

DEF. DOC. #1904

effected before the end of 1934 was to make the conference which would have to be called in consequence of that abrogation coincide in time with the 1935 Conference envisaged by Art. 23 para. 2 of the London Naval Treaty. The notification was given after the adjournment of the Preliminary Negotiations, not from any desire to see first how those negotiations were turning out, but because delay was desired by the British and American delegations.

Abrogation of the Washington Treaty was of course a serious matter. But considering that the British had expressed dissatisfaction at the Washington Conference; that the French, too, were not satisfied; and that Britain's Foreign Minister Simon had stated at the Geneva General Disarmament Conference on 8 February, 1932 that: "Apart from this, it is well known that certain of the Naval Powers have already given serious consideration to the question of reduction of naval armaments and have achieved positive and valuable results in the shape of the Washington and London Naval Treaties. It is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that these treaties represent a substantial contribution to the cause which we all have at heart and our view is that they should be retained intact until they expire in December 1936", the Japanese Government did not feel that there would be anything unreasonable about giving notice of abrogation by the end of 1934 or that it would

greatly excite the Powers concerned. Desire for steps to abrogate the treaty jointly with the other co-Signatories was mentioned in the instructions to the Delegation because of the feeling that it would be unfortunate if the abrogation by Japan alone were to unduly excite public opinion in the countries concerned and give rise to misunderstanding.

IX. The 1935 London Conference was opened on 9 December. This Conference, as was set forth in Mr. Craigie's letter of 24 October relative to the invitation summoning the Disarmament Conference, was opened under the auspices of the British Government in accordance with the express provisions of Art. 23 of the Washington and corresponding Article of the London Treaty, for the purpose of concluding a treaty to take the place of the two expiring at the end of 1936 and thereby to form as comprehensive an agreement as possible relating to naval arms limitation.

A. The Japanese Government being thus definitely informed that the discussions of the coming conference were to cover the whole field of naval limitation, accepted the invitation of the British Government and despatched as delegates Admiral Nagano and Ambassador Matsuzo Nagai. The Japanese Navy also considered the idea of sending Vice-Admiral Yamamoto who had headed the Japanese delegation to the Preliminary Negotiations. But considering that

the other Powers would be represented by high-ranking officers, Admiral Nagano was named delegate as a matter of courtesy to the other delegates, and also because he was well-qualified by reason of his experiences as a delegate to the 1932 Geneva General Disarmament conference. Ambassador Magai had been one of Japan's delegates to the 1930 London Naval Conference.

The Japanese Government accepted the invitation of the British Government on 29 October. But prior thereto, on 18 October, informed the British Government of its desires (already made clear at the Preliminary Negotiations) regarding the 1935 Naval Limitation Conference and clarified its attitude toward the question of disarmament, to the following effect:

(a) The way to maintain and promote world peace is for all nations to give due consideration to each other's existence and necessary requirements, as well as to carry out a thorough disarmament which will bring about among the Powers a state of non-aggression and non-menace. To that end it is essential that the strong Powers take the initiative in working for promotion of peace.

(b) The attitude of the Japanese Government toward the question of naval limitation is to have thorough-going arms limitation carried out in accordance with the aims

abovementioned.

(c) Although the proposal for declaration of building programs submitted by Great Britain at the Preliminary Negotiations was intended for a short period, in substance it will have the effect of retaining discriminatory ratios so long as a common upper limit on tonnages to be allowed is not set. Since it will thus not be productive of the effects of disarmament, the Japanese Government is not able to accept it.

(d) Qualitative limitation unaccompanied by quantitative limitation will not only fail to produce the real effect of disarmament, but will result in the continuance of the existing relative strengths. The Japanese Government is therefore unable to support such a method.

In the light of the attitudes and contentions of the various Powers at the Preliminary Negotiations, special attention of the Japanese delegates to the 1935 London Naval Conference was called to the following points:

(a) Although the British concept of an absolutely necessary strength in armaments was in some respects inconsistent with the achievement of arms limitation, it was necessary, in order to make consummation of an agreement on disarmament certain, to give the utmost consideration to Britain's demand in view of her special national circumstances.

DFP. DOC. #1904

(b) Although Japan's proposal was to fix a maximum limit for the naval armaments of the stronger naval Powers, as a practical question there would be no objection to doing that in such a way that it would take a considerable period for Japan's navy to reach that limit.

(c) Since the problems of the European Powers were extremely complicated, Japan should not become too deeply involved in them.

(d) Consummation of a disarmament agreement being most desirable as a measure for allaying the state of uneasiness then existing throughout the world, efforts to that end should be made to the very last.

(e) Since the lightening of the people's burden was an urgent need for Japan, the agreement to be made should be of such nature as will meet that need without fail.

By way of reference material, a study made with reference to expenditures for armaments was also handed to the delegation (Annex Document No. 18).

3. The Conference was opened on 9 December, 1935 and was attended by the representatives of France and Italy, in addition to the American, British and Japanese delegates. But this time, unlike in the case of the Preliminary Negotiations, formal meetings were the general rule; and as these meetings were attended by large numbers, opportunities for frank

talks were few. As a result, explanations offered by the Japanese delegation might not have been adequate at times; but it is a fact that every effort was directed toward achieving an agreement.

The other Powers concerned, however, were mainly concerned with maintenance of the status quo, and showed little interest in carrying out a thorough-going arms limitation. They confined their efforts for the most part to criticisms of the Japanese proposal, and no new ideas to meet new conditions were brought forward with reference to quantitative limitation. The attendant circumstances were somewhat as follows:

At the informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 7 December, 1935, Mr. Craigie said, "According to my experience in disarmament talks, there is no end of argument when the question of vulnerability is touched upon. That is the reason the British delegation does not hold much hope for the success of quantitative limitation in the present Conference"

At the first informal Japanese-American talks of 17 December, Admiral Standley said, "America probably will not be able to carry out a 20% reduction in cruisers at once, in view of the British attitude. In cruisers, however, America, having about 50 over-age units, is ready to reduce immediately". Then he asked, "Not only does Britain not desire

arms reduction, but in cruisers she even suggests a desire to increase. In such case do you propose to keep up with the British?"

At this same meeting Mr. Davis said, "With British showing the attitude of not desiring to effect reduction, it cannot be said that the British attitude will not affect America, since there is a possibility of America being drawn into the European situation. In that respect we differ from you. Japanese-American parity is by no means a question confined solely to our two countries. America desires Japan's friendship. Japan and America are good customers to each other, and I firmly believe that no other two countries are in as good a position to understand each other. There is nothing that America wants to take away from Japan. But in view of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy and the situation in China, and with everybody in a state of uneasiness because of inability to foretell what will come next, this is not an opportune time for concluding a basic agreement. We therefore desire to have status quo maintained until mutual suspicion shall have been dissolved".

At the first meeting of the 1st Committee held on 10 December, Vice-Admiral Robert, the French delegate, said that he felt on the basis of his past experience that quantitative limitation would be difficult. And at the informal

DEF. DOC. #1904

France-Japanese talks on 7 December, Vice-Admiral Durant-Viel said: "France does not like the question of quantity; rather it hopes for an agreement on qualitative limitation alone. France has hitherto never obtained satisfaction on the question of quantity; and in the present Conference it will probably be difficult to solve the quantitative question even as between France and Italy alone. It will therefore be better to have no limitation as to quantity. While Britain seems desirous of proceeding under a long-period, e.g. 8 years, building limitation plan such a plan in fact differs little from a treaty based on the principle of ratios and hence cannot be approved. What France desires is to preclude the possibility of surprise by requiring notification of short-period, e.g. 1 year, building programs and at the same time to effect an agreement on qualitative limitation".

In the course of the Conference there were proposals from the British, French and Italian delegations, but they were concerned principally with notification of building programs; and the advance notifications advocated were for extremely short periods and did not involve any scrapping. It was the opinion of the Japanese delegation that such proposals could not possibly attain the object of arms reduction.

The American delegation proposed a proportionate reduction

of 20% from the treaty figures, failing which there should be 15% 10% or even 5% cuts from the existing tonnages. And at the Japanese-American meeting of 17 December, as already stated, Admiral Standley stated that in view of the British attitude American could not put a 20% reduction into immediate execution. And with reference to capital-ships, he said, "America will have seven overage capital-ships in 1937. The first three of these she proposed to replace with the 35,000 ton type, and after having tested their efficiency, to study the possibility of reducing the size of that category". The Japanese delegation was therefore lead to believe that perhaps the American delegation did not have any concrete plan in the strict sense of the term.

C. The Conference was thus a great disappointment to the Japanese delegation (for they had looked forward to it with keen anticipation in the firm belief that the Japanese proposal was calculated to bring about an ideal state of affairs wherein the various Powers could develop their respective destinies with complete ease of mind, and that it was the best plan conceivable at the time for lightening the people's tax burdens by forestalling the huge expenditures involved in the large-scale building of big ships which were bound to come under the old treaties. And as that proposal had already been explained to the American and British representatives at the Preliminary Negotiations, it was felt that

it would make a notable contribution to the work of disarmament if only all the Powers concerned, and especially U.S.A. and Great Britain, would study and consider it fairly and without bias.

It was the belief of the Japanese Delegation that while world insecurity might be traced to numerous causes, the principal cause was the fact of a few Powers with strong offensive armaments causing the lesser Armed Powers to feel insecure. The removal of such a situation was felt to be a matter of urgent necessity. Nor did they think that their proposal was necessarily an idealistic one, nor one that would be difficult to put into practice, - the more so as other plans similar to it in formula had already been put forward by other Powers at earlier conferences, as already stated, and a part of it had actually been incorporated into an agreement. And in the way of plans for sweeping disarmament, there was the so-called "Hoover Plan" calling for a one-third or one-fourth reduction in naval armaments which was submitted by the American delegation to the 1932 Geneva General Disarmament Conference in June 1932. And in November of the same year, a proposal for an even more sweeping reduction in air armaments was submitted by Sir John Simon of the British delegation. All of the above plans had been taken into consideration, more or less as a pattern, in formulating the Japanese proposal. And since the Japanese

delegation were prepared, moreover, to delay enforcement for a considerable period in the event immediate enforcement should be found difficult, they did not feel that they were trying to force the impossible or anything radically unreasonable upon the other Powers.

Such was the general situation in the Conference. And although the Japanese delegates, believing that the other delegates could be convinced of their good faith and of the real significance of their proposal if they but tried hard enough, left nothing undone to explain the merits of the proposal. The results, however, were disappointing.

The general purport of the Japanese proposal was that the principal naval Powers (U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan) should make sacrifices by way of showing an example to the rest of the world. Consequently, when at the informal Anglo-Japanese talks held on 7 December Admiral Chatfield asked whether the common upper limit was to be set for all Powers, Admiral Nagano replied that it was meant for U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan. Admiral Chatfield then asked whether, in that case, it was intended to have only those three Powers discuss the proposal in this conference. And Admiral Nagano's reply was that while Japan had no objection to participation by France and Italy also, what she wanted was the setting of a common upper limit for U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan. results, however, were disappointing.

