

*SPD  
file*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
TELEPHONE  
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 4, 1946

SUBJECT: Travel to Japan of Japanese nationals in the United States, not in an internee or a deportee category, who wish to go at their own expense.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Weymueller, American President Lines  
Miss Wolberg, SPD

COPIES TO:

W. 740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 9-2746

Miss Wolberg called in reference to her previous conversation with Mr. Weymueller on September 26, 1946. She informed Mr. Weymueller that the State Department had now received a letter from the INS confirming the telephone conversation between Mr. Anderson, INS, and Mr. Clattenburg which she had mentioned to Mr. Weymueller when she called before. Miss Wolberg inquired whether the branch offices of the American President Lines had now been informed of the arrangements outlined in the Department's letter of July 19, 1946.

Mr. Weymueller informed Miss Wolberg that on September 26, 1946 a letter containing the necessary information had been sent to the American President Lines' San Francisco office, with copies to the offices at Los Angeles, New York, Seattle and Chicago. He also stated that the New York office had informed each member of its staff and had communicated with the Boston office in the matter.

JUN 20 1950

CS/HH

*740.00119 Control (Japan) / 9-2746*

*MW*  
SPD:MEWolberg:erk


10/4/46

*File 740.00119 Control (Japan) / 9-2746*



DC/R

Checks for deposit in the operating logistical fund to be set up in connection with the participation of Chinese forces in the occupation of Japan should be made payable to the Treasurer of the United States and should be delivered to the Office of the Chief of Finance, War Department, Attention Captain Ross E. Leach.

*original from Taiwan  
handed to Chinese Embassy  
10/2/46  
JL*

*FW 740.00119  
Contract (Japan)  
FW 740.000119  
Contract (Japan)*

10-146



September 7, 1946.

Dear Tsui:

Pursuant to our conversation today I am enclosing a copy of the revised agreement of July 20, 1946. We hope to send this to you officially within the next few days.

Sincerely yours,

J. K. Penfield

Enclosure.

(Appendix to SWNCC 70/20.)

Mr. Tawen-ling Tsui,  
First Secretary,  
Chinese Embassy,  
Washington 9, D.C.

FE:JKPenfield:hst

*FW 740.00119 Control (Japan) 10-146*



*copy file*

In reply refer to  
FE 740.00119 Control  
(Japan)/9-1346

October 7, 1946.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT  
MEMBER OF SWNCC

Reference: SWNCC 70/21, REVISED  
TENTATIVE AGREEMENT  
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT  
IN JAPAN OF A CHINESE  
OCCUPATION FORCE

Pursuant to the instructions contained in SWN-4790 of  
1 October 1946, there is enclosed for the information of the  
Committee a copy of a note of October 4, 1946, from the  
Acting Secretary of State to the Chinese Ambassador in re-  
gard to the participation of a Chinese force in the occupa-  
tion of Japan.

The Committee will be informed as soon as a reply has  
been received from the Chinese Ambassador.

Confidential File

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/10-146

TO:	OCF SF Unit
BY:	<i>[Signature]</i>
DATE:	
TIME:	

J. H. Hilldring  
State Department Member  
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Enclosure:  
To Chinese Embassy,  
October 4, 1946.

8 GNEB & RECEIVED  
IN SWNCC

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal

FE:JKPenfield:hst

*JA gma*

*10/9/46  
CA [Signature]*

*SJK [Signature]*

*29/10-1*



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *W*, Mr. Acheson

FROM : FE, Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT: Pending Problems Regarding Japan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
OCT 14 1948  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DATE: October 2, 1946.

**TOP SECRET**

The attached memorandum, which I doubt you will have time to read in full, reports on various pending problems regarding Japan.

Consideration of Japanese Constitution questions in the FEC progresses slowly. The general atmosphere has improved as a result of a recent tendency on the part of General MacArthur to be more responsive to the Commission's views. It seems likely that the Commission will shortly approve the setting up of an inter-Allied trade board for Japan.

The Australian, New Zealand, British and Norwegian Governments have recently protested against SCAP's authorization of a Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic. We are on rather firm ground in replying, as the authorization is not inconsistent with a directive on file with the FEC which has not been questioned by any member of that body. MacArthur has made several minor concessions such as welcoming Allied observers on the expedition, which should make it easier for us to satisfy the protesters.

The Soviets in Tokyo have recently been authorized to reopen discussions regarding the repatriation of Japanese in Soviet-controlled areas and SCAP appears to be optimistic regarding the chances for an early agreement on this subject.

You may care to read the details regarding the proposed reparations conference (section V, beginning on page 4 of the attached memorandum). DELSEC 1016 of October 1, which you have probably seen, contains a succinct expression of opinion on this subject.

*attached (xx)  
J.C.V.*

Unit  
*W*

FE:JKPenfield:hst

UNDER SECRETARY  
2 OCT 3 - 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

F.W. 740 00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-14 FILED

OCT 14 1948

TOP SECRET FILE

*for copy / 10-14*



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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

2163

*File*  
*memo to SWNCC*  
*10/2 JCP*  
*notes*  
*Chinese Embassy JCP*  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs  
Department of State  
OCT 3 1946  
SWN-4790  
1 October 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Revised Tentative Agreement on the Establishment in Japan of a Chinese Occupation Force

- References: a. SWNCC 70/13
- b. Item 2, Minutes of 48th SWNCC Meeting

At its 48th Meeting on 11 September 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 70/21 for transmission to the Secretary of State with the proviso that the last sentence of paragraph 6 j. (Page 115) of the Appendix reading "Conversion rate of Yuan to United States dollars will be prescribed by inter-governmental agreement." be deleted from the Agreement.

A copy of the approved paper is enclosed for such action as is deemed appropriate by the Department of State.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

*W. W. Moreley, for*  
*J. H. Hilldring*  
J. H. HILLDRING,  
Chairman

Enclosure  
Copy No. 47, SWNCC 70/21

	DOE WE Unit
	<i>[Signature]</i>

SECRET

*FE-203 of 15 memo/para. 11 (104)*  
*recommends that the agreement be ratified as a formal governmental agreement. Someone FE will so proceed to implement this or advise SWNCC of any changes. W. W. Moreley*

OCT 11 1946  
FILED

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/10-146

Confidential File



SECRETCOPY NO. 47SWNCC 70/2129 August 1946Pages 104 - 115, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEEREVISED TENTATIVE AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT  
IN JAPAN OF A CHINESE OCCUPATION FORCE

References: a. SWNCC 70/5  
b. SWNCC 70/13  
c. SWNCC 70/14  
d. SWNCC 70/19  
e. SWNCC 70/20

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

A. D. REID

V. L. LOWRANCE

H. W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

SWNCC 70/21SECRET



S E C R E T

E N C L O S U R E

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SM-6605  
28 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Revised Tentative Agreement on the Establishment in Japan of a Chinese Occupation Force.

With reference to participation by Chinese forces in the occupation of Japan the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the Secretary of State be advised as follows:

a. In accordance with the procedure outlined in SWNCC 70/20, General MacArthur has completed detailed arrangements for the acceptance of the Chinese Occupation Force in the occupation of Japan. A draft agreement signed in Tokyo on 20 July 1946 with Chinese representatives is enclosed (Appendix). The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this agreement be ratified as a formal governmental agreement.

b. It is understood that the Department of State has negotiated a contract with the Chinese Government under Section 3 (c) of the Lend Lease Act to provide for the Chinese Occupation Force logistical support which is beyond Chinese capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the State Department should require the Chinese Government to deposit in advance an operating logistical fund of \$5,000,000 to be re-established quarterly in that amount. Such a requirement should result in the Chinese demanding less logistical support than would otherwise be the case. It will also be necessary that these funds, upon receipt, be transferred to the War Department, since no funds are available for this program within the authorized

SWNCC 70/21

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War Department budget and therefore no appreciable logistic support can be rendered to the Chinese Occupation Force prior to the formal establishment and transfer of these funds.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Chinese Government agrees to reduce the size of its forces from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in other Allied forces in Japan. The size of the Chinese forces should also be made subject to re-examination in the light of any arrangements made in the future with the Soviet Union to participate in the occupation. It is considered that these requirements can be effected under the provisions of paragraph 4 of the draft agreement.

d. General MacArthur is requiring that, before the embarkation of the elements of the Chinese Occupation Force, complete arrangements be made to determine the adequacy of detailed organization of the Chinese forces, the full logistical support required, and the assurance of its availability. He estimates that a period of approximately five weeks from the date of the signing of the draft tentative agreement (20 July 1946) will be required to complete these necessary preliminaries to the entry of the Chinese forces.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,  
Colonel, U.S. Army,  
Secretary.

Enclosure (Appendix)

SWNCC 70/21

- 105 -

Enclosure

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

A P P E N D I X

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

20 July 1946

SUBJECT: Chinese Occupation Force in Japan

1. The arrangements herein have been agreed upon between Representatives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and the Chief, Chinese Mission in Japan covering establishment and operation of the Chinese Occupation Force in Japan and incorporating certain modifications made in a similar agreement, now superseded, signed on 4 June 1946. It is understood that these arrangements are tentative in nature until confirmed by the United States and Chinese Governments.

2. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

a. Mission.

The Chinese Occupation Force will constitute a component of Allied Occupation Forces in Japan under the Supreme Command of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. It will be charged with the normal military duties of a force of its size and composition. Areas allocated to the Chinese Occupation Force will not constitute a national zone, and accomplishment of specific occupation missions therein will be assigned to the Chinese and/or other Allied Occupation Forces from time to time as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may direct.

b. Operations.

The Chinese Occupation Force will be charged by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with military control of areas allocated to it for this purpose. The Chinese Occupation Force will be charged with demili-

S E C R E T



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tarization and disposition of Japanese installations and armament within areas allocated and with measures necessary for the security of the Occupation Forces therein. The Chinese Occupation Force will accomplish such ground patrol and surveillance tasks within allocated areas as may be directed. It will conduct such additional military operations outside normally allocated areas as may be directed by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army. Military Government functions within areas allocated to the Chinese Occupation Force will be conducted by United States agencies as directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Relationships of the Chinese Occupation Force with the Japanese and routine security functions pertaining primarily to Eighth Army operations as a whole, will be prescribed by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army.

c. Command Organization.

The Chinese Occupation Force will be assigned to operational control of the Eighth United States Army and will function as a division of the I United States Corps. The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will exercise tactical command of his force under the Corps command of the Commanding General, I United States Corps. Operational control of personnel of the Chinese Occupation Force allocated for port director functions will be assigned to the Commander Naval Activities, Japan, who will exercise control of the port of Nagoya and such other ports within the allocated area as may be utilized by the Chinese Occupation Force. Assignments to operational control will become effective upon arrival of elements of the Chinese Occupation Force at port of debarkation in Japan. The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will be responsible for the



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maintenance and administration of the Chinese Force as a whole.

d. Command and Administration Channels.

(1) For matters of major policy affecting the capabilities of the Chinese Occupation Force the Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will have the right of access to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(2) The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will retain the right of direct communication with the Chinese Government on administrative matters affecting his Force.

(3) For matters of governmental concern affecting the Chinese Occupation Force, the channel of communication lies from the Chinese Government through the United States Government and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(4) In administrative matters pertaining to relations with United States Forces or with the Japanese, the Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will be governed by policies prescribed by Commanders exercising operational control. Such policies will, in general, conform to those prescribed for United States Forces.

e. Liaison.

The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will exchange Liaison Officers with other commands of the United States Army Occupation Forces as directed by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army. Liaison between the Chinese Occupation Force and the Japanese Central Liaison Committees in areas allocated to the Chinese Occupation Force will be conducted as directed by the Commanding General, Eighth United States



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Army. Liaison between the Chinese Occupation Force and United States Naval authorities will be conducted through a United States Naval Liaison officer at the port or ports used by the Chinese Occupation Force. The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, is authorized to maintain an officer at General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for liaison purposes on subjects upon which direct communication is authorized under paragraph 2 d (1) above.

3. AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.

a. The Chinese Occupation Force will be initially allocated AICHI Prefecture, Honshu Island, for exercise of the functions and responsibilities in sub-paragraphs 2 a and b above. The area allocated to the Chinese Occupation Force may be altered by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers as conditions dictate.

b. It is understood that Headquarters and other elements of the Fifth United States Air Force and elements of the Eighth United States Army will also be located in the areas allocated to the Chinese Occupation Force for exercise of its occupation functions.

4. FORCES.

a. It is understood that the strength of the Chinese Occupation Force will be determined by inter-governmental decision. It is also understood that the Chinese Occupation Force will maintain a basic organization of one Infantry Division with suitable ground service supporting elements and will probably total approximately 15,000 personnel.

b. It is understood that the Chinese Occupation Force may be withdrawn wholly or in part from Japan upon agreement between the Governments of the United States and China. It is also understood that progressive reduction



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will be made in the Chinese Occupation Force from time to time in conformity with progressive reductions in other Allied Forces in Japan. Size and composition of such reductions will be determined on a governmental level.

c. The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will provide the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers with troop lists showing strengths in personnel, vehicles, animals, and equipment, upon final determination of the size and composition of the force. Unless otherwise specified by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, troops and supplies of the Chinese Occupation Force will disembark at the port of NAGOYA.

d. It is understood that actual arrival dates of the units of the Chinese Occupation Force are subject to approval by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Initial arrangement for establishment of the Chinese Occupation Force in Japan:

(1) The Chinese Military Liaison Office to SCAP in Tokyo will be disbanded and its functions divided to absorb military elements into the Chinese Occupation Force and withdraw them from Tokyo, with the exception, if desired, of the liaison officer described in subparagraph 2 e above.

(2) Direct communication between the Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, or his authorized representative, and the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, for matters pertaining to the establishment and operation of the force, will be authorized by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon receipt of authority from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for entry of the force into Japan.



S E C R E T

(3) Pending further instructions, travel of staff officers of the Force Headquarters and of preliminary reconnaissance parties and individuals for inspection of areas and other orientation purposes is authorized subject to current clearance procedures by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(4) The Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, will arrange with the Commanding General Eighth United States Army for quartering, subsistence and transportation of advance parties of the Chinese Occupation Force.

(5) Preliminary movement of casual airplanes of the Chinese Government in Japan for staff purposes in connection with establishment of the Chinese Occupation Force will be subject to current clearance procedures by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which will arrange for temporary use by such aircraft of United States facilities in Japan and enroute.

(6) Effective on assumption of tactical responsibilities by the Chinese Occupation Force on a date to be specified by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, arrangements will be made by the Commanding General, Pacific Air Command, United States Army, for the regulation of air traffic incident to the operation of the Chinese Occupation Force.

(7) All airplanes entering or leaving Japan will be subject to such export-import controls and inspections as may be established.

b. Signal Communications:

(1) The Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, will provide facilities in Tokyo for radio communication



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incident to establishment of the Chinese Occupation Force in the NAGOYA area; thereafter, the Force will provide its own signal communications.

Coordination of the use of codes and ciphers will be worked out by the Chief Signal Officer, Eighth United States Army, with the Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force, or his representative.

(2) Available wire facilities of United States Forces in the NAGOYA area will be made available to the Chinese Occupation Force.

(3) The Commanding General, Eighth United States Army will make necessary arrangements for use by the Chinese Occupation Force of courier service in Japan.

c. Press Release.

No press release concerning the Chinese Occupation Force will be made pending governmental arrangements for simultaneous announcement in the capitals concerned. Necessary steps will be taken to insure against premature press reports in this respect. Normal conduct of press relations by the Chinese Occupation Force in Japan will conform to those procedures prescribed for United States Occupation Forces.

6. LOGISTICS.

The Chinese Occupation Force agrees to assume logistic responsibility for the support of the Force to the limit of available Chinese resources. Deficiencies in Chinese resources will be met under authority of United States-China Intergovernmental Agreement. Amount of United States assistance will be determined by the Senior United States Commander in Japan under general policies and instructions of the United States Government.

a. The loan of United States shipping and small craft, to meet deficiencies in Chinese water transportation



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will be made under authority of Intergovernmental Agreement. Rail transportation within Japan will be arranged by the Commanding General Eighth United States Army.

b. Local procurement of supplies, services, housing, construction, etc., in the Chinese Occupation Force area will be accomplished in conformance with Eighth United States Army directives. (Procurement of Japanese food products by Allied Occupation Forces is prohibited.)

c. (1) Supplies of all classes to accompany troops of the Chinese Occupation Force will be prescribed by the Force.

