

DA

536

Pauly

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.

Chap. DA 536

Shelf P2 U7

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

THE QUEEN

AND

THE PREMIER.

A STATEMENT OF

THEIR STRUGGLE AND ITS RESULTS.

SECOND EDITION.

BY DAVID URQUHART.

The Prime Minister of England, the leader of the House of Commons, is also at this moment the complete representative of the feeling and spirit of the English people.—*Times*, January 22nd, 1855.



LONDON:

D. BRYCE, 48, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1857.

DASBC
P227

NOTICE.

Whatever interest may belong to the following pages is concentrated in the description, contained in the Appendix, of the pains and sorrows of a Prime Minister, sketched by LORD JOHN RUSSELL once, but since forgotten; and which seems not even to have been seized at the time by the public in its romantic aspect.

PREFACE.

THE following pages have been in type for many months, the impression having been delayed from time to time, awaiting, like another commodity, the demand. It was a solution that they offered, but it was valueless until the question was asked. While the nation was still unconscious of the greatness it had conferred upon a single man, was dazzled with his supremacy, pleased with its exercise, and content with their abjection, they could be told nothing. The anticipated time seems now to have arrived; the word "enigma" has risen to the lips of men.

On the occasion of the Premier's visit to Liverpool, a local paper expressed itself as follows. The words may stand as an explanation of this pamphlet, the publication of which they have prompted, and which now appears without the alteration of a word from the hour it was written;—that was, while the cannon of the lines of Sebastopol were pouring forth their thunders, and the sounds of peaceful commerce alone were heard on the quays of Odessa.

Born, as it were, for party, formed for party, devoted to party, employed by all parties for the last half century, because useful to all in the sense that Talleyrand was indispensable to countless consecutive governments, and faithful to each for the time being, he has been the destroyer of party; has risen to the utmost attainable altitude on the ruins of party; and now, alone, of all men in our history, holds the first place in England, and the place of the first subject in Europe, not in virtue of party strength, but in right of that party feebleness which he himself has mainly wrought. How he has wrought it is the great enigma, insoluble to the present, and probably undeterminable by posterity. It has not only not been through Court favour, but in spite of it. It has not only not been through popular favour, but in spite of it. It has not only not been through Parliamentary favour, but in spite of it also. Nor can it be said that it has been in consequence of a *prestige* derivable from the exhibition of commanding talents in that arena which challenges universal notice; for though never out of the Legislature a single session for fifty years, he had nearly reached the age of fifty, that is, was as old as Mr. Gladstone at the present moment, before being suspected, even in the House of Commons, of intellectual equality with the Ryders, Robinsons, Wynns, Grants, Herries, Goulburns, and other unremembered mediocrities, among whom he had passed his youth and prime. Nor, yet again, have his been the advantages of reflected power, springing from political associates. Quite the contrary. In the first fervour of the first Reform Bill, *his* Tory antecedents, as the colleague of Perceval, Sidmouth, Castlereagh, and all the obscurantists and obstructives of the then expiring generation of placemen, marked *him*

for the distrust of the Liberals and the obloquy of those whose creed he had apostatized. So with the creation of the kingdom of Belgium, and the other acts in reference to Poland and elsewhere, consequent upon the revolutions of the time. The odium of his vassalage to Aberdeen and other Metternich tools of the Holy Alliance, tainted all his professions with fears of sinister bias;—a fear by no means extinct yet. This distracted, broke up, and prevented the formation of several Liberal, or at least Whig Cabinets, including that which should and would have anticipated Peel's in Free Trade. So again in regard to that measure, Lord Palmerston alone, of all the Whigs, not excepting his brother-in-law, Melbourne, was believed to be secretly wedded to restriction, although he proposed the 8s. duty as a desperate expedient to retain office long after all respect due to office had fled. We find the followers of Bentinck very lately calculating on the same sort of aid to the "landed interest" at the hands of the noble member for Tiverton as was given to some of the "adjustment" crotchets of Mr. Disraeli by the member for Oxford University. One other and most striking instance of the exceptional position of Lord Palmerston was his conduct in reference to the *coup d'état*—his instantaneous and ostentatious approbation of an act that revolted the whole sense of this country, scandalized his colleagues, shocked the Queen, and led to his expulsion from office under circumstances that seemed to render his return utterly impossible. Finally, Lord Palmerston is the only man in England who has always, till comparatively the other day, been the target of the press of his own party ever since he has been conspicuous enough to challenge its aim. Amidst all the official mutations of Whiggery, and of the press in connexion with it, the noble lord has been the invariable *bête noir* of the printers. Greys, Elliots, Russells, Melbournes, Broughams, have all been praised lavishly and for long together; but the praise has ever been qualified by some reference deploring the fatuity or rebuking the criminality of association with the incorrigible Foreign Secretary. For some time back, as all the world knows, this strain has been dropped, and the contrary adopted; but the change in the tone of expression does not alter the facts, if facts they were, and there has been no retractation if they were not. No public man, no public journal, has said in '56 that Lord Palmerston was not what he was declared to be in '51, or any year of the preceding twenty. On the contrary, there are those, and not insignificant, who, since their adherence in the matter of Pacifico, have modified their zeal in consequence of his proceedings in regard to Italy and Hungary, and his treatment of the representatives of their wrongs, leaving out of the question altogether his identification with the Prætorian policy on which the reigning dynasty of France is based.

It would be difficult to imagine more numerous, or seemingly more insurmountable, obstacles to the acquisition of *supreme power* than those enumerated.

THE QUEEN AND THE PREMIER.

THE WAR AND THE MONARCHY.

Some time ago, the nation was informed by the *Times*, that another winter like the last (1854), and the existence, not of the Government, but of the Monarchy, would be in danger.

Such a proposition, uttered by an individual, would class him amongst inoperative visionaries; made by an enemy, it would indicate a rancour that might be despised, or a depth that was terrible. Made by the organ of the public opinion of the nation itself—it is, at least, worth considering.

In its naked form, the proposition is this. The sceptre of England is to be broken on the fortress of Sebastopol. Does the case admit of such a result? Let us see.

The war is with a country possessing no direct means whatever of injuring England; with a country over which England possesses the most absolute control through her trade; with a country destitute of financial power; how, then, can there be a question even of defeat, much less of the downfall of the Monarchy?

In this war England is not a principal; she is but the ally of another state. Before her war commenced, Russia had been beaten by that state: England had France for an ally; how, then, could there be consequences to place the existence of our institutions in jeopardy?

But the proposition of the *Times*, enunciated after a year of war, was only the repetition of what had been stated before the war commenced by persons whose attention had been given to the subject, and who had the opportunity of acquiring information upon it, by having been the agents of the policy of England in the East within the twenty years which preceded the event. Two of these have announced conclusions similar to those of the *Times*, and on the grounds—First, that the war was not just; secondly, that it was not necessary. If these data be correct, the conclusion is no way extravagant. A war unjust and unnecessary may lead to the extinction of an empire, however great its resources and numerous its allies.

The injustice of the war is a proposition distasteful, but not abstruse. It could be just only by Russia's violation of her

engagements, and the adoption of legal measures on the part of England on such violation. There is no one who is not aware that England did not take grounds on the violation of the Turkish territory, which act henceforward could not be counted on as the grounds of a just war.

The second proposition is equally unpalatable and equally incontrovertible. There could be no necessity for a war to protect Turkey when the Turkish arms had triumphed.

The management of a war so commenced can be easily anticipated. Those who, knowing the case beforehand, were in a position to mark the avoidance by the English Government of protesting against Russia's act, also knew of the powerlessness of Russia to injure Turkey, and understood why succour was delayed first, and sent afterwards. It was, therefore, easy for them to say, "your army will never return."

The management of the war consisted in leaving Turkey unaided, whilst there was a hope of her being broken by the arms of Russia; then changing it from defensive for Turkey to aggressive against Russia. The distinction has been accurately drawn by Lord PALMERSTON between the weakness of Russia for attack, and her power for defence. His picture was drawn before the events which have verified it. After she had been beaten by the Turks, nothing more remained to be done. Her armies were dislodged, and could not return. Turkey did not require, even if she aimed at the extinction of the Russian power, to move a single regiment. She had but to maintain the state of war, as a consequence to keep the Dardanelles closed, and thus to place Russia between extinction and the acceptance of equitable conditions of peace. From this predicament the Allies relieved Russia by delivering over the Danubian Principalities to Austria, by compromising in her territories their own armies, and by keeping the Dardanelles open for her trade.