The general purport of the Japanese proposal was that the principal naval Powers (U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan)

At the 2nd meeting of the First Committee held on 11 December Admiral Nagano said, "We should therefore have no objection to the fixing of any suitable figure for the European navies within the common limit through consultation among the Powers concerned. Nor should we have any objection to the United States becoming a party to such conversations of the European Powers. Should there take place, however, in these conversations discussion of any important matter having a direct bearing upon our country's interests we desire to reserve the right to speak on such occasion". Then, at the 3rd meeting of the First Committee held the following day, Vice-Admiral Robert (France) said, "The basic issue apart, we cannot agree to the procedure . . . proposed. It seems to be the intention of the Japanese proposal to obtain agreement first between U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan. But France is opposed to such a procedure which does not take into consideration the position of France with its grave responsibilities". He was followed by the Italian delegate who said, "The explanation that the common upper limit should apply only to U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan amounts to a new proposal entirely different from that explained at the first meeting. Italy is opposed to the procedure of concluding an agreement of the three Powers. The purpose of this Conference should be to discover a basis applicable not only to the five Powers, but to all naval Powers".

The above observations of the various delegates on the Japanese proposal had the effect of bringing out some extreme arguments. For instance, at the 4th meeting of the First Committee held on 13 December Viscount Monsell (Britain) said that if the application of the common upper limit was to be extended from the three Powers to the five Powers, might it not mean that it will in turn be extended to every country with a navy, then eventually even to the Dominions. And at the 10th meeting of the First Committee held on 15 January 1936, the Irish delegate stated that in the event of adoption of the Japanese plan Ireland would demand the same rights as other Powers, and that Ireland could not take any part in an agreement which did not treat her on the same basis with the other Powers.

Such arguments were perhaps without parallel in a disarmament conference which should above all have been realistic and practical, and greatly perplexed the Japanese delegation. Particularly was it astounded by the question whether the British Dominion, if they wished, might also be treated as units, each entitled to a common upper limit of its own. Ever since the Washington Conference it had been taken for granted by Japan that for the purposes of an agreement on disarmament the Dominions were included within the British Empire; and as a matter of fact the

invitation to the London Naval Conference issued under date of 7 October, 1929 contained the statement that the idea of equality of strength is conceived by the British to include the naval strength of the whole of the British Empire. Since Japan had thus looked upon the fact of the British Empire being treated as a single unit as a self-evident truth, the Japanese delegation found difficulty in understanding the real meaning of the above questions.

F. The following are the questions and observations made by the various delegates on the Japanese proposal, and the answers of the Japanese delegation thereto, which were not exact duplications of those made at the Preliminary Negotiations:

(a) Questions and opinions of the various delegations:

(1) The Washington Treaty gave equality of defense to the Powers concerned. Establishment of a common upper limit, and the consequent equalizing of armaments, would upset equality of security.

(2) To set the common upper limit at a point lower than Japan's present strength would be an absolute impossibility. But if the limit be made high, the various Powers would build up to that limit and thus give rise to an arms expansion.

(3) If the common upper limit is applied only to the three Powers, the ratio principle would still be left in the relations with the other Powers. Moreover, it would

be impossible to conclude a long-period agreement between the three Powers, as was done at the time of the conclusion of the London Treaty.

(4) In the case of a country like Great Britain which is a Pacific Power as well as an European Power, the impossibility of scattering its forces will make it necessary for it to possess two parity-strengths.

(5) Does not the extension of the common upper limit from three Powers to five Powers involve the possibility of further extension to every country with a navy, or even to the Dominions?

(b) Replies and opinions of the Japanese delegation:

(1) Since the direct and greatest cause of differences in what the British refer to as vulnerability lies in unreasonable difference in naval strengths, the first step toward the removal of those differences should be the establishment of a common upper limit.

The Washington Treaty merely used the figures obtained by a certain special method of computation on the basis of existing strength, which was a casual fact. It was concluded under the abnormal conditions prevailing immediately after the first world war, and the likelihood of having to amend it later was anticipated. By no means did it accord equality of security to the Powers concerned.

(2) By setting a common upper limit, and at the same time radically reducing or totally abolishing offensive weapons so as to render armaments substantially non-aggressive and non-menacing, no Power will menace another even if it builds within the common upper limit the arms necessary for its defense; nor will the various Powers feel mutually menaced even if the common upper limit further lowered. Nor can there be any apprehension of arms expansion.

(3) Recognizing that an agreement among the three Powers whose positions from the standpoint of sea defense were similar was the first essential step toward disarmament, Japan merely wished to first determine a criterion applicable to those three. But if that method is not acceptable there would be no objection to having the five Powers join the discussion from the beginning, nor to have discussions first by the European Powers, to be followed later by discussions by U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan.

(4) Because of the high mobility of naval vessels, it is no difficult matter for a country to concentrate its warships at a single point whenever necessary. So if a country were to possess two forces on the ground of its having responsibilities in far scattered areas, its armaments are bound to become a menace to others. Depending upon the point of view, such a demand might even be construed

as a demand for the right to possess armaments on a two-Power or even greater standard. Such a demand is untenable from the standpoint of any agreement on disarmament.

(5) The idea of treating the British Dominions as independent units probably was never anticipated by this Conference.

F: In addition to the Japanese proposal, the following proposals were submitted to this Conference:

(a) British proposal pertaining to unilateral declaration of new construction.

Under this plan each Power was to voluntarily declare by categories the figures of strength in naval armaments needed for its national defense, which figures it would undertake not to exceed either by new construction or new acquisition for a certain period.

(b) British proposal pertaining to prior notification and exchange of information.

Under this plan each of the signatory Powers was to give notification relative to construction of all ships exceeding 100 tons (102 metric tons) displacement, as follows;- within the first month of each fiscal year, the list of all ships for which the construction order should be issued within that year, their types and the maximum calibre of their guns; and within the first six months of each fiscal year, the names

DEF. DOC. #1904

and essential specifications of all ships to be laid down during that year.

(c) Italian proposal relating to voluntary quantitative limitation on naval armaments.

Under this plan, each signatory Power, after having recognized the right of all the co-signatories to build, under conditions of absolute autonomy, the naval armaments dictated by their respective defensive needs, would each year notify all the co-signatories the total tonnage and number of ships which it proposed to lay down or acquire during that year, broken down into the categories provided for in the existing treaties, with an undertaking not to exceed the figures so notified.

(d) French proposal relating to unilateral and voluntary declaration on shipbuilding.

Under this proposal all Powers capable of doing so were to declare, at a time of their own choice, the total tonnage of new construction in each category which would not be exceeded during a certain period; and each Power, irrespective of whether or not it makes the above declaration, was to incur the duty of announcing each year the list and principal specifications of all ships to be laid down during that fiscal year.

The attitude taken by the Japanese delegate toward the above proposals was as follows (statement by Admiral Nagano

at the 9th meeting of the First Committee on 8 January, 1936):

The Japanese delegation attaches the greatest importance to the question of quantitative limitation and believes that the creation of a state of non-aggression and non-menace through quantitative limitation is a condition prerequisite to an agreement on disarmament. Being therefore opposed to proceeding to a discussion of other problems before a decision has been reached on the question of quantitative limitation, the Japanese delegate refrains from making any statement now on the exchange of information but reserves all observations thereon for another occasion. But as regards the parts of the French and Italian plans which are based on the idea of quantitative limitation, that is to say, the parts which are concerned with a declaration of building programs, observations thereon will be offered in due course.

The fact of the French plan having been prepared with care can be readily recognized. But it does not appear to be the most suitable method for readjusting the existing relations between navies; nor has sufficient consideration been given therein to the need for securing real reductions in armaments; and it is not likely to prove an effective check on naval competition. With such defects, the application of the French plan cannot bring about an agreement on quantitative limitation that will be really effective. The

French plan, moreover, appears to be aimed at limiting the quantity of naval construction chiefly for reasons of economy, and has not given sufficient consideration to the basic principle of equal security for all Powers.

The Italian plan, too, has been prepared with great care. With the purport of Article I recognizing clearly the sovereign right of each Power in matters pertaining to its naval armament in particular, the Japanese delegation associates itself wholeheartedly. But the plan cannot be accepted, for much the same reasons as those stated in connection with the French plan.

With reference to the 2nd British plan (substituted or the 1st British plan), Admiral Nagano stated at the 9th meeting of the Committee on 8 January that he would reserve his observation thereon till a later time because it was concerned merely with exchange of information. But with reference to the 1st British plan dealing with declaration of building programs, observations were made at the 7th meeting of the Committee on 20 December, to the following effect;

(1) Although the Japanese delegation is wholly in accord with the principle set forth in the British plan that "naval strength should be based on the minimum limits required for national security of the respective Powers"; but in actual practice there is no other course but to go back to the principle of equality of armaments.

(2) Although the British plan is said not to be based on the ratio system, it is very similar to it. And since nothing is made clear regarding the scrapping of ships, it will be difficult to effect any modification of the relations now existing between the various navies, and hence will result in the maintenance of the present relations in general.

(3) The British plan has given no consideration to the carrying out of positive reduction. The aim of disarmament cannot be attained even if qualitative limitation should be carried out.

(4) The British plan may even lead to an increase in armaments if a Power submits a plan of excessive size.

(5) It has been explained that the Japanese thesis regarding security of national defense has been incorporated into the British plan. But such does not appear to be the case since what Japan is demanding is that differences between armaments be substantially removed.

In addition to the various proposals abovementioned, there was the American plan suggesting-though not strongly insisting upon - a 20% reduction. To this plan the Japanese delegate made the observation that while a proportionate reduction of 20% on the existing strength of the various Powers might be effective as a measure of disarmament, it could not be productive of fair results (informal Japanese-American meeting of

7 December and 9th meeting of the First Committee of 8 January).

Suffice it to say that while all the nations but Japan were not strongly determined to carry out disarmament at the time, Japan in striking contrast was bent on a thorough-going disarmament. This difference in attitude, as judged from all that transpired in the Conference, arose from the fact that Japan took the view that since the principal cause of world insecurity was the wide differences between the armaments of the various Powers, the best approach to the problem was to tackle it boldly by removing those differences; while both U.S.A. and Great Britain took the view that since any great modifications in armaments at a time when there was insecurity in the world would only serve to aggravate insecurity, status quo should be maintained. And as for France, it appeared to the Japanese delegation that she was concerned both with Germany's re-armament and the question of relative strength with Italy, and hence was not desirous of touching the question of quantitative limitation.

G. In the following paragraphs is given an account of the various efforts made by the Japanese delegation during the Conference to obtain the understanding and collaboration of the other delegations on the Japanese proposal.

