

INTER K108 - 5 March 46

DOC 4144

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 5 March 1946, 1400 - 1615 hours

PLACE: : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

OATH OF INTERPRETER

Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Suzukawa: I do.

Q I am looking at your diary on August 6 wherein you had a rather long talk with Prince KONOYE. You indicate that you discussed among other things some conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Japan. Do you remember what those discussions were about?

A I cannot recall just what was said during that talk.

- Q Was it a discussion between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Soviet Ambassador with reference to the border dispute between Manchuria, and Japan?
- A I do not believe such a problem was paramount at this time.
- Q You also discussed this proposal on the part of Prince KONOYE to meet with President Roosevelt which had been handed to the Army and Navy in order to obtain their opinions. What was said between you and KONOYE with reference to that?
- A Prince KONOYE desired to go to America and have a talk with Roosevelt and he asked the Navy and the War Minister about it and the Navy and War Minister agreed upon it and Prince KONOYE told me about that fact.
- Q Was it absolutely necessary for the Premier to obtain the consent of the Navy and War Ministers before making such a move?
- A Because unless the War and Navy Ministers pass upon it, or consent to it, it would be more or less difficult because that will be obstructing the province of the negotiations.
- Q Were they the only two Ministers that it was necessary for Prince KONOYE to contact and obtain the consent of?
- A I believe that the Foreign Minister is also necessary to be contacted to have his consent obtained.
- Q What was the nature of the Army's consent? Did it have any conditions to it. Did they voice any objections to the meeting or make any suggestions as to how it should be conducted?
- A The Army at this time, was very much in favor of it and they even selected those persons to accompany the Premier on the trip.
- Q Was War Minister TOJO personally in favor of such a meeting according to your recollection?

- A TOJO agreed to it? Due to the occupation of French Indo-China the province of negotiations hit a snag and for that reason, Prince KONOYE thought he had to go out there personally and conduct the negotiations in order to give great significance to the negotiations and in order to create a good political atmosphere there and also to control the military that way.
- Q Were you personally in favor of such a meeting between KONOYE and Roosevelt?
- A I also hoped if that was possible, it would be a very good thing.
- Q What, if anything, did you personally have to do with bringing about this offer on the part of KONOYE to meet with Roosevelt?
- A Prince KONOYE said that the Navy was starting to become strong in its demands in regard to war and felt that under such an atmosphere, Prince KONOYE's Cabinet became more and more in jeopardy and I was worried in that respect. I said that unless there be a thorough understanding with the Navy and the War Minister, there is no alternative but for Prince KONOYE to quit the Cabinet.
- Q My question was what, if anything, did you have to do with suggesting or arranging or inducing Prince KONOYE to suggest or offer to go and see President Roosevelt?
- A Because I said that, Prince KONOYE replied that he will go to America and make a complete settlement.
- Q Was it his idea that he should go or your idea?
- A I said that Prince KONOYE should make the utmost effort and this utmost effort has been done to the extent of KONOYE's making a visit to the United States, so it is entirely KONOYE's idea.
- Q Back at the time of the Imperial Conference on July 2, what, if anything, did you personally have to do with the decision that Japan would not fight Russia at that time? What influence, if any, did you exert on the Government's decision?

- A I believe that I said it would be very dangerous to go to war against Russia at the present time to Foreign Minister and I said the same thing a great number of times to the Premier.
- Q Did you talk to the War Minister about that?
- A I don't have much recollection as to that.
- Q In other words, as I understand it, you didn't personally attend the Liaison Conference or the Imperial Conference but you were in a position to render advice and opinions to the various ministers, which would help them make up their minds as to what sort of a position to take at the meetings. Is that correct?
- A Only that I am not allowed to give any informal or official advice to the Ministers. Only those that are my close friends, I give my personal advice.
- Q It was customary for some of the Ministers, your personal friends, to come and talk with you, and no doubt your views had some bearing on the opinions they made. Isn't that correct?
- A Because MATSUOKA is a talkative person, it was easy for me to converse with him on all matters but with TOJO, it was very difficult to talk because I never knew him until he became Vice Minister of War and his personal nature is such that it is difficult to talk with him.
- Q But after he became War Minister, you would talk with him on numerous occasions and many times you presented your opinions at his request? Isn't that true?
- A When TOJO came up to me, I talked with him.
- Q What was your position and what, if any influence, did you have or exert toward the decision of that Conference to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? What part did you play in that? I mean, not officially, but behind the scenes - your advice and attitude?

- A I have talked to Premier KONOYE about it and also as expressed by the Emperor, I said that it would be unwise to be hasty in trying to take the position of leadership and because the Emperor expressed such a sentiment, I cautioned Prince KONOYE that he should be very cautious in regard to exercising leadership and to prevent the military from utilizing the leadership principle for making war.
- Q But you were personally in favor of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Your differences with certain people was the manner in which it should be accomplished. Is that correct?
- A Because the world was undergoing a great change and France was more or less down-trodden and weak, I thought that we cannot stand by idly. We have to do something and so we thought to bring French Indo-China and Thailand under our influence by peaceful means and through treaties.
- Q What did you personally fear might happen in the case of French Indo-China and Thailand if Japan didn't do something, as you say? What were you fearful of?
- A Because of the atmosphere at that time, we felt we could not stand by idly due to the fact that public sentiment was very strong in obtaining raw materials and natural resources and things like that and so I urged KONOYE by talking to him that we should obtain raw materials and economic concessions rather than to exercise leadership there.
- Q There was a great deal of pressure in the public thinking in Japan in those days, looking toward the procuring of materials outside of Japan for use in Japan?
- A Also, there was sentiment to the effect that the diplomacy of Japan was weak-kneed, and because of such public sentiment, any inaction on the part of the Government would have brought further unfavorable results.

