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THE POLITICAL EXAMINER.

If I might give a short hint to an impartial writer, it would be to tell him his fate. If he resolved to venture upon the dangerous precipice of telling unbiassed truth, let him proclaim war with mankind—neither to give nor to take quarter. If he tells the crimes of great men they fall upon him with the iron hands of the law; if he tells them of virtues, when they have any, then the mob attacks him with slander. But if he regards truth, let him expect martyrdom on both sides, and then he may go on fearless; and this is the course I take myself.—D^r For.

THE DEBATE ON LORD GEORGE BENTINCK'S MOTION.

A number of sinister rumours and idle apprehensions are set at rest by the declaration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Government is resolved to adhere to the Act of 1846 settling the sugar duties. There is thus to be no retrograde step,—no backing to protection under the pretence of no derogation from free trade. Certain concessions, however, are to be made to the West India proprietors, the value and equity of which we shall take another opportunity of examining.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposes to permit the use of molasses in distilleries on the same terms as sugar, and cane-juice also at the same rate of duty as sugar. He proposes an advance of 200,000*l.* for carrying on spontaneous emigration from Africa, Government for a short time consenting also to defray the expense of conveying liberated blacks from Sierra Leone to the plantations, with their free will. It is also proposed for five years to postpone the payment of the Hurricane loan.

In a very masterly speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer exposed many of the exaggerations and fallacies of the West India complainants. He plainly told them that there must be an end of absentee proprietorship, and a beginning of better thrift and skill in cultivation and manufacture, or that the amelioration of their condition must be hopeless. He referred their backwardness and its consequences to their unfortunate false reliance on that broken reed, protection.

There is truth in these reproaches, but it is not the whole truth. The Home Government has also had its share of blame in the matter; for had it done immediately upon the passing of the Emancipation Act what it now proposes at the twelfth hour for the supply of labour, much of the disadvantage under which the West India colonists unfairly suffer would have been averted. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, asserts, and apparently not without grounds, that the deficiency of labour has been much exaggerated—and what in the world, in disputation, is not exaggerated? The fact never corresponds with the representation.

Lord George Bentinck's allegation that the low price of sugar was altogether referrible to the alteration in the duties admitting competition, was disposed of very shortly by Sir Charles Wood, who showed that sugar had occasionally fallen almost as low during the period of protection, and that other commodities, indigo, rice, and tea, had declined in price in still greater proportion during the late period of general distress.

Indeed, as reasonably might free traders ascribe the high prices of agricultural produce within the last two years to the withdrawal of the corn duties, as the protectionists attribute the low price of sugar wholly to the reduction of duties in the same extraordinary and peculiar circumstances of depression. In the state in which the country has been placed by scarcity of food and other accidents disturbing its trade, causes have been so multiplied and complicated, that no one can be pointed out as purely and solely productive of any specific effect.

The fact, however, that the revenue of the sugar duties has been increased a million by what has contributed to the comforts of the poor, is of weighty significance. Amongst the most salient and monstrous of Lord George Bentinck's charges against the change of 1846 was the attribution to it of certain mercantile failures with which it could have had no more to do than the lamb in the old fable had with the misdeeds of his father or grandfather to the wolf.

It is amusing to observe the perplexity in which Lord G. Bentinck is placed in advocating the claims of the West Indians, clashing with the interests of monopoly at home. The West Indians only want so much protection as they think will serve themselves. For the rest, they are free-traders. They say, tax yourselves to buy our sugar at an artificially enhanced price, and that done, let our sugar compete freely with your malt in your breweries, and with your grain in your distilleries, and let our rum have a fair field and no favour, in competition with your British blue ruin and pernicious compounds; and above all, let us go to the cheapest markets for the bottoms in which to ship the sugars, for which we claim the advantage of differential duties, and the rum, &c., which is to compete with your home produce.

It was pleasant to see how Lord George had to slur over these differences, not agreeing with his clients as to the repeal of the Navigation Laws, and leaving molasses for the breweries *versus* malt to the impartial judgment of the Exchequer.

The fact is, that if the Protectionists had to settle their claims amongst themselves, they would fight a battle like that of the famous Kilkenny cats. Protection is another word for the old-fashioned game called "Beggar my neighbour." Every man loves his own monopoly, and hates his

neighbour's. The analogy is to rapine. The man who has secured a booty will protest most earnestly against any invasion of the rights of property. Once possessed of a spoil, he will be the first to say "Now let us start fair—no more robbery and robbery—let us be honest, and respect *meum* and *tuum*."

The close kin that exists between the principle of (so called) protection and the practice of pillage was very naively betrayed in Lord G. Bentinck's speech, in the close of which, to set things right in the West Indies, to put down slavery, and to put up the Spanish bondholders, he coolly proposed to seize Cuba! Would it not be cheap, he asked. And certainly the prime cost would be simply that of honour, honesty, and faith; and the secondary expenses probably only those of an European war, for the powers of the continent would not be very likely to submit quietly to the example of England's filching a Spanish possession.

The proposal indicates both the morality of "Protection," and the statesmanship of Lord George Bentinck, who, whenever he comes into power, will do so on the principle of seizing Cuba as a cheap and easy solution of the West India question;—not to mention the collateral advantage of cutting the American trade in two—and at making minced meat of things, parties especially, Lord George is a matchless master, superior even to Sir Robert Peel. Such a prodigy, considering the age we live in, do we consider this proposal of Lord George Bentinck, that we cannot be satisfied without a transcript of it from the columns of the *Times*:

"He had read in the *Times* an extract from an United States paper, in which it was stated, that if the United States did not possess herself of Cuba, Great Britain would, and that England had a greater claim by one hundredfold to Cuba than the United States had to Mexico, because a sum of 45,000,000*l.* was due to British subjects upon Spanish bonds, and Cuba was hypothecated for the payment of that debt. And why did the Americans think that Great Britain would like to have possession of Cuba? Because they knew she could never put down the slave trade so long as it was carried on at Cuba in its present form. He would therefore say at once, let them take possession of Cuba, and settle the question altogether; let them distract upon it for the just debt due, and too long asked in vain, from the Spanish Government. (Hear, hear.) They would put an end to the slave trade if they could emancipate the slaves of Cuba. If the people of this country thought it right to spend 150,000,000*l.* in putting down slavery, and ruining our colonies besides, would it not be cheap policy to put an end to slavery for ever by seizing Cuba?"

"The CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.—But would you seize the Brazils as well?"

