

FEC-231

Japanese Whaling

55M1
BOX 14

231 SERIES

Japanese Whaling

by A. E. Rice, Secretary of Committee No. 2:
Economic and Financial Affairs

18 April 1949

JAPANESE WHALING
(FEC-231 series)

Introduced by United Kingdom 28 May 1947.

Dropped from agenda 4 September 1947.

In 1946 SCAP authorized a Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic for the 1946-47 season, despite protests from the Australian, New Zealand, Norwegian and United Kingdom Governments. In December 1946 the Australian representative on the FEC introduced a general policy proposal (FEC-035) covering all phases of Japanese fishing, pearl fishing and whaling. Consideration of FEC-035 went ahead slowly due to technical complexities and the delay of the United States in formulating its position. Because of the greater urgency of the whaling question the United Kingdom Government therefore introduced a separate policy relating only to Japanese whaling on 28 May 1947.

The United Kingdom proposal (FEC-231) provided that the Japanese should be allowed to whale within the area authorized for fishing operations, and that the provisions of the international whaling agreements to which the United States was a party should be observed. It further provided that Japanese whaling should be conducted from shore stations, and that the Japanese should not be permitted to make use of factory ships or of any other vessels for the purpose of treating whales at sea. The clear intent of the paper was to bar the Japanese whalers from Antarctic waters.

The arguments presented in behalf of this paper (which was considered by Committee No. 2, the Steering Committee and the Far Eastern Commission), and supported most vigorously by the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were as follows:

1. At a time when the maximum production of whale oil was needed in the face of a world shortage of proteins, the efficient whale processing methods of the Japanese, as evidenced in the first post-war whaling expedition to the Antarctic in 1946-47, meant a considerable diminution of the total amount of whale oil available, since more efficient Allied whaling ships would be able to catch the maximum permissible number of blue whale units.

2. Pre-war Japanese whaling ignored all the conservation requirements of existing international conventions and there could be no assurance that post-war Japanese whaling would be any different.

3. Japanese whaling in the Antarctic region created a potential security danger to neighboring countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand, since there was opportunity for meteorological observations, depth sounding, training of crews in unfamiliar waters, etc.

The United States vigorously rejected the above arguments. They favored a Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic because it would provide whalemeat to meet the nutritional deficiencies of the Japanese diet. The fact that in the pre-war period the Japanese had disregarded international conventions was no reason to bar them from post-war participation in international whaling, and SCAP would guarantee their strict observance of all whaling conventions. The charge that two Japanese whaling vessels in the Antarctic created a security threat was invalid in view of the lack of Japanese war-making potential.

In the course of the discussions the Australian Government suggested that an Allied whaling expedition under SCAP authority be dispatched, with the whalemeat thus provided being made available to the Japanese. They denied, however, that whalemeat constituted a very significant part of the Japanese diet.

While the discussions were going on in the Far Eastern Commission, diplomatic conversations were also being carried on. At the same time, in June 1947, SCAP informed the Japanese Government that a whaling expedition to the Antarctic would be authorized for the 1947 season. Despite continuing strong objection, the United States Government refused to change its position, and the United Kingdom proposal, which had never been amended in any way, was dropped from the agenda on 4 September 1947.

Pfuntner

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TRAVEL OUTSIDE JAPAN OF JAPANESE COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES

History of FEC Policy No. 51

Dates:

Introduced 27 January 1948 by United States
Adopted 21 October 1948 by vote of 10 in favor
with one abstention
(USSR)

Original Provisions: The original paper stated:

"1. It is desirable as a policy objective to facilitate the re-entry of Japan to world trade relations by providing for the travel or residence of Japanese commercial representatives outside Japan during the period of occupation."

With this objective in view, the policy permitted Japanese commercial representatives to travel or reside abroad, subject to the approval of the country of travel destination, and to the extent necessary for the restoration of the Japanese economy. SCAP and the country of travel destination were to consult on implementation of the policy and were to set down necessary conditions and controls. The policy specified, however, that no commercial representatives should engage in political or propaganda activities and that their total expenses outside Japan should be provided from the proceeds of Japanese exports.

Chief Objections:

In the course of the discussion, there were three chief objections raised by other members.

1. Travel abroad by Japanese commercial representatives was not necessary for the promotion of Japanese foreign trade, whose feeble condition, despite a world shortage of goods, was due to a number of other reasons.

The United States answered this by admitting that the travel abroad of Japanese commercial representatives would not solve Japan's foreign trade problem, but asserted that it would be of assistance, particularly in such areas as South America where very little trade had thus far developed. It also pointed out that each country

must give its permission before such representatives were admitted, so each country could judge for itself the possible benefits.

2. Travel abroad by Japanese commercial representatives should not be permitted at least until foreign commercial representatives in Japan had greater freedom.

To meet this objection, several phrases were added to the proposed policy providing that travel of Japanese abroad should give them no advantage over foreign nationals residing in Japan and that such foreign nationals should be given maximum freedom to develop trade. A general clause was also added recognizing that Japanese foreign trade must be conducted largely through foreign nationals in Japan.

3. Japanese nationals abroad would engage in political and propaganda activities, despite the prohibition on such activities.

Two provisions were added to meet this objection. One provided specifically that Japanese commercial representatives should be screened by SCAP before they are allowed to leave Japan. The other adopted after lengthy debate as to whether specific restrictions of Japanese commercial representatives would be advisable, strengthened the provision of the original proposal by stating that:

"c. The specific travel authorized herein and the extent thereof should be only that essential to raise Japan's foreign trade to a level consistent with her peaceful needs as defined by the Far Eastern Commission."

Other Changes:

Other changes made in the original draft included adding the "prevention of monopolies in Japanese foreign trade" as one of the purposes of ~~preventing~~^{permitting} commercial representatives to travel abroad. It was also specified that no representative could be the sole sales or purchasing medium for Boekiho nor could he represent SCAP. The provision as to expenses was removed entirely.

Summary:

Although the emphasis in the paper was changed to ^{altered}

stress the principal role of foreign traders in Japan and the necessity of adequate safeguards in the case of Japanese nationals abroad, the paper was in substance little changed during the nine months of consideration. Despite early doubts--expressed particularly by Australia and the United Kingdom--as to the wisdom of any such action prior to the Peace Treaty as a matter of principle, the final vote indicated real agreement, since the Soviet abstention was apparently due only to the Commission's failure to adopt certain changes of wording proposed by the Soviet delegation.

Bfuntner

20 April 1949

CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION BY JAPANESE WAR INDUSTRIES
(C2-015 Series)

Introduced by the Soviet Union 9 July 1946.

Removed from the agenda 22 May 1947.

The Soviet Union in a statement of 9 July 1946 suggested that the Far Eastern Commission study action taken by the Japanese Government on claims by Japanese war industries for compensation for various types of war losses. The Soviet statement did not include a specific policy proposal, but the apparent position of the Soviet delegation was that claims by war industries should be cancelled.

During study of this statement by a subcommittee, it became apparent that the Japanese Government itself was carrying out a program for the cancellation of indemnity claims which provided a 100% tax on all indemnity claims subject to certain small exemptions. Since this program appeared to go further than the Soviet proposal, no action by the Commission appeared necessary and after full information on the Japanese Government's program had been supplied, the subject was removed from the agenda on 22 May 1947.

13 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. George H. Blakeslee

SUBJECT: Far Eastern Commission Policy Decisions
Not Released to the Press

In reply to your inquiry as to why policy decisions enumerated in Enclosure B of MI-088/15 were not released to the press, the following information is submitted:

FEC-086/2, Blocked Accounts of the Japanese Government Requested by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The U.S. representative submitted to the Commission a request that the FEC consider a proposal by the International Committee of the Red Cross that blocked accounts in the amount of ten million Swiss francs be released to the International Committee on the basis of a donation purported to have been made by the Empress of Japan in April 1945. The Commission found no evidence to substantiate the claim, and this was the substance of its "policy decision". No directive to the Supreme Commander was required, and furthermore the Commission specifically decided not to release information regarding its action to the press.

FEC-083/5, Assured Production Capacity Levels for Japan. This policy decision authorized SCAP to designate for retention specific facilities in eight categories of industry to the extent necessary to assure the output prescribed for each category. At SCAP's request the Commission agreed not to make the policy public until SCAP had designated the specified facilities for retention.

FEC-280/15, Access to Technical & Scientific Information in Japan. This policy decision was an extension of existing policy decisions (FEC-280/9 and FEC-315/7) until 1 July 1949. The following week, 7 April 1949, before release of this extension could be made, a further extension to 31 December 1949 was approved. The usual press release on this second

Dr. George H. Blakeslee

Page 2

extension was made and indeed mention was made of the early extension in the press release. FEC-280/15 will be omitted from future lists of policy decisions not released to the press.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Acting Deputy Secretary General

CARL H. PFUNTNER:MC

Mr. Stratton

5 May 1948

Carl H. Pfuntner

Work of Committee No. 6 Since Publication of the Report by the Secretary General on the Activities of the Far Eastern Commission.

On 1 August 1947, a proposed policy decision on Disposition of Funds Covering Fines Collected by United States and British Military Occupation Courts was approved by the Committee. On 8 August it was adopted by the Commission as a policy decision.

A Swiss request regarding exemption from certain Japanese tax laws was directed to the United States Government and was referred by the United States Assistant Secretary of State to the Commission. Committee No. 6 on 12 September 1947 approved a reply to the communication from the United States Assistant Secretary of State. The Commission on 18 September 1947 approved the reply as a letter to be forwarded by the Chairman of the Commission to the United States Assistant Secretary of State.

There were no further meetings of Committee No. 6 until 10 March 1948, at which time a Soviet proposal to the effect that certain action by the Supreme Commander was in contravention with the Commission's policy, Taxation of Aliens by the Japanese, was considered. On 17 March, the Committee approved and forwarded a report to the effect that the Supreme Commander's action had not contravened Commission policy and that no further action was necessary. This report was forwarded to the Commission by the Steering Committee on 4 May.

The only other subject dealt with by Committee No. 6 referred to a report to Committee No. 2 in its capacity as master committee on the subject of Charges for Indigenous Port Facilities Furnished to Foreign Vessels in Japanese Ports. The Committee reported that the Supreme Commander had the authority to impose port and service charges upon foreign vessels entering Japanese ports for commercial purposes.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Secretary of Committee No. 6

CHPfuntner:mrc

Mr. Stratton

5 May 1948

Carl H. Pfuntner

Work of Committee No. 4 Since Publication of the Report by the Secretary General on the Activities of the Far Eastern Commission.

On 26 June 1947, a United States proposal (FEC-240) on Interchange of Persons Between Japan and Other Countries was submitted and was referred directly to Committee No. 4, which had under consideration a New Zealand proposal on the same subject. The two proposals were revised and forwarded by Committee No. 4 as a single paper to the Steering Committee on 28 July. The Steering Committee on 5 August split the paper into two subjects, one having to do with inter-governmental conferences, the other having to do with non-governmental conferences and with interchange of persons with Japan. These papers reached the Commission, but both were referred back to Committee No. 4 on 20 November 1947. The paper on inter-governmental conferences was amended by Committee No. 4 and again forwarded on 25 November 1947. It reached the Commission on 20 January 1948, and on 26 February was defeated. On 2 March 1948, a fresh proposal on Attendance at Inter-Governmental Conferences was submitted by the New Zealand delegation and the subject is still on the Commission's agenda.

The paper on non-governmental conferences was reconsidered by Committee No. 4 and was forwarded on 19 April 1948. It is still before the Steering Committee.

Committee No. 4 recommenced on 15 October 1947 the reconsideration of peasants' organizations, a subject which had been taken up and postponed several times in the past, the postponement occurring mainly because of the lack of a United States position. The United States position was finally submitted to the Committee on 9 December 1947. The New Zealand and United States Members combined their two papers into one document and consideration of the subject together with various amendments since proposed is still continuing.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Secretary of Committee No. 4

CHPfuntner:mrc

17 March 1947

Memorandum for: Mr. Stratton

Subject : Work of Committee No. 4

You will recall that at a meeting on 12 March in your office, in canvassing the future of the work of the various committees I pointed out that Committee No. 4 had, at its meeting that same day, disposed of its active agenda by forwarding a paper on reform of the Japanese educational system to the Steering Committee.

I further pointed out that the future work of the Committee was being delayed by the U.S. Government's failure so far to complete papers on interchange of persons (Relations of Japan with the Outside World) and on peasant organizations in Japan.

It was mentioned that the peasant organizations paper was delayed only because it had been made a part of a paper on agrarian reform, and that if it could be separated from the agrarian reform paper it could be presented to the Commission by the U.S. Government in a relatively short time.

I have discussed with Mr. Schuler, the U.S. member of Committee No. 4, the possibility of making the peasant organizations paper into a separate document and thereby obtaining early U.S. approval on it. He tells me, however, that it is now too late to separate it from the paper on agrarian reform since SCAP insists on considering it as part of the question of agrarian reform. He agrees that the paper should have been kept apart from the agrarian reform document but sees no way of bringing about this separation at this late date.

I then asked Mr. Schuler about the paper on interchange of persons, and he estimated that it would be at least five or six weeks before it would be available for consideration by Committee No. 4.

I also told Mr. Schuler that the Secretariat saw at least a faint possibility that Committee No. 4 ^{might} concerned itself with the question of censorship exercised by SCAP in Japan. He expressed a very strongly worded hope that this question would not be introduced into the Committee's deliberations and it was very apparent that should any delegate attempt to raise the question of censorship the U.S. position, if Mr. Schuler's feelings of the moment were a reliable indication, would be that the matter was one of implementation and therefore not an appropriate subject for the Commission to be concerned with.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Recording Secretary

FEC:GHP:LDeP.

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION
2516 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

File
Memo for Mr. Coff

17 June 1947

Memorandum for: Mr. Samuel S. Stratton

Subject : Precedence for Reference of Proposed Policy Concerning Representation of Japan at International Conferences (FEC-236) to Committee No. 4: Strengthening of Democratic Tendencies

1. The agenda for the 62nd FEC meeting, 19 June 1947, will contain a proposed policy decision concerning the representation of Japan at international conferences which was submitted by the New Zealand Representative.

2. The subject of this paper is a phase of Japanese external relations and should therefore be referred to Committee No. 4 for consideration. The chief precedent for this procedure is to be found in a decision taken by the Steering Committee on 20 August 1946 in connection with its consideration of external relations of Japanese trade unions (pages 2 and 3, Minutes 26th SC Meeting). Although in the discussion of the trade union paper a distinction was drawn between the external relations of groups of an educational, scientific, religious, cultural or welfare nature, and external relations of a diplomatic, political, and commercial nature, it was nevertheless agreed that the matter of external relations of trade unions be referred to Committee No. 4 for consideration.

3. On 21 August 1946 Committee No. 4 considered the paper on external relations of trade unions and agreed to defer further consideration until a United States paper on the general subject of external relations should become available to the Commission. The whole question of Japanese external relations has therefore remained in suspension before Committee No. 4 since that time.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Carl H. Pfuntner
Recording Secretary

6 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. George H. Blakeslee

SUBJECT: Status of Restitution Claimants Group

On 6 October 1949 the Far Eastern Commission adopted an amendment (FEC-011/59) to its policy decision (FEC-011/51) on the restitution of looted property. This amendment provided that the secured fund from the proceeds of liquidation of unidentified looted property should finally be distributed among Australia, China, France, India, Netherlands, the Philippines and the United Kingdom either in accordance with their recognized national reparations percentage shares, as provided in the original policy decision, or in accordance with a schedule of shares to be agreed upon by the seven countries.

Immediately upon the adoption of FEC-011/59 there was a discussion in the Commission (Pages 1 and 2, Minutes 167th FEC meeting) as to the procedure whereby the seven countries would attempt to reach an agreement for sharing the secured fund. It was the general consensus that representatives of the seven governments should undertake to work out the necessary agreement but that it was not necessary that they be convened under the formal auspices of the Commission. If and when the representatives of the seven countries should reach an agreement it was felt that the problem of transmitting this agreement to the Supreme Commander might make necessary some action by the Commission.

On the understanding that representatives of the seven countries were not meeting under the jurisdiction or under the auspices of the Commission, they did in fact hold most of their meetings in the FEC Conference Room and were assisted on an informal basis by the Secretariat. Mr. David McNicol of the Australian delegation served as Chairman of the Restitution Claimants Group. Mr. Davidson, who is no longer with the Secretariat, supplied this assistance which did not include the preparation of any kind of a written record of their meetings.

