

AMAU, Eigi DOSSIER
Case File No. 216

(5)

(19)

AMAU Eiji (Case File No. 216)

In Sugamo Prison

I. STATUS OF SUBJECT:

- A. Arrest was ordered pursuant to letter to Imperial Japanese Government of 1 December 1945, GHQ, SCAP, AG 383.7 (1 Dec. 1945) CI, subject: Apprehension of Japanese personnel.
- B. Entered Sugamo Prison - 12 December 1945.

II. DIRECT AND IMPLIED CHARGES AGAINST THE SUBJECT:

- A. The proposed charge is that the subject planned, prepared, initiated and waged aggressive warfare and conspired to perform the same in that he:
 - 1. Aided in the formulation of national policies by virtue of his official positions and molded public opinion to support the means and aims of the conspiracy.
- B. Information serving as the basis for apprehension and as the basis for possible charges against the subject is attached as an annex, marked Tab "A".

III. FACTS REFLECTED FROM THE FILE:

- A. Curriculum Vitae of subject (Tab "B") shows him to have been a career man in the consular and diplomatic corps whose broad experience in foreign service brought him to the post of Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, 1933 to 1937. After serving in diplomatic posts as Minister to Switzerland and Ambassador to Italy, subject resigned from diplomatic service and became Vice Foreign Minister under TOYODA in 1941. He became Chief of the Independent Cabinet Information Bureau and served during 1943 and 1944, resigning upon the fall of the TOYODA Cabinet.
- B. Memoranda from Staff Sections: G-2 report on subject dated 19 June 1947 is set forth in part as follows:

1. "On 17 April 1934 as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, AMAU issued to the press the so-called 'AMAU Statement' concerning the Japanese sphere of influence in China, which has been quoted and requoted in practically every book on Japanese foreign relations since that day." The Information Bureau was at that time a division of the Foreign Ministry. With respect to the duties of its Chief, the GAIMUSHO NENKAN (Foreign Ministry Yearbooks) states "Within this Information Department one person will be appointed by the Emperor as Chief of the said department, who will administer the duties of this department under the orders of the Minister of Foreign Affairs."
2. "AMAU himself, under interrogation, has explained the set-up of the Information Bureau through the years, his connection with it and his relationship to the 'Amau Statement'. He states emphatically that the policy which he voiced was the policy of the Foreign Office.
3. "The Japanese press of the time, in commenting on the incident, did not call the release the 'AMAU Statement'. It ignored AMAU as a factor in the case and called it an 'informal announcement of the Foreign Office'.
4. "In commenting on the statement, the Japan Weekly Chronicle of the day likewise laid the responsibility for the statement squarely at the door of the Foreign Ministry. The wordy discussions in the issue of 26 April 1944³⁴ are pointed up by the opening sentence of an article entitled 'What Next', which says:

"If, in issuing an unofficial statement on the government's China policy, the situation of the Foreign Office was to secure the world's reaction, the maneuver has been eminently successful'. No mention, much less of accusation, of AMAU is contained in the articles.
5. "An OSS report, of which the source is unknown, says: 'On April 17, 1934, (AMAU) made the notorious "Hands Off China Statement". A member of the Foreign Office has since stated that it was a confidential policy, prepared in the Asiatic Bureau. Someone gave the press a tip, and questions were put to AMAU, who did not realize that the policy was confidential.'
6. "Wilfred Fleisher, long editor of the Japan Advertiser and believed to have been a witness at the issuance of the statement, says in his 'Volcanic Isle':

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"AMAU quite unconsciously and accidentally became famous overnight. -- Little realizing the importance his words might have and devoid of the sense of news values his predecessor possessed, AMAU picked up a sheaf of telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and Japanese envoys abroad, and read out a dispatch from Vice-Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu to the Japanese Minister to China, Akira Ariyoshi'.

"AMAU himself had never anticipated the reaction his statement created. He was astounded. He seemed, however, to thoroughly enjoy the limelight into which he had been projected, and if he was censured by both Foreign Minister Hirota and Vice-Minister Shigemitsu, as he undoubtedly was, he was praised and congratulated by many outside the Foreign Office who concurred in the views he had unwittingly given publicity'.

7. "Ambassador Grew's diary ("Ten Years in Japan") considered the question of AMAU's responsibility a draw. His entry dated 28 April, 1934, reads:

"Whether or not HIROTA (the Premier) approved the issuance of the statement is unessential, for the statement accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue'."

8. AMAU was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs on 22 July 1941. This was in the nature of a new deal in the Foreign Office in that it is generally accepted as a fact that the Second KONOYE Cabinet resigned for the express purpose of ousting MATSUOKA as Foreign Minister. It is likewise generally accepted that the Third KONOYE Cabinet through its Foreign Minister made a definite desperate last effort to negotiate the difficult situation with the United States.
9. AMAU was appointed Chief of the Information Bureau in April 1943 and remained in this post until July 1944. The Bureau had been made an independent board under the Cabinet in 1940.
10. On 27 June 1945, the Dai Nippon Asia Development Association was formed to replace the KOA SOHOMBU (Rise Asia General Headquarters) which had died with the parental Imperial Rule Assistance Association. The purpose of this organization was to engage in the spreading and the promotion of the idea of Asiatic development in line with the situation; it was to strengthen the solidarity of the East Asiatic peoples and to engage in powerful thought war in line with the armed hostilities. AMAU was named Vice President and Chief of its Board of Directors.

11. SHIRATORI and AMAU were contemporaries in the consular and diplomatic service, and both were at one time or another associated with the Information Bureau. Also AMAU succeeded SHIRATORI as Ambassador to Rome in 1939.
12. AMAU's connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was a minor one which was due to his position in the Foreign Office and in the Information Bureau. He was Councillor of IRAA from October 1940 to October 1941 and from April 1943 to July 1944.
13. AMAU states emphatically that the policy which he voiced in the "AMAU Statement" was the policy of the Foreign Office. (AMAU's description of his famous statement and the circumstances surrounding it is set forth in Tab "C".)
14. In a statement describing the Information Bureaus in the Japanese Government, AMAU states in part as follows:
 - (a) "For a long time it was the desire of the Army and Navy to control information matters by abolishing the Foreign Office Information Bureau and by establishing an independent Information Bureau in the Cabinet which they could control. In 1937 they therefore, proposed to establish a Committee of Information in the Cabinet comprised of representatives of the Army, Navy and other departments; military, naval and other government officials held many meetings to discuss this proposal. AMAU fought it but he was overwhelmed by a 13 - 1 vote. As a result AMAU was sent to Switzerland as Minister. He was succeeded by KAWAI in April 1937.

"The Information Committee within the Cabinet (NAIKAKU JOHO IIN KAI) was established on September 29, 1937, composed of representatives of all departments of Government including the Army and Navy."
 - (b) "When MATSUOKA was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1940 the Foreign Office Information Bureau was abolished and the Cabinet Information Department became the Information Bureau with a 'Shin-nin-kan' (official appointed like a Cabinet Minister or an Ambassador personally and directly by His Majesty the Emperor) as its chief."
 - (c) "The Cabinet Information Bureau was reorganized in April 1943 when AMAU was appointed as President of the Board succeeding TANI. As a result of the reorganization, all military and naval officers were withdrawn. Instead, a Council Room was established in the Bureau in which the

Army and Navy were formally represented by a Colonel and a Captain respectively. Besides, Army and Navy representatives were present at the weekly conferences of the Bureau.

