

No. 2488

Ex 2488

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TANAKA, Shinichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

I. I, TANAKA, Shinich, formerly a lieutenant-general, live at No. 2,042, Mizawa-mura Yokoseko, Mie District, Mie Prefecture.

I occupied the post of the chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, from March of 1937 to February of 1939, and had charge of the affairs concerning the organization, equipment, budget, mobilization and reinforcement of our forces, under the command of the director of the bureau.

It was about the middle of March, 1937, that I arrived at my post. When I paid a visit of courtesy to Minister of War SUGIYAMA, he pointed out that the time had come to try strenuously to avoid all foreign troubles and devote ourselves to the completion of national defence; that the Army would try to modernize its armaments and particularly to improve and complete its war materials; and that the Military Affairs Section should make a special effort to improve the organization and equipment of our forces.

II. As to whether or not our Japanese Army had a plan of operations against China before the outbreak of the China Incident, the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army had no plan of operations for the war with China before the outbreak of the China Incident. While I was engaged in the affairs concerning the organization, reinforcement and mobilization of our forces, as the Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Service Bureau, War Ministry, I never received any report or information concerning the mobilization and operational preparation necessary for any plan of operations

against China, either from the General Staff or from the superior authorities. This means that the General Staff had no preparatory plan of this kind at that time. For the plan of operations as well as that of mobilization and operational preparation were just in its charge, but the realization of such plans was necessarily accompanied by the strength, munitions and expenditure. Therefore they could not be realized without the approval and cooperation of the War Ministry, and the Chief of Military Affairs Section would have had to be informed of the business concerning such plans, all the more so because I arrived at my post in March -- at the end of the fiscal year.

III. As to whether or not the Japanese Army was then so situated as to be able to attempt Chinese operations in China, in view of the strength and munitional materials of the Japanese Army at that time, it would have been almost impossible to attempt operations in China.

1. In 1937, when the China Incident broke out, Japan had only a peace-time strength of 17 divisions and a war-time one of 30 divisions. In the judgment of the General Staff as well as of the War Minister, as later referred to in this affidavit, it was very dangerous for the Army to operate in China with the fighting strength available at the time in view of the fact that China had a force 20,000,000 strong (200 divisions), and a vast^{land} as well as the social idiosyncracies of the Chinese people.

In addition, we had to be greatly concerned in the Russian military preparations in the Far East. According

to the information received by the General Staff as to the Russian preparations for war with Japan, she had a standing peace-time strength of 28 sniper divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 6 mechanized brigades and 1,900 aircraft for the Far East, including the Siberian Military District, together with a peace-time force of 10 cavalry divisions and some mechanized units and air units for Outer Mongolia. The minimum war-time strength that she could use against Japan amounted to 31 or 50 divisions, of which mobilization, concentration and reinforcement were to be sufficiently secured. It was concluded, therefore, that it would be dangerous and inadvisable to carry out operations in China under such circumstances, taking into consideration the movements of the Soviet Union. In this connection, after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in July, 1937, the General Staff gave the following explanation:

"Considering the Chinese situation, the present incident is liable to turn into a head-on, protracted war between Japan and China. If so, we could use only 11 divisions in these Chinese operations, or, adding the reserve corps of the Army, 15 divisions in total. But, if we should use half our war-time strength, totalling 30 divisions on the plan of mobilization, in the Chinese Area for a long time, then we are sure to meet with a serious crisis from the viewpoint of national defence. So it is necessary to take every possible measure for the immediate settlement of the incident."

As I was present when this explanation was made, I know that the War Minister was in entire accord with

the explanation.

2. The production and maintenance of munitions were under as much difficulty and disadvantage as the abovementioned problem of military strength.

