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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

**COUNTERINSURGENCY IN UZBEKISTAN: AN
ADAPTED FID STRATEGY FOR POLICY
CONSIDERATION**

by

Jeffrey A. Smith

June 2002

Thesis Advisor:
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Anna Simons
Jeffrey Starr

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FOR POLICY CONSIDERATION**

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

Chronic poverty, stagnant transitions towards democracy and a free-market economy, ecological ruin, authoritarian leaders, and ethnic conflict are but a few of the conditions preventing the stabilization and development of Central Asia. Regional stability will continue to be elusive as long as each of the countries in Central Asia faces internal development challenges. This thesis examines the U.S. relationship with Uzbekistan, the strongest of the Central Asian states, to determine what assistance the U.S. could provide to help Uzbekistan in overcoming its internal developmental problems. I argue that the U.S. must shift from the current policy of focusing on rapid, measurable democratic reform and become a determined partner in the process. Using insurgency theory to understand the situation in Uzbekistan, I propose that the U.S. foreign internal defense (FID) framework, presented in Joint Publication 3-07.1, provides the tools necessary to secure U.S. interests in Uzbekistan, assist Uzbekistan with its most pressing concern, and establish the basis for the development of a responsible, democratic government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has led to a power vacuum in Central Asia, creating, on the geopolitical level, what many experts refer to as the “New Great Game.” Russia has continued to exert influence in the region; however, those efforts are increasingly met by international competition from a diversity of interests, including China, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, the United States, and others. Given the multiplicity of players involved in the “New Great Game,” it is apparent that endogenous political evolution of the countries in this region is all but impossible. To further exacerbate the situation, in the past four years a significant internal threat to stability has arisen in the form of fundamentalist Islamic groups, most notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Even prior to September 11, 2001 and the ongoing “War on Terror,” the Central Asian region was important. Situated among five potential nuclear powers (Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan), instability in the region could have profound implications. Aside from instability, the perception of advantage by one of the nuclear powers in the region could easily upset the delicate balance existing among the other nuclear powers. Competition occurs in the region for economic reasons also; the region is rich in the natural resources of oil, natural gas, gold, and uranium. At the moment, U.S. interest in the region is centered on eliminating the threat posed by Usama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization, and securing allies and resources necessary for prosecuting the “War on Terror.” However, the U.S. also has enduring interests in the region in promoting regional security, halting the flow of drugs and weapons, expanding new markets for investment, and fostering the development of democratic societies.

Uzbekistan lies in the center of Central Asia. Bordering all four of the remaining Central Asian states - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan - along with Afghanistan, Uzbekistan also has the region’s largest population and largest military. The capital of Uzbekistan, Tashkent, was the hub of Soviet influence in Soviet Central Asia, resulting in a significant amount of infrastructure development and

industrialization. As the strongest country in Central Asia, Uzbekistan should be considered the keystone state. Although a democratic, prosperous Uzbekistan cannot guarantee regional stability, the converse, an authoritarian, unstable Uzbekistan virtually eliminates any prospect of stability and security throughout Central Asia and beyond. Needless to say, Uzbekistan is the focus of this thesis.

B. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

For the past ten years the U.S. approach to Central Asia has not been unified or focused. The U.S. has been struggling over how and what to formulate as a policy while providing piecemeal assistance in the interim. Haphazard assistance has been offered via military, security, economic, political, and social programs that are not tied to tangible goals or expectations. Meanwhile, international competition for influence increases concurrent with the developmental establishment of internal governmental and social institutions. In order for the U.S. to secure its national interests in the region, a comprehensive policy must be adopted. However, problems posed by undemocratic post-colonial rulers, stagnant transitions toward market economies, and internal instability have made the adoption of a coherent policy difficult.

Despite its ethnic homogeneity, a high level of literacy, a developed (albeit deteriorating) industrial infrastructure, and sufficient natural resources, Uzbekistan also faces daunting challenges given its economy, ruined ecology, and chronic poverty. However, the challenge that stands out as particularly aggravating is that posed by the IMU. With the stated goal of overthrowing the current government of Uzbekistan and creating an Islamic state with sharia law, the relatively small and ineffective IMU is able to disproportionately affect the government of Uzbekistan. The government is compelled to respond to IMU actions in order to create a stable environment for carrying out necessary reforms. Yet, paradoxically, the government lacks the resources and institutional knowledge to implement any counterinsurgency strategy beyond that of its Soviet predecessor; which ran what amounted to a police state with massive internal security. Massive internal security measures, in turn, damage the tenuous link between government and the citizenry that is necessary for the development of liberal, trustworthy governmental institutions.

C. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is policy prescriptive in nature, arguing for increased U.S. involvement in Central Asia in general, with a focus on Uzbekistan in particular. Additionally, this thesis argues for the adoption of counterinsurgency strategy as a means to unify and focus U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan. The goal is to devise a program that will enable Uzbekistan to effectively counter short-term internal threats while laying the necessary groundwork for long-term development of the country that is compatible with U.S. interests. The theoretical model for the thesis is foreign internal defense (FID) strategy, as contained in Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (1996). The logical flow of the thesis seeks to answer the following questions: Does the U.S. have sufficient interests to justify engagement in Central Asia, and Uzbekistan? What is the primary threat to stability in Uzbekistan? What can be done to mitigate this threat, and is there a role for the U.S. to play in threat mitigation? What are we currently doing to secure U.S. interests and stabilize Uzbekistan? Can we be doing those things better and more effectively to accomplish our goals?

In Chapter II I analyze what interests the U.S. has in expanding engagement with Central Asia. I do so by utilizing criteria designated in our National Security Policy. Not only do I determine that the U.S. does have significant interests at stake in Central Asia, which we are legally obligated to secure, but also, I question whether the cornerstone of U.S. engagement policy in the region should be democracy, human rights, and a market economy, if the aim is to secure our national interests.

Chapter III examines the effects of the IMU on Uzbekistan. I argue that while the odds are strongly against the IMU being able to topple the government of Uzbekistan, the mere threat that the IMU poses paralyzes the government and essentially prevents the government from carrying out necessary reforms. Although my analysis vindicates Uzbekistan's approach toward counterinsurgency as a legitimate, albeit severe and inefficient, method of internal defense, I also offer a model for better understanding the effects an insurgent group has on the government and using this model, I consider other tactics available to Uzbekistan in its counterinsurgency effort.

Chapter IV examines the broad range of assistance that the U.S. has provided to Uzbekistan to secure U.S. national interests. Although the various engagement and assistance programs are envisioned, planned, and executed with the best of intentions, their effects are diluted by the lack of a unity of effort.

Chapter V sketches the concept of FID strategy as contained in Joint Publication 3-07.1. I recommend this framework as a method to effectively achieve results in Uzbekistan. The framework provides a philosophy and organizational structure to redress the unity of effort problems associated with our current assistance to Uzbekistan.

Chapter VI proposes tactics borrowed from the FID framework that harness the various elements of national power – military, diplomatic, economic, information – in support of protecting U.S. interests in Uzbekistan, while also promoting the stable development of the country in ways compatible with U.S. interests. These tactics are by no means comprehensive or infallible; they are intended to serve as examples for how the FID strategy can be operationalized to maximize return on our investment. With a common goal, and clear understanding of how each individual program supports the desired end state, those in charge of each of the pieces can more effectively implement and adjust their programs. Allowing for the argument that the IMU insurgency does not represent the most substantial threat to the Republic of Uzbekistan, the effectiveness of the overall FID effort will not be judged by whether or not the IMU is immobilized, but instead by whether popular support for the government and the pace of reform within government is enhanced.

