦτον, καὶ τοιοῦτον.]

VI. Ἐλήλυθε δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα, ἢ τε ΖΗΜΙΑ
 5 καὶ τὸ ΚΕΡΔΟΣ, ἐκ τῆς ἔΚΟΥΣΙΟΥ ἀλλαγῆς. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ πλεόν ἔχειν ἢ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, ΚΕΡΔΑΙΝΕΙΝ λέγεται·
 τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ΖΗΜΙΟΥΣΘΑΙ· οἷον, ἐν
 τῷ ἀνεῖσθαι, καὶ πωλεῖν, καὶ ἐν ὅσοις ἄλλοις ἄδειαν
 ἔδωκεν ὁ νόμος. ὅταν δὲ μήτε πλεόν, μήτ' ἔλαττον,
 10 ἀλλ' αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν γένηται· τὰ αὐτῶν φασὶν ἔχειν,
 καὶ οὔτε ζημιουῖσθαι οὔτε κερδαίνειν. ἄσπε κέρδους
 τινὸς καὶ ζημίας μέσον, τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι, ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ
 ἔΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ· τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

CHAP. V.

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCATATION.

I. Δοκεῖ δὲ τισι καὶ τὸ ἀΝΤΙΠΕΠΟΝΘΟΣ εἶναι 8
 15 ἀπλῶς δίκαιον. ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἔφασαν. ἀρί-
 ζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον· τὸ ἀΝΤΙΠΕΠΟΝΘΟΣ
 ἀλλῶ. τὸ δ' ἀντιπεπονθὸς οὐκ ἐφαρμόττει, οὔτ' ἐπὶ
 τὸ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ διορθωτικόν.
 (καίτοι βούλονταί γε τοῦτο λέγειν καὶ τὸ Ῥαδα-
 20 μάνθυος δίκαιον·

Εἴ κε πάθοι τά κ' ἔρεξε, δίκη κ' ἰθεῖα γένοιτο.)

πολλαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ. οἷον· εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπά-
 ταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι· καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπά-
 ταξεν, οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι.
 25 ἔτι, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον διαφέρει πολύ.

II. Ἄλλ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοινωνίαις ταῖς ἀλλακτικαῖς,
 συνέχει τὸ τοιοῦτον δίκαιον· τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς, κατ'

ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΚΑΤ' ΙΣΟΤΗΤΑ. τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν γὰρ ἀνάλογον, συμμένει ἢ ΠΟΛΙΣ. ἢ γὰρ τὸ κακῶς ζητοῦσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, δουλεία δοκεῖ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἀντιποιήσει· ἢ τὸ εὖ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, μετάδοσις οὐ γίνεται· τῇ μεταδόσει δὲ συμμένουσιν. (διὸ καὶ Χαρίτων ἱερὸν ἐμποδῶν 5 ποιοῦνται, ἵν' ἀνταπόδοσις ᾗ. τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον χάριτος. ἀνθυπηρετῆσαι τε γὰρ δεῖ τῷ χαρισαμένῳ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸν ἄρξαι χαριζόμενον.)

III. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀντίδοσιν τὴν κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΙΑΜΕΤΡΟΝ ΣΥΖΕΥΞΙΣ. οἶον· οἰκοδόμος ἐφ' ᾧ 10 Α, σκυτοτόμος ἐφ' ᾧ Β, οἰκία ἐφ' ᾧ Γ, ὑπόδημα ἐφ' ᾧ Δ. δεῖ οὖν λαμβάνειν τὸν οἰκοδόμον παρὰ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου τὸ ἐκείνου ἔργον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ μεταδίδοναι τὸ αὐτοῦ. εἰάν οὖν πρῶτον ᾗ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἴσον, εἶτα τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθὸς γένηται· ἔσται τὸ 15 λεγόμενον.

τοῦ ἐκείνου
ἔργου.

IV. Εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἴσον, οὐδὲ συμμένει. οὐθὲν γὰρ καλύει, κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου. δεῖ οὖν ταῦτα ΙΣΑΣΘΗΝΑΙ. (ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο 20 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. ἀνηροῦντο γὰρ ἂν, εἰ μὴ 20 ἐποίησε τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἶον, καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἔπασχε τοῦτο καὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον.) οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἰατρῶν γίνεται κοινωμία· ἀλλ' ἐξ ἰατροῦ καὶ γεωργοῦ, καὶ ὅλως ἐτέρων, καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. ἀλλὰ τούτους δεῖ ἴσασθῆναι. ΔΙΟ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΑΗΤΑ ΔΕΙ ΠΩΣ ΕἶΝΑΙ, 25 ὍΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΛΛΑΓΗ.

V. Ἐφ' ὃ τὸ ΝΟΜΙΣΜ' ἐλήλυθε· καὶ γίνεται πως μέσον. πάντα γὰρ μετρεῖ· ὥστε καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· πόσα ἄττα δὴ ὑποδήματ' ἴσον οἰκία ἢ τροφῇ. δεῖ τοίνυν, ὅπερ οἰκοδόμος πρὸς σκυτο- 30 τόμον, τοσαδὶ ὑποδήματα πρὸς οἰκίαν ἢ τροφήν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ οὐδὲ κοινωμία. τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ ἴσα εἴη πως, οὐκ ἔσται. δεῖ ἄρα

ἐνί τινι πάντα μετρεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ἢ ΧΡΕΙΑ ἢ πάντα συνέχει. εἰ γὰρ μὴθὲν δέοιντο, ἢ μὴ ὁμοίως ἢ οὐκ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ. οἷον δ' ὙΠΑΛΛΑΓΜΑ
 5 ΤΗΣ ΧΡΕΙΑΣ τὸ νόμισμα γέγονε, ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΝΘΗΚΗΝ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ΤΟΥΝΟΜΑ ἔχει νόμισμα· ὅτι οὐ φύσει ἀλλὰ ΝΟΜΩ ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μεταβαλεῖν καὶ ποιῆσαι ἄχρηστον.

VI. Ἔσται δὴ ἀντιπεπονθός, ὅταν ἰσασθῇ ὥστε, 10 ὅπερ γεωργός πρὸς σκυτοτόμον, τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ σκυτοτόμου πρὸς τὸ τοῦ γεωργοῦ. εἰς σχῆμα δ' ἀναλογίας [οὐ] δεῖ ἄγειν, ὅταν ἀλλάζωνται. εἰ δὲ μή ἀμφοτέρας ἔξει τὰς ὑπεροχὰς τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον. ἀλλ' ὅταν ἔχωσι τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἴσοι καὶ κοινανοί· ὅτι
 15 αὐτῇ ἢ ἰσότης δύναται ἐπ' αὐτῶν γίνεσθαι. γεωργός Α, τροφὴ Γ, σκυτοτόμος Β, τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἰσασμένον Δ. εἰ δ' οὕτω μὴ ἦν ἀντιπεπονθέναι· οὐκ ἂν ἦν κοινανία. [ὅτι δ' ἢ ΧΡΕΙΑ συνέχει, ὥσπερ ἐν τι ὄν· δηλοῖ, ὅτι, ὅταν μὴ ἐν χρεΐᾳ ὦσιν ἀλλήλων, ἢ
 20 ἀμφοτέροι ἢ ἄτερος, οὐκ ἀλλάττονται· ὥσπερ, ὅταν οὗ ἔχει αὐτὸς δέηταί τις, οἷον οἴνου, διδόντες σίτου ἐξαγωγῆν.] δεῖ ἄρα τοῦτο ἰσασθῆναι.

ἐξαγωγῆς.

VII. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῆς ΜΕΛΛΟΥΣΗΣ ἀλλαγῆς, εἰ ΝΥΝ μὴδὲν δεῖται· ὅτι ἔσται ἐὰν δεηθῇ, τὸ νόμισμα οἷον
 25 ΕΓΓΥΗΤΗΣ ἐσθ' ἡμῖν. δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο φέροντι, εἶναι λαβεῖν.

VIII. Πάσχει μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ. οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἴσον δύναται. ὅμως δὲ, ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ ΜΕΝΕΙΝ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ.

30 IX. Διὸ ΔΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΕΤΙΜΗΣΘΑΙ. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔσται ἀλλαγὴ, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κοινανία. τὸ δὴ νόμισμα, ὥσπερ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ΣΥΜΜΕΤΡΑ ΠΟΙΗΣΑΝ, ἰσάζει. οὕτε γὰρ ἂν, μὴ οὔσης ἀλλαγῆς, κοινανία ἦν· οὐτ' ἀλ-

λαγῆ, ἰσότητος μὴ οὔσης· οὔτ' ἰσότης, μὴ οὔσης
συμμετρίας.

Χ. Τῆ μὲν οὖν ἀληθείᾳ, ἀδύνατον τὰ τοσοῦτον
διαφέροντα σύμμετρα γενέσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρεῖαν,
ἐνδέχεται ἰκανῶς. ἐν δὴ τι δεῖ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ' ἐξ
ὑποθέσεως· διὸ νόμισμα καλεῖται. τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα
ποιεῖ σύμμετρα. μετρεῖται γὰρ πάντα νομίσματι.
οἰκία Α, μναὶ δέκα Β, κλίνη Γ· τὸ δὲ Α τοῦ Β
ἥμισυ, εἰ πέντε μνῶν ἀξία ἢ οἰκία, ἢ ἴσον· ἢ δὲ κλίνη
δέκατον μέρος (τὸ Γ) τοῦ Β. δῆλον τοίνυν πόσαι
κλῖναι ἴσον οἰκία, ὅτι πέντε. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἢ ἀλλα-
γῆ ἦν πρὶν τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, δῆλον. διαφέρει γὰρ
οὐδὲν ἢ ΚΑΙΝΑΙ ΠΕΝΤΕ ἀντὶ οἰκίας, ἢ ὍΣΟΥ Αἰ πέντε
κλῖναι.

9 Τί μὲν οὖν τὸ ἄδικον, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν· 15
εἴρηται.

CHAP. VI.

IN WHAT RESPECT JUSTICE, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
OTHER VIRTUES, IS A MEAN.

I. Διαρισμένων δὲ τούτων· δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ΔΙΚΑΙΟ-
ΠΡΑΓΙΑ μέσον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι. τὸ
μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἔχειν, τὸ δ' ἔλαττόν, ἐστίν. ἢ δὲ
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ μεσότης ἐστίν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς
πρότερον ἀρεταῖς· ἀλλ' ὅτι ΜΕΣΟΥ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἢ δ'
ἀδικία, τῶν ἄκρων.

II. Καὶ ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, καθ' ἣν ὁ ΔΙ-
ΚΑΙΟΣ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ ΤΟΥ
ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΝΕΜΗΤΙΚΟΣ ΚΑΙ ἄλλοις ΠΡΟΣ ἄλλοις,
ΚΑΙ ἄλλοις ΠΡΟΣ ἄλλοις· οὐχ οὕτως, ὥστε τοῦ μὲν
αἰρετοῦ πλέον αὐτῷ, ἔλαττον δὲ τῷ πλησίον, τοῦ

βλαβεροῦ δ' ἀνάπαλιν· ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου τοῦ κατ' ἀναλογίαν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλω πρὸς ἄλλον. ἢ δ' ἀδικία τούναντίον, τοῦ ἀδικοῦ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν·
 ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΕΙΨΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΟΥ ἢ ΒΛΑΒΕΡΟΥ,
 5 ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ.

III. Διὸ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἢ ἀδικία, ὅτι ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΛΕΙΨΕΩΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ· ἐφ' αὐτοῦ μὲν, ὑπερβολῆς μὲν τοῦ ἀπλῶς ὠφελίμου, ἐλλείψεως δὲ τοῦ βλαβεροῦ· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, τὸ μὲν ὅλον
 10 ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὀποτέρως ἔτυ-
 χεν. τοῦ δὲ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑΤΟΣ· τὸ μὲν ἔλαττον, τὸ ἀδι-
 κεῖσθαί ἐστι· τὸ δὲ μείζον, τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, τίς ἑκα-
 τέρως ἐστὶν ἢ φύσις· εἰρήσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
 15 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, περὶ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου, καθόλου.

CHAP. VII.

ON THE QUALITIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACTIONS WHICH ARE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE INJUSTICE IN THE AGENT.

I. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδικοῦντα, μήπω ἀδικον εἶναι· 10
 Ὅ ΠΟΙΑ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑΤΑ ΑΔΙΚΩΝ ἢ ΔΗ ΑΔΙΚΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἐκάστην ἀδικίαν; οἷον κλέπτῃς, ἢ μοιχὸς, ἢ ληστής. ἢ οὕτω μὲν οὐδὲν διοίσει; καὶ γὰρ ἂν συγγένοιτο
 20 γυναικί, εἰδῶς τὸ ἦ· ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ προαιρέσεως ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάθος. ἀδικεῖ μὲν οὖν, ἀδικος δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν. οἷον οὐδὲ κλέπτῃς, ἔκλεψε δέ· οὐδὲ μοιχὸς, ἐμοίχευσε δέ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. [πῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχει τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, εἴρηται
 25 πρότερον.]

II. Δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὅτι τὸ ζητούμενόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ ἈΠΛΩΣ δίκαιον, τὸ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ δίκαιον. δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πολ.

τοῦτο δὲ ἐστίν, ΕΠΙ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΩΝ ΒΙΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΕΙΝΑΙ
ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑΝ, ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΙΣΩΝ, Η ΚΑΤ' ΑΝΑΛΟ-
ΓΙΑΝ Η ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΙΘΜΟΝ. ὥστε, ὅσοις μὴ ἐστὶ τοῦτο,
οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτοις πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὸ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ ΔΙ-

See c. xi. §.
vi. of this
book.

καιον, ἀλλὰ ΤΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΑΘ' ὈΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ. ἐστὶ 5
γὰρ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ, ὍΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΜΟΣ πρὸς αὐτούς· ΝΟΜΟΣ
Δ', ΕΝ ὍΙΣ ΑΔΙΚΙΑ. ἡ γὰρ δίκη κρίσις τοῦ δικαίου
καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου. ΕΝ ὍΙΣ Δ' ΑΔΙΚΙΑ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ
ΕΝ ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ· ΕΝ ὍΙΣ ΔΕ ΤΟ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ, ΟΥ ΠΑΣΙΝ
ΑΔΙΚΙΑ. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ, τὸ πλέον αὐτῶ νέμειν τῶν 10
ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ἔλαττον δὲ τῶν ἀπλῶς κακῶν.

(Διὸ οὐκ ἐῷμεν ἄρχειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸν λό-
γον. ὅτι ἐαυτῶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, καὶ γίνεται τύραννος.

δικαίου, εἰ δὲ
τοῦ δικαίου,
καὶ.

ἐστὶ δ' ὁ ἄρχων, φύλαξ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ
ἴσου. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐθεν αὐτῶ πλέον εἶναι δοκεῖ, εἴπερ 15
δίκαιος· (οὐ γὰρ νέμει πλέον τοῦ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ
αὐτῶ, εἰ μὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν) διὸ ἐτέρῳ
ποιεῖ· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ΑΛΛΟΤΡΙΟΝ εἶναι φασι ἀγα-
θὸν τὴν δικαιοσύνην· καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον.
μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος· τοῦτο δὲ, τιμὴ καὶ γέρας. 20
ὅτῳ δὲ μὴ ἰκανὰ τὰ τσιαῦτα· οὔτοι γίνονται
τύρανοι.)

See c. i. §.
vi. of this
book.

III. Τὸ δὲ ΔΕΣΠΟΤΙΚΟΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ Τὸ ΠΑΤΡΙ-
ΚΟΝ, οὐ ταυτὸν τούτοις, ἀλλ' ὅμοιον. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν
ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ, ΑΠΑΩΣ· τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ 25
τέκνον, ἕως ἂν ἦ πηλίκον καὶ μὴ χαρισθῆ, ὥσπερ
μέρος αὐτοῦ· αὐτὸν δ' οὐθεὶς προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν.
διὸ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν. οὐδ' ἄρα ἀδίκον,
οὐδὲ δίκαιον, τὸ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΝ. κατὰ νόμον γὰρ ἦν,
καὶ ἐν οἷς ἐπεφύκει εἶναι νόμος· οὔτοι δ' ἦσαν, οἷς ὑπ- 30
ἄρχει ἰσότης τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι. διὸ μᾶλ-
λον πρὸς γυναικᾶ ἐστὶ δίκαιον, ἢ πρὸς τέκνα καὶ
κτῆματα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΟΝ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ.
ἕτερον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ πολιτικοῦ.

IV. Τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ δικαίου, τὸ μὲν ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ ΝΟΜΙΚΟΝ. Φυσικὸν μὲν τὸ ΠΑΝΤΑΧΟΥ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ ΕΧΟΝ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ, ΚΑΙ ΟΥ ΤΩ ΔΟΚΕΙΝ Η ΜΗ. νομικὸν δὲ ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐθεν διαφέρει 5 ὡς ἡ ἀλλωσ, ὅταν δε θῶνται, διαφέρει ὡς οἶον, τὸ μνάς λυτροῦσθαι ἢ τὸ αἶγα θύειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο πρόβατα ἔτι, ὅσα ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα νομοθετοῦσιν, οἶον, τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα· καὶ τὰ ψηφισματῶδη.

V. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοις εἶναι ΠΑΝΤΑ τοιαῦτα. ὅτι τὸ 10 μὲν φύσει, ΑΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, (ὡσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει) τὰ δὲ δίκαια, ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΝΑ ὀρῶσιν.

VI. Τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ἔχον, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅσ. καίτοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως, ΟΥΔΑΜΩΣ. 15 παρ' ἡμῖν δ', ἔστι μὲν τι καὶ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ ΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ. οὐ φύσει, μόντοι πᾶν ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἔστι τὸ μὲν φύσει, τὸ δ' οὐ κινήτων μόντοι. φύσει. ποῖον δὲ φύσει τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ποῖον οὐ, ἀλλὰ νομικὸν καὶ συνθήκη· εἴπερ ἀμφω κινήτῃ ὁμοίως· δῆλον. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ 20 αὐτὸς ἀρμόσει διορισμός. φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξιὰ κρείττων· καίτοι ἐνδεχεται τινὰς ἀμφιδεξίους γενέσθαι. τὰ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην καὶ τὸ συμφέρον, τῶν δικαίων ὁμοία ἔστι τοῖς μέτροις. οὐ γὰρ πανταχοῦ ἴσα, τὰ οἴνηρά καὶ σιτηρά μέτρα· ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν ἀνοῦνται, 25 μείζω, οὗ δὲ παλοῦσιν, ἐλάττω ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ τὰ μὴ φυσικὰ ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπινα δίκαια, οὐ ταῦτα πανταχοῦ ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ πολιτεῖαι· ἀλλὰ μία μόνον πανταχοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἡ ἀρίστη.

Τῶν δὲ δικαίων καὶ νομίμων ἕκαστον, ὡς τὰ 30 καθόλου πρὸς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἔχει. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πρᾶττόμενα πολλά· ἐκείνων δ' ἕκαστον ἓν. καθόλου γάρ.

VII. Διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀΔΙΚΗΜΑ, καὶ τὸ ἀΔΙΚΟΝ,

καὶ τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΩΜΑ, καὶ τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ. ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι, Τῆ ΦΥΣΕΙ ἢ ΤΑΞΕΙ. τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν ΠΡΑΧΘῆ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι· πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι, οὕτω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον ΔΙΚΑΙΟΠΡΑΓΗΜΑ, τὸ κοινόν· δικαίωμα δὲ, τὸ ἘΠΑΝΟΡΘΩΜΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΔΙΚΗΜΑΤΟΣ. καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν, ποῖά τε εἶδη, καὶ πόσα, καὶ περὶ ποῖα τυγχάνει ὄντα· ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.

VIII. Ὅνταν δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων· ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖ, ὅταν ἑκῶν τις 10 αὐτὰ πράττη. ὅταν δ' ἄκων, οὐτ' ἀδικεῖ οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οἷς γὰρ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΕ δικαίοις εἶναι ἢ ἀδίκους, πράττουσιν· ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαιοπράγημα ἄρισται, τῷ ἑκουσίῳ καὶ ἀκουσίῳ. ὅταν γὰρ ἑκούσιον ᾖ, ψέγεται, ἅμα δὲ καὶ 15 ἀδίκημα τότε ἐστίν. ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὕτω, εἰ μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῆ.

See B. III.
c. i. §. ix.
and xii.

IX. Λέγω δ' ἑκούσιον μὲν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται, ὃ ἂν τις, τῶν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ὄντων, Εἰδῶς καὶ μὴ ἀγνοῶν πράττη, μήτε ὄν, μήτε ᾧ, μήτε οὐ ἕνεκα· 20 (οἷον, τίνα τύπτει, καὶ τίνι, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα) κακείνων ἕκαστον μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, μηδὲ βία. (ὥσπερ εἴ τις, λαβὼν τὴν χεῖρα αὐτοῦ, τύπτει ἕτερον· οὐχ ἑκῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ, τὸν τυπτόμενον πατέρα εἶναι· τὸν δ', ὅτι μὲν ἄνθρωπος ἢ τῶν παρόντων 25 τις, γινώσκειν, ὅτι δὲ πατήρ, ἀγνοεῖν.) ὁμοίως δὲ, τὸ τοιοῦτον διωρίσθω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄυ ἕνεκα, καὶ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ὅλην. τὸ δὲ ἀγνοούμενον ἢ μὴ ἀγνοούμενον μὲν, μὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ δ' ὄν· ἢ βία· ἀκούσιον. (πολλὰ γὰρ, καὶ τῶν φύσει ὑπαρχόντων, εἰδότες καὶ 30 πράττομεν καὶ πάσχομεν, ὧν οὐθεν οὐθ' ἑκούσιον οὐτ' ἀκούσιόν ἐστίν· οἷον τὸ γηρᾶν, ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.) ἔστι δ' ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ τὸ κατὰ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ. (καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὴν παρακαταθήκην ἀπο-

δοίη τις, ἄκων καὶ διὰ φόβον· ὃν οὔτε δίκαια πράττειν οὔτε δικαιοπραγεῖν φατέον, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ τὸν ἀναγκαζόμενον καὶ ἄκοντα, τὴν παρακαταθήκην μὴ ἀποδιδόντα· κατὰ 5 συμβεβηκός φατέον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὰ ἄδिका πράττειν. τῶν δὲ ἐκουσίων, τὰ μὲν ΠΡΟΕΛΟΜΕΝΟΙ πράττομεν, τὰ δ' οὐ προελόμενοι. προελόμενοι μὲν, ὅσα προβουλευσάμενοι· ἀπροαίρετα δὲ, ὅσα ἀπροβούλευτα.

- 10 Χ. Τριῶν δὴ οὐσῶν ΒΛΑΒΩΝ τῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις· τὰ μὲν μετ' ἀγνοίας ἈΜΑΡΤΗΜΑΤΑ ἐστίν, ὅταν μῆτε ὄν, μῆτε ὄ, μῆτε ᾧ, μῆτε οὐ ἔνεκα, ὑπέλαβε, πράξῃ. ἢ γὰρ οὐ βαλεῖν, ἢ οὐ τούτω, ἢ οὐ τοῦτον, ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔνεκά, ᾗ ἦθη· ἀλλὰ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ οὐχ οὐ ἔνεκα 15 ᾗ ἦθη οἶον, οὐχ ἵνα τρώσῃ ἀλλ' ἵνα κεντήσῃ, ἢ οὐχ ὄν, ἢ οὐχ ᾧς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἢ βλάβη γένηται, ΑΤΥΧΗΜΑ· ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως, ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἈΜΑΡΤΗΜΑ. ἀμαρτάνει μὲν γὰρ, ὅταν ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τῆς αἰτίας· ἀτυχεῖ δ', ὅταν 20 ἔξωθεν. ὅταν δὲ εἰδῶς μὲν, μὴ προβουλεύσας δὲ, ΛΔΙΚΗΜΑ. οἶον, ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἢ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες, ἀδικοῦσι μὲν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστίν· οὐ μόντοι πᾶ ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα, 25 οὐδὲ πονηροί. οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἢ βλάβη. ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ΛΔΙΚΟΣ καὶ μοχθηρός. διὸ, καλῶς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται οὐ γὰρ ἀρχεῖ ὁ θυμῷ πρῶτων, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀργίστας. ἔτι δὲ, οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἢ μὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται, ἀλλὰ περὶ 30 τοῦ δικαίου. ἐπὶ φαινομένη γὰρ ἀδικία, ἢ ὀργή ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι, περὶ τοῦ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· ᾧν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἕτερον εἶναι μοχθηρόν, ἂν μὴ διὰ λήθην αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ἀλλ' ὁμολογοῦντες περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, περὶ τοῦ ΠΟΤΕΡΩΣ

ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ἀμφισβητοῦσιν. ὁ δ' ἐπιβουλεύσας οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὥστε ὁ μὲν οἶεται ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὁ δ' οὐ. ἂν δ' ἘΚ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ βλάβῃ ἀδικεῖ.

ΧΙ. Καὶ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑΥΤ' ἤδη τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ ἀδικῶν, ἀδικῶς [ὅταν παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἦ, ἢ παρὰ 5 τὸ ἴσον]. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δίκαιος, ὅταν προελομένου δικαιοπραγῆ. δικαιοπρᾶγεῖ δὲ, ἂν μόνον ἔκων πρᾶττη.

See B. III.
chap. i. §.
viii.

Τῶν δ' ἀκούσιων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ συγγνωμονικά, τὰ δ' οὐ συγγνωμονικά. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ μὴ μόνον ἀγνοοῦντες, 10 ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀμαρτάνουσι ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΑ. ὅσα δὲ μὴ δι' ἀγνοίαν, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν, διὰ πάθος δὲ μήτε φυσικὸν μήτ' ἀνθρώπινον, ΟΥ ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΟΝΙΚΑ.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHICH ARE PROPOSED, VARIOUS MINOR QUESTIONS
RELATING TO JUSTICE.

11 I. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ἱκανῶς διάρῃσται περὶ τοῦ 15 ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ ἀδικεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν, εἰ ἔστιν, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης εἶρηκε, λέγων ἀτόπως·

Μητέρα κατέκτα τὴν ἐμὴν, (βραχὺς λόγος)
'Ἐκὼν ἐκούσαν, ἢ θέλουσαν οὐχ ἐκὼν.

ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΓΑΡ ὧΣ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶν ἔκοντα ἀδικεῖ- 20
σθαι; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ἀκούσιον ἅπαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον; καὶ ἄρα πᾶν οὕτως; ἢ ἐκείνως [ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον, ἢ] τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον;

II. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ, ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι. (τὸ γὰρ 25 δικαιοπραγεῖν πᾶν ἐκούσιον. ὥστ' εὐλόγον ἀντικεῖσθαι

ὁμοίως καθ' ἑκάτερον, τό τ' ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ δικαιοῦσθαι, ἢ ἐκούσιον ἢ ἀκούσιον εἶναι.) ἄτοπον δ' ἂν δόξειε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοῦσθαι, εἰ πᾶν ἐκούσιον. ΕΝΙΟΙ ΓΑΡ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ ΟΥΧ ἘΚΟΝΤΕΣ.

5 III. Ἐπεὶ, καὶ τόδε διαφορήσειεν ἂν τις· ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ Ὅ ΤΟ ΑΔΙΚΟΝ ΠΕΠΟΝΘΩΣ, ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΑΙ ΠΑΣ; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πάσχειν ἐστίν; ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μεταλαμβάνειν, ἐπ' ^{ἰσ' ἀμφο-} ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ΔΙΚΑΙΩΝ. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ ^{τέρων μετ.}
 10 ἐπὶ τῶν ΑΔΙΚΩΝ. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν τὸ τᾶδिका πράττειν, τῷ ἀδικεῖν· οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικα πάσχειν, τῷ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ, ἐπὶ τοῦ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ δικαιοῦσθαι. ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΓΑΡ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΣΘΑΙ, ΜΗ ΑΔΙΚΟΥΝΤΟΣ· ἢ δικαιοῦσθαι, μὴ δικαιοπραγοῦντος.

15 IV. “Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα τινά· τὸ δ' ἐκόντα, εἰδότα καὶ ὄν, καὶ ᾧ, καὶ ᾧς· ὁ δ' ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ἐκὼν βλάπτει αὐτὸς αὐτόν· ἐκὼν τ' ἂν ἀδικοῖτο, καὶ ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτόν αὐτόν ἀδικεῖν. (ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἓν τι τῶν ἀπορουμένων· ΕΙ ΕΝ-
 20 ΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ.) ἔτι, ἐκὼν ἂν τις, δι' ἀκρασίαν, ὑπ' ἄλλου βλάπτοιτο ἐκόντος· ὥστ' εἴη ἂν, ἐκόντ' ἀδικεῖσθαι.” ἢ οὐκ ὀρθὸς ὁ διορισμὸς; ἀλλὰ προσθετέον τῷ “βλάπτειν, εἰδότα καὶ ὄν, καὶ ᾧ, καὶ ᾧς,” τὸ “παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνου βούλησιν.” ΒΛΑΠΤΕΤΑΙ
 25 μὲν οὖν τις ἐκὼν, καὶ τ' ἄδικα ΠΑΣΧΕΙ· ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΑΙ δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν. [οὐθεὶς γὰρ βούλεται, οὐδ' ὁ ἀκρατὴς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν πράττει. οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς, ὃ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον· ὃ τε ἀκρατὴς οὐχ ἂ οἶεται δεῖν πράττειν, πράττει.] ὁ δὲ τὰ
 30 αὐτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὁμηρὸς φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον τῷ Διομήδει “χρῦσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι ἑνεαβοίων” οὐκ ἀδικεῖται. ΕΠ' ΑΥΤῶ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ δίδοναι.

τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ΟΥΚ ΕΠ' ΑΥΤΩ· ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅΤΙ ΟΥΚ ἔΚΟΥΣΙΟΝ· δῆλον.

12 V. Ἐτι δ' ἂν προειλόμεθα δὴ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΠΟΤ' ΑΔΙΚΕΙ, Ὁ ΝΕΙΜΑΣ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΞΙΑΝ ΤΟ Ὡ ΠΛΕΙΟΝ, ἢ Ὁ ΕΧΩΝ; καί· ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ ἄΥΤΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ;

VI. Εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν, καὶ ὁ ΔΙΑΝΕΜΩΝ ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ ΕΧΩΝ τὸ πλεόν· εἴ τις πλεόν ἐτέρῳ ἢ αὐτῷ νέμει, εἰδῶς καὶ ἐκῶν· οὗτος 10 αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖ. ὅπερ δοκοῦσιν οἱ μέτριοι ποιεῖν. ὁ γὰρ ἐπιεικῆς ἐλαττωτικός ἐστιν. ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν; ἐτέρου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἐπλεονέκτει· οἷον δόξης, ἢ τοῦ ἀπλῶς καλοῦ. ἔτι, λύεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. οὐθέν γὰρ παρὰ τὴν 15 αὐτοῦ πάσχει βουλήσιν. ἄσπερ οὐκ ἀδικεῖται διὰ γε τοῦτο· ἀλλ' εἴπερ, βλάπτεται μόνον.

VII. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ, ὅτι ὁ ΔΙΑΝΕΜΩΝ ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ΟΥΚ Ὁ ΤΟ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΕΧΩΝ αἰεί. οὐ γὰρ, ἢ τὸ ἄδικον ὑπάρχει ἀδικεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἐκόντα τοῦτο 20 ποιεῖν· τοῦτο δ', ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως· ἢ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ διανεμόντι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ λαμβάνοντι. ἔτι, ἐπεὶ πολλαχῶς τὸ ποιεῖν λέγεται· καὶ ἐστὶν ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα κτείνει, καὶ ἡ χεὶρ, καὶ ὁ οἰκέτης ἐπιτάξαντος· οὐκ ἀδικεῖ μὲν, ποιεῖ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα. ἔτι εἰ μὲν 25 ἀγνοῶν ἔκρινεν· οὐκ ἀδικεῖ κατὰ τὸ νομικὸν δίκαιον, οὐδ' ἄδικος ἡ κρίσις ἐστίν. ἔστι δ' ὅΣ ΑἰΔΙΚΟΣ. ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ΝΟΜΙΚΟΝ δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ. εἰ δὲ γινώσκων ἔκρινεν ἀδίκως· πλεονέκτει καὶ αὐτὸς, ἢ χάριτος, ἢ τιμωρίας. ἄσπερ οὖν κἂν εἴ τις ΜΕΡΙΣΑΙΤΟ τοῦ 30 ἀδικήματος, καὶ ὁ ΔΙΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΚΡΙΝΑΣ ἀδίκως, πλεόν ἔχει. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων, ὁ τὸν ἀγρὸν κρίνας, οὐκ ἀγρὸν ἀλλ' ἀργύριον ἔλαβεν.

CHAP. IX.

IN WHICH IT IS ARGUED, THAT JUSTICE IS A VIRTUE
OF DIFFICULT ACQUIREMENT.

I. Οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς οἴονται εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν· διὸ, καὶ τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ΕἶΝΑΙ ῥΑΔΙΟΝ. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. συγγενέσθαι μὲν γὰρ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος, καὶ πατάξαι τὸν πλησίον, καὶ δοῦναι τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ἀργύριον ῥάδιον καὶ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὍΔΙ ΕΧΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΑΥΤΟ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ· οὔτε ῥάδιον, οὔτ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ταυτὰ.

II. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ΓΝΩΝΑΙ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδिका, οὐδὲν οἴονται σοφὸν εἶναι· ὅτι περὶ ᾧ οἱ νόμοι λέγουσιν, οὐ χαλεπὸν ξυνιέναι. ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτ' 10 ἔστι τὰ δίκαια ἀλλ' ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ. ἀλλὰ ΠΩΣ πραττόμενα, καὶ ΠΩΣ νεμόμενα, δίκαια· τοῦτο δὲ, πλέον ἔργον ἢ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ εἰδέναι. ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖ, μέλι, καὶ οἶνον, καὶ ἐλλέβορον, καὶ καῦσιν, καὶ τομῆν, εἰδέναι ῥάδιον· ἀλλὰ πῶς δεῖ νεῖμαι πρὸς 15 ὑγίειαν, καὶ τίνι, καὶ πότε, τοσοῦτον ἔργον ὅσον ἰατρὸν εἶναι.

III. Δι' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ Οἴονται εἶναι οὐθὲν ἥττον τὸ ἀδικεῖν· ὅτι οὐθὲν ἥττον ὁ δίκαιος, [ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον,] ΔΥΝΑΙΤ' ἂν ἕκαστον 20 πρᾶξαι τούτων. καὶ γὰρ συγγενέσθαι γυναικί, καὶ πατάξαι· καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀφεῖναι, καὶ στραφεῖς, ἐφ' ὅποτεραοῦν τρέχειν. ἀλλὰ τὸ δειλαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, οὐ τὸ ΤΑΥΤΑ ποιεῖν ἔστι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὍΔΙ ΕΧΟΝΤΑ, ταῦτα 25 ποιεῖν. ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεύειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν, οὐ τὸ τέμνειν ἢ μὴ τέμνειν, ἢ φαρμακεύειν ἢ μὴ φαρμακεύειν, ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ ὍΔΙ.

IV. Ἔστι δὲ τὰ δίκαια ἐν τούτοις, οἷς μέτεστι τῶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθῶν, ΕΧΟΥΣΙ Δ' ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΛ- ὑπερβολὴν ἐν
τούτοις καὶ.

See B. II.
chap. iv. §.
i.
ἀφελίμων,
τοῖς.

ΛΕΙΨΙΝ. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ αὐτῶν,
οἷον ἴσως τοῖς ΘΕΟΙΣ· τοῖς δ' οὐθεν μόνιον ἀφελίμων,
οἷον τοῖς ἀνιάτως κακοῖς, ἀλλὰ πάντα βλάπτει·
τοῖς δὲ, μέχρι τοῦ. διὰ τοῦτ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΟΝ ἔστιν.

CHAP. X.

ON THE RELATION OF EQUITY TO JUSTICE.

14 I. Περὶ δὲ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΑΣ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς 5
ἔχει ἢ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην, τὸ δ' ἐπιεικὲς
πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· ἐχόμενον ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς
ταυτόν ἀπλῶς, οὔθ' ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει· φαίνεται
σκοποῦμενοις. καὶ ὅτε μὲν, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν,
καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον· (ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα 10
ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ ἐπιει-
κέστερον· ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες·) ὅτε δὲ, τῷ λόγῳ
ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον, εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, παρὰ
τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν, ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν. Η ΓΑΡ ΤΟ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ
ΟΥ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ· Η ΤΟ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΣ ΟΥ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ, ΕΙ ΑΛΛΟ· 15
Η, ΕΙ ΑΜΦΩ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΑ, Τ' ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΣΤΙΝ. ἢ μὲν
οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ
ἐπιεικὲς.

II. Ἐχει δ' ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς, καὶ οὐθεν
ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς. τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς, δικαίου 20
ΤΙΝΟΣ ὄν βέλτιόν, ΕΣΤΙ δίκαιον· καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἄλλο
τι γένος ὄν, βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. ταυτόν ἄρα,
δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικὲς· καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίον ὄντων,
κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς. ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι τὸ
ἐπιεικὲς ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ ΤΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΝΟΜΟΝ δὲ, 25
ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα ΝΟΜΙΜΟΥ δικαίου.

See chap.
vii. §. iv. of
this book.

III. Αἴτιον δ', ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς,
περὶ ἐνίων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. ἐν

οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἶπειν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς· τὸ ἄς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἀμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἤττον ὀρθῶς. τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, οὐδ' ἐν 5 τῷ νομοθέτῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πραγματος ἔστιν. εὐθύς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἔστιν. ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῆ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου· τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπὼν, 10 ἔπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν. ὁ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς ἀν' αὐτὸς εἴποι παρὰν, καὶ εἰ ἤδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν ἀν'. διὸ αὐτὸς οὕτως ἀν' εἴποι ἐκεί τῶν δίκαιον μὲν ἔστι, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου· οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς· ΕΠΑΝΟΡΘΩ- 15 ΜΑ ΝΟΜΟΥ, ἢ ΕΛΛΕΙΠΕΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον, καὶ τοῦ μὴ πάντα κατὰ νόμον εἶναι· ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον θέσθαι ΝΟΜΟΝ· ὥστε ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑΤΟΣ δεῖ. τοῦ γὰρ ἀόριστου, ἀόριστος καὶ ὁ κανὼν ἔστιν. ὥσπερ καὶ τῆς Λεσβίας οἰκοδομῆς ὁ μολίβδινος 20 κανὼν· (πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ λίθου μετακινεῖται, καὶ οὐ μένει, ὁ κανὼν) καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα πρὸς τὰ πράγματα. τί μὲν οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ὅτι δίκαιον, καὶ τίνος βέλτιον δικαίου· δῆλον.

IV. Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτου, καὶ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς τίς 25 ἔστιν. ὁ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων προαιρετικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικὸς, καίπερ ἔχων τὸν νόμον βοηθόν· ΕΠΙΕΙΚΗΣ ἔστι. καὶ ἡ ἕξις αὕτη, ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΑ· δικαιοσύνη ΤΙΣ οὔσα, καὶ ΟΥΧ ἕτερα τίς ἕξις.

CHAP. XI.

IN WHICH ARE MAINTAINED, VARIOUS MINOR POSITIONS RELATING TO JUSTICE.

15 I. ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ Δ' ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ, Η ΟΥ· ΦΑΝΕΡΟΝ ΕΚ ΤῶΝ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ.

See chap. i. §. v. of this book.

II. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δικαίων, ΤΑ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΑΣΑΝ ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου τεταγμένα. οἷον· “ οὐ κελεύει ἀποκτινύναι ἑαυτὸν ὁ νόμος. [ἀ δὲ μὴ 5 κελεύει, ἀπαγορεύει] ἔτι, ὅταν παρὰ τὸν νόμον βλάβη, μὴ ἀντιβλάπτων, ἐκὼν ἀδικεῖ. ἐκὼν δὲ, ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὄν, καὶ ᾧ. ὁ δὲ δι' ὀργὴν ἑαυτὸν σφάττων, ἐκὼν τοῦτο δρᾷ παρὰ τὸν αὐτὸν νόμον. ὁ οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁ νόμος. ἀδικεῖ ἄρα.” ἀλλὰ ΤΙΝΑ; ἢ τὴν πόλιν, 10 αὐτὸν δ' οὐ; ἐκὼν γὰρ ΠΑΣΧΕΙ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΤΑΙ δ' οὐθεὶς ἐκὼν. διὸ καὶ ἡ πόλις ζῆμιοῖ. καὶ τις ἀτιμία πρόσεστι τῷ ἑαυτὸν διαφθείραντι, ὡς τὴν πόλιν ἀδικοῦντι.

τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, δ.

See chap. i. §. viii. of this book.

III. Ἐτι, ΚΑΘ' Ὅ ΑΔΙΚΟΣ, Ὁ ΜΟΝΟΝ ΑΔΙΚΩΝ καὶ μὴ 15 ὄλως Φαῦλος· ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΔΙΚΗΣΑΙ ΕΑΥΤΟΝ. (τοῦτο γὰρ ἄλλο ἐκείνου. ἔστι γὰρ πῶς ὁ ἄδικος οὕτω πονηρός, ὥσπερ ὁ δειλός· οὐχ ὡς ὈΔΗΝ ἔχων τὴν πονηρίαν. ὥστ' οὐδὲ κατὰ ταύτην ἀδικεῖ.) ἅμα γὰρ ἂν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴη, ἀφηρῆσθαι καὶ προσκεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτό. 20 τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' αἰὲν ΕΝ ΠΛΕΙΟΣΙΝ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον.

IV. Ἐτι δὲ, ἐκούσιόν τε καὶ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, καὶ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ· (ὁ γὰρ, διότι ἔπαθε καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντιποιῶν, οὐ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν) αὐτὸς δ' ἑαυτὸν, τὰ αὐτὰ 25 ἅμα καὶ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ. ἔτι, εἴη ἂν ἐκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἄνευ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀδικημάτων οὐθεὶς ἀδικεῖ· μοιχεύει δ' οὐδεὶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδὲ τοιχαρυχεῖ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τοῖχον, οὐδὲ

κλέπτει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ. ὅλως δὲ, λύεται τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖν, κατὰ ΤΟΝ ΔΙΟΡΙΣΜΟΝ, τὸν περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίως ἀδικεῖσθαι. See chap. viii. §. iv. of this book.

V. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ, ὅτι ἄμφω μὲν φαῦλα· καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔλαττον, τὸ δὲ πλεόν, ἔχειν, ἐστὶ τοῦ μέσου· καὶ ὥσπερ ὑγιεινὸν μὲν ἐν ἰατρικῇ, εὐεκτικὸν δὲ ἐν γυμναστικῇ. ἀλλ' ὅμως, ΧΕΙΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΑΔΙΚΕΙΝ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδικεῖν, μετὰ κακίας καὶ ψεκτόν· καὶ κακίας, ἢ τελείας ἀπλῶς, ἢ ^{ἢ τῆς τελείας} καὶ ἀπλῶς ἢ ^{ἢ γγῆς.} 10 σύνεγγυς· (οὐ γὰρ ἅπαν τὸ ἐκούσιον μετὰ ἀδικίας)· τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄνευ κακίας καὶ ἀδικίας. ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΟ μὲν οὖν, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἦττον φαῦλον· ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ δ', οὐθὲν κωλύει μεῖζον εἶναι κακόν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν μέλει τῇ τέχνῃ· ἀλλὰ πλευραῖτιν λέγει 15 μείζω νόσον, προσπταίσματος. καίτοι γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε θάτερον, κατὰ συμβεβηκός· εἰ προσπταίσαντα, διὰ τὸ πεσεῖν, συμβαίῃ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ληφθῆναι καὶ ἀποθανεῖν.

VI. ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ ἐστίν, See c. vii. §. ii. of this book. 20 οὐκ αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τῶν αὐτοῦ τισίν. οὐ πᾶν δὲ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεσποτικὸν ἢ τὸ οἰκονομικόν. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τοῖς λόγοις, διέστηκε τὸ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝ μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ ΑΛΟΓΟΝ. εἰς ἃ δὴ βλέπουσι, καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτόν· ὅτι ἐν 25 τούτοις, ἐστὶ πάσχειν τι παρὰ τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὀρέξεις· ὥσπερ οὖν ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, εἶναι πρὸς ἄλληλα δίκαιόν τι καὶ τούτοις.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν δικαιοσύνης, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν· διαρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τούτον.

BOOK VI.

1870

SUMMARY OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES THE CONSIDERATION OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE, IN GENERAL; AND OF THE SEVERAL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES, IN PARTICULAR.

I. The necessity of embracing in an ETHICAL treatise, a consideration of the INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

II. As, in the first book, the human soul has been viewed as consisting of TWO PARTS, the RATIONAL and the IRRATIONAL: so now, the RATIONAL PART is again viewed as consisting of TWO SUBORDINATE PARTS. Of these, one relates to THINGS NECESSARY AND CERTAIN: this is called the ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΟΝ. The other relates, to THINGS VARIABLE AND CONTINGENT: this is here called the ΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΝ, and, in a subsequent part of the book, the ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΟΝ. With reference to these two, the INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES are, in the first place, classed under the two general heads of SCIENCE and DELIBERATION.

III. There are, in the human soul, three powers DETERMINATIVE OF MORAL ACTION AND TRUTH: namely, SENSATION, REASON, and APPETITE. Of these three, SENSATION does not form the spring or principle of any MORAL ACTION. IV. With respect to the other two: In order to constitute the virtuous quality of moral actions, it is necessary, that REASON should conform to TRUTH, and APPETITE to RECTITUDE. V. Of that REASON which is PURELY CONTEMPLATIVE, the excellence is TRUTH: of that which is PRACTICAL, the excellence is, TRUTH AGREEING WITH RECTITUDE OF APPETITE. VI. The actuating principle of moral action, is the MORAL DETERMINATION OF CHOICE: and this moral determination consists in

REASON COMBINED WITH APPETITE. VII. Of both the two parts of human rationality (described in the second section), the proper work is TRUTH: and the HABITS, by which each part best accomplishes this work, are the VIRTUES of each. That is to say: these habits are the INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

VIII. Of these habits there are FIVE: namely, SCIENCE, ART, WISDOM, INTELLECT, and PHILOSOPHY.

In this enumeration, the terms WISDOM, INTELLECT, and PHILOSOPHY, are intended respectively to stand for the Aristotelian terms, ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ, ΝΟΤΣ, ΣΟΦΙΑ. It is not contended, that the established meaning of the English words is exactly equivalent to that of the Greek: and this applies more especially to the SECOND of them. But SOME English words, equivalent, either in their own force, or else in the sense now assigned to them, it is necessary, or at least greatly desirable, to employ: and these, on a view of the whole extent of their due and unavoidable application, appeared to be preferable to any other.

Of the term ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ, it is conceived, that WISDOM is a better representative than PRUDENCE. It is thus exemplified in our translation of the Bible: THE FEAR OF THE LORD IS THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM. And DR. ISAAC BARROW, in his sermon on the PLEASANTNESS OF RELIGION, among other characters of WISDOM reckons the following: "that it disposes us to acquire and to enjoy all the good, delight, and happiness, we are capable of; that it confers all the advantages which flow from clear understanding, deliberate advice, dexterous address, and right intention; that it distinguishes the circumstances, limits the measures, determines the modes, and appoints the fit seasons, of action." In these instances, the use of the term seems to harmonize, both with its popular acceptation, and with the Aristotelian signification of the Greek. Whereas the term PRUDENCE, however it may be defined in the writings of the learned, appears, according to the customary and most frequent employment of it, too narrow to comprehend, that which it is here intended to express, A VIRTUE COMMENSURATE WITH THE WHOLE RANGE OF HUMAN ACTION AND HAPPINESS.

As a name for the other intellectual virtue, PHILOSOPHY has been preferred to WISDOM. The SUBJECTS of the ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE, are plainly the same with the SUBJECTS of PHILOSOPHY. If any new MODIFICATION OF SENSE is here given to the term: it is no other than that of denoting by it, A RIGHT HABIT OF MIND RELATING TO THOSE SUBJECTS. The comparative impropriety of the term WISDOM may be thus seen. Suppose the case of a man, who accomplishes the most valuable attainments in astronomy or metaphysics: but who, by having his mind absorbed in such pursuits, and by consequent

inattention to his affairs, ruins his estate and reduces himself to want. The case is one, which realizes THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE of Aristotle: it is one, to which the name of PHILOSOPHY, according to the current use of language, cannot be denied: but it is not one, to which we should apply the term WISDOM; and the character is very remote from, or rather contrary to, that of him whom we should call, A WISE MAN. Nor does it avail, in contradiction to this, if it appear, that we sometimes designate as WISE MEN, such as THALES, and perhaps other GREEK PHILOSOPHERS, to whom Aristotle would not (according to his own remark in the sixth chapter of this book) apply the term ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΣ. For this may have arisen from a prevailing misconception of the Greek epithet: and similar improprieties of diction have sometimes become familiar and inveterate, though they at first originated in a false notion relating to the true force and parallel import of native and foreign words.

CHAP. II.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF SCIENCE.

I. The nature of SCIENCE is described. II. The two processes by which it is attained are, INDUCTION and SYLLOGISM: which are here described. III. Science is defined: A DEMONSTRATIVE HABIT, PROCEEDING FROM FIRST AND INDEMONSTRABLE PRINCIPLES, AND DEDUCING INFERENCES FROM TRUTHS, WHICH ARE BETTER KNOWN TO US THAN THOSE INFERENCES, WHICH ARE PRIOR TO THEM IN THE ORDER OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, AND WHICH ARE THE CAUSES AND REASONS OF THEM. (See the Posterior Analytics, Book I. chap. ii. §. 1—12. Buhle's edition.)

CHAP. III.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF ART.

I. The difference between ART and WISDOM, corresponds with the difference between MAKING and DOING, PRODUCTION and MORAL ACTION, ΠΟΙΗΣΙΣ and ΠΡΑΞΙΣ. II. ART is defined: A RATIONAL HABIT, EFFICIENT OF SOME PRODUCTION, AND PRODUCING ITS EFFECT

AGREEABLY TO TRUTH. (It may be noted, that the term ART, as here employed by Aristotle, does not signify the MERE PRINCIPLE, so named in distinction from NATURE: but a RIGHT HABIT relating to the use of that principle. The former signification of the word occurs, however, in the fifth section of the next chapter. For there, the word denotes that which is susceptible of either a right or a faulty use, and which may be either agreeable to virtue, or not: here, the sense of it is restricted to the right use, and to that which is in itself a VIRTUE.) III. The SUBJECTS to which art relates. IV. The similitude between ART and FORTUNE. V. THE HABIT which is CONTRARY to this intellectual virtue.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF WISDOM.

I. Towards determining WHAT WISDOM IS, one step is, to consider the appropriate conduct of the wise. II. Another step is, to ascertain WHAT IT IS NOT. It is not SCIENCE NOR ART. III. WISDOM is defined: A PRACTICAL HABIT, AGREEABLE TO TRUTH, ACCOMPANIED BY THE EXERCISE OF REASON, AND RELATING TO HUMAN GOOD AND EVIL. IV. In what manner it happens, that MORAL DEPRAVITY IS PECULIARLY DESTRUCTIVE of this intellectual virtue. V. Points of DISTINCTION between WISDOM and ART. VI. Of the two parts of human rationality, it is the virtue of that which relates to deliberation, and which is conversant upon things variable and contingent. (See chap. I. §. ii. of this Book.) VII. Reason why it is not enough to define it simply, A RATIONAL HABIT.

CHAP. V.


OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF INTELLECT.

I. Points of distinction between the intellectual virtue of INTELLECT, and the several virtues of SCIENCE, ART, WISDOM, and PHILOSOPHY. II. INTELLECT is that intellectual virtue which relates to FIRST PRINCIPLES.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. PHILOSOPHY, and SKILL IN PARTICULAR ARTS, being both denoted in Greek by one common term, though with some variation of use: the two are here distinguished. II. Philosophy is defined: THE COMBINATION OF SCIENCE AND INTELLECT, EMPLOYED UPON THINGS OF THE NOBLEST NATURE. III. This definition is illustrated by EXAMPLES. IV. The DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND WISDOM is explained. This is done, by specifying those characters of WISDOM which do not belong to PHILOSOPHY.