According to the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry, having charge of the production and maintenance of munitions it was very difficult to mobilize and dispatch about 15 divisions and even to maintain operations in the incident at the time, in view of our conditions of production and supply of munitions. In 1937, our Army had only an eight months' stock of ammunition for fifteen divisions. As to the ability of munitions mobilization, we could barely hope to meet the operational consumption of 15 reinforced divisions in about eight or nine months after the mobilization was commenced, and a continuous supply of special materials was impossible. As regards the arms, supposing that we were able to use all the arms we had in stock and bring our munition mobilization to a maximum, it would have been difficult to meet the operational consumption of 15 divisions, and this was especially the case with special materials. Therefore, if we should go to a protracted war with China, it would not be sufficient to use all the stocks and maximum munitions mobilization in the operations in China, and if our relations with another country should be strained under such circumstances, we were sure to be at a loss what to do for self-defence. Generally speaking, with our anticipated munitions mobilization for 1937, and guaranteed a supply of 70 per cent of munitions, including arms and

ammunitions, for the estimated war-time strength of 30 divisions for the fiscal year, we planned to be able to mobilize in about ten months after such munitions mobilization was commenced. However, far more materials were expected to be consumed in the China Incident, so we admitted that it was extremely difficult to maintain operations with 15 divisions.

iv. Data indicating that the incident was not planned from the Japanese point of view.

In addition to the data in the above II and III, I wish to refer to the following:

1. Establishment of non-enlargement and non-exercise of military strength. On July 8, when the Army was informed of the clash at the Marco Polo Bridge early in the morning, it immediately determined the general policy of non-enlargement of the incident as well as non-exercise of military strength, and informed the Chief of the Staff of the Army at the front to that effect through the Vice-Chief of the General Staff. This I know from documents. About July 8 or 9, the Imperial Government established the policy of non-enlargement, desiring for the smooth settlement of the incident by reconsideration on the part of China, and simultaneously decided to take proper measures for self-preservation, according to the circumstances, though it was too early to send more forces at that time. This I heard from Lieutenant General USHIROKU, Director of the War Service Bureau who was informed thereof in the Bureau-directors Council by the War Minister.

2. Effort for speedy settlement at the front. On July 9, the General Staff instructed the army at the front to nego-

tiate with the Hupei-Chahar authorities for the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which I know from documents. The gist was to avoid reference to political issues under such circumstances, and to obtain the approval of the Hupei-Chahar Political Committee and fulfil as soon as possible our demands, such as the suspension of stationing the Chinese forces on the left bank near the Marco Polo Bridge, its necessary guarantee, and the punishment and apology of those persons directly responsible.

According to the reports which I received from the army at the front, our occupation forces in China prohibited promptly any military movement, following the policy of non-enlargement of the incident and its speedy settlement at the front. In order to save the situation, Major-General MATSUI, Daikuro, Chief of the Peiping Special Service Agency, was negotiating with the Chinese military authorities, and it seemed that an agreement would be reached in conformity to the above-mentioned policy of negotiation with Hupei-Chahar.

However, according to the information received by the General Staff, the Chinese authorities ordered four divisions of her central army near Suchow to march for the frontier of the Honan Province and all her air forces to move out. Moreover, there was no indication that the northern Chinese situation might be mitigated, the Chinese forces in North China were strengthening preparations for war, such as construction of their positions or transport of munitions, and also illegal firing was being repeated near the Marco Polo Bridge.

If the state of affairs had been left as it was, the lives and properties of our residents in Peking and Tientsin would surely have been forced to face unavoidable danger. Thus the General Staff HQ's was compelled to adopt the following judgment of the situation:

"The authorities in Peking and Tientsin as well as the Nanking Government, seem to be exerting themselves to prepare for armed hostilities against Japan. As a result of the aggravation of the situation, caused by the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North China, the lives and properties of our residents are, now, on the verge of utmost danger. It is high time for us now to dispatch a minimum possible number of forces to the Peking-Tientsin area, in order to protect our residents. A grave situation is arising also in areas other than Peking and Tientsin, which comes to call our careful attention with regard to protection of our nationals."

I was informed of the above adoption by the report and explanation of a high class officer of the Military Affairs Section.

IV. Our government made the following point clear in an official statement on 11 July, that we were utterly compelled to send forces to North China to cope with anti-Japanese armed actions, planned by the Chinese side. But upon being informed that the Hopei-Chahar Government authorities had accepted our proposal, we took steps, in the afternoon on the same day, as to reserve our preparation for the mobilization and dispatch of our home divisions. Furthermore, orders

were issued by the General Staff HQ's, with the approval of the Government, to dispatch only a part of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and of the Chosen Army respectively. The latter step was taken in view of the situation as mentioned above, to ensure the achievement of peace-time duty by our garrison in China under aggravated situation in the Peiping-Tientsin area.

