

**STAHMER, Heinrich.**

**Request by: SHIRATORI, Toshio**

**Nationality: German.**

**Address: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo.**

(1)

STAHMER, Heinrich.

Request by: Shiratori, Toshio

Nationality: German

Address: Sugamo Prison, Tokyo.

*STAMMER Henrich Georg*  
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*Request by OSHIMI, Hiroshi*  
**Request by: OSHIMI, Hiroshi**  
**Nationality: German.**

*Address: In custody in SUGAMO Prison.*  
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*This witness was Ambassador to Japan 1943-1945.*  
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**Liaison between Von Ribbentrop and Oshima 1938 to 1941.**

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(4)

STAMMER, Heinrich Georg.

Request by: OSHIMI, Hiroshi

Nationality: German.

Address: In custody in Sugamo prison

This witness was Ambassador to Japan 1943-1945. Liaison between Von Ribbentrop and Oshima 1938 to 1941.

STAHMER, Henrich Georg - Presently in Sugamo Prison J. Curtis

Request by OSHIMA, Hiroshi

21 March 1947

- (a) The nationality of the witness is German.
- (b) Ambassador to Japan 1943 - 1945, Liaison between von Ribbentrop and Oshima 1938 to 1941. Witness will testify to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact, his special mission in Japan, the Pearl Harbor surprise, the circumstances of the conferences reported by Paul Schmidt.

is contained in the files of  
by OSHIMA  
insular.

1 April 1947

according to Nippon Times of recent date  
virtually was released for repatriation  
and see memo of S. H. Wilboughby  
# B. H., G. S. O. Asst C of S, G-2,  
of 4 Feb 47  
for present address

Report By: Lt. J. Curtis

11 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Arthur A. Sandusky, Chief, Document Division  
Mr. G. O. Hyde  
Colonel Fixel

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

A personal Case File, No. 244, is contained in the files of  
IPS on STAHMER, Heinrich, a German witness, requested by OSHIMA  
and SHIRATORI. He is reported to be in ATAMI, Izu Peninsular.

DOUGLAS L. WALDORF  
Chief, Investigation Division  
IPS

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3747

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

24500

\* The witness stated that Berghof was a house where Hitler lived, near Bertchesgaden. He did not know if Ribbentrop called OSHIMA from Berghof on August 21, 1939. He did not know whether on August 22, Weizsaecker conferred with OSHIMA on the non-aggression Pact. He only knew that he got the order and forgot the date, to tell OSHIMA that the non-aggression Agreement was signed. He had nothing more to do with the whole thing.

24501

He did not know that on the night of August 22 there was a discussion in which Weizsaecker explained the reasons for the Pact and OSHIMA his objections, at the end of which OSHIMA assured Weizsaecker of his unchanged intention to keep on working for friendship notwithstanding the pact. He did not hear of the matter. He could not remember if there was any other instance shortly after the Pact in which OSHIMA assured that he would work for improving German-Japanese relations. The witness was then in Salzburg.

24502

\* It is possible that on or prior to August 28 OSHIMA spoke to the witness about Premier ABE, and stated that he and ABE had served on the general staff and that ABE had been an attache in Berlin. However, he could not remember because of the time lapse. It is possible that OSHIMA advised that ABE would be more favorable than HIRANUMA, but he could not remember. He could not recall having a conversation with OSHIMA about the new cabinet.

24503

He could not remember that OSHIMA had told him the press was returning to reason, and not to take the press articles too seriously. \* He did not remember that OSHIMA told him that he was working with all his power to maintain and improve Japanese-German relations. He had a feeling that OSHIMA was still a friend of Germany. The only thing he remembered was the farewell given by Ribbentrop where there were short, formal speeches exchanged.

24504

\* He identified as his signature the signature on Exhibit No. 2476. This exhibit, a note written by Stahmer to Weizsaecker, August 28, 1939, stated that

24505

\* OSHIMA had told him about the new Prime Minister. He had stated that ABE was 64 years old, with an excellent military career, and had served with OSHIMA on the general staff. He had belonged for a long period as a captain to a German military regiment in Thorn, and was acting as military attache in Berlin.

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

ABE was a personal friend of OSHIMA, who considered him more favorable as Premier than HIRANUMA. OSHIMA would get information about the other members of the cabinet named up to now and will inform him. He further felt that the Japanese press was gradually returning to reason, and asked that they not take the articles too seriously and that he was working with all his powers on maintaining and improving German-Japanese relations.

He did not remember that Ribbentrop was advised before August 26 that although the Japanese Army was hard hit by the German-Russian Pact, the Japanese Army leader was working for a Japan- alliance.

Exhibit No. 2746 was not a telegram, but only a memorandum note. The witness did not remember if he dictated it. Normally he let his secretary write them, after giving him short indications of what to write, and then signed it. The information in the memo to Weizsaecker was furnished by the witness.

24507

He did not know whether Ribbentrop was advised on August 26, 1939, that the Army was striving for a change of Cabinet in the direction of closer relations with Germany, and that they were waiting \* for concrete German proposals. It was possible that there was a suggestion made by Ribbentrop to Ott and MATSUOKA that the German Army issue an early declaration of sympathy for the Japanese Army to strengthen the pro-German army policy, but he did not see the telegram. He was not told of the fact. However, he could not say that such a telegram did not exist, but only that he did not know of it. He could not remember that he was told about it.

24508

He did not remember any conference in September 1939 between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA at which Ribbentrop stated that close cooperation between the Axis was not dead, and OSHIMA agreed. However, he remembered that Ribbentrop told him at that time the cooperation between Japan, Germany, and Italy, \* must go on and be strengthened. It is possible he was told that OSHIMA agreed, but he could not recollect it.



June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

- 24509 \* When asked whether Ribbentrop considered it of great importance for his policy that OSHIMA remain as Ambassador and whether OSHIMA enjoyed the complete confidence of Hitler and the German Army, the witness stated he always had the impression that Ribbentrop liked OSHIMA, and he heard that Hitler did too. He did not know of his position with the German Army, but believed he was on good terms with them. He remembered once that Ribbentrop told him that it was very bad, and that he was very sorry that OSHIMA had to leave.
- 24510 \* He did not recall that Ribbentrop had stated that it was of great importance for the policy he had in mind that OSHIMA remain as Ambassador. He had the impression that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were always working to keep up and better Japanese-German relations, but he did not have the idea that they were going to work for an alliance. He did not have access to German Foreign Office files. He only got some telegrams from Ribbentrop when he had to work.
- 24511 With respect to the Red Cross mission, Ribbentrop told the witness in January, 1940, \* that at first the general manager of I.G. should be sent, but he believed it wrong. Later he stated the Duke of Koburg had to go. He did not know if this were Ribbentrop's or Hitler's idea. He asked the witness because he had worked with Koburg, and the witness believed that it was a good idea because Koburg had been both in Japan and the U. S. The witness received the order to accompany the Duke because they had worked together since 1935, and the Duke asked Ribbentrop to give permission for Stahmer to accompany him. Of course, Ribbentrop recommended and selected the witness and gave the order to accompany him.
- 24512 Ribbentrop was his immediate superior. \* The Duke was then not too old a man, around 57 or 58. The witness was not then the political and diplomatic adviser to Ribbentrop. He had not been Ribbentrop's main adviser in policy and diplomacy for several years. He was not then an adviser. He was an employee who worked with and under him.
- 24513 \* When asked to describe the character of his employment, he stated he received an order from Ribbentrop, for instance, to become liaison man with OSHIMA, and then had to fill out his work. An adviser is one who tells his superior how to do things, and who makes diplomatic and political proposals, but the witness never did.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite  
STAHMER - Cross

Page 3750

Page

24514 The witness was sent by Ribbentrop on diplomatic missions to Italy, England, France, twice to Hungary, and then to Japan and the U. S. On the trip the witness had no political order, except to use the opportunity to see how the situation in Japan was. \* He would not call that a political order, but this is a difference in opinion.

The trip to Japan was absolutely secondary. The only important thing was the trip to the U. S., and they wanted to do everything to keep up friendship with the Red Cross because there was no other way to travel via Siberia. They used the opportunity especially to congratulate the Emperor of Japan on the 2600th anniversary to avoid a special commission.

24515 The political purpose was not to lay the groundwork for future commissions. He had no idea or order to lay any groundwork in Japan. He still believed that the trip to the U. S. \* could not be called political because they avoided everything which could be used for political propaganda, or would give the impression of political work. They went so far as to refuse money offered for the German Red Cross, to avoid giving the impression of collecting money.

24516 At the time, he did not hear that Ribbentrop had advised Ott that OSHIMA, after his return, would do further work and that Ribbentrop requested that the Embassy facilities be extended to OSHIMA for transmitting in code, telegrams from OSHIMA to Ribbentrop. He had, however, read about it later in the documents of the Embassy when he took over. He had studied a few of the old files. He had not selected those he would read and leave others out, \* but he was very interested in and had the right to use telegrams and ciphers. This was the reason for study. He did not have time to study all the old files. For recreation, he took some files out for the period before the 1914 War. His secretary could state what he studied or not. He studied these old files as a sort of recreation, but he did not study all the files from 1938 to 1943. He only took out what was needed for immediate work. \* He studied these files when he took over the Embassy in 1943 or 1944.

24519

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

When asked whether his political purpose in coming to Japan included interviews with OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, he stated he wanted to see them because he knew them in Berlin, but he was very careful about a political interview. He had two reasons. First, the situation between the countries at that time was not good, and there was no possibility of making progress. Second, he did not want to trouble the Embassy work and to make more difficult the Ambassador's job.

24520 He examined the documents after he became Ambassador. He did not study the non-aggression pact documents \* at that time, because two years before war had broken out between Russia and Germany, and these were of no interest for his daily work.

24521 \* He stated he was not bending every effort in 1943 to bring Japan into war with Russia. He did not remember one conversation in that line, because that had failed completely prior to his time, and he knew there was no possibility, even if he would have liked it, to have Japan get into war with Russia. He had never received an order from Berlin to work along that line, and he did not believe it necessary to study the documents for this purpose. He knew the large events, and the only important thing was the daily situation.

24522 In 1940 he could not recall discussing political matters with OSHIMA and SHIRATORI. \* They talked over the general situation, and he told them about the war in Germany and about many friends OSHIMA had in Germany. As he recalled, they were never alone.

With respect to exhibit No. 511, in which the witness had stated that he found OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, and TERAUCHI in an unchanged friendly attitude and ready for every support, the witness stated that he regarded the conversation as a general one, and of course these three men were always regarded as pro-German. What he called a political conversation was one about a serious political problem or plans. The report he made in the telegram was a combination of everything he heard from the Japanese he knew, the German Embassy, and German journalists.

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite  
STAHMER - CrossPage

- 24523 \* Ribbentrop's policy of an alliance with Japan was of vital concern to Germany at the time. They then saw only a small possibility, but the idea was most important. OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had exactly the same idea as the German side had, that an alliance would be very favorable. He did not know what support means, but he had the idea that they had the same idea as Germany and wanted to go on and help and that the alliance could be made later.
- 24524 When asked whether he discussed political matters with other persons, he said once on the first meeting \* when TERAUCHI was present and other people, OSHIMA and SHIRATORI took part in the conversation. When asked whether TERAUCHI was sent to Germany by the Japanese Army, he said he knew he was sent to Italy as sort of a commission and later came to Germany.
- 24525 When asked whether this was on conclusion of the non-aggression pact, \* he stated he must have been in Italy or Europe beforehand. On his second trip in May 1940, he saw more people and discussed with them political, military, naval and economic matters of Japanese life. There were many high officials present at the Embassy, because that congratulatory mission of the Duke of Koburg. Col. Meissinger arrived not at this time, but about a year later. Von Duerkheim was in Japan in 1938. \* He returned to Germany for a short time, but was already in Japan when the witness arrived. Helffrich, president of the Hamburg-American Shipping Lines, had already been in Japan before the witness came. This was when he came for the purpose of obtaining close cooperation with Japanese economic circles. He was probably here in the beginning of 1940. He believed Schultze, a leader in the Hitler Youth Movement, arrived in Japan in 1937 or 1938.
- 24526
- 24527 In July, 1940, the witness was a Consul-General. When the YONAI Cabinet fell, the witness was not in Japan, \* and had no connection with any member of the Japanese Cabinet. When asked whether he did not fear that the YONAI Cabinet would improve Japanese relations with the U. S. and Britain and therefore desired that it be replaced by one more favorable to Germany, he stated he would have liked to have the YONAI Cabinet replaced with a more favorable one. It is possible he had expressed the hope that it would be replaced by a government under KONOYE, \* or a group deemed more friendly to Germany. He, however, did not remember when.
- 24528

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3753

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE- Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite

STAHMER - Cross

Page

When asked whether, in June, 1946, Ott did not advocate Japanese negotiation of FIC in the German interests and stated that Japan's failure to accept responsibility for such a decision would probably result in replacing the cabinet by one close to Germany, the witness stated he did not know that telegram because he was away on leave and did not return to Berlin until the second half of June. He did not review the files of the Foreign Office, and could not without special permission.