 CHAP. VII.

IN WHICH VARIOUS OTHER INTELLECTUAL HABITS AND FACULTIES ARE DESCRIBED AND DEFINED, AND COMPARED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF WISDOM.

This chapter consists of five parts. The first explains the nature of political wisdom, and its relation to that wisdom which is private and personal, and which is commonly denoted by the word. The second, explains the nature of good deliberation. The third, treats of intelligence. The fourth, of that mental virtue which is exercised in equitable decision. The fifth, displays the concurrent tendency of this last-named virtue, of intelligence, of wisdom, and intellect.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The difference between WISDOM and POLITICS: the former term having a common relation to things both PERSONAL and POLITICAL, but being in general use restricted to the former. II. According to this restricted use of the word, there often occurs, in the characters of men, a striking contrast between the two. Nevertheless, the wisdom which is PERSONAL, is not perfect, unless

there be combined with it some degree of that which is POLITICAL. III. The frequent DEFICIENCY of political men in personal wisdom, may be accounted for by the DIFFICULTY of attaining it: this difficulty being created by that essential character, in which this virtue differs from the virtues of SCIENCE and INTELLECT, and consisting in the want of EXPERIENCE: while this last cannot be obtained without TIME and some ADVANCEMENT OF YEARS.

PART THE SECOND.

IV. It is proposed to examine the nature of GOOD DELIBERATION: termed in Greek, ΕΤΒΟΤΑΙΑ. V. It is something different from SCIENCE; from each of the mental talents denoted by the terms ΕΤΣΤΟΧΙΑ and ΑΥΧΙΝΟΙΑ; and from OPINION. VI. From an examination of the thing itself, and a comparison of it with other things from which it differs, is deduced the following definition: which discovers to us at once, both its own nature, and the relation in which it stands connected with wisdom: GOOD DELIBERATION IS A RECTITUDE OF COUNSEL, RELATING TO THE MEANS CONDUCTIVE TO AN END, OF THE FITNESS OF WHICH END WISDOM AFFORDS THE TRUE DETERMINATION.

PART THE THIRD.

VII. In what INTELLIGENCE (a mental talent denoted by ΣΥΝΕΙΣ) differs from SCIENCE. VIII. In what it differs from WISDOM. IX. Its proper function consists IN FORMING A RIGHT OPINION ON TO THE DISCOURSE OF ANOTHER MAN, ON THOSE SUBJECTS TO WHICH WISDOM RELATES.

PART THE FOURTH.

X. The mental virtue called ΓΝΩΜΗ, is THAT WHICH IS EXERCISED IN THE DECISIONS OF EQUITY.

PART THE FIFTH.

XI. The MENTAL habit exercised in EQUITABLE DECISION, and those of INTELLIGENCE, WISDOM, and INTELLECT, have this common property: they all relate to EXTREMES. This is the case with the three former, inasmuch as they all relate to PARTICULARS. XII. It is also the case with the last of the four, inasmuch as it relates to BOTH PARTICULARS AND UNIVERSALS: the former being the extreme

limits, from which we commence our reasonings, in cases of practice; and the latter, in cases of science. XIII. ΓΝΩΜΗ, INTELLIGENCE, and INTELLECT, are the gifts of nature connected with a certain advancement of years: but PHILOSOPHY is not so. XIV. It is for this reason that we ought to regard the SAYINGS of aged and experienced men, with as much attention as is due to DEMONSTRATED TRUTHS.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHICH IS VINDICATED, THE INSEPARABLE CONNEXION
OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE WITH MORAL VIRTUE AND
HUMAN HAPPINESS.

This chapter consists of two parts: the first of which contains a statement of difficulties relating to certain intellectual virtues; and the second, a solution of those difficulties.

PART THE FIRST.

I. A question is proposed, respecting the UTILITY, IN RELATION TO HAPPINESS, OF CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

II. As an objection to the utility of PHILOSOPHY it is alleged: That it is INEFFICIENT OF GOOD RELATING TO HUMAN LIFE. III. As an objection to the utility of WISDOM, it is alleged as follows. "Either a man ALREADY POSSESSES the MORAL VIRTUES, OR HE DOES NOT. If he does, wisdom will not be required in order to produce VIRTUOUS ACTS; inasmuch as they will flow spontaneously from HABITS already formed: If he does not, then, the ACTS of those virtues, as in the case of education, may be produced by the CONTROL AND GOVERNMENT of another person, and thus the HABITS of virtue may be formed in him, as well as by the WISDOM RESIDING IN HIMSELF. Thus, in both cases, it would appear, that this intellectual virtue, is not necessary in order to any PRACTICAL EFFECT." IV. It is objected to as an inconsistency: That while philosophy is declared to be MORE SUBLIME than wisdom, it appears that wisdom ought to exercise the DIRECTIVE POWER OVER IT. For this appears to be a consequence flowing from the definition of wisdom; which ascribes to it, a practical exercise in relation to all human good and evil.

PART THE SECOND.

V. With respect to the foregoing objection against PHILOSOPHY. In order to prove the inutility of an intellectual habit, it is not enough to say, that it is inefficient of any good ulterior to itself. For the mere EXERCISE OF THE HABIT, is, in itself, one of the real constituents of human happiness. VI. But it is not true respecting philosophy, that it is inefficient of good. For there are EFFECTS SIMULTANEOUS with their causes, as well as EFFECTS SUBSEQUENT to them: and the efficiency of good, in the present case, is of this nature.

VII. With respect to the foregoing objection to the utility of WISDOM. Towards the purposes of human happiness, there is a necessary conjunction between moral virtue and wisdom: it being the office of the former, to choose the OBJECT of pursuit; and of the latter, to direct the MEANS of attaining it. VIII. The utility of wisdom is further seen, from considering the difference between WISDOM and CUNNING. These two, with regard to the mental faculty, are exactly the same: it is the MORAL DETERMINATION, which makes the difference between them: and it is essential to the character of WISDOM, that the MORAL DETERMINATION should be VIRTUOUS. IX. The utility of wisdom is further seen, from considering the difference between MORAL and NATURAL VIRTUE. The latter of these may exist, as the gift of NATURE; but the former cannot exist, in a state of SEPARATION FROM WISDOM. X. With reference to this last distinction, and in further evidence of the same point, it is observed: That of the NATURAL virtues, a man may have some and be destitute of others; but that of the MORAL virtues, if he possess one, he will possess all: such being THE EFFECT OF WISDOM, acting as the inseparable companion of all moral virtue. XI. Though it should even be granted, that wisdom has no practical effect: it would still be desirable, as being an appropriate virtue of the rational part of the human soul.

XII. With reference to the INCONSISTENCY alleged in the fourth section. It is not true, that wisdom exercises a directive power OVER philosophy. It exercises that power, RELATING TO philosophy, and for the sake of its advancement: but this is only in the same way, in which it does, relating to every thing connected with human life.

CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES THE CONSIDERATION OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE IN GENERAL; AND OF THE SEVERAL DISTINCT INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES IN PARTICULAR.

Ι. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν πρότερον εἰρηκότες, “ ὅτι 1
δεῖ τὸ μέσον αἰρεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μηδὲ
τὴν ἔλλειψιν· τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐστίν, ὡς ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ Ὁ ΟΡΘΟΣ See B. II.
λέγει.” τοῦτο διέλωμεν. c. i. §. x.

5 Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ἕξεισι, καθάπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἐστὶ τις σκοπὸς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπο-
βλέπων ὁ τὸν λόγον ἔχων, ἐπιτείνει καὶ ἀνίησιν· καὶ
τις ἐστὶν ὄρος τῶν μεσοτήτων· ἃς μεταξὺ φάμεν εἶναι
τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ΟΥΣΑΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ
10 ΟΡΘΟΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ. ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰπεῖν οὕτως, ἀληθὲς
μὲν, οὐθὲν δὲ σαφές. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπι-
μελείαις, περὶ ὧσας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς
μὲν εἰπεῖν· ὅτι οὔτε πλείω οὔτε ἐλάττω δεῖ πονεῖν,
οὐδὲ ραθυμεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέσα, καὶ ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος.
15 τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ἔχων ἂν τις, οὐθὲν ἂν εἰδείῃ πλέον,
οἶον, ποῖα δεῖ προσφέρεισθαι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα· εἴ τις
εἴπειεν, ὅτι ὅσα ἢ ἰατρικὴ κελεύει καὶ ὡς ὁ
ταύτην ἔχων. διὸ δεῖ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς
ἕξεις, μὴ μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι τοῦτ' εἰρημένον· ἀλλὰ
20 καὶ διαρισμένον, ΤΙΣ Τ' ΕΣΤΙΝ Ὁ ΟΡΘΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ, ΚΑΙ
ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΤΙΣ ὈΡΟΣ.

Τὰς δὴ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς διελόμενοι· τὰς μὲν 2
εἶναι τοῦ ἨΘΟΥΣ ἔφαμεν, τὰς δὲ τῆς ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ. περὶ

μὲν οὖν τῶν ΗΘΙΚΩΝ διεληλύθαμεν. περὶ δὲ τῶν
λοιπῶν, περὶ ΨΥΧΗΣ πρῶτον εἰπόντες, λέγαμεν οὕτως.

See B. I.
c. v. §. iii.

II. Πρῶτερον μὲν οὖν ἐλέχθη, δὴ εἶναι μέρη τῆς
ψυχῆς· τό τε ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝ, καὶ τὸ ΑΛΟΓΟΝ. νῦν δὲ,
ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝΤΟΣ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον διαι- 5
ρετέον. καὶ ὑποκείσθω ΔΥΟ ΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΝ ΕΧΟΝΤΑ· ἓν
μὲν, ᾧ θεωροῦμεν τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων, ὅσων αἰ
ἀρχαὶ μὴ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν· ἓν δὲ, ᾧ τὰ ἐν-
δεχόμενα. (πρὸς γὰρ τὰ τῷ γένει ἕτερα, καὶ τῶν
τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων, ἕτερον τῷ γένει, τὸ πρὸς ἐκάτερον 10
πεφυκός· εἴπερ καθ' ὁμοιότητά τινα καὶ οἰκειότητα
ἢ γνῶσις ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς.) λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων, τὸ
μὲν ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΟΝΙΚΟΝ, τὸ δὲ ΛΟΓΙΣΤΙΚΟΝ. (τὸ γὰρ
ΒΟΥΛΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ καὶ ΛΟΓΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ, ταῦτόν· οὐθείς δὲ βου-
λεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὥστε 15
τὸ λογιστικόν ἐστὶν ἓν τι μέρος τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος.)
ληπτέον ἄρ' ἐκατέρου τούτων τίς ἢ ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΗ ἔΞΙΣ.
αὕτη γὰρ ΑΡΕΤΗ ἐκατέρου· ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ, πρὸς τὸ ἔργον
τὸ οἰκεῖον.

III. ΤΡΙΑ δ' ἐστὶν, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τὰ κύρια πρᾶ- 20
ξεως καὶ ἀληθείας· Αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ορεξις. τού-
των δ', ἡ Αἴσθησις, οὐδεμιᾶς ἀρχὴ πράξεως. δῆλον
δὲ, τῷ τὰ θηρία αἴσθησιν μὲν ἔχειν, πράξεως δὲ μὴ
κοινωνεῖν.

IV. Ἔστι δ', ὅπερ ἐν ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑ καταφασίς καὶ 25
ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ΟΡΕΞΕΙ, δίωξις καὶ φυγὴ. ὥστ',
ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ, ἔΞΙΣ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΤΙΚΗ· ἢ δὲ προ-
αίρεσις, ΟΡΕΞΙΣ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΗ· δεῖ, διὰ ταῦτα, τὸν τε
ΛΟΓΟΝ ΑΛΗΘΗ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ΟΡΕΞΙΝ ΟΡΘΗΝ, εἴπερ ἡ
ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΑ· καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ, τὸν μὲν φάσαι, 30
τὴν δὲ διάκειν.

V. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ διάνοια καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, ΠΡΑ-

ΚΤΙΚΗ. τῆς δὲ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗΣ διανοίας καὶ μὴ πρα-
κτικῆς μηδὲ ποιητικῆς, τὸ εὖ καὶ κακῶς Τ' ΑΛΗΘΕΣ
ΕΣΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΥΔΟΣ· (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ παντὸς διανοητι-
κοῦ ἔργον·) τοῦ δὲ πρακτικοῦ καὶ διανοητικοῦ, ἢ
5 ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ ὉΜΟΛΟΓΩΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΑ Τῆ ΟΡΕΞΕΙ Τῆ ΟΡΘῆ.

VI. ΠΡΑΞΕΩΣ μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ, προαίρεσις· (ὄθεν
ἢ κίνησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ' οὐ ἐνεκά·) ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΩΣ δὲ,
ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἐνεκά τινος. διὸ, οὔτ' ἀνευ νοῦ
καὶ διανοίας, οὔτ' ἀνευ ἠθικῆς ἐστὶν ἕξωσ, ἢ προαί-
15 ρεσις. ΕΥΠΡΑΞΙΑ γὰρ, καὶ τὸ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΕΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΙ,
ἀνευ ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΗΘΟΥΣ οὐκ ἐστὶν. διάνοια δ'
ΑΥΤΗ οὐθέν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐνεκά τοῦ καὶ ΠΡΑΚΤΙ-
ΚΗ. (αὕτη γὰρ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ ἀρχεῖ. ἐνεκά
ΓΑΡ τοῦ, ποιεῖ πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν. καὶ οὐ τέλος ἀπλωσ
15 (ἀλλὰ πρὸς τι καὶ τινός) τὸ ΠΟΙΗΤΟΝ, ἀλλὰ τὸ
ΠΡΑΚΤΟΝ. ἢ γὰρ ΕΥΠΡΑΞΙΑ, τέλος. ἢ δ' ὄρεξις,
τούτου.) διὸ, ἢ ΟΡΕΚΤΙΚΟΣ ΝΟΥΣ ἢ προαίρεσις, ἢ
(ΟΡΕΞΙΣ ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΗ. καὶ ἢ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ, ΑΝ-
ΘΡΩΠΟΣ.

20 [Οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ προαιρετὸν οὐθέν γεγονός. οἷον· οὐ-
θεὶς προαιρεῖται Ἴλιον πεπορθηκέναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ βου-
λεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος· ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου
καὶ ἐνδεχομένου. τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ
γενέσθαι· διὸ ὀρθῶς Ἀγάθων·

25 Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ θεὸς στερίσκεται,
'Αγένητα ποιεῖν ἄσ' ἂν ἢ πεπραγμένα.]

VII. Ἀμφοτέρων δὲ τῶν νοητικῶν μορίων, ΑΛΗ-
ΘΕΙΑ τὸ ἔργον. καθ' ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει
ἐκάτερον· αὐταὶ ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν.

30 VIII. Ἀρξάμενοι οὖν ἀνωθεν, περὶ αὐτῶν πάλιν 3
λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὲ, οἷς ἀληθεύει ἢ ψυχὴ τῷ κατα-
φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, ΠΕΝΤΕ τὸν ἀριθμόν. ταῦτα δ'

ἔστι· ΤΕΧΝΗ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ, ΣΟΦΙΑ, ΝΟΥΣ.
ὑπολήψει γὰρ καὶ δόξη, ἐνδέχεται διαφεύδεσθαι.

CHAP. II.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF SCIENCE.

I. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ μὲν οὖν τί ἐστίν· ἐντεῦθεν φανερόν, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. πάντες γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὃ ἐπιστά- 5
μεθα, μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως ἔχειν. (τὰ δ' ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως, ὅταν ἔξω τοῦ θεωρεῖν γένηται, λανθάνει εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή.) ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν. Αἴδιον ἄρα. τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντα ἀπλῶς, πάντα αἴδια· τὰ δ' αἴδια, ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα. ἔτι, 10
ΔΙΔΑΚΤΗ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη δοκεῖ εἶναι· καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητόν, μαθητόν. ΕΚ ΠΡΟΓΙΝΩΣΚΟΜΕΝΩΝ δὲ πᾶσα διδασκαλία· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν.

II. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῶν. 15
ἢ μὲν δὴ ΕΠΑΓΩΓΗ, ἀρχὴ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ καθόλου· ὃ δὲ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΙΣΜΟΣ, ἐκ τῶν καθόλου. εἰσὶν ἄρα ἀρχαί, ΕΞ ὄντων ὁ συλλογισμὸς, ὄντων οὐκ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς. ἐπαγωγὴ ἄρα.

III. Ἡ μὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἔξις ἀποδει- 20
κτικῆ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορίζομεθα ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς. ὅταν γὰρ πῶς πιστεύη, καὶ γνώριμοι αὐτῶν ᾧσιν αἱ ἀρχαί· ΕΠΙΣΤΑΤΑΙ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ μᾶλλον τοῦ συμπεράσματος· ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ ἔξει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. 25

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμης· διαρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

CHAP. III.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF ART.

I. Τοῦ δ' ἐνδεχομένου ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἔστι τι καὶ 4
 ΠΟΙΗΤΟΝ καὶ ΠΡΑΚΤΟΝ. ἕτερον δ' ἐστὶ ποίησις καὶ
 πρᾶξις. (πιστεύομεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἐξωτερι-
 κοῖς λόγοις.) ὥστε καὶ ἡ μετὰ λόγου ἕξις πρακτικὴ,
 5 ἕτερόν ἐστι τῆς μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆς ἕξεως. διὸ οὐδὲ
 περιέχονται ὑπ' ἀλλήλων. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πρᾶξις, ποίησις·
 οὔτε ἡ ποίησις, πρᾶξις ἐστίν.

II. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστίν, καὶ
 ὅπερ ἕξις τις μετὰ λόγου ποιητικῆ· καὶ οὐδεμία, *καὶ οὐδεμία*
 10 οὔτε τέχνη ἐστίν, ἥτις οὐ μετὰ λόγου ποιητικὴ ἕξις
 ἐστίν, οὔτε τοιαύτη, ἢ οὐ τέχνη· ταῦτόν ἂν εἴη
 ΤΕΧΝΗ, καὶ ἕΞΙΣ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΑΛΗΘΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ.

III. Ἔστι δὲ τέχνη πᾶσα περὶ γέनेσις· καὶ τὸ
 τεχνάζειν· καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅπως ἂν γένηταιί τι τῶν
 15 ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ
 ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ. οὔτε γὰρ
 τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων, ἢ γινομένων, ἢ τέχνη ἐστίν·
 οὔτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα
 τὴν ἀρχήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ποίησις καὶ πρᾶξις ἕτερον·
 20 ἀνάγκη τὴν τέχνην ποιήσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ πρᾶξεως, εἶναι.

IV. Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ, περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστίν ἡ ΤΥΧΗ
 καὶ ἡ ΤΕΧΝΗ. καθάπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων Φησί·

Τέχνη τύχην ἕστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

V. Ἡ μὲν οὖν τέχνη, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἕξις τις
 25 μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητικὴ ἐστίν. ἢ δ' ΑΤΕΧΝΙΑ,
 τούναντίον, ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ ἕΞΙΣ,
 περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF WISDOM.

5 I. Περὶ δὲ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες, τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς Φρονίμους. δοκεῖ δὴ Φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλευσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα· οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον, ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ ἰσχύν· ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν. σημεῖον δ', ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι Φρονίμους λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ἂν μὴ ἔστι τέχνη. ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη Φρόνιμος, ὁ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΟΣ.

II. Βουλευέται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως 10 ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῶ πρᾶξαι. ὥστ', εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη μὲν μετ' ἀποδείξεως· ἂν δ' αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐνδέχονται ἄλλως ἔχειν, τούτων μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· [πάντα γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν,] καὶ οὐκ ἔστι βουλευσασθαι περὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων· οὐκ 15 ἂν εἴη ἡ Φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη. οὐδὲ τέχνη. ἐπιστήμη μὲν, ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τὸ πρακτὸν ἄλλως ἔχειν· τέχνη δ', ὅτι ἄλλο τὸ γένος πράξεως καὶ ποιήσεως.

III. Λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔΞΙΝ ΑΛΗΘΗ ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩ ΑΓΑΘΑ 20 ΚΑΙ ΚΑΚΑ. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως, ἕτερον τὸ τέλος· τῆς δὲ πράξεως, οὐκ ἂν εἴη. ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ ΕΥΠΡΑΞΙΑ τέλος. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους, Φρονίμους οἴομεθα εἶναι· ὅτι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, δύνανται θεωρεῖν. εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα, τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς.

IV. Ἐνθεν καὶ ΤΗΝ ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗΝ τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι· ὡς ΣΩΖΟΥΣΑΝ ΤΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΝ. σώζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν 30

See B. I. c.
i. §. ii. and
iv.

τῆς ἑξῆς

ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει, οὐδὲ διαστρέφει, τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ
 λυπηρόν· (οἶον, ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας
 ἔχει, ἢ οὐκ ἔχει·) ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ
 μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, τὸ οὖ ἕνεκα τὰ
 5 πρακτά· τῶ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην,
 εὐθύς οὐ φαίνεται ἡ ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν
 οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν. ΕΣΤΙ See B. I. c.
 ΓΑΡ Ἡ ΚΑΚΙΑ ΦΘΑΡΤΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗΣ. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν ii. §. v.
 φρόνησιν, ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ, περὶ τὰ
 10 ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικὴν.

V. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ΤΕΧΝΗΣ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ· φρονήσεως See c. iii.
 δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν. καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ, ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων §. ii. of this
 αἰρετώτερος· περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν, ἦττον· ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ Summary.
 τὰς ἀρετάς. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ οὐ
 15 τέχνη.

VI. Δυσὶν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον
 ἔχόντων· θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετὴ, τοῦ ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΟΥ. ἢ See c. i. §.
 τε γὰρ δόξα, περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ἢ ii. of this
 φρόνησις. Summary.

20 VII. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, οὐδ' ἕξιν μετὰ λόγου μόνον.
 σημεῖον δ', ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἕξεώς ἐστὶ,
 φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἐστὶν.

CHAP. V.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF INTELLECT.

1. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τῶν καθόλου ἐστὶν 6
 ὑπόληψις, καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὄντων· εἰσὶ δ' ΑΡΧΑΙ
 25 τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν καὶ πάσης ἐπιστήμης· (μετὰ λόγου
 γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη) τῆς ΑΡΧΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΤΟΥ, οὗτ'
 ἂν ἐπιστήμη εἴη, οὔτε τέχνη, οὔτε φρόνησις. τὸ μὲν
 γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν, ἀποδεικτόν· αἱ δὲ τυγχάνουσιν οὔσαι

περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. οὐδὲ δὴ σοφία τούτων ἐστίν. τοῦ γὰρ σοφοῦ, περὶ ἐνίων ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν.

II. Εἰ δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύομεν, καὶ μηδέποτε διαψευδόμεθα, περὶ τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἢ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἢ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ἐπιστήμη καὶ φρόνησις ἐστίν, καὶ σοφία, καὶ ΝΟΥΣ· τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν μηθὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι· (λέγω δὲ τρία, φρόνησιν, ἐπιστήμην, σοφίαν) λείπεται, ΝΟΥΝ Εἶναι ΤΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF PHILOSOPHY.

7 I. Τὴν δὲ ΣΟΦΙΑΝ, ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις, τοῖς ἀκρι- 10
βεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν· (οἷον, Φειδίαν
λίθουργόν σοφόν, καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν)·
ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν, οὐθέν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν ΣΟΦΙΑΝ,
ἢ ὅτι ΑΡΕΤΗ ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ἐστίν· εἶναι δὲ τινὰς σοφοὺς
οἰόμεθα ὈΛΩΣ, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι ἢ σο- 15
φούς. ὥσπερ Ὁμηρός φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργιτῆ·

Τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν, οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα,
Οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

II. Ὡστε δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀν τῶν ἐπι-
στημῶν εἶη ἡ σοφία. δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφόν, μὴ μόνον 20
ΤΑ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΑΡΧΩΝ ΕΙΔΕΝΑΙ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ
ΑΡΧΑΣ ΑΛΗΘΕΥΕΙΝ. ὥστ' εἶη ἀν ἡ σοφία ΝΟΥΣ καὶ
ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη, τῶν
τιμιωτάταν. ἀτοπον γὰρ, εἴ τις τὴν πολιτικὴν, ἢ
τὴν φρόνησιν, σπουδαιοτάτην οἶεται εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τὸ 25
ἄριστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ
ὑγιεινὸν μὲν καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἕτερον ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἰχθύ-
σι· τὸ δὲ λευκὸν καὶ εὐθύ, ταυτόν ἀεί· καὶ τὸ σοφόν

ΤΑΥΤΟΝ πάντες ἂν εἴποιεν, φρόνιμον δὲ ἕΤΕΡΟΝ. τὸ
 γὰρ περὶ αὐτὸ ἕκαστα εὖ θεωροῦν, φαῖεν ἂν εἶναι
 ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΝ· καὶ τούτῳ ἐπιτρέψειαν αὐτά. διὸ, καὶ
 τῶν θηρίων ἕνια φρόνιμά φασι εἶναι· ὅσα περὶ τὸν
 5 αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητι-
 κήν. φανερόν δὲ καὶ, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἡ σοφία, καὶ ἡ
 πολιτικὴ, ἡ αὐτή. εἰ γὰρ τὴν περὶ τὰ ὠφέλιμα τὰ
 αὐτοῖς ἐροῦσι σοφίαν· ΠΟΛΛΑΙ ἔσονται σοφίαι. οὐ
 γὰρ μία περὶ τὸ ἀπάντων ἀγαθὸν τῶν ζῴων, ἀλλ'
 10 ἕτέρα περὶ ἕκαστον· εἰ μὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ μία περὶ
 πάντων τῶν ὄντων. || εἰ δ', ὅτι βέλτιστον ἄνθρωπος τῶν
 ἄλλων ΖΩΩΝ· οὐδὲν διαφέρει. καὶ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου,
 ἄλλα πολὺ θειότερα τὴν φύσιν· οἷον, φανερώτατά γε
 ἐξ ὧν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων
 15 δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ σοφία ἐστὶ, ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ
 ΤΩΝ ΤΙΜΙΩΤΑΤΩΝ Τῆ ΦΥΣΕΙ.

III. Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ Θαλῆν, καὶ τοὺς
 τοιοῦτους, ΣΟΦΟΥΣ μὲν, ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΥΣ δ' οὐ, φασι εἶ-
 ναι· ὅταν ἰδῶσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέρονθ' ἑαυτοῖς.
 20 καὶ περιττὰ μὲν, καὶ θαυμαστά, καὶ χαλεπὰ, καὶ
 δαιμόνια, εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασι· ἄχρηστα δ', ὅτι
 οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

IV. Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΑ, ΚΑΙ
 ΠΕΡΙ ὧΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΣΑΣΘΑΙ. τοῦ γὰρ φρόνιμου
 25 μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἔργον εἶναι φαμεν, τὸ εὖ βουλευ-
 εσθαι. βουλευέται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλ-
 λως ἔχειν· οὐδ' ὅσων μὴ τέλος τί ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο
 πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. ὁ δ' ἀπλῶς εὐβουλος, ὁ τοῦ ἀρί-
 στού ἀνθρώπου τῶν πρακτῶν στοχαστικὸς κατὰ τὸν λο-
 30 γισμόν. οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις ΤΩΝ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΜΟΝΟΝ·
 ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν. πρακτικὴ
 γὰρ ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ
 ἔνιοι, οὐκ εἰδότες, ἕτερον εἰδότες πρακτικώτεροι· καὶ,
 ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἱ ἔμπειροι. εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη, ὅτι τὰ

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κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ· οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν. ἀλλ' ὁ εἰδώς, ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινά· ποιήσει μᾶλλον. ἢ δὲ φρόνησις, πρακτική. ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον. εἴη δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀρχιτεκτονική. ⁵

CHAP. VII.

IN WHICH VARIOUS OTHER INTELLECTUAL HABITS AND FACULTIES ARE DESCRIBED AND DEFINED, AND COMPARED WITH THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE OF WISDOM.

PART I.

ON POLITICAL WISDOM.

I. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ, καὶ ἡ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ, ἢ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι^a, οὐ ταῦτὸν αὐταῖς. τῆς δὲ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΙΝ, ἢ μὲν, ὡς ἀρχιτεκτονική φρόνησις, ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΗ· ἢ δὲ, ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τὸ κοινὸν ἔχει ὄνομα, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ. αὕτη δὲ, ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ καὶ 10 ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΗ. τὸ γὰρ ΨΗΦΙΣΜΑ πρακτὸν, ὡς τὸ ἔσχατον. διὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τούτους μόνους λέγουσιν. μόνου γὰρ πράττουσιν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ οἱ χειροτέχναι. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ φρόνησις μάλιστα εἶναι, ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ ΚΑΙ ἕνα. καὶ ἔχει αὕτη τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα, ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ. 15 ἐπεινῶν δὲ, ἢ μὲν ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΑ, ἢ δὲ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΣΙΑ, ἢ δὲ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ. καὶ ταύτης, ἢ μὲν ΒΟΥΛΕΥΤΙΚΗ, ἢ δὲ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΙΚΗ.

9 II. Εἶδος μὲν οὖν τι ἂν εἴη γνώσεως, τὸ αὐτῶν εἶδέναι. ἀλλ' ἔχει διαφορὰν πολλήν. καὶ δοκεῖ ὁ τὰ 20 περὶ αὐτὸν εἶδως καὶ διατρέβων, ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΣ εἶναι· οἱ δὲ πολιτικοί, πολυπράγμονες. διὸ Εὐριπίδης·

Πῶς δ' ἂν φρονοῖν, ᾧ παρῆν ἀπραγμόνως,
 Ἐν τοῖσι πολλοῖς ἠριθμημένῳ στρατοῦ,
 Ἴσον μετασχεῖν; *ὑποφωτιστικῆ τῆς*
 Τρὸς γὰρ περισσοῦς καὶ τι πράσσοντας πλέον. .
ἴσου μισοῦ

5 Ζητοῦσι γὰρ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθόν, καὶ οἴονται τοῦτο
 δεῖν πράττειν. ἐκ ταύτης οὖν τῆς δόξης ἐλήλυθε, τὸ
 τούτους φρονίμους εἶναι. καίτοι ἴσως, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
 αὐτοῦ εὔ, ἄνευ οἰκονομίας, οὐδ' ἄνευ πολιτείας.

III. Ἐτι δὲ, τὰ αὐτοῦ πᾶς δεῖ διοικεῖν ἄδηλον
 10 καὶ σκεπτόν. σημεῖον δ' ἔστι τοῦ εἰρημένου, καὶ
 διότι γεωμετρικοί μὲν νέοι, καὶ μαθηματικοὶ γίνον-
 ται, καὶ σοφοὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. φρόνιμος δ' οὐ δοκεῖ
 γίνεσθαι. αἴτιον δ', ὅτι τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν ἡ
 φρόνησις· ἃ γίνεται γνώριμα *EX EMPIRIAS*, νέοι δ'
 15 ἔμπειρος οὐκ ἔστιν. πλῆθος γὰρ χρόνου ποιεῖ τὴν
 ἔμπειρίαν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἂν τις σκέψαιτο· διὰ τί
 δὴ μαθηματικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν, σοφὸς δ' ἢ
 φυσικὸς οὐ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν, δι' ἀφαιρέσεώς ἐστιν· τῶν *φανερῶν*
 δ' αἱ ἀρχαί, ἐξ ἔμπειρίας· καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ πιστεύου-
 20 σιν οἱ νέοι, ἀλλὰ λέγουσιν· τῶν δὲ, τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ
 ἄδηλον. ἔτι, ἡ ἀμαρτία, ἢ περὶ τὸ καθόλου, ἐν
 τῷ βουλευέσασθαι, ἢ περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ἢ γὰρ,
 ὅτι πάντα τὰ βαρύσταθμα ὕδατα φαῦλα· ἢ, ὅτι τοδὶ
 βαρύσταθμον. ὅτι δ' ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ *ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ*,
 25 φανερόν. τοῦ γὰρ *ΕΣΧΑΤΟΥ* ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τὸ
 γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ *ΝΦ*.
 ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς, *ΤΩΝ ὈΡΩΝ*, ὧΝ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΛΟΓΟΣ· ἢ
 δὲ, *ΕΣΧΑΤΟΥ*, ΟΥ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ, ἀλλ' αἰσθη-
 σις· οὐχ ἢ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ' οἷα αἰσθανόμεθα (ὅτι τὸ
 30 ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον) τρίγωνον. στήσεται
 γὰρ κακεῖ. ἀλλ' αὕτη μᾶλλον *ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ*, ἢ φρόνησις·
 ἐκείνης δ' ἄλλο εἶδος.

PART II.

ON GOOD DELIBERATION.

10 IV. Τὸ ΖΗΤΕΙΝ δὲ, καὶ τὸ ΒΟΥΛΕΥΕΣΘΑΙ, διαφέρει. τὸ γὰρ βουλευέσθαι, ΖΗΤΕΙΝ ΤΙ ἔστιν. δεῖ δὲ λαβεῖν καὶ περὶ ΕΥΒΟΥΛΙΑΣ, τί ἔστι· πότερον ἐπιστήμη τις, ἢ δόξα, ἢ εὐστοχία, ἢ ἄλλο τι γένος.

See p. 80.
line 25.

V. ἘΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐ γὰρ ζητοῦσι 5 περὶ ἃν ἴσασιν· ἢ δ' εὐβουλία, βουλή τις, ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος, ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ΕΥΣΤΟΧΙΑ. ἄνευ τε γὰρ λόγου, καὶ ταχύ τι, ἢ εὐστοχία· βουλεύονται δὲ πολὺν χρόνον· καὶ φασὶ, πρᾶττειν μὲν δεῖν ταχύ τὰ βουλευθέντα, βουλεύε- 10 σθαι δὲ βραδέως. ἔτι, ἢ ΑΓΧΙΝΟΙΑ ἔτερον καὶ ἢ εὐβουλία. ἔστι δ' εὐστοχία τις ἢ ἀγχίνοια. οὐδὲ δὴ ΔΟΞΑ ἢ εὐβουλία οὐδεμία.

VI. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ μὲν κακῶς βουλευόμενος, ἀμαρτάνει, ὃ δ' εὖ, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται· δῆλον, ὅτι ΟΡΘΟΤΗΣ 15 τις ἢ εὐβουλία ἔστιν.

See B. III.
c. ii. §. v.
and vi.

Οὗτ' ἐπιστήμης δὲ, οὔτε δόξης. ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ μὲν γὰρ, ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ὀρθότης. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἈΜΑΡΤΙΑ. ΔΟΞΗΣ δ' ὀρθότης, ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἄρισται ἦδη πᾶν, οὗ δόξα ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ λόγου ἢ εὐβου- 20 λία. ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΣ ἄρα λείπεται. αὕτη γὰρ οὕτω φάσις. (καὶ γὰρ ἢ δόξα οὐ ζήτησις, ἀλλὰ φάσις τις ἦδη.) ὃ δὲ βουλευόμενος, εἴαν τε εὖ, εἴαν τε κακῶς βουλεύεται· ζητεῖ τι καὶ λογίζεται.

Ἄλλ' ΟΡΘΟΤΗΣ τίς ἔστιν ἢ εὐβουλία ΒΟΥΛΗΣ. διὸ 25 ἢ βουλή ζητητέα πρῶτον, τί καὶ περὶ τί.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἢ ὀρθότης πλεοναχῶς· δῆλον, ὅτι οὐ πᾶσα. ὃ γὰρ ἀκρατὴς καὶ ὃ φαῦλος, ὃ προτίθεται [ιδεῖν], ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ τεύξεται, ὥστε

ὀρθῶς ἔσται βεβουλευμένος, κακὸν δὲ μέγα εἰληφώς·
 δοκεῖ δ' ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι, τὸ εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι. ἡ γὰρ
 τοιαύτη ὀρθότης βουλῆς εὐβουλία, ἡ ἀγαθοῦ τευ- οὐ δὲ
 κτική. ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῶ
 5 τυχεῖν· καὶ ὁ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι, τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὐ·
 ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὄρον εἶναι. ὥστ' οὐδ' αὐτῆ πω
 εὐβουλία, καθ' ἣν οὗ δεῖ μὲν τυγχάνει, οὐ μέντοι δι'
 οὗ ἔδει. ἔτι, ἔστι πολὺν χρόνον βουλευόμενον ὄρε
 τυχεῖν· τὸν δὲ, ταχύ. οὐκοῦν οὐδ' ἐκείνη πω εὐ-
 10 βουλία· ἀλλ' ὀρθότης ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ
 δεῖ, καὶ ὡς, καὶ ὅτε. ἔτι, ἔστι καὶ ἈΠΛΩΣ εὖ βεβου-
 λεῦσθαι, καὶ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ. ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀπλῶς, ἡ
 πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἀπλῶς κατορθοῦσα· ἡ δὲ τις, ἡ πρὸς υποθέσει
 τι τέλος
 15 Εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλευῆσθαι, ἡ εὐ-
 βουλία εἴη ἂν, ΟΡΘΟΤΗΣ ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ
 ΠΡΟΣ ΤΙ ΤΕΛΟΣ, ὅΥ ἢ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ ΑΛΗΘΗΣ, ὅΥΠΟΔΗΨΙΣ
 ΕΣΤΙΝ.

PART III.

ON INTELLIGENCE.

VII. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ΣΥΝΕΣΙΣ καὶ ἡ ἀσυνεσία, 11
 20 (καθ' ἃς λέγομεν συνετοὺς καὶ ἀσυνέτους,) οὐθ' ὅλας
 τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπιστήμη ἢ δόξη· (πάντες γὰρ ἂν ἦσαν
 συνετοί·) οὔτε τις μία τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπιστημῶν,
 οἷον, ἰατρικὴ περὶ ὑγιεινῶν, ἢ γεωμετρία περὶ μεγέ-
 θους. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων καὶ ἀκινήτων ἢ
 25 σύνεσις ἔστιν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν γιγνομένων ὅτουοῦν· ἀλλὰ
 περὶ ὧν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις καὶ βουλευσαίτο. εἰς

VIII. Διὸ, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ μὲν τῇ φρονήσει ἔστιν,
 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ΤΑΥΤΟΝ σύνεσις καὶ φρόνησις. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
 φρόνησις ΕΠΙΤΑΚΤΙΚΗ ἔστιν· τί γὰρ δεῖ πράττειν ἢ

μὴ, τὸ τέλος αὐτῆς ἐστίν· ἢ δὲ σύνεσις, ΚΡΙΤΙΚΗ ΜΟΝΟΝ. (ταυτόν γὰρ σύνεσις, καὶ εὐσυνεσία· καὶ συνετοί, καὶ εὐσύνετοι.)

IX. Ἔστι δ' οὔτε τὸ ἔχειν τὴν φρόνησιν, οὔτε τὸ λαμβάνειν, ἢ σύνεσις. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ μαθάνειν λέγεται ξυνιέναι, ὅταν χρῆται τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ· οὕτως
 EN TΩ ΧΡΗΣΘΑΙ Τῆ ΔΟΞῆ ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ, ΠΕΡΙ ὼΝ Ἡ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ΑΛΛΟΥ ΛΕΓΟΝΤΟΣ, ΚΑΙ ΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ ΚΑΛΩΣ· (τὸ γὰρ εὔ τῷ καλῶς ταυτόν). καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐλήλυθε τούνομα ἢ 10 σύνεσις, καθ' ἣν εὐσύνετοι, ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ μαθάνειν. λέγομεν γὰρ τὸ μαθάνειν ΣΥΝΙΕΝΑΙ πολλαίαις.

PART IV.

ON THE MENTAL VIRTUE EXERCISED IN EQUITABLE DECISION.

X. Ἡ δὲ καλουμένη ΓΝΩΜΗ, (καθ' ἣν εὐγνώμονας, καὶ ἔχειν φαμέν γνώμην,) Ἡ ΤΟΥ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΟΥΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΟΡΘΗ. σημεῖον δέ· τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ μάλιστα 15 φαμέν εἶναι συγγνωμονικόν· καὶ ἐπιεικῆς, τὸ ἔχειν περὶ εἴια συγγνώμην. ἢ δὲ συγγνώμη, γνώμη ἐστὶ κριτικὴ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς ὀρθή· ὀρθή δ', ἢ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. *intellect*

PART V.

ON THE CONCURRENT TENDENCY OF THE VIRTUE OF EQUITABLE DECISION, OF INTELLIGENCE, OF WISDOM, AND OF INTELLECT.

12 XI. Εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι αἱ ἕξεις εὐλόγως εἰς ταῦτο τείνουσαι. λέγομεν γὰρ γνώμην, καὶ σύνεσιν, καὶ 20 φρόνησιν, καὶ νοῦν· ἐπὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπιφέροντες γνώ-

μη ἔχειν, καὶ νοῦν ἤδη, καὶ φρονίμους, καὶ συνετούς.
 πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐταὶ τῶν ΕΣΧΑΤΩΝ εἰσὶ καὶ
 τῶν ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ. καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ κριτικὸς εἶναι περὶ
 ὧν ὁ φρόνιμος· συνετός, καὶ εὐγνώμων ἢ συγγνώμων.

5 τὰ γὰρ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΗ, κοινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἐν
 τῷ πρὸς ἄλλον. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῶν
 ἐσχάτων, πάντα τὰ πρακτά. καὶ γὰρ τὸν φρόνιμον
 δεῖ γινώσκειν αὐτά. καὶ ἡ σύνεσις καὶ ἡ γνώμη, περὶ
 τὰ πρακτά. ταῦτα δ' ἐσχατα.

10 XII. Καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα.
 καὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων ὄρων, καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων, νοῦς ἐστὶ,
 καὶ οὐ λόγος· καὶ ὁ μὲν, κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις, τῶν
 ἀκινήτων ὄρων καὶ πρώτων· ὁ δ', ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς,
 τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἐτέρας προ-
 15 τάσεως. ἀρχαὶ γὰρ τοῦ οὐ ἔνεκα αὐταί. ἐκ τῶν καθ'
 ἕκαστα γὰρ τὸ καθόλου. τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἰ-
 σθησιν. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ νοῦς.

XIII. Διὸ καὶ ΦΥΣΙΚΑ δοκεῖ εἶναι ταῦτα· καὶ
 φύσει, σοφὸς μὲν οὐδεὶς· γνώμην δ' ἔχειν, καὶ σύν-
 20 εσιν, καὶ νοῦν. σημεῖον δ', ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις
 οἴομεθα ἀκολουθεῖν· καὶ ἦδε ἡ ἡλικία νοῦν ἔχει καὶ
 γνώμην, ὡς τῆς φύσεως αἰτίας οὔσης. διὸ καὶ
 ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος νοῦς. ἐκ τούτων γὰρ αἱ ἀποδείξεις,
 καὶ περὶ τούτων.

25 XIV. Ὡστε δεῖ προσέχειν τῶν ἐμπείρων καὶ πρεσ-
 βυτέρων ἢ φρονίμων ταῖς ἀναποδεικτοῖς φάσει
 καὶ δοξαίσις, οὐχ ἥττον τῶν ἀποδείξεων. διὰ γὰρ
 τὸ ἔχειν ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὄμμα, ὁρᾶσιν ὁρθῶς.

Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις, καὶ ἡ σοφία· καὶ
 30 περὶ τίνα ἑκατέρω τυγχάνει οὔσα· καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοῦ
 τῆς ψυχῆς μορίου ἀρετὴ ἑκατέρω εἴρηται.

See chap. i.
 §. ii. of this
 book.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHICH IS VINDICATED THE INSEPARABLE CONNECTION OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE WITH MORAL VIRTUE AND HUMAN HAPPINESS.

PART I.

A STATEMENT OF DIFFICULTIES RELATING TO CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

13 I. Διαπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῶν, ΤΙ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΙ ΕΙΣΙΝ.

II. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ΣΟΦΙΑ οὐδὲν θεωρεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος. οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ ἐστὶ ΓΕΝΕΣΕΩΣ.

III. Ἡ δὲ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΣ τοῦτο μὲν ἔχει. ἀλλὰ τίνος ἔνεκα δεῖ αὐτῆς; εἴπερ ἢ μὲν Φρόνησις ἐστὶν, ἢ περὶ τὰ δίκαια, καὶ καλὰ, καὶ ἀγαθὰ, ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν, ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ. οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτερο τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ ἔσμεν· εἴπερ ἔΞΕΙΣ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν. (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ, οὐδὲ τὰ 10 εὐεκτικά· ὅσα μὴ τῷ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως, εἶναι λέγεται. οὐθὲν γὰρ πρακτικώτεροι, τῷ ΕΧΕΙΝ τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἔσμεν.) εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων χάριν φρόνιμον θετέον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ τοῖς ΟΥΣΙ σπουδαίοις οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη χρήσιμος. 15

Ἔτι δ', οὐδὲ τοῖς ΜΗ ΕΧΟΥΣΙΝ. οὐθὲν γὰρ διοίσει ΑΥΤΟΥΣ ΕΧΕΙΝ, ἢ ΑΛΛΟΙΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΙ ΠΕΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ· ἰκανῶς τ' ἔχοι ἂν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν· βουλόμενοι γὰρ ὑγιαίνειν, ὅμως οὐ μανθάνομεν ἰατρικὴν.

IV. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ΑΤΟΠΟΝ ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν, εἰ, 20 χείρων τῆς σοφίας οὕσα, κυριωτέρα αὐτῆς ἔσται. ἢ γὰρ ΠΟΙΟΥΣΑ, ἀρχεὶ καὶ ἐπιτάττει περὶ ἕκαστον.

Περὶ δὴ τούτων λεκτέον. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἠπόρηται περὶ αὐτῶν μόνον.

PART II.

A SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTIES.

V. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν, ὅτι ΚΑΘ' ἄΤΤΑΣ ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετάς αὐτάς εἶναι, ἀρετάς γ' οὕσας ἑκατέραν ἑΚΑΤΕΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΜΟΡΙΟΥ· καὶ εἰ μὴ ΠΟΙΟΥΣΙ See p. 182, l. 6.
μηδὲν μηδετέρα αὐτῶν.

5 VI. Ἐπειτα, καὶ ΠΟΙΟΥΣΙ μὲν· οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν· ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία, εὐδαιμονίαν. μέρος γὰρ οὕσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς, τῷ ΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ποιεῖ, καὶ τῷ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ, εὐδαίμονα.

VII. Ἐτι, ΤΟ ΕΡΓΟΝ ^a ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν ^a See B. I. chap. iii.
10 Φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ, §. v.
ΤΟΝ ΣΚΟΠΟΝ ποιεῖ ὀρθόν· ἡ δὲ Φρόνησις, ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΤΟΝ. (τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τοιαύτη, τοῦ ΘΡΗΣΠΤΙΚΟΥ. οὐθέν γὰρ ἐπ' See B. I. chap. v. § iv.
αὐτῷ πράττειν, ἢ μὴ πράττειν.)

15 VIII. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ΜΘΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΥΣ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΝ τῶν καλῶν καὶ δικαίων· μικρὸν ἀνῶθεν ἀρετέον, λαβόντας ἀρχὴν ταύτην.

Ἵσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὰ δίκαια λέγομεν πράττοντάς τινας, οὕτω δίκαιους εἶναι· (οἶον, τοὺς τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων τεταγμένα ποιῶντας ἢ ἄκοντας, ἢ δι' ἄγνοίαν, ἢ δι' ἕτερόν τι καὶ μὴ δι' αὐτά· καίτοι πράττουσί γε ἅ δει, καὶ ὅσα χρὴ τὸν σπουδαῖον·) οὕτως, ὡς εἰπεν, ἔστι τὸ ΠΩΣ ΕΧΟΝΤΑ πράττειν ἕκαστα ὥστ' εἶναι ἀγαθόν. λέγω δ', οἶον, διὰ προαίρεσιν, καὶ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα
25 τῶν πραττομένων. τὴν μὲν οὖν ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ ὀρθὴν ποιεῖ ἡ ἀρετὴ· τὸ δ' ὅσα ΕΚΕΙΝΗΣ ἕΝΕΚΑ πέφυκε πράττεσθαι, οὐκ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας δυνάμεως.

Λεκτέον δ' ἐπιστήσασι σαφέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ τις δυνάμις, ἣν καλοῦσι ΔΕΙΝΟΤΗΤΑ. αὕτη δ'

βαινε κρη

ἔστι τοιαύτη, ὥστε τὰ πρὸς τὸν ὑποτεθέντα σκοπὸν συντείνοντα, δύνασθαι ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ τυγχάνειν αὐτῶν. ἂν μὲν οὖν ὁ σκοπὸς ἢ καλὸς, ἐπαινετὴ ἔστι· ἂν δὲ φαῦλος, πανουργία. (διὸ καὶ τοὺς Φρονίμους, δεινούς καὶ πανούργους φαμέν εἶναι.) 5

"Ἔστι δ' ἡ Φρόνησις, οὐχ ἡ δεινότης· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἢ δ' ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀνευ ἀρετῆς· ὡς εἴρηται τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον. οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν, ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν. ἐπειδὴ τοιονδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ 10 ἀριστον, ὅτιδήποτε ὄν· (ἔστω γὰρ, λόγου χάριν, τὸ τυχόν·) τοῦτο δ', εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται. ΔΙΑΣΤΡΕΦΕΙ ΓΑΡ Ἡ ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑ, ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΦΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ ΠΟΙΕΙ, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΣ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ. ὥστε φανερόν, ὅτι ΑΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΜΗ ΟΝΤΑ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. 15

ἀρετῆς· καὶ
γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ
παρα-
πλησίως
ἔχει ὡς.

IX. Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. παραπλησίως γὰρ, ὡς ἡ Φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα, (οὐ ταύτῳ μὲν, ὁμοιον δὲ,) οὕτω καὶ ἡ ΦΥΣΙΚΗ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν ΚΥΡΙΑΝ.

Πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ, ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύ- 20 σει πως. καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι, καὶ σωφρονικοί, καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν, εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι, τὸ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ, καὶ θηρίοις, αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις· ἀλλ' ἀνευ 25 νοῦ, βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον εἰκεν ὀρεῖσθαι· ὅτι, ὥσπερ σάματι ἰσχυρῷ ἀνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ, συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν· οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα. ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει. ἢ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὔσα, τότε 30 ἔσται ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΑΡΕΤΗ.

See chap. i.
§. ii. of this
book, in the
Summary.

"Ὡστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ΔΟΞΑΣΤΙΚΟΥ, δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ Φρόνησις· οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ΗΘΙΚΟΥ,

δύο ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ ΦΥΣΙΚΗ, τὸ δ' ἡ ΚΥΡΙΑ· καὶ τούτων, ἡ ΚΥΡΙΑ ΟΥ ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΑΝΕΥ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ.

Διόπερ τινὲς Φασι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΙΣ εἶναι. καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει, τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ Φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ Φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν.

Σημεῖον δέ. καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζονται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασι, “ ΤΗΝ ἔΞΙΝ (εἰπόντες καὶ 10 πρὸς ἅ ἐστι) ΤΗΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΟΡΘΟΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ.” ὀρθὸς δ', “ Ὁ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΝ.” εἰκόασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες, ὅτι ἡ ΤΟΙΑΥΤΗ ἔΞΙΣ ΑΡΕΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἡ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΙΝ.

Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ ΚΑΤΑ 15 τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ ΜΕΤΑ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἔξις, ἀρετὴ ἐστίν. ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἡ Φρόνησις ἐστίν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν ΛΟΓΟΥΣ τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι· (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας) ἡμεῖς δὲ, ΜΕΤΑ ΛΟΓΟΥ. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, 20 ὅτι ΟΥΧ ὍΙΟΝ ΤΕ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ, ΑΝΕΥ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ· ΟΥΔΕ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΝ, ΑΝΕΥ ΤΗΣ ΗΘΙΚΗΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ.