But it was not merely that the war was changed for her from an aggressive one, which she could no longer make, to a defensive one, where she recovered all her power: the Allies went further; they make their aggressive war against the points which she had prepared for their reception, not against the points which were vulnerable to their attack. They cast their forces against Sebastopol, and they spared Odessa. The effect, as regards England, has been the exposed, or supposed, inability of her maritime power to coerce Russia, and the loss of nearly 70,000 men out of 80,000, which, as the French official organ stated, "had been collected from Britain's vast possessions;" the shutting up of one-half of her naval force in a close sea, the key of which is in the hands of France; an interminable and hopeless war upon our

hands; and bread, at the close of the harvest, at 80s. a quarter.*

The loss of an army or two, the sacrifice of a hundred millions of money, the sacrifice of a fleet or two, the high price of bread, and even the stoppage of the Bank, would not be in themselves grounds for predicting the fall of the Monarchy. If these events occurred at the close of a war, undertaken for the defence of the realm, and conducted with political talent, military energy, and public resolution, the energies of the people could only be developed thereby, and the internal social bond more strongly united. But occurring in the course of a war in itself unjust and unnecessary, and the injustice and needlessness of which must at some point come to be fully apprehended, the warning of the *Times* ceases to have those vague and visionary characters under which they were at first shrouded.

At first sight it might appear that the public indignation would fail to attain to the highest persons of the realm, and this being a constitutional country, would concentrate itself on the Minister. But a little reflection will convince any man that the reverse must happen. It is true that we are a constitutional country, but we are also a people ruled by public opinion; we are constitutional against the Crown; we are public opinion for the Minister. Public opinion the Minister can manufacture.

So soon as the nation is prepared to utter with indignation the cry, "Why has Odessa been spared?" it will be intimated that, after all, the position of the Minister was very difficult; that he had been obliged to submit to dynastic influences, and that tenderness towards our foe was the result of Coburg and Prussian alliances.†

* The hopelessness of the war is shown by the capitulations of Paris; its interminability by the new war called "with Persia," but really with Russia.—*Note added December, 1856.*

† Have her Majesty's Government, then, not enough of guilt and responsibility already resting on their heads, that they must needs go out of their way to deepen the indignation of the public, by gratuitously making a mockery of the national feeling on the subject of sparing Odessa?

We do not imagine that the extraordinary conduct of Ministers is to be accounted for in this way. There are reasons for that conduct—reasons why Odessa has been spared, which have not yet been brought before the public, and which have been guessed at only by a few. But those reasons must be brought out. They must be dragged from the dark recesses of the council-room, and exhibited in the broad light of day. Let the people only persist in demanding to know the reasons why Odessa is spared, and know them we will. When the demand is made by the whole nation, speaking simultaneously, it must be attended to. No Minister dares refuse to comply with the request. Public opinion may be disregarded for a time, but it will not be so long. No one knows better than Lord PALMERSTON does, that public feeling cannot be always defied with impunity.

The ground thus laid,—disasters accumulated—suspicions awakened—patience exhausted—new wars sprung up—revolutions breaking out—the crowning disaster coming of rupture with France—and the same process of interpretation being repeated on each occasion, will not a frenzied people be ready to cry, “a torch for Buckingham Palace?”

THE PRINCE CONSORT AS PRIVY COUNCILLOR.

In itself, no doubt, the city of the bleak Sarmatian wastes was sufficiently innocent of any design hostile to the Imperial dynasty of these realms; and yet the connection is indubitable between the circumstances of the one and the fate of the other. The connection did not reside in what Odessa could do, or in what Odessa was; but in what could be done with it. Not what its own proprietor the Czar could do with it, but what an English Minister could do with it. Not even what he could do with it, but what he did not do with it. Odessa was spared.

In like manner, the arsenal fortress of Crim Tartary was, in itself, no less innocent than the city of Ovid, nor could it have been rendered noxious to any one, far less to the Queen of England and her crown, by anything that its master could make of it; it became dangerous only when made use of by the English Minister. Sebastopol was attacked.

The Consort of our British Queen might be equally innocent and equally nugatory with Odessa and Sebastopol, and yet be used like the one and the other by the English Minister. Prince ALBERT was made to speak.

At the Trinity House, Prince ALBERT uttered words conveying an identification of the views of the Queen with the policy of Lord

We have our theory on the subject. That theory forces itself on our mind with resistless conviction. We find a solution, perfectly satisfactory to ourselves, in the pro-Russianism which exists in the Court and councils of Queen VICTORIA. Germanism and pro-Russianism are convertible terms. The reason why Odessa is spared is to be sought for in the vicinity of the Throne itself. Alas for that Throne, as well as for England, that such an influence should have acquired so close a proximity to the person of the Sovereign. The country has cause to regret the circumstance now, because the want of earnestness and honesty in carrying on the war, and which is attributable to the same cause, has already brought deep disgrace and great disaster to the nation. The time is not distant when those in high places will have equal cause with the people to rue the day that this pro-Russian influence ever was introduced into this country in the person of one who, equally as a matter of sound policy and of good feeling, ought never to have taken any part whatever in political affairs. It is not long since we were told that constitutional government was on its trial in this country. In return, we may apprise the party who uttered that sentiment, that the conduct of certain persons has put monarchical institutions on their trial also.—*Morning Advertiser*, Oct. 22, 1855.

PALMERSTON, condemnatory of the existing form of Government, and holding up as a model for our imitation the despotisms as at present existing on the Continent, and urging as an argument for the immediate adoption of such model the difficulty or impossibility of dragging the country through the perils of the present war save by that reform.

These words uttered in the presence of the Prime Minister, must have been the embodying of *his sentiments*, and in as far as they produced contempt or indignation, ought to have concentrated these feelings on that Prime Minister. The effect was different. The people of this country are not in the habit of reasoning to a conclusion, or tracing sequences backwards; the contempt and indignation was for the Prince, and through him for the Crown.

The nation did not know what were the abstract opinions of the Queen in matters of form of Government, and with their uncritical habits had herein grounds for assuming these opinions to be those of the Queen. But the nation did know that the statement in the first part of Prince ALBERT's speech was false, for the Queen had once dismissed Lord PALMERSTON by the direct interposition of her own prerogative, an act of energy too remarkable to pass unobserved, even in these sluggish times, and which has no parallel in our history for 200 years. It was further known that the Queen had resisted to the last the appointment of Lord PALMERSTON as Premier, and a letter of hers had been produced to Parliament in the beginning of 1852, by the then Prime Minister, conveying by implication the charge that Lord PALMERSTON had deceived her, had filched her approbation to measures not understood, and had changed the character of measures when approved. After reading the letter to the House, the then Prime Minister stated that Lord PALMERSTON had repeated the offence under circumstances of deeper aggravation, and that, in doing so, "he had stepped by the Crown, and had put himself in place of the Crown."

These facts being known, what was to be inferred from Prince ALBERT's identification of himself with Lord PALMERSTON? Either that Prince ALBERT had confederated with Lord PALMERSTON to coerce the Queen, or that Lord PALMERSTON had coerced Prince ALBERT.

The first alternative is inadmissible; the second may be difficult to admit, but there is no other solution. The difficulty in admitting it arises, however, solely from the ignorance that prevails regarding the history of England at the present time. We propose to narrate what Lord PALMERSTON has done with Prince ALBERT, and the reader will then be able to apply to the process

the term he likes, and so fit the antecedents to the speech at the Trinity House, whether uttered by Prince ALBERT, or made for him.*

From the time when the factions began alternately to rule, the Royal power had to be put down, no less than the popular liberties. Each successively cloaked itself, in the exercise of its sovereignty, with the name of the King, and one of the factions, the very one which had made the position of faction, gathered round itself the mantle of popular rights. The design of this usurpation was Whig. The Tories were merely suffered, and allowed at intervals to digest the fragments of laws and constitutions which the Whig huntsman had run down. At length, the philosophical party propounded a maxim. "The power of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and has to be abated," which, as Major CARTWRIGHT remarked, "was the veriest insult to the understanding of the people of England, who had nothing to fear from Regal tyranny, but everything to fear from Oligarchic usurpation."

If to become a Minister be an object so attractive that men expend a whole lifetime in its pursuit, sacrifice ease, wealth, domestic ties, principle, honour, and health itself, how much greater must be that of converting the office of Minister into that of Monarch? It is not long since the Secretaries of State were in fact, what still they are in law, mere private clerks of the King. If they have raised themselves to their present authority, starting from that point, what may they not attain to, starting from this? But that authority has been taken from the Monarch. In what predicament then is he to resist further encroachment?

In the last reign, the King had resumed a great portion of his power, internally and externally; in the first case by the balance of the factions, in the second by the knowledge he possessed. The Cabinet was, indeed, for a time superseded, and its members, or at least, the only intellectual member, found himself in that position of constraint and coercion in which hitherto the Crown had been placed by himself and his predecessors.