V. According to an information I got around 13 July from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, the outcome of the Cabinet Conference was as follows:

"It is extremely doubtful whether the Nanking Government has the sincerity to settle the matter in peace. For the Chinese Central Army forces are now advancing hastily to the north and anti-Japanese actions and unlawful firing cases are being repeated everywhere. Thus not only in North China but also in Shanghai and Chingtao the situation is very dangerous in regard to the protection of the Japanese residents there. Therefore, it will be advisable for us in accordance with our firm policy of localization, to pay constant attention to the future course of things; urging on the one hand, the Hopei-Chahar Government to fulfil the stipulated terms, and abstaining on the other hand from provoking the Chinese."

In conformity with this principle, the governing body of the General Staff and of the War Ministry decided upon the so-called 'policy for the settlement of the North China Incident' on the night of 13 July.

The outline of the above 'policy' is as follows:

"All possible measures should be taken to avoid the expansion of the incident to an all-out war, adhering to the principle of localization and settlement at the spot. For this purpose, it is desirable to accept the terms for settlement proposed by the representative of the Chinese 29th Army and signed on 11th instant, and to see to it that these terms are fulfilled by the Chinese. Whether or not our forces now in homeland should be mobilized is a matter to be decided in the light of the future course of things. In case however the Chinese ignore the above terms and show no sincerity to put it into practice, or in case the Nanking Government removes their central army forces to the north to prepare for attack, resolute steps must be taken on our part."

It was that it is necessary for the garrisons stationing in China to receive beforehand the recognition of the central headquarters. This was what Lieutenant-General ATOMIYA who was the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau participating in setting up the plan (regulation) reported directly to me.

VI. As I was connected with mobilization, I wish to explain the real circumstances under which mobilization and dispatch were carried out with cautious attitude.

A. It was a fact acknowledged by the government on July 9th when the incident broke out that the mobilization and dispatch of divisions at home might be necessary to meet the emergency circumstances, although it was not considered necessary at the beginning of the incident. (I knew this through the Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau as a report from the minister after a cabinet meeting.)

B. Taking consideration of the dangerous state of Japanese residents in the Peking-and Tientsin district, increasing preparation of fighting power and repeated attacks of Chinese forces in the same district, as well as the insincerity of Hopei-Chahar authorities in negotiations of reconciliation and the northward advancement of the Chinese central armies, the Japanese Government announced on 11 July the dispatch of troops to north China.

C. But in the afternoon of July 11th, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted our proposal, the mobilization, and dispatch of divisional troops at home and other preparations were discontinued,

D. On 13 July it was decided as the policy of dealing with the north China Incident that the mobilization of divisions at home would be considered properly according to circumstances which might occur afterwards.

E. As a new circumstance which appeared up to 15 July I mention an increase and concentration of Chinese armies in the area of the north Lancho-Haichow railway, the activity of the Canton air forces, the delay of actual withdrawal of the Chinese Army forces from the left side along Yungtinho, which withdrawal had been accepted by an agreement. Not only that, further construction was continued and more army forces were concentrated (a report from the General Headquarters). Considering the above report, it was decided at a cabinet meeting that the carrying out of mobilization of divisional armies at home which had been discontinued on 16 or 17 July should be prepared as to be practicable whenever

necessary after 19 July. The officers and officials concerned in the General Headquarters and the War Ministry proceeded with preparations in their respective sections. But the authorities decided to persevere as much as possible considering self-defense, as the Hopei-Chahar authorities accepted once our proposals, in spite of the report that Chang-Kai-shek revealed his firm determination against Japan on 19 July. Besides the acceptance of the Hopei-Chahar authorities, expecting the conclusions of the "anking Conference," the preparation for mobilization of divisional armies at home was postponed and reserved for the future on 22 July.

F. After the Langfang incident on 25 July and the Kwangan Gate Incident on 26 July, the condition in north China became finally serious. A report was received from a higher officer stating that the Japanese Government had decided upon a program on 27 July to mobilize and dispatch divisional armies at home. And the purpose of the mobilization and dispatch was to eliminate the threat of the Chinese forces to the lives and property of Japanese residents and transportation and communication and also accomplishment of self-defense of the already dispatched garrison troops in north China. The mobilization and dispatch at first for the time being were emergency operations with peace-time formation and equipment not suitable or sufficient for actual operations. These operations were only for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents and to carry out the duty of self-defense.