Χ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ταύτη· λυοῖτ' ἂν, ᾧ διαλεχθεῖη τις ἂν, “ ὍΤΙ ΧΩΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ ἌΙ ΑΡΕΤΑΙ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς εὐφύεστατος πρὸς ἀπάσας· ὥστε τὴν 25 μὲν ἤδη, τὴν δ' οὐπω, εἰληφῶς ἔσται.” τοῦτο γὰρ, κατὰ μὲν τὰς ΦΥΣΙΚΑΣ ἀρετὰς, ἐνδέχεται· καθ' ἃς δὲ ἈΠΛΩΣ λέγεται ἀγαθὸς, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ἈΜΑ ΓΑΡ Τῇ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΙ, ΜΙΑ ΟΥΣῆ, ΠΑΣΑΙ ὙΠΑΡΞΟΥΣΙΝ.

ΧΙ. Δῆλον δὲ, ΚΑΝ ΕΙ ΜΗ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗ ΗΝ, ὅτι ἔδει ἂν 30 αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ΜΟΡΙΟΥ ἀρετὴν εἶναι· καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ὀρθή, ἄνευ ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ, οὐδ' ἄνευ See chap. i. §. ii. of this book. ΑΡΕΤΗΣ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ, τὸ τέλος· ἡ δὲ, τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος· ποιεῖ πρᾶττειν.

XII. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, οὐδὲ ΚΥΡΙΑ γ' ἐστὶ τῆς ΣΟΦΙΑΣ,

See chap. i.
§. ii. of this
book.

οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς υἰγείας ἢ
ιατρική. οὐ γὰρ χρῆται αὐτῇ, ἀλλ' ὄρα ὅπως γίνη-
ται. ΕΚΕΙΝΗΣ ΟΥΝ ἘΝΕΚΑ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλ' οὐκ
ΕΚΕΙΝῃ. ἔτι, ὅμοιον καὶ εἴ τις ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΝ Φαίη
ἄρχειν τῶν θεῶν, ὅτι ἐπιτάττει περὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ
πόλει.


See B. I.
chap. i.
§. vii, viii.

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BOOK VII.

SUMMARY OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.



CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES AN EXAMINATION OF CONTINENCE
AND INCONTINENCE.

This chapter consists of three parts: the first of which opens the subject; the second sets forth the leading opinions respecting it; and the third, the most remarkable difficulties and questions relating to it.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The treatise, taking here a new beginning, presents to our notice AN ARRANGEMENT OF MORAL EVILS under the three following heads; namely, VICE, INCONTINENCE, and BRUTISHNESS. To these, respectively, are opposed the following; namely, VIRTUE, CONTINENCE, and HEROIC GREATNESS. II. The two opposite dispositions of HEROIC GREATNESS, and of BRUTISHNESS, are both uncommon among men. III. The subject and method of the ensuing enquiry are distinctly unfolded.

PART THE SECOND.

IV. A statement of various leading OPINIONS relating to the subject.

PART THE THIRD.

V. An account of the most remarkable DIFFICULTIES AND QUESTIONS, which have been started relating to it.

CHAP. II.

ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF INCONTINENCE AND KNOWLEDGE.

I. THREE LEADING QUESTIONS are proposed for examination. The FIRST of these questions is: WHETHER INCONTINENCE IS COMPATIBLE WITH KNOWLEDGE? IF IT IS: WHAT IS THE KIND AND DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE, WITH WHICH INCONTINENCE IS COMPATIBLE?

II. With regard to this question, it makes no difference, whether it is KNOWLEDGE, or FULL CONVICTION OF OPINION, against which the transgression is committed. III. With regard to the same question, it is necessary to DISTINGUISH, between the SIMPLE POSSESSION OF KNOWLEDGE, and the POSSESSION OF IT, COMBINED WITH ITS ACTUAL PRESENCE IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE MIND. It seems perfectly natural to offend against the former: not so, against the latter. IV. It is also necessary to remark, that in all KNOWLEDGE APPLICABLE TO PRACTICE, there are concerned TWO KINDS OF PROPOSITIONS. Of these, one is UNIVERSAL, and embraces a general rule: the other is PARTICULAR, and relates to the present subject and occasion of action. Now if BOTH these propositions be KNOWN in the way of SIMPLE POSSESSION, but ONLY THE UNIVERSAL be known in the way of ACTUAL PRESENCE AND CONTEMPLATION: against SUCH KNOWLEDGE, it is possible for a man to offend. Again: Of the PARTICULAR^a proposition itself, there are two kinds: one of which relates to the AGENT; and the other, to the THING ACTED UPON. Now, if a man should possess both the KNOWLEDGE AND PRESENT CONTEMPLATION of the UNIVERSAL, and also, of THAT PARTICULAR

^a ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΤ. In these words I cannot discover any rational meaning or coherence. Of propositions relating to moral action, it seems plainly the purpose of Aristotle, to distinguish, in this place, two kinds, not of UNIVERSALS, but of PARTICULARS. I have framed my interpretation on the principle of supposing ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΟΣ, or ΚΑΘ' ἘΚΑΣΤΟΝ, in lieu of ΚΑΘΟΛΟΤ, to be the genuine reading: and this, or equivalent to it, I find to have been the reading of the copy used by the Greek interpreter, whose Paraphrase has been ascribed to Andronicus.—The three propositions may be exemplified thus. NO MAN CAN SAFELY EAT POISON: I AM A MAN: THIS IS POISON. The case supposed, is that of a man, to whom all these three propositions are KNOWN: but who, AT THE MOMENT OF ACTION, is FULLY SENSIBLE of the FIRST TWO, but INADVERTENT of the THIRD.

which relates to himself, the AGENT; while he possesses only the SIMPLE KNOWLEDGE, UNATTENDED WITH PRESENT CONTEMPLATION, OF THAT PARTICULAR which relates to the THING ACTED UPON: against this kind of knowledge, it is easy and natural for him to offend. V. It is also useful to distinguish, in another way, between the SIMPLE POSSESSION of knowledge, and the POSSESSION COMBINED WITH USE AND ENJOYMENT. The former is exemplified in the cases of SLEEP and DRUNKENNESS: and it is also the case of the INCONTINENT. VI. Against this position it does not militate, that INCONTINENT men will sometimes discourse well on scientific subjects. The reason of this is stated. VII. Another explanation of the case, is founded on the supposition, that while the UNIVERSAL proposition is ENTERTAINED, it is OBSCURED AND DROWNED BY APPETITE.

VIII. The question then is decided in the NEGATIVE. If by KNOWLEDGE we understand, the FULL USE AND ENJOYMENT, as well as POSSESSION, of what we know: it appears, That INCONTINENCE IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH KNOWLEDGE.

CHAP. III.

ON THE SUBJECTS TO WHICH INCONTINENCE RELATES.

I. The SECOND leading question is proposed: namely, WHAT ARE THE SUBJECTS TO WHICH INCONTINENCE RELATES?

II. Towards a solution of this question, the efficient causes of pleasure are classed under two heads. The first are, THINGS NECESSARY AND CORPOREAL: the second, THINGS NOT NECESSARY BUT DESIRABLE. III. The second of these, ARE NOT, properly speaking, the subjects to which INCONTINENCE relates: and the TERM, INCONTINENCE, when applied to them, is applied only in a RELATIVE AND QUALIFIED SENSE. IV. The first ARE, properly speaking, the subjects to which INCONTINENCE relates: and it is to them only, that the term applies in a PROPER AND ABSOLUTE SENSE: they being the same subjects with those, to which INTEMPERANCE relates. V. INTEMPERANCE and INCONTINENCE are to be DISTINGUISHED thus. THE ACTS OF INTEMPERANCE are AGREEABLE TO THE MORAL DETERMINATION of the agent: THE ACTS OF INCONTINENCE are CONTRARY TO IT.

VI. With regard to lawful appetites, in general, criminality consists, not in mere INDULGENCE, but in EXCESS. VII. And thus also, with regard, in particular, to the SECOND of the above classes: (see

§. ii. of this chapter :) though there is no criminality in the simple GRATIFICATION of our desire, yet the EXCESS, of such desire and gratification is vicious. VIII. Nevertheless, such excess does not constitute INCONTINENCE: which relates to THE SAME SUBJECTS WITH INTEMPERANCE, and to no other. When, therefore, THE TERM, INCONTINENCE, is applied to other subjects, the use of it is not PROPER, but ANALOGOUS AND METAPHORICAL: for which reason, its signification is, in such cases, limited by a RESTRICTIVE FORM OF SPEECH.

IX. With reference to the question which forms the subject of this chapter, the case is considered, of PLEASURES CONTRARY TO NATURE. X. The habits addicted to such pleasures are pronounced to be those of BRUTISHNESS: and the causes are stated, in which they originate. XI. These pleasures are NOT those to which INCONTINENCE relates: nor can the term, INCONTINENCE, unless modified by some limitation, be properly applied to them.

XII. ANGER, being one of the things, to which INCONTINENCE, in the proper sense of the word, does not relate, and to which the term is applied only in a restricted and relative sense: occasion is taken to shew, by four arguments, that INCONTINENCE OF ANGER IS LESS CRIMINAL THAN INCONTINENCE PROPERLY SO CALLED.

XIII. The question then, started at the beginning of the chapter, is decided thus: THE SUBJECTS TO WHICH INCONTINENCE RELATES ARE THE NATURAL LUSTS AND PLEASURES OF THE BODY: these being the very same with those, to which INTEMPERANCE relates.

XIV. Comparative magnitude of the two evils, VICE and BRUTISHNESS.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE MORAL HABIT OF ENDURANCE.

I. The THIRD leading question is taken up: namely, WHETHER CONTINENCE AND ENDURANCE ARE THE SAME? It is pronounced that they are DIFFERENT, inasmuch as the SUBJECTS to which they relate are different: the former being exercised in ABSTINENCE FROM PLEASURE, the latter in THE SUFFERING OF PAIN. II. The nature of these habits is further unfolded, from a combined view of the RELATIONS in which they stand, first, to TEMPERANCE AND THE HABITS CONTRARY TO TEMPERANCE; and secondly, to THE HABITS

CONTRARY TO THEMSELVES. (See Book V. chap. i. §. ii.) III. From this view is COLLATERALLY deduced an inference, that INTEMPERANCE is worse than INCONTINENCE. IV. It is also argued, that CONTINENCE is more meritorious than ENDURANCE. V. The character and criminality of the HABIT OPPOSED TO ENDURANCE.

CHAP. V.

CONTAINING VARIOUS MINOR POSITIONS AND QUESTIONS
RELATING TO CONTINENCE AND INCONTINENCE.

I. INCONTINENCE wears, in some persons, the character of PRECIPITATION; in others, of WEAKNESS: the former being the fault of those who offend THROUGH INCONSIDERATION; the latter, of those who offend AGAINST CONSIDERATION.

II. III. IV. That INTEMPERANCE IS WORSE THAN INCONTINENCE: is an inference COLLATERALLY deduced, in the third section of the last chapter. The same position, (in the way of negative to one of the questions proposed in the first chapter,) is here MORE FULLY maintained on the ground of THREE principal considerations. II. First: Because it is NOT FOLLOWED BY REPENTANCE, and is therefore less CURABLE. III. Secondly: Because intemperance is a VICE; whereas incontinence does not involve the full criminality of vice, nor does THE TERM, VICE, properly apply to it. IV. Thirdly: Because in the state of intemperance, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION IS DEPRAVED: in the state of incontinence, it is SOUND AND UNDEPRAVED, though borne down for a time by the violence of passion.

V. The question is proposed: Continnence maintains its purpose against temptation: but IS IT ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPER NOTION OF CONTINENCE, THAT THE PURPOSE, THUS MAINTAINED, SHOULD BE RIGHT? Or does that notion apply to any purpose whatever, which a man may happen to have formed? VI. The question is answered thus: According to the ABSOLUTE AND PROPER SENSE OF THE WORD, it is essential that the purpose should be RIGHT: in any other case, the term applies only in a QUALIFIED, OR RELATIVE SENSE. VII. Distinction between CONTINENCE, which maintains its purpose against THE PASSIONS, and OBSTINACY, which maintains its purpose against REASON. VIII. A case sometimes arises, in which a man does NOT MAINTAIN his purpose, and yet does NOT INCUR the fault of incontinence.

IX. It is shewn that CONTINENCE IS A MEAN, and the two EXTREMES opposed to it are defined.

X. The terms CONTINENCE and TEMPERANCE, are not equivalent: neither are the terms INCONTINENCE and INTEMPERANCE.

XI. Incontinence is NOT COMPATIBLE WITH WISDOM.

XII. Circumstances which EXTENUATE THE CRIMINALITY of incontinence.

XIII. Both continence and incontinence SURPASS THE GENERAL HABIT of mankind.

XIV. Certain forms of incontinence are MORE CURABLE than others.



CHAP. VI.

ON PLEASURE.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first contains a statement and examination of opinions relating to pleasure. The second examines the quality of pleasure, in relation to the legitimate objects of human pursuit, and especially to the Sovereign Good. The third embraces several detached questions and positions relating to this subject.

PART THE FIRST.

I. Reasons for embracing in the present treatise, an examination of the subject of PLEASURE.

II. On this subject, THREE leading opinions are stated. The first is, THAT NO PLEASURE IS GOOD. The second is, THAT SOME PLEASURES ARE GOOD, BUT THAT THE GREATER NUMBER OF THEM ARE EVIL. The third is, THAT THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS NOT A PLEASURE. III. Relating to these opinions, EIGHT several arguments are advanced.

IV. It is asserted, that none of the foregoing arguments will warrant an inference, either THAT PLEASURE IS NOT A GOOD, OR THAT THE SOVEREIGN GOOD IS NOT A FORM OF PLEASURE.

V. VI. VII. The FIRST of the foregoing arguments seems to be framed upon a current DEFINITION, taken from the school of Plato. By this definition, if it be allowable to convey its meaning with some enlargement of expression, the nature of pleasure is thus set

forth: A SENSIBLE AND GENERATIVE MOTION^b TOWARDS AN END PURSUED BY NATURE: ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ ΕΙΣ ΦΥΣΙΝ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΗ. Now it is maintained to be an essential character of GOOD, that it is not the attribute of any MOTION OR PROGRESSION TOWARDS AN END, but only of things which are in themselves ENDS; that is, ends or objects of human conduct. V. But in opposition to this it is shewn, that though it were admitted that pleasure is a MOTION TOWARDS AN END, it does NOT THEREFORE FOLLOW, that it is NOT GOOD: VI. VII. And that it is not EVERY pleasure which consists in a motion towards satisfying a want, but that some pleasures belong to the SATISFIED, as distinguished from the CRAVING, state of nature.

VIII. From the FIRST and the EIGHTH of the foregoing arguments, it would appear, that the SOVEREIGN good is not pleasure, because the END IS BETTER than the MOTION TOWARDS THE END: whereas it is essential to the notion of the SOVEREIGN GOOD, that NOTHING SHOULD SURPASS IT IN GOODNESS. But in opposition to this it is maintained, that all pleasures are not motions GENERATIVE of an end, some of them HAVING IN THEMSELVES THE NATURE OF AN END, and being properly of that class of OPERATIONS OR ENERGIES, of which the good is INTRINSIC AND NOT ULTERIOR TO THEMSELVES. IX. Objection to that definition of pleasure, which is contained in the FIRST of the foregoing arguments. The following is substituted in the place of it: AN UNIMPEDED ENERGY OR EXERCISE OF A HABIT WHICH IS ACCORDING TO NATURE: ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ ΤΗΣ ΚΑΤΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ 'ΕΞΕΛΩΣ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΣ.

^b Of MOTION, according to Aristotle's philosophy, there are SIX kinds: ONE of which is ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ OF GENERATION. See the chapter of the Categories, entitled, ΠΕΡΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ Aristotle denies that pleasure is either a GENERATION, or ANY OTHER KIND OF MOTION; and asserts that it is more connected with ΗΠΕΜΙΑ, the state opposed to motion, than with motion itself. See the last section of this chapter, and the earlier part of the tenth book. The term here employed may possibly serve at once, to further an insight into the meaning of his philosophical language, and to dispense with what would have been incurred by a literal version, but which it is always extremely desirable to avoid: a harsh and unusual form of expression. The difficulties contained in the present chapter, and in the early part of the tenth book, may be in a great degree solved, by reading the chapter of the Categories which is above referred to.—It may be useful to add, towards explaining the proper force of the word SENSIBLE, as it occurs in this definition; that it serves the purpose of distinction from certain processes of nature which are UNACCOMPANIED WITH SENSATION, but to which the definition would otherwise apply: such, for example, as the germination of seeds and the growth of plants.

X. Reply to the SEVENTH of the foregoing arguments : which infers, that pleasure is not a good, because some pleasures are NOXIOUS TO HEALTH.

XI. Reply to the FOURTH of the foregoing arguments: which infers, that pleasure is not a good, because it IMPEDES THE INTELLECTUAL EXERCISE.

XII. Reply to the FIFTH of the foregoing arguments: which urges, that pleasure is not a good, because it is NOT THE PRODUCTION OF ANY ART.

XIII. Reply to the SECOND and THIRD of the foregoing arguments : in which it is urged, that pleasure is not a good, because it is TRANQUILLITY, OR EXEMPTION FROM PAIN, and NOT PLEASURE, which is pursued by WISE AND TEMPERATE MEN: And to the SIXTH: in which it is urged, that pleasure is THE OBJECT OF PURSUIT WITH CHILDREN AND BRUTES.

PART THE SECOND.

XIV. It is proved that PLEASURE IS A GOOD. XV. It is proved that THE SOVEREIGN GOOD, is one of those things to which the name of PLEASURE properly applies. XVI. It appears as an inference from the last consideration, that PROSPERITY IS A NECESSARY APPENDAGE TO HAPPINESS. XVII. Nevertheless, it is NOT TO BE IDENTIFIED with happiness. XVIII. A further evidence of the position contained in the fifteenth section. XIX. An explanation of the circumstance, that the term PLEASURE has been peculiarly and improperly applied to the PLEASURES OF THE BODY. XX. A further evidence of the position contained in the fourteenth section.

PART THE THIRD.

XXI. The question is proposed: ARE ALL BODILY PLEASURES ESSENTIALLY EVIL. XXII.—XXV. It is decided in the NEGATIVE. XXII. This inference is grounded on the nature of that which is CONTRARY to them, namely, PAIN, which is allowed to be EVIL. XXIII. The MEASURE and the SENSE, in which bodily pleasures may be pronounced GOOD. XXIV. The CRITERION of their quality rests on the following principle. Of habits and actions, (such as those of virtue,) INCAPABLE OF VICIOUS EXCESS, the appropriate PLEASURES are so likewise: but the CONTRARY is the case with those habits and actions, which are CAPABLE OF SUCH EXCESS. Now of this latter kind are BODILY INDULGENCES: and it is WHEN THEY INCUR THIS EXCESS, AND THEN ONLY, that the PLEASURE resulting from them is EVIL. XXV. It will not avail, to infer, (on the principle alleged in the twenty-second section,) THAT PAIN IS NOT AN EVIL, because it is

the CONTRARY of vicious pleasures : for the PROPER AND ESSENTIAL CONTRARIETY of pain, is, not to PLEASURE IN EXCESS, but to PLEASURE SIMPLY CONSIDERED.

XXVI. The question is proposed: WHY ARE THE PLEASURES OF THE BODY UNDULY PREFERRED? XXVII. First, because they EXPEL PAIN. XXVIII. Secondly, because they are peculiarly attractive to PERSONS INCAPABLE OF ENJOYING OTHER PLEASURES. XXIX. Thirdly, because a propension towards it is formed by the unavoidable HABIT OF YOUTH. XXX. Fourthly, because MELANCHOLY is always inclined to fly to bodily pleasure, for a power REMEDIAL TO GRIEF.

XXXI. The difference between NATURAL and ACCIDENTAL pleasures.

XXXII. The reason why the same thing does NOT ALWAYS RETAIN its power of giving pleasure.

CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES AN EXAMINATION OF CONTINENCE
AND INCONTINENCE.



PART I.

THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY IS STATED.

I. ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησα-
μένους ἀρχὴν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἦθη Φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν
εἶδη· ΚΑΚΙΑ, ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ, ΘΗΡΙΟΤΗΣ. τὰ δ' ἐναντία,
τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ, δῆλα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΑΡΕΤΗΝ, τὸ δ'
5 ΕΥΚΡΑΤΕΙΑΝ, καλοῦμεν. πρὸς δὲ τὴν θηριότητα, μά-
λιστ' ἂν ἀρμόττοι λέγειν, ΤΗΝ ὙΠΕΡ ἩΜΑΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΝ,
ἩΡΩΙΚΗΝ ΤΙΝΑ ΚΑΙ ΘΕΙΑΝ. ὥσπερ Ὁμηρος περὶ
Ἐκτορος πεποιήκε λέγοντα τὸν Πρίαμον, ὅτι σφόδρα
ἦν ἀγαθός,

10

οὐδὲ ἐφίκει

Ἄνδρός γε θνητοῦ πάϊς ἔμμεναι, ἀλλὰ θεοῖο.

ὥστ' εἰ, καθάπερ φασὶν, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γίνονται θεοὶ
δι' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολὴν τοιαύτην τις ἂν εἶη δῆλον ὅτι
ἢ τῇ θηριώδει ἀντιτιθεμένη ἕξις. καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
15 θηρίου ἐστὶ κακία, οὐδ' ἀρετή· οὕτως οὐδὲ θεοῦ.
ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν, τιμιώτερον ἀρετῆς· ἢ δ', ἕτερόν τι γένος
κακίας.

II. Ἐπεὶ δὲ σπάνιον τὸ θεῖον ἄνδρα εἶναι· (καθ-
ἀπερ οἱ Λάκωνες εἰώθασιν προσαγορεύειν· ὅταν ἀγα-
20 σπάνιον καὶ τὸ.
σθῶσιν σφόδρα τοῦ, “σεῖος ἀνὴρ” φασιν) οὕτω καὶ

ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος. μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστίν. γίνεται δ' ἔνια, καὶ διὰ νόσους καὶ πηρώσεις. καὶ τοὺς διὰ κακίαν δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπερβάλλοντας, οὕτως ἐπιδυσφημοῦμεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης διαθέσεως, ὕστερον ποιή- 5
 ἢ τέον τινὰ μνεῖαν· περὶ δὲ κακίας εἴρηται πρότερον.

III. Περὶ δὲ ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑΣ, καὶ ΜΑΛΑΚΙΑΣ, καὶ ΤΡΥΦΗΣ λεκτέον, καὶ περὶ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΕΙΑΣ καὶ ΚΑΡΤΕΡΙΑΣ. οὔτε γὰρ ὡς περὶ τῶν ΑΥΤΩΝ ἔξεων τῆ ἀρετῆ καὶ τῆ μοχθηρία, ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν ὑποληπτέον, οὔθ' ὡς 10
 ἕτερον γένος.

Δεῖ δ', (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,) τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα, καὶ πρῶτον διαφορήσαντας· οὕτω δεικνύναι, μάλιστα μὲν, ΠΑΝΤΑ τὰ ἔνδοξα περὶ ταῦτα τὰ πάθη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὰ ΠΛΕΙΣΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΚΥΡΙΩΤΑΤΑ. εἰ γὰρ 15
 λύηται τὰ δυσχερῆ, καὶ καταλείπηται τὰ ἔνδοξα· δεδειγμένον ἂν εἴη ἰκανῶς.

λύηται τι
 τὰ.

PART II.

THE LEADING OPINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DELIVERED
 RESPECTING IT.

2 IV. 1. ΔΟΚΕΙ δὴ, ἢ τε ἐγκράτεια καὶ καρτερία,

καὶ τῶν ἐπ'
 φαύλων τε
 καί.

τῶν ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΑΙΝΕΤΩΝ εἶναι· ἢ δ' ἀκρασία
 τε, καὶ μαλακία, τῶν ΦΑΥΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΚΤΩΝ.

20

2. Καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἐγκρατῆς, καὶ ΕΜΜΕΝΕΤΙΚΟΣ Τῷ
 ΛΟΓΙΣΜῷ· καὶ ἀκρατῆς, καὶ ΕΚΣΤΑΤΙΚΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΛΟ-
 ΓΙΣΜΟΥ.

3. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀκρατῆς, ΕΙΔΩΣ ὅτι φαῦλα, πράτ-
 τει ΔΙΑ ΠΑΘΟΣ· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῆς, ΕΙΔΩΣ ὅτι φαῦλαι 25
 αἰ ἐπιθυμίαι, οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΛΟΓΟΝ.

4. Καὶ τὸν ΣΩΦΡΟΝΑ μὲν, ἐγκρατῆ καὶ καρτερι-
 κόν· τὸν δὲ τοιοῦτον, οἱ μὲν πάντα σώφρονα, οἱ δ'
 οὔ. καὶ τὸν ΑΚΟΛΑΣΤΟΝ, ἀκρατῆ καὶ τὸν ἀκρατῆ,

* ἀκόλαστον, ΣΥΓΚΕΧΥΜΕΝΩΣ· οἱ δ' ἑτεροῦς εἶναι φασιν.

5. Τὸν δὲ ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΝ, ὅτε μὲν οὐ φασιν ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι ἀκρατῆ· ὅτε δ', ἐνίους Φρονίμους ὄντας
5 καὶ ΔΕΙΝΟΥΣ, ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι.

6. Ἔτι, ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται, καὶ ΘΥΜΟΥ, καὶ ΤΙΜΗΣ, καὶ ΚΕΡΔΟΥΣ.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

PART III.

THE MOST REMARKABLE DIFFICULTIES AND QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN STARTED RELATING TO IT.

V. 1. ΑΠΟΡΗΣΕΙΕ δ' ἂν τις· πῶς, ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑ-3
10 ΝΩΝ ΟΡΘΩΣ, ἀκρατεύεταιί τις; ΕΠΙΣΤΑΜΕΝΟΝ μὲν See the last section, 3. Στι
οὖν, οὐ φασί τινες οἶόν τε εἶναι. δεινὸν γὰρ, ἐπιστή-
μης ἐνούσης, ὡς ἦετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν,
καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ἀνδράποδον. Σωκράτης
μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς ΟΥΚ ΟΥ-
15 ΣΗΣ ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ, ὙΠΟΛΑΜΒΑΝΟΝΤΑ,
πράττειν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν.

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος ἀμφισβητεῖ τοῖς φαινο-
μένοις ἐναργῶς. καὶ δεῖον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸ πάθος· εἰ δι'
ἄγνοιαν, τίς ὁ ΤΡΟΠΟΣ γίνεται τῆς ἀγνοίας; ὅτι See the next chapter.
20 γὰρ οὐκ οἶεται γε ὁ ἀκρατεύόμενος, πρὶν ἐν τῷ
πάθει γενέσθαι· φανερόν.

2. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, οἳ τὰ μὲν συγχωροῦσι, τὰ δ'
οὐ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ, ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ μῆθεν εἶναι κρεῖττον,
ὁμολογοῦσιν· τὸ δὲ, μῆθενά πράττειν παρὰ τὸ ΔΟΞΑΝ
25 βέλτιον, οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, τὸν ἀκρα-
τῆ φασίν, οὐκ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ ἔχοντα, κρατεῖσθαι ὑπὸ
τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλὰ ΔΟΞΑΝ.

3. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, εἴγε ΔΟΞΑ, καὶ μὴ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ,
μῆδ' ἰσχυρὰ ὑπόληψις, ἢ ἀντιτείνουσα, ἀλλ' ἡρε-

δοξω

μαία, (καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διατάζουσι)· ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΗ τῶ
μὴ μένειν ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἰσχυράς· τῇ δὲ
μοχθηρία ΟΥ ΣΥΓΓΝΩΜΗ, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὶ τῶν
ΨΕΚΤΩΝ. ΦΡΟΝΗΣΕΩΣ ἄρα ἀντιτεινούσης. αὕτη γὰρ
ἰσχυρότατον. 5

See the last
section, 1.

See the last
section, 5.

4. Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς, ἌΜΑ
ΦΡΟΝΙΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ. φήσκει δ' οὐδ' ἂν εἰς, φρο-
νίμου εἶναι τὸ πράττειν ἐκόντα τὰ φαυλότατα.

See B. VI.
c. iv. §. iii.
c. vii. §. xi.
and c. viii.
§. x.

See the last
section, 4.

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, δέδεικται πρότερον, ὅτι ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΟΣ
γε ὁ φρόνιμος· τῶν γὰρ ΕΣΧΑΤΩΝ τις, καὶ ΤΑΣ ΑΛ- 10
ΛΑΣ ΕΧΩΝ ἀρετάς.

5. Ἔτι, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχειν ἰσχυράς
καὶ ΦΑΥΛΑΣ, ὁ ἐγκρατής· ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΑΙ ὁ ΣΩΦΡΩΝ
ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗΣ, οὐδ' ὁ ἐγκρατής σάφρων. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ
ἄγαν σάφρωνος, οὔτε τὸ φαύλας ΕΧΕΙΝ. ἀλλὰ μὴ 15
δεῖ γε. | εἰ μὲν γὰρ ΧΡΗΣΤΑΙ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, φαύλη ἢ
καλύουσα ἔξις μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν· ὥσθ' ἢ ἐγκράτεια οὐ
πᾶσα σπουδαία. εἰ δ' ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΦΑΥΛΑΙ,
οὐθεν σεμνόν· οὐδ' εἰ ΦΑΥΛΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΣ, οὐθεν
μέγα. | 20

ἐγκρατής
is of
Dilemma
isic

See the last
section, 2.

6. Ἔτι, εἰ ΠΑΣῃ δόξῃ ΕΜΜΕΝΕΤΙΚΟΝ ποιεῖ ἢ
ἐγκράτεια· φαύλη. οἷον, εἰ καὶ τῇ ψευδεῖ. καὶ εἰ
ΠΑΣΗΣ δόξης ἢ ἀκρασία ΕΚΣΤΑΤΙΚΟΝ· ἔσται τις
σπουδαία ἀκρασία. οἷον, ὁ Σοφοκλέους Νεοπτό-
λεμος ἐν τῶ Φιλοκτῆτη. ἐπαινετὸς γὰρ, οὐκ ἐμ- 25
μένων οἷς ἐπέισθη ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως, διὰ τὸ λυ-
πεῖσθαι ψευδόμενος.

[7. Ἔτι, ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος ΨΕΥΔΟΜΕΝΟΣ, ἀπο-
ρία. διὰ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν, ἵνα
δεινοὶ ᾧσιν ὅταν ἐπιτύχωσιν· ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισ- 30
μὸς ἀπορία γίνεται. δέδεται γὰρ ἢ διάνοια· ὅταν
ΜΕΝΕΙΝ μὲν μὴ βούληται, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ
συμπερανθέν, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύνηται, διὰ τὸ λῦσαι
μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.]

See the last
section, 2.

[8. Συμβαίνει δ' ἔκ τινος λόγου, ἡ ΑΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ μετὰ ἀκρασίας, ΑΡΕΤΗ. τάναντία γὰρ πράττει ἂν ὑπολαμβάνει, διὰ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ὑπολαμβάνει δὲ, τὰγαθὰ κακὰ εἶναι, καὶ οὐ δεῖν πράττειν ὥστε 5 τὰγαθὰ, καὶ οὐ τὰ κακὰ, πράζει.]

9. "Ἐτι, ὁ τῷ ΠΕΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ ^{αὐτοῦ} πράττων καὶ διώκων τὰ ἠδέα καὶ προαιρούμενος, βελτίων ἂν δόξειεν, τοῦ μὴ διὰ λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀκρασίαν. εὐϊατότερος γὰρ, διὰ τὸ μεταπεισθῆναι ἂν. ὁ δ' ἀκρατῆς, ἔνοχος τῇ 10 παρομιμία ἐν ἧ φαμέν "ὅταν τὸ ὕδωρ πνίγη, τί δεῖ ἐπιπίνειν;" εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπέπειστο ἂ πράττει, μετα- ^{γὰρ μὴ ἴσ.} πεισθεὶς ἂν ἐπαύσατο· νῦν δὲ, πεπεισμένος, οὐδὲν ἤττον ἄλλα πράττει.

10. "Ἐτι, εἰ περὶ ΠΑΝΤΑ ἀκρασία ἐστὶ καὶ ^{See the last section, 6, and the third chap. of this book.} 15 ἐγκράτεια, τίς ὁ ἈΠΑΩΣ ἀκρατῆς; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἈΠΑΣΑΣ ἔχει τὰς ἀκρασίας· φαμέν δ' εἶναί τινας, ἈΠΑΩΣ.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν ΑΠΟΡΙΑΙ, τοιαῦταί τινες συμβαίνουσιν. 4 τούτων δὲ, τὰ μὲν ἀνελεῖν δεῖ, τὰ δὲ καταλιπεῖν. ἡ 20 γὰρ λύσις τῆς ἀπορίας, εὐρεσίς ἐστιν.

CHAP. II.

ON THE COMPATIBILITY OF INCONTINENCE AND KNOWLEDGE.

I. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν σκεπτέον, ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ Η ^{See c. i. §. v. 1, of this book.} ΟΥ, ΚΑΙ ΠΩΣ ΕΙΔΟΤΕΣ. εἶτα, ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΑ ΤΟΝ ΑΚΡΑΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗ ΘΕΤΕΟΝ· λέγω δὲ, πότερον περὶ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, ἢ περὶ τινὰς ἀφωρισμένας. 25 καὶ, ΤΟΝ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΚΑΡΤΕΡΙΚΟΝ, ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ Ὁ ΑΥΤΟΣ Η ἘΤΕΡΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συγγενῆ τῆς θεωρίας ἐστὶ ταύτης. [ἔστι

δ' ἀρχὴ τῆς σκέψεως, πότερον ὁ ἐγκρατῆς καὶ ὁ ἀκρατῆς εἰσι τῶ περι ἃ ἢ τῶ πῶς ἔχοντες τὴν διαφορὰν, λέγω δὲ πότερον τῶ περι ταδὶ εἶναι μόνον ἀκρατῆς ὁ ἀκρατῆς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλὰ τῶ ᾧς, ἢ οὐ ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν· ἔπειτ' εἰ περι πάντ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκρασία καὶ ὁ ἐγκράτεια ἢ οὐ· οὔτε γὰρ περι πάντ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀπλῶς ἀκρατῆς, ἀλλὰ περι ἅπερ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε τῶ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπλῶς ἔχειν (ταυτόν γὰρ ἂν ᾦν τῆ ἀκολασία), ἀλλὰ τῶ ᾧδι ἔχειν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγεται προαιρούμενος, νομίζων αἰεὶ δεῖν τὸ παρὸν ἠδὺ διαίκειν· ὁ δ' οὐκ οἶεται μὲν, διαίκει δέ.]

5 II. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ΔΟΞΑΝ ΑΛΗΘΗ, ἀλλὰ ΜΗ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ, παρ' ἣν ἀκρατεύονται· οὔθεν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸν λόγον. [ἔνιοι γὰρ τῶν δοξαζόντων οὐ διστάζουσιν, ἀλλ' οἴονται ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναί. εἰ οὖν 15 διὰ τὸ ἡρέμα πιστεύειν οἱ δοξάζοντες μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπισταμένων παρὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν πράξουσιν, οὔθεν διοίσει ἐπιστήμη δόξης.] ἔνιοι γὰρ πιστεύουσιν οὐδὲν ἦττον οἷς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ ἕτεροι οἷς ἐπίστανται. δηλοῖ δ' Ἡράκλειτος. 20

III. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ ΔΙΚΩΣ λέγομεν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι· (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ΕΧΩΝ ΜΕΝ ΟΥ ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ ΔΕ Τῆ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ὁ ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΣ, λέγεται ἐπίστασθαι) διοίσει, τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ, ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν, τοῦ ἔχοντα καὶ θεωροῦντα. τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν· 25 ἀλλ' οὐκ, εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.

IV. Ἔτι, ἐπεὶ δύο τρόποι τῶν προτάσεων· ΕΧΟΝΤΑ μὲν ἀμφοτέρας, οὔθεν καλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ΧΡΩΜΕΝΟΝ μόντοι τῆ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῆ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΟΣ. πρακτὰ γὰρ, τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. 30

See the Summary.

Διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΕΦ' ΕΑΥΤΟΥ, τὸ δ' ΕΠΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ ἐστὶν. οἷον· ὅτι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ συμφέρει τὰ ξηρὰ, καὶ ὅτι οὗτος ἀν-

θραπος, ἢ ὅτι ξηρὸν τὸ τοιόνδε, ἀλλ' εἰ τόδε τοιόνδε ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἢ οὐκ ἐνεργεῖ. κατὰ τε δὴ τούτους δι-
οίσει τοὺς τρόπους, ἀμήχανον ὅσον. ὥστε δοκεῖν, οὕτω μὲν εἰδέναι, μηθὲν ἄτοπον· ἄλλως δὲ, θαν-
5 μαστόν.

V. Ἔτι, τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἄλλον τρόπον
τῶν νῦν ρηθέντων, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἐν τῇ γὰρ
EXEIN MEN MH XPHSETHAI ΔΕ, διαφέρειουσιν ὁρῶμεν τὴν
ἔξιν, ὥστε καὶ ἔχειν πως καὶ μὴ ἔχειν· οἷον, τὸν
10 καθεύδοντα, καὶ μαινόμενον, καὶ οἰνωμένον. ἀλλὰ
μὴν, ΟΥΤΩ ΔΙΑΤΙΘΕΝΤΑΙ Οἱ ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΘΕΣΙΝ ΟΝ-
ΤΕΣ. θυμοὶ γὰρ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀφροδισίων, καὶ ἔνια
τῶν τοιούτων, ἐπιδήλως καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεθιστᾶσιν,
ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ μανίας ποιοῦσιν. δῆλον οὖν, ὅτι ὁμοίως
15 ἔχειν λεκτέον τοὺς ἀκρατεῖς τούτους.

VI. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπι-
στήμης, οὐδὲν σημεῖον. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι
τούτοις ὄντες, ἀποδείξεις καὶ ἔπη λέγουσιν Ἐμπεδο-
κλέους. καὶ οἱ πρῶτον μαθόντες, συνείρουσι μὲν τοὺς
20 λόγους, ἴσασι δ' οὕτω. δεῖ γὰρ συμφῦναι· τούτω
δὲ χρόνου δεῖ. ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὑποκρινομένους,
οὕτως ὑποληπτέον λέγειν καὶ τοὺς ἀκρατερομένους.

VII. Ἔτι, καὶ ὧδε φυσικῶς ἂν τις ἐπιβλέψει
τὴν αἰτίαν. ἢ μὲν γὰρ, καθόλου δόξα· ἢ δ' ἑτέρα,
25 περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν· ἂν αἴσθησις ἤδη κυρία.
ὅταν δὲ μία ΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἀνάγκη τὸ συμπε-
ρανθῆν, ἔνθα μὲν, φάναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ποιη-
τικαῖς, πράττειν εὐθύς. οἷον· εἰ παντὸς γλυκέος γεύ-
εσθαι δεῖ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ (ὡς ἔν τι τῶν καθ' ἕκα-
30 στον)· ἀνάγκη τὸν δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ κωλυόμενον,
ἅμα τοῦτο καὶ πράττειν. ὅταν οὖν, ἢ μὲν ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ
ἐνῆ, κωλύουσα γεύεσθαι· ἢ δὲ, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ γλυκὺ
ἡδύ, τουτὶ δὲ γλυκὺ· αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ· τύχη δ' ἐπι-
θυμία ἐνοῦσα· ἢ μὲν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ἐπι-

See B. I. *θυμία ἄγει. κινεῖν γὰρ ἕΚΑΣΤΟΝ δύναται ΤΩΝ ΜΟ-*
c. v. §. iii.
 and vii. See ΠΙΩΝ. ἄστε συμβαίνει, ὑπὸ λόγου πᾶς καὶ δόξης
 also B. VI.
c. iv. §. iv. ἀκρατεύεσθαι· οὐκ ἐναντίας δὲ καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ
 and B. VI.
c. viii. §. κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἢ γὰρ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ ἐναντία, ἀλλ'
 viii. οὐχ ἢ ΔΟΞΑ, τᾷ ὀρθῷ λόγῳ. (ἄστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο 5
 τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ· ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου
 ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ
 μνήμην.)

Πῶς δὲ λύεται ἡ ἄγνοια, καὶ πάλιν γίνεται ἐπι-
 στήμων ὁ ἀκρατής· ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ οἴνωμένου 10
 καὶ καθεύδοντος, καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος τούτου τοῦ πάθους.
 ὃν δεῖ παρὰ τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀκούειν.

See §. iv.
 of this
 chap.
 οὐκ ἦν τὸ
 ἔχον.
 See the
 last sec-
 tion.

VIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ τελευταία πρότασις, δόξα τε
 αἰσθητοῦ, καὶ κυρία τῶν πράξεων, ταύτην ἢ ΟΥΚ
 ἔχει ὁ ἐν τᾷ πάθει ὢν, ἢ ΟΥΤΩΣ ἔχει, ὡς οὐκ ἐν τᾷ 15
 ἔχειν ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ἀλλὰ ΛΕΓΕΙΝ, (ἄσπερ ὁ οἴνωμένος
 τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους)· καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ [καθόλου, μὴδ']
 ἐπιστημονικὸν ὁμοίως εἶναι δοκεῖν τᾷ καθόλου, τὸν
 ἔσχατον ὄρον· [καὶ] εἰκὲν ὁ ἐζήτει Σωκράτης συμ-
 βαίνειν. ΟΥ ΓΑΡ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΔΟ- 20
 ΚΟΥΣΗΣ, ΠΑΡΟΥΣΗΣ, ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΠΑΘΟΣ, ΟΥΔ' ἌΤΗ
 ΠΕΡΙΕΛΚΕΤΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΑΘΟΣ· ΑΛΛΑ ΤΗΣ ΑΙΣΘΗ-
 ΤΙΚΗΣ.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ εἰδότα καὶ μὴ, καὶ πῶς εἰδότα,
 ἐνδέχεται ἀκρατεύεσθαι· τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω. 25

CHAP. III.

ON THE SUBJECTS TO WHICH INCONTINENCE
RELATES.

I. Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις ἄπαισις ἀκρατῆς, ἢ πάν- 6
τες κατὰ μέρος· καὶ εἰ ἔστι, περὶ ποία ἔστι·
λεπτότερον ἐφεξῆς.

See the last
chap. §. i.
See also
c. i. §. v.
10. of this
book.

II. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν περὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ λύπαις εἰσὶν,
5 οἳ τ' ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ καρτερικοὶ, καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ
μαλακοί· φανερόν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα, τῶν ποιούντων
ἡδονήν· τὰ δ', αἰρετὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ, ἔχοντα δ'
ὑπερβολήν· ἀναγκαῖα μὲν, τὰ σωματικά· λέγω δὲ
10 τὰ τοιαῦτα· τὰ τε περὶ τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τὴν τῶν
ἀφροδισίων χρείαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωματικῶν,
περὶ ἅ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἐθεμεν καὶ τὴν σωφρο-
σύνην. τὰ δ', ἀναγκαῖα μὲν οὐ, αἰρετὰ δὲ καθ'
ἅ τα· λέγω δ', οἷον νίκην, τιμὴν, πλοῦτον, καὶ τὰ
15 τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων.

III. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν πρὸς ταῦτα παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν
λόγον ὑπερβάλλοντας τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἄπαισις μὲν οὐ
λέγομεν ἀκρατεῖς, προσηθιόντες δὲ, τὸ " χρημάτων
ἀκρατεῖς," καὶ " κέρδους," καὶ " τιμῆς," καὶ
20 " θυμοῦ·" ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ· ὡς ἑτεροῦς καὶ καθ'
ὁμοιοτητα λεγόμενου· ὥσπερ " ἄνθρωπος ὁ τὰ
Ὀλύμπια νενικηκώς." (ἐκείνῳ γὰρ, ὁ κοινὸς λόγος
τοῦ ἰδίου μικρῶν διέφερον· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἕτερος ἦν.) ση-
μεῖον δὲ· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρασία ψέγεται, οὐχ ὡς
25 ἁμαρτία μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς κακία τις, ἢ ἀπλῶς
οὔσα, ἢ κατὰ τι μέρος· τούτων δ' οὐθείς.

IV. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, περὶ ἃς λέγομεν τὸν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον· ὁ ΜΗ ΤΩ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙΣΘΑΙ, τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης, καὶ δίψης, καὶ ἀλείας, καὶ ψύχους, καὶ πάντων τῶν περὶ ἀφῆν⁵ καὶ γεῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ καὶ τὴν δianoian· ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ λέγεται, ΟΥ ΚΑΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΝ, ὅτι περὶ τὰδε, καθάπερ ὀργῆς, ἀλλ' ἈΠΛΩΣ μόνον. σημεῖον δὲ· καὶ γὰρ ΜΑΛΑΚΟΙ λέγονται περὶ ταύτας, περὶ ἐκείνων δ' οὐδεμίαν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτ', εἰς 10 ταῦτόν ΤΟΝ ΑΚΡΑΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΑΚΟΛΑΣΤΟΝ τίθεμεν, καὶ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗ ΚΑΙ ΣΩΦΡΟΝΑ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκείνων οὐδένα· διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς αὐτάς πως ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι.

See c. i. §.
iv. 4. and §.
v. 5.

V. Οἱ δ' εἰσὶ μὲν ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ, ἀλλ' ΟΥΧ ὄΝΕΑΥ- 15 ΤΩΣ εἰσίν. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ΠΡΟΑΙΡΟΥΝΤΑΙ, οἱ δ' ΟΥ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΟΥΝΤΑΙ. διὸ μᾶλλον ἀκόλαστον ἂν εἴποιμεν, ὅστις μὴ ἐπιθυμῶν, ἢ ἡρέμα, διώκει τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ φεύγει μετρίας λύπας· ἢ τοῦτον, ὅστις διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν σφόδρα. τί γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιήσειεν, εἰ 20 προσγένεοιτο ἐπιθυμία νεανικῆ, καὶ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδείας λύπη ἰσχυρά;

VI. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῶν ἡδονῶν, αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ τῶν γένει καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων· (τῶν γὰρ ἡδέων ἔνια φύσει αἰρετὰ, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων, τὰ 25 δὲ μεταξὺ· καθάπερ διείλομεν πρότερον· οἷον χρήματα, καὶ κέρδος, καὶ νίκη, καὶ τιμὴ) πρὸς ἅπαντα δὲ, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ, οὐ ΤΩ ΠΑΣΧΕΙΝ, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ φιλεῖν, ψέγονται· ἀλλὰ ΤΩ ΠΩΣ, καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. 30

VII. Διὸ, ὅσοι μὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον [ἢ κρατοῦνται, ἢ] διώκουσι τῶν φύσει τι καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν· οἷον, οἱ περὶ τιμὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ σπουδάζοντες, ἢ

περὶ τέκνα καὶ γονεῖς· (καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἀγα-
θῶν, καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται οἱ περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζοντες,
ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἔστι τις ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις· εἴ τις,
ὥσπερ ἡ Νιόβη, μάχοιτο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, ἢ,
5 ὥσπερ Σάτυρος ὁ Φιλοπάτωρ ἐπικαλούμενος, περὶ
τὸν πατέρα. λίαν γὰρ ἐδόκει μαρναίνεин.) MOXΘHPIA See page
μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤ' ἔστι, διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· 221. l. 25.
ὅτι φύσει τῶν αἰρετῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστι δι' αὐτό. Φαῦ-
λαι δὲ καὶ Φευκταὶ αὐτῶν εἰσὶν ἅΙ ὙΠΕΡΒΟΛΑΙ.

10 VIII. Ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ. ἢ γὰρ ἀκρασία
οὐ μόνον Φευκτόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΤΩΝ ΦΕΚΤΩΝ ἔστιν. δι'
ὁμοιότητα δὲ τοῦ πάθους, προσεπιτιθέντες, τὴν ἀκρα-
σίαν περὶ ἕκαστου λέγουσιν· οἷον, “κακὸν ἰατρὸν,”
καὶ “κακὸν ὑποκριτὴν” ὃν ἌΠΛΩΣ οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν
15 κακόν. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακίαν
εἶναι ἕκαστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀνάλογον ὉΜΟΙΑΝ·
οὕτω δῆλον, ὅτι κακῆ, ὑποληπτέον μόνην ἀκρασίαν
καὶ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναι, ἢΤΙΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ Τῆ
ΣΦΡΟΣΤΗΝΗ ΚΑΙ Τῆ ΑΚΟΛΑΣΙΑ. περὶ δὲ θυμὸν, ΚΑΘ'
20 ὉΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ λέγομεν· διὸ καὶ προστιθέντες, “ἀκρατῆ
θυμοῦ” ὥσπερ “τιμῆς,” καὶ “κέρδους,” Φαμέν.

IX. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἔνια μὲν ἡδέα φύσει· καὶ
τούτων, τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς, τὰ δὲ κατὰ γένη, καὶ ζῴων
καὶ ἀνθρώπων· τὰ δ' οὐκ ΕΣΤΙΝ, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν διὰ
25 πηρώσεις, τὰ δὲ δι' ἔθνη ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ, τὰ δὲ διὰ μοχθηρὰς
φύσεις· ἔστι καὶ περὶ τούτων ἕκαστα, ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΑΣ
ΙΔΕΙΝ ἘΞΕΙΣ. λέγω δὲ, τὰς ΘΗΡΙΩΔΕΙΣ. οἷον, τὴν ἀν-
θρωπον, ἣν λέγουσι, τὰς κυύσας ἀνασχίζουσαν τὰ
παιδία κατεσθίειν· ἢ οἷοις χαίρειν. Φασὶν ἐνίους τῶν
30 ἀπηγριαμένων περὶ τὸν Πόντον, τοὺς μὲν ἄμοις, τοὺς
δὲ ἀνθρώπων κρέασιν, τοὺς δὲ τὰ παιδία δανείζειν
ἀλλήλοισι εἰς εὐωχίαν· ἢ τὸ περὶ Φάλαριν λεγόμενον.

διὰ τε νόσους
γίνονται καὶ
μανίας.

νοσημ. ἢ ἐξ

Χ. Αὐταὶ μὲν ΘΗΡΙΩΔΕΙΣ. αἱ δὲ, διὰ ΝΟΣΟΥΣ γίνονται, καὶ διὰ ΜΑΝΙΑΝ ἐνίοις· ὥσπερ ὁ τὴν μητέρα καθιερεύσας καὶ φαγῶν, καὶ ὁ τοῦ συνδούλου τὸ ἦπαρ. αἱ δὲ, νοσηματώδεις ἐξ ΕΘΟΥΣ· οἶον, τριχῶν τίλσεις, καὶ ὀνύχων τρώξεις, ἔτι δ', ἀνθράκων καὶ 5 γῆς· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, ἢ τῶν ἀφροδισίων τοῖς ἄρρεσιν. (τοῖς μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τοῖς δ' ἐξ ἔθους συμβαίνουσιν· οἶον, τοῖς ὑβριζομένοις ἐκ παιδῶν.) -

καὶ ἡ θηριό-
της.

XI. Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν φύσις αἰτία, τούτους μὲν οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴπειεν ἀκρατεῖς· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰς γυναῖ- 10 κας, ὅτι οὐκ ὀπιύουσιν ἀλλ' ὀπιύονται. ἀσαύτως δὲ, καὶ τοῖς νοσηματωδῶς ἔχουσι δι' ἔθος. τὸ μὲν οὖν ΕΧΕΙΝ ἕκαστα τούτων, ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς ΚΑΚΙΑΣ, καθάπερ καὶ ΘΗΡΙΟΤΗΣ. τὸ δ' ΕΧΟΝΤΑ ΚΡΑΤΕΙΝ ἢ ΚΡΑΤΕΙΣΘΑΙ, οὐχ' ἢ ἈΠΛΗ ἀκρασία ἀλλ' ἢ ΚΑΘ' 15 ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ· καθάπερ καὶ τὸν περὶ τοὺς ΘΥΜΟΥΣ ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τοῦ πάθους· ΑΚΡΑΤΗ δ' οὐ λεπτέον.