The seventh and final chapter is the conclusion, which summarizes the arguments made, and answers the questions posed in this introduction.

D. CAVEATS

This thesis is not trying to argue that strengthening U.S. ties with Uzbekistan through a comprehensive program is the answer to protecting U.S. interests and ensuring stability throughout Central Asia. Rather, it focuses solely on maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid given to Uzbekistan. To foster security and stability in the region requires a regional solution. However, the general concepts of this thesis are applicable to every country in the region, with the next logical step being the creation

of regional cooperative mechanisms and ongoing objective analysis of regional issues as affected by competition internal and external to the region. It is reasonable to expect that regional stability will continue to be elusive as long as each of the countries in Central Asia faces internal developmental challenges. Therefore, the scope of this thesis is to provide a framework for attaining the *precondition* for regional stability – using Uzbekistan as the case study for illustrating the broader model.

The concept behind, and research for, this thesis started prior to the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. Since the attacks and subsequent “War on Terror” much more attention has been paid to Central Asia and U.S. assistance to the region has dramatically increased. It is important to recognize that the U.S. has interests in Central Asia that go beyond the current “War on Terror,” and that a comprehensive long-term policy is necessary. For this reason, the thesis will largely discount the post-September 11th interests the U.S. has in Uzbekistan as well as the significant contributions that Uzbekistan has made, and can continue to make, as a U.S. ally in the “War on Terror.” Since the point of the thesis is to argue for a more efficient engagement strategy in Uzbekistan, enhancing the thesis with post-September 11, 2001 evidence only strengthens the argument. In fact, there would not have been such a diplomatic scramble to secure Uzbekistan’s support immediately after September 11th had we already had in place the sort of long-term engagement strategy we need.

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II. U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

A. INTRODUCTION

It is almost inconceivable that an entire, new region of the world could suddenly appear. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 initiated such a phenomenon. Regions of the globe, formerly treated as backwater provinces of the Soviet Union by foreign policy, acquired independence and stature and emerged as autonomous participants on the world stage. The emergence of these new regions and countries in turn required the United States to diversify its foreign policy strategy from the bipolar focus of the Cold War. In the ten years since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the United States has been studying, formulating, and implementing policy toward these new regions in efforts to beneficially serve American national interests.

Central Asia is one of these newly emergent regions. The former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan define the Central Asian region. The United States has maintained a diplomatic residence in each country for the past decade and the dominant foreign policy positions which have emerged have included the promotion of democracies, transition to market economies, and compliance with international standards of human rights. While these are noble, worthy goals, they are also ambiguous and not tangibly associated with the protection of national interests. Therefore, it seems crucial to analyze what interests the United States has in Central Asia in order to assess the effectiveness of our policies in securing those national interests. I intend to show that the United States does have significant interests in Central Asia, interests that current policies towards the region are not able to properly secure.

However, the implementation of foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum. There are many players vying for influence in Central Asia, including Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, North Korea, South Korea, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Not surprisingly, many of these countries have views on the development of the region that are not compatible with our national interests. For this reason I will also examine the geopolitical dynamics in the region with an emphasis on how the multiplicity of players

are affecting development and what this might mean for the United States. What I find is that, thanks to a deteriorating regional security situation, partnerships and relations in the Central Asian region are quickly solidifying. Unless the United States increases engagement with the Central Asian states quickly, our opportunities to do so will be further constrained and American influence in the region will wane, along with our ability to secure our national interests.

B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Theories of interdependence and globalization are appropriate for describing how events outside our borders can have direct and significant effects on our security and prosperity. The end of the Cold War, and its associated proxy wars, has not diminished the need for our international involvement. If anything this has only grown. Despite the debates over the effects of globalization, the predominant paradigm throughout the world is that cordial economic and political relations between all countries in the world will benefit everyone. Congress agrees:

The Congress finds that fundamental political, economic, and technological changes have resulted in the interdependence of nations. The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the world's limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system. (22 U.S.C.)

However, in the area of foreign policy, the world is a complicated machine, with lots of moving parts, and this theory alone is insufficient for guiding policymakers. Title 50, Chapter 15, Section 404a of the U.S. Code mandates that the President of the United States must present a National Security Strategy (NSS) annually to Congress (50 U.S.C.).

1. National Security Strategy to Protect National Interests

The purpose of the NSS is to clearly state the administration's position regarding the United States' worldwide interests, as well as policy goals and objectives that are crucial to the country's security (50 U.S.C.). The requirement for, and format of, the NSS makes it clear that the United States must protect national interests with effective foreign policy and military force if necessary. While this concept may seem intuitive, it

is worth highlighting the statutory requirement because the *process* of implementing policy to protect national interests is less well defined.

The most current publicly available NSS comes from the Clinton Administration. President Clinton defined our national interests in three categories: vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian interests (Clinton, 2000, p. 4). However, the U.S. Department of State, in the most recent publicly available “doctrinal” publication, defines U.S. national interests in terms of seven functional categories: national security, economic prosperity, American citizens and U.S. borders, law enforcement, democracy, humanitarian response, and global issues (U.S. Department of State, 2000a, pp. 11-12). Each of these seven functional categories is further subdivided into several strategic goals that could, theoretically, be imported into one of President Clinton’s three categories of national interest. To further complicate matters, members of the legislative branch of government are accountable to their constituents vis a vis the foreign policy process, not any clearly defined terms or categories. However, a recent joint, bipartisan congressional commission concludes that, “Strategy and policy must be grounded in the national interest” (“U.S. National Security Strategy,” 2001, p. 88). The commission’s categories of national interest, meanwhile, are: survival interests, critical interests, and significant interests (p. 89).

2. National Interests Redefined

Given the lack of agreement among these definitions and to retain a non-partisan bias, I am going to borrow from Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Fredrick Starr, and Kenneth Weisbrode, who authored the Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and define national interests in terms of vital interests, strategic interests, and important interests (Fairbanks, Nelson, Starr, & Weisbrode, 2001, p. 93). Redefining national interests in this manner is in no way meant to impugn the intent of policy makers. Instead, my aim is to retain some degree of consistency throughout this thesis.

a. Vital Interests

There is little ambiguity and therefore much consensus in terms of what defines vital interests. According to Clinton (2000) vital interests are:

those directly connected to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and the protection of our critical infrastructures – including energy, banking, and finance, telecommunications, transportation, water systems, vital human services, and government services – from disruption intended to cripple their operation. (p. 4)

The underlying point is that if left unchecked a threat to a vital national interest could directly and fundamentally change life as we know it in the United States. Therefore, it becomes incumbent upon policy makers to employ all the available elements of national power, including military power, necessary to counter threats to vital national interests. While apparently straightforward, Clinton’s definition does allow some room for interpretation. For example, alliance treaties are subject to debate, the “vitality of the nation” is a relative concept, and not even “crippling critical infrastructures” can be defined in measurable terms. However, so far, policy makers have risen to the occasion and mobilized national resources in defense of vital national interests, albeit only after an incident has occurred most times.

b. Strategic Interests

The defining characteristic of strategic interests is that they are not vital; meaning that, if left unchecked, if a strategic interest were threatened, this would not directly or fundamentally change the American way of life. However, strategic interests are important in that they may impact or affect vital national interests, or they may evolve into vital national interests on their own unless proactive measures are taken. In dealing with strategic national interests, policy makers have some time and flexibility to secure these interests through various strategies implementing the elements of national power. Basically, strategic interests must be secured, but with a lower level of criticality than vital interests and a higher degree of concern for long-term and ancillary effects.

c. Important Interests

Important interests are those that the United States would like to secure, but which have a low probability of significantly or directly impacting on a vital interest. The effects of securing important interests range from economic benefits for specific sectors of the American public, to promoting American values, to assisting in

humanitarian endeavors. While securing important interests earns the United States points in the “good guy” category, there is only an indirect correlation between an important interest and national security. However, important interests can impact on the how and why of protecting strategic interests.

C. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

National interests do not readily appear or clearly align themselves in easily defined categories. They often reflect the bias of the group promoting the interest and are refutable when placed in a historical context and compared using a case study methodology. Furthermore, the long-term effects of a specified interest are uncertain in every case. Fueling the debate over the categorization of the interest and the corollary response is the fact that there is almost always a parallel cost involved, requiring money and resources. In addition, interests are not mutually exclusive and, in many cases, they are actually intertwined. Nevertheless, I will categorize the United States’ national interests in Central Asia for the purposes of evaluating the effectiveness of our NSS in Central Asia.

1. Vital Interests

a. Countering/Eliminating the Threat Posed by Groups Associated with Usama bin Laden

Until September 11, 2001 it would have been laughable to argue that the United States had any vital national interests in Central Asia. Fairbanks et al. (2001) plainly state that it is unlikely that a vital interest will appear in Central Asia during the next 20 years, and then only if: a) a hostile regional power emerges that is capable of targeting the U.S. with ballistic missiles, b) a large scale conflict ensues that drags in NATO or the U.S., or c) a regional hegemon that is hostile to the U.S. gains control of the region (pp. 96-97). However, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have forced a reassessment of this view. On September 20, 2001, President Bush mentioned the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in addressing a joint session of congress, the nation, and the world. Given the IMU’s association with Usama bin Laden, President Bush clearly identified the elimination of the IMU as a vital national interest. The Central Asian nations have all willingly stepped up to support President Bush’s “War on Terror,” thus becoming involved with what is inarguably a vital U.S. national interest – the dismantling of Usama bin Laden’s global network. As it happens, this vital interest

for the U.S. is also a vital interest for the Central Asian states. Yet, allying themselves with the U.S. is not the only, or most palatable, means available to them to secure their vital national interests.

2. Strategic Interests

a. Maintain Influence in the Region

It almost goes without saying that the United States has strategic interests in maintaining engagement in every region of the world. However, on a prioritized list, Central Asia would most definitely not be at the top. Nevertheless, failure to secure this national interest would not only adversely impact the United States' ability to secure other strategic and important interests in the region, but also influence the outcome of vital and strategic interests in critical adjoining regions of the world, such as Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. I'll touch on the dynamic geopolitics of the region later, but in a region surrounded by four nuclear powers - China, Russia, Pakistan, and India - along with a potential nuclear power - Iran - it is imperative that the United States remain influential. Securing U.S. influence in the region does not have to be as antagonistic as Ariel Cohen, a distinguished political scientist specializing in the post-Soviet Union region, suggests when he says that the U.S. must maintain influence in order to "deny one country or a group of countries, such as Russia and China, the ability to dominate the region to the exclusion of American presence" (2001). However, when examining the geopolitical milieu, as I will later, there may be some merit to the intent behind Cohen's admonition.

b. Regional Security

The issue of regional security is non-controversial in the sense that regional security is a strategic national interest for the United States. Regional security encompasses three of the four strategic interests that Fairbanks et al. (2001) describe as being at stake in Central Asia: a) peace, stability, and independence of the region as a whole, b) containment of *intra*-regional disputes, and c) prevention of *inter*-regional disputes (their fourth strategic interest is proliferation of WMD) (p. 97). In recent congressional public policy hearings by officials of the Bush Administration, regional security also appears as the first of three "core strategic interests of the United States" in Central Asia (Bond, 2001).

The priority on regional security is well founded. None of the countries in the region can be characterized as having a particularly strong or efficient government. Although Tajikistan has been the only country in the region so far to fight a civil war, this trend cannot be expected to continue. Nancy Lubin and Barnett Rubin (1999) describe the Ferghana Valley of Central Asia, which spans parts of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, as an extremely volatile region, susceptible to ethnic, state, or transnational conflict (pp. 12-14). Instability in Afghanistan could also continue to contribute to regional unrest through refugee situations and the export of Islamist extremists. Or the Afghan situation could implode into an inter-regional conflict involving India, Iran, Pakistan, or even China (Fairbanks et al., p. 97). Each country in the region has communal security concerns, along with individual security concerns, that impact on regional U.S. interests.

The high potential for conflict in the region, coupled with the probabilistic involvement of other nations, which would indirectly affect U.S. vital and strategic interests in adjoining regions, makes regional security in Central Asia a high-value strategic interest. Furthermore, regional stability is an absolute precondition for the protection of our other strategic and important interests in the region.

c. Control Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Along with the sudden dissolution of the Soviet Union went positive control over thousands of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): nuclear, biological, and chemical. Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, while nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons research, technology, and knowledge was dispersed throughout the Central Asian states (Gleason, 1997, p. 151). The lack of physical control that the states exercise over their territory, and the proximity of states and groups that actively seek acquisition of WMD capabilities, is of concern to the United States. Only the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and willingness of the Central Asian states to cooperate in the effort downgrades this concern from a vital to a strategic interest (Fairbanks et al., pp. 78-79). Nevertheless, continuing emphasis must be placed on this issue to ensure that critical knowledge, research, and technology does not proliferate.

3. Important Interests

a. *Energy Development*

Not long after independence was granted to the Central Asian states, it became clear that they possessed significant energy resources which could now be made available to world markets. Conservative estimates credit Turkmenistan with 8.1 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and over 700 million tons of oil (Gleason, p. 141). Meanwhile, Kazakhstan could potentially be one of the top five oil producers in the world by 2010 (Bond, 2001). Other countries in the region are not quite as fortunate when it comes to energy resources, but exploration continues. Uzbekistan has located sizable oil reserves in the Ferghana Valley that are currently earmarked for domestic use (Gleason, p. 141). With the potential to export up to 2 million barrels of oil per day by 2010 (Gleason, p. 141), Central Asia cannot be ignored as a significant oil-producing region.

The United States' interests in developing the energy resources of Central Asia are evident and include: a) ensuring market access for U.S. companies in the energy field, and b) diversifying reliance away from the Middle East. Although energy development in Central Asia would improve our national security posture, this is not a strategic interest because development of these resources will inevitably happen, and market conditions will make the energy available for our consumption. Still, it would be more beneficial to bring the energy to market on our terms.

b. *Political / Economic Reform*

A hallmark of American diplomacy is the promotion of democratic values and a free market economy. As Clinton (2000) sums it up:

The United States has sought to strengthen the post-Cold War international system by **encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development** . . . For the first time in history, over half of the world's population lives under democratic governance. Our national security is a direct beneficiary of democracy's spread, as democracies are less likely to go to war with one another, more likely to become partners for peace and security, and more likely to pursue peaceful means of internal conflict resolution. (original emphasis) (p. 2)

Promoting these values in Central Asia is a challenge. Individuals who had served the Soviet State grabbed power and adopted nationalistic rhetoric in each of

the Central Asia nations following independence. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the only two countries to have had a succession in leadership since independence. However, none of the Central Asia nations has shown a proclivity toward meaningful reform. Ariel Cohen (2001) characterizes Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as having completely ignored the reform process, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as having backtracked away from reform after failed attempts to democratize and achieve market reform.

