

lished principles of financial science which, in their application to war, stamp it uniformly as a political blunder—a weak, and short-sighted resort, unworthy of the wisdom of enlightened legislation.

Behind what pretence can war-makers now retreat? None other than the argument of *unavoidable necessity*. Nothing short of *necessity* will longer justify martial operations, in the estimate of the wise and good; or even in the less important estimate of those who have heretofore been fascinated by the glare of martial renown.

This principle of necessity, the ultimate law of self-defence, it is not within the range of our present undertaking to examine. But we are so confident in the principles of the policy we advocate, that we hesitate not to avow our belief, that this last strong hold of violence will shortly be demolished, and that mankind will learn in its true import, and practice in its true spirit, that much misinterpreted and much neglected command; —“But I say unto you that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.”

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### ARTICLE III.

#### THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REFERENCE TO THE OBJECTS OF PEACE SOCIETIES.

BY FRANCIS FELLOWES, ESQ., HARTFORD.

It is not uncommon to ridicule Societies, which have for their object the abolition of War. Even benevolent and Christian men, who would most heartily rejoice, could such an object be realized, and who perhaps believe that the time is approaching, when the implements of war shall be converted to the uses of peace, are inclined to regard Peace Societies as the result of an excessive refinement of the principle of association for benevolent purposes. What we have to do, in their opin-

ion, is to direct all our efforts to the spreading of the Gospel, to disseminating the principles and diffusing the spirit of Christianity as widely as possible, and the abolition of this horrid custom will follow as a matter of course. They cite in effect, in support of their opinion, the very motto, which some of the Peace Societies have appropriated to themselves. "When the spirit of Christianity shall exert its proper influence over the minds of public men, in their public capacities, war will cease throughout the Christian world." For individuals to think that by associating together they can ever induce nations to come to a universal agreement to adopt some other mode of adjusting national differences, to establish some great tribunal, in whose impartiality all will be willing to confide, and whose decisions to obey, is, in their opinion, utterly vain. But, even suppose such a tribunal *should* be established, and all nations *should* bind themselves in one common league of perpetual amity, agreeing to leave the adjustment of their differences to this great court of international law, where is the guaranty of the treaty to be found? Such a tribunal must sometimes operate with unequal effect; at all events, so many conflicting interests would require to be reconciled, it is not in human nature that its decisions should be final, should be always acquiesced in. In short, there is no ground to expect such a system will ever be adopted; and if it were, it would not work well in practice.

In addition to this form of prejudice, there is another impression respecting the objects of Peace Societies quite prevalent. It is, that the principles of these Societies necessarily involve the unqualified assertion of the doctrine of absolute non-resistance, and of course, deny all right of *defensive* war in any case. Many persons seem to imagine that to co-operate with Peace Societies, they are called upon not only to take a ground which, even on that point, and within that limit, is very questionable; but which, if adopted, is also burdened with *consequences* subversive even of the *judicial* action of society and government, in regard to the employment of *force* and the infliction of punishment. Now,—not to spend time here to show that the denial of the right of defensive war by no means ne-

cessarily involves these consequences,—it is enough for our purpose to say, that the objection rests on an entire misconception. None of the Peace Societies in this country, or on the continent of Europe, have asserted the doctrine of absolute non-resistance. They leave the question for every one's own decision. Without deciding this question, they think there is still broad ground enough for operation, and principles of action and influence sufficiently available. Yet under the impression of the questionable character and subversive consequences of the principles of Peace Societies, combined with the persuasion, to which we first adverted, of the impossibility of ever realizing the practical result of substituting any peaceful mode of adjustment of national differences in place of war,—many persons have declined co-operation with Peace Societies. With a sentiment partaking not a little even of contempt, they consider these societies as pursuing a shadow.

These are views which the writer of this article himself once entertained, and he has heard them expressed, even since he began to write this paper, by those, for whose opinions on subjects which they have really examined, he entertains the most sincere respect.

It is not, however, our purpose at this time to discuss the question concerning absolute non-resistance, nor the question concerning a great international court. On these points there may be different opinions. There is high authority on both sides. Our object is, to see if a broad field does not still remain for the operation of societies, and of individuals, for the abolition of war, and for diffusing among the nations of the earth sentiments of peace and friendship.