"Lord G. BENTINCK said the case of Cuba stood upon its own merits, and upon the debt of 45,000,000*l.* due to British subjects from the Spanish Government. Then, depend upon it, when Great Britain possessed the Havannah, as once she did, in 1762, when she held it for about a year and then exchanged it for the Floridas, and when she could cut the trade of America in two, no more boasts would be heard of what the United States could do, such as that which was not long ago uttered by one of her military officers, who declared that they never would be satisfied until Uncle Sam had set his right foot upon British Canada and his left upon California, embrace the whole of the eastern seaboard, and throw his leg, like a freeman, over the whole continent of South America to Cape Horn, with Cuba for a cabbage-garden. That was the course which should be taken to put an end to slavery and slave-trading, and that having been done, there would be no difficulty in the British planter going to the coast of Africa and obtaining, not by purchase, not by war, but by the inducement of freedom and good wages, any number of Africans he might require for the cultivation of the soil."

This would be but a beginning of the foreign policy of the Protectionists. The figure of the Hercules must be traced *ex pede*, and upon the principle justifying the seizure of Cuba the repudiating states of the American Union would be conquered and made our own. It is well for Austria, in the event of a Bentinck ministry, that she has got out of the debt of England by a shabby compromise; but Greece may yet be sold up under a distress. The opposite poles of policy just now are obviously Free-Trade and Free-Booting; unrestricted commerce on the one side, and unrestricted rapine on the other. A Bentinck ministry would hoist the black flag of the Buccaneer.

CLERICAL ENCROACHMENT REPELLED.

We differ from what seems to be a very general opinion as to the result of the arguments on the *Mandamus*. We do not think that it renders either necessary or expedient any present interference of the Legislature. The minute scrutiny to which the language and provisions of the 25th of Henry VIII have been subjected in the course of the discussions in the Court of Queen's Bench, have in our opinion established that the intention of the lawgiver and the effect of the law are clear and strong beyond what had previously been imagined. Out of the admissions of the reasoners for the *Mandamus*, quite as much as on the authority of the Crown Counsel and the Chief Justice, does this appear to us to have been established.

Mr Justice Patteson explained the statute as leaving no choice to the Dean and Chapter in the form of election. The letter missive orders them "thereupon, and with all speed and celerity, and in due form, to elect the person named, and no other." This election once made, the learned Judge further admitted, cannot be challenged or set aside. "The statute then declared that the election should stand good to all intents and purposes." The next step in the process of Bishop-making is marked out with the same decisive clearness. After reciting the election of the individual by the Dean and Chapter, the certificate of that

election, and the approbation of the Crown, the form thus proceeds: "We, accepting of such election, have given our Royal assent thereto; and this we signify by these presents, requiring you to confirm the said election, and to consecrate the said []; and to do all such other things as belong to your pastoral office, according to the laws and statutes of England." The election has been made and approved; the stage of inquiry and discussion is past; and the Archbishop is called upon to complete the work by performing the solemn ceremonies of confirmation and consecration. He is ordered to do this; he is not ordered to inquire whether it ought to be done. Nor can the appended "do all such other things as belong to your pastoral office," be by any usage of the English language tortured into a precept of judicial inquiry. "Such other things" plainly restricts the Archbishop to the class of ministerial duties, such as confirmation and consecration. "Pastoral office" is used in contra-distinction to "judicial office."

A statute so distinct in its language, so unmistakable in its provisions, cannot be evaded on the untenable plea that it was merely intended to establish the Anglican Church's independence of the see of Rome. Admitting for a moment that this was the only professed object of the statute, clauses of an Act of Parliament are not rendered invalid by their containing enactments not enumerated in the preamble. Mr. Justice Coleridge admits that of the "two prevailing objects" of the Act of 25th Henry VIII, "the first is to put upon a true foundation the Royal power to the nomination of Bishops."

Quite as nugatory is the attempt to neutralize the statute by arguments drawn from the forms of writs or citations issued in conformity to its directions. The law vests the right to nominate and approve the Bishop solely and exclusively in the Crown. But at the same time it prescribes that the Crown shall exercise this right by the ministry of Dean and Chapter, and Archbishop, retaining the old forms of election and confirmation. To this end the law provided these functionaries with no new forms of writs or citations, and they simply adhered to the old; not even omitting clauses which from the curtailment of their powers had ceased to have any meaning. But can it for an instant be maintained that because a court of law (civil or ecclesiastical), in carrying out the enactments of a statute, retains in its formal summons or citation phrases implying a right of jurisdiction of which that very statute has deprived it, the express intention of the statute itself may thereby be defeated? Let these idle forms be abolished, if necessary; but we should regard with great suspicion any proposed legislative confession of the inadequacy of the existing law to uphold the supremacy of the Crown. Far better than this it would be that a *Mandamus* should go, and the judgment of a superior Court finally determine the question.

The frequent references to the canon law in the course of the arguments were inevitable. They were required to explain the circumstances under which the statute was enacted, in order to place the object contemplated by those who framed it in a clear light. But their use is simply historical and exegetical. The canon law has nothing to say in the matter. Had there been any omission in the statute, the English canon law, as the common law of the Church, must have been called in to supply the deficiency. But the statute is so complete, intelligible, and *workable* in itself, as to render recourse to the canon law, with a view to its practical application, entirely superfluous.

It only remains to be asked, what is the state of the decisions of competent courts with regard to the statute in question? Since the time it was enacted, only three discussions have arisen *in foro contentioso*. In two of these cases, no steps were taken that rendered a decision necessary or even possible. In the third, the party calling upon the Archbishop to act judicially was put out of court on a preliminary question of form, and no judgment was pronounced upon the merits. The presiding judge on the occasion is indeed alleged to have declared subsequently, that but for the error in form the party would have been entitled to a hearing. But such an extra-judicial expression of opinion cannot have the weight of a decision; and that even this extra-judicial opinion was expressed, rests upon the unsupported assertion of a writer who lived some hundred years later. The obvious and natural meaning of the statute is borne out by the uniform practice of the Church, ever since it was re-enacted in the reign of Elizabeth.