This action of the Crown depended entirely upon the retention of a functionary through whom it could communicate with its sub-

* The speech was delivered on Saturday. The report appeared only on the subsequent Wednesday, in the *Daily News*, from whence it was copied into the other papers. Persons present state that something in the sense reported was said. An old reporter of the *Times* newspaper declared it to be his conviction that the speech, as printed, bears unmistakable evidence of the hand of Lord PALMERSTON. His words are, "I am as sure it was Lord PALMERSTON'S as if I had taken it down from his own lips." At the dinner Prince ALBERT and Lord PALMERSTON were seated side by side, without a word being exchanged. Prince ALBERT remained mute during the whole of the dinner, and it was observed that from time to time he cast indignant glances at the Premier.

jects independently of the Minister for the time being—a Private Secretary.

On the accession of VICTORIA, the occasion was afforded to the Cabinet for regaining its lost supremacy. Lord PALMERSTON communicated with the head of the opposite faction, the Duke of WELLINGTON; and, he being agreed, the abolition of the office was resolved on, and carried into effect. Not a syllable was uttered on the subject of this revolution.

We had then for Sovereign a woman of an age that would disqualify her in a private station from managing her own affairs. It might be expected that a Minister now having her entirely in his hands, would be able to fashion her completely to his will. Providence had, however, endowed her with a strong mind, and an industrious disposition. She was gifted with a ready wit, and entertained a high sense of the prerogatives and duties of her station, so as fortunately to combine the best and rare qualities of manhood with the facilities which a chivalrous people will grant to a woman, by lenient judgment, even of errors, and enthusiastic support against even the appearance of oppression.

Her quality of woman cast, however, another danger in the path of the Minister. In the Consort whom she selected, she would obtain at least one individual not connected with the factions, at once conversant with measures before they were carried into execution, and possessing a larger scope for intercourse with her subjects than she, under any circumstances, could possess. In fact, the Prince Consort had to be admitted to the *Privy* Council, and could not be excluded from the knowledge, at least, of what was transacted in the *Cabinet* Council.

Prince ALBERT of Coburg was the choice of the Queen, and not the choice of Lord PALMERSTON. There remain to be considered, his talents, character, information, and interests.

In point of natural abilities, no one will contest to the Prince a share above the ordinary average. These abilities have been sedulously cultivated, and the talents and culture of any man whose birth and education connect him with two countries may be considered as doubled. The long and difficult experience he has gone through has left him uncharged with the failings either of rashness or docility. To say this is to establish a claim to a considerable amount of judgment, and we complete the picture by adding industry and versatility. If there be but a meagre aptitude for managing men, and if between him and them there lies the bar of a frigid reserve, he is nevertheless prone to pursue trains of thought, and alert to master facts. When we spoke of information, we meant, of course, not general but special—information upon the subject,

not dreamt of at the time of his espousals, nor for many years afterwards, in which is now understood to reside the qualities and the fate of kingship in England—the dealings of the Russian Cabinet. That Prince ALBERT possessed this information is not to be supposed; it was to be obtained only by a course of study, or by initiation into crime; the first he had not undergone, the second he could not have been subjected to. Had this information been by him possessed, the stream of European history would at this day be running in a smooth current, whilst that of Russia would be dashing over rocks to be lost in sands. Rated, however, by the standard of the statesmen of England, Prince ALBERT stood high, and impositions which passed with them for policy and prudence did not with him pass for sense. Long before the complications in the East arose, he had detected that, in the course pursued by the leading man in England, there was more than the reasons of state of a truly British Minister.

On the occasions when England has been governed by a Queen whose consort belonged to a foreign princely house, or by a Prince who held sway over another realm, we had to guard against, as we suffered from, dynastic interests and influences hostile to the state. In this case, no foreign sovereignty appertained to the husband of the Queen, and we had neither to apprehend the ambition of Madrid, the interests of Amsterdam, nor the influence of Hanover. Prince ALBERT, the younger branch of an insignificant dukedom, husband of England's present sovereign, father of her future kings, *could* have no interest save that of England. Sovereignty in England does not exist on the condition sovereignty on the Continent. The Crown is here the source of no oppression. Against it are arrayed neither open discontent nor hidden conspiracy. Standing apart, as this island does, from the counter-leagues of crowns and nations, Prince ALBERT was not disqualified, as a Councillor of the Crown, by principles any more than by interests.

As regards Russia, he stood peculiarly free, the House of Coburg not being one of the patronised of that power, but, on the contrary, the object of its aversion and persecution. After the events of 1848 it placed itself, on the Eyder, in direct collision with the Court of St. Petersburg, whence that insight into the sinister course pursued by England above referred to.

On these grounds, Prince ALBERT was singularly qualified among the Princes of Europe to occupy his present station, and be an aid, a counsel, and a protection to a Queen ruling a great empire in time of danger; and who, by means of forms to which we are pleased to apply the term constitutional, was circumvented,

secluded, and coerced by the faction in power for the time being, to the extent of being deprived of the faculty possessed by the meanest of her subjects, of asking advice in case of difficulty. For the same reasons was he hateful to Ministers, because interfering with their authority—to the particular Minister, because thwarting his designs.

HISTORIC STRUGGLE BETWEEN MINISTER AND CROWN.

To the complete mind it must be at once evident, that a nation dissatisfied with its own conduct must be ignorant of its own history, for thought is history no less than fact. It is the story of its mind that is told in its events. If the events are displeasing, and yet do occur, it cannot know the reason of them; not because they are concealed, and in such case they are concealed, but because, being published, they could not be understood. The supposition of our possessing a history, is the evidence of our incapability of having one. The words written under that title become a direct and active source in regard to the past, of misconception of the present; if, as DE MAISTRE says, “during the last three centuries history has become a conspiracy against truth,” it is also a conspiracy against men, they themselves being the conspirators. We have not read in our history of ourselves that which has been, and have read that which has not been.

As illustrations, let us select the most signal of those instances which the last three centuries afford, wherein we find combined administrative measures and warlike operations, leaving behind a lesson in dismemberment and debt. We shall first state the case as given by the false history, and then supply the true.

The American war consisted, according to the first, in an armed resistance of the colonies to two bills enacted by Parliament; it was, therefore, a rebellion against the law. The Government was supported by the majority of the English nation; its cause was the supremacy of Parliament, the integrity of the empire, and the authority of the Crown. The injustice of its acts was the plea adopted by the minority that voted against the tea and stamp acts. To this plea they added another: the design of arming the Crown with a power which should render it independent of the Parliament, and dangerous to the rights and liberties of the people. It was in this sense that CHATHAM invoked from Heaven success on the arms of the insurgents. This is history as we read it; in other words, the notions of men for the time.

The other history tells us that the war was made in furtherance of Ministerial power. This is demonstrated to any one who can reason to a conclusion on two facts which are known: first, that

the united colonies did appeal to the Crown against the Parliament, and that the Minister for the time being was the nominee of the Parliament, not of the Crown. Our loyal colonies have been driven into revolt—the armies of England exposed to defeat—the sweat of the artizan wrung from him in taxes—those splendid possessions severed from the British Crown—a debt of 100 millions imposed on generations unborn—a war provoked with France, ending in the convulsion of that country, and thirty years of general European strife, accumulating upon England near 500 millions more, and leaving upon us at this moment the penalty of about twenty millions annual expenditure, only because the Ministerial feelings were unknown. All this happened because the originating portion of history was suppressed, and its enacting portion alone published.

This is patent to the complete mind. It is the inference, as immediate as indubitable, from the step taken by the colonies, and the source of the nomination of the Minister. To such a mind, "not a word has to be added. But such minds are rare, and when men are deficient in penetration, they cry for facts; yet none can be afforded them. The acting powers of nature,—and what is man, even in his most artificial state, but nature's most perfect mechanism?—are always mysteries, and yield their secret only to the powerful compulsion of pains-taking and orderly genius. In such a case as this, concealment is superadded; it is the very condition by which ends are accomplished: the governing system had been already through centuries adapted to this very end, namely, that of concentrating the power of action, and concealing the acting hand,—a process the reverse of which must have been followed with honest dealing, and a system which, being established, argues false dealing in every act.

But in transactions of such magnitude, calling for so many and such contradictory processes, where difficulties diverse and objections discordant had to be overcome and answered, and where, above all, the agents were secure in the sense of their own power, and the unconsciousness of all around them, it is to be expected that exposures should occur which scrutinising industry might afterwards make its own. Such an instance did arise in the course of these proceedings, and from the very lips of the Minister comes the clearest revelation that words can convey.

On the 27th of November, 1781, Lord NORTH replied to the taunts of the Opposition, that the object of the Government had been to add to the power and influence of the Crown:—

Had that been our object, we have thrown away and rejected the opportunity. It is not the prerogative of the Crown, but the claims of Parliament, that America has resisted. It was, to preserve the supremacy of Parliament,

and to maintain its just rights and privileges, that we forbore the offer of advancing one branch of the Legislature to the dominion of America, independent of the other two.