It is often said, as we have before remarked, that the promotion of peace must be left to the general diffusion of the spirit of Christianity. The assertion is correct, though not in the sense in which it is intended to be made. It is by diffusing the spirit of Christianity, that this Society expects to accomplish its object. But instead of extending its labours over the whole field of Christian exertion, it proposes to disseminate Christian principles, and to diffuse a Christian spirit on this one subject of peace and war.

The causes of peace and war, it must be universally admitted, lie in the general opinion and feelings of mankind. To enlighten and correct the public mind, and especially to arouse it to such a sense of right and wrong, and of true expediency, that public practice shall be changed,—these are the great points in our enterprise. And has the public mind no need of being enlightened, corrected and aroused ?

Men, in all their relations and intercourse with each other, have ever been backward enough to acknowledge the obligations of justice, humanity and benevolence ; but especially have they been so in their relations and intercourse with each other as nations.

The early oriental monarchies, those first civiliziers of the world, have left enduring and astonishing proofs of their notions of national intercourse. They owed no small part of their stupendous advancement to the spirit of conquest. In the words of a writer,\* who seems to have examined human society in all ages, with a most philosophic eye, “the policy and civilization of these nations was gigantic and disproportionate, their aim was vastness, and their means, *violence* ; the colossal piles of their towers and walls were reared by slaves ; and these slaves were the *vanquished nations, torn up by the roots, and transplanted entire into countries scarcely known to them by report*. Compared to their works, the buildings of the Romans, who possessed a wider empire, and enlarged science, appear like the edifices of individuals eclipsed by the efforts of kings. Their structures are as astonishing, as if the dreams of oriental romance had been realized, and the genii of the elements had been tasked to superhuman exertion by the seal of Solomon, or the talisman of the pre-Adamite kings. The ancient method of war, as it swept along with it the wealth and the population of every conquered country, furnished hands for these works, in the enslaved inhabitants, and funds in their plundered property.” The sentiments of humanity, justice and benevolence were all absorbed in the spirit of conquest, and in the desire of physical grandeur.

\* Douglass on the Advancement of Society in Knowledge and Religion.

If we advert to the ancient Greeks, we meet with many circumstances which, it might naturally be supposed, would have had a mitigating and softening effect upon their international policy. We allude to the passion for beauty, so remarkably developed in this people, to their taste, refinement, extraordinary attainments in the elegant arts, to their poetry, philosophy, eloquence; in short, to whatever has contributed to adorn and render them illustrious in the eyes of all subsequent ages. To beauty of external form, to harmony of sound, to every thing which can please the ear or delight the eye, they were exquisitely sensible. But for moral beauty and harmony, so far as the intercourse of nations was concerned, history compels us to say, they had neither ear nor eye. Maxims of the most terrific import composed their code of international law. "The most refined states among the ancients," says Chancellor Kent,\* "seem to have had no conception of the moral obligations of justice and humanity between nations. They regarded strangers and enemies as nearly synonymous. In the most enlightened ages of the Grecian republics, piracy was regarded as an honorable employment. Even the fleets of polished Athens were exceedingly addicted to piratical excursions. It was the received opinion, that Greeks were bound to no duties, nor by any moral law without compact, and that prisoners taken in war had no rights, and might lawfully be put to death, or sold into perpetual slavery, with their wives and children."

The Romans made some little approach towards a regular system of international law. They were somewhat in advance of the Greeks, in their notions upon the subject of war. Their superiority consisted, however, rather in a regard to the decencies of *form*, than in any improved sentiments of humanity or duty towards other nations, or in any mitigation of the rigorous maxim, that any thing whatever might be lawfully done to an enemy.† The history of the Roman State is little else

\* Commentaries on American Law, Lecture I.