DEF. DOC. #1904

Beginning with the informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 7 December, 1935, the Japanese delegation continued negotiations, both formal and informal, with the representatives of other Powers until 16 December; and thereafter also efforts were made to explain the purport and application of the Japanese proposal whenever opportunity presented itself. And with regard to Britain's vulnerability, which appeared to be a big obstacle to agreement, the Japanese delegation were prepared to give it the utmost consideration short of altering its own basic policy on disarmament; and to that end, when Admiral Chatfield stated at the 2nd informal Anglo-Japanese meeting of 13 December, 1935, that Britain's vulnerability being high, she required an absolute minimum in certain specified categories as well as relative strengths in other categories; so Britain's position would be rendered extremely difficult under the common upper limit. He then asked whether Admiral Nagano would recognize Britain's special minimum requirement, or would be opposed to it. To which Admiral Nagano replied that since he knew, as a matter of common sense, that Britain's vulnerability was high, he recognized the need of making big adjustment for Britain; but the degree of adjustment must be studied. He further explained that since Japan well understood Britain's position, there would not be actual parity even under the common

upper limit. And to Mr. Craigie's question as to whether Admiral Nagano realized that, depending upon how the common upper limit is fixed, certain countries might require armaments in excess of that limit, the latter replied that while it would be alright to take Britain's strength as the common upper limit, it was mutually desirable to avoid exciting the peoples of the various countries; consequently it was necessary to refrain from inserting in the treaty any provision that would amount to a waiver by the various Powers of their right to possess arms necessary for their respective national defenses. And at the 3rd informal Anglo-Japanese meeting, Admiral Nagano said that although the establishment of a common upper limit would give every Power the right to build up to that limit, the Japanese delegation, being deeply sympathetic regarding Britain's position, was willing to have Britain exceed that limit; but great care should be taken in working that out, so as not to excite the emotions of the peoples concerned.

The observation was made that this attitude on Japan's part was inconsistent with the purport of the Japanese proposal to establish a common upper limit, and that it might end up in the ratio system. But it was only because of its earnest desire to achieve agreement that the Japanese delegation took such an attitude. And by the method of adjustment referred to above, the Japanese delegation had in mind the idea of facilitating the possession by Britain of the large number of ships

she desired by employing the method of transfer which was incorporated in the tentative plan prepared by Admiral Yamamoto at the Preliminary Negotiations, as well as the idea of allowing Britain to retain over-age vessels whose efficiency as combat units was considered inadequate (The question of retention of over-age vessels was recognized also in the Anglo-Japanese compromise plan at the 1927 3-Power Conference, and was also suggested by the British at the Preliminary Negotiations).

The above circumstances can be readily understood from the speech made by Admiral Nagano at the 10th meeting of the First Committee on 15 January, 1936. At any rate, it was the view of the Japanese delegation that however its attitude might appear as to form, there was no substantial inconsistency with Japan's basic thesis.

With regard to France and Italy, there being some delicate questions involved in the relations between those two countries, the Japanese delegation felt it best from the standpoint of achieving general agreement not to get too deeply involved in that matter but to leave it to be considered in friendly discussions by the European Powers. So ~~that~~ the Japanese plan had been so drafted as to have as little repercussion as possible upon French-Italian relations; but as the Conference progressed it became impossible to follow the procedure originally anticipated, and the discussions became complicated.

H. The situation was further complicated by the fact that all the Powers, with the exception of U.S.A., were not desirous of effecting arms reduction and placed emphasis on qualitative limitation rather than on quantitative limitation. And the only other question they seemed to be interested in discussing was that of exchange of information. And since the Japanese delegation was firmly of the belief that without quantitative limitation it would be impossible to achieve real disarmament, to protect the sense of security of the various Powers or to secure economy on naval expenditures, it requested, at the 9th meeting of the First Committee on 8 January, 1936, that the agenda thereafter should be so arranged as to obtain decision first on quantitative limitation, to be followed by discussion of the questions of qualitative limitation and exchange of information.

On the following day, i.e. 9 January, an informal Anglo-Japanese meeting was held at the Foreign Office at 4 p.m. upon the suggestion of the British delegation. At this meeting Viscount Monsell said, "We have now the Japanese plan, the British plan and the French plan before the Committee. If we return to the discussion of these three plans, the time will come when it will be necessary to make decisions on them. Does the Japanese delegation desire that" To which Admiral Nagano replied, "If it is clear that no other plans

DEF. DOC. #1904

are to be submitted anew, please do so whenever it is convenient for you". Viscount Monsell then said, "there is no other plan; and since the Japanese plan was submitted first it will be necessary to take a decision on that first. But in the event the Japanese plan is rejected, will the Japanese delegation be able to remain in the Conference still? And should you withdraw from the Conference and the four Powers decide to continue the discussions in order to consider such questions as qualitative limitation and exchange of information, will Japan be able to leave an observer?"

Such a situation had never been anticipated by the Japanese delegation. And it certainly had no desire to withdraw from the Conference, especially as it knew how the relations between U.S.A. and Great Britain had deteriorated after the 1927 3-Power Conference. Admiral Nagano therefore replied that "the matter was beyond the scope of his instructions". Immediately thereafter the Japanese delegation reported the situation in the Conference to the Government and asked for urgent instructions as to the attitude to be taken thereafter (Annex Document No. 19). The Government's instructions (Annex Document No. 20) were received on 12 January.

DEF. DOC. #1904

The purport of the new instructions was briefly as follows -- You shall further explain at the Committee meetings and other gatherings the thesis which Japan has always maintained regarding the firm establishment of the principle of non-aggression and non-menace and a sweeping reduction in armaments to be achieved through the setting of a common upper limit, which is the fundamental policy of the Japanese Government, and reductions, both quantitative and qualitative in offensive armaments. Nothing shall be left undone to show that what the Japanese Government earnestly desires is the conclusion of a fair and reasonable disarmament treaty and that it entertains a sincere concern for the work of disarmament. And if even then Japan's thesis does not receive the final approval of the other Powers, withdrawal from the Conference may be unavoidable. But even in such an eventuality, in order to avoid unfavorable effect upon international relations, effort should be made to save the situation by having the five Powers agree to matters on which they can come to agreement, then to have the Powers concerned make a joint declaration not to engage in an armament race before bringing the Conference to a close; all other questions to be turned over to a new Conference to be held thereafter by the four Powers. There will be no objection to having an observer present at the four-Power Conference.

DEF. DOC. # 1904

On the following day, i.e. 13 January, therefore, the Japanese delegates had a meeting with the British delegation and voiced their desire to offer further detailed explanations on the Japanese plan at the next meeting of the First Committee with the object of obtaining the understanding of the various Powers, and to take steps to obtain agreement first on the question of restrictions on the use of submarines and other questions upon which there was prospect of agreement among the five Powers. But the suggestion to have the questions upon which there was prospect of agreement by the five Powers was rejected by the British. The next question taken up was that of the measures to be taken in the event of the Japanese plan not being approved by the other Powers. The Japanese delegates expressed the desire that in such an eventuality a vote should not be taken on the Japanese plan; and since it was obvious that agreement by the five Powers on the question of quantitative limitation would be difficult, it was desirable from the standpoint of preserving the tranquility of international relations to end this Conference at this point by going through the form of an indefinite postponement, after the pattern of the 1927 Geneva 3-Power Naval Conference. But as this, too, was rejected by the British, the Japanese delegation was forced to go to the next meeting of the First Committee without being able to do anything more.

DFP. DCC. #1904

On 15 January, at the 10th meeting of the First Committee, Admiral Nagano offered detailed explanations on the Japanese plan and answered points on which the other Powers had doubts, and asked that they consider the Japanese plan (Annex Document No. 21). But the answer of the American delegate to that was that under the Japanese proposal the Powers now having strong navies would have to reduce while those with weak navies would be allowed to build up; that Japan recognized differences in vulnerability, responsibility and need, and hence proposed to make adjustments to meet those differences but that that was a continuation of the ratio system; that equality of security and equality of armament were incompatible and contradictory; and that it was impossible to draw any distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. The French delegate expressed the view that while he supported the principle of each Power determining of its own sovereignty the forces necessary for its defense as laid down in the Japanese proposal, since the conditions of security are not the same for all the Powers their armaments should also differ one from another. The British delegate expressed complete agreement with the first part of Japan's fundamental thesis that "to possess the measure of armaments necessary for national security is a right to which all nations are equally entitled",

DRF. DOC. #1904

but opposed the Japanese plan on such points as the necessity for equality of fleets in the area of contact and the fact of the primary cause of differences in vulnerability being inequality of armaments. On the latter point he did not believe that differences in vulnerability could be adjusted by the indefinite procedure suggested by the Japanese delegation. He was opposed, moreover, to applying the common upper limit to the five Powers, as well as to lowering that limit. The Italian delegate expressed himself as being in complete accord with the principle of the Japanese proposal, but was not prepared to re-examine the naval problem on the basis of any classification or hierarchy of naval Powers; and while the Japanese delegate has proposed to make adjustments on the basis of the common upper limit, there is apprehension that such a procedure would take us right back to the ratio system.

Thus the various delegates made observations on the Japanese proposal from their respective points of view, expressing concurrence on some points, opposition to others

Finally, the Chairman spoke as follows, "The discussion of the Japanese proposal has now proceeded as far as it usefully can. All the delegations have considered it carefully, both inside and outside the Conference; but I have to note that it has received no support. Furthermore, this Japanese

proposal deals in the main only with quantitative limitation, and quantitative limitation itself is only a limited part of the many problems before this Conference. I therefore think the best plan will be adjourn the meeting and to proceed at the next meeting with the other important work before the Committee, beginning with the French, Italian and United Kingdom proposals for the advance notification of building programs".

Such opposition to its proposal was difficult for the Japanese delegation to understand because the points concerning vulnerability on which apprehension was felt by the American and British delegations would have been cleared away had they but made a careful study of the purport of the Japanese proposal and the explanations offered by the Japanese delegates; and the point on which the French delegation felt apprehension was based on the French plan known as the Paul Boncour plan.

As regards the question raised by the American and Italian delegates as to whether the Japanese proposal would not mean a return to the ratio system, it was felt by the Japanese delegation that if a minute study had been made of the method of adjustment which it had in mind it would have been readily discovered that it was nothing more than the method which had been frequently used in disarmament conferences for disposing of difficult questions.

The point raised by the American delegate regarding the difficulty of drawing a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons was also difficult for the Japanese delegation to comprehend, because at the 1927 3-Power Naval Conference the British delegate frequently declared 8-inch gun vessels to be offensive weapons; and at the 1932 General Disarmament Conference a concrete study was made of naval armaments that were offensive and those that were not, and many views were expressed declaring certain of them to be offensive.

Having come to this pass, however, the Japanese delegation felt that they had done everything that should have been done, and that there was nothing more that they could do. And as they were firmly of the opinion that an arms limitation agreement without quantitative limitation would not only fail to attain the aims of arms limitation, but would lead to an unfair result they felt that they could make no further contribution to the Conference even if they remained in it. Hence there remained no alternative but to withdraw from the Conference. On the evening of 15 January, therefore, notice was given to the Chairman of the First Committee to the effect that the Japanese delegation considered that no useful purpose would be served by its continuing to participate in the discussions of the

DEF. DOC. #1904

Conference; and on the 20th the Conference was notified that while the Japanese delegation could not continue to participate in the discussions of the Conference, an observer would be left (Annex Document No. 22).

The Japanese delegation had attended the Conference with high hope of consummating a fair and just agreement on disarmament, and had even completed study of plans for a further extension of the agreement (Annex Document No. 23). But as so many features of the Conference turned out to be contrary to Japan's expectations, there was finally no choice but to withdraw. In his report the Japanese delegate expressed deep regret over the withdrawal from the Conference (Annex Document No. 24).

On this 30th day of July, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT: ENOMOTO, Shigeji (seal)

I, ENOMOTO, Shigeji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At the same place.