G. There was no definite expression of intention of the authorities of the General Headquarters whether further mobilization of divisional armies at home would be carried out

or not in the future besides the above stated one. I recognized that the Minister, the Vice-Minister of the War Ministry and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau who were the highest staff authorities, maintained a passive attitude in regard to further mobilization.

H. Since then higher officers adopted the policy of taking proper steps in regard to further mobilization after consideration and investigation of developments which might occur in the future. When the Shanghai Incident broke out, two divisions were sent to cope with the emergency and when it became urgently necessary to protect the residents of Tsintao, a plan to send out one division was set up and when faced with the necessity of carrying out operations in the area of Paotai, Hopei Province in central China, a hasty mobilization at home was begun. As above stated, patching and supplementary mobilization and dispatch were carried out as circumstances required. Eventually after the outbreak of the incident up to October 1937, army forces totaling 15 divisions, were mobilized and dispatched on eight different occasions, to say roughly 4 divisions in July, 7 divisions in August, and 4 divisions in September and October.

I. In 1938, prior to the execution of operations in Hankao and Canton, the number of the divisions in China reached 23 but among them there were several divisions which were organized in ^{the} fighting zone as the circumstances required. Therefore, although the number of army divisions in China increased generally, the number of soldiers decreased in each division and the predisposition of each division and equipment were lowered.

VII. As examples of lack of unity and non-planning of military action, I wish to make mention of the capture of NANKING, operations in HSU-CHOW, capture of KUANGTUNG and operations in HANKOW.

The following is necessary confines of my duties as announced by the General Staff and other quarters.

1. Concerning the capture of NANKING, I was, at first, informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that the General Staff had no intention to realize it and the War Minister had the same opinion as the General Staff. I approved of this. But because of the tendency of the tide of war on the spot and because of the desire to seize the opportunity of terminating this incident, the decision to capture NANKING was firstly decided on December 1, 1937 (the 12th year of SHOWA) and the order for the taking NANKING was issued.

2. Carrying out of the HSU-CHOW operations.

In May 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA), an agreement of views between the War Minister and Vice-Chief of the General Staff was not reached until immediately before the decision to carry out operations was made. The point at issue was that if it was possible to preserve the contact between north China and central China by securing permanently the important area of HSU-CHOW after the occupation of this area and to supply needed army strength because of the necessity to increase by 2 or 3 divisions the strength necessary for securing the important area of HSU-CHOW, but the fundamental fact was the disagreement of views as to the anticipation of settling this incident in accordance with the policy of non-expansion.

Finally, agreement of views to carry out this military operation was arrived at due to strategic demand in the light of the entire situation. Part of it, I personally heard at the above-mentioned conference and the rest I learned from my superiors.

3. As to the HANKOW and KUANGTUNG operations, decision was not made so quickly. Only in September 1938 it was decided to carry out the HANKOW operation about October 1938 and capture KUANGTUNG about that time to cut the communication and supply route from abroad.

4. Under these circumstances, the army budget passed at the ordinary session of the Diet in 1938 had not anticipated these military operations. Therefore a great deal of inconvenience was felt in the matter of expenses for the year as explained in the following:

VIII. I, as one of the men who were connected with the military budget, wish to state as follows; by way of proposing materials to indicate that the operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG were not planned well before they actually occurred. After about October 1937, in TOKYO, prospects were entertained for putting an end to the positive operations against China and, moreover, plans and preparations were promoted regarding the adjustment of and extraction from the military strength in China, on the premise that the Incident would be concluded in the near future. To explain more in detail, at about the end of 1937, our military strength in China consisted of 16 divisions, forming its main part. As the first step, these were to be reduced to about 10 divisions.

Following this, in the units, which were to remain in China, the reservists were to be relieved from active service. The enforcement of this program was first to be started from the early spring of 1938, and, pursuant to the anticipated establishment of peace, an all-round withdrawal of the armed forces was planned. With respect to this matter, both the department quarters and the out-post army authorities were unanimous in their opinion.