"After the outbreak of the war, the Army and Navy established the DAI HONEI HODO BU (Information Department of Grand Imperial Headquarters) and all news concerning the war was exclusively handled by them."

C. Summary of Interrogations:

1. Interrogation of 14 March 1946 (File 216, Serial 12). Subject explained his reputation of the Japanese Government in the session of the Advisory Committee on Narcotics to the League of Nations in 1938. At that time he was Minister to Switzerland and concurrently Chief of the Japanese Bureau for International Conferences in Geneva, and as such attended all conferences of committees of the League which dealt with non-political matters. Subject stated that he was not an expert in the field of opium and narcotics but that he was assisted by a representative in those matters, who was well versed. Advisers from the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry (which handled some opium and narcotics matters) prepared for him the statement he read before the Advisory Committee in 1938.
2. Interrogation of 17 April 1946 (File 216, Serial 23). Subject stated that all matters pertaining to the military such as strategy, plans, tactics, preparations, "Incidents", policy and Army leadership were zealously secreted by the military and never revealed to civilian officials -- at least he said to civilian officials of his rank or station. He denied having any knowledge or information at any time relative to the fortification of the mandated islands, to Japanese atrocities, to Naval preparations for attack on Pearl Harbor or relative to any of the other vital subjects. The agent reporting the interview found the subject especially ill informed with reference to military and Naval personalities. AMAU related that on or about 16 October 1941 he was ordered by Foreign Minister TOYODA to make a last effort to persuade TOJO to withdraw Japanese troops from China unconditionally so that negotiations with the United States could continue.

// At a conference attended only by TOJO and AMAU, subject states he told TOJO that Japan could not hope to win a war with the United States and that such a war must be avoided even at the expense of unconditional withdrawal of troops from China. Subject describes the meeting as unpleasant and said that TOJO twice asked him to leave since discussion on the point was useless.

D. Subject has not appeared as a witness in this case.

E. Other Facts.

1. Characterization of subject in his evaluation at the time of internment as an "ardent nationalist. Reported associate of SHIRATORI. Close Army connections." appears to have been taken from State Department research and intelligence service report of 3 October 1945, in which it is stated "according to one source AMAU is associated with SHIRATORI Toshio and a pro-Axis group with close Army connections" which is identified as coming from "OSS Source T".

F. Pertinent Information in SAIONJI's Diary.

1. SAIONJI mentions the issuance of the so-called AMAU Statement in April 1934 and states that neither the Foreign Minister nor the Vice Foreign Minister were aware that AMAU was making the statement. He indicates that AMAU's Statement was his (AMAU's) paraphrase to the press of instructions from the Foreign Ministry to all ambassadors. Because of the repercussions to the statement, SAIONJI said it would have been better if an English translation of the actual instructions had been issued.

IV. DISCUSSION:

As suggested in the G-2 report, AMAU's position as a Class "A" war crimes suspect seems to derive principally from his authorship of the so-called "AMAU Statement" which caused an international furor in diplomatic circles. (See Tab "C" for text and circumstances surrounding issuance of the Statement.) At first blush there would seem to be reason for associating with the conspiracy the framer of a statement telling the world in effect that Japan claimed the exclusive right to work with China in settling China's problems and inviting third Powers to cease interference in Chinese

affairs. Until modified by Foreign Minister HIROTA, and perhaps even afterwards, the statement carried the clear implication that the Nine Power Treaty was a dead letter. Although the policy announced by AMAU is considered part and parcel of the conspiracy, personal responsibility would not attach to AMAU unless it could be shown that he, as a conspirator or as a person with knowledge of the conspiracy, issued the statement more or less on his own authority in order to promote the conspiracy.

Available evidence, however, indicates that AMAU was personally responsible for no more than the indiscreet phrasing of the statement and perhaps its premature issuance. The fact that the statement reflected the official position of the Foreign Ministry and not AMAU's personal views or desires is not seriously questioned. Support for this is found in press comments at the time and statements by Ambassador Grew and Prince SAIONJI, noted supra. This is further borne out by the fact that subsequent restatement of the purposes covered by AMAU involve changes in language rather than substance.

No evidence has been gathered with respect to his position as Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, indicating that the office had any policy making functions or that he used the office to insinuate himself into a policy making role. That his office disseminated information or announced decisions that contributed to the progress of the conspiracy is not of itself proof of his involvement in the conspiracy.

Similarly with respect to his later positions as Vice Foreign Minister in 1941 and as Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau 1943-1944, the evidence at hand shows no provable connection with the conspiracy. There is evidence that he was appointed Vice Foreign Minister to assist TOYODA in overcoming the impasse in Japanese-American relations. In his last office as Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau he was directly under TOJO and practically a member of his Cabinet; in fact, he resigned upon the fall of the TOJO Cabinet. But this position alone, unrelated to other evidence linking him to the conspiracy in its earlier stages, would seem insufficient basis for charges. Japan was already at war and in addition his position does not appear to have been a policy making one.

Information concerning his earlier diplomatic posts and his activity in them do not furnish basis for connecting him with the conspiracy during the Manchurian Incident. Though he had been in China prior to 1931, his posts were comparatively minor ones. The Tri-Partite Pact was finally concluded while he was Ambassador to Italy, but

our evidence relating to the Pact does not involve AMAU, which gives support to his claim that he resigned from the post because of his embarrassment at having been kept in ignorance of the Pact until it was concluded.

It is concluded that with the evidence presently available, it would be difficult to sustain war guilt charges against the subject.

TAB
"A"

AMAU

S E C R E T

Evaluation of AMAU, Eiji at time of Internment - Dec 1945.

AMAU Eiji

Career diplomat. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, July-October, 1941. Succeeded Tani as President, Bureau of Information under Tojo. Foreign Office spokesman 1933-37. Author of "Amau Statement" (warning other Powers to keep hands off China) of April 17, 1934. Ardent nationalist. Reported associate of Shiratori. Close Army connections.

He qualified under Paragraph 7-b of Joint Staff Basic Directive for Post Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper of 3 Nov 1945.

