CHRISTIANITY

CONTRASTED WITH

HINDŪ PHILOSOPHY:

AN ESSAY,

IN FIVE BOOKS,

SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH:

WITH PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TENDERED TO

THE MISSIONARY AMONG THE HINDŪS.

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To the Memory

OF

JOHN RUSSELL COLVIN,

LATE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF THE NORTH-WEST PROVINCES OF INDIA,

TO WHOSE CORDIAL APPRECIATION OF HIS EDUCATIONAL AIMS

THE WRITER OWED IT

THAT THE DEATH OF THE LAMENTED THOMASON

DID NOT CRIPPLE THE RESOURCES OF THE BENARES COLLEGE

THIS ESSAY IS INSCRIBED,

WITH SORROWING GRATITUDE,

BY

JAMES ROBERT BALLANTYNE.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS ESSAY, slightly modified subsequently, was submitted in competition for a prize of £300, offered by a member of the Bengal Civil Service. The prize was divided, and a moiety was adjudged to this Essay, the judges being gentlemen appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishops of London and Oxford. In the terms of the prospectus, the prize was offered "for the best statement and refutation, in English, of the fundamental errors (opposed to Christian Theism) of the Vedānta, Nyāya, and Sānkhya Philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities, in the Sanskrit language, treating of those systems; together with a demonstration (supported by such arguments, and conveyed in such a form and manner as may be most likely to prove convincing to learned Hindūs imbued with those errors), of the following fundamental principles of Christian Theism, viz.:—

"*First.*—Of the real, and not merely apparent or illusory, distinctness of God from all other spirits, and from matter; and of the creation (in the proper sense) of all other spirits, and of matter, by God, in opposition to the Vedānta.

"*Second.*—Of the non-eternity of separate souls, and their creation by God, in opposition to the Nyāya and Sānkhya.

"*Third.*—Of the creation of matter, in opposition to the tenet of its eternity in the shape of atoms (as maintained in the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika Schools), or in the shape of Prakriti (as maintained by the Sānkhya).

"*Fourth.*—Of the moral character and moral government of God; and of the reality and perpetuity of the difference between moral good and evil with reference to such dogmas of the above systems as are opposed to these doctrines."

PREFACE.

THIS Essay, in its present shape, is but an imperfect sketch of what the writer would wish to offer as a help to the missionary among the learned Hindūs. Many topics, which might advantageously receive full treatment, are here scarcely more than indicated. With life and health, the writer will continuously prosecute his task towards its completion.

The five books "On Christianity as contrasted with Hindū Philosophy," which form the kernel of the following Essay, are given also in Sanskrit, with the omission of such incidental discussions as have reference exclusively to the missionary, and not to those whom the missionary has to teach.

There are some Sanskrit works, yet untranslated, which the writer must study before deciding upon his theological terminology for India. Among these works is the *Aphorisms of Sāndilya.* Sāndilya rejects the Hindū (gnostic) theory that *knowledge* is the one thing needful, and contends that knowledge is only the hand-

maid of *faith.* Hence, however defective his views may be in other respects, his work seems to promise *phraseology* of which a Christian missionary may advantageously avail himself. This remark might form the text for an extended dissertation on the Christian's right to the theological language and the theological conceptions of his opponents.

If the present work were completed to the writer's mind, he would next desire to be enabled to devote himself to the translation and commentation of the Bible in Sanskrit; taking book by book, not perhaps in the order of the canon—for the completion of such a work as is here intended is not to be looked for in a lifetime—but in the order in which it might seem most advisable to solicit the attention of inquirers, from whom it would scarcely be advisable to withhold the New Testament till they should have threaded all the historical details of the Old. An occasional watchword of Protestants, and a good one in its proper place, is "The Bible without note or comment." This is right, when the design is to exclude such notes and comments as those of the Douay version, and to make appeal to the unbiassed judgment of Europeans, as to the Romish and the reformed interpretations of Scripture language. But when, as in the case of the Hindū inquirer, the question is not, *which* (of two or

more) is the meaning, but simply *what* is the meaning,—notes and comments become the helps or the substitutes of a living teacher. *English* clergymen have commentaries to refer to, and if we may ever look forward to an efficient native Christian clergy, these native clergymen also ought to be similarly supplied.

In speaking of a translation of the Bible in Sanskrit as a desideratum, the writer is very far indeed from ignoring the Sanskrit version of the Baptist missionaries; but his own investigations have shown him that this version—valuable as, in many respects, it is—was made at a time when Sanskrit *literature* had not been sufficiently examined to make a correct version possible. The mere mastery of the Grammar and the Dictionary does not give one the command of a language. As well might it be expected that the study of a mineralogical cabinet should make a geologist. Words, as well as rocks, to be rightly comprehended, must be studied *in situ*. A single example of our meaning will suffice, and we need go no further for it than the first verse of the first chapter of the Book of Genesis in the Sanskrit version of the Baptist missionaries. The Hindū is there told that, in the beginning, God created *ākāśa*[1] and *prithivī*.[2] Now in the dictionary, *ākāśa* will, no doubt, be found oppo-

[1] आकाश ॥ [2] पृथिवी ॥

site the word "heaven," and *prithivī* opposite the word "earth;" but if the books of the *Nyāya* philosophy be looked into, it will be found that *ākāśa* is to be regarded as *one* of the five elements (the five hypothetical substrata of the five diverse qualities cognised by the five senses severally), and that *prithivī* is another of the five. Consequently, when the next verse proceeds to speak of the waters—a third one among the five—the learned Hindū reader is staggered by the doubt whether it is to be understood that the waters were *uncreated*, or whether the sacred penman had made an oversight. A Pandit once propounded this dilemma, in great triumph, to myself; and he was much surprised at finding that the perplexity could be cleared up. But it is obvious what powers of mischief we may place in the hands of unscrupulous opponents, by leaving our versions of Scripture thus needlessly open to cavil.

INTRODUCTION.

I CANNOT better prepare the reader to apprehend the design of this work than by submitting for his consideration the following remarks of the Rev. John Penrose, in his Bampton Lecture of the year 1808:—[1]

"There is nothing which demands not only so much delicacy and address, but also so just and liberal a knowledge of human nature, as interference in matters of religion. It is manifest, however, from past history, and I know not that the experience of present times tends in any degree to invalidate the observation, that those persons who devote themselves to the missionary office, though often men of the most heroic disinterestedness, and sometimes of an acute and active genius, yet are rarely possessed of an enlarged and comprehensive intellect. In the immediate object which they are desirous of attaining—an object, indeed, of the highest worth and greatness—they appear somewhat too exclusively to concentrate all the faculties of their minds; and, from want of an extended contemplation of human nature, to mistake the means by which that very object may be best

Interference in matters of religion requires delicacy and address.

The importance of the end

[1] Entitled,—"An attempt to prove the truth of Christianity from the wisdom displayed in its original establishment, and from the history of false and corrupted systems of religion."

attained. Eager to multiply conversions, they seem naturally to fall into those imprudences which attend an unenlightened spirit of proselytism. In some cases [*e.g.*, that of the Jesuits], as we have seen, they accommodate Christianity to the idolatries of those to whom they preach. In others, they forget that the same causes which make religion necessary to mankind, attach men to the religion in which they have been bred, and that every rude attack serves only to bind them to it more closely. These errors seem not to imply any particular imputation of blame to individual missionaries, but naturally to result from the constitutional imperfection of mankind. Throughout India, and other unconverted countries, they probably will extend to all teachers of Christianity, whether of native or European extraction. We rarely can find accuracy of judgment united with that warmth of character which is necessary to induce men to undertake the difficult and dangerous office of promulgating Christianity to idolaters; however useful they may esteem that office to be, however sublime. Those varied studies which discipline and correct the mind lessen the intensity of its application to any one pursuit. To improve reason has a tendency to diminish zeal. I speak only of what usually is the tendency of such improvement, without examining whether it is capable of being, or ought to be, counteracted.

Rude attacks on false religions, why unadvisable.

"Should these observations be admitted, they probably may lead us to infer that it is so much to the exertions of missionaries that we must look for the future propagation of Christianity, as to the general dissemination of know-

The propagation of Christianity,—how to be hoped from

ledge.

ledge. The indiscretions which it can scarcely, perhaps, be hoped that missionaries will be able to avoid, impede the end which they propose; but when those persons to whom our religion is offered shall be enabled to determine for themselves, concerning its records and evidences, they will learn to admit its truth on rational principles. When they shall add to the possession of our Scriptures, the sagacity to understand their meaning, and the judgment to appreciate their value, they will believe the doctrines which are taught in them. This belief, we may expect, will naturally descend from the more intelligent to the comparatively ignorant. Sound learning and just argument will triumph over fanaticism or error; will first convince the reason of the wise, and, by this means, will, in due time, overcome the prejudices of the vulgar; and thus Christianity will eventually be established by a progress contrary, indeed, to that which it experienced at its origin, but probably not less aptly suited to the altered circumstances of mankind.

Desirableness of converting the learned.

"If this, in truth, be likely to be the case, so extraordinary a revolution in the manner of propagating our religion deserves serious consideration. It is an historical fact, entirely independent of the miraculous means by which it is said to have been effected, that Christianity was introduced into the world by low and uneducated men, and that men of rank and learning were afterwards, by degrees, converted to it. This fact appears, manifestly, to be an inversion in the ordinary progress of opinions, which are usually communicated from the wise to the ignorant,

How it is reasonable to suppose that Christianity should be propagated otherwise now than at its first introduction.

instead of being adopted from the ignorant by the wise. It accordingly has been considered by Christians as an important argument for the belief of a Divine interference in the original establishment of the Church. And if it appears that things have now reverted to their natural order, even in the advancement of that very religion, in the foundation of which this order was interrupted; if it is to abilities and learning that we must now look for the extension and support of a religion which was first propagated by a few unlettered fishermen of Galilee; we have the stronger reason to admire the peculiarity of its origin, and to conclude that none but God could ever have enabled 'the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, and the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty.'"

Evidence of the truth of the Christian religion furnished by the contrariety between the first and the subsequent order of its propagation.

How St. Paul dealt with the learned.

In another place Mr. Penrose says:—"Once, at least, in the course of his ministry, St. Paul addressed himself to a learned, to an Athenian tribunal. He wisely adapted to local circumstances the mode in which he declared the existence of the Supreme. He alluded to a received theology: he quoted a philosophical poet."

I borrow these passages from Mr. Penrose instead of attempting to convey the same sentiments in my own words, the more readily, because the testimony thus borne to the importance of certain branches of learning, as subservient to the spread of Christianity, is not so liable as my own testimony, in respect of Hindū philosophy, might perhaps seem, to the suspicion of a bias received from a favourite pursuit. It is not on the

ground of its intrinsic value (though I may have my own private opinion of its value), that I recommend the Hindū philosophy to the missionary among the Hindūs, as a thing to be mastered, not merely to be dipped into. It is in order that he may be under no temptation splenetically to turn his back upon the learned of the land, and to act as if only the uneducated had souls to be saved. I should wish that when the Missionary has occasion to address the learned of India, he should, like St. Paul, be able "wisely to adapt to local circumstances" the mode in which he declares his message. I should wish that here his "allusions to a received theology" should be such as tend to facilitate apprehension rather than such as are calculated to offend prejudice without altering conviction. I should wish his quotations from the philosophers to be more frequently, like St. Paul's, the winning advances of conciliation.

Hindū philosophy to be mastered not merely for itself—and why.

If the reader should glance at random over any part of the following work, it may perhaps seem to him that my practice differs from my precepts; for, instead of showing always how to conciliate, I have done my best to expose the errors of Hindūism, and, moreover, I have dealt with these in the dry dispassionate manner of a writer on Pathology. Let us attend first to the latter branch of this remark. The feelingless character appropriate to a pathological treatise is not proposed as a model to the physician in his practice; and just as little is it intended that the soul-slaying errors, here treated barely as if matters of scientific

The subject, notwithstanding the depth of the interests involved, why to be treated here with scientific unimpassionedness.

examination, are to be regarded by the missionary in the calm spirit of speculation when he comes to deal with practical cases. In the fashioning and the tempering of a sword-blade, military ardour is not called for; nor even when we are studying the way to wield the weapon. But as nobody would suppose that we undervalued military ardour in the field of battle, because we employed caution and calmness in the previous tempering and exercising of our weapon, so nobody who reflects will probably fail to see that the consistent exclusion of passionate declamation throughout the following work implies no disparagement of passionate declamation in its proper place. Then, again, as to my having applied myself to the exposing the errors of Hindūism, while at the same time I urge the missionary more particularly to cast about for points of agreement, with a view to conciliation, there is here no real inconsistency; because he that best understands both the errors of his opponent and the means of refuting them, is the man who can most safely venture on making advances in the way of conciliation. I would have the missionary know well the errors of Hindūism, and also the means of their refutation, and yet I would have him reserve this knowledge till it is unmistakeably called for; lest, by provoking a contest on ground where he flatters himself he is certain of a victory, he should only needlessly awaken prejudices which had better, where possible, be left sleeping till they die.

We can most safely venture on conciliation, where we best know the errors which we must avoid seeming to countenance.

Prejudices not needlessly to be awakened.

There appears to be a growing conviction—in our

opinion a right one—that the confutation of Hindūism is not the first step, nor even the necessary preliminary, to the Christianization of India. This impression is akin to that under which Lord Bacon wrote the 35th aphorism of his *Novum Organum*, where, through a historical allusion to the expedition of Charles the Eighth into Italy, he explains how he seeks not contention, but a friendly hearing. "Borgia said, regarding the expedition of the French into Italy, that they came with chalk in their hands, that they might mark the inns, not with arms to break through. Such, in like manner, is our plan, that our doctrine may enter into fit and capacious minds; for there is no use of confutations when we differ about principles and notions themselves, and even about the forms of proof." But some of those who entertain this just impression, are apt to draw a wrong conclusion by coupling it with another premiss, which is by no means equally just. Bacon, as his readers are aware, did not *ignore* the opinions of those who differed from him. He was thoroughly versed in the opinions of those others; and this, while it enabled him, in pursuance of the conciliatory line of operations here adverted to, to avoid contention where contention would have been unprofitable, enabled him also to appropriate to the service of sound philosophy all the recognised truth which was not the less truth for having been embedded among the errors of an imperfect philosophy. The fact of Hindūism's not calling for confutation, does not imply that it may be safely neglected. Though

The confutation of Hinduism not the primary indispensable.

An example of Lord Bacon's to be followed.

Bacon's example not to be misinterpreted.

not called upon to *volunteer* the confutation of Hindū errors, the missionary will do well to prepare himself to accomplish that task effectively when occasion imposes it upon him. The following work aspires to aid him in this preparation.

As invited by the suggester of this essay, we aim at refuting "the fundamental errors (opposed to Christian theism) of the Vedānta, Nyāya, and Sānkhya philosophies, as set forth in the standard native authorities in the Sanskrit language," etc. Let us commence with a general view of these Hindū systems of philosophy.

A GENERAL VIEW OF THE HINDŪ SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The systems of philosophy.

THE Hindūs have six systems of philosophy, named the *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeshika*, *Sānkhya*, *Yoga*, *Vedānta*, and *Mīmānsā*.[1] The *Vaiśeshika* being in some sort supplementary to the *Nyāya*, the two are familiarly spoken of as one collective system, under the name of the *Nyāya*; and as the case is somewhat similar with the two other pairs, it is customary to speak of Hindū philosophy as being divisible into the *Nyāya*, the *Sānkhya*, and the *Vedānta*.

Fundamental agreement of the three great systems.

These three systems, if we follow the commentators, differ more in appearance than in reality; and hence they are, each in its degree, viewed with a certain amount of favour by orthodox Hindūs. The partisans of one system may and do impugn the dogmas of another; but, although every one in such a contest nerves his arm to the uttermost, and fights as if his character were staked upon the issue, yet the lances are lances of courtesy, and the blows are loving ones. It is a very different affair when the *denier of the Vedas* is dealt with. With the Buddhist,

[1] न्याय। वैशेषिक। सांख्य। योग। वेदान्त। मीमांसा॥

for example—though his notion of the chief end of man differs in no respect from that of the others—the battle is *à l'outrance*. The common bond of the others is their implicit acceptance of the Vedas, *which they explain differently*. According to the epigrammatic remark, that theological dislikes are inversely as the amount of disagreement, some might expect that these dissentient accepters of the Veda should be more bitter against one another than against the common enemy. But epigrams are not always to be trusted. As Dominican and Franciscan are brothers in asserting the infallibility of Rome; so are the *Nyāya*, the *Sānkhya*, and the *Vedānta*, in asserting the infallibility of the Veda against the Buddhist.

How they differ. Assuming, each of them implicitly, the truth of the Vedas, and proceeding to give, on that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three systems differ in their *point of view*. To illustrate this, suppose that three men in succession take up a cylindrical ruler: the one, viewing it with its end towards his eye, sees a circle; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelogram; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but nowise irreconcileable. So far are they from being irreconcileable, that it might be argued that *all* of them must be accepted in succession, before any adequate conception of the form of the ruler can be arrived at. Now, in somewhat such a way the three Hindū systems differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe

from different points of view,—viz., as it stands in relation severally to *sensation*, *emotion*, and *intellection*.

The *Naiyāyika*, founding on the fact that we have various *sensations*, enquires what and how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows in. Finding that there are five very different channels, he imagines five different externals adapted to these. Hence his theory of the five elements, the aggregate of what the *Nyāya* regards as the causes of affliction.

The Nyāya stand-point.

The *Sānkhya*, struck with the fact that we have *emotions*,—with an eye to the question *whence* our impressions come,—enquires their *quality*. Are they pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent? These three qualities constitute, for him, the external; and to their aggregate he gives the name of Nature. With the *Naiyāyika* he agrees in wishing that he were well rid of all three; holding that things pleasing, and things indifferent, are not less incompatible with man's chief end than things positively displeasing.

The Sānkhya stand-point.

Thus while the *Nyāya* allows to the external a substantial existence, the *Sānkhya* admits its existence only as an aggregate of qualities; while both allow that it really (eternally and necessarily) exists.

Precise distinction between the Nyāya and the Sānkhya stand-point.

The *Vedāntin*, rising above the question as to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks simply, what *is*, and what is *not*. The categories are here reduced to two—the Real and the Unreal. The categories of the *Nyāya* and the *Sānkhya* were merely scaffolding for reaching this pinnacle of philosophy. The

The Vedānta stand-point.

implied foundation was everywhere the same,—viz., the *Veda;* and this, therefore, we shall find is the field on which the battle with Hindū philosophy must ultimately be fought.

Respective subordination of the systems.

The *Nyāya*, it may be gathered from what has been said, is conveniently introductory to the *Sānkhya*, and the *Sānkhya* to the *Vedānta*. Accordingly in Hindū schools, where all three are taught, it is in this order that the learner, who learns all three, takes them up. The *Nyāya* is the exoteric doctrine, the *Sānkhya* a step nearer what is held as the truth, and the *Vedānta* the esoteric doctrine, or the naked truth.

Corresponding distribution of the present work.

This view of the matter suggests the distribution of the following work. A separate account of each of the three systems is first given; and then a summary of Christian doctrine is propounded, in the shape of aphorisms, after the fashion of the Hindū philosophers, with a commentary, on each aphorism, combating whatever in any of the three Hindū systems is opposed to the reception of the Christian doctrine therein propounded. A systematic exposition of the dogmas of Christianity seems to furnish the likeliest means of inviting the discussion of the essential points of difference,—any points of difference in philosophy that do not emerge in the course of such an exposition being, we may reasonably assume, comparatively unimportant to the Christian argument.

SUMMARY OF THE NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY.

General character of the Nyāya system.

The *Nyāya*, as already remarked, offers the sensational aspect of Hindū philosophy. In saying this, it is not meant that the *Nyāya* confines itself to sensation, excluding emotion and intellection; nor, that the other two systems ignore the fact of sensation; but that the arrangement of this system of philosophy has a more pointed regard to the fact of the five senses than either of the others has, and treats the external more frankly as a solid reality.

Meaning of the name.

The word *Nyāya* means "propriety or fitness." The system undertakes to declare the *proper method* of arriving at that knowledge of the truth, the fruit of which, it promises, is the chief end of man. The name is also used, in a more limited application, to denominate the proper method of setting forth an *argument*. This has led to the practice of calling the *Nyāya* the "Hindū Logic,"—a name which suggests a very inadequate conception of the scope of the system.

The Nyāya text-book.

The *Nyāya* system was delivered by GAUTAMA in a set of aphorisms so very concise that they must from the first have been accompanied by a commentary, oral or written. The aphorisms of the several Hindū systems, in fact, appear designed not so much to *communicate* the doctrine of the particular schools as to *aid*, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been *already* communicated. To this end they are in general admi-

rably adapted. The sixty aphorisms, for example, which constitute the first of Gautama's Five Lectures, present a methodical summary of the whole system; while the first aphorism, again, of the sixty, presents a summary of these sixty. The first aphorism is as follows:—"From knowledge of the truth in regard to evidence, the ascertainable, doubt, motive, example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, disquisition, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of the *summum bonum*."[1]

Summary of the topics.

Beatitude the result of knowledge.

In the next aphorism it is declared how knowledge operates mediately in producing this result. "Pain, birth, activity, fault, false notions, —since on the successive departure of these in turn there is the departure of the antecedent one, there is Beatitude."[2] That is to say,—when knowledge of the truth is attained to, false notions depart; on their departure, the fault of concerning one's-self about any external object ceases; thereupon the enlightened sage ceases to *act;* then, there being no actions that call for either reward or punishment, there is no occasion, after his death, for his being born again to receive reward or punishment; then, not being born again, so as to be liable to pain, there is no room for pain;—and the absence of pain is the *Nyāya* conception of the *summum bonum*.

[1] प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः॥१॥

[2] दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः॥२॥

Well, have we *instruments* adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth? He tells us:— "Proofs [*i.e.*, instruments of right knowledge], are the senses, the recognition of signs, the recognition of likeness, and speech [or testimony]."[1] As the present work is concerned with those errors only which are opposed to Christian Theism, it would be irrelevant here to discuss, at any length, the question whether the *Nyāya* is justified in asserting, or the other systems in denying, that the determining of something by "the recognition of a likeness," is specifically different from the determining of something by the recognition of a sign; but it may be worth while to explain the nature of the dispute, because it suggests a caution which is practically important. Let the example be the stock one of the *Nyāya* books. "Some one unacquainted with the meaning of the term *Bos Gavaeus* is told by a forester that the *Bos Gavaeus* is an animal like a cow. Going thereafter to the forest, and remembering the purport of what he has been told, he sees an animal like a cow. Thereupon arises the 'cognition from likeness' that this is what is meant by the term *Bos Gavaeus*."[2] Now it has been asked, what is there here different from the recognition of a sign? What is here recognised, is the likeness to a cow, and this is the sign by means of which we infer that the animal is the Bos Gavaeus. The *Naiyāyika* replies, that there is the following difference. In the

The means of right knowledge.

[1] प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ॥ ३ ॥

[2] गवयशब्दवाच्यमजानन् कुतश्चिदारण्यकपुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इति श्रुत्वा वनं गतो वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् गोसदृशपिण्डं पश्यति । तद्दर्शनस्मरणी गवयशब्दवाच्य इत्युपमितिरित्यचते । इति तर्कसंग्रहः ॥

case of knowledge arrived at by means of a sign, we must, he contends, have inductively ascertained that so and so is a sign; and in the present instance there has been no induction. So much for this disputed point; and we advert to it in order to caution the missionary not to attribute too great importance to this and similar real or seeming discrepancies between the several systems, when he meets with any such mutually conflicting views. The dispute is frequently verbal only, as in the present instance, where the dispute turns on the question whether an indicated "likeness" is or is not entitled to be called by the name of sign. And even where the difference is real, the Hindūs have long ago reconciled all the discrepancies to their own entire satisfaction, so that he who warmly insists upon the existence of the discrepancy gains credit only for being ignorant of the recognised means of harmonious reconcilement. He is regarded very much as the confident supporter of some stale sceptical objection to Christianity is regarded in a company of orthodox Christians. Whether the founders of the Hindū systems attributed no more importance to their mutual discrepancies than is attributed to them by their modern followers, may be open to question; but the practical caution here suggested is not the less worthy of attention. Opportunities, no doubt, may occur, where the discrepancies between the several systems may be urged with effect; and here the missionary must use his discretion, always bearing in mind the general caution not to lay too much stress on what will in most cases practically go for nothing as an argument.

A caution to the missionary.

To return to Gautama: if we have instruments for the obtaining of right knowledge, what are the objects in regard to which we have to obtain right knowledge by means of the appropriate instruments? These he enumerates as follows:—"Soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude,—are that regarding which we are to have right knowledge."[1] Here it is to be carefully observed that the soul (*ātman*) is spoken of as an entirely different entity from the mind (*manas*). The neglect of this distinction may bring a debate with a Hindū into inextricable confusion. The English reader who is accustomed to hear the words soul and mind (*anima* and *mens*—ψυχη and φρην) employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood, and if he desires to avoid such misconceptions as that of Ritter, who makes the *Naiyāyika* call the soul an *atom*, whereas the *Naiyāyika* calls the soul *all-pervading*, and the *mind* an atom,[2]—or that of Cousin, who makes out the *Sānkhya* to be a materialist, as if he derived *soul* from Nature, whereas the *Sānkhya* only derives the soul's *organs*—external and internal—from something other than soul.[3] In the

Objects regarding which we may have right knowledge.

[2] Of the Soul it is declared—(see our version of the *Tarka-sangraha*, §§ 20, 21)—that it is "different in each body—*all-pervading* and eternal"—[illegible]—; while of the Mind it is declared that "it is in the form of an *atom*, and eternal"—परमाणुरूपं नित्यञ्च ॥ Ritter (at p. 376, vol. iv. of his *History of Ancient Philosophy*, as rendered by Mr. Morrison,) assumes that it is a "principle of the *Nyāya*, that the soul is an atom."

[3] M. Cousin (*Cours de l'Hist. de la Philosophie*, vol. ii., p. 125), speaking of the "principles" of the *Sānkhya*, says correctly, "Il y en vingt-cinq." These he

Hindū systems, the soul is the *self*, and the mind is the organ or faculty, which, standing between the self and the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances from crowding in pell-mell; just as a minister stands between the monarch and the thousand simultaneous claims upon his attention, and hands up for his consideration one thing at a time. We offer here no opinion on this theory of the Hindūs; we only put the reader on his guard in respect of an established phraseology, the misconception of which has so egregiously misled Ritter and Cousin. What Gautama understands by soul, he tells us as follows: — "Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain, and knowledge, are that whereby we recognise soul (*ātman*)."[1]

Soul.

Mind.

Of the mind he speaks as follows:—"The sign [whereby we infer the existence] of the mind (*manas*) is the not arising of cognitions [in the soul] simultaneously."[2] Grant that our cognitions are consecutive and not simultaneous. To account for this,

enumerates in a note, giving, as the *Sānkhya* philosophers do, "l'intelligence, bouddhi," as the second in the list; "*manas, mens*," as the eleventh; and soul, "l'âme," as the twenty-fifth. All of these three, unlike the *Sānkhya* philosophers, he derives from one and the same source; for he says, "voici quel est le principe premier des choses, duquel dérivent tous les autres principes: c'est prakriti ou moula prakriti, la nature, 'la matière eternelle sans formes, sans parties, la cause materielle, universelle, qu'on peut induire de ses effets, qui produit et n'est pas produite.'" Now of this radical Nature, "l'intelligence, bouddhi," as well as the soul's internal organ, "*manas, mens*," is reckoned by the *Sānkhya* to be a product; but the notion that the *soul* is either identical with, or anywise akin to, this or any other *product*, is positively the one notion which the *Sānkhya* labours to *eradicate*. In the words of the third of the *Sānkhya Kārikās*, "Soul is neither a production nor productive,"— ॥ That liberation is held by the *Sānkhya* to ensue solely on the *discriminating* of Soul from Nature and the products of Nature, see Aphorism 105, quoted *infra*, p. xxi.

[1] इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ॥ १० ॥

[2] युगपत् ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गम् ॥ १६ ॥

Dugald Stewart tells us that the mind can attend to only one thought at a time. Gautama, recognising the same fact, but speaking of the *knower* invariably as *soul*, accounts for the fact in question by assuming that there is an *instrument*, or internal organ, termed the *mind*, through which alone can knowledge reach the soul, and which, as it gives admission to only one thought at a time, the *Naiyāyika* infers must be no larger than an atom. The conception of such an atomic inlet to the soul may be illustrated by the case of the eye; inasmuch as while the whole body is presented to the rays reflected from external objects, it is only through a special channel, the organ of vision, that these find entrance so as to cause knowledge. The soul, then, may be practically regarded as corresponding to the thinking principle, and the mind (*manas*) to the faculty of attending to one, and only one, thing at a time; it being further to be kept in remembrance, in case of accidents, that the *Naiyāyika* reckons the mind to be a substance and not a faculty.[1]

Activity.

In the list of the objects, regarding which right knowledge is to be obtained, the next after mind is activity (*pravritti*). This is defined as "that which originates the [utterances of the] voice, the [cognitions of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body."[2] This "activity," we have seen under Aph. 2nd, Gau-

[1] To quote the *Tarka-sangraha* :—

तत्र द्रव्याणि पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशकाल.....

"The substances (*dravya*) are just nine,—earth (*prithivī*), water (*ap*), light (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), place (*dis'*), soul (*ātman*), and mind (*manas*)."

[2] प्रवृत्तिर्वाग्बुद्धिशरीरारम्भः ॥ १७ ॥

tama regards with an evil eye, as the cause of birth, which is the cause of pain, which it is the *summum bonum* to get permanently rid of.

What the Nyāya reckons a fault.

Gautama holds that it is through our own "fault" (*dosha*) that we are active; and he tells us that "faults [or failings] have this characteristic, that they cause activity."[1] These faults are classed under the heads of affection (*rāga*), aversion (*dwesha*), and stolidity (*moha*), each of which he regards as a fault or defect, inasmuch as it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good or evil, must be received in some birth, or state of mundane existence, to the postponement of the great end of entire emancipation. The immediate obstacle to emancipation, styled "Transmigration" (*pretyabhāva*), he next defines.

Transmigration.

"Transmigration means the arising again [and again]."[2] According to the commentator, the word here rendered "transmigration," viz., *pretyabhāva*, is formed out of *pretya*, "having died," and *bhāva*,

[1] प्रवर्त्तनालक्षणा दोषाः ॥ १८ ॥ Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term which we have rendered *causer* of activity, as if it had signified *caused* by activity; for, with reference to Gautama's definition of "fault" (*dosha*), he says (see his *Essays*, vol. i., p. 289), "From acts proceed faults (*dosha*), including under this designation, passion," etc. It would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his essay a final revision, after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the oddness of the expression that "from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it without adverting it to the technical definition of "faults," in the same sentence, as the passions which give *rise* to action. Gautama, the votary of quietism, gives to the passions the name of "faults" with a significance akin to that which the word bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Duc D'Enghien,—"ce n'était pas une crime, c'était une *faute*:"—it was a positive *blunder*. The wise man, according to Gautama, is he who avoids the three *blunders* of having a liking for a thing and acting accordingly; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being *stupidly* indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being *intelligently* indifferent, and not acting at all.

[2] पुनरुत्पत्तिः प्रेत्यभावः ॥ १९ ॥

"the becoming [born into the world again]." "As, by the expression 'again,' here *habitualness* is meant to be implied,—there is first a birth, then death, then a birth; thus transmigration, commencing with a birth, ends [only] with [final] emancipation."[1]

Pain and final emancipation.

After defining pain (*du'kha*) as "that which is characterised by uneasiness,"[2] he declares that "absolute deliverance therefrom is emancipation (*aparvarga*)."[3]

Such is, in brief, Gautama's theory of the *summum bonum* and the means of its attainment. His *summum bonum* is absolute deliverance from pain; and this deliverance is to be attained by an abnegation of all action, good or bad. We proceed to review the *Sānkhya* theory.

SUMMARY OF THE SĀNKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

General character of the system.

The *Sānkhya*, as already observed, makes a step in advance of the *Nyāya*, towards the ultimate simplification aimed at in the *Vedānta*, by reducing the external from the category of *substance* to that of *quality*. Souls alone are, in the *Sānkhya*, regarded as substances; whatever affects the soul being

मृत्वा भावो जननं प्रेत्यभावः । तच्च पुन

Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of *pretyabhāva* as the "condition of the soul after death" (see his *Essays*, vol. i., p. 290), while it is literally correct, may mislead the reader if he does not bear in mind that this, according to Hindū notions, is the condition of *every man now alive*; for as we are all supposed to have lived and died, one knows not how often, we are each of us always in the condition "after death."

[2] बाधनालक्षणं दुःखम् ॥ २१ ॥

[3] तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः ॥ २२ ॥

ranged under the head of a quality,—1, pleasing; 2, displeasing; or, 3, indifferent. This mode of viewing the universe we have designated the emotional view of things.

Meaning of the name.

The word *Sānkhya* means "numeral, rational, or discriminative." The system promises beatitude as the reward of that discrimination which rightly distinguishes between soul and nature. What is here meant by "nature" will be explained presently.

The Sānkhya text-book.

The *Sānkhya* system was delivered by KAPILA in a set of aphorisms no less concise than those of the *Nyāya*. Kapila begins by defining the chief end of man. His first aphorism is as follows:—"Well, the complete cessation of pain, of three kinds, is the complete end of man."[1] By the three kinds of pain are meant—1, diseases and griefs, etc., which are intrinsic, or inherent in the sufferer; 2, injuries from ordinary external things; and, 3, injuries from things supernatural or meteorological. In his 19th aphorism he declares that the bondage (*bandha*) under which the soul (*purusha*) groans, is due to its conjunction with nature (*prakriti*); and this bondage is merely *seeming*, because soul is "ever essentially a pure and free intelligence." His words are,—"But not without the conjunction thereof [*i.e.* of nature] is there the connection of that [*i.e.* of pain] with that [*viz.* with the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence."[2] In his 59th aphorism, he says again, of the soul's

The chief end of man.

[1] अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः ॥ १ ॥

[2] न विनाऽपि तद्योगं पुंसः स्वभावतस्तद्योगादृते तु ॥ १९ ॥

bondage,—"It is merely verbal, and not a reality, since it resides in [the soul's organ] the *mind* [and not in the soul or self],"[1] on which the commentator observes,—"That is to say, since bondage, etc., resides only in the mind (*chitta*), all this, as far as concerns the soul (*purusha*), is merely verbal,—*i.e.*, it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,' because it is merely a *reflection*, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China rose is near it], but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China rose itself."[2]

Of nature, which, by its so-much-to-be-deprecated conjunction, makes the soul seem to be in bondage when it really is not, he gives in his 62nd aphorism the following account:—"Nature (*prakriti*) is the state of equipoise of goodness (*sattwa*), passion (*rajas*), and darkness (*tamas*);—from nature [proceeds] intellect (*mahat*), from intellect self-consciousness (*ahankāra*), from self-consciousness the five subtile elements (*tanmātra*) and both sets [external and internal] of organs (*indriya*), and from the subtile elements the gross elements (*sthūla-bhūta*); [then besides there is] soul (*purusha*);—such is the class of twenty-five."[3] Nature, what.

It might be interesting to probe the precise philosophic import of the successive development alleged in

[1] वाङ्मात्रं तत्तु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः ॥ ५९ ॥

[2] बन्धादीनां सर्वेषां चित्त एवावस्थानात्तत्सर्वमुदधे वाङ्मात्रं शब्दमात्रं स्फटिकलौहित्यवत्प्रतिबिम्बमात्रत्वात् नतु तत्त्वमनारोपितं जवाकौहित्यवदित्यर्थः ॥

[3] सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान् महतो ऽहङ्कारो ऽहङ्कारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राणि उभयमिन्द्रियं तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति पञ्चविंशतिगणः ॥ ६२ ॥

the foregoing aphorism; but the special aim of the present treatise (or of this treatise in its present shape) forbids whatever excursion can be safely dispensed with.

Liberation, what and when.

We shall here, therefore, only add, that we are told, in aphorism 105, that "experience [whether of pleasure or pain, liberation from both of which is desiderated], ends with [the discrimination of] thought [*i.e.* soul, as contradistinguished from nature]";[1] that a plurality of souls, in opposition to the *Vedānta*, is asserted in aphorism 150, "From the diverse allotment of birth, etc., the plurality of souls [is to be inferred]";[2] and that the paradoxical conception of the soul in bondage, whilst not really in bondage, may be illustrated by Don Quixote hanging in the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life till daybreak, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground.

Annihilation not sought.

It may be proper to observe that the *Sānkhya* explicitly repudiates the charge of craving *annihilation*. In aphorism 47 we are told that, "In neither way [whether as a means or as an end] is this [viz., annihilation] the soul's aim."[3]

We next advance to a survey of the *Vedānta* theory.

[1] चिद्वसानो भोगः ॥ १०५ ॥ That the word "thought" (*chit*) here means "soul" (*ātman*) we are told by the commentator—चिदात्मा ॥

[2] जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम् ॥ १५० ॥

[3] नापुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा ॥ ४७ ॥

SUMMARY OF THE VEDĀNTA SYSTEM.

Its great tenet.

The Vedānta theory arrives at the limit of simplification, by deciding that nothing really exists besides *one*, and that this one real being is absolutely simple. This one simple being, according to the *Vedānta*, is *knowledge* (*jnāna*),—not the knowledge *of* anything, for this would imply a contradiction to the dogma that nothing exists except knowledge simply. This conception, of the possible nature of knowledge, is quite at variance with the European view, which regards knowledge as the synthesis of subject and object. According to the *Vedanta* there is *no* object, and hence it follows that the term subject is not strictly applicable, any more than is the term substance,[1] to the one reality. Both of these terms, being indicative of a relation, are inapplicable under a theory which, denying duality, does not admit the conditions of a relation. Soul, the one reality, is accordingly spoken of in the *Vedānta*, not as a substance (*dravya*) as it is reckoned in the *Nyāya*, but as the *thing*, or, literally, "that which abides" (*vastu*). Let us enquire how this conception may have been arrived at, consistently with the seeming existence of the world.

The one reality, how designated.

Possible course of the Vedāntin's speculations.

Suppose that God — omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent — exists. Suppose, further, that, at some time or other, God

[1] At the opening of the *Vedānta-Sāra*, indeed, the one is spoken of as the substratum of all (*akhilādhāra*); but the existence of aught else being subsequently denied, it remains ultimately the substratum of nothing, or no *sub*-stratum at all.

exists and nothing else does. Suppose, in the next place, as held long in Europe and still in India, that nothing is made out of nothing (*ex nihilo nihil fit*); and suppose, finally, that God wills to make a world. Being omnipotent, He *can* make it. The dogma "ex nihilo nihil fit" being, by the hypothesis, an axiom, it follows that God, being able to make a world, can make it without making it out of *nothing*. The world so made must then consist of what previously existed,—*i.e.* of God. Now what do we understand by a world? Let it be an aggregate of souls with limited capacities—and of what these souls (rightly or wrongly) regard as objects—the special or intermediate causes of various modes of consciousness. Taking this to be what is meant by a world, how is God to form it out of Himself? God is omniscient,—and, in virtue of his omnipresence, his omniscience is everywhere. Where is the room for a *limited* intelligence? Viewing the matter (if that were strictly possible) *à priori*, one would incline to say "nowhere." But the Vedāntin, before he had got this length, was too painfully affected by the conviction, forced upon him, as on the rest of us, by a consciousness which will take no denial, that there *are* limited intelligences. "I am ignorant," he says; and if he is *wrong* in saying so, then (as a Pandit once remarked to me) his ignorance is established just as well as if he were right in saying so. Holding, then, that the soul *is* God, and confronted with the inevitable fact that the soul does *not* spontaneously *recognize* itself as God, there was nothing for it but to make the fact itself do duty as its own cause,

Why ignorance must be admitted.

to say that the soul does not know itself to be God, just because it does not know it,—*i.e.* because it is ignorant, —*i.e.* because it is obstructed by ignorance (*ajnāna*).[1]

At this point let us suppose that our speculator stopped, but that a disciple took up the matter and tried to make something more palpably definite out of the indefinite term *ignorance*. Were it not, he argues, for this *ajnāna*, of which my teacher speaks, the soul would know itself to be God, —there would be nothing but God,—there would be no world. It is this *ajnāna*, then, that *makes* the world; and, this being the case, it ought to have a name suggestive of the fact. Let it be called *prakriti*, the name by which the *Sānkhyas* speak of their unconscious maker of worlds.[2] Good, says another; but recollect that this *prakriti*, or "energy," can be nothing else than the power of the All-powerful, for we can admit the independent existence of God alone; so that the *ajnāna* which you have shown to be entitled to the name of *prakriti*, will be even more accurately denoted by the word *śakti*,[3] God's "power," by an exertion of which power alone the fact can be accounted for, that souls which are God *do not know* that they are so. The reasoning is accepted, and the term *śakti* is enrolled among the synonymes of *ajnāna*. Lastly comes the mythologist. You declare, says he, that this world would

How Ignorance may have got its various synonymes.

[1] अज्ञान ॥

[2] See the *Sānkhya* Aphorism, B. I. § 127,—चेतना "Of both [nature, or 'the radical energy,' and her products] the fact that they consist of the three qualities, and that they are *unthinking*, etc., is the common property]."

[3] शक्ति ॥

not even appear to be real, were it not for *ignorance*. Its apparent reality, then, is an *illusion*; and for the word *ajnāna* you had better substitute the more expressive term *māyā*,[1] "deceit, illusion, jugglery." The addition of this to the list of synonymes being acquiesced in, the mythologist furnishes his *māyā* with all the requisites of a goddess, and she takes her seat in his pantheon as the wife of *Brahmā* the Creator.

Ignorance, how defined in the Vedānta.

The definition of "ignorance," in the *Vedānta*, requires notice. Ignorance, we are informed, is "a somewhat that is not to be called positively either real or unreal, — [not a mere negation, but] in the shape of an entity, the opponent of knowledge,—consisting of the three fetters."[2] According to the *Naiyāyikas*, *ajnāna* is merely the privation (*abhāva*) of *jnāna*. To exclude such a meaning here it is asserted to be "in the shape of an entity" (*bhāva-rūpa*). The description of it as something "not to be called positively either real or unreal" corresponds with Plato's ὀν και μη ὀν, as distinguished from the ὀντως ὀν.[3] The distinction is that of the phenomenal and the real. The universe being held to be the joint result of soul and ignorance, and soul being the only substance, or "substratum of all," it follows that ignorance is equivalent to and identical with the sum total of *qualities*. These, as in the *Sānkhya* system, are held to be three; so that ignorance, as we have just seen, is spoken of as "con-

[1] माया ॥

[2] अज्ञानम्[illegible]दसदभ्यामनिर्वचनीयं त्रिगुणात्मकं भावरूपं ज्ञानविरोधि यत्किञ्चिदिति वदन्ति ॥

[3] See Sir Wm. Hamilton's note on Reid's works, p. 262.

sisting of the three qualities" (*triguṇatmaka*), or, as it may be also rendered, "consisting of the three *fetters*," the word for "quality" (viz., *guṇa*), meaning originally a "fetter," and these two senses, in Hindū philosophy, being closely related.[1] Let us see what can have led to the division of quality into three.

The one reality—the universal substratum veiled by the garb of the phenomenal world, certain marked distinctions of character among the phenomena present themselves. We have phenomena of pure cognition, of lively emotion, and, finally, of inertness, or, in Shakspere's phrase, "cold obstruction." To one or other of these three heads every phenomenon may, with a little ingenuity, be referred. The three heads are named respectively, in Sanskrit, *sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.[2] According to the commentators, the first of the qualities, whilst endlessly subdivisible into calmness, complacency, patience, rejoicing, etc., consists summarily of *happiness*. The second, on the other hand, consists summarily of *pain*. To these categories belong almost all the sensations and thoughts of thinking beings;—scarcely any feeling, viewed strictly, being one of sheer *indifference*. This *indifference*, the third of the qualities, is exemplified in

[1] See the *Sānkhya Pravachana Bhāshya* on Aphorism 62, Bk I., viz.:—

समवदादिरज्जुनिर्मातृत्वाच्च प्रयुज्यते ॥ "In this [*Sānkhya*] system, and in Scripture, etc., the word 'quality' (*guṇa*) is employed [as the name of the three things under discussion], because they are subservient to soul [and hold a secondary rank in the scale of being], and because they form the *cords* [which the word *guṇa* also signifies], viz., understanding, etc., which consist of the three [so-called] qualities, and which *bind*, as if it were a [cow or other] brute, the soul."

[2] सत्त्व । रजस् । तमस् ॥

its highest potency in such things as stocks and stones, where soul, the substratum of these as of all else, is altogether "immersed in matter," or obfuscated by the quality of *darkness*, as the word *tamas*, the name of the quality, literally signifies. In its lower potencies this third of the qualities exemplifies itself in sloth, drowsiness, etc.

These three qualities, separately or commingled, more or less obscure the soul, which is held to be simple *knowledge—jnāna*; and as the aggregate of them is the opposite of soul, or, in other words, *not*-soul, the aggregate, as we have seen, takes the name of *a-jnāna*, *i.e.* *not*-knowledge, or "ignorance." The soul is often spoken of as a *light*. Now, suppose a lamp to be enclosed in a lamp-shade; the glass may be either so pure that the light passes through scarcely diminished; or it may be stained, so that the light is tinged and partly dimmed; or the lamp-shade may be of opaque materials, so that the light within is altogether obstructed. These three cases may perhaps illustrate the supposed operation of the three qualities, as well as account for the names by which they are spoken of as "purity," "foulness," and "darkness" (*sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*).

The operation of the qualities illustrated.

"Ignorance," according to the *Vedānta*, has two *powers*; that by which it *envelopes* soul, giving rise to the conceit of personality or conscious individuality, and that by which it *projects* the phantasmagoria of a world which the individual regards as external to himself.[1] Soul thus invested is what the universe consists of.

[1] अज्ञानज्ञानावरणविक्षेपनामकं शक्तिद्वयमस्ति ॥

The supposed root of all evil—the belief that aught besides the "one" exists—is to be got rid of, we are told, by a right understanding of the great sentence, "That art thou," *i.e.*, "Thou—whosoever thou art—art the one." When this dictum has been rightly understood and accepted, the accepter of it, changing the "thou" to the first person, reflects thus—"*I* am the one." This is so far well; but he must finally get rid of the habit of making even *himself* an *object* of thought. There must be *no* object. What was previously the *subject* must now remain alone,—an entity, a thought, a joy; but these three being one only—the existent joy-thought.[1]

Means of emancipation, according to the Vedānta.

