

885
EXHIBIT 2405-

Doc. 335

Translated by Defense
Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

against

ARAKI, Sadao et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

Deponent: TAKEDA, Misashi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and
in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I here-
by depose as follows.

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

I, ex-Lieutenant General TAKEDA, Hisashi, live at No. 9,215 Ina, Ina-Machi, Kami-Ina-Gun, Nagano Prefecture. I was on the staff of the Kwantung Army from December the 5th year of Showa (1930) till April the 7th year of Showa (1932) (at first as Captain and later as Major), chiefly dealing with matters concerning military operations. I herein after make a statement concerning the military movements of the Kwantung Army at the earlier stage of the Manchurian Incident.

2. THE SITUATION BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT

Towards the latter part of August in the 6th year of Showa (1931) Lieutenant General HONJO, the newly appointed Commander of the Kwantung Army, arrived at his post. At the beginning of September he started his first tour of inspection and review. I was then in his suite. The reports submitted to the new Commander of the Kwantung Army by the unit commanders at the time were filled with righteous indignation at the contemptuous attitude of the Chinese authorities toward our Army, the recent repeated interruptions to the traffic on the South Manchurian Railway line and the oppressive and insulting treatment of our nationals in the districts. Alarming rumors were current among the local officials and people, which somehow foreshadowed the coming evils. The new Commander always remained calm and serene, and warned his men and the local officials and nationals against hasty and illconsidered

acts, cordially persuading them to endure the difficulties with patience. On Sep. 12 when the new Commander inspected the Independent Garrison at Kungchuling, Lt-Gen. MORI, the commander of the Garrison submitted a report to the effect that the anti-Japanese movement of the Chinese officials and people had been remarkable systematized, with the result that bandits had begun to dominate the districts so rampantly that there were signs that the outlaws, ignoring our army, were going to disturb the South Manchurian Railway as well as the zone attached to it. The railway guards of the Independent garrison had been ordered strictly to be most patient so as to refrain from taking positive action outside the railway zone. Imposing upon such an attitude of our army, who forging fetters for its own bondage, restrained itself from positive movements, the outlaws grew more and more systematic and active in assuming a defiant attitude toward us, and established their bases of operations alongside the Railway Zone. At last it was thought to be impossible for the garrison to discharge its duties unless it without adopting measures outside the ordinary. On the 13th, the day after the inspection of the Independent Garrison at Kungchuling, Commander HONJO gave the commander of the garrison an instruction to the following effect:

"Of late bandits are showing such violent activity that they often attempt to obstruct traffic on the South Manchurian Railway and at times penetrate even into the Railway Zone. This really fills us with apprehension. At this time you will make every effort towards the performance of your duty

of guarding the railway and relieving our nationals of their uneasiness, taking positive and decisive steps against those outlaws who make light of the power and force of our Army".

II. OUTBREAK OF THE INCIDENT AND THE CALLING OUT OF OUR ARMY

Completing the inspection tour of the Army, Lt-Gen. HONJO, accompanied by his staff, returned to Port Arthur shortly after 10, p.m. on Sep. 18.

I was so exhausted from the week's inspection tour that I soon fell asleep. I had scarcely slept for an hour when a loud clang of the bell woke me. I got up, wondering what was the matter. KATAKURI a fellow staff officer, who was my neighbour, told me that something serious had happened and that we were all to meet at Chief of Staff MIYAKE's official residence. When I reached the residence I found the Chief of the Staff sitting with KATAKURA and NAKANO, another staff officer. KATAKURA without uttering a word handed me the purport of which was as follows and was the first news:

"Receiving a report that frenzied Chinese soldiers, at about 10 p.m. on the 18th destroyed part of the South Manchurian Railway line on the west of Peitaying which lies to the north of Mukden, and attacked our garrison, the Second Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison at Mukden has been despatched to the spot."

I, remained silent for a while as the realisation dawned that what was to happen had at last come to pass. After a while all the other staff-officers came to join us, and we moved to the main office of the headquarters about 100 metres away and studied measures to cope with the situation. It was all ^{so} sudden and coming as it did upon the completion of the Army Commander's important annual inspection, both officers and men were relieved of strain and had probably been resting. The fact is, I myself was one of those who were caught off their guard. All that came to my mind at that moment were vision of the confused scene at Mukden and my earnest hope for the success of our troops. Meanwhile the second report reached us, the gist of which read as follows:

"An enemy unit of the Paitaying Barracks has blown part of the South Manchurian Railway line. The strength of the enemy is as three or four infantry companies. Our company despatched from Hushitai after 11 o'clock is now fighting the 500 or 600 enemy troops. A corner of the enemy barracks has been taken by our troops. The enemy is now reinforcing with machine-gun and infantry guns. Our company is fighting with desperation. Lt. NODA seriously wounded."

Thus challenge was given by the Chinese troops. The situation was led to its most serious stage through this Challenge. At last we had reached the end of our patience. In fact battles were going on between both sides, and it was now impossible to draw them apart. No one had opposed the opinion that at this juncture the matter should be settled in the shortest time possible by making a lightning

attack upon the control of the enemy based on the plan provided in peace times for every emergency. But all of the staff felt uncertainty and could not help feeling some hesitation about carrying out such a drastic step which might decide the fate of the nation.