Accordingly, the budget, agreed upon at the ordinary session of the Diet at that time, was also based on the above; namely, it was made on the premise that (1) the military strength in China was to be reduced roughly by half; (2) the repatriation of those troops who had been inducted; (3) the continued stationing of armed forces to such an extent as to presuppose no positive operations.

But, as it was, the situation did not favorably develop as was expected, and after the failure of peace negotiations and the occupation of NANKING, the consequent operations in HSUCHOW, HANKOW and KWANTUNG necessitated the total abandonment of the attempted adjustment of the military strength as aforementioned, not only this but in the 1938-1939 fiscal year an enormous deficiency was found in the budget.

IX. I wish to submit the following materials about how the military budget was actually prepared. About the expenditures of our expeditionary forces which were sent to Korea and Manchuria on July 11, 1937, I was asked by my superiors in the War Ministry to negotiate with the Finance Ministry with a

view to meet current expenses with a reserve fund and to open a three months' budget covering August, September and October for the troops that had already been sent, including their evacuation expenditures and supposing their stay to be about three months. But in fact, after negotiation with the Finance Ministry it was reduced to two months. A budget for two months of August and September was presented at an extraordinary session of the Diet in July and passed. A budget for four months from October till January of the next year for about 11 divisions already mobilized by the end of August, passed at a session convened at the beginning of September.

Thus budgets were prepared little by little according to the number of the expeditionary forces, instead of making a wholesale estimation for a long period in expectation of aggravation and protraction of the incident. This is also clear by the fact that the budget for the fiscal year of 1938 proved greatly deficient as hereinbefore stated.

X. Realization of Japan's policy of non-aggravation.

1. What I have already stated shows efforts to realize a policy of non-aggravation.
2. As a reference to strict execution of non-aggravation policy on the spot, I wish to mention a verbal report made to the Minister of War, in my hearing, by Lt. Col. WACHI, a staff officer of the expeditionary forces in China, who had been called up to the central government to make a report of the situation developing on the spot.

Its gist is as follows:

The policy of non-aggravation and peaceful settlement of the incident was thoroughly disseminated to the commanders and all the rest of the Japanese forces in North China and utmost care was being taken for it. For instance, the transportation of any Japanese troops was prohibited by the railway between Peking and Tientsin. Any Japanese soldier in uniform was also prohibited to make use of the railway between Fengtai and Peking.

And though all the Japanese who passed through the gate of the Peking Castle were examined and interrogated by the Chinese military police. They submitted to it.

Every castle gate in Peking was closed by the military force of the Chinese 37th Division, Chinese machine guns were turned upon the Japanese houses within Peking Castle, and 6,000 Japanese were guarded by only two Japanese infantry platoons.

In spite of being in a position enabling us to go into action immediately against any Chinese bombardment, we were operating upon the instructions of the Army headquarters in Tientsin as they came to us one by one. Being afraid of aggravating the situation, we refrained from carrying the wounded into Peking Castle to be operated upon; likewise we left the bodies of the dead as they were, etc. This was but an example of our policy of localization to prohibit actions which might provoke a magnification of the incident. Thus to carry out this policy, we submitted to any humiliation or inconvenience.

As for the Chinese forces, anti-Japanese sentiment was high among officers and soldiers alike, and especially among those in the grade of second major. The Chinese in the Tientsin Area were convinced that the Chinese 29th Army had won at Marco Polo Bridge, that the Chinese losses were small

and that the Japanese Army had completely withdrawn. We endured the rising anti-Japanese sentiment.

In addition, it was said that the Central Operations Staff had advanced to Paoting.

3. Concerning the strict observance of the localization policy of the local Army Commander, I will state what General Terauchi, the Army Commander in the North China area, told me when I was there about October 1937 (Showa 12), for liaison work.

That was as follows:

Hitherto the Central Supreme Command has made the technique of leading actual operations difficult by not clearly showing beforehand the general purpose of operations and the points of operation. Instead they have simply given the purpose and time of each local operation (such as the Central Hopei operation and the Taiyuan operation). To facilitate operations the Supreme Command should clearly show the general scope and purpose of the operations as a whole and leave the details of local operations to the Army Commander at the front. However, this case being merely an "incident" and having no bearing on our general national policy, it is necessary to sacrifice perfection in technique to the preservation of our general localization policy. In the future, it will be necessary for both the central and local commands seriously to consider various technical methods which would relieve the disadvantage to actual operation, brought about by strict observation of the localization policy.