Take down the cajolery addressed to the assembly around him of the supremacy of Parliament, and put in its place *his* domination of Parliament, because its nominee. Take down the contemptuous hoax of a domination for the Crown in America; and what have you got in this sentence, save the avowal that the war was made by means of a Parliamentary crime, to deprive the Crown of the power of doing justice to its subjects in America, on their appeal. Lord NORTH places the question as between the Crown and the two branches of the Legislature. Had the Lords any thing to do with the Money Bill, which had produced the rebellion? Could Lord NORTH be mistaken on such a point? Here, then, is artifice, and in this alone the case is proved—artifice in a Minister, successful with the nation—the nation is in his hands. The majority of the House of Commons has made him; he uses that majority to unmake the Crown. He, the Minister of the Crown, avows that his object is not to increase its power and influence. Whose Minister, then, is he? Can it be his object to increase the power of the House of Commons? No; it is his own power and influence; a power and influence to be converted into “dominion,” not over America, but over England; over the House of Commons, of which he is the nominee; over the Crown, of which he is the servant.

The next great event in our history is equally illustrative of this truth. We refer to the UNION OF IRELAND.

The false history refers that event to a principle, the principle of centralization. There has passed into it dark suspicion of proceedings by no means to be squared with the maxims or morals which we associate with the word “principle.” These suspicions, however, have not startled the vulgar historic muse into deeper conceptions, or availed to prompt its search into hidden causes. The real history shows us, Mr. PITT, offended by the refusal of the Parliament of Ireland to make him sovereign for the time being, by voting the Regency Bill, and thereupon vowing vengeance; decreeing the extinction of an ancient kingdom, and finding in the system of this land for the concealment of ministerial purposes, and in the character of its people for the execution of ministerial decrees, the fitting instruments.

These attempts were planned and executed directly against bodies never again to interfere with administrative convenience—the United Colonies in the West, and the Kingdom of Ireland, on our shores. They were indirectly made against a Crown and a country severally powerful, as compared with the present, and

triumphed over the opposition of an array of Parliamentary gladiators, to recal whom is to impersonate, by the contrast, our own littleness.

During the course of these events, the Minister did, in fact, put down the Parliament, but, then, he existed by the faction in the Parliament; to stand himself, he had to conciliate his supporters, and to be in office, to make them triumph over their antagonists. But the hollow scheme was verging to dissolution; the sinews of faction were relaxed during the ensuing half century, and the body smitten with atrophy. It might be supposed that power would be re-seized from the Minister by those whom he had dispossessed, or slip away by extravasation into some new channel. The Crown or the people might regain their own, or the fourth estate assume the management.

Supposing, then, the appearance in our day of a man capable of re-planning and re-achieving, under the altered circumstances, the ambition of his predecessors, we shall find him without the elements of their strength, armed with new weapons, and combatting on a new field. He will not be the leader of a faction; he will not be the arbiter of forensic debate; and yet, what other means by which to achieve supremacy, than privilege or prerogative to employ, prerogative or privilege to assail? A new element had to be created, a new fulcrum had to be found. That element was diplomacy; that fulcrum, foreign influence. By involving the nation in the secret meshes of negotiations abroad—by exposing it to losses and disasters, to the hatreds aroused by perfidious acts, and the dangers resulting from treacherous measures, the Minister could mislead opinion, and then subjugate Parliament, people, and Crown. The embarrassments which secured subserviency at home gave him support abroad. If he could no longer aim at the command of an independent England, yet could he aspire to the ruling of that England as a Russian Viceroy.

This is what has occurred: not that the plan sprung from the originating genius of the Minister, but from the practised Cabinet, which had therein a world, not an empire alone, to win; who in England betimes discovered her man, made him her own, successively advanced him in his career, shielded him from all danger, armed him against all accidents, endowed him with all knowledge, and qualified him for all enterprises by the three-fold energies of occasion, ambition, and desperation.

The history of that man's progress is the history of the world for the last quarter of a century. It is written in crimes, perpetrated throughout the globe, and may to-day be listened to in the unconscious sighs of millions at home. It is in his triumphant path that the consort of our Queen has been cast.

LORD PALMERSTON AND THE QUEEN.

That the Parliamentary ladder of Ministerial ambition had been displaced, and a recently constructed one of diplomacy substituted for it; that this ladder was a longer one, and reached to the crowning circle of the constitution; that the man who had devised and placed it was now making his last strides to its summit, has been shown.

A Government organ, not long since, gave the people of England warning:—

Although Lord PALMERSTON is no longer in the proud position he held in the latter days of the Coalition, and the earlier ones of the present Ministry, still his name and policy are so intimately associated with the dignity of the nation, *as involved in the struggle with Russia*, that there can be but little doubt as to the result of a general election.

We all remember the circumstances under which Sir ROBERT PEEL took office towards the close of 1841. Although it was not he who dissolved the Parliament at that epoch, the result was an almost unprecedented majority in his favour. *He had carefully abstained from pledging himself to any particular policy*, but was generally supposed to favour the prevailing dogmas of the Tories. Lord PALMERSTON is now, by the greater portion of the public, *believed to be a war Minister*, and a sincere hater of Russia. In effect, the Parliament of 1841 was favourable to a species of dictatorship, as the only mode of solving the difficulties of the time, and Sir ROBERT PEEL was the dictator chosen, because he was believed to be the most powerful, sound, and sagacious, as well as the best informed, among the statesmen of his age.

England requires at the present moment a Minister who shall be practically in the position held by Sir ROBERT PEEL at that epoch. Lord PALMERSTON might not *command a majority* so large as that which placed such statesman in the proud position of dictator of the affairs of his country, but he would at least have a *Parliament purged of the factious elements* which now impede the wholesome action of legislation and government, and which would discharge its functions under the moral control of public opinion.

This after the French 2nd December! A *coup-d'etat* is a surprise, it is a thing that can not be mentioned before it is done. The organs of LOUIS NAPOLEON did not announce the coming events.

There remains nothing visible to the eye that can limit the authority, or frustrate the ambition, of the Premier. Yet, if we carry ourselves back but a short space of time, during which the observant eye, philosophical and political, will detect no change in the constitution, we will find him in a position exactly the reverse. Five years ago, Lord PALMERSTON was expelled from the Ministry by the direct interposition of the royal prerogative, exerting itself for the first time since the family of Hanover came to the throne to dismiss a Minister. The latent power of the Crown had thus been revived to be exerted against Lord PALMERSTON, owing its resumption to him, and thus bringing into evidence the fact of a

struggle, not between the Sovereign and the Minister, but between the Crown and the man.

The man thus assailed combined in himself four great elements of strength; to use the language of the times, he represented four principles, whilst no other man represented anything or possessed anything. The House of Commons he commanded through the first—the baffling power; the liberal faction of the nation he had the support of by words written in despatches to foreign countries—the mis-stating power; the aggregate of foreign influences he ruled by the Russian connection,—the acting power; and, lastly, he controlled the whispers, and directed the jibes, of society,—the entertaining power.

For Queen VICTORIA to measure herself against so formidable an antagonist, she must have been herself of no ordinary mettle; she took up her grounds with a circumspection, and urged them with a vivacity, which promised a right royal fight.

She had, sixteen months before, framed her case, and committed Lord PALMERSTON to its acceptance, not merely as a fact, but as an engagement, making the Premier of England, and its then supposed most powerful man, a party to the transaction, and a guarantee of the compact. This instrument was the counterpart of the treaty which the Emperor NICHOLAS sought to extort through Prince MENCHIKOFF from the Sultan; at once an acknowledgement of past fraud, and a bond under penalty to abstain from its repetition for the future. The Sultan rejected the one, Lord PALMERSTON submitted to the other; out of the rejection and the acceptance have come the actual convulsions and the future danger of Europe. The acceptance of the Sultan would, *ipso facto*, have made Russia mistress of the East, precisely because the allegation was false; the refusal by Lord PALMERSTON in August, 1850, would, by the counter-process, have averted the present war, by depriving Russia of her instrument in the British Cabinet.

From the period of the Pacifico affair, Lord PALMERSTON held the seals of the Foreign Office on the tenure of the acknowledgement of fraud practised.

But he now no longer stood alone. Lord JOHN RUSSELL, in consenting to be a party to an arrangement involving dishonour, became the slave of the man, the burden of whose dishonour he accepted. He has since then revealed the misgivings of his mind, as any criminal does who makes his confession; but at the very time that he stood approving of the precautionary measures taken by the Queen against the dishonour and disloyalty of Lord PALMERSTON, he was to Parliament and the nation vouching for that honour and that loyalty, not present and prospective only, but retrospective also: the slipshod epigram of “the truly British

Minister" has fixed the incident in the somewhat treacherous memory of the British public.

This state of things continued during five months of 1850, and eleven months of 1851. The detected man had command of the power of England during sixteen months, to prepare the means of gratifying his vengeance, and working out his schemes against his chief and his Queen, concerting at the same time for England those embarrassments and dangers which would leave her helpless in his hands. There were those who knew all this, and who told it too, and who further said that, even when verified by the result, the explanation would be held as preposterous as the announcement.