24529

\* When asked whether he arrived in Japan on August 23, 1940, he stated he arrived in Tokyo on September 7, 1940, with his wife. He did not arrive in Japan on August 23. He came directly via Manchukuo to Tokyo without any interruption or stay. He could not say when he arrived in Manchukuo. On August 23 he must have been in Moscow or Berlin.

24530

As far as he remembered, on the second negotiation around September 9, MATSUOKA had a short draft of the treaty and a sort of preamble. He had not heard from MATSUOKA or any other about the action taken by the Four Ministers' Conference prior to his arrival on the proposed alliance. \* He did not know that.

24531

The witness knew nothing about the revision proposed by MATSUOKA as early as September 4. MATSUOKA did not tell him, and did not tell him that they had meetings beforehand. He could not remember when the decision was reached that he be sent to Japan, which must have been about the 15th of August, because he had to take his visa quickly and a plane to Moscow. He did not know what Ribbentrop had heard from Japan which led to such a hasty decision. He only stated he could not get a clear picture because the telegrams \* from the German Embassy and the communication of KURUSU were so unclear that he did not know the actual situation, and believed it necessary for the witness to go over and find out.

When MATSUOKA asked him after they talked over the whole situation what would be the best thing to do, the witness told him that it would be to make an alliance and a defensive alliance and to go together. It is possible that he urged that it be done quickly, but that has another reason.

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V. - Pacific - Tripartite

STAHMER - Cross

Page

24532 KURUSU, in Berlin, had asked him how long he wanted to stay in Tokyo, but the witness did not know what to say and had said \* maybe three or four weeks. He cabled this to Tokyo, and this was the reason that MATSUOKA believed it must be done quickly. He told the witness that later. The witness did not tell him that it was so very necessary. It is possible that he said that this was the time to do it, but he did not remember his wording.

When asked whether he stated that Germany was taking a long view of the war, including one against America, and that it would go on for tens of years, he stated he told MATSUOKA Germany must be prepared for a long war against France and England, and they wanted to do everything to keep the U. S. out of the war.

24534 He did not make the statement referred to so far as the U. S. was concerned, and he could not remember if he had said he knew the war would probably go on. \* It is possible that on September 9 he made a request that Japan come into the Axis quickly before the war against England closed. He did not remember the wording, but he told MATSUOKA that if an alliance were contemplated with Germany it must be done quickly before the English war was finished, otherwise it would be of no help for the Japanese political situation.

24535 \* So far as he remembered, he had said that Germany must be prepared for a long war. It might go on for years. He then emphasized that the U. S. must be kept out and that they needed to make a platform for a coming peace. MATSUOKA stated he had repeated this to his Prime Minister. The witness had said that the war in which Germany was then involved would probably be very long.

24536 When asked whether he expected the war with England to be over quickly or whether he expected a long war, the witness stated that they had had a long discussion for two hours. The witness had explained the German views of the world situation, and told MATSUOKA that it may be possible \* Germany will attack England and the war ended very soon. In that case it would be good for Japan if she intended to make an agreement with Germany to do it then. However, he had said that they did not know that and must be prepared for a war which would last many years, and to avoid it the only way was to keep the U. S. out and make a platform for a coming peace.

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact.

STAHMER - Cross

Page

24537 He did not remember the exact words. He had merely stated that they must be prepared for a very long struggle. He did not know whether he used England or Anglo-Saxon. He really could not remember, but did remember definitely that it was most important to keep the U. S. out. It is possible that he had said that Germany, Italy, and Japan, should stand together knitted closely \* until the great aim was achieved.

When asked whether the aim was the conquering of the democratic nations, as stated in "Mein Kampf" he stated he had only in mind the victory and not an attack on different countries.

24538 He had \* told MATSUOKA at the time that Germany did not want Japanese military assistance in the war in Europe. He did not remember whether they said they did not want it at this moment. He only wanted to tell him that they did not want Japan's military help now.

24539 It is possible that in November, 1940, KURUSU stated to Weizsaecker that a Russo-Japanese neutrality pact and peace between Japan and China were needed for Japan to advance through the regions south of China, including Siam, without which \* Singapore could hardly be brought to a fall. He, however, was never present at the conversation and did not get a memorandum of the meeting, and Weizsaecker did not talk to him about it. He heard nothing about contemplated assistance from Japan to Germany in the war against England at that time. He had been rather ill, and did not work since December, 1940. The only order he then had was to accompany MATSUOKA when in Germany. He then went on sick leave to Italy, immediately after MATSUOKA left him, till the end of June.

24540 In the conference with MATSUOKA on September 9, he had stated that Germany was willing to acknowledge Japan's position in East Asia and were willing to help the economic and industrial line, and they hoped to get raw materials from Japan, \* and this would develop a healthy economic situation later. It is possible that this offer extended to a promise to immediately furnish Japan with materials for war and technicians, but he did not remember how far they went into details. The general idea that he told him was that Japan was a country with undeveloped industry, while Germany was highly developed.

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

Germany was willing to help develop Japan's industry and receive raw materials against it. It was not his idea in building Japan's industry to supply her with planes, tanks, and war tools, but he knew that even in war-time Germany sold a lot of arms and munitions to other countries, including neutrals.

24541 When he had promised cooperation, \* he had no idea in assisting in the expansion idea in Japan. He only wanted to create a better economic situation. He had not meant by it a better economic situation which would be acquired by force. This is why he had hoped to MATSUOKA that a military attack in Indo-China while Stahmer was in Japan could be avoided.

24542 \*MATSUOKA had told him during the negotiations that the Japanese Army would march into north FIC within three days if France did not accept her demands. He said that if the governor-general did not accept the ultimatum, the army would march in three days. He wanted Stahmer's help in avoiding that. It was around September 20. It is possible that it had been requested about August 15 to assist the Japanese in bringing the French to terms, but this was before the witness' arrival. The witness requested Ribbentrop to bring pressure on the French to accede to Japanese demands. He sent a telegram implying that hostilities could be avoided. \* MATSUOKA told him and it helped a lot, and he was glad that no incident happened.

24543

When asked how he could explain the statement in his affidavit that OSHIMA took no personal stand on any controversial issues, when the Ciano diary showed that OSHIMA acted with SHIRATORI to bring about a fall of the cabinet by resignation unless Japan agreed to a military treaty without reservations, the witness stated that OSHIMA told him nothing about these ideas and he did not see SHIRATORI at the time. He was always impressed that OSHIMA was very cautious and always based his talks on telegrams from home. On several occasions when the witness asked OSHIMA's personal opinion or his government's views, \* he stated he did not know and must ask. He could not explain the difference between the diary and his statement. He only knew what and how he talked with OSHIMA. He had read some parts of the Ciano Diary, but not all.

24544



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3757

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite

STAHMER - Cross

Page

24545 When asked how he could explain the inconsistency between his statement and the telegram from Ribbentrop of April 26, 1939, which showed that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had refused to present the instructions received from Japan on the Tripartite Pact and declared that they would resign, the witness stated \* he could not explain the difference, but could only repeat that OSHIMA did not tell him these things. He had heard later that OSHIMA had difficulties with his government, and he was not present when he had such conversations with Ribbentrop. He was not asked about it and was not shown the telegram.

24546 \* He stated he could not explain the inconsistency between his statement and Ribbentrop's telegram to Ott in which Ribbentrop stated that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI had said that the Japanese modified proposal was impossible. Asked how he explained the inconsistency between this statement and exhibit No. 2230, a confidential conversation between OSHIMA and Ribbentrop in which OSHIMA stated that he officially refused to pass to Germany ARITA's instructions that Japan wished to reserve entrance into a state of war in the European conflict, \* he stated he did not know the document and did not know the fact.

24547 When asked how he could explain the inconsistency with exhibit No. 506, a memo of Weizsaecker, September 18, 1939, showing that OSHIMA disobeyed his government's instructions by postponing delivery of Japan's protest until September 18, the witness stated he did not know the fact. \* Likewise, he did not know exhibit No. 587, the telegram from Ribbentrop to Ott of June 28, 1941, in which Ribbentrop stated he had an agreement with OSHIMA that the latter would influence Japan toward supplying military action against Russia.

24548 The proposal made by SHIGEMITSU to take Russia out of the war with Germany by compromise was made in the second half of August. The statement in his affidavit that the conference of July 8, 1940, between SATO, KURUSU, the witness and Ribbentrop, was no conference, and he could not recall that they discussed matters of the French and Dutch East Asia colonies and Germany's interests in the Pacific, was correct. He recalled practically nothing that was talked about. He was present, \* but sat aside. He said it was not a conference because it was not planned as such, and was no conference.

24549

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3758

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Cross

Page

SATO was not on any official mission in Germany, and he was announced as a foreigner of distinction, and KURUSU had asked that he prepare a courtesy call of SATO to the German ambassador.

Attention of the Tribunal was called to exhibit No. 522.

24550 \* German troops marched into Austria on March 12, 1938. On October 1, 1938 they marched into the Sudetenland. On March 15, 1939, they began the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

When asked whether on April 16, 1939, there was a conference between Goering, Mussolini, and Ciano, at which Mussolini declared a general war was inevitable and asked to determine the most favorable moment, and Goering had expressed the view that the Axis should wait a bit, and it was agreed that the motto for both should be to speak of peace and prepare for war, the witness stated he could say nothing about this conference, and he didn't know about it.

24551 \* He didn't know that in 1938 and 1939 Germany had decided to go to war. Nobody told him. He must now believe that a war was prepared there. The idea he heard at the time, however, from every side, from his colleagues and superiors, was that the general idea was to prevent a war by forming a military alliance with Japan. He knew now that this was false.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CUNNINGHAM.

24552 \* With respect to the nature of the negotiations in September 1938, so far as he could remember, these were preliminary talks about a possibility of a closer understanding between Germany and Japan, and Ribbentrop wanted to know what the Japanese Army was thinking. Ribbentrop asked him to determine that intention by taking the matter up with OSHIMA.

24553 Exhibit No. 511 was his personal opinion and the impression he got from his conversations with OSHIMA, SHIRATORI, and others who were all known as pro-German. He did not talk with these people concerning an alliance

24554 because there was no possibility at the time. \* He had then given up any hope and avoided talk on that line. Neither SHIRATORI, OSHIMA, or others, expressed any readiness at that time to support an alliance with Germany.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

June 17, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Redirect

Page

24555 With respect to OSHIMA's right to use the German Embassy facilities to communicate with Ribbentrop, the witness ordered his personal secretary to investigate who could send letters or cables through the German Embassy \* with or without cipher. He learned that OSHIMA had never sent any letter or telegram using these facilities.

OSHIMA was very well liked in Germany. He was very sociable, spoke good German, and made a good appearance. He was a good host and invited many people to his Embassy.

He did not know whether OSHIMA resigned as Ambassador in September 1939, after the non-aggression pact.

24557 \* He did not remember Knoll and did not know his position, but at the time of the SATO-KURUSU luncheon, he remembered that KAWAI was present. The witness had told Ribbentrop to use the opportunity to invite KAWAI.

# Battle of Saipan

Attack started 16 June '44

See "Contemporary Japan" - p 835

Occupation completed - 11 Aug '44

See World Almanac p 83

C. I. Cole

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

PageDIRECT EXAMINATION OF HEINRICH STAHMER  
by Mr. Cunningham.

24396

\* The witness stated that he lived in Atami. He identified exhibit No. 2744 as his affidavit and verified it. The affidavit stated that the witness was born in Germany in 1892, and became an army officer in 1913. After the First World War he became a business man, and became a director in two German industrial companies. He had been a member of the Nazi Party since 1932, but having been a Mason he had no possibility of a party career.

24397

In June, 1935, Ribbentrop, then Ambassador at large, engaged him as a government employee. One of his first duties was to receive a delegation of British ex-servicemen, the first group of this kind to visit Germany, and was shortly thereafter appointed official representative of the German ex-Servicemen's Organization \* in relations to similar organizations in foreign countries.

While acting as liaison man between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA, his function was mainly to see OSHIMA from time to time and explain the ideas and wishes of Ribbentrop, while OSHIMA gave his comments on cables and instructions from Japan. The witness would convey OSHIMA's explanations to Ribbentrop. He sometimes had to accompany OSHIMA when he travelled in Germany and to keep social contacts with him and the members of his Embassy in Berlin. He was not present at major conferences between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA except on one or two occasions on general matters.

