

Intervi. T070-(21 Jan 46)

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CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 21 January 1946, 1400-1615 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo  
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator  
Commander Yale Maxon, Interpreter  
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Fihelly

Q.: In the last interview you mentioned extremists that were watched closely in Manchuria prior to February 26, 1936. Can you tell us something more of these extremists?

A.: They were people who had been previously noted as radicals in speech or action and whose names were on the books for a variety of specific reasons or events that I do not remember.

Q.: About how many such suspects were listed?

A.: 500 or 600, as I recall, including Army personnel, South Manchurian Railway employees and other civilians.

Q.: Is it not true that most of these people wished the Government to pursue a firmer foreign policy?

A.: They were generally dissatisfied with both internal and external policies for a variety of specific reasons which I cannot now recall.

Q.: Was there not a connection between the dissatisfaction at internal policies and the dissatisfaction at external policies?

A.: This was about ten years ago and it is extremely difficult for me to answer such detailed questions. Speaking generally, I suppose that there probably was some connection, but I hesitate to be very definite about it.

Q.: Were not most of these people dissatisfied because; (1) the Government foreign policy was not firm enough; (2) the domestic policy was not such as to support a firmer foreign policy?



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- A.: It is difficult to classify these causes in a simple paragraph one, paragraph two fashion. There were a variety of problems in regard to the Government's conduct of both internal and external affairs. The Government was sometimes slow to act and sometimes corrupt and all these things led to the discontent which had spread from Tokyo to Manchuria. To explain what I mean by corruption, it was frequently true that the members of one political party would place their party's interests ahead of the interests of the Government and the other party would do similarly. This resulted in the criticism that both parties placed their own interests above those of the country as a whole.
- Q.: Was there not a decided increase in the number of radicals in Manchuria between the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and the time of the February 26, 1936 assassinations?
- A.: I think there was such a tendency.
- Q.: During that same period, was there not a similar increase in such elements in Japan proper?
- A.: Speaking not as the responsible official, I believe there was. This is a common sense answer. I have not investigated these things as to number and therefore I cannot speak categorically.
- Q.: How soon after February 26, 1936 did the Japanese Government adopt a firmer foreign policy?
- A.: That is a difficult question for me. I was in Manchuria at the time and did not follow political events in detail. I think it is probable that the fires of radicalism burned low for awhile after the February 26, 1936 incident because such vigorous measures were taken as a result thereof.
- Q.: Is it not true that shortly after the February 26, 1936 incident the Government did establish a firmer foreign policy?
- A.: I was in Manchuria at that time and did not follow such political movements in Japan closely. Therefore, when you ask me did the Government not establish a firmer policy and so forth, I really am unable to say since these things are not military matters but political matters.



- Q.: Isn't it true that shortly after the February 26, 1936 Incident, the Government adopted a policy of closer ties with China?
- A.: I think of course that the Government did adopt such a course, but I hesitate to speak categorically whether they did or whether they didn't because I was not the responsible person. It is not unreasonable to believe that a policy of firmer ties, especially with Manchuria and later with China, was adopted by the Government.
- Q.: Is it not true that in Manchuria officers of as high rank as colonel were seized and questioned shortly after the February 26, 1936 Incident?
- A.: I cannot answer positively from memory on this point, but I am almost sure that there were no officers as high as the rank of colonel involved. The majority of them, as I recall, were captains or less in rank.
- Q.: Is it not true that in Japan officers of as high a rank as colonel were seized and questioned shortly after the February 26, 1936 Incident?
- A.: I don't like to speak definitely, but I believe there were some of the Major - Lt. Colonel, and Colonel grade that were seized and questioned.
- Q.: Prior to February 26, 1936, did the Military Police in Japan keep on file a list of radicals and extremists?
- A.: It is reasonable to believe that from the nature of their duties, both the Military Police and the civilian police kept files on radicals and extremists of both the right and the left.
- Q.: Of the persons who were listed as extremists in Manchuria prior to the February 26, 1936 Incident, were there not a number of Kwantung Army officers?
- A.: Yes. There were some.
- Q.: Among those who were on the books as extremists before they were picked up, were there not some Kwantung Army officers?
- A.: I cannot remember exactly, but I think there probably were. Of course there were some officers but the majority were civilians. The reason why there were so many civilians comparatively is probably this - that in the Army the various commanding officers at division, brigade and regimental levels had rather definite information about the various



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individuals under them. It was the province of the Military Police to be alert for thought offenses, but the individuals could be identified rather easily. On the other hand, the civilian police had a great number of civilians to watch and it was probably because their information was less definite that the number picked up was relatively greater. Of course I didn't take down any names myself - I gave the order and the various section chiefs under me actually took down the names.

Q.: How many Army officers were on this list as extremists in Manchuria before the February 26, 1936 Incident?

A.: I don't know.

Q.: You were the responsible officer.

A.: Yes, but I don't remember exactly; however, the majority of those seized were civilians.

Q.: You said previously that some of the Manchurian "Ronin" who were arrested could have been hired to do various acts. Was an investigation ever made to establish whether or not any of them had been hired?

A.: I dare say there was, but I don't know what the results of it were. Of course I remember the names of famous "Ronin", such as MITSURU TOYAMA, but I do not know the names or remember the details of all the small fry.

Q.: Was this famous "Ronin" TOYAMA in Manchuria at that time?

A.: No.

Q.: Had he been there prior to the February 26, 1936 Incident?

A.: No he was never there. I never met him.

Q.: You said that about twenty per cent of those arrested in Manchuria shortly after the February 26, 1936 Incident were Army personnel and the other eighty per cent civilians, including South Manchurian Railway employees and Manchurian "Ronin". In what proportions was this other eighty per cent compounded?



A.: I really can't estimate what percentage were South Manchurian Railway employees, what percentage were Manchurian "Ronin" and what percentage were ordinary civilians. These things are essentially small details and I did not investigate them myself. I think though that the number of Manchurian "Ronin" was rather small. The bulk of those arrested were probably ordinary civilians, but I believe the number of South Manchurian Railway personnel was greater than the number of Army personnel. If you want specific details, the records of the Military Police for that period will have them.

Q.: Are you sure those records are available?

A.: Reports were sent to Tokyo and I believe they will be available in the files of the War Department.

Q.: How do you account for such a large percentage of South Manchurian Railway employees among those arrested?

A.: I mentioned before that I did not recall even rough percentages of those arrested as between Army personnel, South Manchurian Railway employees, Manchurian "Ronin" and ordinary civilians. However, I am fairly certain that most of the twenty or thirty persons sent to Tokyo for trial were South Manchurian Railway personnel or Army personnel.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72  
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 5 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon  
Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills  
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 21<sup>st</sup>  
day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO  
Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO  
(Place)

12 August 46  
(Date)