It was at this time that Commander of the Army HONJO arrived at the headquarters and entered his office room, speechless, and looking sad. Major General MIYAKE, and ISHIHARA, staff-officer in charge of operations, followed him into the room. A few minutes later, staff officer ISHIHARA came back with his lips firmly set. (The staff officer told us), that the Commander had made a firm resolution after deep meditation, and had solemnly declared, "Well, I will carry it out on my responsibility." At these words, which cleared the air, I was freed from the feeling of uncertainty which had occupied my mind for a while, and reached a confident belief that the only way for me to follow was to make my utmost efforts in accordance with the Commander's solemn and decisive resolution.

Between 1:30 a.m. ^{and} 2:00 a.m. on the 19th orders were given to each unit. A change was made in the plan of operations already provided in peace time concerning the movement of the unit stationed at Chanchun. According to our original plan that unit was also to go to Mukden. But Commander HONJO ordered that it should not do so, thinking it adequate for the corps to be standing by at Changchun, preparing for actions as it was too early for it to advance on Mukden in accordance with the scanty information they had obtained.

at that time. It is understood that such orders were given because Commander HONJO sought to settle the matter at the earliest stage.

A report was made to the Central Authorities, and a telegram requesting the despatch of additional troops was sent to the Commander of the Korean Army according to the definite agreement made in normal times. The gist of the telegram ran as follows:

About (10:30 p.m.) on the 12th the Chinese troops at Mukden made a sudden attack on our garrison. All our forces are fighting desperately with the enemy. The Army has decided to attack Mukden with full strength. You will please despatch reinforcement as soon as possible.

As it was feared that the Chinese troops stationed near Koupantzu, Chinchou, might make a rear-attack upon us while our troops were fighting alongside the South Manchurian Railway Line, the Army asked Rear Admiral TSUDA, the Commander of the Second Despatched Fleet, which was then near Tsingtao, to collaborate by despatching part of the squadron to the offing of Yingkao. But Commander TSUDA assuring that he would take adequate measures according to the development of the situation, declined to help us then because there was danger that the disturbances might extend to the Shantung district.

Battles in the Mukden Vicinity

Colonel ITAGAKI, a senior staff officer of the Army, was then at Mukden by order of Commander HONJO after the inspection at Liaoyang on the 18th. As he was well aware of the intention of the Commander of the Army as well as the plan of operations, he gave necessary instructions to Colonel HIRATA, the Commander of the 29th Regiment of Infantry and Commander of the Garrison at Mukden, and Lt. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Garrison, and agreed with their determination to attack the barracks at Mukden and Peitaying. The determination of these front-line commanders was reported to Army Headquarters about 2:00 a.m. on the 19th, and Commander HONJO gave his assent. Commander HONJO with full confidence in Colonel ITAGAKI, a stout-hearted man with conscientious scruples, appeared to feel quite secure when he was told that the colonel had happened to be at Mukden, the center of the event, at the time. Reports telling of the favorable progress of the battles reached us about the same time. Smiles appeared on the faces of the staff officers as well as mine which had been strained with anxiety till that time.

III. ADVANCE OF KWANGPUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS, TO MUKDEN POLICY OF LOCALIZATION OF THE INCIDENT, REINFORCEMENT FROM THE KOREAN ARMY

The Commander of the Army, accompanied by the minimum necessary number of men leaving Port Arthur at 3:30 a.m. arrived at Mukden

Battles in the Mukden Vicinity

Colonel ITAGAKI, a senior staff officer of the Army, was then at Mukden by order of Commander HONJO after the inspection at Liaoyang on the 18th. As he was well aware of the intention of the Commander of the Army as well as the plan of operations, he gave necessary instructions to Colonel HIRATA, the Commander of the 29th Regiment of Infantry and Commander of the Garrison at Mukden, and Lt. Colonel SHIMAMOTO, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the Independent Garrison, and agreed with their determination to attack the barracks at Mukden and Peitaying. The determination of these front-line commanders was reported to Army Headquarters about 2:00 a.m. on the 19th, and Commander HONJO gave his assent. Commander HONJO with full confidence in Colonel ITAGAKI, a stout-hearted man with conscientious scruples, appeared to feel quite secure when he was told that the colonel had happened to be at Mukden, the centre of the event, at the time. Reports telling of the favorable progress of the battles reached us about the same time. Smiles appeared on the faces of the staff officers as well as mine which had been strewn with anxiety till that time.

III. ADVANCE OF KWANTUNG ARMY HEADQUARTERS, TO MUKDEN POLICY OF LOCALIZATION OF THE INCIDENT, REINFORCEMENT FROM THE KOREAN ARMY

The Commander of the Army, accompanied by the minimum necessary number of men leaving Port Arthur at 3:30 a.m. arrived at Mukden

about noon on the 19th, after having issued the first order. Chief of Staff MIYAKE and I remained for some time to arrange some unsettled affairs. Leaving there at 7:25 a.m. we arrived at Mukden past 4 o'clock that afternoon, when we saw columns of smoke rising up somewhere in the direction of Peitaying, now and then hearing the reports of guns from the direction of Tung-taying far away. On arriving there we were told of the development of the battle. As such swift and successful operations had never been dreamed of, the more were we grateful for the desperate efforts of our brave and loyal officers and soldiers.