Although Clinton's policy appeals for the spread of "American values" in terms of strategic, or even vital, interests, political and economic reform truly fall out in the important national interest category; democratic reforms would certainly improve our relations and ties in the region, and market reforms would open new markets for investment and expansion. However, the need for regional security and stability should still override our desire to impart our values and democratic governance, as the independent variable, has yet to prove itself as the determining factor that leads to stability. Furthermore, as of yet, there is no recipe for success in transitioning from a communist, command economy to a democratic, market economy. Nevertheless, the principles that Clinton espouses are extremely important and are worthy of our consideration if the region is to develop over the long-term, and certainly these principles align with the United States' national interests.

c. Environmental Concerns

Throughout the former Eastern bloc the environmental legacies of Soviet rule are widespread. Central Asia is no exception. Years of mismanaging the upstream diversions of the two major rivers in the region, the Amu and Syr, to support inefficient irrigation has led to the near-destruction of the Aral Sea, which has lost nearly 50% of its surface size since 1960 (Gleason, p. 19). Addressing this issue will require and promote regional cooperation to apportion water rights, alleviate the suffering of those immediately affected by the disaster, arrest further degradation, and improve the efficiency of irrigation and agriculture throughout the region.

Kyrgyzstan is home to 23 uranium dumps with few environmental controls. The effects from the inoperable drainage systems at these dumps, along with their weakened foundations, could wreak ecological disaster throughout the Ferghana

Valley, which is home to 20% of Central Asia's population and the source of a significant portion of the food for the entire region (Lubin & Rubin, p. 76).

There are numerous other environmental challenges in Central Asia affecting the land and health of the citizens. While none of them directly affects U.S. national security, they are all indirectly tied to our other interests of regional security, political/economic reform, and energy development, and there are U.S. organizations that are uniquely qualified to assist in clean up and other efforts.

d. Combating Smuggling

Central Asia is a major transit point for the opium produced in Afghanistan. A noted scholar on the region, Ahmed Rashid (2002), describes how the drug trade in the region is inextricably linked to political activism and provides the money necessary to buy weapons (p. 229). U.S. domestic efforts to combat drug use are intimately tied to international efforts to curb the production and transportation of illicit drugs. This continues to be a priority effort for our government, and therefore is worthy of identification as an interest in Central Asia. Additionally, this interest is closely associated with regional security and political/economic reform because the corruption and networks created to traffic illegal drugs decrease the amount of social control the governments have over the populace while only further straining budgets as limited resources are required to focus on the drug trafficking problem. Although smuggling, whether in drugs, weapons, or persons, is directly linked to our strategic interests and even our "War on Terror," categorizing smuggling as an important interest recognizes that individuals may participate in this activity merely as a matter of survival. So, combating smuggling in Central Asia really requires a twofold approach. Securing our vital and strategic interests (eliminating the threat posed by groups associated with Usama bin Laden and regional security) will go to great lengths to stop the flow of smuggled goods and decrease the opportunity to smuggle, while addressing smuggling as an important interest will address the underlying factors.

D. POLICY EFFECTIVENESS IN SECURING NATIONAL INTERESTS

My listing of United States national interests in Central Asia is undoubtedly incomplete. However, the major interests have been identified and categorized, so that an

accurate assessment of our NSS in Central Asia can be made. Any unidentified interests are, in most cases, subordinate to the national interests that I have highlighted.

1. Our NSS in Central Asia

Our NSS in Central Asia is embedded within our regional approach to Europe and Eurasia. The guiding principle is the promotion of democratic values over the long-term. The Clinton Administration (2000) summarizes the overall strategy.

Our engagement also helps frame the key choices that only the peoples of the former Soviet Union and their leaders can make about their future, their role in world affairs, and the shape of their domestic political and economic institutions. Our strategy utilizes a long-term vision for the region, recognizing that this unprecedented period of transition will take decades, if not generations to complete. (p. 40)

In order to accomplish this strategy, Clinton cites several initiatives that support the overall goal of a democratic, free market region. These include: assistance to improve the electoral process; assistance to create a legal infrastructure; academic exchanges; and strengthening civil society through grassroots organizations, entrepreneurs, and an independent media (Clinton, 2000, pp. 44-45). The Bush Administration has echoed the same sentiments regarding its goals for the region: “The overarching goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia is to see these states develop into stable, free-market democracies” (Bond, 2001).

In keeping with the NSS, the U.S. Congress has taken steps to achieve our goals in Central Asia. Assistance provided to the newly independent states of the Soviet Union originally fell under the 1992 Freedom Support Act. In order to disassociate assistance to the Central Asian and Southern Caucasus regions from our foreign policy goals for Russia, the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999 was enacted. “The goal of the United States should be to promote economic and democratic reforms in the region while helping to develop oil and gas resources in a manner that is beneficial to all states in the region” (Senate Report 106-45, 1999). The Department of State, representing the administration, responded positively to this legislation, recognizing the value of creating a regional focus, and stating that the Act “provides a useful framework for U.S. interests in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia” (Senate Report 106-45, 1999).

2. Evaluation of NSS

Given our national interests in Central Asia, summarized below in Figure 1 (National Interests in Central Asia), how does our NSS stack up?

Vital Interest	Countering/eliminating the threat posed by groups associated with Usama bin Laden
Strategic Interests	Maintaining influence in the region Regional security Control proliferation of WMD
Important Interests	Energy development Political/economic reform Environment concerns Combating smuggling

Figure 1. National Interests in Central Asia.

As far as the newly emergent vital interest is concerned it is much too early to judge. The Bush Administration is feverishly working to maintain an allied coalition for the “War on Terror,” and the Central Asian states have thus far pledged full cooperation. The results of our efforts to secure this vital national interest are likely to profoundly change the dynamics of our engagement and NSS in the region. Evenso, the effectiveness of our past policies should shed light on what may or may not work well in the future.

As made clear in Clinton’s NSS and in statements by the Bush administration, the guiding principle in Central Asia is the promotion of democratic values and a free market economy. Nor is this a recent phenomenon. Immediately following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Secretary of State James Baker made a trip to Central Asia to let the leaders of the newly independent republics know that the United States “linked U.S. diplomatic recognition to the observance of human rights, the adoption of market-oriented economic reforms, and the establishment of democratic institutions” (Gleason, p.

151). However, from the perspective of U.S. interests, democratic and economic reforms are only of secondary importance. In theory, we should be able to more easily secure our strategic interests in a democratic, free-market society. However, the reality is we do not have that luxury. The Central Asia states are emerging from 70 years of Soviet authoritarian rule. Even the Clinton administration (2000) admitted that our hoped-for “transition will take decades, if not generations to complete” (p. 40). Is it responsible, then, to postpone securing our strategic national interests for “generations,” while we wait for an open society to, maybe, develop?

Helping develop a democratic Central Asia is not in and of itself misguided. But making democratic and market reform, and the observance of human rights, a precondition for engagement in the region may be a mistake. The Silk Road Strategy Act seeks to link the amount of assistance we provide to results in democratic and economic reforms. Furthermore, Section 499E of the Act “specifically prohibits assistance to the government of any country that ‘is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights’” (Senate Report 106-45, 1999). In the Central Asian context, these represent significant impediments to engagement. They hamper our ability to secure the kind of influence in the region that would help us satisfy our strategic needs along with our important interests of energy development, the environment, and combating smuggling. An international non-governmental organization, Human Rights Watch – Helsinki, has recently called for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to be designated countries of particular concern. However, the Administration has so far successfully resisted (“U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” 2001). Designating these countries as countries of particular concern would cut off all but humanitarian assistance, forcing us to halt meaningful engagement, abdicating any influence we have, and essentially abandoning both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan when they need us most and when our influence can be most effective.