Πᾶσα γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη, καὶ δειλία, καὶ ἀκολασία, καὶ χαλεπότης· αἱ μὲν θη- 20 ριώδεις, αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσίν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος, οἷος δεδιέναι πάντα, καὶ ψοφῆση μῦς· ΘΗΡΙΩΔΗ δειλίαν δειλός· ὁ δὲ τὴν γαλῆν ἐδεδίει, ΔΙΑ ΝΟΣΟΝ. καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων, οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον τῇ αἰσθήσει ζῶντες, ΘΗΡΙΩ- 25 ΔΕΙΣ, (ὥσπερ ἔνια γένη τῶν πόρρω βαρβάρων)· οἱ δὲ διὰ νόσους, (οἶον τὰς ἐπιληπτικὰς, ἢ μανίας,) ΝΟΣΗΜΑΤΩΔΕΙΣ.

Τούτων δ', ἐστὶ μὲν ἔχειν τινὰ ἐνίοτε μόνον, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δέ. λέγω δὲ, οἶον, εἰ Φάλαρις κατ- 30 εἶχεν, ἐπιθυμῶν παιδίου φαγεῖν, ἢ πρὸς ἀφροδισίων ἄτοπον ἡδονήν. ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ κρατεῖσθαι, μὴ μόνον ἔχειν.

Ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑ, ἢ μὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπον,

ἄπλωσ λέγεται μοχθηρία· ἢ δὲ, ΚΑΤΑ ΠΡΟΣΘΕΣΙΝ, ὅτι
 θηριώδης ἢ νοσηματώδης, ἀπλῶς δ' οὐ· τὸν αὐτὸν
 τρόπον δῆλον, ὅτι καὶ ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ ἔστιν, ἢ μὲν ΘΗΡΙΩ-
 ΔΗΣ, ἢ δὲ ΝΟΣΗΜΑΤΩΔΗΣ, ἀπλῶς δὲ, ἢ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ
 5 ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΗΝ ΑΚΟΛΑΣΙΑΝ ΜΟΝΗ.

XII. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία καὶ ἐγκράτειά ἐστι 7
 μόνον περὶ ἅπερ ἀκολασία καὶ σωφροσύνη· καὶ ὅτι
 περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔστιν ἄλλο εἶδος ἀκρασίας, ΛΕΓΟ-
 ΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΧ ἄπλωσ· δῆ-
 10 λον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἦντον αἰσχρὰ ἀκρασία ἢ τοῦ
 θυμοῦ ἢ ἢ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν· θεωρήσωμεν.

1. "Ἐοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λό-
 γου, ΠΑΡΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ δὲ· καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν δια-
 κόνων, οἱ πρὶν ἀκοῦσαι πᾶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐκθέουσιν,
 15 εἴτα ἀμαρτάνουσι τῆς προστάξεως· καὶ οἱ κύνες,
 πρὶν σκέψασθαι εἰ φίλος, ἂν μόνον ψοφήσῃ, ὑλα-
 κτοῦσιν. οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς, (διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυ-
 τῆτα τῆς φύσεως,) ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ'
 ἀκούσας, ὄρμαῖ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λό-
 20 γος, ἢ ἢ φαντασία, ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγαγρία, ἐδήλωσεν·
 ὁ δ', ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῶ τοιούτῳ πο-
 λεμεῖν, χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς. ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, εἰάν
 μόνον εἴπῃ ὅτι ἠδὲ ὁ λόγος, ἢ ἢ αἴσθησις· ὄρμαῖ πρὸς
 τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν. ὥσθ' ὁ μὲν θυμὸς ἀκολουθεῖ τῶ
 25 λόγῳ πως, ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. αἰσχίων οὖν. ὁ μὲν
 γὰρ τοῦ θυμοῦ ἀκρατής, τοῦ λόγου πως ἠττᾶται· ὁ
 δὲ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ οὐ τοῦ λόγου.

2. "Ἐτι, ταῖς ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙΣ μᾶλλον συγγνώμη ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν ὀρέξεσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις
 30 μᾶλλον, ὅσαι κοιναὶ πᾶσι, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον κοιναί. ὁ δὲ
 θυμὸς φυσικώτερον, καὶ ἢ χαλεπότης, τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν,
 τῶν τῆς ὑπερβολῆς, καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων. ὥσπερ ὁ

ἀπολογούμενος ὅτι τὸν πατέρα τύπτει· “καὶ γὰρ οὗτος,” ἔφη, “τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ κείνος τὸν ἄνωθεν” καὶ τὸ παιδίον δείξας, “καὶ οὗτος ἐμὲ,” ἔφη, “ὅταν ἀνὴρ γένηται. συγγενὲς γὰρ ἡμῖν.” καὶ ὁ ἐλκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ υἱοῦ, παύεσθαι ἐκέλευε πρὸς ταῖς θύ- 5 ραῖς· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλκύσαι τὸν πατέρα μέχρις ἐνταῦθα.

3. Ἔτι, ΑΔΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΙ Οἱ ἐπιβουλότεροι. ὁ μὲν οὖν θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, οὐδ' ὁ θυμὸς, ἀλλὰ φανερός. ἢ δ' ἐπιθυμία, καθάπερ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην φασί· 10 “δολοπλόκου γὰρ κυπρογενοῦς.” καὶ τὸν “κεστὸν ἱμάντα” Ὀμηρος, “πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντος.” ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀδικωτέρα, καὶ αἰσχίαν, ἢ ἀκρασία αὕτη, τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἐστί[, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀκρασία, καὶ κακία πως]. 15

4. Ἔτι, οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζει ΛΥΠΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ· ὁ δ' ὀργῇ ποιῶν πᾶς, ποιεῖ λυπούμενος· ὁ δ' ὑβρίζων, μεθ' ἡδονῆς. εἰ οὖν οἷς ὀργίζεσθαι μάλιστα δίκαιον, ταῦτα ἀδικώτερα· καὶ ἡ ἀκρασία ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν θυμῷ ὕβρις. 20

XIII. Ὡς μὲν τοίνυν αἰσχίαν ἢ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἀκρασία, τῆς περὶ τὸν θυμὸν· καὶ ὅτι ΕΣΤΙΝ Ἡ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑ ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΔΟΝΑΣ ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ· δῆλον. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰς διαφορὰς ληπτέον. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴρηται κατ' ἀρχάς, 25 αἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπικαὶ εἰσι καὶ ΦΥΣΙΚΑΙ, καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῷ μεγέθει· αἱ δὲ ΘΗΡΙΩΔΕΙΣ· αἱ δὲ διὰ πηρώσεις καὶ νοσήματα. τούτων δὲ, περὶ τὰς ΠΡΩΤΑΣ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀκολασία μόνον ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ τὰ θηρία οὔτε σάφρονα οὔτ' ἀκόλαστα λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ 30 μεταφορὰν, καὶ εἴ τιτι ὅλως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο διαφέρει γένος τῶν ζῴων, ὕβρει, καὶ σιναμωρία, καὶ τῷ

παμφάγον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει προαίρεσιν, οὐδὲ λογισμόν· ἀλλ' ἐξέστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μαινόμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

XIV. Ἐλαττον δὲ θηριότης κακίας, φοβερώτερον 5 δέ. οὐ γὰρ ΔΙΕΦΘΑΡΤΑΙ τὸ βέλτιον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ βέλτιστον. ἀνθρώπῳ· ἀλλ' οὐκ ΕΧΕΙ. ὅμοιον οὖν, ὥσπερ ἄψυχον συμβάλλειν πρὸς ἔμψυχον, πότερον κάκιον. ἀσινεστέρα γὰρ ἢ φαυλότης αἰεὶ, ἢ τοῦ μὴ ἔχοντος ἀρχήν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀρχή. παραπλήσιον οὖν τὸ συμβάλ- 10 λειν ἀδικίαν πρὸς ἀνθρώπον ἀδικόν. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἐκάτερον κάκιον. μυριοπλάσια γὰρ ἂν κακὰ ποιήσειεν ἀνθρώπος κακὸς θηρίου.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE MORAL HABIT OF ENDURANCE.

I. Περὶ δὲ τὰς δι' ἀφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἡδονὰς καὶ 8 λύπας, καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ φυγὰς, περὶ ἃς ἢ τε See c. ii. §. i. of this book. 15 ἀκολασία καὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη διωρίσθη πρότερον· ἔστι μὲν οὕτως ἔχειν, ὥστε ἠττάσθαι καὶ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ κρείττους· ἔστι δὲ, κρατεῖν καὶ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ ἦττους. τούτων δ', ὁ μὲν περὶ ἩΔΟΝΑΣ ἀκρατῆς, ὁ δ' ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗΣ· ὁ δὲ περὶ ΛΥΠΑΣ μαλακὸς, ὁ δὲ ΚΑΡΤΕΡΙ- 20 ΚΟΣ. μεταξύ δ' ἢ τῶν πλείστων ἕξις· καὶ εἰ ῥέπουσι μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰς χεῖρους.

II. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀναγκαῖαί εἰσιν, αἱ δ' οὐ· καὶ μέχρι τινός, αἱ δ' ὑπερβολαὶ οὐ, οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει, καὶ 25 λύπας· ὁ μὲν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς διῶκαν τῶν ἡδέων, ἢ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν, καὶ ΔΙΑ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ, δι' αὐτάς καὶ καθ' ὑπερβ. λὰς ἢ διὰ. μὴδὲν δι' ἕτερον ἀποβαῖνον· ΑΚΟΛΑΣΤΟΣ. (ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοῦτον μὴ εἶναι μεταμελητικόν· ὥστ' ἀνιάτος.

ὁ γὰρ ἀμεταμέλητος ἀνίατος.) ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων, ὁ
 ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΣ· ὁ δὲ μέσος, ΣΩΦΡΩΝ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ὁ φεύγων τὰς σωματικὰς λύπας, μὴ δι' ἦταν, ἀλλὰ
 ΔΙΑ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ. τῶν δὲ ΜΗ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΟΥΜΕΝΩΝ, ὁ
 μὲν ΑΓΕΤΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ἩΔΟΝΗΝ. ὁ δὲ, διὰ τὸ ΦΕΥΓΕΙΝ ὅ
 ΤΗΝ ΛΥΠΗΝ [τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας] ὥΣΤΕ ΔΙΑΦΕ-
 ΡΟΥΣΙΝ ΑΛΛΗΛΩΝ.

See c. i. §.
 v. 9. of this
 book.

III. Παντὶ δ' ἂν δόξειε χεῖρων εἶναι, εἴ τις μὴ
 ἐπιθυμῶν ἢ ἡρέμα, πράττει τι αἰσχροῦν, ἢ εἰ σφόδρα
 ἐπιθυμῶν· καὶ εἰ μὴ ὀργιζόμενος τύπτοι, ἢ εἰ ὀργι- 15
 ζόμενος. τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίοι ἐν πάθει ἄν; διὸ, ὁ ΑΚΟ-
 ΛΑΣΤΟΣ ΧΕΙΡΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

^a See line
 4 of this
 page.

IV. Τῶν δὴ λεχθέντων, ^a τὸ μὲν ΜΑΛΑΚΙΑΣ εἶδος
 [μαῖλλον· ὁ δ', ἀκόλαστος]· ΑΝΤΙΚΕΙΤΑΙ δὲ, τῷ μὲν
 ΑΚΡΑΤΕΙ ὁ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΗΣ, τῷ δὲ ΜΑΛΑΚῷ ὁ ΚΑΡΤΕΡΙΚΟΣ. 15
 τὸ μὲν γὰρ καρτερεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀντέχειν, ἢ δ' ἐγ-
 κράτεια ἐν τῷ κρατεῖν. ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἀντέχειν καὶ
 κρατεῖν· ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἠττᾶσθαι, τοῦ νικᾶν. διὸ
 καὶ ΑΙΡΕΤΩΤΕΡΟΝ ἐγκράτεια καρτερίας ἐστίν.

V. Ὁ δ' ἑλλείπων πρὸς ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνε- 20
 νοῦσι καὶ δύνανται· ΟΥΤΟΣ μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν.
 (καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφή μαλακία τις ἐστίν.) ὅς ἔλκει τὸ
 ἰμάτιον, ἵνα μὴ πονήσῃ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵρειν λύπην·
 καὶ μιμούμενος τὸν κάμνοντα, οὐκ οἶεται ἄθλιος
 εἶναι, ἀθλίῳ ὅμοιος ἄν. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ 25
 ἐγκράτειαν καὶ ἀκρασίαν. οὐ γὰρ εἴ τις ἰσχυρῶν
 καὶ ὑπερβαλλουσῶν ἡδονῶν ἠττᾶται, ἢ λυπῶν, θαυ-
 μαστὸν, ἀλλὰ συγγνωμονικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων· (ὥσπερ
 ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτῆτης, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχεως πεπληγ-
 μένος· ἢ ὁ Καρκίνου ἐν τῇ Ἀλόπῃ Κερκυῶν· καὶ 30
 ὥσπερ οἱ κατέχειν πειρώμενοι τὸν γέλωτα, ἀθρόον
 ἐκκαγχάζουσιν, οἷον συνέπεσε Ξενοφάντῳ) ἀλλ' εἴ
 τις, πρὸς ἃς οἱ πολλοὶ δύνανται ἀντέχειν, τούτων
 ἠττᾶται, καὶ μὴ δύναται ἀντιτείνειν, μὴ διὰ φύσιν

τοῦ γένους, ἢ διὰ νόσον (οἶον, ἐν τοῖς Σκυθῶν βασι-
 λεῦσιν, ἢ μαλακία διὰ τὸ γένος· καὶ ὡς τὸ θῆλυ
 πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν διέστηκεν). δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ ΠΑΙΔΙΩ-
 ΔΗΣ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι. ἔστι δὲ μαλακός. ἢ γὰρ
 5 παιδιὰ ἀνεσίς ἐστίν, εἴπερ ἀνάπαυσις· τῶν δὲ πρὸς
 ταύτην ὑπερβαλλόντων, ὁ παιδιώδης ἐστίν.

CHAP. V.

CONTAINING VARIOUS MINOR POSITIONS AND QUES-
 TIONS RELATING TO CONTINENCE AND INCONTI-
 NENCE.

I. Ἀκρασίας δὲ, τὸ μὲν ΠΡΟΠΕΤΕΙΑ, τὸ δ' ΑΣΘΕ-
 ΝΕΙΑ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ, βουλευσάμενοι, οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν
 οἷς ἐβουλεύσαντο, διὰ τὸ πάθος· οἱ δὲ, διὰ τὸ μὴ
 10 βουλεύσασθαι, ἄγονται ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους. ἔνιοι γὰρ,
 (ὥσπερ προγαργαλίσαντες οὐ γαργαλίζονται, οὕτω)
 καὶ προαισθόμενοι, καὶ προϊδόντες, καὶ προεγείραν-
 τες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν· οὐχ ἠττῶνται ὑπὸ
 τοῦ πάθους, οὐτ' ἂν ἠδὺ ἦ, οὐτ' ἂν λυπηρόν. μά-
 15 λιστα δ' οἱ ΟΞΕΙΣ καὶ ΜΕΛΑΓΧΟΛΙΚΟΙ, τὴν προπετῆ
 ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν τα-
 χυτῆτα, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα, οὐκ ἀναμένουσι
 τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῆ φαν-
 τασία.

20 II. Ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, 9
 ΟΥ ΜΕΤΑΜΕΛΗΤΙΚΟΣ. ἐμμένει γὰρ τῇ προαιρέσει. ὁ
 δ' ἀκρατῆς μεταμελητικὸς πᾶς. διὸ οὐχ, ὩΣΠΕΡ See c. i. §.
 ΗΠΟΡΗΣΑΜΕΝ, οὕτω καὶ ἔχει· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ΑΝΙΑΤΟΣ, v. 9. of this
 ὁ δ' ΙΑΤΟΣ. ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ μὲν μοχθηρία, τῶν νοσημά- book.
 25 των, οἶον ὑδέρῳ καὶ φθίσει· ἢ δ' ἀκρασία, τοῖς ἐπι-

ληπτικοῖς. ἢ μὲν γὰρ συνεχής· ἢ δ' οὐ συνεχὴς
πονηρία.

III. Καὶ ὅλως δ', ἑτερον το γενος ακρασιας
και κακιας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ κακία λανθάνει· ἢ δ' ἀκρα-
σία οὐ λανθάνει. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων, βελτίους οἱ ἐκ-
στατικοί, ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μὲν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες
δέ. ὑπ' ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἠττῶνται. καὶ οὐκ
ἀπροβούλευτοι, ὥσπερ ἄτεροι. ὅμοιος γὰρ ὁ ἀκρα-
τής ἐστι τοῖς ταχὺ μεθυσκομένοις, καὶ ὑπ' ὀλίγου
οἴνου, καὶ ἐλάττονος ἢ ὡς οἱ πολλοί. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
κακία ἢ ἀκρασία οὐκ ἐστι, φανερόν. [ἀλλὰ πη
ἴσως.] τὸ μὲν γὰρ ΠΑΡΑ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ, τὸ δὲ ΚΑΤΑ
ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὅμοιόν γε κατὰ τὰς
ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ. ὥσπερ τὸ Δημοδόκου εἰς Μιλησίους·
“ Μιλήσιοι ἀξύνετοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, δρῶσι δ' οἷάπερ
οἱ ἀξύνετοι.” καὶ οἱ ἀκρατεῖς ἀδικοὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν,
ἀδικοῦσι δέ.

See c. i. §.
v. 9. of this
book.

IV. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ΜΗ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΠΕ-
ΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ, διώκειν τὰς καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ παρὰ τὸν
ὀρθὸν λόγον σωματικὰς ἡδονάς· ὁ δὲ ΠΕΠΕΙΣΤΑΙ, 20
διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος διώκειν αὐτάς· ἐκεῖνος
μὲν οὖν ΕΥΜΕΤΑΠΕΙΣΤΟΣ, ὁ δ' οὔ. Ἡ ΓΑΡ ΑΡΕΤΗ
ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ, Ἡ ΜΕΝ ΦΘΕΙΡΕΙ, Ἡ
ΔΕ ΣΩΖΕΙ. ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι, τὸ ὄΥ ἕΝΕΚΑ ἀρχή·
ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς, αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ 25
ἐκεῖ, ὁ ΛΟΓΟΣ διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὔτε ἐν-
ταῦθα· ἀλλ' ἀρετὴ, ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ, τοῦ ὀρθο-
δοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ΑΡΧΗΝ. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος·
ἀκόλαστος δ' ὁ ἐναντίος. ἐστὶ δέ τις, διὰ πάθος
ἐκστατικὸς παρὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὃν, ὥστε μὲν μὴ 30
πράττειν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, κρατεῖ τὸ πάθος·
ὥστε δ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον, οἷον ΠΕΠΕΙΣΘΑΙ διώκειν ἀνέδη-
δεῖν τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονάς· οὐ κρατεῖ. ΟΥΤΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ
ἽΟ ΑΚΡΑΤΗΣ· βελτίων τοῦ ἀκόλαστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος

ἀπλῶς. σώζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἢ ΑΡΧΗ. ἄλλος δ' ἐναντίος· ὁ ἐμμενετικός καὶ οὐκ ἐκστατικός, διὰ γε τὸ πάθος. φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι ἡ μὲν, ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΑ ἕξις· ἡ δὲ, ΦΑΥΛΗ.

5 V. Πότερον οὖν ἐγκρατής ἐστιν, ὁ ὀποιοῦν λόγῳ, 10
καὶ ὀποιοῦν προαιρέσει, ἐμμένων, ἢ ὁ τῆ ὀρθῆ; See c. i. §.
καὶ ἀκρατής δὲ, ὁ ὀποιοῦν μὴ ἐμμένων προαιρέσει, v. 6. of this
καὶ ὀποιοῦν λόγῳ, ἢ ὁ τῷ μὴ ψευδεῖ λόγῳ, καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ.
τῆ προαιρέσει τῆ ὀρθῆ; ὥσπερ ἠπορήθη πρότερον. τῆ μὴ ὀρθῆ.

10 VI. Ἡ ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΝ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ, ὀποιοῦν· ΚΑΘ' ἄγτο δὲ, τῷ ἀληθεῖ λόγῳ καὶ τῆ ὀρθῆ προαιρέσει,
ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμμένει; εἰ γὰρ τις τοδὶ
διὰ τοδὶ αἰρεῖται ἢ διώκει· καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο
διώκει καὶ αἰρεῖται, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τὸ
15 πρότερον. ἀπλῶς δὲ λέγομεν, τὸ καθ' αὐτό. ὥστε
ἔστι μὲν, ὡς ὀποιοῦν δόξῃ ὁ μὲν ἐμμένει, ὁ δ'
ἐξίσταται· ἈΠΛΩΣ δὲ, ὁ τῆ ἀληθεῖ.

VII. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες καὶ ἐμμενετικοὶ τῆ δόξῃ, οὓς
καλοῦσιν ἰσχυρογνώμονας· οἷον, δύσπειστοι, καὶ οὐκ
20 εὐμετάπειστοι. οἱ ὅμοιον μὲν τι ἔχουσι τῷ ἐγκρατεῖ,
(ὥσπερ ὁ ἄσωτος τῷ ἐλευθερίῳ, καὶ ὁ θρασύς τῷ
θαρρᾶλέῳ,) εἰσὶ δ' ἕτεροι κατὰ πολλά. ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ΔΙΑ ΠΑΘΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΝ οὐ μεταβάλλει, ὁ ἐγ-
κρατής· (ἐπεὶ εὐπειστος, ὅταν τύχη, ἔσται ὀγκρατής·)
25 ὁ δὲ, οὐχ ὑπο λόγου. ἐπεὶ ἐπιθυμίας γε λαμ-
βάνουσι, καὶ ἄγονται πολλοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν. εἰσὶ
δὲ ἰσχυρογνώμονες, οἱ ἰδιογνώμονες, καὶ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς,
καὶ οἱ ἄγροικοι. οἱ μὲν ἰδιογνώμονες, δι' ἡδονὴν καὶ
λύπην. χαίρουσι γὰρ νικῶντες, ἐὰν μὴ μεταπέθωνται·
30 καὶ λυποῦνται, ἐὰν ἀκῦρα τὰ αὐτῶν ᾗ, ὥσπερ ψη-
φίσματα. ὥστε μᾶλλον τῷ ἀκρατεῖ εἰοκάσιν, ἢ τῷ
ἐγκρατεῖ.

VIII. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, ὅτι τοῖς δοξασίν οὐκ ἐμ-

ΜΕΝΟΥΣΙΝ, ΟΥ ΔΙ' ΑΚΡΑΣΙΑΝ· Οἶον, ἐν τῷ Φιλοκτῆτη
 τῷ Σοφοκλέους ὁ Νεοπτόλεμος. καίτοι δι' ἡδονὴν οὐκ
 ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλῆν. τὸ γὰρ ἀληθεύειν αὐτῷ καλὸν
 ἦν, ἐπίσθη δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσεως ψεύδεται. οὐ γὰρ 5
 πᾶς ὁ δι' ἡδονὴν τι πράττων, οὔτ' ἀκόλαστος, οὔτε
 φαῦλος, οὔτ' ἀκρατής· ἀλλ' ὁ δι' αἰσχροῦ.

- 11 IX. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τις καὶ τοιοῦτος, οἷος ἦττον ἢ
 δεῖ τοῖς σωματικοῖς χαίρων, καὶ οὐκ ἐμμένων τῷ
 λόγῳ, ἢ τοιοῦτος· τούτου καὶ τοῦ ἀκρατοῦς, ΜΕΣΟΣ ὁ 10
 ἐγκρατής. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀκρατής, οὐκ ἐμμένει τῷ λόγῳ
 διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι, οὗτος δὲ, διὰ τὸ ἦττόν τι· ὁ δ'
 ἐγκρατής ἐμμένει, καὶ οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον μεταβάλλει.
 δεῖ δὲ, εἴπερ ἡ ἐγκράτεια σπουδαῖον, ἀμφοτέρας τὰς
 ἐναντίας ἕξεις φαύλας εἶναι ὥσπερ καὶ φαίνονται. 15
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ, τὴν ἐτέραν ἐν ὀλίγοις καὶ ὀλιγάκις
 εἶναι φανεράν· ὥσπερ ἡ σωφροσύνη τῇ ἀκολασίᾳ
 δοκεῖ ἐναντίον εἶναι μόνον, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια τῇ
 ἀκρασίᾳ.

See c. i. §.
 iv. 4. and
 §. v. 5.

- X. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ὁμοιότητα πολλὰ λέγεται· καὶ 20
 ἡ ΕΓΚΡΑΤΕΙΑ ἢ ΤΟΥ ΣΩΦΡΟΝΟΣ ΚΑΘ' ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ
 ἠκολούθηκεν. ὅ τε γὰρ ἐγκρατής, οἷος μὴδὲν παρὰ
 τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν· καὶ ὁ
 σώφρων· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἔχων, ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔχων, φαύλας
 ἐπιθυμίας· καὶ ὁ μὲν, τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἡδεσθαι παρὰ 25
 τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ', οἷος ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.
 ὅμοιοι δὲ, καὶ ὁ ἀκρατής καὶ ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἕτερον
 μὲν ὄντες· ἀμφοτέροι δὲ τὰ σωματικὰ ἡδέα διώκουσιν·
 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν, καὶ οἰόμενος δεῖν, ὁ δ', οὐκ οἰόμενος.

See c. i. §.
 iv. 5. and
 §. v. 3, 4.

- XI. Οὐδ' ἄμα φρονιμον καὶ ἀκρατὴ ἐνδέχεται 30
 εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν. ἄμα γὰρ φρόνιμος, καὶ σπουδαῖος
 τὸ ἦθος, δέδεικται ἄν. ἔτι, οὐ τῷ εἰδέναι μόνον φρό-

νιμος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ πρακτικός· ὁ δ' ἀκρατής, οὐ
 πρακτικός. τὸν δὲ ΔΕΙΝΟΝ, οὐδὲν καλύει ἀκρατῆ
 εἶναι. διὸ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἐνίοτε φρόνιμοι μὲν εἶναί
 τινες, ἀκρατεῖς δέ· διὰ τὸ, τὴν δεινότητα διαφέρειν
 5 τῆς φρονήσεως τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις See B. VI. c.
 λόγοις, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν λόγον ἐγγὺς εἶναι, δια-
 φέρειν δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ, ὡς ὁ εἰδὼς See c. ii.
 καὶ θεωρῶν· ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ καθεύδων ἢ οἰνωμένος. §. v.

XII. Καὶ ἐκῶν μὲν· (τρόπον γὰρ τινα ΕΙΔΩΣ,
 10 καὶ ὃ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα·) πονηρὸς δ' οὗ. ἡ γὰρ προ-
 αίρεσις ἐπιεικής· ὡσθ' ἩΜΙΠΟΝΗΡΟΣ. καὶ οὐκ ἄδικος.
 οὐ γὰρ ἐπίβουλος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἐμμενετικός
 οἷς ἂν βουλεύσῃται· ὁ δὲ μελαγχολικός, οὐδὲ βου-
 λευτικός ὅλως. καὶ ἔοικε δὴ ὁ ἀκρατής πόλει, ἢ
 15 ψηφίζεται μὲν ἅπαντα τὰ δέοντα, καὶ νόμους ἔχει
 σπουδαίους· χρῆται δὲ οὐδέν. ὡσπερ Ἀναξανδρίδης
 ἔσκαψεν·

ἡ πόλις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει.

ὁ δὲ πονηρὸς, χρωμένη μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, πονηροῖς δὲ
 20 χρωμένη.

XIII. Ἔστι δ' ἀκρασία, καὶ ἐγκράτεια, περὶ See c. iv. §.
 τὸ ὑΠΕΡΒΑΛΛΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ἘΞΕΩΣ. ὁ μὲν i. of this
 γὰρ ἐμμένει μᾶλλον, ὁ δ' ἥττον, τῆς τῶν πλείστων book.
 δυνάμεως.

25 XIV. ΕΥΓΙΑΤΟΤΕΡΑ δὲ τῶν ἀκρασιῶν, ἢν οἱ μελαγ- See §. i. of
 χολικοί ἀκρατεύονται, τῶν βουλευομένων μὲν μὴ this chap.
 ἐμμενόντων δέ. καὶ οἱ δι' ἐθισμοῦ ἀκρατεῖς, τῶν
 φυσικῶν. ῥᾶον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινήσαι, φύσεως. διὰ
 γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῇ φύσει ΕΟΙΚΕΝ.
 30 ὡσπερ καὶ Εὐήνος λέγει·

φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην ἔμεναι, φίλε, καὶ δὴ ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτώσαν φύσιν εἶναι.

Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐγκράτεια, καὶ τί ἀκρασία, καὶ τί καρτερία, καὶ τί μαλακία· καὶ πῶς ἔχουσιν αἱ ἕξεις αὐταὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας· εἴρηται. 5

CHAP. VI.

ON PLEASURE.

PART I.

A STATEMENT AND EXAMINATION OF OPINIONS
RELATING TO THIS SUBJECT.

- 12 I. Περὶ δὲ ἠΔΟΝΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΛΥΠΗΣ ΘΕΩΡΗΣΑΙ, τοῦ
 See B. I. τὴν πολιτικὴν φιλοσοφοῦντος. οὗτος γὰρ τοῦ ΤΕΛΟΥΣ
 c. i. §. vii, ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΩΝ, πρὸς ὃ βλέποντες, ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν
 viii. κακὸν, τὸ δ' ἀγαθόν, ἀπλῶς λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ, καὶ
 τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτῶν. τὴν τε 10
 See B. II. γὰρ ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν κακίαν τὴν ἠθικὴν, ΠΕΡΙ ΛΥΠΑΣ
 c. i. §. xv. ΚΑΙ ἠΔΟΝΑΣ ΕΘΕΜΕΝ. καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι ΠΛΕΙ-
 See B. I. ΣΤΟΙ ΜΕΘ' ἠΔΟΝΗΣ εἶναί φασιν· διὸ καὶ, τὸν μα-
 c. ii. §. vi. κάριον ἄνομάκασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν.
 and c. iii. §. xiii, xv.

II. 1. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ ΟΥΔΕΜΙΑ ἠΔΟΝΗ ΕἶΝΑΙ 15
 ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ, οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτόν, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἠδονήν.

2. Τοῖς δ', ΕΝΙΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΕἶΝΑΙ, Αἱ ΔΕ ΠΟΛΛΑΙ
 ΦΑΥΛΑΙ.

3. Ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον· εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, 20
 ὅμως ΜΗ ΕΝΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ ΕἶΝΑΙ ΤΟ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ ἠΔΟΝΗΝ.

III. 1. Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν· ὅτι πᾶσα
 ἠδονὴ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΕἰΣ ΦΥΣΙΝ Αἰσθητῆ· οὐδεμία
 δὲ γένεσις, συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν· οἷον, οὐδεμία οἰκο-
 δόμησις οἰκία. 25

2. Ἔστι, ὁ ΣΩΦΡΩΝ ΦΕΥΓΕΙ τὰς ἡδονάς.

3. Ἔστι, ὁ Φρόνιμος τὸ ἀλύπητον διώκει, οὐ τὸ ἡδύ.

4. Ἔστι, ἐμποδίων τῷ φρονεῖν αἱ ἡδοναί, καὶ ὅσῳ μᾶλλον χαίρει, μᾶλλον οἶον, τὴν τῶν ἀφρο-
5 δισίων· οὐδένα γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι νοῆσαι τι ἐν αὐτῇ.

5. Ἔστι, τεχνη οὐδεμία ἡδονῆς· καίτοι πᾶν ἀγαθὸν τέχνης ἔργον.

6. Ἔστι, παιδία καὶ θηρία διώκει τὰς ἡδονάς.

7. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ πάσας σπουδαίας· ὅτι εἰσὶ καὶ
10 αἰσχραὶ καὶ ονειδίζομεναι, καὶ ἔτι βλαβεραὶ· νο-
σῶν γὰρ ἕνια τῶν ἡδέων.

8. Ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἀριστὸν ἡ ἡδονή· ὅτι οὐ τέλος,
ἀλλὰ γενεσις.

IV. Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα σχεδὸν ταῦτ' ἐστίν.

15 Ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα, μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, 13
μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστόν· ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον.

V. Πρῶτον μὲν· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν διχῶς· (τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ τινί·) καὶ αἱ φύσεις, καὶ αἱ
ἕξεις, ἀκολουθήσουσιν ὥστε καὶ, αἱ κινήσεις καὶ
20 αἱ γενεσις. καὶ αἱ φαῦλαι δοκοῦσαι εἶναι, αἱ μὲν
ἀπλῶς φαῦλαι, τινὶ δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' αἰρεταὶ τῶνδε· ἕνια
δ' οὐδὲ τῶνδε, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, αἰρεταὶ
δ' οὐ· αἱ δ' οὐτ' ἡδοναί, ἀλλὰ φαίνονται ὅσαι
μετὰ λύπης, καὶ ἰατρείας ἕνεκεν, οἶον. αἱ τῶν καμ-
25 νότων.

VI. Ἔστι, ἐπεὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ μὲν ἐνέργεια, τὸ δ'
ἕξις· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱ καθίστασαι εἰς τὴν φυ-
σικὴν ἕξιν ἡδεῖαί εἰσιν, ἔστι δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν ταῖς
ἐπιθυμίαις τῆς ὑπολοπιῶν ἕξεως καὶ φύξεως.
30 ἐπεὶ καὶ ἀνεῦ λύπης καὶ ἐπιθυμίας, εἰσὶν ἡδοναί·
οἶον, αἱ τοῦ θεωρεῖν ἐνέργειαί· τῆς φύσεως οὐκ ἐνδεοῦς
οὔσης.

VII. Σημείον δ', ὅτι οὐ τῶ αὐτῶ χαίρουσιν ἡδέϊ, ἀναπληρουμένης τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθεστηκυίας· ἀλλὰ καθεστηκυίας μὲν, τοῖς ἄπλωσ ἡδέσιν, ἀναπληρουμένης δὲ, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ γὰρ ὀξέσι καὶ πικροῖς χαίρουσιν· ὧν οὐδὲν, οὔτε φύσει ἡδύ, 5 οὔθ' ἀπλῶς ἡδύ. ὥστ' οὐδ' ἡδοναί. ὡς γὰρ τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς ἄλληλα συνέστηκεν· οὕτω καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τούτων.

VIII. Ἔτι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερον τι εἶναι βελτίον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς 10 γενέσεως. οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν, οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως, πᾶσαι· ἀλλ' ἐνεργεῖαι καὶ τέλος. οὐδὲ γινόμενων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμένων. καὶ τέλος οὐ πάσων ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. 15

IX. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ, αἰσθητὴν γενέσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεπτέον, ἐνεργεῖαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως· ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς αἰσθητῆς, ἀνεμποδιστόν. δοκεῖ δὲ γενέσις τις εἶναι, ὅτι κυρίως ἀγαθόν. τὴν γὰρ ἐνεργεῖαν, γενέ- 20 σιν οἴονται εἶναι. ἔστι δ' ἕτερον.

X. Τὸ δ' εἶναι φαύλας, ὅτι νοσηρὰ ἐνια ἡδέα· τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ, ὅτι ὑγιεινὰ ἐνια φαῦλα πρὸς χρηματισμόν. ταύτη οὖν φαῦλα ἄμφω. ἀλλ' οὐ φαῦλα κατὰ γε τοῦτο· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ποτὲ βλάπτει 25 πρὸς ὑγίειαν.

XI. Ἐμποδίζει δὲ οὔτε φρονήσει, οὔθ' ἔξει οὐδεμιᾶ, ἢ ἀφ' ἑκάστης ἡδονῆς· ἀλλ' αἱ ἀλλοτριαί. ἐπεὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν, μᾶλλον ποιοῦσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν. 30

XII. Τὸ δὲ ΤΕΧΝΗΣ μὴ εἶναι ἔργον ἡδονῆν μηδεμίαν, εὐλόγως συμβέβηκεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλης ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΣ οὐδεμιᾶς τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ. καίτοι καὶ ἡ μυρεψικὴ τέχνη, καὶ ἡ ὀψοποιητικὴ, ὅδοκεῖ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.

XIII. Τὸ δὲ τὸν σώφρονα φεύγειν, καὶ τὸν φρόνιμον διάκειν τὸν ΑΛΥΠΟΝ βίον· καὶ τὸ τὰ παιδία καὶ τὰ θηρία διάκειν· τῷ αὐτῷ λύεται πάντα. ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἴρηται, πῶς ἀγαθαὶ ἀπλῶς, καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἀγαθαί, 10 πᾶσαι αἱ ἡδοναί· τὰς τοιαύτας τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰ παιδία διάκει, καὶ τὴν τούτων ἀλυπίαν ὁ φρόνιμος. τὰς δ' ἐπιθυμίας καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικὰς· (τοι- ^{τὰς μετ'} αὐταὶ γὰρ αὐταί·) ^{ἐπιθυμίας} καὶ τὰς τούτων ὑπερβολὰς, ^{καὶ λύπης} καὶ τὰς. φεύγει· καθ' ^α αἷς, ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἀκόλαστος. διὸ ὁ ^α ὑπερβολὰς ^{καθ'.} 15 σώφρων φεύγει ταύτας. ἐπεὶ εἰσὶν ἡδοναὶ καὶ σώφρωνος.

PART II.

ON THE QUALITY OF PLEASURE, IN RELATION TO THE GENERAL OBJECTS OF HUMAN PURSUIT, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE SOVEREIGN GOOD.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ μὲν, ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακὸν, ὁμολο- 14 γεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ, ἀπλῶς κακόν· ἡ δὲ, τῷ πῆ ἐμποδιστικὴ. τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἢ 20 φευκτόν τε καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν ΤΗΝ ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις· “ ὥσπερ τὸ μείζον τῷ ἐλάττονι, καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ, ἐναντίον.” οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη, ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

XV. ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί· ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα, ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ

ἐκάστης ἕξέως εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμποδιστοί, εἴθ' ἢ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, εἴτε ἢ τινὸς αὐτῶν· ἂν ἢ ΑΝΕΜΠΟΔΙΣΤΟΣ, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε ΕΙΗ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ἮΔΟΝΗ ΤΟ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, 5 ἀπλῶς.

XVI. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἶονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν· εὐλόγως. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος, ἐμποδιζομένη ἢ δ' εὐδαιμονία, τῶν τελείων. διὸ 10 ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΤΑΙ Ὁ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς, καὶ τῆς τύχης· ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζεται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον, καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα, εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ἢ ἀγαθός· ἢ ἐκόντες, ἢ ἄκοντες, οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. 15

XVII. Διὰ δὲ τὸ ΠΡΟΣΔΕΙΣΘΑΙ τῆς τύχης, δοκεῖ 20
 See B. I. 17. 17. τισὶ ΤΑΥΤΟΝ ΕἶΝΑΙ Ἡ ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑ Τῆ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ, οὐκ οὔσα. ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ, ὑπερβάλλουσα, ΕΜΠΟΔΙΟΣ ἐστὶν· καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΝ καλεῖν δίκαιον. πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς.

XVIII. Καὶ τὸ διάκειν δ' ἅπαντα, καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους, τὴν ἡδονὴν· σημειῖόν τι, τοῦ ΕἶΝΑΙ ΠΩΣ ΤΟ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ.

φήμη δ' οὐ τί γε πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἢν τινα λαοὶ πολλοί. . .

25

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ, οὔτε φύσις, οὔθ' ἕξις, [ἢ ἀρίστη] οὔτ' ἐστὶν, οὔτε δοκεῖ· οὐδ' ἡδονὴν διάκουσι ΤΗΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ πάντες· ἮΔΟΝΗΝ μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἢν οἶονται, οὐδ' ἢν ἂν φαίεν· ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν. πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. 30

XIX. Ἄλλ' εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ κληρονομίαν αἱ ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΑΙ ἡδοναί, διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτάς, καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν.

διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας, μόνας οἶ-
ονται εἶναι.

XX. Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, μὴ ἡδονή.
καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια· οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
5 τίνας γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ,
οὔτ' ἀγαθόν, ἢ ΛΥΠΗ, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἩΔΟΝΗ. ὥστε διὰ τί
ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ
μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

PART III.

CONTAINING SEVERAL DETACHED QUESTIONS AND
POSITIONS RELATING TO PLEASURE.

10 XXI. Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν, ἐπι-
σκεπτόεν τοῖς λέγουσιν· “ὅτι ἐνιαί γε ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ
σφόδρα, οἷον αἱ καλαὶ, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ σωματικαί,
καὶ περὶ αἷς ὁ ἀκόλαστος.”

XXII. Διὰ τί οὖν αἱ ENANTIAI ΛΥΠΑΙ μοχθηραί; See B. V.
c. i. §. ii.
15 κακῶ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ENANTION.

XXIII. Ἡ ΟΥΤΩΣ ΑΓΑΘΑΙ Αἱ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΑΙ, ὅτι καὶ
τὸ ΜΗ ΚΑΚΟΝ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν; ἢ ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟΥ ἀγαθαί;

XXIV. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔΞΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΝ, ὅΣΩΝ
ΜΗ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΥ ΒΕΛΤΙΟΝΟΣ^a ὑπερβολή, οὐδὲ τῆς^a See p. 227,
line 5.
20 ἩΔΟΝΗΣ· ὅσων δ' ἐστὶ, καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐστίν. τῶν δὲ
σωματικῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ὑπερβολή· καὶ ὁ φαῦλος,
τῷ διάκειν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς ΑΝΑΓ-
ΚΑΙΑΣ. πάντες γὰρ χαίρουσί πῶς, καὶ ὄψοις, καὶ οἴνοις,
καὶ ἀφροδισίοις· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἄς δεῖ.

25 XXV. Ἐναντίας δ' ἐπὶ τῆς ΛΥΠΗΣ. οὐ γὰρ τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν φεύγει, ἀλλ' ὅλως. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ

See B. V. c. i. §. ii. ὑπερβολῇ λύπη ENANTIA, ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ διώκοντι τὴν ὑπερβολήν.

15 XXVI. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον δεῖ ἴΑΛΗΘΕΣ εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΤΟ ΑἴΤΙΟΝ ΤΟΥ ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ· (τοῦτο γὰρ 5 συμβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν πίστιν. ὅταν γὰρ εὐλογον φανῇ τὸ, διὰ τί φαίνεται ἀληθές οὐκ ὄν ἀληθές, πιστεύειν ποιεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ μᾶλλον. ὥστε) λεκτέον, ΔΙΑ ΤΙ ΦΑΙΝΟΝΤΑΙ Αἶ ΣΩΜΑΤΙΚΑΙ ἩΔΟΝΑΙ ΑἶΡΕΤΩ- 10 ΤΕΡΑΙ.

XXVII. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δὴ, ὅτι ΕΚΚΡΟΤΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΛΥΠΗΝ. καὶ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῆς λύπης, ὡς οὔσης ἰατρείας, τὴν ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν, καὶ ὅλως τὴν σωματικὴν. σφοδραὶ δὲ γίνονται αἱ ἰατρεῖαι. διὸ καὶ διώκονται, διὰ τὸ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΟ ΕΝΑΝ- 15 ΤΙΟΝ ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ. καὶ ΟΥ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ δὴ δοκεῖ ἢ ἡδονὴν, διὰ δύο ταῦτα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· ὅτι αἱ μὲν, φαύλης φύσεώς εἰσι πράξεις, ἢ ἐκ γενετῆς, ὥσπερ θηρίου, ἢ δι' ἔθος, οἷον, αἱ τῶν φαύλων ἀνθρώπων· αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι, ὅτι ἐνδεοῦς, καὶ ΕΧΕΙΝ βέλτιον ἢ ΓΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ, 20 αἱ δὲ συμβαίνουσι τελευμένων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν σπουδαῖαι.

XXVIII. Ἔτι, ΔΙΩΚΟΝΤΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΣΦΟΔΡΑΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ὙΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΑΛΛΑΙΣ ΜΗ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΝΩΝ ΧΑΙΡΕΙΝ. αὐτοὶ γοῦν αὐτοῖς δίψας τινὰς παρασκευάζουσιν. ὅταν μὲν 25 οὖν ἀβλαβεῖς, ἀνεπιτίμητον. ὅταν δὲ βλαβεράς, φαῦλον. οὔτε γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἕτερα, ἐφ' οἷς χαίρουσιν· τό τε ΜΗΔΕΤΕΡΟΝ, πολλοῖς λυπηρὸν διὰ τὴν φύσιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ πονεῖ τὸ ζῶον. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ΦΥΣΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ μαρτυροῦσι, τὸ ὄραν καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν φάσκοντες εἶναι 30 λυπηρὸν· ἀλλ' ἤδη συνήθεις ἐσμὲν, ὡς φασίν.

XXIX. Ὁμοίως δ', ἐν μὲν τῇ ΝΕΟΤΗΤΙ, διὰ τὴν αὐξήσιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνωμένοι διάκεινται· καὶ ἡδὺ ἢ νεότης.

XXX. Οἱ δὲ ΜΕΛΑΓΧΟΛΙΚΟΙ ΤΗΝ ΦΥΣΙΝ, αἰεὶ δέονται ἰατρείας. καὶ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δακνόμενον διατελεῖ, διὰ τὴν κρᾶσιν, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐν ὀρέξει σφοδρᾶ εἰσίν· ἐξελαύνει δὲ ἡδονὴ λύπην, ἢ τ' ἐναντία, καὶ ἡ 5 τυχοῦσα, ἐὰν ἢ ἰσχυρά. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἀκόλαστοι καὶ φαῦλοι γίνονται.

XXXI. 'ΑΙ Δ' ΑΝΕΥ ΛΥΠΩΝ Οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὑπερβολήν· See §. xxiv.
αὐται δὲ, 'ΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΦΥΣΕΙ ἩΔΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜ- of this chap.
ΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ. λέγω δὲ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ ἡδέα, ΤΑ
10 ΙΑΤΡΕΥΟΝΤΑ. ὅτι γὰρ συμβαίνει ἰατρεύεσθαι, τοῦ
ὑπομένουτος ὑγιουῶς πράττοντός τι· διὰ τοῦτο ἡδὺ
δοκεῖ εἶναι. ΦΥΣΕΙ Δ' ἡδέα, 'Α ΠΟΙΕΙ ΠΡΑΞΙΝ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΙ-
ΑΣΔΕ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ.

XXXII. ΟΥΚ ΑΕΙ Δ' ΟΥΘΕΝ ἩΔΥ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ, διὰ
15 τὸ ΜΗ ἈΠΛΗΝ ἩΜΩΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΦΥΣΙΝ, ἀλλ' ἐνεῖναί
τι καὶ ἕτερον, καθὸ φθαρτά. ὥστε, ἂν τι θάτερον
πράττη, τοῦτο τῇ ἑτέρᾳ φύσει παρὰ φύσιν· ὅταν
δ' ἰσάζῃ, οὔτε λυπηρὸν δοκεῖ, οὔθ' ἡδὺ, τὸ πρατ-
τόμενον. ἐπεὶ, εἴ του ἡ φύσις ἀπλῆ εἴη· αἰεὶ ἡ αὐτὴ
20 πρᾶξις ἡδίστη ἔσται. διὸ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ μίαν καὶ
ἀπλῆν χαίρει ἡδονήν. εὐ γὰρ μόνον ΚΙΝΗΣΕΩΣ
ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΑΚΙΝΗΣΙΑΣ· καὶ ἡδονὴ
μᾶλλον ἐν ἨΡΕΜΙΑ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐν κινήσει. μεταβολὴ
δὲ πάντων γλυκύτερον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν, ΔΙΑ ΠΟ-
25 ΝΗΡΙΑΝ ΤΙΝΑ. ὥσπερ γὰρ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ εὐμετάβολος
ὁ πονηρός· καὶ ἡ ΦΥΣΙΣ ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς. οὐ
γὰρ ἀπλῆ, οὔδ' ἐπιεικής.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐγκρατείας, καὶ ἀκρασίας· καὶ περὶ
ἡδονῆς, καὶ λύπης· εἴρηται· καὶ τί ἕκαστον· καὶ
30 πῶς τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ κακά. λοιπὸν
δὲ καὶ περὶ ΦΙΛΙΑΣ ἐροῦμεν.

The first part of the book is devoted to a general history of the United States from its discovery to the present time. It is divided into three volumes, the first of which contains the history of the continent from its discovery to the establishment of the first colonies.

The second volume contains the history of the colonies from their establishment to the declaration of independence. It is divided into two parts, the first of which contains the history of the colonies from their establishment to the year 1763, and the second part contains the history of the colonies from 1763 to the declaration of independence.

The third volume contains the history of the United States from the declaration of independence to the present time. It is divided into two parts, the first of which contains the history of the United States from the declaration of independence to the year 1800, and the second part contains the history of the United States from 1800 to the present time.

The fourth volume contains the history of the United States from the year 1800 to the present time. It is divided into two parts, the first of which contains the history of the United States from the year 1800 to the year 1850, and the second part contains the history of the United States from 1850 to the present time.

The fifth volume contains the history of the United States from the year 1850 to the present time. It is divided into two parts, the first of which contains the history of the United States from the year 1850 to the year 1880, and the second part contains the history of the United States from 1880 to the present time.

BOOK VIII.

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SUMMARY OF THE EIGHTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES THE CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP.

This chapter consists of two parts. The first expounds the reasons for embracing in the present treatise a consideration of FRIENDSHIP: the second states the most remarkable doubts and questions connected with the subject.

PART THE FIRST.

I, II, III, IV, V. Reasons which shew the necessity, towards the purpose of this treatise, of examining the subject of FRIENDSHIP.

PART THE SECOND.

VI. The opinion of those, who hold that friendship is founded on SIMILARITY. VII. The opinion of those, who hold that friendship is founded on DISSIMILARITY, or CONTRARIETY.

VIII. Waving other questions, those which Aristotle intends to consider, are such as practically relate to human life, and to the morals and affections of mankind.

IX. A false notion relating to one of these questions is briefly dismissed.

CHAP. II.

IN WHICH THE TRUE NOTION OF FRIENDSHIP IS FIXED
AND ASCERTAINED.

I. The first step towards a definition of friendship is taken, by a regard to the MOTIVE of it: which motive has in view, one of these THREE objects; namely, GOODNESS, PLEASURE, OR UTILITY. II. Of these three, the two former are desired as ENDS; the latter, only as a MEAN. III. By the advantage which forms the motive of friendship, we do not mean an ABSOLUTE but a RELATIVE good; nor one which is REAL, but one which APPEARS SUCH to the individual.

IV. The next step is taken, by a regard to the SUBJECTS between whom friendship exists. From this class are excluded, first, inanimate things; secondly, persons between whom there is benevolence without reciprocity; thirdly, persons whose benevolence is mutual, but unknown to each other. The definition of friendship is given: MUTUAL BENEVOLENCE, KNOWN TO THE PERSONS BETWEEN WHOM IT EXISTS.



CHAP. III.

IN WHICH IS PROPOUNDED A FIRST DIVISION OF FRIENDSHIP, INTO THREE KINDS; AND IN WHICH THESE KINDS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER IN THEIR ESSENTIAL QUALITIES AND CHARACTERS.

I. According to the foregoing division of the motives of friendship, the kinds of friendship are declared to be three: namely, FRIENDSHIPS of VIRTUE, of PLEASURE, and of UTILITY. II. Of these, the two latter are only ACCIDENTAL. III: And it flows from their nature, that they are liable to be EASILY BROKEN OFF. IV. Friendships of utility prevail most among the OLD. V. Friendships of pleasure prevail most among the YOUNG. VI. The friendship of VIRTUE is the only perfect and ESSENTIAL friendship. VII. The comprehensive excellence of this kind of friendship is deduced, from COMPARING it with the other two kinds. VIII. It flows from the nature of this kind of friendship, that it will be of RARE OCCURRENCE.

IX. Friendships of utility and of pleasure derive their character as friendships, only from their SIMILITUDE to friendships of virtue. X. With regard to friendships of utility and pleasure: they will be most permanent, when the advantages experienced by the two friends are not only of the same KIND, but also derived from the same SOURCE. XI. But even on this footing, friendships of UTILITY will, of all the three kinds, be the LEAST PERMANENT. XII. Friendships of UTILITY and PLEASURE may be formed PROMISCUOUSLY; but those of VIRTUE will be confined to the virtuous. XIII. It will very rarely occur, that the SAME FRIENDSHIP will be grounded on BOTH UTILITY AND PLEASURE.