(2) Provision of maintenance supplies will be a responsibility of the Force.

(3) Resupply levels of all classes for the Force will conform to those of the Eighth United States Army.

(4) Class I (subsistence), Class V (Ammunition of United States types and calibers) and other supplies or equipment provided for the Force from United States sources to meet deficiencies in Chinese resources will be a subject for agreement on a governmental level.

d. In order to insure that the Chinese Occupation Force is adequately equipped and supplied, the Chinese Occupation Force agrees:

(1) To submit a detailed list of all items of supplies, equipment, shipping and services which they will require from the United States, for a period of one year. This list to be submitted on a prescribed form and show which items will be needed upon arrival and approximate dates on which the remainder should be supplied. A similar list for the second year of Occupation to be supplied six months prior to that period. These lists to



S E C R E T

be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for approval.

(2) To submit a detailed list of all items of supplies, equipment, shipping and services which they will supply from Chinese resources. This list to show which items will accompany initial forces upon arrival, approximate dates of arrival of remainder, and plan for resupply to maintain prescribed levels. Period covered should conform to that required under (1) above. Such list to be reviewed by SCAP in connection with approval of list supplied under (1) above to determine adequacy.

e. The Chinese Occupation Force will provide personnel and equipment in its advance echelon for port director functions conducted under the authority and control of Commander Naval Activities Japan. Necessary equipment and personnel will be prescribed by Commander Naval Activities Japan. Equipment will be assembled and personnel trained in China.

f. The control of shipping schedules pertaining to the Chinese Occupation Force will be the responsibility of the Force.

g. Incoming and outgoing cargoes of shipping pertaining to the Chinese Occupation Force will be limited to military equipment and supplies necessary for establishment and maintenance of the Force. Other cargoes will conform to normal import-export controls by General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

h. Bulk petroleum and packaged products and other United States supplies which may be subsequently agreed upon for maintenance and operations of the Chinese Occupation Force will be furnished under authority of Intergovernmental Agreement. United States Forces will



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deliver bulk products to the water line or railhead, the Chinese Occupation Force being responsible for reception and distribution.

i. The Chinese Occupation Force agrees to furnish such railway guards as may be required for its own operations.

j. The Chinese Occupation Force will employ yen currency only in Japan. Yen currency will be obtained from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, against receipt therefor from the Commanding General, Chinese Occupation Force with accounting in accordance with established procedures. (Conversion rate of Yuan to United States dollars will be as prescribed by inter-governmental agreement.)

k. The Chinese Occupation Force will be prepared to furnish pay schedules, both military and civil, to the Eighth United States Army when requested.

l. Reimbursement will be made to the United States for United States materials and services used in improvements to Japanese facilities, when such facilities are needed and desired by the Chinese Occupation Force.

m. The Chinese Occupation Force will provide its own medical care, hospitalization and evacuation. Existing United States hospital facilities may be made available, in the discretion of the Senior United States Commander in Japan, for emergency treatment of a limited number of emergency cases which cannot be treated adequately in Chinese hospitals.

7. This agreement supersedes a similar agreement signed on 4 June 1946.

/s/ Chu Shih-Ming  
CHU, SHIH-MING  
Lieutenant General, Chinese Army  
Chief of Chinese Mission in Japan

/s/ Paul J. Mueller  
PAUL J. MUELLER  
Major General, G. S. C.  
Chief of Staff




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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

October 2, 1946

JK  
Mr. Martin

The attached letter from the Assistant Secretary of War, transmitting SCAP comments on the Comprehensive Report on Reparations in Japan, by Ambassador Pauley, is referred to you for appropriate action.

  
W. M. CameronHodge  
Σ



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*File in all relevant folders.*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file*

OCT 1 1946

FM/R  
Central  
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Honorable J. H. Hilldring  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Hilldring:

There is transmitted herewith for necessary action copy of SCAP comments on the Comprehensive Report on Reparations in Japan, dated 2 May 1946, by Ambassador Pauley. The comments were received 23 September and have been reproduced in the Civil Affairs Division to provide the necessary distribution for expeditious action. Additional copies are available in that office.

Sincerely yours,

*Howard Petersen*

HOWARD C. PETERSEN  
Assistant Secretary of War

1 Incl  
SCAP comments

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
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FE - Mr. Vincent

FROM : JA - Mr. Borton



DATE: October 1, 1946

SUBJECT: Report on Pending Problems in Japan and Korea.

TOP SECRET

I. Far Eastern Commission

A. Revision of the Japanese Draft Constitution.

General MacArthur had cabled that in deference to the views of other governments he had persuaded the Japanese Government to insert the sentence "universal adult suffrage is hereby guaranteed" in Article XV and the clause "Prime Minister and Ministers of State shall be civilians" in Article LXVI. He further stated that the House of Peers was expected to complete its action on the Constitution by September 30th. The acceptance of the above changes by SCAP created a favorable atmosphere at the Commission meeting and resulted in the Chinese Delegate approving the Constitution without reservation except a desire to see the Constitution in final form.

B. Review of the Constitution (FEC-031/36).

This paper which specifies the right of the FEC to review the Constitution and for the Japanese Diet to consider the situation with respect to the Constitution between one and two years after the Constitution has gone into effect, was postponed awaiting Soviet instructions on a minor revision of the first paragraph.

C. Soviet Proposals Concerning Draft Constitution (FEC-087/6).

This report of the Committee on Constitutional and Legal Reform which was before the Commission accepted only two of the six Soviet proposed changes in the Constitution. Those accepted by the Committee were an amendment that all Ministers should be civilians and a statement that the House of Councillors should not have any predominance over the House of Representatives and that implementing legislation must be scrutinized carefully to insure that such predominance is not established. The Commission approved these recommendations, the first having already been taken care of by SCAP's telegram mentioned above. The Soviet motions to revise the Committee's report to include provision in the draft Constitution

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for a special article on sovereignty residing in the people, an amendment providing that Cabinet members be appointed by the Diet, an amendment that the Supreme Court judges be selected by the Diet for a term of five years, and an amendment that the provision for a Regency should be based on the free will of the Japanese people, received no second and consequently were dropped by the Commission. The Soviet Delegate then read a statement which will be circulated later but which apparently has as its main point the fact that as the proposed amendments of the Soviet Government were not acceptable to the Commission, the Soviet Government can not approve the Japanese Constitution and consequently reserves its right to criticize and consider various points in the Constitution in the future.

D. Inter-Allied Trade Board for Japan (FEC-089).

4 R  
694.0031  
As the Philippine Delegate had not yet received instructions on the paper, its consideration was postponed until the next meeting but it seems likely that the Commission will approve the establishment of an Inter-Allied Trade Board to provide easy and rapid means of consultation between the United States Government and other governments on the FEC, regarding the disposition of exports available for Japan and the furnishing of imports required for Japan.

E. Possible Maintenance of Japanese Land, Sea and Air Forces Under Article IX of Japanese Draft Constitution.

The Committee on Constitutional and Legal Reform resolved that in view of the fact that Article IX of the draft Constitution appears to have recently been so revised as to permit the possible maintenance of land, sea and air forces as well as other war potentials by Japan, the question should be referred to the Committee on Disarmament of Japan. On September 26, the Committee on Disarmament voted unanimously to table the question with the understanding that the Committee would continue to exercise vigilance over developments in Japan which might affect this matter.

II. Whaling

4 R  
894.628  
Aide mémoires have recently been received from the Australian, New Zealand and British Governments which question the advisability of a Japanese whaling expedition to the Antarctic for the coming winter, authorized by General MacArthur. In all of the replies the position has been taken that General MacArthur approved the whaling

expedition



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expedition under provision of Directive 20A of November 13, 1945 filed with the FEC. Oil produced shall be subject to allocation by the IEFEC, the operation will be carried out in accordance with all international regulations, SCAP personnel will accompany the expedition to insure such compliance, and security safeguards have been outlined. SCAP's approval has been obtained to the statement that no authorization will be given any further future whaling expedition without prior consultation with the countries concerned, particularly with reference to the security factors involved. The future of Japanese whaling is left for Allied consultation and decision; the present expedition is purely an emergency one.

In answer to an inquiry of SCAP requesting further details regarding the actual operation of the expedition, a reply has just been received stating that foreign observers on the expedition will be welcome and that it is not the intention to permit the Japanese to fly their flag.

### III. Trusteeship and Pacific Islands

890.0146  
A telegram has recently been despatched to the Secretary outlining action taken by SWNCC concerning the question of trusteeship and the disposition of the Japanese mandated islands and other islands in the Pacific.

The views of the Secretary were requested on the advisability of making a recommendation to the President now as to the future of the Japanese mandated islands, thus enabling him to make a declaration of intention of the United States to place them under trusteeship, in case he accepts this recommendation. The Secretary was also informed that Secretary Forrestal wishes to have Mr. Byrnes' views before a recommendation is made to the President. The Secretary has replied that unless there are compelling reasons which should require a decision on this matter prior to his return, the whole matter might be postponed to enable him to discuss it personally with Secretary Forrestal. A recent report that the President desires to make a full statement of our foreign policy at the opening of the General Assembly of UN may make it necessary to reach a decision on this point prior to the Secretary's return.

A letter has been received from the Secretary of the Navy raising certain questions connected with the mandated islands and trusteeship and stating that he is not aware that any governmental decision has been made whether the ex-Japanese islands are to be annexed or to be included in the

United Nations'



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United Nations trusteeship system. In the reply to the Secretary of the Navy it is proposed to state that the Department of State understands the President's statement of January 15, 1946 to mean that the Japanese mandated islands would be placed under some form of trusteeship, the scope and application of which is to be decided later.

#### IV. Repatriation of Japanese From Soviet-controlled Areas

740.00115 p.w.  
XR  
In responses to messages from SCAP and from POLAD requesting that the matter of repatriation of Japanese from Soviet-controlled areas be taken up on a governmental level, a telegram was drafted to Moscow containing text of a note to be presented to the Soviet Government. In response to POLAD's suggestion that the matter of relief for Japanese nationals be taken up with the Chinese and Soviet Governments, a telegram was sent to Nanking suggesting that inquiries be made of the Chinese Government. It was decided that representations for relief should not be taken up with the Soviet Government at this time since they stood little chance of success and might confuse the repatriation issue. A telegram to Tokyo explaining the Department's position was drafted. Telegram no. C 65561 from SCAP dated September 25 stated that General Dervyanko in Tokyo had received instructions to reopen negotiations. EE drafted a telegram to Moscow asking that delivery of our note be deferred pending further information regarding negotiations to be undertaken in Tokyo.

#### V. Reparations

740.00119 p.w.  
XR  
On September 4, 1946 the U.S.S.R. representative informally replied to the United States proposal regarding the definition and disposition of Japanese external assets, stating that his Government is prepared to discuss in the FEC or at a special conference on reparations the question of extending the reparations fund on account of Japanese external assets for the purpose of establishing a common fund for reparations to meet the claims of the Allies provided the United States Government agree to the following proposals as a basis for the discussion of reparation question:

(1) A definite share of the pool of reparations from Japan should be allocated to the Soviet Union without any connection with the Soviet war booty in Manchuria, this question of war booty in Manchuria to be negotiated separately between the Soviet and Chinese Governments.

(2) The question



-5-

(2) The question of former Japanese assets in southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands should not be discussed in connection with the question of reparations.

(3) All Japanese assets now in Korea should remain there and be transferred for full possession to the Korean people and not be included in the reparations fund.

(4) The share of particular countries in the general amount of reparations to be defined on a broad political basis.

(5) Claims of the Allied nationals for compensation for damage suffered as a consequence to loss of their property in Japanese territory, or territory formerly occupied by the Japanese or ceded to the Japanese, should be met in the common reparations pool.

On September 26 General Hilldring presented a note to the Soviet representative, the contents of which had been approved by the Secretary, in general as follows:

(1) The United States welcomes Soviet agreement to participate in a special reparations conference to consider the broad question of reparations from Japan including the question of Japanese external assets.

(2) The United States concurred in the proposals, points (4) and (5), of the Soviet Union outlined above.

(3) The United States could not endorse unreservedly the second Soviet point with reference to the exemption of Japanese assets in the southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles from the settlement but believed that exploratory discussions could advantageously be continued on this point.

(4) The United States did not consider that it would be fair to other governments whose people had suffered from Japanese aggression to reach a reparations settlement which took no account of Japanese assets in Manchuria.

(5) The United States Government is greatly concerned with the delay in reaching decisions which can lead to the removal of reparations equipment from Japan to the Allied countries, and consequently feels that

it must,



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it must, at the earliest possible date, press for action on the United States recommendation that the FEC call a reparations conference.

The United States further stated that if, within a reasonable period of time, the FEC finds itself unable to call a special conference to determine a Japanese reparations policy which will permit prompt initiation of shipments from Japan, the United States will take the initiative in calling, with the cooperation of whatever other governments now represented on the FEC wish to join with her, a reparations conference outside the framework of FEC to make Inter-Allied decisions which may serve as the basis for the execution of an equitable reparations program.

The Soviet representative, Admiral Ramishvili, requested a period of two weeks for his Government to consider the United States reply. General Hilldring informed him such a time would be given and that he would be informed by this Government a few days in advance of the date we would present our position to FEC in reference to a reparations conference.

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs  
OCT 23 1946  
8:10am  
Department of State

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Action-FB

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Tokyo via Wagon

Dated October 2, 1946

Rec'd 3:59 p.m., 22nd

PRIORITY

439, October 2.

Subject of Jap Demobilization Board which has been charged with and has effected demobilization of some six million Jap soldiers was discussed Allied Council Meeting this morning at request of Soviet member. During discussion Soviet member alleged some members of board are war criminals, research section of board engages in illegal intelligence activities and in effect alleged that SCAP in continuing operation of board was actually continuing existence and activities of Jap General Staffs.

There follows excerpt from verbatim minutes of the meeting which includes my extemporaneous response to Soviet allegations:

The chairman: I believe that at the last meeting I made some inquiries as to the purpose the Soviet member had in mind in placing this subject on the agenda. I think that now at long last, we have learned what his purpose was. I believe I mentioned also at the last meeting that it is stipulated in one of the basic directives that the Supreme Commander shall utilize Japanese personnel for purposes of the occupation. It is stipulated in one of the basic directives that the machinery of the Japanese Govt shall be utilized to the extent that this furthers the purpose of the occupation. Certainly, for the purposes of demobilization, it was necessary and practicable to utilize personnel which had formerly been military and naval personnel and who could be expected to know how to do the job.

These people

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-2-#439, October 2, from Tokyo via War.

These people in the Demobilization Board have themselves been demobilized. They are now in civilian status and have been for a long time. If there is any evidence that any of them should be charged with being war criminals, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to receive such evidence. If any member has any concrete evidence of any illegal or improper activities on the part of the demobilization bureaus or the divisions, or sections or members, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to receive such evidence. Every act of the officials of the demobilization board is under constant surveillance and check. The Soviet member mentions a certain anxiety in regard to them and their activities. I must say that the only anxiety I have felt has been that they would not be able to finish their job. As a matter of fact, if the Soviet authorities had been willing to repatriate the 800,000 or a million Japanese soldiers in their hands as part of our general repatriation program, the activities of the Demobilization Bureaus would now be drawing to a close. As it now stands, if the schedule recently proposed by the Soviet authorities for repatriation of prisoners of war in their hands at the rate of from 15 to 25,000 a month is carried out, the demobilization bureaus will have to remain in existence for at least another year. I would like to repeat again, that if any member has any evidence of illegal activities on the part of any members of the bureaus--demobilization bureaus--on the part of the bureaus or their agencies, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to have it. It is my recollection that on a number of occasions at meetings of the council, charges and allegations have been made against agencies of the Japanese Govt or officials of the Japanese Govt. It is my recollection that on every such occasion I have endeavored to make it clear that if any member has any evidence to support such allegations--any concrete evidence--the Supreme Commander would be very glad indeed to have it. It is also my recollection that in no such instance has any member ever presented any evidence whatsoever in support of the allegations in question.