Our NSS toward the region can, and undoubtedly will, evolve. The “War on Terror” is already changing the way the region is viewed. Representative Joseph R. Pitts (Pennsylvania) recently commented on our past policy toward the region and the need to change:

United States foreign policy toward the region has been one that emphasizes a stand back and watch approach. I do not think that it has been as successful as it could have been. I think we can still effect positive change in the region by engaging these countries. I think we must work with the leaders of the countries and build bridges with them, both economically and politically. I think we must let them know that the United States is not going to turn a blind eye to the region. We need to show them we do care about their stability, their economic growth, and engage them in all aspects. (“U.S. Policy in Central Asia,” 2001)

Accomplishing this will require a change in the laws as well as a change in philosophy. For instance, to begin with, if we are serious about engagement, then instead of making the adoption of American values a prerequisite to substantial assistance we should identify *Central Asians’* most crucial concerns and focus on creating responsible, accountable solutions to these problems. Such an approach serves several purposes. First, it would mitigate the primary obstacle to democratic reform, which is regional security. By taking away leaders’ otherwise valid excuse we would help halt their drift toward authoritarianism. Second, in the process of meaningful engagement with tangible results, our influence would increase with all sectors of society. Third, with increased influence, we can more effectively secure our national interests.

E. WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

In the case of countries that are not closely associated with our vital interests, it must be relatively common that our NSS, or policy goals, do not support our national interests. Surely this is not the first time that well-intentioned policies are counterproductive in light of our overarching security goals. However, it is important in an analysis to put everything in the proper context, and the context of our diplomatic efforts in Central Asia is a diverse geopolitical playing field.

1. The Great Game II

Since 1991, the competition for influence in Central Asia has been dubbed “The New Great Game,” after a term Rudyard Kipling originally coined in his 1912 novel Kim and that Peter Hopkirk expounded on in his 1994 work The Great Game. These references describe Russian and British competition for control over the region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The modern day parallel is apt, but includes a much larger and more diverse set of players.

The players with the most at stake in “The New Great Game” are those who border the region. Russia, China, and Iran are competing for economic and security reasons. Russia and China desperately need to stabilize Central Asia in order to protect the integrity of their most vulnerable borders. Russia wants to maintain its loosening grip on the economy it once monopolized, while China seeks entrée into this new, 50 million person strong market that is no longer subject to Beijing-Moscow negotiations. Iran, meanwhile, is concerned about other outsiders’ desires to militarize the region in the name of regional security; any such moves it considers a threat to its Islamic regime. However, Iran also views cooperation with Russia as a means to possibly improve its relations with the West (Fairbanks et al., pp. 71-81). Thus, competing interests make Central Asia a potential battle zone and with no clear way to satisfy all these diverse concerns, relationships among the external players in the region are bound to remain volatile.

The primary security threats in the region emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries played a role in supporting the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997) with the hopes of securing a “friendly,” Islamic government to their north. Both countries also support the current most serious security threat to the region, the IMU. While Central Asia is predominantly Muslim, most Central Asians’ theological roots are in Sufism and Jadidism, which offer vastly different interpretations of Islam from Wahabbism, to which the Islamists in the region are most closely associated. Recent involvement by Afghani and Pakistani Islamist groups, as well as proponents of the Wahabbi doctrine from Saudi Arabia, has led to an intense mistrust of all Muslim outsiders by regional governments, as well as the governments of Russia, China, and Iran (Rashid, 2001c, pp. 45-46).

At the same time, of course, the centrality of Pakistan in the security problems of Central Asia encourages involvement by India, a nuclear power with restive religious groups and malevolent desires toward the government of Pakistan. Other countries’ involvement is more varied. Turkey (a NATO member) claims to have significant historic ties to the region but is primarily interested in developing export routes for Central Asian oil that would transit through Turkey. It also competes to secure a stake in Turkmenistan’s natural gas reserves for domestic consumption purposes (Fairbanks et al.,

pp. 82-83). The Gulf States serve as the primary transshipment point for high-quality foreign goods into Central Asia, and also profess an ideological interest in assisting the development of new, Muslim societies (Fairbanks et al. p. 89). Israel is quickly building ties with Central Asia for economic reasons, to gain Muslim allies in the United Nations, and to check Iranian influence (Fairbanks et al. pp. 89-91). Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and various European countries are mostly interested in Central Asia for economic reasons.

While worthy of years more study, it seems fair to say that the relationships being formed in Central Asia are complex and dynamic. In such an unstable environment it is nearly impossible to predict how things might shake out. It is important to note, though, that the United States is the only external player that is concerned with democratic evolution. Beyond its national interests, the United States cannot help but have a significant stake in “The New Great Game” given the involvement of the nuclear powers of Russia, China, Pakistan, India, and possibly Iran.

2. Solidifying Relationships

Since independence, the Central Asian states have gone about asserting their independence in various ways with varying degrees of success. The overriding factor in their attempts to assert their autonomy has been from relations with the major adjacent military powers of Russia and China. Each of the Central Asian states has reached out to the United States as a counterbalancing force and for assistance in attaining complete autonomy from Russia (Hunter, 1996, pp. 169-170). As I have already pointed out, we have essentially rebuffed these efforts by making substantive democratic reform a precondition to meaningful assistance.

Uzbekistan is undeniably the strongest state in the region. Surrounded by other Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan has been seen as an independent “island of stability and a potential anchor” (Starr, 1996, p. 80). Until recently, President Karimov has consistently refused to adhere to Moscow’s directives, and has not participated in any military-political blocs, because, in his words, “We do not want a return to old times [Soviet Union],” (“Uzbekistan Will Not Join Military-Political Blocs”, 2001). However, recent events raise question about Uzbekistan’s ability to continue to avoid domination

by Russian and Chinese interests given Karimov's government's concerns regarding the existence and activities of the IMU.

On June 14, 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Five, a cooperative arrangement among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan had avoided inclusion in the group for years. Renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), this body's stated goals are "confronting Islamic radical fundamentalism and promoting economic development" (Cohen, 2001). Uzbekistan joined the SCO to gain assistance in defeating Islamists in the region since its unilateral efforts at counterinsurgency were largely unproductive. Russian and Chinese participation in the SCO almost certainly ensures that individual concerns of the less powerful Central Asian states will be dwarfed by the interests of Russia and China. To further exacerbate the situation, shortly after Uzbekistan signed on with the SCO, the presidents of Russia and China signed a treaty for Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, the first agreement between the two countries since 1950 (when Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin signed an anti-Western alliance treaty) (Cohen, 2001).