XIV. Recapitulation of foregoing matters.

XV. The distinction which has been already applied to VIRTUE, between a HABIT and an OPERATION, is here applied to FRIENDSHIP. XVI. From this distinction is deduced, the great importance of SOCIAL INTERCOURSE to friendship: since it is social intercourse, which makes the difference between the HABIT and the OPERATION. XVII. It is thus explained, why friendship is rare, when intercourse is repulsive; and why the friendship of VIRTUE is more firm than any other.

XVIII. A distinction is here made between FRIENDSHIP and ATTACHMENT.

XIX. Cases in which there may be MUTUAL BENEVOLENCE WITHOUT FRIENDSHIP.

XX. The friendships of UTILITY and PLEASURE will admit of MANY friends. The friendship of VIRTUE will admit only of FEW.

XXI. The friendship of PLEASURE is more LIBERAL, and more allied to the friendship of virtue, than the friendship of UTILITY is.

XXII. The principle on which the friends of great men are selected.

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH IS PROPOUNDED A SECOND DIVISION OF FRIENDSHIP, INTO TWO KINDS.

I. Friendships are again divided into two kinds; EQUAL and UNEQUAL. II. UNEQUAL friendships are subdivided into many kinds, with reference to the difference of MOTIVES, SOCIAL RELATIONS, and DUTIES.

III. The true principle belonging to the constitution and maintenance of such friendships, is PROPORTION: for this serves as a SUBSTITUTE FOR EQUALITY.

IV. The difference between JUSTICE and FRIENDSHIP, with regard to equality and proportion.

V. A VERY GREAT degree of INEQUALITY is wholly incompatible with friendship.

(VI. A collateral question arising out of the last section.)

VII. The character of the FLATTERER is explained, on the principle which has been laid down relating to unequal friendships.

VIII. But this explanation does not warrant a supposition, that the motives for DESIRING KINDNESS, and those for DESIRING HONOUR, are the same.

IX. Friendship consists in the EXERCISE, more than in the EXPERIENCE, of kindness. X. It is therefore the exercise of kindness, which constitutes the VIRTUE of friendship: XI. And which, when regulated by proportion, INTRODUCES AN EQUALITY into friendships, which are IN THEMSELVES UNEQUAL. XII. On this principle it will appear, that the friendships of VIRTUE, though in themselves UNEQUAL, are most capable of BEING EQUALISED, and are therefore of the most ABIDING nature^a.

XIII. With reference to a question stated in the first chapter, it is here collaterally noted; that if there BE any friendships founded on CONTRARIETY, they must belong to the class of friendships of UTILITY. An error relating to this subject is exposed.

^a Thus, for example, in the case of friendship between RICH AND POOR: the inequality is removed, by balancing the greater RESPECT AND OBEYANCE of the poor against the greater POSSESSIONS of the rich: but riches are uncertain, and SUCH a friendship will therefore continue, only so long as the RICHES do. But the case of VIRTUE is different: for this, according to Aristotle, is the most PERMANENT of all human things: and therefore, the friendships established on this basis, whether originally EQUAL, or EQUALISED by proportion, will be MOST PERMANENT. See B. I. c. iv. §. x.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP IS CONSIDERED, WITH REGARD TO THE VARIOUS FORMS AND DEGREES IN WHICH IT ENTERS INTO THE SEVERAL VARIETIES OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION AND COMMUNITY.

This chapter consists of four parts. The first exhibits a general view of COMMUNITIES. The second exhibits a general view of POLITICAL COMMUNITIES. The third shews, how far the element of friendship intermingles with Political communities. The fourth shews, how far it intermingles with the various other Associations and Relations of mankind.

PART THE FIRST.

I. FRIENDSHIP belongs to every form of SOCIAL COMMUNITY: a property which it has in common with JUSTICE. II. These forms being various, the kinds and duties of friendship will vary in proportion to them. III. All OTHER FORMS of human community, are so many separate PORTIONS of the POLITICAL: and the political community has in view, the GENERAL UTILITY of its members. IV. In like manner, and consequently, PARTICULAR COMMUNITIES have in view some PARTICULAR UTILITY. V. Nevertheless it is acknowledged, that some particular communities SEEM to have for their object, PLEASURE, as distinguished from UTILITY. VI. But these communities are still comprehended, as PORTIONS, within the political community.

PART THE SECOND.

VII. There are THREE KINDS of POLITICAL COMMUNITY: each of which is subject to its peculiar DEPRAVATION. VIII. These forms of government are MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, and TIMOCRACY. IX. Of these, the BEST is MONARCHY, and the WORST is TIMOCRACY. X. The depravation of monarchy is DESPOTISM. The difference between the two. XI. The depravation of aristocracy is OLIGARCHY. The difference between the two. XII. The depravation of timocracy is DEMOCRACY. The difference between the two.

XIII. These political communities have their similitudes in the relations of domestic life.

PART THE THIRD.

XIV. Each kind of POLITICAL COMMUNITY has its appropriate kind of FRIENDSHIP. XV. The nature of the friendship, belonging to the relations BETWEEN KING AND SUBJECTS, FATHER AND CHILDREN. XVI. The nature of the friendship, belonging to the relations between HUSBAND AND WIFE, ARISTOCRACY AND PLEBEIANS. These, and the foregoing, are cases of UNEQUAL friendship: in which it is required, that the friendship should be equalised, by making the respect of the less person proportionate to the superiority of the greater. XVII. The nature of the friendship belonging to the mutual relation of BROTHERS and COMPANIONS, and of the MEMBERS OF A TIMOCRACY to each other. This is a friendship of EQUALITY.

XVIII. Of all the DEPRAVATIONS of political communities, the nature is such, that very little friendship can subsist in connexion with any of the social relations which they comprehend.

PART THE FOURTH.

XIX. Certain forms of human association which differ from the general character of communities. XX, XXII. Grounds and character of friendship between PARENTS AND CHILDREN. XXI, XXIII. Grounds and character of friendship between BROTHERS and more remote KINDRED. XXIV, XXV. Grounds and character of the friendship which belongs to the MARRIED STATE.

XXVI. The rules of intercourse belonging to the relations of FRIENDSHIP, are the same with those belonging to the relations of JUSTICE.

 CHAP. VI.

ON THE CAUSES WHICH LEAD TO THE DISTURBANCE OF FRIENDSHIP.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first enunciates a leading and important principle, which Aristotle, in treating of friendship, has frequent occasion to apply. The second discovers the sources of quarrel in equal friendships. The third, in unequal.

PART THE FIRST.

I. In order to the maintenance of friendship, in EQUAL friendships there must be an equality of kindness; in UNEQUAL, the disparity must be equalised by a PROPORTIONATE return on the part of the inferior.

PART THE SECOND.

II. In friendships of VIRTUE, quarrels are impossible. III. Nor can they very easily occur in friendships of PLEASURE. IV. The friendship of UTILITY is that, MOST LIABLE to the disturbance of quarrels.

V. Towards explaining this matter, there is suggested, a distinction between MORAL and CONVENTIONAL friendship. VI. The CONVENTIONAL is not very liable to quarrels. VII. The MORAL is. VIII. The reason why it is. IX. A practical direction of duty relating to this latter case.

X. The question is proposed: Whether the return of a kindness is to be fixed, in its amount, by a regard to the MERIT OF THE DOER, or to the ADVANTAGE OF THE RECEIVER? It is answered thus: in friendships of UTILITY, by the advantage of the receiver; in friendships of VIRTUE, by the PURPOSE OF THE DOER.

PART THE THIRD.

XI. UNEQUAL friendships are also liable to quarrel. XII. Feelings on the part of the SUPERIOR, which lead to this result. XIII. Feelings on the part of the INFERIOR, which lead to this result. XIV. BOTH are right in their pretensions: and the true adjustment of the case, on the principle of proportion, is, that the SUPERIOR ought to have more HONOUR and the INFERIOR more ADVANTAGE. XV. This principle is exemplified in the case of POLITICAL COMMUNITIES.

XVI. The measure of the return must, in some cases, be determined by the POWER OF THE RECEIVER: for it will occur, that an EQUIVALENT is NOT in his power.

XVII. Consideration of a particular case, connected with the relation of father and son.

CHAPTER IV

The first of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a homogeneous one. It is a collection of many different peoples, each with its own history, customs, and traditions. This diversity is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

CHAPTER V

The second of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a static one. It is constantly changing and evolving. The boundaries of the Empire are constantly shifting, and the nature of the Empire is constantly changing. This is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The third of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a homogeneous one. It is a collection of many different peoples, each with its own history, customs, and traditions. This diversity is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The fourth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a static one. It is constantly changing and evolving. The boundaries of the Empire are constantly shifting, and the nature of the Empire is constantly changing. This is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The fifth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a homogeneous one. It is a collection of many different peoples, each with its own history, customs, and traditions. This diversity is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The sixth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a static one. It is constantly changing and evolving. The boundaries of the Empire are constantly shifting, and the nature of the Empire is constantly changing. This is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The seventh of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a homogeneous one. It is a collection of many different peoples, each with its own history, customs, and traditions. This diversity is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The eighth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a static one. It is constantly changing and evolving. The boundaries of the Empire are constantly shifting, and the nature of the Empire is constantly changing. This is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The ninth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a homogeneous one. It is a collection of many different peoples, each with its own history, customs, and traditions. This diversity is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

The tenth of these is the fact that the British Empire is not a static one. It is constantly changing and evolving. The boundaries of the Empire are constantly shifting, and the nature of the Empire is constantly changing. This is one of the strengths of the Empire, but it also presents a challenge to the idea of a single, unified British identity.

CHAP. I.

WHICH INTRODUCES THE CONSIDERATION OF
FRIENDSHIP.

PART I.

REASONS FOR EMBRACING IN THE PRESENT TREATISE
A CONSIDERATION OF FRIENDSHIP.

I. ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα, περὶ ΦΙΛΙΑΣ ἔποιτ' ἂν δι-
ελθεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ΑΡΕΤΗ τις, ἢ ΜΕΤ' ἀρετῆς.

II. Ἔτι δ', ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΕἰΣ ΤΟΝ ΒΙΟΝ. ἄνευ
γὰρ φίλων οὐδεὶς ἔλοιτ' ἂν ζῆν, ἔχων τὰ λοιπὰ
ἀγαθὰ πάντα. καὶ γὰρ πλουτοῦσι, καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ
5 δυναστείας κεκτημένοις, δοκεῖ φίλων μάλιστα εἶναι
χρεία. τί γὰρ ὄφελος τῆς τοιαύτης εὐετηρίας, ἀφ-
αιρεθείσης εὐεργεσίας; ἢ γίγνεται μάλιστα, καὶ
ἐπαινετατάτη, πρὸς φίλους. ἢ πῶς ἂν τηρηθεῖ καὶ
10 σώζοιτ', ἄνευ φίλων; ὅσα γὰρ πλείων, τοσούτω ἐπι-
σφαλεστέρα. ἐν πενίᾳ τε, καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς δυστυ-
χίαις, μόνην οἴονται καταφυγὴν εἶναι τοὺς φίλους.
καὶ νέοις δὲ, πρὸς τὸ ἀναμάρτητον· καὶ πρεσβυτέ-
ροις, πρὸς θεραπείαν, καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τῆς πράξεως
15 δι' ἀσθένειαν, βοηθεῖ· τοῖς τ' ἐν ἀκμῇ, πρὸς τὰς
καλὰς πράξεις. “σύν τε δὴ ἔρχομένα.” καὶ γὰρ
νοῆσαι καὶ πρᾶξαι δυνατώτεροι.

III. ΦΥΣΕΙ τ' ἐνυπάρχειν ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ γεγεννη-
20 μένον τῷ γεννήσαντι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν τῷ γεν-
νηθέντι, οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὄρνεσι

καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ζώων· καὶ τοῖς ὁμοθενέσι πρὸς ἄλληλα· καὶ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ὅθεν τοὺς φιλανθρώπους ἐπαινοῦμεν. ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις, ὡς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον καὶ φίλον. 5

IV. Ἐοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΧΕΙΝ ἢ Φιλία· καὶ οἱ νομοθεταὶ μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν, ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια, ὍΜΟΙΟΝ τι τῇ Φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι· ταύτης δὲ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται· καὶ τὴν στάσιν, ἔχθραν οὔσαν, μάλιστα ἐξελαύνουσιν. καὶ 10 φίλων μὲν ὄντων, οὐδὲν δεῖ δικαιοσύνης· δίκαιοι δ' ὄντες, προσδέονται Φιλίας. καὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ μάλιστα, Φιλικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

V. Οὐ μόνον δ' ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΚΑΛΟΝ. τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν· ἢ τε πο- 15 λυφιλία δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν ἐν τι εἶναι· καὶ ἔνιοι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οἴονται ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φίλους.

PART II.

THE MOST REMARKABLE DOUBTS AND QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE SUBJECT.

2 VI. Διαμφισβητεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐκ ὀλίγα. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὍΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ τινὰ τιθέασιν αὐτὴν, καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους φίλους. (ὅθεν, τὸν ὁμοῖον, φασιν, ὡς 20 τὸν ὁμοῖον· καὶ κολοῖον ποτὶ κολοῖον· καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα). οἱ δ', ἐξ ἐναντίας, κερραμεῖς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους ἀλλήλοις φασὶν εἶναι.

VII. Καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων, ἀνώτερον ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ φυσικώτερον· Εὐριπίδης μὲν, Φάσκων, “ἐρᾶν μὲν 25 ὄμβρον γαῖαν ξηρανθεῖσαν, ἐρᾶν δὲ σεμνὸν οὐρανὸν πληρούμενον ὄμβρου πεσεῖν ἐς γαῖαν” καὶ Ἡρά-

κλειτος, τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ΔΙΑΦΕΡΟΝΤΩΝ καλλίστην ἀρμονίαν, καὶ πάντα κατ' ἔριν γίνεσθαι. ἐξ ἐναντίας δὲ τούτοις, ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐφίεσθαι.

5 VIII. Τὰ μὲν οὖν ΦΥΣΙΚΑ τῶν ἀπορημάτων, ἀφείσθω. οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖα τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως. ὅσα δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπικὰ, καὶ ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ ἦθη καὶ τὰ πάθη· ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα. οἷον· πότερον ἐν πᾶσι γίνεται φιλία, ἢ οὐχ οἷον τε, μοχθηροὺς ὄντας, φί-
10 λους εἶναι· καὶ πότερον ἐν εἶδος τῆς φιλίας ἐστὶν, ἢ πλείω.

IX. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔΝ Οἰόμενοι, ὅτι ἐπιδέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον· οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπιστεύκασι σημεῖω. δέχεται γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον, καὶ
15 τὰ ἕΤΕΡΑ ΤΩ ΕΙΔΕΙ. εἴρηται δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἔμ-προσθεν.

CHAP. II.

IN WHICH THE TRUE NOTION OF FRIENDSHIP IS FIXED AND ASCERTAINED.

I. Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν, ΓΝΩΡΙΣΘΕΝΤΟΣ ΤΟΥ ΦΙΛΗΤΟΥ. δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, ἢ
20 ἩΔΥ, ἢ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ.

II. Δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι, δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή. ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς ΤΕΛΗ.

III. Πότερον οὖν τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ τὸ ἄΓ-
25 ΤΟΙΣ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ; διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. ὁμοίως

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἩΔΥ. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν
 φιλεῖν ἕκαστος· καὶ εἶναι, ἀπλῶς μὲν, Τ'ΑΓΑΘΟΝ
 φιλητὸν, ἐκάστῳ δὲ, ΤΟ ἘΚΑΣΤΩ. φιλεῖ δ' ἕκαστος,
 οὐ τὸ ΟΝ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ. δι-
 οίσει δ' οὐδέν. ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν, Φαινόμενον. 5

IV. Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν· ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ
 τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. οὐ γάρ
 ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ.
 γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως, τῷ οἴῳ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ·
 ἀλλ' εἶπερ, σώζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτὸν, ἵνα αὐτὸς 10
 ἔχη. τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ,
 ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ,
 ΕΥΝΟΥΣ λέγουσιν, εἰὰν μὴ ταυτό καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου
 γίγνηται· ΕΥΝΟΙΑΝ γὰρ ΕΝ ΑΝΤΙΠΕΠΟΝΘΟΣΙ, φιλίαν
 εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον, ΜΗ ΛΑΝΘΑΝΟΥΣΑΝ; πολλοὶ γάρ 15
 εἰσιν εὐνοί, οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ
 ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταῦτόν, καὶ
 ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. ΕΥΝΟΙ μὲν οὖν οὗτοι
 φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· ΦΙΛΟΥΣ δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι,
 λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν 20
 ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ΜΗ ΛΑΝΘΑΝΟΝ-

^a See §. i. of ΤΑΣ, δι' ἕν τι τῶν ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΩΝ^a.
 this chap.

CHAP. III.

IN WHICH IS PROPOUNDED A FIRST DIVISION OF FRIENDSHIP, INTO THREE KINDS; AND IN WHICH THESE KINDS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER IN THEIR ESSENTIAL QUALITIES AND CHARACTERS.

I. Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει. καὶ αἱ 3
 φιλήσεις ἄρα, καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὲ τὰ τῆς φι-
 λίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς. καθ' ἕκαστον
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα.

5 II. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγα-
 θὰ ἀλλήλοις, ΤΑΥΤῆ ἢ ΦΙΛΟΥΣΙΝ. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ
 τὸ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους, οὐ καθ' αὐτοὺς
 φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἣ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων
 ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἩΔΟΝΗΝ. οὐ γὰρ τῶ
 10 ποιούς τινὰς εἶναι, ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ'
 ὅτι ἠδεῖς αὐτοῖς. οἳ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρεῖσιμον φιλοῦν-
 τεσ, διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἠδο-
 νήν, διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἠδύ· καὶ οὐχ ἣ φιλούμενός ἢ ὁ φιλ.
 ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἣ χρεῖσιμος ἢ ἠδύς. ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ
 15 τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὐταί εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἣ ἔστιν ὅσπερ
 ἔστιν, ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται· ἀλλ' ἣ πορί-
 ζουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι, οἱ δ' ἠδονήν.

III. Εὐδαιμόνιοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ δια-
 μερόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων. ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἠδεῖς ἢ χρεῖ-
 20 σιμοὶ ᾧσι· παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρεῖσιμον οὐ
 διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. ἀπολυθέντος
 οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία· ὡς
 οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.

IV. Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΑΙΣ, ἢ τοιαύτῃ
 25 δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι· (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἠδύ οἱ τηλικούτοι
 διάκουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον·) καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ

καὶ νέων, ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διάκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δ' οἱ
 τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ τοιοῦτοι συζῶσι μετ' ἀλλήλων. ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδ' εἰσὶν
 ἡδεῖς. οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὀμιλίας,
 εἰ μὴ ἠφέλιμοι ᾖσιν. ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γὰρ εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς,
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ. εἰς ταύτας δὲ
 καὶ τὴν ΞΕΝΙΚΗΝ τιθέασιν.

V. Ἡ δὲ τῶν ΝΕΩΝ φιλία, δι' ἩΔΟΝΗΝ εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ. κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὔτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα
 διάκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὐτοῖς, καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἩΛΙΚΙΑΣ
 δὲ μεταπιπτούσης, καὶ τὰ ἩΔΕΑ γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ
 ταχέως ΓΙΓΝΟΝΤΑΙ φίλοι, καὶ ΠΑΥΟΝΤΑΙ. ἅμα γὰρ
 τῷ ἡδεῖ, ἢ φιλία μεταπίπτει· τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδο-
 νῆς, ταχεῖα ἢ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δ' οἱ νέοι.
 κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ δι' ἡδονὴν, τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτι-
 κῆς. διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις
 τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ
 καὶ συζῆν οὔτοι βούλονται. γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ
 κατὰ φιλίαν οὕτως.

4 VI. Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν, ἢ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ φιλία καὶ
 κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. οὔτοι γὰρ τὰγαθὰ ὁμοίως βού-
 λονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἀγαθοί· ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ'
 αὐτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων
 ἔνεκα, μάλιστα φίλοι. δι' αὐτούς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι,
 καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

VII. Διαμένει οὖν ἢ τούτων φιλία, ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ
 ᾖσιν· Ἡ Δ' ΑΡΕΤΗ ΜΟΝΙΜΟΝ. καὶ ἐστὶν ἐκάτερος ἈΠΛΩΣ
 ἀγαθός, καὶ Τῷ ΦΙΛΩ. οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπλῶς
 ἀγαθοὶ, καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἡδεῖς. καὶ γὰρ ἈΠΛΩΣ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς, καὶ ΑΛΛΗ-
 ΛΟΙΣ. ἐκάστῳ γὰρ καθ' ἡδονὴν εἰσιν, αἱ οἰκεῖαι πρᾶ-
 ξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται· τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ, αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ
 ὅμοιοι. ἢ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία ΜΟΝΙΜΟΣ εὐλόγως ἐστίν.
 συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ, πάνθ' ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ
 ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία δι' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν, ἢ δι'

ἡδονὴν, ἢ ἀπλῶς, ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητά
 τινὰ ταύτη δὲ, πάνθ' ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθ'
 αὐτούς. ταύτη γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ, τό τε
 ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἀπλῶς ἐστίν· μάλιστα δὲ
 5 ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὲ, καὶ ἡ φιλία, ἐν
 τούτοις μάλιστα, καὶ ἀρίστη.

VIII. ΣΠΑΝΙΑΣ δ' εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι. ὀλί-
 γοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ, προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ
 α. συνηθείας. κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ, “οὐκ ἐστὶν εἰδῆ-
 10 σαι ἀλλήλους, πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλλας συνανα-
 λῶσαι.” οὐδ' ἀποδέξασθαι δεῖ πρότερον, οὐδ' εἶναι φί-
 λους, πρὶν ἂν ἐκάτερος ἐκατέρῳ φανῆ φιλητὸς καὶ
 πιστευθῆ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους
 ποιοῦντες, ΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΑΙ μὲν φίλοι εἶναι· οὐκ εἰσι δὲ,
 15 εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοὶ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἴσασι. ΒΟΥΛΗΣΙΣ μὲν
 γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, ΦΙΛΙΑ δ' οὔ. Αὕτη δ'
 μὲν οὖν, καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, καὶ κατὰ τὰ
 λοιπὰ, τελεία ἐστὶ· καὶ κατὰ πάντα γίνεται <sup>πάντα ταῦ-
 τὰ γίνεται</sup> ὅμοια, ἐκατέρῳ παρ' ἐκατέρου· ὅπερ δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις ^{καὶ ὅμοια.}
 20 ὑπάρχειν.

IX. Ἡ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ, ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑ ταύτης ἔχει.
 καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ, ἡδεῖς ἀλλήλοις. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον. καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλήλοις, οἱ
 ἀγαθοί.

X. Μάλιστα δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις αἱ φιλίαι δια-
 μένουσιν, ὅταν ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ γίγνηται παρ' ἀλλήλων,
 οἷον ἡδονή· καὶ μὴ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ΑΠΟ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ, οἷον τοῖς εὐτραπέλοις, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐραστῆ καὶ
 ἐρωμένῳ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἡδονταὶ οὔτοι·
 30 ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν, ὄρῳν ἐκεῖνον, ὁ δὲ, θεραπευόμενος ὑπὸ
 τοῦ ἐραστοῦ· ληγούσης δὲ τῆς ἄρας ἐνίοτε, καὶ ἡ
 φιλία λήγει· τῷ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡδεῖα ἢ ὄψις,
 τῷ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ θεραπεία. πολλοὶ δ' αὖ διαμέν-

ουσιν, ἐὰν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ἤθη στέρξωσιν, ὁμοί-
θεις ὄντες. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀντικαταλλαττόμενοι,
ἀλλὰ τὸ χεῖσιμον, ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ Εἰσιν ἤ-
τον φίλοι καὶ ΔΙΑΜΕΝΟΥΣΙΝ.

XI. Οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ ὄντες φίλοι, ἅμα 5
τῷ συμφέροντι διαλύονται. οὐ γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἦσαν
φίλοι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς.

XII. Δι' ἡδονὴν μὲν οὖν, καὶ διὰ τὸ χεῖσιμον,
καὶ φαύλους ἐνδέχεται φίλους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις· καὶ
ἐπιεικεῖς φαύλοις· καὶ μηδέτερον ὁποιοῦν· ΔΙ' ΑΥ- 10
ΤΟΥΣ ΔΕ, δῆλον ὅτι μόνους τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς. οἱ γὰρ
κακοὶ οὐ χαίρουσιν ἑαυτοῖς, εἰ μὴ τις ἄφέλεια γίγ-
νοιτο. καὶ μόνη δὲ ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Φιλία ΑΔΙΑΒΑΗΤΟΣ
ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον οὐδενὶ πιστεῦσαι, περὶ τοῦ ἐν
πολλῷ χρόνῳ ὑπ' αὐτῶν δεδοκιμασμένου. καὶ τὸ 15
πιστεύειν ἐν τούτοις· καὶ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἀδικῆσαι·
καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς φιλία ἀξιοῦται. ἐν
δὲ ταῖς ἐτέραις, οὐδὲν καλύει τὰ τοιαῦτα γίνεσθαι.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους, καὶ τοὺς διὰ
τὸ χεῖσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις· (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ 20
συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέ-
ροντος·) καὶ τοὺς δι' ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας,
ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες· ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς, Φί-
λους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω· καὶ
πρώτως μὲν καὶ ΚΥΡΙΩΣ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἣ ἀγαθοὶ, 25
τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ΚΑΘ' ὈΜΟΙΟΤΗΤΑ. ἣ γὰρ ἀγαθόν τι
καὶ ὅμοιον, ταύτῃ φίλοι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ, ἀγαθὸν
τοῖς φιληδέσιν.

XIII. Οὐ πάνυ δ' αὐται συνάπτουσιν· οὐδὲ γί-
νονται οἱ αὐτοὶ φίλοι, διὰ τὸ χεῖσιμον καὶ διὰ τὸ 30
ἡδὺ. οὐ γὰρ πάνυ συνδυάζεται τὰ κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός.

6

ταῦτα δὲ γὰ.

XIV. Εἰς ταῦτα δὴ τὰ εἶδη τῆς φιλίας νενεμη-

μένης· οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι ἔσονται φίλοι δι' ἡδονὴν ἢ τὸ
 χρήσιμον, ταύτη ὅμοιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ, δι' αὐ-
 τοὺς φίλοι. ἢ γὰρ ἀγαθοί. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ἈΠΛΩΣ
 φίλοι· ἐκεῖνοι δὲ, ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ καὶ τῶ ὈΜΟΙ-
 5 ΩΣΘΑΙ τούτοις.

XV. Ὡσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ΑΡΕΤΩΝ, οἱ μὲν ΚΑΘ' See B. I. chap. iii. §. xiv.
 ἔΞΙΝ, οἱ δὲ ΚΑΤ' ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ, ἀγαθοὶ λέγονται· οὕτω
 καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ΦΙΛΙΑΣ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ συζῶντες, χαίρουσιν
 ἀλλήλοις καὶ πορίζουσι τὰγαθὰ· οἱ δὲ καθεύδοντες
 10 ἢ κεχαρισμένοι τοῖς τόποις, οὐκ ἐνεργοῦσι μὲν, οὕτω
 δ' ἔχουσι ἄστ' ἐνεργεῖν φιλικῶς. οἱ γὰρ τόποι οὐ
 διαλύουσι τὴν φιλίαν ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

XVI. Ἐὰν δὲ χρόνιος ἢ ἀπουσία γίνηται, καὶ
 τῆς φιλίας δοκεῖ λήθην ποιεῖν. ὅθεν εἴρηται·
 15 πολλὰς δὲ φιλίας ἀπροσηγορία διέλυσεν.

XVII. Οὐ φαίνονται δ' οὐθ' οἱ πρεσβῦται, οὐθ'
 οἱ στρυφνοὶ, φιλικοὶ εἶναι. βραχὺ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ
 τῆς ἡδονῆς· οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῶ λυ-
 πηρῶ, οὐδὲ τῶ μὴ ἡδεῖ. μάλιστα γὰρ ἡ φύσις φαί-
 20 νεται, τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν φεύγειν, ἐφίεσθαι δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος.
 οἱ δ' ἀποδεχόμενοι ἀλλήλους, μὴ συζῶντες δὲ, ΕΥ-
 ΝΟΙΣ εἰοικασί μαλλον ἢ φίλοις. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως
 ἐστὶ φίλων ὡς τὸ συζῆν· ἀφελείας μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἐν-
 δεεῖς ὀρέγονται· συνημερεύειν δὲ, καὶ οἱ μακάριοι.
 25 μονώταις μὲν γὰρ εἶναι, τούτοις ἥκιστα προσήκει.
 συνδιάγειν δὲ μετ' ἀλλήλων οὐκ ἔστι, μὴ ἡδεῖς ὄν-
 τας, μηδὲ χαίροντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς· ὅπερ ἡ ἐταιρικὴ
 δοκεῖ ἔχειν. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φιλία, ἢ τῶν 7
 ἀγαθῶν· καθάπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται. δοκεῖ γὰρ φι-
 30 λητὸν μὲν καὶ αἰρετὸν τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδύ·
 ἐκάστῳ δὲ, τὸ αὐτῶ τοιοῦτον· ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς τῶ ἀγαθῶ,
 δι' ἄμφω ταῦτα.

XVIII. Ἐοικε δ' ἡ μὲν ΦΙΛΗΣΙΣ πάθει, ἡ δὲ Φιλία, ἔξει. ἡ γὰρ Φίλησις οὐχ ἦττον πρὸς τὰ ἀψυχά ἐστιν ἀντιφιλοῦσι δὲ, μετὰ προαιρέσεως· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις, ἀφ' ἕξεως. καὶ τὰγαθὰ βούλονται τοῖς φιλουμένοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα, οὐ κατὰ πάθος, ἀλλὰ καθ' ἔξιν. καὶ φιλοῦντες τὸν φίλον, τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν· (ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς φίλος γινόμενος, ἀγαθὸν γίνεται ἢ φίλος). ἑκάτερος οὖν φιλεῖ τε τὸ αὐτῶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀνταποδίδωσι τῇ βουλήσει καὶ τῶ ἡδεῖ. λέγεται γὰρ Φιλότης, ἰσότης. μάλιστα δὲ ἡ τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

XIX. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς στρυφνοῖς καὶ πρεσβυτικοῖς ἦττον γίνεται ἡ Φιλία, ὅσῳ δυσκολώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ἦττον ταῖς ὀμιλίαις χαίρουσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ μάλιστα εἶναι Φιλικά, καὶ ποιητικά Φιλίας. διὸ, νέοι μὲν γίνονται φίλοι ταχὺ, πρεσβῦται δ' οὐ. οὐ γὰρ γίνονται φίλοι, οἷς ἂν μὴ χαίρωσιν. ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ στρυφνοί. ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ΕΥΝΟΙ μὲν εἰσιν ΑΛΛΗΛΟΙΣ. βούλονται γὰρ τὰγαθὰ, καὶ ἀπαντῶσιν εἰς τὰς χρείας. ΦΙΛΟΙ Δ' ΟΥ Πάνυ εἰσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ συν- ημερεῦειν, μηδὲ χαίρειν ἀλλήλοις· ἀ δὲ μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ Φιλικά.

XX. Πολλοὶς δ' εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν ΤΕΛΕΙΑΝ Φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται· ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἕρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα. ἔοικε γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ· τὸ τοιοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῶ αὐτῶ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα, οὐ ράδιον ἴσως δ', οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν, καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι ὁ παγχάλεπον. διὰ τὸ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ δὲ καὶ τὸ ἨΔΥ, πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται. πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοί· καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

XXI. Τούτων δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικε, φιλία ἢ διὰ τὸ
 'ΗΔΥ' ὅταν ταῦτά ὑπ' ἀμφοῖν γίγνηται, καὶ χαίρω-
 σιν ἀλλήλοις, ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· οἷαι τῶν νέων εἰσὶν αἱ
 φιλίαι. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ ἐλευθέριον. ἢ δὲ
 5 διὰ τὸ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ, ἀγοραίων. καὶ οἱ μακάριοι δὲ
 χρησίμων μὲν οὐδὲν δεύονται, ἠδέων δέ. συζῆν μὲν
 γὰρ βούλονται· τισὶ τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν, ὀλίγον μὲν
 χρόνον, φέρουσιν· συνεχῶς δ', οὐθείς ἂν ὑπομείναι
 οὐδ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, εἰ λυπηρὸν αὐτῶ εἴη. διὸ, τοὺς
 10 φίλους ἠδεῖς ζητοῦσιν. δεῖ δ' ἴσως καὶ ἀγαθοὺς,
 τοιούτους ὄντας, καὶ ἔτι αὐτοῖς. οὕτω γὰρ ὑπάρξει
 αὐτοῖς ὅσα δεῖ τοῖς φίλοις.

XXII. Οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις, διηρημένοι φαίνον-
 ται χρῆσθαι τοῖς φίλοις. ἄλλοι γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ
 15 χρήσιμοι, καὶ ἕτεροι ἠδεῖς· ἀμφω δ' οἱ αὐτοί, οὐ
 πάνυ. οὔτε γὰρ ἠδεῖς μετ' ἀρετῆς ζητοῦσιν, οὔτε
 χρησίμους εἰς τὰ καλά· ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν, εὐτραπέ-
 λους, τοῦ ἠδέος ἐφίεμενοι, τοὺς δὲ, δεινοὺς πρᾶξαι
 τὸ ἐπιταχθέν. ταῦτα δ' οὐ πάνυ γίνεται ἐν τῷ
 20 αὐτῷ.

CHAP. IV.

IN WHICH IS PROPOUNDED A SECOND DIVISION OF
 FRIENDSHIP, INTO TWO KINDS.

I. Ἦδὺς δὲ καὶ χρήσιμος ἅμα εἴρηται ὅτι ὁ
 σπουδαῖος. ἀλλ' ὕΠΕΡΕΧΟΝΤΙ οὐ γίνεται ὁ τοιοῦτος
 φίλος, ἂν μὴ καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ ὑπερέχηται. εἰ δὲ μὴ,
 οὐκ ἸΣΑΖΕΙ ΑΝΑΔΟΤΟΝ ὑπερεχόμενος. οὐ πάνυ δ' εἰώ-
 25 θασι τοιοῦτοι γίνεσθαι.

8 Εἰσὶ δ' οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι φιλίαι, EN ΙΣΟΤΗΤΙ. τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ γίνονται ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ βούλονται ἀλλήλοις· ἢ ἕτερον ἀνθ' ἑτέρου ἀντικαταλλάττονται, οἷον, ἡδονὴν ἀντ' ὠφελείας. ὅτι δ' ἦττον εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ φιλίαι, καὶ μένουσιν, εἴρηται. 5

Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ, δι' ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα ταυτοῦ, εἶναί τε, καὶ οὐκ εἶναι, φιλίαι. καθ' ὁμοιότητα γὰρ τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν, φαίνονται φιλίαι· (ἢ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ ἔχει, ἢ δὲ τὸ χρήσιμον· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει κακείνῃ) τῷ δὲ, τὴν μὲν ἀδιάβλητον καὶ μό- 10 νιμον εἶναι, ταύτας δὲ ταχέως μεταπίπτειν, ἄλλοις τε διαφέρειν πολλοῖς· οὐ φαίνονται φιλίαι, δι' ἀνομοιότητα ἐκείνης.

Ἔτερον δ' ἐστὶ φιλίας εἶδος, τὸ ΚΑΘ' ὙΠΕΡΟΧΗΝ οἷον, πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν, καὶ ὅλως πρεσβυτέρῳ πρὸς 15 νεώτερον, ἀνδρὶ τε πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ παντὶ ἀρχοντι πρὸς ἀρχόμενον.

II. Διαφέρουσι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ ἀλλήλων. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα, καὶ ἀρχουσι πρὸς ἀρχομένους· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πατρὶ πρὸς υἱὸν, καὶ υἱῷ πρὸς 20 πατέρα, οὐδ' ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυναῖκα, καὶ γυναικὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα. Ἔτερα γὰρ ἐκάστῳ τούτων ΑΡΕΤΗ, καὶ τὸ ΕΡΓΟΝ ἕτερα δὲ καὶ, ΔΙ' Ἄ ΦΙΛΟΥΣΙΝ ἕτεροι οὖν, καὶ αἱ φιλῆται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ΤΑΥΤΑ μὲν δὴ οὔτε γίνονται ἐκατέρῳ παρὰ θατέρου, οὔτε δεῖ ζητεῖν. ὅταν 25 δὲ γονεῦσι μὲν τέκνα ἀπονέμῃ, Ἄ ΔΕΙ τοῖς γεννήσασι, γονεῖς δὲ υἱέσιν, Ἄ ΔΕΙ τοῖς τέκνοις· μόνιμος ἢ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἐπιεικῆς ἔσται φιλία.

III. ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ δ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὔσαις φιλίαις, καὶ τὴν φίλησιν δεῖ γίνεσθαι· οἷον, 30 τὸν ἀμείνω μᾶλλον φιλεῖσθαι ἢ φιλεῖν, καὶ τὸν ὠφελιμώτερον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὁμοίως. ὅταν

γὰρ ΚΑΤ' ΑΞΙΑΝ ἢ Φίλησις γίγνηται, τότε γίγνεται ΠΩΣ ΙΣΟΤΗΣ· ὃ δὴ τῆς Φιλίας εἶναι δοκεῖ.

IV. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ τὸ ἴσον, ἐν τε τοῖς δικαίοις 9 καὶ ἐν τῇ Φιλίᾳ, φαίνεται ἔχειν. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν μὲν 5 τοῖς δικαίοις ἴσον, πρῶτως τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ποσὸν δευτέρως· ἐν δὲ τῇ Φιλίᾳ, τὸ μὲν κατὰ ποσὸν πρῶτως, τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀξίαν δευτέρως.

V. Δῆλον δ', ἐὰν ΠΟΛΥ διάστημα γίγνηται ἀρε- 10 τῆς, ἢ κακίας, ἢ εὐπορίας, ἢ τινος ἄλλου. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀξιοῦσιν. ἐμφανέστατον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν. πλεῖστον γὰρ οὗτοι πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχουσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βασι- 15 λέων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτοις ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, οἱ πολὺ καταδεέστεροι· οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἢ σοφωτάτοις, οἱ μὴδενὸς ἀξιοί. ἀκριβῆς μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμὸς, ἕΩΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ οἱ φίλοι. πολλῶν γὰρ ἀφαιρουμένων, ἔτι μένει· πολὺ δὲ χωρισθέντος, οἷον τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐκέτι.

VI. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται, μή ποτ' οὐ βούλονται 20 οἱ φίλοι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οἷον, θεοὺς εἶναι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι φίλοι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἀγαθὰ· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι ἀγαθὰ. εἰ δὴ καλῶς εἴ- 25 ρηται, ὅτι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα· μένειν ἂν δέοι, οἷός ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος. [ἀν- 30 θρώπων δὲ ὄντι, βουλήσεται τὰ μέγιστα ἀγαθὰ. ἴσως δ' οὐ πάντα. αὐτῷ γὰρ μάλισθ' ἕκαστος βούλεται τὰγαθὰ.]

VII. Οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι, ΔΙΑ ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΙΑΝ, βούλεσθαι φιλεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ φιλεῖν. διὸ, φιλοκό- 30 λακες οἱ πολλοί. ὑπερεχόμενος γὰρ φίλος, ὁ ΚΟΛΑΞ·

ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιοῦτος εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον φιλεῖν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι, ἐγγὺς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῦ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΑΙ· οὗ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ ἐφίενται.

VIII. Οὐ δὲ ἄγχο δ' εἰκάσιν αἰρεῖσθαι τὴν ΤΙΜΗΝ, ἀλλὰ ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΗΚΟΣ. χαίρουσι γὰρ, οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ, ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τιμώμενοι, διὰ τὴν ΕΛΠΙΔΑ. οἴονται γὰρ τεύξεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἂν του δέωνται· ὡς δὲ σημείω τῆς εὐπαθείας, χαίρουσι τῇ τιμῇ. οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεικῶν καὶ εἰδότην ὀρεγόμενοι τιμῆς, βεβαιῶσαι τὴν οἰκείαν δόξαν ἐφίενται περὶ αὐτῶν· χαίρουσι δὲ ὅτι εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν λεγόντων κρίσει. τῷ ΦΙΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ δὲ ΚΑΘ' ἄγχο χαίρουσιν. διὸ δόξειεν ἂν κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ ἡ φιλία, καθ' αὐτὴν αἰρετὴ εἶναι.

15

IX. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ΦΙΛΕΙΝ, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ΦΙΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ, εἶναι. σημείον δ' αἱ μητέρες, τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρουσαι. ἔναι γὰρ διδῶσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν τρέφεσθαι, καὶ φιλοῦσι μὲν εἰδυῖαι, ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι δ' οὐ ζητοῦσιν, εἰ ἂν ἀμφοτέρω μὴ ἐνδέχεται· ἀλλ' ἰκανὸν αὐταῖς εἰκεν εἶναι, εἰ ἂν ὀρῶσιν εὖ πράττοντας· καὶ αὐταὶ φιλοῦσιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐκεῖνοι μηδὲν, ἂν μητρὶ προσήκει, ἀπονέμωσι, διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

10 X. Μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινουμένων· ΦΙΛΩΝ ΑΡΕΤῆ τὸ φιλεῖν εἰκεν.

XI. "Ὡστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται ΚΑΤ' ΑΞΙΑΝ· οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι, καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. οὕτω δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἄνισοι μάλιστ' εἶεν φίλοι. ΙΣΑΖΟΙΝΤΟ γὰρ ἂν. ἡ δ' ἰσότης καὶ ὁμοιότης, φιλότης.

30

XII. Καὶ μάλιστα μὲν, ἡ τῶν ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ὁμοιότης. μόνιμοι^a γὰρ ὄντες καθ' αὐτοὺς, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους μένουσι· καὶ οὔτε δέονται φαύλων, οὔθ'

^a See page 258, line 26.

ὑπηρετοῦσι τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ', ὡς εἰπεῖν, καὶ διακαλύ-
 ουσιν. τῶν ἀγαθῶν γὰρ, μήτ' αὐτοὺς ἀμαρτάνειν,
 μήτε τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν. οἱ δὲ ΜΟΧΘΗΡΟΙ, τὸ
 μὲν βέβαιον οὐκ ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς δια-
 5 μένουσιν ὅμοιοι ὄντες· ἐπ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον γίγ-
 νονται φίλοι, χαίροντες τῇ ἀλλήλων μοχθηρίᾳ. οἱ
 ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΙ δὲ, καὶ ἩΔΕΙΣ, ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν· ἕως
 γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις.

XIII. ΕΞ ΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΝ δὲ, μάλιστα μὲν δοκεῖ Ἡ See chap. i.
 §. vii. of this
 book.
 10 ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ γίγνεσθαι Φιλία· οἷον, πίνης πλου-
 σία, ἀμαθῆς εἰδέτι. οὗ γὰρ τυγχάνει τις ἐνδεῆς ὢν,
 τούτου ἐφιέμενος, ἀντιδωρεῖται ἄλλο. ἐνταῦθα δ' ἂν
 τις ἔλκοι καὶ ἐραστὴν καὶ ἐρώμενον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ
 αἰσχρὸν. διὰ, φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ γελοῖοι ἐνίοτε,
 15 ἀξιοῦντες φιλεῖσθαι ὡς φιλοῦσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ φιλητοὺς
 ὄντας, ἴσως ἀξιωτέον· μηδὲν δὲ τοιοῦτον ἔχοντας,
 γελοῖον.

Ἴσως δὲ, οὐδ' ἐφίεται τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου
 καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πυμβεβηκός, ἢ δ' ὄρεξις
 20 ΤΟΥ ΜΕΣΟΥ ἐστίν. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀγαθόν· οἷον, τῶ
 ξηρῶ, οὐχ ὑγρῶ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἐλθεῖν·
 καὶ τῶ θερμῶ, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁμοίως. ταῦτα
 μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀλλοτριώτερα.

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP IS CONSIDERED, WITH REGARD TO THE VARIOUS FORMS AND DEGREES IN WHICH IT ENTERS INTO THE SEVERAL VARIETIES OF HUMAN ASSOCIATION AND COMMUNITY.

PART I.

A GENERAL VIEW OF COMMUNITIES.

- 11 I. Ἐοικε δὲ, (καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται,) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, εἶναι, ἢ τε Φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν ἀπάσῃ γὰρ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ ἰδοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ Φιλία δέ. (προσαγορεύουσι γοῦν ὡς φίλους, τοὺς σύμπλους καὶ τοὺς συστρατίώτας· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις κοινωσίαις.) ΚΑΘ' ὍΣΟΝ δὲ κοινωνοῦσιν, ΕΠΙ ΤΟΣΟΥΤΟΝ ἐστὶ Φιλία. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον. καὶ ἡ παροιμία, “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων,” ὀρθῶς. ΕΝ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ γὰρ ἡ Φιλία.
- II. Ἔστι δ' ἀδελφοῖς μὲν καὶ ἑταίροις, ΠΑΝΤΑ 10 κοινὰ τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις, ΑΦΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΑ· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ΠΛΕΙΩ, τοῖς δ' ΕΛΑΤΤΩ. καὶ γὰρ τῶν Φιλῶν, αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον, αἱ δ' ἥττον. διαφέρει δὲ καὶ τὰ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά γονεῦσι πρὸς τέκνα, καὶ ἀδελφοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐδ' ἑταίροις καὶ πολίταις· ὁμοίως 15 δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων Φιλῶν. ἕτερα δὴ καὶ τὰ ΑΔΙΚΑ, πρὸς ἐκάστους τούτων. καὶ αὐξήσει λαμβάνει, τῶ μᾶλλον πρὸς φίλους εἶναι. οἷον, χρήματα ἀποστερηῆσαι ἑταῖρον, δεινότερον ἢ πολίτην. καὶ μὴ βοηθῆσαι ἀδελφῶ, ἢ ὀθνεῖα· καὶ πατάξαι πατέρα, 20 ἢ ὄντινον ἄλλον. αὐξέσθαι δὲ πέφυκεν ἅμα τῇ Φιλίᾳ, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ὡς ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄντα καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον διήκοντα.

III. Αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πᾶσαι, ΜΟΡΙΟΙΣ εἰκόασι τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ. συμπορεύονται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινι συμφέροντι, καὶ πορίζομενοί τι τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον· καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ δὲ κοινωνία, τοῦ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΟΣ χάριν δοκεῖ καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνελθεῖν, καὶ διαμέγειν. τούτου γὰρ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται στοχάζονται· καὶ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ φασιν εἶναι, “ΤΟ ΚΟΙΝῆ ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝ.”

IV. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλαι κοινωνίαι, ΚΑΤΑ ΜΕΡΗ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐφίενται· οἷον, πλωτῆρες μὲν, τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πλοῦν, πρὸς ἐργασίαν χρημάτων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον· συστρατιῶται δὲ, τοῦ κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, εἴτε χρημάτων, εἴτε νίκης, ἢ πόλεως ὀρεγόμενοι· ὁμοίως δὲ, καὶ φυλέται καὶ δημόται.

V. Ἐναι δὲ τῶν κοινωνιῶν ΔΙ’ ἨΔΟΝΗΝ ΔΟΚΟΥΣΙ γίνεσθαι, θιασῶν καὶ ἐραυιστῶν. αὗται γὰρ θυσίας ἕνεκα, καὶ συνουσίας.

VI. Πᾶσαι δ’ αὗται ὑπὸ τὴν πολιτικὴν εἰκόασιν εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ τοῦ ΠΑΡΟΝΤΟΣ συμφέροντος ἡ πολιτικὴ ἐφίεται, ἀλλ’ εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν βίον, θυσίας τε ποιοῦντες καὶ περὶ ταύτας συνόδους, τιμὰς ἀπονέμοντες τοῖς θεοῖς, καὶ αὐτοῖς ἀναπαύσεις πορίζοντες μετ’ ἡδονῆς. αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖαι θυσίαι καὶ σύνοδοι φαίνονται γίνεσθαι μετὰ τὰς τῶν καρπῶν συγκομιδὰς, οἷον ἀπαρχαί. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐσχόλαζον τοῖς καιροῖς. πᾶσαι δὲ φαίνονται αἱ κοινωνίαι μόρια τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. ἀκολουθήσουσι δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται ΦΙΛΙΑΙ ταῖς τοιαύταις ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑΙΣ.

manuscript notes
Κοινωνία

PART II.

A GENERAL VIEW OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES.

12 VII. ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ δ' ἐστὶν εἶδη τρία· ἴσαι δὲ καὶ ΠΑΡΕΚΒΑΣΕΙΣ, οἷον Φθοραὶ, τούτων.

VIII. Εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν πολιτεῖαι, ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑ τε, καὶ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ, τρίτη δ', ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων· ἢν ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗΝ λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται· ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΝ δ' 5 αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι καλεῖν.

IX. Τούτων δὲ, ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΗ μὲν ἡ βασιλεία, ΧΕΙΡΙΣΤΗ δ' ἡ τιμοκρατία.

X. Παρέκβασις δὲ βασιλείας μὲν, ΤΥΡΑΝΝΙΣ. ἄμφω γὰρ μοναρχίαι, διαφέρουσι δὲ πλείστον. ὁ 10 μὲν γὰρ τύραννος, τὸ ἑαυτῶ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ· ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς, τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς, ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οὐδενὸς προσδεῖται· τὰ ὠφέλιμα οὖν αὐτῶ μὲν, οὐκ ἂν σκοποῖη, τοῖς δ' ἀρχομένοις. 15 γὰρ μὴ τοιοῦτος, κληρωτὸς ἂν τις εἴη βασιλεὺς. ἢ δὲ τυραννίς, ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτης· τὸ γὰρ ἑαυτῶ ἀγαθὸν διώκει. καὶ φανερώτερον ἐπὶ ταύτης, ὅτι χειρίστη· κάκιστον δὲ, τὸ ἐναντίον τῶ βελτίστῳ. μεταβαίνει δ' ἐκ βασιλείας εἰς τυραννίδα. φαυλότης γὰρ ἐστὶ 20 ἰδὲ μοχθ. μοναρχίας, ἢ τυραννίς· ὁ δὲ μοχθηρὸς βασιλεὺς, τύραννος γίνεται.

XI. Ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ, εἰς ΟΛΙΓΑΡΧΙΑΝ, κακία τῶν ἀρχόντων· οἱ νέμουσι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, καὶ πάντα, ἢ τὰ πλείστα, τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυ- 25 τοῖς, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς· περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενοι τὸ πλουτεῖν. ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄρχουσι καὶ μοχθηροὶ, ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπιεικιστάτων.

XII. Ἐκ δὲ δὴ τιμοκρατίας, εἰς ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑΝ. σύνοροι γὰρ εἰσιν αὗται. πλήθους γὰρ βούλεται 30

καὶ ἡ τιμοκρατία εἶναι, καὶ ἴσοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῷ
τιμήματι. ἥκιστα δὲ μοχθηρόν ἐστιν, ἡ δημοκρατία.
ἐπὶ μικρὸν γὰρ παρεκβαίνει τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶ-
δος. μεταβάλλουσι μὲν οὖν μάλισθ' οὕτως αἱ
5 πολιτεῖαι. ἐλάχιστον γὰρ οὕτω, καὶ ῥᾶστα, μετα-
βαίνουσιν.