Witness (signed) OKUYAMA, Hachiro (seal)

DEF. DOC. #1904

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ ENOMOTO, Junji (seal)

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Edwards

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

ENOMOTO, Juji

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Permanent Address and Status - Tokyo	Commoner	
Former Status		
Date of Birth	16 Jan 1890	
Former Name		
Name	ENOMOTO Shigeharu	
March 1907	Graduated from the 3rd TOKYO-FU Middle School.	
July 1910	Graduated from 2d High School	
Nov. 1913	Passed the Higher Civil Service Exam.	
July 1914	Graduated Legal Department (English Law) Tokyo Imperial University.	
11 July 1914	Appointed Secretary to Railroad Board	
" " "	Granted 6th Salary Grade.	
" " "	Service at the Secretariate to the President.	
26 Oct. 1915	Appointed Professor in Navy concurrently Ministry of Navy Councillor Appointed 7th Rank, Higher Civil Service	Cabinet
	Granted 10th salary grade	Navy Ministry
	Appointed instructor Naval College	Navy Ministry
10 Jan. 1916	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 7th grade.	
30 Sept. 1916	Granted 9th salary grade	
12 Apr. 1917	Relieved of present post. Appointed solely as Councillor, Navy Ministry	Cabinet
	Granted 9th salary grade	Navy Ministry
1 Oct.	Granted 8th salary grade	
31 Mar. 1918	Granted 7th salary grade	Navy Ministry
1 Apr. 1918	Promoted to 6th Rank, Higher Civil Service	Cabinet

20 Apr. 1918	Conferred Senior Court Rank, 7th Rank	
4 June 1919	Appointed to Staff of Regulations (Law and degree) Adjustment Committee (Not mentioned in official gazette.)	Cabinet
31 Mar. 1920	Granted 6th salary grade	Navy Ministry
18 Aug.	Revision of salary ordinance for Higher Civil Service Officials (Applied as of August pay).	
30 Sept.	Granted 6th salary grade	Navy Ministry
31 March 1921	Promoted to 5th Rank, Higher Civil Service	
10 May 1921	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 6th Grade.	
30 May 1921	Received 1 silver cup Merits for the Revision of Army and Navy Criminal Code	
1 Nov. 1920	Conferred with 6th Order of Merit with the Single Ray of the Rising Sun. Awarded with the grant of 900 yen. Merit in War from 1915 to 1920.	
27 Sept. 1921	Appointed attendant to plenipotentiary to attend Washington Conference	Cabinet
30 Sept. 1922	Granted 5th salary grade	Navy Ministry
5 October "	Appointed attendant to Imperial Delegation to the Committee for Revision of War Time Rules and Regulation held at Hague, Holland.	Cabinet
31 Mar. 1924	Promoted to 4th Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
31 May 1924	Decorated with 5th Order of Merit with Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure (For service at the Washington Conference, etc.)	
15 May 1924	Promoted to Senior Court Rank, 6th Grade	
20 Dec. 1924	Abolition of Post according to Imperial Ordinance Number 311.	
20 Dec. "	Appointed Naval Secretary Appointed to 4th Rank, Higher Civil Service. Granted 3rd salary grade Appointed member of Higher Examination Committee for Shinto Priest of the Government and National Shrines Appointed member of Ordinary Examination Committee for Shinto Priest of the Government and National Shrines.	Naval Ministry Navy Ministry Navy Ministry

30 Sept. 1926	Promoted to 3rd Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
15 Oct. 1926	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 5th Grade.	
31 Mar. 1927	Granted 2nd salary grade	Navy Ministry
15 Apr. 1927	Appointed Attendant to the Plenipotentiary to attend Navy Armament Limitation Conference at Geneva.	Cabinet
31 Mar. 1928	Granted 1st salary grade	Navy Ministry
12 Nov. 1929	Appointed attendant to the plenipotentiary to attend London Naval Conference	Cabinet
12 June 1930	Decorated with 4th Order of Merit, with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure	
13 Apr. 1931	Appointed Navy Professor concurrently appointed 3rd Rank, Higher Civil Service. Appointed Instructor of Naval College.	Cabinet Naval Ministry
25 Sept. 1931	Appointed Navy Professor concurrently Naval Secretary Granted 1st salary grade Appointed instructor, Naval College.	Cabinet Naval Ministry
30 Sept. 1931	Promoted 2nd Rank, Higher Civil Service (permanent office) Granted 2nd salary grade	Cabinet Naval Ministry
15 Oct. 1931	Promoted to Senior Court Rank, 5th Grade	
31 Oct. 1931	Decorated with the Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for service in the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty.	
9 Dec. 1931	Appointed attendant to the plenipotentiary to attend the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva	Cabinet
3 Oct. 1933	Relieved of Attendant to Plenipotentiary to attend the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva.	Cabinet
30 Sept. 1934	Granted 1st salary grade.	Cabinet
5 Nov. 1935	Appointed Attendant to the Plenipotentiary to attend the Naval Disarmament Conference at Geneva	Cabinet

29 Apr. 1934	Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. For Service in the Incident from 1931 to 1934	
16 Nov. 1936	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 4th Grade.	
1 Oct. 1938	Promoted to the 1st Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
23 Mar. 1939	Decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. Received 600 yen as additional salary for long service.	Naval Ministry
1 Dec. 1941	Conferred with Senior Court Rank, 4th Grade.	
17 Dec. 1941	Appointed Councillor for Higher Prize Court.	Cabinet
14 June 1943	Relieved upon request of present office.	Cabinet.

5 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton
: Colonel Rowland W. Fixel
SUBJECT: Blockades
Yamamoto, Def. Doc. #1338
Enomoto, Def. Doc. #1330.

Reference to Blockades in the Record, the Lytton Report
and Indictment and Appendices

1. Examination of the indictment and appendices does not disclose any allegation that Japan blockaded Chinese ports. Nor is there any reference in the Lytton report to the League of Nations indicating that such a measure was announced or enforced by Japan against China. The practical effect, however, of Japan having naval control of the Chinese ports, was tantamount to a blockade, and no doubt the reference in the record (p. 3670) to such a situation implies that the blockade referred to followed as a result of military occupation. This is evident already lost most of her harbors, and her entire coast is being blockaded by our forces." This sort of blockade is not considered a "blockade" within the meaning of the term as used in International Law. Oppenheim (supra p. 635), comments on this kind of a blockade by saying: "Even the actual blocking of the approach to an enemy coast by belligerent men-of-war need not by itself mean that the ingress and egress of neutral vessels are to be prohibited, since it may be for the purpose of preventing the egress and ingress of enemy vessels only."

War and Pacific Blockade Defined.

2. "A blockade that is a war blockade as distinguished from a pacific blockade, may be defined as an act of war carried out by the warships of a belligerent, detailed to prevent access to or departure from a defined part of an enemy's coast." (Wheaton Int. Law War, Seventh Ed. p. 525). A pacific blockade is a means of settlement of State differences, other than by means of war. (Oppenheim Int. Law Vol. II Sixth Ed Rev p. 629) amplifying the definition of pacific blockade is a statement by Pitt Cobbett in Cases on Int. Law (Walker) Vol. 2, Fifth Ed p. 460-1, where it is said: "At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish a war blockade --- from a so-called pacific blockade which---is not strictly an operation of war, and cannot be enforced against neutrals. The former may be defined as an act of war carried out by the warships of a belligerent, detailed to prevent access to or departure from a defined part of an enemy's coast." And in "A Documentary Textbook in Intern

Law" by Pfankuchen, (p. 638-9) he says, that a 'Pacific Blockade' is an act of reprisal by which the complaining State utilizes naval forces to prevent ingress or egress from the ports of the offending State. It differs radically from war blockade, in that war blockade permits the blockading State to prevent ingress or egress of the vessels of all States, including neutrals, to or from the legally blockaded ports; while in the case of pacific blockade, third States do not admit any right of the blockading State to interfere with the passage of their ships.

Notice of blockade and concurring conditions.

3. "A blockade, in order to be binding, must be declared in accordance with Article 9, and notified in accordance with Articles 11 and 16" of the Declaration of London, 1909 (Wheaton, supra p. 537 Oppenheim, supra p. 635); it must be absolute, that is, it must interdict all commerce whatever with the blockaded port, and must be maintained by such a force as is sufficient really to prevent access to the coast. (Oppenheim, supra p. 639; Wheaton, supra, p. 533; Pitt Cobbett, supra p. 463).

Laying of mines.

4. Article I of the Second Hague Convention, concluded Oct. 18, 1907, and proclaimed Feb. 28, 1910, and to which Japan was a party, prohibits belligerents from laying unanchored automatic contact mines unless they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after those who laid them lose control over them. It also forbids the laying of anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they break loose from their moorings. Thirdly, the convention in Art. II prohibits belligerents from laying automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation. (Treaties, Conventions, Int. Acts and Protocols etc. (Malloy) Vol 2 p. 2310).

Oppenheim, (supra, p. 367) says that the latter provision has been of limited value inasmuch as it is left open to belligerents to maintain that mines were laid for a purpose other than merely intercepting commercial navigation.

Wheaton, (supra, p. 343-4) points out that the "high professions" made by the German delegation at the Hague Conference were not carried out in World War I. Mines were laid indiscriminately upon ordinary trade routes and not in the interest of any "definite military scheme". This resulted in retaliation by Britain. The Provisions of the Convention were again disregarded by Germany from 1939 onward. Thereupon Britain again retaliated by establishing minefields.

The extensive use of minefields by all belligerents in World War II, each claiming such use as a retaliatory measure, and the designation of the zone in which the mines are used as "war zones", has led to the comment in Wheaton, (supra, p. 346) that "the change in the nature of naval weapons and methods of warfare may compel revision of the issue of freedom of neutral navigation by sea" and may "authorize the use of the conception of war zones."

Oppenheim (supra, p. 545, in note 1), says that the developments in World War II in connection with minefields "tended in the direction of a successful assertion of the right of the belligerent to lay minefields on the high seas irrespective of reprisals but subject to the duty to ensure the relating safety of neutral traffic."

The laying of mines in war zones, contrary to the terms of the Hague Convention, is another instance of where the covenant is more observed in its breach than in its observance, and appears to require a reappraisal of its binding force.

Search and Seizure as related to Def. Doc. 1275

5. Par. I of Def. Doc. 1275 appears to conform to recognized international law, in that it asserts the right to destroy or seize enemy vessels and confiscate enemy goods found thereon (Wheaton, supra, p. 305). The reference to vessels of certain listed firms in Par. I(6), including same as Japanese-owned vessels, is subject to determination why they should be thus classified.

Par. II is understandable. Japanese owned vessels under Chinese registry would be free from capture except where exceptional reasons exist.

Par. III enunciates the Chinese Prize Regulations (Art. 3) following the British rule that enemy flag is conclusive of nationality, but neutral ships preponderantly owned by enemy subjects are deemed enemy. (Wheaton, supra p. 294; also note 33 in p. 295).

Par. IV outlines treatment of Third Power vessels and vessels flying Third Power flags, and seems to follow generally established rules. (Wheaton, supra, p. 296-7).