While not immediately threatening to United States interests, these two events signal a shift in Eurasian and Central Asian alliances and the balance of power in the region. With Uzbekistan, the strongest and most independent country in the region, submitting to Russian and Chinese pressure there is no doubt as to the political allegiances of the other countries in the region. It is safe to assume that, prior to September 11, 2001, the window of opportunity for United States involvement in the region was fast closing, despite the fact that countries in the region sought out a relationship with us as a pro-active, stabilizing counterbalance to Russian and Chinese pressure.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF MISSING THE WINDOW

After analyzing the United States' vital, strategic, and important interests in the region, the consequences of being shut out should now be obvious. Ironically, the creators of the Silk Road Strategy Act foresaw such a possibility:

It is not inconceivable that, in failing to act, the United States would miss an opportunity to secure the independence of states that, in the worst circumstance, could prove to be the building blocks of a hostile, regional

empire reproducing the threat and tensions of the Cold War. (Senate Report 106-45, 1999)

Ariel Cohen does not necessarily conclude that we are on the verge of another Cold War, but he is convinced that:

These two regional giants [Russia and China] are positioning themselves to define the rules under which the United States, the European Union, Iran, and Turkey will be allowed to participate in the strategically important Central Asian region. (2001)

Russian and Chinese dominance of Central Asia creates three conditions that should be of utmost concern to the United States. First, is the inability of the United States to independently secure its national interests in the region. In this scenario, the United States would have to meet the conditions set by the Russians and Chinese in order to secure national interests in Central Asia. This would fundamentally change the dynamics of our diplomatic efforts throughout Europe and Asia, and arguably the world. Second, Russian and Chinese dominance of the region nearly guarantees that the United States would have to abandon its long-term goal of promoting democratic governance in Central Asia. This would impact not only our ability to promote democratic values elsewhere, but would also adversely affect Central Asia's free market potential, and hence the global economy, as well as international recognition of the importance of respect for human rights. Third, while the Russians and Chinese can be expected to significantly improve regional security in the near-term, any forceful action they take will produce the potential for conflict in the mid- to long-term. Russian and Chinese dominance only increases pressure on Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Given this, any number of scenarios involving the use of military force to secure local regional interests can be conceived. And with Turkey as a NATO partner, and Pakistan and Iran (potentially) as nuclear powers, the United States would undoubtedly get pulled into the conflict.

G. CONCLUSION

Central Asia is important. It may not be the most important region of the world, but the United States cannot afford to ignore its significance. The proper way to view engagement with Central Asia is through the protection of our national interests, as mandated by federal law. In securing our national interests we will gain influence in the

region and set an example for other countries to emulate. It is important to understand the realities confronting the Central Asian states. They have no experience with democratic governance and free-market economies, and these transitions cannot be expected to occur overnight. What these nations desperately need is reliable assistance to help them address their immediate concerns while receiving consistent support in what will be a long transition. However, our current policies of making assistance contingent upon rapid, measurable democratic and economic reforms are not only counterproductive to our overall goals for the region, but jeopardize our ability to secure our national interests.

Even before September 11, 2001, the window of opportunity had not completely closed. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made some significant inroads and the Department of Defense maintains a small, low-level military-to-military engagement plan. U.S. NGOs are also active in the region. Furthermore, our engagement is still desperately sought by the Central Asian states. This fact alone is vitally important. It is the means through which we could attain our long-term goals if only we reversed our approach. If we were to focus our assistance on what Central Asians regard as *their* critical problems, thus proving ourselves a dependable partner, we would have more influence when it came to securing our national interests in Central Asia while at the same time helping shape the region's long-term political evolution. It is virtually impossible to achieve this when we demand democratic reforms up front. Therefore, as we reassess our national priorities, it is necessary to take advantage of the geopolitical imbalance created by the events of September 11, 2001 and seize the opportunity to expand engagement in Central Asia, and to do so shrewdly.

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III. IMU THREAT

A. INTRODUCTION

Uzbekistan does not rank high on anyone's list of stable countries in the world. The government of Uzbekistan has faced tremendous challenges in the ten years since gaining independence - chaotic economic conditions highlighted by a non-convertible currency, ecological disaster in the Aral Sea, a flailing transition to a market economy, desperate social conditions, deteriorating infrastructure, and the list goes on. It is not trivial to observe that the government is still in power; this is a testament to its ability to govern. Presumably, each year the government gains valuable experience in the execution of its duties, thereby becoming more effective. Yet, the international community sees things moving in the opposite direction and criticizes the Uzbekistani government for increasingly repressive policies and decreasing effectiveness. But, do increasingly repressive security measures really indicate that the government of Uzbekistan is losing its grip on power? Or, can its apparent regression toward totalitarianism be explained differently?

I intend to show that the threat posed by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), an insurgent movement with the stated goal of replacing the government of Uzbekistan, has significantly impacted the policies of the government. Even though the actual threat of the IMU may be small and its chances for success even smaller, it has effectively forced the government of Uzbekistan to fully enforce the only counterinsurgency strategy it knows: internal security - Soviet style. The effects of the internal security measures that have been adopted in turn affect the government's ability to carry out other necessary reforms. Thus, before accurately judging the ability of the government of Uzbekistan to govern, and likewise to serve as an effective American ally in the region, one must first understand the dynamic effects of the IMU on the government and the rationale behind the government's current counterinsurgency strategy. While nothing may fully justify suspending civil liberties and regressive economic reforms, understanding the dynamics involved provides a more accurate frame of reference for evaluating domestic events in Uzbekistan than simply blaming everything on an incompetent, insecure dictator. Similarly, understanding the IMU-

government-counterinsurgency relationship highlights what should be the focal point for all U.S. assistance to the country as the United States moves to secure its national interests.

B. BACKGROUND OF THE IMU

Although, the roots of the IMU can perhaps be traced back to Gorbachev's glasnost policy, the first manifestation of insurgent attempts by current members of the IMU was in December of 1991, when independent Uzbekistan was still in its infancy. Tohkir Yuldashev, the twenty-four year old leader of a political movement named Adolat (justice), took control of the southern town of Namangan in response to official clergy of the city endorsing the candidacy of Islam Karimov for president (Lubin and Rubin, 1999, p. 48). Assisted by a persuasive twenty-two year old, Jumma Namangani, Yuldashev maintained control in the Namangan region for several months. It is estimated that during this time Yuldashev enjoyed the support of 5,000 activists and Saudi funds to spread his message in support of a strict form of Islamic rule, atypical to the region (Rashid, 2001c, p. 51). Yuldashev enjoyed some success, as up to 50,000 people in the Fergana Valley embraced his vision of Muslim self-rule (Lubin and Rubin, p. 49). After three months, in March 1992, Karimov responded to this first challenge to his authority in typical Soviet manner, by criminalizing Adolat, initiating widespread arrests, and tightening police security. While these security measures were effective, the seeds planted during this early insurrection remained dormant for several years.

Escaping the crackdown in Namangan, Yuldashev traveled between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey in order to improve his knowledge of Islamic movements, make important contacts, and raise money. Yuldashev settled down in Afghanistan in 1996, where Afghan and Pakistani Islamic groups provided him with organizational assistance as he set about establishing the IMU. One of Yuldashev's more important contacts was Usama bin Laden (Rashid, 2001c, p. 51). Jumma Namangani also escaped from Uzbekistan in 1992 and, like Yuldashev, sought to improve upon his revolutionary skills. Perhaps due to his three years of experience as a Soviet airborne soldier in Afghanistan, Namangani seems to have been drawn toward conflict. After leaving Uzbekistan, he commanded troops of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in the 1992-1997 Tajik Civil War (Rashid, 2001b). He traveled throughout Afghanistan and

Pakistan, and spent a year in Saudi Arabia undergoing religious training and working with Saudi intelligence officials (International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 3). Yuldashev and Namangani joined forces again in Afghanistan in the 1997-1998 timeframe with the stated goal of overthrowing the secular government of Uzbekistan; the IMU is their military force. Yuldashev remains the political leader of the movement while Namangani commands the armed forces.