24398

The witness participated from time to time in the negotiations for a consultation and assistance Pact which took place in Berlin in \* 1938 and 1939. In 1938 the European situation was getting tense for Germany after the "Anschluss", while Japan was in a difficult position because of the China Incident. This led to consider strengthening the ties between Germany, Japan, and Italy.

Toward the end of 1938, especially after the HIRANUMA Cabinet came in at the beginning of 1939, Japan was slowing down the negotiations, and Germany felt that Japan was not seriously interested in a closer relation. After the end of March 1939, negotiations continued, but cables from Tokyo only after long intervals, and it seemed that the new Japanese government had definitely changed its ideas about the aims of the planned treaty.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3732

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHER - Direct

Page

24399

\* While negotiations were deadlocked, Germany's political situation grew more tense. Ribbentrop, on the occasion of OSHIMA's and SHIRATORI's presence at Hitler's birthday party on April 20, 1939, told them quite frankly that he was not optimistic concerning the conclusion of the treaty. Since Germany wished under all circumstances to be most friendly with Japan, he felt obliged to inform them confidentially that under prevailing conditions Germany might feel forced to approach the Soviet to conclude a non-aggression pact. He assured them that nothing yet had been done.

24400

24401

To find a way out of the deadlock, in May and June 1939 some Japanese Embassy officials had several conversations with Gauss, legal expert of the German Foreign Office, \* but without success. The negotiations \* were completely broken off when the pact between Germany and Russia was concluded on August 23, 1939. The negotiations resulting in the Russo-German Pact were kept secret from the Japanese. When the matter was agreed on, \* the witness was ordered by Ribbentrop to tell OSHIMA. OSHIMA's attitude was perfectly gentlemanly, but he could not conceal his extreme disappointment and stated it.

24402

24403

The witness visited Japan for the first time in February, 1940, when he accompanied the president of the German Red Cross on his visit to the U. S. They travelled via Siberia and Japan, staying in Tokyo for four or five days. On the return they touched Japan in May 1940, and remained about two weeks. During his stay in Tokyo they made a courtesy call on the Japanese Foreign Office and Red Cross. On the way back through Japan the Duke of \* Koburg and the witness delivered a congratulatory message to the Emperor on the celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Dynasty.

He met his old friend OSHIMA and SHIRATORI, whom he had met once or twice before socially. He saw them twice, once at a dinner in the German Embassy and a second time at lunch. They talked, but not about political questions. OSHIMA was in complete retirement and took no part in politics, to the witness' knowledge. During these two visits the witness sent one telegram each time to the Foreign Minister in Berlin, giving a short survey of his impressions of the general political situation. On his return he made no further oral or written reports.

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact  
STAHMER - DirectPage

24404 His third visit to Japan was in 1940, when on instructions from Ribbentrop he came to Tokyo via Siberia on September 7 and stayed there till October, 1940. During his stay he and Ott negotiated with \* MATSUOKA the Three-Power Pact. In July 1940, the YONAI Cabinet had been replaced as a result of increasing American pressure. So far as they knew, Germany understood that the KONOYE Cabinet was trying to improve relations with the U. S., but at the same time wanted a closer contact with Germany to strengthen Japan's political position in consummating U. S. negotiations. MATSUOKA began to throw out feelers cautiously via KURUSU in Berlin and Ott in Tokyo. The telegrams from Ott and the verbal information from KURUSU created a completely confused picture of Japan's attitude from Germany's viewpoint, and Germany could not figure out what Japan had in mind.

24405 In view of the confused picture and under the pressure of time, the witness was ordered by Ribbentrop to Tokyo to find out Japan's actual intention toward Germany, \* to take up immediately negotiations in Ott's presence should Japan show an intention to conclude a new agreement with Germany; to report every detail in case of negotiations which item had to be approved by Berlin before continuing.

After arriving in Tokyo on September 7, the witness was cautious in regard to Ribbentrop's instructions. He avoided talking to any Japanese other than MATSUOKA about his mission. He met MATSUOKA first on September 9, with Ott, and explained Germany's intention to avoid further spreading of the war, to keep the U. S. out, and created a platform on which peace could be built. He declared that Germany had no intention to draw Japan into the European war, and was ready if Japan asked, to use her good offices to promote friendly relations with the Soviet and to contribute to settling the China Incident. MATSUOKA agreed wholeheartedly.

24406 The witness reported to Berlin and received instructions from Ribbentrop to begin negotiations. \* Negotiations progressed quickly, and the Pact was signed on September 27. In the course of negotiations the witness had time to get a good personal impression of MATSUOKA. He spoke good English and was proud of his U. S. education. At their first meeting MATSUOKA told about his life story. He seemed to feel that he was the right man as political leader in the decisive time for

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3734

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

Japan, and the witness' private talks later in Germany in 1941 confirmed this impression. OSHIMA had no official position and no concern with the negotiations, so far as the witness knew. During the witness' stay he called on OSHIMA as an old friend, and met him socially. He, however, neither revealed to OSHIMA the negotiations nor asked his advice.

24407 \* When OSHIMA returned to Berlin as Ambassador in February 1941, the witness was again liaison man between him and Ribbentrop. As previously, the witness seldom attended the conversations between them.

In conversations with the witness, OSHIMA never committed Japan to attack Singapore or the Soviet. He could not recall that Ribbentrop had ever told him that OSHIMA had done so. While the witness was always friendly with OSHIMA, the latter never told him any military plans or revealed secrets. The witness himself had nothing to do with military matters, and neither did Ribbentrop officially. OSHIMA was many years in Germany, spoke German well, and was well-liked there.

24408 When MATSUOKA visited Germany in March, 1941, the witness was ordered by Ribbentrop to accompany him during his stay in Germany, and the witness therefore travelled with him. The witness was not concerned with preparing the trip program, which had been finished by the protocol chief. He immediately left Berlin and met MATSUOKA at the German-Russian border. He accompanied him to Berlin and was present at his courtesy call on Ribbentrop. The witness was not present at the political conversations between MATSUOKA, Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Goering. Ott attended some of these meetings, having received permission to be present while MATSUOKA was in Berlin.

24409 The witness took MATSUOKA to the Siemens-Schuckert Works in Berlin, and accompanied him as far as the Italian border. When he returned from Rome, the witness took him to the German-Russian border. He had no personal political talks with MATSUOKA. He did not speak at the time with Ribbentrop as to the purpose of the conversations with MATSUOKA, and never heard from Ribbentrop that MATSUOKA made any commitment. Ribbentrop was very secretive, and usually took only what was necessary for the work of the moment. At that time the witness' relations with Ribbentrop were rather strained.



## NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

Before MATSUOKA's arrival the witness heard nothing from OSHIMA about the items to be taken up by MATSUOKA, nor of his wishes or ideas that he wanted to convey to Ribbentrop. During MATSUOKA's stay, the witness met OSHIMA at various lunches only. He did not believe OSHIMA had much influence on MATSUOKA, and he felt that their personal relations were not close. MATSUOKA told him nothing about OSHIMA.

24410

It was a practice of the German Foreign Office that no stenographic records be taken of conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and prominent foreign statesmen or ambassadors. Unofficial minutes were made afterward as dictated \* by Hitler, Ribbentrop, or attending interpreters, mostly by Schmidt. These minutes, being only unofficial, were never given to foreign participants or shown for confirmation. Internally, these records were regarded as an aide-memoire, and never as documentary proof. He remembered on one occasion Schmidt, acting as official interpreter, wrote down only about five or six single words for a twenty minute speech, and then began to translate. Though he had a very good memory, there was sometimes a difference between Ribbentrop and Schmidt about what was really said.

Ribbentrop disliked that various representatives directly contacted high German officials other than those in foreign service. On several occasions he was ordered by Ribbentrop to try as politely as possible to prevent this practice. Because of this outspoken wish of Ribbentrop there were no official relations between foreign Embassies, including the Japanese and German ministries other than the Foreign Office.

24411

\* The witness became Ambassador to Nanking, China, in 1941, and left Germany with Bolze on October 18, 1941, going to Nanking via South America and Japan. While aboard ship he heard of the outbreak of the Japanese-American war. Until he left Germany, Germany he thought, had no notion that the relation was strained to such an extent.

In December 1942, the witness became Ambassador to Japan, arriving in Tokyo on January 28, 1943. While Ambassador he had cordial personal relations with SHIGEMITSU and other Foreign Office officials.

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

Political collaboration between Japan and Germany was not close, and the commissions of the Three Power Pact were only a formal show without practical results. In the two or three meetings the witness attended there was not a single word which was not found in the newspapers.

24412 Although he was not concerned with military matters, so far as he knew there was no military or \* operational collaboration between the two nations. The main reason was the fact that Japan was completely absorbed in the U. S. war and was neutral in the German-Russian war. The two countries were far apart, and had no regular communication except radio.

During all conversations and negotiations with OSHIMA, the latter took no positive personal stand on any controversial issue, but reserved judgement until he had submitted the matter to his government, unless he had prior instructions. In their discussions, personal opinions would have no bearing, for in diplomacy it is the government and not the individual.

24413 With German checks on information, they nearly always knew Japan's attitude before receiving it through OSHIMA or any other. When action was taken in Japan, Germany knew of it at the same time or sooner than OSHIMA or others. \* Rarely did they learn anything new from OSHIMA. On hearing it from him, they merely verified or made official what other sources of information supplied.

24414 \* Dirksen, who was ambassador in Tokyo for some years, could not stand the climate, suffering from asthma, and had asked to be transferred, and Ott, who was in Tokyo since 1934 and Military Attache in 1935, was interested in becoming Ambassador. With the assistance of Keitel he was appointed Ambassador to Tokyo in the beginning of 1938. Ribbentrop did not object, but on the contrary assured Ott several times of his full confidence. When the idea of strengthening relations with Japan came up, Ott was ordered to Berlin in the

24415 \* summer of 1938, and in his presence the new course was talked over with Hitler and Ribbentrop. At that time Hitler made him a party member which he could not become earlier, being an officer. It was expected from him to maintain friendly relations with the parties in power, get a survey of the changing political situation, and to report to the Foreign Office.

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

The greatest efforts in Germany during the witness' time were expended toward establishing close ties with England and France. Much more work, money, propaganda, and persons were used for that. The German-English and German-French Societies were regarded as more important than the German-Japanese one. After the failure of the first negotiations in 1939, Germany and Japan had not proposed any agreements for more than a year, until Japan began in July 1940 to take up new diplomatic negotiations. He could not see where Japan helped Germany in the war in any way.

24416 \* There was no joint German-Japanese war, but two wars. There was no joint high command, no plans for teamwork worked out or proposed, since there was no connection except cables and an occasional submarine. There could be no comparison with the teamwork of Eisenhower and Montgomery, and MacArthur and Mountbatten. Japan had its own ideas about the pacific war, and never seriously tried to stop the transport of U. S. goods to Soviet. Japan's idea of an ally were different than that of other countries. While in China, even in official Japanese proclamations the Germans were friendly neutrals, and not allies.

24417 \* While the witness was busy with negotiations of the agreement, it was the general idea in 1938 and 1939 to avoid political isolation and prevent war through a defensive alliance and thus strengthen the international political situation. In 1940, after Germany was in the war, the idea was to avoid further spread by preventing U. S. entry and to establish a peace platform. He had never heard from any side a word about a plan of dominating the world.

24439 Exhibit No. 2744-A, an interrogation of Stahmer, stated \* that in negotiations prior to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact of September, 1940, only MATSUOKA participated and no other Japanese statesmen. At no time during the conversations did MATSUOKA ever telephone other people or interrupt conferences to confer and consult with other Japanese about the Tripartite Pact. He stated it was not true, according to his knowledge, that OSHIMA and SHIRATORI were sent to Rome to induce

24440 \* Mussolini to join the Pact. Germany could not and would not use foreign ambassadors for this purpose. As the witness knew, Hitler and Ribbentrop had already talked to Mussolini about such a pact during the Munich Conference of 1938, when Mussolini agreed.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

Page 3738

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

The witness was not advised as to the mission of the ITO Commission sent to Berlin and Rome. He had only read an abridged version of the Ciano Diary, but did not take it as a historical document. For instance, he asserts he was against Italy attacking Greece, but at the time the witness heard from the Italian Embassy that he assisted the plan and was proud of it. It was only after the Italian defeat in Albania that he changed his opinion.

24441

When \* asked whether the Ambassador asserted that they would resign if the alliance was not concluded without reservation, the witness stated he had not heard of this assertion. If it was true, Japan must know it, and would have known of it if it were true. He had only heard mention of it from one source.