On the 2nd of December came the *coup-d'état* in France, a measure of Russian reaction as the events of 1848 had been of Russian revolution. NAPOLEON had avowed, before he quitted the shores of England to the revolutionists of Europe, that he had the support of Russia to his plans. The fact was asserted in the *Times* newspaper. The money distributed on the occasion was not even exchanged at the Bank for French coin, but bore the effigy and superscription of the Russian Emperor. On the first day spontaneously burst from the breast of the people of Paris, "this is from St. Petersburg," and a gloomy and menacing mob assembled round the Russian embassy. The moment was critical. Instantly was required from England the expression of her adherence and support, in order to crush the hopes of the liberal and constitutional party, and to counteract the effect of the acknowledged patronage of the usurpation by the despotic powers. The Queen, it was well known, would lend her sanction to no such act, and she had taken measures to prevent her royal name from being used without her sanction by the Minister. What, then, remained for Lord PALMERSTON to do? He had either to disobey the Emperor of Russia, or to disobey the Queen of England. The first was not in his option, the second was. But to disobey the Queen of England, when it was to obey the Emperor of Russia, could only be by passing by the Crown, acting in the name of the Crown, and so putting himself in the place of the Crown. Thus, by one blow, was the royal prerogative usurped in England by a Minister, and a usurper placed on the throne of France. Yet these are but incidents in the Emperor of Russia's proposed settlement of Europe.

It was on this, but *after the deed was done*, that the Queen expelled Lord PALMERSTON, compelling Lord JOHN RUSSELL to read, in the House of Commons, the compact: so was brought to light a portion of the real history of England. From it we learn that that history consists in a struggle, not between the Minister and the Crown, but between Lord PALMERSTON and the Queen.

The Queen's act was, however, more than a justification, it was an appeal—and to her people; it revealed to that people their sovereign in the hands of a base and desperate man; it revealed, moreover, the character of his colleagues, and those the highest names in the realm, coldly conscious of their Queen's peril, approvingly conscious of their colleague's infamy. It revealed, in the Queen, courage and capacity, joined to industry and honour—it revealed her standing alone against the factions by which she was oppressed at home, the perfidious designs to which her country was exposed abroad, and to the continental doctrines, whether absolutist or revolutionary, severally the instruments of that perfidy. The revelation came too late for the Minister's triumph; too soon for the people's sense.

In the ordinary course, we should have been left in the dark as to the incidents of this expulsion; but here again the Queen interposed to enlighten us; at her command a detailed statement was made by Lord JOHN RUSSELL, in the House of Commons, by which it appears, not only that the approving words and despatches had been sent to Paris without the Queen's sanction or knowledge, but that the Foreign Secretary had not condescended so much as to notice the communications of the Prime Minister or the Queen. The statement of Lord JOHN RUSSELL will be found subjoined. Thus, in the beginning of 1852, Lord PALMERSTON, in the judgment of every political man, was utterly broken, having been ignominiously expelled by the Crown, sacrificed without an instant's hesitation by his colleagues, and dropped by his party. He was the object of parallel detestation to legitimists and liberals, not in England only, but throughout the world; to the former, by his tamperings with revolution, and his coquettings with KOSSUTH; to the latter, by his identification with LOUIS NAPOLEON. To the public he was a detected impostor; to the Parliamentary courtier, a fallen man; he departed from the public arena, amidst a shout of derision from the rabble, and with a brand of falsehood affixed by the hand of the Queen.

The catastrophe fell upon Lord PALMERSTON neither unexpectedly nor unsought, otherwise he would not have added the personal insult to the infraction of the compact.

Russia could not venture on the plan now unrolled in the East, without having, in England and in France, men in power on whom she could entirely and absolutely rely, and before whom every faculty of independent thought or action had disappeared; so that no change of administration at home might bring the fleets or armies of either power upon any other point of her territory, save those which she directed. In England we see what never was dreamt of: one man being the Government, and that Government

a dictatorship, because there is no one to replace them. Observant experience might have informed us of this connection of cause and effect—that what we are each day, Russia had settled the day before. The problem which Russia had to solve at the close of 1851 was, how an Administration without an opposition was to be obtained in England. She did solve it by breaking up the Ministry of Lord JOHN RUSSELL, to be followed by one of Lord DERBY, which, not having a Parliamentary majority, came in by prerogative, but was incapable of using prerogative. This opened the way for a COALITION, which means prostration of opposition. This is no *ex post facto* statement: step by step, as the measures were taken by Russia, were they announced in England.

Lord PALMERSTON insulted the Queen, to force her to expel him from office. So much of her act was calculated upon and forced; that which was not foreseen was the production of the memorandum. His expulsion was with the view of breaking up the Government; it was immediately broken up, and by another step of Lord PALMERSTON'S. The first announcement whispered in London of Lord PALMERSTON'S retirement from the Cabinet came from the Russian Ambassador, and through M. BIELKE, the Danish Minister, whose name we have now no hesitation in mentioning. On the night of the 14th of December, he learnt from M. BRUNOW what Lord JOHN RUSSELL would do, but had not decided upon doing till the 20th.

But the publication of the memorandum, and the accompanying declaration of Lord JOHN RUSSELL, that the Foreign Secretary "had passed by the Crown, and put himself in the place of the Crown," had disconcerted the whole plan, by rendering Lord PALMERSTON an impossible man in any future Administration; some new device had, therefore, to be adopted to parry the blow.

THE SUPPRESSED PAMPHLET.

The Queen was particularly sensitive on the subject of the Prince Consort. The nation would be most easily touched by inuendoes concerning Coburg and German influences. Without a moment's delay, Lord PALMERSTON commissioned from MR. S. PHILLIPS, literary journeyman, a pamphlet for a cheque for £100 and a butt of sherry. It is written and printed within eight and forty hours, and the proofs are inclosed to the Queen, with the intimation that the late Foreign Secretary had obtained its suppression.* The Queen, in consternation, invites her protector to Windsor; he crosses the threshold of that royal residence master of it and of England.

* As the story goes, Lord PALMERSTON paid £200 to have it suppressed,

The Administration had fallen because Lord PALMERSTON had insulted the Queen, and had been expelled. Lord DERBY undertakes to form a new Administration, and the first thing he does is to propose to Lord PALMERSTON to join it. As to the fact there is no doubt whatever—the explanation is impossible without the knowledge of the foregoing private passages.

The nail had been driven, but still it had to be clenched. The bolt had to be riveted. This was to be done by allowing the Queen to remain under no misprision. Light had to be let into the gulf into which she had fallen, that its horrors might be revealed—that she might have no hope. She could be rendered hopeless, and so inert, only by the knowledge of the man. *The history of the suppressed pamphlet transpired.* Thus ceased the struggle between the Queen and Lord PALMERSTON, the obstacle which stood in his path to supremacy—the Prince Consort—becoming the chain by which he held the Queen.

The foreknowledge by the Russian Ambassàdor of what was to happen on the 20th December indicates Russia's part in this domestic English arrangement. This knowledge was not confined to diplomatic whispers in London, but published also at Vienna. This fact was brought forward in the House of Commons, as evidence of the collusion of the Queen and Lord JOHN RUSSELL with the despotic powers to expel the "truly British Minister." Lord JOHN RUSSELL did not dare to expose the perfidy, and has reaped his reward, being broken, as Lord PALMERSTON has broken every man who has served with him, confided in him, or "lied for him."* The man who produced the Vienna announcement in Parliament on the 3rd of February has also reaped his reward, not in the shape of a cheque or a cask of wine, but in that of a Cabinet post created for him; Sir BENJAMIN HALL watches over the health of the bodies of the people of England.

After all, the pamphlet known as the "suppressed" alleges absolutely nothing against Prince ALBERT, except the false construction put on the pre-announcement of Lord PALMERSTON's dismissal. It does, however, give details of Cabinet resolves, which must have been communicated to the writer by some Cabinet Minister, *in violation of his oath.* Yet from it are assumed to be derived the data for that wonderful popular excitation at the beginning of the session of 1854, when the tapsters throughout England were anxiously inquiring when Prince ALBERT would be sent to the Tower, and be executed for high treason.

One word, however, on the case, as hereafter it will come before judicial history, if such tribunal be ever created—judicial history,

* Words of Lord DERBY in 1840.

rating men, not by their compeers, but by their duties; and events by that which has been neglected, no less than by that which has been achieved. Against that period of deliberation, the present one of activity lays by this wonderful lesson, indited as maxim by the man who has justified it in practice: IN NATURE THERE IS NO RULING POWER BUT MIND; ALL ELSE IS PASSIVE AND INERT. It is not the human faculties in their essence that are here implied, but in their result, which is the consequence of their action—the accurate judgment of surrounding things, or the knowledge of these.