C. CURRENT DISPOSITION OF THE IMU

Aside from Yuldashev and Namangani, little information is available about the personalities within the IMU or about their organization. It is widely reported, and logical, that a large number of the IMU militants are former UTO freedom fighters. In addition to the former UTO fighters, reports frequently cite the presence of former Afghan freedom fighters, Arabs, Chechens, Uighurs, as well as ethnic Uzbeks. Accounts of the size of the IMU vary depending on the source; however, it is widely agreed that the IMU has in the neighborhood of 5,000 active fighters, perhaps more. The IMU conducts most of its organizational tasks and training within Afghanistan while being able to conduct limited operations from, and move somewhat unrestricted through, Tajikistan. There are credible links between the IMU and Usama bin Laden, but the extent of support that bin Laden provides to the IMU is not clear. By at least one report, bin Laden has provided the IMU with two helicopters (Rashid, 2001a).

In addition to the former Taliban of Afghanistan and Usama bin Laden, the IMU receives financial and equipment support from the remnants of the UTO in Tajikistan (who are officially recognized in the coalition government as a result of the peace treaty that ended that civil war). Internal recruiting/fundraising efforts take place in Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group, pp. 7-8). And Iran, which never recognized the Taliban, also provides some degree of assistance as evidenced by the government-controlled media in Iran serving as a mouthpiece for the IMU (Iran Report, 2001). Additionally, the lucrative drug trade in the region provides a means by which the IMU can raise funds internally.

It is difficult to judge the level of popular or underground support the IMU enjoys in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government has arrested thousands in crackdowns on Islamic extremists; however, critics argue that the government has arrested innocent individuals not involved in insurgent efforts (LeVine, p. A1). It appears that support for the IMU is

widely available in the economically depressed, politically isolated, religiously devout Ferghana Valley, which also spans parts of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyzstan. The Ferghana Valley comprises less than 5% of the landmass of Uzbekistan while housing over 25% of the Uzbek population and also serves as the major source of food and water in the region (Lubin and Rubin, p. 35).

In its first out-of-cycle nomination, the United States designated the IMU as an International Terrorist Organization, even though, thus far, the violence it has committed has been comparatively insubstantial and aimed only at the government (U.S. Department of State, 2000b). There are signs that the IMU may have larger ambitions than seizing control of Uzbekistan, or that the IMU is now appealing to a wider constituency given its reported name change to the Islamic Party of Turkestan (Pannier, 2001). The symbolism behind identification as a political party and the mention of Turkestan is worth bearing in mind. Turkestan represents the ideal notion that the people of Central Asia, from the Caspian Sea into western China, can be united under an Islamic Caliphate. U.S. military action in Afghanistan has undoubtedly disrupted and degraded IMU capabilities. However, it is imprudent to assume that the IMU has been destroyed because it enjoys a degree of sanctuary in Tajikistan and could have escaped elsewhere, not to mention the likelihood that “sleeper” cells exist in Uzbekistan. More recent reports indicate that the IMU is actively regrouping, recruiting, and rebuilding a logistical capability (McConnell, 2002). In the final analysis, there is no reason not to believe that the IMU still exists in significant numbers and remains fixated upon its cause while searching for an effective strategy to achieve its goals.

D. IMU ACTIVITIES

It is an understatement to say that so far the IMU has failed to capitalize on its potential. After ten years of conceptual development, and over four years of existence, the IMU has proven to be little more than a nuisance. While some small-scale attacks on government facilities and assassination of government officials in the Ferghana Valley in late 1997 and early 1998 were probably carried out by the IMU, the first large-scale operation attributed to them is the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent. In this event, six bombs exploded in the capital of Uzbekistan within an hour and fifteen minutes of each other at key government facilities. Only an unplanned delay prevented the president

from being caught in one of the explosions (Lubin and Rubin, pp. 52-55). Since the Tashkent bombings, the IMU has been involved in three fairly clumsily handled hostage-takings, including one incident in Kyrgyzstan involving several American mountain climbers (International Crisis Group, 2001, pp. 7-8). Even though two of the hostage situations were resolved through the payment of ransom, operationally it appears that the hostage takings occurred due to chance contact with IMU forces and not as *modus operandi*.

Instead, the primary operational pattern of the IMU has been small-scale, armed unit infiltration of Uzbekistan during the summer months, the only time of year it is feasible to move a military unit over land through the Pamir Mountains. In 1999 and 2000 the IMU was involved in a series of confrontations with Uzbek government forces in border regions throughout Uzbekistan. It took the government forces several months to put an end to the various infiltrations of anywhere from 70 to 100 fighters who were sufficiently well-armed with sniper rifles, small arms, machine guns, and mortars (International Crisis Group, 2000, p. 4-5). Border incidents in 2001 were small and isolated, but this is perhaps due to reports that the IMU was being employed along with Taliban forces in an offensive to destroy the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan (Kasabolo, 2001) (“Uzbek Exile Forms Political Party,” 2001). It is too early to gauge the level of activity for the IMU in the summer of 2002. However, the “War on Terror” and an increased military presence in Uzbekistan and northern Afghanistan is likely to compel the IMU to adopt tactics different than those employed in the summer of 1999 and 2000.

E. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

How can the IMU, a relatively small insurgency in exile, pose a serious threat to the established government of Uzbekistan? The answer lies in understanding the dynamics behind this insurgency. Insurgency expert, Gordon McCormick (2001), provides a model for understanding the relationships involved in an insurgency. Depicted below, in Figure 2 (Relationships in an Insurgency), is the model that he has dubbed “The Mystic Diamond.” The fundamental characteristic of the model is the interactive nature of the relationships. Preconceived actions or strategies by any of the players are dependent upon the forces at play within the model, not the efficacy of the players’ plan.




Figure 2. Relationships in an Insurgency (After: McCormick)

The primary struggle in the case of the IMU and Uzbekistan is for popular support, located at the top of the diamond. In this model, the main goal or strategy of the IMU is to gain popular support in order to expand the area of operations, increase the amount of inputs coming into the organization, and erode support for the government. The government is similarly competing for the support of the same finite population in order to extract the resources necessary to protect civilians and manage the affairs of the state. At a macro level it is easy to see how gains in popular support by the IMU occur at the expense of the government and how this poses a threat to the government. But, given the presumed size of the IMU, its activities, and exile status, the likelihood of the IMU gaining a significant percentage of popular support seems remote. However, the dynamic nature of the relationships in this conflict can produce disproportionate results.

For instance, in the struggle for popular support, the IMU enjoys some key advantages. Even though, as Rashid (2001c) points out, the form of Islam that the IMU supports is not openly embraced in Central Asia, the IMU is able to exploit some existing fissures in state-society relations to gain support for its cause or, more importantly,

undermine support for the government. To start with, the IMU seeks a relatively small amount of support from the people in comparison to the government. As a newly independent state and underdeveloped country, Uzbekistan faces many challenges. To meet these challenges the government is dependent upon the people to make sacrifices for the good of the country. Taxes, materiel, people, patience, and unwavering support are some of the inputs that the government of Uzbekistan requires from its citizens in order to meet its obligations to them (see the upper, right-hand portion of Figure 2). In contrast, thanks in part to outside sponsorship, the IMU requires only implicit support from the population in order to exist, although more support is certainly welcome and always sought. The economic hardships in Uzbekistan make the situation ripe for people to grudgingly meet their obligations to the government while turning a blind eye towards insurgent activity. When this occurs it perpetuates and even magnifies the threat of the IMU to the government.