All the arguments in the case by which it was sought to impugn the interpretation here given, appear to us to be tainted by the indirectness of men who seek to make the law not what it is but what they think it ought to be. The exception is Mr Justice Patteson, if (which we doubt) he can be said to have argued in favour of the side which had the benefit of his decision. "I have great doubt," he said, "as to the power of this Court to grant a *Mandamus* under the circumstances; and my mind has fluctuated upon this subject, both during the argument and during the delivery of the judgment of my brother Erle. But by refusing the writ, we prevent the party from appealing against our decision; whereas, if we grant the writ, it will only lead to a

fuller consideration, and more satisfactory determination of this question. I think, then, that we ought to grant the writ." It will hardly be unfair to assume that even this impartial and able Judge, perplexed in the matter as he appears to have been, permitted the balance of his judgment to be in some degree affected by his connection with Mr Justice Coleridge. Nothing could well be more opposed than their reasons for the same decision, both in spirit and in terms. We take that portion of Mr Justice Patteson's argument in which he seemed most clearly decided that the *Mandamus* ought to go:

"The fifth section of the statute enacts, that after the election, the election is to stand good and effectual to all intents, and the archbishop is then to be required to confirm the election. But he is not required in express terms to confirm without inquiry, or in any other than the usual form. Upon that subject the statute is silent. If the statute had not introduced the letters missive, the election must have been free, and the confirmation must have been clearly a judicial act. It is important to consider the effect of these letters missive. This proceeding makes the election a mere form. Does it also make the confirmation a mere form? It is said the election is to stand good and effectual to all intents, so that the refusal to confirm cannot affect the election. It may be that the election is to stand good as an election, but the statute has made no provision for the refusal of the archbishop to confirm. It has therefore, in some sense, rendered it in the power of the archbishop to refuse to confirm the election, subject to the penal consequences of his refusal. The Legislature seems to have considered that confirmation was not necessary where there was no election; and in the Irish statute, which abolishes election, no mention is made of confirmation from the beginning to the end. It is contended that as confirmation is unnecessary where the Crown appoints the bishop avowedly, it was not necessary where the Crown appoints the bishop circuitously, and therefore confirmation is a ministerial act and a mere form; but that the form of confirmation was preserved, because in each case the form was a mere shadow. But if the Crown appointed a bishop by letters patent, and any lawful impediment came to the knowledge of the archbishop, it is impossible to believe that in such a case the Legislature required the archbishop to perform the solemn act of confirmation."

It is clear to us that Mr Justice Patteson has here no doubt of the intention of the statute, but simply doubts whether certain unrevoked forms do not rise to interfere with its practical efficiency. And why did the Legislature consider confirmation not necessary where there was no election, if it were not that the Legislature considered confirmation as an exclusively ministerial act, only called for where the Sovereign did not himself directly nominate? This appears to us also the sufficient answer to the case put by Mr Justice Patteson, of any "lawful impediment coming to the knowledge of the Archbishop." Confirmation cannot take place without election. Manifestly, if the election is in itself unlawful and void, the Archbishop cannot be called upon to confirm. There has been no election. The "lawful impediment" implies non-compliance with provisions of the statute, such for example as to the age or birth of the person elected; and there is no provision of the statute within which the case of the Bishop of Hereford could by any possibility be brought. At no step in these discussions, in no part of what we cannot help thinking this very monstrous and un-Christian controversy, has it been alleged that judgment of disqualification could pass against Doctor Hampden without previous formal trial of heresy.

The tone of Mr Justice Coleridge, as we have said, was a striking contrast to that of Mr Justice Patteson. He goes even so far, being "a member of the English Catholic Church," as to rely mainly on what his brother judge as clearly rejects, the "intention" of Henry the Eighth! He thinks Henry's statute was meant to leave the Anglican Church precisely where it was before, in respect of what he calls "the general canon law of Christendom." He regards its penalties as little more than a grim joke on the part of the "Defender of the Faith." The statute being an arbitrary one, he thinks it never could have been meant to be construed strictly;—its author being Henry the Eighth, he cannot believe that it was meant to fix "a yoke upon our necks." Readers of history will not be very ready to concur with Mr Justice Coleridge in all this.

"The statute, though severe in the measure of its penalties, is not so in reference to the scale of punishments in the age in which it passed; for the same penalties, even in the last century, were awarded to those who were mixed up with the frauds connected with the South Sea bubbles. But I cannot believe that a statute, which, though with a rough hand, freed us from the vexatious interference of Rome, at the same time intended that we should wear a yoke upon our necks, and that our archbishops should be liable to these penalties, if in the discharge of a most solemn duty they refused to confirm the election of a bishop who might be disqualified for that sacred office. I cannot believe that Henry VIII so intended, who gloried personally in the title of Defender of the Faith. It has been said that in Ireland and the colonies the Crown exercises this power of nomination without confirmation; but it is obvious that the revival in Ireland of the statute of Edward VI, which had rendered confirmation unnecessary, and its non-revival in this country shows that we have the same forms as existed before the Reformation, and from early ages."

Yes, "the same forms as existed before the Reformation" are precisely those which the Coleridge class of reasoners rest upon, and which the persecutors of Doctor Hampden desire to revive in all their efficacy. But they are very dangerous "forms." Their aim is distinctly to transfer to the clergy the authority which the Act of 25th Henry meant to vest and did vest in the Crown. The object and effect of that statute has been to confine the clergy to their ministerial functions; to strip them of the hierarchical power which the clergy of Rome had usurped, and which sections of the Protestant clergy who succeeded them have from time to time attempted to usurp. We shall not, we apprehend, do greater wrong to Mr Justice Coleridge than is already done by his recorded votes at Oxford on Tractarian questions, if we repeat that he has on every occasion shown himself favourable to such claims on the part of that "Catholic Church" of which he is so careful to proclaim himself a member. But this is not our view of the rights or duties of ministers in an English Protestant Church.