As regards the

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-3-#439, October 2, from Tokyo via War.

As regards the question of the Research Bureau, I may say by way of explanation that that bureau undertakes research at the specific instruction of General Headquarters. Its purpose is to undertake research into such matters as the location and former activities of military units. I see no connection between it and the recent commission for the investigation of war causes. Since the Soviet member has mentioned it, I may say that his statement that the commission has been dissolved. I may further say that the Jap Govt dissolved the commission on its own initiative in view of the criticism directed against it by the Soviet member and the British Commonwealth member,-

Mister Ball: Good.

The Chairman: And in order to avoid further misrepresentation of its purposes.

Mister Ball: Mister Chairman, do you imply that you personally regret its dissolution?

The Chairman: I may say that General MacArthur's attitude toward it, and my attitude toward it, have not changed.

As regards the statement of the Soviet member that is continuing the operation of these demobilization bureaus for their various purposes which include demobilization, repatriation, care of widows and orphans in regards to his statements indicating that we are thus actually supporting a camouflaged Jap General Staff, I would say that this to me is a most surprising statement. In fact-

(Soviet interpreter requests pause for translation)

The Chairman: In fact, it is a fantastic statement. It should be just as fantastic if some misguided and propaganda-minded person should make the ridiculous allegation that the 800,000 or so Japanese soldiers in Soviet hands have been retained for the purpose of developing a secret army".

Again and as usual

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-4-#439, October 2, from Tokyo via War.

Again and as usual British Commonwealth member sided with Soviet member by remarking he was glad that I had branded as untrue allegations in question in regard to Soviet members staff and in regard to Soviet utilization of Japanese prisoners of war in their hands.

ATCHESON

JSP:EHL

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Copy for Department.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 5 1946  
INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOCIAL AND HEALTH AFFAIRS - ILSH

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No. 20.

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Taipei (Taihoku), Taiwan (Formosa)  
October 2, 1946.

Restricted.

SPECIAL PROJECTS  
DIVISION  
NOV 1 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS  
OCT 25 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 18 1946  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
REPORTING SERVICES

SUBJECT: 10,132 Okinawans soon to enter  
the jurisdiction of United States  
forces.

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
OCT 25 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable  
J. Leighton Stuart,  
American Ambassador,  
Nanking, China.

Sir:

In anticipation of the transfer of 10,132 Okinawans from Taiwan to the jurisdiction of the United States Military Government for Okinawa, I have the honor to submit the following report to assist, if possible, in preparation for the reception of this large group. The health conditions and nature of illnesses, occupational potentials and hoped-for destinations are of immediate interest. Present attitudes toward repatriation and the political ideas of their leaders may be of some significance.

America's "Responsibility"

The Okinawans feel increasingly insecure. The number of incidents of oppression by local private and semi-official persons increases. However unjustified, the Okinawans look to the United States as the power responsible for their safety and for the protection under American ideas of fair play as professed in national policy. They hold the United States indirectly responsible for the order which made them ready for repatriation in April and then left them in destitution without tangible signs of relief, or even of interest in their plight. There are constant appeals to the American Consulate to intervene with local authorities on their behalf, and to communicate the facts of their condition to the authorities on Okinawa. It is accordingly believed that the situation in Taiwan should

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OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE  
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION



Taipei despatch no. 20  
of 10/2/46.

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be brought to the attention of the appropriate military authorities in the hope that they may cause a representative of the Military Government of Okinawa either to be stationed on Taiwan or to make periodic visits of inspection in preparation for the repatriation of these people.

It is borne in mind that America has long term interests in Okinawa, and therefore must avoid causes for popular antagonism and radical unrest wherever possible. The receptive and articulate leaders among 10,000 Okinawans on Taiwan may well become leaders of influence after repatriation. They are demonstrating a capacity for organization and leadership. The management for Okinawan affairs (Okinawan Association), voluntarily set up, has minimized difficult problems of administration and public order and welfare. It is believed that a substantial demonstration of American interest here at this time would pay dividends in future cooperation.

Numbers and Categories of Okinawans in Taiwan

Total for all categories 10,132

In April, 1946, the Okinawans on Taiwan were officially ordered to prepare for repatriation. They gave up their jobs, sold their personal effects and in many cases removed to temporary quarters. There was a general drift northward toward Keelung, the port of embarkation. Two camps were established at Taipei and one at Keelung, where the most impoverished prepared to take temporary shelter under most primitive conditions. The majority living in and around Taipei and Keelung were permitted to remain in their own homes or temporary private residences.

Of the total number the Chinese Government retained 1,791 for specific services, under the general agreement permitting a limited number of Japanese nationals to be retained through 1946 to assist in the transfer of political and economic administration from Japanese to Chinese hands.

Retained for service	1,791
Ex-Army conscripts	594
Ex-Navy conscripts	227
Conscripts' dependents	188
Civilians in relocation centers.	2,424
Ordinary temporary residents, not in camps	4,908

Health and







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<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
31-40	332	81	251
41-50	204	71	133
51-60	84	39	45
61-70	46	14	32
71-80	17	3	14
81-90	4	2	2

Illness among Camp Inmates

<u>Illness</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>		<u>Female</u>		<u>Percent of total</u>
		<u>Adult</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Adult</u>	<u>Children</u>	
TOTAL:	1,280	246	329	301	406	55.10
Malaria	267	37	60	77	93	11.22
Colds	382	82	88	92	120	16.01
Alimentary inflammation	90	18	21	22	29	3.78
Bronchial inflammation	54	17	17	2	18	2.99
T.B. and lung infections	9	8	-	1	-	0.34
Measles	53	-	28	-	25	2.23
Round worm	145	16	48	37	44	6.89
Duodenal worm	4	1	-	2	1	0.17
Digestive disorders	34	-	18	-	16	1.38
Beriberi	25	7	-	-	18	1.05
Inflammation of the bladder	13	-	-	13	-	0.54
Acute infection of the large intestine	1	-	-	1	-	0.04
Inflammation of the Kidney	9	3	1	5	-	0.34
Conjunctivitis	9	5	2	1	1	0.34

External wounds



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<u>Illness</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>		<u>Female</u>		<u>Percent of total</u>
		<u>Adult</u>	<u>Children</u>	<u>Adult</u>	<u>Children</u>	
External wounds	102	16	32	30	24	4.28
Ear and nose troubles	22	4	8	2	8	0.94
Jaundice, catarrh type	5	3	1	1	-	0.21
Diphtheria	2	-	-	-	2	0.08
Arthritis	7	5	-	2	-	0.29
Pleurisy	22	17	-	5	-	0.94
Asthma	17	5	3	7	2	0.71
Dental trouble	6	1	2	-	3	0.25
Rheumatism	1	-	-	1	-	0.04
Blind piles	1	1	-	-	-	0.04

#### Standards of Living

Many Okinawans lost their jobs just at the time when living costs began to soar. For persons living in Taipei city, the minimum cost per family of five for one month is now (September) ¥ 3,512.00 (average per person ¥ 702.00) which includes basic foods, supplementary foods, rental, lighting, water and medical care. Since few individuals in a family can earn more than enough for their own minimum needs, the waiting repatriates are selling every possible possession in order to eke out a subsistence. The diet of children and students measures about 1,000 calories per day. Rice gruel, a little pickle and vegetable and some drops of sauce make up the diet. Meat is entirely out of the question at present market prices.

The Okinawans have the Japanese capacity for sharing within the family. As a result only 200 persons are dependent wholly on the Okinawan's Association for total support, and 19 are cared for entirely at the government leprosarium. There are none begging in the streets. UNRRA, through CNRRA, is able to make some relief supplies available.

People outside of the camps are left to their own resources. At the camps, however, the distribution of food is supervised by a subsidiary organization of the Japanese Civilian Control Commission. The inhabitants

are organized



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are organized into cooperative cooking groups. Each person receives about 450 grams of white rice and five yen per day with which to buy supplementary foods, which average about 300 grams of vegetables, 10 grams of fish and 6 grams of sauces. A very small ration of pork is supplied at supper once per month.

Shelter and sanitary facilities are of the most primitive sort. One of the camps at Taipei is a bombed out government building which offers very little shelter from sun and wind and almost none from rain. Thin mats (not tatami) have to suffice for comfort on the cement floors. Toilets are simply open pit latrines along the street, around which hang tattered matting. Bathing must be done at the fire hydrants in nearby lots and roadways.

#### Repatriation Destinations

Upon return to their native land these people expect to be able to return to their local villages, although they have been warned that the tremendous change which has taken place will make it impossible for many even to find their old homes. For the possible use of American administrators who may have to handle the influx of these thousands, the following table gives the numbers of Okinawans who expect to return to the respective towns, villages and country hamlets.

#### General Destinations for Entire Group

Shuri city (首里市)	1,106
Naha city (那覇市)	2,289
Kunigami <u>gun</u> (國頭郡)	1,790
Nakagami <u>gun</u> (中頭郡)	1,020
Shimajiri <u>gun</u> (島尻郡)	2,132
Miyako-jima <u>gun</u> (宮古島郡)	705
Yaeyama <u>gun</u> (八重山郡)	870

#### Destinations of



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Destinations of Those Retained in Camps

<u>Place</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
General Total:	2,424	1,025	1,399
NAHA city	434	194	240
SHURI city	265	117	148
KUNIGAMI gun	704	299	405
ONNO son	12	4	8
KUSHI son	26	9	17
MOTOBU cho	408	176	232
NAMORI cho	95	45	50
OGIMI son	61	22	39
IMAKIJIN son	37	17	20
KUNIGAMI son	42	17	25
KIMU son	11	5	6
HIGASHI muna	3	-	3
HANEJI son	4	2	2
IE son	5	2	3
NAKAGAMI gun	388	165	223
KITATANI son	43	16	27
MIZATO son	71	28	43
YONAGUSHIKU son	54	20	34
KATSUNEN son	16	7	9
GUSHIGAWA son	72	27	45
GOEKU son	22	14	8
NAKAGUSHI son	15	7	8
GINOWAN son	31	16	15
NISHIHARA son	19	7	12
YOMITANIZA son	27	16	11
URASOHE son	18	7	11

SHIMAJIRI gun



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<u>Place</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
SHIMAJIRI gun	619	241	378
COZATO son	14	6	8
GUSHIGAWA son	17	9	8
HOEHARA son	12	6	6
TAKAMINE son	22	11	11
TONAKI son	28	10	18
ITOMA son	180	58	122
GUSHICHIANG son	26	8	18
TAMAGUSHIKU son	32	11	21
ZAMAMI son	67	26	41
NAKAZATO son	31	16	15
TOKASHIKI son	18	8	10
TSINEN son	25	9	16
KIANG son	9	2	7
MABUNI son	11	8	3
IHEYA son	33	13	20
AGUNI son	5	3	2
SASHIKI son	4	1	3
TOMIGUSHIKU son	14	7	7
OROKU son	15	7	8
MAWASHI son	37	15	22
MAKABE son	6	2	4
KOCHINDA son	13	5	8
MIYAKO gun	1	1	-
TOIRA cho	1	1	-
YAHEYAMA gun	13	8	5
ISHIGAKI cho	6	4	2
TAKETOMI son	7	4	3

Present or



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Present or Former Occupation

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Camps</u>	<u>Waiting outside camps</u>	<u>Retained for ser- vices</u>	<u>Total</u>	
					<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Officials	889	56	635	198	875	14
Educators	392	64	324	4	373	19
Technicians	1	-	1	-	1	-
Assistant technicians	3	-	3	-	3	-
Company employees	302	30	63	209	299	3
Bank employees	6	1	1	4	6	-
Office clerks	246	17	229	-	34	212
Station employees	1	-	1	-	1	-
Communications	2	2	-	-	2	-
Factory employees	48	5	43	-	48	-
Railway Department	84	9	12	63	84	-
Newspaper reporter	1	-	1	-	1	-
Electrical engineers	10	1	9	-	10	-
Mechanics	5	2	3	-	5	-
Steel engineers	2	-	2	-	2	-
Chauffeurs	1	-	1	-	1	-
Carpenters	11	3	8	-	11	-
Shipwrights	10	-	10	-	10	-
Motor car repairing	6	5	1	-	6	-
Shoemaker	1	-	1	-	1	-
Signboard construction	1	-	1	-	1	-
Photographer	1	-	1	-	1	-

Barbers



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<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>In Camps</u>	<u>Waiting outside camps</u>	<u>Retained for ser- vices</u>	<u>Total</u>	
					<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Barbers	14	2	12	-	14	-
Hairdressing	1	-	1	-	1	-
Dress-makers	2	-	2	-	2	-
Lacquer-ware craftsman	1	-	1	-	1	-
Doctors	14	1	10	3	14	-
Dentists	2	1	1	-	2	-
Midwife	6	1	5	-	-	6
Nurses	12	3	2	7	-	12
Plasterers	2	1	1	-	2	-
Cooks	5	-	5	-	5	-
Stokers	1	-	1	-	1	-
Crewmen	51	-	51	-	51	-
Fisheries	194	5	189	-	194	-
Woman workers	2	-	2	-	-	2
Business men	32	5	27	-	28	4
Hotel workers	3	1	2	-	3	-
Housemaids	8	4	4	-	-	8
Rickshaw men	9	-	9	-	9	-
Transportation workers	1	-	1	-	1	-
Day labourers	40	11	29	-	24	16
Guardians	16	-	16	-	16	-
Agri- culturists	17	17	-	-	6	11
Typists	2	2	-	-	-	2
Telephone operators	2	2	-	-	-	2
Kindergarten teacher	1	1	-	-	-	1
Foreign dress-making	9	9	-	-	-	9
Sewing(machine)	8	8	-	-	-	8
Land registration employees	3	-	3	-	3	-
Waitresses	2	-	2	-	-	2
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>2,483</b>	<b>269</b>	<b>1,726</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>2,152</b>	<b>331</b>

Detention for



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Detention for Services by the Chinese Government

Those detained for services have had better living conditions, and as a consequence better health and more stable living. Their occupational distribution is as follows:

Total:	490
Company employees	209
Government employees	193
Railway employees	63
Medical services (Hospitals)	12
Bank employees	4
Teachers	4

With their dependents this represents 1,791 individuals or 438 families.

In as much as few of these persons are willing to continue in service under the Chinese, and have so declared themselves the Chinese intend to bring pressure to bear upon them, and as a first step have asked them to "apply for the privilege" of staying on when all other Okinawans are repatriated. Few have complied with this request and the Chinese organizations for which they work have begun to issue orders that they will have to stay nevertheless. The Okinawans hope that if the Chinese Government requests SCAP for an extension of the time they may be retained, and represents them as desiring to stay, the true circumstances will be brought to the attention of the American authorities.

With the progressive transfer of office routine and other organized services from the Japanese to the Chinese pattern, Okinawans find less and less to do. In many offices they remain entirely idle, or they are dismissed. This idleness is said to be a principal cause of discontent.

Of the total number of Okinawans only 284 (147 male, 137 female) have expressed a desire to remain in Taiwan.

Attitude toward



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#### Attitude toward Repatriation

Instead of immediate repatriation they have suffered a long demoralizing wait, with steadily declining health standards, general and extreme impoverishment and a consequent embitterment. The local Chinese are indifferent to their welfare. Okinawan leaders look to the United States for action and improved conditions, but with failing hope and rising resentment. There has been some Chinese effort to propagandize for an Okinawan demand that the Ryukyu islands be returned to China, there has been some radical agitation looking toward Russia through the Chinese Communists, and there is some expressed desire that the territory continue to be governed by the United States. The majority (estimated as approximately 80 per cent) are indifferent to the political disposition of Okinawa, and wish only for some relief and opportunity to get back to normal work. Approximately ten per cent continue to feel strongly oriented toward Japan and consider themselves Japanese, desiring the restoration of Japanese rule in Okinawa.