Let us now contrast the scheme of Christian revelation with these three Hindū theories of man and of the universe.

[1] See our "Lecture on the *Vedānta*, embracing the text of the *Vedānta Sāra*" (Allahabad, 1851), §§ 95-152.

CHRISTIANITY

CONTRASTED WITH

HINDŪ PHILOSOPHY.

BOOK I.

A PARTIAL EXPOSITION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

MAY God, the giver of all good, the Saviour of those who believe on Him, accept this my humble effort in His service; and may the hearers of it, those skilled in the *Vedānta*, the *Sānkhya*, and the *Nyāya*, with discriminating judgment examine it candidly.[1]

भगवद् बुद्धा
मत्सराः ॥

In the first place the writer states the subject of the proposed work.

[1] As an argument can be satisfactorily addressed only to one whose sentiments are definitely known, what follows in Sanskrit is addressed, we may remark, to the Vedāntin who knows and values the *Nyāya* and the *Sānkhya* as introductory to the *Vedānta*. The question here is not what do those need to be told who know nothing, but what do those need to be told who know just what Hindūism can tell.

APHORISM I.

inquiry

Now the inquiry regards the means of the attainment of the chief end of man.

अथ परमपुरुषार्थप्राप्त्युपायजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥

(1) Next he states the definition of the chief end of man.

। २ । अथ परमपुरुषार्थस्य लक्षणमाह ।

APHORISM II.

Man's chief end.

Man's chief end is to glorify God, and enjoy Him for ever.

देवमाहात्म्यवर्द्धनमनघं तत्सान्निध्यसुखास्वादनञ्चेति द्वयं परमपुरुषार्थः ॥ २ ॥

(1) What is God, will be stated in the fifth Aphorism. If it be said that it is impossible to glorify God because man cannot add in the slightest degree to the glory of God, we reply:—Not so,—because by glorifying God we mean the acknowledging His perfections, and behaving suitably to them, by trusting, loving, and obeying Him.

। १ । देवस्य लक्षणं पञ्चमसूत्रे वक्ष्यते । ननु देवमाहात्म्यवर्द्धनं न सम्भवति देवमहात्म्ये लेशतोऽप्याधिक्यस्य पुरुषेण विधातुमशक्यत्वादिति चेन्न । तन्माहात्म्यवर्द्धनस्य तदीयगुणपूर्त्तिस्वीकारः श्रद्धया भक्त्यानुवृत्त्या च तद्गुणानुरूपाचरणमिति द्वयरूपत्वात् ।

(2) To enjoy God [to experience the joy of His pre-

। २ । तत्सान्निध्यसुखास्वा-

sence] is to be the object of His special favour here and hereafter.

(3) But the *Nyāya* [Bk. I., § 22] says that the chief end of man is the absolute cessation of pain; and the *Sānkhya* [Bk. I., § 1] says that it is entire liberation from all the three kinds of pain: why, abandoning that simpler view, is this new definition made? If you say this, then take this in reply:—Since such a *summum bonum*, implying nothing more than a state of nonenity, and unconnected with any sort of moral action, might satisfy beasts indeed [such as tortoises or dormice], but not men, therefore ought a different definition of the chief end of man, *e.g.* as above laid down, to be accepted.

(4) But then, it may be said, the Vedāntins say that, all pain having surceased on the final intuition of deity, the chief end of man consists in the soul's then spontaneous manifestation of the joy which is its

दृगस्येहामुष्मिन् लोके विशिष्टतत्कृपाभागित्वम् ।

। ३ । ननु दुःखात्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्ग इति न्यायविदः तथाविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरात्यन्तपुरुषार्थ इति साङ्ख्या आहुः किमिति तद्दर्शनं विहायाभिनवमेतत् तस्य लक्षणं क्रियत इति चेत् तादृशो हि परमपुरुषार्थः केवलं शून्यावस्थात्मकत्वाद् धर्माधर्माधिकारानुरूपक्रियाजातविरहितो ऽत्यन्तालसान् पशूनेव प्रीणयेन्नतु मनुष्यानिति पूर्वोक्तमेव परमपुरुषार्थलक्षणं याङ्ग्मिति गृहाण ।

। ४ । ननु परमब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारेण सर्वदुःखोपशान्तौ जीवस्य स्वत एव स्वस्वरूपानन्दाविष्कारो ब्रह्मणि लयस्य परमपुरुषार्थ इति वेदान्तिनो वदन्ति तदनादृत्य किं तत

own essence, and in its mergence in deity. Why then, disregarding this, need anything higher than this be sought? If you say this, then hearken:—Since there is no evidence that there is such a chief end of man as is imagined by the Vedāntins, the chief end of man had to be enquired after, and it is that which was stated before. Moreover, the opinion of the Vedāntins shall be subjected to examination in the concluding section of Book II.

उक्तश्चेत् स्मर्यत इति चेत् श्रृणु वेदान्त्यभिमते परमपुरुषार्थे मानाभावादुक्तस्वरूपः परमपुरुषार्थो स्मर्यते। अपिचेदं वेदान्तिमतं द्वितीयाध्यायस्यान्तिमप्रकरणे परीक्षिष्यते।

(5) But then, it may be asked, where is the evidence of this, too, which you have asserted, viz., that man's chief end is to glorify God and enjoy Him for ever? We reply: Say not so; because the evidence of this is the plain argument that, if there is an omnipotent Ruler of all, then the supposition that man's chief end can be irrespective of His favour, would be incongruous.

। ५। ननु देवमाहात्म्यवर्द्धनमनन्तं तत्सान्निध्यसुखास्वादनञ्चेत्यनयोः परमपुरुषार्थत्वं यदुक्तं तत्रापि किं मानमिति चेन्न तत्रानुमानस्यैव प्रमाणत्वात् तथाहि यदि तावत् सर्वशक्तिर्जगन्नियामकः कश्चिदस्ति तर्हि तस्य प्रसादमनपेक्ष्यैव पुरुषाणां परमपुरुषार्थसिद्धिकल्पनात्यन्तमसङ्गतैव स्यादिति।

(6) Well, granting that

। ६। अथ स्वीक्रियतां सर्व-

there *is* an omnipotent Ruler, still what evidence is there that there exist any means of obtaining His favour? With an eye to this, we declare as follows:—

अस्तिर्निर्धामकस्तथापि केषाञ्चित् तत्प्रसादप्राप्त्युपायानां सत्त्वे किं मानमित्याकाङ्क्षायामाह।

APHORISM III.

The rule for Man's direction his

The word of God, which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, is the only rule to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy Him.

पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्ग्रन्थस्थानि देवस्य वचांस्येव केवलं तत्माहात्म्यवर्द्धनानन्ततत्साक्षिसुखास्वादनयोरितिकर्त्तव्यताबोधकानि ॥ ३ ॥

(1) If it be asked how the sentences which stand in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God, we reply that they are so because they were composed by the makers of the books under the influence of God's power. And, in respect of this, the operation of God's power is in three ways: to explain,—1, God sometimes suggested to the writers the words as well as the matter; 2, and sometimes the matter

।१। ननु पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्ग्रन्थस्थानां वाक्यानां देवोक्तत्वं कथमिति चेत् देवशक्तिव्यापारद्वारा तेषां ग्रन्थकारैर्निबन्धनात्। तच्च देवशक्तिव्यापारस्त्रेधा तथाहि कदाचिद् देवो निबन्धृभ्यो ऽर्थमिव शब्दमप्युपदिदेश। कदाचित्तर्थमेव सच्च निबन्धकारैर्वाच्यं वाक्यैरुपनिबद्धः। कदाचिच्च कस्यचिदुपलब्धार्थस्य निबन्धने प्रवृत्तेभ्यो विस्मरणादिदोषे-

only, which was put into language by the writers according to their own genius; 3, and at other times He guarded the writers from errors of memory, etc., to which they might have been liable in narrating a matter with which they had been previously acquainted.

(2) If it be asked how a communication could be made without words, then hearken: We do not now undertake to explain this; but that there actually are means of revelation such as it is impossible to explain to others who are debarred from knowing through such means, we cite an example to show. Our illustration is as follows:—In a certain village, the whole of the inhabitants were blind from their birth, and one of them obtained his sight by means of a surgical operation. His companions having learned that he was able to describe what was going on at a great distance even better than they themselves

भ्यो निबन्धृणां वारणमकरोदिति।

।२। ननु कथं शब्दं विनैवार्थोपदेश इति चेच्छृणु। नवयमेतदिदानीमुपपादयामः परन्तु तादृशा अप्यपूर्वज्ञानोपायाः सन्ति यांस्तज्ज्ञानरहितेभ्यो ऽन्येभ्यः प्रतिपादयितुं न शक्नोतीत्येतत्प्रदर्शनाय दृष्टान्तं दर्शयामः। यथा। कस्मिंश्चिद् ग्रामे सर्व एव पुरुषा जन्मनान्धा आसन्। तेषु च केनचिद् वैद्योपचारवशाद् दृष्टिरासादिता। अथात्यन्तसमीपे ऽपि जायमानानां कार्याणां यावद् वर्णनं वयं कर्तुं शक्नुमस्ततो ऽप्यतिसमीचीनमतिदूरस्थानामपि कार्याणां वर्णनं कर्त्तुमेष शक्नोतीति

could tell what was going on close beside them, desired him to say by what means it was that this knowledge reached him. He endeavoured to declare it to them, but he found his endeavours useless. They could not in any way understand how a knowledge of the shape of objects not within reach of his hand could enter by the front of his head; but that such knowledge really did belong to the man, those who candidly investigated the truth of his words became assured. The application of the illustration to the matter illustrated is obvious.

ज्ञात्वा तस्य सहचाराः केनोपायेन भवानिदं ज्ञानं प्राप्नोतीति कथयेति तं प्रार्थयामासुः। स च तेषां समाधानाय प्रायतत स्वप्रयत्नांश्च व्यर्थानपश्यत् यतो हस्तेनालभ्यानामपि विषयाणामाकारस्य ज्ञानं शिरःप्राग्भागावच्छेदेन जायत इति बोद्धुं ते कथमपि नाशक्नुवन् परन्तु ये मत्सररहिताः सन्तस्तदीयवचनस्य तत्त्वं विचारयामासुस्ते तादृशं ज्ञानं तस्मिन् पुरुषे वस्तुतो वर्त्तत इति निश्चिता अभूवन्निति। अस्यच दृष्टान्तस्य दार्ष्टान्तिके योजनं स्पष्टम्

(3) If it be asked: But what proof is there that the words contained in the Old and New Testament declare the truth? —then listen. The evidence of it is of two kinds, external and internal. First, the truthfulness of the Old Testament is proved by the testimony of Jesus Christ, the Son of God,

।३। ननु पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्ग्रन्थस्थानां वचसां यथार्थाभिधायकत्वे किं मानमिति चेच्छृणु। द्विविधं हि तत्र मानं बाह्याभ्यन्तरञ्चेति। तत्र प्रथमं यथा। पूर्वसंविद्ग्रन्थस्य तत्त्वार्थाभिधायित्वं मनुष्यशरीरेणावतीर्णस्य देवपुत्रस्य देवाद-

incarnate in human form, and one with God. That Jesus Christ possessed the character just stated, is proved by the words of the New Testament. That the New Testament declares what is true, is proved by the testimony of the disciples of Jesus, who could not have been mistaken, and who could have had no reason for asserting what was not true. This point will be discussed more fully in Book II. The second [the internal evidence] is the tendency of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to the glorifying of God and to the promoting the happiness of mortals, — the mutual consistency of all their parts, etc. This also there will be frequent occasion to advert to.

(4) If it be said: But, though the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament be not inconsistent among themselves, yet they cannot declare the truth, inasmuch as they are inconsistent with the *Veda*,

भिन्नस्य ऋष्टस्य वचनात् सिद्धति । ऋष्टस्योक्तविधत्वं उत्तरसंविद्वन्यवचनात् सिद्धति । उत्तरसंविद्वन्यस्य यथार्थाभिधायकत्वं स्वप्रमाणवक्तृत्वे कारणरहितानां निर्भ्रमाणाञ्च ऋष्टशिष्याणां वचनैः सिद्धम् । एषच विषयो विस्तरेण द्वितीयाध्याये विवेचयिष्यते । द्वितीयं यथा । पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्यवचनानां देवमाहात्म्यवर्द्धनानुकूलत्वं मर्त्यजातिकल्याणवृद्ध्यनुकूलत्वं सर्वेष्वंशेषु परस्परा विरोधश्चेत्यादि । इदमपि बहुधा सप्रपञ्चं निरूपयिष्यते ।

। ४ । ननु पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्यस्यवचनानां परस्परा विरोधेऽपि वेदविरोधादेव तत्त्वार्थविधायकत्वं न सम्भवतीति चेन्न । उक्तयुक्त्या तेषां तत्त्वार्थाभिधायकत्वसिद्धौ तद्विरो-

we reply: Not so; because, their truthfulness having been established by the foregoing reasoning, it is of the Vedas themselves, in consequence of this inconsistency, that the authoritativeness is disproved. The nugatory pretension to authority on the part of the Veda will be disposed of in Book II.

धाद् वेदानामेव प्रामाण्यसिद्धेः । इयञ्च निरर्थिका वेदप्रामाण्यदुराशा द्वितीयाध्याये निवारयिष्यते ।

(5) Next we state what matters are principally declared in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament.

। ५ । अथ पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्थस्थानां वचसां प्राधान्येनाभिधेयमर्थमाह ।

APHORISM IV.

What the Scriptures principally teach.

The Scriptures principally teach what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man.

यादृशं देवस्य रूपं मर्त्येण श्रद्धेयं यादृशानि वा मनुष्योचितानि कार्याणि देवो ऽपेक्षते तदुभयं पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्था अभिदधति ॥ ४ ॥

(1) We now state what is declared in Scripture concerning the nature of God.

। १ । अथ यादृशं देवस्य रूपं तच्चोक्तं तदाह ।

APHORISM V.

What we are to believe concerning God.

God is a spirit [a certain non-material substance], infinite, eter-

देवो नामानादिनिधनो निर्विकारैः सत्ताज्ञानशक्ति-

nal, and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

(1) But then, if it be argued that such is the nature of God, why say that it is by the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament that such a character of God is made known, seeing that God is declared by the Veda also to be a spirit, from everlasting to everlasting, and this we her it be that this which is declared in the Vedas was derived from primitive tradition, or from the power of conscience placed by God in the human heart, either way we welcome it. But where are God's justice, goodness, and truth, declared in the Vedas? Nay, rather these characteristics are in the Veda denied to be possible in God. For example, to whom should the God (*Brahm*) of the *Vedānta*, if just, be just, since there is none besides himself? For the same reason,

पाविश्यन्यायित्वसाधुत्वसत्यवक्तृत्वादिभिर्गुणैर्युक्तश्चाभीतिकद्व्यविशेषः ॥ ५ ॥

। २। ननु यद्येतादृग्रूपमेव देवस्य स्वरूपमभिमतं तर्हि किमर्थमिदमुच्यते पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्ग्रन्थाभ्यामेवैवंविधं देवस्य स्वरूपं प्रतिपाद्यत इति वेदेनाप्यनाद्यनन्ताविकरात्मरूपस्य देवस्य प्रतिपादनादिति चेत् सत्यम्। यदेतद् वेदेषु वर्णितं तत् तावत् पूर्वपूर्वसम्प्रदायप्राप्तमस्त्यथवा देवेन मर्त्यमात्रस्य हृदये निहिताया उचितानुचितविवेचनशक्तेर्योगेन प्राप्तमस्तु उभयथापि वयं तमर्थमाद्रियामहे। परन्तु वेदेषु देवस्य न्यायित्वसाधुत्वसत्यवक्तृत्वानि च प्रतिपादितानि सन्ति। प्रत्युत ते धर्मा देवे प्रतिषिद्धाः। तथाच वेदान्तगोचरं ब्रह्म न्यायि भवत् कं प्रति न्यायि स्यात् स्वातिरिक्तस्य कस्याप्यभावात्। अत एव

to whom should he be good or true? Nay, rather, since he is the sole being in existence, it must be himself whom he deludes by the phantasmagoria of a false creation.

(2) That God is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, it is unnecessary to demonstrate to the Vedāntin. As for the assertion by the author of the *Sānkhya* [in his Aph. 93 of Bk. I.], that the fact of there being a "Lord" (*īśwara*) is unproved,—the import of this is explained by the commentators to be, that it is not intended, by the expression "For a Lord is unproved," to a Lord, but that the author of the *Sānkhya* denies that he is bound to show the consistency of certain of his own statements with other statements which, he says, are "unproved,"—and so, until his opponent shall have proved them, he is under no obligation to take them into consideration.

(3) Again, as for what the

तत् साधु सत्यवक्तृ वा कं प्रति स्यात्। प्रत्युत तद्द्वितीयत्वात् स्वं प्रति मिथ्याभूतसृष्टिप्रदर्शनेनात्मवञ्चकमेव तत्।

।२। तच्च देवस्यानाद्यनन्ताविकारित्वानां साधनं वेदान्तिनां पुरतो नावश्यकम्। यत्तु साङ्ख्याचार्य ईश्वरासिद्धेरित्याह तस्य तात्पर्यं तत्रैव टीकाकारैरेवमुपवर्णितं यदीश्वरासिद्धेरित्यनेन नेश्वरनिषेधो ऽभिप्रेत आचार्यस्यापितसिद्धविषयकवाक्यैः केषाञ्चिदाप्तानां विरोधपरिहारावश्यकत्वं तथा यावत् परो न साधयति तावत् तदिचारानावश्यकत्वञ्च साङ्ख्याचार्यो निषेधतीति।

।३। यत् पुनः साङ्ख्या चा-

Sānkhyas say, that if there be any primal energy, competent to produce the world, then let it be called Nature, or the chief one; but, in that case, the supposition of an all-directing Lord is superfluous. We reply: Not so; because there is a plain contradiction in holding that a primal energy, competent to the production of the world, labours for soul's end, and is at the same time unintelligent, — inasmuch as the working towards an end is proof of intelligence. This shall be set forth diffusively in Book III.

(4) The followers of the *Nyāya* [see the *Siddhānta Muktāvali*, p. 2], in demonstration of the being of a God, say that "such productions as a water-jar are produced by a maker, and so also are the vegetable sprouts and the earth, etc.; and to make these is not possible for such as we are; hence the existence of the Lord, as the Maker of these, is demonstrated."

ङ: यदि जगज्जननानुकूला प्रधानशक्तिः कापि वर्तते तर्हि तस्याः प्रकृतिरिति प्रधानमिति वा व्यवहारः क्रियतां परन्तु तथा सति सर्वनियामकेश्वराभ्युपगमो निरर्थक इति। तत्र। जगज्जननानुकूलप्रधानशक्तेः पुरुषार्थप्रवृत्तिश्लीनताया जडतायाश्च स्वीक्रियमाणायाः स्फुटं विरोधात्। प्रवृत्तेश्चैतन्यलिङ्गत्वात्। एतच्च तृतीये ऽध्याये विस्तरेण वक्ष्यते।

। ४। नैयायिकास्त्वीश्वरसत्त्वसाधनायेदमाहुः यथा घटादिकार्यं कर्तृजन्यं तथा चित्यङ्कुरादिकमपि। नच तत्कर्तृत्वमस्मदादीनां सम्भवति अतस्तत्कर्तृत्वेनेश्वरसिद्धिरिति।

(5) But, it may be objected, that the assertion that God is a spiritual substance cannot be true; because what is spiritual is without parts, whereas in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament there is mention of God's eyes, hands, and other bodily parts. But we reply: Not so; because there the expressions, "eyes," etc., are figurative, the word "eyes" signifying knowledge, "hands" signifying power, and so on.

।५। नन्वभौतिकद्रव्यविशेषो देव इत्युक्तं तत्र सम्भवति अभौतिकत्वस्य निरवयवत्वरूपत्वात् पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्ग्रन्थयोश्च देवस्य चक्षुर्हस्तादिशरीरावयवानामुक्तत्वादिति। तत्र। तत्र चक्षुरादिनिर्देशस्य गौणत्वात्। तथाहि चक्षुः पदं ज्ञानबोधाय हस्तपदं शक्तिबोधायेत्यादि।

(6) It being thus settled, then, that God exists, we deny that there are more gods than one. For—

।६। अथैवं देवस्य सिद्धौ तदनेकत्वं प्रतिषेधति।

APHORISM VI.

The unity of God.

There is but one God, the living and true God.

चेतनः सत्यश्च देव एक एव ॥६॥

(1) We say "living," in order to exclude idols; and "true," in order to exclude imaginary gods.

।१। चेतनत्वं मूर्तीनां व्यावृत्तये। सत्यत्वं काल्पनिकानां व्यावृत्तये।

(2) If it be said that there is no proof that there is but

।२। नन्वेतादृशेश्वरपदाभिधेयस्य देवस्यैकत्वे च क्वि-

such God as is here designated "the Lord," we reply: Not so; because both reasoning and Scripture furnish proof of this. The reasoning is this, that God is one, because a unity of design runs through all created things.

(3) Now, in order to obviate the doubt how we are justified in saying that only one God is declared in Scripture, when, in the New Testament, three persons are spoken of under the name of God, we declare as follows:—

सिद्धमानमिति चेन्न अनुमानागमयोश्च प्रमाणत्वात्। तथाच प्रयोगः देव एकः तत्सृष्टानां सर्वेषां पदार्थानामेकफलपर्यवसायित्वादिति।

।३। ननूत्तरसंदिग्धे त्रयः पुरुषा देवपदेन व्यवह्रियन्ते तथाच कथमुच्यते एक एव देव आगमेन प्रतिपाद्यत इति शङ्कां निरसितुमाह।

APHORISM VII.

There are three persons in the Godhead, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one the same in substance, equal in power and glory.

पिता पुत्रः पवित्रात्मेति त्रयो देवत्वविशिष्टा अभिन्नाश्चान्यूनानतिरिक्तशक्तिमाहत्म्यादिकाः सन्ति॥ ७॥

(1) This dogma will be discussed in the Fourth Book.

।१। एष सिद्धान्तश्चतुर्थेऽध्याये विचारयिष्यते।

(2) Having thus far described the nature of God, we proceed to describe the nature of what is other than He.

।२। अथैवं देवस्वरूपनिरूपणं परिसमाप्य तदितरपदार्थस्वरूपं निरूपयति।

APHORISM VIII.

Creation. God made all things of nothing, by his mere word, in the space of six days, and all very good.

देवः शब्दमात्रेण षड्भिर्दिनैः सर्वाणि वस्तून्यसत उदपादयत् तानिच सर्वथः साधून्येव ॥ ८ ॥

(1) But how is it possible that God "made all things of nothing?" We retort: How should it not be possible? To explain,—We ask you in turn, how does fire burn fuel? If you answer, from the nature of things,—then we rejoin that it is the same in the case before us [—God makes things out of nothing "from the nature of things"]. If you ask, how can this or that thing be produced without the aggregate of its concurrent causes? we reply, that the doubt would be a fitting one if we were speaking of *men's* works; for we do not assert that a potter can make a jar without a lump of clay, or a weaver a web without yarn, and so on: but this doubt is inapplicable to

। १ । ननु कथं सम्भवति सर्वाणि वस्तून्यसत उदपादयदिति । न कथं सम्भवति । तथाहि त्वमेवं प्रतिप्रष्टव्यः कथमग्निरिन्धनानां दाहं करोतीति । स्वभावादिति चेत् प्रष्टृते ऽपि तुल्यम् । विनैव तत्तत्पदार्थोपादानकारणकलापं कथं तत्तत्पदार्थोत्पत्तिरिति चेत् युज्येतैषा शङ्का यदि मनुष्यकर्तृकसृष्टेरेष प्रक्रमः स्यात् नहि वयं कुलालकुविन्दादीनां विनैव मृत्पिण्डतन्त्वादिकं घटपटाद्युत्पादनसामर्थ्यं प्रतिपादयामः । प्रक्रान्ते सर्वलोकातीतसामर्थ्यशालिनि परमेश्वरे तु नैषा शङ्का युक्ता । यदिचास्म-

the case in question, of the Supreme Lord possessed of power beyond that of all creatures. And if we suppose, from the example of the like of us, that God's power of creation also is dependent on an aggregate of concurrent causes, then we ought to suppose, from the example of the child's walking with the support of the nurse's finger [see the *Raghuvanśa*, canto iii., v. 25], that your power also of walking [—grown-up person as you are—] is dependent on the support of a nurse's finger.

दादिदृष्टान्तेनेश्वरस्याणुपादानकारणकलापपराधीनसर्ज्जनसामर्थ्यवत्त्वं कल्प्यते तर्हि धात्रीकरशाखावलम्बेनोच्चलनं बालं दृष्टान्तमादाय यूनामपि धात्रीकरशाखावलम्बपराधीनोच्चलनसामर्थ्यवत्त्वं कल्प्येत।

(2) And if you say that the world could not have arisen from nothing, because what exists must have been without beginning, on the rule that nothing comes of nothing ["ex nihilo nihil fit"],—then we reply: Not so; for there is no proof that there is any such absolute rule, and an unsupported allegation deserves to be met only by an unsupported [or blank] negative. Moreover, were the case as you say,

।२। यदि च सत एवोत्पत्तिर्नासत इति नियमाद् यद्यदुत्पन्नं तदनाद्येवेति नासतो जगदुत्पत्तिसम्भव इति चेन्न। तथाविधे नियमे मानाभावात्। निर्हेतुकस्यचाद्येपक्ष निर्हेतुकेनैव नेत्यनेन निरासयोग्यत्वात्। अपिचैवं सति पुरुषाणां क्षणं जायमानसुखदुःखसाक्षात्कारोऽनादिरतस्मानन्तः स्यात्। नान्तः

then the feeling, whether of pleasure or of pain, which at any moment arises in the mind of a man, must have existed eternity, and as such must be imperishable. If it be rejoined that what we assert is the arising not merely of real changes of the mind, but the arising also of substances, we reply: Say not so; for that makes no difference:—if you yourself admit that mental states, not previously existing, do arise, how should this be wrong in the case of substances?

करणपरिणामानां सतामेवोत्पत्तिरुच्यते ऽपितु द्रव्याणामिति चेन्न विशेषाभावात् यदि तावच्चित्तवृत्तीनामसतीनामुत्पत्तिरिष्यते किमपराद्धं द्रव्यैः।

(3) But still, it may be said, it is impossible that God should have made all things out of nothing, because the souls of men, etc., are without beginning. To this we reply: Not so. To explain:—That the ground of all is the One Self-existent we are both agreed. Such being the case, there remains the consideration—whence has come the existence of anything apart from Him?—and this is entirely hidden with

। ३। ननु तथापि सर्वाणि वस्तून्यसत उत्पादयदिति न सम्भवति जीवात्मनामनादित्वादिति चेन्न। तथाहि। सर्वेषां मूलभूतः कश्चित् स्वयम्भूरस्तीति तावन्निर्विवादमावयोः। एवं सति तस्मादतिरिक्तस्य कस्यापि सत्त्वं कस्मादायातमिति चिन्तावशिष्यते। तच्चेदं सर्वथा देवगुह्यं यस्योपादानं स स्वयम्भूरेव कर्त्तुमकर्त्तु-

God, and can be explained by ; alone, and by none other. But this is agreed, alike by those who accept the authority of the Vedas and by those who accept the authority of the Bible, that there is so much of difference between the existence of the Self-existent and the existence of the human soul, that rules are required for the guidance of men,—otherwise what need of the Vedas? what need of the Bible? In the Bible there is no discussion as to how the human soul is numerically different from God; but rules are laid down for human guidance, clearly on the understanding that the difference is a fact. If, therefore, the Bible be acknowledged to be the Word of God, to say that the human soul is not numerically different from the Lord would be to make God a liar. And it must not be said that the difference between God and the soul is illusory and not real, because such illusoriness is in-

ति नान्वः। इदन्तु वेदप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृभिः पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्यप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृभिश्च तुल्यमेव स्वीक्रियते यत् स्वयमुपलभ्यतो जीवसत्ताया इयान् विशेषो यज्जीवानां प्रवृत्तये केषाञ्चिन्नियमानामपेक्षा वर्तत इति। अन्यथा हि किं वेदैः किं वा पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्याभ्यां प्रयोजनम्। पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्ययोर्हि न जीवेश्वरभेदकथनाभावो विचार्यते किन्तु तयोर्भेदं सिद्धवन्निर्दिश्य जीवप्रवृत्तिनियमा अभिधीयन्ते। यदि तु पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्ययोरीश्वरप्रणीतत्वं स्वीक्रियत्यापि ताभ्यां प्रतिपादितो जीवेश्वरव्यक्तिभेदो नाभ्युपेयते तर्हीश्वरस्यासत्यवक्तृत्वमेव स्वीकृतं स्यात्। नच जीवेश्वरयोर्भेदो माथिको नतु तात्त्विक इति वाच्यम् प्रत्यक्षसिद्धस्य माथिकत्वायोगादिति।

consistent with the facts of consciousness.

So much, in our elucidation of the First Book, that devoted to the exposition of the dogmas about which we wish to speak.

इति सङ्क्षेपधर्मकौमुद्यां विवक्षितसिद्धान्तोद्देशो नाम प्रथमोऽध्यायः ॥

BOOK II.

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

Now we commence a second Book in order to establish what was treated under the 3rd Aphorism of the preceding Book as if already established, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the Word of God. It was there stated [Aph. III. 3] that the authority of the contents of the Old Testament is established by force of the declarations of Christ conveyed in the New Testament, and that the authority of the declarations of Christ is established by the testimony of His disciples. And all this is founded on historical inference, so that by those can it be clearly understood who, by

अथ पूर्वाध्याये तृतीयसूत्रे सिद्धवन्निर्दिष्टं पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्वन्न्यायोरीश्वरोक्तत्वं व्यवस्थापयितुं द्वितीयाध्यायमारभते। तत्रोत्तरसंविद्वन्न्यायस्य तृष्टवचनबलेन पूर्वसंविद्वन्न्यायस्य प्रामाण्यं तृष्टवचनस्यतु तच्छिष्यवचनबलात् प्रामाण्यं सिद्धतीत्यभिहितं तच्च सर्वमैतिह्यानुमानमूलकमतो येविवेचनानुकूलेन धीशक्तिसंस्कारेण प्रमाणतत्त्वविवेचननिपुणास्तैः स्वतृष्टवेद्यमतं तृतिहासपरिचयात् तृष्टमतस्येश्वरादायतत्वविषये याः साधिका युक्तयो ऽवगम्यन्ते ता वक्तुमुपक्रमते।

the appropriate culture of their mental faculties, have become skilled in discriminating the reality [from the semblance] of evidence. We therefore proceed to state what valid arguments, in respect of the fact that the Christian religion came from God, are derivable from the stores of history.

APHORISM I.

the of a religion.

A religion attested by miracles is from God, and the Christian religion is attested by miracles, therefore it is from God.

(1) The miracles performed by Christ, in order to establish the fact that he was sent by God, are such as these:—His giving, by a word merely, eyes to the blind and life to the dead; and His Himself rising again alive on the third day after he had been put to death.

(2) But, it may be asked: Granting that miracles displayed could be so only through

यद्यन्मतमद्भुतचरितोपपन्नं तदीश्वरादायातं दृष्टमतश्चाद्भुतचरितोपपन्नमतस्तदीश्वरादायातम् ॥ १ ॥

। १। स्वेश्वरप्रेरितत्वं द्रढयितुं दृष्टेन ह्यतान्यद्भुतचरितानि तावदिमानि तथाहि वचनमात्रेणान्धेभ्यो नयनदानं मृतेभ्यो जीवनदानं स्वस्य वधानन्तरं तृतीयदिनेपुनर्जीवित्वोत्थानमित्यादीनि ।

। २। ननु प्रदर्शितान्यद्भुतचरितानि केवलमीश्वरश्चैव

the power of God,—still what proof is there of this that such were performed by Christ? To this question we reply—

भवितुमर्हन्तीत्यस्तु परन्तु तानि खदृष्टेन श्रुतानीत्यत्र किं मानमित्याकाङ्क्षायामाह ।

APHORISM II.

The Christian miracles worthy of credit.

Miracles attested by such evidence as exists in attestation of the Christian miracles, are to be believed.

खदृष्टश्रुतचरितोपपादकप्रमाणजातीयप्रमाणैरुपपन्नान्यद्भुतचरितानि श्रद्धेयानि ॥ २ ॥

(1) "Attested by evidence," etc. The import is this, that the proof which should set at rest this question is this, that many men, professing themselves to be original witnesses of the miracles performed by Christ, voluntarily underwent, as long as they lived, toil and danger and suffering, in attestation of what they had witnessed, and solely through belief in what they reported. But no such sufferings were ever undergone, in the case of any other supposed miracles, by men alleging themselves to be original wit-

। १ । प्रमाणैरित्यादि । अयं भावः । इदमेवेह जिज्ञासानिवर्त्तकं मानमस्ति यद् बहवः पुरुषा आत्मनः खदृष्टश्रुतचरितप्रथमसाक्षितां प्रतिपादयन्तः केवलं दृष्टश्रुतान्तोपपादनार्थं तद्वृत्तान्तविश्वासादेव यावज्जीवं श्रमभयदुःखानि स्वेच्छयैव सेहिर इति । अद्भुतत्वाभिमतचरितान्तरविषयेतु तत्प्रथमसाक्षितामात्मनः कथयद्भिः पुरुषैः कथ्यमानवृत्तान्तोपपादनार्थं तद्वृत्तान्तविश्वासादेवंविधानि

nesses thereof, in attestation of what they narrated, and through belief in the narrative: this also is a proof which should set the question at rest.

दुःखानि न सोढानीत्येतदेव विश्वासनिबन्धनं मानम्।

(2) But if the voluntary undergoing of sufferings entitles persons to confidence, then whatever is asserted by the Indian ascetics, who voluntarily undergo the sharpest sufferings, ought also to be accepted. If this be urged, we reply: Not so; for we do not say that the mere voluntary undergoing of sufferings produces a title to confidence, but only that the endurance of suffering, inflicted by others, and endured with no view to any fruit beyond the establishing of a particular occurrence, does so. But the sufferings of the Indian ascetics are self-inflicted, and are not undergone in attestation of any particular occurrence. That is to say, these ascetics undergo sufferings, seeking, in some cases, the gratification of

।२। ननु यदि स्वेच्छया दुःखभारसहनमेव पुरुषाणां विश्वासयोग्यतासम्पादकं तर्हि भारतवर्षीया स्वेच्छयैव तीक्ष्णतमान् क्लेशान् सहमानास्तपस्विनोऽपि यद्यद् वदन्ति तदपि स्वीकार्यमिति चेन्न। नहि वयं केवलं स्वेच्छया दुःखभारसहनमात्रं विश्वासयोग्यतासम्पादकं ब्रूमोऽपितु वृत्तविशेषोपपादनव्यतिरिक्तफलाभिसन्धिरहितं परकृतपीडासहनमेव तथा। भारतवर्षीयतपस्विनां दुःखानि तु स्वयं कृतानि नच वृत्तविशेषोपपादनार्थमनुभूतानि तथाहि ते कदाचिदाभिमानिकानि फलान्यनुसन्धाय स्वशरीरसुखमनादृत्य प्रेक्षकाणां सरोमाञ्चविस्मयमधिकमि -

vanity, disregarding bodily ease and desiring more the rapturous admiration of the spectators; and, in other cases, hoping for supramundane glory and enjoyment which they imagine is thus to be obtained in another birth. In the first case no motive is established besides vanity; and there needs no proof of this vanity, for the vanity of these is equally clear with that of the silly women who undergo the pain of tattooing and the boring of their noses for the reception of a nose-jewel. And in the second case there is established their belief merely in the assurances of those who inculcate that present sufferings are the causes of future enjoyment, but not likewise the veracity of those who thus inculcate.

(3) But the circumstances of the sufferings voluntarily undergone by the first believers in Christ were quite different from the foregoing.

क्वचित् कदाचित्त्व जन्मान्तरप्राप्यत्वेनाभिमते लोकोत्तरप्रभावप्रमोदादौ श्रद्धाना दुःखानि सहन्ते। तत्र प्रथमपक्षे मूर्खतातिरिक्तः को ऽपि हेतुर्न सिद्धति मूर्खतासिद्धौच न हेत्वपेक्षा उत्तुण्डितपक्षखेखं नासाभरणधारणोपयोगि-नासावेधञ्च सहमानानां मूर्खस्त्रीणां सामान्येन स्फुटमेव तेषां मौर्ख्यसिद्धेः। द्वितीयेत्व पक्षे वर्त्तमानि दुःखानि भाविसुखकारणमीत्युपदेशकारिपुरुषवचने तेषां विश्वासमात्रं सिद्धति नतु तादृशोपदेशकारिपुरुषवचनप्रामाण्यमपि।

।६। परन्त्वाद्यैः स्वदृष्टान्तैः स्वेच्छया सोढानां दुःखानां कृत्तैर्वैधर्म्यादत्यन्तविलक्षणमस्ति। यदि चैतेष्वपि दिनेषु कस्मिन्

And if in the present day any believer in Christ, when called upon to abjure his religion, should prefer undergoing death or other sufferings, then the sincerity of his profession of Christianity is what would be thereby proved: but sufferings were undergone by the first believers in Christ, in attestation of events which they had themselves beheld, by their giving attestation whereof the world was enraged against them, and in respect of which they were under no delusion; whilst, on the alternative of their being deceivers, they could reap no fruit besides the anger of God for having obstinately borne testimony to a wilful lie. And by merely refraining from bearing such testimony, they might have remained quietly, clear of the sufferings which they underwent. Would men in such circumstances assert that they had seen what they never saw? would they declare what they had no know-

दृष्टभक्तः स्वमतच्युतिप्रसङ्गे स्वेच्छया मरणादिदुःखानि सहेत् तर्हि तेन कर्मणा तदीयदृष्टधर्माङ्गीकारस्य निष्कपटत्वं सिद्धति। आद्यदृष्टभक्तैस्तु प्रत्यक्षीकृततादृग्घटनान्तर्विशेषोपपादनाय दुःखान्यनुभूतानि यत्साक्ष्यदानात् तेभ्यो जगद्बुक्रोध यद्विषयेष तेषां भ्रमो नासीत् येषासत्यत्वपक्षे बुद्धिपूर्वकानृतसाक्ष्यागृहप्रयुक्तपरमेश्वरीयकोपादन्यत् फलं नोदपादयिष्यन्। केवलञ्च तादृग्घसाक्ष्यदानपरिवर्जनमाचादेवानुभूतसकलदुःखपरिवर्जनपूर्वकं तूष्णीं स्थिता अभविष्यन्। किं लोका एवंविधविषये यं दृष्टान्तं कदापि नापश्यंस्तमपि दृष्टं ब्रूयुः। अविज्ञातमेव किमपि कथयेयुः। धर्मोपदेशार्थञ्चानृतभाषणे प्रवृत्ता भवेयुः। अपिच न केवलं दृष्टस्य वक्तृकर्तां यावत् तादृग्घवक्तृकर्तृफलभूतं तद्धर्मपि दृष्ट्वा ता-

ledge of? and employ themselves in telling lies in order to teach virtue? Further, not only having seen Christ to be an impostor, but having seen also the result of such imposture in his being put to death, how could they have persisted in bringing upon themselves, for nothing and with a full knowledge of the consequences, enmity, contumely, contempt, danger, and death, by obstinately carrying out such an imposture? It is impossible.

दृश्यवञ्चकत्वानुष्ठानायद्यापि-ष्यन्ते बुद्धिपूर्वकेण देषमान-भङ्गानादरभयमृत्युस्वीकारे कृतायद्याः कथं स्युः । नच्चेवं सम्भवति ।

(4) Now, in regard to the doubt as to what proof there is that sufferings *were* undergone, in the way just mentioned, by the first promoters of Christianity, we observe—

। ४ । अथाद्यैः दृष्टभक्तिप्रवर्त्तकैः पूर्वोक्तरीत्या दुःखानि सोढानीत्यत्र किं मानमित्याशङ्क्याहाह ।

APHORISM III.

sufferings should be undergone by the attesters of the miracles of Christ was likely, and moreover that they were established by cumulative evidence.

दृष्टकृताद्भुतचरितसाक्षि-र्दुःखानि सोढानीति सम्भवति अपिच स्वतन्त्रानेकप्रमाणसद्भावादेतत्सिद्धति ॥ २ ॥

(1) That is to say, it is likely that they underwent sufferings, because they were promulgators of a religion distasteful both to the Jews and to the rest of the world. For the Jewish people, misconceiving the import of the Word of God in the Old Testament, looked for a Redeemer from temporal bondage, and not from the spiritual bondage of sin; while the Gentiles resented the Christian scheme of salvation because of its requiring the entire abandonment of man's natural pride. Further, that the Christians did suffer, is established by the testimony of profane writers of good authority. Again, the writings of the Christians themselves furnish evidence to the same effect. And these arguments are mutually independent, as each separately goes to establish the probability of the one common conclusion that the first followers of Christ underwent sufferings.

(2) Now, to the question

। १ । तथाहि ते दुःखमनुभूतवन्तो यद्धदीयतदन्यजनसमूहहृदयहेयमतप्रचारकत्वादिति सम्भवति। यद्धदीया हि जनाः प्रत्नसंविन्नश्वेश्वरवचनस्यार्थमन्यथा पश्यन्तो लौकिकादेव बन्धान्मोचनकारिणं कञ्चन प्रतीक्षाञ्चक्रिरे नतु पापहतादलौकिकबन्धात्। तदन्यजनास्तु खृष्टनिर्दिष्टं मुक्तिप्रकारं मनुष्यजातीयगर्वात्यन्तपरिहारकत्वादनिष्टं मेनिरे। अपिच खृष्टभक्तैः कृतं दुःखसहनं तदन्यजनानां प्रामाणिकग्रन्थकाराणां वचनैः सिद्ध्यति। किञ्चैतद्विषयप्रमाणानि खृष्टभक्तवचनान्यपि सन्ति। इमानिच प्रमाणानि स्वतन्त्राणि। आद्यखृष्टभक्तैर्दुःखानि सोढानीत्येवंविधसमाननिगमनसम्भवसाधकत्वात्।

। २ । अथाद्भुतचरितान्तरं

whether no other miracle has been established by such evidence, we reply—

नैवंविधप्रमाणविद्भुमित्याह ।

APHORISM IV.

Unlikelihood that the mat- It is improbable that any false story should have been adopted by witnesses of this kind.

असत्यकथानामेवंविधसाक्ष्यनुगृहीतत्वं न सम्भवति ॥४॥

(1) "Is improbable," etc. For no *false* story of miracles ever *has been* adopted by witnesses of this kind; and, further, no other miraculous story *whatever* has been seen to be adopted by such witnesses. Such is the import.

। १ । न सम्भवतीति । नह्यद्भुतचरितविषयिण्या असत्यकथायाः कदापितथाविधसाक्ष्यनुगृहीतत्वं दृष्टं नवान्या काचिदप्यद्भुतचरितकथा तथाविधसाक्ष्यनुगृहीता दृश्यते ऽपीति भावः ।

(2) If you say, but were not the miracles of Krishna, such as his lifting up the mountain of Govardhana, attested by witnesses such as attested the miracles of Christ? We reply: Not so. For, even supposing them to be true, we require you to tell us, by what persons, professing to have witnessed them, was even the slightest suffering undergone

। २ । ननु खृष्टकृतानामद्भुतचरितानामिव कृष्णकृतानामपि गोवर्धनोद्धरणादीनां तादृग्विधसाक्ष्यनुगृहीतत्वमस्तीति चेन्न । तेषां हि सत्यत्वपक्षे ऽपि तत्साधितामात्मनः कथयद्भिः कैस्तदिषयकविश्वासपरीक्षाक्लेशो लेशेनाप्यनुभूत इति वक्तव्यम् ।

in testimony of their belief of them?

(3) But, it may be said, the Vedas are themselves proof [*i.e.* causal of right knowledge], for they are divine; and therefore there is no need of another proof to corroborate their authority, just as there is no need of a lamp in order to see the sun. We clear up this doubt as follows :—

। ३ । ननु वेदाः स्वत एव प्रमाणमपौरुषेयत्वात्। अतश्च तत्प्रामाण्यसमर्थनाय न प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा सूर्यदर्शने दीपापेक्षावदित्याशङ्कां समाधते ।

APHORISM V.

No evidence of the veracity of the Veda producible.

In claiming for the Veda that it is self-evidently an authority, it is acknowledged in so many words that no evidence of its being an authority is producible.

वेदस्य स्वतप्रामाण्यस्वीकारे तत्प्रामाण्ये प्रमाणाभावः कण्ठोक्तः ॥ ५ ॥

(1) Be it so;—but, it may be said, it suffices to establish the authority of the Veda that it is in harmony with all demonstration. In the Bible, on the other hand, we are told that the world was produced out of nothing; while great sages among the moderns—such as Sir William Hamilton—seem to adhere to the tenet

। १ । स्यादेतत्। वेदस्य प्रामाण्ये तदीयमुपपत्त्यविरुद्धत्वमेव साधकम्। पूर्वोत्तरसंविन्नत्थयोस्त्वसतो जगदुत्पत्तिः श्रूयते तच्च नवीना इमिल्टनाख्यप्रभृतयः सुपण्डिता विप्रतिपन्नाः सन्तः शास्त्रस्य शास्त्रकरणादिति प्रथमाध्यायीयाष्टादशोत्तरशततमकापि-

laid down in the 118th Aphorism of Book I. of the *Sānkhya*, viz.: "Because that which is possible is made out of that which is competent to the making of it."

सतश्चसिद्धात्मेवाङ्गीकुर्वन्ती ति दृश्यते।

[For the convenience of the English reader, we cite here the remarks, above referred to, of Sir William Hamilton, at p. 585 of his *Discussions*.

"When aware of a new appearance, we are *unable* to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are, therefore, *constrained* to think that what now appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence under others. These *others* (for they are always plural) are called its cause; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot but suppose, for a cause is simply everything without which the effect would not result, and all such concurring, the effect cannot but result. We are utterly unable to *construe it in thought* as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this, by supposing, that He evolves the universe out of Himself; and, in like manner, we conceive annihilation only by conceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into power.

"'Nil posse creari
De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari.'
"'——— Gigni
De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti.'

"—— these lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a physical axiom of antiquity, which, when interpreted by the doctrine of the conditioned, is itself at once recalled to harmony with revealed truth, and expressing in its purest form the conditions of human thought, expresses also implicitly the whole intellectual phenomenon of causality.