Defense Document 1330 Affidavit of Enomoto

6. The statement in the last paragraph of Def. Doc. 1330 that some powers, "including the United States Navy", recognize that vessels of third states may be prevented from entering any port before which another state is maintaining a pacific

blockade, appears to run counter to the actual facts. Pfankuchen, (supra, p. 639) cites the instance where Great Britain, Germany and Italy proposed in 1901 what first was called a pacific blockade against Venezuela, but upon objection of the United States that it did not recognize as a valid proceeding a pacific blockade which adversely affected the rights of neutrals, Germany stated it was the intention to establish a warlike blockade, with all concomitant conditions. The United States also objected to the legality of such a blockade, and made its abandonment one of the conditions on which alone the United States would accede to the Declaration of Paris (Pitt-Cobbett, supra, p. 461). However the same author cites the use of such a blockade by the U. S. against the Confederacy (p. 461).

Therefore the witness should be made to produce proof of his allegation that the United States adheres to a rule such as he states.

The rest of his affidavit is objectionable because it refers to documents, not a part of the affidavit.

Defense Document 1338, Affidavit of Yamamoto

7. If what the affiant says is true, there is nothing of importance to be gained by cross-examining him, as it appears that he claims the blockade established was pacific and not a war blockade, but nevertheless notice thereof was given by a Proclamation of the blockade of the China Sea Coast, and that rights of neutrals were carefully observed. Unless this can be disputed by probative evidence, there was compliance with the rules generally adhered to. In this connection, please note that the Declaration of London, dealing with this matter was never ratified, and it was this Declaration which would have formalized many antecedent procedures and practices, such as a declaration as well as a notice to make a blockade binding; the date when the blockade is to begin; the geographical limits; the period in which neutral vessels may come out etc. (Oppenheim, supra p. 636). As the practices now stand, there is a great divergence of opinion on whether a blockade is merely a "paper" blockade or an "effective" blockade; also as to the required notice; (Pitt-Cobbett, supra, p. 463, 465).

ROWLAND W. FIXEL
Colonel, JAGD

~~No ^{was} charge in indictment copy~~

No charge about blockade
in indictment or affidavit

Excori ~~agreed~~ at

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

5 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Col. Rowland W. Fixel
FROM : D. N. Sutton
SUBJECT : Blockades
YAMAMOTO, Def. Doc. No. 1338
ENOMOTO, Def. Doc. No. 1330

Will you please make an investigation and brief report on the following:

1. The evidence introduced by the prosecution on the subject of blockade by Japan of Chinese ports, rivers and coastline. This is mentioned in the League of Nations Report, also R. 3670.
2. Define the distinction between a pacific blockade and a war time blockade.
3. Is the laying of mines in violation of Article 2 of the Hague Convention?
4. Check the indictment and appendices to see what charges, if any, are alleged with regard to blockades by Japan of Chinese ports.
5. Suggest the line of cross examination, if any, or statement of our evidence to be made in connection with the witness YAMAMOTO, Def. Doc. No. 1338.
6. Do the same with regard to the witness ENOMOTO and particularly with regard to the last portion of his affidavit.

We would like to have this report as early as practical.

D. N. SUTTON
Assistant Counsel

CC:
Mr. Tavenner

5/2

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

YAMAGUCHI, Sadao, et al

Ex 2541

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: ENOMOTO, Juji
No. 5 Shoto Machi,
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

I graduated from Tokyo Imperial University Law School in 1914. In 1915 I entered the Navy Ministry as legal advisor. I continued in this capacity from 1915 to 1945 and since then have continued in the service of the 2nd Demobilization Ministry and subsequently the 2nd Demobilization Bureau.

In 1921 I attended the Naval Disarmament Conference in Washington as a legal Expert.

In 1922 I attended the commission of Jurists to consider Amendment of Laws of War at the Hague.

In 1927, 1930, 1932, 1934 and 1935 I also attended Disarmament Conference at Geneva and London as a legal Expert.

My principle duty in the Navy Ministry was to examine the draft of laws and regulations prior to their enactment or revision and to submit my opinion thereon to the Minister or Vice-Minister of the Navy.

files re bombing
object unless copies of the instructions for
check last statement

any laxity in the application of the original set of regulations.

Subsequently, and in November 1937 further rules of conduct concerning the Visit and seizure of shipping were published and distributed to the various sections of the Navy. This was likewise carried out because of the non-existence of any definite international rules of conduct which would be applicable to the situation.

A careful check was kept on the reports received daily in order to verify the fact that the rules were being adhered to as well as to prevent any possible unnecessary damage to non-military targets and property, especially that of third powers.

In general, it seems the establishing of a pacific blockade is usually approved on the ground that it may make resort to war less probable, and thus limit the range of possible use of force.

With reference to application of the pacific blockade, visit of third power Vessels was carried out only in cases where there was doubt concerning the nationality of the ship. In cases of doubtful ships, they were required to be detained for a longer period of time in order to make certain of their nationality. In other cases ships were detained only when they were clearly being used to lend direct military assistance to the Chinese forces.

In handling any protests from third powers, we usually took the report which came in concerning the incident and sent it to the respective commanders for their further investigation.

On July 27, 1937, the pamphlet "Criteria in Air Fighting" was issued for the guidance of the Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry.

This pamphlet was distributed to the various sections mentioned in the certificate attached to said publication.

In view of the lack of any recognized rules of conduct at the time of the incident of July 7, 1937, it was decided that the rules of aerial conduct should be clarified in order to avoid unnecessary damage or possible conflict with third powers.

Although some complaints were received from the China area that these rules were placing too severe restrictions on their operations, they were given the force of an order.

Subsequently on September 24, 1937, a supplementary guide was distributed to the same sections. This was the pamphlet entitled "Miscellaneous Observations on Aerial Bombing".

This second pamphlet was issued through the initiative of Vice-Admiral YAMAMOTO because of reports which he received indicating that there was some further need for clarifying the rules in order to assure strict observance of the previously published regulations.

For example, one of the reports stated that the pilot had bombed a target "which seemed to be a military target". This, the Admiral stated, was a dangerous situation in that it would lead to bombing objectives without definitely ascertaining their military character. The further rules were published to prevent

In some cases we experience difficulty in carrying out our investigation because the area in question was exclusively under Chinese control.

In addition, it was recognized by some powers, including the United States Navy, that vessels of third states could be prevented from entering any port before which another state is maintaining a pacific blockade.

*Made
him
further
it*

On this 16th day of April 1947,
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT: /S/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

I, SOMIYA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the present of this witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo.

WITNESS: /S/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ ENOMOTO, Juji (seal)

*What is his authority -
Has not that always + consistently
opposed this.*

(1)

Personal History of

ENOMOTO Jūji.

Full Name: ENOMOTO Jūji.

Caste Designation: Commoner.

Domicile: No 830, ŌMUKAI, NAKASHIBUYA,
~~No. 830 Shibuya Machi,~~
ŌAZA, ^{SHIBUYAMACHI,} TOYOTAMA-GUN, TOKYO-FU.
~~Nakashibuya Ōmukai, County~~
~~of Toyotama, Tōkyō-fu Pref.~~

Birthplace: same as the
domicile.

Date of Birth: ~~the~~ 16th January 16,
1890.

The Names and Dates of Birth Dates
of the Members of Family:

page 1/

(2)

Wife: ENOMOTO, ~~Ka~~^{Taka}; born on

~~the 30th~~ November³⁰, 1898.

Elddest son: ENOMOTO Ichirō; born on

~~the 24th~~ October²⁴, 1920.

Elddest daughter: ENOMOTO Toyoi; born

^{on} ~~the 26th~~ April²⁶, 1917.

Second son: ENOMOTO Kenjiro; born

^{on} ~~the 30th~~ March³⁰, 1923.

Second daughter: ENOMOTO Shige; born

^{on} ~~the 21st~~ March²¹, 1919.

Dates	Items	Names of offices.
July, 1914	graduated from the English Law Course of the Tokyo Imperial University's Law School	School Dept.

(page 1)

(3)

November, Passed the higher civil

1913 service examination.

July 11, ~~was~~ Appointed as clerk

1914 of The Government Railway

Board / "TETSUDŌIN" /

^{Given} was placed on the 6th Railway

Board grade pay.

Oct. 26, ~~was~~ Assigned to a professor

1915 ~~real post in~~ of the Navy;

~~being appointed concurrently~~

as a counselor to the Navy ^{Ministry} Dept.

^{Given} ~~was~~ placed on the

7th grade of ^{the Higher Civil} Senior service

~~Office~~

Cabinet

(page 1)

(4)

Oct. 26, ^{Given} ~~was placed on the 10th~~

1915 grade pay.

~~was Appointed Instructor~~ Navy
~~to The Naval War College~~ Ministry
Dept.

Dec. 28, ^{Conferred with} ~~was placed on the Junior~~

1915 Grade of the 7th Class Court Household
Rank. Imperial
Ministry
Dept.

Nov. 16, ^{Received the} ~~was given the honor to~~

1915 attend the
~~join~~ Dinner Party on
the 1st Day of the State
Banquet, following the
Entronement Ceremony
and the Great Thanks-
giving Festival.

1 page 1/

(5)

Nov. 10, ~~was~~ ^{awarded} granted the Medal
1915 for Commemoration of the
Entronement, in accordance Bureau
with Imperial Ordinance of Decor-
No. 154. tions

Sept. 30, ~~was placed~~ ^{Given} on the 9th Navy
1916 grade pay. Ministry
Depts.

April 12, Relieved of present post and
~~Discharged from the~~

1917 post referred to above; being

then appointed to serve

exclusively as ~~Navy Dept's~~

→ Councilor of the Navy Ministry. Cabinet.

~~was placed~~ ^{Given the} on the 9th Navy
grade pay. Ministry
Depts.

/page 1/

Dec. 23, ~~was~~ ^{Appointed} ~~was~~ ⁽⁶⁾ ~~nominated~~ as a

1916 member of the Extraordinary ^{Navy} ~~Investigation~~ ^{Ministry} ~~Committee of~~ ~~Naval Affairs~~ ^{Naval Affairs} ~~Dept.~~

Oct. 1, ^{Given} ~~was~~ ~~placed~~ on the 8th

1917 grade pay. "

Mar. 31, ^{Given} ~~was~~ ~~placed~~ on the 7th

1918 grade pay. "

April 1, ^{Raised to the} ~~was~~ ~~placed~~ on the

6th grade of Senior ^{Civil} Service

~~Officers~~ Cabinet

/page 2/

April 20 ^{Raised to} ~~was~~ ~~placed~~ on the Senior ^{Imperial} ~~Grade of the 7th Class~~ ^{Household} ~~Court Rank~~ ^{Ministry} ~~Dept.~~

Page 2/

June 4, ~~was~~ Appointed as Executive
1919. of the Law Adjustment
~~#433~~ ~~Staff~~ to the Legislative

~~Readjustment~~ Committee. Cabinet

Mar. 31, ~~was~~ ^{Given} placed on the 6th
1920
~~#434~~ grade pay.

Aug. 17, The Salary ^{Scale} Schedules

1920
~~#434~~ Regulation was revised

as per Imperial Ordinance

No. 257. Subsequently receiving
~~as a result,~~

was placed on the

~~scale of~~ \rightarrow $\$2,637.00$ as

annual
~~yearly~~ salary (effective

~~starting~~ from the pay

~~for~~ August, 1920.)

Page 2/

Sept 30, ^{Given} was placed on the

1920 ~~1734~~ 6th grade pay.