The progress of the battle at Changchun had not yet been reported. Although, after my departure from Port Arthur, I had heard on the train of the outbreak of hostilities at Changchun, I did not pay so much attention to it judging from the situation at Mukden. But on my arrival at Mukden, the staff officers there told us that seemingly a fierce battle was going on at Changchun, and the reports of the development of the battle was not so favorable until six o'clock. At last toward the evening we received reports about the occupation of the town of Hunchengtzu and the barracks at Wanling. This report was delivered to us so late on account of the crippled military communication -- the military communication between Changchun and Mukden had been maintained radio of the South Manchurian Railway at the time -- due to the sudden increase in telegrams concerning railway traffic caused

by the congestion arising from the transportation of troops.

Prior to this, Commander HONJO at 3:40 on the 19th received a telegram from the Commander of the Korean Army when he was passing Tashihchiao. It reported that five infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, one cavalry company and one engineer company together with two squadrons of airplanes were to be despatched. On receiving this telegram we were given fresh heart, feeling as if we had got a million reinforcements. At the time there were reports of bitter fighting at Changchun and increasing uneasiness in Kilin and Harbin, and ISHIHARA, who was in charge of operations, was deliberating with other staff officers on a plan for the period after the arrival at Mukden. Shortly after 5 p.m. on the 19th, information from some quarters of the South Manchurian Railway was received as to the reinforcements from Korea which; it seems, were waiting at Shingishu by orders from above. About 11 o'clock that night we had an official telegram from the Commander of the Korean Army to the same effect. About 6 that afternoon an instruction by wire from the War Minister, closely followed by a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, reached us. Their purport was as follows:

The instruction from the War Minister:

The present issue between the troops of Japan and China was caused by the attempt at the part of the Chinese troops to blow up the railroad of the South Manchurian Railway, and it is obvious that the blame should be placed upon China, but we have

definitely adopted a policy of localizing the affair to a minimum. You will therefore deal with this affair with due consideration of the above.

The instruction from the Chief of the General Staff:

1. The resolution and steps taken by the Commander of the Kwantung Army after Sept. 18 were adequate, and are believed to have been effective in upholding the dignity of our Army.
2. It has been decided at a Cabinet meeting that in view of the attitude of China since the outset of the affair we should not go farther than necessity drives in measures adopted for the settlement of the issue. Your operations, therefore, will be carried out in accordance with that decision.

Commander HONJO always bore in mind the localization of the affair and endeavored to settle it in the shortest time possible. He made a detailed report on the situation since the night before and watched the development of the affair. Meanwhile deeper unrest prevailed in the districts of Kilin and Harbin, and at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 20th he issued an order to concentrate the main force of the Second Division near Changchun leaving some troops near Mukden.

IV. SECOND DIVISION DESPATCHED TO KILIN, AND
KOREAN ARMY REINFORCEMENTS

From the outset Kilin was the centre of the anti-Japanese Movement in Manchuria. The report of the clash between the troops of China and Japan caused further aggravation of the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people near Kilin. On the 19th Ed. Hsia, the Deputy Chief of Kilin Province, declared that he could not take the responsibility thereafter as to the protection of Japanese nationals. According to the information we obtained from the authorities of the Kilin-Changchun Railway, the main force of the Kilin Army had already been called out (Its strength and the direction of its movement were not clear). Toward the evening of the 20th, we were furnished with information by Lt. Col. OSEKO, the Military Adviser to the Kilin Army, to the effect that the Kilin Army had crossed the border on the 20th, and we thought that these troops would advance in the direction of Changchun, or come down along the Mukden-Hailung Railway to the south up to Fushun for the purpose of counteracting our movement and reinforcing the enemy main force.

At 9:45 that night we received a telegram (sent at 11:40 p.m. from the President of the Japanese nationals in Kilin. The gist was as follows:

"The situation in the Kilin area is tense. The residences of some Japanese nationals. have already been fired upon.

Therefore, a section of the women and children here has already been evacuated. The remainder however not only find evacuation impossible but the danger grow hourly imminent. As a decision on the part of this Society we beg you to adopt swift and complete measures to protect this place."

At the time the situation in the Harbin area was also considerable aggravated. And the Japanese nationals there were preparing to evacuate. In the vicinity of Mukden, things were all in a state of confusion, a considerable number of the remnants of the defeated enemy troops being seen prowling thereabout. Under the condition, if troops were to be despatched to Kilin for the purpose of protecting our nationals there, considering the strength of the enemy force stationed near Kilin it would be necessary to despatch the complete strength of the 2nd Division at Changchun. This, however, would weaken the defence of a long stretch of the railway line and much danger was apprehended that the remnants of the defeated enemy troops making a rally, might attempt to destroy the rail road, cut our army into two parts and keeping them some four hundred and fifty miles apart, one in the south and the other in the north. But now that the Government had definitely adopted the policy of localizing the affair, the Commander of the Army had

to be most deliberate in making decisions. And yet he, who had the heavy responsibility for the protection of our nationals, could not find it within himself to leave in imminent danger the nationals whose only hope lay upon that single track of railway. Moreover, a passive measure taken in fear of the danger of separation of strength might prove to be an incentive to the enemy's reaction and cause a state of hopeless confusion. At last we reached a conclusion that there was no other way left for us but to deliver such a crushing blow to the enemy at Kilin that it would be thoroughly cowed and, at the same time, to take firm measures for safeguarding the South Manchurian Railway line. Commander HO JO and MIYAKE, the Chief of the Staff deliberated upon the matter for about an hour, and later again fully discussed it with all the staff-officers. At 3 a.m. on the 21st a decision to despatch troops was given by the Commander.