The clergy of what is now the national church of England are, by every just construction of the Protestant dogma, merely the ministers of the nation; and the power of choosing them ought to be in the nation. By the Act of 25 Henry VIII the right of nomination is indeed vested in the Crown; but as all the powers of the Crown must be exercised by ministers responsible to the people's representatives, the statute in reality acts as the mere instrument for giving effect to the national choice. The applicants for a *Mandamus* in the case of the Bishop of Hereford are seeking to deprive the laity of the power of choosing their own ministers, and to compel them to submit in this matter to clerical dictation. Their aim is to make a local Pope of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Wisely did Lord Denman say, "that he felt it was doubly the duty of the Court on such a question to take care that they did not yield too much to the authority of those ecclesiastical powers, which in his opinion it had been the duty of that Court, in all ages, to watch with peculiar jealousy;" and very creditable to the Chief-Justice was his resolve, contrary to what the general practice has been where such judicial difference existed, that the writ should not go. In emergencies like these, his firmness of character asserts itself; and the service he has rendered to the spiritual liberties of the country in resisting insidious clerical encroachment, is not second in importance to the service he conferred to its secular liberties in resisting the attempted encroachment of the Crown in the Irish indictments for conspiracy. It is not necessary, while we say this, that we should conceal our regret at anything which has the tendency to convert a court of law into a political or religious arena; and we could wish that some portions of Lord Denman's judgment, apparently suggested by the extra-judicial and very devotional tone of Mr Justice Coleridge's, had been spared. Declaring, as he did, that in the course he took he conceived himself "bound by the Act of Parliament," his recital of "the consequences which would arise from the issuing of such a writ" seemed to us out of place. It was addressed, we know, to the mere question of the usage of the Court, and as a reason for departure from it in this special case; but (having elected to insist upon his own opinion, and not, as in less important cases, to waive it) the reason given was not called for, and was subject to misinterpretation. Consequences are a consideration with which a judge should have nothing to do; and it is important that the opinions which have had the effect of preventing the *Mandamus* issuing in this case, should be understood to have been formed on judicial and not on politic grounds. The service done by the Chief-Justice and Mr Justice Erle has been to uphold the law in its substance and integrity.

EMANCIPATION OF ITALY.

There have been stirring debates and most eloquent speeches in the French Chamber. The members of the Liberal party seem to have awakened from a long trance, during which jealousy to England absorbed their thoughts and energy. Of a sudden this spell has been dissolved. The Italians are struggling for their freedom, and Englishmen and Frenchmen, both sympathising with and eager to help them, see how efficacious their help would be, were the countries united. What is the obstacle? Simply M. Guizot having quarrelled with England about the Spanish marriages, and his having in consequence formed a close alliance with Austria. The question now is, shall Italy be sacrificed to this alliance? Shall France disgrace herself by aiding Austria to enslave the Italians, whilst England takes the glorious part of striving in their behalf?

Such is the question that M. Thiers asked with consummate eloquence from the tribune of the Chamber, such the question mutually put by press and public. Mr Cobden desires the mission of peace-maker, and now is the time for him to come forward. He has no need of appeasing the French by disbanding the British army and laying up the British navy in ordinary. He has but to propose a frank co-operation to save Italy, and a mutual sacrifice of French and English pretensions in Spain on the altar of Italian liberty.

It is no easy task to rear that altar. We cannot conceive a more difficult political problem, than, Given the Pope and his supreme power, to establish in and around his dominions a free or representative government? If there are immense objections to the Pope being swayed by Austrian or by French councils, what is to be said of the Papal Cabinet being forced open by a constitutional opposition, which has acquired a majority in a Roman Parliament? M. Guizot says, the great object is to reconcile the Catholic religion and its chief with the ideas and liberal progress of the age. M. Thiers adds, that this can only be done by secularising the Roman Government. One says, that in the difficulties of reform the priest will save the sovereign; the other, that the sovereign will save the priest. We must own that we ourselves, though influenced by a sincere desire to be neither extravagant nor extreme, cannot but consider the Pope as a huge anomaly, a monster fragment of the great wreck of the middle ages, still surviving for no purpose except as a shoal and an obstruction. And with all our respect for Pius the Ninth, we do not see how either the priestly part of power is to save the monarchial, or *vice versa*. Unless, indeed, as M. Mariotti suggests, the Ferretti were to form a dynasty of Popes and proclaim themselves the Chiefs of free Italy, sacerdotal and lay. Here, however, would be the end of the universal Popedom.

The Sicilians, however, have made the important step. They have deposed a vacillating despot, driven him and his troops out of their capital, and rejected his offers of state councils and quasi-independence, insisting on nothing less than the constitution given by Lord William Bentinck in 1820. This con-

stitution is very favourable both to the clergy and the noblesse, and would rally these classes, as well as the rural population, in its favour. But unfortunately its House of Commons is a very diminutive assembly. Sicily, divided into twenty-three districts, would elect but two members each district, which, with six for Palermo and three for the other great towns, would form a very small body for the national representation. Had Ferdinand of Sicily any wisdom, he ought to be contented with such a constitution; nay, ought to have grasped at it, since it gave him an Upper Chamber, like that of Westminster, which could be made a firm bulwark of the throne. The King has, however, flung them away, and prefers something "on the basis of the French Charter." What this something is he does not appear to say; but the Sicilians will probably ask him, and the Neapolitans too. The latter people despise their noblesse, and would gladly do without a Chamber of Peers. Therefore the refusal of the constitution of 1812 is no unwelcome act to them. But to the Sicilian nobles it will prove the contrary; and it may impel them to unseat Ferdinand altogether, and divide the island of Sicily from the mainland of Naples.

But then comes the consideration that the King has married an Austrian princess, and that Austria will desire to intervene. The Pope denies the Austrians passage. But the Austrians can go by sea. It is not for the Pope to bar their passage by this route; it is for France and England.

Have they courage?—have they unity for this? That is the question.

MR COBDEN'S PACIFIC HERESIES.

A storm of obloquy has been blowing in upon Mr Cobden from many discordant quarters. It is not the Protectionist *Herald* or ultra-Protectionist *Post* that alone assails him now. The *Times* allows cold nipping gales of sarcastic criticism to breathe upon him, and the *Chronicle* visits him with the full weight of its anger.

What has Mr Cobden done? In the matter of foreign policy, he has preached the doctrine of non-intervention; the creed of Washington and Franklin; the doctrine proclaimed by every enlightened Liberal of Europe before the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto unsettled the minds of men and sent the seum of the French revolution seething to the surface. Mr Cobden has delivered himself of this abstract opinion; and in addition has ridiculed the irrational panic which calls so loudly to have the national resources, at a period of national pressure, squandered upon augmented armies and useless fortifications.

There has been a persevering effort on the part of Mr Cobden's critics to misrepresent the speech he made at the late Manchester free-trade meeting. He drew with evident care a broad and distinct line of demarcation between the course he was resolved to pursue on the general question of British intervention in foreign politics, and that which he recommended with respect to the special question of an immediate increase of our armaments. On the first of these questions he frankly admitted his belief that he was in a minority; and that therefore it became him to assume the position of a missionary in his attempts to gain acceptance for his opinions.

"You cannot have any material reduction in our armaments, until a great change shall have taken place in the public feeling of the country with regard to our foreign policy. The English people must first abandon the notion that they are to regulate the affairs of the whole world. I wish to do no injustice to the Minister that maintains our armaments, nor do I blame him for it now; all I wish is to invoke public opinion upon the folly of conducting our foreign policy as it has been conducted in times past, and this I will do on all occasions."