† *Ac belli quidem æquitas sanctissime fetiali populi Romani jure perscripta est. Ex quo intelligi potest, nullum bellum esse justum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante sit et indictum.* .Cic. de Offi.

than the history of wars and conquests. The temple of Janus erected by Numa Pompilius, was shut only once during the period which intervened between his reign and the time of the historian Livy. "Bis deinde post Numæ regnum clausus fuit ; semel T. Manlio consule, post Punicum primum perfectum bellum ; iterum, quod nostræ ætati Dii dederunt, ut videremus, post bellum Actiacum, ab Imperatore Cæsare Augusto, pace terra marique parta."\* So singular was the spectacle, that the historian might well congratulate himself and his contemporaries on being permitted by Divine Providence to witness it. A period of about seven hundred years employed, with one slight interruption, in perpetual war, shows with sufficient clearness, what sentiments of moderation and justice the Romans entertained in their international policy. They made great advances in the arts. A system of municipal jurisprudence was growing up and maturing, from the earliest times of the Republic down to the reign of Justinian, when its multifarious rules were, by his command, embodied and reduced to order ; a system in regard to all that concerns the domestic relations of life, replete with justice and with wisdom. This code is the basis of the municipal laws of almost the whole continent of Europe. English jurists have borrowed largely from its decisions, and its influence upon modern society has been incalculable ; in the language of a distinguished authority,† "no one who peruses it can well avoid the conviction, that it has been the fruitful source of those comprehensive views and solid principles, which have been applied to elevate and adorn the jurisprudence of modern nations."—"I shall go down to posterity," said Napoleon, "with the code in my hand." The Emperor Justinian has come down to posterity with the Roman Law in his hand, and now, when dead, exerts a much wider sway than all his physical greatness and power enabled him to do, when living. Yet, notwithstanding all this progress in the science of law as a rule of civil conduct, the reign and barbarity of ancient ideas on the subject of national relations, seems to have been scarcely

ciiis Lib. I. C. XI. From this it seems, that among the Romans a just war meant one declared in due form.

\* Livii Hist. B. I. Sect. 30.

† Chancellor Kent.

abated. The express doctrine of this refined and enlightened system was, that by the law of nations, *jure gentium*, (by which were meant, not any professed rules of international intercourse, but only certain maxims, in which all nations were agreed,) prisoners of war became the slaves of the captor. It is also declared in the Digests, "that if with any nations we are neither in friendship, hospitality nor treaty, these nations are not indeed enemies; but should any individual from them come into our territory, or any of our citizens go into theirs, they become slaves." We find it difficult to believe, however, that the Romans of the latter days, of the Republic and of the Empire, should have entertained the same harsh, rigid, and inflexible sentiments, as the Romans of earlier times. And though we find the above-mentioned barbarous maxims laid down in form, we can scarcely suppose, that with the softening and refining of the Roman character, they should have always produced their full and unabated effect. If we regard, for a moment, the relation of the Romans to the rest of the world, as masters, and not as equals with other independent nations, we cannot wonder that they had no professed system of international law founded on the obligations of moderation and justice, and on the enlightened views of a refined and liberal policy. To them it belonged to dictate; to others to obey.

The middle ages, it need not be said to those who are acquainted with their history, were a period of universal violence and confusion. "Piracy, rapine, and ferocious warfare deformed the annals of Europe." Foreigners who had suffered the disasters of shipwreck, were exposed to, and in numerous instances actually suffered the still greater disasters of captivity and slavery. Prisoners of war were entirely at the mercy of the conqueror. He might kill them, sell them into slavery or demand the most exorbitant sum for their ransom. According to Mr. Hallam, in his history of the middle ages, it was a common practice, in case of debt owed by a foreigner, and payment delayed or refused, to seize upon the property of some other foreigner of the same nation, to satisfy the demand. Mr. Hallam mentions one instance, in which a foreigner, having

killed an individual of the nation where he was residing, and having fled, some of his countrymen were seized and imprisoned for the crime. The sacred rights of ambassadors, hostages and heralds were violated. Honor and faith between nations were unknown.—In the eleventh century some advancement began to be made towards a better state of things. Certain causes, which now began to operate, are mentioned by writers upon this subject, as having changed very sensibly public sentiment and ameliorated very considerably the usages and practices of nations. Among the most important of these were Christianity, chivalry, commerce, and the study of the civil law. By Christianity, however, we are here to understand rather the influence of a common faith, than the precepts and spirit of the Gospel.—In the beginning of the 16th century, much improvement had been made; but it was as nothing compared with that which remained to be accomplished.