The Okinawan leaders have made an exceptional effort to maintain hope and tolerance of the difficulties now and hereafter, and an especially noteworthy attempt has been made to maintain schools in which children and young people are urged to look forward to a new life in Okinawa.

#### The Okinawan Troops on Taiwan

Units of Japanese troops formed of Okinawan natives were not repatriated with other Japanese troops in early 1946. After several stages of reorganization this body of soldiers (as of August 31, 1946) has been settled at Keelung and at Taipei. There are 13 commissioned officers, 108 warrant officers and 700 troops and civilian attaches.

Among these are 244 Okinawans formerly attached to the Japanese Navy who are now stationed at Keelung.

In July, 1946 an effort was made to set up an elementary educational training program, bracing morale and providing useful occupation. The troops were employed to great advantage in the earlier stages of rehabilitation in Keelung, and subsequently at Taipei. They were used to assist in the embarkation of all Japanese troops and civilians at the time of the mass repatriation movement. They have been assisting in the maintenance and support of the Okinawan relocation camps at Taipei and Keelung, and have been employed on public works in Taipei city. Though they are poorly

equipped and



Taipei despatch no. 20  
of 10/2/46.

- 13 -

equipped and have diminishing ration and clothing supply, they have caused no trouble. There has been, however, a fairly high incidence of disease contracted by soldiers who, without family ties and with very little money, have been consorting with Okinawa girls who try to eke out a living while waiting to return to their homeland.

Material for this report was obtained through members of the Okinawa People's Association, through personal observation and through interviews with members of the Okinawan, Japanese and Chinese communities.

Respectfully yours,

Ralph J. Blake  
American Consul

Original to Embassy, Nanking.  
Two copies (one ozalid) to Department.  
Two copies to U. S. Political Adviser,  
SCAP, Tokyo. *in FR*

George H. Kerr/klc


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the signed original.  
H.C.



TOP SECRET 545-4619

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM



TOP SECRET 91

Control 1223

Rec'd November 5, 1946 11:10 a.m.

6

Action: FE Info:

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FROM: Tokyo via War TO: Secretary of State NO: 454, 7 October 1946

File no other HB

Strictly confidential not for distribution

British Ambassador, came to me today to express very privately his concern, which he said was profound, at attitude of British Commonwealth Member in Allied Council Meetings and especially latter's constant support of Soviet member in Council matters, including harsh and direct false Soviet attack on the occupation such as Derevyankos criticism of General MacArthur and occupation authorities in connection with operation of Jap Demobilization Board, as reported in my 439, October 2.

740.00119 Control (Japan)

British Ambassador said he had endeavored to influence Ball to adopt attitude of cooperation and avoid opposition to occupation authorities and that United Kingdom adviser on Ball's staff had persistently endeavored to do likewise. He mentioned that he himself is in delicate position because he has not official connection with Allied Council and no control over British Commonwealth Member, but said he wished me to know he followed Council proceedings very closely and was keeping British Govt meticulously informed.

For Dept's information only, he added that after much consideration he had come to conclusion that Ball personally was pro-Soviet in his thinking and that this circumstance was very disturbing to him as well as to other British and some Australian officials.

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PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-746 TOP SECRET FILE Confidential File



454 from Tokyo

The original of this  
message was returned  
to Mr. Neigel of F.E.  
(Nav Dept. message)

Mrs Muller

Nov 5, 1946





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, October 8, 1946

RE  
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CONFIDENTIAL

No. 639

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
OCT 28 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OCT 24 1946  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES

SUBJECT: Question of Exchange of Information between General Headquarters and Soviet Member, Allied Council; Soviet Use of Council to Obtain Intelligence.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 615, September 26, 1946, on the subject of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, held on September 18, 1946 and to enclose a copy of a letter dated September 30, 1946, from myself, as Chairman and Member for the United States, to Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in regard to the question of his requests for information.

As indicated in the reference despatch, an endeavor was made during the meeting of September 18 to satisfy the Soviet Member's request for information concerning the Demobilization Board and the progress made in the destruction of Japanese armaments and war materials. During the meeting the Soviet Member stated that my information was very brief and of a general nature. He also indicated that he would request General Headquarters to furnish additional information in reply to specific questions which he had placed on the Agenda.

It has been the invariable experience of General Headquarters and of this Mission that the Office of the Soviet Member has virtually ignored requests for information especially desired by the Supreme Commander in the discharge of his responsibilities and directly connected with the Occupation. In a few cases in which replies have been received from the Soviet group, the information furnished has been superficial and largely of a negative character.

With the dual purpose of discouraging the Soviet Member from using the Council to obtain detailed intelligence concerning Japan and the Occupation forces, as well as of placing the matter on the record, I addressed the letter of September 30 to General Derevyanko, with the concurrence of General MacArthur.

DCR NE Unit

It is

NOV 20 1946

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

/10-846

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740.00119 Control (Japan)

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Handwritten notes and signatures in a box at the bottom of the page.



- 2 -

Tokyo's despatch no. 639  
October 8, 1946

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740.00119 Central (Japan) / 10-846 (2)  
FR I A RE CIVR C O P E D F K O I C O D

It is clear from the Soviet Member's statement at the Sixteenth Meeting, held on October 2, 1946 (see Verbatim Minutes of the Sixteenth Meeting, forwarded as an accompaniment with our despatch no. 638, October 8, 1946) that the subject of the Demobilization Board was placed on the Agenda with a view to making a false attack upon the Occupation authorities.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosure: *NR 54*

To Lt. Gen. Derevyanko,  
September 30, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.  
Copy to: American Embassy, Moscow.

500 ACJ  
WJSebald:lh



Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 639, October 8, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Requests for Information by Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan".

September 30, 1946.

Dear General Derevyanko:

Reference is made to the second and third subjects under Official Matters which you placed on the Agenda for the fourteenth meeting of the Council and which were discussed at the fifteenth meeting held on September 18, 1946. The requests under "Specific Information Desired" consist of a series of questions both detailed in provision and broad in scope, and in combination they call for a considerable amount of research, compilation, and effort by the relevant sections of General Headquarters.

At the meeting of September 18 I endeavored to place before the Members such material as would seem to be sufficient for the purposes of the Council. Discussion during the meeting, however, indicated that you were not wholly satisfied with the amount of information supplied and desired in some instances to have exhaustive information. You stated that my information was very brief and of a general nature and indicated that you would request General Headquarters to furnish additional information concerning a number of questions to which, you felt, reply had not been adequate.

As intimated at the last meeting, I have not understood the purpose which motivated your request for data in such great detail. It appears to me that when a subject is placed on the Agenda, the proposing Member does so with some particular purpose in mind, and unless his objective is clarified, it is not only difficult for the interested officers of General Headquarters to supply appropriate information but it seems scarcely worth while for them to engage in a nebulous project involving many man-hours of research and labor. 10-846

Also, in all fairness to the officers of General Headquarters, it appears reasonable to conclude that when your Office does not cooperate in a mutual exchange of information necessary to carry out the objectives of the Occupation, they will naturally wonder at the purpose of requests which involve heavy research and compilation. In glancing over a number of letters addressed to you by General Headquarters requesting information especially desired by the Supreme Commander in the discharge of his responsibilities and directly connected with the Occupation, it appears that such requests have almost without exception been ignored by your Office. In the few cases in which replies have been received, the information furnished has been superficial and largely of a negative character. Lengthy delay in despatching replies (in some cases, several months) has been the rule rather than the exception. It is my understanding that the usual basis for exchange of information between Governments and Governmental Representatives is that such exchange generally is to be on a reciprocal basis. I believe I mentioned during the last meeting that information on the subject of disarmament is under compilation and is from time to time furnished Allied Representatives and Governments;

Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko,  
Member for the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics,  
Allied Council for Japan,  
Tokyo.

that when



- 2 -

Enclosure no. 1 to  
Tokyo's no. 639,  
October 8, 1946.

that when compilation is completed full reports will be provided the Governments of all directly interested Allies; and that compilation cannot be completed until full information is received from other areas.

We have had a number of discussions in our meetings as to the primary functions and purposes of the Council. I am sure that you will agree with me that it was not intended that the Council should be utilized merely for the purpose of gathering information. I believe that it is a correct interpretation of the terms of reference to say that subjects are appropriately placed on the Agenda only with a view to the formulation of well-considered advice and recommendations and that, while all phases of the Occupation are open for discussion, Council discussions have as their principal objective constructive assistance to and consultation with the Supreme Commander.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.  
Chairman and Member for the United States

500  
WJS/GA/blc

cc to:  
The Honorable the Members  
for China and the British  
Commonwealth.  
Secretary General.  
G-2

M/R: Draft approved by General  
MacArthur 9/28/46.

GA 2-22255



*OPH*  
*JK*

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER

**OUTGOING TELEGRAM**

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

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2264

**Department of State**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to **STATE**

Prepare before communicating to anyone.  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

OCT 8 1946

*7P*

**AMEMBASSY**

**NANKING (CHINA)**

*548*

Dept addressed note to Chinese Emb Oct 4 requesting Chinese Govt agreement to arrangements covering establishment and operation of Chinese occupation force in Japan. These arrangements identical with memo for record signed Jul 20 by Chief of Staff SCAP and Chief Chinese Mission in Japan except for deletion last sentence para 6(j). Chinese Govt also asked to deposit with War Dept operating logistical fund of five million dollars to be reestablished quarterly in that amount, to be used for provision logistical support to force.

*XR*  
*893.51*

Sent to Nanking. Repeated to Tokyo.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-846

*740.00119 Control*  
*10-846*

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

CODE ROOM: Please repeat to TOKYO (JAPAN) as no. \_\_\_\_\_

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN



Restricted

No. 635

Tokyo, October 8, 1946

SUBJECT: Forwarding Political Parties Report for Period Ending September 20, 1946.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES  
OCT 24 1946

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to forward a copy of the "Report, Political Affairs Division" for the period ending September 20, 1946, prepared by the Government Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The report is adequately summarized in the first few paragraphs of the first section.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-846

Enclosure: *11/15/46*

Report, "Political Affairs Division"

Original and Hectograph to Department

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Gabbey:cbk

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Inclosure No. 1 to Tokyo's Despatch No. 635, 8 October 1946.  
Subject: Forwarding Political Parties Report for Period Ending  
September 20, 1946.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Government Section  
Political Affairs Division

20 September 1946

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF, GOVERNMENT SECTION

SUBJECT: Report, Political Affairs Division

DATE: 20 September 1946

Political party activities marked time during the period ending 20 September. The Lower House of the Diet passed the budget and the bill for reorganizing local government, the latter of which was described by Mainichi Shimbun as an act "second only in importance to the Constitution Draft." This is regarded as a vital step toward democratization of provincial, city and village government.

A tentative draft of the Diet Law has also been drawn by the Government and by representatives of the Lower House.

In none of these matters, although there were differences of opinion between bureaucrats and advocates of a more democratic system, have party lines been drawn; in each case discussions were intra-party affairs and in each case the bureaucrats were defeated.

Matters of party organization specifically concerned merger prospects of the Co-operatives and the Shinseikai, and of the Liberals and Progressives. In each case the projected merger failed.

A work-stoppage by seamen and a threatened general strike by transport workers, while not endorsed by any political party except the Communists, was utilized by the Central Executive Committee of the National Congress of Industrial Organizations as the reason for a resolution demanding the downfall of the YOSHIDA Cabinet.

The House of Peers came into greater prominence. This is traceable to the fact that while the Lower House was concerned with routine legislation, such controversial matters as the draft Constitution and the problem of coal nationalization were under discussion in the Peers.

Party lines have been loosely drawn over the suggestion of the proposed nationalization of coal mines, the administration forces opposing and the Social Democrats and Communists favoring the idea.

Unemployment relief has also been the subject of party discussion but no party has presented a clear-cut solution of the problem.

MERGER PLANS:

Collapse of the projected Co-operative Party-Shinmeikai merger



-2-

Inclosure No. 1 to  
Tokyo's No. 635  
8 October 1946

marked the early September period. The break-down of merger negotiations is attributed by both the Co-operative Party managers and by Shinseikai leaders to disputes over the title of the projected amalgamation. The former insisted upon the inclusion of the word "Co-operative" in the official name; the latter refused to accept the title.

Whether this explanation, to which both groups subscribe, is the true reason for failure to reach agreement, is a matter for debate. Evidence exists that the Co-operative Party failed to show itself sufficiently generous in the matter of official positions to be awarded the Shinseikai members. There is also a strong suspicion that the Co-operatives were more concerned with building up a major party sufficiently large to warrant demanding for their leader, YAMAMOTO, a Cabinet seat than with the creation of a new party based upon sound ideological foundations. The fact that at the same time that the merger with the Shinseikai was under discussion the Co-operatives were also bartering with the Government coalition and that the post of head of the Economic Stabilization Board was, according to WIKAWA Tadao, offered to him indicates that the Co-operatives were moved by opportunist considerations.

There is at present no sign that negotiations, broken off when the two factions proved unable to agree, will be resumed. News reports, indeed, indicate that the Shinseikai has pledged itself to preserve its independence and that its members will not ally themselves with any other major party. Plans are under way to raise the Shinseikai to the status of a political party under the name Kokuminto, or People's Party. Platform planks are currently under consideration.

Dissent came to a head within the Co-operative Party itself. Three of the original party members, those most insistent that the Co-operative Party should restrict its ranks to those holding firm belief in co-operative principles, resented the invitation to admit Shinseikai members who had no such convictions. These men, AZUMA Takashi and the KITA brothers, all of them Hokkaido Diet members and all of them once central figures in the party (KITA Katsutaro was vice president) insisted that the party held fast to its principles; they were, however, purged from the party as being without discipline.

The Co-operative Party, therefore, instead of possessing the seventy to eighty seats it had hoped to control through coalition, now find itself, because of its expulsion, with only 43 Diet members.

The projected merger of the Liberal and Progressive Parties, a matter more discussed in the press than in the influential councils of the parties, is also indefinitely postponed. Although, INUKAI Ken, operating chief of the Progressives, has talked over possibilities with younger members of the Liberals and with certain Right Wing Social Democrats, no real support was ever afforded the plan by other leading party members. He now says, however, that no amalgamation will be completed "without first securing the approval of party members."

Threatened revolt within the Liberal Party, led by certain "younger members" under the guidance of former Welfare Minister ASHIDA Hitoshi, led to the concession by the more conservative



-3-

Inclosure No. 1 to  
Tokyo's No. 635  
8 October 1946

Liberal leadership that two-thirds of the executive committeemen be elected by Diet members but that the other third be appointed by the party president. The younger members retaliated with the suggestion that all committeemen be chosen by Diet members, (one representative from each block of ten members) and that the president and the secretary-general also be chosen by secret ballot of the Diet group. A compromise was reached by which most of the executive committeemen are to be elected by the Diet members (by blocks of ten), and the president shall nominate, but the General Assembly shall approve, the secretary-general. The president continues to be elected for a four year term by the General Assembly.

In spite of this concession made by the Old Guard it is apparent, however, that the threatened insurrection within the party has been allayed without change in leadership.

#### POPULARITY OF PEERS:

Top interest in political affairs has been shifted to the House of Peers rather than continued in the Lower House. This is due to the fact that consideration of both the draft Constitution and of the controversial coal nationalization program has been a concern of the Peers. Postponement until 18 September, and later until October, of the coal nationalization question by the Four Power Allied Council for Japan dampened interest, however, in the latter subject, both in the Peers and in the Lower House.

General praise has been voiced in the press of the high level of debate concerning the Constitution by members of the House of Peers. In comparison with the speeches delivered in the Lower House the Peers have supposedly taken a more scientific and more long-range attitude. The reason for this general approval of the Peers is attributed by the conservative newspapers, Nippon Keizai and Tokyo Asahi, not so much to the superior ability of the Peers nor to their dissociation from politics, but rather to the desire to justify the continued existence of an upper chamber of the Diet. This explanation is, however, not generally accepted.