KURUSU only told Germany in June 1940 that the new government in Tokyo wanted closer contact. He had not begun negotiations, otherwise it would not have been necessary to send the witness to Tokyo, because the situation was too obscure to be analyzed from Berlin. During the Tokyo negotiations, KURUSU was only scantily informed by his government.

24442

\* The meeting on July 8, 1940, between SATO and Kurusu, the witness and Ribbentrop was not a conference, but only a courtesy call with normal conversation, where he had the impression that both sides wanted to avoid talking on unsolved political questions. Minister KAWAI was also present. He had no recollection that the French and NEI colonies came up for discussion in this conversation, and no recollection that the Japanese had shown any fears concerning the interests of Germany in the Pacific Islands.

24443

From the new cabinet with KONOYE as Premier and MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister, Germany was impressed that it was interested in coming into closer contact with Germany. When he arrived in Japan he found that it had already made preparations for a pact with Germany and Italy. \* When he arrived in Tokyo, he had considered that Japan and the U. S. would become engaged in war, and he wanted to prevent the U. S. entrance into the war.

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V. - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

When MATSUOKA asked him about the influence of German-descent Americans, the witness told him that he believed they were better Americans than many others, and informed him of his experiences in that line in Chicago.

24444 He had not discussed, neither with KONOYE or any other cabinet member, the terms of the Pact. Only after signature was the matter commented upon. He did not remember why the pact was signed in Berlin, \* but the Embassy received a cable some days before negotiations were finished that Germany and Italy wanted it signed there. At first MATSUOKA was reluctant, but he soon agreed. As compensation, Ribbentrop invited him to come to Berlin.

On arriving in Germany, MATSUOKA did not advise the witness of the principal question he desired to discuss with Ribbentrop. He only heard shortly after he left Berlin that MATSUOKA wanted to make a non-aggression pact with the Soviet.

24445 He did not know whether OSHIMA knew beforehand \* the object of his tour, because OSHIMA did not tell him.

He had never heard, and therefore did not know, that on May 24, 1941, a report was made by the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the Foreign Intelligence Office, that Japan acknowledged her treaty obligations in the event the U. S. entered the war. He did not recall talking with MATSUOKA about a "no separate peace" clause on September 27, 1940.

24446 While he was still in Germany in 1941, the German officials were very nervous because they never had a clear answer to the state of negotiations between Japan and the U. S. until October 1941. They then heard only indirectly and through unreliable information or rumors.

June 16, 1947

DEFENSE - Div. V - Pacific - Tripartite Pact

STAHMER - Direct

Page

At the time of the signature of the Tripartite Pact, there was no action or situation contemplated for concluding a military agreement and providing for operational coordination.

24447

At \* no time during the conversation did OSHIMA commit himself as favorable to Japan's commencing or participating in any war. There was no collaboration between Germany and Japan, so far as the witness knew, that was not provided for by treaty and which did not go through established channels.

24448

OSHIMA's dealings with the witness and Ribbentrop did not differ at all from dealings with other ambassadors with whom he worked. As far as he knew, OSHIMA never interested himself in matters outside diplomatic tasks \* contrary to the best interests of either Germany or Japan.

New contacts were always necessary to keep up contact with the changing ministers. Though Germany's foreign policy toward Japan over the period of years of the witness' association was unchanged, the Japanese foreign policy changed several times. The ideas of KONOYE-HIROTA, ARITA-HIRANUMA, and KONOYE-MATSUOKA, were completely different.

24449

\* The witness had never heard OSHIMA express greater friendship toward any particular foreign ministers. Having been absent so long from Japan, he probably did not even know them personally.

JUNE 16, 1947  
 DEFENSE, PART V, PACIFIC  
 STAHMER- DIRECT.

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LOGAN

24,450 The witness stated that he did not recall either meeting or talking with KIDO. Since he became Ambassador in January, 1943, it was his duty to try to find out especially the feeling of leading statesmen and responsible men toward Germany. He made inquiries about KIDO. \* He heard from several of his officials that KIDO was always regarded very much pro-Anglo-Saxon and had never shown any especially friendly feeling toward Germany.

24,457 \* The witness stated he had not reported anything said by  
 24,458 KIDO. \* His subordinates did not tell him anything definite of  
 24,459 what KIDO said. They only stated how he was regarded. \* The witness never had any negotiations with KIDO and never heard of any negotiations by KIDO with any member of the German government.

24,461 \*He had not dealt with KIDO because he did not have the  
 slightest contact with him, contrary to other statesmen and ministers and could not approach him. \*The witness stated he knew of meetings held in Washington and London between military officials of Britain and the United States, particularly navy, in the latter part of 1938 and early 1939. He knew at least two secret negotiations took place when Singapore was taken out for a mutual defense base. Germany knew this at the time the meetings were held. He stated they had heard about a meeting in the United States in Washington of secret military negotiations between admiralty officials in the early part of 1941.

24,464 \*He had heard this information from Ribbentrop and certain other news he had in the so-called ministerial office of the foreign ministry where all the incoming cables from the different embassies and legations came.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MAJOR BLAKENEY  
 Counsel for TOGO

24,468 The negotiations in 1938 and 1939 were conducted between Ribbentrop and OSHIMA and OSHIMA was still military attache and TOGO was ambassador. So far as he knew, TOGO had nothing to do with these negotiations and while he did not remember the exact

Page

24,469 date, the negotiations began in the summer 1938. TOGO was transferred to Moscow in October, 1938. \* So far as the witness' information went TOGO had nothing to do with the negotiations from the beginning until his transfer. The witness never talked to TOGO personally about \* this subject.

24470

24472

24473

24474

\*He did not know if the negotiations between RIBBENTROP and OSHIMA were kept secret from TOGO. \* He received no orders from Ribbentrop as to whether the negotiations should be made known to TOGO. He only had to deal with OSHIMA. \* The witness did not get any order from Ribbentrop. Later Ribbentrop made him liaison man to OSHIMA to deal with him at the beginning of the negotiations. Normally these negotiations were made between ambassadors and foreign ministers. He did not know the reason why the military attache was used in this case. It was probably because Ribbentrop knew OSHIMA before and during the negotiations of the anti-comintern pact.

Conditions between Ribbentrop and TOGO at the time seemed to be rather cool but he did not know the reason for this.

24478

\*The witness stated that when he went to Japan he had never any order to investigate Ott or any other person. He only had to study the political situation in Japan and he talked it over with Ott personally. He (Ott) told him of certain mistakes in a telegram in a rather lengthy story. The witness made no report to Ribbentrop or any other man. By this he meant he made no report on the question of accuracies of telegrams.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. CAUDLE  
Counsel for Shiratori

24,479

\*The witness stated he first met SHIRATORI in 1939 when the latter was invited to Berlin during Hitler's birthday. He saw him twice at lunch and at dinner and they talked but not politically. The next time he saw him was in February 1940 during his first short stay in Japan when he was on the Red Cross tour. At that time he sent Exhibit 511 in which he stated he found SHIRATORI, OSHIMA, ISHII and others in the same friendly attitude.



Page

24,484 Official communications were made in German with an English translation. \* In August, the witness had several conversations with SHIGEMITSU. They had a conversation on the possibility of coming to an understanding between Germany and Russia with the idea of making peace, and then use the situation for a common peace between all nations. This conversation was reported to his government. 24,485 In September, after he had received an answer to his cable to Berlin, he had another conversation with SHIGEMITSU.

The witness identified Exhibit No. 2745 as the document he brought with him to the conference in the middle of September. He had had it especially translated into English and brought it to Shigemitsu. He gave him his official communication verbally but also gave him the written paper as an aide memoire, to prevent misunderstanding.

24,486 The document stated that OSHIMA informed Hitler about the Japanese Government's suggestion for a separate peace between Germany and the Soviet. Hitler explained the German point of view \* that they had no indications that the Soviet was ready for an understanding with Germany. They believed that Stalin will try to come to an understanding with Germany only when he is convinced that he cannot continue the war successfully or that his forces are insufficient to defeat Germany.

If this should happen, a new political situation would be created. The German Government fully appreciates Japan's suggestion. Because of the explanation German would be obliged if the Japanese Government would refrain from all steps with the Soviet.

To OSHIMA's question whether the German war aims against Russia had changed, Hitler replied that Stalin did not ask for peace negotiations when the German troops were on the Don and the same holds good for Germany under the present circumstances.

24,487 At the time of presenting the memoir, the witness had a discussion with SHIGEMITSU \* relating to the peace proposal 24,488 between Russia and Germany. \* The discussion was about the possibility of coming to an understanding and peace with Russia.

Page

The witness was interested to know if there was any background or knowledge by Japan which he could never find out. The general idea was that when such an understanding was possible, it should be the basis for making peace with other nations. These talks were initiated by SHIGEMITSU. SHIGEMITSU was for an proposed negotiations of peace between Germany and Russia.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. TAVENNER.

24,489

\*When asked why in view of his lack of possibility of a party career, he had risen to the rank of Ambassador in Germany, the witness said he had become ambassador at large in Germany and later ambassador in China and Japan but that had nothing to do with party career. He meant he had never been promoted in the party and could not be promoted. He became the consul-general in January 1940.

24,490

\* When asked to whose influence in Germany he owed his preferment he stated he was proposed by Ribbentrop in 1938 and promoted by Hitler as the other officials from the German Embassy were. He was promoted because Ribbentrop was satisfied with his work.

24,491

When asked whether after the German Soviet non aggression pact had been concluded, whether Japan continued its efforts to effect a Japan German Alliance, the witness stated that after the conclusion of the non aggression pact, Germany received a cable in which Japan stated that the negotiations were broken off.

When asked whether he had access to the Ribbentrop files or those of the foreign office, he said generally he could only read what was offered to him. He could get cables and documents necessary for his work. He stated he had never seen a telegram in the German files from Mackensen in Rome to Ribbentrop stating that in a conversation with SHIRATORI September 2, 1939, SHIRATORI had expressed the opinion that with a new cabinet there was a good chance for successful continuation of rapprochement with the Axis Powers and to be able to work more effectively

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Page

24,480

He saw SHIRATORI at that time together with some other Japanese officials whose names he did not remember and they talked about general topics. He could not recall if he saw SHIRATORI on the way back from the U.S. but he did see him during or after the conclusion of the Tri Partite Pact.

24,481

When asked what part SHIRATORI played in concluding the pact, he stated that he knew that he was an adviser of the foreign minister. \* He did not know what part he took in the negotiations. He never sat in on any of the discussions. There were always only MATSUOKA and OTT, and in the end the witness saw SAITO and MATSUMOTO for technical details, but not in the meeting; he could not recall that he had ever discussed the tri-partite pact with SHIRATORI; they may have talked it over during the dinners and lunches after the pact had been signed. Prior to the conclusion of the pact he talked only with MATSUOKA.

SHIRATORI could have met Ribbentrop only during the 50th birthday of Hitler in 1939...only during two or three days, he did not remember exactly how long SHIRATORI stayed.

24,482

When asked what he meant by saying that most of the negotiations were made with Italy through Germany, the witness stated that during the Munich negotiations in 1939 Ribbentrop and Hitler talked about this with Mussolini and Mussolini agreed immediately in principle but said he must think over a suitable time to begin the negotiations by Italy.

He stated that about the beginning of January 1939.

The negotiations were carried on strictly between Germany and Italy through Mussolini and Ciano. In October 1938 Ribbentrop went to Rome and talked with Mussolini and Ciano and later when the Italian ambassador in Berlin was informed and worked together in the negotiations.

24,483

\*

DIRECT BY MAJOR FURNESS  
Counsel for SHIGEMITSU

In conversations with SHIGEMITSU, the witness always spoke in English and the writings presented were mostly in English.

24,492 he was returning to Tokyo. He had not been advised of the contents of the telegram. He was not informed that SHIRATORI was on the early failure of the ABE Cabinet soon after his return to Japan. He could not recall \* receiving information that SHIRATORI considered that there was a weakening in army circles due to the costly military defeat at Nomonhan. He did not recall any connection between SHIRATORI and the NOMONHAN Incident. He had no knowledge of the political activities of SHIRATORI in Japan between the time he returned from Italy and the time the witness went to Japan. In 1940 he heard that SHIRATORI had become adviser to MATSUOKA. The position of adviser was a very difficult one which the witness found only in Japan. He heard there were different types.

24,494 Some would be nominated by ministers themselves, and some, so far as he had heard, were nominated by the premier. He did not know if they were what is known as "legal advisers". He did not know whether SHIRATORI was appointed by MATSUOKA he only knew that he was adviser of MATSUOKA. He did not recall the exact date when he told OSHIMA that the Russian-German pact had been signed. But he knew of it immediately after Ribbentrop first returned from Moscow. He remembered Ribbentrop had been to Moscow twice and after the first \* trip he told him to inform OSHIMA. At that time the witness was in Berlin and Ribbentrop took the plan to go to Bartschegaden.