Arrested 12 December 1945 Sugamo Prison

S E C R E T

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Curriculum Vitae of AMAU Eiji

1887, 19 Aug.	Born in Tokushima Ken, son of AMAU Kumeya, merchant
1912, Jul	Finished post-graduate course at Tokyo Higher Commercial School
1912, Oct	Passed Diplomatic and Consular Service Examination
1912, Nov - 1914, Nov	Vice-Consul in Antung, China
1914, Nov. - 1917, Jun	Vice-Consul in Sydney, Australia
1917, Jun - 1918, Jun	Attache at Embassy in London, England
1918, Jun - 1919, Jan	3rd Secretary at Embassy in London
1919, Jan - 1920, Dec	3rd Secretary at Legation in Geneva, Switzerland
1920, Jan - 1921, Feb.	Member of Committee for Execution of the Peace Treaty
1920, Dec - 1921, Feb.	2nd Secretary at Legation in Geneva
1921, Feb - 1921, Sept	Secretary of Foreign Ministry, Tokyo; concurrently assigned to 2nd Section of European and American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry
1921, Sept	Appointed Attendant to Minister Plenipotentiary to Washington Disarmament Conference
1922, Jul	Appointed Attendant to Delegate to Sino Japanese Conference (Shantung Question) at Peking, China
1923, Mar - 1924, Mar	Consul-General at Canton, China
1923, Jul - 1925,	Concurrently Junior Secretary assigned to Foreign Affairs Section of Secretariat of Formosan Government
1924, Mar - 1927, Aug	Consul-General at Harbin, Manchuria
1927, Aug - 1929, Sept	1st Secretary at Legation in Peking, China
1929, Sept - 1929, Dec	1st Secretary at Embassy in Moscow, Russia
1929, Dec - 1933, Jun	Councillor at Embassy in Moscow, Russia
1933, Jun - 1937, Apr	Chief of Information Bureau of Foreign Ministry
1937, Apr - 1939, Sept	Minister Extraordinary to Switzerland
1939, Sept - 1940, Sept	Ambassador to Italy
1941, Mar	Resigned from Diplomatic and Consular Service
1941, Jul - 1941, Oct	Vice Foreign Minister
1943, Apr - 1944, Jul	Chief of Cabinet Information Bureau

TAB
"C"

AMAU

FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU.

INSTRUCTIONS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

STATEMENT

SECOND STATEMENT

NATURE OF STATEMENTS

by AMAU Eiji

It was the principal function of the Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office to clarify the foreign policy of Japan to the public. I was used to meeting, as a rule, the Japanese correspondents, twice every day and the foreign correspondents, three times or four times a week. Sometimes a written statement was published at a certain time which had been fixed beforehand. But usually the spokesman explained a policy or an intention of the Foreign Office at his interview with the correspondents. Once it was decided by the Foreign Office to make known a certain policy or intention, it was left generally to the discretion of the spokesman as to when, how or in what way it might be treated.

Concerning the statement in question, what it stated was the policy of the Government which had been formulated upon the Imperial Rescript and the speech made by Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister at the Diet on January 23, 1934. It was the intention of the Foreign Office also to clarify such formulated policy to the world. The Japanese representatives abroad had been informed of such concrete policy concerning China and at the same time, instructed to make it known as fully as possible to all parts of the world. The instruction ran as follows:

I.

It has been manifested several times that (1) the present conditions in China are so extremely abnormal that the ordinary regulations of International Law or International customs can hardly be applied to them and it is not so easy as the Europeans and the Americans in general think to improve her conditions and that (2) taking into consideration such circumstances Japan's prestige and power are to be the only base upon which peace can be established in that district. Consequently Japan is naturally to be the principle factor as regards the International questions regarding China, particularly I (Hirota) emphasized on item (2) mentioned above in a speech at the Imperial Diet on the 23rd January last.

You are instructed, therefore, to enlighten hereafter as heretofore, in all parts of the world, on the above purport. At the same time, it is important to deal tediously with the complete problems relating to the China questions in the lines already mentioned. As a consequence of authority to the above principle we may receive some disadvantages in the eminent future in obtaining concession or on other matters, but we must endeavor to attain the ultimate object of our diplomatic policy having the main aim in the far reaching situation in the Far East.

II.

It is needless to state that it is essential to have complete cooperation between the Foreign Office in Tokyo and its representatives abroad. You are instructed to clarify thoroughly the above sense in all directions of the world.

I thought it might be appropriate to pronounce our policy in Tokyo first rather than it might be explained by our representatives in different places abroad at different times and then our representatives would make supplementary remarks upon it if it was deemed necessary. Moreover, there was earnest desire and demand among our people, particularly among the press circle that in view of the movement in China and the attitude or action of foreign people toward China, our policy should be more clearly known to the public in order to avoid complications and embarrassment which might be created out of ambiguity of our policy.

On April 17, 1934, I spoke, therefore, informally and mostly in reply to questions, to the Japanese correspondents a gist of what it had been intended to make known to the public. I spoke verbally and it was reported in different words or expressions but the following article was almost to the point.

"Japan was compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations in March last year because of their failure to agree in their opinions of the fundamental principles of preserving peace and order in East Asia. It goes without saying that Japan is endeavoring at all times to maintain and promote her friendly relation with foreign nations but her views and mission may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations respecting matters that concern East Asia.

Japan shares naturally with the nations of East Asia the responsibility of maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission of maintaining peace and order in East Asia and she has to endeavor first of all to maintain peace and order with China in order to fulfill her mission.

Consequently unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity as well as restoration of order in that country are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that this can be attained through no other means than the awakening and voluntary efforts of China herself. It would be intolerable to us, therefore, if China tries to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan if she takes any action calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers in the name of technical or financial support at this particular moment as the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance.

Undertakings of such a nature if carried through to the end may give rise to establishment of a sphere of influence or lead to international control or division of China which not only will be a great misfortune for China but have serious repercussion upon the security of East Asia and consequently Japan. Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade. Such actions as are detrimental to peace and order in East Asia is objectionable to us, for example, supplying China with warplanes, detailing military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide for political uses would obviously tend to ~~alliance~~ friendly relations between Japan and China and Japan and other countries, and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan cannot overlook such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she ~~persued~~ pursued in the past but on account of the fact that positive movement have joined actions in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot. It is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time."

Soon after I had finished my press interview, I saw Mr. Shigemitsu, Vice-Minister, and Mr. Hirota, Foreign Minister, and reported to them of it. They approved what I had done.

I had interviews with the Japanese correspondents twice every day. The morning interview was reported in the evening edition of the papers and the interviews of the afternoon, in the morning edition of the following morning. There was ample time always to make arrangements if necessary, with the press about the treatment of news which I gave out to them.

It was not unusual at that time to stop reporting what I had said at my press conference, or to prevent them from publishing it if it had already been printed either by arrangement with an editor of the press or by means of censorship in case it was deemed absolutely necessary to do so. But in this case I did not take any steps as I had received no directions from my chief.

The next morning the Japanese press reported it, in general, favorably and with approval. Finding, however, that some of the criticism from abroad seemed to be based upon misunderstanding or misinformation, I further explained it at the regular press conference with foreign correspondents on April 20th, which was reported in the "Japan Advertiser" as follows on April 21st:

Statement Based on Hirota's Words.

"Japan has no desire to deviate from the Open Door Principle or Existing Treaty.

Denial that the unofficial statement of the Japanese policy regarding foreign assistance to China issued on Tuesday implies deviation from the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China or from existing treaties was voiced by the Foreign Office Spokesman at yesterday morning's press conference. What it does mean is that Japan objects to any action by other powers that may lead to disturbance of peace in East Asia.