On the second question he took up very different ground, and claimed the immediate co-operation of all who heard him, and of the general public:

"But the question is not whether we shall dismantle our fleets: that is not the question. It is—will you have an increase in your army and navy? When I admit that public opinion is not with me to the extent that I would carry out my views for a reduction of our armaments, I, at the same time, maintain, speaking for the West Riding of Yorkshire, speaking for Lancashire, speaking for London, speaking for Edinburgh and for Glasgow, that it is with me in opposition to any augmentation of our armaments. And if that public opinion is expressed through public meetings like this—for I have no hesitation in saying that a large portion of the press of the country has abrogated its duties on this question—I say if public opinion on this question is expressed in public meetings before the estimates are brought on in the House of Commons, there will be no increase in our armaments."

Not for the sake of Mr Cobden, who is quite competent to defend himself, and enjoys ample opportunities of doing so, but in behalf of healthy political opinion and the best interests of the nation, moral and physical, we desire to make plain the distinction thus drawn. Two subjects of discussion are proposed, entirely different in respect of their immediate urgency: the one a practical question for immediate solution, the other a great general principle to be expounded and disseminated by missionary efforts.

It is at times Mr Cobden's fault to address himself exclusively to a class, and we could have wished that, in this late speech, he had abstained from some reflections too much limited by his own pursuits and too little tolerant of others. All soldiers and sailors, nay, even all diplomatists, are not advocates of the meddling system; and on the other hand, how many of our attempts to subject the governments of foreign states to acquiescence in a policy deemed subservient to mere British interests, and how many of the wars in which these attempts have involved us, have been prompted by the short-sighted selfishness of the merchant and manufacturer classes? But to stand aloof from Mr Cobden, simply on the ground of critical objection to part of his phraseology, or even because we may deem his perception

of an important truth dimmed and discoloured by an admixture of error, would be to play the game of our common adversaries. We are not disposed to think that the hopes and wishes of the best and greatest minds of the past and present century anchored themselves altogether to a mere Utopian fallacy, in looking forward to a time when the right of every nation to administer its internal affairs free from the intervention of foreign powers should be universally recognized and acted upon. Nor are we disinclined to believe that the progress of free and unrestricted trade among all nations will materially accelerate the chances of that era; less perhaps by the promotion of brotherly feelings among the parties who engage in it, than by the creation, in every region, of large material interests which have everything to lose and nothing to gain by war. Apart from incidental and not very important expressions, we understand this to be the view propounded by Mr Cobden: and to his accompanying proposition, that it is the duty of every public writer or speaker who entertains the same view to lose no opportunity of reconciling public opinion to it, we can have no hesitation in assenting. Such are the only means by which it can ultimately be rendered the practical rule of conduct for nations. We must frankly add that the economy possible to be effected in the expenditure upon national defence by the adoption of this principle in international concerns, appears to us the least important of its benefits.

Principles of less universal application must of course determine the immediate practical question of whether there exist at this moment any reasonable grounds for largely augmenting our armaments. We have to ask ourselves whether there is anything in the present aspect of foreign affairs to render an unforeseen and overwhelming attack upon these islands probable, or even possible? We have to consider, supposing the apprehended attack is not to be immediate, whether there is any other way of placing ourselves in a position to resist it when it comes, than by serious addition to our outlay upon fleets, armies, and fortresses? And if the former of these questions is answered in the negative, the latter in the affirmative, we have still to determine whether the season of mercantile embarrassment through which we are still passing ought not in itself to be a conclusive argument against any such present increase of our annual expenditure?

With respect to the first of these questions, it is to be kept in mind, as we have pointed out very recently, that in the actual organization of Europe a mere buccannering invasion of our soil is really a preposterous chimera. The little states of middle-age Italy indulged in desultory intermitting assaults and reprisals as the spleen of the moment suggested; but the tendency of modern Europe to aggregate itself into a few large states has put an end to this condition of affairs. Any attack by France or Russia upon Great Britain will be for the attainment of a great and permanent advantage and the preparations for it must be on a corresponding scale, requiring length of time for their completion. We have diplomatic envoys at every European court; we have consuls in all their ports; we have traders and tourists continually passing and re-passing, and mingling with all classes of society; we have merchants corresponding unreservedly with each other on every movement that may affect the operations of exchange, or the price and supply of any commodity. The workings of the great European corporation are visible to all. It is utterly impossible that an invasion of Great Britain—such as the great powers of the world would undertake—could be prepared and matured without our receiving ample forewarning in time to be prepared for it. We have repeatedly declared that, where there is proved insufficiency, we would not dispute the prudence of augmenting our establishments. We would have them maintained on such a scale, that in the event of need they could be expanded to meet the emergency. But of any such immediate need there is no symptom to be detected in any quarter at present. Nay, the language and policy just adopted by powerful oppositions in the French Chambers and in the American Congress, render any serious acts of hostility against this country less probable than they have been for years.

Having breathing time allowed us, therefore, it may be worth while to inquire, in reference to the question of insufficiency, whether by any re-distribution of our land and sea forces our national defences may not be more efficiently provided for than hitherto, with small increase of cost. We cannot say that we thought Mr Cobden very successful in this part of his speech; but that the expense of the army might be reduced and its efficiency increased by confining it to its legitimate duties, we think a plausible argument enough. If, instead of having one half of it permanently quartered in Ireland to enforce the collection of rents by the landlords, and a large proportion in the colonies to uphold very doubtful systems of government, the army were distributed with a view to defence alone, its numbers might surely be made more decidedly available. And so with the navy. If the permanent coast blockade of Western Africa were abandoned as useless, and if we were to cease sending ships to the Tagus to enable the Queen to banish to Africa our own especial friends, we might, with the same number of vessels in commission as at present, better occupy every point required for the protection of our trade and territory. At any rate *prima facie* arguments in abundance have been advanced, to entitle these suggestions to grave consideration.

As to the inability of the people of this country to bear at present any new burdens not inevitable, that unluckily needs no demonstration.

THE BENCHERS OF THE INNER TEMPLE.

The 'Report of the Proceedings before the Judges' on Mr Hayward's Appeal has recently been published, and we are glad it has; for the course pursued by the Benchers is one which every right-thinking man must unequivocally condemn; and it seems morally impossible that so palpable an abuse can be maintained much longer, now that its existence is established by documentary evidence of the clearest kind.