24,495 He believed he notified OSHIMA after the 23rd of August, after the pact was signed - very shortly after the return of Ribbentrop.

When asked whether OSHIMA had in fact been notified by Ribbentrop of the pact as early as August 21, 1939, the witness stated he knew that Ribbentrop told the witness to inform OSHIMA because it was a very difficult task and he ordered him to tell OSHIMA that the pact was concluded and that Ribbentrop would come to see OSHIMA as soon as possible to talk the situation over.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

16 June 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Frank S. Tavenner  
FROM : D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: (1) Battle of Midway  
(2) Battle of Saipan

(1) Battle of Midway, June 3 - 6, 1942:

"On June 3, 1942, a Japanese naval force heading toward Midway and including three battleships and four carriers, was sighted by U. S. naval aircraft.

"During June 3, 4, 5 and 6, 1942, U. S. naval carrier-based aircraft and heavy land-based army bombers pounded the Japanese fleet, which in turn attacked U. S. forces with planes and bombed Midway. \* \* \* " (quotation from The War in Outline 1939-1944, a publication of the War Department, page 140)

(2) Battle of Saipan:

- 15*  
(a) Landing <sup>15</sup> June 1944. *see World Almanac page 7, 8, 25*  
(b) Sea battle 19 June 1944.

(see World Almanac 1945, pages 74 and 75)

China | rec 10 p. 9  
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**SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR CROSS-EXAMINING STAHER**

1. When did Germany recognize the Puppet Nanking Government headed by Wang Ching-Wei ?
2. After ~~the~~ Germany has recognized the Puppet Nanking Government, what was the German Government's attitude towards the Chungking Government ?  
What was the German Government's relation to the Chungking Government ?
3. Were you the first German Ambassador to the Puppet Nanking Government ?
4. When did you assume your duties in Nanking ?
5. While in Nanking what other missions did you have in addition to your diplomatic mission ?
6. Following your arrival in Nanking, whom did you see first; Chinese officials or Japanese officials ?
7. About how many Japanese advisers did you meet in Nanking ?
8. Will you name some of the advisers ?
9. While in Nanking did you contact Japanese advisers frequently ?
10. Who was the <sup>P</sup>~~Puppet~~ Foreign Minister when you were in Nanking ?
11. What negotiations, if any, did you conduct with him or his representatives ?
12. Who was <sup>the</sup> Japanese Ambassador at Nanking when you were there ?
- 12 A Who was the Head of the Japanese Armed Forces in ~~Shink~~ Nanking ?
13. From what you personally knew, who exercised a greater dictatorial power over the Puppet Nanking Government- the Japanese Ambassador or the Head of the Japanese Armed Forces ?
14. How long did you stay in China as the German Ambassador to the Puppet Nanking Government ?
15. During that period did you ever see American Citizens or British subjects in Nanking or Shanghai ?
16. If so, in what conditions were they placed ?
17. You stated in your affidavit, page 11, last paragraph, that you continued the efforts of Mr. Trautmann, former German Ambassador to China, in trying ~~in bringing~~ to bring about an understanding between China and Japan by negotiating in Berlin with the Chinese Ambassador Mr. Chen Chieh. What were the terms you proposed ?

What were the terms which Mr. Trautmann proposed ?

18. Who ordered you to negotiat<sup>e</sup> with Ambassador Mr. Chen ?
19. Was the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin ever responsible for such negotiation ?
20. You stated in your affidavit, page 11, last paragraph, that it was your secret hope that during your stay in China the unification of China could be perfected. Did you know that such unification was impossible in the face of Japanese policy concerning the establishment and support of Puppet Regimes ?

21.



INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION  
SECTION

11 June 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. D. N. Sutton

FROM : Floyd W. Cunningham

SUBJECT : STAHMER, Heinrich G. (Witness for OSHIMA  
and SHIRATORI)

Mr. A. A. Sandusky, to whom the defendant SHIRATORI is jointly assigned, had previously agreed to prepare on the above witness STAHMER. He is now completing preparation on same.



Floyd W. Cunningham

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

No. I

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- v -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT OF HEINRICH STAHRER, FORMER  
GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO CHINA (NANKING)  
AND JAPAN

I. BACKGROUND

I, Heinrich STAHRER, being just sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say: I was born in Hamburg, Germany, on 3 May 1892. I entered the army in September 1911 as Ensign and became an officer in February 1913. After the war I left the service and became a businessman. In that capacity I was a director in two German industrial companies of the electric branch. I was a member of the National-Socialistic Party since 1932, but having been a freemason, with out any possibility of a party career.

In June 1935 Ribbentrop, at that time Ambassador at large, engaged me as an employee of the German Government. Some time after entering upon my duties in the office of Ribbentrop, I received a delegation of British ex-servicemen, the first group of this kind to visit Germany. About a month later I was appointed the official representative of the German Ex-Servicemen's Organization in their relations to the similar organizations in foreign countries.

I organized a central office of the different German ex-servicemen's groups after receiving a special appointment from Ribbentrop, and began to work with representatives of other nations, especially in England and France. The purpose of this move was to maintain peace and the organization was regarded by the German Government as of foremost importance.

In the two following years I visited England, France, Italy, Hungary, and other countries of Europe and came in close contact with the leaders of the foreign ex-servicemen's organizations. In the latter part of 1936 at a meeting held in Rome, the representatives of the respective organizations unanimously accepted my proposal for the formation of an international organization of ex-servicemen, which was called, "Permanent International Committee of Ex-Servicemen".

In February 1937, I organized the first international congress of ex-servicemen in Berlin. This grew to be a very successful meeting. Members of the International Committee of Ex-Servicemen included organizations of Germany, United States, Great Britain and the Commonwealth, France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland and other nations totaling 15 or 16 members in all.

My duties in this enterprise took me to many different European countries and as a result I had close association with the leaders of many major powers, among them King Edward VIII, Sir Neville Chamberlain, Sir Robert Vansittard, Mr. Duff Cooper, Mr. Greenwood, Sir Samuel Hoare of England; General George C. Marshall, Admiral Stark of the United States; Mr. Scapini of France; and Mr. Delacroix of Italy.

In the winter of 1937 the international political situation was so changed that it was impossible for the organization to function any longer, but my association in the various countries of Europe furnished to me a background for my later public service.

In 1938 I was made Liaison man between Ambassador Oshima and Ribbentrop until October 1939, when Ambassador Oshima resigned and returned to Japan. In November 1940 I was appointed as Ambassador and I was again the Liaison man between Ribbentrop and Oshima from February till October 1941. In October, 1941, without being consulted, I was sent as Ambassador to Nanking. In January 1943 I was moved to Tokyo as head of the mission there.

## 2. DUTIES AS LIAISON

When I was Liaison man between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima, my function consisted mainly in that I had to see Ambassador Oshima from time to time and to explain to him the ideas and wishes of Ribbentrop, while Ambassador Oshima gave me his comments on the cables and instructions he received from his Government; then I had to convey his explanations to Ribbentrop, who was very often absent from Berlin. Furthermore, I had sometimes to accompany Ambassador Oshima when he travelled in Germany, and had to keep social contacts with him and the members of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I was not present at the major conferences between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima, except on one or two occasions when they conferred on general matters.

In Germany it was usual to employ Liaison man between the Foreign Minister and the different Ambassadors for the purpose of saving time and for convenience. So I kept up for some time the liaison with the Italian Embassy and the Bulgarian Legation, as, for instance, Count Duschekheim was in contact with the British Embassy and Mr. von Raumer was before me Liaison man to the Japanese Embassy. I was succeeded in the position as Liaison man with Ambassador Oshima in October, 1941, by Councillor of Legation Gottfriedsen, a young man of about 32 years.

Ribbentrop mostly met alone with Ambassadors of all important countries, when state affairs of first order were discussed. This was the case, for instance, with Ambassador Oshima, the British Ambassador Henderson, the French Ambassador Francois Poncet, and the Italian Ambassadors Attolico and Alfieri. Sometimes an interpreter was present too, as in the case of the Italian and Brazilian Ambassadors.

Occasionally the Ambassadors had been summoned at any hour of the day or night, specifically, shortly before important events. These meetings, as far as I know, were always between Ribbentrop and the concerned Ambassador alone.

### 3. PARTICIPATION IN 1938-39 NEGOTIATIONS

On account of my function as mentioned above I participated from time to time in the German-Japanese negotiations for a consultation and assistance Pact which took place in Berlin in 1938 and 1939. In 1938 the situation in Europe was getting rather tense for Germany after the sensation caused by the "Anschluss" of Austria, while Japan was in a difficult position as a result of the "China Incident". (These circumstances caused the two countries to consider the strengthening of the ties existing between Germany, Japan and Italy since the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 and 1937.)

The proposed treaty the negotiating powers had in mind in 1938 and 1939 was of a purely defensive nature, and I can definitely say that, although military matters were talked about during the negotiations, none of the three powers contemplated war or aggression. Their only purpose was to create a political instrument in order to strengthen their respective international positions.

It is suggested that the negotiations were secret and I might say that all preliminary negotiations are always most secret; it is necessary in international relations.

The negotiations progressed at first smoothly, and a rough draft of a defensive agreement was drawn up between Germany and Japan in the last part of 1938. Italy declared her willingness to join at the beginning of 1939. As far as I remember, it was a draft of a defensive pact of mutual consultation and assistance between Germany, Italy and Japan against a possible aggression of third powers.

However, towards the end of 1938 and especially after the change of the Japanese Cabinet from Konoye to Hiranuma at the beginning of 1939, Japan was slowing down the negotiations and Germany got the impression that the administration in Japan was not seriously interested in a closer relation with Germany and Italy. A deadlock developed over the interpretation of Article III, which provided mutual help and assistance in case one of the signatories became the object of an unprovoked attack by a power or powers not party to this Pact. Japan wanted to have a written assurance from her partners that Japan would virtually be exempted from this obligation in case Germany and/or Italy were attacked by a power (or powers) other than Soviet Russia (mainly Britain and France). Germany and Italy refused to give any written assurance as they feared the leakage and the consequent weakening of the political effect of the Pact, although they declared that they fully understood Japan's difficulties and would not request impossibilities of her.

After the end of March, 1939, negotiations continued; but the cables from Tokyo arrived only in long intervals and it seemed no doubt that the new government in Japan had definitely changed its ideas about the aims of the planned treaty. While the negotiations were thus deadlocked, the general political situation for Germany grew more and more tense. Ribbentrop therefore took the opportunity of the presence of Ambassador Oshima and Shiratori at Hitler's 50th birthday party on 20 April 1939, to tell them quite frankly that he was not very optimistic concerning the conclusion of the above mentioned agreement; that, as Germany wished under all circumstances to maintain most friendly relations with Japan, he felt himself obliged to inform them confidentially that under the then prevailing conditions Germany might feel herself forced to approach U.S.S.R. with the aim of concluding a non-aggression pact; he assured them, however, that nothing yet has been done heretofore.

In order to find a way out of the deadlock, in May and June 1939 some officials of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin had several conversations with the Undersecretary of State D. Gauss, who was the legal expert of the German Foreign Office, but without success on either side. In May 1939 the Japanese Prime Minister Hiranuma sent a sort of message to Hitler and Mussolini, in which as far as I remember he manifested his good will to come to an understanding, but there were practically no consequences.

Nevertheless, I did not hear that either the German or the Japanese Government stopped the negotiations till after the conclusion of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, when the Japanese Government at the end of August 1939 filed a formal protest against this pact and declared the end of the negotiations of a Tri-Partite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

Although it is the duty of an ambassador to keep his government well informed on all that he does, see, hears and discovers, which might be of interest to his country, there is no duty on the part of the government or foreign office to impart any more information to the ambassador "on the spot" than it desires for him to know. Diplomacy, secrecy and efficiency requires this procedure in International Relations. This is the usual practice as I understand it and I remember, that Ambassador Oshima several times complained to me that he did not get information about the general political situation from his foreign office, nor even answers on several cables.

The negotiations were conducted in Berlin between Germany and Japan, and contact with Italy was made mainly by Germany. The German Embassy in Tokyo was not informed for some time; however, when Ambassador Ott asked for information concerning this matter, which came to his attention via the German Military Attache through the Japanese Army General Staff, a telegram was sent to Tokyo informing him only of the general progress of the negotiations. As far as I recollect it was April 1939.

#### 4. TERMINATION OF GERMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1939

The negotiations were completely broken off when the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Russia was concluded on 23 August 1939.

German-Russian negotiations resulting in this Pact were kept secret from the Japanese. When the matter was agreed upon between Germany and Russia. I was ordered by Ribbentrop to go to Ambassador Oshima and tell him the fact. The Ambassador's attitude was perfectly gentlemanlike, but he could not conceal that he was extremely disappointed, and he told me so.