XIII. ὍΜΟΙΩΜΑΤΑ δ' αὐτῶν, καὶ οἷον παραδείγ-
ματα, λάβοι τις ἂν καὶ ἐν ταῖς ΟΙΚΙΑΙΣ. ἡ μὲν
γὰρ πατὴρ πρὸς υἱεῖς κοινωμία, βασιλείας ἔχει
10 σχῆμα. τῶν τέκνων γὰρ τῶ πατρὶ μέλει. ἐντεῦθεν
δὲ καὶ, Ὅμηρος τὸν Δία "πατέρα" προσαγορεύει. πα-
τρικὴ γὰρ ἀρχὴ βούλεται ἡ βασιλεία εἶναι. ἐν
Πέρσαις δ', ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς, τυραννικὴ. χρῶνται γὰρ
ὡς δούλοις τοῖς υἱεῖσιν. τυραννικὴ δὲ καὶ, ἡ δεσπότου
15 πρὸς δούλους. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ δεσπότου συμφέρον ἐν
αὐτῇ πράττεται. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ὀρθὴ φαίνεται· ἡ
Περσικὴ δ', ἡμαρτημένη. τῶν διαφερόντων γὰρ, αἱ
ἀρχαὶ διάφοροι. ἀνδρὸς δὲ καὶ γυναικὸς, ἀριστο-
κρατικὴ φαίνεται. κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀρχει,
20 καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἂ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα· ὅσα δὲ γυναικὶ
ἀρμόζει, ἐκείνη ἀποδίδωσιν. ἀπάντων δὲ κυριεύων ὁ
ἀνὴρ, εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν μεθίστησιν. παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν
γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀμείνων. ἐνίοτε δὲ ἄρ-
χουσιν αἱ γυναῖκες, ἐπίκληροι οὔσαι. οὐ δὲ γίνονται
25 κατ' ἀρετὴν αἱ ἀρχαί, ἀλλὰ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ δύν-
αμιν· καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις. τιμοκρατικὴ
δ' ἔοικεν, ἡ τῶν ἀδελφῶν. ἴσοι γὰρ, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον,
ταῖς ἡλικίαις διαλλάττουσιν. διόπερ, ἂν πολὺ ταῖς
ἡλικίαις διαφέρωσιν, οὐκέτι ἀδελφικὴ γίνεται ἡ φι-
30 λία. δημοκρατία δὲ, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀδεσπό-
τοις τῶν οἰκήσεων· (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ πάντες ἐξ ἴσου)
καὶ ἐν αἷς ἀσθενῆς ὁ ἄρχων καὶ ἐκάστῳ ἐξουσία.

PART III.

THE MANNER AND DEGREE IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP INTERMINGLES WITH POLITICAL COMMUNITIES.

- 13 XIV. ΚΑΘ' ἑΚΑΣΤΗΝ δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν ΦΙΛΙΑ φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.
- XV. ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους, ΕΝ ὙΠΕΡΟΧῃ ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑΣ. εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ἂν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν, ἢν εὖ⁵ πράττωσιν ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων. ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα “ποιμένα λαῶν” εἶπεν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ ἡ ΠΑΤΡΙΚΗ. διαφέρει δὲ τῶ μεγέθει τῶν εὐεργετημάτων. αἴτιος γὰρ τοῦ εἶναι, δοκοῦντος μεγίστου, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας. καὶ τοῖς προγόνοις δὲ ταῦτα ἀπονέμεται. φύσει τε ἀρχικὸν πατρῶν¹⁰ υἱῶν, καὶ πρόγονοι ἐγγόνων, καὶ βασιλεὺς βασιλευμένων. ΕΝ ὙΠΕΡΟΧῃ δὲ αἱ φιλίαι αὗται· διὸ καὶ ΤΙΜΩΝΤΑΙ οἱ γονεῖς. καὶ τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ δὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ΤΑΥΤΟ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ΚΑΤ' ΑΞΙΑΝ. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἡ¹⁵ ΦΙΛΙΑ.
- XVI. Καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ πρὸς γυναῖκα, ἡ αὐτὴ φιλία καὶ ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ. ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ γὰρ, καὶ τῶ ἀμείνονι πλέον ἀγαθόν, καὶ τὸ ἀρμόζον ἐκάστα. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον.²⁰
- XVII. Ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀδελφῶν, τῇ ἑΤΑΙΡΙΚῃ ἔοικεν. ἴσοι γὰρ καὶ ἡλικιωταί· οἱ τοιοῦτοι δ' ὁμοπαθεῖς καὶ ὁμοῆθεις, ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. ἔοικε δὴ ταύτῃ, καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ΤΙΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗΝ. ἴσοι γὰρ οἱ πολῖται βούλονται καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι. ἐν μέρει δὴ τὸ ἀρχεῖν,²⁵ καὶ ΕΞ ΙΣΟΥ. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία.

XVIII. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ΠΑΡΕΚΒΑΣΕΣΙΝ, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ΦΙΛΙΑ ἐστί·

See §. vii. and viii. of the last chapter.

καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίσθη. ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν,
 ἢ μικρὸν, φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῷ
 ἄρχοντι καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· (οὐδὲ γὰρ
 δίκαιον) ἀλλ' οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον, καὶ ψυχῇ
 5 πρὸς σῶμα, καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον. ὠφελεῖται
 μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων· φιλία δ'
 οὐκ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀψυχα, οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 πρὸς ἵππον, ἢ βοῦν· οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον, ἢ δοῦλος. οὐ-
 δὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν. ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος, ἐμψυχον ὄργα-
 10 νον· τὸ δ' ὄργανον, ἀψυχος δοῦλος. ἢ μὲν οὖν δοῦ-
 λος, οὐκ ἐστὶ φιλία πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἢ δ' ἄνθρωπος. δοκεῖ
 γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, πρὸς πάντα τὸν
 δυνάμενον κοινωνῆσαι νόμου καὶ συνθήκης· καὶ φι-
 λίας δὲ, καθ' ὅσον ἄνθρωπος. ἐπὶ μικρὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν
 15 ταῖς τυραννίσιν, αἱ φιλίαι καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐν δὲ ταῖς
 δημοκραταίαις ἐπὶ πλεῖστον. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ
 ἴσοις οὔσιν.

See B. V.
 chap. vii.
 §. ii, iii.

PART IV.

THE MANNER AND DEGREE IN WHICH IT INTERMINGLES
 WITH VARIOUS OTHER ASSOCIATIONS AND RELATIONS
 OF MANKIND.

XIX. Ἐν Κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πᾶσα φιλία ἐστίν, 14
 καθάπερ εἴρηται. ἀφορίσειε δ' ἂν τις τήν τε ΣΥΓ-
 20 ΓΕΝΙΚΗΝ, καὶ τήν ἘΤΑΙΡΙΚΗΝ. αἱ δὲ πολιτικάι, καὶ
 φυλετικάι, καὶ συμπλοϊκάι, καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται,
 κοινωνικαῖς εἰκόασι μᾶλλον. οἷον γὰρ καθ' ὁμολο-
 γίαν τινὰ φαίνονται εἶναι. εἰς ταύτας δὲ τάξειεν ἂν
 τις καὶ τήν ΞΕΝΙΚΗΝ.

25 XX. Καὶ ἡ ΣΥΓΓΕΝΙΚΗ δὲ φαίνεται πολυειδῆς εἶ-
 ναι, ἡρτῆσθαι δὲ πᾶσα ἐκ τῆς ΠΑΤΡΙΚΗΣ. οἱ γονεῖς
 μὲν γὰρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα, ὡς ἑαυτῶν τι ὄντα·

τὰ δὲ τέκνα, τοὺς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. μᾶλλον δ' ἴσασιν οἱ γονεῖς τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἢ τὰ γεννηθέντα, ὅτι ἐκ τούτων. καὶ μᾶλλον συναρκείωται τὸ ἀφ' οὗ τῶ γεννηθέντι, ἢ τὸ γενόμενον τῶ ποιήσαντι. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οἰκείον τῶ ἀφ' οὗ, οἷον ὀδοὺς, ἢ θρίζ, ἢ ὀτιοῦν, τῶ ἔχοντι· ἐκεῖνα δ' οὐθέν τὸ ἀφ' οὗ, ἢ ἦττον. καὶ τῶ πλήθει δὲ τοῦ χρόνου. οἱ μὲν γὰρ, εὐθύς γενόμενα, στέργουσιν· τὰ δὲ, προελθόντα τοῖς χρόνοις, τοὺς γονεῖς, σύνεσιν ἢ αἰσθησιν λαβόντα. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον, καὶ δι' ἃ φιλοῦσι μᾶλλον αἱ μη-10 τέρες. γονεῖς μὲν οὖν τέκνα φιλοῦσιν, ὡς ἑαυτούς· (τὰ γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἕτεροι αὐτοὶ τῶ κεχαρίσθαι) τέκνα δὲ γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων πεφυκότα.

XXI. ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ Δ' ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ, τῶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι. ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ταυτότης, ἀλλήλοις 15 ταυτοποιεῖ· ὅθεν φασί, ταυτὸν αἷμα, καὶ ρίζαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. εἰσὶ δὲ ταυτό πως καὶ ἐν διηρημένοις. μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν, καὶ τὸ σύντροφον καὶ τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν. ἤλιξ γὰρ ἤλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἑταῖροι. διὸ καὶ ἡ ἀδελφικὴ τῆ ἑταιρικῆ ὁμοιοῦται. ΑΝΕΨΙΟΙ 20 δὲ, καὶ οἱ ΛΟΙΠΟΙ ΣΥΓΓΕΝΕΙΣ, ἐκ τούτων συναρκείωνται. τῶ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίγνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δ' ἄλλοτριώτεροι, ΤΩ ΣΥΝΕΓΓΥΣ Η ΠΟΡΡΩ ΤΟΝ ΑΡΧΗΓΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ.

XXII. Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ΠΡΟΣ ΓΟΝΕΙΣ Φιλία τέκνοις, 25 καὶ ἀνθρώποις ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΟΥΣ, ὡς πρὸς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὑπερέχον. εὖ γὰρ πεποιήκασι τὰ μέγιστα. τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τραφῆναι αἴτιοι, καὶ γενομένοις, τοῦ παιδευθῆναι. ἔχει δὲ καὶ ΤΟ ἮΔΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ ἢ τοιαύτη Φιλία, μᾶλλον τῶν ὀβνείων, ὅσα καὶ κοινότε-30 ρος ὁ βίος αὐτοῖς ἐστίν.

XXIII. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν τῆ ΑΔΕΛΦΙΚῆ, ἅπερ καὶ ἐν τῆ ἑταιρικῆ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι· καὶ

ὅλως ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις· ὅσα οἰκειότεροι, καὶ ἐκ γενετῆς
 ὑπάρχουσι στέργοντες ἀλλήλους, καὶ ὅσα ὁμοιόθε-
 στεροι, οἱ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ σύντροφοι καὶ παιδευ-
 θέντες ὁμοίως. καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον δοκιμασία
 5 πλείστη καὶ βεβαιωτάτη. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 λοιποῖς τῶν συγγενῶν τὰ φιλικά.

XXIV. ΑΝΔΡΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΙ Φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ
 φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει συνδυαστι-
 κόν, μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν· ὅσα πρότερον καὶ ἀναγ-
 10 καιότερον οἰκία πόλεως, καὶ τεκνοποιία κοινότερον
 τοῖς ζώοις. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοι-
 νωνία ἐστίν· οἱ δ' ἄνθρωποι, οὐ μόνον τῆς τεκνοποιίας
 χάριν συνοικοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν εἰς τὸν βίον. εὐθύς
 γὰρ διήρηται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἐστὶν ἕτερα ἀνδρὸς καὶ
 15 γυναικός. ἐπαρκοῦσιν οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινόν
 τιθέντες τὰ ἴδια. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. εἴη δ'
 ἂν καὶ δι' ἀρετὴν, εἰ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶεν. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐκα-
 τέρου ἀρετὴ, καὶ χαίροιν ἂν τῷ τοιούτῳ.

20 XXV. ΣΥΝΔΕΣΜΟΣ δὲ τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. διὸ
 θᾶττον οἱ ἄτεκνοι διαλύονται. τὰ γὰρ τέκνα κοινὸν
 ἀγαθὸν ἀμφοῖν· συνέχει δὲ τὸ κοινόν.

XXVI. Τὸ δὲ ΠΩΣ ΣΥΜΒΙΩΤΕΟΝ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς γυν-
 αῖκα, καὶ ὅλως φίλῳ πρὸς φίλον· οὐδὲν ἕτερον φαί-
 25 νεται ζητεῖσθαι, ἢ ΠΩΣ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΝ. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτόν
 φαίνεται τῷ φίλῳ πρὸς τὸν φίλον, καὶ τὸν ὀθνεῖον,
 καὶ τὸν ἐταῖρον, καὶ τὸν συμφοιτητήν.

CHAP. VI.

ON THE CAUSES WHICH LEAD TO THE DISTURBANCE
OF FRIENDSHIP.

PART I.

THE LEADING PRINCIPLE RELATING TO THE SUBJECT OF
THIS CHAPTER.

- 15 I. Τριττῶν δ' οὐσῶν φιλιῶν, (καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται)· καὶ καθ' ἐκάστην, τῶν μὲν EN ΙΣΟΤΗΤΙ φίλων ὄντων, τῶν δὲ ΚΑΘ' ὙΠΕΡΟΧΗΝ· (καὶ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀγαθοὶ φίλοι γίνονται, καὶ ἀμείνων χεῖροσι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ διὰ τὸ χρέσιμον· ἰσάζοντες ταῖς ἀφελείαις, καὶ διαφέροντες)· τοὺς ἴσους μὲν κατ' ἰσότητα, δεῖ ΤΩ ΦΙΑΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΛΟΙΠΟΙΣ ἰσάζειν, τοὺς δ' ἀνίσους, ΤΩ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΤΑΙΣ ὙΠΕΡΟΧΑΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΙΔΟΝΑΙ.

PART II.

THE SOURCES OF QUARREL IN EQUAL FRIENDSHIPS.

- II. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ ΕΓΚΛΗΜΑΤΑ καὶ αἱ μέμψεις 10 ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸ χρέσιμον φιλίᾳ, ἢ μόνῃ, ἢ μάλιστα· εὐλόγως. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ΔΙ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ φίλοι ὄντες, εὖ δρᾶν ἀλλήλους προθυμοῦνται. τοῦτο γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ φιλίας. πρὸς τοῦτο δ' ἀμιλλωμένων, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐγκλήματα, οὐδὲ μάχαι. τὸν γὰρ φιλοῦντα καὶ εὖ 15 ποιοῦντα οὐδεὶς δυσχεραίνει, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἦ χαρῖεις, ἀμύνεται εὖ δρᾶν. ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλον, τυγχάνων οὐ ἐφίεται, οὐκ ἂν ἐγκαλοῖη τῷ φίλῳ. ἐκάτερος γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται.

III. Οὐ πάνυ δ' οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δι' ἡδονῆν. ἄμα γὰρ ἀμφοῖν γίνεται οὗ ὀρέγονται, εἰ τῷ συνδιάγειν χαίρουσιν. γελοῖος δ' ἂν φαίνοιτο καὶ ὁ ἐγκαλῶν τῷ μὴ τέρποντι, ἔξόν μὴ συνδιημερεύειν.

5 IV. Ἡ δὲ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ ἐγκληματική. ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γὰρ χρώμενοι ἀλλήλοις· ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος δέονται, καὶ ἔλαττον ἔχειν οἴονται τοῦ προσήκοντος, καὶ μέμφονται, ὅτι οὐχ ὅσων δέονται, τοσούτων τυγχάνουσιν, ἄξιοι ὄντες· οἱ δ' εὖ ποιοῦντες οὐ δύνανται
10 ἐπαρκεῖν τοσαῦτα, ὅσων οἱ πάσχοντες δέονται.

V. Ἐοικε δὲ, καθάπερ τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστι διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀγροφόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον· καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ χреσίμον Φιλίας, ἡ μὲν ΗΘΙΚΗ, ἡ δὲ ΝΟΜΙΚΗ εἶναι. γίγνεται οὖν τὰ ἐγκλήματα μάλισθ', ὅΤΑΝ ΜΗ
15 ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΑΥΤΗΝ ΣΥΝΑΛΛΑΞΩΣΙ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΛΥΩΝΤΑΙ.

VI. Ἐστὶ δὴ ΝΟΜΙΚΗ μὲν, ἡ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς· ἡ μὲν, *to be content*
πάμπαν ἀγοραία, ἐκ χειρὸς εἰς χεῖρα· ἡ δὲ, ἐλευ- *an unwise*
θεριωτέρα εἰς χρόνον, καθ' ὁμολογίαν δὲ τί ἀντι-
20 τίνος. δῆλον δ' ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ ὀφείλημα, κοῦκ ἀμφί-
λογον. Φιλικὸν δὲ τὴν ἀναβολὴν ἔχει. διὸ, παρ'
ἐνίοις οὐκ εἰσὶ τούτων δίκαι· ἀλλ' οἴονται δεῖν στέρ-
χειν τοὺς κατὰ πίστιν συναλλάξαντας.

VII. Ἡ δ' ΗΘΙΚΗ, οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς· ἀλλ' ὡς φίλῳ
ΔΩΡΕΙΤΑΙ, ἢ ὅτιδήποτε ἄλλο, ΚΟΜΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ ΔΕ ΑΞΙΟΙ
25 τὸ ἴσον ἢ πλεόν, ὡς οὐ δεδωκώς ἀλλὰ χρέσας. οὐχ
ὁμοίως δὲ συναλλάξας καὶ διαλυόμενος, ἐγκαλίσσει. *repaid*

VIII. Τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ ΒΟΥΛΕΣΘΑΙ
μὲν πάντα ἢ τοὺς πλείστους ΤΑ ΚΑΛΑ, ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΙ-
ΣΘΑΙ ΔΕ ΤΑ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΑ. καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν, μὴ ἵνα
30 ἀντιπάθῃ· ὠφέλιμον δὲ, τὸ εὐεργετεῖσθαι.

IX. Δυναμένῳ δὴ, ἀνταποδοτέον τὴν ἀξίαν ὣν
ἔπαθεν, καὶ ἐκόντι. ἄκοντα γὰρ φίλον οὐ ποιητέον.
ὡς δὴ διαμαρτόντα ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ, καὶ εὖ παθόντα ὕφ'

οὐ οὐκ ἔδει· (οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ φίλου, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δρῶντος· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς εὐεργετηθέντα,) διαλυτέον. καὶ ὁμολογήσαι δ' ἄν, δυνάμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἀδυνατοῦντα δ', οὐδ' ὁ δοὺς ἠξίωσεν ἄν. ὥστ' εἰ δυνατὸς, ἀποδοτέον. ἐν ἀρχῇ δ' ἐπισκεπτέον, ὅτι ὑφ' οὗ εὐεργετεῖται, καὶ ἐπὶ τίνι· ὅπως ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑπομένη, ἢ μή.

Χ. Ἀμφισβήτησιν δ' ἔχει, πότερα δεῖ τῇ τοῦ ΠΑΘΟΝΤΟΣ ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ μετρεῖν, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην ποιῆσαι τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ΔΡΑΣΑΝΤΟΣ ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες, τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν, ἃ μικρὰ ἦν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν κατασμικρίζοντες. οἱ δ', ἀνάπαλιν, τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς· καὶ ἃ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν· καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις, ἢ τοιαύταις χρεῖαις. 15

Ἄρ' οὖν, ΔΙΑ ΜΕΝ ΤΟ ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης, ἢ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΟΝΤΟΣ ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑ μέτρον ἐστίν; οὗτος γὰρ ὁ δεόμενος, καὶ ἐπαρκεῖ αὐτῷ ὡς κομιούμενος τὴν ἴσην. τοσαύτη οὖν γεγένηται ἡ ἐπικουρία, ὅσον οὗτος ἠφέληται· καὶ ἀποδοτέον δὲ αὐτῷ ὅσον ἐπηύρατο, ἢ καὶ πλέον· κάλλιον γάρ.

Ἐν δὲ ΤΑΙΣ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ, ἐγκλήματα μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, μέτρῳ δ' ἔοικεν, ἢ ΤΟΥ ΔΡΑΣΑΝΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΣ. τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἠθους, ἐν τῇ ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΕΙ τὸ κύριον. 25

PART III.

THE SOURCES OF QUARREL IN UNEQUAL FRIENDSHIPS.

- 16 XI. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ΚΑΘ' ὑΠΕΡΟΧΗΝ φιλίαις. ἀξιοῖ γὰρ ἐκάτερος πλέον ἔχειν· ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται, διαλύεται ἡ φιλία.

XII. Οἶεται γὰρ ὁ τε βελτίων, “ προσήκειν αὐτῷ πλεόν ἔχειν· τῷ γὰρ ἀγαθῷ νέμεσθαι πλεόν” ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀφελιμώτερος. “ ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ὄντα, οὐ” φασὶ “ δεῖν ἴσον ἔχειν· λειτουργίαν τε γὰρ γίνεσθαι, 5 καὶ οὐ φιλίαν, εἰ μὴ κατ’ ἀξίαν τῶν ἔργων ἔσται τὰ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας.” οἴονται γὰρ, “ καθάπερ ἐν χρημάτων κοινωνίᾳ πλείον λαμβάνουσιν οἱ συμβαλλόμενοι πλείον, οὕτω δεῖν καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ.”

XIII. Ὁ δ’ ἐνδεὴς καὶ ὁ χείρων, ἀνάπαλιν. 10 “ φίλου γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν. τί γὰρ,” φασὶν, “ ὄφελος σπουδαίῳ ἢ δυνάστῃ φίλου εἶναι, μῆθὲν γε μέλλοντα ἀπολαύειν.”

XIV. Ἔοικε δὲ ἑκάτερος ὁρθῶς ἀξιῶν, καὶ δεῖν ἑκατέρῳ πλεόν νέμειν ἐκ τῆς φιλίας· οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 15 δέ· ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ὑπερέχοντι, τιμῆς, τῷ δ’ ἐνδεεῖ, κέρδους. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας, ἢ ΤΙΜΗ γέρας· τῆς δ’ ἐνδείας ἐπικουρία, τὸ κέρδος.

XV. Οὕτω δ’ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ γὰρ τιμᾶται ὁ μῆθὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷ 20 πορίζων. τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετούντι· ἢ τιμὴ δὲ κοινόν. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅμα ΧΡΗΜΑΤΙΖΕΣΘΑΙ ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ ΤΙΜΑΣΘΑΙ. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τὸ ἔλαττον οὐδεὶς ὑπομένει. τῷ δὲ περὶ χρήματα ἔλαττουμένῳ, τιμὴν ἀπονέμουσι· καὶ τῷ δω- 25 ροδόκῳ, χρήματα. τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν γὰρ ἐπανισοῖ καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν καθάπερ εἴρηται.

XVI. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἀνίσοις ὁμιλητέον· καὶ τῷ εἰς χρήματα ἀφελουμένῳ, ἢ εἰς ἀρετὴν, τιμὴν ἀνταποδοτέον· ἀνταποδιδόντα ΤΟ ΕΝΔΕΧΟΜΕΝΟΝ. τὸ 30 δυνατὸν γὰρ ἢ φιλία ἐπιζητεῖ, οὐ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν πᾶσι· καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τιμαῖς, καὶ τοὺς γονεῖς. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ποτε

τὴν ἀξίαν ἀποδοίη. εἰς ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ δὲ ὁ θεραπεύων,
ἐπεικῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

XVII. Διὸ, καὶν δόξειεν οὐκ ἐξεῖναι υἱῷ πατέρα
ἀπείπασθαι, πατρὶ δ' υἱόν. ὀφείλονται γὰρ ἀπο-
δοτέον· οὐθέν δὲ ποιήσας, ἄξιον τῶν ὑπηργμένων δέ-
δρακεν· ὥστ' αἰεὶ ὀφείλει· οἷς δ' ὀφείλεται, ἐξουσία
ἀφεῖναι· καὶ τῷ πατρὶ δὴ. ἅμα δ' ἴσως, οὐδεὶς ποτ'
ἂν ἀποστῆναι δοκεῖ, μὴ ὑπερβάλλοντος μοχθηρίας.
χωρὶς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας, τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ἀν-
θρωπικὸν μὴ διαθεῖσθαι. τῷ δὲ, φευκτὸν ἢ οὐ σπου-
δαστὸν, τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν, μοχθηρῶ ὄντι. εὖ πάσχειν γὰρ,
οἱ πολλοὶ βούλονται. τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν, φεύγουσιν ὡς
ἀλυσιτελέες.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

BOOK IX.

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SUMMARY OF THE NINTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

CASES OF FRIENDSHIP DISSOLVED BY VIOLATING PROPORTION.

I. Inasmuch as the due PROPORTION, belonging to FRIENDSHIP, cannot, like that belonging to JUSTICE, be determined by a COMMON MEASURE: there arise a variety of considerations relating to cases, in which friendship is DISSOLVED BY VIOLATING PROPORTION.

II. One of these cases is, when the GROUNDS of friendship are not PERMANENT. III. Another is, when the RETURNS of friendship on the one side, do not correspond with the MOTIVES of it on the other.

CHAP. II.

ON THE TRUE ESTIMATE OF FRIENDLY SERVICES.

I. The question is proposed: In order to a due return of good offices, WHO IS TO ESTIMATE THE VALUE OF THEM, the giver, or the receiver?

II. In such cases, it is sometimes recommended, for the prevention of strife, that there should be a PREVIOUS CONTRACT^a.

III. But even this, in cases where the remuneration is given BEFORE the service is performed, does not always exclude litigation. The practice of the SOPHISTS furnished an example. IV. In the friendships of VIRTUE, no quarrel relating to this point can arise: and the requital will be determined, by a regard to the PURPOSE

^a Such is the import of the verse from Hesiod, of which Aristotle here curtails the quotation:

μισθὸς δ' ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΟΣ ἄρκιος ἔστω.

and INTENTION of the benefactor. V. In other friendships, the return should be fixed in its value, if it be possible, so as to be satisfactory to BOTH parties. VI. But if this be not possible, it is most equitable that the RECEIVER should be the person to fix the value of the benefit: In doing which, perhaps, his judgment will be most correct, if he regards the value he entertained of it before, rather than after, receiving it.

CHAP. III.

ON CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF FRIENDSHIP.

I, III, V. Difficulties arising from conflicting and unequal claims of friendship. II, IV, VI. Principles of conduct relating to these difficulties. VI. Of these principles, the leading one is this: That WE SHOULD RENDER TO EVERY ONE, THAT WHICH IS APPROPRIATELY DUE TO HIS STATION, AND TO THE RELATION IN WHICH HE STANDS TO US. VII. This principle is EXEMPLIFIED, and applied to particulars.

VIII. The points to which, in adjusting the CLAIMS OF PREFERENCE, attention is due.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE MANNER IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP IS AFFECTED BY A CHANGE IN THE CONDITION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF FRIENDS.

I. Friendship is to be considered, with regard to a CHANGE in the CIRCUMSTANCES under which it was CONTRACTED.

II. The case of friendships of UTILITY and of PLEASURE. III. The case of friendships, in which one motive is PRETENDED and another ENTERTAINED. IV. The case of friendships of VIRTUE, in which, after a time, one of the friends CEASES to be virtuous. V. The case of friendships of VIRTUE, in which, after a time, one of the friends GREATLY SURPASSES the other in virtue.

CHAP. V.

ON SELF-LOVE, CONSIDERED AS A STANDARD FOR REGULATING THE DUTY OF FRIENDSHIP.

I. The following opinion is proposed for consideration : namely, That a MAN'S LOVE FOR HIMSELF IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF HIS LOVE TO HIS FRIEND.

II. In order to the trial of this opinion, certain DEFINITIONS are proposed. III. And thus, according to these definitions, the opinion, with regard to the VIRTUOUS, is confirmed by arguments. IV. According to the same definitions, it is shewn, with regard to the VICIOUS, that this opinion cannot apply to them.

 CHAP. VI.

ON BENEVOLENCE.

I. BENEVOLENCE differs from FRIENDSHIP. II. And from ATTACHMENT. III. It is the beginning of friendship. IV. The way in which it GROWS INTO friendship, and the KIND of friendship into which it grows. V. The CAUSES by which benevolence is EXCITED.

 CHAP. VII.

ON CONCORD.

I. CONCORD, which is allied to friendship, is not exactly the same as AGREEMENT OF OPINION. II. The SUBJECTS OF MENTAL DETERMINATION to which concord relates. III. Concord is POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP. IV. It can subsist only among the VIRTUOUS. V. Reasons why it cannot subsist among the VICIOUS.

CHAP. VIII.

CONTAINING VARIOUS DETACHED QUESTIONS AND POSITIONS RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP.

This chapter consists of six parts: each of which is severally concerned in examining so many several questions relating to friendship.

PART THE FIRST.

I. The question is proposed: WHY ARE BENEFACTORS MORE ATTACHED TO THOSE WHOM THEY BENEFIT, THAN THE LATTER TO THE FORMER?

II. An opinion offered by some towards the solution of the question: namely, That the benefactor feels an anxious interest in the welfare of the man he has obliged, because he is desirous that the latter may enjoy life and opportunity to requite his kindness. III. This solution is rejected. IV. Another solution is offered: namely, That the affection of the benefactor to the obliged is grounded on the same cause, as the attachment of the artist to the production of his labour. V. This last solution is vindicated on the ground of its agreement with nature. VI. A second reason offered towards the solution of the same question: The pleasures of virtue surpass those of self-interest, and the pleasures of our own actions surpass those which we derive from being in any way affected by the actions of other men. VII. A third reason: The fruits of activity and exertion are more dear to us, than those advantages which are quietly and passively obtained.

PART THE SECOND.

VIII. The question is proposed: WHETHER THE SELFISH, OR THE SOCIAL, ATTACHMENT OUGHT TO PREDOMINATE IN FRIENDSHIP.

IX. Arguments AGAINST the selfish feeling. X. Arguments IN FAVOUR of it. XI. In order to the decision of the question, it is necessary to distinguish between two different USES of the word SELFISH. XII. The IMPROPER use of it. XIII. The PROPER use of it. This is fixed by ascertaining the true and exact idea of SELF. XIV. According to the proper use of the word, the question is determined in favour of the selfish principle. XV. It is shewn in detail, that all acts of benevolence, even the most generous and heroic, contribute to the truest ends of self-love.

PART THE THIRD.

XVI. The question is proposed: WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF FRIENDS BE NECESSARY TO A STATE OF HAPPINESS.

XVII. Arguments for the NEGATIVE. XVIII, XIX, XX. The AFFIRMATIVE is maintained by THREE ARGUMENTS. XXI. An argument for the NEGATIVE is again stated. XXII, XXIII, XXIV. This last argument is encountered by the THREE following arguments for the AFFIRMATIVE. XXII. First, Happiness consists partly in the CONTEMPLATION OF VIRTUOUS ACTIONS: but this contemplation is MORE READILY EXERCISED ON THE ACTS OF OUR FRIENDS THAN ON OUR OWN. XXIII. Secondly, Virtue, in itself essential to happiness, DEMANDS OBJECTS ON WHICH TO EXERCISE ITSELF: which demand is most readily satisfied by the opportunities arising from familiar society with virtuous friends. XXIV. Thirdly, The same pleasures which arise from the CONSCIOUSNESS OF LIFE AND VIRTUE IN OURSELVES, or pleasures similar to them, are derived from the KNOWLEDGE OF LIFE AND VIRTUE IN OUR FRIENDS.

PART THE FOURTH.

XXV. The question is proposed: IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY LIMITATION, AS TO THE NUMBER OF OUR FRIENDS?

XXVI. If we consider friendships of UTILITY AND PLEASURE, it cannot be necessary that they should be more than a FEW. XXVII. The question becomes then confined to the friendships of VIRTUE. XXVIII. With regard to these last, the RULE is, that our number of friends ought not to comprehend more than those with whom we can CONVENIENTLY MAINTAIN INTERCOURSE. XXIX. There is however one case which, WITHOUT VIOLATING the principle of virtue, admits of NUMEROUS friendships. Such is the nature of POLITICAL friendships: but these are not the same with those, which Aristotle SPECIFICALLY considers as the FRIENDSHIPS OF VIRTUE.

PART THE FIFTH.

XXX. The question is proposed: WHETHER FRIENDS ARE MORE NEEDFUL IN PROSPERITY OR ADVERSITY.

XXXI. Friendships of utility most suited to adversity; and of virtue, to prosperity. XXXII. The essential and disinterested pleasure of friendship, which renders it desirable in prosperity, is forcibly discovered by the MERE PRESENCE of a friend, unattended by any other advantage, in adversity. XXXIII. The presence of friends in our adversity is a source of MINGLED pleasure and pain.

XXXIV. VARIETY OF HUMAN CHARACTER, which discovers itself in relation to the foregoing remark. XXXV. The CAUSES of the pleasure which we derive from the presence of our friends in prosperity. XXXVI. PRACTICAL RULES relating to the intercourse of friends both in prosperity and adversity.

XXXVII. General conclusion.

PART THE SIXTH.

XXXVIII. A proposition in an interrogative form: FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE IS MOST HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO THE PURPOSES OF FRIENDSHIP.

XXXIX. This proposition proved and illustrated.

XL. The influence of familiar intercourse on the moral character.

CHAP. I.

CASES OF FRIENDSHIP DISSOLVED BY VIOLATING PROPORTION.

I. EN πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀνομοιοειδέσι φιλίαις, τὸ
ANALOGON ἰσάζει καὶ σώζει τὴν φιλίαν καθάπερ
εἴρηται. οἷον καὶ ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ, τῷ σκυτοτόμῳ,
ἀντὶ τῶν ὑποδημάτων, ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν
5 καὶ τῷ ὑφάντῃ, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν
πεπόρισται KOINON METPON, τὸ νόμισμα· καὶ πρὸς
τοῦτο δὴ πάντα ἀναφέρεται, καὶ τούτῳ μετρεῖ-
ται. ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐρωτικῇ· ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁ ἐραστὴς ἐγκα-
λεῖ, ὅτι ὑπερφιλῶν, οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔχων
10 Φιλητὸν, εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν· πολλάκις δ' ὁ ἐρώμενος,
ὅτι πρότερον ἐπαγγελλόμενος πάντα, νῦν οὐδὲν ἐπι-
τελεῖ.

II. Συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν δι'
ἡδονὴν τὸν ἐρώμενον φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ διὰ τὸ χρησίμον τὸν
15 ἐραστὴν· ταῦτα δὲ μὴ ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει. διὰ ταῦτα
γὰρ τῆς φιλίας οὐσης, διάλυσις γίνεται, ΕΠΕΙΔΑΝ
ΜΗ ΓΙΝΗΤΑΙ ὄΝ ἘΝΕΚΑ ΕΦΙΛΟΥΝ. οὐ γὰρ αὐτοὺς
ἔστεργον, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, οὐ μόνιμα ὄντα.
διὸ, τοιαῦται καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. ἢ δὲ τῶν ἡθῶν, καθ'
20 αὐτὴν οὔσα, μένει καθάπερ εἴρηται.

III. Διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ, ὅΤΑΝ ἘΤΕΡΑ ΓΙΝΗΤΑΙ
ΑΥΤΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΜΗ ὄΝ ΟΡΕΓΟΝΤΑΙ. ὁμοίον γὰρ τῷ μη-
θὲν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν οὐ ἐφίεται μὴ τυγχάνη. οἷον,
καὶ τῷ κίθαρωδῷ ὁ ἐπαγγελλόμενος, καὶ ὅσῳ ἄμει-

νον ἄσειεν, τοσούτω πλείω· εἰς ἕω δ' ἀπαιτοῦντι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἀνθ' ἡδονῆς ἡδονὴν ἀποδεδωκέναι ἔφη. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκάτερος τοῦτο ἐβούλετο· ἰκανῶς ἂν εἶχεν. εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν τέρψιν, ὁ δὲ κέρδος· καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχει, ὁ δὲ μὴ· οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ κατὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν καλῶς. ἂν γὰρ δεόμενος τυγχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κακείνου γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει.

CHAP. II.

ON THE TRUE ESTIMATE OF FRIENDLY SERVICES.

I. Τὴν ἀξίαν δὲ ΠΟΤΕΡΟΥ ΤΑΞΑΙ ΕΣΤΙ, τοῦ προΐ-
εμένου ἢ τοῦ προλαβόντος; ὁ γὰρ προΐεμενος ἔοικ' ἐπιτρέπειν ἐκείνῳ. ὅπερ φασὶ καὶ Πρωταγόραν ποιεῖν. 10
ὅτε γὰρ διδάξειεν ἀδήποτε, τιμῆσαι τὸν μαθόντα ἐκέλευεν, ὅσου δοκεῖ ἀξία ἐπίστασθαι· καὶ ἐλάμβανε τοσοῦτον.

II. Ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δ' ἐνίοις ἀρέσκει τὸ, “ ΜΙ-
ΣΘΟΣ Δ' ἈΝΔΡΙ.” 15

III. Οἱ δὲ ΠΡΟΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ τὸ ἀργύριον, εἶτα μη-
θὲν ποιοῦντες ἂν ἔφασαν· διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν
ἐπαγγελιῶν εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασι γίνονται. οὐ γὰρ
ἐπιτελοῦσιν ἢ ἠμολόγησαν. τοῦτο δ' ἴσως ποιεῖν οἱ
σοφισταὶ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΖΟΝΤΑΙ, διὰ τὸ μηθένα ἂν δοῦναι 20
ἀργύριον ἂν ἐπίστανται. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ἂν ἔλαβον
τὸν μισθὸν, μὴ ποιοῦντες, εἰκότως ἐν ἐγκλήμασιν
εἰσιν.

IV. Ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ γίγνεται διομολογία τῆς ὑ-
ουργίας· οἱ μὲν δι' αὐτοὺς προΐεμενοι εἶρηται ὅτι 25
ἀνέγκλητοι. τοιαύτη γὰρ ἦ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ Φιλία.
τὴν ἀμοιβὴν τε ποιητέον κατὰ τὴν ΠΡΟΑΙΡΕΣΙΝ. αὕτη

γὰρ τοῦ φίλου, καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. οὕτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφίας κοινωθήσασιν. οὐ γὰρ πρὸς χρέμαθ' ἢ ἀξία μετρεῖται· τιμὴ τ' ἰσόρροπος οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλ' ἴσως ἰκανόν, (καθάπερ καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς
5 γονεῖς,) τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον.

V. Μὴ τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης τῆς δόσεως, ἀλλ' ἐπί τινι· μάλιστα μὲν ἴσως, δεῖ τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν γίνεσθαι ΔΟΚΟΥΣΑΝ ΑΜΦΟΙΝ ΚΑΤ' ΑΞΙΑΝ εἶναι.

VI. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνοι· οὐ μόνον ἀναγ-
10 καῖον δόξειεν ἂν, ΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΕΧΟΝΤΑ τάττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκαιον. ὅσον γὰρ οὗτος ὠφελήθη, ἢ ἀνθ' ὅσου τὴν ἡδονὴν εἴλετ' ἂν· τοσοῦτον ἀντιλαβὼν, ἔξει τὴν παρὰ τούτου ἀξίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀνίοις οὕτω φαίνεται γινόμενον· ἐνιαχοῦ τ' εἰσὶ νόμοι, τῶν ἔκου-
15 σίων συμβολαίων δίκας μὴ εἶναι· ὡς δέον, ᾧ ἐπί-
στευσε, διαλυθῆναι πρὸς τοῦτον καθάπερ ἐκοινώησεν. ᾧ γὰρ ἐπετράφθη, τοῦτον οἶεται δικαίωτερον εἶναι τάξαι τοῦ ἐπιτρέψαντος. τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ ἴσου τιμῶσιν οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ οἱ βουλόμενοι λαβεῖν.
20 τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα, καὶ ἃ διδῶσιν, ἐκάστοις φαίνεται πολλοῦ ἀξία. ἀλλ' ὅμως, ἢ ἀμοιβὴ γίνεται πρὸς τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἂν τάττωσιν οἱ ΛΑΒΟΝΤΕΣ. δεῖ δ' ἴσως οὐ τοσοῦτου τιμᾶν, ὅσου ΕΧΟΝΤΙ φαίνεται ἀξίον, ἀλλ' ὅσου ΠΙΠΙΝ ΕΧΕΙΝ ἐτίμα.

CHAP. III.

ON CONFLICTING CLAIMS OF FRIENDSHIP.

25 I. Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ τοιάδε· οἶον, πόττερα 2
δεῖ πάντα τῷ ΠΑΤΡΙ ἀπονέμειν καὶ πείθεσθαι· ἢ, κἀμνοντα μὲν ΙΑΤΡῶ πειστέον, στρατηγὸν δὲ χειρο-
τονητέον ΤΟΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΙΚΟΝ. ὁμοίως δὲ, ΦΙΛῶ μᾶλλον,

ἢ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩ, ὑπηρετητέον· καὶ, ΕΥΕΡΓΕΤῆ ΑΝΤΑΠΟΔΟΤΕΟΝ χάριν, μᾶλλον ἢ ἙΤΑΙΡΩ ΔΟΤΕΟΝ, ἐὰν ἀμφοῖν μὴ ἐνδέχεται. ἄρ' οὖν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκριβῶς μὲν διορίσαι οὐ ῥάδιον; πολλὰς γὰρ καὶ παντοίας ἔχει διαφορὰς, καὶ μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, 5 καὶ τῷ καλῷ, καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ.

II. "Ὅτι δ' οὐ ΠΑΝΤΑ Τῷ Αὐτῷ ΑΠΟΔΟΤΕΟΝ οὐκ ἄδηλον. καὶ τὰς μὲν ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑΣ ΑΝΤΑΠΟΔΟΤΕΟΝ, ὥς ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΠΟΛΥ, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η ΧΑΡΙΣΤΕΟΝ ἙΤΑΙΡΟΙΣ· καὶ ὥσπερ δάνειον, ὧ ΟΦΕΙΛΕΙ ΑΠΟΔΟ- 10 ΤΕΟΝ, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η ἙΤΑΙΡΩ ΔΟΤΕΟΝ.

III. "Ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τοῦτ' αἰεὶ. οἶον, τῷ λυτρωθέντι παρὰ ληστῶν, πότερον ΤΟΝ ΛΥΣΑΜΕΝΟΝ ἀντιλυτρωτέον, κἂν ὅστισοῦν ἦ· ἢ καὶ μὴ ἐαλωκότι, ἀπαιτοῦντι δὲ, ἀποδοτέον· ἢ τὸν ΠΑΤΕΡΑ λυτρωτέον; δό- 15 ζειε γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ μᾶλλον, τὸν πατέρα.

IV. "Ὅπερ οὖν εἴρηται, καθόλου μὲν, ΤΟ ΟΦΕΙΛΗΜΑ ΑΠΟΔΟΤΕΟΝ· ἐὰν δ' ὑπερτείνῃ ἢ δόσις τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ, ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΥΤ' ΑΠΟΚΛΙΤΕΟΝ.

V. Ἐνίστε γὰρ οὐΔ' ΕΣΤΙΝ ἼΣΟΝ, τὸ τὴν προ- 20 ὑπαρχὴν ἀμείψασθαι· ἐπειδὴν ὁ μὲν, σπουδαῖον εἰδώς, εὖ ποιήσῃ, τῷ δὲ ἢ ἀνταπόδοσις γίγνηται, ὃν οἶεται μοχθηρὸν εἶναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ δανείσαντι, ἐνίστε ἀντιδανειστέον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ, οἴομενος κομιεῖσθαι, ἐδάνεισεν ἐπιεικεῖ ὄντι· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐλπίζει κομι- 25 εῖσθαι παρὰ πονηροῦ. εἴτε τοίνυν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ ἀξίωμα· εἴτ' ἔχει μὲν μὴ οὕτως, οἶονται δὲ, οὐκ ἂν δόξαιεν ἄτοπα ποιεῖν.

VI. "Ὅπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται· ὍΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΘΗ ΚΑΙ ΤΑΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ ΛΟΓΟΙ ὍΜΟΙΩΣ ΕΧΟΥΣΙ ΤΟ 30 ὈΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ, ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ Ἄ ΕΙΣΙΝ. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταῦτὰ πᾶσιν ἀποδοτέον, οὐδὲ τῷ πατρὶ πάντα, (καθάπερ οὐδὲ τῷ Διὶ θύεται,) οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἕτερα γονεῦσι, καὶ ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ ἑταίροις, καὶ εὐερ-

See B. I.
c. i. §. ix.
and x.

γέταις· ἑκάστοις τὰ οἰκεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄρμοττοντα ἀπονεμητέον.

VII. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ποιεῖν φαίνονται. εἰς γάμου
 μὲν γὰρ καλοῦσι τοὺς ΣΥΓΓΕΝΕΙΣ. τούτοις γὰρ κοι-
 νὸν τὸ γένος, καὶ αἱ περὶ τοῦτο δὴ πράξεις. καὶ εἰς
 τὰ κῆδη δὲ μάλιστ' οἴονται δεῖν τοὺς συγγενεῖς
 ἀπαντᾶν, διὰ ταῦτό. δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς μὲν ΓΟ-
 ΝΕΥΣΙ δεῖν μάλιστ' ἐπαρκεῖν· ὡς ὀφείλοντας, καὶ
 τοῖς αἰτίοις τοῦ εἶναι κάλλιον ὢν ἢ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς ταῦτ'
 10 ἐπαρκεῖν. καὶ τιμὴν δὲ γονεῦσι, καθάπερ θεοῖς· οὐ
 πᾶσαν δέ. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν πατρὶ καὶ μητρί·
 οὐδ' αὖ τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὴν
 πατρικὴν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν μητρικὴν. καὶ παντὶ
 δὲ τῷ ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΕΡΩ, τιμὴν τὴν καθ' ἡλικίαν, ὑπανα-
 15 στάσει, καὶ κατακλίσει, καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. πρὸς
 ἑταίρους δ' αὖ καὶ ἀδελφοὺς, παρρησίαν καὶ ἀπάν-
 των κοινότητα.

VIII. Καὶ συγγενέσι δὴ, καὶ φυλέταις, καὶ πο-
 λίταις, καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς ἅπασιν, αἰεὶ πειρατέον τὸ
 20 ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ ΑΠΟΝΕΜΕΙΝ· καὶ ΣΥΓΚΡΙΝΕΙΝ τὰ ἑκάστοις
 ὑπάρχοντα κατ' ΟΙΚΕΙΟΤΗΤΑ, καὶ ΑΡΕΤΗΝ, ἢ ΧΡΗ-
 ΣΙΝ. τῶν μὲν οὖν ὁμογενῶν, ῥάων ἢ κρίσις· τῶν δὲ
 διαφερόντων, ἐργωδεστέρα. οὐ μὴν διὰ γε τοῦτο
 ἀποστατέον, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω διορι-
 25 στέον.

CHAP. IV.

ON THE MANNER IN WHICH FRIENDSHIP IS AFFECTED,
BY A CHANGE IN THE CONDITION AND CIRCUM-
STANCES OF FRIENDS.

3 I. Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαλύεσθαι τὰς
φιλίας, ἢ μὴ, ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΜΗ ΔΙΑΜΕΝΟΝΤΑΣ.

II. Ἡ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς διὰ τὸ ΚΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ ἢ τὸ ἍΔΥ
φίλους ὄντας, ὅταν μηκέτι ταῦτ' ἔχωσιν, οὐδὲν ἄτο-
πον διαλύεσθαι; ἐκείνων γὰρ ἦσαν φίλοι· ἂν ἀπο-⁵
λιπόντων, εὐλογον τὸ μὴ φιλεῖν.

III. Ἐγκαλέσειε δ' ἂν τις, εἰ, διὰ τὸ ΚΡΗΣΙΜΟΝ
ἢ τὸ ἍΔΥ ἀγαπᾶν, ΠΡΟΣΕΠΟΙΕΙΤΟ διὰ τὸ ΗΘΟΣ.
ὅπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴπομεν· πλεῖσται διαφοραὶ γίγ-
νονται τοῖς φίλοις, ὅταν μὴ ὁμοίως ΟΙΩΝΤΑΙ, καὶ 10
c. vi. §. vii.

ΩΣΙ, φίλοι. ὅταν μὲν οὖν διαψευσθῇ τις, καὶ ὑπο-
λάβῃ φιλεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἦθος, μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκείνου
πράττοντος· ἑαυτὸν αἰτιῶτ' ἂν. ὅταν δ' ὑπὸ τῆς
ἐκείνου προσποιήσεως ἀπατηθῇ· δίκαιον ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ
ἀπατήσαντι· καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς τὸ νόμισμα κιβδη- 15
λεύουσιν, ὅσα περὶ τιμιώτερον ἢ κακουργία.

IV. Ἐὰν δ' ἀποδέχεται ὡς ἀγαθόν, ΓΕΝΗΤΑΙ δὲ
μοχθηρὸς καὶ δοκῇ· ἄρ' ἔτι φιλητέον; ἢ οὐ δυνατὸν,
εἴπερ μὴ πᾶν φιλητὸν, ἀλλὰ τὰγαθόν; οὔτε δὲ φι-
λητέον πονηρὸν, οὔτε δεῖ. φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρῆ²⁰
εἶναι, οὐδ' ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ· εἴρηται δ', ὅτι τὸ
ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον. ἄρ' οὖν ΕΥΘΥΣ διαλυτέον;
ἢ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνιάτοις κατὰ τὴν μοχθη-
ρίαν; ἐπανόρθωσιν δ' ἔχουσι, μᾶλλον βοηθητέον εἰς
τὸ ἦθος ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν· ὅσα βέλτιον, καὶ τῆς φιλίας²⁵
οἰκειώτερον. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ ΔΙΑΛΥΟΜΕΝΟΣ, οὐδὲν ἄτο-

πον ποιεῖν. οὐ γὰρ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ φίλος ἦν· ἀλλοιωθέντα οὖν ἀδυνατῶν ἀνασῶσαι, ἀφίσταται.

V. Εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν ΔΙΑΜΕΝΟΙ, ὁ δ' ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΣΤΕΡΟΣ γένοιτο καὶ ΠΟΛΥ διαλλάττοι τῇ ἀρετῇ· ἄρα χρηστέον φίλῳ; ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται; ἐν ΜΕΓΑΛῃ δὲ διαστάσει, μάλιστα δῆλον γίνεται· οἷον, ἐν ταῖς παιδικαῖς φιλίαις. εἰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν διαμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν παῖς, ὁ δ' ἀνὴρ εἴη οἷος κράτιστος· πῶς ἂν εἶεν φίλοι, μὴτ' ἀρεσκόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς, μῆτε χαίροντες καὶ λυπούμενοι; οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ ἀλλήλους ταῦθ' ὑπάρξει αὐτοῖς· ἄνευ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἦν φίλους εἶναι. συμβιοῦν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων. ἄρ' οὖν οὐθεν ἀλλοιότερον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκτέον, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἐγεγόνει φίλος μηδέποτε; ἢ δεῖ μνεῖαν ἔχειν τῆς γενομένης συνηθείας, καὶ, καθάπερ φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ ὀθνεῖσις οἰόμεθα δεῖν χαρίζεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τοῖς γενομένοις ἀπονεμητέον τι, ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΡΟΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΗΝ ΦΙΛΙΑΝ, ὅταν μὴ δι' ὑπερβολὴν μοχθηρίας ἢ διάλυσις γένηται;

CHAP. V.

IN WHICH IT IS CONSIDERED, WHETHER SELF-LOVE IS A PROPER STANDARD FOR FRIENDSHIP.

20 I. Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς 4 αἱ φιλίαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΣ ἑΑΥΤΟΝ ἐληλυθέναι.