4. On the policy of localization in the Pingtsin Area in July 1937 (Showa 12) it was decided that the occurrence of the Langfang and Kwangan Gate Incidents, together with the lack of sincerity on the part of the Hopei-Charhar authorities to fulfill the terms of agreement as well as

the aggressive actions repeated everywhere by the Chinese, made it at last necessary to mobilize our divisions now in the homeland.

On the night of July 26, the General Staff gave me a notice: "Hitherto we have avoided the mobilization of the home divisions but the actual situation in China admits of no further delay." Even the then Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, who was one of the strongest opponents to the mobilization of forces for fear of conflict between Japan and China, at last admitted on the 26th the necessity of mobilization by way of self-defense.

On the 27th the governing body of the War Ministry also recognized the unavoidability of mobilization.

Then a draft was prepared for adoption by the Cabinet conference concerning the mobilization of three home divisions, and the War Minister issued orders in the evening of the same day with the approval of the Cabinet conference about the mobilization of three home divisions.

After a meeting of the Bureau Chiefs, I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that on the 27th of July the government had decided as follows:

To mobilize three home divisions; to maintain the policy of localization and settlement at the spot even in case of the outbreak of a self-protective battle in the Pingtsin Area, such a battle should be purely for the achievement of the peacetime duties of the commander of the Japanese Army in China; to do its best not to bring about a situation which might require despatching soldiers to Tsingtao and Shanghai for the protection of Japanese residents -- though such a situation may eventually come about; and to do no damage to the personnel of third Powers.

Besides I learned that the Minister gave an explanation at the said meeting of the Bureau Chiefs to the following effect:

Exercise of military force in Pingtsin Area which might be required in the future would be purely self-defensive action and as such it would never be contradictor to the policy of localization adhered to by Japan. And even if despatch of forces to Shanghai or Tsingtao should be required for the protection of the Japanese whose security was being seriously menaced at that time; it would never run counter to the policy of localization. And the actions of the Japanese forces had hitherto been in strict conformity with the localization of military movements, and could and should remain so in the future as well.

I also learned from a document that the mobilization of home divisions was ordered in the evening of the 27th, and the Chief of the General Staff approved the application of the Commander of the Japanese Army in China for taking military action against the Chinese 29th Army, and that at the same time he ordered that the actual shooting be limited to the line of the Yungting River.

5. I was informed by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that at the Five Ministers' Meeting held about the 20th of July, they debated upon the advisability of the Japanese policy to improve the situation by taking means to clarify our observance of the principle of equal opportunity in North China, in order to satisfy the Western Powers, as well as China herself; and upon the plan to withdraw the forces at that time in the Pingtsin area, which had been despatched there from Manchuria and ^{Korea} after the settlement of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and then to take diplomatic means for the solution of questions pending between Japan and China. The Five Ministers' Meeting was a conference

held at the time by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, and the Finance Minister.

I also heard directly that at the end of July, there was an opinion among the governing body of the General Staff that contemplated neutralizing the situation by gathering and moving all the Japanese forces in North China back to the area of Tientsin in order to bring about prompt settlement of the incident, and then to hold a personal interview between Konoye and Chiang Kai-shek, and thus to smooth out the difficulty between Japan and China. However, since the attitude on the part of the Chinese was against this plan, it was not realized after all.

6. Circumstances after the Oyama Incident at Shanghai:

About the Incident Captain Oyama, I received a report on the morning of the 10th of August 1932 in the War Ministry from Hoshina, the Chief of the First Section of the Navy Ministry. It purported that the Japanese authorities in Shanghai would not take further steps until they were assured of the sincerity of the Chinese by negotiating with them, and that the circumstances might require preparations for despatch of troops.