The Japanese Government protested vigorously stating that the German-Russian Pact was in contravention of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, and announced the complete break-off of the above mentioned negotiations.

The effect of the German-Russian Pact on the German-Japanese relations was more far-reaching than that. Germany tried hard to keep Japan on her side, declaring her unchanged desire to promote the understanding with Japan. However, it was quite obvious to the German Government that the German-Russian Pact offended Japan so much and the Anti-German feelings in Japan were running so high that the relations between Germany and Japan underwent a complete cooling-off. Ambassador Oshima was replaced by Ambassador Kurusu, who was, although well liked, a so-called typical economic Ambassador, and the German Government understood well that this change should have been a symbol of the altered attitude of the Japanese Government, which tried at that time by all means to come to an understanding with the United States of America.

#### 5. VISITS TO TOKYO

I visited Japan for the first time in February, 1940, when I accompanied the President of the German Red Cross, the Duke of Koburg, on his visit to the United States. We travelled via Siberia and Japan, staying in Tokyo for four or five days only. On the return journey we touched Japan in May 1940 and stayed in Tokyo about a fortnight. That was my second visit. (The Duke of Koburg's visit to the United States was made in order to thank the American Red Cross for its activities in Poland and Germany during the German-Polish War in 1939, and to return the visits of some prominent members of the American Red Cross to him. No political purpose was hereby pursued.)

During my stay in Tokyo we made courtesy calls on the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Red Cross. On our way back through Japan the Duke and I delivered a congratulatory message to the Emperor of Japan on the celebration of the 2600th anniversary of the Dynasty.

I met my old friend Oshima and also Shiratori, whom I had met once or twice in Berlin before on social occasions. As far as I remember I saw them twice, once during a dinner in the German Embassy and a second time on occasion of a Japanese lunch in Tokyo, where I do not remember the host. We talked together, but not about political questions. Mr. Oshima was then in complete retirement and did not take any part in actual politics to my knowledge.

During my two visits together with the Duke of Koburg I sent one telegram each time to the Foreign Minister or to the Secretary of State in Berlin, wherein I gave a short survey of my impressions of the general political situation. After my return to Germany I made no further verbal or written report to anybody.

My third visit to Japan was in the year 1940, when I upon instructions from Ribbentrop, arrived in Tokyo via Siberia on 7 September and stayed there until the beginning of October, 1940. During my stay in Tokyo, I together with Ambassador Ott, negotiated with Foreign Minister Matsuoka on the Japanese side the Three Powers Pact.

#### 6. NEGOTIATIONS-TRI PARTITE PACT

In July, 1940, in Japan, the Yonai Cabinet was replaced by the Konoye Cabinet as a result of the increasing American pressure. As far as we know, Germany understood at that time the Konoye Cabinet was endeavoring to promote the idea of improving the relations with the United States; however, at the same time it wanted a closer contact with Germany with a view of strengthening Japan's political position in consummating the negotiations with the United States. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Matsuoka began to throw out his feelers very cautiously via the Japanese Ambassador Kurusu in Berlin and the German Ambassador Ott in Tokyo. Incoming telegrams from Ambassador Ott of the German Embassy in Tokyo and verbal information from Ambassador Kurusu in Berlin created a completely confused picture of the Japanese attitude from the viewpoint of the German Government, which eventually could not figure out what the Japanese Government had in mind.

In view of the confused picture and under the pressure of time, I was ordered by Ribbentrop to go to Tokyo. Ribbentrop's order included the following main points:

- (a) To find out the actual intention of the Japanese Government towards Germany;
- (b) To take up immediately negotiations in presence of Ambassador Ott, should the Japanese show the intention to conclude a new agreement with Germany;
- (c) To report immediately every detail in case of negotiations, of which every item had to be approved by Berlin before continuing.

After arriving in Tokyo on 7 September 1940, I was very cautious about my conduct in accordance with Ribbentrop's instructions. Above all, I avoided to talk to any Japanese other than Foreign Minister Matsuoka on my mission to Japan. I met him first on 9 September 1940, together with Ott, and explained to him the German intention to avoid any further spreading of the war, to keep the United States out of war, and create, if possible, a platform on which peace could be built. I declared further that Germany had no intention to draw Japan in the European war, and was ready, if requested by Japan, to use her good offices in order to promote friendly relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, and to contribute to the settlement of the China Incident.

Matsuoka agreed wholeheartedly. I reported this to Berlin, and received instructions in return from Ribbentrop to begin with the negotiations of an agreement. The negotiations showed quick progress and the Three Powers Pact was signed on 27 September 1940.

In the course of the negotiations I had time to get a good personal impression of Minister Matsuoka. He spoke very good English and was very proud of having had an education in the United States. On the first meeting we had he began to talk about half an hour of his life, his career, his connections and his importance and told me himself, which I heard later several times confirmed "I, my, me, myself". He seemed to believe to be just the right man as political leader in this decisive time for Japan and my later private talks with him, when he visited Germany in the next year confirmed this impression.

Mr. Oshima had no official position at that time, and no concern with these negotiations as far as I know. During my stay in Tokyo I called on him, because he was an old friend of mine, and met him on several social occasions. However, I neither revealed to him the negotiations for the Three Powers Pact nor asked I for his advice concerning the matter.

#### 7. AMBASSADOR OSHIMA'S RETURN TO GERMANY

When Ambassador Oshima came to Germany for the second time as Japanese Ambassador on February 1941, I was again Liaison man between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima. However, as in the previous time, I seldom attended personally the conversations between them.

In his conversations with me Ambassador Oshima never committed Japan to attack Singapore or U.S.S.R.; I have also no recollection that Ribbentrop ever told me that Ambassador Oshima did so in conversation with him.

Although I always was on friendly terms with Ambassador Oshima during the whole period of my contact with him, he never told me any military plans or revealed me any secrets. Besides, I myself had nothing to do with military matters, these being the task of Generals and Admirals, neither did Ribbentrop officially.

Ambassador Oshima was many years in Germany and spoke German well. Being an outspoken personality, he was well liked by the German people generally.

#### 8. FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA'S CONFERENCE WITH HITLER

When Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Germany in March 1941, I was ordered by Ribbentrop one or two days before his arrival to accompany him during his stay in Germany, and travelled with him on his trip in Germany. I was not concerned with the preparation of the program of his trip, which had already been finished by the protocol Chief, Baron Doernburg, when I received the order. Immediately after that I left Berlin by special train and met Minister Matsuoka at Malkinia, a German-Russian border station. I accompanied him to Berlin and was present when he made his first courtesy call on Ribbentrop; however, I was not present at the subsequent political conversations between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering.



Ambassador Ott had obtained permission to come to Berlin from Tokyo, to be present at the time of Minister Matsuoka's stay in Berlin. He attended some of these meetings.

I went with Minister Matsuoka to Siemens-Schuckert Works in Berlin, which he specially desired to see. When he left Berlin for Italy, I accompanied him as far as the Italian border, and after he returned from Rome I accompanied him again from Berlin to Malkinia. Personally, I had no political talks with Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I did not talk at that time with Ribbentrop as to what purpose he was pursuing in his conversations with Foreign Minister Matsuoka, also I never heard from Ribbentrop that Minister Matsuoka made any commitment. Beside the fact that Ribbentrop was always very seclusive and usually talked to one only of what was absolutely necessary for the work of the moment, my personal relation with Ribbentrop was rather strained at that time.

Before the arrival of Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Germany I heard nothing from Ambassador Oshima about the arrangements or the items to be taken up by Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, nor any wishes or ideas which he wanted to convey to Ribbentrop regarding the matter. During Minister Matsuoka's stay in Berlin I only met Ambassador Oshima at various luncheons. I do not believe that Ambassador Oshima had much influence on Minister Matsuoka and I had the feeling that their personal relations were not close, both being very different personalities. Foreign Minister Matsuoka told me absolutely nothing about Ambassador Oshima.

#### 9. RECORDS KEPT IN GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

It was the practice of the German Foreign Office that no stenographic records were taken of the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and the prominent foreign statesmen or ambassadors. Only unofficial minutes were made afterwards either as dictated by Hitler or Ribbentrop or by attending interpreters, mostly by Minister Schmidt. These minutes were, as being unofficial, never handed to the foreign participants of the conversations or shown to them for confirmation.

For internal use these records were only regarded as a sort of aide memoire, but never as documentary proof. I remember, that I was present at one occasion during a reception of foreign ex-servicemen, when Minister Schmidt, who acted as official interpreter wrote down only five or six single words from a discourse of over twenty minutes and then began to translate. Though he had very good memory sometimes arose a difference of opinion between Ribbentrop and Schmidt about what was really said.

Ribbentrop disliked very much that the foreign representatives would make direct contacts with high German officials other than those in the foreign service. I remember several occasions when I was ordered by Ribbentrop to try as politely as possible to prevent foreign diplomats from this practice. On account of this outspoken wish of Ribbentrop no official relations whatsoever existed in Germany between the foreign Embassies (including Japanese) or Legations and the German ministries other than the Foreign Office.

10. AMBASSADOR STAHRER SENT TO CHINA

I was appointed German Ambassador to China (Nanking) in 1941, left Germany with Councillor Bolze on 18 October 1941 and went to Nanking via South America and Japan.

While I was on the boat in the Pacific, I heard of the outbreak of the Japanese-American war. Until my departure from Germany the German Government, as far as I know, had no notion that the Japanese-American relation was strained to such an extent.

11. AMBASSADOR STAHRER MOVED TO TOKYO

I was appointed German Ambassador to Japan in December, 1942 and arrived in Tokyo on 28 January 1943. During my stay as German Ambassador in Japan I had very cordial personal relations with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and other officials of the Japanese Foreign Office. The political collaboration between Germany and Japan was however not close, and the commissions created by the Three Powers Pact was nothing but a formal show without any practical results. In the two or three meetings when I was present I did not hear a single word which was not to be found in the newspapers as well.

Although I was not concerned with military matters, as far as I know there existed between Germany and Japan no military or operational collaboration either. The main reason was, as I believe, the fact that while Germany was engaged in a life and death struggle with U.S.S.R. Japan was completely absorbed in the war with the United States and remained neutral to the German-Russian war. Moreover, the two countries were so far apart and no regular means of communications existed except radio, making the personal traffic almost impossible.

12. ATTITUDE OF AMBASSADOR OSHIMA

During all of my conversations, negotiations and conferences with him, Ambassador Oshima took no positive personal stand on any of the controversial issues which we discussed but reserved his judgment until after he had submitted the matter to his government, unless he had received prior instructions.

In our discussions personal opinions or suggestions would have no bearing, for in diplomacy it is the government speaking and not the individual.

With our checks on information we nearly always knew the attitude of the Japanese Government before we received official communication thru Ambassador Oshima or any other ambassador.

When action was taken in Japan we knew of it at the same time or sooner than Ambassador Oshima or his predecessors or successors. Rarely did we find out anything really new from the ambassador. Hearing it from him merely verified or made official what other sources of information had supplied.

13. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL OTT AS AMBASSADOR

Ambassador v. Dirksen, who was in Tokyo already some years, could not stand the climate, suffering from bronchial asthma, and had asked several times to be transferred. Ott, who was in Tokyo since 1934 and Military Attache in 1935, was very interested to become ambassador. With the assistance of General Keitel and the party-leader in Japan Mr. Hillmann, who worked closely together, he was appointed Ambassador to Tokyo in the beginning of 1938. Ribbentrop, who became Foreign Minister in February, 1938, did not object. On the contrary, he assured Ambassador Ott several times of his full confidence. When the idea of strengthening the relations with Japan came up Ott was ordered to Berlin in the summer of 1938, and in his presence the new course was talked over with Hitler and Ribbentrop. At this occasion Hitler made him a member of the party, which he could not become earlier, being an officer, to whom membership of the party was forbidden. It was expected from the German Ambassador in Tokyo to maintain friendly relations with parties in power, to get a survey of the changing political situation, and to report in this line to the Foreign Office.

14. LACK OF EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION

The greatest efforts in Germany during my time were expended towards the establishment of closest possible ties with England and France. Much more work, money, propaganda, and persons were used in that line. The German-English Society and the German-French Society were always regarded as more important than the correspondent German-Japanese Society. After the failure of the first negotiations with Japan in 1939, Germany and Japan had not proposed any agreements for more than a year, until Japan from her side again began in July, 1940, to take up new diplomatic negotiations.