I was informed by Mr. Davidson on his departure from the Commission that the Restitution Claimants Group held its last meeting on 6 April

Dr. George H. Blakeslee

Page 2

1950. At that time the Chinese delegation proposed the following schedule of shares:

China	26 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
Netherlands	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
United Kingdom	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
Philippines	16 $\frac{1}{2}$ %
Australia	8%
France	8%
India	8%

This schedule was submitted to governments, but I learned from Mr. McNicol that up to the present time most governments have not replied.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Acting Deputy Secretary General

CARL PFUNTNER:MC

20 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. K. F. Khalil, Pakistan Delegation

SUBJECT: Information on Far Eastern Commission Policy Decisions
Regarding Secured Fund

1. The original FEC policy decision on restitution of looted property (FEC-011/51) was adopted on 29 July 1948. Paragraph 8 of this policy decision provided that the secured fund from the proceeds of the liquidation of looted property should finally be distributed among Australia, China, France, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom in accordance with their recognized national reparations percentage shares.

2. On 29 September 1949 the Commission approved an amendment (FEC-011/58) of its policy decision which provided that the secured fund would be made available for distribution not later than 1 April 1950, instead of 1 October 1949, as originally provided.

3. On 6 October 1949 the Commission adopted an amendment (FEC-011/59) which provided that the secured fund should finally be distributed among the seven countries enumerated above either in accordance with their recognized national reparations percentage shares, as provided in the original policy decision, or in accordance with a schedule of shares to be agreed upon by the seven countries. Immediately upon the adoption of FEC-011/59 there was a discussion (Pages 1 and 2, Minutes 167th FEC Mtg.) as to the procedure whereby the seven countries would attempt to reach an agreement for sharing the secured fund. It was the general consensus that representatives of the seven governments should undertake to work out the necessary agreement; it was not considered necessary that they be convened under the formal auspices of the Commission. It was felt that if and when the representatives of the seven governments should reach an agreement, then the problem of transmitting this agreement to the Supreme Commander might make necessary some action by the Commission.

4. On 6 April 1950 (Page 3, Minutes 190th FEC Mtg.) the Chairman and U. S. Representative announced that the Supreme Commander had informed the U.S. Government that the secured fund was available for distribution in accordance with the provisions of FEC-011/51, FEC-011/58, and FEC-011/59. On 20 April 1950 (Page 3, Minutes 191st FEC Mtg.) the Chairman and U.S. Representative, in the course of giving further information on the secured fund, said: "If no objection is made the United States Government will advise the Supreme Commander when agreement is reached on percentage shares for the distribution of the secured fund in accordance with the relevant

Page 2

Mr. K. F. Khalil

Far Eastern Commission policy, that he should distribute all proceeds accrued to the secured fund..."

5. At the 192nd FEC Meeting, 4 May 1950, the Representatives of Pakistan and Burma recorded their interest in the subject of the secured fund.

6. The Philippines Representative has on three occasions (Pages 3 and 4, Minutes 205th FEC Mtg.; Page 1, Minutes 216th FEC Mtg.; Pages 1 and 2, Minutes 218th FEC Mtg.) recorded his Government's interest in an early solution of the question of the distribution of the secured fund.

7. Periodic reports have been made to the Commission on the dollar and yen components of the secured fund. The latest such report (FEC-011/70) was made on 1 June 1951 and covered the period through March 1951. The fund contained, according to this report, \$3,400,146.64 and 3,358,410.12 yen.

Carl H. Pfuntner
Deputy Secretary General

CARL H. PFUNTNER:MC

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 1597**REGULATION OF WHALING** ℓ**Protocol Between the UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA and OTHER GOVERNMENTS**

**Amending the International Agreement
for the Regulation of Whaling signed
June 8, 1937, as amended by the Protocol
signed June 24, 1938**

- Signed at London November 26, 1945
- Ratification advised by the Senate of
the United States of America
July 30, 1946
- Ratified by the President of the
United States of America
August 12, 1946
- Ratification of the United States
of America deposited at London
August 30, 1946
- Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 (1), 6 (2), 7, and 8
Proclaimed by the President of the
United States of America
February 10, 1947



The Department of State publications entitled *Treaty Series* and *Executive Agreement Series* have been discontinued. The *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* has been inaugurated to make available in a single series the texts of treaties and other instruments (such as constitutions and charters of international organizations, declarations, agreements effected by exchanges of diplomatic notes, et cetera) establishing or defining relations between the United States of America and other countries. The texts printed in the present series, as in the *Treaty Series* and *Executive Agreement Series*, are authentic and, in appropriate cases, are certified as such by the Department of State. The *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* begins with the number 1501, the combined numbers in the *Treaty Series* and *Executive Agreement Series* having reached 1500, the last number in the *Treaty Series* being 994 and the last number in the *Executive Agreement Series* being 506.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PUBLICATION 2768

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S.
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Price 5 cents*

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1947

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

WHEREAS a protocol amending the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London on June 8, 1937, [1] as amended by the Protocol signed at London on June 24, 1938, [2] was signed at London on November 26, 1945 by the respective plenipotentiaries of the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of South Africa, the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, Denmark, the French Republic, the United Mexican States, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

WHEREAS the text of the said protocol, as certified by the Foreign Office of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is word for word as follows:

¹ [Treaty Series 933; 52 Stat. 1460.]

² [Treaty Series 944; 53 Stat. 1794.]

PROTOCOL.

THE Governments of the Union of South Africa, the Commonwealth of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America;

Desiring, in view of the fact that pelagic whaling operations in the area defined by Article 7 of the international Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, signed at London on the 8th June, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Agreement), as amended by the Protocol signed at London on the 24th June, 1938 (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol of 1938), have been interrupted for a considerable period by the war, and in order to meet the emergency produced by post-war conditions without prejudice to the conservation of stocks of whales, to put into force by agreement such provisions as may be necessary in regard to pelagic whaling for the season 1946/47;

Have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of Article 3 of the present Protocol, the period fixed by Article 7 of the Principal Agreement, during which factory ships or whalecatchers attached thereto may be used for the purpose of taking or treating baleen whales, shall be extended for the season 1946/47 so as to cover the period from the 8th December to the 7th April inclusive.

ARTICLE 2.

Each contracting Government shall give notice to the Government of the United Kingdom when factory ships registered under the law of any territory under its authority or otherwise under its jurisdiction engage in whaling operations in the area defined by Article 7 of the Principal Agreement. The Government of the United Kingdom will inform the other contracting Governments of all notices received under this paragraph and shall itself similarly give notice to the other contracting Governments if factory ships registered under the law of any territory under its authority or otherwise under its jurisdiction engage in whaling operations in the said area.

ARTICLE 3.

The prohibition contained in Article 1 of the Protocol of 1938 relating to the taking of hump back whales in any waters south of 40° south latitude shall apply during the season of 1946/47.

ARTICLE 4.

(1) During the season of 1946/47 the number of baleen whales caught in the area defined by Article 7 of the Principal Agreement shall not exceed 16,000 blue whale units.

(2) For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article blue whale units shall be calculated on the basis that one blue whale equals—

- (a) Two fin whales or
- (b) Two and a half hump back whales or
- (c) Six sei whales.

(3) Each contracting Government undertakes to ensure that the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics shall be provided, within two days after the end of each calendar week, with data on the number of blue whale units caught by each factory ship under the jurisdiction of the said Government in the area defined by Article 7 of the Principal Agreement. The Government of the United Kingdom shall consult from time to time with the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics and if it should appear that the annual quota provided by paragraph (1) of this Article may be reached before the 7th April, the International Bureau for Whaling Statistics shall be requested to determine, on the basis of the data provided, the date on which the annual quota of blue whale units shall be deemed to have been reached and to notify each contracting Government of that date not less than two weeks in advance thereof. The taking of baleen whales shall be illegal after the date so determined.

ARTICLE 5.

The provisions of Article 3, paragraph (2), of the Protocol of 1938, regarding the operation of factory ships as land stations in the territorial waters of any contracting Government, shall not apply during the period from 1st May, 1947, to 31st October, 1947, inclusive.

ARTICLE 6.

(1) In the present Protocol the following expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them in Article 18 of the Principal Agreement: "factory ship," "whalecatcher," "land station," "baleen whale," "blue whale," "hump back whale," "fin whale."

[No. 1597]

4

(2) Sei whale means, for the purposes of this Protocol, any whale known by the name of *balaenoptera borealis*, sei whale, Rudolphi's rorqual, pollack whale, or coalfish whale, and shall be taken to include *Balaenoptera brydei*, Bryde's whale.

(3) The expression "land station" shall, for the purposes of Article 5 of the present Protocol, include a factory ship the movements and anchorage of which are confined to the territorial waters of any contracting Government.

ARTICLE 7.

(1) The present Protocol shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United Kingdom; and it shall be open to accession on behalf of any Government which is a party to the Principal Agreement and the Protocol of 1938 and has not signed the present Protocol.

(2) Accession shall be effected by notification addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom.

(3) The Government of the United Kingdom shall inform the Governments which are parties or signatories to the present Protocol of all ratifications of this Protocol or accessions thereto.

ARTICLE 8.

(1) The present Protocol shall come into force in its entirety when all the Governments referred to in the Preamble hereof shall have deposited their instruments of ratification or given notifications of accession.

(2) The provisions of this Article and Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 (1), 6 (2) and 7 of the present Protocol shall, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by at least three signatory Governments, become binding on those Governments and shall become binding on each other Government which subsequently ratifies or accedes, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or notification of its accession.

(3) The ratification of or accession to the present Protocol by a Government which is not a party to the Principal Agreement and the Protocol of 1938 shall not become effective until such Government becomes a party to that Agreement and the Protocol of 1938.

ARTICLE 9.

The present Protocol shall bear the date on which it is opened for signature and shall remain open for signature for a period of 14 days thereafter.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries being duly authorised to this end by their respective Governments have signed the present Protocol.

Done at London this 26th day of November, 1945, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom, by whom certified copies will be transmitted to all the Governments referred to in the preamble.

For the Government of the Union of South Africa:

A. P. VAN DER POST.

For the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia:

J. S. DUNCAN.

For the Government of Canada:

VINCENT MASSEY.

For the Government of Denmark:

P. F. ERICHSEN.

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic:

NOËL HENRY.

For the Government of the United Mexican States:

ALFONSO DE ROSENZWEIG DIAZ.

For the Government of the Netherlands:

E. TEIXEIRA DE MATTOS.

For the Government of New Zealand:

R. M. CAMPBELL.

For the Government of Norway:

BIRGER BERGERSEN.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

A. T. A. DOBSON.

J. E. DE WATTEVILLE.

[No. 1597]

6

For the Government of the United States of America:

REMINGTON KELLOGG.

IRA N. GABRIELSON.

Certified a true copy.

[SEAL]

D. A. BIGBY

LONDON

27 Dec 1945

*Acting Librarian and Keeper of the Papers for
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by their Resolution of July 30, 1946, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said protocol;

WHEREAS the said protocol was duly ratified on behalf of the Government of the United States of America on August 12, 1946, and the instrument of ratification on the part of the said Government was duly deposited in the archives of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on August 30, 1946;

WHEREAS it is provided in Article 8 of the said protocol that Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 (1), 6 (2), 7, and 8 of the said protocol shall, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by at least three signatory Governments, become binding on those Governments and shall become binding on each other Government which subsequently ratifies or accedes on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or notification of its accession;

WHEREAS instruments of ratification of the said protocol were deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland by the Government of New Zealand on March 7, 1946, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on March 29, 1946, and the Government of Norway on April 4, 1946; and

WHEREAS pursuant to the aforesaid provision of Article 8 of the said protocol, Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 (1), 6 (2), 7, and 8 of the said protocol came into force on April 4, 1946, in respect of the Governments of New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Norway;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and make public Articles 2, 3, 4, 6 (1), 6 (2), 7, and 8 of the said protocol amending the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London on June 8, 1937, as amended by the Protocol signed at London on June 24, 1938, to the end that the aforesaid Articles and every provision and clause thereof shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America, and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

8

[No. 1597]

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused
the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington this tenth day of February in the
year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred forty-seven
and of the Independence of the United States of America
the one hundred seventy-first.

[SEAL]

HARRY S TRUMAN

By the President:

G C MARSHALL

Secretary of State

○

FEC-231RESTRICTEDFEC-23128 May 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

(References: JAPANESE WHALING
FEC-035, FEC-035/1, C2-014 Series)

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a draft statement of policy on Japanese whaling, has been submitted by the United Kingdom Representative and is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-231

RESTRICTEDENCLOSUREJAPANESE WHALING

1. The Far Eastern Commission decides as a matter of policy that the Japanese should be permitted to capture whales within the area in which they are permitted, from time to time, to fish. The provisions of the International Whaling Agreements to which the United States is a party should be observed except so far as they are in conflict with this statement of policy.

2. Japanese whaling should be conducted from shore stations and the Japanese should not be permitted to make use of factory ships or of any other vessels for the purpose of treating whales at sea.

FEC-231/1RESTRICTEDFEC-231/129 May 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONJAPANESE WHALING
(Reference: FEC-231)Note by the Secretary General

The Far Eastern Commission at its fifty-ninth meeting on 29 May 1947 referred FEC-231, a United Kingdom draft statement of policy on Japanese Whaling, to COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS for consideration as a matter of urgency.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-231/1

C2-231/2RESTRICTEDC2-231/211 June 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONCOMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRSJAPANESE WHALING
(Reference: FEC-231)Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, the official report by the Australian observer on the operations of the Japanese whaling factory ship S.S. "HASHIDATE MARU", submitted by the Australian member, is circulated herewith for the information of COMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

C2-231/2

RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R EJAPANESE WHALINGOfficial Report on the Operations of the
Japanese Whaling Factory Ship S.S. "HASHIDATE MARU"

By Australian Observer, Kenneth J. Coonan

As directed, I departed from Australia for Tokyo by R.A.A.F. Courier 'plane on November 5th, 1946, to join the Japanese whaling expedition which was proceeding to the Antarctic under the approval of SCAP. After two days in Tokyo, I proceeded to Osaka, Yokosuka, to join the "Hashidate Maru" which left at 0820 hours on Friday, November 15th. The mother-ship was joined by 6 catcher boats at 0630 hours the next day at a position 10 miles south of Shionomi.

This ship was originally built for use as a tanker during the war. On her maiden voyage she struck a mine and was forced to return to Kobe, where she remained idle until a year ago, when she was converted into a whaling factory ship for the Nippon Suisan Kaisha Ltd.

The "Hashidate Maru" is a vessel of 10,798.84 tons. She carries a crew of 304, including 186 factory workers. The seamen's quarters are in the forecastle. The factory workers are cramped together in several small rooms between decks amidships, built near the oil extracting boilers.

The passage-way to the workers' quarters has head room of less than five feet, owing to the fact that the steam pipes to the Kvaener Boilers are built overhead. The passage-way is both dangerous and difficult to pass along. The heat, bad odors and low deck head did not worry the Japanese, who appeared to be quite satisfied with their quarters.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers appointed a representative, Lieutenant D. McCracken of G.H.Q., Tokyo, to accompany the fleet. A Japanese photographer, with complete motion picture and still photographic equipment, was aboard the factory ship. His services were at the disposal of the SCAP representative.

Lieutenant McCracken informed me that he was directed by General Headquarters to pay particular attention to the Japanese methods of killing, hunting, use of electricity and also the methods of inserting air in whale.

The Master of S.S. "Hashidate Maru" was Captain Dai Miyata, aged 43 years. Captain Miyata has a fair grasp of the English language. He has been with Nippon Suisan Kaisha for about 15 years, and prior to the voyage he was instructor in the company's school. During the war he was master of a frozen meat vessel of this company, which was torpedoed off the Marshall Islands.

Captain Miyata had been to the Antarctic six times previously. He was once master of a catcher boat, and appeared to have a profound knowledge of the Antarctic and was adept at foretelling the weather two or three days in advance, a knowledge which is essential for the working of the factory.

RESTRICTED

Mr. Onishi, the whaling superintendent on board, is about 60 years of age. He has been whaling for the past thirty years and appears to have no special duties on board except that he is the direct representative of the company aboard the "Hashidate Maru". I believe that Mr. Onishi also controls the movement of the fleet from one position to another.

Mr. Kureybashi was the factory manager. He is about 30 years old and has been whaling for eight years. He was once master of a catcher boat.

The factory manager is responsible for everything connected with whaling operations, including the running of the factory and the amount of production each day.

The most outstanding feature of this expedition was, in my opinion, the very young age of the crew members. Except for a few old hands in the flensing department, the workers' ages were between 15 and 20 years old.

The factory workers are divided into three watches and a "boss", a senior hand about 30 years of age, is in charge of each watch.