Nov. 1, ~~was~~ Awarded the Sixth

1920 class ~~1734~~ Order of the Rising Sun

with Single Rays plus a

the grant of \$900.00

for the services rendered Bureau

in connection with the of

1915-1920 War. Decorations

" Awarded was granted a war

medal for the active service

in of the 1914-1920 War. "

Mar. 31, ^{Given Raised to} was placed on the 5th

1921 grade of Senior ^{Civil} Service. Cabinet
officer.

(page 2)

(9)

May 10, 1921 ~~Was placed on~~ ^{Raised to} the Junior
Grade of the 6th Class
Court Rank. Imperial Household Ministry Dept.

May 30, 1921 ~~Was granted~~ ^{Awarded} a Silver Cup
in recognition ^{for} of the services
rendered in connection
with the revision of the
Navy and Army Criminal Bureau
Codes. of Decorations

Sept. 27, 1921 ~~Was~~ ^{as} appointed ~~as~~
assistant to the Delegate
Plenipotentiary to the
Washington Conference. Cabinet

April 28, 1922 applied for ^{change} alteration

1 page 2/

permanent
of the registered domicile.

Sept. 30, 1922 ~~was placed on~~ ^{given} the Navy Ministry Dept. 5th grade pay.

Oct. 5, 1922 ~~was~~ Appointed on as Assistant to the Imperial Government's Delegates to the Committee for Revision of the Laws of War, opened at The Hague, Netherlands. Cabinet

April ~~ceased to remain~~ ^{Relieved} as

21, 1923 the Assistant to the Imperial Government's Delegates to the Committee for Revision of the Laws of War, opened at The Hague, Netherlands.

Chief of Staff of General ...

Committee for priests for

(12)

nation of the candidate

Government and National

Shrines priests

May 31,	was Awarded the 5th	Bureau
1924	Class Imperial	of
May 15,	Order of the Sacred Treasure	Decorations
1924	Raised to	
May 15,	was placed on the Senior	Imperial
1924	Grade of the 6th Class	Household
	Court Rank.	Ministry
		Dept.
Aug. 25,	was Appointed a member	
1924	of the Armament Restriction	Navy
	Research	Ministry
	Investigation Committee	Dept.
Oct 20/2/	The form for	
1924	Appointments Transfers	
	and Discharges was	

(page 2)

(13)

revised as per ~~the~~

Naval Personnel Bulletin

No. 79.

Dec. 20,

~~was~~ Appointed ~~Senior~~

1924

Secretary ^{of} the Navy

Ministry,

Cabinet

Juji
ENOMOTO, ~~SHIGEHARU~~ Translated by K. ASAI.
Checked by Ogita

(14)

Page 3.

Dec. 20, 1924 Raised to the 4th ^{Grade} ~~rank~~ of ^{the Senior} ~~higher~~

Civil Service.

Given the 3rd grade salary.

Appointed a member of the ^{Higher} Examination
~~Assigned to an examiner of the~~

Committee for priests for ^{higher}

Government Shrines, ~~forest examination~~

Appointed a member of the Regular Examination
~~Assigned to an examiner of Govern-~~

Committee for priest for Government Shrines.

~~most shrines ordinary priest examination~~

March 1, 1925 Granted
Given. ¥ 460⁰⁰ for the services

rendered in the work
~~concerning the matters of sending~~

troops toward Russian territory, Navy Ministry

Sept. 30, 1926 Raised to the 3rd ^{Grade} ~~rank~~ of ^{the Senior} ~~higher~~

Civil Service.

~~The Cabinet~~

Oct. 15, 1926 Raised to the junior grade of

the 5th Court Rank.

~~Imperial Household Ministry~~

Nov 22, 1926

~~Temporarily assigned to the~~
Unofficially appointed a
a secretary of the Military Service
manager of the Surrendering
Bill Council.

Committee for the Military Service

Law Bill.

War Ministry.

March 31, 1927

Given the 2nd grade salary of Navy Ministry

April 15, 1927

~~Made an~~ Ordered to accompany
Made an ~~attache~~ on the delegates

for attending the ~~Disarmament~~
Limitation Conference
Council in GENEVA.

~~Cabinet~~

Oct. 15, 1927

Made a member of the
Arms and Ammunition Research
Disarmament Surrendering

Committee.

Navy Ministry

March 6, 1928

member of the
Made a preparatory Committee

the Revision of
~~member~~ for ~~Amending~~ the
Naval Disciplinary Law. Navy Ministry

March 31, 1928 Given the 1st grade salary

Feb. 14, 1929 Made ~~a~~ ^a ~~Committee~~ member
of the Committee for the Revision of the
for Amending Naval Disciplinary
Law.

Feb. 26, 1929 Made ~~a~~ ^a ~~Committee~~ member
of the Policy Investigation Committee
for Fuel Measures.

Nov. 16, 1928 Awarded Exthronement
Conferred with the ~~Coronation~~
Commemoration Medal according to the
the provisions of Imperial
Ordinance No. 188 of ~~the~~ ¹⁹²⁸ year

~~1928~~

The Decoration
Bureau

Nov. 12, 1929 Ordered to accompany
 Made an attached ~~to the delegates~~
 London
 attending the Naval Conference
 in LONDON. (Departed on board
 the ~~S.S.~~ SIBERIA-MARU, leaving
 YOKOHAMA on Nov. 30). The Cabinet

June 12, 1930 Awarded the 4th class Imperial
 Orders of the Sacred Treasure
 (No. 726711) The Decoration
 Bureau

Sept. 5, 1929 Granted
 Given ¥210⁰⁰ for the services
~~such~~ ~~concerning~~ in the CHINA Incident
 of 1928 and in the Incident
 of CHINA Disturbance ~~in~~ Incident
 of 1927 and 1928. Navy Ministry

April 13, 1931

Concurrently appointed ~~to~~
Instructor. Raised
Naval Professor. Assigned
to the 3rd rank of ^{the senior} higher Civil
Service.

Navy Ministry

"

"

Assigned ~~to~~ ^{as} Instructor in the
Naval ^{War} Staff College.

Sept. 25, 1931

Concurrently
Appointed ~~to~~ ^{instructor} Naval Professor
and Naval Secretary.

The Cabinet.

"

"

Given the 1st grade salary. Navy Ministry

"

"

Assigned ~~to~~ ^{as} Instructor in
the Naval ~~Staff~~ College.

"

"

Assigned to ~~an~~ ^(the Regular Civil Service) Examination
Committee ~~ordinary~~
for the Civil Service during

ENOMOTO SHIGEHARU

(19)

the absence of
Naval Secretary SUGITA, KAZUMASA
who was sent on official trip
absence of journey ~~on official~~

~~stands~~

Navy Ministry

Sept. 30, 1931 Raised to the 2nd ^{Grade} ~~Rank~~ of
the Higher Civil Service.

Page 4

Sept. 30, 1931 Given the 2nd grade salary.

Oct. 15, 1931 Raised to the Senior Grade

of the 5th Court Rank
(Little Cordon of the)

The Imperial Household Ministry

Oct. 31, " Decorated with the Imperial

Order of the Rising Sun

(No. 936614)

The Decoration Bureau

Dec. 9, 1931 Made an attache to the

delegate ~~for~~ attending the

Conference
General Disarmament ~~Council~~

in GENEVA. (Left TOKYO station

at ~~nine o'clock~~ ^{9:00} a.m. on the

~~15th~~ ¹⁵ of Dec, and departed on
the

board SUWAMARU which left

KOBE harbour on the 17th inst)

The Cabinet

Dec. 9, 1931

Relieved ^{from assignment on the} of the ~~examiner for~~
Regular Civil Service Examination Committee
which was made ~~the ordinary civil service~~ during
the absence of

Naval Secretary SUGITA KAZUYA

who was ^{on account of his} sent on an official trip.
~~absence of journey, on official~~

~~the post~~
~~arrants~~ to which I was

previously assigned.

Navy Ministry

Jan. 9, 1932

Relieved ^{of post as member of} of the Committee

for the Revision of
~~member for Amending the Naval~~
 Disciplinary Law. Navy Ministry

Oct. 3, 1933 Relieved ^{as} of the ~~attache~~ to
 the delegate for attending the
 General Disarmament Conference,
 Council
 in GENEVA. The Cabinet.

Oct. 20, 1933 Assigned ^{as a member of the} to ~~an~~
 Regular Civil Service Examination Committee
 for the ~~ordinary civil service~~
 the absence of
 during Naval Secretary SUGITA
 KAZUMA, ^{on account of his} who was sent on an official
 absence of ~~journey~~
 trip.
 on official orders Navy Ministry

Sept. 8, 1933 Returned to Japan from
 Came back, on this day, from
 my journey to GENEVA on

the
~~boat S.S.~~ KASHIMA-MARU, which
 entered KOBE harbour to-day.

Feb. 13, 1934 Relieved ^{as member of the} of the ~~examiner for~~
 Regular Civil Service Examination Committee
 to which assigned
~~the ordinary civil service during~~
 during the absence of
 Naval Secretary SUGITA KAZUMASA
 who was ~~sent on official trip~~ ^{on account of his}
~~absence of journey, to which~~

~~I was previously assigned~~ Navy Ministry

Sept. 7, 1934 Assigned ^{as a member of the} to a technical
 Japanese Navy Expert Committee for
~~member of JAPANESE Navy~~
 for the preparatory negotiation
 concerning the Naval Dis-
 armament ^{Conference of 1935.}
~~Council of the~~
~~1925th year.~~ (Departed on

~~board~~ ^{the} S.S. HIE-MARU, leaving
 YOKOHAMA on ^{Sept. 20,} ~~the 20th, Sept.~~ Navy Ministry
 Sept. 19, 1934 Unofficially assigned to
~~given charge of~~ Foreign Ministry
 Ministry affairs. Foreign Ministry
 " " Ordered to go to ENGLAND ~~on a~~
~~trip~~ via the UNITED STATES. Foreign Minister's
 Secretariat
 Personnel
 Section Chief
 Sept. 30, 1934 Given the 1st grade salary. Navy Ministry
 Feb. 28, 1935 Relieved of ~~the~~ technical member
 of JAPANESE Navy ~~for the~~ preparatory
 negotiation concerning the Naval
 Disarmament Conference. Council of the
 1935~~th~~ year. (Returned ~~to~~ JAPAN via
 SIBERIA on Feb. 12)

Nov. 5, 1935 Assigned ^{as} ~~to an~~ attache to the
delegate ~~for~~ attending the Naval
Disarmament ^{Conference} ~~Committee~~ in LONDON.

(Left TOKYO on Nov. 16, 1935 via
SIBERIA.

Came back to KŌBE on board
the ~~S.S.~~ MIYAZAKI-MARU on March

4, 1936.)

The Cabinet.

April 29, 1934 Awarded the 3rd Class Imperial

Order of the Sacred Treasure

and the sum of ¥700 for ~~the~~

~~merits~~ ^{meritorious} in the services of the

1931-1934 Incident. (No. 887626) Bureau

The Decoration

April 29, 1934 Given a War-Medal of the
1931-1934 Incident. (No. 253265) The Decoration Bureau.