#### UNEMPLOYMENT:

Party activity in the Diet has concerned itself chiefly with controversy over the policy to be followed with regard to the unemployed, allegedly numbering 4,500,000 persons. Three points of view are held by the various parties.

The Liberals favor an Unemployment Allowance Law, together with SCAP assistance in resuming privately managed production and distribution of essential commodities. They would discourage strikes, lock-outs and other capital-labor disputes until after the revival of industry. Whether this involves anti-strike legislation is not, however, entirely clear.

Progressives, while in coalition with the Liberals as the Government party, ask more extensive national assistance than the Liberals are willing to permit. The Progressive leaders call for the setting up of food manufacturing establishments, under central supervision and perhaps with foreign capital, in the rural areas and in the fishing villages; they also suggest that the national authorities assume the leadership in reforming the industrial management systems.



-4-

Inclosure No. 1 to  
Tokyo's No. 635  
8 October 1946

Social Democrats, following their general policy of nationalizing key industries, propose state control over essential industrial materials, by which they apparently mean all important raw materials. They ask that industrial management committees be established through which the anticipated further dismissal of workers shall be channeled and through which labor-capital relations shall be handled.

Other parties offer no specific suggestions, other than those embraced in their basic platforms, for the growing unemployment problems.

#### STRIKES:

Disputes between the Transportation Ministry and employees of government-owned railways culminated in mid-September in a threatened general strike of all rail workers east of Nagoya. Simultaneously a seamen's strike, called over the protests of the president of the Seamen's Union, tied up approximately 4,000 ships of all tonnages and classes.

The two labor disputes were at once reflected in political circles. Although the Communist Party Central Executive Committee approved both strikes and called upon all workers to walk out in sympathy, placing the blame on the "reactionary YOSHIDA government," other parties waited cautiously to gauge the extent and probable importance of the matter. NISHIO Suychiro, a Right Wing Social Democrat opposed a general strike as "a murderous weapon," but his associates announced their intention of withholding decision until the National Federation of Government Railway Workers agreed upon a stand.

The railway workers, however, decided at the last moment to accept a Transportation Ministry "compromise" and called off the strike. This obviated any need for party action, although the Communists, for no definite reason, at once hailed this decision as a victory for their labor policy.

The Seamen's strike continued, but without any political support other than that granted by the NCIO and the Communists.

P. K. RORST  
Chief, Political Affairs Division

Prepared by: HARRY EMERSON WILDES  
Noted: CIK



UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
OCT 8 1946  
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Tokyo, October 8, 1946

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SECRET

No. 638

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN  
REPORTING SERVICES  
OCT 17 1946  
RECEIVED

SUBJECT: Sixteenth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, October 2, 1946; Continued Soviet Attack and Support thereof by the British Commonwealth Member

OCT 16 1946  
PM 5 40

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington

*PV - Mr. Forst - J.A.*  
*War & Hand*  
*10/15/46*

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's telegrams Nos. 439, October 2, and 454, October 7, 1946, in regard to the Sixteenth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan held in Tokyo on October 2, 1946, and to forward as an accompaniment five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of that meeting.

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The first subject under Official Matters, "Policy With Regard to Ownership of Coal Mines and Subsidy Financing of Coal Production," was again postponed at the request of the Soviet Member who stated that he had not yet received recommendations of coal experts in the Soviet Union. The only other subject under Official Matters, "The Demobilization Board," was placed on the Agenda by the Soviet Member who read a long statement (page 3 et seq. of the Minutes) in which, as mentioned in our 439, October 2, he alleged that some members of the Board were war criminals; that the Research Section of the Board was engaging in illegal intelligence activities; and that in effect the Supreme Commander in continuing operation of the Board was actually perpetuating the existence and activities of the Japanese general staff. This false charge impelled me to reply as indicated in our 439 October 2, and as set forth on page 8 et seq. of the Minutes. It will be observed that I emphasized repeatedly, as I have done in past meetings, that if any Member possesses any concrete evidence of illegal activities on the part of the Japanese authorities the Supreme Commander would be glad to receive that evidence. As regards the Demobilization Board I may add, in all fairness to the Japanese concerned, that according to competent Occupation authorities the Board has, under SCAP's direction, been performing its task in a highly excellent manner from a professional point of view.

The meeting in question, I believe, clearly demonstrates that my task on the Allied Council unfortunately continues to demand

NOV 1946

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 10-846

Confidential File



Tokyo's No. 638  
October 8, 1946

-2-

demand that my efforts be devoted principally to protecting the Occupation and Allied policy against false attack by Allied representatives. It also demonstrates that the British Commonwealth Member, the Honorable W. Macmahon Ball of Australia, continues his persistent support, either directly or indirectly, of the Soviet Member and of false Soviet attacks upon the Occupation. In this instance, even after the meeting, he continued his support of the Soviet attack by complaining in writing to me against entirely proper action on the part of the Secretariat in opening the stenographic notes to press correspondents in order that they might obtain an accurate account of my extemporaneous reply to General Derevyanko's charges. We do not, of course, believe that Mr. Ball's attitude is a reflection of the attitude of the British Government or of the Australian, New Zealand or Indian Governments. After five months' association with Mr. Ball, I am inclined to concur in the view of the official mentioned in my telegram 454 October 7 that Mr. Ball is personally pro-Soviet in his thinking.

Because of the persistent attacks on the Occupation by the Soviet Member and of the support given him by the British Commonwealth Member, the Supreme Commander is not in a position to utilize the Council fully along the lines for which it was assumably established.

Respectfully yours,

*George Atcheson, Jr.*  
George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures: *att*

5 copies each, Agenda and Corrected  
Verbatim Minutes, 16th Meeting

Original and Hectograph to Department

Copies to: American Embassy, Moscow  
American Embassy, London  
American Embassy, Nanking  
American Legation, Canberra  
American Legation, Wellington  
American Mission, New Delhi

500

GAbbey:cbk



Enclosure No. 1 to Tokyo's Despatch No. 638, October 8, 1946, subject:  
"Sixteenth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, October 2, 1946,"

16-1002

AGENDA

for the

SIXTEENTH MEETINGALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo  
Wednesday, 2 October 1946 at 1000 Hours

I APPROVAL OF THE VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE FOURTEENTH  
AND FIFTEENTH MEETINGS (3 Sessions, Numbered 14-904,  
15a-918 and 15b-918).


## II PROCEDURAL MATTERS

None held over or submitted as items for this Agenda.

## III OFFICIAL MATTERS

1. Policy with Regard to Ownership of Coal Mines and  
Subsidy Financing of Coal Production (Inclosure #1).
2. The Demobilization Board (Inclosure #2).

By Direction of the Chairman:

  
GLENN ABBEY  
Secretary-General

## 2 Incls:

- 1 - Agenda Item 14-904-1 (Revised)
- 2 - Agenda Item 14-904-2 (Revised)

27 September 1946



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPANProposed Discussion Agenda

- I AGENDA NO. 14-904-1 (Revised 27 September 1946).
- II PROPOSED BY: THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
- III SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION: Policy with Regard to Ownership of Coal Mines and Subsidy Financing of Coal Production.
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Wednesday, 2 October 1946.
- V SCOPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED: Comments of Members of the Council.
- VI SPECIFIC INFORMATION DESIRED ON PROGRESS TO DATE:  
None requested.
- VII REFERENCES:
1. Partial Staff Study, "Policy with Regard to Ownership of Coal Mines and Subsidy Financing of Coal Production." (Inclosure A to Inclosure 2, Agenda 14-904, Fourteenth Meeting, Allied Council for Japan).
  2. Memorandum to Chief, Economic and Scientific Section from Secretary-General, Allied Council for Japan, 4 September 1946 (Inclosure A-4 to Agenda 15-918, Fifteenth Meeting, Allied Council for Japan).
  3. Memorandum, file AG 463.3 (12 Sept 46) ESS/IN, to Secretary-General, Allied Council for Japan, from Chief, Economic and Scientific Section, 12 September 1946 (Inclosure B-4 to Agenda 15-918, Fifteenth Meeting, Allied Council for Japan).

Inclosure #1



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPANProposed Discussion Agenda

- I AGENDA NO. 14-904-2 (Revised 27 September 1946).
- II PROPOSED BY: LIEUTENANT GENERAL KUZMA N. DEREVYANKO  
Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- III SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION: The Demobilization Board.
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Wednesday, 2 October 1946.
- V SCOPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED: Information concerning the  
Japanese Demobilization Board
- VI SPECIFIC INFORMATION DESIRED ON PROGRESS TO DATE:  
Information on the First and Second Demobilization Bureaus  
is desired as follows:
1. The names of the principal officers of the two  
Bureaus.
  2. A list of the local branches of the two Bureaus.
  3. The various expenditures of the two Bureaus by item.
- VII REFERENCES: Report on changes in the organization of the  
Japanese Government as of 1 July 1946 drawn up by the  
Government Section of GHQ SCAP (Inclosure A to Inclosure  
3, Agenda 14-904, Fourteenth Meeting, Allied Council for  
Japan).

Inclosure #2



The Demobilization Board

President  
Shidenara, Kyuro

President's Secretariat  
Morita, Shunsuke

First Demobilization Bureau  
(ARMY)

Director  
Kozuki, Yoshio

Section	Location	Section Chief
Archives and Documents Section	Tokyo	Miyama, Yoza
Personnel Section	"	Sakakibara, Kazue
General Affairs Division	"	Arao, Okikatsu
Personal Affairs Division	"	Kuramoto, Keijiro
Accounts Division	"	Endo, Takekatsu
Institute for War Records Investigation	"	Miyazaki, Shuichi
Technical Intelligence	"	Morita, Chikazo
Legal Investigation Division	"	Yama, Ayao
Translation Division	"	Gunji, Kuchi
Liaison Division	"	Kamata, Senichi

Second Demobilization Bureau  
(NAVY)

Director  
Maeda, Minoui

Section	Location	Section Chief
Archives and Documents Section	Tokyo	Yamamoto, Yoshio
General Affairs Division	"	Kawai, Iwao
Personnel Division	"	Yamamoto, Ushinosuke
Accounting Division	"	Akishige, Jutsue
Supply Division	"	Takenchi, Kaoru
Investigation Division	"	Yokoyama, Ichiro
Liaison Division	"	Uehara, Yashio
Institution for War Records and Technical Intelligence	"	

Tab A (Incl. 1 to <sup>A</sup>A-2)



The Demobilization Board

President  
Shidehara, Kyuro

President's Secretariat  
Morita, Shunsuke

Local Branches of First Demobilization Bureau

Home Depot Bureau	Chiba	Mouri, Suehiro
Demobilization Communication	(discontinued)	Hiraoka, Toichiro
Shipping Remaining Business	Ujina	Baba, Hideo
Northern Demobilization		
Liaison Office	Sapporo	Hagi, Saburo
Eastern Demobilization		
Liaison Office	Tokyo	Karakawa, Yasuo
"    "    "    "	Sendai (branch)	Nasu, Yoshio
Uraga Repatriation Station	Uraga	Shigenabu, Yoshikata
Central Demobilization		
Liaison Office	Osaka	Kawagoe, Moriji
"    "    "    "	Nagoya (branch)	Tokunaga, Hikanosuke
"    "    "    "	Hiroshima (branch)	Matsunaga, Tomeo
Zentsuji	Zentsuji	Terakura, Koshiro
Nagoya Repatriation Station	Nagoya	Hayashida, Kaneshiro
Maizuru    "    "	Maizuru	Iwamura, Toyajiro
Hiroshima    "    "	Hiroshima	Matsunaga, Tomeo
Western Demobilization		
Liaison Office	Fukuoka	Yano, Masao
Senzaki Repatriation Station	Senzaki	Okuyama, Yakeshia
Hakata    "    "	Hakata	Yano, Masao
Saseho    "    "	Saseho	Koko, Yoichi

Local Branches of Second Demobilization Bureau

Maizuru Dist. Demob. Bureau	Maijaru	Torigochi, Shinichi
Saseho    "    "	Saseho	Ichimiya, Yoshiyuki
Osaka    "    "	Osaka	Matsuzaki, Akira
Ominato    "    "	Ominato	Kanome, Zensuke
Kure    "    "	Kure	Morishita, Nobuei
Yokosuka    "    "	Yokosuka	Yamazumi, Jeijiro

Tab B (Incl 2 to <sup>A</sup>~~B~~-2)



## SECOND BUREAU - NAVY

I. Expenses for Administration in the Home Islands:

	¥
Salaries and Allowances for personnel in various offices ... ..	125,411,038
Miscellaneous office expenses - charter fees, travel pay for officials, etc. ... ..	148,662,509
Sub Total 17.3%	<u>274,073,547</u>

II. Expenses incurred in the demobilization of troops returning from overseas: (Monies paid to personnel returning and ships' expenses).

Back pay and allowances, including travel pay ...	451,861,681
Clothing distributed to returning personnel ...	54,450,000
Food used by returnees on board ship ... ..	258,732,000
Salaries for crews of repatriation and mine-sweeping ships ... ..	192,882,772
Maintenance and repair expenses for ships ...	250,000,000
Port facilities ... ..	3,000,000
Supplies used on ships ... ..	26,300,000
Fuel ... ..	61,700,000
Freight costs for transportation of supplies ...	<u>12,000,000</u>
Sub Total 82.7%	<u>1,310,926,453</u>
2nd Bureau Grand Total 100%	<u>1,585,000,000</u>



Demobilization Board Budget

1st Bureau (ARMY)	2,388,712,000
2nd Bureau (NAVY)	<u>1,585,000,000</u>
Total	3,973,712,000

## 1st Bureau Army

Expenses for Administration in the Home Islands

Salaries, Family and Living Allowance	223,977,237	
Travel Exp. Related to Business	7,837,320	
Pay of Officials while at Sea conducting Repatriation	1,530,000	
Reimbursement for Travel for Repats Recalled from Home	2,574,194	
General Office Supplies	8,058,960	
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Expns.	7,714,459	
Liaison Work between First and Second Demob. Bureaus	70,000	
Misc. Office Expenses	7,205,000	
Rental Expenses for Bldgs in Use	3,700,248	
Maintenance of Bldgs	5,000,000	
Reception Expenses	498,000	
Sub Total	<u>268,165,418</u>	11.3%

Expenses incurred in Demobilization of Troops returning from overseas areas:

Back pay (and Allowances of Returning Soldiers)	1,126,370,969	
Travel expense for demobilized personnel from port of debarkation to homes	680,471,400	
OTHER EXPENSES:		
Funeral expenses for war dead	23,424,300	
Death gratuities	137,706,270	
Travel reimbursement for members of family summoned to offices to accept ashes of dead	104,000,000	
Transportation expenses for demobilizing of personnel	48,573,643	
Sub Total	<u>2,120,546,582</u>	88.7%

Total 1st Bureau 2,388,712,000 100%



Enclosure No. 2 to Tokyo's Despatch No. 638, October 8, 1946, subject:  
"Sixteenth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, October 2, 1946"

16-1002

COPY NO. 43RESTRICTED

CORRECTED  
VERBATIM MINUTES  
of the  
SIXTEENTH MEETING  
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Wednesday, 2 October 1946, at 1000 hours.

MEMBERS PRESENT

The Honorable George Atcheson, Jr., Deputy for the Supreme  
Commander, Chairman, and Member for the United States

His Excellency, Lieutenant General Chu Shih-Ming, Member for China

The Honorable W. Macmahon Ball, Member representing jointly the  
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of  
Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Glenn Abbey

Office of the Secretariat  
Allied Council for Japan  
3 October 1946



THE CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, shall we begin? The meeting will please come to order. During the last meeting, there was some question raised in regard to the Minutes of the previous meeting. Since then two corrected sheets have been distributed to the Members and I assume that all the Members are now agreeable to having the Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting recorded as approved. I also assume that all the Members are agreeable to having the Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting recorded as approved.