LORD PALMERSTON is not a conqueror, is not a hereditary prince; he is the leader of no powerful class, the chief of no faction, and he has no army; he is simply possessed of that which his antagonist lacks, knowledge. That antagonist, by position, did not require even dexterity. No single step of LORD PALMERSTON could have been so much as dared, had the Queen or her Consort have understood its purpose. The dangers which menace, therefore, the Crown, flow directly from the ignorance of its wearer; these dangers menace equally the State, and are to it equally the just penalty of the like crime. The State has formed and disciplined no men to whom it might confide in trying conclusions with a power which had painfully performed for itself that duty, and yet would try conclusions with that power—its master before the contest even commenced—a contest which this state carries on by physical efforts, directed against the body of its foe, which is carried on against it by a mental process directed against its understanding.

Some time ago it was asked, "What will the Emperor of Russia do?" as if the fate of the world depended on his power. Then it was asked, "What will the Emperor of the French do?" as if every thing depended on his will. But the question upon which all things did depend was never asked—*What does the Queen of England know?*

APPENDIX.

Opinion is stronger than armies.—LORD PALMERSTON.

Wisdom is better than weapons of war, but one sinner destroyeth much good.—SOLOMON.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL, FEB. 3, 1852.

Before I enter into those points, it is as well that I should state what I conceive to be the position which a Secretary of State holds as regards the Crown in the administration of foreign affairs, and as regards the Prime Minister of this country. With respect to the first, I should state that when the Crown, in consequence of a vote of the House of Commons, places its constitutional confidence in a Minister, that Minister is, on the other hand, bound to the Crown to the most frank and full detail of every measure that is taken, and is bound either to give a special case (as we understood), or to leave to the Crown its full liberty—a liberty which the Crown must possess—of saying that the Minister no longer possesses its confidence. Such I hold to be the general doctrine. But as regards the noble lord, it did so happen that in August, 1850, the precise terms were laid down in a communication on the part of her Majesty with respect to the transaction of business between the Crown and the Secretary of State. I became the organ of making that communication to my noble friend, and thus became responsible for the document I am about to read from. I shall refer only to that part of the document which has reference to the immediate subject:—

The Queen requires, first, that Lord PALMERSTON will distinctly state what he proposes to do in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction. Secondly, having once given her sanction to a measure, that it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister. Such an act she must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing that Minister. She expects to be kept informed of what passes between him and the foreign Ministers before important decisions are taken, based upon intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches in good time; and to have the draft for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make herself acquainted with their contents before they must be sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord JOHN RUSSELL should show this letter to Lord PALMERSTON.

I sent that accordingly, and received a letter in which the noble lord said,—“I have taken a copy of this memorandum of the Queen, and will not fail to attend to the directions it contains.” * * * * When the noble lord was first appointed Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he was placed under Lord GREY, a statesman of age and experience, to whom my noble friend, then young in that office, would readily listen. When Lord MELBOURNE was at the head of the government, Lord MELBOURNE’s long intimacy and connexion with my noble friend, would give him also influence with my noble friend. Without either of those advantages I certainly have found from time to time that relations like those were difficult to acquire. *Sometimes I felt great responsibility.* I will now refer to events which occurred in the autumn of last year. There was a meeting of the cabinet on the 3rd of November, and I happened to

have my memory more impressed with what I stated on that occasion, having in that instance only taken a note of what my own statements were. * * I stated that, in my own opinion, in this critical situation of affairs, it was the interest of England to observe a strict neutrality. I said that we ought to guard most especially against any just cause of offence to France—that we ought to exert the utmost vigilance in order to prevent any such cause of offence. I think my colleagues generally, and my noble friend in particular, entirely concurred in that opinion. No resolution was come to by the cabinet on the subject, but there was a general understanding as to the desirableness of adopting such a course. Now, it happened, as I think, very unfortunately, a very short time after the events of the 21st of December had taken place, that my noble friend had received at the Foreign-Office deputations from certain districts of the metropolis presenting to him addresses containing terms of a most offensive nature to the Sovereigns of Europe. I was fully persuaded at the time, and I am still fully persuaded, in that respect—that although he had not taken the precaution of seeing those addresses at the time they were presented to him, and although he had not taken the further precaution when the deputations came into his room at the Foreign-Office of taking care that his words were duly and accurately reported, yet I was entirely persuaded that my noble friend had fallen into an error that day, wholly from oversight arising from the quantity of business with which he had to deal. I was persuaded, likewise, that there were great misrepresentations with respect to the words which my noble friend used in reply to those addresses. I was ready, therefore, and I declared it at once to adopt with my noble friend the whole responsibility of his conduct on that occasion, although I could not forbear seeing that an error had been committed. I did hope that after that my noble friend would have treated me with that fairness to which I think I was entitled; and that he would take no important step—that he would make no important communication to foreign ministers, without giving me information,—without enabling me to give an opinion upon any step taken,—in short, without that full and complete communication to which Sir ROBERT PEEL alluded. The next transaction which occurred is that from which the whole of this unfortunate circumstance has arisen. It has relation to the events which took place in France on the 2nd of December last. On the 3rd of December a despatch was received from the Marquis of NORMANBY, containing a question as to the diplomatic relations which were to be maintained by him with the government of the President of France. A meeting of the Cabinet was held on the subject, and there existed a generally prevailing opinion among its members that the government of this country had nothing more to do than to abstain from any interference whatever with the internal affairs of France. My noble friend correctly represented the views of the government in this respect in the following despatch:—

Foreign Office, Dec. 5, 1851;

My Lord,—I have received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch, No. 365, of the 3rd inst.; requesting to be furnished with instructions for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France. I am commanded by her Majesty to instruct your Excellency to make no change in your relations with the French Government. It is her Majesty's desire that nothing should be done by her Ambassador at Paris which would wear the appearance of an interference of any kind with the internal affairs of France.

I am, &c.,

PALMERSTON.

There was this solemn and formal decision of her Majesty's Government, approved of by the Queen, communicated to her Ambassador at Paris, and, as I conceive, pointing out to him the line of conduct which was to be pursued by the English Government, whether here or at Paris. It was sent to her Majesty on the 4th, it came back on the 5th, and was then sent to Paris. A few

days afterwards, among the despatches from the Foreign Office which came to my hands, there was one from the Marquis of NORMANBY to Viscount PALMERSTON, dated December 6th, 1851, and which was received December 8th. [The despatch follows.]

My Lord,—I this morning received your lordship's despatch, No. 600, of yesterday's date, and I afterwards called on M. TURGOT, and informed him that I had received her Majesty's commands to say that I need make no change in my relations with the French Government in consequence of what had passed. I added, that, if there had been some little delay in making this communication, it arose from material circumstances not connected with any doubt on the subject. M. TURGOT said that delay had been of less importance, as he had two days since heard from M. WALEWSKI that your lordship had expressed to him your entire approbation of the act of the President, and your conviction that he could not have acted otherwise than he had done. I said I had no knowledge of any such communication, and no instructions beyond our invariable rule, to do nothing which should have the appearance of interfering in any way in the internal affairs of France; but that I had often had an opportunity of showing, under very varied circumstances, that, whatever might be the Government here, I attached the utmost importance to maintaining the most amicable relations between the two countries. I added that I was sure, had the Government known of the suppression of the insurrection of the rogues at the time I had heard from them, I should have been commanded to add their congratulations to mine. I have thought it necessary to mention what was stated about M. WALEWSKI's despatch, because two of my colleagues here have mentioned to me that a despatch containing expressions precisely to that effect had been read to them in order to show the decided opinion which England had pronounced.

I have, &c.,

NORMANBY.

Now, I own that it did not appear to me that any serious difficulty would arise from that despatch. I wrote to my noble friend to ask an explanation of it, which I felt convinced he would be able to give, and that, without denying what had been stated with regard to the communication made by a foreign ambassador to M. TURGOT, my noble friend would have explained that he had done nothing more than stated to M. WALEWSKI what appeared to him to be, on the whole, the best for the interests of France; and not that Lord NORMANBY was the less to be guided by the instructions which were forwarded to him by his Government, or that he was to rest entirely upon information derived from other sources; but that in all his communications with the representatives of the various governments of Europe at Paris he was to let it be understood that the government of England expressed no opinion with regard to the internal affairs of France. I own that appears to me the only wise and the only safe course that could have been adopted. However, I heard nothing—I received no information from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the meaning of this declaration at Paris that England had pronounced in favour of the act of the President. Let me here say what is the view I take of this case. If England were to allow her Foreign Secretary to pronounce an opinion of that kind, it could no longer be said that she had no interference with the internal affairs of France, for, in pronouncing such an opinion by her Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a moral support, a moral sanction, and a moral influence would be given and exercised in favour of the course which had been taken by the President. Not having received any communication from my noble friend of any kind, but being at Woburn Abbey on the 13th of December, a messenger arrived, bringing to me a communication from her Majesty, making inquiries concerning the said despatch of December 6th, and asking for an explanation. The next morning (the 14th) I sent a messenger to the noble lord, and my communication must have arrived in London at an early hour, but I received no answer from the noble lord on that day; on the 15th I received no answer whatever. On the 16th I wrote a note, by the early post, to the noble lord, expressing my opinion that silence was not respectful to her Majesty, and

asking for a reply. However, neither on the 15th nor yet on the 16th did any communication reach me, but the same disdainful silence was observed. The inquiry of the Queen as to the meaning of the alleged conversation between her Foreign Secretary and the ambassador of a foreign country, was left entirely unnoticed. But on the morning of the 17th I received copies of two despatches, one from the Marquis of NORMANBY to Lord PALMERSTON, and the other from Lord PALMERSTON to the Marquis of NORMANBY. The former despatch was in the following terms:—

Paris, Dec. 15th, 1851.