This spokesman expressed surprise to the unfavorable reaction to the statement. It was nothing more, he said, than a reassertion of portions of the Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota's speech to the Diet on foreign policy on January 23, and that speech was cordially received abroad. He pointed specifically to the following piece of the speech:

'We should not forget for a moment that Japan serving as the only corner-stone for the edifice of peace of East Asia bears the entire burden of responsibility'.

United States will understand:- I am confident that the United States will not fail to appraise correctly Japan's position in East Asia.----If only America will clearly perceive the actual conditions of the Orient and realize Japan's role as a stabilizing force in East Asia.

The Japanese Government has serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and has a firm resolve in that regard.

Translating orally from a typed memorandum in Japanese, the spokesman asserted that Japan has no intention to interfere with the independence of China or its vested rights. It wants China to achieve unification and prosperity. As regards Manchukuo it wants others to recognize the fair and just actions of that country. It has no territorial ambitions even there. Japan because of her geographical position is in a position to share profits if China united and prospered. But unity and prosperity must be attained by China's own awakening and endeavors and not by the selfish exploitations of others.

Responsibility Shared:- Japan has no intention to interfere with the rights of third powers, the spokesman continued. If they engage in trade and other transactions with China for the benefit of the Chinese, Japan will welcome their activities. It has no desire to deviate from the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity in China or from the existing treaties. Japan objects to having other powers, regardless of the form or pretext, take any action that may lead to disturbance of peace and order in East Asia. Japan shares the responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia with the other Asiatic countries, particularly China. The time has passed, he concluded, when the other powers of the League of Nations will exercise their policies for the exploitation of China.

Pressed for the reason for issuing the statement at this time, the spokesman declared that its aim was to give the world a clear conception of Japan's position in East Asia.

Its essence had been sent to Japanese diplomatic representatives abroad before it was made public here, he said. No instructions were sent regarding the use to which the information might be put, this being left to their discretion."

On the other hand, being afraid that my statement might affect friendly relations between the United States and Japan, and therefore, my retention of the present position be a hindrance to our endeavor to improve the relations of these two countries, I again saw Mr. Hirota and Mr. Shigemitsu, and told them frankly that I would like to give my Minister no embarrassment on account of the statement and I would receive any punishment or resign my post quite willingly if it were deemed fit or convenient to do so. They also said that they were entirely in accord with me and they would also resign if I were to do so.

On April 20th, the following instruction was cabled by Mr. Hirota to the Japanese representatives abroad:

"Regarding the unofficial statement of the spokesman of the Foreign Office, we have been making supplementary explanations in the following sense in order to clarify it. He explained in the same way replying to the questions at the regular press conference of foreign correspondents on April 20th.

1. Not only has Japan no intention to impair the independence or integrity of China, but she desires wholeheartedly that China may maintain her integrity, achieve her unification and promote her prosperity. However, her integrity, unification and prosperity must be attained, as a matter of principle, by her own awakening and natural development.

2. Japan has no intention to impair vested interests of third powers in China. Japan welcomes economic dealings with third powers with China as it will ultimately bring benefit to China. It goes without saying that Japan does not desire that China may act against the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity. Japan respects the existing treaties concerning China.
3. However, Japan must object to any action which may be taken under whatever form it may be, by other powers in collective form and which is detrimental to peace and order in East Asia. Japan is responsible with China and other Asiatic countries for maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. It is unbearable that other powers or the League will make use of the China question for executing of their selfish purposes behaving as if they were judges at a tribunal".

The statement was nothing but the concrete policies formulated, upon the principles which had been enunciated by the Foreign Minister at the Diet. It was an application but not a deviation from the established principle. Those who were well aware of the conditions in Japan at that time, knew this matter quite well, for example Mr. Hugh Byas, correspondent of the London Times and the New York Times for a long time in Japan, had a long article in the New York Times Magazine of August 26, 1934 under the title of "Japan's Destiny As She Sees It" in which he said nothing about the statement but solely referred to the speech of the Foreign Minister. The statement was made in order to preserve peace and security in the Far East.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
LEGAL SECTION

4 March 1948

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Chief, Legal Section, SCAP

SUBJECT: AMAU, Bi ji

I. PRESENT STATUS:

Subject has been incarcerated in Sugamo Prison since 12 December 1945 as a Class "A" war crime suspect.

II. PURPOSE OF MEMORANDUM:

This report is based on the oral request of the Chief, Legal Section, to examine all available evidence against the twenty (20) Class "A" war crime suspects now held in custody to determine whether or not they can be indicted for "B" or "C" war crimes.

III. SOURCES OF MATERIAL EXAMINED:

1. All files and information available in Legal Section.
2. The complete G-2 report, dated 19 June 1947, with reference to subject.
3. All files, records and reports available at the International Prosecution Section of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

IV. RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that subject be released from custody immediately.

Memo: AMAU, Eiji (Cont'd)

V. DETAILS UPON WHICH THE RECOMMENDATION IS BASED:

1. Pertinent curriculum vitae:

Secretary and later Councillor to the Japanese Embassy in Soviet Russia.	Sept. 1929-June 1933
Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Ministry.	June 1933-April 1937
Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Switzerland.	April 1937-Aug. 1939
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Italy.	Sept. 1939-March 1941
Vice-Foreign Minister.	Aug. 1941-Oct. 1941
Chief of Cabinet Information Bureau.	April 1943-July 1944

2. Subject is a career diplomat who never ascended the highest rungs in the Japanese diplomatic corps. His greatest claim to infamy rests on the famous "Amau Statement" made to the press on 17 April 1944, wherein the Japanese policy of Asia for the Asiatics and the claim for an absolute Japanese sphere of influence in China was first baldly announced. His statement was not a policy that was originated by subject, but an announcement of policy that had been determined in the Foreign Ministry.
3. The Tri-Partite Pact was negotiated at the time subject was Ambassador to Italy. He has admitted that he was extremely angry at SHIGEMITSU because this pact was negotiated without him having any knowledge of what was going on.
4. Subject's position as Chief of the Cabinet Information Bureau was a purely administrative position. He did not have cabinet or ministerial rank and had nothing to do with the formation or execution of high policy in Japan.
5. Reports in the files of the International Prosecution Section are unanimous in that it was not felt subject could be charged with a Class "A" crime on the basis of the evidence then in hand and serious doubt was expressed that additional investigation would develop any evidence upon which a Class "A" charge could be preferred.

AMAU, Elji (Cont'd)

6. This writer concurs in the opinion that existing evidence is insufficient to charge subject with a Class "A" crime. Examination of all evidence and information does not indicate a single act on the part of subject which makes him suspect to a "B" or "C" crime and it is not believed that additional investigation could develop any evidence of "B" or "C" crimes.

L. P. B. LIPSCOMB,
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY.

Date: 17 June 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.
2530

CRD No.

Report by: Lt. Daniel F. Resendes

Title: Eiji AMAU

Synopsis of facts:

Eiji AMAU born 19 August 1887, Tokushima-ken Prefecture. Major positions Japanese Government, President Bureau of Information, 1943-1944, Vice Foreign Minister, 1941. House Arrest.