It will be noted that the Verbatim Minutes of the last meeting have been marked "Corrected Verbatim Minutes." This additional term was added to the title of the Minutes by the Secretary-General as being correct, and because in looking over the stenographic notes and draft minutes of past meetings, it appears that almost from the earliest meetings of the Council the Members in general have adopted the custom of making changes in the draft minutes. My impression is that most of these changes have been made with a view to clarification of language and grammar. A number of substantive changes have, however, been made. According to the record, there are a number of instances in which Members have stricken out entire paragraphs or added entire paragraphs. Perhaps I have been somewhat negligent as Chairman, but I have paid very little attention to the draft minutes or to the Minutes after they are mimeographed. In looking over the record of changes which has been furnished me, it does not seem to me that they are of any great importance, and it seems to me that there are too many of them for us to take them up one by one with a view to having corrected pages inserted in the Verbatim Minutes of all the past meetings. Also, for my part, I see no objection to Members making phraseological changes with a view to clarifying language and grammar, and to eliminating words such as "Well" which seem to punctuate oral discussions. I do think, however, that any substantive change which appears in the draft minutes



should be taken up with the Member concerned by the Secretary-General, and if the question cannot be resolved then I think the question of the language should be brought before the Council.

Are there any other procedural matters?

(None signified)

The first subject under official matters, "Policy with Regard to Ownership of Coal Mines and Subsidy Financing in Coal Production," was placed on the agenda by the Supreme Commander two meetings ago and was held over from the last meeting at the request of the Soviet Member. I will, accordingly, ask the Soviet Member if he wishes to offer any comment or recommendation in regard to the subject.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I must say that on my staff there are no experts on coal problems, and that's why I had to ask the opinion of experts who are in the Soviet Union and I regret to say that I haven't received their reply as yet. Due to this I am not in a position to give my opinion and to give recommendations on this subject. If there are no objections on the part of MR. CHAIRMAN and the Members of the Council, I would like to make my recommendations on this subject at the next meeting of the Allied Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have no objections. GENERAL CHU?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHU: Neither have I.

THE CHAIRMAN: MR. BALL?

MR. BALL: No.

THE CHAIRMAN: Then this subject will be held over for further discussion at the next meeting, two weeks hence.

The other subject for discussion today under Official Matters is the Demobilization Board. This subject was proposed for discussion by the Soviet Member, held over for further discussion from the last meeting. Does the Soviet Member have any



remarks that he wishes to make in connection with it?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: On the ground of the information, far from complete, which I have about the Japanese Demobilization Board I am forced to state that condition in it cannot but cause anxiety. It is known that in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Commander dated January 4th, 1946, officers of the Japanese armed forces must not be used in the government service. It is also known that the Demobilization Board exists as an independent ministry in the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers and the government minister is at the head of it. It's also no secret that in the administrative organs of the Demobilization Board, that is to say, in governmental service, are being used several thousands of officers of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Aviation. I think that no arguments of "irreplaceability" can account for such a wide use of officers of the Japanese armed forces in the Japanese governmental service, so much so, if we bear in mind that on the staff of the Demobilization Board are being widely used the personnel of the operation and special divisions of the former Army and Navy general staffs, and special divisions and sections of Army and Navy ministries. The personnel of certain special divisions as the former Fifth (Russian) Intelligence Division of the general staff is being fully used by the First Demobilization Bureau.

Almost the same picture is in the Second Demobilization Bureau, at the head of which is one of the oldest Japanese naval intelligence officers, the former Chief of Intelligence Division of the Naval General Staff, Vice Admiral Maeda Minoru. There arises a natural question, what is the expediency of employment of operative and intelligence officers of Japanese general staffs in the demobilization agencies? Employment of these officers in the State service is still more undesirable as many of them



together with the ideologists and leaders of Japanese militarism are responsible for the enacting of minor and major "incidents" for preparation of the last aggressive war, because they directly took part in the elaboration and realization of occupation plans of Japanese militarists, and in a number of cases they were even initiators of various aggressive criminal actions of the Japanese militarists. Therefore, I repeat it again, that this benevolent attitude to such persons is dangerous and fraught with serious consequences for the Allies.

It attracts one's attention also that the staff of the Demobilization Board is very numerous. Even a person who is absolutely unacquainted with the questions of demobilization, after a brief survey of the organization of the Demobilization Board, may see many divisions, sectors, groups and bureaus, the activity of which has absolutely nothing to do with the question of demobilization or repatriation of the former Japanese armed forces. For example: In the First Demobilization Bureau, there is the so-called Historical Facts Investigation Division, headed by former Chief of Operative Department of the General Staff of the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Miyazaki Suichi. I have already spoken of this department at the Eleventh Meeting of the Council in connection with the question of investigation of the Japanese "Commission for the Causes of the Start and Defeat of the Greater East Asia War" which, judging by the press reports, was dissolved only the day before yesterday after the Japanese Government "had been studying the methods of dissolution" of this Commission during nearly two months. The Historical Facts Investigation Division employing former officers of the operative and intelligence divisions of the general staff, as well as high-ranking officers of the Army, is quite legally engaged in studying and generalizing the experience of the last war, conducting research and detailed investigation of each very



important operation on this or that front. It is quite opportune to ask, why is this necessary for the Demobilization Board? It's important to note that a number of very high-ranking officers of this division were concurrently attached to the governmental commission which studied the causes of the outbreak of the war and defeat of Japan. A number of other divisions and sections of the Demobilization Bureaus of the Demobilization Board are also engaged in the activity which has nothing to do with the demobilization and repatriation.

Thus, for instance, the Research Section of the General Affairs Bureau, First Demobilization Bureau, together with the study of "the actual state of the Japanese troops outside Japan," is engaged in the study and evaluation of the international situation in checking the conditions of cities destroyed during the war, etc.

All these facts make me think that the Japanese general staff, which was officially dissolved, actually continues to operate to a certain degree until now, taking refuge in the Japanese Demobilization Board. The difference as compared with the past, is only that their specific work which was done as a rule by the officers of the general staffs, is now conducted in an office with another less pompous title and the officers of the general staff, instead of military uniforms, are wearing civilian clothes. Therefore, due to all said above, I cannot but express apprehension that the Japanese Government, as it seems to me, abuses the trust of the Supreme Commander and creates the opportunity for legalized military activity of officers of the former Japanese general staffs.

I believe that even that information, far from being complete, which I have regarding this question, is sufficient to formulate the following well-grounded recommendations to the



Supreme Commander: To direct the Japanese Government:

(1) To reconsider radically the structure of the Demobilization Board aiming at the drastic reduction of the personnel of the demobilization agencies and corresponding reduction of very large amounts of budget allocations by the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the Demobilization Board.

(2) To abolish immediately those divisions and sections of the Demobilization Board, which have absolutely nothing to do with the matters of repatriation and demobilization and are engaged in operative and intelligence and information work which is proper, as a rule, for the general staff. (For example: the Historical Facts and Investigation Division of the First Demobilization Bureau, the Research Section of the General Affairs Division of the same Bureau, the Research Division of the Second Demobilization Bureau, etc.) To dismiss immediately from the State service the personnel of the divisions and sections subject to abolition.

(3) To dismiss immediately all former officers and officials of Japanese general staffs, as well as officers and officials of Japanese Intelligence Agencies who work until now in the central and local agencies of the Demobilization Board. To prohibit employment of these persons in the State service.

(4) All the papers and documents of the divisions and sections subject to abolition, should be handed over to the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

(5) To expedite completion of matters of divisions engaged in matters "left uncompleted" by former technical and special organizations of the Army and Navy. (For example: the Technical Adjustment Division of the First Demobilization Bureau and others), setting definite and short periods of time for the winding up of these matters.



(6) To permit the functioning only of those divisions and sections of the Demobilization Board, both central and local, which are directly connected with the demobilization and repatriation of personnel of the former Japanese armed forces. At the same time, the organizational setup of these divisions and sections, also should be radically reconsidered with the view of dismissing numerous officials, who for instance, deal with such questions as awards, bonuses, traditional festivals, etc.

(7) To check up what is actually being done by local agencies of the Demobilization Board and whether or not they are liaison and unification centers of the demobilized officers. When considering these recommendations, it is necessary to take into account the evident tendency of the Japanese Government to postpone the dissolution and reduction of the agencies of the Demobilization Board under the pretext of necessity of their existence up to the final completion of the repatriation.

In conclusion, I would like to note once more than in including this concrete subject matter into the Agenda, and in introducing the above-mentioned recommendations regarding it, I have tried to follow exactly the repeated advice of MR. CHAIRMAN addressed to the Members of the Council, namely, to inform the Supreme Commander of all abnormal facts and actions of the Japanese authorities, which run counter to the Potsdam Declaration, as well as to the directives of the Supreme Commander. Doing this, my only aim is to promote the success of the Occupation and to further the democratization of Japan, which is the common aim of the Allies.



THE CHAIRMAN: I believe that at the last meeting I made some inquiries as to the purpose the Soviet Member had in mind in placing this subject on the Agenda. I think that now at long last, we have learned what his purpose was. I believe I mentioned also at the last meeting, that it is stipulated in one of the basic directives that the Supreme Commander shall utilize Japanese personnel for purposes of the Occupation. It is stipulated in one of the basic directives that the machinery of the Japanese Government shall be utilized to the extent that this further the purpose of the Occupation. Certainly, for the purposes of demobilization, it was necessary and practicable to utilize personnel which had formerly been military and naval personnel and who could be expected to know how to do the job. These people in the Demobilization Board, have themselves been demobilized. They are now in civilian status and have been for a long time. If there is any evidence that any of them should be charged with being war criminals, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to receive such evidence. If any Member has any concrete evidence of any illegal or improper activities on the part of the Demobilization Bureaus or their divisions, or sections or members, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to receive such evidence. The every act of the officials of the Demobilization Board is under constant surveillance and check. The Soviet Member mentions a certain anxiety in regard to them and their activities. I must say that the only anxiety that I have felt has been that they would not be able to finish their job. As a matter of fact, if the Soviet authorities had been willing to repatriate the 800,000 or a million Japanese soldiers in their hands as part of our general repatriation program, the activities of the Demobilization Bureaus would now be drawing to a close. As it now stands, if the schedule recently proposed by the Soviet



authorities for repatriation of prisoners of war in their hands at the rate of from fifteen to twenty-five thousand a month is carried out, the Demobilization Bureau will have to remain in existence for at least another year. I would like to repeat again, that if any Member has any evidence of illegal activities--on the part of any member of the Bureaus--Demobilization Bureaus--on the part of the Bureaus or their agencies, the Supreme Commander would be very glad to have it. It is my recollection that on a number of occasions at meetings of the Council, charges and allegations have been made against agencies of the Japanese Government or officials of the Japanese Government. It is my recollection that on every such occasion I have endeavored to make it clear that if any Member has any evidence to support such allegations--any concrete evidence--the Supreme Commander would be very glad indeed to have it. It is also my recollection that in no such instance has any Member ever presented any evidence whatsoever in support of the allegations in question.

As regards the question of the Research Bureau, I may say by way of explanation that that Bureau undertakes research at the specific instruction of General Headquarters. Its purpose is to undertake research into such matters as the location and former activities of military units. I see no connection between it and the recent commission for the investigation of war causes. Since the Soviet Member has mentioned it, I may say that his statement that the commission has been dissolved is correct. I may say further, that the Japanese Government dissolved the commission on its own initiative in view of the criticism directed against it by the Soviet Member and the British Commonwealth Member--

MR. BALL: Good.

THE CHAIRMAN: --and in order to avoid further misrepresentation of its purposes.

MR. BALL: MR. CHAIRMAN, do you imply that you personally



regret its dissolution?

THE CHAIRMAN: I may say that GENERAL MacARTHUR'S attitude toward it, and my attitude toward it, have not changed.

As regards the statement of the Soviet Member that in continuing the operation of these Demobilization Bureaus, for their various purposes which include the demobilization, repatriation, care of widows and orphans--in regard to his statement indicating that we are thus actually supporting a camouflaged Japanese General Staff, I would say that this to me is a most surprising statement. In fact--

(SOVIET INTERPRETER requests pause for translation.)

THE CHAIRMAN: --in fact, it is a fantastic statement. It would be just as fantastic--it would be just as fantastic if some misguided and propaganda-minded person should allege that the four hundred or so officers on the staff of the Soviet Member actually constitute a general army corps headquarters. It is just as fantastic as if some misguided and propaganda-minded person should make the ridiculous allegation that the eight-hundred thousand or so Japanese soldiers in Soviet hands have been retained for the purpose of developing a secret army.

SOVIET INTERPRETER: Of the development of what?

THE CHAIRMAN: Of the development of a secret army or for the secret development of an army.

Do you have any comment, MR. BALL?

MR. BALL: On the main body of what GENERAL DEREVYANKO said, MR. CHAIRMAN?

THE CHAIRMAN: In regard to the subject on the Agenda.

MR. BALL: Yes. Well yes, not very much, MR. CHAIRMAN. I think that insofar as the Japanese army officers and officers of the General Staff are being used for demobilization only, and insofar as that demobilization is being carried out as quickly



as possible, there can be no real objection to their use. You referred to this yourself at the last meeting, on page 27 of the Minutes of the last meeting, pointing out that there was nothing inconsistent with the purge directive of January 4th in the use by the Supreme Commander of army officers for specific and temporary purposes. On the other hand, I notice that GENERAL DEREVYANKO alleged that a number of these officers were being used for operative, intelligence, and information work, that was not concerned at all with demobilization.

SOVIET INTERPRETER: Excuse me, sir. I will have to translate.

MR. BALL: All right. Certainly.

I was just saying that I noticed that GENERAL DEREVYANKO did allege that a certain number of these officers were being used for operative, intelligence, and information work not concerned with demobilization. Now whether that is true or not, I don't know. If it is true, I think it would be a very dangerous thing to do. I would be very interested to know whether GENERAL DEREVYANKO can give us some more evidence of that particular statement made by him. There are two other quite minor things. I would have wished, MR. CHAIRMAN, that you might, perhaps, have given us a little more information on this subject. If you had been able to tell us, for example, the former ranks of the members of the Demobilization Bureau, and I notice that--

(SOVIET INTERPRETER interrupts for time to translate.)

Another point, MR. CHAIRMAN, is that I notice that in giving us the expenses for the administration of these bureaus, you don't mention the period for which the expenses apply. Without that information, the figures don't really mean very much. There is only one other point. I am very pleased and relieved to hear that these various allegations to which you have referred, allegations by GENERAL DEREVYANKO, allegations about GENERAL



DEREVYANKO'S staff here, allegations about the 800,000 Japanese still held in Russian hands, that those allegations are only made by misguided and propaganda-minded people.

THE CHAIRMAN: I still continue to hope that the British Commonwealth Member and I will see eye to eye on some subject on some occasion.

As regards MR. BALL'S question on the subject of expenditures, my understanding is that this is an estimated fiscal year. In regard to the question of the rank of these officials, I do not know what military or naval rank they held, but I assume that a good many of them were high-ranking officers, as it would be natural to select high-ranking and experienced officers for a tremendous task of this sort.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: Could you give us specific information on this subject, sir--exact information, if possible?

THE CHAIRMAN: I think the information which has been furnished is sufficient for the purposes of discussions in the Council. I took occasion the other day to address a letter to the Soviet Member in regard to the question of information which I assume he has received. The GENERAL received the letter, did he not?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: If the CHAIRMAN so desires, I would suggest that we should consider this letter after we have finished to discuss this problem.

THE CHAIRMAN: He raised the question of information and I think I have explained that fully in the letter to him, from our point of view. There is no need to discuss the letter that I see, except as to this question which he raised.

MR. BALL: Certainly it is not on the Agenda, MR. CHAIRMAN.

THE CHAIRMAN: No, it is not on the Agenda. It is a question of information which might fall under Procedural



Matters. I mention it merely in regard to his request for information.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: Yes, sir, it is not on the Agenda.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have any comment, GENERAL CHU?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHU: Well, I have listened with a good deal of interest, but I have no comment to make.

THE CHAIRMAN: That would seem to conclude the business of the meeting.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I would like to say a few words, sir. I don't think it expedient to open a discussion on MR. CHAIRMAN's remarks, but for my part, I must say that I never made a recommendation to abolish the Demobilization Board. I made a recommendation only to bring the organizational structure of the Demobilization Board into line with an organ which is carrying on functions connected with the realization of repatriation and demobilization.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, GENERAL, for your explanation. MR. BALL, do you have any comment?