The essential facts lie within a small compass. Each of the four Inns of Court is governed by a select body (from twenty-five to fifty) called Benchers, who are precisely analogous to the Fellows of a College, except that they live less together and have more important duties to perform. They possess the exclusive privilege of calling to the Bar, and exercise judicial authority in all cases of discipline or professional honour. The office, therefore, is strictly of a public character; and the Benchers of the two Temples hold the whole of their large property under a grant from the Crown (6 Jac. 1) in trust for the profession. The elective power is vested in the body itself: but the custom, time immemorial, has been for every barrister receiving the rank of Queen's Counsel or a patent of precedence to be made a Bencher of his Inn; and this custom has been the principal means of preserving what still remains of the original character of the institution; for the discretionary choice of the body (as shown in the last number of the *Law Magazine*) has almost always fallen on retired barristers of social habits, or on men of rank and influence who are only nominally connected with the bar. At Lincoln's Inn, Gray's Inn, and the Middle Temple, the votes are given openly, and the majority decide. At the Inner Temple it was the practice to subject the claimant to a ballot, in which a single black-ball excluded; but, whatever the origin of this practice, the impropriety of indulging private animosities in the administration of a trust is so obvious, that it had long come to be regarded as a mere form; and the professional understanding was that it was never to be used arbitrarily.

In this state of things Mr Hayward received his silk gown, and claimed the customary appendage of his rank. He was duly proposed at the Bench of the Inner Temple by Sir George Rose and Sir F. Thesiger, balloted for, and black-balled. Mr Roebuck told Sir George Rose, before the ballot, that he meant to black-ball Mr Hayward (a circumstance of which Mr H. was not informed till afterwards), and avowed subsequently that he had black-balled him; alleging a quarrel in 1832 as the ground. As Mr Roebuck has not attempted to support or even authenticate his version of this (as Serjeant Talfourd justly characterizes it) very trumpery affair, it need not be discussed. It is sufficient to say that the Benchers refused to give up their ballot; that Mr Hayward appealed to the Judges as visitors of the Inns; and that they delivered a judgment, which (after negating the legal right of Queen's Counsel) concludes thus: "But they (the Judges) all think that the mode of election, by which a single black-ball may exclude, is unreasonable; and they strongly recommend the Benchers of the Inner Temple in future to conduct their elections to the Bench on some more satisfactory principle."

The modified tone of this judgment, compared with the strong remarks made by some of their lordships during the argument, may be in part accounted for by the fact that five of the eleven Judges who signed it had been Benchers of this very Inn. Still the practice (the cause of all the mischief) was condemned, and perhaps the Judges thought that the Benchers would gladly avail themselves of the opportunity of getting rid of a dangerous and utterly indefensible anomaly. But the *esprit de corps* was roused; and under the influence of feelings which should be uniformly suppressed, they enacted a new by-law: "That in future no one shall be elected to the Bench of the Inner Temple unless he obtain the votes of a majority of the existing Benchers, and that four black-balls shall be sufficient to exclude." There are twenty-eight existing Benchers, so that fifteen votes must be obtained; and as fifteen or sixteen is an average attendance, one might still exclude. The majority of those present elect at the other Inns, and in all other collegiate or corporate bodies. It is also a recognized principle of law, that when the trust is of a public or general character, the majority of the trustees decide; and some of the Judges intimated a strong opinion that a body like the Bench could not legally adopt a different course. The decision, therefore, is evaded in spirit as well as in letter, and the recommendation is entirely disregarded; for no one pretends to say that there is the slightest difference in principle between the new by-law and the old.

The spirit by which the body are likely to be actuated in their elections for some time to come, may be collected from the tone of their mouth-piece, the late Sir Charles Wetherall, and his successor, Sir F. Thesiger. The latter plainly says (*Rep.* p. 140) that Lord Mansfield's injunction to public trustees—"to be fair, candid, and unprejudiced, not arbitrary, capricious, or biassed; much less warped by resentment or personal dislike"—is inapplicable to a body like the Bench, who have only their own pleasure to consult; and as to considerations of fitness, in the very letter to Mr Hayward in which he justifies the continued exclusion on the ground that it is now necessary to promote the "comfort and harmony" of his colleagues (who have caused the whole mischief by upholding the bad by-law), he says: "When you obtained your silk gown, and the period arrived for considering your call to the Bench, having known you for many years, and believing you to be in every respect entitled to admission amongst us, I willingly undertook (I believe unsolicited) the duty of seconding your nomination." Sir F. Thesiger might have gone still further; for it is only bare justice to say that

Mr Hayward's familiarity with foreign systems and general jurisprudence (shown by his juridical writings) peculiarly qualify him to be a useful member of a body who are (or ought to be) about to co-operate in establishing an improved system of legal education and remodelling the faulty constitution of the Bar. According to Sir F. Thesiger's doctrine, no wrong of the kind should ever be remedied, and to resist injustice is to justify it.

In the middle of one of Serjeant Talfourd's admirable speeches, Baron Alderson pointedly inquired whether the same principle of exclusion was to be extended to calls to the Bar, or where it was to stop? Where, indeed? Why should not a similar *reto* on the appointment of a new colleague be claimed by the members of all public boards (as the Treasury, the Admiralty, the Horse Guards, &c.); or by the Judges; or by the Bishops, who might have been saved the discredit of an open responsible opposition to Dr Hampden, had they been allowed to black-ball him? But further argument would be wasted on so clear a question; and the Benchers of the Inner Temple must know by this time, that they are discrediting the Judges, lowering the profession, impairing the stability of all the Inns, trifling away their character as a body, and even bringing their own individual conduct and motives under suspicion, for no earthly purpose but to avoid the acknowledgment of a notorious error, or maintain during a brief interval a system which, the moment any one thinks proper to mention it in either House of Parliament, must be put down.

THE COURT OF JENNERS.

The Court of Arches is a Court impersonal. In other courts the judge frequently speaks of himself, but in the Court of Arches the President's name is never heard, it is the Court that feels this and that, and does this and that. The Court was the other day "disgusted," and more recently it was "indignant;" but a Court should know only one mood, that of justice, and the calmness and dispassionateness belonging to it. Disgust and indignation should be utterly foreign to the feelings of a Court.