"*b.* The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes, between the *causatum* and the *causa.* We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect, the effect to contain nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of the other. *Omnia mutantur, nihil interit,* is what we think, what we must think; nor can the change itself be thought without a cause. Our judgment of causality simply is: We necessarily deny in thought, that the object which we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins; but, on the contrary, affirm, as we must, the identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its past existence. And here, it is not requisite for us to know under what form, under what combination this *quantum* previously existed; in other words, it is unnecessary for us to recognize the particular causes of this particular effect. A discovery of the determinate antecedents into which a determinate consequent may be refunded, is merely contingent,—merely the result of experience; but the judgment, that every event should have its causes, is necessary, and imposed on us, as a condition of our human intelligence itself. This necessity of so thinking is the

only phenomenon to be explained." And he adds (at p. 591), "We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of *existence;* we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except in *time;* and we cannot know or think a thing to exist in time, and think it *absolutely to commence.*"]

(2) Again, Bishop Berkeley has brought forward cogent arguments to prove that the "matter"[1] which [you say] is alleged in the Bible to have been brought from non-existence into existence, neither exists nor could possibly exist.

(3) In like manner Sir William Jones, who was versed in the scriptures of the Hindūs as well as in those of the Christians, appears to hold the tenet of Kapila above cited.

१२। तथा बर्क्लीनामको ऽप्यसतः सकाशात् परमेश्वरोत्पादित्वेन पूर्वोत्तरसंविद्व्ययोः प्रतिपादितानामनात्मद्रव्याणामसत्त्वमसम्भावितसत्ताकत्वञ्च साधयितुं प्रवृत्तानि प्रमाणान्युपन्यस्तवान्।

१३। तथा विलियम् जोन्साख्यो ऽपि खृष्टीयधर्मग्रन्थानामिव भारतवर्षीयधर्मग्रन्थानामपि विचारकः पूर्वोक्तमेव कपिलसिद्धान्तं स्वीकरोतीति दृश्यत इति।

[Sir William Jones, at p. 367, vol. i. of his works, remarks that "the inextricable difficulty attending the *vulgar notion* of *material substances*, concerning which

"'We know this only, that we nothing know,'

induced many of the wisest among the ancients, and some of the most enlightened among the moderns, to

[1] See the question of "Matter," as regards the philosophical terminology of the East and of the West, discussed in Appendix, Note A.

believe that the whole creation was rather an *energy* than a *work*, by which the Infinite Being, who is present at all times, in all places, exhibits to the minds of His creatures a set of perceptions, like a wonderful picture or piece of music, always varied yet always uniform; so that all bodies and their qualities exist indeed to every wise and useful purpose, but exist only as far as they are *perceived*, a theory no less pious than sublime, and as different from any principle of atheism as the brightest sunshine differs from the blackest midnight."]

(4) Why then am I bound to believe what Christians themselves acknowledge to be impossible, and to abandon my belief in the Veda, which harmonizes with the evidence which commends itself to me, and the matter of which [as in the instances just cited] is accepted even by Christians? To clear up this *primâ facie* view, we remark as follows.

। ४। तथाच यं विषयं खृष्टीया एव स्वयमसम्भाव्यं मन्यन्ते स मया किमिति स्वीकर्त्तव्यः किमितिच मदभिमतप्रमाणाविरुद्धे खृष्टीयजनैरपि स्वीकृतविषये वेदे न विश्वसनीयमिति पूर्वपक्षं समाधत्ते ।

APHORISM VI.

It is not that the Veda should have been revealed by God, because, apart from trifles, it

वेदस्येश्वरप्रणीतत्वं न सम्भवति । ईश्वरवचनसाध्यमन्तरा विचारकबुद्धिगम्यानां वि-

reveals only such things as the speculative intellect is disposed to arrive at without the aid of God's word.

यथाणां कतिपयक्षुद्रवस्तूनाञ्च प्रकाशकत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥

[I say "apart from trifles," because that to which I refer especially is the great tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One ever really existed or will exist or could exist. To this *conception*, if not to this belief, every one, we think, must come, who, studying the mystery of being—by the bare light of his own reason—determinedly analyses and takes account of every thought and every term in the chain of his speculation. I can articulate the term *creation*, and I may appear to attach a distinct idea to the term when I say that it means "making out of nothing," which I do hold it to mean; but is it possible for me to conceive that what is so made has in it a principle of existence which would sustain it for an instant if the creative force were withdrawn? I am *not* able to conceive this. I believe that, by a confusion of mind—or confusion of words—people may persuade themselves that they have a conception of it (as a child may imagine that it has a clear conception of a *round square*); but I find in my inmost thoughts that I have *not*. Were there a withdrawal of the support of the One, I cannot conceive otherwise than that all *that appears* must collapse—as the electro-magnet drops the load that it sustained the instant that it is disconnected from the source of its magnetic power. Can we call such a thing a *magnet*—a *real* magnet? No; it only appears to be one through the influx of an adventitious power. The illustration is

an imperfect one;—as what illustration, of the conception here spoken of, but must be?

Now, while the speculative reason, fearlessly followed, brings us inevitably to the brink of that precipice of Pantheism over which the Vedāntin would have us cast ourselves, *here*, I say, is a worthy occasion for the intervention of a benevolent Providence, if a benevolent Providence there be; and here, accordingly, a benevolent Providence *has* interposed].

(1) The import is this. Had the tenets, that the Real is but One,—that sin, misery, etc., are all illusion,—that Man himself is God, and so forth, been true, there would be no need of a divine revelation to teach them, inasmuch as these facts might have been ascertained by the unassisted intellect. But, though in Him, the Almighty, we live and move and have our being, our destiny is at His disposal; and so, to set at rest such enquiries as this, viz., what that destiny, alternatively, must be, and what are the conditions by which that destiny is to be determined, a revelation was needed, and it has been given by the Most High.

। १ । अयं भावः । एकमेव सत्यं । पापदुःखादिकं सर्वं मिथ्या । जीव एवेश्वर इत्यादिसिद्धान्तानां सत्यत्वे तज्ज्ञान ईश्वरोक्त्यपेक्षा नास्ति तदसद्दृतयापि बुद्ध्योक्तसिद्धान्तनिश्चयस्य शक्यत्वात् । परन्तु तस्य सर्वज्ञेश्वरज्ञजीवज्ञस्वरूपः सत्तावन्तो ऽपि वयं तदिच्छाधीनभवितव्यताकाः स्मः । तथाच कतरास्माकं भवितव्यता वर्त्तते केच त उपायाः सन्ति यैर्भवितव्यता निश्चीयेतेत्येवमादिजिज्ञासानिवृत्तये ईश्वरोक्तिरपचिता दत्ताच सा भगवता सर्वोत्कृष्टेनेति ।

[Now, with regard to the declaration above quoted, of Sir William Hamilton, that creation, as usually defined, is unthinkable, we have to observe further, that "unthinkable" is not synonymous with "impossible." As Sir William Hamilton remarks (at p. 596), "there is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be impossible, merely from *our inability to conceive it possible.*" Those, then, who prefer the ordinary explanation of the term creation, are not bound to surrender their view simply on the ground of our inability to conceive the possibility of such a thing. But, on the other hand, a Christian is just as little under any obligation to adopt that view; and a missionary among the Hindūs will give himself a great deal of needless trouble if he insist on inculcating, as an essential element of Christianity, a questionable metaphysical dogma which he himself, in all probability, has only taken up by rote. St. Augustine wisely remarks, that, "the opinions of philosophers should never be proposed as dogmas of faith, or rejected as contrary to faith, when it is not certain that they are so." He draws this general conclusion from the more special case of questions of natural philosophy. "A Christian," he says, "should beware how he speaks on questions of natural philosophy as if they were doctrines of Holy Scripture; for an infidel who should hear him deliver his absurdities could not avoid laughing. Thus the Christian would be confused, and the infidel but little edified; for the infidel would conclude that our authors really entertained these extravagant opinions, and therefore he would despise them, to his own eternal ruin."

Moreover, those who, like the Pandits, can really brace

their minds to metaphysical speculation, are not to be overborne by those more lazy minds which cannot. Dr. Whewell somewhere acutely observes that when a disputant professes that he will have nothing to do with metaphysics, you may safely expect to hear him propound some excessively bad metaphysics of his own, for which he arrogates an immunity from discussion. Now I have no sympathy with those (bad and most dogmatic of all metaphysicians) who profess to despise metaphysics, but great sympathy with those who would deprecate the raising of obstructions to mutual good understanding on the ground of points in metaphysical theory which are absolutely indifferent as regards practical results. The thinker is not to be overridden by the talker, who insists that there is "matter" (by which he means he knows not what), because, forsooth, *language* implies its existence. Language implies that there is redness in the rose, though no thoughtful person in Europe now believes that colour or any other secondary quality exists, as such, apart from a percipient mind. The *Idola Fori*, the fictions of the Market-place, are not entitled to the implicit deference in general so arrogantly claimed for them by the indolent and impatient, who, while, justly enough, professing that they have no turn for metaphysics, might advisably abstain from intermeddling where a turn for metaphysics (and perhaps even more than this) is indispensable for usefulness.]

(2) Now, to show how the foregoing considerations affect the matter in hand, we assert that—

। २। अथ पूर्वोक्तं विचारं प्रकृते योजयन्नाह।

APHORISM VII.

The Vedantic tenet does not justify the Vedantic inference.

तस्मादेकस्मादन्यस्य सत्ता स्वतन्त्रा नास्तीति वेदान्तिमताभ्युपगमेऽपि जीवस्तस्माद्भिन्न इति जीवस्यानन्तः संसारः स्वमाचाधीन इति वा न सिद्धति ॥ ७ ॥

Granting to the Vedāntin that nothing *of itself* exists besides the One, it neither follows that a man *is* the One, nor that a man's endless course of existence depends upon himself alone.

[Since we here use the expression "exists *of itself*," it is fitting that we should consider what is meant by saying that something "exists" in a different sense of the word from that in which something else exists. To quote the words of Berkeley (*Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 89), "Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing*, *reality*, *existence*; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words."

Now, according to the *Vedānta*,[1] "Existence or being (*sattwa*) is of three kinds,—1, Being, in its highest sense (*pāramārthika*); 2, such as has to be dealt with (*vyāvahārika*); and, 3, merely seeming (*prātibhāsika*).[2]

[1] We quote from the *Vedānta-paribhāshā*, Chapter II.

[2] सत्त्व ॥ पारमार्थिक ॥ व्यावहारिक ॥ प्रातिभासिक ॥

Of these, being, in its highest sense, belongs to God (*i.e.* soul or spirit); being, such as has to be dealt with, belongs to the ether [or space], etc.; and merely seeming being, belongs to the [merely seeming] silver, which is [in fact] mother-o'-pearl [mistaken for silver by a beholder]." The first of these is equivalent to substantial or independent existence, the second to phenomenal or dependent existence, and the third to deceptive appearance. Let us compare this with the views of Berkeley. In regard to the first kind of existence, Berkeley declares, "From what has been said, it follows there is not any other substance than *spirit*, or that which perceives."[1] Here we have independent existence. But such an existence as this, Berkeley concurs with the Vedāntists in denying to the objects perceived. To these (whose "esse" he holds to be "percipi") while he denies "an existence independent of a substance,"[2] contending that it is either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all, to speak of "the absolute existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind;"[3] yet he does not deny a *real* existence. He says, "I can as well doubt of my own being, as of those things which I actually perceive by sense, it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in *being perceived*."[4] The third degree of existence,

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § vii. [2] *Ibid*, § xci.

[3] *Ibid*, § xxiv. It must be remembered that mind and spirit, in Berkeley's language, mean the same thing. This is not the case with मनस् (*manas*) and आत्मन् (*ātman*) in Sanskrit. See *ante*, p. 23. [4] *Ibid*, § lxxxviii.

inferior to this, he assigns to dreams and creatures of the imagination; for, in comparison with these, he says, "The ideas of sense are allowed to have *more reality* in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent;"[1] and these, being impressed upon the mind "according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits."[2]

While Berkeley and the Vedāntists, then, agree in holding that existence differs in its degrees, and agree also in allowing the first degree—viz., that of independent or substantial existence—to spirit alone; they differ—apparently at least—in their application of the term *real*. In examining this part of the question, therefore, we may expect to come upon some difference of opinion, such as shall imply, on one side or the other, an error requiring to be combated. But before proceeding to investigate this, let us take account of what has been ascertained. We have seen that the Vedāntins, in allowing the rank of substantial existence to spirit alone, hold the opinion which one of the most pious and thoughtful of Christian bishops advocated, not as merely harmless, but as a grand bulwark of the truth against the assaults of a debasing materialism. Verily, there seems to be anything but an obligation upon us to insist that the Vedāntin should give up this philosophical belief, and accept at our hands, as something indispensable to his further progress, "an unknown quiddity with an absolute existence," the term designating which, Berkeley adds,

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § xxxiii. [2] *Ibid*, § xxxvi.

"should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses (he goes on to say) it seems the best way to leave it quite out, since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards atheism, than the use of that general confused term."[1]

With regard to the third degree of existence—that belonging to what presents itself in dreams, etc.—there is no occasion for our here remarking more than this, that the missionary is not likely to quarrel with the Vedāntin for calling such things, in general, illusions rather than realities. What we are more particularly concerned about is the *second* degree of existence, which some of the Vedāntins *professedly*, and the others too generally *in fact*, degrade to the level of the third. The second and third degrees are in effect reduced to much the same level by the employment of the term *vastu* to denote spirit, and, on the other hand, its contradictory—*a-vastu*—to denote all else. Now the word *vastu* means a "thing," and since *a-vastu*, therefore, means "*not* a thing," the Vedāntins are disposed to treat whatever comes under the name as being (in the familiar sense of the word) no *thing*,—or *unreal*. They are, in fact, not disinclined to own the impeachment, against which Berkeley has in his own case so repeatedly protested,

[1] Third Dialogue, between Hylas and Philonous. We beg leave to remind the reader that we are not here professing ourselves a follower of Berkeley, nor urging any one to adopt his views. We are simply concerned to show which of the Vedānta tenets, by being Berkeleian, are not in any way anti-Christian, and not therefore the points against which it were wise to direct our efforts. Hence we are at present under no engagement to satisfy the reader in regard to all the difficulties which Berkeley's theory may, at first sight, appear to give occasion for. More objections than were likely to have occurred to any single objector, Berkeley himself has anticipated and replied to. His treatises are open to all, and are not voluminous.

of holding that the phenomenal universe is delusive, *because* phenomenal and dependent. The Vedāntins—as philosophers—(for at present we are viewing them as speculative ontologists and not as assertors of a revelation)—would seem to have been duped by the word *thing* and its kindred term *real*. They chose to restrict the name of *thing* to spirit, and then jumped to the conclusion that all else must be *nothing*, or nothing of any consequence.

Waiving here the question of revelation, which does not fall within the present section of our argument, we would recommend, therefore, that, in reasoning with a Vedāntin on his philosophical belief, he should be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of the opinion that there is no independent entity besides spirit,—that opinion being one which need not prevent his becoming as good a Christian as Bishop Berkeley. We should also leave him to think, for the present, as he may choose in regard to dreams or waking misapprehensions; but we should press him with the unreasonableness of holding that the phenomena of waking existence are beneath the notice of the wise, because, forsooth, they are not entitled to the name of *vastu*—the name of *substance* or *thing*. If phenomena have an existence "that must be dealt with" (*vyāvahārika*), their importance will depend upon our relation to them; and if it so happen that our relation to them is to be *eternal*, it is idle to disparage their immense importance by dubbing them "insubstantial." Whether their relation to us *is* to be eternal, and what relation our spirits bear to that Great Spirit whom we agree with the Vedāntins in holding to be the sole independently

existent—the Self-existent—are questions to be answered only by a revelation.

Confining ourselves, for the present, to the consideration of ontological theories and terminology, we proceed to inquire what is the Vedāntic conception of the relation of the phenomenal to the real. The Vedāntists are sometimes charged with holding that the phenomenal *is* the real,—in other words, with material Pantheism. At the same time they are charged with the wildest extravagance, of an opposite description, in declaring that the Supreme is *devoid of qualities*, or, in Sanskrit, *nir-guṇa*. With regard to the relation of the real and the phenomenal, no point appears to have occasioned more perplexity to the European assailants of Vedāntism than the employment of this term *nir-guṇa*, so frequently connected in the Vedāntic writings with the name of the Supreme (*Brahm*). We find, for example, a zealous writer against Vedāntism declaring that, "In any sense, within the reach of human understanding, he (*Brahm*) is *nothing*. For the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes." And the same writer calls upon his readers to admire the extravagant notion that *Brahm* exists "without intellect, without intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own existence!" Now, the reply to all this is, that the word *nir-guṇa* is a technical term, and must be understood in its technical acceptation. It means "devoid of whatever is meant by the term *guṇa*," and the term *guṇa* is employed (as already explained at pp. xxxiv. xxxvi.) to denote whatever is phenomenal. In denying that anything phenomenal belongs constitu-

tively to the Supreme Being, the Vedāntin speaks very much like Bishop Berkeley, and like other good Christians whom Milton's epic has not educated into a semi-conscious Anthropomorphism. Berkeley expresses himself as follows:—"We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected by any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body; that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities,"[1] and so on. The Vedāntin, in like manner, denying that such "qualities" belong to the Supreme, declares, "We ought not to ascribe to Almighty God properties, attributes, or modes of being, which are the peculiar characteristics of humanity, such as the faculty of vision,"[2] etc. In short, the Vedāntin denies that the Supreme either has or requires either senses or bodily organs; and, holding that organs of sense or motion are made up of what he calls *guṇa*, as we Europeans in general say they are made up of what we prefer to call *matter*, he

[1] Berkeley's Third Dialogue.

[2] The *Tattwa-bodhinī Patrikā*—the Calcutta organ of the modern Vedāntins—p. 113.

asserts that the Supreme is *nir-guṇa*, in very much the sense that we Europeans assert that God is *immaterial*. We say, guardedly, "in very much the sense," and not simply "in the sense," because the term *guṇa* denotes strictly, not the *imperceptible* quiddity "matter," but what Berkeley calls *the sensible*, or the sum of the objects of sense. Theologically, the Vedāntin, asserting that the Deity is *nir-guṇa*, and the Christian, asserting that God is *immaterial*, are asserting the very same fact in terms of separate theories,—just as two chemists might make each the same assertion in regard to some individual specimen, while the one spoke of it as destitute of chlorine, and the other spoke of it as destitute of oxymuriatic acid.

To say that "the mind of man can form no notion of matter or spirit apart from its properties or attributes," is therefore no *reductio ad absurdum* of the Vedāntic dogma that nothing of what is technically called *guṇa* enters into the essence of God. Take away everything of what is comprised under the name of *guṇa*,—that is to say, take away everything that is perceived through the organs of sense, and take away every sense-organ, and take away all human feelings or mental processes, such as alarm, delighted surprise, recollection, computation, deduction,—take away all this, and there remains to the Vedāntin, not a mere empty substratum, but the One Reality, consisting of existence, thought, and joy, in their identity as an ever-existing joy-thought. This, whatever else we may think of it, is something very different from a substratum evacuated to non-entity. *We* are accustomed to regard eternal existence,

wisdom, and blessedness, as *attributes* of God. The Vedāntin, on the other hand, instead of regarding these as attributes of God, regards them, in their eternal identity, as God himself.[1] Instead of holding, as they have been so often accused of holding, that God has no attributes in *our* sense of the term, they hold, in fact, that He is *all* attribute,—sheer existence, sheer thought, sheer joy, "as a lump of salt is wholly of uniform taste within and without." So far is the conception of *Brahm* from being reduced to that of a non-entity by the Vedāntic tenet of his being *nir-guṇa*, that, according to one of Vyāsa's aphorisms, as rendered by Mr. Colebrooke (*Essays*, p. 352), "Every attribute of a first cause (omniscience, omnipotence, etc.), exists in *Brahme*, who is devoid of qualities." It is rather strange that the occurrence of this passage in Mr. Colebrooke's well-known essay should not have sufficed to awaken a suspicion that the term "devoid of qualities," must be employed in a sense other than that of an empty substratum—a non-entity. The Vedāntin, seeing no occasion for any such vehicle of the joy-thought, never postulated any such. The empty substratum, the "nothing," which they are fancied to place in the room of the Supreme, is precisely what, as a nothing, does not enter into their conception of the Supreme at all. It will readily occur to the reader that the Hindū conception of *thought*, as the ultimate ground of all, independently of any substratum beyond it, anticipates, in its own way, Hume's extreme development of Locke.

[1] Compare St. John's expression, "God is love." I do not suggest a parallelism, for the Vedāntic enunciation is meant literally. See *ante*, p. xxxvii.

The misconception to which we have now been adverting, furnishing, as it has done, seeming ground for a charge which has been reiterated against the Vedāntins under all the varied forms of remonstrance, taunt, anathema, and virtuous indignation, has, we fear, done much harm. It has done much to confirm the modern Vedāntin in his opinion that his European assailants are incompetent to appreciate his system, and in his belief that the creed pressed upon his acceptance by such assailants cannot have any solid claims on his attention. If it be asked why the Vedāntin could not explain so simple a matter as this misconception to the person who blamed him unjustly, we reply, that the asker had better reflect what intense confusion of mind has been again and again occasioned, in every part of the world, by a mutual misunderstanding of a term when the two parties were not aware that they really misunderstood one another. People are always too apt to fancy that it is in regard to some *opinion* that they differ, when they only differ in regard to *the employment of a term.*

Reverting to the charge of extravagance in the notion that *Brahm* exists "without intellect, without intelligence, without even the consciousness of his own existence," it may be well to repeat here what the Vedāntin means by the terms thus rendered. By intellect (or mind) he means an internal organ which, in concert with the senses, brings the human soul into cognitive relation with the external. This, of course, he denies to *Brahm*, who, as Berkeley says of God, "perceives nothing by sense as we do." By intelli-

gence, again, the Vedāntin means the conceptions of an intellect, as just defined, which, of course, cannot be present where an intellect, as just defined, is not. Finally, by consciousness, he means the individualizing of one's-self by the thought of "ego," thereby implying an existent "non ego;" and with reference to *what* is the *One* sole existent thus to individualize Himself? The denial of *Brahm's* "consciousness" in *this* sense, does not imply unconsciousness in the sense in which *we* employ the term. It merely implies that the one—who is not three as consisting of existence, thought, and joy,—is an existence, which existence is in the shape of thought only, and that thought an ever existent joy, which never really abandons (however much it may *seem* to abandon) its absolute unity by shaping itself into the complex thought that "*I* am blessedness." The practically important mistake of the Vedāntin, as we have argued in the aphorism, is his assuming that what *seems* is of no consequence.

But, it may be asked, is not this system—view it as you will—one of Pantheism? We admit that it is; but we would recommend that it be borne in mind that there is, as urged by Sir William Jones (see *ante*, p. 32), a great difference between the Pantheism which, in—or rather across—all that it sees, sees God alone, and the Pantheism (more properly called Atheism) which, beyond what it sees, acknowledges no God. The condemnation due to the grovelling system last mentioned, it were idly mischievous cruelty to hurl against the Vedāntin. The man who believes that his spirit is in the same category with his digestion,

that his soul is a function of his brain, as the secretion of bile is a function of his liver, let us not, in common justice, insult the Vedāntin by mentioning in the same breath with him. If the Vedāntin be a Pantheist, he must be one of the other order, — a spirit of a far higher mood, erring though he be. Let us be cautious, too, lest we condemn him on a charge which he repudiates. Two expressions, familiar in the *Vedānta*, are usually cited in contending that the Vedāntin confounds the Creator with the creature, viz., the Vedic text, "All this is God," and the illustration of the spider spinning its web from its own body. The passage in the *Vedānta-sāra*, where the illustration of the spider occurs, we render as follows:—"Thought [*i.e.* Deity] located in *ajnana* [*i.e.* in the aggregate of the phenomenal], which has the two powers [of obscuring the light and of projecting its own shadow[1]], is, in virtue of itself, the efficient cause, and, in virtue of what it is located in, the substantial cause; as the spider is in itself the efficient, and in virtue of its *body* [—which body is not the agent, but the locus of the agent—] the substantial cause, as regards that product [which we call] its threads."[2] Now, as no one charges the man who says that the spider made its web from its own stores, with saying that the web is the spider, so we think that no one is justified in deciding that the Vedāntin says "The world is God," on the allegation that the Vedāntin virtually does say,

[1] See *ante*, p. xxxvi.

[2] शक्तिद्वयवदज्ञानोपहितं चैतन्यं स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं स्वोपाधिप्रधानतयोपादानञ्च भवति। यथा लूता तत्कार्य्यं प्रति स्वप्रधानतया निमित्तं शरीरप्रधानतयोपादानञ्च भवति॥

"God made the world out of stores of His own." What were those stores? They are, in the creed of the Vedāntin, just what amount to the sense of the word *power*, the word *śakti*, the recognised synonyme for the aggregate of the phenomenal, for the *ajnāna*, —*i.e.* for that which is *not* God.[1]

But the reader will be ready to exclaim, how can we be said to be unfair in assuming that the Vedāntin says "The world is God," when there is no dispute that a *Vedanta* text declares, "All this is God?" We reply, that there is a distinction between "the world" and "all this," which, however wire-drawn it may seem, yet requires to be recognized. "The world" is the display of the phenomenal. It is not *this*, as we have shown from the *Vedānta-sāra*, that the Vedāntin regards as God. But when he looks on the phenomenal, the Vedāntist feels that an unchangeable reality must *underlie* this changeable; he recognizes, through the phenomenal veil, the one reality; and if he exclaims, "*All* is God," is the exclamation necessarily profane? Understood as we have put it, the phenomenal being ignored as a reality, we think it is not. He only says, "All that is *real* in this visible is the God who is invisible." I have discussed this again and again with learned Hindūs, and I here state my conviction that those who condemn the Vedāntins as Pantheists on this particular ground, would in like manner condemn St. Paul, if—not recognized as St. Paul—he were to reappear, declaring explicitly what was implied in his asserting of God that in Him "we live and move and have our being."

[1] See *ante*, p. xxxiii.

In making these remarks, we have been regarding the system under its philosophical aspect, and we have therefore sought our data in the systematic treatises of the school. But there is in Bengal a modern sect of Vedāntists—to our mind not the least interesting among the followers of the Vedas — who deny the authority of the systematic treatises, and allow of no appeal except to the Vedāntic portion of the *Veda* itself. We cannot reasonably dispute their right to take up this position. The claim is not other than that which Protestants asserted at the Reformation,—the privilege of having Scripture as their rule of faith and not uninspired dictation. The removal of the contest from the *champ-clos* of the systematic treatises to the wide and diversified region of the *Upanishads*, is, indeed, inconvenient for those who would rather meet their man than hunt him. But the challenger cannot claim the choosing of the ground, and the missionary who heartily seeks the conversion of these men will seek it vainly if he shirk the task, however irksome, of exploring the field where alone the Vedāntists of modern Bengal will consent to be found. He must try to take accurate account of the *Upanishads;* that is to say, he must not content himself with picking out a few of the passages which are most open to ridicule, but he must endeavour candidly to understand what it is, in these treatises, that *satisfies* the modern thinkers of Bengal. The study, if entered upon in a mocking spirit, might at least as profitably not be entered upon at all.

In the aphorism on which we have been comment-

ing, we affirm that, even granting that nothing *of itself* exists besides the One, it neither follows that a man is the One, nor that a man's eternal destiny depends upon himself alone.

(1) But [the Hindū may ask] if the identity of the human soul and the divine soul be denied, then of what nature do you hold the human soul to be? In regard to this doubt we declare as follows.

। १। ननु यदि जीवात्मपरमात्मनोस्तादात्म्यं निषिध्यते तर्हि जीवस्य स्वरूपं कीदृग्मंस्वीक्रियत इत्याकाङ्क्षायामाह।

APHORISM VIII.

of what kind.

Human souls, will have no end.

जीवात्मनां सादित्वेऽपनन्तत्व सम्भवति ॥ ८ ॥

(1) If it be said that in that case there is a contradiction to a necessary rule, viz., that whatever had a beginning must have an end, we reply: Not so; because there is no proof that such is the necessary rule, and because the blank assertion of it can be set aside by a blank denial, and because, as in the 45th Aphorism of Book I. of the *Sankhya Pravachana*, so here

। १। अथैवं सति सादिभावमात्रस्य विनाशित्वमिति नियमविरोध इति चेन्न। तादृग्नियमे मानाभावात्। उक्तिमात्रेच तस्मिन्नुक्तिमात्रनिषेधस्य सम्भवात्। साङ्ख्यप्रवचनप्रथमाध्याये ऽपवादमात्रमबुद्धानामिति पञ्चचत्वारिंशत्तमसूत्रवदिहापि वक्तुं शक्यत्वात्। अपिच य ईश्व स्व-

too we may say, this [—that nothing can be endless which had a beginning—] is, "a mere denial on the part of unintelligent persons." Further, God, who is able to sustain for one moment those whom he has created, can with equal ease sustain them during an eternity. The question only remains, whether or not He chooses to do so. To this we reply, that, in the book which we hold to be the revelation of the will of God, we are informed of the promise of God that He will sustain the human soul in existence through eternity. But the doubt is not to be entertained whether there be any proof that that book reveals the will of God, for we have already discussed the establishment of the authority of that book by the argument from miracles, and by the testimony of competent persons who underwent suffering in this world solely for the purpose of attesting those miracles.

यमुत्पादितान् क्षणं रक्षितुं समर्थः स तथैवानायासेनानन्तकाले रक्षितुं समर्थ एवेति। केवलन्तु स एवमिच्छति नवेति चिन्तावशिष्यते तत्र ब्रूमः तथाहीश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशनपरत्वेनाभिमते ग्रन्थे पूर्वोक्तसार्वकालिकजीवरक्षणविषयिणी परमेश्वरस्य प्रतिज्ञा श्रूयत इति। तस्य ग्रन्थस्येश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशनपरत्वे किं मानमिति तु न शङ्क्यम्। अश्रुतचरितलिङ्गकानुमानेन तादृशाश्रुतचरितसाक्षित्वमाचार्यैः लौकिकदुःखं सोढवतामाप्तपुरुषाणां वचनेनच तद्ग्रन्थप्रामाण्यसिद्धेरस्माभिः पूर्वं विचरितत्वात्।

(2) Now we bring forward another proof that the Christian religion is from God.

। २। अथ खृष्टीयधर्मस्येश्वरोक्तत्वे प्रमाणान्तरमुपन्यस्यति।

APHORISM IX.

The Christian religion is established by the evidence of prophecy.

भविष्यदुक्तिरूपप्रमाणेन खृष्टीयधर्मः सुव्यवस्थापितो भवति ॥ ९ ॥

(1) If you say, but if prophecy be a sign of authority, then why should not those lists of kings, which were drawn up in the *Purāṇas* before those kings came into existence, be worthy of our belief? We reply: Not so; because we see there nothing to determine whether these lists of kings were drawn up before the kings came into existence, or whether they were interpolated in the *Purāṇas* afterwards.

। १। ननु यदि भविष्यदुक्तिः प्रामाण्यलिङ्गं तर्हि तत्तद्राजोत्पत्तेः पूर्वमेव पुराणेषूपनिबद्धा राजवंशावली किमिति न विश्वासपात्रं भवेदिति चेन्न सा राजवंशावली तत्तद्राजोत्पत्तेः पूर्वमुपन्यस्ताथवा तत उत्तरं पुराणेषु प्रक्षिप्तेत्यत्र विनिगमकादर्शनात्।

(2) Now we state what peculiarly distinguishes the Christian miracles [from the miracles of the *Purāṇas*].

। २। अथ खृष्टशास्त्रीयभविष्यदुक्तिभ्यो ऽसाधारणं भेदकमाह।

APHORISM X.

That the prophecies were really such.

The prophecies which establish Christianity were made before the advent of Christ, because they are found in the sacred books of the Jews, who are up to this day the enemies of Christ.

(1) That is to say,—the prophecies regarding the Messiah, to be found in the Old Testament, the Scripture of the Jews, represent the Anointed One under the seemingly irreconcileable characters of a conqueror and a sufferer. But the Jews, eager for deliverance from the tyranny of strange governors, looked only for a Messiah who should cause the overthrow of their enemies. When Christ came on earth, to suffer, and to conquer sin, death, and hell, then the Jews denied that this was the Christ's office;—to this day they look for a temporal deliverer. Yet when the matter is con-

खृष्टधर्मसाधका भविष्यदुक्तयः खृष्टोत्पत्तेः पूर्वं सञ्जाता अद्यापि खृष्टं द्विषतां यह्नदीयानां धर्मग्रन्थेषूपलभ्यमानत्वात्॥ १०॥

। १। तथाहि मूर्धाभिषिक्तं विषयाक्रान्तं यह्नदीयधर्मशास्त्ररूपे पूर्वसंविद्ग्रन्थ उपलभ्यमाना भविष्यदुक्तयो व्यक्तं विरुद्धाभ्यां विजयित्वदुःखित्वाभ्यामुपलक्षितं खृष्टं प्रतिपादयन्ति यह्नदीयास्तु परराजबलात्काराद्दासनो मुक्तिं कामयमानाः कञ्चन केवलं शत्रुपराजयकारिणं मूर्धाभिषिक्तं प्रतीक्षाञ्चक्रिरे। यदा खृष्टो दुःखीभवितुं पापमृत्युनरकान् पराजेतुञ्च भुवमाजगाम तदा यह्नदीयास्तस्य तमधिकारं निषिषिधुः तेऽद्यापि कञ्चन लौकिकं रक्षकं प्रतीक्षन्ते। परन्तु विचार्यमा-

sidered, it appears clearly that the prophecies do not in every respect consist with a merely triumphant and temporal deliverer; but they find in every respect their fulfilment in the history of Christ.

(2) The veracity of the Jewish Scriptures, of which we possess volumes transcribed several hundred years ago, as well as translations into hundreds of languages—so that, even if an invention, yet, like the Vedas, with their [voluminous and various] commentaries, they could not be supposed to be a recent invention—is corroborated by fresh evidence, through the discovery of cities [such as Nineveh] which had disappeared under the sands of the desert, exactly where the Scriptures describe them to have stood in all their pomp, and where the prophets declared that they would become an uninhabited waste. And the predictions in regard to the Jews themselves fur-

ऐ स्फुटमेतत् प्रतीयते यद् भविष्यदुक्तयः केवलं प्रतापविजयशालिनि लौकिके रक्षके न सर्वरूपैः संवादं प्राप्नुवन्ति खृष्टचरितेतु ताः सर्वरूपैः पूर्णतां प्राप्नुवन्ति।

।२। कतिपयवर्षसहस्रेभ्यः पूर्वं लिखितानां पुस्तकानां तथा भाषासहस्रेष्ववतरणानाद्याप्युपलभ्यात् कल्पितत्ववादे ऽपि वेदवदेव खटीकाभिः सहार्वाचीनकल्पितत्वेन ग्रहीतुमशक्यानां यहूदीयधर्मग्रन्थानां साधुत्वमारण्यकवालुकानिचयपिधानाद्दृश्यभावं गतानां नगरीणां यचैव तासां सर्वोत्कर्षस्थितिर्धर्मग्रन्थैर्वर्णिता यच्च भविष्यद्वादिनो भाविनं निर्मानुषारण्यभावमवदंस्तच्चैव खल उपलभ्याद्याधुनिकप्रमाणेनापि सिद्धम्। यहूदीयजातिविषयिणश्च भविष्यदुक्तयस्तद्ग्रन्थसाधुत्वे प्रमाणान्तरम्। अ-

nish further proof of the veracity of the book. The existence of this people up to the present time, throughout all nations, and yet commingling with none, is a standing miracle.

(3) If it be said that the prophecies are no evidence, because they are of obscure and doubtful meaning, we reply: Not so; because the obscurity of their meaning may have been designed to baffle attempts at their fictitious fulfilment. "No prophecy is of private interpretation," for all the prophecies are severally explained through the manifestation, on the fulfilment of the matter, that each really was a prophecy.

(4) Now, it were fruitless to bring forward evidence that a particular book contains a revelation of the will of God, if evidence have not been shown that there *is* a God; so we have to consider whether there be a God. According to the teaching of the

यापि कथापि जात्या सङ्कर-मप्राप्य सर्वदेशेषु वर्तमानाया अस्या जातेः सत्यमथाधुनिक-मद्भुतचरितमेव।

। ३। ननु भविष्यदुक्तयो ऽप्रसिद्धसन्दिग्धार्थत्वान्न प्रमाणमिति चेन्न छद्मिमतदर्थानुष्ठानप्रयत्नवारणार्थं तदर्थगोपनमुद्दिश्य सन्दिग्धार्थताकरणसम्भवात्। नच कापि भविष्यदुक्तिः स्वतः स्पष्टार्था तदर्थसिद्धेव तदीयभविष्यदुक्तिस्वप्रकटनद्वारा सर्वासां भविष्यदुक्तीनां व्याख्यातत्वात्।

। ४। अथेश्वरसत्त्वे प्रमाणप्रदर्शनमन्तरा ग्रन्थविशेषस्येश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशकत्वे प्रमाणप्रदर्शनं निष्फलमितीश्वरसत्त्वं चिन्त्यते। किं तावदीश्वरसत्त्वे मानं। तत्र वेदान्तनयानुसारेणेश्वरेच्छैव वस्तुतो नास्ति

Vedānta, there is really no will of God; for if by the word God, is meant *Brahm*, then *that* consists of knowledge only, and is what is meant by the word *Veda* itself. And the *Veda* cannot be the *revealer* of the will of God, else we should find a duality; whereas, according to the creed of the Vedāntin, there is no distinction between the Veda and the Lord.

यदि हि ब्रह्मेश्वरशब्देनाभिप्रेतं तर्हि तद् विज्ञानमात्ररूपं वेदपदस्थापयेतदेव प्रतिपाद्यम्। नच वेद ईश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशक इति सम्भवति द्वैतापत्तेः। वेदेश्वरयोर्वेदान्तिमते भेदाभावात्।

(5) Again, according to the *Sānkhya* creed, there is no need of acknowledging a Lord, since everything is accounted for by Nature, the unintelligent maker of worlds. In reply to these opinions of the *Vedānta* and the *Sānkhya* we have this to say,—that if it be not agreed that there exists anything besides *Brahm*, then there is no foundation for the employment of arguments, either affirmative or negative. If there is any real Vedāntin in the world, then to argue with him would be like arguing with a child or a

।५। किञ्च साङ्ख्यमतानुसारेणेश्वरस्वीकारे प्रयोजनं नास्ति अचेतनया जगत्कर्त्र्या प्रकृत्यैवोपपत्तेः। अनयोर्वेदान्तसाङ्ख्यमतयोः प्रथम इदमभिधीयते तथाहि ब्रह्मसत्तातिरिक्तसत्तायाः अनभ्युपगमे सर्वेषां साधनबाधनव्यवहाराणां निरालम्बनत्वापत्तिः। यदि हि कश्चिदास्तिको वेदान्ती जगति स्यात् तर्हि तेन सम्भाषणं बालोन्मत्तादिसम्भाषणतुल्यं स्यात्। तदुक्तं साङ्ख्यप्रवचनग्रन्थमाध्यायषष्ठिं-

madman. In the words of the 26th Aphorism, Book I., of the *Sānkhya Pravachana*, "There is no acceptance of the inconsistent; else we come to the level of children, madmen, and the like."

प्रतिसूत्रे नाधौक्तिकस्य सङ्ग्रहो ऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वमिति ।

(6) We commence, then, a separate Book, in order to establish that the Creator of the world is intelligent: a point acknowledged by the *Naiyāyika*, but denied by the *Sānkhya* Institute, which is the vestibule of the *Vedānta*.[1]

। ६। अथ जगत्कर्तुर्बुद्धिपूर्वकारित्वं नैयायिकानां सम्मतं वेदान्तिमतपूर्वभूमिकाभूते साङ्ख्यशास्त्रे प्रतिषिद्धं व्यवस्थापयितुमध्यायान्तरमारभते ।

[1] See p. xviii.

BOOK III.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

Now, following out the argument already cited as current among the *Naiyāyikas*, viz., that the earth, with its sprouts, etc., had a Maker, because it is a product, and it could not be made by the like of us; so that one different from us, a God, must be its Maker,—we first set forth the principle on which the argument is based.

तच्च क्षित्यङ्कुरादिकं कर्तृजन्यं कार्यत्वात् नच तत्कर्तृत्वमस्मदादीनां सम्भवतीति तत्कर्तृत्वेनास्मदादिविलक्षणेश्वरसिद्धिरित्यनुमानं नैयायिकसम्प्रदायमनुसृत्य पूर्वमुपन्यस्यं तस्य मूलभूतं नियममादौ निरूपयति।

APHORISM I.

Evidence of a Designer.

That the Cause of the world operates intelligently, because we see means adapted to the production of ends.

तत्तत्कार्योत्पत्तिनियततत्तत्कारणदर्शनात्अनत्कारणं बुद्धिपूर्वकारि सिद्ध्यति ॥ १ ॥

(1) Now, in opposition to the *Sānkhyas*, who say that the world is not made by one operating intelligently, because Nature alone may, unconsciously and spontaneously, construct the world, just as the milk spontaneously and unconsciously becomes developed in the udder of the cow for the sake of the calf, we declare as follows :—

। १ । अथ प्रकृतिरेवाबुद्धिपूर्वकं स्वातन्त्र्येण जगदुत्पादयिष्यति यथा गोरूधसि क्षीरमबुद्धिपूर्वकं स्वातन्त्र्येण वत्सार्थं प्रवर्त्तते ऽतो जगन्न बुद्धिपूर्वकारिनिर्मितमिति वदतः साङ्ख्यान् प्रत्याह ।

APHORISM II.

The Sānkhya theory of unin-

[We reject the argument of the *Sankhya*] because the illustration is not a fact; for it is quite impossible that the milk should exert itself spontaneously for the sake of the calf.

दृष्टान्तासिद्धेः क्षीरस्य वत्सार्थं स्वतः प्रवृत्त्यत्यन्ताभावात् ॥ २ ॥

(1) In explanation, let this story be heard by the attentive:—A certain king's son, observing that, always at the time of his hunger's becoming sharp, a variety of food, brought by the hands of his immediate attendants, is set before him, fancied that *cooked*

। २ । तथाह्यवहितैरेषा कथा श्रूयताम् । कश्चिद्राजसूनुर्नित्यं बुभुक्षोत्तेजनसमये विविधमन्नं सन्निहितपरिजनकरोपनीतमुपसीदतीत्युपलभ्य पक्वमन्नं मदर्थं स्वत एव प्रवर्त्तत इति मेने तथैव दृश्यतां

developes itself spontaneously for my sake, and he expressed himself to this effect before his attendants. But they, having smiled to one another, instructed him as follows:—"Prince! this food is the result of arrangements established by the will of the king, thy father; for nothing unintelligent, such as a jar or a web, is ever seen to exert itself spontaneously." Just so, too, in the case in hand, does a melancholy smile come over the face of the wise when they hear the *Sānkhyas* foolishly saying, as if in emulation of this king's son, that the preparation of the calf's food is independent of intelligence, and spontaneous, instead of being effected by a Divine Foreseer for the accomplishment of a proposed end.

पुरतो जगादच्च तेतु परस्परं सस्मितमवलोक्य तं निबोधयामासुः। ननु कुमार तव तातस्य नृपतेरीहया विहितानां नियमानां फलमिदमन्नं नच्चचेतनं घटपटादि स्वतः प्रवर्त्तमानं दृष्टमिति। तथैव प्रकृते ऽपि वत्सभक्ष्योत्पत्तिरबुद्धिपूर्विका स्वतन्त्राच्च नतु दिव्येनानागतद्रष्ट्रोद्दिष्टफलसिद्धये कृतेति बालिश्याद् राजसूनुवत् स्वयमुत्प्रेक्ष्य ब्रुवतः साङ्ख्यान् पृष्ठतां विदुषां मुखे सविषादो हास उल्लसति।

(2) But [the *Sānkhya* may

the soul is itself Divine: so that, claiming the services of Nature, it is competent to create the world; and though it be in the bonds of Ignorance,

। २। अथ जीवः स्वयमीश्वर एवातः प्रकृतिमधिष्ठाय जगत् स्रष्टुं समर्थः। तच्चाज्ञानवशत्वापि स्वीयैश्वर्यज्ञानमात्रोपदेशाद् भवितुमर्हति

it may recognise its divinity through instruction by a fit person, as was the case with the king's son [in the story given under Aph. I., Bk. IV., of the *Sānkhya Pravachana*], as follows:—"A certain king's son, in consequence of his being born under the star of the tenth [and unlucky] portion [of the twenty-seven portions into which the ecliptic is divided by astrologers], having been expelled from his city, and reared by a certain forester, remains under the impression that 'I am a forester.' Having learned that he was alive, a certain minister informed him, 'Thou art not a forester: thou art a king's son.' Just as he, immediately, having abandoned the impression of his being an outcast, falls back on his royal condition, saying. 'I am a king;' so too it [the soul], in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect that 'Thou, who didst originate from the First Soul, which

राजपुत्रवत्। तथाहि कश्चिद्राजपुत्रो गण्डर्चजन्मना पुराच्चिसारितः शबरेण केनचित् पोषितो ऽहं शबर इत्यभिमन्यमान आस्ते तं जीवन्तं ज्ञात्वा कश्चिदमात्यः प्रबोधयति न त्वं शबरो राजपुत्रो ऽसीति। स यथा झटित्येव चाण्डालाभिमानं त्यक्त्वा तात्त्विकं राजभावमेवावलम्बते राजाहमस्मीति। एवमेवादिपुरुषात् परिपूर्णचिन्मात्रेणाभिव्यक्तादुत्पन्नस्त्वं तस्यांश इति कारुणिकोपदेशात् ब्रह्मत्वाभिमानं त्यक्त्वा ब्रह्मपुत्रत्वादहमपि ब्रह्मैव नतु तद्विलक्षणः संसारीत्येवं स्वस्वरूपमेवावलम्बत इति निष्प्रयोजनं जीवव्यतिरिक्तेश्वरकल्पनमिति चेत्। अत्रोच्यते। तादृशकथामात्रेण कस्यचिदर्थस्यासिद्धेः दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः प्रमाणाभावस्यात्। सहि राजपुत्रो राजपुत्रत्वेनाभिमत इति तस्य राजपु-

manifests itself merely as pure Thought, art thyself a portion thereof,' having abandoned the impression of Nature [or of being something material and phenomenal], falls back upon its own character, saying, 'Since I am the son of the Deity, I am myself Deity, and not something mundane and different therefrom.' And so it is needless to postulate any deity besides the soul." If you say all this, I reply: [Not so], for such a story proves nothing, the illustration and the thing illustrated being alike groundless. For that prince was a prince by convention—princehood [independently of the consent of others] being a fiction. In like manner the fruits of soul's works are dependent on the will of Another; not dependent on its own fancies as to its inherent divinity. And that Will on which soul's treatment is dependent cannot be that of a Nature which is [devoid of will, being] devoid of intelligence.