The main force of the Second Division left Changchun for Kilin on the morning of the 21st.

According to information from our secret agents, the Kilin Army were taking up positions all around the city of Kilin. We waited for the first reports, being prepared for a heavy battle. On account of the defective means of communication, however, we could not make contact with the despatched troops, until a report of the bloodless occupation of the city reached us after 9 o'clock that evening. Such news was really a surprise -- a pleasant surprise which put our mind at ease. When commander

HONJO decided to send to troops to Kilin, he reported by wire the details of the despatch of the troops to the Commander of the Korean Army as well as the Military authorities at Tokyo and eagerly waited for the answer, which did not come so soon. Somehow it was felt that the atmosphere in the headquarters of the Army was rather gloomy. Shortly after 1 p.m. we obtained information from the authorities of the South Manchurian Railway to the effect that the 39th Mixed Brigade had begun to cross the Yalu River. This report was closely followed by a telegram from the Brigade Commander, the gist of which was as follows:

"The 39th Mixed Brigade crossed the frontier at 1:00 p.m. on the 21st and is coming up to Mukden under Your Excellency's command."

Commander HONJO and all the other members of the Army were grateful for the friendship of the Korean Army in such a difficult situation.

Shortly after this the Chief of the General Staff sent a telegram from Tokyo recognising that the despatch to Kilin of our troops was the outcome of necessity.

Upon this Commander HONJO ordered the 39th Mixed Brigade to garrison the Mukden area and the whole strength of the Second Division to concentrate near Changchun.

V. ARMY'S RETURN TO RAILWAY ZONE:

BOMBING OF CHINCHOU

As our occupation of Kilin relieved the South Manchurian Railway Zone of its fear of attack, Commander HONJO determined to call back the main force of the Army immediately to their posts alongside the Railway line, and watch the development of the situation, taking advantage of the occasion of the arrival of the 39th Mixed Brigade. On Sept. 23 he made a speech to his men, in which he admired their valor and instructed them to maintain complete defence of the Zone under strict discipline. On the 24th, the following day, the main force of the Second Division was ordered to guard the vicinity of Changchun, coming back from Kilin, the 39th Mixed Brigade the vicinity of Mukden, and part of the Independent Garrison was stationed at Kilin (the corps stationed at Tunghwa left the post on Oct. 10.) and near the crossing point of the Liao River east of Hsinmin, and ^{took} charge of maintaining ⁱⁿ peace in the district. Chang Hsuehliang, who was staying at Peiping, established the Headquarters of the Northern Frontier Army and the Government of Mukden Province at Chinchou. High officials, military and civil, including Chang Tsohsiang, the former Chief of Kilin Province were given their posts. Gradually the Headquarters and the Army was opened. And he attempted to harass our rear inciting mounted brigands and soldiers

Def. Doc. 885

bandits to guerrilla warfare. Not a few Japanese nationals, especially Koreans, were victims of their looting and violence. In spite of the efforts made by our army uneasiness seemed to prevail wider and wider.

It was natural that the attention of the Kwantung Army should be called to these Chinese machinations at Chinchou.

First the flying units were ordered to reconnoitre the Chinchou area. According to their reports, our planes appeared above the city of Chinchou, on Oct. 3 when the enemy displayed its hostility firing at the planes, which then bombed the military establishments including the enemy barracks and the College of Communications where the enemy Headquarters had been established. But at that time those planes attached to the Army had no bombing equipment and were fitted with temporary gear and the bombs were also very crude ones. So we learned the bombing made on that day did not cause any material damage to the enemy.

VI. BATTLE IN THE TAIHSING VICINITY

SITUATION BEFORE BATTLE

Since May, 1931, because of the precarious political situation in North China, Wan Fulin, the Chief of Heilungkiang Province and Vice-Commander of the Northern Frontier Army, had been staying at Peiping by order of Chang "suehliang with there infantry brigades and an artillery corps, the pick of the

Heilungkiang Army. Wan Kuopin, his eldest son, remained in his father's place during his absence, and Chief of the Staff Hsieh K'ow was in charge of military affairs in place of the Vice-Commander. Faced with a grave situation in Heilungkiang Province, where signs of drastic change were seen after the outbreak of the incident, Wan Kuopin was too young to have any strong authority over the people, and Hsieh K'ow a mere colonel and not competent enough to decide major important matters, which were all conducted according to the instructions of Wan Fulin who was then at Peiping. More than once Wan Fulin, worried about the inconvenience, and requested his return to his post of Chang Hsuehliang, who refused him permission each time. (The above information was obtained through Chinese telegrams which were intercepted and deciphered by us.) Chang Haibeng, the Commander of the Border Garrison of Taonan-Liaosi Districts, seemingly with the intention of expanding his influence toward the north at this opportune time, made a declaration of independence on Oct. 10, and set forth to advance into Heilungkiang Province. Thereupon Wankuopin asked for instructions from his father on the one hand, while a messenger was sent to Chang Haibeng to appease him. Every time Chang Haibeng's advance was reported to Wan Fulin, he was utterly taken aback and did not know what to do, being either elated or depressed according to the situation. Later on Oct. 4, as it was revealed that our army had no intention of helping Chang Haibeng, Wan Fulin sent tele-

graphic instructions to the following effect:

"The Japanese Army will never advance into North Manchuria. Chang Hai-peng seeks to take over Heilungkiang Province by threat so, rather than indulging in futile negotiations you should resist him with determination. You will see to it that, as the Japanese Army has no intention of violating North Manchuria, the people should set their minds at ease, and be careful not to be deluded by false reports." (The above was the translation of an intercepted telegraphic instruction sent on Oct. 4. The following information of the enemy's movements was also obtained from the enemy's telegrams intercepted by us. The code-book of the Chinese Army was obtained by us when we entered Mukden.) Then the troops of Heilungkiang Province were concentrated near Tsitsihar, and Ma Chanshan, the Commander of the 3rd Brigade of Infantry at Meiho was summoned to Tsitsihar and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Provincial Army and concurrently Deputy Governor of Heilungkiang Province.