The Antarctic whaling grounds were reached at 1340 hours on Sunday, December 15th, after a voyage of 6,804 miles which occupied 30 days. Whaling operations did not commence until Tuesday, December 17th, owing to the weather conditions and the first whale, a 60 foot fin whale, was received on board at 1900 hours. At this early stage of operations it was known that the freshwater supply would be short of requirements and that the expedition would have to leave the Antarctic by the middle of February. The operations continued for 10 weeks and the following brief summary of the catch and production is given:

Time on grounds	72 days
Distance run	3,383 miles
Average speed	5.87 knots
Time drifting	48 days

Catch:

Total whales killed - Blue	297
Fin-back	189
Sperm	<u>4</u>
Total	490

Ten whales were lost for various reasons and were not processed

Production:

Whale oil	3,700 tons
Salted blubber and meat	<u>10,608</u> tons
Grand total of products	14,308 tons
Oil production per blue whale unit	9.57 tons
Blubber and meat per blue whale unit	<u>27.41</u> tons
Total production per blue whale unit	37.02 tons

RESTRICTED

The 1946/47 season was an abnormal one because of the unusually high air temperatures causing frequent and dense fogs. According to the Captain, the ice pack had shifted 40 miles to the south since 1939, and all the large icebergs were to the eastward instead of the west. There appeared to be no shortage of blue and fin whales as the catcher boats never failed to bring in whales on fine days.

Report:

In addition to an infringement in that a 68-foot blue whale was taken by one of the catcher boats, namely the Shonan Maru No. 8, by Gunner Sakishi Kawamura, at 3:05 p.m. 30th December, Lat, 64-01 S. Long 153-06 E., I have to report the following wastage of oil-bearing material, mainly bones.

It was quite apparent after one week's fishing, that the "Hashidate Maru's" three Kvaener oil extracting boilers would not cope with the bones on hand.

Back bones and ribs took up all available space on the flensing deck, making work on that deck both dangerous and difficult.

To extract the maximum amount of oil from bones they must be processed as soon as possible after flensing: if they are allowed to lie around too long the oil will seep or dry out.

A check was made on ribs which were piled high against the saloon door, and it was found that they remained in the same position for two days before being processed. The amount of oil yielded from these bones would have been very poor.

The whaling staff were very concerned about the Dvaener boilers because these boilers, besides taking much longer to cook the bones than was expected, were using a great deal more fresh water than was anticipated.

The entire production of the fleet depends upon the efficient operation of the Oil Extracting Boilers, as the number of whales killed per day must be limited to the number of whales the boilers can treat a day. Therefore, within limits, the more boilers a Factory Ship has the more efficient she will be.

Captain Miyata informed me, that it is very unusual for a factory ship to have only three boilers, most ships have six at least, while his last ship (Tona Maru 19,000) was fitted with fourteen.

The Captain estimated that, at the rate the boilers were consuming fresh water, the fleet would be forced to leave the Antarctic about the 7th February.

On Saturday, 4th January, Lieutenant McCracken held a conference in his cabin to discuss the fresh water situation and possible methods of alleviating it. The following officers were present: Lieut. McCracken, U.S.A., Captain, Superintendent, Manager, Japanese Inspector and myself.

The Captain stated during the conference, that he had considered closing the factory down for two days a week and making water, but he was doubtful whether the water gained by that method would make much difference, and besides, he would have to draw on his fuel reserve to make water.

RESTRICTED

"Hashidate Maru" produces sixty tons of fresh water per day, and the fleet uses approximately one hundred and ten tons per day, which means that each day she must draw approximately forty-five tons from her reserve supply.

The boilers were taking longer to cook the bones than was anticipated, and as previously mentioned, the decks were cluttered with these massive bones. In my opinion, the Japanese were taking more whales than they could handle in the boilers, and the logical remedy for this would have been to have taken less whales. By doing so, the boilers would have been given an opportunity to catch up with the whales on hand, the bones could have been cooked without having to lie around the decks for twenty-four hours or more, and I think a better yield of oil per blue whale unit would have resulted.

Lieut. McCracken asked the manager what he considered was the cause of the boiler hold-up, to which the manager replied that the bones were taking nearly eight hours to cook instead of five or six, which meant that each boiler could only be filled three times in twenty-four hours; consequently the bones were piling up.

Lieut. McCracken then asked the manager whether, if he was to discard some of the bones and only cook the best oil-bearing parts, would they be able to increase the production and save water?

The Manager replied that if they were to cook only the best bones, the boilers would be able to be filled more often and also more whales could be taken per day...Lieut. McCracken then gave the Manager and Japanese Whaling Inspector his written permission to discard "poor bones" until further notice in an attempt to save fresh water and increase production.

The following is a list of the parts that the Japanese are discarding:

- (1) Parts of back-bone
- (2) Internal organs
- (3) Meat and bone damaged by harpoon
- (4) Baleen
- (5) Flippers

The parts mentioned above have very little oil and the discarding of internal organs, baleen and flippers is in accordance with Article II of the Whaling Regulations 1937. However, when "Hashidate Maru's" factory was busy, the complete back-bone and whole sides of ribs were discarded. A side of ribs is a huge affair and when the factory has been quiet I have watched the workers separate and cut away the meat from them, and the amount of meat thus obtained was astounding.

The complete back-bone was also discarded on the above occasions. As can well be imagined, the back-bone is massive and has quite a lot of meat on it. The meat should be cut away and the bone then sawn into sections with the steam saws and placed in the boilers. I have endeavored to compare the oil output per blue whale unit on these days to that of a day when the factory has been working at full pressure, but it is very difficult.

While the daily production record will show the products per blue whale unit, it is rather hard to make a comparison of any two days, because the oil yield will vary according to the species of whales, and also, it must be taken into consideration that some whales are fatter than others regardless of their relative lengths.

RESTRICTED

Lieut. McCracken pointed out that our total production per blue whale unit in comparison with that of other nations, is good; but, once again, I find it difficult to make any comparison because our methods were so different. For instance, we were not cooking all the blubber--some if it going back to Japan salted, and also other parts such as Sunoko and the liver were not rendered down on board, but were being returned to Japan in salt. It will be noted that oil production per B.W.U. was 9.57 tons compared with 17-19 tons for pre-war expeditions.

I would like to make it clear that the only time any useable portion is discarded is when the factory is working under pressure. However, it has happened, and therefore has to be mentioned in this report.

On February 18th, the factory was very busy, the catch for the previous day being 19 whales. I was on the flensing deck and noticed three sides of ribs piled on top of each other near the boilers. These ribs were fresh and once again I was struck with the rich appearance of them. Oil bearing fat was hanging from them and the meat was of a good color.

I spent about an hour and a half on the flensing deck, during which time I took several photographs of the ribs. I then returned to the bridge to reload my camera. About half an hour later, I was standing on the bridge and looking aft when I saw the derrick swinging out over the ship's side suspending one of these sides of ribs. The derrick was lowered level with the deck and the ribs were cut loose, falling into the sea. This happened to the other two as well. I had my camera with me and took several shots.

I then went below to Lieut. McCracken's cabin and told him of what I had seen, Lieut. McCracken replying that he would speak to Mr. Onishi about it.

Later in the day, Lieut. McCracken informed me that he had spoken to the whaling staff about the discarding of ribs, but there wasn't much he would do about it, as the manager explained to him that if they were to cut up all the ribs much time would be lost and fewer whales could be taken, and Lieut. McCracken did not consider that the little oil gained would warrant the loss of so much meat.

The Japanese themselves were not concerned about oil production since the oil produced was to be transferred to the Allied Food Council, whereas the meat and blubber was to be utilized in Japan.

The manager estimated that though being permitted to discard bones, the fleet gained 7,000 tons of products, without which the expedition would have been a failure. As a factory ship the "Hashidate Maru" is only suitable for small operations. If she is permitted to proceed South next season in her present condition, she should be restricted to three catcher boats.

The following is a list of those parts which the Japanese took for human consumption:

- (1) Meat
- (2) ventral Grooves (Being the blubber from throat to belly which is pleated in the Baleen Whales).
- (3) Liver
- (4) Tendons

RESTRICTED

(5) Tail (blubber)

(6) Sunoko

(That meat next to the ventral grooves. It is a pale red in color and streaked with white and has some oil).

(7) Kabura

(Head Tendon)

(8) Dendo

(It is the meat from the cavities on each side of the head. Part of it is similar in appearance to Sunoko, and the other part is fatty and rich in oil...the fatty portion goes in the boiler).

Reference liver...The liver, which, in appearance is similar to that of any other animal, but much larger contains oil that is of medicinal value being rich in Vitamin A, and should be rendered down on the ship. "Hashidate Maru" has no boiler or machine for this purpose.

SC-231/3RESTRICTEDSC-231/313 June 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONJAPANESE WHALING(References: FEC-035, FEC-035/1, FEC-231 series)Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a proposed statement of policy on Japanese whaling, approved by Committee No. 2: Economic and Financial Affairs at its sixty-second meeting, 12 June 1947, is forwarded herewith for the consideration of the STEERING COMMITTEE.

2. The United States member opposed the motion adopting the enclosure. The Chinese member reserved his position on the absence of a reference to the authority which should prescribe the fishing area and on the present authorized area with particular reference to the western boundary. The Philippine and Soviet members also reserved their positions.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

SC-231/3

RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R EJAPANESE WHALING

1. The Far Eastern Commission decides as a matter of policy that the Japanese should be permitted to capture whales within the area in which they are permitted, from time to time, to fish. The provisions of the International Whaling Agreements to which the United States is a party should be observed but should not be held to justify any departure from the terms of this statement of policy.

2. Japanese whaling should be conducted from shore stations and the Japanese should not be permitted to make use of factory ships or of any other vessels for the purpose of treating whales at sea.

FE -231/4RESTRICTEDFEC-231/417 June 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONJAPANESE WHALING

(References: SC-231/3, 231 Series,
FEC-035 Series)

Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure, a proposed statement of policy on Japanese whaling, approved by the Steering Committee at its sixty-seventh meeting, 17 June 1947, is forwarded herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.
2. The United States member did not object to the motion forwarding the proposed policy to the Far Eastern Commission but was opposed to the substance of the policy itself.
3. The Chinese member reserved his position on the absence of a reference to the authority which should prescribe the fishing area and on the present authorized area with particular reference to the western boundary. The Philippine and Soviet members also reserved their positions.
4. In accordance with paragraph 3 of FEC-067/3 the Steering Committee recommended that the text of the enclosure be released for the press in the normal procedure.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-231/4

RESTRICTEDENCLOSUREJAPANESE WHALING

1. The Far Eastern Commission decides as a matter of policy that the Japanese should be permitted to capture whales within the area in which they are permitted, from time to time, to fish. The provisions of the International Whaling Agreements to which the United States is a party should be observed but should not be held to justify any departure from the terms of this statement of policy.

2. Japanese whaling should be conducted from shore stations and the Japanese should not be permitted to make use of factory ships or of any other vessels for the purpose of treating whales at sea.

[6/19/47 -

FEC-231/5RESTRICTEDFEC-231/526 June 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

JAPANESE WHALING: STATEMENT BY THE
AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE
(References: FEC-231/4; FEC-035/1;
C2-231/2)

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a statement relative to Japanese whaling, submitted by the Australian Representative at the sixty-third meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, 26 June 1947, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary general

7/10/47- *Soviet reference removed*

FEC-231/5

RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R EJAPANESE WHALING: STATEMENT BY THE
AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. Chairman, my Government's opposition to the resumption of Japanese Antarctic whaling is well-known. It has been stated by Australian representatives at meetings of this Commission and of its Committees, and has been pointed out in aide-memoires to the State Department. Australia's position has been unambiguous from the beginning: we are opposed to any deep-sea whaling by the Japanese before the permanent future of this industry has been decided by the peace conference.

This opposition has been based on many grounds. We consider that the presence of Japanese in Australian or Antarctic waters constitutes a threat to the security and welfare of Australia. Factory ships are capable of conversion into tankers and submarine refuelling vessels, and chasers can be converted into naval patrol craft. We know that during the war former Japanese whaling vessels were used for naval purposes, and proved of great value to the enemy because they were specially constructed in order to be readily converted into war uses. Moreover, the crews of these ships are given an opportunity to gain valuable experience in Antarctic waters and to make scientific observations. These things should not be permitted before the peace conference has had an opportunity to discuss and determine the whole question of the military disarmament and control of Japan. I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that if these arguments seem to carry much more weight in Australia and New Zealand than they apparently do in Washington, it is because both Dominions are exposed and alone in the South Pacific and are the ones most closely affected by these operations of the Japanese. Ninety per cent of the whales captured by the Japanese last year were taken off Australian Antarctic territories.

The Japanese violations of international whaling conventions in the past are well known. Their depredations have done much to reduce the numbers of whales now living in these seas and thus to reduce the quantity of whale oil available to the world. The Japanese ruthlessly killed all the whales they could get, regardless of sex or age, regardless of whether they were with calf or not. A few years of enforced abstinence from whaling would do no more than allow the Japanese to make some recompense to the rest of the world for their past conduct in reducing the total number of whales to its present figure. Moreover, Mr. Chairman we have no confidence that the Japanese in future will observe the international whaling conventions with any better faith than in the past.

Another Japanese expedition to the Antarctic will not increase the quantity of oil available to the world this year. The international whaling conference has limited the total catch to 16,000 blue whale units. Exclusive of the Japanese, at least sixteen Allied factory ships will be operating in 1947/48, and they will be able to attain the maximum of 16,000 whales. Therefore, any Japanese catches will be at the expense of Allied vessels. But not only will the total number of whales captured be no greater; the total output of oil will probably be smaller. Japanese whaling methods before the war were most wasteful and unsatisfactory, and they continued to be so last year. My Government has estimated that, from the whales which were captured by the Japanese last year, at least 3,000 tons more oil could have been obtained, which at the present price of £ 100 a ton represents a loss of £ 300,000, or some \$1,000,000. I understand that the Norwegian Government has made estimates which are

RESTRICTED

even higher. We are informed that the Supreme Commander intends to take steps to improve the Japanese ships and methods so that this waste will not continue, but we cannot forget that ships were allowed to leave Japan last year obviously unfitted for their job, despite the fact that the Supreme Commander's attention had been drawn to the dangers of waste. I might add, for the information of members who might not have already perused it, that I have had distributed to members, on 11 June, a copy of the official report of the Australian observer who accompanied the last Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic--this is document C2-231/2, and fully bears out what I have been saying about waste and infringements of the international conventions.

At this stage, Mr. Chairman, I should like to recapitulate the course of events over the past year. My Government, in common with the Governments of New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom, protested very strongly in 1946 against the Japanese expedition to the Antarctic last year. Our protests were of no avail, and the expedition sailed. However, we did receive certain assurances from the United States Government, one of which was that the question of the future of the Japanese whaling industry was a matter of Allied consultation and decision. We were also assured that the Australian Government would be fully consulted in connection with any future proposals concerning Japanese whaling with which the United States was concerned. I understand that similar assurances were given to the Governments of New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom.

Last December my Government introduced a paper into the Far Eastern Commission -- FEC-035/1 -- which would have had the effect of forbidding Japanese whaling in the Antarctic. This paper was carefully considered in the economic committee, and by the end of February had secured the support of every country represented on the Commission with the exception of the United States. At this stage the American member, finding himself outvoted by 10 to 1, suggested that the committee agree to divide the paper into two separate papers covering fishing and whaling, and the committee was led to believe that the United States was preparing a paper which would have forbidden Japanese Antarctic whaling. On that understanding the committee adjourned its discussion, and whenever members raised questions subsequently they were assured that the papers were being prepared. Suddenly my Government was confronted on 27th May with a statement from General Hilldring that a second Japanese expedition was contemplated, and this was followed swiftly on 9 June with an aide-memoire bluntly announcing that an expedition would definitely be authorized--a unilateral act which disregarded the wishes of every other member of this Commission and every other interested Government. Apparently, Mr. Chairman, the three months' respite which the economic committee gave the United States Government as a matter of courtesy, resulted, not in an American counter-proposal designed to meet the views of other Governments, but in the rest of the Commission being lulled into a sense of false security and in the ultimate frustration of their wishes.

Surely no one could maintain that the assurances given to my Government in 1946 have been fulfilled. There was no real "Allied consultation and decision." My Government was not "fully consulted in connection with future proposals concerning Japanese whaling". Apparently General MacArthur's proposal for a second expedition was considered in Washington

RESTRICTED

for some weeks before any other Government was informed. If we had been approached frankly in April and informed of the Supreme Commander's proposals and the United States views, we are confident we could have reached a detailed agreement acceptable to all. My Government proposed last year that the expedition should be manned by Allied crews, and assured the United States of Australia's ability to provide the crew of one factory ship and ancillary craft. I remember very well an interview which I had with Mr. Dean Acheson on 5 October, in which I renewed that offer. But apparently, in all the consideration given to this latest expedition before other Governments were consulted, no consideration was given to the earlier Australian offer to provide crews, or to the possibility of an Allied expedition.