MR. BALL: No.

THE CHAIRMAN: You have none, GENERAL CHU?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CHU: No.

THE CHAIRMAN: Let us adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 1115 hours.)

oOo

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
SUGGESTIONS FOR SCAP

ITEM II -- "The Demobilization Board."

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO recommended that the Japanese Government be directed:

(1) To reconsider radically the structure of the Demobilization Board aiming at the drastic reduction of the personnel of the



demobilization agencies and corresponding reduction of very large amounts of budget allocations by the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the Demobilization Board.

(2) To abolish immediately those divisions and sections of the Demobilization Board, which have absolutely nothing to do with the matters of repatriation and demobilization and are engaged in operative and intelligence and information work which is proper, as a rule, for the general staff. (For example: the Historical Facts and Investigation Division of the First Demobilization Bureau, the Research Section of the General Affairs Division of the same Bureau, the Research Division of the Second Demobilization Bureau, etc.) To dismiss immediately from the State service the personnel of the divisions and sections subject to abolition.

(3) To dismiss immediately all former officers and officials of Japanese general staffs, as well as officers and officials of Japanese Intelligence Agencies who work until now in the central and local agencies of the Demobilization Board. To prohibit employment of these persons in the State service.

(4) To hand over to the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, all the papers and documents of the divisions and sections subject to abolition.

(5) To expedite completion of matters of divisions engaged in matters "left uncompleted" by former technical and special bodies of the Army and Navy. (For example: Technical Adjustment Division of the First Demobilization Bureau and others), setting definite and short periods of time for the winding up of these matters.

(6) To permit the functioning only of those divisions and sections of the Demobilization Board, both central and local which are directly connected with the demobilization and repatriation of personnel of the former Japanese armed forces. At the same time, the organizational set-up of these divisions and



sections, also should be radically reconsidered with the view of dismissing numerous officials, who for instance, deal with such questions as awards, bonuses, traditional festivals, etc.

(7) To check up what is actually being done by local agencies of the Demobilization Board and whether or not they are liaison and unification centers of the demobilized officers. When considering these recommendations, it is necessary to take into account the evident tendency of the Japanese Government to postpone the dissolution and reduction of the agencies of the Demobilization Board under the pretext of necessity of their existence up to the final completion of the repatriation.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : ~~Mr. Borton~~

DATE: November 1, 1946

FROM : R. Fearey

SUBJECT: Summary of Letter, Enclosed with Tokyo's Despatch No. 639, Oct. 8, from Mr. Acheson to Lt. General Derevyanko

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV - 7 1946  
Department of State

NOV 12 1946  
GENERAL BUILDING  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The letter enclosed with the attached despatch was occasioned by the series of questions regarding the Demobilization Board and progress in the destruction of Japanese armaments which General Derevyanko submitted to Mr. Acheson as Chairman and American Member of the Allied Council in early September. When Mr. Acheson endeavored to reply to these questions at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council on September 18 the General indicated dissatisfaction with the replies as being too brief and of too general a nature, and stated that he would request additional, specific information.

In his letter of September 30 to General Derevyanko, Mr. Acheson states that Headquarters is prepared to provide Council Members with all necessary information to aid them in their assigned function of providing the Supreme Commander with constructive advice and assistance. It is not prepared, however, to expend the considerable amount of research, compilation and effort required to answer the Soviet Member's questions in the detail requested when the constructive purpose for which the material is to be used is not clear, and still has not been made clear. Furthermore, Headquarters officials are naturally reluctant to perform the labor necessary to meet the General's requests for information, when letters addressed to the General's Office by Headquarters requesting information especially desired by the Supreme Commander in the discharge of his responsibilities and directly connected with the occupation have almost without exception been ignored, or answered after long delay in a superficial and unhelpful manner. In closing, Mr. Acheson emphasizes that the Council was formed to be of constructive assistance to the Supreme Commander, and that its machinery is available to Members for that purpose only.

F. W. 740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)

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
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LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



MEMORANDUM



To: Department of State, Washington  
From: American Embassy, Canberra

Attached are three copies of an editorial appearing in the Australian press on October 8, 1946, which has been forwarded to the Supreme Commander, Tokyo, in accordance with the Department's telegraphic instruction no. 130, December 27, 1945, 5 p.m.

*740.00119 Control (Japan) / 12-2745*

Canberra, Australia,  
October 8, 1946.

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*[Signature]*

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SCAP  
TOKYO

October 8, 1946

Unnumbered

En Clair

(Sent to Sydney for trans-  
mission via US Army)

Following is Sydney Daily Telegraph October 8 editorial  
entitled QTE Policy in Japan UNQTE CLN PGH

The British Commonwealth of Nations occupies a subordinate  
position in Japan today PGH

There is an Allied Council on which are representatives of  
the United States CMM The British Commonwealth CMM and Russia PGH

The British representative is Mr Macmahon Ball CMM from Aus-  
tralia CMM who is assumed to be able to interpret the wishes of  
the United Kingdom CMM Australia CMM New Zealand CMM Canada and  
South Africa PGH

But the real power in the land is General MacArthur CMM who  
appears to have the powers the Emperor formerly possessed PGH

The Allied Council is entitled to advise PRD General Mac-  
Arthur is entitled to ignore that advice PGH

And in the course of making up its mind what to advise the  
General about CMM the members of the Allied Council get on each  
others nerves PGH

Mr Macmahon Ball seems to sit between the glares of the Amer-  
ican and Russian delegates CMM occasionally diverting their snarls  
from each other to himself PGH

The British/



- 2 -

The British Empire DASH and Australia in particular DASH has a vital interest in the future of Japan PGH

It should make up its mind on its conception of Japans future PGH

At present it appears to be content to differ both from the United States and Russia CMM working on a purely empirical basis CMM merely putting the brake on the ambitions of the other two Allies PGH

But even if the rest of the British Empire has lost interest in Japan we cannot afford to be indifferent PGH

Parliament and the country should have a chance of finding out what it is we want in Japan and how we propose trying to get it PRD UNQTE

BUTLER

Drafted: DJenkins  
Typed & Sent: baf



SCAP  
TOKYO

October 8, 1946

Unnumbered

En Clair

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BUTLER

Drafted: DJenkins  
Typed & Sent: baf



SCAP  
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- 2 -

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BUTLER

Drafted: DJenkins  
Typed & Sent: baf



DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

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8711, Ninth

London

Dated October 9, 1946

Rec'd 10:30 a.m., 9th

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 OCT 9 1946  
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*No action required*

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
 OCT 9 1946  
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TIMES editorial on adoption of new Japanese constitution states that two late amendments which exclude members of Armed Forces from Cabinet and guarantee independence of Supreme Court illustrate prevailing temper of Japanese people who have made it clear they desire neither revolution nor reaction but ordered progress along democratic lines. It states that Yoshida Cabinet has already proved its desire to eliminate from public life anyone identified with old aggressive imperialism and that its spirit of cooperation with Allied authorities finds its counterpart in willingness of Zaibatsu companies to facilitate compliance with orders against trusts and cartels.

TIMES says General MacArthur's success in efforts to transform entire outlook of Japanese people has won a well-deserved tribute from British Parliamentary Delegation which recently visited Japan. It says methods and ideas of whole process are predominantly American and sometimes appear strange to other Allied representatives and that Russians in particular complain too much use is made of Japanese Staff Officers in demobilizing forces and are disappointed that Communism makes so little headway, blaming American command for encouraging western democracy, permitting continuance of a capitalist economy and failing to bring Emperor to trial as war criminal.

Editorial adds that on other hand Americans are conscious of progress being made and do not welcome such criticism and, moreover, deplore Russian reluctance to

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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-2- #8711, Ninth, from London

repatriate some 800,000 Japanese prisoners whose services are badly needed for rehabilitation of Japan. Declaring that in such a complex task, differences are inevitable, TIMES says that Britain which has direct interest in speedy restoration of normal conditions in Japan may be able to mediate in resolving them. Commenting that Britain, however, has her own difficulties, TIMES states "the present obstacles to free communications with Japan are exercising a bad effect upon the well-being of the Commonwealth troops forming part of the army of occupation and the Parliamentary Delegation has found a number of unsatisfactory features about the conditions in which these troops are living especially in the remoter areas". It holds that grievances must be redressed and that Commonwealth Forces are sharing in what British parliamentary described as most marvelous experiment in worlds history; the recreation of an entire people.

Repeated Tokyo.

GALLMAN

SW:JWM

PLAIN





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Tokyo, October 9, 1946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FOREIGN REPORTING SERVICES  
OCT 28 1946

UNRESTRICTED  
No. 640

*Bj*  
DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS  
OCT 31 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*DA*  
*740.00119 control (Japan) / 9-944*  
*XR 793.94*  
*494.108*

SUBJECT: The "Shibuya Incident" of July 19, 1946.

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch no. 595, September 9, 1946, on the subject of the Shibuya Incident of July 19, 1946, and to enclose a copy of the charge and specifications against forty-one Formosans, arising out of the subject incident.

The Military Commission convened by authority of the Commanding General, United States Eighth Army, on September 30, 1946, comprises two American and one Chinese member, as follows:

- Colonel Sexton Berg
- Lieutenant Colonel Glenn L. Epperson
- Mr. Henry Chui, Assistant Associate Prosecutor of the Chinese Division of the International Prosecution Section.

Prosecutors in the case are Major Dick Elliott, Robert D. Scott, and George T. Hagen. The accused have furnished their own defense counsel, with advisory counsel, T/5 Herbert L. Berman and Mr. Lin Ting-Sheng, supplied by the Eighth Army.

Enclosure:

Copy of charge and specifications, dated September 24, 1946.

Original and hectograph to Department.  
Copy to: American Embassy, Nanking.

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*10-946*



Enclosure to despatch No. 640, dated October 9, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "The Shibuya Incident" of July 19, 1946.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY  
United States Army  
APO 343

\*\*\*\*\*

BEFORE A MILITARY COMMISSION CONVENED BY AUTHORITY OF THE  
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES EIGHTH ARMY, 30 SEPTEMBER 1946

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS

CHENG SHUNG, CHING SHIM MING, LYOU YONG CHING, HUNG CHUNG JEN,  
SHIE CHAI FUN, CHON JONG LI, LEONG CHUNG, LI BUN TEI, KUEI CHU HO,  
FANG YUN HO, SUNG BEN SHONG, KANG BO SHONG, LING YU SHONG, YO SHU  
TEI, YUNG CHING TSUI, CHUNG MO, LIU CHOU KONG, ONG ENG HONG, LIEU  
JIN YUNG, CHANG AH TING, HAM HOGI, CHU TO FU, LI MO RU, LI TE TUN,  
KE SHAKU, LIM KA LUN, CHAI LUN TU, TIAN SHU TSU, CHAI LIT SHO, LIYANG  
SHU KING, GAN LAI MING, LO SHU KAN, CHUAN TING TIOU, CHANG HUNG KAI,  
WANG CHING TOW, CHIU YU CHONG, LIU E CHANG, CHENG TEH WANG, WANG TENG  
LONG, LIM SUI GEN, RYO KI HATSU, CHIN KIN LYU and RYU SHI ZAI.

CHARGE

Acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation forces.

SPECIFICATIONS

1. In that Cheng Shung, Ching Shim Ming, Lyou Yong Ching, Hung Chung Jen, Shie Chai Fun, Chon Jung Li, Leong Chung, Li Bun Tei, Kuei Chu H o, Fang Yun Ho, Sung Ben Shong, Kang Bo Shong, Ling Yu Shong, Yo Shu Tei, Yung Ching Tsui, Chung Mo, Liu Chou Kong, Ong Eng Hong, Lieu Jin Yung, Chang Ah Ting, Ham Hogi, Chu To Fu, Li Mo Ru, Li Te Tun, Ke Shaku, Lim Ka Bun, Chai Lun Tu, Tian Shu Tsu, Chai Lit Sho, Liyang Shun King, Gan Lai Ming, Lo Shu Kan, Chuan Ting Tiou, Chang Hung Kai, Wang Ching Tow, Chiu Yu Chong, Liu E. Chang, Cheng Teh Wang, Wang Teng Long, Lim Sui Gen, Ryo Ki Hatsu, Chin Kin Lyu and Ryu Shi Zai together with other unidentified persons acting jointly and severally, on or about the 19th of July 1946, in the area surrounding Shibuya-Ku police station in Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place under the jurisdiction of the Occupation Forces, did wrongfully and unlawfully have and possess dangerous weapons, to-wit, pistols, iron bars, and other instruments wooden clubs, to the prejudice of Law and Order and to the prejudice of the objectives of the Occupation.



-2-

Enclosure to  
Tokyo's 640/  
October 9, 1946.

2. In that Cheng Shung, Ching Shim Ming, Lyou Yong Ching, Hung Chung Jen, Shie Chai Fun, Chon Jung Li, Leong Chung, Li Bun Tei, Kuei Chu Ko, Fang Yun Ho, Sung Ben Shong, Keng Bo Shong, Ling Bo Shong, Ling Yu Shong, Yo Shu Tei, Yung Ching Tsui, Chung Mo, Liu Chou Kong, Ong Eng Hong, Lieu Jin Yung, Chang Ah Ting, Ham Hogi, Chu To Fu, Li Mo Ru, Li Te Tun, Ke Shaku, Lim Ka Bun, Chei Lun Tu, Tian Shu Tsu, Chai Lit Sho, Liyang Shun King, Gan Lai Ming, Lo Shu Chang, Cheng Teh Wang, Wang Teng Long, Lim Sui Gen, Ryo Ki Hatsu, Chin Kin Lyu, and Ryu Shi Zei together with other unidentified persons, action jointly in concert on or about the 19th of July 1946, in the area surrounding the Shibuya-ku police station, in Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Forces, did, wrongfully and unlawfully aid, abet and engage in a disorder and fight, by using reproachful and provocative language, by acting in a violent and threatening manner, and by firing pistols, to the disturbance of the peace and to the terror of the people in the neighborhood, resulting in the death of several people and the wounding of others, all to the prejudice of the objectives of the Occupation.

3. In that Cheng Shung, Ching Shim Ming, Lyou Yong Ching, Hung Chung Jen, Shie Chai Fun, Chon Jung Li, Leong Chung, Li Bun Tei, Kuei Chu Ho, Fang Yun Ho, Sung Gen Shong, Kang Bo Shong, Ling Yu Shong, Yo Shu Tei, Yung Ching Tsui, Chung Mo, Liu Chou Kong, Ong Eng Hong, Lieu Jin Yung, Chang Ah Ting, Hem Hogi, Chu To Fu, Li Mo Ru, Li Te Tun, Ke Shaku, Lim Ka Bun, Chai Lum Tu, Tien Shu Tsu, Chai Lit Sho, Liyang Shun King, Gen Lai Ming, Lo Shu Kan, Chuan Ting Tiou, Chang Hung Kai, Wang Ching Tow, Chiu Yu Chong, Liu E Chang, Cheng Teh Weng, Wang Teng Long, Lim Sui Gen, Ryo Ki Hatsu, Chin Kin Lyu and Ryu Shi Zai, together with other unidentified persons, acting in concert on or about 19th of July 1946, in the area surrounding the Shibuya-ku police station, in Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Forces, did wrongfully and unlawfully aid, abet and engage in, a disorder and fight, by using reproachful and provocative language, by acting in a violent and threatening manner, and by firing pistols, to the disturbance of the peace and to the terror of the people in the neighborhood, all to the prejudice of the objectives of the Occupation.