I  
I cannot see any way where Japan assisted Germany in the war in any way. There was no joint German-Japanese war, in fact there were two wars, a German and a Japanese. This was due to the fact that there existed no joint high command, no plans for teamwork were worked out or even proposed, because there was no connection between the two countries except cables and occasional visits of submarines. For instance there cannot be even the slightest comparison with the excellent teamwork of the Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery in Europe and Africa, and MacArthur and Mountbatten in the Pacific and India. Besides, the Japanese had their own ideas about the Pacific war and never made serious efforts for instance to stop the transport of United States goods to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Japanese ideas of an ally were different than that of other countries. When I was in China, even in the official Japanese proclamations the Germans were noted as "friendly neutrals", not as allies.

C O N C L U S I O N

When I was occupied with the negotiations of the German-Italian-Japanese Agreement it was the general idea in 1938 and 1939 to avoid threatening political isolation and to prevent war through forming a defensive alliance, and thereby strengthening the international political situation in general. In 1940, after Germany was already in the war, the idea was to avoid the further outspreading of the war by preventing the United States from entering the war, and to establish a platform for peace. Never have I heard from any side any word about a plan of dominating the world. The claim that the three nations, Germany, Italy and Japan sought to dominate the world through their international relations is absurd.

As I said beforehand, Germany regarded the United States as the predominant nation in the Western Hemisphere and respected her resources and her highly developed industry, and did everything possible to prevent her entry into the war.

Toward the British Commonwealth of Nations there was no real hostile feeling till the outbreak of the war, Germany hoped for years to come to a lasting understanding with England. There was a widespread affection for England and especially for Scotland. Among the countries of the Commonwealth, Germany wanted to keep up friendly relations with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, recognizing their vast possibilities and the clever way in which the governments helped and guided their agricultural and industrial development.

As far as the Republic of France is concerned, there were many wars between these two countries, but there has never been real hate from the German side. This was especially evident in the connection between the Ex-servicemen of these countries, which were always more cordial between France and Germany as for instance between France and Italy. Besides all cultivated people in Germany respected and admired always the French language and the outstanding performances of French culture, literature and art.

After the attack of the Netherlands, Germany did not want to become in any way a successor of Dutch rights, also not as far as the Dutch possessions were concerned. The maintenance of close economical connections in time of peace were regarded as very important for both countries.

Friendly relations with China had always been traditional in Germany. Therefore, Germany was very much interested in acting as mediator in the China-Japanese affair, which was looked upon as an especially unfavourable development both for China and for Japan. In 1938 the then German Ambassador in China, Mr. Trautmann, tried to help in the outcome of an understanding, and in November, 1940, I negotiated in Berlin with the Chinese Ambassador Chen Chieh. When I had to go to China in 1941 as Ambassador to Nanking, it was always my secret hope that during my time there the unification of China could be perfected, sometimes it seemed not far away.

Def. Doc. # 1675

India always interested Germany very much. Not from the political point of view, but it was hoped to develop economical relations, besides there existed a great interest for Indian philosophies and languages.

The Kingdom of Siam was regarded as an Asiatic country, of which the independence must be maintained, owing to the geographical situation and tradition of the Kingdom.

In regard to the Commonwealth of the Philippines, Germany favored very much the liberty of this nation. It was always hoped that the economic relations between Germany and the Commonwealth of the Philippines could be considerably enlarged.

Many people in Germany and also I personally had since August, 1939, sincerely hoped that a lasting understanding could be reached between Germany and the Soviet Union, and that under completely changed political conditions the traditional friendship of the nineteenth century between these two peoples, which have so much in common, could be renewed. When crossing the German Italian border on the 22nd June, 1941, I heard by radio that Germany had attacked Russia. This was for me the worst surprise in my political career, and I knew that now the fate of Germany was sealed.

I considered it most unfortunate that the two greatest nations of Europe could not find a way to avoid war and to live together peacefully.

/s/ Heinrich Stahmer,

Sworn to and subscribed by the above-named STAHER, Heinrich, before the undersigned officer at \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1947

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See R. 24236

INTERROGATORIES OF AMBASSADOR STAHRER

QUESTIONS FOR AMBASSADOR STAHRER

1. At any time during your conversations, negotiations or conferences with Ambassador OSHIMA did he at any time commit himself as favorable to Japanese commencing or participation in any war?

Answer - No, he did not commit himself in that way.

2. At any time did Ambassador OSHIMA take a partisan stand on any matters under consideration or were his acts, conversations and opinions governed by his instructions from his government?

Answer - When we talked together as far as our work was concerned, I always had the impression that he spoke according to instructions from his government.

3. Did you see him in Japan during his retirement? Socially, officially? Did he discuss his plans for the future? Military mission to Germany? Corps Commander, etc?

Answer - In Japan I saw him in 1940 only socially, but he never discussed his plans for the future nor any politics. When he left Berlin in 1939, he told me also nothing about his ideas for the future.

4. Did OSHIMA occupy any position officially or otherwise except that of Ambassador while he was in Germany? Did he ever go beyond his authority or responsibility at any time, to your knowledge?

Answer - No. as far as I know, nor got I ever the impression that he went beyond his authority or responsibility.

5. In Germany is the ambassador considered the representative of the head of the State or of the government in power?

Answer - Head of the state, we were not so much interested in the political processes by which results were obtained, but with the relationship resulting through the action taken. Ambassadors represent the head of the State. Ministers represent the government, their authority is more limited. The ambassador is the head of the mission and enjoys all the privileges of his rank and immunities from jurisdiction and interference.

6. Did OSHIMA ever at any time receive instructions as far as you know, which obliged him to do anything beyond diplomatic protocol or procedure established in international relations? Were you more or less protocol chief for diplomatic relations with Japan & Oshima? Were you ever asked by OSHIMA or Ribbentrop to go beyond diplomatic practice in any of your negotiations with OSHIMA?

Answer - I never got the impression that Oshima received instructions which obliged him to do anything beyond diplomatic protocol. I was not protocol chief for diplomatic relations with Oshima and the Japanese Embassy, but I worked in that line closely together with the Germany chief of Protocol Baron Dornberg. Neither OSHIMA nor Ribbentrop ever asked me to go beyond diplomatic practice in any of our negotiations.

7. Were there any collaboration between Germany and Japan as far as you know that was not provided for by treaty and regulated by some agreement entered into thru the established diplomatic channels?

Answer - There was no collaboration between Germany and Japan, as far as I know, that was not provided for by treaty and went not through the established channels.

8. Were all of OSHIMA's dealings with you and with Ribbentrop usual procedure adopted by other diplomats in their relations with Germany?

Answer - OSHIMA's dealings with me and with Ribbentrop were not different at all from the dealings of other ambassadors with whom I had to work.

9. Did OSHIMA ever interest himself in matters outside of his diplomatic tasks and duties which were contrary to the best interest of either Germany or Japan and those required of his office?

Answer - No, not so far as I know.

10. Did OSHIMA ever manifest any interest in party politics of Japan or have advance information on who was to be Prime Minister of Foreign Minister? Did you know as quickly as he in most cases?

Answer - He never talked about Japanese party politics, and he was as surprised as we were when the governments changed. Sometimes we heard through radio sooner the names of the new Prime or Foreign Minister than he heard it officially.

11. How many different Foreign Ministers were there in Japan during his tour of duty in Germany? Did all of the various cabinets express different foreign policies, or vary the policy towards Germany?

Answer - As far as I know 10 or 11.

All of the various cabinets had different political ideas as far as Germany was concerned. Sometimes their policy towards Germany varied slightly, sometimes very much.

Q. Was there not always some anxiety in Germany when a change came about?

Answer - Yes, we were always nervous and never knew beforehand what a change of cabinet meant for us.

Q. Were new contacts always necessary when a change in Cabinet took place?

Answer - Yes, in Tokyo the embassy always had to try to keep up contact with the changing ministers.

Q. - From your relationship with OSHIMA could you say that he was affiliated with any certain political party in Japan? Was he quite divorced from party politics?

Answer - I never got the impression that OSHIMA was interested in Japanese party politics. He seemed quite divorced from party politics.

12. Were all of the official acts of OSHIMA based upon the policy of the Japanese Government as expressed in messages, telegrams and commissions? Or did he impose his personal views in his official negotiations?

Answer - All the official acts of OSHIMA were based upon the policy of his government, I never got any other impression.

Q. Did he represent his views and would his position permit it?

A. - When he represented his views, he did it either to assist or to explain the instructions of his government. When he was asked questions, which he felt he could not answer on his own behalf, he told us he would cable to his government and ask for explanation or definition. That happened several times.

Q. - What would happen in the event of a conflict of views between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador? Whose word is more final in diplomatic procedure?

A. - In the event of a conflict of views between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador, obviously the Foreign Minister's word is final in diplomatic procedure.

13. To what extent is an ambassador regarded as the representative of the head of the state and granted immunity and special privileges under International Law and customs among Nations? Germany?

Answer - An ambassador is especially treated as the personal representative of the head of the State. When he appears officially he enjoys special honours, and he is granted immunity and special privileges according to International Law and customs among nations. All these ambassadorial privileges are connected with his person, not with any other official of his embassy.

Q. - Were these principles adhered to rigidly in Germany as respects ambassadors of the allied nations at outbreak of war? Please explain procedure.

A. - These principles were always rigidly adhered to in Germany as respects ambassadors of the allied nations at outbreak of war. I remember that special officials of the foreign office were ordered to take care of the different ambassadors. Special trains and guards had to transport all members to a resort, normally first-class hotel, where they could wait till the German Embassy members in the respective countries were ready. Then the ambassadors and embassy members were exchanged, under German responsibility till the German borders. When diplomatic relations were severed as for instance between Chungking-China and Germany, the ambassador and his staff could nevertheless stay in their houses, and they enjoyed special privileges in the rationing of food, gasoline and so on. This is customary as long as he stays in the country where he was formerly accredited, when he leaves this country, he is estimated as foreigner of distinction. During the siege of Warsaw in September, 1939, i.e. even before the occupation, a special armistice of 24 hours was granted to the city only to give the diplomatic corps possibility to leave.

14. Was OSHIMA informed of the American-Japanese negotiations prior to Pearl Harbor? Had he ever protested to his government as far as you know on account of lack of information? Was he kept informed usually or only as to certain negotiations?

Answer - I do not know, but I do not believe it, because he told me several times that he was badly informed from his government, and he complained about it. I got the impression that he was usually only informed as far as his government believed it to be necessary.



BASED UPON COUNT 5 OF THE INDICTMENT

- Q. At any time during your negotiations, conversations or conferences with Ambassador Oshima did he initiate discussions or any questions officially or unofficially dealing with Japan-German relations without first obtaining instructions from his Government?
- A. Not as far as I know.
2. Did he take a lead or role as organizer of any movement, policy or program which was sponsored by any group in the Japanese Government, as distinguished from the organized machinery and governmental process of Japan?
- A. I never got the impression, when I saw him, that he talked otherwise as in his capacity as ambassador, that means as representative of his government.
3. Did he instigate any program or governmental policy of Japan which later became the foreign policy of his government?
- A. No, he always talked according to the instruction of his government, which several times changed its policy concerning Germany.
4. Did he assist or in any way further the program of any faction, group or organization as distinguished from the ordinary channels of diplomatic intercourse during the period of your relations with him?
- A. I never got that impression.
5. Did he formulate in any manner any policy or plank of any program which was proposed by the Japanese government or were all of his negotiations based upon matters which originated in Tokyo, or through the governmental machinery in Berlin?
- A. His negotiations were always based upon orders coming from Tokyo or wishes from the government in Berlin.
- Q. Did he take any part in the execution of any program, policy or agreement which was not sponsored, promoted and urged by his own government through diplomatic channels?
- A. I never heard of it.
- Q. Was there any definite continuity in the foreign policy of Japan towards Germany over the period of years of your association with this problem?
- A. Through the German foreign policy towards Japan was unchanged, the Japanese policy as far as Germany was concerned changed several times; the ideas of the Government Konoe - Hirota (Summer 1938), Hiramama - Arita (January 1939), and Konoe - Matsuoka (July 1940) in that line was extremely different.
- Q. Did you ever have any conversations or negotiations with Ambassador Oshima which would indicate to you that he bore any closer relationship to one of the nine foreign ministers of Japan than to the other eight, who were in charge of foreign affairs during his tour of duty as Ambassador?

- A. No, I have never heard him express greater friendship towards any foreign minister particularly; having been absent such a long time from Japan, probably he did not even know them personally.
- Q. It is charged that the object of the German-Japanese-Italian agreements were to secure the military, naval, political and economical domination of the whole world, each having specific domination in its won sphere.  
Would you please give your explanation of the underlying purpose of the international relations between the three nations.
- A. The claim that the three nations Germany-Japan-Italy sought to dominate the world through their international relations is absurd. When I was occupied with the negotiations of the German-Japanese-Italian agreement, it was the general idea in 1938 & 1939 to avoid threatening political isolation and to prevent war through forming a defensive alliance, thereby strengthening the international political situation in general. In 1940, after Germany was already at war, the idea was to avoid the farther outspreading of the war by preventing the United States from entering the war, and to establish a platform for peace. Never have I heard from any side any word about a plan of dominating the world.