Immediately my Government learned that a second expedition was contemplated, we made an earnest endeavour to find a solution which would not only meet our position but satisfy the United States. The chief argument posed by the United States appears as follows in an aide-memoire to my Government on 9 June of this year: "The protein food products and whale oil provided by the expedition will be a vitally necessary component of Japanese food and oil supplies during the calendar year 1948....If the requisite protein foods and oil for calendar 1948 are not obtained from whaling operations, it will fall upon the United States, which continues in the interest and to the advantage of all the Allies to supply the entire Japanese food deficit, to make up the deficiency, something which, in view of the manifold demands on its fats and oils resources, it can ill afford to do".

My Government carefully considered this argument. We are not unappreciative of the burdens borne by the United States, and on many occasions in this Commission and in Japan we have shown a willingness to co-operate in sharing or relieving those burdens. You must remember that we did not have much time to act on this matter. If we had been consulted last April, we could have discussed various proposals in detail. But we did what we could. Mr. Macmahon Ball discussed the position with General MacArthur and officials of his staff. Here in Washington last week we began to discuss a proposal which I can best summarize by quoting from an aide-memoire which I have since given to the State Department:

"The difficulties of the United States Government in financing relief for Japan and the difficulties of the Supreme Commander in securing adequate supplies are fully appreciated. The Australian Government is prepared to play its part in relieving these difficulties. To this end it proposes that a factory ship and chasers should be made available to Australia immediately for use in the coming whaling season. The Australian Government is in a position to man these ships and operate them more efficiently than the Japanese, thus increasing the amount of oil available. The allocation of the food products to relieve the Japanese food shortage would be entirely a matter for determination by the Supreme Commander, and the oil would be allocated as at present by the International Food Emergency Committee, thus assuring supplies at least as adequate as those which would be obtained from the proposed Japanese expedition. The Australian Government is prepared to consider methods of payment which would avoid the cost being a charge on United States revenue. If a separate Australian expedition is not considered feasible or desirable, Australia is prepared to conduct the expedition in association with other Allies, in particular the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Norway."

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In putting forward that proposal, Mr. Chairman, my Government deliberately refrained from going into detail because we wished to give full opportunity for the United States to state, and for us to take account of, the practical difficulties and views of the Supreme Commander and the United States Government. There are obviously many courses open in giving effect to our offer, such as allocating a ship as advance reparations deliveries or leasing a ship, and there are many ways of considering the financial problems involved. We feel that details can readily be worked out if agreement is first reached on the fundamental principles: that Japanese Antarctic whaling this year should be forbidden; and that the Allies themselves should be given all rights of operating any emergency expedition for the purpose of obtaining whale meat and oil for the Japanese, to be allocated by SCAP and the International Emergency Food Committee.

My Government feels this is a matter for decision by the Far Eastern Commission, not for unilateral action by one Government. My Government's position has been supported at Committee level by nine other Governments, and I hope they will remain firm. I accordingly move the adoption of FEC-231/4.

FEC-RESTRICTED

FEC-231/6

FEC-231/6

23 July 1947

FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING ANTARCTIC
WHALING BY JAPANESE-MANNED SHIPS UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

Note by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a statement by the United States Government regarding Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships under the supervision of the Supreme Commander, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission at its sixty-seventh meeting on 24 July 1947.

7/24/47 - Further Aus. statement - Delg. UK (UK)
 Positions: Pro U.S. - UK }
 Aus }
 NZ. } Hold
 NELSON T. JOHNSON
 Secretary General

FEC-231/6

FEC-RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R ESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REGARDING ANTARCTIC
WHALING BY JAPANESE-MANNED SHIPS UNDER THE
SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

The Far Eastern Commission was informed in a statement by the United States Member on June 19 that the United States Government had decided it could not approve FEC-231/4 prohibiting further Japanese whaling during the occupation except from shore stations within the permitted fishing area, that in its view the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan had the authority to authorize a second Antarctic whaling expedition under his control, and that he should do so. The principal considerations leading to this decision, as explained in aide-mémoire to the concerned governments, were that the fats and oils provided by the expedition were an essential component of Japanese food supplies, that the United States Government perceived no security threat to any nation in the expedition, and that the Supreme Commander had provided assurances that all international whaling regulations, including those pertaining to the efficient processing of whales, would be observed. In this latter connection it might be mentioned in passing that the United States Government was recently informed by the Supreme Commander that the reported low oil production on last year's expedition was to be accounted for by the fact that 4424 metric tons of blubber were shipped to Japan for consumption, and that, allowance being made for this factor, the yield of oil plus meat and other products per blue whale unit on the expedition was actually higher than that achieved by other nations.

On June 17, too late for consideration before reading of the above-mentioned statement on June 19, a proposal by the Australian Government to operate a Japanese whaling unit on behalf of Japan was submitted orally and informally by an officer of the Australian Embassy to an officer of the Department of State. As a result of this proposal, confirmed in an aide-mémoire of June 23 from the Australian Embassy, and of notes received from the British, New Zealand and Norwegian Governments expressing renewed opposition to the projected expedition, the United States position was carefully reviewed by the Department of State and further consultations held with the Supreme Commander in the matter. The United States Government nevertheless found it necessary to inform the Australian Government on July 9 that it could not accept the proposal. Among the reasons given for this decision were the facts that the considerable quantities of foreign exchange obtained from the last expedition, available to lighten the burden of occupation costs on the American taxpayer, would not be available under the Australian proposal; that in the absence of apparent security risk, or of any probability that international whaling regulations would not be fully observed, there appeared to be no justification for the abandonment of the projected expedition; and that the United States regarded the expedition as necessary to the rehabilitation of a self-supporting economy for Japan, which is the policy of the United States Government and of the Far Eastern Commission. The British and New Zealand Governments,

FEC-RESTRICTED

which in their aide-mémoire of July 1 and June 25, respectively, had expressed support for the Australian proposal, were informed on July 23 of the United States decision not to accept the proposal, and of the reasons for that decision.

As stated on June 19, the United States Government regrets that it should have been impossible to reach agreement on this issue. Having finally determined its position after careful and prolonged consideration of the matter and of other governments' views thereon, the United States Government has been obliged to instruct its representative on the Commission to withhold his approval from FEC-231/4 "Japanese Whaling", should that paper come up for a vote.

FEC-231/7FEC-RESTRICTEDFEC-231/725 July 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONSTATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING
ANTARCTIC WHALING BY JAPANESE-MANNED SHIPS UNDER
THE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDERNote by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a statement by the United States Representative regarding Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships under the supervision of the Supreme Commander, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-231/7

FEC-RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R ESTATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING
ANTARCTIC WHALING BY JAPANESE-MANNED SHIPS UNDER
THE SUPERVISION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

At the meeting of the Commission held on June 19th, I stated the position of my Government in regard to the pending paper Japanese Whaling (FEC-231/4). In that statement I said:

"My Government has concluded that it cannot approve the pending paper because it believes that participation in Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships under SCAP's supervision is important in the interest of the Allied occupation of Japan.

"My Government has also concluded that the Supreme Commander has the authority to authorize another Antarctic whaling expedition and that he should do so."

This position of my Government has been reaffirmed in the statement of the United States Government regarding Antarctic Whaling, which was made available yesterday for the members of the Commission.

At the meeting of the Commission on June 26th, the Australian Ambassador read a formal statement presenting the views of his Government on the issue of Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships. Since that time exchanges of view between my Government and certain other Governments on this subject have been in progress and apparently have now been concluded.

I wish to comment on the three main points contained in the statement of the Australian Ambassador of June 26th. The first point deals with the advisability and the propriety of Antarctic whaling by Japanese ships under the supervision of the Supreme Commander. The views of the United States Government on this subject have been presented at length by my representatives in the Economic Committee and the Steering Committee, by the United States Government in aide memoire to the several countries particularly interested in Antarctic whaling, and in the statement of the United States Government just distributed.

The second point in the statement of the Australian Ambassador is the contention that the United States Government did not fulfill a commitment, contained in an aide memoire to one or more of the states particularly interested in Antarctic whaling, that the United States Government would consult with other states concerned before a second whaling expedition would be authorized by the Supreme Commander. The contention, which the United States does not accept, raises an issue between the governments of certain states and the Government of the United States. The issue is one to be considered by the Governments of these states concerned.

The third point, however, involves the good faith of the United States member of the Commission and his representatives on the Economic Committee. The Australian Ambassador has said that the statements of the United States member on the Economic Committee and the resulting postponement of the discussion of Antarctic whaling, "resulted...in the rest of the Commission being lulled into a sense of false security and in the ultimate

FEC-RESTRICTED

frustration of their wishes."

I wish to make clear that every statement made by the United States member in the Economic Committee was both accurate and sincere and was motivated solely by the desire to facilitate the work of the committee and the Commission. Neither I nor my representative has attempted to mislead the Commission or to lull it "into a sense of false security." The United States Government gave much time and thought to the consideration of preparing papers which would state the position of the United States on the two fields of Japanese fishing and Japanese whaling. There were delays, such as normally have occurred when Governments have attempted to determine their views on important policies. Consultations have to take place, agreements have to be reached between various agencies within the Government, and, often, the views of the Supreme Commander have to be ascertained and considered.

Before the United States position was determined, the Supreme Commander requested authorization for a whaling expedition in 1947. On May 27th the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas consulted with the representatives of states directly concerned in Antarctic whaling. Since that time the exchanges of view have been taking place in larger measure between certain states and the United States Government than in the Far Eastern Commission.

In summary, everything said and everything done by myself and my representatives in the Far Eastern Commission in relation to this subject of Antarctic whaling by Japanese-manned ships has been said and done in good faith.

FEC-231/8FEC-RESTRICTEDFEC-231/825 July 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONSUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIAN
REPRESENTATIVE ON JAPANESE WHALINGNote by the Secretary General

The enclosure, a statement by the Australian Representative embodying certain observations on the subject of Japanese whaling which are supplementary to the statement made by him at the sixty-seventh Meeting of the Far Eastern Commission on 24 July 1947, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission.

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

FEC-231/8

FEC-RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R ESUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIAN
REPRESENTATIVE ON JAPANESE WHALING

In FEC-231/6 the United States Member stated that the Australian proposal to conduct an Allied whaling expedition would result in a considerable loss of foreign exchange to the Supreme Commander, and thereby increase the burden on the U. S. taxpayers.

The Australian Member finds it necessary to point out the fallacy in this argument. The Australian proposal provides that the Supreme Commander will retain all proceeds of the expedition after essential costs have been met. The only loss in foreign exchange thereby involved would be labour costs of Australian and Allied personnel. These, of course, would be negligible in relation to the value of the catch. Other costs such as fuel and provisions would have to be met eventually from the Supreme Commander's holdings of foreign exchange in any event. The Supreme Commander would still be able to sell the same proportion of the catch overseas as he did on the previous occasion.

RESTRICTED

- AAA 2 -

FAR EASTERN SECTION

Japan

Apr. 16, 1948

CONTINUED CONTROL ON WHALING URGED

Dispatch in English Morse from AFP Correspondent in Tokyo for AFP Agencies in the Far East, Apr. 15, 1948, 4:30 a.m. EST--H

(Text)

"Tokyo, Apr. 15---Although the Japanese have strictly observed international regulations in the 1947-48 whaling expedition, Japanese whaling should be kept under foreign control for the next few years, a foreign observer who accompanied the Japanese whaling fleet to the Antarctic aboard the factory ship Nisshin Maru told AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE today.

"The 10,000-ton Nisshin Maru docked at Tokyo Monday after a 5-month journey. This observer who preferred to remain anonymous said that British and Australian fears that the Japanese would indiscriminately slaughter young whales and hasten the extinction of the species were totally unjustified as far as this year's expedition was concerned.

"Of the 833 whales treated aboard the Nisshin Maru, only three had been killed in violation of international regulations, and two of these three cases could be considered as dubious, he said. In all other cases, the Japanese had taken utmost care to capture only whales well above the authorized size and the proportion of violations was certainly not higher than in any Australian, British, or Norwegian expedition, he said.

"As to the manner in which the Japanese extracted oil and meat from the captured whales, they extracted less oil but more meat than the fishermen of other nations and the ultimate result could be considered as satisfactory. This observer pointed out however that three foreign observers were aboard the Nisshin Maru and there was no guarantee that the Japanese would remain as careful in the future as they had been this time, if foreign control was removed.

"They do not appear to have understood that these regulations were made to preserve the whale species from total extinction, and only a long habit could ensure that these regulations were always observed; thence the necessity for foreign control on Japan whaling over a period of several years' the observer said.

"Well-informed quarters had hinted that American authorities here would be glad to do away with foreign control on Japanese whaling as soon as possible, possibly next year. As to sailors aboard the whaling fleet, they were competent and experienced and could well take their places in any other navy in the world."

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F A R E A S T E R N S E C T I O N

J A P A N

Apr. 16, 1948

THREAT OF FLOODING MARKETS DISCLAIMED

Dispatch in English Morse from REUTERS Correspondents in Tokyo for REUTERS Far Eastern Agencies, Apr. 15, 1948, 5:15 a.m. EST--H

(Text)

"Tokyo--Japanese textile circles received with mixed feelings the results of talks between the United States Textile Mission and British cotton industry delegates in Manchester who today occupied leading, front-page columns of all morning Japanese newspapers.

"Japanese Government Board of Trade officials told REUTERS they welcomed the suggestion that Japan be allowed to sell cotton textiles to the sterling area for sterling, but doubted whether Japan would be able to export a sufficient quantity of goods in order to obtain essential materials in return, if her operation capacity was restricted to 3½ million spindles. The materilaization of this suggestion would lead to the expansion of Japanese exports to the sterling area, officials said, but added that this expansion would be restricted by the amount she is able to export under a limited capacity. The limitation of the textile industry capacity would lead to a lower standard of living, since the Japanese would be compelled to sacrifice home consumption in favor of exports. Japan needs 8½ million spindles to maintain the 1937 level of home consumption--8.7 pounds per capita--and half of the 1937 cotton textile export, they said.

"At the end of last year nearly two million spindles were in operation, whereas last year's total cotton textile exports amounted to 100 million sterling and domestic consumption less than one pound per capita. Production per spindle was one hundred fifty pounds. According to present plans, Japan expects to have three million working spindles by June 1949. Board of Trade officials disclaimed a possible threat of Japanese cotton goods flooding the world markets. Japan cannot flood the world markets with cheap goods as she did before the war owing to the extremely high labor cost today.

"Our policy (aims at) the export of good quality products that will compete favorably with the cotton goods of a foreign manufacture,' the officials stated."

*Whaling
Protocol*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

FEBRUARY 17, 1948
NO. 124

The Protocol for the Regulation of Whaling which was signed at Washington on December 2, 1946 was proclaimed by the President today. The President's proclamation is effective from February 5, on which date the Department received notification from the French Government of its acceptance of the Protocol. Since the Protocol had been accepted previously by the United States, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom, acceptance by France was the last action required to bring the Protocol into force between those Governments. Advice and consent to the ratification of the Protocol on behalf of the United States was given by the Senate on July 2, 1947.

The Protocol provides for the extension of the current Antarctic whaling season for an additional month from next March 7th.

* * *

MI-124/1FEC-RESTRICTEDMI-124/12 December 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONGENERAL REPORT ON WHALING OPERATIONS 1946-47Note by the Secretary General

1. The enclosure a summary report submitted to the Supreme Commander by the Japanese Government regarding the 1946-47 whaling operations in the Antarctic, is circulated herewith for the information of the Far Eastern Commission.
2. The particular attention of Committee No. 2: Economic and Financial Affairs is invited to the enclosure.
3. A single copy of the following reports are available for inspection in Room 101 of the Commission Headquarters (Republic 5600 Extension 3853):
 - "Report on Whale Catch 1946-47"
 - "Report on Employment, Craft, and Products of Whaling, 1946-47."

NELSON T. JOHNSON
Secretary General

MI 124/1

FEC-RESTRICTEDE N C L O S U R EGENERAL REPORT ON WHALING OPERATIONS 1946-4730 May 1947

	Nihon Suisan K. K.	Taiyo Gyogyo K.K.	Total	Remarks
Name of factory ship, Gross tonnage.	Hashidate Maru, 10,798.84 gross tons (8,294.08 net tons)	Nisshin Maru No. 1, 11,781.04 gross tons (8,475.33 net tons)	2	
Number of whalers, Total tonnage.	6 2,021.92 gross tons	6 1,914.66 gross tons	12 3,936.58 gross tons	
Carrier	Tadotsu Maru (9,976.89 gross tons)	Tenyo Maru 7 (10,269.01 gross tons) Banshu Maru (992.38 gross tons) Banshu Maru No. 32 (782.21 gross tons) Banshu Maru No. 35 (993.45 gross tons) Banshu Maru No. 36 (998.71 gross tons) San Diego Maru (7,268.64 gross tons)		The San Diego Maru was used jointly by both companies.
Catch (treated)				
a. Blue whale	294	396	690	
b. Fin whale	185	289	474	
c. Sperm whale	1	0	1	
Total	480	685	*1,165	

* 1175 whales were caught but 10 were lost, so that the number treated was 1165.