- Q By unfavorable results, do you mean the possible taking over by the military?
- A By standing idly, a Government change will occur or a worse thing might occur in the way of aggression or things like that on foreign soil.
- Q But you agreed with Prince KONOYE in favoring Japan adopting as its foreign policy the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, although you say you didn't advocate the use of arms to accomplish that?
- A Yes.
- Q What, if any influence, did you have on the decision to send troops to French Indo-China?
- A I wasn't involved at all in that.
- Q Wasn't that matter discussed between you and Prince KONOYE during the time the negotiations took place between Japan and Vichy.
- A Prince KONOYE was saying that in order to terminate the China incident as quickly as possible, he thinks it is necessary to put forth troops into French Indo-China and attack China from the South. On that, I did not disagree and did not get myself involved, although Prince KONOYE was telling me about those things. Also, I felt that it was a matter of military operations and also that the world situation at this time was changing so "revolutionarily".
- Q In your personal conferences with Prince KONOYE or any of the Government officials or Ministers, did you ever voice any opposition to the sending of troops into French Indo-China?
- A I have no recollection of opposing the occupation of French Indo-China. I did not make any strong opposition because I felt that negotiations were being conducted with the Vichy Government and that was for the purpose of ending the China situation.
- Q Of course, there were many conferences with Prince KONOYE and the ministers during which the subject of sending troops to French Indo-China was talked about, were there not. It was an important subject of conversation in those days but in those conversations, you don't recall taking a stand one way or another as to whether troops should be or should not be sent?

- A I have no special recollection.
- Q As I remember, you indicated TOJO and his military and Army followers desired to send troops irrespective of treaty arrangements while MATSUOKA came forward and insisted on a treaty with Vichy?
- A Yes.
- Q Did you talk to any of the Ministers, or MATSUOKA, or Prince KONOYE with reference to which of those policies should be followed?
- A I vigorously opposed any plan of occupying French Indo-China without any diplomatic negotiations and agreement of both parties.
- Q How did you express your opposition? To whom did you give your opinions where they might have some influence?
- A Because through the opposition of MATSUOKA, it was decided that diplomatic negotiations will be conducted under diplomatic means. Therefore, it was not necessary for me to give my sentiment to anyone.
- Q Didn't you in talking to MATSUOKA indicate that you agreed with his policy and you thought he was on the right track, and you thought he ought to insist upon negotiations being conducted?
- A I believe that MATSUOKA came to me and talked about it and I said it would be a very good thing to send in troops under diplomatic negotiations and conduct everything through diplomatic negotiations and I told MATSUOKA to go right ahead.
- Q You don't recall having talked to any of the military group in an effort to deter them from sending troops short of first having the treaty permitting the same?
- A I don't recall having talked on that type of matter to any military man. If I did, it would have been TOJO.
- Q You don't have any recollection of having tried to deter him from going in without a treaty?

- A Because at this time it was already decided to go into French Indo-China under a treaty and so I did not wish to dig up that issue.
- Q But in your conversations with Prince KONOYE and MATSUOKA, you did encourage them to take the necessary steps to enter into negotiations with Vichy in order to obtain permission by that method of sending troops into French Indo-China. You favored that along with MATSUOKA, Prince KONOYE and that group?
- A Yes. I have had many straight-from-the-shoulder conversations with Prince KONOYE and I cautioned that there should not be any case of Japan utilizing the troops in French Indo-China for southward advancement and I cautioned Prince KONOYE in that respect. I said that this is unavoidable because it is necessary for the settlement of the China Incident but I told Prince KONOYE to exercise caution on that point.
- Q I think you said the other day you realized that Vichy France could hardly decline granting the request if it was properly made by Japan through Germany, so I assume you favored putting the necessary pressure upon Vichy France to permit the landing of troops because you thought it was sufficiently important for Japan in order to end the China War? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Can we say that you favored Japan taking advantage of the world situation and the weakened condition of France because of your strong feeling that it was necessary for Japan to do so in order to bring an end to the conflict of China?
- A As said before, I was strongly opposed to "thievery while the house was on fire" and I felt that due to the world situation at this time, we cannot stand by idly and I felt that taking advantage of the situation must be committed at the minimum and I said that an aggressive expansionist policy should not be taken. I talked on that matter to Prince KONOYE.