My Lord,—In my despatch, No. 372, of the 6th instant, notifying my communication of my instructions to M. TURGOR, I reported that his excellency had mentioned that M. WALEWSKI had written a despatch in which he stated that your lordship had expressed your complete approbation of the course taken by the President, in the recent *coup d'état*. I also reported that I had conveyed to M. TURGOR my belief that there must be some mistake in this statement, and my reasons for that belief. But, as a week has now elapsed without any explanation from your lordship on this point, I must conclude M. WALEWSKI's report to have been substantially correct. That being the case, I am perfectly aware that it is beyond the sphere of my present duties to make any remark upon the acts of your lordship, except inasmuch as they affect my own position. But within these limits I must, with due deference, be permitted to observe that, if your lordship, as Foreign Minister, holds one language on such a delicate point in Downing-street, without giving me any intimation you had done so—prescribing afterwards a different course to me, namely, the avoidance of any appearance of interference of any kind in the internal affairs of France—I am placed in a very awkward position. If the language held in Downing-street is more favourable to the existing order of things in France than the instructions on which I am directed to guide myself on the spot, it must be obvious that by that act of your lordship's I become subject to misrepresentation and suspicion in merely doing my duty according to the official orders received through your lordship from her Majesty. All this is of more importance to me, because, as I stated before, several of my diplomatic colleagues had had the despatch read to them, and had derived from it the conviction that, if accurately reported, your expressions had been those of unqualified satisfaction.

I have, &c.,

NORMANBY.

Now, although no answer had been given to me, and although I was unable to satisfy the inquiries which were made by the Sovereign, it appears that Lord PALMERSTON, on the 16th, the day on which this despatch was received, wrote, on his own authority, a despatch which was sent to our ambassador at Paris, but which had not received the sanction of her Majesty. [The despatch follows.]

Foreign Office, Dec. 16th, 1851.

My Lord,—I have received your Excellency's despatch, No. 406, of the 15th, referring to the statement made to you by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the occasion of your communicating to his Excellency the instructions with which you have been furnished by her Majesty's Government for your guidance in the present state of affairs in France; and I have to state to your Excellency that there has been nothing in the language which I have held, nor in the opinions which I have at any time expressed, on the recent events in France, which has been in any way inconsistent with the instructions addressed to your Excellency—to abstain from anything which could bear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs of France. The instructions contained in my despatch, No. 600, of the 5th, to which your Excellency refers, were sent to you, not in reply to a question as to what opinion your Excellency should express, but in reply to a question which I understood to be, whether your Excellency should continue your usual diplomatic relations with the President during the interval which was to elapse between the date of your Excellency's despatch, No. 365, of the 3rd, and the voting by the French nation on the question to be proposed to them by the President. As to approving or condemning the step taken by the President in dissolving the Assembly, I conceive it is for the French nation, and not for the British Secretary of State, or for the British Ambassador, to pronounce judgment upon that event; but if your Excellency wishes to know my own opinion on the change which has taken place in France, it is that such a state of antagonism had arisen between the President and the Assembly, that it was becoming every day more clear that their co-existence could not be of long dura-

tion, and it seemed to me better for the interests of France, and through them for the interests of the rest of Europe, that the power of the President should prevail, inasmuch as the continuance of his authority might afford a prospect of the maintenance of social order in France; whereas the division of opinions and parties in the Assembly appeared to betoken that their victory over the President would be the starting point for disastrous civil strife. Whether my opinion was right or wrong, it seems to be shared by persons interested in property in France, as far at least as the great and sudden rise in the funds and other investments may be assumed to be indications of increasing confidence in the improved prospect of internal tranquillity in France.

I am, &c.,

PALMERSTON.

Now, it appeared to me that that despatch, in the first place, was not written in the usual style of my noble friend; it was written in a style very unlike his usual force and correctness. However, that despatch altogether avoided the real question which was at issue. Lord NORMANBY asked, and was entitled to ask, "Have you, Lord PALMERSTON, expressed your entire approbation of the act of the President on the 2nd December, and, if so, am I to guide myself by that opinion, or am I to act according to the letter of the 5th December?" To that question no answer whatever was given; neither is there in that despatch a reference to the opinion which the government had given, nor was the opinion expressed sanctioned by the Crown. But the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs *put himself in the place of the Crown*; he neglected and passed by the Crown, in order to give his own opinion of the state of affairs in Paris. * * * The act of the President was not merely that of dissolving the Assembly. It was an act which, in the first place, dissolved the Assembly, and put an end to the existing constitution; it was an act which, in the next place, anticipated the elections of 1852, which were to take place according to that constitution, but with respect to which great apprehensions had been entertained. In the third place, it was an act putting an end to Parliamentary government in France—an act which, together with Parliamentary government, suspended the right of freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, which are considered the usual accompaniments of Parliamentary government. I am not going to enter into any dispute whether that was a fit thing to be done; that was entirely a question for the French people to decide. But with respect to our position, it was to be remembered that, during the existence of the present administration, with my noble friend as its organ, we have given the moral support and the moral sympathy of England to constitutional government. We have done so in Spain, we have done so in Portugal, we have done so in Piedmont; and none was more ready than my noble friend to impart that moral influence. But if we were at once to side with a deviation from constitutional government, and to give our sanction to the act of the President of France, how can we tell any other country that we advise them to continue Parliamentary government? It therefore appeared to me a departure, a signal and wide departure, from the policy which my noble friend had specially advocated. When this took place,—when, as I conceived, the authority of the Queen had been set aside,—it appeared to me that I had no other course than to inform my noble friend that he, while I held office, could no longer hold the seals as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Later in the day, and *after I had formed that resolution*, I received a long letter from my noble friend, stating the reasons why he approved of the act of the President of France. But it appeared to me that those reasons no longer touched the case; because the real question now was, whether the Secretary of State was entitled, of his own authority, to write a despatch, as the organ of the Queen's government, in which his colleagues had never concurred, and to which the Queen had never given her royal sanction. It appeared to me that, without *degrading the Crown*, I could not advise her Majesty to retain that Minister in the Foreign Depart-

ment of her government. I at the same time informed her Majesty of the correspondence that had gone on between Lord PALMERSTON and myself, with respect to her Majesty. *That was on Wednesday*, I think, and I waited *till Saturday*, in order to consider and re-consider the matter before I fairly submitted the correspondence to the Crown. I think, on Thursday, I informed my noble friend that I would be at home (as we understood), *thinking he might propose some course whereby a separation might be avoided*, but nothing of the kind took place, and I, being as fully convinced then as I had been of what I should do, wrote on Saturday, the 20th, to her Majesty, conveying the correspondence that had passed between my noble friend and myself, and shortly intimating my advice to her Majesty that Lord PALMERSTON should be required to give up the seals of the Foreign Office. Sir, in coming to a decision so painful—in coming to the decision that I must separate from a colleague with whom I had acted so long, whose abilities I had admired, and in whose policy I had agreed—I felt, whether rightly or wrongly it is not for me now to say, I was bound to take that decision alone—to consult none of my colleagues, to avoid anything which might hereafter have the appearance of a cabal, but to assume the sole and entire responsibility on myself. With respect, therefore, to the stories which my honourable friend has quoted from a Breslau paper, as regards a letter written in Vienna, I can assure him that, *however curious the coincidence* of that letter may be, there is no truth whatever in the stories that there was an attempt to establish fairer terms and more intimate relations with the court of Austria, and that the affair was entirely founded on the correspondence—I have stated, and on the motives I have laid before the House.

LORD PALMERSTON'S REPLY.