On that day the government authorities seemed to be of the opinion that adequate measures for the protection of our residents in Shanghai should be taken after the real circumstances of the Oyama Incident came to light, but that it would be worth while to study the Navy Minister's proposal demanding preparations for eventual mobilization as a last resort. But I learned later that on the 13th, the Cabinet conference took up a plan to despatch forces, and that on the 14th this plan was being subjected to re-consideration. Then a statement was made by the Imperial Government on August 15. In accordance with this

statement, it was decided to despatch a 'despatched force' to Shanghai of which two divisions from the homeland formed the main body, for the purpose of protecting the Japanese subjects in Shanghai. The word 'despatched force' was used to show that it had nothing to do with pure military operations thoroughly. The mobilization for this purpose was ordered on August 15.

As for Tsingtao, I heard that it was talked about at the Cabinet conference that the situation in Tsingtao being calm, it would be possible to maintain the status quo, provided that nothing happened to disturb it, but some measure would be taken for the protection of residents there in case the worst should happen.

About August 15 or 16, 1937, the General Staff concluded that the Chinese had decided upon the policy of beginning over-all military operations. This conclusion was based on the report that the Chinese had established headquarters on August 15th, made Chiang Kai-shek Supreme Commander of all the land, sea and air forces and divided the whole country into four war zones (the 1st war zone, Hopei-Chahar; the 2nd, Chahar-Shansi; the 3rd, Shanghai, the 4th, South China), and that general mobilization was ordered on the same day.

About the 16th or 17th of August, I was duly notified at the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs as usual that the following has been decided at the Cabinet conference:

"It is becoming difficult to solve the affair in strict conformity with the policy of localization, as the Chinese have determined to carry out a long war. Therefore, the utmost efforts should be made to restrict the war to the minimum in point of time as well as strategically, and territorially.

As the original object of the Shanghai operations lay chiefly in the protection of the Japanese residents, they had to be confined to a minimum. To check the danger of creating a general clash between Japan and China on the one hand, and to avoid trouble with other countries on the other, Japan at first despatched less than two divisions temporarily with the idea of carrying out the operations with minimum forces. Nevertheless the difference of forces between Japan and China was so great that the war situation did not take a favorable turn as it was expected. The central Supreme Command, therefore, despatched first five battalions during the period from the end of September to the beginning of November, and then five more divisions from North China; in addition, the beginning of November three divisions landed at Hangchow and again in the middle of that month one division landed at Paimaokiang. By supplying forces temporarily as stated above, the battle continued for three months, and at last in the middle of November the Chinese Army made a general retreat to the west. Thus the operations which were executed to protect the residents in Shanghai were brought to a conclusion. But the fact that Japan was obliged to use forces in such a way as was considered to be an error from a viewpoint of strategy shows the circumstance under which Japan was curbed by her own policy of localizing the Incident. In fact, General Sugiyama, ex-Minister of War, who was afterwards appointed Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army, pointed out these circumstances, saying that the delay in occupying Shanghai was an important cause that prolonged the Incident, but the fundamental cause lay in the numerical shortage in military forces and amount of materials, so the Japanese policy of solving the Incident in a short time should have been carried out more thoroughly. The

General told me so personally when I made a business trip to North China in the winter of 1938 (Showa 12). He was then the Commander of the North China Expeditionary Army.

The headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was reorganized into the headquarters of the ^{Central} China Expeditionary Force, and at the same time was entrusted with the duty of operating in the vicinity of Shanghai with the aim of creating an opportunity to settle the Incident. This meant that the authorities wanted to find an opportunity of settling the Incident in the operations near Shanghai, and had no intention of capturing Nanking at that time. After the battle near Shanghai the Central Authorities of the Supreme Command instructed our forces not to advance beyond the line of Changshu-Soochow-Kashing so as not to give an unnecessary provocation to Nanking. Later I learned from documents that confidential instructions had been given to the forces not to enlarge the theatre of operations further west than Wusih and Fuchow.

8. In our country the Imperial Headquarters Ordinance was enacted on November 17, 1937, and the Imperial Headquarters was established in Tokyo for the first time on November 20 of the same year.

In the same month the munitions mobilization program was begun. However, the order for the national general mobilization had not yet been put into force (T.N. in that year).

The General Mobilization Law was promulgated in March of the following year, that is, 1938. But it was in May 1938 that a part of the law was applied for the China Incident.

With this I bring my affidavit to an end.

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch,
hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the
attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning
of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

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