- Q Well, it is a matter of degree, is it not. What you favored and what was favored by the Government and ultimately accomplished was to some degree, at least, "thievery while the house was on fire" although you favored it not getting out of hand and becoming an occupation of all of French Indo-China. Is that right?
- A I was thinking to the extent of obtaining only those things necessary for Japan and not for any territorial acquisition or occupation.
- Q But in a sense, you will agree with me, I think, that because of your feeling of the great need on the part of Japan to have these bases in which to operate in China, you favored a moderate amount of "thievery while the house was on fire" in order to accomplish that purpose. Isn't that right?
- A Due to the world situation and the sentiment of the people at this time, I thought that was more or less a safety valve and it would have to be done, otherwise the pressure of the public would cause it to explode.
- Q You thought the exigency of the situation at that time justified Japan going that far at least.
- A I thought that no other course can be taken as long as it was peaceful and according to a treaty.
- Q Did the Emperor hold the same views as you did with reference to French Indo-China?
- A Yes, the Emperor generally agreed with me, although his sentiment against "thievery while the house was on fire" was much stronger than mine.
- Q So, in your conversations with MATSUOKA and Prince KONOYE and the Emperor, you encouraged Japan negotiating treaties with Vichy for the purpose of merely obtaining bases in French Indo-China from which to operate into China? That was your theory?
- A I talked with that sort of an understanding.

- Q Why was it that the troops were originally landed in Southern Indo-China rather than Northern Indo-China if the strategy was to operate against China and not against the Southern Pacific?
- A I believe the troops were landed in North and South Indo-China.
- Q Why was it necessary to land troops in South Indo-China when the policy, as you explained to me, was to obtain bases for operation into China? As I view it, the greater need would be for bases in Northern China and relatively speaking, not for bases in South China.
- A That isn't clear to me either. I believe for that reason I talked with Prince KONOYE with great concern. that such a situation may have been misused and is being misdirected.
- Q In other words, when you advocated obtaining bases in Indo-China, you weren't thinking in terms of obtaining bases in both North and southern Indo-China?
- A I did not hear anything about specific location.
- Q Isn't it true that the negotiators with Vichy through Germany and the military group obtained more bases and strategic bases for operation in the South in their negotiations?
- A I didn't hear anything about that.
- Q After you learned that troops had been landed in Saigon in Southern Indo-China, did that cause any concern in your thinking as to what the future developments there might be in that area?
- A I have no recollection as to what concern I held at that time.
- Q This phrase "Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity". Was that the first time that was used by high Government officials, at the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, or was that a slogan or phrase that had been in existence for some time prior? That particular phrase - "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"?

A I believe such a phrase has been expounded from before.

Q My recollection is that you indicated that as of July 2nd, "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was brought to include Thailand and French Indo-China in addition to Manchuria and China and that public officials in their speaking of the Greater East Asia Sphere of influence on prior occasions only contemplated Manchuria, China and Japan. Is that true?

A I do not know if there was a clear-cut phrase such as "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" but the sentiment or the feeling held was the same.

Q That general policy or foreign policy on the part of Japan had been originated during the First Konoye Cabinet, had it not by Prince KONOYE, himself?

A Yes.

Q This other decision that was made at that Conference that Japan should take measures with the view of advancing Southward. What influence, if any, did you exert upon bringing about that decision in that conference in your dealings with these officials?

A Until the Imperial Conference, I did not know anything about going out toward the South.

Q By not knowing anything about it, do you mean there were those in military circles who prior to July 2, 1941 had advocated moving southward for oil and supplies and materials? That wasn't the first time you ever heard of the alternative of Japan securing supplies and materials and resources in the South, was it, at that July 2 Conference?

A I heard about the great hope for the procurement of natural resources and oil from the South but I did not know about the decision being reached at the Imperial Conference for going into the South.

Q In other words, you mean prior to that Conference, in your talks and discussions, you did not advocate such a position? You mean that prior to July 2, 1941 you had not talked to Government officials and advocated and encouraged such a decision as to foreign policy on that date?

- A I did not know about such a decision to be made, although I was greatly in favor of obtaining somehow natural resources from the South.
- Q Had Prince KONOYE been advocating such a foreign policy immediately prior to the July 2 Conference?
- Q KONOYE's true sentiment was strongly opposed to any southern incursion other than by peaceful means.
- A Yes, but I wasn't discussing whether or not it was to be by peaceful means or force of arms. Did Prince KONOYE prior to July 2, 1941 openly advocate that Japan should expand its influence in the South by peaceful means?
- A Yes.
- Q Then you did talk to Prince KONOYE prior to July 2 with reference to southern expansion by peaceful means, did you not?
- A Yes, I was highly desirous of obtaining natural resources through peaceful means because the procurement of oil from the South would more or less change the situation in regard to America and it will avert or change the sentiment of getting into a conflict with America.
- Q When you say you didn't know this was a possible decision as to foreign policy at the July 2 Conference, what is new or novel about what was decided? How does that decision differ as to foreign policy - differ from what you and Prince KONOYE had been discussing prior to July 2. Was this decision something new?
- A The problem was not new. Only, it was motivated by the desire of averting a clash with America.
- Q Can we say that prior to July 2, 1941, Prince KONOYE and you favored peaceful expansion into the South Pacific but that as of July 2, 1941, you were surprised to learn that as a matter of foreign policy the Government had decided to use force to go into the South Pacific?