FEC-RESTRICTED

	Nihon Suisan K.K.	Taiyo Gyogyo K.K.	Total	Remarks
Products				
a. Whale oil	3,700 metric tons	8,560 metric tons	12,260 metric tons	Measured on board factory ships.
b. Salted meat	10,557.04 metric tons	9,777.70 metric tons	20,334.74	Salted meat and frozen meat include blubber, ventral groove, etc.
c. Frozen meat	0	1,832.09 metric tons	1,832.09 metric tons	
d. Salted liver	50.67 metric tons	0	50.67 metric tons	
e. Liver oil	0	4,450 kg	4,450 kg	
f. Baleen	0	6.30 metric tons	6.30 metric tons	

RESTRICTEDAppendix to Min. - Com. No. 262nd Mtg. - 12 June 1947FAR EASTERN COMMISSIONCOMMITTEE NO. 2: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRSAPPENDIX TO MINUTESAppendix to the Minutes of the sixty-second Meeting of Committee No. 2: Economic and Financial Affairs held on 12 June 1947.ITEM 4 - JAPANESE WHALING: VERBATIM RECORD OF DISCUSSION

MR. WHITMAN: Mr. Chairman, as far as I know the United States has not formally or at any length discussed before the Commission its position with regard to pelagic whaling by Japan, at least in recent months. Most of the conversations that have gone on have been diplomatic conversations but it now seems desirable, in view of the fact that this has been reintroduced to the Commission as a policy question, to have the reasons for the United States position set forth in some detail. In setting forth the position of my Government I intend to proceed by basing my discussion on a number of arguments that have been advanced principally by the United Kingdom in favor of its proposal in FEC-035/1. I feel, therefore, that I should give the United Kingdom delegate the opportunity first to outline and discuss, as he might wish, the reasons in favor of this policy since I must first verify my understanding of the arguments in favor before I can proceed to state the United States position. I would like to make clear that the United States emphatically refutes any acceptance of a great many of the arguments that have been advanced in favor of restriction of Japanese whaling. Therefore, I think I might first let any of the other members state their position before I proceed with my statement.

MR. EVERSON: Well, since the ball is thrown at me I will try and catch it. The United Kingdom Government has studied this question intensively. My Government has for some time taken a deep interest in the regulation of whaling because the United Kingdom ships and crews were, I think, before the war second in importance in this field only to the Norwegians. We found before the war that the stock of whales was being depleted by overfishing and by the undesirable practices of certain whalers in that they captured undergrown and lactating whales and overfished certain areas. Consequently, international agreements were sought among all whaling nations and eventually conventions were signed under which certain nations agreed to restrict their catches of whales in order to preserve the stock. They also agreed that inspectors should travel on their whalers and that these inspectors should insure that certain other provisions were carried out, such as that whales under a certain size should not be taken, that whaling ships should only operate at certain seasons of the year, that lactating and pregnant whales should not be taken, and similar regulations of that sort, and that when whales were lawfully taken the processes through which the blubber was put should be in accordance with the most modern practice so that the fullest advantage

RESTRICTED

was taken of the available supplies. Now, Japan did not sign the whaling conventions and continued before the war to fish without any regard for the conventions. We have adequate evidence that the Japanese violated almost every clause of the international conventions. They took undersized whales and violated all those other provisions relating to the kind of whale to take. They fished out of season and they did not adequately process all of the whales that they took. The position now facing the nations interested in whaling is this: Under the conventions which have been signed to limit the catch of whales in order to preserve the stock only 16,000 blue whale units can be taken each year by all of the countries concerned. That limit is observed by reporting catches week by week to the international station at Sandes Fjord in Norway, which is the reporting center.

Now the British Government is informed that the number of factory ships which will proceed to the Antarctic whaling grounds for the next season will be capable of treating 16,000 blue whale units without any Japanese participation. The position therefore is that if the Japanese participate the catch of the ships of other nations will have to be reduced, and, while we do not wish to exclude the Japanese merely because they are a defeated nation, we do think we are justified in excluding them because if they take some part of this regulated total of 16,000 blue whale units their inefficient methods of processing the whales they take will produce the result that the world will acquire less whale oil and other products than if the Japanese were excluded. That is the main ground on which we should exclude the Japanese. ①

Now it has been argued that Antarctic whaling should also be prohibited for security reasons. My Government doesn't think the security reasons are of enormous importance, but it does feel that in the context of regulating Japanese shipping in general we should take care that the Japanese are not allowed to keep any large vessels or the facilities for building them; any unduly fast vessels, any vessels which are adaptable to naval use, any vessels which provide especially arduous training for crews, or any vessels which preserve the know-how for building the kind of ships that are useful in wartime. ②

Now on some of those grounds there are therefore objections to allowing the Japanese to possess whaling factories. I think my Australian colleague is in a better position to reinforce the arguments for security. The British Government supports them on those grounds.

It has been argued that the Japanese can't do without whales. Those arguments are of course put forward by Mr. Whitman and I will try to refute them if he raises them. I think that is all I need to say now.

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: Mr. Chairman, before Mr. Whitman replies I might state that the views of the Australian Government are very close to those of the United Kingdom. We are opposed to any expedition by the Japanese before the peace treaty, which will determine the long-term future of the Japanese whaling industry.

We consider that because of the record of the Japanese before the war, and in particular their violation of the international whaling conventions, they do not deserve to be trusted to whale at this stage and that their permanent future must have special consideration.

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My Government attaches very great importance to the security aspects of Japanese whaling. An Antarctic expedition, of course, will be very close to Australian home waters, and the expedition last year was conducted mainly in waters adjacent to Australian Antarctic territories. The ships that the Japanese use for whaling are capable of being used for naval purposes. In particular, we know that before the war the Japanese specifically designed some of their ships in order to carry midget submarines. The craft generally can be used for naval uses. In addition to that, there is the fact that these vessels will be carrying Japanese crews that are given experience in southern waters and given an opportunity to make meteorological observations, soundings, and scientific investigations. We know that in time of war whaling crews form an important part of any navy - they are used to rugged conditions and they are used to operations in unusual waters. For those reasons we feel that the security of Australia and New Zealand demands that the Japanese should not be allowed to participate in whaling in the Antarctic.

As far as the recent expedition to the Antarctic is concerned, we are not at all satisfied that the Japanese conducted that expedition in the way in which we had been assured they would. I have circulated to the Commission a report of the Australian observer on that expedition - that is C2-231/2 - and it demonstrates very clearly what our Chairman has shown: that the Japanese whaling methods were such that the output of oil was far less than would have been secured by any Allied expedition. My Government estimates that the Japanese, from the number of whales that they captured, could have taken at least 3,000 more tons of oil. So that if we allow the Japanese to catch whales at the expense of Allied ships - and we know that the Allied ships can catch up to the full 16,000 - the total amount of oil available to the world will be reduced very considerably.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that further remarks can be made later after we hear Mr. Whitman.

MR. WHITMAN: May I ask one question? I haven't had an opportunity to read this report. Has that just come out?

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: It has only just been circulated to the Commission, but I gave a copy to the American Government a little while earlier.

MR. WHITMAN: Not knowing the details of that report I would like to ask this question. I have always understood that some of the less oil taken was because of an increased use of blubber for other things in addition to oil. Is that part of the 3,000?

MAJOR PLIMSOLL: I think the reasons why the oil was short were in the main two. First, the ships were not fully equipped they didn't leave Japan equipped to obtain the maximum amount of oil from the whales. The second reason was that the Japanese wanted whale meat and therefore did not treat all the parts of the whale that could have given oil. As far as whale meat is concerned, I think the output is not nearly of the importance that some people attribute to it. The yield of the last expedition would give the Japanese about half a pound per head a year - an infinitesimal amount. The Japanese got along very well without any whale meat during the war, and I can't see that it has suddenly become important.

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MR. WHITMAN: Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to find that I apparently misunderstood in part the position of the United Kingdom on one of these issues. It was not clear in the diplomatic correspondence that I have seen that your position was exactly the same as stated today with regard to your justification for excluding Japan from the 16,000 limit. I will come to that point in due time.

The United States Government believes that the Japanese should be allowed to continue to whale in the Antarctic. It believes that they should be allowed to do so as a matter of assisting themselves to meet their very dire food situation. It does not see how we can encourage the Japanese on the one hand to do the utmost to take care of themselves and at the same time cut them off from resources which are of substantial importance to them in this field of proteins and oils. The 1946/1947 expedition produced a quantity of meat equal to 34% of their total consumption of animal meat and animal protein from indigenous sources. The situation during the war must be quite carefully studied, because during the war the Japanese had sources of 350,000 tons of soy beans per year and we are able now to procure less than 50,000 tons of soy beans per year. The total protein situation has deteriorated progressively. If the requisite protein foods and oils for the calendar year 1948 are not obtained from whaling operations it will fall upon the U. S., which continues in the interests of all the Allies to supply the entire Japanese food deficit, to make up this deficiency, something, which, in view of the manifold demands on fats and oils resources -- proteins -- it can ill afford to do.

Now, with regard to the Japanese situation in protein and oil, I would like to refer to certain pertinent sections of the recent food report on Japan which I trust will shortly be circulated to the Commission. I might point out that this report, familiarly known as the Harrison report, has been greatly criticized by SCAP as not being as generous to the Japanese as the Hoover report was to the Germans, so it cannot be charged as containing pro-Japanese bias. It was quite bitterly attacked on those grounds. But in the field of Japanese requirements for proteins and fats the position of the report is quite clear-cut and cannot be contradicted.

NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF JAPANESE POPULATION

"Before the war the nutritional content of the food consumed by the Japanese people was never physiologically adequate for while the caloric intake prior to 1941 was sufficient, there never was sufficient protein, fats and vitamins in the average diet of the population. The food of both farmers and industrial workers has always been primarily rice, with inadequate amounts of protein derived chiefly from consumption of fish and soy bean products. Meat and milk products have never been available except in limited quantities and only provided a small portion of the average food consumption.

"The inadequacies and dietary deficiencies of the foodstuffs available to the majority of the population were increased and accentuated during the war. After V-J Day the deficiencies increased still more.

"The present ration schedules do not appear to provide sufficient food for good health, both because of the reduction from prewar in the total intake and an even greater deficiency than prewar in proteins, fats and oils, and vitamins.

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"Nutritional and health surveys of representative samples of various classes of the population have revealed that despite the distribution of important foods, a state of chronic malnutrition generally exists due to continuing dietary deficiencies of which the most serious is the shortage of protein, milk and fat products.

"Two-thirds of the children under 6 and five-sixths of the school children and adolescents are suffering from chronic malnutrition.

"Physical examinations in 1946 of samples of the population indicated that 30 percent of the urban population and 27.5 percent of the rural population showed clinical symptoms associated with vitamin deficiencies and malnutrition. The death rate from tuberculosis in Japan has increased 50 percent since 1931 and is now seven times that of the United States and four times that of Germany.

"The 1946-47 Japanese indigenous food production was low in body-building proteins and provides on an overall average less than half the total proteins normally required and only one-third of the animal protein necessary for the maintenance of good health. The Public Health Section of SCAP has pointed out that these deficiencies are 'a major factor in their (the Japanese) undernourishment and low resistance to all diseases, particularly such chronic diseases as tuberculosis'."

Thus, in my opinion and in the opinion of my Government, any protein and fat available to the Japanese, and particularly through their own efforts, is of very significant consequence. Let me now proceed to discuss various of the arguments for preventing the Japanese from securing additional food supplies through whaling.

It has been the understanding of my Government, and a number of the officials have felt, that a part of the argument against the Japanese fishing was that such fishing would reduce the whales that could be caught by other countries operating in the Antarctic because of the very proper limitation now placed by treaty upon the total catch of whales in any one season. I am very happy to hear, as I stated before, that the United Kingdom does not introduce that argument in this case.

MR. EVERSON: I should like to say that the idea that we used that argument was entirely due to misunderstanding by the State Department. We have never used it and we never used words to justify anybody saying that we used it.

MR. WHITMAN: Well, Mr. Chairman, I would interrupt myself and say that I very much regret that it was not made clear, and there certainly were words that confused me as well as other people in the Department, because my Government has felt that one of the most serious consequences of any agreement to limit Japanese whaling would be a step direct or indirect, towards abandoning the fixed position of my Government that Japan's position as a defeated nation should not be taken advantage of to gain economic and trade advantages for the victors. This is a position which we consider most important and the abandonment of it would put us in a most damaging light with respect to our own economic interests, which, of course, are strongly urging in all directions that we should

RESTRICTED

prevent the Japanese from doing this and prevent them from doing that, because if we do not their own interests are going to be injured. My Government has resisted, I believe successfully attacks and pressure from our own businessmen and we emphatically do not wish to agree to anything which prejudices our position on that ground.

Then, going beyond that, we proceed to the argument that Japanese participation reduces the total catch. When my Government has had more opportunity of reading the statement circulated by the Australian observer, I may have something in the future to say on that. It is a somewhat technical subject so it may be necessary for me to add to my remarks on that particular ground. As far as we can determine, however, from our conversation with SCAP and from what has been reported to us previously, the Australian observer during the last expedition reported that the expedition was conducted in accordance with the international conventions, except in one particular case, which was: "The discarding of certain poor oil-bearing bones during processing since facilities of the factory ships did not permit this to be done and at the same time secure maximum recovery of whale meat." But the Supreme Commander has assured the Department of State and the United States Government that the factory ship in question will be modified before another expedition to permit the necessary processing in complete conformity with the conventions and that all regulations of the convention will be observed. In addition I point out that it seemed to me that the Japanese should, in view of their severe protein shortage, be permitted to have a somewhat higher ratio of whale meat and a somewhat lower rate of oil. This seems to me to be hardly a sufficient argument for completely eliminating them from whaling.

I would now like to proceed to the argument that because of their bad performance before the war the Japanese should not be permitted to whale at present. I have no question that the Japanese did violate the conventions, which they really did not violate because they did not sign, but, in any case, used methods in whaling which were contradictory to the consensus of opinion of other governments as to measures to be taken to preserve whales. The U. S. Government cannot agree that the Japanese should be penalized in the future because of this past bad record of pelagic whaling. Acceptance of the principle that future disabilities should be placed on the Japanese because of their manifold past violation of the rules of international economy in the commercial and other fields could only retard the reorientation of Japan as a peace-loving and law-abiding member of the family of nations. And, as already stated, the Supreme Commander has undertaken to insure that the Japanese comply with all international regulations during another expedition.

Now, to elaborate on that somewhat. We know that the Japanese were also acting in violation of what are considered to be proper rules for conducting trade in general. They conducted various forms of economic warfare including the use of subsidies, both open and hidden, and of regulations by which they forced traders out of their own and other markets and all other kinds of practice which, if the international trade charter is adopted, will presumably be ruled out as a proper way of conducting international business. The fact that the Japanese did not conduct trade in what other countries then and now consider to be a proper fashion and because they violated principles which seemed to be the only possible ones for sound international trade, cannot be used to eliminate

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Japan from trade. That, of course, would mean essentially putting them in jail forever and you would have to support them. They must reenter trading fields and they must be educated to become law-abiding members of the family of nations. It can't happen if they are officially restricted. They have to be guided and controlled but not prevented from conducting legitimate peaceful activities. That is a very strong view of my Government and we do not see that Japan's operation in whaling was different, certainly not in kind, and I am not at all certain it differed in degree. Certainly very strong cases can be made against practices by the Japanese in other fields. I don't think that it would be particularly worthwhile to try to document in which particular field the malpractice of the Japanese was more serious, but certainly the principle that you can prevent them from conducting peaceful economic activity because before the war they had not behaved properly is a principle that my Government cannot accept.