“Such was the antagonism arising from time to time between the French Assembly and the President, that their long co-existence became impossible; and it was my opinion that, if one or the other were to prevail, it would be better for France, and, through the interests of France, better for the interests of Europe, that the President should prevail than the Assembly; and my reason was, that the Assembly had nothing to offer for the substitution of the President, unless an alternative ending obviously in civil war or anarchy; whereas the President, on the other hand, had to offer *unity of purpose and unity of authority*, and, if he were inclined to do so, might give to France internal tranquillity, with good and permanent government.*”

EXTRACTS FROM THE SUPPRESSED PAMPHLET ENTITLED, “PALMERSTON: WHAT HAS HE DONE?”

I venture, my lord, (Lord J. RUSSELL) to dwell upon this point, because when I first asked, “What has been done?” the answer I immediately received from an organ which took upon itself to speak in your name, was, without any circumlocution, “He has offended the foreign courts.” I grant that the same authority gave, in a day or two, another and a very different account of the matter; and to that I shall not fail to refer; but I cannot forget that the first authoritative and most striking explanation given to the people of England of the sudden expulsion of Lord PALMERSTON was, that his persistence in a policy which carried the hearty approval and fervent blessings of millions of his

* On the 7th of August, 1855, Lord PALMERSTON said, “Indeed, upon this great question, the two Governments (France and England) may be said to form one cabinet, some of the members of which are sitting in London and some in Paris.”

fellow-countrymen had finally disgusted certain foreign statesmen persisting in a policy which their fellow-countrymen as cordially detested and abhorred. That there was colour for the accusation, who can for a moment doubt? Certainly not you, my lord, who, scarcely a twelvemonth since, in your triumphant vindication of the minister whom you have since ignobly given up, tanned Lord ABERDEEN with uttering imputations and making attacks upon your Government, "being prompted," as you believed, "by foreigners and other persons with whom he had been in communication."* Certainly not you, my lord, who, on the same occasion, were vigilant enough to discern, though your acuteness has signally failed you since, "that there had lately exhibited itself in this country a tendency to deprecate English objects, and to give credence to communications which come from one knows not where, but from foreign powers—sometimes the most incredible stories; sometimes diplomatic transactions, which ought to be kept secret—communications insinuating charges against the Government, and having a most unfortunate effect."† Instructed by your lordship in the month of June, 1850, and further advised by your accredited organ in December, 1851, that foreign influence has been struggling, beyond these realms and actively within them, to shake a British minister from his eminence, we have no choice, in the absence of other evidence, but to conclude that the conspiracy has had effect; and that, to the great damage of freedom all over the world, the longed-for sacrifice has been extorted, which, in my heart, I believe, my lord, you, hereafter in your retirement, will be among the loudest to deplore. Exultant, we know, has been the yell of triumph abroad upon the success of the long-sustained machinations. But when tyrants meet to drink long life to oppression, is that a time when a RUSSELL should fill his glass to the brim? Remember, my lord, had your whole ministry been dismissed, and Lord PALMERSTON remained, there would have been no merry-making among the despots. * * Did you, I ask, when, *of your own mere motion*, you called upon Lord PALMERSTON summarily to resign, because he had disgraced his office by collusion with the President of France, feel, as we must feel, that, by the perpetration of his folly, Lord PALMERSTON had shown himself utterly unworthy the further confidence of the people and of the Crown? My lord, you felt no such thing. How could you feel it, when you knew that there was no ground whatever for the whole ridiculous accusation, and that the sole object to be effected was not the downfall of Lord PALMERSTON, but his removal simply from the Foreign Office? What will the people of England, my lord, think of you and of the whole transaction, of the means taken for ejecting a popular minister from an important post, of the intrigues secretly at work in England and abroad for depriving England of a foreign minister devoted to no family interests, but eager solely for his country's welfare, and for the maintenance of freedom, wheresoever his strong hand might be capable of upholding it? Did you dismiss Lord PALMERSTON for the grave and unpardonable offence which the *Times* brings against him, and did you immediately afterwards offer the disgraced minister the Vice-royalty of Ireland, or any other appointment upon which he might chance to fix his affection? If you say, "No!" there is an end of my argument. But if, as you unquestionably will, you answer, "Yes!" I tell you then, my lord, that the people of England will have arrived, by your own confession, at a solution of the whole difficulty. It will require no great acuteness to discover that Lord PALMERSTON has been removed, not because he has dishonoured his office, but clearly because a more convenient tool is

* Lord JOHN RUSSELL'S Speech on Foreign Policy, June, 1850.

† *Ibid.*

required to conduct the foreign affairs of England at this moment with the crowned heads of Europe; and it may be, my lord, you have found one. It is with the deepest reluctance and pain that I call your lordship's recollection to a remarkable letter which was published in the public prints about a month ago—to which letter the especial attention of your friends was, at the time of its appearance, earnestly directed, but of which no notice whatever has been taken, either by you or them, up to the moment at which I write. That letter was written from Vienna, and was dated December 23rd—mark, my lord, the 23rd—the very day after you announced the dismissal of the Foreign Secretary, and a week before the news of his downfall could have travelled to Austria. It ran as follows:—"Rumours are current here of negotiations said to have been engaged in by high personages in England with our Court, without the knowledge of Lord PALMERSTON. Their object is said to be a *rapprochement* between the two Courts, and the retirement of the noble lord from office is announced as certain to happen soon. The first index of this *rapprochement* has been the admission of Lord WESTMORELAND to an audience, and his invitation to dinner by the Emperor." As the result plainly shows, the rumours current in Vienna were only too well founded. The ink was forming the words abroad while you were humbly acting in their spirit at home. Since contradiction of the astounding intelligence has been invited, and has not been given, and since we are driven to look where we can for a reason of your sudden desertion of the man whom no consideration could induce you to give up a year ago, what is the sickening conclusion at which every Englishman must arrive as he reads the pregnant words which I have quoted? Who, my lord, are the "high personages in England," who have corresponded with foreign courts, "without the knowledge of Lord PALMERSTON?" What personage, however high, dares to usurp the authority of a Minister of State, and, behind his back, to traffic with foreigners, not only against his political existence, but against the dignity, the honour, the independence of this free country? I assured you, my lord, at starting, that, in asking you the cause of Lord PALMERSTON's unexpected retirement, I had a nobler object in view than the mere vindication of his personal honour. The character of Lord PALMERSTON is as nothing in comparison with the good name of the "high personages" here bespattered with calumny; and even the good name of the highest sinks into insignificance beside the grand and paramount interests of our hitherto unshackled nation. If, my lord, as it now too plainly appears, that not NAPOLEON's *coup d'état*, but your own anxiety to adapt the foreign policy of England to the views of certain foreign princes, has led directly to the calamitous dismissal of Lord PALMERSTON, you need no additional pang to increase the remorse which your inconsiderate act must inevitably occasion you. But if, in working the downfall of your colleague, you have not scrupled to employ the names of personages which have hitherto been kept sacred from the turmoil of political agitation, and which can never be appealed to or misused without shaking the whole fabric of the state to its foundations, you have done more to injure the Crown of England, which you have sworn to keep from tarnish, than the sternest demagogue that ever vowed, in his madness, to cut the monarchy from its moorings;—if, by renouncing Lord PALMERSTON, and availing yourself, on the instant, of the services of Lord GRANVILLE, you have given rise in the hearts of Englishmen to the faintest suspicion that unauthorised hands are dealing with the public interests—that undue influences have been brought to bear upon the nation's policy—that family considerations have been suffered to assume the place of imperial necessities,—you will have touched the national sensibilities in the very tenderest point, and awakened a jealousy that, once aroused, will be slow again

to slumber. From personal interference with their public concerns the people of this country shrink with fatal alarm. Slow to suspect, they will take no evidence of culpability which is not unimpeachable. But, conviction once satisfied, you may hope, my lord, as readily to stop the tide that washes these shores as to place barriers against their determination to punish the unwarrantable and unpardonable usurpation of their most cherished rights. I dare not trust myself to pursue this theme. Loyal to my Queen, I would lose my right arm rather than ruffle by a breath the chivalric popularity she has won from her people, or impair the strong hold she boasts on their devoted affections. But popularity may be shaken by ministers unfaithful to their duty, and love may be sullied if the just consequences of treachery are hastily transferred from the guilty to the innocent. In your place in Parliament, my lord, I call upon you solemnly to deny that "high personages" have corresponded with foreign potentates, with a view to the overthrow of Lord PALMERSTON; and, in the name of my country, I bid you also assert in open day that, neither in your own name, nor in that of your superiors, correspondence with foreign princes has taken place without the knowledge of Lord PALMERSTON, while that nobleman still held the seals of office. If the denial be made, your fellow-subjects will undoubtedly believe—but as certainly not till then—that Lord PALMERSTON was not ejected to make room for Lord GRANVILLE, and that Lord GRANVILLE did not receive his appointment mainly—to borrow once more from the Vienna letter—"that England might return to the continental policy, which does not mean the institution of a military government repugnant to the habits and tastes of the English, but her adhesion to the counter-revolutionary system."

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 021 953 728 1