A The decision at this time was not to the extent of utilizing force for incursion into the South. If America did interfere while negotiations were being conducted with Thailand and French Indo-China, a clash would be unavoidable with America and for that reason, I expressed great concern to Prince KONOYE about that possibility and because the Navy and the military had an opinion that war with the United States was unavoidable, I was afraid that the situation might be utilized and any position might be taken for a clash with America.

Q The point that I was trying to get an answer to was that a little while ago you indicated that when the July 2 Conference came out with the decision that Japan would take measures to advance to the South, you were surprised because you said you were not familiar or didn't know of that policy. You also now say that you had talked generally to Prince KONOYE with reference to expansion to the South providing it was done by peaceful means. What I want to know is what is new or novel about this decision that made it come as a surprise to you?

A The policy was for a peaceful means of acquiring our end but the surprising and different part was that if in the event America interferes with the negotiations in the South, then war would be inevitable.

Q By that you mean that prior to July 2, you, in your talking and thinking favored Southern expansion but you were surprised to have the Imperial Conference decide at that time on such a foreign policy in view of the strong opposition that America was making at the moment which might cause trouble between Japan and the United States. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q You indicated that at about that time, in your talks with MATSUOKA and Prince KONOYE, and others, although you favored the obtaining of bases in French Indo-China by negotiation, you were opposed to obtaining bases in French Indo-China for use in Southern expansion. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Was that Prince KONOYE's attitude in those days?

A I expressed that opinion to Prince KONOYE and Prince KONOYE wholeheartedly agreed with me. Prince KONOYE was greatly in favor of the Japanese-American negotiations and the occupation of French Indo-China influenced unfavorably the negotiations and he felt that any further stimulus might aggravate the situation more and he was greatly concerned in regard to that.

Q In your conversations, immediately prior to July 2, 1941 with MATSUOKA, did he indicate a similar opinion or was he in favor of obtaining bases for the additional purpose of expanding southward?

A MATSUOKA also did not say anything to me to the effect of going down South through force, only that the opinions voiced by MATSUOKA changes so frequently that it is very difficult to grasp just what he is holding in mind.

Q But you would say that Prince KONOYE, at least in your conversations with him immediately prior to July 2, 1941, although he favored negotiating for bases in French Indo-China, he was opposed to obtaining those bases for southern expansion. Was that his attitude in those days?

A Yes.

Q Did he change his mind at that time or in the liaison conference immediately preceding the Imperial Conference so as to hold a different view, as you say he expressed in his talks with you?

A Because of the previous experience of Prince KONOYE he was greatly not in favor of the decision but as expressed before, the liaison conference was conducted frequently for the purpose of curbing the sentiment of MATSUOKA in advocating an attack on Soviet Russia. This decision of Southward incursion was more or less a diversion of the sentiment for the position into the North. It was diverted to the South instead.

- Q You would say that even though Prince KONOYE originally agreed with your thinking of not obtaining bases in French Indo-China for Southern expansion, during the liaison conferences and during the time of the Imperial Conference, he came around to the view that those bases should be obtained for Southern expansion as well as for use in the China War.
- A I don't believe that at this Imperial Conference it was decided to the extent of using it as a bases for further Southward expansion. In the conversation had with Prince KONOYE he did not express sentiment to that effect. Prince KONOYE said that it was for curbing the action advocated by MATSUOKA and that it was more or less a displacement of that sentiment advocated by MATSUOKA.
- Q Did Prince KONOYE advocate the Southern Expansion program in order to help alleviate this argument that MATSUOKA was making that Japan attack Russia?
- A Prince KONOYE only favored it to the extent of obtaining resources from the South and did not favor any forceful incursion there.
- Q Prince KONOYE, however, was present and agreed to the decision of the Imperial Conference that Japan would take measures for Southern expansion. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q In his diary, Prince KONOYE wrote as follows in referring to the decisions that were made at this Imperial Conference on July 2: "First, due to the policy to be enforced against French Indo-China and Thailand and the matters regarding hastening of the policy in the South, various plans will be completed in regards to French Indo-China and Thailand and thus strengthen our position for expansion to the South". In other words, Prince KONOYE joined in and agreed to a foreign policy of negotiating with French Indo-China and Thailand in order to put Japan in a better position for southern expansion. Isn't that true?

A I didn't hear anything about that.

Q You don't recall that being one of the decisions as to foreign policy on July 2?

A I didn't hear anything about it.

Q There certainly were elements in the Japanese Government at the time of the July 2 Conference that favored obtaining the bases for Southern expansion as well as for use in the China War, were there not?

A That was a point of greatest concern to me and for which I cautioned Prince KONOYE. Because I was greatly opposed to obtaining bases in French Indo-China Prince KONOYE did not from the beginning talk to me on that matter. I believe that was so.

Q In other words, I understand that you personally favored the obtaining of bases in French Indo-China to help end the China War but there were people in the Japanese Government that wanted those bases not only for that reason but also to have bases in the South Pacific. Is that correct?

A I believe that was so.

Q And War Minister TOJO was one of those persons, was he not?

A Yes, TOJO was one of them.

Q In your conversations with War Minister TOJO, he indicated to you that he felt that Japan would have to use military force to obtain supplies in the Southern Pacific if she couldn't settle her differences with the United States. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

Q And that also was the attitude of Admiral NAGANO, the Chief of Staff of the Navy, was it not? He took the position that Japan would have to use military force to get supplies from the South Pacific if she couldn't settle her issue with the United States.