There was as yet no system of the law of nations. The materials for composing a system existed; but they required to be collected, fashioned and arranged. The structure had not yet been reared. No full and concentrated light, either from nature or religion, could then have been made to illuminate it. It was now, that Grotius arose. What Newton was to Modern Astronomy, with some qualification; what Bacon was to the system of Inductive Philosophy, Grotius was to the law of nations. Grotius found the sentiment universally prevalent, not only among the vulgar, but among men of reputed wisdom and learning, that war was a stranger to all justice, and that no commonwealth could be governed without injustice. The saying of Euphemus in Thucydides, he perceived to be in almost every one's mouth, that nothing which was useful was unjust. Many persons, who were friends to justice in *private life*, made no account of it in a *whole nation*, and did not consider it as applicable to *rulers*. He perceived a horrible licentiousness and cruelty in war, throughout the Christian world, of which barbarians might be ashamed. When men took up arms, there was no longer any reverence for law, either human or divine, and it seemed as if some malignant fury was sent



forth into the world, with a general license for the commission of all manner of wickedness and crime.\* Grotius possessed a mind of uncommon natural discernment. To his extraordinary native powers was added an education of the most careful kind. He was conversant with the writings of poets, philosophers and historians of all ages. The sayings of the wise and good, he seems to have treasured up in his memory. His treatise upon the truth of the Christian religion, and his commentaries upon certain parts of the Bible, show him to have been a faithful student of the scriptures, a firm believer in divine revelation, and a warm admirer of the exalted excellence of the Christian religion. His mind was illuminated not only by the light of nature; but also by the clearer light of revealed truth. As he surveyed the principles and practices of nations, he saw how far they were departed from the teachings of nature, the true policy of mankind, and the precepts of Christianity. It must not be supposed, however, that the injustice and inhumanity of nations towards each other have in any age been either entirely and universally unperceived or uncondemned. There always have been those, who from a happy original organization of mind, or some peculiar combination of circumstances, or rather, perhaps, from both these causes united, have risen superior to the times in which they lived.† These men have attained to more extended views of human nature, juster notions of science, maxims of a purer morality and more exalted virtue; and through them the voice of nature and of truth has sometimes spoken, though it has not been till long after listened to and obeyed. To recite their names would only be to recite the names of the most illustrious of the wise and good. To collect and concentrate the rays of light scattered throughout their works, to exhibit their unanimity of sentiment in favor of justice and humanity, as evidence of the true sentiment of nature, to arrange in method, undigested rules and

\* *Proleg. De Jur. Bel.* as cited by Ch. Kent, Comment. on Am. Law, Lec. I.

† *Atque idem ego contendo, cum ad naturam eximiam atque illustrem accesserit ratio quædam confirmatioque doctrinæ; tum illud nescio quid præclarum ac singulare solere existere. Cicero pro Archia poeta.*

precedents, and thus to erect the edifice of international jurisprudence, was the design of Grotius, which he accomplished in his masterly work upon the rights of nations in peace and war; a work whose influence upon society, in diminishing the causes of war, mitigating its severity, and uniting nations together by a stronger sense of justice, establishing their mutual rights upon a more substantial basis, and giving a more definite shape to their relations towards each other, cannot be computed. The arguments of those, who are for waiting, until the precepts of the Gospel shall have had time to produce their appropriate effect, come too late. They should have been addressed to Grotius. More than two hundred years ago, when he, resolving to do something to mitigate the horrors of war, and promote the interests of peace, had conceived the plan of his immortal work, and was about putting his hand to the task of its execution, it should have been arrested and stayed by the prudent counsels and tender remonstrances of these sage advisers: 'Trouble not yourself with this matter. There is some disorder here it is true. There are some great errors prevalent; much that is wrong, both in theory and in practice. We sincerely lament the barbarities and cruelties of war. We should most heartily rejoice to see mankind living together more like brethren, and understanding better their true interests. Our eyes are often pained with the spectacle of their selfish animosities, and our hearts made to bleed at the recital of their inhuman cruelties; but we have one consolation, one cheering source of hope in the promise of the universal diffusion of the Gospel. When the happy period shall arrive, in which men shall beat their spears into pruning hooks, and their swords into ploughshares, and learn war no more, then all these disorders will be regulated, these errors removed, these cruelties and animosities softened down into the peaceful sentiments of harmony and love. What you are about to do, is indeed innocent, but it is all in vain. It will be like a dream when one awaketh. Leave this work therefore to be accomplished by the universal diffusion of the Gospel.