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DETAILS:

At Tokyo:

This investigation is predicated upon a request of the Honorable Lord WRIGHT, President of the International War Crimes Commission.

Eiji AMAU, was a career diplomat. He is a graduate of the Kobe Higher Commercial School. He completed a post graduate course at the Tokyo Higher Commercial School, passed the Higher Civil Service Examination in 1912. The same year he entered foreign service. He served successively as eleven-Consul at Antung and Sydney (1912-1919) and as Attache (1916) and subsequently secretary of the Japanese Embassy in London (1916-1919). In 1919 he was attache to the Japanese Delegation to the Versailles Conference; he was a member of the Peace Treaty Executive Commission in Paris. The next year he was sent to Berlin as Commissioner to execute the Versailles Treaty. The same year he became Secretary to the Legation at Berne, Switzerland and the next year he was attached as secretary to the Tokyo Foreign Office. From 1921-1922 he was a member of the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Disarmament Conference. In 1922 he became a member of the Joint Settlement Committee of the Shantung Question, as well as of the Conference for Abolition of Postal Agencies in China at Peking. From that year until 1927 AMAU served in China as Consul General at Canton (1923) and Harbin (1925) and as First Secretary at the Peking Legation (1927). From 1929 till 1933 he was a Counsellor at the Moscow Embassy.

In September 1933 AMAU became Director of the Bureau of Information of the Foreign Office. While holding this post, on 17 April 1934, he made

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the famous "hands off China" statement. This statement has since been known as the "AMAU Declaration". AMAU attacked the activities of Great Britain and the United States in China and stated: "Japan will take the sole responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia." One source reports, that a member of the Foreign Office has since stated, that it was a "confidential policy, prepared in the Asiatic Bureau." Source continues that someone gave the press a tip. Subsequently questions were put to AMAU, who did not realize that the policy was confidential, AMAU, according to source, created a furor in the Foreign Office by giving it out, and it produced serious international repercussions.

In April 1937 he was named Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. While occupying this post, he was named Director of the Japanese Office of the International Conference at Geneva and Japanese Representative to the International Commission of the Opium Question. In September 1939 he succeeded SHIRATORI, Toshio as Ambassador to Italy. He arrived in Rome from Berlin on 15 November 1939. During AMAU's tenure of office, on 27 September 1940, Italy joined the German-Japanese Alliance. According to one source AMAU was one of the best-known foreign envoys in Italy. In November 1940, he was succeeded to his post by HORIKIRI, Zembel. Back in Japan, he spent a year touring the country, surveying home conditions. From July 1941 until October 1941 AMAU served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Admiral TOYODA, Tajiuro in the third KONOE Cabinet. A report of 20 August 1941 states, that he was appointed a member of the China Affair Damage Investigation Commission. On 22 October 1941 he was succeeded as Vice Foreign Minister by Hawahiko NISHI.

On 20 April 1943, AMAU succeeded TANI, Masayuki as President of the Bureau of Information. According to one source, AMAU promised on 21 May 1943, a "propaganda war victory." Radio Tokyo broadcast on 7 July 1943, that AMAU was among those who have been named councilors of a new dormitory provided by SASAKI, Kyuji for the use of overseas students. The next day same source broadcast, that during a meeting of the Board of Information, he outlined the objectives of the Board in wartime. On 14 July 1943, AMAU addressed the Imperial Rule Assistance Association's Fourth Central Cooperative Council, which convened in Tokyo that day. The following October 23rd Tokyo Radio carried a declaration by him on the establishment of the "Provisional Government of India." On 16 November he addressed the opening session of the Greater East Asia Press Conference in Tokyo. In the January session of the House of Representatives, AMAU declared, that the "Thought front was equally important with the armed war front. On the 17 March 1944, he was listed as one of five government members of the National Movement Liaison Headquarters. On 15 April 1944 he was a representative at the Tripartite Technical Commission which met that day at Premier TOJO's official residence. On 18 July 1944 AMAU resigned as President of the Bureau of Information. When the TOJO Cabinet resigned, he was succeeded by OGATA, Toketora. On the 22nd of December 1944 AMAU addressed the Japanese Youth Corps Conference on "World Developments and the Greater East Asia War." On 27 June 1945 AMAU was named Vice President and Director of the Protocol Enforcement Department of the Dai Nippon Koakai (Great Japan New Asia Society).

He made an address at the inauguration ceremony, held that day in Marunouchi Hall in Tokyo. A Tokyo Radio report of the next day also mentions him as chairman of the Board of Directors of the organization. According to one source AMAU is associated with Toshio SHIRATORI and a pro-Axis group with close army connections. AMAU holds the second class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.

The following information is contained in an analysis of Documentary Evidence No. 4064, dated 4 August 1941. Persons Implicated: AMAU. Crimes to Which Document Applicable: Conspiracy for Aggression against Russia, Thailand, Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies. Summary of Relevant Points as follows:

1. Telegram from THOMAS, Bangkok, 6 Aug 1941.

The Japanese military Attache in Bangkok stated that military action against Thailand would cause conflict with Britain or the United States. An attack on the Netherlands E. Indies would only be possible after occupation of Siam and a line up on the Burma-Malaya frontier. It would be better to wait till Germany threatened India from the west. An attack on North Sakhalin and Vladivostok might be more advantageous to Germany and need less forces. As Thailand is dependent upon imports from the Allies, it is better for it to stay neutral with a secret leaning towards Japan. Thomas says this shows that Japan will avoid open conflict with Britain and America as long as this is economically possible. Japan can be assured of Thailand's friendship by her recognition of Manchukuo, settling of trade accounts, and non-agreement to an Anglo-American offer of a guarantee of independence.

2. Telegram from THOMAS, Bangkok, 8 Aug 1941.

Movements of Japanese and Thai troops up to the frontier of Thailand.

3. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 Aug 1941. The economic reaction from America, Britain and China to Japanese advance on Indo-China forces Japanese economic circles to recognize the need for a state-controlled economy. The enemies of the New Order and the activist foreign policy point out that Japan is obtaining war materials under the disguise of a conciliatory policy. Japan is still dependent on the import of oil from the Netherlands East Indies. NOMURA is trying to keep trade with America going. It is clear from many examples that Japan is trying to avoid a conflict with the U.S. and fears that any further step may lead to war.

The proportion of Japan's military preparations suggest that she is in a position to oppose a military power like Russia. According to the military attache in Manchuria, forces are lining up in three places in the direction of Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensky and Chita. The new Chief of Army (air forces), General DOIHARA, declared that the Russian Far East Army has been strengthened. The army has decided for an action and the air forces are obtaining the necessary informations for an attack. On the other hand, the Navy is more interested in Thailand. OTT warned of the dangers of scattering Japan's forces.

SHIRATORI, who is otherwise keen on a speedy entry by Japan into the war, is also concerned over the sacrifice involved. An excuse for war must be sought, he affirmed, in giving demands to Russia respecting North Sakhalin, military security for the sea provinces, and perhaps other Far Eastern territories, as well as a break with Chungking. Refusal of these demands would provide the excuse. OTT has warned against any negotiations with the Russians, who are past masters at protracting such negotiations to give time for their (the Russian) position to be improved. TOYODA has categorically denied the existence of any negotiations. Japan has not got the leadership to resolve to oppose encirclement by eliminating the Soviet Union as its first opponent.

4. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 9 August 1941. Details of the disposition of Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria. About thirty division

will ostensibly have been moved up by the end of August. Any decision to move on Russia is dependent upon German successes, and ITAGAKI has stated that another advance in the south, e.g., into Thailand, is beyond Japan's powers at the moment. Japan's economy is cramped by American pressure. OTT considers a speedy decision to enter the war against Russia essential. Japanese activity in China is small as ever, progress is being made in the occupation of Indo-China.

5. Telegram from Thomsen, Washington, 11 Aug 41.
United Press report on statement of WAKASUGI in English.

6. Telegram from TROMSEN, Washington, 12 August 1941.
The question arises, as military threats are being used against Japan, of how much strength Australia, the Netherlands East Indies and Britain have to attack Japan with.

Australia. One division in Singapore, and 60,000 insufficiently equipped troops. Air forces divided between Singapore and Australia.

Netherlands East Indies. A limited number of Curtisses and Brewsters, and some obsolete Curtisses and Martins.

Singapore. Probably not so strong as has been made out. Its core is one English and one Australian Division and 500-800 planes.

The allies are probably content to stave Japan off as long as possible.

7. Telegram from WAGNER, Hsinking, 13 Aug 1941. The population of Manchukuo is anti-Japanese throughout. Vice Foreign Minister and Propaganda Chief MUTO have both assured him that Japan wants neither a war with Russia or the southeast. Her duty in accordance with the Tri-Partite Pact is to keep up the tension in the Pacific.

8. Note on Baron HIRANUMA, signed by BOLTZE, Berlin, 14 Aug 1941. As Premier in 1939 he showed himself to be "difficult and bureaucratic" in the negotiations over the military pact. After being relieved of office by Prince KONOYE he again became President of the secret state council.

As Home Minister in 1941 he represented a "conservative, cautious and reserved policy." He was an opponenet of MATSUOKA who was "too full of ideas and too much orientated to Europe" for him. He feared his activities would embroil Japan in the European conflict.

In the present Cabinet he is Minister without Portfolio. Among his adherents in the Cabinet are TANABE, IWAMURA and YANAGAWA. He is founder of the SUYODAN. The attempt on his life was probably made by young officers, who hoped thus for a more active policy on the part of the government. He was well received in liberal financial and economic circles, as in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, he successfully opposed state socialist measures. His attitude to Germany was always positive. He expressed his joy at the conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

9. Note, signed by BOLTZE, 15 August 1941, about AMAU, the newly appointed Vice Foreign Minister.

The following information is contained in an Analysis of Documentary Evidence No. 4065, dated 1 Oct 1941. Persons Implicated: AMAU. Crimes to which document applicable: Aggressive warfare. Summary of Relevant Points: Contains, among others, the following items:

1. Telegram from HEMMEN, Paris, German Armistice Delegation for Commerce. 1 Oct 1941. Report on the disposition of 5,000 tons of Indo-Chinese rawrubber, sent to the U.S. Further export to America of raw rubber would not be permitted by Germany and Japan.

2. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo. 20 Oct 41. Report on negotiations in Washington, which KONOYE had initiated. No Japanese government is able to make palatable to the people and the army the demands on which the U.S. bases its negotiating.

3. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo 4 Oct 41. Report from the Japanese government has protested Britain and Iranian action in denying the Japanese the use of code telegrams from Teheran and have applied similar restrictions on the Iranian Minister here. The Japanese legation in Teheran was accused of harboring a German which was not true. Further, the Iranian Government and British circles claimed that the legation was giving asylum to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who is a dangerous anti-British agitator. The foreign office confidentially tells me that the Grand Mufti had actually found sanctuary in the legation for awhile, but has now fled. OTT told the Foreign office that the Germans did not want the Grand Mufti to fall into the hands of the Russians or English and asked the whereabouts of the Mufti. However, the Foreign Office didn't know.

4. Telegram from Ott, Tokyo, 4 October 1941. Report on Japanese sentiment, which OTT describes as disillusionment at not gaining a clear victory in China, a resulting feeling of weakness, the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. The recognition is spreading, however, that Japan's aims are not to be obtained by doing nothing. The opinion of the army leadership (War Minister TOJO, Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA and Director of political Division OIKAWA, is as follows: The Three Power Pact has the inherent aim of conquering the British Empire and a new distribution of power in Europe and East Asia. After Russia has been beaten, the most important thing would be to resume contact of the Axis powers over Siberia and to concentrate our entire energy in fighting England everywhere. As no Japanese attack on the Russian Far Eastern Army can be expected before spring, there are two ways of reopening the Trans-Siberian Railroad. One way would be to utilize the capture of Moscow to press the rest of Russia to cooperation - and Japan, at the proper moment, could apply pressure on Russian imports in the Far East. On the other hand, there could be an attack on Siberia from East and West next spring, which Japan could undertake despite her problems in China. Independent of the time of year is a Japanese attack against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South.

OTT states that he is repeating the confidential statements of the War Minister, made in the presence of the Chief of Staff, to OTT. They show how the leadership feels about a war against Russia. Furthermore, they show that the plans against the South, which have to be borne by the Navy in the main, are not complete and thorough. Because of this and due to the fact that there is no strong leadership, it is probably that the present government will try to postpone the action in the South. An activation of Japan can be most easily achieved if the possibility of operations of a common goal, such as Siberia on a combined attack on the Near and Far East, can be made clear technically and militarily. OTT suggests that, after proper preparations, the attempt is made to advocate that the Commission, which was formed by the Three Power Pact at Japan's insistence, concern itself with common military, economic and political problems. The feeling that they are not being consulted bothers the Japanese, especially their egoism.

The statements of the military leaders above refrain from mentioning America and speak only of England as the main enemy. Japan would only attack America as a last resort. In the negotiations here MATSUOKA insisted on defining attacks in the sense of Article III of the Pact. The feeling that a conflict with America is inevitable is gaining.

4. Telegram from WOHLTAT and OTT, Tokyo 6 Oct 41. Report from WOHLTAT in which he argues that Germany should continue the flow of heavy machinery to Japan in exchange for raw materials from the Far East. Due to Anglo-Saxon measures, Japan now feels herself weak, and activist circles are hoping for the reopening of the Siberian Railroad to a friendly industrial power, Germany. OTT adds that circles in Japan, which favor an understanding with America, are pointing to the fact that no economic help could be gained if Japan remains in the Axis camp. Thus, if Germany could send material aid to Japan, it would strengthen activist forces here.

5. Telegram from ABETZ, Paris, 6 Oct 1941. State Secretary BENOIST-MECHIN told ABETZ that difficulties regarding Japan are mounting daily in Indo-China. Though Japan, with a few exceptions, is keeping to the military clauses of the agreement, she is more and more endangering French political and economic sovereignty. Though DARLAN has been in favor of meeting Japan's terms, his judgment has now been doubted by the French government, because of Japan's aggressive action against French sovereignty, and a stiffening of French political and economic opposition to DARLAN's policy is consequently feared.