On the other hand Chang Hai-peng, although he had designs on Heilungkiang Province, still remained irresolute, and was continuing negotiations with the Heilungkiang Provincial Government (according to the reports from KONO, Chief of the Branch office of the South Manchurian Railway Company at Taonan), and seemed to be trying to take the area by means of diplomatic tactics. On the part of the Heilungkiang authorities the minds of the

leaders were still agitated. Some days went by and it was understood that they were waiting for Ma Chanshan's arrival at Heiho, and at the same time setting forth to fortify the vicinity of Tashing. At last Chang Haipeng made a decision and left Taonan on Oct. 15 (according to the reports from KONO, the Chief of the Branch Office of the Manchurian Railway Company at Taonan) and began to march northward. Thereupon the Heilungkiang Army resisted the aggressing force, burning up a railway bridge across the Nonni River, which caused interruption of traffic on the Taonan--ngangchi Railway line. The railway, was not only part of the main line of international communication but was built on our loan and at the time it was the only security for the loan as neither principal nor interest had been paid by China. Faced with the season of transportation of 2,500,000 tons of special products in North Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway suffered a serious loss through the destruction of the railway bridge, and economic life of the people in North Manchuria was also considerably affected. Therefore, on Oct. 20 TAKEMURA, Katsukiyo, an engineer of the Taonanⁿ-ngangchi Railway Bureau, accompanied by fifteen persons were sent by the South Manchurian Railway Company to the spot for actual inspection. When TAKEMURA's party arrived there they were illegally fired on at close range by the troops of the Heilungkiang Army who were fully aware of their being non-combatants.

After this MURAKAMI, a director of the South Manchurian

Railway, together with the consul-general at Mukden made a demand upon the Kwantung Army and the central circles at Tokyo for the repairs. Concerning this the Army had negotiations with Ma Chan-shan through Consul SHIMIZU at Tsitsihar, and with Kuznetsov, the Vice-President of the Board of Directors of the East-China Railway through the consul-general at Harbin. We made most reasonable representations, but all in vain. It was absolutely necessary to complete the repairs before the freeze set in. At the last on Oct. 27 we gave them notice that the repairs should be completed by Nov. 3, a week later than that day, and added that if they should not agree with us we must carry out the repairs on our part by using force. The Heilungkiang Government promised to start repairing on Oct. 30, but it was not sincere in its promise, and right from the start no attempt at repairing was made.

NONNI RIVER DETACHMENT DESPATCHED

As no sincerity was shown by the Heilungkiang Provincial Government the Faouan--angangchi Railway Bureau and the South Manchurian Railway Company determined to start the repairs and made a request to the Army to sending troops to protect the working party at the destroyed bridge. It was thought that the main force of the Heilungkiang Army massed on the northern bank of the Nonni River consisted of about 2,000.

As the bridge was situated more than 500 kilometres away from the Manchurian Railway Zone where the mainforce of our Army

was stationed, it was quite difficult to send reinforcements at an adequate time in case on emergency. What was worse, the Nonni River ran there isolating from us the working party and the covering force. Under such circumstance, it was obvious that in case of emergency at least one regiment of infantry was absolutely necessary. But Commander HONJO, honestly observing the localizing policy, determined to send the necessary minimum of men so as not to provoke the people of Heilungkiang Province, and ordered the dispatch of the Nonni River Detachment (one infantry battalion, one artillery battalion and an engineer company) under the command of Colonel HAMAMOTO, the Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment. Commander HONJO gave special instructions to Colonel HAMAMOTO to use prudence and caution in conducting the despatched troops, for instance, first he was to negotiate with Heilungkiang Army and then send a unit to protect the working party after having ascertained the complete withdrawal of the Heilungkiang Army. He made every effort possible to avoid trouble, to the spot sending ISHIHARA, staff officer in charge of planning military operations. The Nonni River Detachment, starting from Changchun, arrived at the vicinity of Chengchiatuh on Nov. 1. and the next day advanced to the vicinity of Tailai, and then commenced various preparations.

On that day Commander HONJO notified Ma Chanshan and Chang Haipeng to the following effect: --

As the Taonan-Angangchi Railway Bureau and the South Manchurian Railway Company are now going to repairⁱ the railway

bridge near Nonni River Bridge under cover of our forces;

1. It will not be permitted to use the bridge for military purposes.
2. The troops of the both armies should be withdrawn farther than 10 kilometres from the bridge. They are not to be permitted to enter an area within 10 kilometres of the bridge until the completion of the repairs.