25 II. Τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον, “ τὸν ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΑ τὰγαθὰ, ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα, ΕΚΕΙΝΟΥ ἔνεκα” ἢ, “ τὸν ΒΟΥΛΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΕἶΝΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΖΗΝ τὸν φίλον ΑΥΤΟΥ χάριν.” (ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα

πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων οἱ προσκεκροκότες.) οἱ δὲ,
 “τὸν ΣΥΝΔΙΑΓΟΝΤΑ καὶ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΑἰΡΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ” ἢ, “τὸν
 ΣΥΝΑΔΙΟΥΝΤΑ καὶ ΣΥΓΧΑΙΡΟΝΤΑ τῷ φίλῳ.” (μάλιστα
 δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει.) τούτων
 δὲ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. 5

III. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον ΤΩ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙ
 ὑπάρχει· τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνου-
 σιν εἶναι. (ἔοικε γὰρ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκά-
 στω ἢ ἀρετῇ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι.) οὗτος γὰρ ὁμο-
 γνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ· καὶ ΤΩΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΟΡΕΓΕΤΑΙ^a κατὰ πᾶ- 10
^a See the last section.
 σαν τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ ΔΗ ἘΑΥΤῷ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΑ^a,
 καὶ τὰ ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ^a· καὶ ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙ^a· (τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ
 τὰγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἘΑΥΤΟΥ ἜΝΕΚΑ^a. (τοῦ γὰρ
 ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΟΥ χάριν· ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ.) καὶ
 ΖΗΝ ΔΕ ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ ἘΑΥΤΟΝ^a, καὶ σώζεσθαι, καὶ μά- 15
 λιστα τοῦτο, ᾧ φρονεῖ. ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ
 εἶναι· ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τὰγαθὰ· [γενό-
 μενος δ' ἄλλος, οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν ΕΚΕΙΝΟ
 ΤΟ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ. ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τὰγαθόν·
 ἀλλ' ἂν, ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν.] δόξειε δ' ἂν ΤΟ ΝΟΟΥΝ 20
 ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. ΣΥΝΔΙΑΓΕΙΝ^a τε ὁ τοι-
 οῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται. ἠδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ. τῶν
 τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερεπεῖς αἱ μνήμαι, καὶ τῶν
 μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἠδέϊαι.
 καὶ θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. ΣΥΝΑΔΕΙ 25
 καὶ ΣΥΝΗΔΕΤΑΙ^a μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ. πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστι
 τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἠδὺ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο.
 ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν
 μὲν ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικέι, πρὸς δὲ
 τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ἄσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν· (ἐστι γὰρ ὁ Φί- 30
 οὗτος), καὶ ἄλλος ἄλλος αὐτός·) ἢ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δο-
 κεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει. ΠΡΟΣ ἘΑΥΤΟΝ δὲ
 πότερόν ἐστιν, ἢ οὐκ ἐστι φιλία· ἀφείσθω ἐπὶ τοῦ
 παρόντος. δόξειε δ' ἂν ταύτη εἶναι φιλία, ἢ ἐστὶ δύο

ἢ πλείω, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς
φιλίας τῆ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁμοιοῦται.

- IV. ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς
ὑπάρχειν, καίπερ οὔσι φαύλοις. ἄρ' οὖν ἡ ἀρέσκουτιν
5 ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, ταύτη
μετέχουσιν αὐτῶν; ἐπεὶ τῶν γε κομιδῆ φαύλων καὶ
ἀνοσιουργῶν, οὐθενὶ ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ΦΑΙ-
ΝΕΤΑΙ. σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς φαύλοις. διαφέρονται
γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς^a, καὶ ἑτέρων μὲν ΕΠΙΘΥΜΟΥΣΙΝ, ἄλλα δὲ^a See §. ii.
10 ΒΟΥΛΟΝΤΑΙ· οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς. αἰροῦνται γὰρ, ἀντί
τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι, τὰ ἡδέα, βλα-
βερὰ ὄντα. οἱ δ' αὖ, διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν, ἀφίσ-
τανται τοῦ πράττειν ἑαυτοῖς ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΑ
ΕΙΝΑΙ^a. οἷς δὲ πολλὰ καὶ δεινὰ πέπρακται, διὰ τὴν
15 μοχθηρίαν μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι ΤΟ ΖΗΝ^a, καὶ
ἀναιροῦσιν ἑαυτούς. ζητοῦσί τε οἱ μοχθηροὶ μεθ' ὧν
συνδημερεύουσιν, ἑαυτοῖς ΔΕ ΦΕΥΓΟΥΣΙΝ^a. ἀναμι-
μνήσκονται γὰρ πολλῶν καὶ δυσχερῶν· καὶ τοιαῦθ'
ἕτερα ἐλπίζουσι, καθ' ἑαυτούς ὄντες, μεθ' ἑτέρων δ'
20 ὄντες, ἐφιλανθάνονται. οὐθέν τέ φιλητὸν ἔχοντες, οὐθεν
φιλικὸν πάσχουσι πρὸς ἑαυτούς. οὐδὲ δὴ ΣΥΓΧΑΙΡΟΥ-
ΣΙΝ, οὐδὲ ΣΥΓΝΑΛΓΟΥΣΙΝ^a, οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς. στασιάζει
γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ· καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν
ἀλγεῖ, ἀπεχόμενον τινῶν, τὸ δ' ἡδέεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν
25 δεῦρο, τὸ δ' ἐκείσε, ἔλκει, ὥσπερ διασπᾶντα. εἰ δὲ
μὴ οἷόν τε ἄΜΑ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι· ἀλλὰ ΜΕΤΑ
ΜΙΚΡΟΝ γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἦσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο
ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῶ. ΜΕΤΑΜΕΛΕΙΑΣ ΓΑΡ ὍΙ
ΦΑΥΛΟΙ ΓΕΜΟΥΣΙΝ. οὐ δὲ φαίνεται ὁ φαῦλος, ΟΥΔΕ
30 ΠΡΟΣ ἑΑΥΤΟΝ φιλικῶς διακεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν
ἔχειν φιλητόν.

Εἰ δὲ τὸ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον· φευκτέον
τὴν μοχθηρίαν διατεταμένως, καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῆ

εὐνοίαν, τὰ δίκαια δρᾶν. ὁ δὲ βουλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν, ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δι' ἐκείνου, οὐκ ἔοικ' εὐνοὺς ΕΚΕΙΝΩ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἑΑΥΤΩ· καθάπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύει αὐτὸν διὰ τινα
 5 χρῆσιν.

V. Ὅλως δ' ἡ εὐνοία ΔΙ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΑΝ ΤΙΝΑ γίνεται, ὅταν τῷ φανῆ καλὸς τις, ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον· καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγανιστῶν εἴπομεν.

CHAP. VII.

ON CONCORD.

10 I. Φιλικὸν δὲ καὶ ἡ ὍΜΟΝΟΙΑ φαίνεται. διό-6
 περ οὐκ ἔστιν ὍΜΟΔΟΞΙΑ. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀγνοοῦσιν ἀλλήλους ὑπάρξειεν ἄν. οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ ὁτουοῦν ὁμογνωμονοῦντας, ὁμονοεῖν φασίν· οἷον τοὺς περὶ τῶν οὐρανίων. οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν τὸ περὶ τούτων
 15 ὁμονοεῖν.

II. Ἀλλὰ τὰς ΠΟΛΕΙΣ ὁμονοεῖν φασίν, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ΣΥΜΦΕΡΟΝΤΩΝ ὁμογνωμονῶσι, καὶ ταυτὰ προαιρῶνται καὶ πράττωσι, ΤΑ ΚΟΙΝῆ ΔΟΞΑΝΤΑ. περὶ τὰ ΠΡΑΚΤΑ δὲ ὁμονοοῦσιν. καὶ τούτων, περὶ ΤΑ ΕΝ
 20 ΜΕΓΕΘΕΙ, καὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ΑΜΦΟΙΝ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ ΠΑΣΙΝ· οἷον αἱ πόλεις, ὅταν πᾶσι δοκῇ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρετάς εἶναι, ἢ συμμαχεῖν Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἢ ἀρχεῖν Πιπτακόν, ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἠθελεν. ὅταν δ' ἐκάτερος ἑαυτὸν βούληται, (ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς
 25 Φοινίσσαις,) ΣΤΑΣΙΑΖΟΥΣΙΝ. οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὁμονοεῖν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐκάτερον ἐνοεῖν ὀδῆποτε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ· οἷον, ὅταν καὶ ὁ δῆμος καὶ οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς, τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀρχεῖν. οὕτω γὰρ πᾶσι γίγνεται οὗ ἔφίενται.

III. ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ ΔΕ ΦΙΛΙΑ φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται. περὶ τὰ συμφέροντα γὰρ ἔστι, καὶ τὰ εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνήκοντα.

IV. Ἔστι δ' ἡ τοιαύτη ὁμόνοια ἐν τοῖς ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΣΙΝ. οὗτοι γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ ἀλλήλοις· 5 ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντες, ὡς εἰπεῖν. τῶν τοιούτων γὰρ μένει τὰ βουλήματα, καὶ οὐ μεταρρεῖ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπος. βούλονταί τε τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, τούτων δὲ καὶ κοινῇ ἐφίενται.

V. Τοὺς δὲ ΦΑΥΛΟΥΣ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὁμονοεῖν, πλὴν 10 ἐπὶ μικρόν· καθάπερ καὶ φίλους εἶναι· πλεονεξίας ἐφιεμένους ἐν τοῖς ἀφελίμοις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πόνοις καὶ ταῖς λειτουργίαις ἐλλείποντας. ἑαυτῶ δ' ἕκαστος βουλόμενος ταῦτα, τὸν πέλας ἐξετάζει καὶ κωλύει. μὴ γὰρ τηρούντων τὸ κοινόν, ἀπόλλυται. συμβαίνει 15 οὖν αὐτοῖς στασιάζειν· ἀλλήλους μὲν ἐπαναγκάζοντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν.

CHAP. VIII.

IN WHICH VARIOUS DETACHED QUESTIONS, RELATING TO FRIENDSHIP, ARE EXAMINED.

PART I.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHY ARE BENEFACTORS MORE ATTACHED TO THOSE WHOM THEY BENEFIT, THAN THE LATTER TO THE FORMER?

7 I. Οἱ δ' ΕΥΕΡΓΕΤΑΙ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΥΕΡΓΕΤΗΘΕΝΤΑΣ ΔΟΚΟΥΣΙ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΦΙΛΕΙΝ, ἢ οἱ εὖ παθόντες τοὺς

δράσαντας· καὶ ὡς παρὰ λόγον γινόμενον, ἐπιζη-
τεῖται.

II. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πλείστοις φαίνεται, ὅτι οἱ μὲν
ὀφείλουσι τοῖς δὲ ὀφείλεται· καθάπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν
5 δανείων, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες βούλονται μὴ εἶναι οἷς
ὀφείλουσιν, οἱ δὲ δανείσαντες καὶ ἐπιμέλονται τῆς
τῶν ὀφειλόντων σωτηρίας· οὕτω καὶ τοὺς εὐεργετή-
σαντας βούλεσθαι εἶναι τοὺς παθόντας, ὡς ΚΟΜΙΟΥ-
ΜΕΝΟΥΣ ΤΑΣ ΧΑΡΙΤΑΣ· τοῖς δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιμελῆς τὸ
10 ἀνταποδοῦναι. Ἐπίχαρμος μὲν οὖν τάχ' ἂν φαίη
ταῦτα λέγειν αὐτούς, ἐκ πονηροῦ θεωμένου· ἔοικε δ'
ἀνθρωπικῶ. ἀμνήμονες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ, καὶ μᾶλλον
εὖ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐφίενται.

III. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ΦΥΣΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ εἶναι τὸ αἴτιον,
15 καὶ οὐχ ὅμοιον τῷ περὶ τοὺς δανείσαντας. οὐ γάρ
ἔστι φίλησις περὶ ἐκείνους, ἀλλὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαι
βούλησις τῆς κομιδῆς ἕνεκα· οἱ δ' εὖ πεποιηκότες
φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πεπονθότας, καὶ μὴθὲν
ᾧσι χρήσιμοι, μὴδ' εἰς ὕστερον γένοιντ' ἂν.

20 IV. Ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν συμβέβηκεν.
πᾶς γὰρ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον ἀγαπᾷ, μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγα-
πηθεῖν ἂν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔργου, ἐμψύχου γενομένου.
μάλιστα δ' ἴσως τοῦτο περὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς συμβαίνει.
ὑπεραγαπῶσι γὰρ οὗτοι τὰ οἰκεῖα ποιήματα, στέρ-
25 γοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα. τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικε καὶ τὸ τῶν
εὐεργετῶν. τὸ γὰρ εὖ πεπονθὸς ΕΡΓΟΝ ἔστιν αὐτῶν.
τοῦτο δὲ ἀγαπᾶσι, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἔργον τὸν ποιή-
σαντα.

V. Τούτου δ' αἴτιον, ὅτι τὸ εἶΝΑΙ πᾶσιν αἰρετὸν
30 καὶ φιλητὸν, ἐσμέν δ' ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ. τῷ ζῆν γὰρ καὶ
πράττειν. ἐνεργεῖα δὲ ὁ ποιήσας τὸ ἔργον ἔστι πως.
στέργει δὲ τὸ ἔργον, διότι καὶ τὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ

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ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ· ὃ γὰρ ἔστι δυνάμει, τοῦτο ἐνεργεία το ἜΡΓΟΝ ΜΗΝΤΕΙ.

VI. "Αμα δὲ καὶ, τῷ μὲν εὐεργέτη, καλὸν τὸ κατὰ τὴν ΠΡΑΞΙΝ· ὥστε χαίρειν ἐν ᾧ τοῦτο· τῷ δὲ ΠΑΘΟΝΤΙ, οὐθεν καλὸν ἐν τῷ δράσαντι, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ⁵ συμφέρον· τοῦτο δ' ἥττον ἢ δὴ καὶ φιλητόν. ἡδεῖα δ' ἐστὶ, τοῦ μὲν παρόντος ἢ ἐνεργεία, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἢ ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ γεγενημένου ἢ μνήμη· ἡδιστον δὲ, τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν· καὶ φιλητόν ὁμοίως. τῷ μὲν οὖν πεποιηκότι, μένει τὸ ἔργον. τὸ καλὸν γὰρ πολυ- ¹⁰ χρόνιον. τῷ δὲ παθόντι, τὸ χρήσιμον παροίχεται. ἢ τε μνήμη, τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡδεῖα· τῶν δὲ χρησίμων, οὐ πάνυ, ἢ ἥττον. ἢ προσδοκία δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχειν ἔοικεν. καὶ ἢ μὲν φίλησις, ποιῆσει ἔοικεν· τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ¹⁵ δὲ, τῷ πάσχειν. τοῖς ὑπερέχουσι δὲ περὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν, ἔπεται τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὰ φιλικά.

VII. "Ἐτι δὲ, ΤΑ ΕΠΙΠΟΝΩΣ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΑ πάντες μᾶλλον στέργουσιν· οἷον καὶ τὰ χρήματα οἱ κτη- ²⁰ σάμενοι, τῶν παραλαβόντων· δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὖ πάσχειν, ἄπονον εἶναι, τὸ δ' εὖ ποιεῖν, ἐργῶδες. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ αἱ μητέρες φιλοτεκνότεραι. ἐπιπονω- ²⁵ τέρα γὰρ ἢ γέννησις, καὶ μᾶλλον ἴσασις ὅτι αὐτῶν. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐεργέταις οἰκείον εἶναι.

PART II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER THE SELFISH, OR THE SOCIAL, FEELING OUGHT TO PREVAIL IN FRIENDSHIP.

VIII. Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ, ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΔΕΙ ΦΙΛΕΙΝ 8
Εἴη τὸν ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ, ἢ ἌΛΛΟΝ ΤΙΝΑ.

IX. ΕΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙ γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦς μάλιστα ἀγα-
πῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῶ, ΦΙΛΑΤΤΟΥΣ ἀποκαλοῦσι.
5 δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν Φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράτ-
τειν, καὶ ὅσα ἂν μοχθηρότερος ἦ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον
ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῶ, ὅτι οὐθέν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει.
ὁ δ' ἐπεικῆς, διὰ τὸ καλόν· καὶ ὅσα ἂν βελτίων ἦ,
μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν· καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα· τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ
10 παρήσιν.

X. Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφανεῖ· οὐκ
ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ, δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλ-
ιστα φίλον· φίλος δὲ μάλιστα, ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ
βούλεται τὰγαθὰ, ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηθεὶς εἴσ-
15 ται· ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῶ πρὸς αὐτόν·
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάνθ', οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται. εἴρη-
ται γὰρ, ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ, καὶ πρὸς
τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι
ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν· οἷον, τὸ “μία ψυχὴ” καὶ “κοινὰ
20 τὰ φίλων” καὶ “ἰσότης φιλότης” καὶ “γόνυ κνή-
μης ἔγγιον.” πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλισθ'
ὑπάρχει. μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῶ· καὶ φιλητέον
δὴ μάλισθ' ἑαυτόν.

XI. Ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπε-
25 σθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντων τὸ πιστόν. ἴσως οὖν τοὺς
τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν, καὶ διορίζειν, ἐφ'

ὅσον ἑκάτεροι, καὶ πῆ, ἀληθεύουσιν. εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν
 ΤΟ ΦΙΛΑΥΤΟΝ ΠΩΣ ἘΚΑΤΕΡΟΙ ΛΕΓΟΥΣΙΝ· ΤΑΧ' ἂν
 γένοιτο δῆλον.

XII. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ, Φι-
 λαύτους καλοῦσι, ΤΟΥΣ ἘΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΑΠΟΝΕΜΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΟ 5
 ΠΛΕΙΟΝ ἐν χρήμασι, καὶ τιμαῖς, καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς
 σωματικαῖς. τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ
 ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα. διὸ καὶ
 περιμάχητά ἐστιν. οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται,
 χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι, 10
 καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολ-
 λοί. διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται, ἀπὸ τοῦ ΠΟΛ-
 ΛΟΥ, ΦΑΥΛΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ. δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύ-
 τοις ὀνειδίζεται. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπο-
 νέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ Φιλαύτους· οὐκ 15
 ἄδηλον.

XIII. Εἰ γάρ τις ΑΕΙ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΖΟΙ ΤΑ ΔΙΚΑΙΑ
 ΠΡΑΤΤΕΙΝ αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων, ἢ τὰ σάφρονα, ἢ
 ὅποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς· καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ
 τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιῶτο· οὐβείς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον Φί- 20
 λαυτον, οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος ΜΑΛΛΟΝ
 ΕἶΝΑΙ ΦΙΛΑΥΤΟΣ. ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλ-
 λιστα, καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ· καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ
 τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ
 καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ 25
 πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ Φί-
 λαυτος δὴ μάλιστα, ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ
 χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατῆς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατῆς λέγε-
 ται, τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ· ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου
 ὄντος. καὶ πεπραγῆναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ, καὶ ἐκουσίως, 30
 τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἑκαστός
 ἐστιν, ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον· καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικῆς
 μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. διὸ, Φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν
 εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδίζομένου· καὶ δια-

φέρων τοσοῦτον, ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν, τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ, ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.

XIV. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις δια-
 5 φερόντως σπουδάζοντας, πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλόν, καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἶη τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν· εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
 10 ὥστε ΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΔΕΙ ΦΙΛΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται, τὰ καλὰ πράττων, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει. τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ. βλάβει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν, καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθειν ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφανεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράτ-
 15 τειν, καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς, ἃ δεῖ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει. πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ· ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ.

XV. Ἀληθὲς δὲ, περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου, καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα, πολλὰ πράττειν· καὶ τῆς πατρίδος·
 20 καὶ δέη, ὑπεραποθνήσκειν. προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα, καὶ τιμὰς, καὶ ὅλας τὰ περιμάχητα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν. ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα, μᾶλλον ἔλοιτ' ἂν, ἢ πολὺν ἡρέμα· καὶ βιωῆσαι καλῶς ἑνἑαυτὸν, ἢ πόλλ' ἔτη τυ-
 25 χόντως· καὶ μίαν πράξιν καλὴν καὶ μεγάλην, ἢ πολλὰς καὶ μικράς. τοῖς δ' ὑπεραποθνήσκουσι τοῦτ' ἴσως συμβαίνει· αἰροῦνται δὴ μέγα καλὸν ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ χρήματα προοῖντ' ἂν, ἐφ' ᾧ πλείονα λήψονται οἱ φίλοι. γίγνεται γὰρ τῷ μὲν φίλῳ χρήματα.
 30 αὐτῷ δὲ τὸ καλόν· τὸ δὴ μείζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀποπέμει. καὶ περὶ τιμὰς δὲ καὶ ἀρχὰς, ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος. πάντα γὰρ τῷ φίλῳ ταῦτα προήσεται. καλὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαινετόν. εἰκότως δὴ δοκεῖ σπουδαῖος εἶναι, ἀντὶ πάντων αἰρούμενος τὸ καλόν.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ πράξεις τῷ φίλῳ προῖεσθαι, καὶ εἶναι κάλλιον, τοῦ αὐτὸν πράξει, τὸ αἴτιον τῷ φίλῳ γενέσθαι. ἐν πᾶσι δὴ τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς, ὁ σπουδαῖος φαίνεται ἑαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ΦΙΛΑΤΤΟΝ ΕἶΝΑΙ ΔΕΙ' καθάπερ εἴρηται· ὡς δ' οἱ πολλοὶ, οὐ χρή.

PART III.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER THE POSSESSION OF FRIENDS BE NECESSARY TO A STATE OF HAPPINESS.

9 XVI. Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, Εἰ ΔΕΗΣΕΤΑΙ ΦΙΛΩΝ ἢ ΜΗ.

XVII. Οὐθέν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὰ-10 γαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας, οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι· τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἅ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ. ὅθεν τὸ, “ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὔ διδῶ, τί δεῖ φίλων;”

XVIII. Ἐοικε δ' ἀτόπως, τὸ ΠΑΝΤ' ἀπονέμοντας 15 τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι, ΦΙΛΟΥΣ μὴ ἀποδιδόναι· ὁ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ εἶναι.

XIX. Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τὸ εὔ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν· καὶ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τὸ εὐεργετεῖν· κάλλιον δ' εὔ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνεῖαν· τῶν 20 ΕΥ ΠΕΙΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΔΕΗΣΕΤΑΙ ὁ σπουδαῖος. (διὸ καὶ ἐπιζητεῖται, πότερον ἐν εὐτυχίαις μᾶλλον δεῖ φίλων, ἢ ἐν ἀτυχίαις· ὡς καὶ τοῦ ἀτυχοῦντος δεομένου τῶν εὐεργετησόντων, καὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων, οὓς εὔ ποιήσουσιν.)

XX. Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ, τὸ ΜΟΝΩΤΗΝ ΠΟΙΕΙΝ ΤΟΝ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΝ. οὐθὲς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἄν, καθ' αὐτὸν, τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ. πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ συζῆν ΠΕΦΥΚΟΣ. καὶ τῶ εὐδαιμόνι δὴ τοῦθ' ὕπάρχει. τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. δῆλον δ', ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν, κρεῖττον, ἢ μετ' ὀθνεῖων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων, συνημερεύειν. ΔΕΙ ΑΡΑ Τῷ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙ ΦΙΛΩΝ.

XXI. Τί οὖν λέγουσιν οἱ πρῶτοι, καὶ πῆ ἀληθεύουσιν; ἢ ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ φίλους οἴονται τοὺς ΧΡΗΣΙΜΟΥΣ εἶναι; τῶν τοιούτων μὲν οὖν οὐθεν δεήσεται ὁ μακάριος, ἐπειδὴ τὰγαθὰ ὑπάρχει αὐτῶ. οὐδὲ δὴ τῶν διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ἢ ἐπὶ μικρόν. ἡδὺς γὰρ ὁ βίος ὄν, οὐθεν δεῖται ΕΠΕΙΣΑΚΤΟΥ ἡδονῆς. οὐ δεόμενος δὲ τῶν τοιούτων φίλων, οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖσθαι φίλων.

XXII. Τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἀληθές. ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ εἴρηται, ὅτι ἡ εὐδαιμονία ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ τίς ἐστίν· ἢ δ' ἐνέργεια δῆλον ὅτι ΓΙΝΕΤΑΙ, καὶ οὐχ ὕΠΑΡΧΕΙ ὡσπερ κτῆμά τι. εἰ δὲ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐστίν ἐν τῷ ζῆν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν· τοῦ δ' ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐνέργεια, σπουδαία καὶ ἡδεῖα ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΗΝ, (καθάπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴρηται)· ἔστι δὲ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ τῶν ἡδέων· ΘΕΩΡΕΙΝ ΔΕ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΠΕΛΑΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΘΑ, ἢ ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων πράξεις, ἢ τὰς οἰκείας· αἱ τῶν σπουδαίων δὴ πράξεις, φίλων ὄντων, ἡδεῖται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. ἄμφο γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ τῇ φύσει ἡδέα. ὁ μακάριος δὴ φίλων τοιούτων δεήσεται· εἴπερ θεωρεῖν προαιρεῖται πράξεις ἐπεικεῖς καὶ οἰκείας· τοιαῦται δ' αἱ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, φίλου ὄντος.

XXIII. Οἴονται τε δεῖν ἩΔΕΩΣ Ζῆν τὸν εὐδαιμόνα. μονώτη μὲν οὖν, ΧΑΛΕΠΟΣ ὁ βίος. οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον, καθ' αὐτὸν ἐνεργεῖν συνεχῶς. μεθ' ἑτέρων δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους, ῥᾶον. ἔσται οὖν ἡ ἐνέργεια ΣΥΝΕΧΕΣΤΕΡΑ,

ἡδέϊα οὖσα καθ' αὐτήν· ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν μακάριον εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ σπουδαῖος, ἢ σπουδαῖος, ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεσι χαίρει, ταῖς δ' ἀπὸ κακίας δυσχεραίνει· καθάπερ ὁ μουσικὸς τοῖς καλοῖς μέλεσιν ἡδεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις λυπεῖται. γίνοιτο δ' ἂν 5 καὶ ΑΣΚΗΣΙΣ ΤΙΣ ΤΗΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς· καθάπερ καὶ Θεόγνις φησιν.

XXIV. ΦΥΣΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ δ' ἐπισκοποῦσιν, ἔοικεν ὁ σπουδαῖος φίλος, τῷ σπουδαίῳ Τῆ ΦΥΣΕΙ αἰρετὸς εἶναι. 10

See B. I. c.
iii. §. xv.

Τὸ γὰρ Τῆ ΦΥΣΕΙ ἀγαθὸν, εἴρηται ὅτι Τῷ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι, καθ' αὐτό.

Τὸ δὲ ζῆν ὀρίζονται τοῖς ζῴοις, δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως· ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ δ', αἰσθήσεως ἢ νοήσεως. ἡ δὲ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ εἰς τὴν ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ἀνάγεται· τὸ δὲ ΚΥΡΙΟΝ, 15 ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔοικε δὴ τὸ ζῆν εἶναι κυρίως, ΤΟ Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν.

Τὸ δὲ ζῆν, τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἡδέων.

(ἀρισμένον γὰρ τὸ δ' ἀρισμένον, τῆς Ἰ ΑΓΑΘΟΥ φύσεως.)

τὸ δὲ τῇ ΦΥΣΕΙ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ τῷ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙ. διόπερ, 20 ἔοικε ΠΑΣΙΝ ἮΔΥ Εἶναι. (οὐ δὲ δὲ λαμβάνειν μοχθηρὰν ζῶν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδ' ἐν λύπαις. ἀόριστος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῇ. ἐν τοῖς ἐχομένοις δὲ περὶ τῆς λύπης ἔσται φανερώτερον.) 25

Εἰ δ' αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ· (ἔοικε δὲ, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πάντας ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ μακαρίους· τούτοις γὰρ ὁ βίος αἰρετώτατος, καὶ ἡ τούτων μακαριωτάτη ζῶν) ὁ δ' ὀρῶν, ὅτι ὀρᾷ αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ὁ ἀκούων, ὅτι ἀκούει, καὶ ὁ 30 βαδίζων, ὅτι βαδίζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως, ἔστι τι τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ὅτι ἐνεργοῦμεν· (ἄσπε αἰσθανοίμεθ' ἂν ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα, καὶ νοοῖμεν ὅτι νοοῦμεν)

τὸ δ' ὅτι αἰσθανόμεθα ἢ νοοῦμεν, ὅτι ἐσμέν· (τὸ γὰρ εἶναι, ἢν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ νοεῖν·) τὸ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ζῆ, τῶν ἡδέων καθ' αὐτό· (φύσει γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ζῆ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἡδύ·)
 5 αἰρετὸν δὲ τὸ ζῆν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅτι τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡδύ· (συναισθανόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ ἡδονται·) ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον· (ἕτερος γὰρ αὐτὸς ὁ φίλος ἐστίν·) ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ ΟΥΤΩ ΤΟ
 10 ΑΥΤΟΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ Αἰρετον εστιν ἕκαστω, ὅτω καὶ το τὸν φίλον, ἢ παραπλησίως.

Τὸ δ' εἶναι ἢν αἰρετὸν, διὰ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἑαυτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος· ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη αἰσθησις, ἡδεῖα καθ' ἑαυτήν. ΣΥΝΑΙΣΘΑΝΕΣΘΑΙ ΑΡΑ ΔΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ
 15 ΦΙΛΟΥ, ὅτι ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ γίνοιτ' ἂν, ἐν τῷ συζῆν καὶ κοινωνεῖν λόγων καὶ διανοίας. (οὔτω γὰρ ἂν δόξειε τὸ συζῆν, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεσθαι καὶ οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν βόσκηματων, τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νέμεσθαι.)

20 Εἰ δὲ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετὸν ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτό, (ἀγαθὸν τῇ φύσει ὄν καὶ ἡδύ,) παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλου ἐστίν· καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρετῶν ἂν εἴη. ὁ δ' ἐστὶν αὐτῷ αἰρετὸν· τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἢ ταύτη ἐνδεὴς ἐσται.

25 ΔΕΗΣΕΙ ΑΡΑ Τῷ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΗΣΟΝΤΙ ΦΙΛΩΝ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩΝ.

ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει, μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλάτατον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ τοσούτους, ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν, πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον ΣΦΟΔΡΑ. δίοπερ, οὐδ' ἐρᾶν πλειόνων. ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας· τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ, πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δ' ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων. οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοί, κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικήν φιλίαν· αἱ δ' ὑμνούμεναι, ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται.

- 10 XXIX. Οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες, οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΣ. οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ΑΡΕΣΚΟΥΣ. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι, πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον· καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπεικῆ. ΔΙ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ δὲ καὶ δι' αὐ-
- 15 τοὺς, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὐρεῖν τοιούτους.

PART V.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER PROSPERITY OR ADVERSITY IS MORE IN NEED OF FRIENDS.

- XXX. ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ Δ' ΕΝ ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΙΣ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΦΙΛΩΝ ΔΕΙ, ἢ ΕΝ ΔΥΣΤΥΧΙΑΙΣ; ἐν ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ἐπιζητοῦνται. οἳ τε γὰρ ἀτυχοῦντες δέονται ἐπικουρίας·
- 20 οἳ τ' εὐτυχοῦντες, συμβίων, καὶ οὓς εὖ ποιήσουσιν. βούλονται γὰρ εὖ δεῖν.

- XXXI. ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΜΕΝ Δὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀτυχίαις· διὸ τῶν ΧΡΗΣΙΜΩΝ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ. ΚΑΛΛΙΟΝ δ' ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις· διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικέεις ζητοῦσιν. τούτους γὰρ αἰρετώτερον εὐεργετεῖν, καὶ μετὰ τούτων διάγειν.

XXXII. Ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ ΑΥΤῆ τῶν φίλων ἡδεῖα, καὶ ἐν ταῖς δυστυχίαις. κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι, συναλγούντων τῶν φίλων. διὸ, καὶ ἀπορήσειέν τις, πότερον ὥσπερ βάρους μεταλαμβάνουσιν· ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ, ἢ παρουσία δ' αὐτῶν, ἡδεῖα οὔσα, καὶ ἡ ἔννοια τοῦ συναλγεῖν, ἐλάττω τὴν λύπην ποιεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα, ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι κουφίζονται, ἀφείσθω· συμβαίνειν δ' οὖν φαίνεται τὸ λεχθέν.

XXXIII. Ἔοικε δ' ἡ παρουσία ΜΙΚΤΗ τις αὐτῶν εἶναι. αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ὄραν τοὺς φίλους, ἢ δὲ, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτυχοῦντι· καὶ γίνεται τις ἐπικουρία πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι. παραμυθητικὸν γὰρ ὁ φίλος καὶ τῇ ὄψει, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, εἰάν ἢ ἐπιδέξιος. οἶδε γὰρ τὸ ἦθος, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς ἡδέεται καὶ λυπεῖται. τὸ δὲ λυπούμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς αὐτοῦ ἀτυχίαις, λυπηρόν. πᾶς γὰρ φεύγει λύπης αἴτιος εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις.

XXXIV. Διόπερ, οἱ μὲν ἈΝΔΡΩΔΕΙΣ τὴν φύσιν, εὐλαβοῦνται συλλυπεῖν τοὺς φίλους αὐτοῖς. καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνῃ τῇ ἀλυπία, τὴν ἐκείνοις γινομένην λύπην οὐχ ὑπομένει. ὅλως τε, συνθρήνου οὐ προσίεται, διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἶναι θρηνητικός. ΓΥΝΑΙΑ δὲ, καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες, τοῖς συστένουσι χαίρουσι· καὶ φιλοῦσιν, ὡς φίλους καὶ συναλγούντας. μιμεῖσθαι δ' ἐν ἅπασιν δεῖ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν βελτίω.

XXXV. Ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΙΣ τῶν φίλων παρουσία, τὴν τε διαγωγὴν ἡδεῖαν ἔχει, καὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν, ὅτι ἡδονταὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῖς.

XXXVI. Διὸ, δόξειεν ἂν δεῖν, εἰς μὲν τὰς εὐτυχίας, καλεῖν τοὺς φίλους προθύμως· εὐεργετητικὸν γὰρ εἶναι καλόν· εἰς δὲ τὰς ἀτυχίας ὀκνοῦντα. μεταδιδόναι γὰρ ὡς ἥκιστα δεῖ τῶν κακῶν. ὅθεν τὸ, “ἄλις ἐγὼ δυστυχῶν.” μάλιστα δὲ παρακλητέον,

ὅταν μέλλωσιν, ὀλίγα ὀχληθέντες, μεγάλ' αὐτὸν
 ἄφελήσειν. ἴεναι δ' ἀνάπαλιν ἴσως ἀρμόζει, πρὸς
 μὲν τοὺς ΑΤΥΧΟΥΝΤΑΣ, ἀκλητον καὶ προθύμως· (φίλου
 γὰρ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν χρεΐα, καὶ τὸ
 5 μὴ ἀξιώσαντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ κάλλιον καὶ ἥδιον)
 εἰς δὲ τὰς ΕΥΤΥΧΙΑΣ, ΣΥΝΕΡΓΟΥΝΤΑ μὲν προθύμως·
 (καὶ γὰρ εἰς ταῦτα χρεΐα φίλων·) πρὸς ΕΥΠΑΘΕΙΑΝ
 δὲ σχολαίως· (οὐ γὰρ καλὸν τὸ προθυμεῖσθαι
 ἄφελεῖσθαι). δόξαν δ' ἀηδίας ἐν τῷ διαθεῖσθαι *in gratiam*
 10 ἴσως εὐλαβητέον. ἐνίοτε γὰρ συμβαίνει.

XXXVII. Ἡ ΠΑΡΟΥΣΙΑ ΔΗ ΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΩΝ ΕΝ ἘΠΑΙ-
 ΣΙΝ ΑΙΡΕΤΗ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ.

PART VI.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE QUESTION: WHETHER FAMILIAR
 INTERCOURSE IS GREATLY DESIRABLE TO THE PUR-
 POSES OF FRIENDSHIP.

XXXVIII. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὄραν 12
 ἀγαπητότατόν ἐστι, καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην
 15 τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς, ὡς κατὰ ταύτην μᾶ-
 λιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γινομένου· οὕτω καὶ
 ΤΟΙΣ ΦΙΛΟΙΣ, ΑΙΡΕΤΩΤΑΤΟΝ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟ ΣΥΖΗΝ;

XXXIX. Κοινωνία γὰρ ἡ φιλία. καὶ ὧς πρὸς
 ἑαυτὸν ἐχει, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον. περὶ
 20 αὐτὸν δ', ἡ αἴσθησις ὅτι ἔστιν, αἰρετή· καὶ περὶ τὸν
 φίλον δὴ. ἡ δ' ἐνεργεῖα γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ
 συζῆν. ὥστ' εἰκότως τούτου ἐφίενται. καὶ ὅτι
 ποτ' ἔστιν ἐκάστοις τὸ εἶναι, ἢ οὐ χάριν αἰροῦνται
 τὸ ζῆν· ἐν τούτῳ, μετὰ τῶν φίλων βούλονται διάγειν.
 25 διότερ, οἱ μὲν συμπίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ συγκυβεύουσιν,
 ἄλλοι δὲ συγγυμνάζονται, καὶ συγκυνηγοῦσιν, ἢ

συμφιλοσοφούσιν· ἕκαστοι ἐν τούτῳ συνημερεύοντες, ὃ τί περὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶσι τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. συζῆν γὰρ βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῶν φίλων ταῦτα ποιούσι, οἷς οἴονται. καὶ τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε συζῆν.

XL. Γίνεται οὖν ἡ μὲν τῶν ΦΑΥΛΩΝ ΦΙΛΙΑ, ΜΟ-⁵
 ΧΟΗΡΑ. κοινωνοῦσι γὰρ φαύλων, ἀβέβαιοι ὄντες· καὶ
 μοχθηροὶ δὲ γίνονται, ὁμοιούμενοι ἀλλήλοις. ἡ δὲ
 τῶν ἐπεικῶν, ἐπεικῆς, συναυξανόμενη ταῖς ὀμιλίαις.
 δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ βελτίους γίνεσθαι, ἐνεργοῦντες, καὶ
 διορθοῦντες ἀλλήλους. ἀπομάττονται γὰρ παρ' ἀλ-¹⁰
 λήλων οἷς ἀρέσκονται ὅθεν, “ ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ’
 ἐσθλά.”

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ΦΙΛΙΑΣ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω. ἐπό-
 μενον δ' ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν περὶ ἩΔΟΝΗΣ.

BOOK X.

2100H

SUMMARY OF THE TENTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF PLEASURE.

This chapter may fitly be divided into seven parts. The first of these, sets forth the REASONS FOR EXAMINING THE SUBJECT. The second enquires, whether pleasure is the SOVEREIGN GOOD. The third enquires, whether it has in ANY DEGREE the nature of GOOD. The fourth fixes its ESSENTIAL CHARACTER. The fifth discusses the VARIETIES of it. The sixth ascertains which, among these many varieties, constitute the real and essential pleasures of HUMAN LIFE. The seventh embraces the consideration of that kind of pleasure, which is afforded by AMUSEMENTS.

PART THE FIRST.

I. Reasons for examining the subject of PLEASURE. And first, those which arise from the INTRINSIC NATURE of it. II. Additional reason, arising from the variation of the SEVERAL JUDGMENTS which have been pronounced upon it.

III. The probable MOTIVE in which this difference of judgment has partly originated.

(IV. Collateral remark, on the danger of preferring expediency to truth, in philosophical enquiries.)

PART THE SECOND.

V. The reasons of EUDOXUS, for thinking pleasure to be the SOVEREIGN GOOD. VI. One of these reasons makes it evident, that pleasure is NOT the Sovereign Good.

PART THE THIRD.

VII. Pleasure must have the nature of good, inasmuch as it is the object of UNIVERSAL PURSUIT. VIII. Exposure of a FALLACY designed to prove the CONTRARY. IX. It does not follow, as some contend, that, because pleasure is not a QUALITY, therefore it has not the nature of good. X. Nor does it follow, because it is susceptible of INTENSION AND DIMINUTION. XI. Nor does it follow from the consideration, that it is either a GENERATIVE MOTION, OR ANY OTHER KIND OF MOTION whatever. For, first, it is not even a MOTION OF ANY KIND: And secondly, much less is it a GENERATIVE MOTION^a. XII. Nor does it follow from the consideration, that pleasure consists in the SATISFACTION OF A WANT: for ALL pleasure has not this character. XIII. Nor does it follow from the fact, that SOME pleasures are DEPRAVED AND DISGRACEFUL.

XIV. It appears, however, that the character of PLEASURE in some instances differs from the character of GOOD. XV. For PLEASURE, in a state of SEPARATION from GOOD, would sometimes be DECLINED. XVI. And GOOD, in a state of SEPARATION from PLEASURE, would sometimes be DESIRED.

PART THE FOURTH.

XVII. Pleasure is A THING ENTIRE, UNCOMPOUNDED, AND PERFECT AT THE MOMENT OF EXPERIENCE, SO AS NOT TO DEPEND, FOR ITS ATTAINMENT OF PERFECTION, ON THE PROGRESS OF TIME.

XVIII. From which consideration are deduced further arguments, that pleasure is not, according to the philosophical language of Aristotle, a species of MOTION: this latter being, either IN ITSELF IMPERFECT, or else, REQUIRING TIME FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF PERFECTION; and relating, not to things ENTIRE AND UNCOMPOUNDED, but to things DIVISIBLE.

XIX. The most perfect ENERGY OR OPERATION, is that, of the PERSON best affected towards the best OBJECT of that energy: this energy is also the MOST PLEASURABLE: and it is the CONCOMITANT

^a See the note at page 209.

PLEASURE which perfects the energy. [It is therefore to be considered as the most essential character of pleasure, that it is THAT WHICH PERFECTS THE ENERGIES OF THE NATURE OF MAN.]

XX.—XXIV. An explanation of the MODE, in which the ENERGIES OR OPERATIONS of man are PERFECTED BY PLEASURE. XX. This mode is different from those, of both the SENSITIVE FACULTY, and the SENSIBLE OBJECT, from which pleasure arises ^b. XXI. The DEGREE of pleasure will be proportioned to the CONDITION OF THE SENSITIVE FACULTY, and to the WORTH OR GOODNESS OF THE OBJECT, which are concerned in producing it: thus, in the case of music, it will depend, partly on the performance, and partly on the ear. XXII. And thus, PLEASURE WILL ALWAYS ARISE, wherever there exists, both a SUBJECT CAPABLE OF AFFORDING IT, and a FACULTY CAPABLE OF RECEIVING IT: as, for instance, when there are melodious sounds, and their influence is not impeded by deafness or by unsusceptible organs. XXIII. It acts, not after the way in which a moral or intellectual HABIT perfects itself in ACTIVE OPERATION; but as a FRUIT, EFFECT, OR CONSUMMATION, of that active operation ^b. XXIV. Pleasure will always connect itself with those ENERGIES OR OPERATIONS, which are accompanied by a CORRESPONDENCE OF MUTUAL ADAPTATION, between the ACTIVE CAUSE and the PASSIVE FACULTY; that is, between objects capable of affording pleasure, and a power of sensation capable of feeling it.

XXV. From the principle, that pleasure perfects the energy with which it is connected; is deduced the reason, why PLEASURE CANNOT HAVE A CONTINUAL DURATION.

XXVI. On the same ground it is shewn, that the DESIRE OF PLEASURE IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE DESIRE OF LIFE.

PART THE FIFTH.

XXVII. From the same principle is deduced, an explanation of the difference which exists among the many VARIETIES OF PLEASURE. As the ENERGIES of man are various, so will his PLEASURES be marked by a corresponding variety. XXVIII. XXIX. XXX. This foundation of the difference of human pleasures, is confirmed and illustrated by THREE striking considerations.

^b The meaning of these two passages may probably be illustrated by supposing cases like the following: which are sometimes, it is conceived, of real occurrence. A man may be a good judge of poetry, at a time, when he is quite unattuned to its delights and raptures: or he may have a very refined discrimination of flavours, without any sense of the gratification which they afford to other men.

XXXI. The same principle explains in detail the difference of various pleasures, considered with reference to the several ways in which they may be classed and distinguished. First, of the various pleasures, distinguished from each other by the characters of VIRTUOUS, VICIOUS, AND INDIFFERENT. XXXII. Secondly, of the various pleasures of INTELLECT and SENSE. XXXIII. Thirdly, of the various pleasures of VARIOUS ANIMALS. XXXIV. Fourthly, of the various pleasures of VARIOUS MEN.

PART THE SIXTH.

XXXV. Of the various pleasures of various men, those only are REAL and accordant with nature, which SEEM SO TO THE VIRTUOUS MAN. XXXVI. Others are merely ACCIDENTAL, deriving their quality from the depravation and unnatural temperament of the individual.

XXXVII. General conclusion. The pleasures which, by the constitution of nature, belong to the human species, are THOSE ONLY, WHICH PERFECT THE ENERGIES OF THE VIRTUOUS AND HAPPY MAN.

PART THE SEVENTH.

XXXVIII. This section embraces a RECAPITULATION of matters contained in the foregoing parts of the treatise. The sum of it consists in these leading points: That HAPPINESS is NOT a HABIT: That it is an ENERGY or OPERATION: That it is an energy of that kind, which is desirable on account, not of MINISTERIAL UTILITY, but of INTRINSIC VALUE: And, that the ACTIONS appropriate to this energy, are those of a VIRTUOUS LIFE.

XXXIX. Hence, as an enquiry supplemental to both the GENERAL design of the TREATISE, and the PARTICULAR design of THIS CHAPTER; occasion is taken, to consider the case of PLEASURABLE RECREATIONS: and, with reference to the nature of the ENERGY, or OPERATION, just now described, the question is proposed: ARE SUCH RECREATIONS AMONG THE ACTIONS APPROPRIATE TO IT? XL. Arguments are stated for the AFFIRMATIVE. XLI. The question is decided in the NEGATIVE. The grounds of argument for the AFFIRMATIVE are partly denied, and partly shewn to be inconclusive: and the REAL VALUE of pleasurable recreations, arising from their MINISTERIAL RELATION TO HAPPINESS, is set forth.

CHAP. II.

ON THE HAPPINESS DERIVABLE FROM CONTEMPLATION.

This chapter may be divided into two parts: The first of which declares the perfection of that happiness, which arises from contemplation; and the second treats of the limitations and circumstances, under which human life is susceptible of such happiness.

PART THE FIRST.

I. PERFECT HAPPINESS is that, which arises from PURE CONTEMPLATION. II. This position is confirmed by SIX SEVERAL REASONS. III. The same position is repeated in the form of an inference from the foregoing reasons.

PART THE SECOND.

IV. It is declared, that the happiness of contemplation is a kind of happiness TOO EXALTED FOR HUMAN NATURE. V. Nevertheless, to THE UTMOST EXTENT WHICH HUMAN LIFE WILL PERMIT, it is desirable that we should pursue this kind of happiness. VI. Acting under this limitation, we are to remember, that we are not beings of PURE INTELLECTUALITY, and that human virtue is the virtue of a COMPOUNDED BEING, endued with affections as well as with reason.

VII. The exercise of contemplation demands much less of external goods, than the exercise of moral virtue does.

VIII. That the highest human happiness is that which partakes most of the contemplative; is inferred from considering, first, the nature of the GODS: IX. And secondly, that of BRUTES.

X. The ENJOYMENT of contemplative happiness demands, in the condition of humanity, some portion of EXTERNAL GOODS. XI. But it is not required, that this portion be VERY LARGE. XII. This is confirmed by the TESTIMONY of wise men. XIII. Which testimony however, is not, in a case of this kind, so valuable as the evidence of FACTS AND REALITY.

XIV. Under these limitations, the contemplative life will be at once the happiest, and, as it is most CONGENIAL TO THE DIVINE NATURE, most distinguished by the PROPITIOUS REGARDS of Heaven.

CHAP. III.

ON THE POLITICAL CULTIVATION OF VIRTUE.

I. Moral discourses, such as the preceding, being unable of themselves to PRODUCE VIRTUE AMONG THE GENERALITY OF MANKIND: it becomes needful to enquire, by what methods this end may be attained.

II. Virtue, according to Aristotle, being produced either by NATURE, INSTRUCTION, or HABIT: the FIRST lies beyond the power of man, and the SECOND will be unavailing without the THIRD. III. But this third, namely HABIT, which is properly provided for by education, and requires even in manhood a further superintendence of conduct; cannot be obtained without LAWS ENACTED FOR THE PURPOSE. IV. The foregoing views of this chapter corroborated, by a reference to the opinions of others. V. The NECESSITY OF LEGAL PROVISION FOR MORALITY is further set forth, by insisting on the INEFFICIENCY OF ALL PRIVATE EFFORTS of individuals towards that end. VI. The LACEDÆMONIAN COMMONWEALTH is commended, as being almost the only one in which this point is duly attended to.

VII. But this object, though it demand a POLITICAL provision, is not by any means to be neglected as a matter of PRIVATE LIFE: it is also to be noted, that the nature of domestic relations is such, as to afford PECULIAR FACILITIES for the attainment of it. VIII. It will however best be attained, even in its application to particulars, by a SOUND KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

IX. It is therefore universally desirable, in all endeavours to reform mankind, whether they aim at the reformation of many or of few, that we should understand the BUSINESS OF LEGISLATION, and the GENERAL PRINCIPLES on which it proceeds: whence is deduced the necessity of EXTENDING this enquiry from an ETHICAL to a POLITICAL design. X. Which is rendered the more necessary, by reason of the science of POLITICS being peculiarly circumstanced in the way of distinction from other sciences. For, with regard to these latter, those who PRACTISE, and those who PROFESS TO TEACH, are the same persons. Whereas, the science of politics has derived no propagation of its truth, either from those who practise, namely, the STATESMEN: XI. Nor yet from those who profess to teach, namely, the SOPHISTS.

XII. Transition to the ENSUING enquiry relating to POLITICS, and exposition of its DESIGN and METHOD.

CHAP. I.
ON PLEASURE.

PART I.

REASONS FOR EXAMINING THE SUBJECT.

I. ΜΕΤΑ δὲ ταῦτα, ΠΕΡΙ ἨΔΟΝΗΣ ἴσως ἔπεται
διελθεῖν. μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ ΣΥΝΩΚΕΙΩΣΘΑΙ Τῷ
GENEI ἡμῶν. διὸ παιδεύουσι τοὺς νέους, οἰακίζοντες See B. II. *Stavris*
ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ΗΘΟΥΣ C. i. §. xv.

5 ΑΡΕΤΗΝ μέγιστον εἶναι, τὸ χαίρειν οἷς δεῖ καὶ μισεῖν
ἃ δεῖ. διατείνει γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου,
ρόπην ἔχοντα καὶ δύναμιν, πρὸς ἀρετὴν τε, καὶ τὸν
εὐδαίμονα βίον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ
δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν.

10 II. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἥκιστ' ἂν δόξειε παρ-
ετέον εἶναι· ἄλλως τε καὶ ΠΟΛΛΗΝ ΕΧΟΝΤΩΝ ΑΜ-
ΦΙΣΒΗΤΗΣΙΝ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν·
οἱ δ' ἐξ ἑναντίας, ΚΟΜΙΔΗ ΦΑΥΛΟΝ.

III. Οἱ μὲν ἴσως, πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχουσιν· οἱ
15 δὲ, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν, ΑΠΟ-
ΦΑΙΝΕΙΝ τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ ΜΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ·
ρέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτήν, καὶ δουλεύειν
ταῖς ἡδοναῖς· διὸ, δεῖν εἰς τὸναντίον ἀγεῖν· ἐλθεῖν See B. II.
γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον. c. iv. §. iii.

20 IV. Μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγεται. οἱ γὰρ
περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσι λόγοι,

ἥττον εἰσι πιστοὶ τῶν ἔργων. ὅταν οὖν διαφανῶσι τοῖς
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν καταφρονούμενοι, καὶ τὰ ληθεῖς
προσαναιροῦσιν. ὁ γὰρ ψέγων τὴν ἡδονὴν, ὀφθείς ποτ'
ἐφίεμενος, ἀποκλίνειν δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὴν, ὡς τοιαύτην
οὔσαν ἅπασαν. ΤΟ ΔΙΟΡΙΖΕΙΝ ΓΑΡ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΩΝ 5
ΠΟΛΛΩΝ. εἰκόασιν οὖν οἱ ἀληθεῖς τῶν λόγων, οὐ
μόνον πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι χρησιμώτατοι εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
πρὸς τὸν βίον. συναδοὶ γὰρ ὄντες τοῖς ἔργοις, πι-
στεύονται. διὸ, προτρέπονται τοὺς ζυιέντας ζῆν κατ'
αὐτούς. τῶν μὲν οὖν τοιούτων ἄλις· τὰ δ' εἰρημένα 10
περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπέλθωμεν.