A NAGANO, as related to you yesterday, was of the mind that Japan cannot be wasting time with America as there would be no agreement with America so Japan must go down South.

Q So both TOJO and NAGANO favored southern expansion to get supplies if the negotiations with the United States were unsuccessful.

A Yes.

Q And that same policy was held by the Navy Minister OIKAWA, was it not?

A OIKAWA was more or less suppressing or restraining sentiment to that effect but he was not opposing it.

Q You had talks with him on occasions and he expressed that to be his policy, although he wasn't quite as aggressive, you say, as TOJO or NAGANO?

A OIKAWA is not aggressive.

Q But he favored Southern expansion by military force to get supplies if the dispute between the United States and Japan could not be negotiated.

A If negotiations with America was unsuccessful, the Navy had no other course but that.

Q And OIKAWA told you that in so many words in your talks with him, did he not?

A Yes.

Q How about the Chief of Army Staff, SUGIYAMA, in your talks with him, did he express the same opinion as to what Japan ought to do in the South Pacific?

A I didn't meet Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA, not even once at that time.

Q Do you know from what you learned from others what his policy was with reference to Southern expansion; whether or not it was the same as these other men we mention?

- A I believe that SUGIYAMA in my personal opinion was of the same standing as OIKAWA.
- Q Foreign Minister TOYADA-was that his policy and opinion likewise, that Japan should move southward in order to obtain resources and military supplies?
- A TOYADA was a strong advocate of harmony with America but as a Navy man, he thought it may be inevitable for Japan to go down to the South in the event negotiations were unsuccessful
- Q In other words, with your talks with Foreign Minister TOYODA, he indicated to you he desired successful negotiations with the United States but if they were unsuccessful, he favored the Navy policy of going down South by force of Arms.
- A I believe he felt that was inevitable.
- Q He favored such a program if it was necessary to get the supplies, isn't that right?
- A But he was always expressing, he would not like to do that so he was strongly advocating continued negotiations for successful negotiations with North America.
- Q General MUTO - he was in the Bureau of Military Affairs in those days, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q What was his attitude in your talks with him with reference to this Southern expansion by military force?
- A I believe he was a strong advocate of Southern expansion.
- Q In other words, in your talks with him, he indicated he likewise favored the use of force to move into the South Pacific if negotiations were unsuccessful.
- A I don't believe I have talked with him.
- A You don't think he ever personally expressed those view to you?
- A I never met him, not even once.

- Q But your impression is from what you learned that that was his policy?
- A Yes.
- Q And General SUZUKI. You talked with him on many occasions, did you not? What did he express to you as his opinions as to the use of force in the South Pacific.
- A He was greatly concerned about going into the South and especially about getting into a clash with America and he was more concerned with national strength rather than the acquisition of natural resources.
- Q By that, you mean he didn't favor Southern expansion?
- A He wanted to acquire natural resources from the South but did not desire going to war with America.
- Q In other words, he held to the view that Japan likely would not be successful in a war with America?
- A He was greatly worried that Japan does not have sufficient strength.
- Q But he desired Japan to use military force in the Southern Pacific to obtain supplies, if necessary, because of failure of negotiations with the United States if it could be determined that Japan had sufficient power and strength to acquire them. Isn't that correct?
- A I cannot say clearly to that extent.
- Q To put it more simply, he favored, as did these other military men, the use of force in the Southern Pacific to obtain supplies if the negotiations with the United States failed if he thought Japan, to use slang, could get away with it.
- A He was saying that it was dangerous to go to war against America but I cannot say any more than that because it would be purely conjectural.
- Q You don't think he had as positive a policy with reference to using force in the South Pacific as TOJO and NAGANO, and people such as that?

- A I believe he was greatly interested in that because he was dealing with the matter of natural resources as a member of the Cabinet Planning Board.
- Q Yes, but my question was that you don't think that he was as strong an advocate of the use of force in going to the South Pacific as were people such as TOJO and NAGANO?
- A His thinking differed from that of TOJO.
- Q What was the main difference in his thinking?
- A He was constantly arguing that the settlement of the China Incident was necessary from the standpoint of national strength so I cannot say that he was thinking of going down hastily into the South.
- Q Can we say that after the decisions that were made at the July 2 Conference, Prince KONOYE favored the use of force to go into the Southern Pacific if negotiations with the United States failed.
- A But Prince KONOYE ^{was} to the last/not in favor of going down into the South to the extent of having a clash with the United States and that matter became the cause for his Cabinet collapsing in October.
- Q Who are the other leading men in Japan as of this July 1941 period? Who, other than those we have mentioned favored the use of force to acquire supplies in the South Pacific if negotiations failed with the United States? Was ITAGAKI in those days a member of the General Staff and a leader of that movement?
- A I believe that ITAGAKI was in China at that time.
- Q How about MASAKI at that time?
- A No, MASAKI was retired.
- Q And ARAKI was retired?