Now, let me come to the question of security which, with all due regard to the position of the other governments and with also, I believe, an understanding that Antarctic whaling comes closer to other countries than it is to the U. S., my Government still cannot see a present or future security threat in Japanese whaling. In the first place it is quite clear, I think, that there is no present security threat. The control of the Japanese is sufficiently complete - the families and the Government itself are hostages - to prevent two whaling ships at present being a threat to any Allied Powers. In addition, there are the Allied fleets in the Pacific which are certainly adequate protection at the moment against two Japanese whaling ships. Therefore, apparently, the argument must look to the future, some future day, ten, twenty years from now, when, conceivably, Japan might again be in a position to attempt to dominate other countries. The question of future Japanese whaling, whether in the Antarctic or in other waters, clearly must be decided in the peace treaty. If the treaty prohibits such whaling it is difficult to see how an expedition last year, this year, or next year, would give the Japanese such additional meteorological observations that they did not accumulate before 1940, which at some future day - obviously quite a long time from now - would constitute a security threat. If, on the other hand, the treaty has no prohibition against Japanese Antarctic whaling, it seems quite clear that all these aspects of non-security (training of crews, weather observations etc.) if they are such, and I deny it, could easily be cultivated by the Japanese in a period after the treaty. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for me, and for my Government, to see, how factory ships going to the Antarctic this year constitute an immediate or future security threat.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that it is regrettable, in the interests of international cooperation, that my Government has found it necessary to take this position on Japanese whaling. But I must say in all earnestness that from the standpoint of the logic of the situation I feel that the position of my Government is extremely sound, and we regret, and it is unfortunate for me certainly, to have to be in opposition to the majority on this point.

MR. AHMAD: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask four questions, purely to enable myself to understand the subject more clearly. (1) Could I have the total amount of oils and fats required by Japan? (2) The proportion Japanese whaling represents out of the total supplies. (3) The ratio between

RESTRICTED

the amount covered by whales caught in Japanese home waters and those in the Antarctic area. The fourth question is really addressed to the Chairman. I want to find out whether it is intended to debar Japan from signing the international whaling agreement at a future date. (4) Suppose at a future date they want to sign that agreement, would it still be intended to debar them from whaling in the Antarctic?

MR. EVERSON: That would have to be decided by the peace conference. At present Japan can't sign any international agreement.

MR. WHITMAN: I would like to clarify this first question. By requirements, do you mean physiological requirements, what the doctors say the Japanese need, or do you mean the minimum which SCAP said he requires?

MR. AHMAD: I was thinking primarily of your food plan for Japan - total quantities required and the quantity of various items that have to be supplied.

MR. WHITMAN: I can guess the first one right now. The proteins is 10,000 tons from whales as against 50,000 tons required; however, that is an import.

DR. HART: May I ask two questions of the same nature as the questions of our Indian delegate? (1) What is the amount of fish and whales caught by the Japanese and the amount of fish exported out of Japan. (2) What is the cost per unit of whaling and the cost of soy protein in Japan. I think this question is partly economic and partly medical but the economic question is more important. If you will give these figures, which will certainly be found in the Harrison report, I think we can easily see what is the importance of the whole whaling question for Japan and the necessity of it.

MR. WHITMAN: The other fishing is about 3,000,000 tons at the moment and the amount of fish exported, which was very little, was some crab. I will have to check on that. On the question of cost I would like to be clear as to exactly what you mean. As for the cost of the whale protein I don't know exactly what you would figure actually. Some of the oil is sold to other countries. SCAP has a net income from the expedition last year of \$3,000,000. So on that basis the cost is zero.

DR. HART: If you give the cost of the whaling expedition you can easily calculate the cost of the protein.

MR. EVERSON: Do you mean the yen cost per unit for producing protein by whaling as compared to the unit cost of protein by other means?

MR. WHITMAN: That is an extremely complex question.

DR. HART: No. That is a question that any nutritionist will ask because whaling will only have an economic advantage if the cost per unit is cheaper or lower.

MR. EVERSON: I don't think the point is very important because we have to get all the protein we can get nowadays. Whatever the cost we have to go after it. As far as my country is concerned we would go after whale protein whatever the cost.

RESTRICTED

MR. WHITMAN: I still don't see that that question can be answered sensibly. The yen price of whale protein is obviously completely irrelevant.

DR. HART: It is not irrelevant because if the cost of whale protein is much higher than the cost of other proteins, it would be much better to get that other protein.

MR. WHITMAN: The only way of approaching that would be to determine whether the Japanese resources that went into whaling could have obtained an equal amount of protein if they had been used some other way.

MR. EVERSON: I agree that the question is irrelevant.

MR. WHITMAN: We have speculated whether you could use those ships to do other kinds of fishing as floating canneries or something like that. That would be an alternate way of using the same resources to get protein.

MR. HU: How large is the existing whaling fleet at this stage and to what extent can it be converted to other purposes?

MR. WHITMAN: There are two factory ships and I would have to check on the exact number of killer ships. Those are fairly flexible anyway, being small, about 200 tons. On the other question I would have to have the advice of experts. It gets to be a very complex issue because it will depend upon the agreement of the other countries to extend the fishing area for Japan to be able to use the fleets very usefully in other waters.

MR. EVERSON: I should like to make some remarks in reply to Mr. Whitman's statement. He started off by talking about the value of Antarctic whaling in connection with the Japanese food supply and mentioned that whale meat brought in by the last expedition provided Japan with 34% of her supply of animal protein. That, I am afraid, I must call a very misleading statement. The Japanese never have been accustomed to derive much protein from meat, animal meat. They have never been accustomed to have what we regard as an adequate supply of protein at all. The main supply of protein for the Japanese always came from fishing and that we do not deny them. To talk of the whale meat as 34% of the Japanese supply makes one think that it is of vast importance to the Japanese, but, as Major Plimsoll pointed out, the information at our disposal leads us to think that it amounted to about eight ounces per head of the population for a whole year, which is obviously an insignificant amount. In other words, if the Japanese did not have this whale meat they would not suffer from a nutritional point of view in a noticeable degree. Secondly, he said that if the Japanese did not have this whale meat the U. S. would have to supply some alternative food. We shall never agree, I fear, with our U. S. colleague about the quantity of food that Japan requires to import. We haven't yet had the Harrison report and perhaps one ought to reserve judgment about the supply of food to Japan until one sees it, but the Committee is very well aware that my Government takes the views from the information that has been available to it that if Japanese indigenous supplies of food, including those derived from fishing, were adequately controlled and distributed Japan could get by - I don't say she would be well fed - but could get by without imports. Now, he went on to say that examinations of Japanese indicate that they are suffering from nutritional deficiencies. I find that a rather surprising remark to hear from the U. S. member because only two or three

RESTRICTED

weeks ago in the Allied Council for Japan Colonel Sams went to great pains to say that the Japanese public health was much better now than it had ever been. I suppose Mr. Whitman distinguishes between nutritional troubles and health in general. But I don't think one can contend that if the health of the Japanese is generally improved their nutritional deficiencies can be serious. I don't think the two things are compatible. Moreover, when one talks of discovering in the Japanese diseases which are a consequence of vitamin deficiency, I don't think it is a bit surprising that one can find a higher incidence of those troubles in Japan than one would in the U. S. or even in my country. The Japanese never had a balanced diet. Before the war these troubles were common in Japan. You had cases of diseases like beri beri in Japan which are unheard of in countries which eat an adequate supply of other foods including green vegetables. Now, I would like to say one more word about this accusation, I must call it, that the United Kingdom is defending an economic interest in trying to prevent the Japanese from whaling. I think I have said in this Committee more than once that the United Kingdom Government had carefully considered whether it would be proper to impose limitations on Japanese industry in the interests of defending its own industries. Some of our industries suffered very severely from what we regarded as unfair Japanese competition before the war and there was a good deal of pressure on the United Kingdom Government to take steps now to defend those industries from future competition of the same kind. The United Kingdom Government deliberately took a decision against such action. They felt and decided that the only adequate reasons that they could hold for curtailing the capacity of Japanese industries was their security interest in them. That has been quite apparent in the discussions we have had in the Economic Committee on the level of industry, because His Majesty's Government has never proposed that the Japanese textile industry should be curtailed. That would have been the first industry that we should have suggested harnessing if we wanted to put a brake on any Japanese industry that competed unfairly with our own economic interests. Mr. Whitman said that his Government did not accept the argument that Japanese participation in whaling would reduce the net yield as we contend it would but he gave no arguments on the other side. He also went on to say that the Japanese will observe the conventions next year. Well, we were told that last year and the Supreme Commander dispatched a ship which was incapable of observing the conventions - a ship which only had three boilers when it ought to have had seven, apparently. It mustn't be considered surprising then if we have a certain amount of skepticism as to whether this promise that the Japanese will observe the conventions next season will be observed in any more detail than it was last time. Of course, we have only seen the Australian observer's report. I haven't seen reports yet from either the British observer or the two American observers and it can't be conclusively stated that the violation observed by the Australian was the only one that occurred. I should like to see a complete report on the expedition and I think one ought to be presented promptly to this Committee or to the Commission.

Now, Mr. Whitman used a curious argument about not excluding the Japanese from whaling. He said that his Government took a view that you couldn't exclude Japanese from world trade because they did undesirable things in world trade before the war. Well, of course we don't want to exclude them from world trade but there is a difference between trade and whaling.

RESTRICTED

We want all the trade we can have; we want the greatest possible interchange of trade among nations, but whaling is limited we want people to catch only the 16,000 units and we have shown that if the Japanese do catch any part of those 16,000 blue whale units the net result will be that the world will enjoy the use of less whale oil than if they didn't. Mr. Whitman wound up on a note of regret that he couldn't reach agreement on this. This was not the opinion of the Commission. That was like the Irishman complaining that he was the only one in step when the regiment marched past. I think there is a fair amount of agreement, especially among countries most involved, that the Japanese ought not to be allowed to whale this season.

MR. WHITMAN: I only want to point out two very minor points to clarify the record rather than to repeat any of my statement, which I think will stand on its own grounds with reference to the points covered. The question of the public health situation I feel has nothing to do with the question of chronic malnutrition. Public health, as I understand the term, is mainly concerned with the control of communicable disease, especially venereal diseases. I am sure there is no necessary connection between venereal disease and chronic malnutrition. It is an outstanding achievement of modern public health methods that communicable diseases can be controlled even when general health conditions are poor. I believe, therefore, that there is no contradiction between the position Colonel Sams took with the Allied Council and the information he provided the Harrison Committee.

RESTRICTEDAPPENDIXTO THE MINUTES OF THE 64th MEETING OFTHE FAR EASTERN COMMISSION3 JULY 1947VERBATIM RECORD OF REPORT BY R. H. WHITMANON FOOD MISSION TO JAPAN

GENERAL McCOY: Some time ago there was a food mission to Japan under Colonel Raymond L. Harrison, Assistant Administrator of the Production and Marketing Administration of the Department of Agriculture. The report of that mission has been circulated this morning (FEC-026/15). The United States representative on the Economic Committee, Mr. Whitman, was with Mr. Harrison and I thought that in view of this report now being available Mr. Whitman might discuss briefly the Mission itself and its result.

MR. WHITMAN: Mr. Chairman, if the Commission will permit me, I would like to add a few comments on the report and give a little of its background. The Mission, known as the Harrison Mission, was sent to Japan because neither the United States Government nor SCAP were quite satisfied with the way in which the food program was being handled. We were troubled by the Japanese handling of food and the basic information we had about SCAP requirements, and SCAP on his part was not satisfied that the United States Government was giving his requests for food imports as much weight as he thought they should have. In view of that mutual dissatisfaction the Mission was dispatched to Japan to see if it could be in some part resolved.

The Mission was composed of Colonel Harrison, Chief, who has spent many months of the last two years on foreign relief programs and has traveled all over the world, including Japan the year before, and seen the food problems in many places; Mr. Koenig, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture; Mr. Jacobs, a fertilizer expert; and a Captain Kitheridge and a Mr. Tuck, who were former associates of ex-President Hoover in the First World War. Mr. Tuck was also with ex-President Hoover in the world food trip that he made in the spring of 1946. Mr. Tuck also had been in Japan the previous year. Another War Department representative, Colonel Seoby, an expert on supply problems, and myself were present.

The procedure of the Mission, I suppose, was the same as usual mission procedure. We talked to all the people on SCAP's Staff that worked on the food problem. We read voluminous reports and had very many conferences. We discussed the food problem with the Japanese Government -- the Minister of Agriculture, the Premier, and other people concerned. We all made a number of inspections in Tokyo and elsewhere; saw how the nutrition surveys were conducted; examined the school lunch program, et cetera. We also made trips to a number of the prefectures around Tokyo, in Japan, and one as far away as Hokkaido, as we were particularly interested in the situation in the coal mining areas. In those prefectures we talked to military government officials and also prefecture officials who were responsible for food collection and distribution programs. I might just summarize the general impressions and conclusions of the Mission under four headings.

The Mission concluded that there was too much complacency on the part of the Japanese Government as to how they were going to meet their

RESTRICTED

food problem. We felt that they had not taken their own responsibilities for maximum production and collection as seriously as might be, and while the collection program had not completely fallen down it had not been as good as it should have been. I think that has been corrected now to a very large extent, but in the beginning of February that was the opinion of the Mission.

The second general conclusion was that there hadn't been as much progress as might have been hoped for in solving the basic economic problems in Japan in getting fertilizer production, which is dependent upon increased coal production.

The third general impression was that, while there was no acute malnutrition in Japan, there was definitely a very low and inadequate nutritional status of the Japanese people. A number of people who have been to Japan a short time and merely observed the Japanese people, who eat cereals almost exclusively and therefore tend to look fat, without examining the actual records, tend to feel that there is no real food problem in Japan. The Mission went into this problem very thoroughly. We examined exactly how the nutrition surveys were made; talked to doctors in the hospitals who had analyzed them and to the government officials who handled the program. We are convinced that there is a serious nutritional problem in Japan.

The fourth general conclusion is that there is and will continue to be requirements for food imports. I might call your attention to page 3 of this report and I might just read two and a half paragraphs on that point:

"...The Mission itself clearly recognizes that even a maximum increase in agricultural production (including fish), together with the successful execution of a collection program based on goals in line with actual food production, will not provide the Japanese people with enough food to meet their basic requirements.

"To expect present Japanese land areas to provide food on this scale is to expect the impossible. The Japanese farmers, it is true, have shown great aptitude in getting a large total production from their limited amount of land. But the fact remains that Japan has a total of only 15 million acres of cultivated land (as compared with a U.S. total of 330 million). No matter how ingeniously utilized, this acreage cannot conceivably provide enough farm foods for Japan's present population of 78 million. This acreage did not do so under the most favorable circumstances in the past, and it would be unrealistic to expect it to do so in the future for an even larger population.

"It is the opinion of the Mission that (a) Japan will be a food-deficit country even under a program setting the average caloric intake at a level considerably below the prewar norm, and that (b) Japan can offset this deficit in toto only by importing the requisite amount of food."

I wish to point out before I take up certain points in this report in a little more detail that the position of the Mission and any of its recommendations are not related to relative Japanese needs with other parts of the world. A Mission working in Japan without knowledge of other needs is not in a position to do so. It could only study the problems and make its recommendations in the light of absolute Japanese requirements and in the light also of certain fiscal problems about paying for food imports. None of the recommendations bear on the question of relative Japanese needs or relative imports as compared with the needs of other countries. So I want to be sure you understand that any comments I make in relation to the Mission bear only on the Japanese situation and the relative fiscal situation and not on its relationship to other countries.

A few more comments on the nutritional status which I think were particularly interesting. A major factor in the nutritional situation of the Japanese is the quality of their diet. If anything, the more important is the fact that its caloric intake has not been adequate in the last two

RESTRICTED

years. Of course, before the war the Japanese had an inadequate diet from the quality standpoint. It was lacking in proteins and particularly lacking in fats and vitamins. During the war and since the war the situation has become even worse and less than half of basic fat and protein requirements have been met. This has resulted in a very serious deterioration of health from the standpoint of the children to a very measurable extent, and if not corrected will probably have permanent effect on the population. The Mission did not feel that there was any immediate need for an increase in the standard ration of calories for the normal population but did feel that more proteins and fats were required and that the rations for children in particular and other vulnerable groups of the population needed to be increased. While the import requirements for Japan have been based upon a theoretical 1550 calories per day, the Mission concluded that the actual intake, that is for usual consumers, was somewhat higher than that, probably averaging at least about 500 calories over the staple ration of about 1256.

Some interesting statistical problems are involved in all this question of the relationship between the total intake -- calories, et cetera, total intake in calories, food crops, known imports, and its distribution. There was evident conflict in the Japanese statistics between the crops that are available which, combined with imports, would come out automatically to a maximum consumption average of something like 1550 and between the observations of the nutritional statistics and the status of health which indicate that consumption must clearly be somewhat higher than that. We can't prove exactly what it is. The Mission doesn't take any very conclusive stand. It points out that the last survey shows some 500 calories more but it says that will be because of the later period. My opinion is that the minimum average is 1700 for usual consumers. Part of that difference, of course, is an under-estimation of crops and part of it, I think, particularly this -- my own opinion is that it is due to an over-estimation of farm retention. The Department of State experts with whom I have discussed the problem since I have returned think that the Mission and I have exaggerated the possibility of crops being higher than the Japanese statistics, on the basis of their very careful analysis of the weather, fertilizer available, and other situations -- feel that the crops cannot be very badly under-estimated. But there is this factor of observed under-consumption by the farm population in order either to obtain very much wanted commodities through the black market particularly or to help out relatives. There is less division between the farm and non-farm populations in Japan in a period of food crisis and particularly in a period as bad as it was in 1946 than occurs in some other countries, and I think that is one of the very fortunate situations in Japan. We do have this observed actual farm population getting down to the consumption of 1900 and 2000 calories largely in order to help relatives.