We had received no information whatever about the state of things after Nov. 3. On the 4th, the day for the repairs to be started, Commander HONJO and other staff officers waited for information from the detachment. They were kept in suspense until a telegram sent by KONO, the Chief of the Branch Office of the South Manchurian Railway at Taonan, reached them at 1:30 p.m. The purport of the telegram was as follows:

An officer patrol left Tsilai on the 2nd and arrived at the 2nd Bridge on the Nonni River at 4:00 a.m. on the 3rd, when a unit of the Heilungkiang Army at Tausing fired a volley at them. There were no casualties on our part.

About the same time the army signal squad commander of the, received a telegram from the chief of the wireless station at Hsiangchiao. It was to the following effect:

Hostilities Started. Please observe signal schedule.

We therefore thought that hostilities had commenced but at about 2 o'clock that afternoon we received a telegram to the following

effect:

"Staff officer ISHIMURA will return from Tai lai on the 5th. You will please send a passenger plane to Tailai as soon as possible."

We concluded that since ISHIMURA was returning the situation there was not so serious. At 6:00 p.m. we learned that the commander of the air unit at Mukden had received from the commander of the airplanes assisting the detachment a telegram to the following effect:

It seems that the enemy has retired without offering any resistance. The Norni Detachment advanced up to Tahsing at 11:00 a.m.

At this report we felt easier, thinking that the enemy might have conceded to our demand, but as we had not yet received any report from the commander of the detachment, there still remained a feeling of uncertainty in our minds.

From that night until the afternoon of the following day, we received several reports on the progress of the battle. The conditions at the outset of the battle were reported as follows:

"On the night of Nov. 3, our engineer corps repaired the destroyed bridge so that infantry on foot might be able to cross it. At 3:00 a.m. on the 4th Captain HANAI, the Company Commander, and part of his men occupied the 5th Bridge about 3 kilometres south of Tahsing Station and took up their posts protecting the working party. At 3:30 a.m. the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army,

accompanied by SHIMIZU, the Consul at Tsitsihar, came to the spot and declared that the Heilungkiang Army had no intention of resistance, and promised to withdraw his troops from the first line by noon that day, and returned.

On that morning we had a dense fog which prevented us from ascertaining the enemy's position in front of our troops.

The 7th company of the 16th Infantry Regiment left the 5th Bridge at noon, trusting in the words of the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army. They marched with a big sunflag at the head of the column and each member carried a small one. When they reached a point some distance to the south of Tahsing Station, they were suddenly fired on from several directions with rifles and guns. In an instant we had 13 casualties and the company had to retire to the 5th Bridge to wait for the arrival of the main force.

Hearing the reports of guns, the main force then staying near Kiangchiao Station, suddenly began to press forward and hostilities began in earnest at dawn on the 5th. The enemy, which had taken up a position and were superior in number to us made an enveloping attack upon the detachment, which soon found itself in a most difficult situation."

Each report which reached us successively brought unfavorable news of the progress of the battle.

One after another our reinforcements reached the firing line after the daybreak of the 6th. It took them from 25 to 30 hours

to reach there. The enemy at first made light of our forces ^{which} were much inferior in number to the enemy, and repeatedly made heavy attacks upon us. But with the arrival of our reinforcements they were compelled to fall back with heavy losses. Commander HONJO in accordance with the policy of the central authorities in Tokyo, ordered his troops to stand by near Tahsing Station so as to protect the working party at the bridge under repair. Those who were in the first line could not understand the true intention of Commander HONJO who ordered them to refrain from pursuing the enemy. They were burning with revenge as they had been suffering extremely under the siege of the enemy for a whole ten days and nights since the evening of the 4th, during which some of their comrades were killed and they themselves suffered with no supply of food or water. It is said the commanders in the first line, sharing the feeling of their men who were in a fury of excitement, persuaded them with bitter tears.

VII. BATTLE NEAR ANGANGCHI

The strength of our Army, massed near Tahsing before Nov. 1937, was 5 infantry battalions, 5 artillery companies, 1 engineer company, and 2 flying companies. It would have been very easy for us to take Tsitsihar, the capital of the province, with these forces. The soldiers in the first line wanted to carry it out,

but they were ordered to stand by near Tahsing. The only reason for this was the policy of localization of the affair and peaceful settlement of the issue.

Our peaceful attitude, however, caused the enemy to make light of our army. Soon some enemy troops were stationed at the Hsiaohsingtun-Sanchienfang area, which was situated on the south of the East China Railway line, and the main force was concentrated near Angangchi. They spread propaganda that the Japanese forces had been defeated and their attitude was getting more and more arrogant and defiant.

On the other hand the enemy at Chinchou also gradually assumed activity in cooperation with the Heilungkiang Army. About 10,000 armed bandits instigated by the enemy, crossed the Liao River, threatening to come down to the South Manchurian Railway line.

Mr. Chen Shan, who had won great renown as the hero of the day, boosted by Chang Hsuehliang and various other circles with admiration and encouragement, triumphantly declared that he would have a decisive battle with the Japanese Army. He concentrated about 20,000 troops, including the Heilungkiang Army (T.N. Not Clear) in the area between Tsitsihar and Angangchi before Nov. 10. His cavalry took a position so as to encircle us on the right flank. Thus the movement of the enemy troops became remarkably active. The situation was so keen that hostilities might be opened at any moment by a challenge on the part of the enemy.

The Kwantung Army made a report to the central authorities at Tokyo on the tense situation, and was prepared both for war and peace, gradually concentrating the main force of the Army (mainly including the 2nd Division) near Tahsing.