चलमलीकमेव। तथैव जीवस्य कर्मफलानि परकीयेच्छाधीनानि नतु स्वीयस्वाभाविकैश्वर्यकल्पनाधीनानि। सा च जीवस्य कर्मफलनियामिकेच्छा ज्ञानशून्याया: प्रकृतेर्न सम्भवति।

(3) To make this matter clear, we cite the doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* [Gautama, Bk. I., Aph. X.], to the effect that effort [or volition, *pra-*

as it is a property of soul only, is therefore evidence of it, in opposition to the decision of the *Sānkhyas* [Kapila, Bk. III., Aph. 59], to the effect that "Though she be unintelligent, yet Nature acts, as is the case with milk."

। ३। अथैनं विषयं स्पष्टीकर्तुं प्रयत्नस्यात्ममात्रधर्मतयात्मलिङ्गत्वमेवेति नैयायिकमतमचेतनत्वे ऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्येति सांख्यविदूषणमुपन्यस्यति ।

APHORISM III.

The criterion of the intelligent.

Desire, aversion, *effort*, enjoyment, suffering, and thought, are the mark of soul.

इच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नसुखदुःखज्ञानान्यात्मनो लिङ्गम् ॥ ३ ॥

(1) And each of these severally is to be understood to be a mark. And thus it is rightly declared by the *Naiyāyikas* that the doctrine of an unintelligent Nature's working with a view to a special end, is untenable because self-contradictory.

। १। एतेषाञ्च प्रत्येकं लिङ्गता बोध्या। एवञ्चाचेतने प्रधाने फलविशेषोद्देश्यकप्रवृत्तिविधानं व्याघातान्न सम्भवतीति नैयायिकोक्तं सम्यक् ।

(2) But [it may be said]

। २। अथ प्रमाणान्तरविरो-

though this may be held inconsistent with other evidence, yet that Nature does work unconsciously with a view to a special end can be gathered from the *Veda*. This *primâ facie* view we repel [in the words of Vijnāna Bhikshu, commenting on Aphorism 9, Book I. of the *Sānkhya*].

धे ऽपि प्रकृतेरबुद्धिपूर्वकं फलविशेषोद्देश्यकप्रवृत्तिर्वेदादधिगन्तुं शक्येति पूर्वपक्षं निरस्यति ।

APHORISM IV.

cannot be],

"for it is an established maxim that not even the *Veda* can make one see sense in what is absurd."

बाधितमर्थं वेदो ऽपि न बोधयतीति न्यायात् ॥ ४ ॥

(1) Well, it has been laid down [in Aph. 1 of this Bk. III.] that, through our seeing the adaptation of means to ends, it is demonstrated that there is an intelligent Maker of the world. We proceed to show how it is that His intelligence [or designingness] is thus proved by our seeing in the case before us the employment of means adapted to ends. To explain [in words adapted

। १ । अथ तत्तत्कार्योत्पत्तेस्तत्कारणनियतत्वदर्शनात् कस्मिञ्चिगतो बुद्धिपूर्वकारी कर्त्ता सिद्धतीत्युक्तं तच्च कार्योद्देश्यककारणप्रयोगदर्शनेन तस्य बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धिप्रकारः प्रदर्श्यते । तथाहि । यत् किमपि प्रयोजनं स्फुटं सिद्धं पश्यन्नीश्वरवादी नियतमेवं विचारयति यदि तावदस्मिदं

from those of Lord Brougham's Discourse, p. 32]: — A theologian, on seeing any purpose manifestly accomplished, always reflects as follows: — "If I myself desired to perform this operation, and were acquainted with the laws on which its performance depends, should I accomplish it by any other means than the means here seen to be employed for its accomplishment? If not, then it is clear that some intelligent agent, possessing a knowledge of what is required to be done for the production of this result, has employed those means in producing the result."

कार्यं स्वयं कर्त्तुमिच्छेयं तदुत्पत्त्यावश्यकेतिकर्त्तव्यतानियमांश्च जानीयां तर्ह्यहं च तदुत्पत्तिप्रयोजकतया परिदृश्यमानानुपायान् विहायोपायान्तरेणैतत् कुर्य्यां नवेति। नो चेत्। कश्चिद्बुद्धिपूर्वकारीतत्तत्कार्यप्रयोजकेतिकर्त्तव्यताज्ञानवानेतानुपायानेतत्कार्योत्पत्तौ योजितवानिति सिद्ध्यति।

(2) Having thus shown the scientific ground of the decision that the employment of means with a view to an end presupposes intelligence, now desiring to set forth a narrative illustration to exemplify the ground thereof popularly, we state the illustration in an aphorism.

।२। एवं कार्योद्देश्यककारणप्रयोगस्य बुद्धिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः शास्त्रीयं स्वयं प्रदर्श्य लौकिकं तत्स्वयं वक्तुं सेतिहासदृष्टान्तं कथयिष्यन् दृष्टान्तं सूचयति।

APHORISM V.

The argument from design illustrated.

As a boat.

नौवत् ॥ ५ ॥

(1) And the narrative regarding the boat is this, *e.g.*, When a man of the woods, having arrived at the bank of a river, beholds the branch of a tree carried down by the stream, then perchance he reasons thus: "This tree, the bank having been undermined by the stream, having fallen into the current, and having been stripped of all its leaves by friction with the bottom, is borne along by the water:" and further than this he does not reflect upon the case. But when he perceives a boat, deserted by its crew by reason of a squall, floating on the water, and, after coming towards him, stranded on the bank, then, having his curiosity excited, he considers that structure. "This structure, which, by reason of its having a hollow form, is buoyant like

। १ । नौप्रधानक इतिहासस्त्वायं यथा यदा कश्चिदारण्यको नदीतीरं प्राप्य जलपूरेण नीयमानां वृक्षशाखामवलोकयति तदा नूनमेष वृक्षो जलपूरोत्खाते तीरे प्रवाहे निपत्य तलदेशघर्षणविगलितपत्रजालो जलेन नीयत इति तर्कयति नचेतोऽधिकं तं विषयं विचारयति। परन्तु यदा स काञ्चिन्नावं वात्यातिशयवशात् पोतवाहविरहितां जले तरन्तीं स्वाभिमुखमागत्य तीरे स्वग्रामुपलभते तदा जातजिज्ञासस्तं संघातं विचारयति य एष संघातो रिक्ताकारतया रिक्तघटवत् प्लवमानो दृश्यते तस्याधोभागोऽन्योन्यसंश्लेषितकाष्ठफलकैर्घटितोऽस्ति येनायमति-

a hollow jar, has its lower portion composed of planks joined together, so that being very light it may float. And staves are arranged on both sides, moveable and with flattened ends, so that these if put in motion would cause this [vessel] also to move. And places for sitting are seen, convenient for the persons who are to pull the propellant staves. And staves are fitted inside, at such a distance from the seats as is exactly proportioned to the measure of an ordinary man, so that the rowers, by resting their feet firmly against these, may without hindrance apply their strength." From all this, without going into the question of the sails, the mast, the rudder, etc., even the man of the woods decides with certainty that — "Therefore this structure was evidently made by some one intelligently, with the design of accomplishing such an end as this."

लघुर्भूत्वा तरेत्। दण्डाश्च तथा सुघसास्तनूनताग्राः पार्श्वद्वये घटिताः सन्ति यथा ते चाल्यमाना इमामपि चालयेयुः। उपवेशनस्थानानिच समीचीनानि चालकदण्डक्षेपकारिपुरुषाणां क्षते क्षतानि दृश्यन्ते। अभ्यन्तरदण्डाश्चासनेभ्यः सामान्यपुरुषप्रमाणमित एवावान्तरे निर्मिताः सन्ति यावता क्षेपणीपुरुषास्तेषु पादौ दृढमवष्टभ्य निश्चिन्तबन्धं स्वबलप्रयोगं कुर्युरिति ततो जवनिकाकूपककेतिपातकादिकमविचार्यैवारण्यको ऽपि तस्मादेव संघातः स्फुटं केनचिदेवंविधफलनिष्पत्त्युद्देशेन बुद्धिपूर्वं कृतो ऽस्तीति निश्चिनोति।

(2) So, pray, in the composition of the bodily parts of plants and animals, is not the extraordinariness of the employment of means adapted to ends even more striking than the extraordinariness which belongs to the above-described composition of parts in a boat? Or, in the way shown in the *Muktāvali* [as cited in Bk. I., Aph. V., § 4], is not this earth with its vegetable growths, etc., distinguished above artificial things by endless distinctions, so that here there must be a pre-eminent Lord, possessing supramundane knowledge and power, who makes use of means with a view to ends? Let not this be regarded by the intelligent as a superfluous repetition.

। २। तथैव किं स्थावरजङ्गमशरीरावयवसंस्थाने तत्तत्कार्यो-द्देश्यकतत्तत्कारणप्रयोगवैजात्यं न प्रदर्शितनौकावयवसंस्थानगततद्वैजात्याद्-धिकविस्मयावहं किं वा चित्यङ्कुरादिकं क्षितिमपदार्थेभ्यो मुक्तावलीप्रदर्शितरीत्यानन्त-विशेषैर्न विशिष्यते येन लोकोत्तरज्ञानशक्तिमान् कार्य्योद्देश्यकारणप्रयोगकर्त्ता परमेश्वरो ऽस्तीति वचनं विदुषां पुरतः पुनरुक्तं न स्यात्।

(3) But then, if it be said, Granting that there is a God, of the character above stated, still, how can it be proved that there is a Trinity of Persons in that One God, as asserted in Bk. I., Aph. VII., we reply: This, like the other mys-

। ३। ननु भवतु परमेश्वरो नाम कश्चिदुक्तप्रकारकः परन्तु तस्यैकस्यापि व्यक्तित्रयं प्रथमाध्याये प्रदर्शितं कथमुपपद्यत इति चेदुच्यते दृष्टमतीश्वरदृष्टान्तरवदस्यापि विचारः क-

teries of the Christian religion, is matter for consideration. Now, therefore, although the mind of man is incompetent to clear up the several mysteries of this religion, we commence a Fourth Book for the purpose of discussing, briefly and to the best of our judgment, the Christian mysteries.

र्त्तव्यः। अथ मनुष्यबुद्धा तत्त्व-
तत्त्वसकलरहस्योपपत्तेरशक्य-
त्वे ऽपि यथामति संक्षेपतः रह-
स्यतरहस्य विवेकार्थं चतुर्थ-
माध्यायमारभते।

BOOK IV.

OF THE MYSTERIOUS POINTS IN CHRISTIANITY.

Now, beginning to speak of the mysteries of the Christian religion, we first state, as follows, the doctrine of the divine Trinity.

अथ रहस्यतरहस्यं निर्वक्तुमारभमानः पारमेश्वरचैरूप्यसिद्धान्तमादौ सूचयति।

APHORISM I.

In the re we are told that the Father is God, so also is the Son, and so also the Holy Ghost, and further that there is but one God; but we are not told how this is to be explained.

रहस्यीयधर्मशास्त्रे श्रूयते ईश्वरः पिता स एव पुत्रः स एवच पवित्रात्मेति तथेश्वर एक एवेत्यपि परन्तु तदुपपत्तिर्न श्रूयते ॥ १ ॥

(1) If the *Vedāntin* throws out the doubt—how is this possible,—to be in the shape of three, and yet one? this is our first reply. If the truth

। १। अथ कथमेतत् सम्भवति त्रिरूपस्यैकस्येति वेदान्ती शङ्केत चेत् तत्र प्रथममुत्तरमुच्यते यदि तावत् पूर्वोक्तयुक्तिभिः

of the Christian Scriptures has been established by the preceding arguments, and if these contain statements which inform us of a unity in trinity, then, though it be not stated in the Scripture how this is to be explained, yet these statements must be in *some* way reconcileable.

(2) Our second answer is this. If it be hard to conceive how the One God subsists in Three Persons, it is as hard to conceive how the One Eternal Spirit has produced human thinking souls personally distinct from Himself;—yet this distinct personality is proved by the separate self-consciousness of souls severally.

(3) Our third answer is this. If the *Vedāntins* say that it is the One Sole Spirit which is manifested in the form of all human souls, then what stumbling-block is there in the way of their acceptance of the doctrine of the Divine Trinity? For if the one doctrine have been accepted by them on the

खष्टीयधर्मशास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यं सिद्धं तद्घटकत्वञ्च चैरूप्ये ऽप्येकतावोधकवाक्यानां तर्हि तदुपपत्तेर्धर्मग्रन्थे ऽनुक्तत्वे ऽपि तानि कथमपि समाधेयान्येव।

। २। द्वितीयं त्वत्तरं यदि ब्रह्म एवेश्वरस्विरूप इति दुर्ज्ञेयं तर्ह्यनादिरात्मा खातिरिक्तान् व्यक्तिभेदवतो ज्ञानाश्रयान् जीवान् ससर्जेत्यपि दुर्बोधमेव व्यक्तिभेदस्य जीवानामहंप्रत्ययवैद्यात्यात् सिद्धः।

। ३। तृतीयञ्चोत्तरं यदि तावद्वेदान्तिन एकमेवात्मानं सर्वजीवरूपेण दृश्यमानं वदन्ति तर्हि पारमेश्वरचैरूप्यसिद्धान्तस्य स्वीकारे किं बाधकं। यदि हि वेदं प्रमाणं मत्वा तैरेकः पक्षः स्वीकृतस्तर्हि खष्टीयधर्मग्रन्थः प्रमाणं नतु वेद

authority of the *Veda*, then they ought to be prepared to accept the other doctrine, since it has been already proved that the Christian Scripture, and not the *Veda*, is the true authority.

(4) Further, it is not necessary to hold that whatever transcends our comprehension involves a contradiction. The prophetic description of Christ, as a sufferer and yet triumphant, as the humblest and yet the highest, etc., was matter of mystery until explained by the events of His life.

(5) Now, in order to set aside the doubt that a mystery is neither matter of proof nor of disproof, but that one must just remain silent in regard to it,—intending to suggest that proof and disproof cannot both be inapplicable, because of the rule [known as that of "Excluded Middle"], that there can be no alternative besides being and not being,—we propound that rule as an aphorism.

दृष्टस्य पूर्वं प्रसाधितत्वादपरपक्षस्वीकारे ऽपि तैः सम्क्षोभितव्यम्।

।४। किञ्च यद्यद् दुर्ज्ञेयं तत्तद् बाधितमिति स्वीकर्त्तुमनावश्यकं यतः रहस्यविषयिका दुःखभागपि विजयी नम्रतमो ऽपि महत्तम इत्याद्या भविष्यदुक्तिर्यावत् तदीयवृत्तान्तेन न व्याख्याता तावद् रहस्यार्थैवासीत्।

।५। अथ रहस्यवस्तु न साध्यते बाध्यते वा किन्तु तद्विषये तूष्णीं स्थीयत इति शङ्कां निराकर्त्तुं भावाभावयोरन्यप्रकारासम्भवनियमात् साधनबाधनोभयनिवृत्तिर्न सम्भवतीति सूचयंस्तं नियमं सूचयति।

APHORISM II.

of Middle.

साधनं वा सञ्चवेद्वाधनं वा नतु प्रकारान्तरं भावाभावयोरन्यप्रकारासञ्चवात् ॥ २ ॥

An assertion must either be true, or else its contradictory; there is no other way, because there is no way besides being and not being.[1]

(1) To illustrate:—[as Sir William Hamilton remarks, at p. 529 of his Discussions, "We find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought as possible." For example, as he observes at p. 581], Time cannot be conceived by the mind either on the one hand as absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or, on the other, as without beginning or end. Yet time *must* be either of the one nature or the other [—though neither alternative can be positively

। १ । तथाहि । कालस्यावत् सादिप्रध्वंसित्वेन वानाद्यन्तत्वेन वा मनसा न ग्रहीतुं शक्यत्वेऽपि कालोऽन्यतररूपोऽवश्यं स्यात् । तथा वर्त्तमानकालोऽपि यथा यथा विचार्यते तथा तथा दैर्घ्यपिण्डविस्तारादिभावधर्मानुपलभ्या-

[1] Stated by Mr. Thomson (*Laws of Thought*, p. 280), thus:—"Either a given judgment must be true, or its contradictory; there is no middle course."

thought, our conception of time as without beginning and end being not positive but negative, whilst a conception of it as absolutely beginning or ending cannot be formed at all]. So again [as Sir William adds], time present, when we meditate on it, ceases to present an object for meditation, as if vanishing into nonentity, since we discern in it no positive character whatever, of length, quantity, protension, etc. And for this reason, in Bk. II. of the *Nyāya*, Section VI., "On the sifting of time present," having stated, as the *primâ facie* view, the unreasonableness, as aforesaid, of time present, and then deciding that although the nature of time present be inconceivable by the mind, yet time present is inferrible from perception [of the objective or subjective], inasmuch as without that [time present, in which, and not elsewhere, any perception has place], perception would be impossible,

दभाववत् तिरोभूयविचारागोचरो भवति। अत एवाभीक्ष्णं द्वितीयाध्याये षष्ठे वर्त्तमानपरीक्षाप्रकरणे पूर्वोक्तां वर्त्तमानकालग्रहणानुपपत्तिं पूर्वपक्षत्वेनोद्भाव्य वर्त्तमानकालस्य मनसा स्वरूपग्रहणासम्भवे ऽपि प्रत्यक्षरूपकार्य्येण वर्त्तमानकालो ऽनुमीयते तेन विना प्रत्यक्षासम्भवादिति समाधानो गौतमो वर्त्तमानाभावे सर्वाग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेरिति साधु सूचयामास। तथाच वर्त्तमानकालविषये भावाभावरूपताया अग्राह्यत्वे ऽपि न भावाभावविलक्षणसिद्धिः किन्तु कार्य्येण कारणस्य भावरूपतासाधनमेव सम्भवति भावाभावयोरन्यप्रकारासम्भवादिति।

Gautama has well declared in his aphorism [42 of Bk. II.], that "were there no present, there would be no cognition of anything, because perception [together with inference, and all else that is based on perception], would be impossible." And thus, although as regards time present, it be impossible to conceive it either as being or not being, yet this does not establish anything distinct alike from what is and what is not; but, what is proved by an effect, is just the existence of the cause, since, besides a thing's either being or not being, there can be no other alternative, [and it is not the *non-existence* of a cause that is deducible from an effect].

(2) Now, intimating that this rule does not help us to *explain* a mystery, we declare as follows:—

। २। अथायं नियमो रह-स्यनिर्वचनविषये ऽकिञ्चित्कर इति सूचयन् सूचयति।

APHORISM III.

no mystery.

By explaining things which we acknowledge to be mysteries, we should contradict our acknowledgment of their being mysteries.

रहस्यत्वेनाभिमतानां वस्तूनां निर्वचने रहस्यत्वव्याघातः ॥ ३ ॥

(1) For instance, such illustrations, adduced in explanation of the mysterious doctrine of the Divine Trinity, as that of the triangle consisting of three lines mutually combined, or of Chaitra Maitra and Vishnudatta, rendered of one mind by friendship, are to be eschewed by acute reasoners, because the momentary light thrown thereby on such doctrines is immediately swallowed up in the glaring spuriousness of such illustration, resulting from its utter inapplicability to the case of what is sought to be illustrated.

।१। तथाहि। पारमेश्वरतैरूप्यसिद्धान्तरूपस्य रहस्यस्य निर्वचनायोपन्यस्ताः परस्परसंयुक्तरेखात्रयघटितत्रिकोणवत् सख्येकीकृतमनस्कचैत्रमैत्रविष्णुदत्तादिव्यक्तित्रयवदित्यादयो दृष्टान्ताः सूक्ष्मविचारकैर्हेयाः। तैरुत्पादितस्य तादृशसिद्धान्तविषयकस्य त्रणिकप्रकाशस्य तादृशदृष्टान्तगतेन स्पष्टेन दार्ष्टान्तिकस्वादित्यन्तवैधर्म्यप्रयुक्तदृष्टाभासत्वेन कवलीकरणात्।

(2) Now, in order to describe the peculiarities set forth in the Christian Scrip-

।२। अथ पारमेश्वररूपत्रयान्तर्गतद्वितीयपुरुषस्य रहस्टी-

ture as pertaining to the Second Person in the Divine Trinity, we state as follows :—

यधर्मग्रन्थे वर्णितान् विशेषान् वक्तुं सूचयति ।

APHORISM IV.

Mystery of the Incarnation.

The Word was made flesh.

स शब्दो मांसं बभूव ॥ ४ ॥

(1) "Was made flesh," that is to say, the Lord became incarnate as the Son.

। १ । मांसं बभूवेति । ईश्वरः पुत्ररूपेणावतीर्ण इत्यर्थः ।

(2) Here the dissentient Hindū is to be admonished with arguments similar to the arguments stated when establishing the Divine Trinity; for he, acknowledging many incarnations of the Lord, can find no absurdity in acknowledging the incarnation of Christ; but the only question open to him is, which Scriptures are they by force of the authority of which the incarnation of the Lord is to be acknowledged? And to the question *how* an incarnation could take place? the counter-question—how are our souls linked to our bodies?—is a sufficient reply;—for,

। २ । अत्र विप्रतिपन्नो भारतवर्षीयः पारमेश्वरैक्यौपपादकोक्तयुक्तितुल्याभिर्युक्तिभिर्बोधनीयः स्वयमनेकानीश्वरावतारानभ्युपगच्छतस्तस्य खृष्टावतारस्वीकारे बाधकाभावात् केवलं तु कः पुनः स ग्रन्थो यत्प्रामाण्यबलादीश्वरस्यावतारः स्वीकर्त्तव्य इति प्रश्नस्य प्रति सावकाशः । अवतारकथम्भावप्रश्नेचात्मदादिशरीरात्ममंयोगकथम्भावप्रतिप्रश्न एवोत्तरं तदज्ञाने ऽपि प्रकृतविषयस्य कथमपि बाधाभावात् ।

although we are ignorant of that, this in no way invalidates the fact in question.

(3) Now, to consider the purpose of the Incarnation, we declare as follows.—

। ३ । अथेश्वरावतारप्रयोजनं विचारयितुं सूचयति ।

APHORISM V.

The Lord became incarnate as the Son, to make atonement for the sins of men.

लोकपातकप्रायश्चित्तायेश्वरो ऽवतार पुत्ररूपेण ॥ ५ ॥

(1) If it be asked, how could atonement be made through the acting thus? we reply: Everywhere, even in the *Veda*, etc., it is seen to be the natural conviction of mankind that sin requires atonement. If it be agreed that this universal tendency of man's mind is a just one, then the question remains, what kind of sacrifice is to be offered to the Deity for the removal of sin? Now, whatever offering we can present, in the shape of goats or bulls or the like, all this already belongs to God, and is only lent by Him to us for a few years; and thus these

। १ । अथ कथमेवं करणेन प्रायश्चित्तं स्यादिति चेदुच्यते। पातकं स्वनिवृत्तये प्रायश्चित्तमपेक्षत इति तावद् वेदादिष्वपि सर्वत्र मनुजानां मतिः स्वाभाविकी दृश्यते । सेयं सार्वलौकिकी मनसः प्रवृत्तिरुचितास्तीति यदि स्वीक्रियते तर्हि पापनिवृत्तये कीदृशो बलिर्भगवते समर्पणीय इति चिन्तायामुच्यते । तत्र च यत् किमपि छागवृषभादिरूपमुपायनं तत्तो दातुमस्माभिः शक्यते तत् सर्वं पूर्वसिद्धमेव भगवतः स्वं कतिपयवत्सरपर्य-

offerings can have no efficiency except through God's favour; and so we are informed, in the Law, what sacrifices God gave the Israelites to understand would obtain His favour. A sacrifice, effectual in itself for the removal of sin, can therefore be provided by God alone; and such a sacrifice, we learn from Scripture, was provided through the Incarnation. How God is satisfied even with such a sacrifice is a mystery, and consequently not to be explained; since an explanation would involve self-stultification [on the part of him who should offer explanation of what, in calling it a mystery, he declares to be inexplicable]. But what behoves *us* is merely to appropriate to ourselves the benefits arising from such an atonement.

(2) If it be said that the benefit of an atonement thus prepared by God for the removal of the sins of mankind must be common to all men, since there is no distinction,

त्तमेवच तेनास्माङ्गोचरीकृतं तथाचैते बलयो निष्फला एव स्युते भगवदनुग्रहात्। तथाच तत्तद्बलैरनुग्राह्यत्वमिसरालियेभ्य उक्तं भगवतेति श्रूयते प्राचीनधर्मशास्त्रे। अतश्च स्वातन्त्र्येण पापनिवृत्त्यनुकूलो बलिर्दातुं भगवतैव शक्यते स एवचावतारद्वारेण दत्त इति धर्मशास्त्रादवगम्यते। भगवांस्तथाविधेनापि बलिना कथं तुष्यतीति तु रहस्यमिति तदनिर्वचनीयमेव निर्वचने स्वतो व्याघातात्। केवलं तु तादृग्प्रायश्चित्तजन्यफलस्वीकारोऽस्माकमुचितः।

।२। नन्वेवं लोकपातकनिवृत्तये भगवता कृतस्य प्रायश्चित्तस्य फलं सर्वपुरुषसाधारणं स्यादविशेषादिति चेन्न

we reply: Not so, because Faith is the means of appropriating the benefit.

(3) But then, it may be said, according to the text, that "Faith without works is dead," good works must be co-operative in the production of the benefit through faith; and so how can faith alone be the determining cause of the benefit? We reply: Faith alone is the means of appropriating the benefit of the atonement; but good works are an invariable effect of faith, and are evidence of their own cause. In whatever person these [good works] are not found, there is in him no real faith, but only a semblance of faith. And thus there is no conflict between the two declarations [of St. Paul and of St. James] that men are justified by faith, and that faith without works is dead.

(4) Now, it may be asked, how can man, without free-will, be amenable to question as to transgression of duty,

फलोत्पत्तौ श्रद्धाया हेतुत्वात्।

।३। ननु निष्क्रिया श्रद्धा मृतेत्यागमवचनाच्छ्रद्धया फलोत्पत्तौ धर्माचरणरूपा क्रिया सहचारिणी तथाच कथं श्रद्धा फलनियामिकेति चेन्न। तादृशप्रायश्चित्तफलप्राप्तौ केवला श्रद्धा हेतुः धर्माचरणन्तु श्रद्धाया अव्यभिचारि कार्यं स्वकारणानुमापकञ्च तथाच धर्माचरणं यस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपलभ्यते तस्मिन् वास्तविकी श्रद्धा नास्ति किन्तु श्रद्धाभासमाचमित्यत्र च जनाः श्रद्धया मृद्धा इत्यस्य निष्क्रिया श्रद्धा मृतेत्यस्य चागमवचनयोर्न विरोधः।

।४। अथ पुरुषः स्वतन्त्रेच्छतां विना कथंकर्मअयोर्विषये स्वाधिकारातिक्रमहेतुप्रश्ना-

whether in the matter of faith or works? And how can freedom of the will, in the shape of non-dependence on a previous cause, consist with the doctrine already laid down [in the commentary on Aph. V. of Bk. II.], of the impossibility of conceiving an uncaused origination? For, on the alternative of freedom, the will must be in the shape of a cause which is not an effect [and this, according to your doctrine, is inconceivable]; and if it *be* an effect, then there is an end of its [independence or] freedom. To remove this doubt, we reply [following Sir Wm. Hamilton at p. 597 of his *Discourses*].

र्ः कथं चेच्छायाः कारणान्तरानपेक्षस्वरूपं स्वातन्त्र्यं पूर्वोक्तेन कारणरहितोत्पत्तिज्ञानासम्भवसिद्धान्तेन न विरुध्यते। स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षे हीच्छया कार्यानात्मककारणरूपया भाव्यं कार्यात्मकत्वे स्वातन्त्र्यच्युतेरिति शङ्कां निरसितुं सूचयति।

APHORISM VI.

The freedom of the will.

How freedom of the will is possible in man or God, it is impossible speculatively to understand; but, practically, the fact that our will is free is established by the conscious-

स्वतन्त्रेच्छता जीवानां परमेश्वरस्य च कथं जातेति तावत् परमार्थतो ऽत्यन्तदुर्ज्ञेयं व्यवहारतस्त्वस्माकं स्वतन्त्रेच्छता स्वाधिकारातिक्रमहे-

ness of [our moral accountability, or] our deserving to be asked the reason of our violation of duty.

(1) In accordance with the indication already given [under Aph. II. of this Bk. IV.], that things which are inconceivable, may yet be possible, there is not, on the theory of freedom, an assumption of more things inconceivable than those the assumption of which is necessary on the alternative theory of necessity. Such being the case, the consciousness of our moral accountability falls into [and turns] the scale [in favour] of the theory of freedom. On this point a certain sage [Sir Wm. Hamilton, at p. 597 of his *Discussions*], says, More things inconceivable are not necessitated on the scheme of freedom than on the scheme of necessity. To explain. The scheme of fatalism is pressed on our acceptance by the dread of the inconceivability of a phenomenon's originating without a

तुप्रश्नार्हताविषयकात्मप्रत्यक्षेणैव सिद्धा ॥ ६ ॥

। १ । दुर्ज्ञेयान्यपि वस्तूनि सम्भवन्तीति प्रतिपादितदिशा स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षे तावद्यो ऽधिकानां दुर्ज्ञेयपदार्थानां कल्पनं नास्ति यावतां पारतन्त्र्यपक्षे कल्पनमावश्यकम् । एवं स्थिते स्वाधिकारातिक्रमहेतुप्रश्नार्हताविषयकात्मसाक्षात्कारः स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षतुलायां पतति । अत्र कश्चित् पण्डित आह । पारतन्त्र्यपक्षावश्यकदुर्ज्ञेयपदार्थेभ्यो ऽधिका दुर्ज्ञेयपदार्थाः स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षे नावश्यकाः । तथाहि । निष्कारणककार्योत्पत्तिदुर्ज्ञेयताभयादेव पारतन्त्र्यपक्षो ऽङ्गीकर्त्तव्यस्तादृश्येव चोत्पत्तिः स्वातन्त्र्यपक्षाङ्गीकारमूलं पारतन्त्र्यपक्षे ऽपि च तुल्यैवानादिकार्यकारणधारादुर्ज्ञेयता सैवचानादिधारा पारतन्त्र्यपक्षाङ्गीकारमूलम् ।

cause, and it is just such origination that is the basis of the acceptance of the doctrine of liberty; while on the scheme of fatality also there is an exactly equal inconceivability of a beginningless series of causes and effects, which [assumed] beginningless series is the basis of the acceptance of the doctrine of fatality. And these two schemes, of liberty and necessity, are thus determined to be theoretically balanced; but, practically, the doctrine of freedom is the most correct, because, without freedom, the consciousness of moral accountability could not be justified. If men are accountable for transgression of duty, it is quite clear that they must be free to perform their duty.

तौचेमौ स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्त्र्यपक्षौ विचारे समतुलाविधृताविव सिद्धौ तथापि स्वातन्त्र्यपक्ष एव व्यवहारे साधीयान् स्वातन्त्र्यं विना स्वाधिकारातिक्रमहेतुप्रश्नार्हतायाविषयकात्मप्रत्यक्षानुपपत्तेः । यदि हि जीवाः स्वाधिकारातिक्रमहेतुप्रश्नार्हास्तर्हि स्वाधिकारनिर्वहणे स्वतन्त्रा इति स्पष्टमेव ।

[The words of Sir Wm. Hamilton, rendered in our Sanskrit version as above, are as follows:—"The scheme of freedom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of necessity. For while fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commencement the doctrine of liberty proceeds; the fatalist is shown to overlook the

equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an infinite non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-commencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty in man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act if we are accountable for our actions."]

(2) But whence is the existence, permitted by God, in this world, of suffering which causes all this perplexity, and why are we involved in this suffering? We state in an aphorism the Christian avoidance of this question, as preferable to the Hindū attempt to get rid of it by the theory of Transmigration.

। २ । अथ कुतो ऽस्मिन् जगति व्याकुलताहेतोर्दुःखस्य सत्त्वं भगवतो ऽनुमतं कुतश्चास्माकं तादृग्दुःखादृतत्वमच भारतवर्षीयाणां जन्मान्तर-सिद्धान्तेन परिहारात् समीचीनं दृष्टीयमतस्यं परिहारं सूचयति ।

APHORISM VII.

Abortive attempt of Hinduism to clear up the mystery of evil.

The permitted existence of evil, since, as we hold, it is a mystery, is inexplicable. The attempt of the Hindūs to stave off the said inexplicability, by the assumption of the infinite

दुःखसत्त्वानुमतिरस्माभते रहस्यत्वादनिर्वाच्या । जन्माधाराया अनादित्वस्वीकारेण भारतवर्षीयाणामुक्तानुपपत्तिपरिहारो न कथमपि विषयनिर्वचनक्षमः ॥ ७ ॥

non-commencement of the series of births, is in no way adequate to the explaining of the case.

(1) "By the assumption of the infinite non-commencement of the series of births," etc. [To borrow the reasoning of Paley, *Nat. Theol.* chap. ii., in reference to another case, in support of which the same futile attempt at explanation is made.] If, by going further and further back, there were diminution of the unaccountableness, then, by going back indefinitely, even the surcease of the unaccountableness were possible. This method of accounting is applicable only in such a case as that where, accordingly as we suppose the number to be greater and greater [of the terms, here] of the things to be explained [viz., the cases of evil] and the explainers [*e.g.*, the repeated births], there is continually an approach towards a limit. *There*, by supposing the number of

।१। जन्मधाराया अनादित्वस्वीकारेणेति । यदि तावत् पूर्वपूर्वानुसरणेनानुपपत्त्यपचयः स्यात् तर्ह्यनन्तपूर्वपूर्वानुसरणेनानुपपत्तिनिवृत्तिरपि सम्भवति । स एष उपपादनप्रकारस्तादृश एव स्वप्ने सम्भवति यत्रोपपाद्योपपादकयोरधिकाधिकसङ्ख्याकल्पने क्रमेणावधिसमीपप्राप्तिर्भवति तत्रैवत्रोपपाद्योपपादकयोरनन्तसङ्ख्याकल्पने ऽवधिप्राप्तिः सम्भवति । यत्तु नैवमवधिसमीपप्राप्त्याशा तत्रोपपाद्योपपादकयोरधिकाधिकसङ्ख्याकल्पनमकिञ्चित्करम् । एतच्च परिच्छिन्नापरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्यप्रकृतधर्मैर्विलक्षणयोरपि श्रेण्योस्तुल्यमेव । तथाहि यथा परिच्छिन्नसङ्ख्याककटकघटिता यष्टिरात्मानं

terms to be infinite, the attainment of the limit is conceivable. But where there is no tendency to approach a limit, nothing is effected by supposing the number of terms to be greater and greater. And this applies alike to one series or another, though they should differ in properties other than the one in question, such as being finite or infinite, etc. To explain,—as a chain consisting of a finite number of links cannot support itself, so exactly is it with one consisting of an infinite number of links. And of this we are assured (though it has never been tried, since that would be impossible), because there is absolutely no approach towards the limit of self-support, though we suppose the number of links, beginning with ten, to be a hundred, a thousand, and so on. And it is the same with all chains, however they may differ in other respects than the one in question [viz., incapacity

धर्त्तुं क्षमा तथैवापरिच्छिन्नसङ्ख्याकटकघटितापि । एतच्चाशक्यत्वादपरीक्षितमपि सिद्धम् । कटकसङ्ख्याया दशसङ्ख्यामारभ्य शतसहस्रादिसङ्ख्याकल्पने ऽपि स्वतन्त्रधारकरूपावधिसामीप्यप्राप्त्यभावात् । एतच्च दैर्घ्यव्यक्तिपरिच्छिन्नत्वाद्यप्रकृतधर्मैर्विलक्षणास्वपि शृङ्खलासु तुल्यम् ।

of self-support], such as length, numerical difference, finiteness, and so on.

[The words of Paley are as follows:—"If the difficulty were diminished the further we went back, by going back *indefinitely* we might exhaust it. And this is the only case to which this sort of reasoning applies. Where there is a tendency, or, as we increase the number of terms, a continual approach, towards a limit, *there*, by supposing the number of terms to be what is called infinite, we may conceive the limit to be attained; but where there is no such limit or approach, nothing is effected by lengthening the series. There is no difference as to the point in question (whatever there may be as to many points) between one series and another; between a series which is finite, and a series which is infinite. A chain composed of an infinite number of links can no more support itself than a chain composed of a finite number of links. And of this we are assured (though we never *can* have tried the experiment), because, by increasing the number of links, from ten for instance to a hundred, from a hundred to a thousand, etc., we make not the smallest approach, we observe not the smallest tendency, towards self-support. There is no difference in this respect (yet there may be a great difference in several respects) between a chain of a greater or less length, between one chain and another, between one that is finite and one that is infinite."]

(2) And thus it is impossible, by the theory of trans-

।२। तथाच याभिरापद्भि-र्दृतो ऽयं पुरुषो ऽस्मिन् ज-

migration, to account for the variety of evils encompassed with which a man is born into this world, or to explain how an infant, which never exerted free will at all, comes to experience sufferings. As a chain does not become competent to support itself through indefinite addition of links, just as incompetent is the theory of transmigration to account for the diversity of condition in the case of human souls.

गति जातस्यासां वैजात्यस्य हेतुनिर्वचनं स्वतस्त्वेच्छाकरणशून्यो ऽपि भिशुर्दुःखान्यनुभवतीत्येतद्धेतुनिर्वचनञ्च जन्मान्तरसिद्धान्तेन न सम्भवति। यथाह्यनन्तानन्तकटकयोजने ऽपि शृङ्खला कदाप्यात्मानं धर्त्तुं न क्षमा तथैव जन्मान्तरवादो जीवावस्थावैषम्यमुपपादयितुं न क्षमः।

(3) But, it may be said, such a book, professing to clear up doubts, can be no *revelation* of the will of God, because, since there is no clearing up of the question how the existence of evil is permitted by the Deity, there is really no proof that we have here a revelation of God's will. To meet this doubt, we propound an aphorism.

। ३। ननु दुःखस्य सत्त्वं किमित्यनुमतं भगवतेति प्रश्नस्यानिर्वचनीयतया समाधानपरे ग्रन्थ ईश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशनपरत्वं प्रमाणाभावान्न सम्भवतीति शङ्कां निरसितुं सूचयति।

APHORISM VIII.

Mystery not distinctive of Christianity.

If you reject Christianity, then you must reject the world of sense also, since else your decisions are inconsistent.

(1) Now, that by such difficulties as the Christian religion is beset by, in respect of the permitted existence of evil, this world also, which has the same author, is beset, — that there are not more difficulties in regard to the Christian religion than there are in regard to the world itself, we commence a Fifth Book on purpose to show.

यदि खृष्टीयधर्मो नाभ्युपेयते तर्हि प्रत्यक्षसिद्धं जगदपि नाभ्युपेतव्यमन्यथा खवचनविरोधात् ॥ ८ ॥

। १ । अथ दुःखसत्त्वानुमतिविषयकयादृशानुपपत्तिभिः खृष्टधर्मो बाध्यते तादृशीभिरेव समानकर्त्तृको ऽयं प्रपञ्चो ऽपि बाधितुं शक्यते जगद्बाधकानुपपत्तिभ्यो ऽधिका अनुपपत्तयः खृष्टधर्मे न सन्तीति संक्षेपतो वक्तुं पञ्चममाध्यायमारभते ॥

BOOK V.

THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

Now, beginning an exposition of the analogy of the Scriptural arrangement to that of the mundane system of cause and effect, we first propound as an aphorism the quintessence of the doctrine of an ancient sage [Origen].

अथ धर्मशास्त्रीयव्यवस्थायाः सांसारिककार्यकारणभावानुरूपतां प्रदर्शयितुमारभमाण आदौ कस्यचित् प्राचीनपण्डितस्य मतसारांशं सूचयति ।

APHORISM I.

's state- The man who bescriptures were given by the Creator of the world, is not disturbed even when he sees the same sort of difficulties in the world and in the Scriptures.

यः पुमान् धर्मग्रन्थानां जगत्कर्त्रा प्रणीतत्वं स्वीकरोति सोऽस्मिन् जगति धर्मग्रन्थेषु च समानानि रहस्यानि पश्यन्नपि न व्याकुलितो भवति ॥१॥

(1) "Of the same sort," etc. To the same effect another sage [Bishop Butler] says,—If by such difficulties as these it is proved impossible that the Scriptures should have been given by God, then, by the very same difficulties, it would be also proved impossible that the world should have been made by God. But the arguments for their being both alike the work of God have been already exhibited [in Books II. and III.]

। १। समानानीति। एतदेवाभिप्रेत्यान्योऽपि पण्डित आह यदि तावदेवंविधैः रहस्यैर्धर्मग्रन्थानां परमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वं बाध्यते तर्हि ताभिरेव रहस्यैर्जगतोऽपि परमेश्वरकृतत्वं बाध्येत विशेषाभावात्। तदुभयस्य भगवत्कर्तृत्वेतु युक्तयः पूर्वं प्रदर्शिताः।

[Origen's words, as given by Butler, are these:—"He who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of nature." Hence, adds Butler, "He who denies the Scripture to have been from God, upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very same reason, deny the world to have been formed by Him," which, however, the reader, at this stage of the argument, is supposed to have conceded.]

(2) Although it would be proper for us to leave off here, since, to the intelligent, not a word more requires to be said; yet, since *all* persons are not thoroughly intelligent, we

। २। यद्यप्यस्माभिरिहैव विरमितुमुचितं विदुषामधिकवचनापेक्षाविरहात् तथापि सर्वेषां जनानां सम्यक् पाण्डित्यस्याभावेनोक्ताचार्यदृष्ट्य-

must endeavour to make intelligible, even to those of lower capacity, the foregoing words of those two great teachers. With reference, then, to the question how it is that its analogy to the constitution and course of nature proves the Scriptural scheme to be the work of God, we propound an aphorism, to intimate, that, analogy, in the shape of likeness, produces only a probability of what it is desired to prove, and that probability, arising from the contemplation of likeness, though it is of the nature of an inference, is yet an assurance lower in degree than that of inference proper.

चांसि मन्दाधिकारिबोधानि विधातुं यतितव्यमेव। तच्च धर्मशास्त्रीयव्यवस्थायाः सांसारिककार्यकारणभावानुरूपत्वं परमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वस्य कथं साधकमित्याकाङ्क्षायां सादृश्यरूपस्यानुरूपत्वस्य तादृश्यसाध्यसम्भावनामात्रजनकत्वं सादृश्यदर्शनोत्था सम्भावना तु अनुमितिजातीया ऽप्यनुमितितो निकृष्टा प्रमितिरिति सूचयितुं सूचयति।

APHORISM II.

[1] de- Analogy, though akin to induction, is evidence falling short of an induction.

(1) And, from the contemplating of likeness, assurance of the following kind arises [—in other words, the form of

सादृश्यमनुमानजातीयमप्यनुमानादपकृष्टं मानम्॥२॥

।२। सादृश्यदर्शनाच्चैवंप्रकारा प्रमितिरुत्पद्यते तथाहि यौ द्वौ पदार्थावन्योन्यमेकेन

analogical reasoning is as follows]: "two things resemble each other in one or more respects; a certain proposition is true of the one, therefore it is [probably] true of the other."

वाधर्म्यैर्वा धर्मैः सदृशौ तयोरेकस्मिन् यो धर्मो निश्चितः सोऽपरस्मिन् सम्भाव्यत इति।

(2) But [as Mr. Mill, in his *Logic*, vol. ii., pp. 97-8, goes on to say, "we have here nothing to discriminate analogy from induction, since this type will serve for all reasoning from experience," so] if it be asked, when the unperceived is established through perception of likeness, as is required in all cases, in what respect is there any falling short of induction? —we reply, that in induction are employed the ascertained invariable conjunction or non-conjunction of certain properties; but it is not so in the case of a conclusion from analogy [or of assurance arising from perception of likeness].

।२। ननु सादृश्यस्य प्रत्यक्षादप्रत्यक्षसिद्धौ सर्वत्रोपयुक्तस्यानुमानात् केनांशेनापकर्ष इति चेदुच्यते अनुमाने तावदन्वयव्यतिरेकौ निश्चितावुपयुज्येते नत्वेवं सादृश्यदर्शनोत्थप्रमितिस्थले।

(3) But, it may be said, the cause of a genuine inference is a genuine induction;

।३। अथ सदनुमितौ सदनुमानं हेतुः सादृश्यस्य त-

and what use is there then for analogy, which you acknowledge to fall short of induction? To remove this doubt, we propound an aphorism.

नुमानादपह्नवेन स्वीकृतस्य क उपयोग इत्याशङ्कां निरसितुं सूचयति ।

APHORISM III.

ue Analogy, though falling short of induction, is universally the guide in practice.

सादृश्यमनुमानादपह्नवमपि व्यवहारे सार्वत्रिकं प्रवर्त्तकम् ॥ ३ ॥

(1) The import is this. It is only in the case of beings who are not omniscient that knowledge, in the shape of probability, and not consisting of certainty, arises from the contemplation of likeness [or from analogy]. For, in the case of one omniscient, nothing whatever — present, past, or future—is matter of probability, since He knows with absolute certainty the truth of what things are true and the falsity of what things are false. But in the case of the like of us, who are not omniscient, it is probability

।१। अयं भावः । सादृश्यदर्शनात् केवलमसर्वज्ञानामेव सम्भावनारूपमनिश्चयात्मकं ज्ञानं जायते । सर्वज्ञस्य हि न किमपि वस्तु वर्तमानमतीतमनागतं वा सम्भावनाविषयः सत्यवस्तूनां सत्यताया मिथ्यापदार्थानां मिथ्यात्वस्य च तेन सुनिश्चितत्वात् । असर्वज्ञानां त्वस्मदादीनां सम्भावनैव प्रायेण व्यवहारप्रवर्त्तिकेति।

that pre-eminently furnishes the motives of conduct.

[In the words of Bishop Butler, "Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information; and it is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence, since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false. But to *us*, probability is the very guide of life."]