Sept. 21, 1935 Awarded and permitted to
~~Granted to receive and wear~~
the ^{Commemoration'} ~~Memorial~~ Medal of ^{the} MANCHOUKUO
Emperor's visit to JAPAN, ^{and} which
~~had been~~ ^{was} presented ^{by} from the
Emperor of MANCHOUKUO. (52896)

Nov 16, 1936 Raised to the Junior Grade
of the 4th Court Rank. The Imperial Household Ministry

Translated by KASAHARA
checked by Ogito

July 10, 1936	Awarded ^a memorial for the meritorious services during the Incident from 1931 to 1934.	(26) Navy Ministry
Oct. 1, 1938	Raised to the 1st Grade of the Higher Civil Service Promoted high official of the first class.	Cabinet
Nov. 12, 1938	Ordered to make an official trip to China. (Departed : Nov. 12.) (Returned : Dec. 6)	Navy Ministry
Mar. 23, 1939	Decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit with 2nd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. (No. 4036,896)	Bureau of Decorations
Apr. 1, 1939	Appointed concurrently instructor at the Naval ^{as} Navy Intendance School School of Supplies and Accounts.	Navy Ministry
Sep. 30, 1939	Granted 600 Yen ^{for longevity.} as an allowance for long service.	Cabinet
May 15, 1940	Assigned as a (System and Facility) member of the Investigation Committee concerned with for the System and Institution Service and Life Livelihood.	Navy Ministry

Nov. 10, 1940 ^{Awarded a Commemoration Medal}
~~Granted a medal on Celebration~~ for the
 2600th Anniversary of the Foundation of
 the Japanese Empire ^(according) to the purport of ~~Bureau~~
 the Imperial Ordinance No. 488 ~~of~~ 1940. ~~Board of~~ Decorations

Dec. 1, 1941 Relieved from the concurrent position. ^{Naval} Ministry
 " " Promoted to the Fourth Court Rank, of
 Senior Grade. ^{Imperial Household} ~~Ministry~~ ^{Department}

Dec. 17, 1941 Appointed ^{a councillor} ~~judge~~ of the Higher Prize
 Court. Cabinet.

Apr. 29, ¹⁹⁴⁰ ~~1938~~ ^{Awarded} ~~Granted with~~ the ^(Class Imperial) First Order of Merit with
 the Sacred Treasure and granted an allowance
 of ~~¥1,700.00~~ ^{¥1,700.00} for ~~the~~ meritorious ^{services} ~~deeds~~ during
 the ^{China} ~~Chinese~~ Incident.

Apr. 29, 1940	Awarded Granted a War Medal of the Chinese	
	Incident.	
Dec. 1, 1945	Appointed secretary of the ^{Second} Demobilization	
	Ministry in accordance with the Imperial	
	Ordinance No 686 of 1945.	Second Demobilization Ministry
" "	Ordered to serve ^{work} at the Minister's Secretariate	"
	as observer)	
	in the 2nd Demobilization Ministry.	
Apr. 1, 1946	Appointed secretary of the ^{Second} Demobilization	
	Ministry in accordance with the Imperial	
	Ordinance No. 189.	
" "	Granted the 7th Grade Salary (¥490.00)	
	in accordance with the Imperial Ordinance	
	No. 192.	

June 14, 1946 Granted the 6th Grade Salary.

" " Relieved from ~~the~~ position at request.

June 15, 1946 Charged with ^{work} ~~business~~ in the Archives

Section of the Second Demobilization Bureau

of the Demobilization Board, ~~provided~~ However,

that ^{he was} granted $\yen450^{00}$ ~~450~~ Yen a month and

treated as a first class administrative

officer ^{within the section.} ~~in this Board alone.~~

Demobilization Board.

July 1, 1946 Granted $\yen1,700^{00}$ ~~1,700~~ Yen a month ^{thereafter} ~~from then on~~

through ^{allowance} ~~the~~ the revision of the Official Allowance System for Officials. ~~System.~~

Archives Section

①
①

Permanent Address & Status - Tokyo Commoner.

Former Status.

Date of Birth 16 Jan 1886 1890

Former Name.

Name ENOMOTO Shigeharu.

MARCH 1907, - Graduated from ~~Tokyo~~ The 3rd TOKYO-FU Middle School.

July 1910 - Graduated from 2d High School

Nov 1913 - ~~Grad~~ Passed the Higher Civil-Service Exam. (English Law)

July 1914 - Graduated Legal Dept., Tokyo Imperial University.

11 July 1914 - Appointed Secretary to Railroad Board.

" " " - ~~Appointed~~ Granted 6th salary grade.

" " " = Service ~~at the~~ Secretariate to the President.

26 Oct 1915 - Appointed Professor in Navy Concurrently Ministry of Navy Counselor. Councillor.

Appointed 7th RANK, Higher Civil-Service CABINET.

Granted 10th salary grade NAVY MINISTRY

(2)

- 10 JAN 1916 Appointed instructor Naval College. - Navy Ministry
Conferred with Junior Court RANK, 4th ~~grade~~ ^{grade}
- 30 Sept. 1916 Granted 9th salary grade
- 12 Apr 1917 Relieved of present post. ~~Assigned~~ ^{Appointed} solely as
Councillor, Navy Ministry. - CABINET.
- 1 Oct. ~~Granted~~ Granted 9th salary grade - NAVY MINISTRY
~~Granted~~ Granted 8th salary grade
- 31 MAR 1918 Granted 7th salary grade - Navy Ministry.
- 1 Apr 1918 Promoted to 6th RANK, Higher Civil Service
- 20 Apr ~~1918~~ Conferred Senior Court RANK, 7th RANK ^{CABINET}
- 4 June 1919 Appointed ^{to} Staff of Regulations (Law ~~and~~ degree)
Adjustment Committee. (Not mentioned in
official gazette. - CABINET.
- 31 MAR 1920 Granted 6th salary grade - NAVY MINISTER.
- 18 Aug. ~~Revision of Higher Civil Service officials~~
Revision of Salary Ordinance for Higher Civil-Service
Officials (Applied as of August pay).
- 30 Sept. Granted 6th Salary Grade - NAVY MINISTRY.
- 31 MAR 1921 Promoted to 5th RANK, Higher Civil Service
- 10 MAY 1921 Conferred with ~~Junior~~ Court RANK 6th Grade.
- 30 MAY 1921 Received 1 Silver Cup.
MERITS for the Revision of Army + Navy Criminal Code

(3)

- 1 NOV 1920 - ~~Granted~~ ^{Conferred} with 6th Order of Merit with the
Single - RAY of the Rising Sun.
Awarded with the grant of 900 Yen.
Merit in WAR from 1915 to 1920.
- 27 Sept. 1921 - Appointed attendant to plenipotentiary to
ATTEND WASHINGTON Conference. - CABINET.
- 30 Sept. 1922 - Granted 5th salary grade NAVY MINISTRY.
5 Oct " - Appointed attendant to Imperial Delegation
to the Committee for Revision of ~~the~~ WAR
TIME Rules & Regulations held ^{at} HAGUE,
HOLLAND. CABINET.
- 31 MAR 1924 - Promoted to 4th RANK, Higher Civil Service.
CABINET.
- 31 MAY 1924 → ~~Am~~ Decorated with ~~Imperial~~ ^{the} Order 5th Order
of MERIT, with Imperial Order of the
SACRED TREASURE. (For service at the WASHINGTON
Conference, etc) a
- 15 MAY 1924 Promoted to Senior Court RANK, 6th Grade
- 20 Dec " Abolition of Post According to Imperial Ordinance
Number. 366
- 20 Dec " Appointed NAVAL SECRETARY
Appointed to 4th RANK, Higher Civil Service.

(4)

Granted 3rd salary Grade - NAVY MINISTRY.
Appointed member of Higher EXAMINATION Committee
for the Government + National Shrines
Shinto Priest of

NAVY MINISTRY.

Appointed member of Ordinary EXAMINATION
Committee for Shinto Priest of the Government
+ National shrines.

NAVY MINISTRY.

30 Sept, 1926 Promoted to 3rd RANK, Higher civil service.

CABINET.

15 Oct 1926 - ~~Conf~~ Conferred with Junior Court RANK,
5th Grade.

31 MAR 1927. Granted 2nd salary Grade NAVY MINISTRY.

15 Apr 1927 Appointed ATTENDANT to the Plenipotentiary
to ATTEND NAVY ARMAMENT LIMITATION
Conference at GENEVA - CABINET.

31 MAR 1928 - Granted 1st salary Grade - NAVY MINISTRY.

12 NOV 1929 - Appointed attendant to the plenipotentiary
to ATTEND LONDON NAVAL Conference - CABINET.

12 June 1930 Decorated with 4th Order of MERIT, with the
Imperial Order of the SACRED TREASURE

(5)

- ~~1927~~
13 Apr. 1931 - Appointed ~~NAVY~~ NAVY Professor concurrently
appointed 3rd ~~RANK~~ RANK, Higher Civil
service. CABINET.
Appointed Instructor of NAVAL College
NAVAL MINISTRY.
- 25 Sept. 1931 Appointed, ~~NAVY~~ NAVY Professor concurrently
NAVAL Secretary. CABINET.
Granted 1st salary grade
Appointed instructor, NAVAL college.
NAVAL MINISTRY.
- 30 Sept 1931 - Promoted 2nd RANK, Higher Civil Service.
(permanent office). CABINET.
Granted 2nd salary grade - NAVAL MINISTRY.
- 15 Oct 1931 Promoted to Senior Court RANK, 5th Grade.
- 31 Oct 1931 Decorated with the SMALL Cordon of the
Imperial Order of the Rising Sun
For service in the conclusion of the LONDON
NAVAL TREATY.
- 9 Dec 1931 - Appointed ATTENDANT to the PLENIPOTENTIARY
to ATTEND the General DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
AT GENEVA. CABINET.

(6)

- 3 July 1933 - Relieved of ATTENDANT to the Plenipotentiary
to ATTEND the GENERAL DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE AT GENEVA - CABINET.
- 30 Sept. 1934 - Granted 1st salary Grade - CABINET.
- 5 Nov 1935 - Appointed ATTENDANT to the Plenipotentiary
to ATTEND the NAVAL DISARMAMENT
CONFERENCE AT GENEVA - CABINET.
- 29 Apr 1934 - Decorated with the 3rd Order of MERIT
with the Imperial Order of the SACRED
TREASURE
For service in the Incident from 1931
to 1934
- 16 Nov. 1936 - Conferred with Junior Court RANK, 4th Grade.
- 1 Oct 1938 - Promoted to the 1st RANK, Higher Civil
service CABINET.
- 23 MAR 1939 - Decorated with the 2nd Order of MERIT,
with the Imperial Order of the SACRED
TREASURE
- Received Additional salary for long service
~~24~~ 600 Yen as NAVAL MINISTRY.
- 1 Dec 1941 - Conferred with Senior Court RANK, 4th Grade

(7)