PART II.

IT IS ENQUIRED, WHETHER PLEASURE IS THE
SOVEREIGN GOOD.

2 V. ΕΥΔΟΞΟΣ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΩΕΤ'
ΕΙΝΑΙ, διὰ τὸ ΠΑΝΘ' ὍΡΑΝ ΕΦΙΕΜΕΝΑ ΑΥΤΗΣ, καὶ
ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα· ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετόν,
ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα, κράτιστον· τὸ δὴ πάντ' 15
ἐπὶ ταῦτο φέρεσθαι, μνηύειν, ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον·
ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῶ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ
τροφὴν· τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθὸν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται,
τὰγαθὸν εἶναι. (ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι, διὰ τὴν τοῦ
ἡθους ἀρετὴν, μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. διαφερόντως 20
γὰρ ἐδόκει σάφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς
ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλή-
θειαν.) οὐχ ἥττον δ' ἄετ' εἶναι φανερόν, ΕΚ ΤΟΥ
ΕΝΑΝΤΙΟΥ· τὴν γὰρ λύπην καθ' αὐτὸ πᾶσι φευκτὸν
εἶναι· ὁμοίως δὴ τούναντίον αἰρετόν. μάλιστα δ' 25
εἶναι αἰρετόν, ὃ ΜΗ ΔΙ' ἘΤΕΡΟΝ, μηδ' ἑτέρου χάριν,
αἰρούμεθα· τοιοῦτον δ' ὁμολογουμένως εἶναι τὴν

ἡδονήν· οὐδένα γὰρ ἐπερωτᾶν, τίος ἔνεκα ἡδέεται· ὡς καθ' αὐτήν οὔσαν αἰρετήν τὴν ἡδονήν. ΠΡΟΣΤΙΘΕ-
 ΜΕΝΗΝ τε ὁταοῦν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, αἰρετώτερον ποιεῖν·
 οἷον, τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· καὶ αὐξέσθαι
 5 δὴ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ.

VI. Ἔοικε δὴ οὗτός γε ὁ λόγος, ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΘΩΝ
 αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνειν, καὶ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ἘΤΕΡΟΥ· πᾶν
 γὰρ μεθ' ἑτέρου ἀγαθοῦ, αἰρετώτερον ἢ μονού-
 μενον. τοιοῦτῳ δὴ λόγῳ καὶ Πλάτων ἀναιρεῖ, ὅτι
 10 ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἩΔΟΝΗ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ· αἰρετώτερον γὰρ
 εἶναι τὸν ἡδὺν βίον μετὰ φρονήσεως, ἢ χαρῆς· εἰ δὲ
 τὸ μικτὸν κρεῖττον, οὐκ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τ' ἀγαθόν·
 οὐδενὸς γὰρ προστεθέντος αὐτὸ τ' ἀγαθὸν αἰρετώτερον
 γίνεσθαι. δῆλον δ', ὡς οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τ' ἀγαθὸν ἂν
 15 εἶη, ὃ μετὰ τίος τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν, αἰρετώτε-
 ρον γίνεται.

See B. I.
 c. iii. §. iv.

PART III.

IT IS ENQUIRED, WHETHER PLEASURE HAS, IN ANY
 DEGREE, THE NATURE OF GOOD.

VII. Τί οὖν ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς κοινωνοῦ-
 μεν; τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖται. οἱ δ' ἐνιστάμενοι,
 ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ΟΥ ΠΑΝΤ' ΕΦΙΕΤΑΙ· μὴ οὐθὲν λέγω-
 20 σιν. ὃ γὰρ ΠΑΣΙ ΔΟΚΕΙ, τοῦτ' εἶναι φάμεν. ὃ δ'
 ἀναιρῶν ταύτην τὴν πίστιν, οὐ πάνυ πιστότερα ἐρεῖ.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἀνόητα ἀρέγετο αὐτῶν· ἦν ἂν τι τὸ
 λεγόμενον. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὰ φρόνιμα· πῶς λέγοιεν ἂν
 τι; ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις ἐστὶ τι ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ
 25 ἀγαθόν, κρεῖττον ἢ καθ' αὐτὰ, ὃ ἐφέεται τοῦ οἰκείου
 ἀγαθοῦ.

object

VIII. Οὐκ ἔοικε δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐναντιοῦ,
 καλῶς λέγεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ φασιν, εἰ ἢ λύπη κακόν

εἶναι, τῶν
μηδ.

ἔστι, τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἀντικειῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ κακὸν κακῷ, καὶ ἄμφω τῷ μηδέτερω· λέγοντες ταῦτα οὐ κακῶς, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τῶν εἰρημένων ἀληθεύοντες. ἀμφοῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων κακῶν, καὶ ΦΕΥΚΤΑ ἔδει ἄμφω εἶναι· μηδέτερων δὲ, μηδέτερον, [ἢ] ὁμοίως. νῦν δὲ φαίνονται τὴν μὲν φεύγοντες, ὡς κακὸν, τὴν δ' αἰζοῦμενοι, ὡς ἀγαθόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἀντίκειται.

IX. Οὐ μὴν οὐδ' εἰ μὴ τῶν ΠΟΙΟΤΗΤΩΝ ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονή, διὰ τοῦτ' οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ 10 τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

X. Λέγουσι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀρίσθαι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν ἀόριστον εἶναι, ὅτι ΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ ΤΟ ΜΑΛΛΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟ ἩΤΤΟΝ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ ἩΔΕΣΘΑΙ τοῦτο κρί- 15 νοῦσι· καὶ περὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς, (καθ' ἃς ἐναργῶς φασι μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον τοὺς ποιοὺς ὑπάρχειν [κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς,]) ἔσται τὸ αὐτό. δίκαιοι γὰρ εἰσι μᾶλλον, καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι· ἔστι δὲ καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν, καὶ σωφρονεῖν, μᾶλλον καὶ 20 ἥττον. εἰ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἩΔΟΝΑΙΣ· μή ποτ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ αἴτιον, ἂν ᾧσιν αἱ μὲν ἀμιγῆς αἱ δὲ μικταί. τί γὰρ καλύει, καθάπερ ὑγίεια, ἀρισμένη οὔσα, δέχεται τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον· οὕτω καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν; οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ συμμετρία ἐν πᾶσιν ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ 25 αὐτῷ μία τις αἰεί· ἀλλ' ἀνιεμένη, διαμένει ἕως τινός, καὶ διαφέρει τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι.

See the note
at p. 209.

XI. Τέλειόν τε τὰ ἀγαθὸν τιθέντες, τὰς δὲ κινήσεις καὶ τὰς γενέσεις, ἀτελεῖς· τὴν ἡδονὴν ΚΙΝΗΣΙΝ καὶ 30 ΓΕΝΕΣΙΝ ἀποφαίνειν πειρῶνται. οὐ καλῶς δ' εἰκόασι λέγειν, οὐδ' εἶναι ΚΙΝΗΣΙΝ. πάση γὰρ οἰκεῖον εἶναι δοκεῖ τάχος καὶ βραδυτής· καὶ εἰ μὴ ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΗΝ, οἷον τῇ τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς ἄλλο· τῇ δ' ἡδονῇ τούτων

εἰς τὴν μεταβολὴν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ἵστανε αὐτὸ κίνησις ὅτι

οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει. ἡσθῆναι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι ταχέως, ὥσπερ ὀργισθῆναι ἡδεσθαι δ' οὐ. οὐδὲ ΠΡΟΣ ἘΤΕΡΟΝ ΒΑΔΙΖΕΙΝ δὲ, καὶ ΑΥΞΕΣΘΑΙ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. μεταβάλλειν μὲν οὖν ΕΙΣ τὴν ἡδονὴν ταχέως καὶ 5 βραδέως, ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖν δὲ ΚΑΤ' αὐτὴν, οὐκ ἔστι ταχέως· λέγω δ', ἡδεσθαι. ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ τε πῶς ἂν εἴη; δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ τυχόντος τὸ τυχὸν γίνεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί, εἰς τοῦτο διαλύεσθαι. καὶ οὗ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ ἢ ἡδονή, τούτου ἢ λύπη ΦΘΟΡΑ.

- 10 XII. Καὶ λέγουσι δὲ, τὴν μὲν λύπην ἔνδειαν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἡδονὴν, ΑΝΑΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ. ταῦτα δὲ σωματικά ἐστι τὰ πάθη. εἰ δὴ ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἡδονή· ἐν ᾧ ἀναπλήρωσις, τοῦτ' ἂν καὶ ἡδοίτο· τὸ ΣΩΜΑ ἄρα. οὐ δοκεῖ See B. VI.
c. i. §. iii.
- 15 δέ. οὐδ' ἔστιν ἄρα ἀναπλήρωσις ἢ ἡδονή· ἀλλὰ ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΗΣ μὲν ἀναπληρώσεως, ἡδοίτ' ἂν τις, καὶ τεμνόμενος, λυποῖτο. ἢ δόξα δ' αὕτη δοκεῖ γεγενῆσθαι, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὴν τροφήν λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν· ἐνδεεῖς γὰρ γινομένους καὶ προλυπηθέντας, ἡδεσθαι τῇ
- 20 ἀναπληρώσει. τοῦτο δ' οὐ περὶ πάσας συμβαίνει τὰς ἡδονάς. ἄλυποι γὰρ εἰσιν, αἵ τε μαθηματικά· καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις, αἱ διὰ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως, καὶ ἀκροάματα δὲ, καὶ ὄραματα πολλά· καὶ μνήμαι καὶ ἐλπίδες. τίνος οὖν αὐταὶ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ ἔσον-
- 25 ται; οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἔνδεια γεγένηται, οὗ γένοίτ' ἂν ἀναπλήρωσις.

XIII. Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας ΤΑΣ ΕΠΟΝΕΙΔΙΣΤΟΥΣ τῶν ἡδονῶν· λέγοι τις ἂν, ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ταῦθ' ἡδέα. οὐ γὰρ, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς διακειμένοις 30 ἡδέα ἐστίν, οἷητέον αὐτὰ καὶ ἡδέα εἶναι πλὴν τούτοις· καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὰ τοῖς κάμνουσιν, ὑγιεινὰ, ἢ γλυκεία, ἢ πικρά· οὐδ' αὖ λευκὰ, τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσιν. ἢ οὕτω λέγοιτ' ἂν· ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡδοναὶ αἰρεταὶ εἰσιν, οὐ μὴν ΑΠΟ ΓΕ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ· ὥσπερ

καὶ τὸ πλουτεῖν, προδόντι δ' οὐ· καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν, οὐ μὴν ὀτιοῦν φαγόντι. ἢ ΤΩ ΕΙΔΕΙ διαφέρουσιν αἱ ἡδοναί. ἕτεραι γὰρ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν τῶν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχερῶν. καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡσθῆναι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου, μὴ ὄντα δίκαιον, οὐδὲ τὴν τοῦ μουσικοῦ, μὴ ὄντα μου- 5 σικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

XIV. Ἐμφανίζειν δὲ δοκεῖ καὶ ὁ φίλος, ἕτερος ἂν τοῦ κόλακος, ΟΥΚ ΟΥΣΑΝ ΑΓΑΘΟΝ ΤΗΝ ἩΔΟΝΗΝ, ἢ διαφόρους εἶδει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰγαθὸν ὀμιλεῖν δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ πρὸς ἡδονήν· καὶ τῷ μὲν ὀνειδίζεται, τὸν 10 δ' ἐπαινοῦσιν, ὡς πρὸς ἕτερα ὀμιλοῦντα.

XV. Οὐδέεις τ' ἂν ἔΛΟΙΤΟ ΖΗΝ, παιδίου διάνοιαν ἔχων διὰ βίου, ἩΔΟΜΕΝΟΣ ἔφ' οἷς τὰ παιδία, ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα· οὐδὲ χαίρειν ποιῶν τι τῶν αἰσχίστων, μηδέποτε μέλλων λυπηθῆναι. 15

XVI. Περὶ πολλά τε σπουδὴν ποιησαίμεθ' ἂν, καὶ ΕΙ ΜΗΔΕΜΙΑΝ ΕΠΙΦΕΡΟΙ ἩΔΟΝΗΝ· οἷον, ὄραν, μνημονεύειν, εἰδέναι, τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχειν. εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπονται τούτοις ἡδοναί, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἐλοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν ταῦτα, καὶ εἰ μὴ γίνοιτ' ἀπ' αὐ- 20 τῶν ἡδονή.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τὰγαθὸν ἢ ἡδονή, οὔτε πᾶσα αἰρετή· δῆλον ἔοικεν εἶναι· καὶ ὅτι εἰσὶ τινες αἰρεταὶ καθ' αὐτὰς, διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει, ἢ ἀφ' ἂν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, 25 ἰκανῶς εἰρήσθω.

PART IV.

ON THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF PLEASURE.

XVII. Τί δ' ἐστίν, ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον ³
 γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἢ μὲν
 ὍΡΑΣΙΣ, καθ' ὄντινον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι. οὐ γάρ
 ἐστὶν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενός, ὃ, εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον, τελει-
 5 ὴσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος. τοιοῦτω δ' ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἩΔΟΝΗ.
 ὍΛΟΝ ΓΑΡ ΤΙ ΕΣΤΙ καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι
 τις ἂν ἠδονῆν, ἥς, ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης, τελει-
 αθήσεται τὸ εἶδος.

XVIII. Διόπερ, οὐδὲ ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ ἐστίν. ΕΝ ΧΡΟΝῳ
 10 γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις, καὶ ΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ. οἷον ἡ οἰκο-
 δομικὴ ΤΕΛΕΙΑ, ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἈΠΑΝΤΙ
 δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ, ἢ ΤΟΥΤῳ.

Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ΜΕΡΕΣΙ τοῦ χρόνου, πᾶσαι ΑΤΕΛΕΙΣ.
 καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἢ γὰρ
 15 τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις, ἕτερα τῆς τοῦ κίνου ραβδώσεως·
 καὶ αὗται, τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως. καὶ ἢ μὲν τοῦ
 ναοῦ, τελεία. οὐδενός γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον.
 ἢ δὲ τῆς κρηπίδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου, ἀτελής. μέ-
 ρους γὰρ ἑκατέρω. τῷ εἶδει οὖν διαφέρουσι.

20 Καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν ὍΤΩΟΥΝ χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν
 τελείαν τῷ εἶδει, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἈΠΑΝΤΙ.

Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως, καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ
 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ Φορὰ, ΚΙΝΗΣΙΣ ΠΟΘΕΝ ΠΟΙ' καὶ ταύτης
 διαφοραὶ κατ' εἶδη, πτῆσις, βάδισις, ἄλσις, καὶ τὰ
 25 τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δ' οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
 βαδίσει. [τὸ γὰρ ΠΟΘΕΝ ΠΟΙ, οὐ ταυτόν ἐν τῷ στα-
 δίῳ, καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἑτέρῳ·
 οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε, κακείνην. οὐ

Emp. Ous

μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὔσαν· ἐν ἑτέρῳ δ' αὕτη ἐκείνης.]

Δι' ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται. ἔοικε δ' [οὐκ] ἐν ἈΠΑΝΤΙ χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι· ἀλλ' αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς[, καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἶδει· 5 εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν]. τῆς ἡδονῆς δ', ἐν ὈΤΩΟΥΝ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν, ὡς ἕτεράι τ' ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων· καὶ τῶν ὈΛΩΝ τι καὶ ΤΕΛΕΙΩΝ, ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δ' ἂν τοῦτο, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἢ δεσθαι δέ. τὸ γὰρ ἐν 10 τῷ νῦν, ὅλον τι.

Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον, καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ΜΕΡΙΣΤΩΝ καὶ μὴ ὅλων. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις, οὐδὲ στιγμῆς, οὐδὲ 15 μονάδος· οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθεν κίνησις, οὐδὲ γένεσις. οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς. ὈΛΩΝ γάρ τι.

XIX. Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης· τελείως δὲ, τῆς εὔ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν· (τοιούτον γὰρ μάλιστ' 20 εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ, μηθὲν διαφερέτω) καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ, ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ Ἡ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΡΙΣΤΑ ΔΙΑΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΥ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΚΡΑΤΙΣΤΟΝ ΤΩΝ ὙΦ' ΑΥΤΗΝ. αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη, καὶ ἩΔΙΣΤΗ. κατὰ πᾶσαν γὰρ 25 αἴσθησίν ἐστὶν ἡδονή· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν· ἡδίστη δ', ἡ τελειοτάτη· τελειοτάτη δ', ἡ τοῦ εὔ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὙΦ' αὐτήν. ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙ ΔΕ ΤΗΝ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ ἢ ἡδονή.

XX. Οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἩΔΟΝΗ τελειοῖ, 30 καὶ ΤΟ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΟΝ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΣ, σπουδαῖα

ὄντα ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια, καὶ ὁ ἰατρός, ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν.

ἡ υγιεινότης
 ὁ ἰατρὸς ἔστι
 αἰτία

XXI. Καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον. Φαμέν γὰρ ὄσάματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἰσθησις ἢ ΚΡΑΤΙΣΤΗ, καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῆ.

XXII. Τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ΑΕΙ ΕΣΤΑΙ ἩΔΟΝΗ, ὙΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΟΣ ΓΕ ΤΟΥ ΠΟΙΗΣΟΝΤΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΙΣΟΜΕΝΟΥ.

10 XXIII. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἡ ἡδονή, οὐχ ὡς ἡ ἔξις ἐνῆπαρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγιγνομένον τι τέλος· οἷον, τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ἄρα.

XXIV. Ἐως ἂν οὖν τὸ τε νοητὸν ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἢ οἷον δεῖ, καὶ τὸ κρινόν ἢ θεωροῦν· ἔσται ἐν 15 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ἡδονή. ὁμοίων γὰρ ὄντων, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων, τοῦ τε παθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ· ταῦτό πεφυκε γίνεσθαι.

XXV. ΠΩΣ ΟΥΝ ΟΥΔΕΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ ἩΔΕΤΑΙ; ἢ κάμνει; ΠΑΝΤΑ ΓΑΡ ΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΕΙΑ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΕΙ 20 ΣΥΝΕΧΩΣ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΝ. οὐ γίνεται οὖν οὐδ' ἡδονή. ἔπεται γὰρ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ. ἔνια δὲ τέρπει, καινὰ ὄντα ὕστερον δὲ, οὐχ ὁμοίως· διὰ ταῦτό. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια, καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, (ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέ- 25 ποντες)· μετέπειτα δ' οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνεργεῖα, ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη. διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται.

XXVI. Ὁρέγεσθαι δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς οἰηθεῖη τις ἂν ἅπαντας, ὅτε καὶ τοῦ ζῆν ἅπαντες ἐφίενται, ἡ δὲ 30 ζωὴ ἐνεργεῖα τίς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἅ καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαπᾷ· οἷον, ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν

ἕκαστος. ἢ δ' ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας, καὶ τὸ ζῆν δέ· οὐ ὀρέγονται. εὐλόγως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐφίενται. τελειοῖ γὰρ ἕκαστῳ τὸ ζῆν, αἰρετὸν ὄν.

Πότερον δὲ ΔΙΑ ΤΗΝ ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ΤΟ ΖΗΝ αἰρούμεθα, ἢ ΔΙΑ ΤΟ ΖΗΝ ΤΗΝ ἩΔΟΝΗΝ· ἀφείσθω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. ⁵ συνεζεύχθαι μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ χωρισμὸν οὐ δέχεσθαι. ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή· πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργειαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή.

PART V.

ON THE VARIETIES OF PLEASURE.

XXVII. Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ Εἶδει ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙΝ. τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει, ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦ- 10 σθαι. οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης· οἷον ζῶα, καὶ δένδρα, καὶ γραφὴ, καὶ ἀγάλματα, καὶ οἰκία, καὶ σκεῦος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας, τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει, ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς 15 διανοίας, τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις· καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων, κατ' εἶδος. καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

XXVIII. Φανεῖν δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ, ΕΚ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΝΩΚΕΙΩΣΘΑΙ ΤΩΝ ἩΔΟΝΩΝ ἘΚΑΣΤΗΝ Τῇ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ ἮΝ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙ. συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργειαν ἢ οἰκεία 20 ἡδονή. μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρῖνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν, οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες. οἷον· γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι, καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι, ἐπιδιδύασιν ²⁵ εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. συναύξουσι δὲ αἱ ἡδοναί· τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει, καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει.

XXIX. Ἐτι δὲ, μᾶλλον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη, ἐκ τοῦ
 ΤΑΣ ΑΦ' ἘΤΕΡΩΝ ἩΔΟΝΑΣ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΟΥΣ ΤΑΙΣ ΕΝΕΡ-
 ΓΕΙΑΙΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ. οἱ γὰρ φίλαυλοι ἀδυνατοῦσι τοῖς
 λόγοις προσέχειν, ἐὰν κατακούσωσιν αὐλοῦντος· μᾶλ-
 5 λον χαίροντες αὐλητικῇ τῆς παρούσης ἐνεργείας· ἢ
 κατὰ τὴν αὐλητικὴν οὖν ἡδονήν, τὴν περὶ τὸν λόγον
 ἐνεργεῖαν φθείρει. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἅμα περὶ δύο ἐνεργῇ. ἢ γὰρ
 ἡδίων τὴν ἑτέραν ἐκκρούει· καὶ πολὺ διαφέρει κατὰ
 10 τὴν ἡδονήν, μᾶλλον· ὥστε μὴδ' ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τὴν
 ἑτέραν. διὸ, χαίροντες ὁπαοῦν σφόδρα, οὐ πάνυ ἡδῶ-
 μεν ἕτερον· καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦμεν, ἄλλοις ἡρέμα ἀρε-
 σκόμενοι· οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις οἱ τραγηματίζον-
 15 αὐτὸ δρῶσιν. ἀρεσκόμενοι,
καὶ.
cont sweetener

XXX. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡδονὴ ἐξακριβοῖ τὰς
 ἐνεργείας, καὶ χρονωτέρας καὶ βελτίους ποιεῖ, αἱ δ'
 ἀλλότριαι λυμαίνονται· δῆλον, ὡς πολὺ διεστᾶσιν.
 σχεδὸν γάρ, Αἱ ἀλλότριαι ἡδοναὶ ποιοῦσιν ὅπερ
 20 Αἱ οἰκείαι λυπαί. φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς ἐνεργείας αἱ
 οἰκείαι λυπαί. οἷον· εἴ τῳ τὸ γράφειν ἀηδὲς καὶ
 ἐπίλυπον, ἢ τὸ λογίζεσθαι· ὁ μὲν οὐ γράφει, ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐ.
 δ' οὐ λογίζεται, λυπηρᾶς οὔσης τῆς ἐνεργείας. συμ-
 βαίνει δὲ περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τούναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν
 25 οἰκείων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν· οἰκείαι δ' εἰσὶν, αἱ ἐπὶ
 τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ καθ' αὐτὴν γινόμεναι. αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι
 ἡδοναί, εἴρηται ὅτι παραπλήσιόν τι τῇ λύπῃ ποιοῦσιν.
 φθείρουσι γάρ· πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως.

XXXI. Διαφερουσῶν δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐπιεικεία
 30 καὶ φαυλοτήτι· καὶ τῶν μὲν αἰρετῶν οὐσῶν, τῶν δὲ
 φευκτῶν, τῶν δ' οὐδετέρων· ὁμοίως ἔχουσι καὶ αἱ
 ἡδοναί. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἐνεργεῖαν, οἰκεία ἡδονή
 ἐστίν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ οἰκεία, ἐπιεικῆς· ἢ

*then also
in quality*

δὲ τῇ φαύλῃ, μοχθηρά. καὶ γὰρ αἱ ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑΙ, τῶν μὲν καλῶν, ἐπαινεταί· τῶν δ' αἰεχρῶν, ψεκταί· οἰκειότεραι δὲ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ ἐν αὐταῖς ἩΔΟΝΑΙ, τῶν ΟΡΕΞΕΩΝ. αἱ μὲν γὰρ διωρισμέναί εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις, καὶ τῇ φύσει· αἱ δὲ σύνεγγυς ταῖς

See §. xxiii. ἐνεργείαις· καὶ ἀδιόριστοι οὕτως, ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφισβήτησιν, εἰ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια τῇ ἡδονῇ. οὐ μὴν ἔοικέ γε ἡ ἡδονὴ διάνοια εἶναι, οὐδ' αἴσθησις. ἄτοπον γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρίζεσθαι, ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ τισι ταυτόν. ὥσπερ οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἕτεραι, καὶ αἱ 10 ἡδοναί.

XXXII. Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ΟΥΙΣ ἘΦΗΣ, καθαριότητι· καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὄσφρησις, γεύσεως. ὁμοίως δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί· καὶ τούτων, αἱ περὶ τὴν ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ· καὶ ἐκάτεραι, ἀλλήλων. 15

XXXIII. Δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστω ΖΩΩ καὶ ἡδονὴ οἰκεία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔργον. ἡ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστω δὲ θεωροῦντι τοῦτ' ἂν φανεῖη. ἑτέρα γὰρ ἵππου ἡδονὴ, καὶ κυνὸς, καὶ ἀνθρώπου· καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτός φησιν, ὄνον σύρματ' ἂν ἐλέσθαι μᾶλλον 20 ἢ χρυσόν. ἡδιον γὰρ χρυσοῦ τροφή ὄνοις· αἱ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἑτέρων τῶ εἶδει, διαφέρουσιν εἶδει· τὰς δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀδιαφόρους εὐλογον εἶναι.

XXXIV. Διαλλάττουσι δ' οὐ μικρὸν, ἐπὶ γε τῶν ἈΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ. τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τέρπει, τοὺς δὲ 25 λυπεῖ· καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστί, τοῖς δὲ, ἡδέα καὶ φιλητά. καὶ ἐπὶ γλυκέων δὲ τοῦτο συμβαίνει. οὐ γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ τῶ πυρέττοντι, καὶ τῶ ὑγιαίνοντι· οὐδὲ θερμὸν εἶναι, τῶ ἀσθενεῖ, καὶ τῶ εὐεκτικῶ. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων 30 συμβαίνει.

PART VI.

ON THE REAL AND ESSENTIAL PLEASURES OF HUMAN LIFE.

XXXV. Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις εἶναι, TO
 ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ Τῷ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΩ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς See B. III.
c. iii. §. iii.
 λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἢ
 ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος· καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν,
 5 αἰ τούτῳ φαίνόμεναι, καὶ ἡδέα, οἷς οὗτος χαίρει.

XXXVI. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται
 ἡδέα· οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν. πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ
 λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται. ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
 ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΤῷ ΔΙΑΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙΣ. τὰς μὲν οὖν ὁμο-
 10 λογουμένως αἰσχροῦς, δῆλον ὡς οὐ φατέον ἡδονὰς
 εἶναι, πλὴν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις.

XXXVII. Τῶν δ' ἐπιεικῶν εἶναι δοκουσῶν, ποίαν
 ἢ τίνα φατέον ΤΟΥ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ εἶναι; ἢ ΕΚ ΤΩΝ
 ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΩΝ δῆλον; ταύταις γὰρ ἔπονται αἰ ἡδοναί.
 15 εἴτ' οὖν μία ἔστιν, εἴτε πλείους, αἰ τοῦ τελείου καὶ
 μακαρίου ἀνδρός· αἰ ΤΑΥΤΑΣ ΤΕΛΕΙΟΥΣΑΙ ἡδοναί,
 ΚΥΡΙΩΣ λέγοντ' ἂν ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ ἡδοναὶ εἶναι· αἰ δὲ
 λοιπαί, ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΤΩΣ· ὥσπερ αἰ ἐνέρ-
 γειαι. *at a long v*

PART VII.

ON THE PLEASURE DERIVED FROM AMUSEMENTS AND
PLEASURABLE RECREATIONS.

6 XXXVIII. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε, καὶ φιλίας, καὶ ἡδονάς· λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας ΤΥΠΩ ΔΙΕΛΘΕΙΝ· ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἀναλαβοῦσι δὴ τὰ προειρημένα, συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. 5

Εἴπομεν δ', ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ἕΞΙΣ. καὶ γὰρ τῶ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχουσι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον· καὶ τῶ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΝ τινα θετέον, (καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται)· τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν, 10 αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς· δηλον, ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ΤΩΝ ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΑΣ ΑΙΡΕΤΩΝ τινὰ θετέον, καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο. οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσιν αἰρεταί, ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖ- 15 ται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν, ΑΙ ΚΑΤ' ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ. τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν, τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν.

XXXIX. ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΙΔΙΩΝ ΔΕ ΑΙ ἩΔΕΙΑΙ;

XL. Οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται. βλά- 20 πτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί. διὸ, παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι. 25 ἂν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. ΔΟΚΕΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΕΥΔΑΙ-

ΜΟΝΙΚΑ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΕΙΝΑΙ, διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν.

XLI. Οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημείον οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ, οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς· ἀφ' ὧν αἰ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι. οὐδ' εἰ, ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ ἐλευθερίου, ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφύγουσιν· διὰ τοῦτο ταύτας οἰητέον αἰρετατέρας εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα, κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ 10 παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια· οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ, τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστω δὲ, ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔξιν, αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια· καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ, ἢ κατὰ τὴν 15 ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ γὰρ ΑΤΟΠΟΝ ΤΟ ΤΕΛΟΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΑΙΔΙΑΝ, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα τοῦ παίξειν χάριν. ἅπαντα γὰρ, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἑτεροῦ ἕνεκα αἰρούμεθα, πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη. 20 σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν ΠΑΙΔΙΑΣ ΧΑΡΙΝ, ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίξειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάξῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ· ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν, ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυ- 25 σις. γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα, τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς· καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἰεὶ καὶ ΜΟΡΙΟΥ, καὶ ἀνθρώπου, 30 σπουδαιοτέρα τὴν ἐνέργειαν. ἢ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος, κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἦδη. ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν, ὁ τυχόν· καὶ ἀνδράποδον, οὐχ ἦττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου. οὐ γὰρ

μη. Εκείνοτ' hezimes kein also a share of ^{the} happiness

ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἢ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις· καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

CHAP. II.

ON THE HAPPINESS DERIVABLE FROM CONTEMPLATION.

PART I.

ON THE PERFECTION OF THAT HAPPINESS WHICH ARISES FROM CONTEMPLATION.

7 I. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια· εὐλογον, κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἀρχειν, καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων· εἴτε θεῖον ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον· ἢ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑ, κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, εἴη ἂν ἡ ΤΕΛΕΙΑ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟ-
 ΝΙΑ. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΗ, εἴρηται. ὁμολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς πρότερον, καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ.

II. 1. ΚΡΑΤΙΣΤΗ τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ αὐτοῦ νοῦς.

2. Ἔτι δὲ, ΣΥΝΧΕΣΤΑΤΗ. θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν.

3. Οἰόμεθά τε, δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. ἨΔΙΣΤΗ δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν, ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν. δοκεῖ γοῦν ἢ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν, καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ. εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι, τῶν ζητούντων, ἡδῖα τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

4. Ἡ τε λεγομένη ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ, περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν
 μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίαν,
 καὶ σοφός, καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δεόνται. τῶν δὲ τοιούτοις ἰκανῶς κεχορηγημένων, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος
 5 δεῖται, πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων, καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἕκαστος· ὁ δὲ σοφός, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ἂν, δύναται
 θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσω ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον. βέλτιον δ'
 ἴσως, συνεργοὺς ἔχων· ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

10 5. Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ ΜΟΝΗ ΔΙ' ΑΥΤΗΝ ΑΓΑΠΑΣΘΑΙ.
 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται, παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι· ἀπὸ
 δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν, ἢ πλείον ἢ ἕλαττον περιποιούμεθα,
 παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν.

6. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ΕΝ Τῇ ΣΧΟΛῃ εἶναι.
 15 ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ, ἵνα σχολάζωμεν· καὶ πολεμοῦ-
 μεν, ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρε-
 τῶν, ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, ἢ
 ἐνέργεια. αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχο-
 λοι εἶναι· αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς. οὐδεὶς
 20 γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ
 παρασκευάζει πόλεμον. δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς
 μισαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο,
 ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιτο. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ
 πολιτικοῦ, ἀσχολος· καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεῦσθαι,
 25 περιποιουμένη δυναστείας, καὶ τιμᾶς, ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαι-
 μονίαν αὐτῶ καὶ τοῖς πολίταις· ἕτεραν οὖσαν τῆς
 πολιτικῆς· ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον, ὡς ἕτεραν οὖσαν.

III. Εἰ δὴ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξων,
 αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει
 30 προέχουσιν· αὗται δ' ἀσχολοὶ, καὶ τέλους τινὸς
 ἐφίενται, καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἰρεταί· εἴτιν' ἢ δὲ τοῦ
 νοῦ ἐνέργεια, σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ, θεωρητικὴ
 οὖσα· καὶ παρ' αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους· ἔχειν
 τε ἡδονὴν οἰκείαν· αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν·

καὶ τὸ αὐτάρκες δὴ, καὶ σχολαστικὸν, καὶ ἀτρυτον (ὡς ἀνθρώπων), καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν φαίνεται ὄντα· Ἡ ΤΕΛΕΙΑ ΔΗ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑ ἌΥΤΗ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ἀνθρώπου, λαβούσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές ἐστὶ τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας.

PART II.

THE LIMITATIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH HUMAN LIFE IS SUSCEPTIBLE OF SUCH HAPPINESS.

IV. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος ΚΡΕΙΤΤΩΝ Η ΚΑΤ' ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ. οὐ γὰρ ἦ ἀνθρώπος ἐστὶν, οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἦ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ὅσα δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου· τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, 10 τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς, πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον· καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος, πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

V. Οὐ χρεὶ δὲ, κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας, ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν· 15 ἀλλ', ΕΦ' ὍΣΟΝ ΕΝΔΕΧΕΤΑΙ, ΑΘΑΝΑΤΙΖΕΙΝ, καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ, μικρὸν ἐστὶ· δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι, πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ ΕΙΝΑΙ ἕκαστος τοῦτο· εἴπερ τὸ κύριον, καὶ 20 ἄρειον. ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο, ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν. τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει, κράτιστον καὶ ἡδιστόν ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ· καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ, ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος· εἴπερ τοῦτο, μάλιστα 25 ἀνθρώπος. οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

VI. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν. αἱ 8
 γὰρ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνεργεῖαι, ANΘΡΩΠΙΚΑΙ. δίκαια
 γὰρ, καὶ ἀνδρεία, καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς,
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν, ἐν συναλλάγμασι, καὶ
 5 χρείαις, καὶ πράξεις παντοίαις, ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι
 διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω. ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαί-
 νεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. ἔνια δὲ καὶ συμβαίνειν
 ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ· καὶ πολλὰ συνακειῶσθαι
 τοῖς πάθεσιν, ἢ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῆ. συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ See B. VI.
c. viii. §. 7.
 10 ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη, τῇ φρονή-
 σει· εἶπερ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς
 ἠθικὰς εἰσιν ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν, κατὰ
 τὴν φρόνησιν. συνηρημέναι δ' αὗται καὶ τοῖς πά-
 θεσι, περὶ τὸ ΣΥΝΘΕΤΟΝ ἂν εἶεν· Αἱ ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΣΥΝΘΕ-
 15 ΤΟΥ, ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὴ ὁ κατ' αὐ-
 τὰς, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ, ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣ-
 ΜΕΝΗ. τοσοῦτον δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω. διακριβῶ-
 σαι γὰρ, μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. τοσοῦτον γὰρ
περὶ.

VII. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἑκτοῦς ΧΟΡΗΓΙΑΣ ΕΠΙ
 20 ΜΙΚΡΟΝ, ἢ ΕΠ' ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ ΔΕΙΞΘΑΙ τῆς ἠθικῆς. τῶν
 μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων, ἀμφοῖν χρεία, καὶ ἐξ ἴτου ἔστω.
 (εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός,
 καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει.) πρὸς
 δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας, πολὺ διοίσει. τῶ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευ-
 25 θέρῳ, δέησει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευ-
 θέρῳ· καὶ τῶ δίκαιῳ δὴ, εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις· (αἱ
 γὰρ βουλήσεις ἀδῆλοι· προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ
 δίκαιοι, βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν·) τῶ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ,
 30 καὶ τῶ σώφρονι, ἐξουσίας. πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ
 οὔτος, ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις; ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ, πότερον
 κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ προαίρεσις, ἢ αἱ πράξεις· ὡς
 ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης. τὸ δὴ τελειον, δῆλον ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν

ἂν εἴη. πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις, πολλῶν δεῖται. καὶ ὅσα
 ἂν μείζους ᾧσι καὶ καλλίους, πλείονων. τῶ δὲ θεω-
 ροῦντι, οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων, πρὸς γε τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
 χρεῖα· ἀλλ', ὡς εἶπεῖν, καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι, πρὸς γε
 τὴν θεωρίαν. ἥ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστι, καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ· 5
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν. δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν
 τοιούτων, πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι.

VIII. Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς
 ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανεῖη. τοὺς θεοὺς
 γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαί- 10
 μονας εἶναι. πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεῶν
 αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται,
 συναλλάττοντες, καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες,
 καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας
 τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν; ἢ τὰς 15
 ἐλευθερίους; τίμι δὲ δάσουσιν; ἄτοπον δ', εἰ καὶ
 ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. αἱ δὲ σώφρονες
 τί ἂν εἶεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι
 φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα, φαίνοιτ' ἂν
 τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις, μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. ἀλλὰ 20
 μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν
 ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα.
 τῶ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ
 μᾶλλον, τοῦ ποιεῖν· τί λείπεται, πλὴν θεωρία; ὥστε
 ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρη- 25
 τικὴ ἂν εἴη. καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ, ἢ ταύτη συγγε-
 νεστάτη, εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.

IX. Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ, τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ
 ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα
 τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς, ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος· 30
 ταῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμα τι τῆς τοιαύτης
 ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῶων, οὐδὲν εὐδαι-
 μονεῖ· ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ

διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν· οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν. αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, θεωρία τις.

5 X. Δέησει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας, ἀνθρώπων ὄντι. οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν· ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν, καὶ τροφὴν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν.

XI. Οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε ΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ
10 δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκης, οὐδ' ἡ πρᾶξις· δυνατὸν δὲ, καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, πράττειν τὰ καλά. καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἂν τις πράτ-
15 τειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς. οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. ἰκανὸν δὲ ΤΟΣΑΥΘ' ὑπάρχειν. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργούντος.

20 XII. Καὶ ΣΟΛΩΝ δὲ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς· εἰπὼν, μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ἄετο, καὶ βεβιωκότας σαφρόνως. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτημένους, πράττειν ἅ δεῖ. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ΑΝΑΞΑ-
25 ΓΟΡΑΣ οὐ πλούσιον, οὐδὲ δυνάστην, ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· εἰπὼν, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν, εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς· οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μόνον. συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκάσιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν δόξαι.

30 XIII. Πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά· τὸ δ' ἀληθές, ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς, ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΒΙΟΥ ΚΡΙΝΕΤΑΙ. ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προειρημένα χρῆ, ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν

βίον ἐπιφέροντας· καὶ συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις, ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωρούντων δὲ, λόγους ὑποληπτέον.

XVI. Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων, καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα, καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀβρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ καὶ εἶη ἂν εὐλογον, καὶ τῶ συγ. χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῶ ἀρίστῳ καὶ συγγειεστάτῳ, (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἶη ὁ νοῦς,) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας, ἀντευποιεῖν, ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους, καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῶ σοφῶ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει· οὐκ ἄδηλον. ΘΕΟΦΙΛΕΣΤΑΤΟΣ ἄρα. τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκός, καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἶη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

CHAP. III.

ON THE POLITICAL CULTIVATION OF VIRTUE.

10 I. Ἄρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων, καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας, καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἰκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις· ΤΕΛΟΣ ΕΧΕΙΝ ΟΙΗΤΕΟΝ τὴν προαίρεσιν; ἢ, καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος, τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰκανὸν, τὸ εἶδέναι· ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα;

Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ ΛΟΓΟΙ αὐτάρκεις, πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς· πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον, κατὰ τὸν Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι. νῦν δὲ, φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι μὲν, καὶ παρορμηῆσαι, τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους, ἰσ-

χύνει, ἦθος τ' εὐγενές καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον,
 ποιῆσαι ἂν κατοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς· τοὺς δὲ
 πολλοὺς, ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι. οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ πειθαρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ
 5 φόβῳ· οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ τὸ αἰσχροῦν,
 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας. πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες, τὰς
 οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι, καὶ δι' ἧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται·
 φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας· τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ
 καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἠδέος, οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι
 10 ὄντες.

ΤΟΥΣ ΔΗ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΥΣ ΤΙΣ ἌΝ ΛΟΓΟΣ ΜΕΤΑΡΡΥΘΜΙ-
 ΣΑΙ; οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε, ἢ οὐ ράδιον, τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ
 τοῖς ἦθεσι κατεκλημμένα, λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. ἀγα-
 πητὸν δ' ἴσως ἔστιν, εἰ, πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι'
 15 ἧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι, μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς
 ἀρετῆς.

II. Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται, οἱ μὲν ΦΥΣΕΙ, οἱ
 δ' ΕΘΕΙ, οἱ δὲ ΔΙΔΑΧῃ. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως δῆλον,
 ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος θείας αἰ-
 20 τίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει. ὁ δὲ λόγος
 καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ, μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύη· ἀλλὰ
 δέη ΠΡΟΔΙΕΙΡΓΑΣΘΑΙ τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ
 ψυχὴν, πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν· ὥσπερ
 γῆν τὴν θρέψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε
 25 λόγου ἀποτρέποντος, οὐδ' αὖ συνείη, ὁ κατὰ πάθος
 ζῶν. τὸν δ' οὕτως ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπεῖσαι;
 ὅλως τ', οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ ὑπέικειν το παθος, ἀλλὰ
 βία. δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προὔπαρχειν πως, οἰκειὸν τῆς
 ἀρετῆς· στέργον τὸ καλὸν, καὶ δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰ-
 30 σχρόν.

III. Ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν,
 χαλεπὸν, ΜΗ ὙΠΟ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙΣ ΤΡΑΦΕΝΤΑ ΝΟΜΟΙΣ. τὸ
 γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν, οὐχ ἠδὲ τοῖς

*causis lib.
 25. "beauty,
 holiness."*

bring back.

*See B. I.
 c. i. §. xi.*

πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. διὸ, ΝΟΜΟΙΣ ΔΕΙ ΤΕΤΑΧΘΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΤΡΟΦΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΑ ΕΠΙΤΗΔΕΥΜΑΤΑ. οὐκ ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ, συνήθη γινόμενα. οὐχ ἰκανὸν δ' ἴσως, ΝΕΟΥΣ ὄντας, τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς. ἀλλ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἈΝΔΡΩΘΕΝΤΑΣ δεῖ ἐπιτη-⁵ δεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ ἐθίζεσθαι· καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως δὴ, περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον. οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκη, μᾶλλον ἢ λόγῳ, πειθαρχοῦσι· καὶ ζημίαις, ἢ τῷ καλῷ.

IV. Διόπερ οἴονται τινες, τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν¹⁰ μὲν ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΝ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ προτρέπεισθαι, τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν· ὡς ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων· ἀπειθοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέρους οὔσι, κολάσεις τε καὶ ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑΣ ΕΠΙΤΙΘΕΝΑΙ, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐπεικῆ, καὶ¹⁵ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα, τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσει· τὸν δὲ φαῦλον, ἠδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον, λύπη κολάζεσθαι ὥσπερ ὑποζύγιον. διὸ καὶ φασι, δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς λύπας, αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπαμέναις ἠδοναῖς.²⁰

See B. II.
c. i. §. viii.

V. Εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν, τραφῆναι καλῶς δεῖ, καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἴθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐπεικῆσι ζῆν, καὶ μὴτ' ἄκοντα, μὴτ' ἐκόντα, πράττειν τὰ φαῦλα· ταῦτα δὲ γίγνοιτ' ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν²⁵ ὀρθῆν, ἔχουσαν ἰσχύν· ἢ μὲν οὖν ΠΑΤΡΙΚΗ ΠΡΟΞΤΑΞΙΣ ΟΥΚ ΕΧΕΙ ΤΟ ΙΣΧΥΡΟΝ, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος, ἢ τινος τοιοῦτου. ὁ δὲ νόμος ἈΝΑΓΚΑΣΤΙΚΗΝ ΕΧΕΙ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ, λόγος ἂν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.³⁰ καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων, ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὀρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς, τάτταν τὸ ἐπεικῆς.

VI. Ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λαμεδαίμονίῳ πόλει, μετ'

ὀλίγων, ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων. ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων, ἐξημέληται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῆ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλεται, κυκλωτικῶς “θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ’ ἀλόχου.”

from the 0045
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VII. Κράτιστον μὲν οὖν, τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν, καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι. κοινῇ δ’ ἐξαμελουμένων, ἘΚΑΣΤΩ ΔΟΞΕΙΕΝ ἂν προσήκειν, ΤΟΙΣ ΣΦΕΤΕΡΟΙΣ ΤΕΚΝΟΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΟΙΣ εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. μάλιστα δ’ ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν, ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος. αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαι, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ νόμων γίνονται· ἐπεικεῖς δ’, αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. (γεγραμμένων δ’ ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν· οὐδὲ δὲ ἂν εἶς, ἢ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται· ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ μουσικῆς, καὶ γυμναστικῆς, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων.) ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ ἔθη· οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις, οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ ἔθη· καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, διὰ τὴν συγγενειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργεσίας. προὔπαρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. ἔτι δὲ, καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ’ ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι, τῶν κοινῶν· ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς. καθόλου μὲν γὰρ, τῶν πυρέττοντι συμφέρει ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὶ δ’ ἴσως οὐ· ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως, οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθῃσιν. ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος.

VIII. Ἄλλ’ ἐπιμεληθεῖη μὲν ἀριστα καθ’ ἕν, καὶ ἰατρὸς, καὶ γυμναστῆς, καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος, ὅ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΕΙΔΩΣ, ὅτι πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε. τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε, καὶ εἰσίν. οὐ μὲν ἄλλ’ ἐνός τινος, οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπι-^{ἀλλὰ καὶ} _{ινός.}

μεληθῆναι, καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ, δι' ἐμπειρίαν· (καθάπερ καὶ ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι). οὐδὲν δ' ἦττον ἴσως, τῷ γε βουλομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ ὁ θεωρητικῶ, ΕΠΙ ΤΟ ΚΑΘΟΛΟΥ ΒΑΔΙΣΤΕΟΝ εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κἀκεῖνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται. εἴρηται γάρ, ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἰ ἐπιστήμαι.

See B. VI.
c. ii. §. ii.

IX. Τάχα δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε πολλοὺς εἴτ' ὀλίγους, ΝΟΜΟΘΕ-¹⁰ ΤΙΚῶ ΠΕΙΡΑΤΕΟΝ ΓΕΝΕΣΘΑΙ· εἰ διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. ὄντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν προτεθέντα, διαθεῖναι καλῶς, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος· ἀλλ' εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος· ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἰατρικῆς, καὶ τῶν λοι-¹⁵ πῶν ἂν ἔστιν ἐπιμελεία τις καὶ φρόνησις.

X. Ἄρ' οὖν, μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπισκεπτέον, ΠΟΘΕΝ Η ΠΩΣ ΝΟΜΟΘΕΤΙΚΟΣ ΓΕΝΟΙΓ' ΑΝ ΤΙΣ; ἢ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ΠΑΡΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ; μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι.

Ἡ οὐχ ὅμοιον φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς, καὶ τῶν²⁰ λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις, οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται τὰς τε δυνάμεις παραδι- δόντες, καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν· οἷον, ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς. τὰ δὲ πολιτικά, ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν δι- δάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί· πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ'²⁵ οἱ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΟΙ. οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν, καὶ ἐμπειρία, μᾶλλον ἢ διανοία. οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες, οὔτε λέγοντες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνον- ται· (καίτοι κἀλλίον ἦν ἴσως, ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς·) οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιη-³⁰ κότες τοὺς σφετέρους υἱεῖς, ἢ τινὰς ἄλλους τῶν φίλων. εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύνατο. οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν· οὔθ' αὐτοῖς

Thylinos. "The world will go on well when either
the world will be better than the world is now"

ὑπάρξει προέλιντ' ἄν, μᾶλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνά-
 μεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλότατοις. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε
 ἔοικεν ἢ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγ-
 νοντ' ἄν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας, πολιτικοί. διό,
 5 τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναί, προσδεῖν ἔοικεν
 ἐμπειρίας.

ΧΙ. Τῶν δὲ ΣΟΦΙΣΤΩΝ οἱ ἐπαγγελόμενοι, λίαν
 φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι. ὅλας γὰρ οὐδὲ
 ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ποῖα, ἴσασι. οὐ γὰρ ἄν τὴν
 10 αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ, οὐδὲ χεῖρω ἐτίθεσαν· οὐδ' ἄν ἄοιτο
 ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι, συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδο-
 κιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς
 ἀρίστους· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὕσαν συνέσεως,
 καὶ τὸ κρῖναι ὀρθῶς, μέγιστον· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ
 15 μουσικῇ. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν
 ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔΡΓΑ, καὶ δι' ἃν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶ-
 σιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει· τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγα-
 πητόν, τὸ μὴ διαλανθάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποίηται
 τὸ ἔργον· ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. οἱ δὲ νόμοι, τῆς
 20 πολιτικῆς ἔΡΓΟΙΣ εἰοίκασι. πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθε-
 τικὸς γένοιτ' ἄν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρῖναι; οὐ γὰρ
 φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοί, ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσ-
 θαι. καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν, οὐ μόνον τὰ θερα-
 πεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἄν, καὶ ὡς δεῖ θερα-
 25 πεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις. ταῦτα δὲ,
 τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις, ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ· τοῖς δ'
 ἀνεπιστήμοσιν, ἀχρεῖα. ἴσως οὖν, καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ
 τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαί, τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις
 θεωρῆσαι, καὶ κρῖναι τί καλῶς, ἢ τούναντίον, καὶ
 30 ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἄν εἴη· τοῖς δ' ἄνευ
 ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι, τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς
 οὐκ ἄν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον. εὐσυνετώτε-
 ροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἄν γένοιτο.

XII. Παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον, βέλτιον ἴσως· καὶ ὅλως δὴ, περὶ πολιτείας· ὍΠΩΣ ΕἰΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΑ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑ ΤΕΛΕΙΩΘΗ.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν, εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγεστέρων, πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν· εἶτα, ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι, τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς πόλεις· καὶ τὰ ποῖα, ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν· καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, αἱ μὲν καλῶς, 10 αἱ δὲ τούναντίον, πολιτεύονται. θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων, τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν, καὶ ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. λέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξάμενοι.

THE END.

By the Editor of this Work.

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5 kinds of priority

1st priority in point of time επιείκεια

2nd το μη αντιστρέφον δεδα τῆς τοῦ ἑωυτοῦ
ακολουθίῃ

or that which is not convertible accord. to
conseq

3rd τῶν τὰς ἐξ

4th Priority in the sense of superiority

5th Priority in causality, as the sun prior
to its light

If 1 is laid down it does not follow that
there must be 2. - if 2 there must have been

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