(2) Now some one who, as if he were omniscient, does not acknowledge any authority in the probability which results from the contemplation of likeness, and who is accustomed [in the books of Hindū philosophy] to certainty in respect of a thing's being, or else not being, so and so [—and whose language, therefore, abundantly wealthy as it is, almost grudges us terms for the discussion of probabilities], may doubt whether error must not be inevitable, if we follow evidence which falls short of perfection. To this doubt we reply as follows.

।२। अथ कश्चित् सर्वज्ञ इव सादृश्यदर्शनजन्यसम्भावनायाः प्रामाण्यमनादृत्य भावाभावान्यतरविषयकनिश्चयशीलोऽपह्नष्टप्रमाणानुसरणेऽवश्यं भ्रान्तिः स्यादिति शङ्केत तच्चोत्तरं सूचयति।

APHORISM IV.

Probability not to be despised.

In the absence of superior evidence, evidence comparatively inferior is not to be despised, as a lamp in the absence of the daylight.

उत्कृष्टप्रमाणाभावे ततो निकृष्टं प्रमाणं नानादरणीयं सूर्यज्योतिषो ऽसन्निधाने दीपवत् ॥ ४ ॥

(1) "Not to be despised," etc. For if the inferior ought to be rejected because the superior is unattainable, then, since they are unable to fly through the air as birds do, people ought not either to walk with their feet.

। १ । नानादरणीयमिति । यदि ह्युत्कृष्टं न लभ्यत इति निकृष्टं परित्यज्येत तर्हि पक्षिवदन्तरिक्षे सवेगोत्पतनासामर्थ्यात् पादाभ्यामपि लोका न चलेयुः ।

(2) Again, the attendants of a certain child whose mother has died, seeing that he cannot survive without milk, desiring to procure milk, there being at hand no cow, or she-buffalo, or the like, become hopeless as they look around on stones, logs, pieces of cloth, etc., all very unlike in character to the cow or any other source of milk. Suddenly observing a female of the Bos Gavaeus, an animal of a

। २ । किञ्च कस्यचिन्मृतमातृकस्य शिशोः परिजना विना दुग्धं तस्य जीवनानुपपत्तिदर्शिनो दुग्धसम्पादनेच्छवो गोमहिष्याद्यसन्निधाने पाषाणकाष्ठपटखण्डादीन् दुग्धयोनिगवादितो ऽत्यन्तविधर्मकान् पश्यन्तो निराशाः सहसा गवयामदृष्टपूर्वजातीयामुपलभ्य सास्नाविरहिताप्येषा बहुभिर्धर्मैर्गोसदृशीति कदा-

kind they had never seen before, on the probability that she, resembling a cow in many respects, even though destitute of a dewlap, may perhaps give milk, putting her to the proof, they obtain milk from her. In this instance, we see how analogy, though falling short of a perfect induction, instigated [and rightly too] the conduct of those persons.

चिदेषा दुग्धं दद्यादिति सम्भावनया तां परीक्षमाणास्ततो दुग्धमासादयन्ति। तथाचाच सादृश्यमनुमानादपह्नष्टमपि तेषां पुरुषाणां व्यवहारं प्रवर्त्तयामास।

(3) But then we see that, in mundane affairs, the cause of action is will, preceded by knowledge; whereas, in the Christian institute, action is enjoined with a view to knowledge. To explain. We are informed in Scripture [John vii., 17], "If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God;" so here there is no analogy between the world and the Scripture. To meet this objection, we propound an aphorism.

।३। अथ लोके क्रियां प्रति ज्ञानपूर्विकेच्छा कारणमिति दृष्टं दृष्टशास्त्रेच ज्ञानार्थं कर्म विधीयते। तथाहि। श्रूयते यस्त्वेष्टं करिष्यति स एव भगवतो धर्मो ऽयमस्ति नवेति निश्चयं लप्स्यत इति। तथाचाच लोकानुरूपत्वं नास्ति शास्त्रस्येत्याक्षेपं समाधातुं सूचयति।

APHORISM V.

Belief may be the reward

Belief in the doctrines of Christianity is indispensable; but this may grow from doing the will of God, and experiencing the benefit of so doing.

(1) "May grow," etc. A sick man, though doubting the skill of the physician who attends him, yet, by obeying his directions and by experiencing the benefit of such obedience, may come to place confidence in the physician. So is it in the case before us: such is the import.

(2) Moreover, whatever proofs, establishing the truth of the Christian Scriptures, have been set forth in Book II., so long as a man does not also *act* upon these in accordance with the Christian Scriptures, so long will they fail to confirm belief in him.

खृष्टधर्मग्रन्थेषु श्रद्धा तावदवर्जनीया किन्तु भगवदिष्टाचरणेन तादृशाचरणफलानुभवेनच सा वर्धते ॥ ५ ॥

। १ । वर्धत इति । कश्चिद्रोगी निजोपचारकारिणो वैद्यस्य शिल्पे सन्दिहानोऽपि तदुक्ताचरणेन तादृशाचरणफलानुभवेनच तस्मिन् वैद्ये श्रद्धते तदत् प्रकृते ऽपीति भावः ।

। २ । अपिच यानि खृष्टधर्मग्रन्थप्रामाण्यसाधकानि प्रमाणानि द्वितीये ऽध्याये निरूपितानि तेषामपि यावदयं पुरुषः खृष्टधर्मग्रन्थानुसारि न व्यवहरति तावदस्य श्रद्धां दृढीकर्त्तुं न समर्थानि ।

[As Mr. Fitzgerald remarks, at p. 6 of his edition of Butler's Analogy, "I am not sure that any one could be a fair judge of the sufficiency of the evidence

to determine belief, until he had allowed it to determine behaviour."]

(3) But, it may be objected, we are told that belief results from doing the will of God; but doing the will of God just *consists* in believing,—for we are told in Scripture [John vi., 29], "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent,"—and the sense of the proposition that "belief in Christ results from belief in Christ" is nugatory. With a view to removing this difficulty we propound an aphorism.

।३। अथेश्वरेष्टाचरणाच्छ्रद्धा जायत इत्युक्तं। ईश्वरेष्टाचरणञ्च अद्धारूपमेव। ईश्वरप्रेरिते अद्धैवेश्वरेष्टाचरणमिति धर्मग्रन्थोल्लेखाच्च अद्धया अद्धा जायत इति वाक्यार्थो निराकाङ्क्ष इति शङ्कां निरसितुं सूचयति।

APHORISM VI.

Belief may have of assurance.

Belief may be of two kinds, attended by doubts, or entirely cleared from doubts.

अद्धा द्वेधा ससन्देहा निःसन्देहाचेति ॥ ६ ॥

(1) To explain,—The expression employed, in addressing Christ [Mark ix. 24], "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief," met with no rebuke from Christ. The import of the expression was

।१। तथाहि खृष्टं सम्बोध्य प्रयुक्तं हे प्रभो अद्धे किन्तु ममाश्रद्धां दूरीकुर्विति वचनं खृष्टेन न तिरस्कृतं मदीया अद्धा स्थिरा न भवति तमेनं दुर्बलभक्तिमन्तं निः-

this,—"My faith is not steady: —help thou this weak believer by the bestowal of undoubting faith."

(2) And so the matter ascertained is this: 1st, It is fitting that, by reason of the external evidences, we should acknowledge the truth of the Scriptures, as it is said in Scripture [John xiv., 11], "or else believe me for the very work's sake;" and again [John v., 36], "the works which the father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." 2nd, It is fitting that the faith thus originated, though still encumbered by doubts, should be ingenuously carried out into action, as a child in many cases acts according to his father's directions, trustingly, though not knowing the motives which his father has in view. And further, 3rd, It is fitting that thoroughly defecated faith, amounting to knowledge, should be the re-

सन्देहभङ्गिदानेनानुगृह्णत्वेति तदाकूतार्थः।

।२। तथाचायं निष्कृष्टार्थः। बाह्यप्रमाणैः सदृष्टधर्मग्रन्थानां प्रामाण्यं मन्तुमुचितमेभिरेवाद्भुतचरितैर्मयि विश्वासं कुरुतेति यानि चरितानि कर्त्तुं पित्राहं प्रेरितस्तान्येव मम पितृप्रेरितत्वं साधयन्तीतिच धर्मग्रन्थवचनात्। अपिचेयमेवमुत्पन्ना श्रद्धा ससन्देहापि निष्पक्षपातमाचरणपर्यवसायिनी कर्त्तव्या यथा बहुधा पितुरभिप्रेतं प्रयोजनमजानन्नपि बालो विश्वासमात्रेण तदुक्ताचरणे प्रवर्त्तते तद्वदिति। अपिच सत्स्वपि सन्देहकारणेष्ववितर्कमुत्पन्नायाः श्रद्धायाः सम्यङ्निर्मलीकृता ज्ञानपर्यवसायिनी श्रद्धैव फलमिति।

ward of that faith which sprang up uncavillingly even while there existed causes of doubt.

(3) Well, grant that all this is as you have said,—now it is alleged in Scripture that God governs both this world and the other world according to a fixed scheme. What, then, are the facts in that scheme? [or, in the words of Butler, "What things are implied in the divine government of both worlds, according to the Christian doctrine?"] To meet this inquiry, we propound an aphorism.

। ३। अथ भवतु सर्वमिदं यथोक्तं परन्तु ख्रष्टमतग्रन्थे एतल्लोकपरलोकयोर्व्यवस्थां नियतदर्शनानुसारेणभगवान् करोतीत्युक्तं तत्र तादृग्दर्शने कीदृशाः सिद्धान्ताः सन्तीत्याकाङ्क्षां निरसितुं सूचयति।

APHORISM VII.

What the divine government according to

The divine government of both worlds according to the Christian doctrine, these propositions, viz., 1st, All souls are appointed to exist endlessly; 2nd, It is appointed that every one, after death, shall be either rewarded or punished; 3rd, The abiding of souls in this world is for

ख्रष्टधर्मग्रन्थानुसारिणा लोकद्वयव्यवस्थाया गर्भ दमे सिद्धान्ताः सन्ति। तथाहि जीवानामनन्तजीवनं नियतमित्येकः। सर्वेषं मरणोत्तरं निग्रहानुग्रहान्यतरन्नियतमिति द्वितीयः। एतल्लोके स्थितिर्जीवानां परीक्षार्थं परलोकानुगुणश्चिचार्थञ्चास्तीति ख-

the purpose of trial, and of discipline for the next world; 4th, Since this world, through wickedness, tends to ruin, and since men's knowledge both of their own condition and of duty has become corrupted, occasion was thus given for God's contriving a new remedy; 5th, The truth of this remedial dispensation, which consists of a special scheme carried on by a divine person, the Messiah, for the benefit of the world, is proved by miracles; 6th, And that means of salvation is not revealed to all, nor proved with the strongest possible evidence [with evidence not less strong than the strongest good evidence] to all those to whom it is revealed; but it is revealed only to such a part of mankind as God has chosen, and with such particular evidence as God has chosen.

तीयः। अस्य लोकस्य पापवशेन क्षयोन्मुखतया जनानां स्वीयावस्थाधर्माचरणविषयकज्ञानापचयेनचापूर्वलोकमुक्त्युपायरचनमीश्वरस्य प्रसक्तमिति चतुर्थः। लोकहितार्थं दिव्यपुरुषेण कर्त्तृकेन प्रवर्त्तनीयधर्मविशेषरूपस्य तादृशोपायस्य प्रामाणिकत्वमद्भुतचरितैः सिद्धतीति पञ्चमः। सच मोक्षोपायो न सर्वान् प्रति ज्ञापितो न वा यांश्च प्रत्येष ज्ञापितस्तान् सर्वान् प्रत्यपि बलवत्तमसाधुप्रमाणान्यूनबलेन प्रमाणेनैव ज्ञापितः किन्त्वीश्वरेच्छाविषयीभूतं कञ्चन लौकिकदेशं प्रति भगवदिच्छाविषयीभूतप्रमाणविशेषैरेवचज्ञापित इति षष्ठः॥७॥

(1) "To exist endlessly after death," etc. The import is this. It is unnecessary here to set forth proofs that

।१। मरणोत्तरानन्तस्थितिरित्यादि। अयं भावः। एतादृशस्थितिसत्त्वे तस्यास्त-

such [endless existence] is really the condition [of soul], and that this state will be in accordance with each soul's deserts, since our dispute is not at present with him who denies the soul to be other than the body; but we have entered on an argument with those only who accept as authoritative the Hindū Spiritual Institutes. But we do not, on the strength of the Hindū Institutes, accept the theory of transmigration, because we do not allow that the Hindū Institutes have any authority as proof. And it must not be said, moreover, that, since the existence of evil cannot be without some cause, transmigration is established as its cause, because we have already shown that even by the supposition thereof, the existence of evil cannot be accounted for. In the Christian Scripture, the truth of which has been established by the arguments set forth [in Book II.], it is declared that the endless condi-

तज्जीवानां तत्तत्कर्मफलप्राप्त्यनुकूलत्वेच प्रमाणोपन्यासस्तु नावश्यकः देहात्मवादिनासमं विवादस्याप्रस्तुतत्वात्। भारतवर्षीयाध्यात्मशास्त्रप्रामाण्याभ्युपगन्तृभिः सहैव विवादस्योपक्रान्तत्वात्। भारतवर्षीयशास्त्रबलात् पुनः पुनर्जन्मवादस्तु न स्वीक्रियते भारतवर्षीयशास्त्राणां प्रामाण्यस्यास्माभिरस्वीकारात्। दुःखसत्त्वस्याकस्मिकत्वासम्भवात् तद्धेतुतया पुनः पुनर्जन्म सिद्धतीत्यपि न वक्तव्यम्। तत्कल्पनेऽपि दुःखसत्त्वोपपादनासम्भवस्य पूर्वं प्रदर्शितत्वात्। प्रदर्शितयुक्तिसिद्धप्रामाण्यके खृष्टधर्मग्रन्थे मरणोत्तरानन्तस्थितिः केषाञ्चिदनन्तानन्दवती केषाञ्चिच्चानन्तदुःखवती भवतीत्युक्तम्।

tion after death is, in the case of some, a condition of endless happiness, and, in the case of some, a condition of endless misery.

(2) "State of trial and discipline," etc. The special means of salvation which have been enjoined by God, constitute one trial for the proud and rebellious heart of man. The particulars of this have been set forth in the section on the Atonement [Book III., Aph. V.] For man, by reason of pride, would fain obtain salvation, not through what is done by another, but by works of his own, such as perseverance in austerities, however wearisome, — by something other than the imputation to himself of the merits of Christ's death.

।२। परीक्षाग्निक्षयोरवस्थेति। तत्र गर्वद्रोहपरचेतसोमनुष्यस्य मुक्त्यसाधारणकारणानि यानीश्वरेणोपदिष्टानि तानि परीक्षारूपाणि तद्विशेषाश्च पूर्वमेव प्रायश्चित्तप्रकरणे प्रतिपादिताः। मनुष्यो हि गर्ववशात् खृष्टमरणपुण्यस्यात्मन्यारोपादन्येन तपश्चर्यादिनात्यन्तश्रमदेनापि स्वकृतेन कर्मणा मुक्तिमिच्छति नतु परकृतेनेति।

(3) "The ruin of this world through wickedness," etc. The doctrine of the Hindū Institutes is, that ignorance is the cause of the unhappy state of the present life. But this doctrine is unproved, for we

।३। अस्य लोकस्य पापवशात् क्षयोन्मुखत्वमित्यादि। इदानीन्तनदुरवस्थायाः कारणमविद्येति भारतवर्षीयशास्त्रसिद्धान्तः सतु तच्छास्त्राणां प्रामाण्यशास्त्राभिरनङ्गी-

do not admit that those institutes are any proof. Nay, the further a man advances in vice, the less conscious of his sinfulness does he become; and so, from forgetfulness of his danger, he dreads not the pain of retribution [—thus owing to ignorance his *freedom* from mental distress]. On the other hand, the more truly a man discerns his own condition, the more is he distressed by the view of his own sinfulness, and he remains in dread so long as he has not found any means of deliverance from his sins.

कारादसिद्ध एव किन्त्वयथा यथायं दुष्कर्मणि प्रवर्त्तते तथा तथासौ स्वीयां पातकितां न्यूनमनुभवति तथाच स्वानर्थविस्मरणाद् दण्डदुःखान्न बिभेति। प्रत्युतायं यथा यथायं स्वीयामवस्थां वस्तुतः पश्यति तथा तथा स्वीयदुष्कर्मदर्शनेन सन्तप्यते यावच्च कश्चित् पापमोचणोपायं न प्राप्नोति तावद् व्याकुलितो भवति।

(4) [If it be asked, "Whence is sin?" we reply that] we have already acknowledged, in the chapter on the Mysteries, that the source of the existence of sin, like the cause of the existence of evil, we cannot tell.

।४। पापस्य सत्त्वे बीजं तु दुःखसत्त्वहेतुवद् दुर्वचमेवेति रहस्यप्रकरणे पूर्वमेव चिन्तितम्।

(5) "Not revealed to all men," etc. But it may be said,—Since all men are under apprehension of terrible and eternal misery, the means of escape from such misery ought

।५। सर्वमनुष्यान् प्रति न ज्ञापितमिति। ननु भयावहेनानन्तेन दुःखेन सर्वमनुष्याणां व्याकुलितत्वात् तादृग्दुःखमोचनोपायः सर्वान्

to be told to all;—and so, why has it not been told to all? We reply, that we have not here undertaken to remove all the objections that have been raised or that may be raised either against the course of nature or against the will of God as revealed in the Christian Scripture; but [what we have undertaken is] to explain that the world, though established by the evidence of the senses, might be disbelieved on the ground of the very same objections, on the strength of which you say that the mysteries announced in the Christian Scriptures ought not to be believed. And so it is fruitless to raise these same objections against the Scriptures, the truth of which is established by other unobjectionable proofs.

प्रति वक्तव्यः तथाचेश्वरेण सर्वमनुष्यान् प्रति स कुतो नोक्तः इति चेदुच्यते प्रकृते जगद्व्यवस्थायां वा दृष्टधर्मग्रन्थप्रकाशितेश्वरेच्छायां वोद्भाविताना मुद्भावयिष्यमाणानां वा दोषाणां वारणे वयं न प्रवृत्ताः स्मो ऽपि तु यैर्दोषैर्धर्मग्रन्थोक्तानि रहस्यानि न श्रद्धेयानीति त्वयोच्यते तैरेव दोषैः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमपि जगन्न न श्रद्धेयं स्यादिति वक्तुं तथा च निर्दोषप्रमाणान्तरदृढीकृतप्रामाण्यकेषु धर्मग्रन्थेषु तेषां दोषाणामुद्भावनमफलमेव।

(6) But, it may be asked, since it was declared in Scripture [Revelations, xv. 3], "Just and true are all thy ways," how is it acknowledged by you who accept the Christian religion that you are unable to

। ६। ननु परमेश्वरस्य तव सर्वे व्यवहारा उचिताः सत्याश्च सन्तीति धर्मग्रन्थेषूक्तत्वात् दृष्टमतस्वीकर्द्भिर्युष्माभिरग्रेषतस्तन्निर्वचनासामर्थ्यं कथं

justify those ways in every respect? We reply [with Dr. Chalmers], To utter such an expression is fitting for those only to whom the day of the revelation of hidden things has come, whose condition of having the secrets of God hidden from them has ceased, or by whom the fulfilment of God's designs has been witnessed. But previously to such great and final manifestation of the hidden things of God, we have only to expect with humility; and the mysteries which in our present state we cannot comprehend we must silently acquiesce in.

प्रतिपाद्यत इति चेत्। अत्रोच्यते तादृशं हि वचनं तैरव वक्तुमुचितं यान् प्रति रहस्यवस्तुप्रकाशनदिनं प्राप्तं येषां देवगुह्यगोपनावस्था विरता भगवदिच्छासिद्धिर्वा यैः प्रत्यवीक्षता। तादृश्या महत्या अन्त्यायाश्च देवगुह्यप्रकाशावस्थायाः पूर्वं तु केवलमस्माभिः सविनयं प्रतीक्षितव्यम्। इदानीन्तनावस्थायां ज्ञातुमशक्यानि रहस्यानिच तूष्णीमेव स्वीकर्त्तव्यानि।

[The words of Dr. Chalmers, in his *Evidences*, vol. i., p. 310, are these:—"This [Rev. xv. 3] might well be said by those to whom the day of the revelation of hidden things has come, and to whom the mystery of God is finished—or who have witnessed its fulfilment. Previous to that great and final manifestation, it is our part to wait in humble expectancy, and to acquiesce in the mysteriousness of many things which at present we do not comprehend."]

(7) Further, whoever says that he can now everywhere discern God's wisdom and

।७। अपिच यः को ऽपि साम्प्रतं भगवतो ज्ञानं साधु-

goodness, he, like one "lying for God," injures with great effort [or unintentionally does his best to injure], though loving it, the very cause which he seeks [thus disingenuously] to advance.

(7) Let us now recapitulate the matters that have been laid down in the several sections of this treatise. In Bk. I. is an account of the leading points in the Christian religion. In Bk. II. is an account of the arguments for the truthfulness of the Christian Scriptures. In Bk. III. it is shown that this world was made by an Intelligent Worker, possessed of power transcending that of mortals. In Bk. IV. it is shown that as there are learned, from the books which reveal God's will, things different from the visible, and which we cannot explain,—so, too, are there in God's created world things seen and yet mysterious, and by us at present inexplicable. In Bk. V. it is shown that as the mys-

ताच्च सार्वत्रिकीं ज्ञातुं शक्नोमीति वदेत् स भगवतस्त्रातुकार इव यं पक्षं स्थापयितुमिच्छति तमेव पक्षमिच्छन्नपि महता यत्नेन दूषयति।

। ७। तथाचास्मिन् ग्रन्थे तत्तदध्याये प्रस्तुतानां विषयाणामेवमुपसंहारः। यथा। प्रथमे ऽध्याये खृष्टमतसारांशनिरूपणं। द्वितीये खृष्टधर्मग्रन्थानां प्रामाण्ये हेतूनां निरूपणं। तृतीये ऽस्य जगतो लोकातीतशक्तिमता बुद्धिपूर्वकारिणा कृतत्वनिरूपणं। चतुर्थे यथा भगवदिच्छाप्रकाशकग्रन्थेभ्यो दृष्टविलक्षणानि दुर्वचानि वस्तून्यवगम्यन्ते तथास्मिन् भगवत्सृष्टे जगति दृश्यमानानि वस्तूनि रहस्यानीदानीमस्माभिर्दुर्वचानि सन्तीति निरूपणं। पञ्चमे परमेश्वरेच्छाप्रकाशकग्रन्थानां यैरहस्यैरश्रद्धेयत्वं कल्पनोद्यं तानि दृश्ये जगति वर्त्तमानानामपि

teries, because of which it is imagined that the Christian Scriptures ought not to be believed, are analogous to the mysteries which exist in the visible world, and which yet do not cause men to disbelieve in the world; therefore, they ought not to be brought as objections against the Scriptures, the truthfulness of which is established by the evidence already adduced [in Bk. II].

जगत्यश्रद्धामनुत्पादयतां रहस्यानां तुल्यानि सन्यतस्य प्रदर्शितप्रमाणदृढीकृतप्रामाण्यकधर्मग्रन्थेषूद्भावनं नार्हन्तीति निरूपणमिति।

(8) Thus strong reasons have been stated for the probability that the Christian Scriptures are true; and if they *are* true, it is quite clear that tremendous consequences must attend the rejection of them. We wind up, then, the present discussion of the leading points in Christianity, by indicating to those who desire to know the whole truth of these Scriptures, the method of satisfying that desire of knowledge.

। ८। ऐवं तावत् खृष्टीयधर्मागमानां प्रामाण्यसम्भावनायाः प्रबलानि कारणान्युक्तानि तेषां प्रामाण्यपक्षेच तदनङ्गीकारे ऽतिभयावहानि फलानि स्फुटान्येव। अथ तादृग्आगमानामशेषार्थजिज्ञासून् प्रति तज्जिज्ञासानिवर्त्तनोपायं प्रदर्शयन् प्रस्तुतं खृष्टधर्मसारांशविचारमुपसंहरति।

APHORISM VIII.

Concluding advice to the inquirer.

Search the Scriptures;—search the Scriptures.

खृष्टीयधर्मागमा विचारणीयाः खृष्टीयधर्मागमा विचारणीया इति ॥ ८ ॥

(1) The repetition is to indicate [as it will do to the reader of the *Sānkhya* Aphorisms], that this is the conclusion of the section.

।१। वीप्सा प्रकरणसमाप्त्यर्था।

(2) "Search," etc. That is to say, they are to be studied diligently and candidly, not with the intention of finding objections, but with the desire of finding the truth. Further, at the time of thus studying, let him with sincerity and humility pray to the Lord of the universe, saying, "Show me the truth who am seeking to know it, and the way in which I ought to walk." Amen.

।२। विचारणीया इति। सपरिश्रमं निष्कपटं दोषदृष्टिवर्जनपूर्वकं तत्त्वजिज्ञासापूर्वकञ्चाभ्यासनीया इत्यर्थः। किञ्च तथाविधाभ्यासकाले तत्त्वं जिज्ञासमानं मां नयमार्गञ्च दर्शयेति निष्कपटं सविनयञ्च जगदीश्वरः प्रार्थनीय इति शम्।

Here ends the Fifth Book of the Elucidation of the Christian Religion.

इति खृष्टधर्मकौमुद्यां पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ॥

APPENDIX

OF

NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS.

SEVERAL points involved in the preceding treatise appear to call for a fuller exposition than could have been given, where each point first presented itself, without the risk of injuriously interrupting the thread of the argument. Such points may be, perhaps, profitably treated in separate Notes, in which a somewhat familiar style of treatment, and an admixture of dialogue, —employed not less for the sake of perspicuity than of vivacity,—may be not displeasing to the reader. Our first dissertation is on the subject of "Matter," a most important topic where the missionary has to reason with idolaters,—much more with idolaters imbued, from the cradle, through the very language, with a system of metaphysics of such a nature that, if the missionary neglect or fail to master it and its strictly defined terminology, he will strive in vain to make his arguments against idolatry intelligible, even to the most candid among those whom he addresses. One missionary, for example (the case is not feigned), thinks that he has stated, with sufficient precision, the proposition that "God is not material," when he has stated to a Hindū

that God is not *dravya*, *i.e.* not a "substance," which an idol certainly is;—but he omits to keep in mind that there is (as Milton says), "spiritual substance" as well as "material," both of them included under the head of *dravya* = "substance;" so that his proposition conveys to the Hindū the assertion that "God is neither Matter nor Spirit." These things, though metaphysical, are not trifling. The man who thinks them such, mistakes his vocation when he ventures to become a missionary to the Hindūs. Again, the missionary may perhaps feel equally convinced that his meaning *ought* to be understood when he has propounded that God is no *padārtha*,—this term certainly being denotative of a "material thing,"—but it denotes also *whatever is meant by any term*,—so that the proposition here conveys to the Hindū the assertion that the term "God" has *no meaning*, denotes nothing,—not even the *non-existence* of anything. Another reasoner suggests—for "Matter"—the term *Vastu*, which, where it is a recognised and defined metaphysical term, denotes the "Supreme Spirit," to the exclusion of whatever is *not* spirit. But the reader who cares to see this question discussed more fully need not be longer detained from the note following.

NOTE A.

A DIALOGUE ON THE TERM "MATTER" AND ITS POSSIBLE CORRESPONDENTS IN THE HINDŪ DIALECTS.

You have frequently expressed a wish, my Theophilus, that I should explain to you clearly and concisely those opinions of my Hindū friends which, in the current expositions of them, appear to be so strange as to render it

scarcely credible that a thinking person should seriously entertain them. It occurs to me that I may in some measure perform what you require of me by giving you—to the best of my recollection—an account of a conversation, on the subject of "Matter," which took place the other evening. You know Eusebius, our indefatigable missionary. He had just returned, rather wearied, from preaching all day amidst the noise and distraction of a *melā*, or religious fair; but he brightened up as he saw the inquiring young Brāhman, Tārādatt, approaching. Eusebius and I had been sitting on the high bank that overhangs the Ganges, where the sacred stream glides past the garden of the excellent Philoxenus. By the strangest of coincidences, Lawrence happened to be with us. You know Lawrence, with his huge quantity of reading, and his frequent, or, rather, habitual, absence of mind. Tārādatt smiled as he sat down and addressed Eusebius. "You have been labouring to enlighten the holiday makers at the *melā* to-day, my dear Sir, if one may judge from your jaded look." "You have guessed rightly," replied Eusebius; but why do you smile?" "At the amusing inexhaustibleness of your patience," replied the other. "Surely," exclaimed Eusebius, "you do not expect that I shall ever give up labouring in my vocation from despair at the apparent ineffectualness of my efforts? It is my part to labour; it belongs to God to give the increase in his own good time."

Tārādatt.—My being a Hindū does not prevent me from appreciating and honouring your perseverance in the face of difficulties. But I could not help smiling at

the thought of the discouragements to which you must have been exposed to-day. Did your audience consist entirely of the illiterate?

Eusebius.—No. There was a forward young man who interrupted me from time to time, declaring that all that was true in my account of the Deity was to be found in the books of the Hindūs, from which the Europeans had borrowed, or stolen, without understanding the real import of what they were appropriating. He produced a marked effect upon the people, by declaring that my views of the omniscience and the omnipresence of God were lamentably imperfect,—the true view of that subject being conveyed, he contended, in a text of the *Veda*, which he quoted in Sanskrit, and which, of course, not one of them understood a word of."

Tārādatt.—"Can you repeat the text?"

Eusebius declared he feared he could not, not having fully understood it himself. Only he was sure it contained a pointed reference to the word "all," and sounded somewhat like so and so,—reciting here certain sounds, with which, O Theophilus, I cannot at this moment tax my memory. The words which had appeared of so grave import to the listeners at the *melā*, had quite a different effect upon the Brāhman, who burst out laughing, assuring us, as gravely as he could, that the words were quoted from the Grammar of *Pāṇini*, and that they bore reference to nothing beyond the fact that in *all* cases the word "cow" was optionally amenable to a certain euphonic rule. Eusebius himself could not help smiling at the barefaced impudence of the trick which had been played him; and Tārādatt took advantage of the incident to

press a suggestion which it appears he had made more than once before.

Tārādatt.—You see, my dear Sir, that you would be the better of knowing our sacred language. I do not, indeed, promise you that, even with a knowledge of the Sanskrit, you would be able to convince the illiterate. Our low-caste Hindūs are too modest to think for themselves. They commit the keeping of their consciences to the hands of us Brāhmans just as, I have heard, the people on the continent of Europe make over the same trust to their own Brāhmans. The Europeans are unfortunate in this, that they are necessarily misled, their guides being blind leaders, or, at all events, guides groping in the dark; but in this more favoured land the people have reposed their implicit confidence in guides who have eyes and who have light. The people here are content with guidance; they do not seek for light, which might possibly dazzle them. Can it be, that you, Eusebius, shrink from meeting the learned of India on their own ground, preferring, as less arduous, to defy them from a safe distance, and to come to close quarters only with the avowedly uninstructed, who afford you an easy triumph in argument, though, you will admit, they afford you little else?

Eusebius.—You wish to provoke me, I perceive, to an argument with your learned self, friend Tārādatt; and you know very well that neither I nor my brother missionaries are wont to shrink from a contest with you, arduous as you may choose to think it. But you are not ignorant that a characteristic difference between the Gospel and the lights which the Brāhmans declare that

they possess is this, that to the poor the Gospel is preached. By the poor we understand those whom you look upon as of *low caste*, and hence unworthy, or incapable, of enlightenment. The Gospel acknowledges no distinctions among men, except to point out the lowly as the especial objects of its care.

Tārādatt.—But are these to be the sole objects of its care?

Eusebius.—By no means. How can you insinuate that we have made them so? You have long had the New Testament in your loved Sanskrit, and you have more recently received the Pentateuch in the same. I wish that, to us, as large a proportion of your *Veda* were available, if it were only as a literary curiosity.*

Tārādatt.—Your mention of the *Veda* reminds me that the portion of it which has been printed in Europe is accompanied by an ample commentary, without which even *we* could not understand the text. Now, much of the text of your Scriptures is, to us, at least not less obscure. Have you no explanatory commentary?

Eusebius.—We have, and more commentaries than one. To select from these the portions most likely to be needed by a Hindū reader, and to digest them into a separate volume in the vernacular, or to print them along with the text, would be a commendable work in one who could do no better.

Tārādatt.—I should welcome such a work, though I should like it in the Sanskrit rather than in the vernacular.

* The substance of this Note appeared in the *Benares Magazine* some years ago, when only the first volume of the *Rig Veda* had been published by Max Müller.

Eusebius.—That is to say, you would prefer keeping it to yourself and your brother Brāhmans.

Tārādatt.—If I did, yet its being in Sanskrit would scarcely secure that end. But let that pass. I am not so anxious to keep all knowledge to my own class, but that I should be very well pleased if I could make you yourself understand and appreciate the sublime philosophy of the Hindū religion.

Eusebius.—Why, Mr. Colebrooke has enabled me to do that already. But that need not prevent you from indulging in some declamation on your favourite topic. I am all attention. Lawrence, who is watching the first glimmer of the rising moon on the ripple of the stream, will not interrupt you without good reason; and as for our other friend, he, for reasons of his own, is not likely to interrupt you at all.

This last observation, my Theophilus, was designed to convey a gentle sarcasm on myself; Eusebius holding, in spite of all my protestations to the contrary, that I am half a Hindū, because I am fonder than he is of their sacred language. You, my friend, know that the imputation is undeserved; but it would have been useless to remonstrate with Eusebius, so I contented myself with shrugging my shoulders in the way of protest, whilst Lawrence, removing his eyes from the moon, looked benevolently, yet mournfully, on Tārādatt. The latter, instead of becoming eloquent on the theme proposed, simply stated his belief that one thing alone existed.

Eusebius.—Well, what thing?

Tārādatt.—Do not accuse me of trifling with you if I answer "*that* thing." As one of your poets makes a

lady ask, so I may ask here, "What's in a name?" If there be but one thing, then this one thing is all, and it may be (what nothing else supposable can be) *definitely* named by that which you Europeans call a pronoun, and which we, the followers of Pāṇini, call a *sarva-nāma*, or "name of all or any thing." We call the one thing, in Sanskrit, *taṭ*, *i.e.* "that."

Eusebius.—Good;—but if you, like your lady in the play, have no predilection for any name in particular, you will perhaps have no objection to give me some other name in exchange for this "that," which does not please me.

Tārādatt.—Let the name be *Brahm.*

Eusebius.—Has that name a meaning?

Tārādatt.—The word being derived from the root *vṛih*, "to increase," may signify "that from which all emanates."

Eusebius.—From which all *what* emanates?

Tārādatt.—All that which is no *thing*,—Brahm being the one only thing—the sole reality—according to the sense of that term as derived from the Latin *res*, a "thing," as I suppose it is.

Eusebius.—Well, laying aside for the present all that is *no* thing, pray tell us all that you can about the one thing.

Tārādatt.—All that can be told about it,—in fact, all that it *is*,—may be enounced very briefly. It is existence, knowledge, and joy. There you have the whole. It is not a something, of which these are the properties or qualities,—but these are *it*, and it these.

Eusebius.—And this material world?

Tārādatt.—That to which you give the name of a material world is an illusion.

At this moment, O Theophilus, Lawrence, who had seemed previously to be wrapped in his own thoughts, broke silence and spoke as follows :—

Lawrence.—"We are placed in a system in which mankind will deal with us, and we, in spite of all theories to the contrary, must deal with mankind, as if the objects of sense were real. Hence it does, I own, seem to me an unpractical philosophy which leads men to treat these things as if they were unreal."

On hearing these words, O Theophilus, the Brāhman seemed not a little perplexed. After pondering them for some time, with his eyes fixed upon the ground, he looked up, designing apparently to reply to the speaker; but, perceiving that the eyes of Lawrence were again bent intently on the moon, he turned to Eusebius, and remarked as follows :—

Tārādatt.—Men *do* deal with one another as if the objects of sense were real; and, for aught that I can say to the contrary, they possibly *must* so deal with one another, so long as the illusion of a world continues. I, for one, am not concerned with the inquiry whether this or that philosophy is "practical" or "unpractical." I ask simply, what is *true?* What you Europeans call "practical," is, I imagine, what we Hindūs call *vyāvahārika;* and we admit the importance of attending to such a consideration, so far as concerns this illusive world; but we do not see how the consideration bears upon the one reality, which is the sole object of sound philosophy. If I mistake not, your own Berkeley was

idly charged with inculcating an "unpractical" philosophy, when he questioned the existence of material substance; but the best of your writers now-a-days acknowledge, that, while he questioned the existence of anything *under* the phenomena,—to be called material substance from its being *sub* or *under* these,—he did not deny that there *were* such phenomena as required such and such actions to be *practised.* For example, he did not neglect to practise the action of getting out of the way of a loaded wagon, although he held that the driver of the wagon no more believed in the existence of a *material substance* of the wagon, over and above all its powers and properties, than he himself did,—the conception that there is any such inscrutable substratum, being, he contended, the conception of his metaphysical opponents, and not that either of himself—accused of over-refinement in speculation—or of the wagoner not so accused. We do *not*, then, *treat* phenomena as if they were unreal,—that is to say, as if they were *not;* but we deny that they are *real*—that they are *things.* Our *treatment* of them *is* "practical," our conception of them, at the same time, is correct.

Eusebius.—We must look a little closer into that word *real*;—but hark, Lawrence, who has seemingly been in a brown study since he last spoke, appears to be again about to speak.

Lawrence.—"And as *experience* is our guide, and not *theory*, in practical matters; as, further, men often entail upon themselves, and even upon others, very great misery, even in this life, by obstinately following their own theories of things, in opposition to the teaching of

men of experience, it becomes a very serious question for you, whether you ought not to be able to prove the *Vedānta* system far more demonstratively, before you let it have the least influence upon your practice. And the choice between Christianity and Brahminism is a *practical* question, and one which you will find, the more you know of Christianity, to be materially affected by the view you take of our relations to matter."

The Brāhman, O Theophilus, on hearing this, became apparently more puzzled than before. He paused so long that at length Eusebius interrupted his meditations by asking what was the Sanskrit word for matter.

Tārādatt.—There is no Sanskrit word for "matter."

Eusebius.—You surprise me. Colonel Vans Kennedy, I know, denied that there was a Sanskrit word answering to our philosophical term "matter;" but Sir G. Haughton immediately supplied him with a dozen.

Tārādatt.—What were they?

Eusebius replying that he could not undertake to recollect them, I, O Theophilus, being not unwilling to aid, in some subordinate manner, a discussion which interested me not a little, got up and fetched the book, which happened to be among the borrowed volumes that enrich my library, and occasionally reproach my punctuality. Eusebius, turning to the place [the 221st page of the (London) *Asiatic Journal*, vol. xviii., new series, 1835], read out the words of Sir Graves Haughton as follows:—"I must, however, go beyond this refutation, and inform your readers of what they might reasonably have expected, namely, that the Sanskrit language contains many words for *matter*. Take the following examples:

ı, vasu, dravya, śarīra, mūrtti, tattwa, padārtha, pradhāna, mūla-prakriti; and, with the Jainas, *pudgala.*"

On hearing this list read, to each item in which it struck me that Lawrence nodded a mild approval, the Brāhman, O Theophilus, gradually opened his eyes wider and wider. At the close, he rubbed them as if in doubt whether he were awake; and then he requested a sight of the volume. Having certified himself that the words were printed as they had seemed to strike his ear, and that he was therefore probably awake, he asked Eusebius whether he was content to receive each or any one of these words as the synonyme of the term "matter,"—the ὕλη of the Greeks.

Eusebius.—I am content to hear what you have got to say against receiving them as such.

Tārādatt.—Let us look at them in succession. The word *vastu* (as the *Vedānta Sāra* will tell you) means the Divine Spirit, the one thing recognised as a reality in the *Vedānta.* The whole of what we talk of as the world is, according to the *Vedānta, a-vastu, i.e.* "not a thing." What you speak of as the *material* world is what we call *not vastu.* And the same applies to the term *vasu,* the second in the list. Then the term *dravya,* as stated in the *Tarka Sangraha* and a score of other works, is the generic name of earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, and mind.

Eusebius.—Soul, do you say?

Tārādatt.—Certainly. Soul is one of the things belonging to the list headed *dravya.* Do you hold it to be matter?

Eusebius.—Heaven forbid.

Tārādatt.—Then I fear that this term will not suit; the more so as I imagine you will object to classing time and space as varieties of *matter*.

Eusebius.—Pray, on what principle do you class these with earth and water?

Tārādatt.—On the principle that *qualities*, etc., belong to them, as you may see by referring to the 23rd verse of the *Bhāshā-parichchheda*, the text-book of the *Nyāya*, that is in the hands of every schoolboy.

Eusebius.—Then you hold *time* to be a *substance?*

Tārādatt.—What do you mean by "substance?"

Eusebius.—Its meaning accords with its etymology. It is that which "stands under," and serves as it were for a support to the qualities which could not exist apart from it.

Tārādatt.—I like your definition, for it is my own; and so if time has any qualities, then time is the substance in which these its own qualities inhere. But tell me:—We mortals have wishes and we have fears; we have doubts, difficulties, and, occasionally, joys. Do these exist apart and of themselves?

Eusebius.—No. A wish does not exist without a wisher, nor a doubt apart from one that doubts. Why do you ask a question the answer to which is so self-evidently obvious?

Tārādatt.—I ask it because I am curious to know whether you hold that these wishes and doubts can exist apart from *matter*. Is your wisher or your doubter necessarily material?

Eusebius.—By no means. I happen to remember that your own revered Gautama declares that "desire, aver-

sion," etc. belong to the *soul.* The soul is a *spiritual* substance, not a material substance.

Tārādatt.—You remember rightly; you refer to the tenth aphorism of Gautama's first lecture. But you speak of *spiritual* substance as differing from *material* substance;—do you really then, in Europe, hold that there is such a twofold distinction in "substance?"

Eusebius.—Unquestionably. There are, indeed, men, calling themselves "materialists," who hold that there is only one substance; but those who recite the creed in which the persons of the Trinity are acknowledged to be "the same in *substance*," speak, as Milton does, of *spiritual* substance, not of matter. If you will glance down the page that is before you, you will see an apposite remark of Cudworth's, which, as Sir G. Haughton observes, Lord Brougham, in his *Discourse on Natural Theology*, page 93, quotes with applause. Pray read it aloud.

Tārādatt.—Ah, here is what you refer to:—"Whatever is, or hath any kind of entity, doth either subsist by itself, or else is an attribute, affection, or mode of something that doth subsist by itself." Well, I agree with Sir G. Haughton that this is obviously true. But tell me, in your opinion, does the *Deity* "subsist by itself," or is it "an attribute, etc.?"

Eusebius.—Of course you know my opinion. God exists of himself. His is a spiritual substance.

Tārādatt.—This I expected you to say; and I thoroughly agree with you. But I must now beg you to explain the passage which had just caught my eye on the opposite page.

Eusebius.—Read out the passage.

Tārādatt.—I find Sir G. Haughton, in page 220, declares as follows:—"Every one conversant with these subjects must know that, in philosophical language, *substance*, *body*, and *matter* mean all one and the same thing, and, as such, are opposed to *spirit*." Permit me to ask you, when your creed speaks of the persons of the Trinity as being "the same in *substance*," does it mean that they consist of the same *matter?*

Eusebius.—Again, I say, God forbid. But allow me to look at the book; for the passage that you have just read makes me suspect, as you did of yourself a little while ago, that I must be dreaming.

Taking the book, O Theophilus, Eusebius appeared the more perplexed the more he pondered and reperused the passage asserting the identity of "substance, body, and matter." At length he exclaimed:—"Indeed it seems to me that Col. Vans Kennedy, when he assailed Mr. Colebrook's account of the *Vedānta*, and Sir G. C. Haughton, when he defended it, must have been engaged in a game of cross-purposes, which the enlightened Mr. Colebrooke himself,—had he not been then, alas, upon his death-bed,—would have been able to bring to a satisfactory conclusion.

Tārādatt.—Pray explain what you refer to.

Eusebius.—I shall perhaps be the better prepared to do this, if you will first complete your detail of objections to the string of terms which Sir G. C. Haughton offered to Col. Kennedy as equivalents for the philosophical term *matter*;—but see, here comes the cheerful Chrysostomus and his meek-eyed helpmate. Let us welcome them.

The cheerful Chrysostomus, you must know, O Theo-

philus, is a valiant polemic,—formidable in argument, for his good-humoured imperturbability, as he is attractive at all times through his imperturbable good humour. With a sigh that seemed to come from a heart as light as heart could wish, he shook his head gently at Tārādatt, who, receiving this not unexpected greeting with an expression of countenance blending the comic and the kindly, without further exordium addressed him.

Tārādatt.—We are enquiring, O Chrysostomus, whether there be any Indian term answering to the word "matter."

"And where is the difficulty?" exclaimed Chrysostomus. "Down in the city, *padārtha* is one very good word for it, and *dravya* is another."

Tārādatt recapitulated the objections to the term *dravya*, which I have already recorded; and Chrysostomus shook his head, as if he thought that there were here a splitting of straws; but just then Philoxenus, hearing that a lady had arrived, hastened out to say that tea was preparing; and the lady was led off, followed by her worthy spouse.

The Brāhman then resumed his criticism of the list, remarking that to place among the synonymes the term *śarīra*, which (as rendered rightly in Wilson's Dictionary, and also in Sir G. C. Haughton's own) means only *the* body, looked almost like a punning design to burlesque the proposition that "substance, *body*, and matter, mean all one and the same thing." "The next term," he continued, "viz., *mūrtti*, which, in common language, means a form or image (μορφη), means, in philosophical language, whatever has definite limits. Earth, water, light, air,

and *mind*, we are told,[1] are of this description, while the ether is a substance *not* of this description. If the substance air extended as far as the substance ether, it would cease to bear the name in question, yet this would be very different from its ceasing to be *material*."

Eusebius.—But what do you hold to be the definite magnitude of the *mind?*

Tārādatt.—In the system to which the term under discussion belongs, the mind is held to be of the size of an atom.[2]

Eusebius.—Well, let that pass;—but pray continue your censures. The next term that you have to deal with is *tattwa.*

Tārādatt.—The term *tattwa* belongs more peculiarly to the Sānkhya school. Being, according to the ordinary etymology, an abstract derivative from the pronoun *tat*, "that," it answers to the *hœcceitas* of Duns Scotus; but in the Sānkhya it is employed as a concrete term to denote the eight "producers," the sixteen "productions," and "soul."