Since the time of Grotius, the science of international law has been in a state of almost constant progression. The impulse which he imparted, set in motion a series of improvements, which reaches down to the present time. He was followed by several writers, who explained his meaning, carried out his principles, and contributed much to give a moral sanction to the authority of this law. Tribunals have been erected, to which are referred for decision the multifarious questions arising out of commercial intercourse and maritime trade. Within the last thirty years, judgments have been pronounced by a single Judge of one of these courts, to which Mr. Justice Story declares, that, "in his deliberate opinion, the world is more indebted for a practical exposition of the law of nations, upon the eternal principles of justice and reason, than to all the jurists of all former ages."\* Nations, in their intercourse with each other, can now appeal to established authorities upon almost any point, which may come into dispute, which, to disregard, would be consistent neither with their interests nor their honor. How much has thus been achieved, to diminish the causes and remove the barbarities of war, it is not difficult to perceive.

It may be asked, what remains to be done? International Law is now a highly cultivated science. The mutual rights and reciprocal duties of nations are now pretty well defined and understood. What remains to be done? We answer, it remains to persuade mankind to reduce this science to a much more complete and universal practice. It remains to give to the world full and convincing illustrations of the meaning of the rules, which have been laid down, by which to determine the lawfulness or unlawfulness of declaring war. They are two. War may be declared when necessary for self-defence. Let this rule be made the subject of the strictest scrutiny. What is the import of the word, necessity? Does it mean a fear of future attack, or an alarming apprehension of the increasing strength of some foreign power, or an actual beginning, either

\* Story's Inaugural Discourse, p. 50. The Judge here referred to by Mr. Story, is Lord Stowell, late Sir William Scott.

in preparation or in fact, of hostile operations? And besides, have we a right to create this necessity, by inviting or exciting aggression? Have we, by cultivating the arts of peace, increasing our resources, maintaining the strictest justice and good faith in our intercourse with other nations, done all that we could to place ourselves in an attitude of such moral power, as to intimidate aggression? And the other rule; War should never be declared, until all other means of redress have been faithfully tried; nor then, unless the conditions of peace are more rigorous and severe than war itself. Let this rule be made the subject of the most lucid exposition. Let it be fully shown what it means to try *faithfully* all other means of redress, whether it means to pass minatory resolutions, to send threatening messages, to recall, by sudden despatches, ministers resident at the court of the offending nation, to endeavour to overreach by some diplomatic manœuvre; or in the most calm and dispassionate manner, and in a spirit of friendship and conciliation, to state frankly our grievances, and appeal to the honour and justice of the other party. Let it be also shown, what are *all other* means of redress. And the other clause of the rule; nor then unless the conditions of peace are more rigorous and severe than war itself; let it be most clearly shown, by a full exhibition of all the horrors of war, so far as it is in the power of the pen or the tongue of man to do it, what are the rigors of its conditions, that by contrasting them with the conditions of peace, it may be more readily decided whether or not the case falls within the rule. And again, is an appeal to arms for redress an appeal to the God of hosts, or an appeal to mere brutal force?\*

\* Offences against the law of nations, says Sir William Blackstone, can rarely be the object of the criminal law of any particular state. For offences against this law are principally incident to whole states or nations; in which case recourse can only be had to war; which is an *appeal to the God of hosts*, to punish such infractions of public faith, as are committed by one independent people against another: neither state having any superior jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice. Com. on the Laws of Eng. B. IV. ch. 5. War, to use the language of Lord Bacon, says Chancellor Kent, and he seems to appropriate the sentiment to himself, is one of the highest trials of right;

Lastly, it remains to urge upon nations *perpetually*, in the words of Dr. Chalmers, quoted now not for the first time, but which never can be quoted too often, "with irresistible argument that the Christian ethics of a nation is as one with the Christian ethics of the humblest individual."