Even at this time HONJO, the Commander, did not abandon the idea of peaceful settlement, and he demanded that Ma Chan-shan finally reflect giving him the following conditions on the 14th

- (a) to withdraw his forces north of the Chinese ^a Eastern Railway and not to send them south of it again
- (b) not to check the traffic of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway
- (c) the Japanese forces will withdraw south of Chengkiatun after ascertaining that the above two conditions are being carried out.

Ma Chan-shan however, not only took no notice of those conditions, but also destroyed the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, thus disturbing the Japanese forces in the rear and became more and more challenging.

In such a critical condition the 4th Mixed Brigade and some aid support were coming to aid us from Japan and they were expected to reach the battlefield about the 22nd. Therefore we were making preparations to deliver a blow after uniting those forces, but on the 16th and 17th the enemy threatened us in the right rear with numerically superior cavalry and the enemy in front also became more active, so that the 2nd Division confronted them with small strength and occupied Tsitsihar at one blow.

Of course our plan was to withdraw our forces as soon as possible if our object was attained; in accordance with that plan we sent no troops into Tsitsihar, stationing our main force at Nantaying and a part at Peitaying and chiefly entrusted China with the preservation of peace. About the 13th it snowed and it was bitter cold; nevertheless the heating apparatus was entirely destroyed in the barracks and clothes etc. had not arrive as yet. Thus the Japanese officers and men had bitter experiences beyond description. The fact that in this battle no less than 1,000 soldiers were frozen among 1,4000 who were killed and wounded shows what hardships they underwent.

VIII. THE DESPATCH OF JAPANESE FORCES TO CHINCHOU

The Chinese forces at and around Chinchou, co-operating with the Ma Chan-shan's forces in the Heilungkiang Province, played an active part about the beginning of November. They advanced a corps to the neighbourhood of Tahushan and Koupangtzu and drove forward a newly organized volunteer force, a detached one, east of the Li River; consequently the disturbance of public peace along the South Manchurian Railway became systematic and large scale. We were exhausted with ceaseless activity as if we were continually driving away summer flies. The conclusion was that so long as we did not capture the base of enemy operations near Chinchow, we

would find it difficult to preserve peace in our district.

In the meanwhile the Chinese people who were indignant at the defeat of Ma Chan-shan once extolled as the greatest hero of the age attributed responsibility to Cheng Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek who looked on with folded arms and they became active in the anti-Chiang and Chang Movement in connection with the complicated internal problems.

It was expected, therefore, that Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang would take positive actions to some extent to keep themselves in countenance, no matter how they felt in their hearts. About this time all over Liaosi, with Chinchou as its centre, the rumour was prevalent that China would open hostilities against Japan and the people either danced for joy or began to take refuge for fear of the disasters of war. Then the situation in North China was very uneasy and the Tientsin expeditionary force suffered great hardship with very small strength (estimated less than 1,000). If an incident should breakout in that district, the Kwantung Army must save our comrade force (i.e. the Tientsin force) from crisis and clear the neighbourhood of Chinchou of Chinese forces; indeed we felt that need.

When the Kwantung Army was in an atmosphere of such unrest, on the night of November 26th the commander of the Tientsin force unexpectedly reported that hostilities had opened between Japanese and Chinese forces in the neighbourhood of Tientsin and that they were spreading all over the district. Receiving the demand for rein-

forcoments, the Kwantung Army were resolved to save the Tientsin force from the crisis. The 4th Mixed Brigade which had been newly reinforced from Japan and had been stationed near Mukden was ordered on the 27th to start from the line of the Liao River and advance at first to near Koupantzu in order to cover the gathering of the Army's main force and began its operation. Rec a report however that the serious situation in the Tientsin dist was somewhat relieved and concurrently receiving the order of the Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo to stop the operation, we withdrew the above-mentioned forces to the line of the South Manchurian Railway.

Prior to this, the Nanking government which had expected to imminent attack on Chinchow by Japanese forces implored the British American and French ambassadors to establish a neutral zone in the neighbourhood of Chinchow on November 24. But once we withdrew our forces east of the Liao River, the Nanking government declared that it was opposed to the establishment of the neutral zone and even issued a false statement that the proposal had been offered by the Japanese forces. That was judged to have been a cunning trick characteristic of China to mitigate the attack on Chinchow and the cessation of our operations raised the morale of the Chinese as usual and they grew more and more presumptuous. Knowing that, the officers and men of the Kwantung Army became very incensed and public opinion stiffened, too.

In the middle of December the positions near Chinchow were

made stronger and the Chinese strength which gathered in the vicinity of the city reached 35,000 and the number of volunteer bandits, detached forces, incited by the Chinese forces reached from 50,000 to 60,000: disturbances plotted east of the Liao River gave direct threats to the South Manchurian Railway and the bandits along the Antung-Fengtien Railway appeared to be co-operating. The destruction of railroad and stoppages of traffic occurred in rapid succession. Though we adopted the policy of localizing the affair, the situation became so serious that we could not tolerate the Chinese insults any longer, and from the point of view of securing the self-defense of the Japanese army and the welfare of the Japanese residents in Manchuria and Mongolia it was a pressing need to capture the base of their operations. The Kwantung Army reported the above situation to the central authorities of the army. The Japanese Government took measures to make the League of Nations have an ample understanding of this situation and reserved the right to suppress the bandits. Then as the bandits in Liaosi were clearly supported by the Chinese regular forces, their suppression made it inevitable that we should have an encounter with the Chinchow force. The Japanese Government, therefore, issued necessary statements and opened negotiations in Nanking, Peiping and other places demanding the withdrawal of the Chang Hsuehliang force from the inside of the Wall. But the latter's activity became such that by permission of the central authorities of the army the 2nd Division advanced along the Yingkov branch-line starting from the