6. Telegram from RITTER, Special Train, 8 Oct 1941. A proposal to open up a route from Japan to Germany via the waters north of Siberia. In order to achieve this, the cooperation of Japan and complete secrecy are most essential. RITTER asks OTT to give this information to the Japanese Foreign Minister in a confidential manner. The proposal should be carried through by the German Naval Attache and a small group of Japanese Navy officers.

7. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo. 9 October 41. Report that the threat of restricting the propaganda activities of belligerent nations in Japan has now been actualized. OTT told the Vice Foreign Minister AMAU he would not voluntarily retreat from his stand on propaganda which is in the interest of the Three Power Pact. AMAU answered that the verbal note represents the decision of the cabinet and cannot be changed. However, the Japanese authorities have decided for a policy of furthering the Three Power Pact, and will therefore take over German propaganda interests themselves. OTT believes that he will be able to influence the Japanese public, with the help of friends in the government, who share that viewpoint, and also publicly are against the restrictive measures. He will look for new ways of disseminating embassy propaganda.

8. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 11 Oct 41. OTT believes that the matter of opening up a route via northern Siberian waters would better be taken up with the proper Navy people, instead of with the Foreign Minister.

9. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo 11 October 1941. A report by OTT on the Navy plans. The Navy has recently won a lot of prestige and the naval air arm has been able to gain much experience in China. Since the Anglo-Saxon influence in the Navy is still very considerable, it was especially important to utilize politically the embassy's personal friendships in Navy circles. A comparatively fast change has occurred. Young

officers feel that an attack on the Anglo-Saxons is inevitable. In order to remain a great power Japan must attack the Dutch East Indies. It was consequently a clever move on the part of the group under KONOYE that they termed the probably unsuccessful negotiations with the United States as final, after the failure of which Japan can pursue its aims with greater assurance.

The Navy believes it has reached its maximum power and is ready to do its part in Southern operations. Concerning the fluctuation of the strategic attack plans, OTT has already reported. Plans mentioned are: Surprise attack on Singapore, either before or after occupation of Thailand, occupation or by passing of the Philippines, blockade of Singapore with attack on Borneo and Sumatra. In this indecision, there is a weakness. A direct attack of Singapore is now considered impossible because of the increased British strength there. After the occupation of Siam, a land and sea blockade of Singapore can be affected. At the same time, the Philippines must be taken. Despite difficulties, the securing of cover in the flanks will secure the occupation of British and Dutch Oil regions in Borneo and Sumatra. It is doubtful whether the areas can be held for a long time against Anglo Saxon pressure. Consequently, it is important to know how the Axis powers intend to operate after conclusion of the war in Russia, and whether or not they will be able to supply arms to Japan against the United States, after the collapse of England. I have emphasized Japanese participation in the final blow against Russia and Germany's approval of bold Japanese plans in the South. In order to activate the Japanese allies, it would be best to agree on a common plan against the Anglo-Saxons.

10. Telegram from THOMSEN, Washington, 11 Oct 1941. THOMSEN believes that American policy will have to change since Japan's national spirit has been aroused and will not be contained by the ABCD powers.

11. Memo from GAUS, Berlin, 11 Oct 1941. The Japanese Ambassador in Vichy, KATO, asked GAUS about future operations against England and expressed the fear that Germany would conclude a compromise peace with England. Ambassador OSHIMA thought that it was important to renew the Anti-Comintern Pact. He telegraphed to Tokyo about it several times, but received no answer. If a big event would be made of the renewal, it would have a great political effect.

12. Memo from WEI2SAECKER, Berlin, 14 Oct 1941. The attacked article shows Japanese concern not to miss her connection with the great political developments. Perhaps this uncertainty is the best way of getting Japan into the war.

13. Memo from the DNB representative, Berlin, 13 Oct 41. Germany's successes point to a quick Russian collapse, the KOKUMIN SHIMBUN says, England might yet make peace with Germany, and to regain what she has lost in Europe, will try to make up for it in the Far East. America would join England's advance. The difficulties facing Japan in creating the Greater East Asia Sphere would increase. Japan should not remain behind the development of the world.

14. Telegram from OTT, Tokyo, 15 Oct 1941. Report that the Japanese occupation of Indo-China is not proceeding without friction. The controversy concerns the handling of the Chungking Consul, relinquishing of certain airplanes, confiscation of quarters and warehouses, the spreading of Japanese anti-French propaganda among the native population, and so on.

The Japanese government intends to increase her occupation army to 40,000 troops. The Japanese government has the intention to force through several demands through its army there. After the fait accompli have been in effect, former Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA will go to Saigon presumably to discuss the Indo-Chinese problem.

OTT has the impression that neither side is willing to let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government wants to protect the picture of a treaty defense to the outside, and a conflict would lower the country's economic value.

The following excerpt was received from the Civil Censor Detachment dated 2 April 1946, re Eiji AMAU, Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan. Written by AMAU to Eiji and Taihei AMAU, 753 Kichijoji, Tokyo, Japan:

AMAU states "Our country that was built in a century's toil of blood and sweat has finally crashed. We lost the war, but we will rise again, if the men with the spirit of Yamato unite once again. We lost the war, our hills and rivers are invaded, but, may we have not lost Yamato's spirit."

The following statements were made by TANAKA, Ryukichi (General) re Eiji AMAU on 25 March 1946:

- Q. Let's go on to Eiji AMAU.
- A. We were together in Peking in 1917. He had long been connected with the diplomatic field with America, England and Russia. He was probably in Russia at the time of the Manchurian Incident. In 1933 he became Chief of the Information Bureau of the Foreign Office, at which time the famous AMAU statement was made. This statement concerned the policy of keeping Asia for the Asiatics.
- Q. Did he make that statement of his own accord?
- A. Yes, he made it of his own accord.
- Q. The Foreign Minister did not authorize him to do it?
- A. It was without the influence of the military, and he made it on his own accord.
- Q. Was he disciplined for it?
- A. No, he was not reprimanded for this act as his reputation was good at the time. I believe he went to Italy as Ambassador. I believe he did not have much to do with the Tri-partite Pact. He came back from Italy in 1939 and did nothing in particular. He became Chief of the Information Bureau in the TOJO Cabinet in 1940, and held this post until the fall of the TOJO Cabinet.
- Q. Do you know of anything he did while he was President of the Board of Information.
- A. Yes, he was responsible for the propaganda program. Since the fall of the TOJO Cabinet he has been a man of leisure. He is now in Sugamo Prison.
- Q. Did he plan the radio addresses to the allied forces during 1942 and 1943?
- A. He did broadcast to the Allies many times.
- Q. Did he broadcast to the allied soldiers in the field?

A. Any propaganda aimed at the soldiers was the responsibility of the army and navy. He was not much of a diplomat; he was very anti-American and anti-British.

Q. Did he hire Tokyo Rose?
A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Do you have anything else to add about AMAU?
A. No, I haven't except he is "peanuts".