But this Court of Arches is unlike any other Court. It is a Court with a large family tree planted in it. The Court has a son a Proctor, another an Advocate; it has a son-in-law brother-in-law of a party in a suit, and two sons who are indebted to the same party for hospitality. There is no other Court that presents such delightful domestic features. You are in that Court in the bosom of a family amongst whom reign the most perfect concord. They are all Proctors, Advocates, &c., as like as so many peas. Take care, therefore, not to mistake the Judge for the Advocate, or the Advocate for the Judge. The Judge speaks in the name of the Court, because of the number of the Jenners, whose name is Legion. He is called Fust Jenner, a corruption of First Jenner, to signify that he stands first on the family list; but to tell who is last Jenner would require a vast deal of counting, for there are Jenners without end in that Court. The Court has ceased to be known and described as the Court of Arches (an unmeaning name), it is now called the Court of Jenners.

THE LATE MIRFIELD MURDERS.—The facts connected with these atrocious murders have engaged so much of the public attention that it is unnecessary to recount the particulars; but it may be remarked that the strong evidence which was adduced to prove the innocence of McCabe, coupled with the dying declaration of Patrick Reid that he (McCabe) had nothing to do with the murder, led to the general supposition that McCabe would be liberated from prison so soon as the facts connected with the trial had engaged Sir George Grey's attention. Anxious to know the intention of the Home Secretary with respect to the prisoner, his friends made application to the right honourable baronet, requesting information on the subject. To this application the following reply has been received:—"Whitehall, Feb. 1, 1848. Sir,—I am directed by Secretary Sir George Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st ult., respecting the case of Michael McCabe, who was convicted at the winter assizes, holden in the county of York in December last, of murder, and sentenced to death; and I am to acquaint you that since the trial the case of McCabe has been frequently under the consideration of the judge who tried the prisoner, and he is of opinion that McCabe was a participator in the crime to some extent, and has recommended that his sentence should be commuted to transportation for life, and that Sir George Grey has, therefore, recommended the prisoner to her Majesty for the grant of a pardon, on that condition.—I am, sir, your obedient servant, S. M. PHILLIPS."—*Morning Chronicle*.

[It is possible that this may be a right decision, but we entertain very serious doubts of it. At the trial, the Judge whose authority is here relied on charged strongly for McCabe's acquittal; the prisoner executed for the murder repeatedly and solemnly declared all absence of guilty knowledge or participation in his fellow convict; and if any fresh evidence against McCabe has since been obtained, the public ought to be put in possession of it. They will not be satisfied with the decision as it stands. If necessary, we will reproduce the principal points of evidence in the case, and show how strongly they corroborate the presumption of entire innocence in the poor friendless creature whom it is the present intention of the Home Office to visit with the strange mercy of a punishment only short of Death.—Ed. Ex.]

THE LITERARY EXAMINER.

Memoir of the Life of Elizabeth Fry, with Extracts from her Letters and Journals. Edited by Two of her Daughters. Gilpin.

We have little to add on the appearance of the concluding volume of this book, to the remarks suggested by the first volume. We could have wished something more definite and palpable in the biographical details. The incidents even of Mrs Fry's life, and in a still greater degree those which befel her friends and relatives, are rather hinted at than related. We can understand the delicacy which has deterred two ladies from being more specific, though we regret that we in consequence obtain mere shadowy glimpses of Mrs Fry and the familiar circle within which she moved—a society of which a clear graphic account could not fail to have been both pleasing and instructive.

SPORTING INTELLIGENCE.

TATTERSALL'S, Thursday.—LIVERPOOL STEEPLE CHASE.—500 to 25 agst Sir Arthur (t).
NEWMARKET STEEPLE CHASE.—500 to 100 agst Eagle (t), offers to take 7 to 1 about Profligate.

Commerce and Trade.

THE FUNDS.

MONDAY.—Consols opened at 89 1/4 for the account, and 89 1/2 for money, and fell to 89 1/4 for account, and 89 1/2 for money. They rallied, however, towards the close of the day, and left off at 89 1/2 for account, and 89 1/2 for money.

BANK OF ENGLAND.

An Account, pursuant to the Act 7th and 8th Victoria, cap. 32, for the week ending on Saturday, the 29th day of January, 1848.

ISSUE DEPARTMENT.

Table with columns for £ and Government Debt, Old Securities, Gold Coin and Bullion, Silver Bullion.

BANKING DEPARTMENT.

Table with columns for £ and Proprietors' Capital, Reserves, Public Deposits, Exchequer, Savings Banks, Commissioners of National Debt, and Dividend Accounts.

RAILWAYS AND PUBLIC COMPANIES.

Table with columns for SHARES, RAILWAYS, PAID, and CLOSING PRICES. Lists various railway companies and their share prices.

PUBLIC COMPANIES. Table listing various public companies and their share prices, including Australasia Bank, London Joint Stock Co., National Provincial Do., etc.

SMITHFIELD MARKET. MONDAY.—The arrivals of foreign meat into the port of London during the past week have been exceedingly limited, owing to the prevalence of frost on the Continent.

Table with columns for Prices per Stone and At Market. Lists prices for Beef, Mutton, Veal, Pork, and Lamb.

HOP MARKET. MONDAY.—The market continues firm, and prices remain without any alteration. The demand seems to run upon the fine samples more particularly.

COAL MARKET. MONDAY.—Prices of Coals per ton at the close of the market:—Adair's Main 16s 6d, Original Tanfield 14s 0d, Haswell 23s 6d, etc.

CORN EXCHANGE, Monday.—On Friday we had intense frost, which gave way on Saturday to a rapid thaw; and we had torrents of rain during last night and this morning.

Table with columns for Wheat, Barley, Oats, Malt, and Flour. Lists prices for various types of grain and flour.

CORN EXCHANGE, Friday.—The weather is milder, we had white frost this morning with south-westerly wind, and it now rains slightly. The arrivals are short.

Into London from Jan. 30, to Feb. 3, both inclusive. Table with columns for Wheat, Barley, Oats, Malt, Flour.

Table with columns for Gazette Averages, Wheat, Barley, Oats, Rye, Beans, Peas.

Week ended Feb. 3. Six Weeks (Governs Duty). No Duties payable till March 1.

Hay and Straw, per load of 36 trusses. Hay 3l. 0s. 0d. to 3l. 10s. 0d. | Clover 4l. 0s. 0d. to 4l. 15s. 0d. | Straw 1l. 0s. 0d. to 1l. 6s. 0d.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

BANKRUPTCIES ANNULLED.

G. Holland, Portway, Warwickshire, licensed victualler.—J. Stringer, Kingston-upon-Hull, draper.—J. Hall, Coventry, riband manufacturer.