- A Yes, he was retired. The younger staff officers had the greatest power at that time.
- Q How about the ministers. Were there any ministers other than those mentioned who were outspoken advocates of this policy of going into the Southern Pacific by force, if necessary?
- A The Cabinet Ministers were naturally opposed to a Southern incursion and there were many Cabinet members that did not know anything about the decision reached at this Imperial Conference.
- Q You mean Cabinet ministers other than TOJO, TOYODA, OIKAWA and the military faction of the Cabinet?
- A Yes.
- Q How about the Vice Chiefs of Staff? Were they leaders in that foreign policy for southern expansion by force, if necessary; for example, ITO. Wasn't he Vice-Chief of the Navy Staff?
- A ITO was greatly familiar with the problems but because he was very friendly and highly respect and revered by the younger officers, he probably was in the status of representing the younger officers.
- Q Being in that status, he would have favored this policy of Southern Expansion by force. Did you ever talk to him about it?
- A No.
- Q Do you recall who the Vice Chief of the Army Staff was and what he thought about it?
- A I didn't see him nor have I talked with him. I don't know who it was so I don't know.
- Q Were there any military men in the Navy or Army who were on the inactive list who played an important part in advocating such a policy, such as, for example, Prince KANIN or Prince FUSHIMI?
- A All the princes were vigorously opposed.

- Q Were there any people like that who were on the Staff Section in the past who were, behind the scenes encouraging this foreign policy in Japan?
- A Generally, all the aged persons were greatly concerned. They were even concerned over the China Incident and therefore they did not want a war on their hands.
- Q The older men were more conservative so far as foreign policy was concerned and the younger men the most aggressive?
- A Yes.
- Q We can say then that at the time of the July 2 Imperial Conference, Japan thought she should adopt a policy of expansion by some means or other and the younger officers in both the Army and Navy were clamoring for such a movement to the South and were putting pressure on for such a movement. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q We can say then that on top this pressure was reflected from underneath and lead by TOJO, TOYADA, OIKAWA, NAGANO, MUTO and SUGIYAMA and those men comprised the leaders of the movement, reflecting the pressure from underneath of these younger officers.
- A Generally so. Among the retired Navy officers that were close to the young officers and who became more or less the center of the young officers group were Admiral Suetsugu and Admiral Nakamura.
- Q Those two gentlemen favored expansion into the Southern Pacific, if necessary.
- A Their arguments and opinions tended to that.
- Q Did you ever talk to them personally?
- A I knew Admiral SUETSUGU but I did not know Admiral NAKAMURA.

- Q In your conversations with Admiral SUETSUGU, he indicated to you that he felt that Japan should use force to go into the Southern Pacific, if necessary, if negotiations with the United States failed?
- A He did not talk to me on that matter but he said that Japan should not be sluggish or hesitant in its policy; that Japan should be more concrete and clear-cut.
- Q How about YAMAMOTO? Was he one that advocated the same thing as NAGANO did?
- A ISOROKU YAMAMOTO was always voicing that Japan should avert war with America. But he was always saying if the Nation decides a policy, he will execute it.
- Q Didn't he favor expansion into the South by force if negotiations with America failed?
- A No, he did not hold such an opinion. There is another Admiral YAMAMOTO - EISUKE YAMAMOTO.
- Q What was his position in the Navy in July 1941?
- A He was a retired Admiral.
- Q Was he a leader of this younger faction and an advocate of Southern expansion?
- A He was a propagandist of the virtues of the Japanese spirit and he was not too popular with the younger officers.
- Q What propaganda did he espouse so far as expansion into the South Pacific was concerned?
- A He was not voicing his opinion with reference to Southern Expansion.
- Q Well, MUTO and SUGIYAMA - you never talked to personally about their views as to the expansion into the South? Is that correct?
- A Yes.

- Q TOJO, TOYADA, OIKAWA and NAGANO you did talk to from time to time in those days and they each expressed a foreign policy favoring a foreign policy on the part of Japan of using force to go into the South Pacific if such was made necessary by the failure of negotiations with the United States.
- A Only I wish to say I spoke to NAGANO only once.
- Q You spoke to the other men on more occasions that you did to NAGANO and while your direct information as to NAGANO is rather slight and you have no direct information as to SUGIYAMA and MUTO, you do have direct information from the other men you mentioned because of their talks with you?
- A Yes.
- Q Back to August 6 where you started out to recall your talk with Prince KONOYE, among other things, you discussed proposed Japanese measures with reference to the proposed Soviet-Manchurian border. Do you remember your conversation on that?
- A I heard that he said he would take on a policy of minimizing the occurrence of incidents along the Soviet-Manchurian border.
- Q You refer to Japan's answer to the protest from President Roosevelt. Was that protest that you were discussing on August 6 the one where President Roosevelt protested the landing of troops in French Indo-China.
- A It may have been, but I have no recollection. I wish to make a correction. The Vice Chief of the Navy General Staff was not ITO. It was KONDO at this time
- Q ITO became Vice Chief of Staff later on after TOJO became Premier?
- A I believe ITO became that just before the start of war.
- Q What was Vice Chief of Staff KONDO's attitude toward the Southern expansion?

A Because KONDO was a quiet man, I don't believe he was aggressive and perhaps for that reason he was replaced just before the outbreak of war.