4. In that Cheng Shung, Ching Shim Ming, Lyou Yong Chiug, Hung Chung Jen, Shie Chai Fun, Chon Jung Li, Leong Chung, Li Bun Tei, Kuei Chu Ho, Fang Yun Ho, Sung Ben Shong, Kang Be Shong, Ling Yu Shong, Yo Shu Tei, Yung Ching Tsui, Chung Mo, Liu Chou Kong, Ong Eng Hong, Lieu Jin Yung, Chang Ah Ting, Ham Hogi, Chu To Fu, Li Mo Ru, Li Te Tun, Ke Shaku, Lim Ka Bun, Chai Lun Ty, Tian Shu Tsu, Chai Lit Sho, Liyang Shun King, Gan Lai Ming, Lo Shu Kan, Chuan Ting Tiou, Chang Hung Kai, Wang Ching Tow, Chiu Yu Chong, Liu E Chang, Cheng Teh Wang, Wang Teng Long, Lim Sui Gen, Ryo Ki Hatsu, Chin Kin Lyu and Ryu Shi Zai together with other unidentified persons, acting in concert on or about 19th of July 1946, in the area surrounding the Shibuya-ku police station, in Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Forces, did wrongfully and unlawfully aid, abet and engage in a



-3-

Enclosure to  
Tokyo's 64C.  
October 9, 1946.

disorder and fight, by using reproachful and provocative language, by acting in a violent and threatening manner, and by firing pistols, thereby interfering with the lawful performance of the functions and duties of the Japanese Police, all to the prejudice of the objectives of the Occupation.

5. In that Cheng Shung, Ching Shim Ming, Lyou Yong Ching, Hung Chung Jen, Shie Chai Fun, Chon Jung Li, Leong Chung, Li Bun Tei, Kwei Chu Ho, Fang Yun Ho, Sung Ben Shong, Kang Bo Shong, Ling Yu Shong, Yo Shu Tei, Yung Ching Tsui, Chung Mo, Liu Chou Kong, Ong Eng Hong, Lieu Jin Yung, Chang Ah Ting, Ham Hogi, Chu To Fu, Li Mo Ru, Li Te Tun, Ke Shaku, Lim Ku Bun, Chai Lun Tu, Tian Shu Tsu, Chai Lit Sho, Liyang Shun King, Gan Lai Ming, Lo Shu Kan, Chuan Ting Tiou, Chang Hung Kai, Wang Ching Tow, Chiu Yu Chong, Liu E Chang, Cheng Teh Wang, Wang Teng Long, Lim Sui Gen, Ryo Ki Hatsu, Chin Kin Lyu and Ryu Shi Zai, together with other unidentified persons, acting in concert on or about the 19th of July 1946, in the area surrounding Shibuya-ku police station in Tokyo, Honshu, Japan, a public place under the jurisdiction of the Occupational Forces, did wrongfully and unlawfully aid, abet and engage in, a disorder by using reproachful and provocative language, by acting in a violent and threatening manner, and by the possession of pistols and other weapons, to the disturbance of the peace and to the terror of the people in the neighborhood, all to the prejudice of the objectives of the Occupation.

24 September 1946

s/s Carlos U. Lowrance  
/t/ CARLOS U. LOWRANCE

Captain, CAV

AFFIDAVIT

Before me personally appeared the above named accuser this 24th day of September 1946, and made oath that he is a person subject to military law and that he personally signed the foregoing charge and specifications and further that he has investigated the matters set forth in the charge and specifications and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.

s/s William R. Ward  
/t/ WILLIAM R. WARD

Major, JAGD

A TRUE COPY

\_\_\_\_\_  
M. L. JONES.  
1st Lt. Inf.



OCT 10 1946

**SECRET**

No. 278

To the  
United States Political Adviser to  
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
Tokyo.

The Acting Secretary of State encloses for the  
information of the Political Adviser copies of SWNCC  
documents as listed below.

Enclosures:

- 1. SWNCC 108/1, copy no. 45.
- 2. SWNCC 236/24, copy no. 45.
- 3. SWNCC 236/27, copy no. 45.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/10-1046

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

London, England, October 10, 1946

OIG OCCUPIED AREAS DIVISION  
(ADD)  
DEC 16 '46  
Department of State

UNRESTRICTED

No. 1988

Subject

New Statesman Article on "Control."

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 16 1946

OIG OCCUPIED AREAS DIVISION  
(ADD)  
DEC 9 1946  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

For the information of the Department, I have the honor to enclose copies of two articles published in the New Statesman and Nation in its issues of September 28 and October 5, 1946, under the title of "Japan Under Control." The articles, written by Max Bickerton, a correspondent of this Leftist British weekly, are strongly critical of aspects of Allied, and particularly American policy in Japan.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a. i.:

*Dorsey Gassaway Fisher*

Dorsey Gassaway Fisher,  
First Secretary of Embassy

OIG OCCUPIED AREAS DIVISION  
(ADD)  
DEC 6 - 1946  
Department of State

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
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FEB 20 1947

DIVISION OF BIOGRAPHIC  
INTELLIGENCE

Enclosures:  
Clippings from New Statesman and Nation  
of Sept. 28 and Oct. 5, 1946

Copy to CINCAFFAC, Tokyo.

Original and 4 copies to Department

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OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE  
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
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740.00119 Control (Japan)



SOURCE: NEW STATESMAN AND NATION NUMBER  
28 September 1946.  
London. Page. 222

## JAPAN UNDER CONTROL

VERY little has been published in this country about Japan under American rule. But it is now possible, with the aid of S.C.A.P.\* and reports in the United States and here from officers recently in Tokio, to get some general picture of the implications of American government in Japan.

Immediately after the occupation the situation did not look hopeful. Industry and education were at a standstill. The great matchwood cities were in ruins, and the people were hungry. It was reported that in Tokio, its population shrunk from almost seven million to under three, 900,000 people on one Sunday in September went into the country to buy black market vegetables. The whole nation was stunned by the impact of the atom bomb, but still more by the sudden shattering of all the grandiose promises of victory and world conquest. "Add to this the fact that the real leaders are afraid to speak out, not knowing how long United States troops will be here to protect them against the dreaded secret police, and it will be readily seen why as yet there has been no significant political developments in Japan." (S.C.A.P., October, 1945).

Then, on October 4th, MacArthur made what seemed at first, like all his overt steps, a move in the direction of democracy. He issued a directive that has been called Japan's Bill of Rights, permitting free discussion of the Emperor system, removing all restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, releasing all political prisoners and nominally abolishing the secret police.

The effect was electrical. Thousands of Korean and Chinese slave miners downed tools and prepared for repatriation. Socialist and Communist leaders came out of gaol, and when the Trade Union Bill was passed in December, trade unions sprang up like mushrooms. In January they were being formed at the rate of two a day; and by the end of May, Central News reported 10,000 unions with a membership of three million. Only eight of these, however, were national unions. The unions were of every political colour, and to some extent the pre-war rivalry between Social-Democrat and Communist unions was revived.

The new unions quickly demanded increases in wages, shorter hours, a share in management, and the dismissal of "war-guilty" officials. S.C.A.P. estimated that only 14 per cent. of workers earned enough to meet the increasing cost of living, and in some cases unions were strong enough to negotiate wage increases of 300 per cent. In others they originated a new type of strike which went one stage further than the famous French sit-down strikes of 1938; for the Japanese workers not only took possession of the plant but also carried on production without the management. The reason for this was partly that S.C.A.P. forbade strikes in essential industries, and partly that workers realised that with the tremendous shortage of goods, production had to go on.

In the first of these strikes, in the newspaper *Yomiuri-Hochi*, the workers alone continued to issue the paper until their demands were granted. In a strike in a small electric tramway in Tokio, the union collected fares, paid workers' wages, then banked the balance for the company. In some cases, for instance, in the Mitsui coal strike in Hokkaido, during the period of "self-control," output increased. Almost all the strikes were successful to some degree.

Second only to this fever of unionisation was the political awakening of Japanese women. The civil and social inequality of women of all classes in Japan was so flagrant that the feminist movement cut across divisions of class or party. Now that political restrictions seemed to have been removed, women became vocal and demanded a revision of the civil code under which they are mere chattels.

Through radio, press and cinema, S.C.A.P.

\* S.C.A.P. are the Monthly Summations of non-military activities in Japan issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

encouraged women to use their new vote; and, at the General Election, 67.1 per cent. of women registered voted. The high percentage of the women candidates who were elected to the Diet was amazing. Of a total of 2,781 candidates for the 466 seats in the Diet, only 82 were women; but 39 of these were elected. Most prominent was Mrs. Shizue Kato, one of the founders of the birth-control movement in Japan.

Women also began to fight for better industrial conditions and, after successful negotiations, women workers in the Nihon Woollen Mills for the first time in Japanese history were granted four days menstrual leave and seventy days leave for childbirth. The repeal of all war-time exceptions to the labour code will affect ultimately 43,000 women and 20,000 children working in mines; and, by April 1st, all women and children underground night workers were discharged.

Other developments were the appointment of policewomen and a decree abolishing licensed prostitution. It is debatable how effective such a decree can be, but it may do away with some of the worst abuses of the Japanese system.

When we come to politics it is more difficult to assess progress. During the war all political parties were dissolved, but after the surrender Diet members regrouped themselves in four main parties, Shimpoto or Progressives, Jiyuto or Liberals, Kyodoto or Co-operators, and Social-Democrats. It is easier to say what these parties are not than what they are. The Progressives are not progressive, the Liberals not liberal, and the Co-operators have no connection with industrial or consumers' co-operatives. These parties resemble nothing so much as a coiled mass of snakes who, having sloughed their skins, continue their reptilian movements in spite of occasional proddings by MacArthur's big stick.

One such prodding was the purge of January 2nd, known as "MacArthur's typhoon," a directive which dissolved 120 Right-wing organisations and disqualified active supporters of the war from public office. The Progressives lost 200 of their 274 Diet members, the Co-operative leadership was completely wiped out, while the Liberals and the Right Wing of the Social-Democrats also suffered severely. Later events suggest that MacArthur did not realise at the time that logically the purge should have embraced many of his "reliable" Japanese.

The results of the General Election, held on April 10th, were: Liberals 140 (previous Diet 46), Progressives 93 (274), Social-Democrats 92 (17), Co-operators 14 (28), Communists 5 (0), Minor Parties 38, Independents 82. While MacArthur warmly congratulated the electorate on taking a wise middle course, other writers have asserted that the new Diet is just as reactionary as previous ones. My own opinion is that replacement of the Progressives by the slightly less reactionary Liberals and the big gain of Left Wing parties represented the beginning of a swing to the Left.

After the General Election, the Shidehara Government reluctantly resigned. Ichiro Hatoyama, the leader of the Liberal Party and as fine a Fascist wolf as ever wore democrat's clothing, expected to be the new Premier but was purged by S.C.A.P. at the last moment. Tetsu Katayama, the secretary of the Social-Democrats, was then asked to form a Government, but owing chiefly to the big schism between the Right, Centre and Left Wings of his party, he was unable to do so. Finally, the Liberal, Shigeru Yoshida, Foreign Minister in the Shidehara Cabinet and former Ambassador to the United Kingdom, formed a Liberal-Progressive Cabinet which was given a very luke-warm reception by the press. S.C.A.P., however, said that it marked a further step forward in democratic progress, and that to set-off its conservative bias there was a vigorous Opposition with the difficult biological function of acting "as a watchdog of the liberal groups of the populace and as a gad-fly to the parties in power." Present indications are that it will be a stop-gap Cabinet, as the Social-Democrats

are gaining more and more press and public support.

The Communists have had more influence than their five seats in the Diet would suggest. In February S.C.A.P. reported, "They speak out and get a hearing on all controversial issues. . . Press reactions show that they are accorded more newspaper space than all other political parties combined." Being the only party free from war guilt, they readily assisted MacArthur in his purge. They are the only party openly opposed to the Emperor-system. Their agrarian policy is a radical one, but, believing Japan is not ready for Socialism, they have put forward a moderate political programme, aiming—so far without success—at a united front with the Social-Democrats.

MAX BICKERTON

[To be concluded.]



London, England, October 10, 1946

UNRESTRICTED

No. 1988

Subject: New Statesman Article on "Japan Under Control."

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

For the information of the Department, I have the honor to enclose copies of two articles published in the New Statesman and Nation in its issues of September 28 and October 5, 1946, under the title of "Japan Under Control." The articles, written by Max Bickerton, a correspondent of this Leftist British weekly, are strongly critical of aspects of Allied, and particularly American policy in Japan.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a. i.:

Dorsey Cassaway Fisher,  
First Secretary of Embassy


Enclosures:

Clippings from New Statesman and Nation  
of Sept. 28 and Oct. 5, 1946

Copy to GINCAFPAC, Tokyo.

Original and 4 copies to Department

DGFisher:jn





SOURCE: NEW STATESMAN AND NATION NUMBER  
28 September 1946.  
London. Page. 222.

## JAPAN UNDER CONTROL

VERY little has been published in this country about Japan under American rule. But it is now possible, with the aid of S.C.A.P.\* and reports in the United States and here from officers recently in Tokio, to get some general picture of the implications of American government in Japan.

Immediately after the occupation the situation did not look hopeful. Industry and education were at a standstill. The great matchwood cities were in ruins, and the people were hungry. It was reported that in Tokio, its population shrunk from almost seven million to under three, 900,000 people on one Sunday in September went into the country to buy black market vegetables. The whole nation was stunned by the impact of the atom bomb, but still more by the sudden shattering of all the grandiose promises of victory and world conquest. "Add to this the fact that the real leaders are afraid to speak out, not knowing how long United States troops will be here to protect them against the dreaded secret police, and it will be readily seen why as yet there has been no significant political developments in Japan." (S.C.A.P., October, 1945).

Then, on October 4th, MacArthur made what seemed at first, like all his overt steps, a move in the direction of democracy. He issued a directive that has been called Japan's Bill of Rights, permitting free discussion of the Emperor system, removing all restrictions on political, civil and religious liberties, releasing all political prisoners and nominally abolishing the secret police.

The effect was electrical. Thousands of Korean and Chinese slave miners downed tools and prepared for repatriation. Socialist and Communist leaders came out of gaol, and when the Trade Union Bill was passed in December, trade unions sprang up like mushrooms. In January they were being formed at the rate of two a day; and by the end of May, Central News reported 10,000 unions with a membership of three million. Only eight of these, however, were national unions. The unions were of every political colour, and to some extent the pre-war rivalry between Social-Democrat and Communist unions was revived.

The new unions quickly demanded increases in wages, shorter hours, a share in management, and the dismissal of "war-guilty" officials. S.C.A.P. estimated that only 14 per cent. of workers earned enough to meet the increasing cost of living, and in some cases unions were strong enough to negotiate wage increases of 300 per cent. In others they originated a new type of strike which went one stage further than the famous French sit-down strikes of 1938; for the Japanese workers not only took possession of the plant but also carried on production without the management. The reason for this was partly that S.C.A.P. forbade strikes in essential industries, and partly that workers realised that with the tremendous shortage of goods, production had to go on.

In the first of these strikes, in the newspaper *Yomiuri-Hochi*, the workers alone continued to issue the paper until their demands were granted. In a strike in a small electric tramway in Tokio, the union collected fares, paid workers' wages, then banked the balance for the company. In some cases, for instance, in the Mitsui coal strike in Hokkaido, during the period of "self-control," output increased. Almost all the strikes were successful to some degree.

Second only to this fever of unionisation was the political awakening of Japanese women. The civil and social inequality of women of all classes in Japan was so flagrant that the feminist movement cut across divisions of class or party. Now that political restrictions seemed to have been removed, women became vocal and demanded a revision of the civil code under which they are mere chattels.

\*Through radio, press and cinema, S.C.A.P.

are the Monthly Summations of non-

encouraged women to use their new vote; and, at the General Election, 67.1 per cent. of women registered voted. The high percentage of the women candidates who were elected to the Diet was amazing. Of a total of 2,781 candidates for the 466 seats in the Diet, only 82 were women; but 39 of these were elected. Most prominent was Mrs. Shizue Kato, one of the founders of the birth-control movement in Japan.

Women also began to fight for better industrial conditions and, after successful negotiations, women workers in the Nihon Woollen Mills for the first time in Japanese history were granted four days menstrual leave and seventy days leave for childbirth. The repeal of all wartime exceptions to the labour code will affect ultimately 43,000 women and 20,000 children working in mines; and, by April 1st, all women and children underground night workers were discharged.

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