25 BANKRUPTS.

W. Wyatt, Neithrop, Banbury, Oxfordshire, coachmaker. [Sharp, Vernian buildings, Gray's Inn.] J. Clayton, Crown court, Cheapside, Manchester warehouseman. [Teague, Crown court, Cheapside.]

CERTIFICATES to be granted, unless cause be shown to the contrary, on the day of meeting.

February 21, J. Edwards, Nag's Head court, Gracechurch street, ironmonger (and not J. Edwards, Upper Stamford street, Blackfriars, corn merchant, as advertised in last Friday's 'Gazette').—February 22, J. Baines, Whitechapel road, baker.

CERTIFICATES to be granted by the Court of Review, unless cause be shown to the contrary on or before February 22.

J. Parfitt, High street, Newington, draper.—G. A. Sear, Great Marylebone street, St. Marylebone, glass cutter.—C. Proctor, Witham, Essex, wine merchant.—W. F. Merritt, Greenwich, draper.—W. Newson, St. Mary axe, merchant.—J. Riley, Pilkington, cotton manufacturer.—F. Rippingale, Ordsall, Nottinghamshire, auctioneer.

SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS.

ST. J. Houston, Auchtermuchty, Fifeshire, manufacturer.—R. Craig, Edinburgh, tailor.—T. Burns, Edinburgh, writer to the signet.—D. Hall, Cambusnethan, Lanarkshire, merchant.—W. Moffatt, Glasgow, merchant.—J. Blair, Paisley, manufacturer.—J. G. Peebles, Glasgow, commission agent.—A. Cay, Edinburgh, stockbroker.—J. Ross, Edinburgh, commission agent.—A. Coupar, sen. St. Andrew's, shoemaker.—J. Inglis, Edinburgh, leather factor.

WAR-OFFICE, February 4.

Scots Fusilier Guards—Ensign and Lieut. the Hon. E. K. W. Coke to be Lieut. and Capt. by purchase, vice Brevet Major the Hon. D. H. Murray, who retires; the Hon. A. Vernon to be Ensign and Lieut. by purchase, vice Coke.

OFFICE OF ORDNANCE, February 2.

Corps of Royal Sappers and Miners—Serjeant Major J. Jones to be Quartermaster, vice Hilton, retired on full-pay.

ADMIRALTY, January 30.

The following promotions have this day taken place, consequent upon the death of Rear Admiral P. Stoddart: Rear Admiral of the Blue C. F. Daly, C.B., to be Rear Admiral of the White. Capt. Hon. G. A. Crofton to be Rear Admiral of the Blue.

BANKRUPTCY ANNULLED.

J. Belling, Fore street, Bodmin, Cornwall, watchmaker.

28 BANKRUPTS.

J. Garrett and F. H. Phillips, St. Pancras Saw Mills, Cambridge street, Old St Pancras road, saw mill proprietors. [Chilcote, George street, Mansion House.] G. Freeman, White cottage, Southampton street, Camberwell, dealer in colonial produce. [Shaw, Fish-street Hill.]

CERTIFICATES to be granted, unless cause be shown to the contrary, on the day of meeting.

February 25, S. Lawford, Church street, Luton, Bedfordshire, straw plait dealer.—February 25, W. Silcock, Inn, Crawley street, Oakley square, victualler.—February 25, R. Hattam, Saxmundham, Suffolk, draper.—February 25, E. Robinson, Ipswich, Suffolk, draper.—February 25, J. Hills, Billeray, Essex, auctioneer.—February 25, T. Pope, Kildbrooke, near Blackheath, Kent, cowkeeper.—February 24, G. Tattersall, Davies street, Berkeley square, saddler.—February 25, H. E. Field, Mark lane, eating house keeper.—February 25, E. Rose, Road, Northamptonshire, licensed victualler.—February 28, W. H. and J. E. Hitchcock and W. Connor, Broadwalk, Stamford street, Blackfriars road, saw mill proprietors.—February 25, H. Smith, East Malling, Kent, paper manufacturer.—February 25, J. Hill, Southampton, builder.—February 25, J. Hyams, Jewry street, Aldgate, City, watchmaker.—February 25, T. W. Crowhurst, Bristol, grocer.—February 28, W. Hodgson, jun. Leeds, Yorkshire, licensed victualler.—February 29, C. H. Fereday, Tettenhall, Staffordshire, coal dealer.—February 28, E. Wallington, Stockport, Chester, carpenter.—February 28, W. Smith, Colne, Lancashire, cotton manufacturer.—February 26, D. Greenwood and J. Batesman, Bury, Lancashire, joiners.

CERTIFICATES to be granted by the Court of Review, unless cause be shown to the contrary on or before February 25.

T. Ryland, Birmingham, Britannia metal worker.—W. L. Ryland, Birmingham, Britannia metal worker.—W. H. Hill, Walsall, Staffordshire, merchant.—T. Sampson, Nailsworth, Gloucestershire, grocer.—J. F. Kemp, Uxbridge, grocer.—I. Williams, Merthyr Tydfil, Glamorganshire, grocer.—W. C. Wells, Clarendon terrace, Pentonville, merchant.—J. Burnett, Sunderland, hosier.—W. Wayne, Basford, Nottinghamshire, ironfounder.—J. Nicholls, Bristol, mason.—J. Baker, Redcliff hill, Bristol, grocer.—J. Lawton, Heywood within Heap, Lancashire, grocer.—E. Winscom, Southampton, pastrycook.

SCOTCH SEQUESTRATIONS.

B. Martin, Meikle Kilcattan, Kingarth, farmer.—A. D. Campbell, Glasgow, merchant.—P. Grassick, Glenlogie, Aberdeenshire, farmer.—M. Inglis, Edinburgh, stockbroker.—J. M'Gill, Glasgow, provision merchant.—J. Reid, Anderson of Glasgow, bricklayer.

Births.

MEIK—January 26, at Teignmouth, the lady of Captain F. T. Meik, H. P. 16th Lancers, of a daughter. MILBANK—January 28, in Chapel street, Grosvenor square, the Lady Margaret Milbank, of a daughter. TREVOR—January 29, at the Rhyssant, near Oswestry, the lady of E. S. R. Trevor, Esq., of a daughter. EVERARD—January 30, at Claybrooke hall, the lady of H. Everard, Esq., of a son and heir. SMEE—January 31, at Ockley, Surrey, the lady of Lieut.-Col. Walter Smeé, of the Bombay Army, of a daughter. SUTHERLAND—February 3, at Stafford house, the Duchess of Sutherland, of a daughter.