On the question of the nutritional status, I would like to indicate what the recommendations of the Mission were. The report before you does not include the recommendations of the Mission in detail, largely because they bore on specific administrative actions recommended to the United States Government and to SCAP. However, with regard to its recommendations in the case of the nutritional status, I believe that they are of particular interest to the Commission and I would like to be sure you have them for the record. The first recommendation was that the present basic staple food ration should be continued and increased only as Japanese exports provide additional funds for such increase; second, that irrespective of funds or the production locally that should be increased as soon as possible as supplementary rations, particularly for growing children, are available; thirdly, that the ration level should be increased when funds were available from Japanese exports and in particular that attention should be given for a better balanced diet; fourthly, that there should be continued emphasis on increasing imports of proteins and fats; and fifthly, that the control of imported food distribution should be strengthened to provide for better distribution of food through school lunches, supplementary rations and similar programs that would increase the calory intake of the most needy part of the population.

RESTRICTED

Turning briefly to the indigenous production, I won't try to give you the figures. As you know, the rice crop of '46 was good through very fortunate weather circumstances. The data on fish production and availability are not good and I don't think that too much reliance can be given on any of the available figures on that. The Mission felt that there had not been sufficient attention to increasing the fish catch and that a much more comprehensive and vigorous program looking in that direction was necessary in order to meet Japan's protein requirements. Pre-war sources of vegetable protein in Manchuria are not available in the foreseeable future and some other protein source must be found. The Mission found that there was little possibility of any great increase in food production immediately. Perhaps over a very long run changed methods might help, but not very much immediately. Fertilizer, of course, is a very essential and immediate problem, and since Japanese production cannot be expanded to meet requirements continued imports will be necessary. As far as recommendations are concerned in this field, the Mission thought that immediate exploration must be given to changing the agricultural program in Japan to meet their problems arising from being cut off from pre-war sources of proteins. But that 's a long-run program. We also felt that the fish program must be expanded through increasing both nets, fuel oil supplies, and, if necessary, additional fishing areas since, as I pointed out before, that seems to be the only possibility of increasing the protein supply in the immediate future.

With regard to the collection program, I don't think I need to add much to what the Mission report is. No outsider probably looks at another's food program in a period of great shortage and finds it very satisfactory. We do not find that the Japanese were doing as much as we thought they might be able to do and felt that considerable more pressure needed to be exerted all around to get food collections in. There isn't any panacea that we found, I think, as far as anyone else has ever found, for this problem of getting maximum collections from farmers in a very short food situation. I would just like to point out that a number of steps have been taken since the Mission first came to Japan that have helped. When we went there the food collection program was lagging. It started off very well and then slumped off in January and early February. Measures taken since then have brought it back to about five percent under the goals, if I remember the latest figures. Some of the new measures were some bonus prices that the Japanese Government offered for deliveries over quotas, et cetera, and increased police measures by the Japanese Government which were not very easy for them to take, of course, just before an election. But, nonetheless, there was some increase in police measures taken in late March and early April. There was also the letter of General MacArthur to the Prime Minister in March calling attention to the very serious problem of lagging food collections among other economic problems, and by putting SCAP's weight behind that it undoubtedly helped improve the collection picture in later months.

As far as import requirements are concerned, the Mission recommended that imports be adequate to maintain the present level of rations on the assumption that the Japanese would have proper collection goals and vigorously get crops collected. In other words, we did not recommend imports to make up for deficiencies of the Japanese Government. We recommended that the full IEFC allocation of last year, that is '46 - '47 allocation, be shipped as there was clear need for that, and that shipments be made in this year adequate to meet immediate requirements pending the determination of what the crops were going to be in this year. Japanese crops being later than other crops, of course it is impossible to tell yet how the Japanese crop will be.

As far as the payment of imports, the Mission felt that the Japanese are not going to be able to pay for their food needs from any exports they are going to be able to develop in the next twelve months; that more emphasis is needed to be put upon getting Japanese exports back to a point that they can meet Japanese import requirements; but, in the

RESTRICTED

meantime, that the imports of food necessary to meet the objectives of the occupation should, if necessary, and will be necessarily met by appropriations by Congress.

That summarizes very briefly. Now I would like just to add a few more comments on this report. The report of the Mission has been criticized on three grounds I would like to point out to you. It was criticized that it was not as favorable to the Japanese as the Hoover report made about the same time was to the Germans. Now the Mission had no intention to discriminate against the Japanese as Japanese. We had no reason to think that they should as Japanese have any worse treatment than the Germans. However, we did recommend only the maintenance of the ration of 1250 whereas the Hoover report, which, I think, is supported by at least two governments mainly concerned, has recommended an increase of rations in Germany, I believe, to the level of 1800, which would theoretically be considerably better for the Germans. Of course, in practice the answer is that they haven't been able to meet that increase, and even with a somewhat higher ration for Germans than would be mathematically correct - there is some dispute about that but it is around eighty percent of the occidental ration required for the average Japanese - the Japanese will get a greater supply per urban population over a ration than would be available in the bi-zonal area in Germany in particular. The reason for that is not that there is any better administration of indigenous food supplies in the bi-zonal area. As far as I know I don't think it is handled much better than the Japanese are handling their own problems but the fact that in Germany the self-supplier is a much smaller part of the population, that even if you have the same ration of indigenous food on the black market, say five or ten percent, whatever you wish to assume, the Japanese urban consumer is going to get a larger part, larger additions to his rations, than you will in Germany because the indigenous food resources in Germany are less than fifty, or whatever they are, percent of the requirements, whereas in Japan they are something like eighty-five. So, with about the same in the administration of the program, the Japanese will be better off, the urban consumer in Japan will be better off than the urban consumer in Germany.

GENERAL McCOY: Are you speaking of the American Zone or the American and British?

MR. WHITMAN: Both, particularly in the British, because of their very heavy urban populations.

The second criticism is that the Mission's report was somewhat too critical of the interim administration of food in Japan. But the Mission feels that that's an extremely important issue and does not wish to retreat at all from its position. Its position is made clear at the bottom of page 2 and on top of page 3 in the report that I might point out to you, in which the Mission reports that:

"The need for food imports is so apparent and dominates discussion of food problems in Japan to such an extent that not enough thought has been given to the need for improving the systems now in use for collecting, distributing, and rationing food, or to the need for increasing indigenous production. In the opinion of the Mission there should be clearer recognition in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) and among the Japanese Government that the Japanese food problem breaks down into three main factors in the following order of importance.

- "1. Indigenous food production.
- "2. Collections, distribution, and rationing programs.
- "3. Food imports.

"Until these factors and their relative importance are recognized, and

RESTRICTED

energetic efforts made to correlate all three, no real solution to the Japanese food problem appears probable."

In pointing this out I just would also like to point out the reverse that, in the case of the Commission reading this report, it of course will not have the same point of view as the Japanese Government and will have no difficulty in recognizing this order of importance. But I do want to point out that the order of importance does not mean that the third item on there is not crucial in the Japanese program. Continued emphasis on the local situation is important because the world food situation is apparently not going to solve itself in the next twelve months and every country, certainly including the Japanese, cannot relax at all in handling, maximizing their own food production and assuring its equitable distribution. In addition, there is the necessity of putting constant pressure on the Japanese Government in this field because politically it's a very difficult problem for any Japanese government to put a great deal of pressure on collections. Therefore, we must give attention and care to see that they constantly live up to their responsibilities in that regard.

The Mission report, as you will find, is no whitewash of the situation in Japan. I only ask that the people reading the report should also not expect on the contrary any perfectionist performance which no country ever had in managing a food program.

The third criticism has been that inadequate allowance has been made in the food import requirements to provide for industrial recovery. Some experts in Washington, including those in the State Department, feel that 1700 calories is too low a figure for urban populations if you are going to get social stability and the actual energy that you require to bring the Japanese production back. I think there is considerable merit in that point of view. Seventeen hundred calories is a very low figure to step up industrial production to anywhere near the pre-war Japanese level. However, the Mission feels that some recognition must be taken of the shortage of food and the shortage of money to buy food and that the Japanese can probably get by a little longer on the present ration if the supplementary rations to heavy workers are adequate.

I trust then, in view of this, that the Commission will not consider the report on the other hand too generous to the Japanese. I think the case for food imports on some basis is clear and I want to emphasize the conclusions of the Mission that we cannot achieve the objectives of the occupation in Japan for recovery of industrial production and for the social conditions necessary for democratization program unless we can at least maintain something like the present food situation.

MR. SEN: On page 6 you have given production levels for 1947 and 1948. This probably does not include what we call the self-suppliers to which you have made reference on page 5. That means that self-suppliers who, according to you, number about 32,000,000 people get a basic staple food ration of 2100 calories and in addition to that they get other nutrients, though you haven't specified what the caloric value of those nutrients is.

MR. WHITMAN: Some small amount, yes.

MR. SEN: Have you any figure of the average intake of calories of the self-suppliers who number 32,000,000 people out of the population of 77,000,000?

MR. WHITMAN: The nutrition surveys made in 1946 and early '47 indicated that the actual consumption ranged from something like 2250 down to 1950. I already mentioned that in the most serious part of the food crisis in Japan in 1946 the self-suppliers were considerably below this particular level.

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MR. SEN: On page 7 you say the quota for the 1946 rice crop permitted an average farmer to retain 2100 calories of staple food per day and that partial self-suppliers were allowed to retain 1750 calories. On page 5 you said that these self-suppliers also had other nutrients. It seems that about forty percent of the population of Japan is getting food of the caloric value of about 2500.

MR. WHITMAN: No, I am not quite sure. That would not be correct.

MR. SEN: What would be the figure?

MR. WHITMAN: Well, it would not be much more than 2200.

MR. SEN: So, about forty percent of the population of Japan is getting about 2200 calories?

MR. WHITMAN: That would be at the most.

MR. SEN: Then at another place you say that collection is only eighty-four percent of the total.

MR. WHITMAN: That was at the time the report was made.

MR. SEN: That means sixteen percent is left with the growers; you cannot collect the sixteen percent.

MR. WHITMAN: No, sir. I believe we said that the eighty-four percent was at the time the report was being made.

MR. SEN: But isn't it correct that you have found it difficult to improve the collection system in Japan?

MR. WHITMAN: Yes. But it is up to about 105 percent now.

MR. SEN: How can you have 105 percent?

MR. WHITMAN: Well, you get more from the farmer through regular channels than the original collection quota was. This report was completed in April.

MR. SEN: The eighty-four percent is related to the total crop production.

MR. WHITMAN: Can we find the reference to that? At the end of February farmers had delivered only eighty-four percent.

MR. SEN: You begin this paragraph saying, "Collections of rice and rice substitutes have not been satisfactory to date of this survey." Since then we have seen reports in the papers that collections in Japan as well as in Germany have not been satisfactory. The point I am making is that apart from the fact that forty percent of the population of Japan is getting about 2200 calories, they have got about fifteen to sixteen percent of the crop in their hands which the government has not been able to control. In other words, the total food left to the self-suppliers would give them more than 2200 calories.

MR. WHITMAN: But may I point out, sir, that this sentence says that as of the end of February the farmers had delivered only eighty-four percent.

MR. SEN: Then your report is that the collection now is 105 percent?

MR. WHITMAN: That is my recollection of the latest figure, sir.

MR. SEN: The other point on which I seek clarification is this, that the scale which has been adopted, both for 1947 and 1948, in Japan is not

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related to the availabilities of food for other countries in Asia. That is correct, isn't it?

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: He made that point very plain, that no attempt was made to correlate supplies.

MR. WHITMAN: As far as the report of the Mission is concerned there certainly is no attempt to do that.

MR. SEN: In other words, you went on the general health of the people and you decided the ration was below the requirements of the people in Japan without reference to the availabilities of food in other countries. Now, you said that the food in Japan is lacking in proteins and vitamins. Now in fixing the scale, did you try to find out what the pre-war scale of food was in Japan and whether it was adequate in proteins and vitamins?

MR. WHITMAN: Well, we made some study of it, yes.

MR. SEN: Have you got any figures?

MR. WHITMAN: I think the best statement of that is contained in the protein statement in another paper just circulated to the committee in which we take up fish specifically. I think that is a somewhat more accurate and detailed statement than is available here.

MR. SEN: Generally speaking, is it your information that even in pre-war days the food in Japan was lacking -- not adequate in proteins and vitamins?

MR. WHITMAN: That is correct, sir. I think that point is taken up on page 4.

MR. SEN: The point I am making is that, if in pre-war days the Japanese people didn't have food which was fully adequate in proteins and vitamins and still then they could make war on the scale they did, what is the objective you are aiming at now on the matter of food? What standard are you aiming at? How many calories ultimately?

MR. WHITMAN: The Mission made no attempt to report on the ultimate caloric basis. I can say that the experts in the United States Government feel that Japan must have at least approximately 2200 calories that they had before the war. From a nutritional standpoint it would obviously be desirable to considerably improve the pre-war diet.

MR. SEN: Without reference to other countries?

MR. WHITMAN: I suppose if you improved it enough the Japanese would grow a lot, get much bigger if they got anywhere near a proper diet.

SIR CARL BERENDSEN: We don't want to breed another race of warriors.

MR. SEN: Arising from the information given, I would like to bring to the notice of the members of the Commission that we had been discussing a paper in the Commission that the supply of food to Japan should have some reference to the availabilities of food in countries which were the subject of aggression of Japan and that is a very vital fact, and it doesn't seem from this report that in arriving at these ration scales that fact has been taken into account.

DR. KOO: Mr. Chairman, I had in mind two questions but I found that one has already been raised by Mr. Sen. One is whether there was any attempt made by the Mission to compare the food situation in Japan during the war years, particularly the last war years before V-J Day? And then one of my questions is that Mr. Whitman has remarked that the health situation in Japan is bad, deteriorating, and that it may have permanent effect on them unless some remedy is found. Now, to what extent is that an accumulated effect from the war years or simply a result of a situation that came into

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existence after V-J Day?

MR. WHITMAN: That, sir, I think would be a quite difficult question to answer quantitatively. Both factors entered into it, but I would point out to you that the Japanese during the war maintained food imports up until 1945 at a quite high level. I believe in '44 they must have taken at least 500,000 tons of soy beans from Manchuria. They still had considerable availabilities of rice from Korea whereas in previous years they had had rice from Southeast Asia. Their food imports during the war almost approximated the diet of pre-war years -- not quite. There is certainly much less difference between the diet of the Japanese in the war years and pre-war. Now that doesn't mean that there is not a cumulative effect. I think the Mission concludes that there is a somewhat cumulative effect.

DR. KOO: Of course the Mission had a special purpose of finding out the food situation in Japan and from the standpoint of the Commission you are calling our attention to the situation in Japan without regard to the food situation in other countries, particularly countries which have been victims of Japanese aggression. We feel that if the Japanese could tighten their belts and fight or something of that type obviously we think they could do it now. Of course, at the same time, we recognize the food policy is to give them a good diet because that in itself would be conducive to a stabilization and make them more democratic, et cetera, because we all agree on such principles. But, at the same time, we must bear in mind the situation in other countries.

MR. WHITMAN: Well, the presentation of this report, I am sure I do not need to say, was not in any sense an attempt to make a complete final statement of any kind on the Japanese food situation. It was merely promised to the Far Eastern Commission that when this Mission returned its findings would be available for such use and information as there might be. I think you can see that a Mission operating only in Japan is in no position to try to compare Japan with the rest of the world.

MR. SEN: It will probably interest you to hear that in India in 1946 and since 1946 the basic staple food ration for self-suppliers is 16 ounces as against that of 21 ounces. That is 2100 calories - 1600 calories, and I am sure that the situation in parts of China is even worse.

MR. GRAVES: Mr. Chairman, I should just like to say that, having listened to Mr. Whitman's very interesting remarks, I can only say that the Japanese seem to be a remarkably fortunate people in the matter of food. We have heard that the urban population has had more than 1500 calories available to them. Well the position in some of our territories -- for example, the Malaysians at the moment and after many years of suffering through Japanese aggression are only getting 4 ounces of rice a day. Now we know that in Japan the Japanese are getting at least a ration of 12 ounces a day. Three times as much. We listen to a series of recommendations for increases in food supplies for the Japanese, but what seems to me a most deplorable disregard of the needs and the justice that should be given to the countries that have been subject to Japanese aggression. It seemed to me to show a most undue tenderness for the Japanese.

