

The essay on "Life, Death, and Immortality" is written from the point of view of the scientific postulate of the conservation of energy. The discussion contains constant reference to Spencer's *First Principles*. But, while accepting many of Spencer's definitions, the writer insists that the 'total energy' or 'great first cause,' instead of being 'unknowable,' is 'progressively manifesting itself' to the finite mind. Every phase of reality is referable to this 'total energy,' which can be conceived only as active. Its total quantity is, of course, changeless, and its various modes reciprocally determine each other. The evolution of life is conceived as the manifestation or unfolding of energy in 'ever-increasingly adequate modes of conscious existence,' in Hegel's words it is 'a struggle upward out of nature into spirituality.' Death is represented as a necessary and normal factor in the process of life. Only by a continuous disintegration and dissolution is the universe maintained in its maturity, and yet in all the freshness and vigor of a new creation. This is substantially the same thought which Professor Royce has presented in his paper on "The Knowledge of Good and Evil." The argument for human immortality is essentially Kantian. Man's true or ideal nature is infinite, and, as that nature can be realized only by 'finite stages' of advancement, an infinite existence is necessary for its complete realization. Immortality is thus, in a sense, 'man's natural destiny.' But moral evil is seen to be a denial and contradiction of this ideal nature. May not the process of self-contradiction be carried to the point of final extinction? In answer to this question, it is argued that all evil acts, as self-contradictory acts, lessen the power of activity of every kind whatever. The farther one proceeds in an evil course, the less becomes the reality of his life, and the less also his power 'further to reduce that reality.' This means that the individual is thrown back more and more upon his environment, which, as containing a 'residuum of good,' of the 'all-pervasive rational' element, rescues the individual from complete self-annulment. Throughout the volume, the author insists upon the essential identity of the finite mind with the infinite Reason immanent in the world-process. Thus man in his true nature possesses the high prerogative of divine sonship.

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*Ueber die Anlage und den Inhalt der transcendentalen Aesthetik in Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft.* Von DR. GEORG DAXER. Hamburg and Leipzig, Leopold Voss, 1897.—pp. 95.

This monograph undertakes to prove and to illustrate from the *Aesthetik*, what Adickes has already shown for *Analytik* and *Dialektik*, that Kant's systematic scheme or plan (*Anlage*) has an influence upon the evolution of his thought. It cannot, however, be claimed that this purpose has been executed; for the author usually succeeds only in showing that the *wording* of certain passages must be explained by Kant's desire to make one

section conform, in plan and in outline, with an earlier one. This failure on Dr. Daxer's part to carry out a design so clearly avowed is the more to be regretted, since it is not due to any lack of material for such criticism, in the text of the *Aesthetik*.

In the main, the book consists of an analysis and summary, paragraph by paragraph, of the *Aesthetik*. This readily discloses an evident passion for symmetry, on Kant's part, and, nevertheless, an abundance of irregularities and of deviations from an indicated order of exposition.

Perhaps the most useful comparison and comment concerns the arguments of the so-called Metaphysical Deduction. Taking space and time-arguments of both editions into consideration, it is shown (p. 39) that only Arguments 1 and 2 on Space, are perfectly paralleled by the corresponding time-arguments; that Argument 3 (4, in Edition *A*) on Space has two distinct parts, answering to Argument 4 and Argument 5 (of Edition *A*) on time; that the last space argument, as presented in the two editions, has different forms, with which no time-arguments correspond; and that the fifth time-argument, besides varying with the two editions, has a misleading and merely verbal likeness to the last of the space arguments.

Even more significant is the detailed comparison (p. 23) of the second space argument with its parallel in the other series. Dr. Daxer shows that Kant says only that objects cannot be *thought* as out of space; while he asserts that phenomena cannot *exist* except as in time. Thus the *Denkbarkeit* in the case of space is contrasted with a *Seinsunmöglichkeit* with reference to time. This is an acute and a well-justified criticism, but its author is apparently unaware of its significance. It should have led him at least to suspect that the parallel of time with space is an artificial one, and that Kant's entire discussion of time is burdened by the false analogy with space.

It is useless to comment further on Dr. Daxer's exposition; it is painstaking and usually accurate, but one wonders why it should have been drawn out to such length. Much of it is a sort of duplicate of Vaihinger's work. Moreover, it is so detailed as to be of use only to one who knows his *Kritik* as he knows his alphabet, and such a student has made for himself most of the comparisons here suggested.

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*Névroses et idées fixes, II. Fragments des leçons cliniques du mardi sur les névroses, les maladies produites par les émotions, les idées obsédantes et leur traitement.* PROF. F. RAYMOND et DR. PIERRE JANET. Travaux du laboratoire de Psychologie de la Clinique à la Salpêtrière, deuxième série. Paris, F. Alcan, 1898.—pp. x, 559.

The first volume of these Studies was noticed in the REVIEW, Vol. VII, p. 669 (November, 1898). The present instalment consists of notes, clinical and psychological, upon 152 cases, arranged under the two headings