The following is an excerpt from the Document No. 822, dated 14 March 1946 re ANAU, Eiji:

"Crime to which Document Applicable: Manchurian Incident. Summary of Relevant Points: p. 72 Foreign Office announcement concerning AMAU statement. "Japan will oppose all economic and trade negotiations by foreign powers with China if she considers such negotiations detrimental to peace and order in East Asia".

The following is an excerpt received from the Civil Censorship Detachment dated 13 February 1946, from Chosho YOSHIDA, Osaka, Japan to Eiji AMAU, Sugamo Prison. YOSHIDA states: "Great changes have been brought to the world. Our ignorant misbehaviour has been exposed and Japan is undergoing a reformation. I am not down-hearted because I believe that the results of the reformation will appear after ten or twenty years. Such phrase as 'cooperation of the military; the government and the people' came into existence because the militarist looked down upon the people as slaves. If they considered the people as equals it wasn't necessary to make such phrases. They would merely have said, 'cooperation of the people'. I am not accusing you of anything just 'I pray for your good health'."

Biographical History of Eiji AMAU follows:

Date of Birth: 19 Aug 1887

1912 Jul 7	Graduated from Post-graduate course of the Tokyo Higher Commercial School.
1912 Oct 16	Passed the examination for diplomats and consuls.
1912 Nov 15	Appointed Vice-consul and granted 7th Grade in the higher Civil Service.
	Given 7th Grade Salary and stationed at Antung China.
1913 Jan 30	Given the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
1914 Sep 18	Given and allowed to wear the Chinese 5th Grade Decoration.
1914 Nov 24	Transferred to Sydney and paid the 4th Grade Salary.
1915 Jul	Paid the 3rd Grade Salary.
1916 Apr 1	Paid ¥ 120 for service in the Affairs of 1914 and 1915.
1916 Dec 26	Promoted to the 6th Grade of the Higher Civil Service.
1917 Jan 31	Promoted to the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
1917 Jun 31	Appointed as Eleven Diplomat; Transferred to England as the 3rd Secretary of the Japanese Embassy, London.
	Paid the 2nd Grade Salary.
1918 Jun 28	Paid the 1st Grade Salary.
1918 Dec 29	Transferred to Switzerland.
1919 Jan 20	Promoted to the 5th Grade in the Higher Civil Service
1919 June 30	Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
1919 Aug 11	Appointed as member on the Peace Treaty Execution Committee
1920 Jan 10	and relieved of the same on February 24, 1921.
1920 Feb 28	Promoted to the 2nd Secretaryship of the Legation.

1921 Feb 16 Appointed Secretary at the Foreign Office, Tokyo and served in the 2nd Secretaryship of the European and American Bureau.
 1920 Nov 1 Given a 5th Class Decoration of the Order of the Sacred Treasure. Paid ¥700 for services in the Affairs of 1915-20.
 1921 Sep 27 Appointed as Secretary attached to the plenipotentiaries sent to the Washington Conference.
 1921 Dec 26 Promoted to the 4th Grade in the higher civil service.
 1922 Jan 20 Promoted to the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
 1922 Jul 19 Appointed as Secretary to the Joint Committee to settle the Shantung Affairs.
 1922 Jul 26 Appointed as secretary attached to the Negotiating Committee concerning the communication between Japan and China.
 1923 Mar 23 Appointed as Consul-General. Promoted to the 4th Grade of the higher civil service; Granted 2nd grade salary.
 1923 Mar 23 Transferred to the Kwang-tung. Granted 1st grade salary.
 1923 Jul 23 Held an additional post as Secretary of the government General of Formosa and served in the Foreign Affairs Section (Formosan Government-General). Promoted to the 4th grade of the higher civil service.
 1924 May 15 Decorated with the 4th Class Order of the Sacred Treasure for services at the Washington Conference.
 1924 Aug 18 Promoted to the 3rd grade of the higher civil service.
 1925 Sep 15 Promoted to the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
 1929 Mar 14 Transferred to Harbin, Manchuria.
 1928 Aug 24 Appointed 1st Secretary of the Legation and stationed in China. Promoted to the 3rd grade of the higher civil service.
 1921 Sep 12 Appointed 1st Secretary of the Embassy and transferred to the U.S.S.R. and ordered to act as councillor.
 1929 Dec 28 Promoted to the 2nd Grade of the higher civil service. Ordered to Russia. Received 3rd class pay.
 1931 Feb 11 Decorated with the 3rd class Order of the Sacred Treasure
 1933 Jun 2 Appointed Chief of the Intelligence Dept. of the Foreign Office. Promoted to the 2nd grade of the higher civil service.
 1933 Jun 14 Appointed Manager of the International Tourist Bureau.
 1933 Sep 9 Appointed member of the Inquiry Committee of Cultural Enterprises in China.
 1934 Jul 3 Promoted to the 1st grade of the higher civil service.
 1934 July 16 Promoted to the 4th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
 1935 Apr 1 Paid an additional salary of ¥ 600 a year.
 1934 Apr 29 Given the second class Order of the Rising Sun for service in the Affairs of 1931-1935.
 1937 Apr 28 Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, stationed in Switzerland and ordered additionally as Chief of the Japanese Affairs Bureau in the International Council of the League of Nations.
 1938 Mar 9 Decorated with the 2nd Class Order of the Sacred Treasure.
 1938 Mar 28 Appointed Japanese member on the Opium Committee of the League of Nations and relieved of the same November 9, 1938.
 1939 Aug 1 Promoted to the 4th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
 1939 Sep 30 Appointed Ambassador Plenipotentiary and stationed in Italy. Relieved of the same at his own request, March 14, 1941.
 1941 Apr 2 Promoted to the 3rd Court Rank, Junior grade.
 1941 Apr 29 Decorated with the 1st Class Order of the Rising Sun for service in the China Affairs.
 1941 Aug 15 Appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1941 Aug 19 Appointed member of the Inquiry Committee on Damage in the China Affairs. Appointed as Councillor of the Cabinet Planning Board. Appointed as Councillor of the Research Institute on the General Mobilization of the National Spirit. Appointed as member of the General Mobilization Council.

1941 Aug 29 Appointed as Councillor of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau. Appointed as member of the Valuation Committee on funds placed by the Japanese Government in the North China Development Co. Ltd., and the Central China Promotion Co. Ltd.

1941 Sep 5 Appointed a member of Management Committee on Government Loans. Appointed as member of the Management Committee on Foreign Exchanges. Appointed as temporary member of the Special Funds Adjustment Committee. Appointed as member of the Custom and Tariff Investigation Committee.

1941 Sep 25 Appointed as member of the Overseas Colonization Committee.

1941 Sep 30 Appointed as promoter of the East Asia Marine Transportation Co. Ltd.

1943 Apr 20 Appointed President of the Intelligence Dept. Appointed manager of the Greater East Asia Construction Committee.

1943 Jun 15 Appointed a Government Commission for the Diet.

1944 Jul 22 Resigned the Presidency of the Intelligence Dept.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office - At Tokyo - Will report and follow disposition of Subject.

P E N D I N G