GENERAL McCLOY: The same responsibility, I think you will find, from the British authorities in Germany. Is it not a fact that Australia is supplying large shipments of food to Germany through the British responsible authorities in Germany? It's like the law of nature in its effects. From the time I heard Marshall Montgomery tell about his fight with his home Government for food for the occupation of Germany I have been conscious that whoever has the responsibility in a particular part of the world is naturally going to be concerned with that. But this report, I think, will give the representatives of particular countries such as Malaya, India, and China, where we are all conscious of the terrible stress and strain, bases for consideration here, and this report, I think, will be useful in helping the Commission make their studies and recommendations in the committees. There will be plenty of chance to discuss this from the particular points of view, but from the point of view of the Commission we recognize it as a world problem and we see that the responsible commanders in each part of the world are going to be faced with exactly this same problem.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 800.217 (6 Aug 46) NR
(SCAPIN - 1103)

AF0 500
6 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Japanese Whaling Operations in the Antarctic

1. Reference is made to the following;

a. Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, AG 800.217, (3 Nov 45) NR, (SCAPIN - 233), 3 November 1945, subject: "Whaling Industry."

b. Memorandum from Imperial Japanese Government to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, C.L.O. No. 2416 (EA), 19 May 1946, subject: "Whaling in the Antarctic Ocean," with inclosure thereto.

2. Japanese whaling operations in the Antarctic are hereby authorized for the 1946 - 1947 season. Such operations will be conducted only in that part of the Pacific and Indian Ocean of the Antarctic bounded by south latitude 55 degrees on the north and that part of the Antarctic land mass on the south generally known as Wilkes Land, South Victoria Land and the Ross Shelf and between east Longitude 90 degrees on the east of Greenwich and West Longitude 170 degrees on the west of Greenwich, hereinafter referred to as the Antarctic Whaling Area, during the period and under the conditions set forth by the International Whaling Conventions or modifications thereof which may be adopted prior to the season.

3. The following vessels are authorized to conduct whaling operations in the Antarctic Whaling Area:

	<u>Name of Vessel</u>	<u>Gross Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
a. Factory Ships:	Hashidate Maru	10,020
	Nisshin Maru No. 1	10,000
b. Whalers or (killer Boats):	Fumi Maru No. 2	300
	Fumi Maru No. 3	300
	Fumi Maru No. 5	387
	Koyoo Maru	370
	Seki Maru	300
	Seki Maru No. 3	298
	Seki Maru No. 5	300
	Shonan Maru No. 8	350
	Shonan Maru No. 11	350
	Takunan Maru No. 2	350
	Takunan Maru No. 3	350
	Takunan Maru No. 8	350
c. Carriers	Benshu Maru	983
	Benshu Maru No. 32	782
	Benshu Maru No. 35	993
	Benshu Maru No. 36	1,000
	San Diego Maru	7,268
	Tadotsu Maru	10,000
	Tenyo Maru	10,000

(SONN - 1103)

4. The following applies to the vessels listed in paragraph 3:

a. Each vessel will be marked and operated in conformity with directives from the Administrator, Naval Shipping Control Authority.

b. Each vessel will display in the usual manner the flag of the Japanese Merchant Marine.

c. The master of each of the factory ships listed in paragraph 3 during the period enroute to and from the Antarctic Whaling Area will forward a daily radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo listing the location of his ship at 1200 hours on the date the radiogram is dispatched.

d. The master of each of the factory ships listed in paragraph 3 during the whaling operations in the authorized Antarctic Whaling Area will forward a daily radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo listing the following information:

- (1) Location of his ship at 1200 hours on the date radiogram is dispatched.
- (2) Number and kind of whales processed on his ship during the previous 24-hour period and output of whale oil, meat, blubber, and other products.

e. Applications for frequency for radio communications by the whaling fleet will be made to Civil Communications Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

f. Each vessel will proceed to and return from the Antarctic Whaling Area by the most direct route and without approaching any land nearer than 12 miles. The route to be followed by each vessel to and from the Antarctic Whaling Area will be supplied by the Imperial Japanese Government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Commander, Naval Activities Japan (COMNAVJAP), 15 days prior to departure of each vessel from Japanese ports and from the Antarctic Whaling Area.

g. The master of each of the factory ships on departing from the Antarctic Whaling Area will dispatch a radiogram to the Japanese Bureau of Fisheries in Tokyo stating date of departure.

h. On departure from and arrival at their home ports in Japan each vessel will clear its respective port through the duly constituted port authorities of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at that port.

i. The vessels are authorized to leave Japanese ports for the Antarctic Whaling Area during the period 1 November 1946 to 15 December 1946. Return from the Antarctic Whaling Area to the home port of each vessel must be accomplished by one month after the closing of the whaling season in the Antarctic or by 30 April 1947, whichever occurs first.

j. The Japanese Bureau of Fisheries will maintain at its office in Tokyo a file of all radiograms required to be dispatched in accordance with paragraph 4 for reference by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers when desired.

5. The whale oil produced by the operations of the vessels listed in paragraph 3 will be brought to Japan and as soon as possible after arrival the oil will be suitably stored and safely guarded. The Imperial Japanese Government will notify the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the location of the place or places where the whale oil is stored and amount in storage within ten days after it is safe in storage. Final disposition of the whale oil will be the subject of a further memorandum from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to the Imperial Japanese Government.

(SCAFIN - 1103)

6. The attention of the Imperial Japanese Government is called to memorandum on the whaling industry mentioned in reference 1a above. Reports called for in accordance with this memorandum will be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers by 1 June 1947.

7. This authorization does not establish any precedent for whaling operations in the Antarctic area or any other area for any subsequent period of time nor is it an expression of Allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing and whaling operations in the area concerned or in any other area.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ John B. Cooley

JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 800 (20 Jan. 46)NR
(SCAPIN - 630)

20 January 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.
THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT : Use of Harbors by the Whaling Industry.

1. Reference is made to memorandum from the Central Liaison Office dated 8 January 1946, file CLO No. 84 (3.2), to the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers requesting permission for the Japanese whaling industry to use harbors in the Bonin Islands and secure fresh water on the Islands.

2. The request is not favorably considered.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ H.W. Allen
H. W. ALLEN,
Colonel, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 560 (23 Aug 46) ESS/IN
(COAFIN - 1152)APO 500
23 August 1946MEMORANDUM FOR: THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.
SUBJECT : Conversion Plan of Oil Tankers.

1. Reference is C.L.O. No. 3186 (CM) with Inclosure 1, dated 29 June 1946, subject: "Conversion Plan of Oil Tankers," requesting permission to convert three (3) 10,000 ton oil tankers into whale processing ships, two of which are under construction. This request was submitted as plan No. 2A of the fishing vessel construction program.

2. The request for permission to convert the above oil tanker to whale processing vessels as indicated on Inclosure 1 is approved.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ R. G. Hersey

For JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General1 Incl:
Plan 2A

STEEL FISHING SHIPS CONSTRUCTION PLAN NO. 2
(CONVERSION OF OIL TANKERS)

1. UNDER CONSTRUCTION

NAME OF SHIPYARD	DESCRIPTION	TYPE	GROSS TONS	OWNER	KEEL LAID
HARIMA SHIPYARD	Whale Manu- factory ship	2TL8	10,000	Kyokyo Hogei Co.Ltd.	Jan. 45
mitsubishi H.I. NAGASAKI SHIPYARD	Whale Manu- factory ship	3TL5	10,000	Taiyo Gyogyo Co. Ltd.	Jan. 45

2. COMPLETED SHIP

NAME OF SHIPYARD	DESCRIPTION	NAME OF SHIP	TYPE	GROSS TONS	OWNER
*HITACHI INNOSHIMA SHIPYARD	Whale Manu- factory Ship	Hashidate-Maru	1TL	10,000	Nihon Su Co. Ltd.

* REMARKS: This ship was completed on 31 Oct. 1944.

SHIPS CONSTRUCTION PLAN NO. 2A
(CONVERSION OF OIL TANKERS)

27 May 1946 General Maritime Bureau

OWNER	KEEL LAID	EXPECTED TIME OF LAUNCHING	EXPECTED TIME OF COMPLETION
Kyokyo Hogei Co.Ltd.	Jan. 45	Dec 1946	May 1947
Taiyo Gyogyo Co. Ltd.	Jan. 45	July 1946	Oct. 1946

GROSS TONS	OWNER	EXPECTED TIME OF CONVERSION
10,000	Nihon Suisan Co. Ltd.	Oct. 1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAPO 500
24 August 1946AG 800.217 (24 Aug 46)NR
(SCAPIN-1154)

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Whaling Industry.

1. Reference is made to Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, AG 800.217 (3 Nov 45)NR, (SCAPIN-233), dated 3 November 1945, subject: "Whaling Industry". The Imperial Japanese Government is hereby advised that paragraph two (2) of this reference is amended to include the following additional protocols:

a. Protocol signed at London, 7 February 1944, amending in certain particulars The International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London, 8 June 1937 as amended by the Protocol signed at London, 24 June 1938.

b. Supplementary Protocol concerning whaling signed at London, 5 October 1945.

c. Protocol signed at London, 26 November 1945 and the Final Act of the International Whaling Conference at which the protocol was drafted.

d. Supplementary Protocol signed at London, 15 March 1946.

2. For the information and guidance of the Imperial Japanese Government one copy each of the following documents are attached hereto:

a. International Whaling Convention concluded at Geneva, 24 September 1931.

b. International Whaling Agreement signed at London, 8 June 1937.

c. Protocol signed at London, 24 June 1938 amending the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London, 8 June 1937.

d. Protocol signed at London, 7 February 1944, amending in certain particulars The International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling signed at London, 8 June 1937 as amended by the Protocol signed at London, 24 June 1938.

e. Supplementary Protocol concerning whaling signed at London, 5 October 1945.

f. Protocol signed at London, 26 November 1945 and the Final Act of the International Whaling Conference at which the protocol was drafted.

g. Supplementary Protocol signed at London, 15 March 1946.

3. All notices and reports as required under the terms of the International Whaling Agreements will be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/
JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

1 Incl:
As indicated in paragraph 2.
(Distribution to addressee only)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 800 217(6Nov 46)NR
(SCAPIN 1321)APO 500
6 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Imperial Japanese Government

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Japanese Whaling Expedition to the Antarctic Ocean

1. Reference Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government for General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers AG 800 217 (6 Aug 46)NR (SCAPIN 1103) 6 August 1946 subject as above.

2. The following officers of the United States Army will accompany the Japanese Whaling Fleet on its voyage to the Antarctic Ocean as representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers:

Captain William M. Terry, AUS, 0-1825893, SCAP, Representative.

1st Lt David R. McCracken, TC, 0-1950400, SCAP, Representative.

3. The above named officers will accompany the Japanese whaling fleet to insure Japanese compliance with terms of the International Whaling Conventions and the provisions of SCAP directives relating to the whaling industry.

4. During the period of the voyage, these representatives will be acting under instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. They will be given every assistance in accomplishing these instructions and extended fullest consideration and courtesy.

5. Changes or additions to directives of the Supreme Commander which are required by exigencies of unforeseen conditions will be referred to SCAP representatives for decision.

6. Necessary contact with nationals or other countries will be conducted by the representatives of the Supreme Commander.

7. Radio communication facilities aboard the whaling vessels will be available to SCAP representatives at all times.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/
JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERSAG 676.3 (7 Nov 46)CCS
SCAPIN 1323)APO 500
7 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Radio Communication for the Japanese Whaling Fleet

1. Reference is made to:
 - a. Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government file AG 800.217 (6 Aug 46) NR (SCAPIN 1103), dated 6 August 1946, subject: Japanese Whaling Operations in the Antarctic.
 - b. Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government file AG 676.3 (29 Aug 46)CCS (SCAPIN 1166), dated 29 August 1946, subject: Control of Radio Communications.
2. Amendments to the list of authorized frequencies recommended by the Ministry of Communications are approved, and are listed in Inclosure 1.
3. The Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will act as the communication agent for the Taiyo Gyogyo (Ocean Fishing Company) and the Nippon Suisan (Marine Products Company). All communications from the Japanese Whaling Fleet will be addressed to the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry who will relay the message to the company concerned. Any communications with the Whaling Fleet will be transmitted by the Japanese Coastal Radio Service only when sent via the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. A file copy of all these messages sent via the Bureau of Fisheries will be retained by that Bureau.
4. With respect to the navigation of vessels, meteorological observations and fishing data, the Japanese Whaling Fleet is authorized radio communication with the following:
 - a. Other vessels of the authorized Japanese Whaling Fleet.
 - b. Radio stations of the Japanese Coastal Radio Service.
 - c. Whaling vessels of Allied Powers.
5. The Japanese whaling vessels may establish contact with other vessels to handle distress traffic according to the General Radio Regulations (Cairo Revision 1938).
6. Messages pertaining to the navigation of Japanese whaling vessels, meteorological observations and fishing data may be sent in the following codes:
 - a. Nippon Suisan's Telegraph Code for Fishery Information.
 - b. Taiyo Gyogyo's Telegraph Code for Fishery Information.Copies of these codes will be deposited with the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
7. Procedures and code forms for exchange of meteorological data with the Whaling Vessels of the Allied Powers will be prescribed in a separate directive.

(SCAPIN 1323)

8. The Japanese Whaling Fleet will answer interrogations of non-Japanese Coastal Stations when so interrogated.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ R. G. Hersey
JOHN B. COOLEY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl

1 Third Amendment to List of Frequencies
Assigned for use by Japanese Government

1 Incl

1 Third Amendment to List of Frequencies
Assigned for use by Japanese Government

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

THIRD AMENDMENT TO
MASTER LIST OF FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR USE BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

NOTE: Basic List : Inclosure 1, Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1166),
dated 29 August 1946.
1st Amendment : Inclosure 1, Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1222),
dated 20 September 1946.
2nd Amendment : Inclosure 1, Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1283),
dated 22 October 1946.
As further amended by this publication.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

1 Nov 46

THIRD AMENDMENT TO
OF FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR USE BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1166),
August 1946.
Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1222),
September 1946.
Memorandum to Imperial Japanese Government (SCAPIN 1283),
October 1946.
Application.

Inclosure 1 to SCAPIN 1323

(SCAPIN 1323)

THIRD AMENDMENT TO MASTER LIST OF FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR USE BY
ADDITIONS

<u>SCAP Reg. No.</u>	<u>Freq.</u>	<u>Call</u>	<u>Emission Power (KW) Class</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Notes and Limitation</u>
1510C	5520	JCT	A1-2.5-FC	Coastal	Auth. expires 30 April 1947
6615C	do	JMU	do	do	do
1510C	8325	JCU	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMV	do	do	do
1510C	11040	JCV	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMW	do	do	do
1510C	12420	JCW	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMX	do	do	do
1510C	12460	JCW	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMX	do	do	do
1510C	16480	JCX	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMY	do	do	do
1510C	16560	JCX	do	do	do
6615C	do	JMY	do	do	do

FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR USE BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
ADDITIONS

Notes and
 Limitation

Name and
 Location

Auth. expires 30 April 1947

do

do

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do

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do

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See, 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

Choshi, See 132kc-1510C

Nagasaki, See 139kc-6615C

(SCAPIN 1323)

THIRD AMENDMENT TO MASTER OF FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED FOR USE BY
ADDITIONS-SHIPS OF JAPANESE WHALING EXPEDITION

<u>SCAP Reg.No.</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Call Sign</u>	<u>Emission Power(KW) Class</u>	<u>Notes & Lim</u>
17S001	125	JWPM	A1-.5-MN	Auth expires
	143	do	do	do
	375	do	A2-.5-MN	do
	400	do	do	do
	425	do	do	do
	500	do	do	do
	5520	do	A1-.5-MN	do
	8325	do	do	do
	11040	do	do	do
	12420	do	do	do
	12460	do	do	do
	16480	do	do	do
	16560	do	do	do
17S002	See 17S001	JCSJ	See 17S001	See 17S001
17S003	(a) See 17S001	JJLA	do	do
17S004	See do	JWCN	do	do
17S005	do	JJBL	do	do
17S006	See 17S001	JCVN	do	do
17S007	do	JJXJ	do	do
17S008	(a) See 17S001	JQJB	do	do
34S001	do	JUPR	do	do
34S002	do	JUNM	do	do
34S003	do	JMPM	do	do
34S004	do	JWBL	do	do
34S005	do	JWHL	do	do
34S006	do	JWLL	do	do
44S001	do	JJLA	do	do
44S002	do	JJML	do	do
44S003	do	JUBC	do	do
44S004	do	JFNC	do	do
44S005	(a) See 17S001	JZUQ	See 17S001	See 17S001
44S006	do	JJKU	do	do
44S007	(a) See 17S001	JWLU	See 17S001	See 17S001