Q You did talk to ITO, however, personally, did you not with reference to his attitude?

A No, I did not talk to him.

Q I think you said the other day that all leading Government officials favored a foreign policy on the part of Japan which would change the status quo in East Asia by giving Japan the dominant position there, although there was a difference between the various leaders as to how it should be accomplished. That is correct, is it not?

A Yes.

Q But after ^{the} July 2, 1941 Conference, the men we have been discussing, TOJO, TOYODA, OIKAWA, MUTO, NAGANO, came out into the open and advocated the establishment of that change of status quo, even by use of force, if necessary, and if Japan's efforts were interfered with by the United States?

A Yes.

Q On August 7, did you remember the nature of the report of the Vice Chief of Staff KONDO to the Emperor?

A On July 1931, Nagano reported to the Emperor and the Emperor was very much concerned about the report made, so I called OIKAWA and cautioned him concerning that.

Q What did the Emperor say KONDO stated by way of explanation?

A I believe that the problem was made more clear than what NAGANO has done.

Q As I recall, the July 31 report, in effect, was that the Navy was sufficiently strong to successfully fight the United States but at the same time, NAGANO expressed his own personal feeling that he wasn't so sure about it and the Emperor was concerned because there was no unanimity of decision. Now, when that came back on August 7, was the report unanimous one way or the other as to the ability of the Navy to fight the United States?

- A I believe that at this time, it was told to the Emperor that in the event Japan got into a war with the United States, Japan would not lose.
- Q Why was it that the Vice Chief of Staff made the report instead of the Chief of Staff on this occasion?
- A That reason is not clear to me. Only in the event of the Chief of Staff being ill or having some accidents that the Vice Chief goes out.
- Q It wasn't an indication of the brushing aside of Admiral NAGANO? It was just that he was not available for the occasion?
- A No, I don't believe that was the case.
- Q So, as of August 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Navy reported to the Emperor that in carrying out their policy of using force of arms to expand into the South Pacific, if necessary, they felt they could successfully meet and fight the United States.
- A I believe that was what he told the Emperor.
- Q And that is what the Emperor told you had been stated to him by the Vice Chief of Staff. Is that right?
- A It is not written here to that effect but that is my recollection.
- Q On that same day, you talked with Prince KONOYE after he returned from a conference with the Emperor and you had a long discussion with him at which time you voiced your opinions. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q One of the opinions you voiced according to your diary was that Japan would have to immediately decide on its national policy by having the Government and the Army get together and decide on a policy. Isn't true that the foreign policy of Japan had been determined and passed upon on July 2, 1941. What required a change in your foreign policy?

- A The July 2 decision was final but I thought that was a very dangerous course and I felt that Prince KONOYE should have greater discretion or control of that decision.
- Q And what was it in your opinion that was particularly dangerous about the decision of the July 2 conference.
- A I felt that the military may utilize the decision for making war upon America and I felt that a war with America at this time would prove dangerous.
- Q At the July 2 Conference it was decided that Japan would prepare for war against the United States and they would not shy away from war with the United States, if necessary to carry out the policy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and expansion into the Southern Pacific, wouldn't it?
- A I was greatly worried. If things go along like that, it would prove disastrous.
- Q What did you have in mind when you expressed this: "We are facing a very serious situation which we could have easily reduced to a simple problem such as oil, by making a little difference on our view-point."
- A I felt that the problem was really that of oil so if the problem of oil is settled, every other problem will change.
- Q What did you have in mind by "making a little difference in our view-point"? What difference in viewpoint did you think was necessary to help solve the situation?
- A I felt that Japan should concede to America on every point and reestablish normal relations with America and to establish her strength and then, if necessary, to advance into the South, but at the present time it would be dangerous to go down into the South.
- Q Do you mean by that you favored military advancement into the South at a later date?

- A No, I was not in favor of going down into the South at a future date by means of force but I had to say in the event in the future, otherwise, the military would not listen.
- Q In other words, you thought the real question was one of oil and as you said, Japan should accept all the demands that the United States was making at the time and get the necessary oil and then make plans later on. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you mean by that you expressed the opinion to Prince KONOYE that Japan should withdraw its troops from China?
- A Yes
- Q And withdraw troops from French Indo-China?
- A I expressed that Japan should withdraw everything and to withdraw in the spirit she had right after the Sino-Japanese War during which the three other parties have interfered. I said that if Japan was to execute such a plan, she must be prepared for it and she should not carry that plan out at the present time.
- Q According to your diary, you concluded that principally because of the oil situation, Japan could not fight both the United States and Russia and you went ahead and further concluded you didn't think she could successfully fight the United States and also that if Japan would move into the South Pacific, such as the Dutch East Indies, you felt that the United States would declare war?
- A Yes.
- Q And then you conclude with this statement. I wonder what you meant: "We couldn't do what we wanted to on account of the shortage of our national power". When you say what you wanted, what were you wanting to do? You mean you felt that Japan couldn't use force in the Southern Pacific successfully; therefore, she shouldn't try?