Eusebius.—In such an acceptation the term certainly does not correspond with matter; but, though the term bears a sense so extensive in the Sānkhya system, may it not answer to the term matter in some of the others?

Tārādatt.—In the Nyāya it bears a sense founded on its supposed etymology,—it means the nature of anything as it really is,—in short, *truth.*

Eusebius.—Its *supposed* etymology? Is the etymology called in question that you have just mentioned?

[1] See the *Bhāshā-parichchheda*, v. 24, and its commentary, p. 12.

[2] See *ante*, p. xxiv.

Tarādatt.—Certainly; by those who know what truth is. There is but one truth that can be declared to any one; and that one solitary truth,—obscured only by the unavoidable imperfections of language,—is conveyed in the formula *tat twam*, "That art thou." The hearer of this truth—(from the terms of which, you perceive, truth itself takes its designation of *tattwa*)—when he has rightly understood and accepted it, changing the "thou" to the first person, reflects thus—"*I* am Brahma." This is so far well;—but he must finally get rid of the habit of making even *himself* an *object* of thought. There must be *no* object. The *subject* alone must remain—a thought, a joy, an existence,—and the only one.[1]

Eusebius.—Take breath, I beseech you, and then let us finish the list, the next term in which is the word *padārtha*, which our friend Chrysostomus thinks a good one.

Tārādatt.—The term *padārtha*[2] means "substance" (including soul), "quality," "action," "com——."

"In short," interrupted Eusebius, "it seems to mean everything;—is it so?"

Tāradatt.—It means everything that is,—with the varieties of non-existence into the bargain.

Eusebius.—Very possibly it may do so in the philosophical systems; but when the word recalls to the mind of the generality of hearers the idea of sticks and stones, and rivers and fruits, and so on, why is it not as good a word to use for matter, when speaking to those who are not philosophers, as any other?

[1] See *ante*, p. xxxvii.

[2] *Tarka-sangraha*, p. 1.

At this question, O Theophilus, the Brāhman looked as if taken aback. After some reflection he replied.

Tārādatt.—Let me understand you, my dear Sir. The question in hand, if I am not mistaken, was this,—viz., Do such and such terms represent the European term "matter" so precisely, that the difference in opinion between Colonel Vans Kennedy and Sir G. C. Haughton could, so long as we employ one of those terms as the substitute for the term matter, be brought under the cognizance of learned Hindūs in such a manner that the difference of opinion could be intelligently entertained, and rightly adjudicated upon, by these competent judges? I deny that the terms are such as to allow of this. Few more competent judges could have been found than Rammohun Roy; and yet he, when the dispute was laid before him,[1] was so absolutely ignorant of the meaning of the term matter, that he thought that he had settled the question submitted to him, by pointing to a passage in his own works, fully supporting Mr. Colebrooke's interpretation, "that," according to the Vedānta philosophy, "God was not only the *efficient* but the *material* cause of the universe." I have been all along talking on the supposition that the enquiry is, how you are to let Indian philosophers understand what you mean by matter,—not—what words may serve when speaking to the illiterate about material products, without any reference to the philosophical conception of matter at all.

Eusebius.—Well,—let it be so. I shall expect you to explain what bearing the remark of Rammohun

[1] *London Asiatic Journal*, vol. xxxv., new series, 1835, p. 214.

Roy has upon your *spiritual* Vedāntism, which it seems to me to reduce to something very like simple materialism; but, in the first instance, pray finish your list of terms. What objection have you to *pradhāna?*

Tārādatt. — The term *pradhāna* belongs to the *Sānkhya* philosophy, where it is interchangeable with the next term in the list, viz., *mūla-prakriti*, as Professor H. H. Wilson's translation shows.[1] Either term is usually translated by the term nature. Such a term—(for of the Jaina misuse of the word *pudgala*, I, like other Brāhmans, know nothing)—comes, perhaps, nearer to the term matter than any other in the list; but yet it will not serve as a substitute for the ὕλη. You cannot speak of the *pradhāna* of a jar, or the *pradhāna* of a web, as you speak of the ὕλη or matter of a goblet or a statue, because *pradhāna* is the name of a single power, like the "Nature" of European sceptics. Further, instead of this *pradhāna* being a substance, you may learn from Professor Wilson,[2] that it is the aggregate of the three *qualities*, "goodness," "foulness," and "darkness."

Eusebius.—Aha, my friend,—but I happen to have jotted down in my note-book an extract from the page preceding that to which I presume you mean to refer me. There[3] Professor Wilson says that, "in speaking of qualities, however, the term *guṇa* is not to be regarded as an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul through the

[1] "*Mūla*, 'the root,' *prakriti* 'nature,' is *pradhāna*, 'chief,'" &c. See Wilson's *Sānkhya Kārikā*, p. 16.

[2] *Sānkhya Kārikā*, p. 53. [3] *Ibid*, p. 52.

medium of the faculties." What, then, is the use of founding upon its being *called* a quality?

Here, O Theophilus, I ventured to express my own opinion on this point. "Professor Wilson," I said, "rightly reports the opinion of the *Sānkhya* when he says that what are usually spoken of as the three 'qualities,' (*guṇa*) might with propriety be termed 'Ingredients or constituents of nature.' But while it would follow logically that, if nature be substantial, these its ingredients or constituents cannot be *insubstantial*, it also follows logically that, if these ingredients or constituents are *not* substances but qualities, then nature, the aggregate of them, cannot be substantial, but is an aggregate of qualities." Here Eusebius showing symptoms of impatience, I paused deferentially, and he exclaimed, as I had partly expected—"What room is there for any such *opinion*, forsooth, when Professor Wilson cites the very words of Kapila's commentator, who tells us that *Satwa* and the rest are 'things,' not 'specific properties.'"[1] "Forgive me," I here exclaimed in turn, "if I object to the rendering, in this present connexion, of *Vaiśeshikā guṇāh* by 'specific properties,' instead of by 'the *Vaiśeshika guṇas*.' According to the *Vaiśeshikas*, the *guṇas*—the things to which exclusively these philosophers allow the name of 'quality'—are twenty-four in number, and to these they deny the possession of, or the right of standing as substratum to, any of the said four-and-twenty qualities. The *twenty-four* 'qualities' of the *Vaiśeshika* philosophy,[2] are

[1] सत्वादीनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणाः ॥

[2] See the *Tarka-sangraha*.

called *guṇa;*—and the *Sānkhya* commentator, dreading that his own *three* 'qualities' might be mistaken for these, took care to warn us that they are *not* the *Vaiśeshika guṇas;*—and, to make assurance doubly sure, he stated that they were spoken of by Kapila in terms which a *Vaiśeshika* or a *Naiyāyika* was bound to apply only to a substance,—viz., as 'themselves having qualities.'" "Well, well," interrupted Eusebius, "waiving that question, let me recall friend Tārādatt to the dictum of Rammohun Roy, 'that, according to the Vedānta philosophy, God was not only the *efficient* but the *material* cause of the universe.' If God be the material cause of a material universe, then what is God but matter? Really I begin to doubt how I am to avoid agreeing with Colonel Kennedy that it is impossible to suppose that Mr. Colebrooke, who employs the same terms—saying of God, that 'He is both efficient and material cause of the world'[1]—could be of opinion that such a system could be otherwise than material. I see, indeed, that Mr. Colebrooke, by what Sir G. C. Haughton calls 'a fortunate departure from his usual reserve,'[2] has left an explicit record of his opinion of the Vedánta philosophy that removes all doubt as to his conception of its nature. The Vedānta, he says, 'deduces from the text of the Indian scriptures a refined psychology, which goes to a denial of a material world.'[3] But is not this contradictory to the other assertion? Deny a material world, and what do you mean by its material cause? Sir G. C. Haughton

[1] Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. i., p. 371.
[2] *Asiatic Journal*,, vol. xviii., p. 215.
[3] Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. i, p. 227.

appears to have been conscious that there was some inconsistency here, for he seeks to shift the blame from Mr. Colebrooke to the Vedāntists themselves. Mr. Colebrooke held the Vedānta to be a refined psychology, and 'consequently,' argues Sir G. C. Haughton, 'should it appear to be, as Colonel Kennedy asserts, a system of gross and material pantheism in the writings of Mr. Colebrooke, such an inference must be deduced from the expressions of its Indian interpreters, who are faithfully rendered by him.'[1] I must say, I think Sir G. C. Haughton had better have confined his defence of Mr. Colebrooke to this single assertion that the inconsistency belongs to the system itself which Mr. Colebrooke faithfully expounded. No more then needed to be said. The most marvellous thing of all is the fact that Colonel Kennedy, with the inconsistency staring him in the face, could speak of the *Vedānta* as 'the most spiritual system that ever was imagined by man.'[2] Solve this riddle, friend Tārādatt, if you have the power,—which I greatly doubt."

Tārādatt.—The riddle can be solved without difficulty. There is *no* such inconsistency as you imagine in the system, and neither is there in Mr. Colebrooke's exposition. Colonel Kennedy misunderstood Mr. Colebrooke, and Sir G. C. Haughton, with his well-intended interference and his pet dogma of the co-extensive signification of the terms "substance" and "matter," bewildered the Colonel still further. The Rajah, Rammohun Roy, was right in declaring that Mr. Colebrooke was right. Had the Rajah been as thoroughly well

[1] *Asiatic Journal*, vol. xviii, p. 215. [2] *Ibid*, p. 98.

versed in the technical terminology of European philosophy as in that of the Vedānta and the Nyāya, he could at once have placed his finger on the misconceived term which lay at the bottom of the strange logomachy recorded in these papers of the *Asiatic Journal*. Mr. Colebrooke, had he been in health, could have done this; and I can fancy the readiness with which that most candid of scholars would have given up the use of a term which was liable to such misconception. When Mr. Colebrooke, or Rammohun Roy, speaks of the Vedāntic tenet that God is the *material cause* of the universe, do you suppose he means a cause consisting of the *matter* which we have been hitherto in vain seeking to find a name for in the list offered by Sir G. C. Haughton?

Eusebius.—If not, then what is it that he does mean?

Tārādatt.—Why, surely,—if we have had such difficulty in finding—what we have not yet found—a term in the philosophic vocabulary of India answering to *matter*, does it not strike you as an odd circumstance that the same vocabulary should so readily supply a term for a "*material* cause?"

Eusebius.—Now that you mention it, the circumstance does seem indeed somewhat odd. But may we not turn it to good account? We want a word for "matter;"—tell me then your word for "material," and I imagine that we shall only have to lop off the adjectival termination in order to find what we were in search of.

Tārādatt.—It grieves me to disappoint you, but in the present instance your disappointment is unavoidable.

The Sanskrit term rendered "material cause" is *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. In the Vedānta books the term *upādāna-kāraṇa* is more commonly used, but the same thing is meant. The portion of the term (viz., *samavāyi*) so frequently rendered, by Mr. Colebrooke and his successors, "material," is the adjectival derivative of the word *samavāya*—which Mr. Colebrooke rightly renders "intimate and constant relation."[1]

Eusebius.—"Intimate and constant relation?"—this will never serve as an equivalent for matter.

Tārādatt.—No. But it will serve very well to denote the relation between a substance and its qualities, as it is employed, in our philosophical vocabulary, to do. Hence the logomachy of Colonel Kennedy and Sir G. C. Haughton might have been prevented if Mr. Colebrooke had rendered *samavāyi-kāraṇa* by "*substantial* cause" instead of "*material* cause." That Mr. Colebrooke did not confound substance with matter, like his well-intentioned defender, is evident from his speaking of *soul* as a substance. "Being a substance," he says, "though immaterial, as a substratum of qualities, it is placed in Caṇāde's arrangement as one of the nine substances which are there recognized."[2] Now, pray observe,—Soul, though immaterial, is a substratum of qualities:—qualities, according to Plato and the Vedāntists alike, have not an *esse* such as their substratum has:—hence, soul, the immaterial, is the only *real* essence;—Mr. Colebrooke was right in saying that the Vedānta is a "refined psychology;" Colonel Kennedy, rightly entertaining the same view of the Vedānta, was

[1] Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. i., p. 267. [2] *Ibid*, vol. i., p. 268.

to blame for boggling at Mr. Colebrooke's employment of the technical term "material cause" for what might better have been called "substratum;"—and Sir G. C. Haughton was to be condoled with for a confusion of ideas in regard to the co-extensiveness of matter and substance, which are no more co-extensive in meaning than cow is co-extensive with quadruped.

Having heard this, Eusebius, as it appeared to me, became thoughtful. He shook his head several times, as if doubtful. At length he looked up briskly and exclaimed:—"Why do you talk of soul, as if there were but one? I have a soul; you have a soul; even our friend here——" "Stop, my dear sir," exclaimed the Brāhman, "we have separate *minds*, but soul is one only—pure and unchangeable." But here, O Theophilus, as you will observe, the conversation diverged from the question of matter;—so I will not at present report the discussion that ensued. Ultimately left alone, I joined the circle at the tea-table of Philoxenus, where the conversation, cheerful and miscellaneous, bore little reference to the notions of the Hindūs.

NOTE B.

ON THE HINDŪ EMPLOYMENT OF THE TERMS "SOUL" AND "MIND."

You ask me, O Theophilus, what the Brāhman was going to say, when my last communication was abruptly brought to a close by the diverging of Eusebius from the question of the term "matter." Eusebius, then, in reply to the Brāhman's assertion of the unity of soul

and the plurality of minds, exclaimed—"You talk most strangely, explain yourself if possible."

Tārādatt.—You observe the moon, which Lawrence has kept gazing at,—indifferent to our conversation, on the subject of which his mind is apparently made up. Now look into any of these large earthen vessels which Philoxenus keeps filled with water for the benefit of his beloved shrubs and trees. If it should seem to you that the moon is visible in every one of these, as well as in the sacred stream that ripples before us, would you conclude that there are many moons, some of them at rest, as in the water-tub, and some in agitation, as in the rippling stream?

Eusebius.—No; because there is but one real moon, and the others are reflections.

Tārādatt.—Good:—and if the water, to which these reflections are due, were removed, what would remain?

Eusebius.—Why, as regards the present question, the moon itself.

Tārādatt.—True. Now, in like manner remove the ignorance or delusion, out of which men's minds are made, and then there will be no dim or disturbed *reflections* of soul, but soul itself will remain alone.

Eusebius.—You ought to be very sure indeed that you have good evidence for the authenticity of a revelation which asserts things so repugnant to reason and common sense.

Tārādatt.—On the contrary, I think, we may dispense with the trouble of enquiring into the credentials of a revelation conveying a doctrine which so irresistibly approves itself to the reason.

At this declaration, O Theophilus, Eusebius shrugged his shoulders, Lawrence sighed, and I myself felt moved to speak, which I proceeded to do as follows:—"That the doctrine of the Vedānta so entirely approves itself to the reason ought to lead you to doubt, O Tārādatt, whether the doctrine required a revelation, and was therefore likely to be the subject of one. I do not refer to those queer observances, such as inhaling the breath by one nostril and expelling it by the other, which are inculcated in the system, and which, in my opinion, are so far from approving themselves to the reason, that an unquestionably authenticated revelation alone could justify their being gravely considered. I refer solely to the great tenet that only One exists, and that nothing but One ever really existed, or will exist, or could exist."

Here Eusebius, starting up, put on his hat, and, turning on his heel, walked off. Tārādatt, who seemed to waver between the inclination to follow his friend and some curiosity to hear me out, laughingly welcomed me as a convert to Vedāntism; while, disregarding the interruption, I proceeded,—until ultimately left alone, as I mentioned before.[1]

NOTE C.

ON "LOGIC" AND "RHETORIC," AS REGARDED BY THE HINDŪS.

He who undertakes to argue with a learned Hindū will be the better of knowing how a Hindū reasoner

[1] See *ante*, p. 34.

arranges his arguments, and why. This has been generally and often mischievously misconceived. A misconception of this matter suggested [*Benares Magazine*, 1852, vol. viii., p. 251] the following

REMONSTRANCE TO SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON ON HIS INJUSTICE TO THE HINDŪS.

The reader may probably recollect the notable paradox of Dr. Campbell's, that "there is always some radical defect in a syllogism, which is not chargeable with that species of sophism known among logicians by the name of *petitio principii*, or a begging of the question" (*Phil. of Rhet.*, vol. i., p. 174). This "epigrammatic, yet unanswerable remark," as Mr. Dugald Stewart styles it, was well answered by Archbishop Whately, when he observed (*Logic*, bk. i. § 4) that Dr. Campbell little dreamt, "of course, that his objections, however specious, lie against the *process of reasoning itself*, universally; and will therefore, of course, apply to those very arguments which he is himself adducing. He should have been reminded of the story of the woodman who had mounted a tree, and was so earnestly employed in lopping the boughs, that he unconsciously cut off the bough on which he was standing."

Sir William Hamilton (in his *Discussions*, p. 615) has answered this "unanswerable" epigram of Dr. Campbell's, less epigrammatically, but more searchingly, in a passage which we transcribe the more readily, as it will afford us an opportunity of vindicating what Sir William calls "the Hindū syllogism," against his undeserved disparagement of it. He says:—"Mentally

one, the categorical syllogism, according to its order of announcement, is either *analytic* (A), or *synthetic* (B). Analytic, if (what is inappropriately styled) the conclusion be expressed first, and (what are inappropriately styled) the premises be then stated as its reasons. Synthetic, if the premises precede, and, as it were effectuate the conclusion." He then goes on, in a note, to say, "This, in the *first* place, relieves the syllogism of *two one-sided views*. The Aristotelian syllogism is exclusively synthetic; the Epicurean (or Neoclesian) syllogism was—for it has been long forgotten—exclusively analytic; whilst the Hindū syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms, being nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning enounced, 1st, analytically, 2nd, synthetically. In thought the syllogism is organically one; and it is only stated in an analytic or synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — language. For the conditions of language require that a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these detailed before and after other. The analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement are thus only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shown in practice, for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order.

"In the *second* place, this central view vindicates the syllogism from the *objection of petitio principii*, which, professing logically to annul logic, or at least to reduce it to an idle tautology, defines syllogistic—the art of avowing in the conclusion what has been already con-

fessed in the premises. This objection (which has at least the antiquity of three centuries and a-half) is only applicable to the synthetic or Aristotelic order of enouncement, which the objectors contemplate as alone possible. It does not hold against the syllogism, considered aloof from the accident of its expression; and being proved irrelevant to this, it is easily shown in reference to the synthetic syllogism itself, that it applies only to an accident of its external form." He goes on to say, that the synthetic form of the syllogism is the "less natural. For if it be asked, 'Is C in A?' surely it is more natural to reply, 'Yes' (or C is in A); for C is in B and B in A (or, for B is in A and C in B), than to reply, B is in A, and C in B (or C is in B and B in A), therefore, C is in A.

"In point of fact, the analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, it is even *pre-supposed* by the synthetic. To express in words, we must first analyse in thought the organic whole—the mental simultaneity of simple reasoning, and then we may reverse in thought the process by a synthetic return. Further, we may now enounce the reasoning in either order; but certainly, to express it in the essential, primary, or analytic order, is not only more natural, but more direct and simple, than to express it in the accidental, secondary, or synthetic. This also avoids the objection of P. P." [*i.e.*, the objection that the syllogism involves a *petitio principii*.]

Well, let us first consider how this debars Dr. Campbell's objection, and then we may proceed to the vindication of the Hindū Philosophers.

The synthetic syllogism is of this form :—

"All things smoking are fiery,
The mountain is smoking,
Therefore the mountain is fiery."

This is the form of syllogism contemplated by Dr. Campbell, and he says that here *the question is begged.* The question is, whether the mountain be fiery or not; and he alleges that you *beg*, or *take for granted*, the very question in dispute, when you lay down the premise, "*All* things smoking [and among these the smoking mountain] are fiery." This seems plausible; but let us now look at the analytic form of the same syllogism, which is as follows :—

"The mountain is fiery,
Because it is smoking,
And all things smoking are fiery."

In this form of expression we do not begin by laying down anything which can be charged with taking for granted the point in dispute; we propound affirmatively, for discussion, the point in dispute itself, and then assign a reason, and then propound a condition in the absence of which the reason would avail nothing. The objection of "avowing in the conclusion what has been already confessed in the premises," does not apply to the argument in this analytic form; and as the argument in this form is none other than the same argument in the synthetic form, neither does the objection really apply to the latter.

But now, however far the Scotch Philosophers may have gone astray, we should like to be told what there is in all this that the Hindū Philosophers have failed to

discern. Let us follow Sir William through his analysis of the syllogistic process just quoted, and see whether there be any one single step in it for which our Sanskrit books do not supply the counterpart, and no "clumsy" counterpart, but something as perfectly elaborated (at least) as ancient Greece or modern Germany (or "modern Athens" either) can offer us.

To begin with the beginning. Sir William Hamilton, as we have seen, observes, that, "In thought, the syllogism is organically one; and it is only stated in an analytic and synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression—language." Good:—and have the Hindūs failed to discern *this?* So far from it, that they have endeavoured, and, as far as we are aware, at least as successfully as any that ever attempted it, to embody *this organic unity of the syllogism in thought* in a linguistic unity of expression. When they discuss the laws of the mind syllogizing "*for itself*,"—*i.e.*, to use Sir William's language, "*in thought*," — they notify the organic unity of the process by wrapping the two premises in one sentence so constructed (viz., in the shape of a period), that, until the last word of the sentence is uttered, no demand is made—or rather no pretence exists — for either affirmation or negation. In reference to the stock example above quoted, the premises "*in thought*," are propounded, in their unity, by writers on the Nyāya, thus:—"By smoke, invariably attended by fire, is attended this mountain." We subjoin the Sanskrit[1] (from the *Tarka-sangraha*, ed. 2,

[1] वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयम्पर्वतः ॥

p. 39). Can Sir William Hamilton point out, anteriorly to his own statement regarding the organic unity of the syllogism "in thought," any expression, in a European work, evincing a more thorough conviction of the truth in question than this *periodic* form of expression adopted by the Hindūs for conveying the premises in their simultaneity? To our mind it was a noble, and far from unsuccessful, effort to emancipate their exposition of the mental process, in its unity, from those hampering "conditions of language," which, as Sir William remarks, "require that a reasoning be distinguished into parts, and these detailed before and after other." In a *period*, strictly, nothing is detailed "before and after other." The "yes" or the "no" can no more legitimately leave the lips of the auditors till the last word of the period has been heard, than the bullet can leave the gun before the process of loading is finished and the trigger pulled.[1]

Let us now follow Sir William in his next step. "The analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement are, thus, only accidents of the syllogistic process. This is, indeed, shewn in practice, for our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order." Good again;—but have the Hindūs failed to discern *this?* Not a bit of it, as we shall show. The Aristotelic syllogism may be, as Sir William observes, "exclusively synthetic," and the "long

[1] Some one may perhaps say—Nay; but when you have uttered thus much of your period, viz., "by smoke invariably attended by fire," then we may legitimately interrupt you, and deny the invariable attendedness. To this we reply, that you have no legitimate right to do any such thing. For anything that *you* know, before you have heard me out, my period might have been intended to run thus—"By *smoke invariably attended by fire* this mountain is *not* attended, because [I choose to hold that] there is *no* such kind of smoke." You have no pretence to understand me till I finish my period.

forgotten" Epicurean or Neoclesian syllogism "exclusively analytic;" and Dr. Campbell and Mr. Stewart, conversant only with the former, may have written (as indeed they have) most dismal nonsense on the whole subject; but have the Hindūs done so? Again we reply,—not a bit of it. We have seen how the *Tarka-sangraha* (following hundreds of consentient writers), recognized, and sought to symbolize, in language guardedly periodic, the unity of the syllogism "in thought,"—the "reasoning for one's-self."[1] Let us now see how the Hindūs regard "the analytic and synthetic orders of enouncement,—the mere 'accidents,'" as Sir William justly observes, "of the syllogistic process;" and let us see whether *they* failed to discern the fact that "our best reasonings proceed indifferently in either order." Let us turn to the *Vedānta-paribhāshā*, section second. There we read as follows:—"Reasoning is divided into that which is for one's-self, and that which is for another. Of these, that which is for one's-self has been already described; but that which is for another is effected by a process. This process is an aggregate of parts; and the parts are three only, in the shape of—1st, the proposition, the reason, and the example [—making up Sir William's analytical, or more natural, form of exposition];—or, 2nd, the example [—equivalent to the major premiss—], the application, and the conclusion"[2] [Sir William's synthetical, or less natural form].

[1] स्वार्थानुमानमिति ॥

[2] तच्चानुमानं स्वार्थपरार्थभेदेन द्विविधम्। तत्र स्वार्थन्वनुमानमेव परार्थन्तु न्यायसाध्यम्। न्यायो नामावयवसमुदायः। अवयवाश्च त्रय एव प्रतिज्ञा-हेतूदाहरणरूपाः उदाहरणोपनयनिगमनरूपा वा ॥

And here, before we go further, let us remark in passing, that Sir William's parenthetical protests against things being "inappropriately styled" the premises, or "inappropriately styled" the conclusion, do not apply *at all* to the language of Hindū philosophers. When the matter in question is stated first, as in the analytical form, they style it the proposition (*pratijñā*); when it is stated last, they style it the conclusion, or issue (*nigamana*). The "clumsy" instances of want of terminological foresight in Western speculators, thus noticed by Sir William, do not occur in the Indian scientific language, where things are not named from their *separable accidents*.

But why did the author of the *Vedānta-paribhāshā* think it necessary to impress upon his readers long ago the essential equivalence of the analytic and synthetic forms of the syllogism, to which Sir William Hamilton has found it necessary to call the attention of Western sages in the year 1852? He tells us, when, in continuation of the passage last quoted, he says that the *five* members of what Sir William Hamilton calls the "clumsy agglutination," are not, as some Hindū learners by rote might have imagined them to be, indispensable; "for," to quote the work itself, "since no more than three members are required to set forth the general principle and its relevancy to the subject, the other two members [of the five-membered exposition] are superfluous."[1] Here, then, we see that the Hindūs were just as well aware as Aristotle, that three members suffice to contain all the essentials of a process of reasoning, and just as well

[1] न तु पञ्च अवयवत्वे
यवद्वयस्य व्यर्थत्वात् ॥

aware as Sir William Hamilton, that these three members may be arranged indifferently in either the analytic or the synthetic order. What, then, becomes of Sir William's scornful remark that "the Hindū syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms?" It is irrelevant altogether,—the five-membered exposition, which it alludes to, not being the Hindū *syllogism* at all, but the Hindū *rhetorical exposition*. Sir William Hamilton might, with the same (absolutely the same) propriety, accuse Euclid of a "clumsy agglutination" of the analytic and synthetic syllogisms, because he begins by stating his proposition *as a proposition*, and ends by restating it *as a conclusion*. Sir William very well knows that logic and rhetoric are not the same thing. At page 641 of his *Discussions*, he says, "Here we must not confound the logical with the rhetorical, the necessary in thought with the agreeable in expression." Good: may we, then, cherishing, as we do, the profoundest admiration for Sir William Hamilton, entreat that he will not[1] (in imitation of those who have on this point erred before him) continue to confound the logical with the rhetorical when again writing or speaking of Hindū speculation? We have shown him that the Hindūs have the analytic syllogism of Epicurus, the synthetic syllogism of Aristotle, and an expression (not excelled in precision by any similar attempt that we are aware of) for his own syllogism "in thought," in its organic unity. Is all this to be ignored, and the error of the earlier investigators of Sanskrit literature, misrepresent-

[1] [This was written in 1852, after a letter, the last received by me, from Sir William Hamilton.]

ing the *oration* as the syllogism,[1] to be for ever perpetuated? Sir William Hamilton is not unknown to living successors of the old Indian sages on the banks of the Ganges. But had the unfortunate passage on which we have animadverted been the first on which the eye of one of these readers alighted, the chance is that it would have gone some way to confirm the impression, here yet too prevalent, that the Europeans, though capital workers in brass and iron, had better leave the discussion of things intellectual to those whose land was the birth-place of philosophy.

[In justification of the foregoing remarks, we quote from the familiar text book, the *Tarka-sangraha* (Benares, 1852), as follows:—]

THE CHAPTER ON INFERENCE.

अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम्। परामर्शजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः। व्याप्तिविशिष्टपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः। यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानं परामर्शः। तज्जन्यं पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः। यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः। व्याप्यस्य पर्वतादिवृत्तित्वं पक्षधर्मता।

TRANSLATION.

"An induction (*anumāna*) is the instrument of an inference (*anumiti*). An inference is knowledge that results from syllogizing (*parāmarśa*). Syllogizing is the taking cognizance that the subject (*paksha*) possesses

[1] See this point explained more fully at p. 45 (2nd Edition) of the English version of the *Tarka-sangraha*.

what is constantly accompanied [by something which is thus seen to belong to the subject]. For example,—the taking cognizance that 'This hill has smoke—which is constantly accompanied [at the point where it originates] by fire'—is [an instance of] syllogizing [*i.e.*, of apprehending, in connection, an induction and an observation]. The knowledge resulting therefrom, viz., that 'The hill has fire [somewhere about it],' is an inference. 'The being constantly accompanied' (*vyāpti*) is such an invariableness of association as this—that wherever there is smoke there is fire. By the 'subject's *possession*' [of something that is constantly accompanied], we mean the fact that there *exists*—in a mountain, for instance,—that which is constantly accompanied [by something else]."

REMARKS.

In order that we may be enabled to trace the analogy which, disguised by differences arising from diversity in the point of view or in the form of expression adopted, must yet necessarily exist between any two expositions of the reasoning process, neither of which is unsound, let us examine the terms in the foregoing passage, which we have rendered, as nearly as we could, by equivalents borrowed from the logic of Europe.

The first formal difference that requires to be noticed, is the fact that, whilst the European logic employs a phraseology founded on classification, the *Nyāya* goes to work with the terms on which the classification is based. The former infers that kings are mortal because they belong to the class of men. The latter arrives at the same inference by means of the consideration that mor-

tality is present wherever there is the human nature, and the human nature wherever there is that of a king.

In the argumentative expression, "This hill has invariably-fire-attended smoke," there are wrapt up, in one, the major premiss, "wherever there is smoke there is fire," and the minor premiss, "this hill is smoking." The reason for preferring to regard these as two constituent parts of a single statement appears to be this, that it is only when simultaneously present to the mind that the premises compel the inference. When they are stated separately, they are no other than the premises of an Aristotelian syllogism.

The term which we have rendered "the being constantly accompanied," viz., *vyāpti*, means, literally, "pervadedness." In regard to the import of a proposition which the logic of Europe calls a universal affirmative, such as "all men are mortal," the *Naiyāyika* would say that there is pervadedness (*vyāpti*) of humanity by mortality;—and he would state the proposition thus: "Where there is humanity there is mortality." In a universal affirmative, the predicate or major term connotes the "pervader" (*vyāpaka*), or constant accompanier of that, connoted by the subject or minor term, which is "pervaded" (*vyāpya*), or constantly accompanied by it.

अनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च। स्वार्थं स्वानुमितिहेतुः। तथाहि स्वयमेव भूयो दर्शनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति महानसादौ व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा पर्वतसमीपं गतस्तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति। तदनन्तरं वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। अयमेव लिङ्गप-

रामर्श इत्युच्यते । तस्मात् पर्वतो वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमिति-रित्युच्यते । तदेतत स्वार्थानमानम ।

TRANSLATION.

"An induction is of two kinds [inasmuch as it may be employed], for one's-self and for another. That which is for one's-self is the cause of a private conclusion [in one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], having gone near a mountain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., 'where there is smoke there is fire.' Thereupon the knowledge arises that 'this mountain has smoke, which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called [by some] the 'pondering of a sign' (*linga-parāmarśa*). Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is fiery,' which is the conclusion (*anumiti*). This is the process of inference for one's-self."

यत् तु स्वयं धूमादग्निमनुमाय परप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्चावयव-वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते तत् परार्थानुमानम् । यथा पर्वतो वह्निमान् । धूम-वत्त्वात् । यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमान् यथा महानसः । तथा चायम् । तस्मात् तथेति । अनेन प्रतिपादितात्लिङ्गात् परो ऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते ।

TRANSLATION.

"But after having, for one's-self, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form

of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of 'inference for the sake of another.' For example: (1) The mountain has fire in it; (2) because it has smoke; (3) whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; (4) and so this has; (5) therefore it is as aforesaid. By this [exposition], in consequence of the sign [or token] here brought to his notice, the other also arrives at the knowledge that there is fire."

प्रतिज्ञाहेत्वदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानि पञ्चावयवा । पर्वतो वह्निमानिति प्रतिज्ञा । धूमवत्त्वादिति हेतुः । यो यो धूमवान् स वह्निमानित्युदाहरणम् । तथा चायमित्युपनयः । तस्मात् तथेति निगमनम् ॥

TRANSLATION.

"The five members [of this exposition are severally named]: (1) the proposition (*pratijñā*), (2) the reason (*hetu*), (3) the example (*udāharaṇa*), (4) the application (*upanaya*), and (5) the conclusion (*nigamana*). 'The mountain is fiery,' is the proposition; 'because of its being smoky,' is the reason; 'whatever is smoky is fiery,' is [the general proposition or principle founded on] the example [of culinary hearths and the like]; 'and so this [mountain] is' is the [syllogistic] application; 'therefore it [the mountain] is fiery,' is the conclusion."

REMARKS.

The five-membered argumentative exposition has been the object, sometimes of undeserved censure, and sometimes of commendation equally undeserved. When it is commended, at the expense of the Aristotelian syllogism,

on the allegation (see a quotation in Sir G. C. Haughton's *Prodromus*, p. 215), "that it exhibits a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism, and that its conclusion is as convincing as that of the syllogism," the commendation is based simply on a misconception of the syllogism thus disparaged. On the other hand, when it is censured as "a rude form of the syllogism," the censure is misapplied, because what corresponds to the syllogism is the two-membered expression, which, we have already seen, comprises neither more nor less than the syllogism does; whereas the form now under consideration is proposed as the most convenient for communicating our convictions to others. Being a matter of exposition, it is therefore a question of rhetoric whether the form be, or be not, the most convenient in which to arrange our proposition, our proofs, and our illustrations. The five-membered expression, so far as its arrangement is concerned, is a summary of *Kaṇāda's* views in regard to rhetoric, "an offshoot from logic," (see Whately's *Elements of Rhetoric*, p. 6), and to which, after "the *ascertainment* of the truth by investigation," belongs "the *establishment* of it to the satisfaction of *another*." Disregarding what is called rhetorical artifice, which, in his system, would have been out of place, as it would have been out of place in Euclid's *Elements of Geometry*, Kaṇāda directs his rhetorician to commence, as Euclid does, by stating the proposition to be proved. The reason is next to be alleged, and then instances are to be cited in order to show that the reason is sufficient to establish the fact in regard to all cases of a certain given character. The auditor is then to be

reminded that there is no dispute that the case in question is of the given character, and the oration winds up with the re-introduction of the original proposition, in the new character of an established conclusion, just as Euclid's argument winds up by re-introducing the triumphant proposition with a flourish of trumpets in the shape of a "Quod erat demonstrandum."

Thus, rhetorically considered, the five-membered expression is a very suitable framework for a straight-forward argumentative speech, making no appeal to the passions, and not hesitating to table, without exordium, the proposition which it proceeds to establish.

Logically considered, the five-membered expression is a combination of the inductive with the deductive syllogism.[1] The instances which led the speaker to an inductive generalization, are cited [in the shape of some one or other example, followed or not by a suggestive "etc."] for the satisfaction of the auditor, in the third division of the rhetorical address; from which circumstance it has happened that those who suppose the intended function of the model oration and of the Aristotelic syllogism to be identical, have come, either to regard the oration as an illogical monstrosity, or else to fancy that it is a great improvement upon the syllogism. The former misconception is that of those who, like Ritter (*History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. iv., p. 365), were familiarly conversant with the logic of the schools. The other misconception was to be looked for in the case of those whose notions of the logic of the schools were derived from Locke's Essay and Campbell's Rhetoric.

[1] [As well as of the Epicurean and the Aristotelian syllogism. See *ante*, p. 147.]

Thus it is quite unfair to say, with Ritter (*History of Philosophy*, vol. iv., p. 365), that two of the five members of Kaṇāda's argument "are manifestly superfluous, while, by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated:"—for, as we have shown, the citation of the example serves, as a matter of rhetorical convenience, to bring to the recollection of the hearer instances, in regard to which all parties are unanimous, and which are such as should constrain him to admit the universality of the principle from which the conclusion follows.

स्वार्थानुमितिपरार्थानुमित्योर्लिङ्गपरामर्श एव करणं तस्मा-
ल्लिङ्गपरामर्शो ऽनुमानम्।

TRANSLATION.

"The instrument [in the making] of an inference (*anumiti*), whether for one's-self or for another, is simply the consideration of a 'sign' (*linga*); therefore an induction (*anumāna*) [which was previously stated to be the instrument of an inference], is (just) this consideration of a sign."

ऽपि नास्ति

लिङ्गं केवलव्यतिरेकि यथा पृथिवीतरेभ्यो भिद्यते । गन्धवत्त्वात् । यदितरेभ्यो न भिद्यते न तद्गन्धवद्यथा जलम् । न चेयं तथा । तस्मान्न तथेति । अत्र यद्गन्धवत् तदितरभिन्नमित्यन्वयदृष्टान्तो नास्ति पृथिवीमाचक्ष पक्षत्वात् ।

TRANSLATION.

"A sign [or characteristic token] (*linga*) is of three sorts: 1, that which is [a token in virtue of its being constantly] accompanied [by what it betokens], and absent [when what it would betoken is absent] (*anwaya-vyatireki*); 2, that which is [a token in virtue of its being constantly] accompanied only [and never absent through the absence of what it should betoken, the thing betokened being in this case one everywhere present] (*kevalānwayi*); and, 3, that which is [a token in virtue of its being invariably] absent only [in the case of everything that could be cited in addition to the subject of the proposition itself] (*kevalavyatireki*). [To illustrate these three in order],—that which is accompanied and absent (*anwayavyatireki*) is that which is pervaded by [or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable] accompaniment (*anwaya*) [on the part of what it betokens], and absence (*vyatireka*) [on its own part, when what it might betoken is absent], as the possession of smoke, when fire is what is to be established. [For example], 'Where there is smoke there is fire, as on the culinary hearth [where the fire is assumed never to be extinguished]:'—here there is 'pervadedness by attendance' (*anwayavyāpti*) [*i.e.*, it is predicable of the token, smoke, that it is attended

by fire which it betokens]. 'Where fire is not, there smoke is not, as in a great lake [where it is taken for granted that fire cannot be]:'—here there is 'pervadedness by absence' (*vyatirekavyāpti*) [*i.e.*, it is predicable of smoke, as a token, that it will be absent where what it would have betokened is absent]. [In the second place], that [sign] which is accompanied only (*kevalānwayi*) is that which is 'pervaded by [or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable] accompaniment only' [on the part of what it betokens]. For example: 'A jar is nameable because it is cognizable, as a web is:'—here there is no [case of] 'pervadedness by absence,' in cognizability and nameableness, because *everything* [that we can be conversant about] is both cognizable and nameable. [Thirdly, and lastly], that [sign] which is absent only (*kevalavyatireki*) is that which is 'pervaded by [or, in other words, of which there is invariably predicable] absence only,' [on its part, in the case of whatever could be cited, as an example, in addition to the subject of the proposition itself]. For example:—

(1) 'Earth is different from these others [of the elements]:

(2) Because it is odorous:—

(3) What is *not* different from these others is not odorous,—as water, [for example, is inodorous]:

(4) But this [earth] is not so [*i. e.*, is not inodorous]:

(5) Therefore it is not such [as the other elements, but different from these others].'

Here [we are obliged to employ, in the third mem-

ber, a universal negative, because] there is no analogous example [to cite in confirmation], in the case of [the universal affirmative] 'What possesses odor is different from the others,' seeing that earth alone [according to the *Nyāya*] can be the subject [of a proposition in which *odor* is affirmatively predicated]."

सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान् पक्षो यथा धूमवत्त्वे हेतौ पर्वतः । निश्चितसाध्यवान् सपक्षो यथा तत्रैव महानसः । निश्चितसाध्याभाववान् विपक्षो यथा तत्रैव महाह्रदः ।

TRANSLATION.

"That, whose possession of what is to be established is doubted, is called the subject (*paksha*); as the mountain, when the fact of its smoking is [adduced as] the reason [for inferring the presence of fire]. That which certainly possesses the property in question is called an instance on the same side (*sapaksha*); as the culinary hearth, in the same example. That which is certainly devoid of the property in question, is called an instance on the opposite side (*vipaksha*); as the great lake, in the same example."

REMARKS.

The *sapaksha* corresponds to Bacon's *instantiæ convenientes* "quæ in eadem natura conveniunt, per materias licet dissimilimas." The *vipaksha* corresponds to the instantiæ "quæ natura data privantur."—*Novum Organum*, Lib. 2, Aph. XI. and XII.

NOTE D.

ON THE "VEDAS."

[If the Indian missionary be staggered by the contemplation of the bulky published volumes (Sanskrit and English) of the *Veda*, the following remarks, penned in 1851, on receipt of the first volume in Benares, may possibly either satisfy or excite his curiosity.]

(From the *Benares Magazine*, for June, 1851).

Professor Wilson's version of the *Rig-Veda* is a book to be received with thanks. The *Friend of India*—no friend to the Sanskrit—with grumbling acknowledgment admits this. The *Friend's* opinion, further, that the book is dryish reading as it stands, appears to be the opinion of the periodical press generally. Reflecting upon these facts, it occurs to us that there may be readers who would thank us for something like a bit of the kernel of the volume,—being content to read it as the Lord of Session read the Waverley Novels, which he used to buy for his wife, as they came out, with the understanding that she was to tell him the story.

In his "Introduction," filled with matter interesting to the philosophical inquirer, Professor Wilson comes to the conclusion that the Vedas are *very* old, though it is difficult, if not impossible, to say how old they are. For our own part we believe the determination of their age to

be a point so little likely to be settled between this and the end of the world, that we should almost be tempted, if hard pressed, to profess doggedly the Hindū belief in their existence from all eternity, rather than pledge ourselves to the discussion of the question until we should have found out how much younger than eternity the books really are. The materials for forming an opinion as to the *positive* date of the books, are, if possible, more scanty than those which served the antiquary and the knight for common battle-ground, when they disputed as to the Teutonic or the classical origin of the Pictish language, the only extant word of which was, if we remember rightly, *pen-vall*—which the one declared to be "caput valli," and consequently Latin, while the other —admitting the interpretation—insisted that it was "head of the wall," and consequently Saxon. To "breathe the thin air of the mountain-top"—where there is such a lung-trying lack of respirable matter, is what we ourselves—un-condor-like—have no sort of relish for. Presuming that the reader to whom we address ourselves has as little, if not less, we leave this question,—satisfied that the Vedas are very old, and that, like an old maid who happens to be, like Junius, the "sole depositary of her own secret," they are not very likely to give up the secret of their age without being put to a degree of torture which we nowise feel called upon to apply in the face of the admission on all hands that they are "certainly aged."

The hymns of the *Rig-Veda* are in verse. Professor Wilson, pledging himself to a literal version of them, writes of course in prose. Almost all verse is heavy

when turned into prose. We shall take the liberty of turning some of the hymns into metre, not copying the measure of the original but employing what form of English verse seems to us to suit the subject. The first hymn of the *Rig-Veda* is addressed to Agni, the god of fire, the favourite character of the book. According to Professor Wilson, with whom we are disposed to agree, the "author" of this hymn is Madhuchhandas, the son of Viswamitra. At all events, if Madhuchhandas is not the author—(and his name, signifying, as it does, "the man whose verse is sweet," has somewhat of an impersonal air about it)—we are not prepared to mention a likelier claimant of the authorship. When we spoke of this the other day to a learned Hindū friend, he exhibited very marked dissatisfaction and distress, begging us to write and tell Professor Wilson that the hymn had *no* author—that it had existed from everlasting—and that Madhuchhandas was only the fortunate seer to whom, on the last occasion of its revelation, it had been revealed. In the meantime, till Professor Wilson's retractation of the obnoxious epithet could be obtained, he begged us to draw our pencil through the word "author," or to allow him to do it himself. We assured him that it was useless, and that we knew enough of Professor Wilson to make us certain that he would not alter the word for anything that we could, with a good conscience, urge against the use of it. The Brāhman mournfully acquiesced in our proposal, that the matter should be left as it stood—only with the pencilled protest in the margin;—and here follows the hymn versified, without rhyme, licentiously, but with a tolerably close adherence to the letter.

HYMN TO THE GOD OF FIRE.

I.

"Glory to Agni the high priest,
The ministrant divine, who bears aloft,
And offers to the gods the sacrifice,—
Wealth-saturated Fire!

II.

May He, the radiant, by the seers of eld
And later sages sung,
Invite for us the presence of the gods.

III.

'Tis all to fire we owe our wealth,
Kindred and fame;
Through Him descends each blessing from the skies.

IV.

Borne up to heaven,
Safe in thy flaming arms, the sacrifice
How sure to reach the gods!

V.

And when the gods attend well pleased,
May He, renowned, the true, divinely bright,
Be with us to present the offering.

VI.

Bless thou the giver of the sacrifice
With all thy blessings, for the well-placed gifts
Shall sure revert to thee.

VII.

At morn and even,
With reverential homage in our hearts,
To thee, bright deity, we turn;—

VIII.

To thee the guardian of the sacrifice,
Illustrious,
Expanding in thy glory, as thou tak'st
The offering to thy keeping.

IX.

Be ever present with us for our good;—
And as the father to the son he loves
Is easy of access,
So be to us, O Fire!" [1]

The second hymn is addressed to the god of the winds, Vāyu by name. Our version of this hymn has a sprinkling of rhyme, which militates somewhat against fidelity; but we have been as faithful as we could contrive to be under the circumstances.

HYMN TO THE GOD OF THE WINDS.

I.

"Vāyu, pleasant to behold,
Approach:—for thee this offering,
Juice of the moon-plant, is prepared;—
Drink whilst we thy praises sing.

II.

Holy praises sing we now
To the Air-god;—'tis the hour
We have chosen for our hymn,
When Vāyu cometh in his power.

[1] We annex the prose version of this hymn, as given by Professor Wilson:—

"1. I glorify Agni, the high-priest of the sacrifice, the divine, the ministrant, who presents the oblation (to the gods), and is the possessor of great wealth.

2. May that Agni who is to be celebrated by both ancient and modern sages conduct the gods hither.

3. Through Agni the worshipper obtains that affluence which increases day by day, which is the source of fame and the multiplier of mankind.