line of the Liao River on December 28th in order to drive away the enemy from the neighbourhood of Tienchuangtai and Fanshan which was the strongest base of operations of the volunteer force, a detached one, in Liaosi. Just as we had expected, near Tienchuangtai the Chinese regular forces reinforced the volunteers with armoured trains and in Fanshan the bandits mixed with powerful regular forces made a night attack upon us in other places we had encounter with such mixed forces. Therefore Honjo, the Commander, made up his mind and from the 30th on he began to suppress the enemy along the Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Railway, but the enemy unexpectedly retreated without fighting. The consequence was that Chinchow and district was in a state of anarchy for a while and the peace was disturbed so that the 2nd Division was moved there and the other main force of was withdrawn to the South Manchurian Railway.

IX. THE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO HARBIN

Hsi Hsia, acting-chief of Kirin Province, took the lead of the other provinces in the establishment of a new regime late in September of 1931, and broke off relations with Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang, while the military caste of the Chang Tso-hsiang faction betook themselves to Harbin and its south-eastern vicinity and established a regime in Pinhsen (about sixty kilometres north-east of Harbin) in opposition to this move.

Def. Doc. # 835

(Hsi Hsia's regime will be called the "Kilin Regime", the other the "Anti-Kilin Regime" in the following.)

The Kirin Regime, seeing that there was no way to solve the matter except by force, set about forming new forces, and their strength was computed at nine thousand towards December of at year. Hsi Hsia left the neighbourhood of Kilin on Jan. 5 of the 7th year of Showa(1932), and started on a suppression mission. Pressing the Anti-Kilin forces he reached the suburbs of Harbin, and a battle between the two main forces took place from Jan. 27. About that time some quarters of the Anti-Kilin forces entered Harbin and began to pillage, so the whole city was thrown into an uproar, and the inhabitants filled with alarm. About 5500 Japanese residents (4,000 Japanese and 1,500 Koreans) were there. They urgently demanded that troops be despatched. Though the Kwantung Army also foresaw the aggravation of the situation, it kept observing the situation impartially and carefully, for it was not desirable to be involved in a conflict between Chinese factions. But it was reported on the night of Jan. 27 that four Japanese had been killed and many Koreans arrested. Furthermore, Captain SHIMIZU, a pilot of a Japanese aeroplane, was murdered by the Anti-Kilin Army when he made a forced landing in the suburbs of Harbin while he was reconnoitering the city on the same day, so that the Army decided to dispatch two infantry battalions in order to protect the residents, having communicated

Def. Doc. # 335

with the central military authorities and having given both of the two forces notice that there was no intention but that of protecting the Japanese residents.

At that time there were 4 locomotives and 400 carriages and waggons at the Eastern Chinese Railway's Manchingtzu station, and the consent of the Eastern Chinese Railway had already been obtained for the transportation of our troops. It was therefore optimistically considered that things would be easy. At the case of the transportation, however, as most of the workers of the Eastern Chinese Railway had already fled, workers of the South Manchuria Railway had to be dispatched promptly from Changung. Furthermore as these workers did not know well the condition of the stations and railway-line of the Eastern Chinese Railway and the construction of its cars was different from those of the South Manchuria Railway, unexpected hitches occurred. What with wasting time in assembling trains and a derailment the preparation of the trains was much delayed, and the first train started about 11 p.m. of the 28th. But the trains met on the way with resistance from a part of Anti-Kilin Army and destruction of the railway lines, so progress was very slow, and it was 5 p.m. of Jan. 30 when the trains reached Shuangching station.

The Kwantung Army feared that the opportunity of protecting the residents should be lost, as the progress of the trains was so slow, but nothing could be done. Furthermore it was reported that the Anti-Kilin Army was ill-disposed toward us at that time,

so the Kwantung Army feared that unexpected accidents would occur due to the independent advance of small units. And indeed some two thousand Anti-Kilin troops set for Shuangcheng before dawn of Jan. 31, and there broke out a confused fight. At this report also the Kwantung Army was very alarmed, for the four available locomotives were all at Shuangcheng and there was no means of reinforcement. Commander HONJO specially, would have suffered in his mind, because we would not have been able to force, although knowing of its critical situation. For the above mentioned reasons it proved to be dangerous to small units advance solely, by so the main force of the 2nd Division was added to the two battalions.

Reaching Harbin on Feb. 4, the 2nd Division was challenged by the Anti-Kilin force which had occupied a position near there and was compelled to fight back, then entered Harbin on the 5th.

Of course Commander HONJO troubled himself with the policy of localizing the affair and of withdrawing the 2nd Division promptly to Nanpu district in order to avoid the occurrence of useless trouble with Soviet Russia, because Harbin heavily involved her rights and interests. But once a severe battle with the anti-Kilin Army had been fought, unrest could not be dispelled easily, and the division also could not evacuate there immediately.

(End)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TAKEDA, Hisashi (seal)

On this 13th day of January, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT TAKEDA, Hisashi (seal)

I, TAKEDA, Hisashi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) BAWNO, Junkichi (seal)

Def. Doc. # 885

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 20th March 1947