17 Dec 1941 - Appointed Councillor for Higher Price Court
~~Cabinet~~ CABINET.

14 JUNE 1943 - Relieved upon Request of Present OFFICE
CABINET.

Permanent Address and Status - Tokyo Commoner

Former Status

Date of Birth 16 Jan 1890

Former Name

Name HENOMOTO Shigeharu

March 1907	Graduated from the 3rd TOKYO-FU Middle School.	
July 1910	Graduated from 2d High School	
Nov. 1913	Passed the Higher Civil Service Exam.	
July 1914	Graduated Legal Department (English Law) Tokyo Imperial University.	
11 July 1914	Appointed Secretary to Railroad Board	
" " "	Granted 6th Salary Grade.	
" " "	Service at the Secretariate to the President.	
26 Oct. 1915	Appointed Professor in Navy concurrently Ministry of Navy Councillor Appointed 7th Rank, Higher Civil Service	Cabinet
	Granted 10th salary grade	Navy Ministry
	Appointed instructor Naval College	Navy Ministry
10 Jan. 1916	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 7th grade.	
30 Sept. 1916	Granted 9th salary grade	
12 Apr. 1917	Relieved of present post. Appointed solely as Councillor, Navy Ministry	Cabinet
	Granted 9th salary grade	Navy Ministry
1 Oct.	Granted 8th salary grade	
31 Mar. 1918	Granted 7th salary grade	Navy Ministry
1 Apr. 1918	Promoted to 6th Rank, Higher Civil Service	Cabinet

20 Apr. 1918	Conferred Senior Court Rank, 7th Rank	
4 June 1919	Appointed to Staff of Regulations (Law and degree) Adjustment Committee (Not mentioned in official gazette.)	Cabinet
31 Mar. 1920	Granted 6th salary grade	Navy Ministry
18 Aug.	Revision of salary ordinance for Higher Civil Service Officials (Applied as of August pay).	
30 Sept.	Granted 6th salary grade	Navy Ministry
31 March 1921	Promoted to 5th Rank, Higher Civil Service	
10 May 1921	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 6th Grade.	
30 May 1921	Received 1 silver cup Merits for the Revision of Army and Navy Criminal Code	
1 Nov. 1920	Conferred with 6th Order of Merit with the Single Ray of the Rising Sun. Awarded with the grant of 900 yen. Merit in War from 1915 to 1920.	
27 Sept. 1921	Appointed attendant to plenipotentiary to attend Washington Conference	Cabinet
30 Sept. 1922	Granted 5th salary grade	Navy Ministry
5 October "	Appointed attendant to Imperial Delegation to the Committee for Revision of War Time Rules and Regulation held at Hague, Holland.	Cabinet
31 Mar. 1924	Promoted to 4th Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
31 May 1924	Decorated with 5th Order of Merit with Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure (For service at the Washington Conference, etc.)	
15 May 1924	Promoted to Senior Court Rank, 6th Grade	
20 Dec. 1924	Abolition of Post according to Imperial Ordinance Number 311.	
20 Dec. "	Appointed Naval Secretary Appointed to 4th Rank, Higher Civil Service. Granted 3rd salary grade Appointed member of Higher Examination Committee for Shinto Priest of the Government and National Shrines Appointed member of Ordinary Examination Committee for Shinto Priest of the Government and National Shrines.	Naval Ministry Navy Ministry Navy Ministry

30 Sept. 1926	Promoted to 3rd Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
15 Oct. 1926	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 5th Grade.	
31 Mar. 1927	Granted 2nd salary grade	Navy Ministry
15 Apr. 1927	Appointed Attendant to the Plenipotentiary to attend Navy Armament Limitation Conference at Geneva.	
31 Mar. 1928	Granted 1st salary grade	Cabinet
12 Nov. 1929	Appointed attendant to the plenipotentiary to attend London Naval Conference	Navy Ministry
12 June 1930	Decorated with 4th Order of Merit, with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure	Cabinet
13 Apr. 1931	Appointed Navy Professor concurrently appointed 3rd Rank, Higher Civil Service. Appointed Instructor of Naval College.	Cabinet Naval Ministry
25 Sept. 1931	Appointed Navy Professor concurrently Naval Secretary Granted 1st salary grade Appointed instructor, Naval College.	Cabinet Naval Ministry
30 Sept. 1931	Promoted 2nd Rank, Higher Civil Service (permanent office) Granted 2nd salary grade	Cabinet Naval Ministry
15 Oct. 1931	Promoted to Senior Court Rank, 5th Grade	
31 Oct. 1931	Decorated with the Small Gordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for service in the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty.	
9 Dec. 1931	Appointed attendant to the plenipotentiary to attend the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva	Cabinet
3 Oct. 1933	Relieved of Attendant to Plenipotentiary to attend the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva.	Cabinet
30 Sept. 1934	Granted 1st salary grade.	Cabinet
5 Nov. 1935	Appointed Attendant to the Plenipotentiary to attend the Naval Disarmament Conference at Geneva	Cabinet

29 Apr. 1934	Decorated with the 3rd Order of Merit with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. For Service in the Incident from 1931 to 1934	
16 Nov. 1936	Conferred with Junior Court Rank, 4th Grade.	
1 Oct. 1938	Promoted to the 1st Rank, Higher Civil Service.	Cabinet
23 Mar. 1939	Decorated with the 2nd Order of Merit with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure. Received 600 yen as additional salary for long service.	Naval Ministry
1 Dec. 1941	Conferred with Senior Court Rank, 4th Grade.	
17 Dec. 1941	Appointed Councillor for Higher Prize Court.	Cabinet
14 June 1943	Relieved upon request of present office.	Cabinet.

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMIAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

APD 500
31 July 1947

SUBJECT : ENOMOTO Juji (Shigeji)

DATE OF BIRTH : 16 Jan 1890.

EDUCATION :

Mar 1907 Completed TOKYO 3rd Prefectural Middle School.

Jul 1910 Graduated from 2nd Higher School.

Nov 1913 Passed State Examination for Higher Civil Service.

Jul 1914 Graduated from TOKYO Imperial University, majoring in English Law.

CAREER :

11 Jul 1914 Secretary, Railways Board.

26 Oct 1915 Appointed Navy Instructor. Concurrently Counsellor of Navy Ministry and Instructor, Naval Staff College.

12 Apr 1917 Relieved of his concurrent posts and appointed Counsellor, Navy Ministry.

4 Jun 1919 Director, Legislation Adjustment Committee (HOKI SEI-RI IINKAI), Cabinet.

27 Sep 1921 Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference.

5 Oct 1922 Attache to the Imperial Delegates to the Meeting of the Wartime Legislation Revision Committee (SENJI HOKI KAISEI IINKAI) held at the Hague, Holland.

20 Dec 1924 Secretary, Navy Ministry.

15 Apr 1927 Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the Naval Conference at Geneva.

12 Nov 1929 Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the London Naval Conference.

Incl 5

SECRET

SECRET

ENOMOTO Juji (Shigeji)--cont'd:

CAREER (cont'd) :

13 Apr 1931	Professor, Naval Staff College.
25 Sep 1931	Concurrently Navy Secretary and Professor, Naval Staff College.
9 Dec 1931 - 3 Oct 1933	Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva.
5 Nov 1935	Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the London Naval Conference.
14 Jun 1946	Relieved of his principal post as Navy Secretary.

SECRET

Report by H. Shimojima

2 May 1947

Memo for the file

Subject: EHOMOTO, Juji

Check of IPS case files reveal no information regarding Subject.

Report by: H. Shingun
1 May 1947

Memo for the file

Subject: ENOMOTO, Yuji

Check of IPS case files reveal
no information regarding Subject.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

General Activities
APO 500
22 September 1947

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: ENOMOTO, Juji

Born: 16 January 1890

- Mar 1907 - Completed Tokyo 3rd Prefectural Middle School
- Jun 1910 - Graduated from 2nd Higher School
- Nov 1913 - Passed State Examination for Higher Civil Service
- Jul 1914 - Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, majoring in English Law
- 26 Oct 1915 - Appointed Navy Instructor. Concurrently Counsellor of Navy Ministry and instructor, Naval Staff College.
- 27 Sep 1921 - Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the Washington Conference.
- 5 Oct 1922 - Attache to the Imperial Delegates to the Meeting of the Wartime Legislation Revision Committee held at Hague, Holland.
- 20 Dec 1924 - Secretary, Navy Ministry.
- 15 Apr 1927 - Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the Naval Conference at Geneva.
- 12 Nov 1929 - Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the London Naval Conference.
- 13 Apr 1931 - Professor, Naval Staff College.
- 9 Dec 1931 - 3 Oct 1933 - Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva.
- 5 Nov 1935 - Attache to the Delegates Plenipotentiary to the London Naval Conference
- 14 Jun 1946 - Relieved of his principal post as Navy Secretary.

CONFIDENTIAL

Incl 3

2 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: **Mr. Sutton; Mr. Edwards**

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

ENCBOTO, Juji

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Memo for the file

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

375

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Edwards

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Acting Chief
Investigative Division, IFS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT - General

WITNESS

ENOMOTO, Juji

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl
(Described above)

E P M
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Def. Doc. # 1904 Annex 1

14 November 1921

No. 1. Conference committee.
Chief, League of Nations Section
For Limitation of Armaments.

To Secretary-General (of Japanese Delegation).

Subject: Observations On The U.S. Secretary of State's
Proposal of November 12.

According to the statement made by the Secretary of State, the U.S. Government intends to submit another formal proposal on the limitation of naval strength. An accurate discussion on the U.S. Proposal may therefore not be possible until after the above proposal has been made. But since the general effect of the U.S. proposal can be perceived from the Secretary of State's statement, we submit the following observations.

First: Proposal to reconsider the matter of replenishment ten years later.

The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to bind the respective signatory powers permanently in naval strength for the U.S. British Empire and Japan.

However, such factors as fast changing international relations, differences between nations as regards ups and downs in their national destiny, the progress of science

leading to a boundless development of armaments, etc., render it difficult to recognize as reasonable the Secretary of State's proposal of fixing permanently the ratio of naval strength among the U.S., Great Britain and Japan at 5:5:3 and to indicate the standard of naval strength by tonnage.

Therefore, while we should willingly accept the Secretary of State's proposal, it should be in order for us to propose that ten years later, should a necessity arise to make alterations due to changes in circumstances, another conference should be held in Washington for free exchanges of opinion with a view to establishing a reasonable and practical agreement.

Moreover, the following matters are worth being considered as reference in respect of this question.

1. The Secretary of State's proposal seeks to establish the principle of maintaining status quo on armaments.

However, such severe opposition was voiced by the U.S. and other powers against the so-called "status-quo" principle in connection with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant that the fate of the said article was, in effect, virtually the same as though it had been rescinded.

2. The fact that the United States, whose armaments did not even become an issue when the question of arms limitation was discussed at the first Hague Peace Conference held some twenty years ago, is today sponsoring a disarmament conference is one instance showing how greatly the international situation

may change.

3. Being confident that Japan is destined to develop greatly in the future, we do not consider it advisable to adhere to an agreement which would permanently restrain us on the problem of armament on which the basis of national strength should be sound. Furthermore, for us to openly agree to maintain the ratio of 5 to 3 against the U.S. and Britain would be a grave problem affecting Japan's prestige. We deem it necessary therefore to take every precaution so that the agreement may not become absolute and immutable.

Second. Proposal to have the agreement on armament limitation take the form of a treaty.

The execution of armament limitation, unlike in the case of its expansion, does not require the approval of the Diet under the municipal law of any country. It is not impossible to carry it out by the sole authority of the Government. Consequently it is not necessarily impossible to adopt the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes or of an agreement which does not require ratification, rather than the form of a formal treaty.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Japanese Government gladly accepted the invitation to the Conference and are now considering the proposal made by the Secretary of State with good will because first, arms limitation is the demand of world opinion and second, we were moved by the sincerity of the