4. Agni, the unobstructed sacrifice of which thou art on every side the protector, assuredly reaches the gods.

5. May Agni, the presenter of oblations, the attainer of knowledge, he who is true, renowned, and divine, come hither with the gods.

6. Whatever good thou mayest, Agni, bestow upon the giver (of the oblation), that verily, Angiras, shall revert to thee.

7. We approach thee, Agni, with reverential homage in our thoughts, daily, both morning and evening.

8. Thee, the radiant, the protector of sacrifices, the constant illuminator of truth, increasing in thine own dwelling.

9. Agni, be unto us easy of access, as is a father to his son; be ever present with us for our good."

III.

Ha! thy soft approving speech
Greets mine ear,—I know thy voice;
Thou com'st to drink the soma-juice—
We see it vanish,—we rejoice.

IV.

Another rich libation pour,
Now the Thunderer summon we;
Indra come!—with Vāyu come!
Partake the juice prepared for thee.

V.

Conversant with every rite
Of sacrifice—full well ye know
These libations are prepared
For you,—on us then favour show.

VI.

Lord of skies and Lord of air,
Indra come and Vāyu too,
Manful gods both,—we shall soon
Gain all we wish, if helped by you.

VII.

Now call the regent of the sun,
Mitra, lustrous in his powers,
And ocean's ruler, Varuna,
The joint bestowers of the showers.

VIII.

Ye that treasure up the floods,—
Lords of the sun and of the seas!—
To be dispensed in grateful showers,
Requite our present services.

IX.

Sun and Ocean, for the sake
Of many were ye born,—most wise,
Most kind to multitudes, are ye,—
Prosper this our sacrifice."

There are some noticeable points in this hymn. In the first place, the author—(begging our friend the Brāhman's pardon for the phraseology)—speaks of the wind as "pleasant to behold." Pigs, as we all know, are proverbially said to see the wind; but here the poet would seem to claim participation in the privilege. Professor Wilson here remarks—"*Vāyu* is invoked in a visible form as the deity presiding over the wind; it is doubtful if the expressions, which in this and similar instances intimate personality, are to be understood as indicating actual figures or idols: the personification is probably only poetical." We incline to the opinion that the personification is only poetical, for two reasons—first, because we never saw any Hindū idol that could be conscionably spoken of as "pleasant to behold"—(except those of Hanumān, the monkey-chief, which our friend the archæologist assures us are long posterior to the date of the Vedas),—and, secondly, because we find a remark of Professor Wilson's in another page which seems to throw a different light upon the matter. The remark to which we allude occurs in the 24th page of the Introduction, where Professor Wilson observes that, in these hymns, "the power, the vastness, the generosity, the goodness, and even the *personal beauty* of the deity addressed, are described in highly laudatory strains." Now what could be more highly—more *implicitly*—laudatory than for the poet to laud the visible loveliness of the wind which he had never set eyes on in the whole course of his life?

The next point noticeable is the sacrificer's assurance that the wind has drunk up the exhilarating

juice of the moon-plant, when the juice has evaporated. Here we have chemistry itself adumbrated in poetical mythology.

Then we have the poet, at a loss for anything beyond it as a climax of commendation, patting the wind and the firmament on the back, with the protestation that they are *men*—stout fellows both of them. There is something hearty in this;—he is evidently in earnest.

Lastly, the description of the sun and of the ocean as the joint bestowers of the showers that refresh the earth, is, to our mind, as beautiful as it is philosophical. "Aurum latet in hoc," as Leibnitz said of the writings of the Schoolmen. We may turn the Vedas to account, if we but eschew the lazy blunder of a lazy scorn. It is a glorious point gained when you can find any truth enwrapped in language which the man that you have to deal with has sucked in as with his mother's milk.

We may further remark—(in conclusion, after the "lastly")—that their thankfulness for showers of rain goes far to prove that the Hindūs (as Professor Wilson observes at page 41 of his Introduction), were an agricultural people at the time when this hymn was composed, and not a nomadic, as has been by some contended. Nomads, though not independent of rain, are usually less anxious about it than agriculturists.

The third hymn introduces us to the Hindū Castor and Pollux—the Aświns—"the two sons of the Sun, begotten during his metamorphosis as a horse (*aśwa*), endowed with perpetual youth and beauty, and physicians of the gods." The invocation of the hymn is not confined to these,—Indra, the thunderer, with his "tawny

coursers," certain miscellaneous deities, and the goddess of eloquence, being also invoked.

HYMN TO THE TWIN-BORN OF THE SUN, AND OTHERS.

I.

Twin-sons of heaven's bright orb,
Friends of the pious,—whose far-reaching arms
Avail to guard your worshippers, accept
The sacrificial viands. Ye whose acts,
Mighty and manifold, declare your power,
Ye that direct the hearts of the devout,
With favouring ear attend our hymn of praise.
Faithful and true, destroyers of the foe,
First in the van of heroes, As'wins, come!
Come to the mixed libations that we pour
On the lopped sacred grass.

II.

Now on Indra we call, on the wondrously bright;
See—we press from the moon-plant the juice of delight,
The juice, ever pure as enchanting, that longs[1]
To be quaffed by thy lips;—come and list to our songs.
The wise understand Thee—'tis only the wise
That the knowledge of Indra full rightly can prize;
Approach and accept then the prayers of thy priest,
Let thy fleet tawny steeds bear thee swift to the feast.

III.

Next the throng divine invite
Of deities that guard the right,
Ever watching o'er us all,—
Call them to our festival.
Come, ye swift-moving spirits, ye spirits that run
Through the universe—swift as the rays of the sun—
That preside o'er the rain-showers, accept of our cheer,
Nor despise the libation we pour for you here.

[1] In the prose version—"these libations, ever pure, expressed by the fingers (of the priests) are desirous of thee," p. 9.

Omniscient immortals, whose might is for aye,
In the youth of its vigour exempt from decay,
In whose souls void of malice all kindly thoughts spring,
Deign to look on the gifts that your worshippers bring.

IV.

Now to Saraswatī address the song,
Saraswatī to whom all gifts belong,
The recompenser of the worshipper
With food and wealth,—our hymn be now to her.
Joy!—for Saraswatī, whose inspiration
Is theirs alone that in the truth delight,
Accept our sacrifice;—pour the libation
To her, the guide of all whose hearts are right.
Behold the present deity!—the stream,[1]
The mighty stream named hers,—behold it roll,
Bearing on its fair bosom such a gleam
Of light as she alone can stream upon the soul."

Some of the most graceful of the hymns are addressed to the goddess of the morning—Ushas—the Aurora of Hindū mythology. Here is a portion of one,—for the entire hymn would be rather long.

Hymn to Aurora.

I.

Daughter of heaven,—Aurora, dawn on us;
Diffusing light, and bringing wealth with thee,
Bountiful goddess, dawn.

II.

Rousing the flocks and waking up the birds,
Nourishing all, yet onward to decay
Conducting all her transitory charge,
Even as a matron to her household cares,
Daily the dawn comes forth.

[1] As Professor Wilson observes, *Saraswatī*, the divinity of speech, "is here identified with the river so named," p. 10. The river, we believe, is now nowhere to be met with,—ominous, one might think, that the genius of India had run itself out, for the time at least.

III.

Shedder of dews, delay she knows not. See
How her approach inspires the diligent;
The client early seeks his patron's gate,
The soaring birds suspend their flight no more,
Up-springing with the dawn.

IV.

All living things invoke her, and adore;
Bringer of good, she lighteth up the world,
While the malevolent that love the dark
Flee at her blest approach.

These may suffice as a sample of the hymns, in which there is much sameness of character both as to style and subject. From the remaining hymns we shall now glean a few noticeable passages.

In the 3rd verse of the 9th hymn, Indra is addressed as "thou, who art to be reverenced by all mankind." In a note on this passage, Professor Wilson says that the epithet *viśwa-charshane* is literally "oh! thou who art all men," or, as the commentator explains it, "who art joined with all men,"—which is further qualified as "to be worshipped by all institutors of sacrifices." Professor Wilson adds—"It may be doubted if this be all that is intended." It strikes us that what is intended may be that now familiar conception of the chief energising deity—*īśwara*, "the lord"—as being not other than the aggregate of all embodied souls, "as a forest is not other than the trees that compose it,"—a conception which may be seen elaborated in any work on the Vedānta, such as the *Vedānta-sāra*. Dr. Rosen's rendering of the epithet as "omnium hominum *domine*" is not opposed to this view. It is curious to trace, in these the

most ancient portions of the *Veda*, anything like the dawning of those conceptions which, gradually elaborated through the subsequent portions entitled the *Upanishads*, took at length the form which they now hold in the Vedānta philosophy. In the 3rd verse of the 6th hymn there is another passage, which appears to have puzzled the commentator, and which has to our eye a Vedāntic aspect. The verse runs thus—"Mortals, you owe your (daily) birth (to such an Indra), who with the rays of the morning gives sense to the senseless, and to the formless form." Indra, according to Professor Wilson, is here "identified with the sun, whose morning rays may be said to re-animate those who have been dead in sleep through the night." This is the obvious explanation, and probably the correct one; but there is something strange in the construction,—the word for "mortals" being plural, whilst the verb is in the singular. The commentator "is of opinion that the want of concord is a *Vaidik* license." This it possibly is; but the assumed indifference between the singular and the plural reminds us not only of the Vedāntic tenet of the indifference between the collective and the distributive aggregate of humanity,—"as between the forest and its constituent trees,"—but also of another tenet, viz., that, during profound sleep, the world *actually* as well as apparently ceases to exist for the sleeper, whose disembodied spirit, at that time merging in the Infinite Spirit, re-assumes, in the processes of awakening, a body with its senses and its outward form.

But whether there be or not in these ancient hymns faint indications of the philosophy which was gradually

elaborated in the Vedānta, the indications are abundantly plentiful of those myths which have supplied topics for the poets. The combats of Indra, the thunderer, especially with the demons of drought, remind us of the fights of the Scandinavian Thor with the Jötuns.

In the 7th verse of the 11th hymn we read :—"Thou slewest, Indra, by stratagems, the wily Sushna: the wise have known of this thy (greatness); bestow upon them (abundant) food." On this Professor Wilson remarks, that Sushna is described as a demon slain by Indra, but that "this is evidently a metaphorical murder. *Sushna* means dryer up, exsiccator . . . . heat or drought; which *Indra*, as the rain, would put an end to." The greatest of Indra's foes is *Vritra*, who ought by rights to be the father of *Sushna*, or the drought, seeing that he represents the retentive power of the clouds whereby they withhold from the earth the waters that they contain, until Indra, "with his thunderbolt or electrical influence, divides the aggregated mass, and vent is given to the rain, which then descends upon the earth."

Dr. Müller's edition of the Sanskrit text of these hymns is a monument both of his own diligence and of the liberality of the Honourable Court, without whose patronage the publication could not have been ventured upon. The volume is a handsome quarto of nine hundred and ninety pages. The bulk of these is occupied by the commentary, which is a very ample one. The text of the hymns, in its translated form, does not occupy much more than the half of some three hundred octavo pages, the other half being devoted to the notes of the translator. Sāyanāchārya, the com-

mentator, makes something like an apology for the amplitude of his exegesis.

This edition of the *Rig-veda*, Dr. Müller remarks, "is not intended for the general scholar, but only for those who make Sanskrit their special study," etc. To such students this massive tome presents a supply of pabulum, such as a helluo librorum may well be expected to lick his lips at. And then, to think of the other volumes that are to come, this first instalment, with its thousand pages, being but the one-eighth part of one Veda out of the four! But the other volumes are not likely to be so big; for, as the commentator Sāyana remarks of his work, in some introductory verses,—"The first section of this, deduced as it is from traditional doctrine, is to be listened to. An intelligent person, perfect in thus much, can understand the whole." He then proceeds to explain why the Rig-veda, rather than any one of the others, is taken for commentatorial illustration first in order. To justify the selection, he brings forward various arguments,—among others, the fact that when the separate Vedas are enumerated in the Veda itself, the Rig-veda stands first in the enumeration. The objector then, acquiescing in the proposed order, falls back upon the more perilous doubt whether there is any such thing as the Veda *at all!* "The short and the long of it is," he insists, "there is *no* Veda: how, then, can there be a *Rig*-veda, —an integrant portion thereof? For there is no sign whereby one can recognise anything as being the Veda, nor is there any proof of it; and nothing can be established when there is neither the one nor the other

of these. For those that understand logic, hold that a thing is established by characteristic signs and by proofs." And so the hardy objector goes on, while Sāyana, calm in the consciousness of strength, abides his time. When the objector has finished, the other disposes of the objection; whereupon our objector, conceding—for the sake of argument—that there *may* be "a certain thing called the Veda," demurs to there being any occasion for making a commentary on it. The Veda, he argues, is no authority, some of its texts being downright nonsense. Such charges, it may be presumed, Sāyana did not deck out in all the pomp of regular disputation, without feeling tolerably sure of his own power to dispose of them satisfactorily. He allows to both sides of the question ample elbow-room, and it is not till after three-and-forty of Dr. Müller's broad quarto pages that we come to the first line of the first hymn of the Rig-veda. Four pages of comment on this hemistich bring us to the second line, and so the work goes on.

The exegetical part of Sāyana's commentary is quite exhaustive. For example:—on the first verse, beginning "I laud Fire, the priest," etc., he remarks—"I laud Fire, *i.e.*, the deity so named; laud, *i.e.*, praise, the verb here being *īḍ*, 'to praise,' the letter *ḍ* in which is changed to *l* by Vaidik license," and so on.

We may mention to our Hindū friends that this edition is intended not only for Sanskrit scholars, but also Dr. Müller tells, "for those among the natives of India who are still able to read their own Sacred Books in the language of the original." The price of

the volume is a trifle compared with that of a good manuscript; and no manuscript in the market can vie with it in point of accuracy. The copyists of the Veda admit their liability to error; and, in the verses which they are in the habit of appending to a completed transcript, they frequently complain of the hardships and difficulties of their task. One of the most touching of these penmen's plaints is the following, which Dr. Müller instances:—

"My back, my hips, and my neck are broken; my sight is stiff in looking down: keep this book with care, which has been written with pain."

NOTE E.

THE ETERNITY OF SOUND; A DOGMA OF THE MĪMĀNSĀ.

[This dogma being of vital importance to the *Veda*, he who argues against the *Veda* ought to understand what the dogma means. We reprint the following remarks of ours on it from the *Benares Magazine*, August, 1852.]

At page 305, vol. i. of Mr. Colebrooke's *Collected Essays*, where he is treating of Jaiminī's system of philosophy, the *Mīmānsā*, we read as follows:—"In the first chapter of the lecture occurs the noted disquisition of the *Mīmānsā* on the original and perpetual association of articulate sound with sense." What this dogma means, and why the question forced itself upon

Jaiminī at the opening of his work, we here propose to consider.

"The object of the *Mīmānsā*," to employ the words of Mr. Colebrooke, "is the interpretation of the *Vedas*." As he adds, "Its whole scope is the ascertainment of duty." This is declared in the opening aphorism, which, interspersing an explanatory comment, we may render as follows:—"Well, then [O student, since thou hast read the *Vedas* while residing in the family of thy preceptor], therefore a desire to know *duty* [which knowledge, without further aid, thou wilt scarcely gather from the texts with which thy memory is stored, ought now to be entertained by thee]."[1] But what do you *mean* by "duty?" inquires the student. To expound the entire import of the term would be difficult, if not impossible, at the outset; so Jaiminī, following the recognised method of laying down a "characteristic" (*lakshaṇa*), by which the thing, though not fully described, may be securely *recognised*, declares as follows:—"A duty is a matter which may be recognised [as a duty] by the instigatory character [of the passage of Scripture in which it is mentioned]."[2] As Mr. Colebrooke observes, "Here *duty* intends sacrifices and other acts of religion ordained by the *Vedas*. The same term (*dharma*) likewise signifies *virtue*, or moral merit; and grammarians have distinguished its import according to the gender of the noun. In one (the masculine), it implies virtue; in the other (neuter), it means an act of devotion. It is in the last-mentioned sense that the term is here employed." We may add, in expla-

[1] अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ ॥ [2] चोदनालक्षणो धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

nation of this, that the discussion of the gender of the word was provoked by Jaiminī's choosing to employ the masculine form (as may be observed in the original aphorism given in the note), instead of the neuter. To the query, why Jaiminī was guilty of this grammatical solecism, one of his commentators coolly replies, "take [and be content with] as the reason thereof, the fact that he [Jaiminī] is a great sanctified sage [and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases]." Arguments of this lofty Pope Hildebrand order, which were doubtless rolled out with unction, *et ore rotundo*, in the palmy days of Hindūism, the Brāhmans now-a-days are most amusingly ashamed of; those of them, at least, who are not prepared to join cordially in a broad grin over the "bumptiousness" of the pretension.

Whilst Jaiminī contents himself with giving, in the first instance, a "characteristic", by which *duty* may be recognised, his commentator supplies an account of its *nature* (*swarupa*), *i.e.*, what constitutes that a duty to which the characteristic in question belongs. According to him, what constitutes anything a duty is "the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure [or, in other words, its being calculated to produce more pleasure than pain]." The agreement of this with the Benthamite definition of the Useful is noticeable. Another thing which we wish here to take an opportunity of noticing, is a correspondence, in point of terminology, between the systems of the East and of the West. That which constitutes anything what it is, was called by Plato its *Idea*. Aristotle disliked the term; and he

sought to convey the same meaning by a term which the Schoolmen rendered *Form*. Bacon adopted the word *Form* in this sense, and the exactly corresponding Sanskrit word, viz., *swarūpa*, is the one here employed, and generally employed, to convey the notion of what is the abiding cause of a thing's being what it is. When a Hindū writer, at the opening of a treatise on anything, says "I shall declare the *lakshaṇa* and the *swarūpa* of the thing in question," he means to say, that he will tell first, how we are to recognise the thing as *the* thing that we are talking about, and that he will next tell, *all about it*. The *lakshaṇa* is the mark on the sealed package, by which we recognise it among other packages; the *swarūpa* is the contents of the package. The reason why we think it worth while to advert to the import of the phrascology in question is this, that we ourselves once took a good deal of pains unprofitably to reconcile these two terms with the "genus" and the "specific difference" which together make up the "definition," according to European logic. The one set of terms and the other, however, belong to different aspects of thought.

To return to Jaiminī:—Having intimated that the cause of our knowing anything to be a duty was simply an instigation, in the shape of a passage of Scripture holding out the promise of a reward for the performance of a given act, he next thinks proper to show how nothing else *could* be the evidence for it. "An examination," he says, "of the cause of [our recognising] it [viz., a duty, is to be made];"[1] and he ex-

[1] तच्च निमित्तपरीष्टिः ॥ ३ ॥

plains, as follows, how our organs of sense cannot supply the evidence of it. "When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something *extant*, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is perception—[and this perception is] *not* the cause [of our recognising a duty], because the apprehension [by the senses] is of what is [then and there] extant, [which an act of duty is *not*]."[1] Since perception is not the evidence of a thing's being a duty, it follows, according to the commentator, that inference or analogy, or anything else, "which has its *root* in perception," cannot be the evidence; and, consequently, precept—express or implied—is the only evidence of a thing's being a duty.

But here the doubt presents itself, whether the evidence in favour of a thing's being a duty may not be as fallacious as is the evidence of the senses. According to the objector,—"after words and meanings have presented themselves, since the connection between the two is one devised by *man*,—consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised; therefore, as sense-knowledge wanders away from truth when it mistakes mother-o'-pearl for silver, so language is liable to part company with veracity in matters of assertion, and consequently the instigatory nature of a passage which, being couched in words, is liable to be misunderstood, cannot be the instrument of certain knowledge in respect of duty." Jaiminī, in reply, denies that this doubt affects the evidence of Scripture. "But the

[1] सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भात् ॥ ४ ॥

natural [*i.e.*, the *eternal* and not conventional] connection of a word with its sense, *is* [the instrument of] the knowledge thereof, and the intimation [of Scripture which is] infallible, though given in respect of something imperceptible. This, [according to our opinion, as well as that] of Bādarāyana, [the author of the *Vedānta* aphorisms], is the evidence [by means of which we recognise a duty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence, such as that of sense]."[1] Assertions in regard to ordinary things, such as the assertion that there is fire in this or that place, meet with credit, because people have opportunities of verifying such assertions by ocular inspection. This is not the case with regard to the assertion that this or that act is a duty; and therefore Jaiminī—in the absence of the possibility of verification—rests the evidence of testimony, in the case of Scripture, on its *infallibility*. The mention of the name of Bādarāyaṇa (who is the same as Vyāsa), in this fifth aphorism, goes to prove that Jaiminī's work, the *Pūrvva-mīmānsā*, was not antecedent in time to Vyāsa's *Uttara-mīmānsā*. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering of the terms *pūrvva* and *uttara* by "prior" and "later" (see *Essays*, vol. i., pp. 227 and 295), would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that Jaiminī's system was the earlier in order of publication. Dr. Ritter says (at p. 376, vol. iv., of his *History of Philosophy*, Morrison's version) that, "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and the later;" and then he goes on

[1] औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशो ऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थे ऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

to speak of "the older and genuine *Vedānta*:" but in fact the terms "prior" and "later" refer not to time, but to the divisions of the *Veda* which Jaiminī and Vyāsa respectively expound, the latter directing his attention to the *Upanishads*, or theological sections, which stand last in *order*. The word *mīmānsā* means "a seeking to understand," and the *pūrvva-mīmānsa* is "a seeking to understand the prior (or ritual portion of the *Vedas*)," while the *uttara-mīmānsā* is a "seeking to understand the later (or theological portion of the *Vedas*)." These two compounds, in short, to speak grammatically, are not *Karmadhāraya*, but *Shashṭhī-tat-purusha*.

Jaiminī, we have just seen, denies that the connection of a word with its sense is dependent on human convention. This he was obliged to do in order to remove the *Vedas* beyond the imputation of that fallibility which attaches to all that is devised by man. The *eternal* connection between a word and its sense, the commentator here remarks, "is dependent on the eternity of *sound*," —seeing that if sound were not eternal, then words which consist of sound could not be eternal, nor consequently could the relation of such to their significations be eternal. Being compelled, therefore, to demonstrate that sound *is* eternal, Jaiminī, in pursuance of the established method of procedure, first grapples with the arguments which, *primâ facie*, might seem to countenance an opposite view of the matter. The first objection to the eternity of sound is its being made by effort. Thus, according to Jaiminī, "Some [viz., the followers of the Nyāya] say that it is a product, for, in the case

of it, we *see* [the effort made for its production]."[1] Jaiminī is far too secure in the strength of his own position, to be under any temptation to stop the mouths of objectors before they have said their say. Half a dozen objections he allows to be tabled against the eternity of sound, the second of them being, "Because of its transitoriness,"[2]—because, "beyond a moment it is no longer perceived." Moreover, the Naiyāyikas contend, in the third place, that sound is not eternal, because it is stamped as factitious by the usage of language,—"Because of [our employing, when we speak of sound] the expression '*making*.'"[3] When you talk of *making* something, as a jar for instance, you talk of something that has a commencement, else where were the need of its being *made?* Fourthly, according to the Naiyāyikas, the alleged eternity of sound is incompatible with its undeniable *multeity*: and the fact that multeity *does* belong to it is inferred "From its being simultaneously in another person [occupying a different place from some first person whom it also affects]."[4] According to the explanation of the scholiast, "The scope of the present objection is this, that an argument which establishes the *eternity* of any sound will equally establish its *unity*; and thus we should have to admit that a numerically single and eternal entity is simultaneously present to the senses, both of those near and those far off—which is an inconsistency." And the Naiyāyikas infer that sound is not eternal, because,

[1] कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात् ॥ ६ ॥
[2] अस्थानात् ॥ ७ ॥
[3] करोतिशब्दात् ॥ ८ ॥
[4] सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यात् ॥ ९ ॥

"Also, of the original and altered forms"[1] of words—a condition incompatible with the changelessness of eternity—and, finally, because, "Also, by a multitude of makers there is an augmentation of it."[2] A thousand lamps, rendering a jar manifest, do not make the jar seem larger than a single lamp does: yet a thousand persons uttering any sound in concert, make a proportionately greater sound than one person does; so this must be a case not of manifesting a previously extant sound, but of *making* one.

Before stating the arguments in support of his own view, Jaiminī addresses himself to the refutation of the foregoing objections; and antecedently to this, also, he judiciously seeks to narrow the ground of contention by determining how far both parties *agree*. "But alike," he says, "is the *perception* thereof,"[3]—according to both views,—both agreeing that the *perception* of sound is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to sound itself being momentary. But though acquiescent so far as *this* point is concerned, Jaiminī cannot allow that the sound which we perceive for the moment was *produced* at the moment. He explains:—"Of this [sound], while it really exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] is due to the non-application [of a manifester] to the object [the then unheard sound]."[4] In like manner, a jar, seen by a flash of lightning, is not then *produced*, nor does it cease to exist on its ceasing to be perceived. The same

[1] प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च ॥ १० ॥ [2] बुद्धिश्च कर्तृभूयस्त्वे ॥ ११ ॥
[3] समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ॥ १२ ॥
[4] सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् ॥ १३ ॥

jar may be manifested for another moment by a subsequent flash. According to the commentator, "Sound is eternal [as we are constrained to admit], by force of the recognition that, 'This is that same letter K" [viz., the same[1] sound that I heard yesterday, or fifty years ago], and in virtue of the *law of parcimony*,"—one of the fundamental laws of philosophising acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for it. Europeans hold that sound is due to vibration. Jaiminī's commentator admits that it is not perceived when there is *no* vibration: but, with perverse ingenuity, he argues that the *absence* of vibration, or the *stillness* of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound, which never ceases to *exist*, whether perceived or not. "The conjunctions and disjunctions [or undulations] of the air issuing from the mouth, remove the *still* air which was the obstacle to the perception of sound, and thence it becomes perceptible."

Replying to the objection conveyed in Aph. 8, Jaiminī says, "This [expression 'making'] means *employing*;"[2]—we talk of *making* a sound when we only make *use* of it. Then, as for the objection that a sound cannot be *one*, because its perception is present to many at a time, he replies, "The simultaneousness is as in the case of the sun:"[3] which is explained to mean, that,

[1] In opposition to the Mīmānsakas, the Naiyāyikas contend that the form of expression, "This is that same letter K" is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same *kind*,—just as is the case with the expression, "He has taken the same medicine that I did." See the *Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, p. 103; and compare the remarks of Whately (in the Appendix to his *Logic*) on the ambiguity of the word "Same."

[2] प्रयोगस्य परम् ॥ १४ ॥

[3] आदित्यवद्योगपद्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

"As the sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, a sound is a great object, not a minute one"—such as cannot come at once under the cognizance of persons at any distance from one another. Then, as for the objection that a sound cannot be eternal, since it undergoes changes in the hands of the grammarian, he says, "This [*e.g.*, the letter *y* coming in the room of *i*] is another letter, not a modification"[1]—of that whose place it takes. As the commentator adds, "The *y* is not a modification of the *i*, as a mat is a modification of the straw. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw to make it of, the man that employs the letter *y* would be under the necessity of taking the letter *i* to make it of." Finally, to the objection that a sound must be a product, because there is the more of it the more numerous are those employed in making it, he replies, "It is the increase of the *noise* that becomes great,"[2]—and not of the *sound*.

Here we begin to perceive that this notable dispute is somewhat of a verbal one, and that Jaiminī does not mean by sound what his opponents mean by it. Sound, according to Jaiminī, like the music spoken of in Othello, is of a kind "that may not be heard,"[3]—a "silent thunder" in its way. But let us hear Jaiminī, who, having disposed of the offered objections, proceeds

[1] वर्णान्तरमविकारः ॥ १६ ॥ [2] नादवृद्धिः परा ॥ १७ ॥

[3] *Clown.*—If you have any music that may not be heard, then to't again: but, as they say, to hear music, the general doth not greatly care.

Musician.—We have none such, sir.

Clown.—Then put up your pipes——

Othello, Act iii, sc. 1.

to defend his own theory. "But it must be eternal [this or that articulate sound], because its exhibition is for the sake of another;"[1] and the commentator adds, in explanation—"If it were not eternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our meaning [the *perception* of the sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause;—for, to explain further, the understanding of what is uttered must *follow* —at however short an interval—the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound perish on the hearing, as the *noise* does, then being no longer in existence, it cannot be the *cause* of anything." If, on the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived, it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence,—whence its eternity may be inferred. Moreover, as it is prospectively eternal, so was it antecedently, which he considers to be proved, "By there being everywhere simultaneousness"[2] in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers, who could not *recognise* it if it were a new production. For example, when the word *cow* is uttered, a hundred persons recognise the word alike; and, the commentator adds, a "hundred persons do not simultaneously fall into an error,"—this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by *mistake* hit the same object. Then, again, a sound is proved

[1] नित्यस्तु स्याद्दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १९ ॥
[2] सर्वत्र योगपद्यात् ॥ २० ॥

to be eternal "By the absence of number;"[1] for, *e.g.*, "When the word *cow* has been uttered ten times, we say 'The word *cow* has been uttered ten times,' but not 'ten words of the form *cow* have been uttered." Further, sound, as being indiscerptible, is proved to be eternal, "By there being no ground for anticipation"[2] of its destruction. "As, on the mere inspection of a web, one feels certain that 'this web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,' so,—from the absence of the knowledge of any cause that should lead to the destruction of a *sound*, we conclude that *it* is eternal."

But some one may contend that a sound is a mere modification of the air, and he may cite the *Sikshā*—that appendage of the Vedas which treats of pronunciation, which tells us that "air arrives at the state of being sound" after undergoing such and such treatment;—so Jaiminī anticipates and repels this, "Because [if it were so], there would not be perception [by the organ of hearing] of an object appropriate to it."[3] He means to say that "modifications of the *air* are not what the organ of hearing takes cognizance of, sound not being something *tangible*," as the air is held by the Naiyāyikas to be, while sound, they hold, has an altogether different substratum, viz., the ether. Here Jaiminī, though he does not himself hold sound to be a quality of ether, does not however disdain to avail himself of the *argumentum ad hominem*.

Finally, to put the seal upon the evidence of sound's

[1] संख्याभावात् ॥ २१ ॥

[2] अनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥ [3] ग्रह्याभावाच्च योग्यस्य ॥ २३ ॥

eternity, he refers to the Hindū scriptures:—"And [each articulate sound is proved to be eternal] by our seeing a proof"[1] of this, in the text which the commentator supplies, viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal," etc. Here ends the topic of sound; and assuredly Jaiminī does not make it very clear what he means by the term. Let us therefore turn to a fuller exposition of the dogma in question, and this may be found in the *Mahābhāshya* and its commentaries.

Patanjali commences the *Mahābhāshya*, or "Great[2] Commentary," on the Grammatical Aphorisms of Pānini, by saying "Now, the teaching of sounds:"—"Of *what* sounds?" he asks;—and he replies, "Of those secular and those sacred." Kaiyaṭa remarks on this as follows: "Since the word 'sound' signifies sound in general, having reflected that—since, but for the question in hand, etc., there would have been nothing to determine the species,—the teaching also of the sounds of fiddle-strings, and of the cries of crows, etc., might have suggested itself, he asks, '*Of what*,' etc." Then, "having further reflected, that since Grammar is an appendage of the Veda, from the sense of the terms the species [of sounds with which Grammar is concerned] may be inferred, he says [in order to give a useful reply to his own question], '*Of secular*,' etc." After several pages of such disquisition, which provoke twice as many more

[1] लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ २४ ॥

[2] Its "greatness,"—though the commentator Kaiyata, with allusion to its bulk, styles it an "ocean of a commentary,"—is explained by *his* commentator, again, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, to consist in its being, unlike ordinary commentaries, a supplementary authority, and not a mere exegesis.—See vol. i. of the Benares College edition of the *Mahābhāshya*, p. 1 of translation.

from Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Patanjali is allowed to go on again. "Of these, the secular, in the first place, are such as *cow*, *horse*, *man*, *elephant*, *bird*, *deer*, *brāhman*. The scriptural are verily indeed such as *sauna devīrabhīshtaye* ('may the goddess be propitious to my prayers,')" etc. He goes on to say—"Well—'*cow*'—here which is the *word?* That which is in the shape of a thing with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns,—pray, is *that* the word? Nay, replies he, that is verily a *thing*. Then the hints, gestures, and winking,—is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is *action*. Then the white, the blue, the tawny, the spotted,—is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is *quality*. Then, that which in [many] different is [one and] not different,—and which is not destroyed in things which [by disintegration] are destroyed,—that which is the common nature,—is *that* the word? Nay, he replies, that verily is the *form*—[implying the genus, or Platonic 'idea'—the ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν]. What then *is* the word?[1] The word ['cow'] is that through which, when uttered, there is the cognition of things with dewlap, tail, hump, hoofs, and horns." We must not at present indulge in a *réchauffement* of all the drolly sagacious things that Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa take occasion to propound with reference to these remarks of his Snakeship[2] Patanjali. We must confine ourselves to the question of what is *eternal*, or held to be eternal, in the matter of sound.

Everybody allows that the constituent *letters* of a word

[1] The inquirer is supposed to ask this after having run through all the categories, which the grammarians reckon to be four,—the four above-mentioned.

[2] Whilst the author of the *Mahābhāshya* (and of the *Yoga* Aphorisms) honoured the world with his presence, he is understood to have been a serpent.

are non-significant; because, says Kaiyaṭa, "if letters severally were significant, the pronunciation of the second, or of any subsequent [letter in any word] would be purposeless. But, assuming that they are severally non-significant, then, on the theory that they *arise*, since they cannot arise *simultaneously;* and [then again] on the theory that they are *manifested*, since, from their being manifested *successively*, there is no [stable] aggregate,—if those that are impressed on a single [page of] memory were what express [the meaning connected with these letters so recorded], then we should find no difference between the sense gathered in the case of *sara*, 'an arrow,' and *rasa*, 'a taste,' [the letters of which are the same]. In the *Vākyapadīya* [of Bhartrihari] it is diffusely established, that what denotes [the thing denoted] is [so to speak] a 'disclosure' (*sphoṭa*), other than these [letters, and, at the same time], revealed by utterance." What is here called *sphoṭa*—a 'disclosure'—is what Jaiminī meant by the term sound (*śabda*), though he chose, for prudential reasons of his own, not to point out to his opponents—what they ought to have had perspicacity enough to discern for themselves—that he was "paltering with them in a double sense." Possibly, again, the case may have been an exemplification of the Hudibrastic principle, that

> Sure the pleasure is as great
> Of being cheated, as to cheat.

The Naiyāyikas had no interest in really clearing up a confusion of ideas which allowed Jaiminī to settle the eternity of the *Veda*, on which all the six schools repose, while at the same time it left a world of cloud-

land available for endless and luxurious logomachy. The Naiyāyikas were *humbugs* when they did not come down upon Jaiminī with the sledge-hammer of Gautama's 52nd aphorism. They *knew* that he was "paltering in a double sense,"—but then their philosophical virtue was not of the termagant order, but rather of the kind that coyly resists with sheathed claws. Paying no further attention to the Naiyāyikas, let us attend to the conception which the grammarians, in accordance with the Mīmānsakas, denominate *sphoṭa*.

At page 305 of the first volume of his *Essays*, Mr. Colebrooke says, "Grammarians assume a special category, denominated *sp'ho'ta*, for the object of mental perception, which ensues upon the hearing of an articulate sound, and which they consider to be distinct from the elements or component letters of the word. Logicians disallow that as a needless assumption." Of this *sphoṭa*, which the grammarians—as being Vedāntins—assume to be the only real entity in the universe, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa speaks as follows: "The cognition, 'This is one word,' 'This is one sentence,' is proof of there being such a thing as *sphoṭa*, and of its unity [it being held to be one with knowledge, or one with God]; because, too, there is no solid evidence of the fact that memory is exactly according to the order of apprehension [so that *sara* and *rasa* might come to suggest each the same idea] since we *see* things that were apprehended in one order, recollected even in the inverse order. But, in my opinion, as there becomes gradually, in a web, a tincture of various hues deposited by various dye-stuffs, so in that [*sphoṭa*] which is perfectly single,

by the course of utterance does there take place a quite gradual tincture in the shape of each letter; and this is permanent, and it is this that the mind apprehends." He adds, that this *sphoṭa*—this substratum of unqualified, but diversely qualifiable, knowledge—is *one* thing, though "common to the [particular] denominations of jars, webs, etc.;" and he mentions, that, in another work of his, the *Manjūshā*, he has shown how "the apprehension of the difference is reflectional,"—as when the pellucid crystal[1] assumes successively the hue of the red, blue, or yellow flower beside it.

This illustration of the web, to which a succession of tints may be communicated, reminds us of the contrivance of an editor in the backwoods of America, where printing materials were scarce. Each of his subscribers was provided with a towel, on which the current number of the journal was stamped, not with ink, but with the black mud from the neighbouring swamp. When this had been duly perused by the family, the towel was washed and sent back to receive the next day's impression. The towel of the subscriber, like the *sphoṭa* of the grammarian, remained one and the same towel throughout, whether serving as the substratum of a democratic harangue, a defence of repudiation, or an advertisement of wooden nutmegs.

We observed that, by the Vedāntin grammarians, the *sphoṭa* is regarded as the sole entity:—with them th "word" (*śabda*) is "God" (*Brahma*). This remark-

[1] Cf. *Sānkhya Aphorism*, Bk. I., § 19, *c*. The word *sphoṭa* is derived from *sphuṭ*, "to open as a bud or flower," being that by means of which each particular meaning is opened out and revealed. It means *meaning in general*, the foundation of all particular meaning.

able expression would require to be carefully considered, when the question has reference whether to the adoption or the avoidance of such and such terms in conveying the doctrines of Christianity.[1] The pandits furnish a striking exemplification of Bacon's remark, that, by men in general, "those things which are new in themselves will still be understood according to the analogy of the old." Employ a term that holds a definite place in any of the current systems, and the whole of the pandit's thoughts will immediately run in the mould of that system, to which he will strive to accommodate what he hears, rejecting whatever refuses to be so accommodated. A pandit remarked to us one day,[2] for example, that the opening verses of the Bible contained a palpable contradiction. "It is stated here," said he, pointing to the first verse of the Sanskrit version of Genesis by the Baptist Missionaries, "that God, in the beginning, created Earth (*prithivī*) and Ether (*ākāśa*); and then it is added that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the *Water*,—an element, the creation of which is nowhere mentioned in the chapter, the next verse going on to speak of the creation of Light. If Water and Air did not require to be created, why did the other three?" Here the unfortunate employment of the terms *prithivī* and *ākāśa* had marshalled his thoughts at once under the categories of the *Nyāya*. Our explanation, that the one term was intended to denote all the matter of this globe, and the other term all that is material, external to this globe, satisfied him that the contradiction did not exist which he

[1] [See Preface, p. iv.] [2] [As already observed in the Preface, p. v.]

had supposed; but he felt sure that the words would raise precisely the same notions in the mind of every Naiyāyika that they had raised in his own. The terms *bhūmi* and *diva*, not being technically appropriated, would be free from the objection.

NOTE F.

ON "TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGES OF INDIA."

[THE dispatch of the Honourable Court of Directors, of the 19th of July, 1854, ordaining a great extension of the means for the education of India, gave a fresh interest to the question how the books to be employed in carrying out the work of enlightenment and civilization ought to be constructed. From a *Discourse* addressed to the Government of the North-west Provinces, and printed by the Government at the time, extracts are subjoined].

What the value of native learning in India consists in.

As regards our educational proceedings, the importance of native learning in India is not to be measured by the value—real or supposed—of the amount of information contained in the Arabic and in the Sanskrit. The disparagers of the one or the other literature will scarcely be found among those who really possess any knowledge of either. The best judges have long ere this decided that the Arabic and the Sanskrit languages are noble disciplinal studies, and that they are fountain-languages, from which the vernaculars can be indefinitely supplied with fresh forces. But, in order that the fresh additions may become

naturalised, it is indispensable, first, that the additions should be made by persons thoroughly qualified to make them rightly; and, secondly, that the learners should have access to complete information respecting the reasons why each particular addition was made exactly as it was. In other words, a permanently vital system of education in modern science, through the medium of un-barbarized Urdū, implies the possibility of reference at all times to learned and well-informed Maulavīs; and, analogously, in the case of Hindī dialects, to learned and well-informed Pandits; just as a scientific English education implies the possibility of reference to reliable sources of information relative to the classical languages from which the terms of science are taken in Europe. Where this access to the fountains is not open, or not made use of, the terms will be found to degenerate rapidly into a gibberish—such as we find in the *digarī* of our law-courts, for a "decree," the *tārpīn-kā-tel* of our laboratories, for "turpentine," or the *māmlet* of our kitchens, for an "omelette."

Through what practical agency India is to be educated.

If these views are just, then the first question which requires to be distinctly settled, and not thereafter to be perpetually opened up again, or to be kept hovering vaguely as a mirage before the eyes of the speculator, is the question—whether we are going to undertake the education of the Indian millions through an English agency or through a native agency? The idea of its being possible to employ a direct English agency in the tuition of all India, is perhaps explicitly entertained by no one; but the legitimate consequences of the impossibilty are constantly and most mischievously

overlooked. The labour and difficulty of reproducing —really, and not merely in fallacious appearance,— European terms of science in the languages of the East, originate that "indolent impatience" which seeks to cut the Gordian knot by deciding that the English language ought to be the language of science for all the world,—a decision which it is further sought to recommend by the plausible plea that a cosmopolitan language of science offers obvious advantages. My reply rests on the fact, which I have asserted and illustrated, that scientific terms, cut off from the possibility of reference to their sources, tend headlong towards degeneracy. Under an English agency employed in the tuition of all India, this natural and experienced result might be partially staved off; but with the agency which, as already agreed, we must go to work with—if the work is to be done extensively at all—the English names will rapidly alter to such a degree, that no one who has not watched the progress of their degeneracy will be able to recognise them; and thus the fancied advantages of a cosmopolitan terminology vanish into smoke. The degenerated English terms of our law courts, our laboratories, and our kitchens, are just as unintelligible to the English new comer as if they were native terms which he had never before met with. A shout of laughter usually accompanies the discovery of what the transmogrified vocable was intended for; but the word is no help towards mutual understanding. The same would be eventually the fate of an English scientific terminology in the hands of the only agency which,

How the indolently impatient cut the Gordian knot.

Chimerical hope of a cosmopolitan terminology.

by the hypothesis, is at our disposal for the education of the millions.

Having set forth reasons for holding that an extended vernacular terminology, to have any chance of becoming profitably naturalized, must be fed from the sources of the Arabic or of the Sanskrit; and having declared my conviction that neither of these can be made—except in most delusive semblance—to supply the place of both, I should now proceed to exemplify the application of an Eastern fountain-language, the Sanskrit, to the production of new terms of science; but, before entering upon the terminology of the sciences, I must state my reasons for taking them in the order in which I take them.

Neither the end nor the means, in the attempt to educate India, unanimously or clearly determined.

In designing an educational course, if we are to go to work methodically, systematically, and profitably, then regard must be had to the end and to the means. Where no distinct end, or not the same end, is kept in view by those who take part in a discussion, agreement as to the means is pretty well out of the question. And how can we hope, as Bacon says, to achieve the course if we have not first distinctly fixed the goal? It may be said, indeed, that there are more goals than one, inasmuch as we do not expect all our pupils to go as far as the one who goes the furthest. Be it so; but let us first settle the goal for that *one*, and then the various stages which the others may content themselves with reaching, will all lie along that more extended course.

Shall our absolutely ultimate end, then, be the production of a first-rate engineer, or of a valuable revenue

officer, or of an accomplished native magistrate? With this I am not prepared to be satisfied. My proposed end is the making of each educated Hindū a Christian, on principle and conviction. This end, as I propose here to indicate, implies every thing that the amplest course of education can comprise. Let us trace this assertion backward,—as thus. That a Hindū should, on principle and conviction, embrace a religion which, like Christianity, bases its claims on historical evidence, presupposes not merely an acquaintance with historical assertions, but a cultivation of the critical faculty, so as that the force of the historical evidence may be intelligently felt. The immediate preparation for a critically intelligent study of history is the study of Physical Geography. A history, all of whose assertions are found quite consistent with the multifarious information supplied by Physical Geography, must be felt to present very different claims on our respect from those of a *Purāna*, with its nowhere discoverable oceans of treacle, cane-juice, and butter-milk. But, to apprehend with full intelligence what is presented of Physical Geography, a knowledge of Zoology, Botany, and Geology are required. The full appreciation of these, again, presupposes Chemistry, in all its extensive bearings on Meteorology, climate, etc. The study of Chemistry must be preceded by that of Physics. Physics demands an anterior acquaintance with the sciences of Number and Magnitude,—sciences which present the most elementary exemplification of applied Logic. Such is a rapid enumeration of the great steps in the intellectual course. How the moral course combines with

The end, according to my own view.

this, we shall see, when, returning on our steps synthetically, we enquire what apparatus of educational materials the course above indicated will require.

Science the only solid foundation of art.

Now, it may be objected as follows:—"You call this an intellectual course,—it is all science,—mere knowledge; but are we to have no applied science?—are we not to teach the *arts?*" I reply,—assuredly you have got to teach these; and if you wish to teach them effectually, you will take care that your exposition of each of them shall emanate from a previously well-digested exposition of the sciences from which the arts draw their life-blood. Your instructions in Surveying will bear reference to your scientific exposition of Geometry and Arithmetic, and will be given in the accurately determined language of those scientific expositions. Your Pharmacy will be founded on your scientific exposition of Chemistry, and will avail itself of chemical language and chemical principles. You will not—it is to be hoped—when penning practical instructions for the miner, ignore the scientific views and terms of your Geology. In short, all treatises on the arts ought to bear reference to the parent sciences, and should be constructed in such exact accordance with the exposition of the parent sciences, that the artist may have nothing to unlearn, or to confuse him, when he turns to the expositions of the parent sciences for fresh suggestions in the prosecution of his art. Hence, in a systematic preparation of a literature, we must, except in cases of urgency, attend to science first; and, even in the exceptional cases, you must regard your first rude manuals of art as merely provisional, and as awaiting the

rectification which a thorough exposition of the parent sciences will subsequently render possible.

The relative order of the sciences not the order in which boys are bound to study.