- A From July 2 to August, during that month, the sentiment voiced by the Navy became very strong and it became very difficult to obtain oil from the Dutch East Indies by peaceful means and it became evident that war with America was inevitable.
- Q Well, was it your honest opinion on that occasion that Japan was not strong enough to carry out its stated policy of expansion into the South Pacific by force of arms in spite of interference by the United States and you thought that foreign policy should be abandoned but only for the time being, and you should maintain that as your ultimate goal and some time in the future after Japan built up herself and got herself strong, she then should use military strength and go down South and get what she wanted?
- A I believe such a course may be necessary and in that event, I thought adequate preparations should be made. My fundamental desire was to take on that course through peaceful measures. In regard to the present strength of the Nation, I felt that it was necessary to stop just such a sentiment held at this time and in order to stop that sentiment it was necessary to speak in terms of the future; otherwise, they would not listen to me.
- Q In other words, you had to say that you recognized that Japan was committed by the strong position taken at the Conference for aggressive military expansion into the South even if the United States declared war and you didn't think that Japan could be successful, and although you weren't expecting that the Government abandon its policy by expansion into the South, you thought it should be postponed until a more opportune time when Japan had sufficient arms and would be successful.
- A And I thought that I would obtain time in which to direct Japanese diplomacy toward a more peaceful end.

- Q Can we say in all fairness that it was your opinion in those days that if Japan was strong enough to move in the South Pacific by force of arms at that time, you would have been in favor of it?
- A Even in that case, I did not favor it. If there was hope of Japan winning, I may be dragged with that sentiment, but at this time, there was no hope for Japan so I was vigorously opposed to it.
- Q But the people who were really dragging Japan into it in spite of your view that it would not be successful were these men we mentioned today primarily, would you say?
- A Yes, they thought Japan would succeed.
- Q Isn't it true that all the high Government officials would have been willing to use force of arms to go into the South Pacific if they thought they could be successful but there was a dispute between factions as to whether you would be successful or not?
- A I don't believe that the Prime Minister or the other Ministers had the confidence of victory.
- Q No, but my point was that all the leading Government officials, if they had confidence of victory as of this time, would have favored the use of force of arms to go into the Southern Pacific even though it involved war with the United States.
- A I believe it was evenly divided.
- Q You believe that there were elements that thought that even though Japan could easily have won the war with the United States, would have favored the use of arms against the United States?
- A I was greatly concerned.
- Q Was that your opinion, that force of arms shouldn't be used even if Japan was strong enough to win?
- A Even though Japan would be strong, I didn't believe she would be that strong.

Q Assuming she was strong enough and that Prince KONOYE and you, and people in that school of thought came to that conclusion that Japan was strong enough to beat anybody in the Far East, would that have changed your attitude as to your foreign policy in the South Pacific?

A But my conscience would not permit me to agree to incursion into the South by use of force. If Japan had sufficient power, I believe Japan would have been able to procure oil easily from the Dutch East Indies.

Q Well, by way of summary - I summarized this before, but it is your opinion, I believe, is it not, that the Government of Japan and its leaders desired to change the status quo in the Far East by making Japan a dominant factor in that part of the world; and that there were two elements in the Government, one that desired to do it by peaceful means and another group that desired to do it by force of arms; and in the final analysis, the group that advocated the use of arms won out. This group was led by Premier TOJO and included these men as the outstanding leaders of the movement: TOJO, NAGANO, MUTO and SUGIYAMA. You would say they were the outstanding leaders although you add that they were encouraged and pressure was brought to bear upon them by many younger army and Navy officers. Is that about a fair statement of what brought about some of this expansion toward the South?

A Yes.

Q I thought you indicated that TOYODA was not a leading advocate of the Southern expansion and he advocated the use of arms, if necessary, to carry out this foreign policy of expansion.

A I desire that TOYODA be eliminated from that list because he said that if no other course can be had - as a final step or only as a last resort and for that reason I believe he should not be included.

Q In place of TOYODA we could well substitute the subsequent Foreign Minister TOGO, could we not, who advocated the carrying out of this foreign policy in the Southern Pacific, even though it might result in a war with the United?

- A TOGO was not an aggressive man in that respect.
- Q How about Admiral SHIMADA, the successor to OIKAWA?
- A The real feeling of SHIMADA would not put him on that list but as a Navy man, he may be one of them.
- Q In other words, the position he was in and the activities he engaged in would tend to fix responsibility upon him, and wouldn't the same thing apply to Foreign Minister TOGO?
- A I believe that TOGO was also of the opinion that such a course was unavoidable and that he had no other recourse.
- Q Let us put it this way. Would you say that TOJO, NAGANO, SUGIYAMA and MUTO and SHIMADA were the primary ones that led Japan into the use of force of arms in the South Pacific even though it involved war with the United States while TOGO and TOYADA, instead of being leaders, were more or less followers. Is that a fair statement?
- A When TOGO entered the TOJO Cabinet, he made as a provision that he is entering the Cabinet provided that Japan would not go to war against America.
- Q My last statement as to the leaders and the followers, you would say was correct, would you not?
- A Yes.
- Q Those I have named as leaders, would you say those were all the outstanding leaders that really led Japan into this Southern expansion, culminating into a war with the United States?
- A I believe that is all, there weren't any others, other than the younger officers which are named here.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 31 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. AVS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S M Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~was~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 5th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Place

5 March 1946
Date