

ERRATA SHEET

M I T C

4 Nov. 1947

Def. Doc. 2686, Affidavit of YAMAMOTO, Kumaichi:

Page 1, Para. numbered 1, Line 3 and 4, "since October 1941" should read:

"since last decade of October 1941"

" 1, " " 2, " 5, "namely, the explanation and adjustment"
should read:
"namely, the preparation, explanation, and
adjustment,"

" 1, " " 2, " 6, "the documents concerned, etc."
should read:
"the materials concerned, etc."

" 1, " " 2, " 15 and 16, "by the General Headquarters,"
should read:
"by the Supreme Command, and"

Def. Doc. 2686
(Muto)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: YAMAMOTO Kumaichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was Chief of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Foreign Office since September 1940 (15th year of Showa) and had concurrently held the post of Chief of the American Affairs Bureau since October 1941. Consequently, I had kept in close touch with MUTO and OKA, Chiefs of the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Ministries of the Army and Navy, who had been concerned deeply with the negotiations between Japan and America. Not only that, I had had many chances, through the Liaison Conferences between the Government and the Imperial General Headquarters, to meet these two persons who were both secretaries of the Conference, to which I usually presented myself as a sort of liaison secretary for the Foreign Office. Accordingly, I can say that I am one of those who are well acquainted with the fact that both MUTO and OKA had always exerted their utmost efforts for the success of the negotiations between Japan and America.

HOSHINO, after his appointment as Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, was also one of the secretaries of the Conference, but as regards the negotiations, he had very little connection with me, owing to the nature of his duties.

2. I will explain further the duties of the secretary for the Liaison Conference between the Government and the General Headquarters:

The secretary took charge of the clerical work in the Conference, namely, the explanation and adjustment of the draft as well as the collection of the documents concerned, etc.

By preparation of the draft, I mean preparation for submitting the draft which had been studied and prepared by others on various matters which were deemed necessary to be submitted to the Conference.

The draft was not written by the secretary himself. It was to be written by the proper authorities in the Government or the General Headquarters, respectively, through the ordinary business routine. For instance, the draft on military matters was to be done by the Ministry of the Army or Navy or by the General Headquarters, and that on diplomatic matters would be prepared by the Foreign Office, and those concerned with the resources and productions were done by the Planning Board. To collect and submit and distribute these drafts to the Conference is what is meant by "preparation" --.

The adjustment of the draft means to adjust the proposed draft after various amendments, as there had usually been active exchange of opinions in the Conference.

The decision of the Conference was not made by a simple majority. The discussion was continued until all views of the members present were completely agreed, and after that all the members present signed the draft decided upon.

As I stated before, the secretary did not attend the Conference as one of the members, but as a clerical official; so that neither HOSHINO, MUTO nor OKA had any right to express their opinions, to vote, nor had they the right to sign the document.

3. Premier TOJO declared, at the beginning of the Conference which was opened immediately after the formation of the TOJO Cabinet, that "the new Cabinet will reconsider the Japan-American negotiations entirely on a clean slate, freed from the decision on September 6", and since then careful studies were continued. In the meantime, MUTO, Chief of the Bureau, always wished the negotiations to reach a satisfactory agreement, and he had considerable anxiety in adjusting and softening the strong opinion of some military group which was too prone to be involved in the war.

Especially in November 1941, on the preparation of the A and B drafts which were submitted to America from Japan, a strong opinion was expressed from a certain group of the Supreme Command of the Army. I heard from MUTO, however, that he succeeded with difficulty in bringing about a modification of these strong opinions.

In dealing with daily routine functions, MUTO as well as OKA had to get the approval from the Supreme Command, in addition to the consent of their senior officers. They seemed to have had internal hardships, unknown to persons outside the Ministries. On this point, I feel most strongly in the case of MUTO. At any rate, MUTO's enthusiastic efforts in avoiding war are still deeply impressed on me.

4. The Japanese draft which was decided upon on November 5 was such that it was deemed to be most fair under the political, economic and military situation in Japan at the time, and, in Japan's view, it was a draft which conceded the utmost, so we had expected and heartily wished that the peace would be brought about by understanding and compromise on the part of America.

In the middle part of November, when it was reported from Ambassador NOMURA that President Roosevelt proposed to offer his good offices between Japan and China, we recognized a ray of hope for the future and I, together with the two Chiefs, was heartily glad and was busily engaged in making preparations in the event of an agreement's being concluded. The memory of this situation is still very clear in my mind.

At that time, there had been a clear understanding between the Government and the Supreme Command that if the Japan-American negotiations should be concluded, the emergency measures which had been taken would be cancelled and the situation would be restored to a normal condition. I remember it was in the middle of November that both Chiefs of Bureaus told me that although an in-

struction had already been issued to the dispatched troops, simultaneously with the conclusion of the negotiations, all emergency measures should be immediately stopped. They were making their best efforts in avoiding any fault in this respect, as this was a most difficult work to be smoothly carried through.

On this 27th day of March, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: YAMAMOTO Kumaichi (Seal)

I, HARA Seiji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: /s/ HARA Seiji (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

YAMAMOTO Kumaichi (seal)