( 2 )  
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR AMBASSADOR  
STAMMER

COLLABORATION - JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY BASED UPON  
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTION ON THIS PHASE.

1. To what extent did any Japanese statesmen, other than Matsuoka, participate in the negotiations with you and Ambassador Ott prior to the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact in September 1940?
  - A. Only Matsuoka participated, no other Japanese statesman.
2. During your negotiations with Matsuoka did he at any time interrupt conferences or conversations to confer and consult with other Japanese statesmen concerning the content, wording or intent of the Tri-Partite Pact?
  - A. No, during our negotiations Matsuoka did not even telephone with other people.
3. The Prosecution has stated on page 7, sub-division 2: "Shortly after the reorientation of German policy with respect to Sino-Japanese conflict, and German-Japanese relations, von Ribbentrop, then German Foreign Minister, proposed German-Japanese military alliance aimed at the entire world". Is this statement true? If not, explain.
  - A. As far as I know, Ribbentrop proposed a new agreement with Japan, with the idea of strengthening political relations with this country. I came in shortly after the negotiations began, and I was instructed to work in the preparations of a defensive alliance. Never have I heard from Ribbentrop or any other side even a hint of a proposed German-Japanese military alliance aimed at the entire world.
4. It is stated that the accused Oshima and Shiratori were sent to Rome for the purpose of inducing Mussolini to enter in to the proposed Tri-Partite Pact? Is this statement true? If not, explain to what extent Ribbentrop and Hitler had previously negotiated and conferred with Mussolini concerning this matter.
  - A. It is not true, according to my knowledge, that Oshima and Shiratori were sent to Rome to induce Mussolini to enter in the proposed Tri-Partite Pact. The German Government could and would never use Foreign ambassadors for such a purpose. Besides, as I know definitely, Hitler and Ribbentrop had already talked with Mussolini about the idea of a Tri-Partite Pact during the Munich Conference in September 1938, where Mussolini agreed principally.
5. Were you advised as to the mission of the Ito Commission which was sent to Berlin and Rome relating to the abortive Tri-Partite agreement.
  - A. No.

6. In Count Ciano's Diary it is related that Shiratori and Oshima refused to follow the instructions delivered by the Ito Commission.  
What has been your experience concerning the accuracy of the items set out in the Ciano diary?
- A. I have only read an abridged version of Ciano's diary, but I do not take it as a historical document. He asserts, for instance, that he was against the Italians attacking Greece, but at that time I heard from the Italian Embassy that Ciano assisted this plan very much and was proud of it; only after the Italian defeat in Albania he changed his opinion.
7. It is charged that the ambassadors asserted that they would resign in the event the pact of alliance was not concluded without reservation.  
Were you aware of any such condition?
- A. I did not hear of this assertion, if it is true, the Japanese Government must know it. I think I would have known of it, surely, if it were true. The only mention I have ever heard of such a thing was from the one source.
8. It is charged that Germany endeavored to excite Japan's feeling against America by influencing the press and leading personalities. Please state if this is true, if not, please explain the attitude of the German leaders towards appeasement of the United States.
- A. I do not know, and I was personally never connected with this line. I only remember that Goebbels wanted to attack F.D.R. personally, but that Hitler, after a conference with Ribbentrop, strictly forbade any personal attack of the person of a foreign Chief of state.
9. It is charged that negotiations for Japanese-German alliance were renewed by Kurusu on the 19 June 1940.  
Please explain this statement in the light of the actual circumstances.
- A. Kurusu only told the German Government that the new government in Tokyo wanted a closer contact; he did not begin negotiations otherwise it would not have been necessary to send me to Tokyo, because the situation was too obscure to be analyzed from Berlin. As far as I know, he was during the negotiations in Tokyo only very scantily informed by his own government.
10. It is charged that on 8 July 1940 Ambassador Sato and Kurusu in conference with you and Ribbentrop conferred concerning the relations between Japan and Germany.  
Please explain the nature and extent of this discussion.
- A. That was no conference, but only a courtesy call with a normal conversation, where I got the impression that both sides wanted to avoid any remark concerning unsolved political questions. I remember that the Japanese Minister Kawai, who travelled at that time in Europe was present.
11. To what extent the French and Dutch East Asia colonies came in for discussion during this conversation?
- A. I have no recollections.
12. To what extent had the Japanese statesmen manifested their fears concerning the interest of Germany in the Pacific Isles?
- A. Same as question number 11.

13. To what extent did the appointment of Matsuoka effect the Japanese Foreign policy towards Germany?

A. From the new cabinet with Konoye as Prime Minister and Matsuoka as Foreign Minister we got the impression that this cabinet was interested to come to a closer contact with Germany. When I arrived in Japan I found that the government had already made preparations for a pact with Germany and Italy.

14. In Germany what was the impression as to what officials of the Japanese government determined upon the Foreign Policy of Japan during all of the time while you were Liaison between Ribbentrop and Oshima?

A. We did not have the impression that any single statesmen determined upon the Japanese foreign policy. For us the different statesmen were only exponents of different groups or a combination of groups, sometimes more friendly towards Germany, sometimes more towards the United States and England.

15. At the time when you arrived in Tokyo for the negotiations of the Tri-Partite Pact did you consider that Japan and the United States would become engaged in war in the Pacific  
(p. 19)

A. No, I wanted to prevent the entrance of the United States into the war.

16. The prosecution has stated that the 20 million of German descent Americans were considered to hold an influential position in the United States. Would you please state what you told Matsuoka concerning this?

A. When Matsuoka asked me about the influence of the German descent Americans, I told him that I believed they were better American citizens than many other Americans, and informed him of my experiences in that line in Chicago.

17. Did you discuss the terms of the Tri-Partite Pact with Prince Konoye or any other cabinet member before or after its completion in Tokyo?

A. No, neither with Prince Konoye nor any other cabinet member whom I saw. Only after the signature, during official lunches or dinners was the matter commented upon.

18. Please explain the circumstances which brought about the signing of the Pact in Berlin rather than in Tokyo.

A. I do not remember; the German Embassy in Tokyo got a cable some days before the negotiations were finished that Germany and Italy wanted to have the pact signed in Berlin.

19. Please explain Matsuoka's idea concerning this matter.

A. At first he seemed a little reluctant, but very soon he agreed; I believe that, as a sort of compensation, Ribbentrop invited him on the evening of the 27 September to come to Berlin.

20. \* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* \* \*

21. Was the Soviet Union considered a potential participant in the Tri Partite Pact? Explain. O

A. Though I was never told so, I believe both Germany and Japan wanted the Soviet Union to participate later. At any rate, both governments were very anxious to avoid any possibility to offend the Soviet Union.

22. It is stated that "The German Ambassador to Japan made a report on the 31 January 1941 to his government of a two day research with the attaches of the armed forces in which it was concluded that the chances of success of an attack by Japan against Singapore were favorable". Was this action authorized in Berlin or taken upon the initiative of Ambassador Ott?

A. I believe that this action was taken upon the initiative of Ambassador Ott, because if Berlin had asked for such a research the telegram concerned must be referred to after the custom of the German Foreign Office, as for instance in the telegram Nr. 129 from the 27th September, 1941. German Number 119.

23. Upon the arrival of Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Germany in 1941 did he advise you of the principle international question which he desired to discuss with Ribbentrop?

A. No.

24. Did you at any time learn of the purpose of his mission?

A. I only heard shortly after he had left Berlin that he wanted to make a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

25. As far as you know was Ambassador Oshima advised beforehand or during the visit of the object of his tour?

A. I do not know, because Oshima did not tell me.

26. Were you ever aware of any conversations between Ambassador Oshima and von Ribbentrop concerning the advisability of an Japanese attack on Singapore?

A. I was never present at a meeting between Ribbentrop and Oshima where a Japanese attack on Singapore was mentioned.

27. Is it likely that such a conversation took place? Explain ⊕

A. I do not believe it, for as far as I know Oshima, he was always very cautious.

28. Was it understood in Berlin that Matsuoka's opinions and expressions were purely unofficial and personal views, rather than backed by his Government, when he discussed Singapore and joint economic and military cooperation? O

A. I believe that Berlin understood Matsuoka's opinion as purely unofficial and personal views, because we knew that the governments changed very often in Japan and that a strong man, as what Matsuoka wished to impress himself, was not possible under the Imperial Regime in Japan.

Def. Doc. # 1714

29. It is stated (p30) that "On the 24 May 1941 a report was made by German Military Attache in Tokyo to German Foreign Intelligence Office that Japan acknowledged her treaty obligations in the event United States entered the war." Is this statement based on facts?
- A. I do not know. I never heard of it.
30. It is charged that "When the Tri-Partite Pact was concluded 27 September 1940, Matsuoka in reply to a question stated that an agreement would be negotiated between the three powers for a now separate peace pact in the event of hostilities". Are you aware of any such statement being uttered at that time?
- A. I do not remember to have talked with Matsuoka about a "no separate peace clause".
31. Up until the time you left Germany were the officials of the government informed of the state of negotiations between Japan and the United States? Please explain this situation.
- A. When I was still in Germany in 1941, the German officials concerned were very nervous, because they never got a clear answer of the state of negotiations between Japan and the United States, during early 1941 until October when I left. We only heard indirectly and thru unreliable information or rumors.
32. It is stated that on the 18 January 1942 the armed forces of Japan, Germany and Italy concluded military agreement "In the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact 27 September 1940", and provided for operational coordination among them. Was any such situation contemplated at the completion of the Tri-Partite Pact?
- A. At the time of the signature of the Tri-Partite Pact no such action or situation was contemplated.

*original les signatures*

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

S U M M A R Y

FROM: Worth E. McKinney

12 March 1946

TO : Executive Committee

SUBJECT: Heinrich Stahmer.

On March 6, interrogation of the above named subject was begun at Sugamo Prison concerning his activities in Germany, China, and Japan in regard to the plan of expansion of Germany and Japan. In the interrogation Stahmer admitted that he joined the Nazi Party in Germany about the year 1932, but did not become active until about 1938 when he was called in by Ribbentrop for the purpose of organizing an international veterans' association. According to Stahmer, the purpose of this organization was to co-ordinate all veterans under an international basis, but it appeared from the interrogation that Ribbentrop's plan was to form a veterans' organization for the benefit of the Nazi Party. Stahmer worked on this plan for some time and then was called by Ribbentrop to take charge of German-Japanese relations.

His job was to work out a military, political, and economic alliance with Japan, Germany, and Italy. He was to confer with Oshima and Shiratori and to work out some sort of a pact that would be beneficial to Germany and Japan in their program for the expansion in Europe and Greater East Asia. According to the interrogation, this work began during the summer of 1938. A number of meetings were held with Oshima, Shiratori, Ribbentrop and Hitler in an effort to reach some definite plan. At that time they were unable to draft a pact that all parties would sign. It appears that Stahmer was a very outstanding German, as he was chosen by Ribbentrop to be his right hand man. (See interrogation of Stahmer dated March 6, 1946, pp. 20 and 21.)

Stahmer, in conferring with Shiratori and Oshima, was well informed on the Japanese plan for the expansion in Greater East Asia. (See interrogation of Stahmer dated March 6, 1946, pp. 23-25. Also interrogation of Stahmer dated March 7, 1946, pp. 9-12.)



Stahmer

12 Mar 46

Just prior to the signing of the Tri-Party Pact in 1940, Stahmer was sent to Japan by Ribbentrop to feel out Japan's attitude toward the United States and England and whether or not it would be possible to complete a pact under the plan started in 1938. (See interrogation of Stahmer dated March 8, 1946, pp. 3-5.)

It appears that Germany, Italy, and Japan formed a conspiracy to assist each other in their respective plans for the development of Europe and Greater East Asia. (See interrogation of Stahmer dated March 8, 1946, pp. 8-13 and p. 21.)

The interrogation of Stahmer above referred to covers the period from the time he joined the Nazi Party in 1932 up until the signing of the Tri-Party Pact in September 1940. Further activities will be covered in another interrogation from 1940 through 1944.

From documentary evidence in the files of Shiratori and Oshima and from the admissions made by Stahmer, I am of the opinion that he should be included as a defendant. In the interrogations above referred to, Stahmer quotes conversations had with Oshima and Shiratori which could be used as evidence against them, however, Stahmer is not a willing witness at the present time and is rather reluctant to make an admission against his interests or any one else connected. A summary of further interrogations will be furnished the Committee as soon as possible.

WORTH E. MCKINNEY