The sketch which we have given of the progress of international law, shows that within the last two centuries, much has been gained. The history of the past is rich in omens for the future. Let it serve to encourage and direct us in a course of advancement. What has been accomplished, has been accomplished by a two-fold mode of operation. Christianity combined with other causes has exerted a general influence upon international intercourse, and direct means have been used for establishing and improving the rules of this intercourse. It has not been by the general influence of Christianity alone, nor by the general influence of any other causes. Doubtless there is an intimate relationship between all the great objects of Christian effort and enterprise. As in the entire circle of the sciences, so in the entire circle of the moral interests of mankind, no one department can be cultivated and improved without affecting more or less remotely all the others. Yet, each individually requires its own peculiar culture. No man would think of saying in regard to any one of the sciences, cultivate all the other sciences and this will take care of itself, or diffuse the principles of science generally, and you will have done all that needs to be done. No, it is not thus, that advancement is to be made. It is not thus that the condition of society is to be changed by the power of the Gospel. It must be made to bear directly and with irresistible force upon every department of human conduct. The voice of the past to the present is, use *direct efforts* for strengthen-

for, as princes and states acknowledge no superior upon earth, they put themselves upon *the justice of God* by an appeal to arms. Kent's Com. on Am. Law, vol. I. Lec. 3. Quere, had these eminent jurists ever examined the grounds on which this opinion rests? Could they have shown the distinction between public war as a trial of right, and the famous modes of trial by ordeal and by wager of battle?

ing the bonds which unite together the great society of nations, that war may be abolished from the earth. Let us obey the voice of the past. But let not the work of promoting peace be confined to jurists, judges and statesmen. Let every Christian and every benevolent man, whose time and talents and influence are not entirely engrossed with other great interests of humanity, come in for a share of the blessing promised to those who shall be makers of peace. It is not a hopeless work in which we are engaged. For more than two hundred years, the slave trade was esteemed by the powers of Europe a legal commerce, and sustained as such by their legal tribunals. But did not the British Parliament, by a series of acts beginning at 1807 and terminating at 1824, raise their voice against it, and at each successive time louder than before, until at last they declared it piracy? Did not the British government, in the treaty of Paris in 1814, stipulate with the king of France that he should declare the trade illegal, decree its abolition, so far as his authority would go, and use his influence at the approaching congress of the European powers, to induce them also to decree its suppression? And in 1815, did not the chief powers of Europe, assembled by their ministers, at the Congress of Vienna, "solemnly declare in the face of Europe and the world, that the African slave trade had been regarded by just and enlightened men in all ages, as repugnant to the principles of humanity, and of universal morality, and that the public voice in all civilized countries demanded that it should be suppressed, and that the universal abolition of it was conformable to the spirit of the age, and to the generous principles of the allied powers?" The efforts of England did not stop here. In 1826, we find her stipulating with Brazil, that it should be piracy for any of the subjects of the latter power to engage in this trade after 1830.—We behold here an extraordinary spectacle, a nation exerting itself in its national capacity, in the great cause of humanity. Are not this waking up of Britain to the enormities of the slave trade, and the subsequent efforts made for its suppression, to be ascribed mainly to the zeal, and the action of British philanthropists, *directed to-*

*wards the accomplishment of this one object? If similar efforts should be made, why may not the nations of Europe and America, be awakened to such a sense of the enormities of war, that at some future congress they shall solemnly declare in the face of Europe and the world, that the custom of public war has been regarded by just and enlightened men in all ages, as repugnant to the principles of humanity, and of universal morality, and that the public voice in all civilized countries demands that it shall be suppressed, and that the universal abolition of it is conformable to the spirit of the age, and to the generous principles of the powers in this congress assembled?*

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ARTICLE IV.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

BY THE EDITOR.

- 1.—*Essays on the Principles of Morality, and on the Private and Political Rights and Obligations of Mankind. By Jonathan Dymond. With a Preface by the Rev. George Bush. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1834. pp. 432.*

THE author of this work was a member of the society of Friends, and a tradesman at Exeter, in the south western part of England, where he died at an early age, in the spring of 1828. He was already known to the public by an "Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity." The present work was published after his death, and has passed through two editions in England. We recollect to have read an interesting notice of it three years ago in the Quarterly Review; a recent examination of the work itself has confirmed and increased the favorable impression we then received of its merit and value. We rejoice that an American edition has been brought out. It is a work which deserves, and we trust will secure, an extensive circulation and a thorough perusal. We heartily agree with the judgment of the Quarterly Review, Jan. 1831, that "the present work is one which the society (the Friends) may well consider it an honor to have produced; it is, indeed, a book of such ability, and so excellently intended, as well as executed, that even those who differ most widely, as we must do, from some of its conclusions, must regard the writer with the greatest respect, and look upon his death as a public loss."