A second probable objection is this, that the course indicated above presents the sciences in an order which is not adapted to practical education. That you should begin with Logic,—then proceed to Mathematics (including all its branches),—go next to Physics, and so proceed through the whole series of the sciences, before reading a page of history, or a chapter of Zoology, is not feasible. True,—nor do I intend that anything of the kind should be attempted. A boy may with great advantage store his mind with passages of history before he is at all qualified to decide on the historian's claims to respect; and he may, not unprofitably, become acquainted with the chemical characters of the gases, though he may not have studied Physics so as thoroughly to understand the physical principles on which the manipulation of the gases depends;—and he may profitably become familiar with the mechanical powers, even when his mathematical acquirements are but slender;—and he may advisably prosecute his mathematical studies pretty far, before he turns his attention to the general laws of reasoning,—to that abstract science, of which all other sciences are the concrete embodiments. But still, the books which he reads ought all to be constructed in prospective contemplation of his eventually coming to recognise the chain of evidence in all its strength and in the logical order of its links. This cannot be expected, if no attention, in the preparation of the course, be paid to the order of the links.

Independent translational labours a source of wasteful expenditure.

A third objection may be this, that so systematic a course as that proposed could not be the result of the independent working of the numerous persons who would be required to work upon it. This I most readily allow; and therefore it is that I grieve over the comparative waste of a great quantity of independent working, which has hitherto produced loads upon loads of books, and yet, by general admission, no educational course. Look at the voluminous catalogue of the [Benares] Centralizing Book Society, and see what sort of a course could be culled out of it;—what course such as could train a man's mind, and lead his convictions, with any sort of certainty, in the direction which I have indicated as desirable.

How co-operation, with saving of much useless labour, and of great needless expense, might be effected.

How co-operation, as contra-distinguished from a mass of simultaneous but irrespective labour, might be secured, I must not here allow myself the space which would be necessary for discussing. Suffice it to say that my views in regard to the desirableness of a college of translators, coincide with those set forth by Mr. B. H. Hodgson in his published letters on *The Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars*.

No wish to drag valuable English teachers into vernacular studies where they have no turn for these.

Let me now enumerate the sciences, and show how I think each ought to be dealt with, in presenting it to India through those of the vernaculars which hang upon the Sanskrit. Let it be remembered that I am not proposing any substitute for English education, where English education is available; and that I am not proposing that English teachers who have neither taste nor turn

for vernacular teaching, should trouble themselves for one moment by attempting it. My suggestions have reference to that purely native agency, which I contend we must employ, if the millions are to be really educated; and in the hands of which agency I would seek to place an educational literature containing nothing that is insoluble, in the absence of the power of reference to that European erudition which, by the hypothesis, is not available. The native erudition, competent to the solution of all the terminology which I advocate, *is* available, and would remain available if the English, by any strange chance, should have been driven from India into the sea.[1] It is scarcely worth while to remark, parenthetically, that to those who, in such event, care not what might become of India, I am not now addressing myself.

The order of the sciences.

All science, or knowledge, rests on its appropriate evidence, direct or indirect. Sense and consciousness are direct evidence. Inference and testimony are indirect or mediate. In a synopsis of the sciences, these topics come properly at the outset; though they are not, I repeat, the topics which first demand the attention of a learner. In our Sanskrit synopsis, designed to furnish the terminology for versions in the Hindī, Bengālī, Mahratta, Telugu, etc., we treat these topics in the order of (1) the senses and the mind, (2) inductive investigation, (3) deduction, (4) demonstrative exposition, *i.e.* rhetoric, and (5) formal logic. The philosophical writings of the

[1] [This was first published in 1855. The contemplated possibility did not then appear at all so near as it did to us at Benares on the 4th of May, 1857].

Hindūs furnish a tolerably ample terminology for the satisfactory treatment of the first four of these topics; but, to be wielded with any effect at all, this terminology requires to be carefully and critically sought out, and estimated, *in situ*, not to be taken on trust from the pages of a dictionary. Moreover, where an appropriated term exists, if we fail to discover it, and if we invent a different term of our own, the established and appropriated term will be almost sure to prevent the new term from being understood; because the hearer naturally supposes that you must mean something else than what is meant by the appropriated term, else why not have made use of it? For example,—Archbishop Whately explains *induction* to mean the "bringing in" of instances sufficient to support a general conclusion. Dr. Whewell, again, holds that the word properly means the "superinducing" of a general conception upon the observed facts. Now any attempt to translate the word according to either of these views, would only mystify a Pandit, who really has already the required idea in his mind, but a very different term—and, in my opinion, a much better one—to express it by. The term is *vyāpti-graha*—literally, "the cognizance of pervadedness,"—*i.e.* the cognizing that some given nature or property, *e.g.* "human nature," is invariably attended by some given nature or property, *e.g.*, "mortality." It may be objected that we have nothing to do with this, when dealing with the *tabula rasa* of a student's mind; to which objection I give the reply—requiring with such sad frequency to be reiterated—that when

Translators, by dictionary, of little avail, except to spoil paper.

we have settled that a native agency must be employed in the education of the millions, and this agency one owing its value to the possession of a fountain-language, and a classic literature, we do ill to obtrude terms which tend to keep the learner from understanding the *right* views embodied in the time-honoured phraseology of his teacher. Why do we, in any case, obtrude our uglier term, when the finer one might be found, if dug for, like a diamond, in the proper mine? It is because of that "indolent impatience," which has so long cankered all translational efforts in India, and made the hasty and ill-concocted results so comparatively valueless.

Construction of necessarily new terms.

But, without dwelling further on the advisableness of learning what the Hindūs *know*, before we undertake to *teach* them, let us advert to the construction of new terms, where established terms are avowedly *not* available. Formal logic, a subject neglected or overlooked by the Hindūs, demands a construction of new terms. The nomenclature of the parts of the syllogism, adopted in concert with Pandit Viṭṭhal Sāstrī, may here suffice for illustration. To explain how we rendered "illative conversion," and why; or "conversion by negation," or "reduction to the first figure;" would take up too much space: and, besides, the information can be found, if wanted, in the published synopsis. As regards the syllogism, taken as a sample of our treatment of the science, equivalents were required for *proposition*, *term*, *major premiss*, *minor premiss*, *conclusion*, *subject*, *predicate*, *major term*, *minor term*, and *middle term*.

Now, a proposition is "a sentence indicative;" and there is no one word in Sanskrit which distinguishes a proposition from other sentences (questions or commands), by implying its indicative character. The matter required, therefore, to be looked at from a different point of view, as thus:—a syllogism, or argument in regular form, is called *nyāya;* and each of its three members (*avayava*) is called a *nyāyāvayava.* As each of these is necessarily a proposition, it follows that the term *nyāyāvayava*, though it does not etymologically signify "a sentence indicative," is yet, for the purposes of logic, its precise equipollent; and as such we employ it. Next, there is no Sanskrit word for *term.* The terms of a proposition are the subject (*uddeśya*) and predicate (*vidheya*); and Hindū speculators, having a separate name for each of these, did not take the trouble of devising an expression which, like our word *term*, might refer the two to one common genus. An equipollent expression being, however, wanted in our exposition, instead of seeking to obtrude the novel and infructuous conception of the two as being alike the boundaries (termini) of a proposition, we accommodate ourselves to the language already in use; we dissolve the expression which will fit no Sanskrit mould, and we recast it in a *shape which dispenses with the necessity of any accompanying explanation*, as "that which expresses a subject or a predicate" (*uddeśya-vidheya-bodhaka*). It may be objected that an expression like this is cumbrous; but even cumbrous instruments are not unmanageable in powerful hands,—and the Pandits of Benares are no children.

Just as we dealt with the word *term*, making our expression denote explicitly the subject and predicate which we found already provided with separate names, so have we dealt with the word *premiss*. There is no Sanskrit word for premiss; but there is a word for what we denominate the *major premiss*, and another for what we denominate the *minor premiss* (*udāharaṇa* and *upanaya*). The aggregative compound of the two—*udāharaṇopayanau*—is equipollent to "the premises." For the other words above-mentioned, there were available terms already in use.

Mathematics.

We pass now to those sciences in which logic, the most abstract of the sciences, the science of the forms of thought, first becomes concrete, by applying itself to those object matters of the widest generality,—space, time, and number. For Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry, an exact and tolerably extensive terminology exists in the mathematical books of the Hindūs. In devising additional terms—as is necessary, for example, in the case of the differential and integral calculus—regard should be had to the analogy of the existing terms, none of which ought to be rashly set aside and replaced by new names. New names will almost certainly prove (it could easily be shown that they *have* proved) inferior to the established ones; and, further, they have a tendency to prevent the native mathematician from seeing, so clearly as he otherwise might do, that our higher Mathematics are the legitimate development of his own science. The only kind of man, therefore, to be trusted with the formation of new mathematical terms for the Hindī vernaculars, is

one who unites to the most familiar conversancy with Hindū mathematics, an accurate and extensive knowledge of the modern European methods. Such a man we possess in the accomplished Bāpū Deva Sāstrī, to whose care and superintendence I could wish that the preparation of the whole of our Hindī vernacular course of Mathematics were confided; and to whom, in the matter of mathematical terminology, I have not the presumption to fancy that I could offer any needful suggestion.

Formal Astronomy.

The first subject—in the order of simplicity—to which the Mathematics are applicable, is motion; and a science of pure motion is found in formal astronomy. Here again I have nothing to suggest, but that this department also may be safely confided to the superintendence of Bāpū Deva, whose published *Euclid*, *Arithmetic*, *Algebra*, and *Trigonometry*, are models of what educational works ought to be.

Physics.

Force, the cause of motion, is the next element, the conception of which introduces the matter of a new science,—the so-called "Physics." The modern application of this term ought, consistently, to relegate chemistry and physiology to the region of metaphysics or of ethics. But there is no use, at this moment, in quarrelling with English terms. Let us endeavour that our Indian term shall not be open to the same reproach. To ensure this, we must guard against being led away by the etymology of the name, and we must take an unbiassed view of the nature of the thing. On examining the sciences which are clubbed under the name of "Physics," we find that, while in common they treat of

force, they differ from the subsequent sciences of Chemistry and Physiology, in this, that the forces considered in the sciences called physical, produce motion or rest, but no permanent and essential change of property.* The aggregate, therefore, constitutes the science of the causes and conditions of motion and rest, *gati-sthiti-kāraṇa-vidyā*, or, in the vernacular Hindī, *gati aur sthiti ke kāraṇoṅ kī vidyā*. Under this aggregative heading we find the mechanics of the solid, of the fluid, of the aeriform, and of the imponderable. It might seem at first sight as if our designation were inappropriate in the cases where, as in acoustics and optics, we take cognizance of sounds and colours, which are not modes of motion or rest. Strictly, however, the sounds and the colours are phenomena of *physiology*, and not of the physical science, to whose province belong only the motions on which the physiological phenomena depend. There seems no use, however, in our attempting here to disjoin these physiological developments of the physical sciences from the physical sciences to which they are related. Our general term, then, being equivalent to "Statics and Dynamics," the four sub-divisions readily accept the names of *ghana-padārtha-gati-sthiti-vidyā*, the statics and dynamics of solids; *drava-padārtha-gati-sthiti-vidyā*, those of fluids; *vāyava-padārtha-gati-sthiti-vidyā*, those of airs; and *gurutwa-rahita-padārtha-gati-sthiti-vidyā*, those of the imponderables. To a mere English eye, these names may appear terribly long; but to a Hindū, familiar with the sense of each several member in the compound, they are not long at all. And as they carry their own meaning with them, their employment puts an end to those prevalent

Names may seem long, which in actual effect are not so

confusions of memory, under which a school-boy blurts out confidently, in reply to his examiner, that the radiation of heat belongs to the science of Stereostatics, or that the pressure of fluids is a phenomenon of Optics. Where the memory loses its hold upon the sense of terms insoluble as are these Greek ones to the Hindū, it possesses no resources in itself for regaining it. This I have repeated very often. I wish I could believe that I have repeated it sufficiently often.

Terms in mechanics.

Of the terms employed in the exposition of the physical sciences, in our *Synopsis of Science* —and which can be found there if wanted—I shall here cite only two, in illustration of two principles. The

The lever.

lever we name *uttolana daṇḍa*, "the lifting-rod." Now, it may possibly seem to some that the word "rod" implies a solidity which does not belong to the "lever" of rational mechanics;—but the word "lever" originally meant a solid lifting-rod; and if the English mathematician, after his training in mechanics, has come to associate with the name the notion of an absolutely rigid line devoid of weight, the notion is due to that training, and not to any inherently suggestive power in the word, which it could carry with any profit into a Hindī treatise. Whatever rationalization of the originally solid "lever" can be effected by the explanations of the science, can be effected precisely in like manner with the *uttolana daṇḍa* of our *Synopsis*. The other term on

Impenetrability.

which I would offer a remark is "impenetrability." This term must have proved a source of much misery to successive generations of lecturers on physics; for no sooner has the lecturer announced that

matter is "impenetrable," than he must breathlessly follow up the announcement with the explanatory assurance that he does not at all mean what he seems to mean; for he is perfectly willing to admit that a deal board is penetrable by a nail or by a pistol-bullet. To render the term "impenetrability" by *abhedyatā*, "incapability of being cleft,"—as I have seen it rendered,—is needlessly to multiply the terminological inconvenience just referred to. What is it, then, that physicists actually *do* mean when they speak of matter as "impenetrable?" It is not that it cannot be pierced,—not that it cannot be divided,—not that it cannot be compressed into smaller space,—the degree of smallness being limited apparently only by the limit of the compressing force available;—but what they mean to deny is, that matter can be so compressed as to occupy *no* space. It may be indefinitely but it is not *infinitely* compressible. This important philosophical conception,—much more obscured than illustrated by the term "impenetrability,"—we convey, in our *Synopsis*, by the self-explanatory term *parimāṇātyantatyāgāsambhava*, "the incapability of entirely resigning bulk." It may be asked,—what Hindū will gain the conception by the mere enunciation of this term? I reply,—what human being, Hindū or European, will gain the conception by the enunciation of the word "impenetrability?" Both terms—like other technical terms—require explanation at the outset; and the Indian term has the merit of being to the purpose, which the English term has not. It may be worth while to notice the fact that, when such a term as "impenetrability" has been once explained by a writer, the conception is taken

for granted throughout the remainder of his treatise, and the term itself scarcely ever recurs, if it recur at all. Such being the case, the apparent cumbrousness of the term by which we communicate the conception intelligibly at the outset is of very little moment. But our term is not really cumbrous. "Civil-disabilities-removal-bill," is a term not at all cumbrous for an Englishman, though it would sorely tax the memory of the foreigner who should be required to remember it as one sound simply denotative of a document upon a particular shelf.

Chemistry. The next conception, the introduction of which marks out the object-matter of a new science, is that of essential change of character. That the yellow substance sulphur, and the silvery fluid mercury, should combine to form the brilliant red vermilion, compels us to think of some other force than that which results merely in motion or rest. This special force is termed "chemical." Chemistry being nothing else than purified alchemy, we reclaim to our own use the *rasāyana* of the Hindūs; designing to show, under that familiar title, what the true science is. Ancillary to chemistry is the section of natural history called mineralogy, *khanija-padārtha-vidyā*, "the knowledge of things produced in mines," which we treat as an *anga*, or "appendage," of the science.

Mr. Mack, in the preface to his treatise on Chemistry, published in Bengālī and English at Serampore, in 1834, tells us that he was advised to discard all European terms in his Bengālī version, but that he could not persuade himself to adopt the advice. He retained therefore many of the European names, and adapted Sanskrit terminations

to them. European names I entirely discard. As an educational instrument,—and it is in *this* capacity that we at present seek to employ it,—the science of chemistry loses more than half its value when its compound terms do not tell their own meaning; and it is impossible that they should rightly tell their own meaning to one who is not familiar with the language from which they are derived. To an Englishman, unacquainted with the classical languages, the study of a work on chemistry is very far from being such a mental exercise as it is to a classical scholar. The long compound names which exercise the reflection and excite the admiration, or provoke the criticism of the latter, more frequently torture the memory and bewilder the understanding of the former. How entirely is the scientific beauty of the nomenclature thrown away upon the man who must look out hydro-chlorate and sesquioxide in his glossary in order to make sure which is which! It is all very well to teach long chemical names by rote to a youth who is to be employed as an apprentice in wielding a pestle. Him you perhaps do not seek to educate; you merely make a convenience of him; and if he does not practically mistake corrosive sublimate for coloquintida in making up a prescription, why all is well. The case is otherwise where the aim is to educate and to instruct. Where chemistry is to be efficiently employed for such a purpose, the learner must be conversant with Latin and Greek, or else the language of the science must be rendered into the language of the learner, as has been in a great measure done by the Germans for themselves.

The teaching of a trade is not education.

Indigenation of chemical language by the Germans.

Acting as if under the impression of this truth, that the educational value of terms lies in their connotation and not in their mere denotation, the Germans have indigenated for themselves the language of chemistry; so that the study is far more profitable, as a mental exercise, for the German villager who knows no language besides his own, than it is for the English villager who does not know Greek and Latin. I wish the Hindū to enjoy in this respect the same advantage as the German. Of course the German who inclines to go deeply into chemistry will not rest until he learns also the Græco-Latin terminology of Europe in general. He can then talk of *bi-tartrate of potassa*, which does not tell its own tale to a plain German ear as his *Doppeltweinstein-saures Kali* does, and of *sulphuretted hydrogen*, which, to the plain German ear, would be but a baldly denotative and sense-eviscerated substitute for his own instructively connotative *schwefelwasserstoffgas*. As with the German, so with the Hindū. Let the study of foreign languages be encouraged to the utmost; but do not spoil the education offered to the millions, by using sense-evacuated foreign terms with a view to the imaginary convenience of the possibly exceptional few. Let the exceptional genius be sent up to College, and be set to study the sciences in English. His acquisition of the foreign terminology (just like the German's acquisition of it at the University) will be very far indeed from being impeded by his previous acquaintance with a kindred, though as yet less fully elaborated, vernacular phraseology; and, further, he will, by that

previous training, be the better able to teach to his countrymen those new matters which he might else have found himself destitute of indigenous terms for teaching at all. Ask Liebig or Berzelius whether his own previous knowledge of *wasserstoff* and *schwefelsaure* stood in the way either of his learning about *hydrogen* and *sulphuric acid*, or of his explaining anything about these to a plain German (a dyer, for example) who knew them only by the names which, to *his* ear, carried a meaning in their component parts. I might, with tolerable security, peril the issue on a reference to Liebig or Berzelius or Humboldt, and acquiesce in the adoption (so congenial to mental indolence) of "transliteration" in the room of translation, if any one of these philosophers should consent to discountenance the principle on which the indigenous German terminology of chemistry is based. At all events, I wish that the discountenancers of veritable translation would clear up their ideas by trying to convert the Germans, before dealing with the scientific education of the Hindū millions as if the Germans were unquestionably in the wrong.

Having given examples from the German, let me illustrate the matter further from the language in hand, —say the Hindī.

Suppose an Englishman unacquainted with any Oriental language, and a Hindū unacquainted with any European language. Exactly as is the difficulty to such Englishman of recollecting and distinguishing between *jīvāntakik* and *gāndhakik*, is, conversely, the difficulty to the Hindū of recollecting and distinguishing between *nitric* and *sulphuric*. The supposed Englishman, again,

though constantly liable to confound *gāndhakik* with *jīvāntakik*, cannot, by any lapse of memory, fall into a doubt whether *sulphuric* be the one related to *sulphur*; nor, conversely, can the Hindū fall into a doubt whether *gāndhakik* be the one related to *gandhak*. If, therefore, it would be unadvisable to make that Englishman who is never going to study Hindī, employ Hindī terms which would leave him unceasingly upon a sea of doubt, it is scarcely advisable to make that Hindū who (typifying millions on millions of our contemplated village pupils) is never going to study English, employ English chemical terms which would leave *him* unceasingly upon a sea of doubt. Now to proceed.

Indian nomenclature for the simple bodies.

The first question, in settling a chemical nomenclature, regards the naming of the simple bodies. The common metals, as well as sulphur and carbon, have names in most languages which there is no occasion for changing. All the other simple bodies require to have names devised for them. First, there are the four simple gases. The name of oxygen, "the generator of acids," might readily be rendered by a corresponding Sanskrit compound; but this (as Mr. Mack has remarked) would only tend to preserve the exploded theory that there is no generator of acids besides oxygen. Its old name of vital air connotes one of its most important characters, and therefore we name it *prāṇaprada*, or *prāṇaprada-vāyu*, "the air that emphatically gives us breath." Nitrogen (or azote) we call *jīvāntaka*, "that which would put an end to life." Hydrogen is *jalakara*, "the water-former;" and chlorine *harita*, "the greenish-coloured."

Of the nine simple non-metallic bodies that are not gaseous, two, viz., sulphur (*gandhaka*) and carbon (*angāra*), have Sanskrit names. Boron, as it is the basis of borax (*ṭaṅka*), we therefore call *ṭaṅka-janaka;* Silicon is the generator of flint—*agniprasthara-janaka;* Selenium —so named after the moon—we have likewise named after the moon—*chāndra*,—it being a matter of moonshine what so rare and unimportant a substance be denominated. Phosphorus is *prakāśada*, "the giver of light;" bromine is *pūta*, "the fetid;" iodine is *aruṇa*, the name, like the Greek one, referring to the violet colour of its vapour; and fluorine is *kāchaghna-janaka*, "the generator of that (fluoric acid) which corrodes glass."

Of those metals which have no names in Sanskrit, platinum, the "heaviest" of metals, is, with allusion to its weightiness, named *gurutama*; and potassium, the "lightest," *laghutama*. Sodium is "the basis of culinary salt"—*lavaṇa-kara;* and calcium, "the basis of nodular limestone"—*śarkarā-kara*. Zinc, the Urdū name of which is *dastā*, we have named *dasta*, in allusion to the way in which its oxide, the "philosophical wool," is "tossed about" in the air.

Of binary compounds.

Taking such, then, as the names that we have to deal with in forming the names of compounds, we come first to binary compounds. Compounds must have names suggestive of the fact that they are *acid* or otherwise. The termination *ic* belongs to the Sanskrit as well as to the Latin, so that sulphur and sulphuric acid can be satisfactorily rendered *gandhaka* and *gāndhakikāmla*. To the acids in *ous*, another

termination (*ya*) has been appropriated. To the non-acid binary compounds, without attempting at present to fix separate terminations for the several varieties, the general termination *ja*, meaning "produced from," has been assigned. Thus an oxide is *prāṇaprada-ja;* a chloride, *harita-ja;* and so on. The alkalis, potassa and soda, take feminine names, according to the analogy of the Latin, from those of their metallic bases; thus —*laghutamā* and *lavaṇa-karā*. The oxide of calcium may be termed *chūrna*, analogously to the English "lime."

Compounds of compounds.

Coming to the compounds of compounds, as the acid affix *ic* changes to *ate* in the name of the resulting salt, the Sanskrit *ika* is replaced by *āyita*. Thus, as the sulphuric acid gives a sulphate, the *gāndhakikāmla* gives a *gandhakāyita*. It should be unnecessary to remark, that the suitableness of these names is not to be estimated on the principle which led the British sailor to set down the Spaniards as a nation of fools, because they call a hat a *sombrero*. To the British sailor the word hat sounds much more natural than *sombrero;* and, for like reasons, sulphate of soda may seem to sound much more natural than *lavaṇa-karāyā gandhakāyitam*. But as "hat" is not good Spanish, so "sulphate of soda" is not good Sanskrit; and this leads us to forestall another criticism of kindred calibre. Is the sombrero-like expression, *lavaṇa-karāyā gandhakāyitam*, good Sanskrit? The question is not to be resolved by submitting the term to a Sanskrit grammarian ignorant of physical science, to whom, without an attentive, serious, ingenuous, and uncavilling study

of the tract in which it appears, the term has a *right* to be as obscure as the term binoxalate of potassa to the grandfathers of Lindley Murray.

Objections to the translation of scientific terminology dissected.

Having shown, by the publication of our Chemical section in the Sanskrit Synopsis of Science, that the nomenclature of chemistry can be reproduced in an Indian language; and, finding that my Pandits now take a lively interest in the science, which formerly they regarded with indifference, looking as they did upon our *āksijen* and *haidrajen* as things of no more concern to Indian life than tomahawks and wampum are to ours; I think it worth while to dissect the following remarks (those of a gentleman highly and deservedly esteemed[1]), which appear in a recent fasciculus of *Selections from the Records of Government, N. W. P.* The remarks are these. "I cannot imagine any one proposing to translate all the nomenclature and terminology of the arts and sciences: even were it easy of performance, it would in many cases be useless; in chemistry, for instance, it would establish the misnomer oxygen (I may add hydrogen) and the indefinite names, chlorine, bromine, ammonia, etc. Were hydriodate of potash translated into Arabic or Sanskrit, a Maulavee or Pundit would perceive that the name was composed of words meaning water, purple, a saucepan, and ashes; but he would never be able to select that substance from several placed before him, for it is a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid."

Futile objections stated.

Now it has been already seen that I expressly *reject*

[1] Mr. Vincent Tregear, massacred in the mutinies of 1857.

The objector conjectures what *must* be done, instead of condescending to observe what *has* been done.

the sense suggested by the term "oxygen," and ground my denomination of the element on that characteristic feature, its being the "vital air," which no revolution in chemical theory is likely to deprive it of. So much for the reverence shown in the Benares College for the supposed obligation to perpetuate misnomers in translation.

The logical "fallacy of objections" exemplified in the passage under review.

Now look at the rest of the passage. The writer says we should also have to perpetuate "indefinite names," such as chlorine. And, pray, do we escape the indefiniteness by adopting the indefinite name itself, and writing it *klārin gess?* If the indefiniteness is productive of no evil in Europe, where the name reminds us at least of the characteristic "greenness" of the gas, why should a like indefiniteness in the Indian term be dreaded *here?* To reject a self-explanatory name (our *harita vāyu*,—green air), which is precisely as definite or as indefinite as the European one, in favour of a name which here suggests nothing at all, seems to me most strange. The besetting delusion in the passage under review is what may be found admirably described in Whately's *Logic*, under the denomination of the "Fallacy of Objections." Suppose two ferry boats. Our friend objects to one of them that it is cumbrous; and having thus condemned it on the strength of the objection, he steps unhesitatingly (as the necessary alternative) into the other, which, rotten and leaky, will sink under him before he has got a third of the way across.

At a risk of being tedious, since the case of the

oxygen suffices to dispose of the principle in question, I cannot refrain from remarking on the treatment of *hydriodate of potash* in the passage under review. The writer alleges that the term hydriodate of potash, if translated into Arabic or Sanskrit, would be seen by a Maulavī or a Pandit, "to be composed of words meaning water, purple, a saucepan, and ashes; but he would never be able to select that substance from among several placed before him, for it is a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid." The reasoning here is unsatisfactory. The sense of the Sanskrit translation would never enable the Pandit to recognise "a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid;" but does the writer conceive that in the term hydriodate of potash, formed of Greek and English, the sense of the same linguistic elements is of itself qualified to suggest "a dry, white, cubical, crystallized solid?" He will reply, that the name will suggest the thing, when the thing has been shown and the applicability of the name has been explained: but precisely so will it be in the case of the properly constructed Sanskrit term; so where is the relevancy of the objection? To have the shadow of a leg to stand upon, it must borrow the principle of the British sailor already cited, who held that the word "hat" was *naturally* significant, and that the Spaniards were fools for calling it a *sombrero*. "Why can't they call it a *hat*, when they must know it *is* one?" And, analogously, "why can't they call it hydriodate of potash, when they must know it *is* hydriodate of potash?"

Further, and perhaps supererogatory, exposure of the fallacy.

Let me show how little, in the Benares College,

Practical refutation of the objection in question.

we find ourselves encumbered with the fancifully inevitable "saucepan" and "ashes," when reproducing the term hydriodate of potash in a form suited to furnish matter for the *judgment* and not merely for the *memory;* in a form, that is to say, educationally valuable and not educationally valueless. Well, then, knowing that the more strict designation is *iodide of potassium* (just as chloride of sodium is scientifically preferable to muriate of soda), we look, in our list of elements, for *potassium*, and we find it designated not with reference to the "ashes" of the "saucepan," but with reference to its being the "*lightest*" metal (*laghutama*). Iodine, again (*aruṇa*), is named after the colour of its vapour, just as in the European nomenclature. Our term, therefore, is *laghutamasyāruṇajam*, or, vernacularised, *laghutam kā aruṇaj*,—"the iodine-product of potassium." Now, to one who has been instructed regarding the elements, and the principles of nomenclature in designating compounds, this is *self-explanatory*. If any doubt or dispute arise regarding its sense, a reference to the account of the elements determines the question; and, again, the etymological sense of the names assigned to the elements can, in case of doubt, be ascertained by consulting a Pandit. There is no occasion for a reference to an *educated Englishman*. By such and similar means, and by such only, shall we ever succeed in *naturalizing* our knowledge among the Hindūs. The lazy barbarous plan of talking (to those who are not intended to learn English) about *klārin gess*, and *haidraiyadet āf patāss*, is, frankly, a wretched accommodation to the mental in-

dolence of English teachers and of incompetent translators.

Many of the names which I have proposed must necessarily, as I have already said, appear very long ones to the mere English reader, to whom the elements of the names convey no sense; just as "tithes-commutation-amendment-bill" must appear a very long name to a person ignorant of English. But if it would be cruelly unprofitable to attempt to impose on the mere English reader the employment of a terminology, to him key-less and non-significant, so cumbrous as our Sanskrit terminology would necessarily prove to him, is it less cruelly unprofitable to attempt to impose on the teachers and pupils of the purely native schools, the employment of a terminology to *them* key-less and non-significant, and just as cumbrous? It is not for *English* teachers that the vernacular terminology is required, but for the hundreds of *native* teachers whom I hope to see trained; and for the trainers of those teachers, in the normal classes which I hope to see ere long rapidly filling up.

Greek words in the Arabic the reverse of beneficial to the latter.

We have seen it urged that the Arabic has not disdained to borrow from the Greek. True; and its borrowings are blots upon the language. What, for example, is gained by styling an introduction to logic *īsā ghojī;* because, forsooth, the Greek term is *eisagogē?* Nothing but mystification and pedantry is advanced by the sanctioning of cabalistical gibberish like this. Had the Arabs kept up a knowledge of the Greek language, as has been done in Europe, *then* the case would have stood very differently.

Worthlessness of Greek contributions to Arabic illustrated.

To make this point sufficiently clear, I shall avail myself of some observations on language by the Rev. Chenevix Trench. Quoting "a great writer not very long departed from us," Mr. Trench (at p. 4 of his delightful little volume, *On the Study of Words*, says—"There are few modes of instruction more useful or more amusing than that of accustoming young people to seek for the etymology or primary meaning of the words they use. There are cases in which more knowledge of more value may be conveyed by the history of a word than by the history of a campaign." Let us test this principle by the case of a Greek word borrowed by the English and by the Arabic: let us take the word *philosophos*. The English teacher, learned in Greek, or having access to the learning of those who are, can explain to his pupil how the "philosopher" was he who modestly disclaimed the proud title of *sophos*, or "wise," and professed himself merely a "*lover* of wisdom." How much of this teaching can the modern Maulavī extract from the exanimate sound *failsūf?* Ignorant of Greek, and without access to those who know it, the Arabs can boast of a very poor linguistic acquisition indeed, when they point to the defunct *failsūf* of their lexicon.

The worse than uselessness of Greek contributions to Arabic illustrated.

Further, Mr. Trench (at p. 182 of his *English, Past and Present*), says—"One of the most frequent causes of alteration in the spelling of a word is a wrongly assumed derivation. It is then sought to bring the word into harmony with, and to make it by its spelling suggest, this derivation, which has been erroneously thrust upon it." He continues (at

p. 188), "It is foreign words, or words adopted from foreign languages, as might beforehand be expected, which are especially subjected to such transformations as these. The soul which the word once had in its own language having departed from it, for as many as do not know that language, or not being now any more to be recognised by those who employ the word, these are not satisfied till they have put another soul into it, and thus it becomes alive to them again. Thus—to take first one or two familiar instances, but which serve as well as any other to illustrate my position—the Bellerophon becomes for our sailors the 'Billy Ruffian,' for what can they know of the Greek mythology, or of the slayer of chimaera?" Now, may we not discern something of this process in the *īsā ghojī* above referred to? The word, when the Arabs left off studying Greek, became exanimate; and may we not trace a "Billy-Ruffian"-like attempt to reanimate it by splitting the *cisagogē* in two, and spelling the first half like a proper name? The word *īsā* means "Jesus." "Jesus ghojī" might perhaps (to the Arab analogues of the sailors of the "Billy Ruffian") adumbrate some supposed author or patron of the work.

The argument founded on the superficial and fancied analogy, when looked at more deeply and seriously, proves the very reverse.

If such, and such-like, are the gains which Arabic has made by borrowing from the Greek, does the example hold out encouragement to the lazy plan of deluging the Indian vernaculars with our Greek scientific terminology; or does it not rather hold out a caution and a warning? We may smile at the successful resurrection of "Bellerophon" in the shape of "Billy Ruffian," and shrug our

shoulders at the barely half re-animation of the Greek *eisagogē* as *īsā ghojī*, where the *ghojī* means nothing and so remains dead; but what ingenuity of Hindū thought is to re-animate, and in what vampire-shape, the *haidraiyadet āf patāss*, after it shall have been reposited as a mummy in the catacombs of the sham-vernacular?

The hinge of the cosmopolitan analogy.

That a Graeco-Latin terminology of science is cosmopolitan throughout Europe, is the natural and appropriate consequence of the fact that every nation in Europe has *retained its hold* upon the Greek and upon the Latin. This is the one sole cardinal element in the analogy,—the hinge on which it hinges if it is to hinge at all. This, the one solely and cardinally important element in the analogy, is non-existent in the case of the Indian vernaculars, just as I have shown it to be absent in the case of the Arabic. To the logical reader what need I say more? To others, what is the use of anything that could be said?

Rootless branches do not flourish.

The difference between a scientific terminology backed up by the means of access to its radicles, and the same dissevered from such means of access, suggests the illustration of the electro-magnet in its two widely different conditions. A mass of soft iron acts as a magnet—a most potent magnet—so long, but only so long, as it remains in connection with the galvanic battery. Break the connection, and your magnet subsides into an inert mass of soft iron. The off-hand plan of transplanting into the vernacular a terminology dissevered from its roots is but an imitation of the child who with impatient eagerness extemporises a garden by sticking in the ground flowers plucked from his father's

bushes. Such floriculture may look imposing at the moment, but only to children.

A futile challenge anticipated.

Some advocate of the easily constructed and useless sham-vernacular—where "translitera-tion" claims the honours of "translation"—will probably exclaim, in indignation at my uncompromising exposure of its rootlessness—"Well then—you, who pretend that everything both can, and ought to, be honestly translated, as you call it,—tell me—right off—on the moment—and without a moment's pause or reflection—how will you translate this, and this, and this, and that, and ten hundred thousand other things?" I reply, that my recorded and standing protest against the indolent impatience which I so much deprecate, suggests, of itself, the reason for my answering no one of these questions until I shall have given it such patient, careful, and studious consideration as may perhaps enable me to answer it worthily.

Imagination no legitimate substitute for candid examination.

We have seen that the writer on whom I have been animadverting says, "I cannot imagine any one proposing to translate all the nomenclature and terminology of the arts and sciences." But why, in this way, trust everything to *imagination?* If the man who proposes to undertake the task brings forward a fair sample of that task already executed, then a candid examination of the work done might peradventure help the lagging "imagination." If, on the other hand, it can be shown that the work is not worthily executed—*that* may furnish reason for frowning on the undertaking—but not so the objector's lack of imagination. This is just another and a very noticeable phasis

of that "indolent impatience" of which I complain, and which Lord Bacon has limned with such keen master-strokes at the opening of the 88th aphorism of the Novum Organum. "At longe majora a pusillanimitate, et pensorum, quae humana industria sibi proposuit, parvitate et tenuitate, detrimenta in scientias invecta sunt. Et tamen (quod pessimum est) pusillanimitas ista non sine arrogantia et fastidio se offert." Which we may English thus:—"But far greater detriments have been brought upon the sciences through pusillanimity, and the littleness and slenderness of the tasks which human industry has proposed to itself. And yet (what is the worst of it) this same [*ista*] pusillanimity presents itself not without arrogance and disdain."

Difficulty no reason for shirking a sacred duty.

Our objector urges as an objection to undertaking the task of translating the language of European science into the Indian dialects, that it is not an "*easy*" one. But it is not in the hope of finding it an *easy* task that any man, competent to judge of the case at all, is likely to devote himself to the solution of such a problem, or to meddle with the solution at all. From this long controversial digression, let us revert to the handmaid of chemistry, viz., mineralogy.

Mineralogy.

For the exposition of mineralogy, we find a good number of terms ready to our hand; but there are many more which we must ourselves devise. Where two different minerals, *e.g.* talc and mica, are confounded under one name, *abhraka*, we distinguish them by specifying their most characteristic or most obvious difference. Seeing that mica is elastic, and talc not, we designate them as *sthitisthāpaka-visishṭa* and *sthitisth*^{a}*paka-rahita*,

severally. Where the European name alludes to the structure—as in the case of granite—we preserve the allusion, as in our term *kanochchaya-prastara*, "the rock which is an agglomeration of grains." Of course the explanatory "*prastara*" can be dropped when the pupil is familiar with the term, just as the word "rock" in "trap-rock," is habitually dropped in English. Names that convey no sense—names simply denotative—as "basalt," we render by some obvious character of the thing denoted. "*Basalt*," we render *krishṇa-prastara*, "black-rock." It may be objected that many rocks (Obsidian in particular), are black, no less than basalt is. I reply, that European mineralogists and geologists name a certain rock "*Greenstone*," (*harita-prastara*), without regard to the fact that many other stones are green. Greenstone is the most important of the rocks that are green, and basalt of those that are black. Why should *we here* be required to attain a precision of nomenclature which has not been attained in Europe, and which, on principles of philosophical necessity, is not attainable at all? In conclusion, as regards naming the minerals, where there is no native name, and nothing suggestive in the European name, and no very marked characteristic property, as is the case with "gypsum," we may designate the mineral by reference to its chemical composition. Thus "gypsum" is *chūrna-gandhakāyitātmaka-prastara*, "the rock which consists of sulphate of lime."

Vegetable physiology and botany.

The additional conception of *life* gives occasion for the next in the order of the sciences, viz., vegetable physiology, with its ancillary section of

natural history, named botany. Here we find some terms ready to our hand. For example, cryptogamic plants are classed under the head of *vanaspati*, while the phanerogamic are termed *vānaspati*. The Hindūs, however, have fallen into the error of ranging the *fig* among the cryptogamic. The "stamens" and "pistils," not discriminated from each other apparently by Hindū physiologists, we into *paurusha-kesara*, "the male filaments," and *straiṇa-kesara*, "the female filaments."

Animal physiology and zoology.

The next of the sciences is marked off by the introduction of the additional conception of *sensation*. Here we have animal physiology, with its ancillary section of natural history, termed zoology. For the more obvious parts of the body we of course find names ready to our hand. For the more minute parts, names will have to be adapted. Where the Hindūs, for example, have not discriminated the nerves from the veins, we must designate the former by some such term as *mastishka-tantu*, "thread of cerebral matter." "Chyme" and "chyle" are not discriminated by the Hindūs. They can be easily distinguished in our terminology by prefixing to the established name for both, viz., *dhātupa*, the specification of its being the "prior," or "the latter," *pūrva* or *uttara*.

Zoological divisions.

In dividing the animal kingdom into its four provinces, we call the "vertebrata" *prishṭhavaṅśa-viśishṭa*, those "distinguished by a backbone;" the "mollusca," *komala-śarīra-viśishṭa*, "distinguished by a soft body;" the "articulata," *kāṇḍa-viśishṭa*, "distinguished by their sections;" and the "radiata," *samānāvayavāvṛitta-nābhi-viśishṭa*, "distin-

guished by a centre with similar members disposed around it."

Geology.

All the sciences which we have thus hastily run through, are put in requisition by *geology*. As for the terms to be employed in the exposition of geology, the mineralogical ones have been already discussed. Of things organic, belonging specially to geology, I shall cite only two examples, each to illustrate a principle. The "mammoth," whose name is to us simply denotative, or non-significant, I speak of as the *prāchīnakālika hastin*, "the elephant of the old world." The "Ichthyosaurus," on the other hand, whose name is connotative, I render in accordance with the connotation, and denominate the *matsya-makara*, the "fish-lizard."

Physical geography.

Furnished with the knowledge supplied by the sciences which we have reviewed, the inquirer will next ask, what, in consequence of all these entities and agencies, is the actual aspect of the globe on which we dwell? He desires instruction in physical geography. When we have once thoroughly secured right terms in all the sciences which we have been considering, the question of terminology for the exposition of physical geography presents few difficulties. While we endeavour to give an accurate general conception of the contour of the land and water of the globe, we must take care to proportion the minuteness of detail to the historical importance of the several regions. We must not waste upon Tierra del Fuego or Nootka Sound the fulness of detail which may be due to the plateau of Central Asia, or the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile. Physical geography is the legitimate introduction

to civil history, and our teaching of it ought to be regulated by the consideration of what we intend to teach of civil history.

Civil History. Since, in the department of Civil History, I have nothing which I wish at this moment to suggest in the matter of terminology, I shall here content myself with remarking that our first exposition ought to be rigidly bare of ornament and flourish. The historical series, let me add, must be so constructed that no allusion shall anywhere occur which the perusal of what went before does not qualify the attentive reader to understand. This obvious precaution has hitherto been much neglected.

Political Economy. From history we advance to one of the considerations which the perusal of history should naturally suggest to the thoughtful reader. Certain courses of conduct appear to have enriched a nation, —other courses to have kept a nation poor, or to have reduced it to poverty. What are those courses severally? Adam Smith's reply to the question was given under a title which I should have no objection to adopt, giving the science the name of *deśa-dhana-vriddhihrāsa-kāraṇa vidyā*,—*i.e.*, "The Science of the Causes of the Increase and the Decrease of the Wealth of Nations." Whether a name moulded on this view of the question be adopted, or a name moulded on Whately's stricter view of the science as "The Theory of Exchanges"—*ādana-pratidāna-vidyā* — let us at all events sink the hideous *pālitikal ikānami*, with which the hybrid treatises have hitherto puzzled India.

Following the thread of connection among Ethics.

the sciences, we find that a fresh consideration inevitably meets us. The wealth of a nation, as of an individual, may be increased by practices against which political economy offers no remonstrance, but yet against which there is *something* in the human soul that revolts. For example, the wonderful and beneficial results of the division of labour are among the most attractive of the subjects offered to our contemplation at our entrance upon the study of political economy; but when we find this division and subdivision carried out to such an extent, that a human being becomes a mere machine for the sole and life-long performance of some such labour as the pointing of a pin, a mournful feeling comes over us, and we cannot help asking, "*ought* this to be exactly as it is?" The word "ought" embodies a new conception,—the essential conception on which is based the science of ethics. But how are we to translate the word? I confess that I find here very much more difficulty than in the physical sciences. The superficial observer may flatter himself that there is no difficulty in the case; but that is because he has not looked far enough beneath the surface to discern the difficulty. "Conscience," "duty," "moral obligation,"—where are the words to convey (except in most delusive semblance) what we really understand by those terms? The difficulty, however, is not purely philological. Let us hear Mr. Trench again (*On the Study of Words*, p. 8). "Nothing, I think, would more strongly bring before us what a new power Christianity was in the world, than to compare the meaning which so many words possessed before

Peculiar difficulty in rendering ethical terms.

its rise, and the deeper meaning which they obtained, so soon as they were assumed by it as the vehicles of its life, the new thought and feeling enlarging, purifying, and ennobling the very words which they employed." Apparently we must abide in hope that such influence will eventually raise *dhārmika*, for example, to a real as well as an etymological equivalence with "moral;" for which, at present, it is but a sorry substitute. At all events, I presume it is not likely that here the system of make-believe translation will venture on a suicidal "reductio ad absurdum" by attempting to press *kānshinss* and the *māral sinss* into the service of the sham-vernacular.

Natural Theology.

Still another consideration arises out of the moral one last adverted to. *Why* do we feel this obligation in regard to right and wrong? Be the answer what it may, all experience shows that the human mind turns instinctively towards a Ruler, to whom we feel ourselves under the obligation that we do always what is right, and abstain from what is wrong. Again the consideration of the external world points to the fact of there being One Almighty Governor, But the question is not to be taken for granted. The decision, to a thoughtful mind, would be much more satisfactory if supported by evidence. The evidence lies abundantly around us,—the evidence of the being of a God, — the evidence which, in recent times, has appropriated the name of *Natural Theology*.

Revelation.

Natural Theology closes the series of our secular teaching, leading onward to those more solemn subjects, for which the secular curriculum may be re-

garded, in its highest aspect, as being preparatory. The conclusion reached by Natural Theology compels the thinking mind to ask the question, "Has the God of nature anywhere, except in nature, revealed himself to man?" The answer to this question we offer to the Hindū in our Scriptures. But his compatriots, he replies, have scriptures of their own. True, we rejoin; but scriptures resting their claims only on the futile ground of self-assertion. Of our own, we tender him the evidences, historical and internal. But the missionary will exclaim—"It is the peculiarity of the Gospel that it is preached to the poor;—and must every poor villager go through all this course of training before he can reasonably become a Christian?" I reply, that such is not at all my meaning. The question on the lip of the uneducated masses is always, "Have any of the chief priests or rulers believed on him?" When those who are educated shall come to be won over, the uneducated masses will follow. The baptism of a Clovis entails that of armies and of crowds. "But are we not to follow the example of our Lord?" Let us see what is the example here meant. It is that conveyed, we presume, in the reply to the interrogatory of the Baptist—"The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the Gospel preached to them." If this were designed as our example, why confine ourselves to the last in the list of marvellous works? Is it because, out of the signs of the Divine mission here co-ordinately enumerated,—out of the six instances of work accomplished in suspension of the

ordinary laws of nature,—the last only, when we have *no* power to suspend the laws of nature, can be imitated without risk of obvious and glaring failure? When our missionaries can raise the dead, or give sight to the blind, then they may hopefully attempt the conversion of a nation by the non-natural process of leavening the lowest first. This much-misunderstood matter has been handled in the clearest and fullest manner by the Rev. John Penrose, in his Bampton Lecture of the year 1803, a book quoted from in our Introduction, and which every missionary would do well to read and ponder. Far be it from me to wish that the poor should receive one atom less of attention than they receive at present; but it is not from this quarter—as the enormous aggregate of avowed missionary failure might suggest—that any *infectious* extension of the faith will emanate, in an age when miracles have ceased and ought not to be counted on.

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