Additionally, through small-scale, isolated attacks on government infrastructure, the IMU is able to capitalize on another government weakness: its inability to provide security. Since independence, Karimov has been fixated on the requirement to maintain a secure and stable environment in order to provide the conditions necessary for economic development. His justification is the Tajik Civil War, after which various armed militias succeeded in gaining government recognition in a coalition government that has become a model of inefficiency (Gleason, 1997, p. 125). From the Uzbekistani government's perspective, at a minimum, the small IMU incursions expose a chink in its armor that adversely affects economic development and potentially represents a threat to the entire system, as was the case in Tajikistan. In order to maintain popular support the government is forced to respond harshly to these attacks to keep its promise to provide an environment conducive to improving conditions. However, through repeated attacks, the IMU is able to demonstrate to the people that the government is not able to stop the IMU activity, thereby enhancing the perception of IMU strength in the minds of the people.

The IMU is also able to capitalize on the economic and social conditions in Uzbekistan to gain popular support. The economic conditions in Uzbekistan are indeed desperate for many people, to the point that in many rural areas even maintaining basic sustenance is a serious problem (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 13). Socially, the

government has closed down all non-government mosques and, due to extended family networks, nearly every family in the Ferghana Valley has been affected by the mass arrests of between 50,000 and 100,000 people who are now in internment camps (“Uzbekistan: A War Waiting to Happen,” 2001). The IMU is easily able to spread the message that the government is solely responsible for these conditions without having to provide any credible solutions. This does not necessarily strengthen the IMU-citizenry bond in the mystic diamond, but it does weaken the government-citizenry bond, and that poses a threat to the government.

There are many more examples of how the competition between the IMU and government for popular support magnifies the threat to the government. Each example reinforces the criticality and frailty of the government-citizenry bond and highlights the legitimacy of the IMU as a viable threat. The IMU’s near-term strategy seems to be to pursue continued weakening of the government because it has not yet attempted to consolidate political control of any areas within Uzbekistan, or made public any alternatives to the current system of government. In fact, the IMU still faces a significant hurdle in gaining popular support. McCormick describes this hurdle as the “rational paradox.” Simply put, the rational paradox requires the insurgents to convince the population that they have more to gain and less to lose by joining the movement. How the IMU intends to overcome the rational paradox remains to be seen.

F. UNDERSTANDING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

As mentioned several times previously, the government’s primary response to insurgent activity is increased internal security and mass arrests, precisely how the Soviet Union responded to numerous uprisings and terrorist activities. Popular perception is that this type of government response is due to weakness and insecurity. Many believe that the measures are radicalizing the population unnecessarily in response to an overstated threat (LeVine, 2001, pp. A1, A8), and others argue that the governmental reactions represent the real source of the problems (“Uzbekistan: A War Waiting to Happen,” 2001). While the observation is valid that the government’s repressive measures are not helping to build state-society bonds, the assertion that the government’s counterinsurgency strategy is invalid and is radicalizing the population is not supported by in-depth analysis.

Generally speaking, the government of Uzbekistan has six options for conducting counterinsurgency operations: they are depicted below in Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options). In applying the mystic diamond model to counterinsurgency operations it is important to note that the strength of the overall effort is not based on the independent effect of each strategy, but the confluence of effects of all the strategies combined added to the response by each actor (McCormick).




Figure 3. Counterinsurgency Options (After: McCormick)

Option “A” is the hearts and minds approach, extremely popular with stable, liberal democratic societies that are not facing a serious threat of their own. In this approach the government builds its ties to the people by implementing democratic reforms, carrying out government programs that help the people, and becoming more responsive to the people’s needs. This is a long-term approach that does not provide any immediate relief from the threat. In the case of Uzbekistan, Option “A” may even increase the size of the threat by providing money to the IMU in the form of government loans and programs, and by offering the IMU sanctuary in Uzbekistan enabling it to operate free from prosecution. While ideologically the hearts and minds option has the

moral high ground and should be the ultimate goal, it requires some preconditions of stability in order to be effective.

Option “B” is interdicting the IMU’s ability to connect with the populace. This can be accomplished through high-tech surveillance and intelligence-collecting methods that compromise underground networks and identify collaborators with legally sufficient evidence or via massive internal security measures that make subversive activity extremely risky. Lacking the resources to rely on high-tech equipment, the government of Uzbekistan is accomplishing Option “B” through massive internal security measures. This option is absolutely essential for eliminating the threat to the government in an overall counterinsurgency strategy and the government of Uzbekistan is aggressively going down this path. The weakened government-populace ties are an unfortunate side effect of the government’s inability to pursue this mandatory option by other means.

Option “C” is targeting the IMU with military force. In armed confrontations the government forces have always emerged as the victor and have suffered minimal losses. However, the IMU does not have any readily identifiable armed forces in Uzbekistan. Therefore, this option is not a mainstay of the current counterinsurgency strategy and is unlikely to significantly affect the threat. Likewise, Option “D”, interdicting the ability of the IMU to receive outside support, is not very applicable in this case. Uzbekistan did not recognize the Taliban and cannot influence the support the IMU receives while members are in Afghanistan, short of invading. Uzbekistan has attempted to apply pressure on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to increase security in regions of the countries where the IMU is believed to operate, and has even conducted unilateral military operations on foreign soil. However, the Kyrgyz and Tajik military and security forces are woefully under-prepared for providing security in the areas in question.

Option “E” is to build sufficient ties to external supporters that can help combat the IMU. Uzbekistan is the most prosperous and most stable of all the Central Asian states, which means other Central Asian states cannot provide the support necessary. For developmental reasons Uzbekistan has repeatedly turned down inclusion in regional political-military security alliances, because, in Karimov’s words, “We do not want a return to the old times [Soviet Union],” (“Uzbekistan Will Not Join Military-Political

Blocs”, 2001). Uzbekistan has sought U.S. assistance, but meaningful aid has been contingent on the types of reforms characterized in Option “A.” Sufficient support from Option “E” does not appear imminent unless Uzbekistan is willing to subordinate itself to one, or more, of the major powers.

The final option, “F,” consists of infiltrating the IMU organization or collecting a large amount of the right type of intelligence necessary to effect counter-organizational targeting. While the government of Uzbekistan may be pursuing this option, the results of this option are always uncertain and cannot serve as the basis for a counterinsurgency strategy.

Therefore, evaluating the options that Uzbekistan has in implementing a counterinsurgency strategy to eliminate the threat that the IMU poses yields:

<u>OPTION</u>	<u>Feasibility</u>
A	Not yet, need to meet preconditions
B	Yes
C	No
D	No
E	Uncertain
F	Feasible but uncertain effectiveness

It should therefore come as no surprise that the government of Uzbekistan is so wholeheartedly employing aggressive internal security measures; it is literally their only option that will definitively decrease the threat. How these limited options in countering a seemingly small threat affect policy comprises the rest of the story.

G. EFFECTS ON POLICIES

Having established that the IMU is a threat that the government must address, and that the government has limited options in dealing with the threat, the next question concerns the effects that the IMU has on the policies of Uzbekistan. The most notable effect is in the area of foreign relations. Since independence Uzbekistan has remained fiercely independent and has assiduously sought to distance itself from Russia. In 1996 Uzbekistan was seen as an independent “island of stability and a potential anchor” (Starr, 1996, p. 80). However, since 1999 Uzbekistan has been increasingly drawn towards

Russia and China for security reasons. I have already discussed how Uzbekistan recently joined the SCO in order to gain assistance in defeating Islamists in the region. However, I need to emphasize that the presence of China and Russia in the cooperative will undoubtedly affect Uzbekistan's independent development - not necessarily towards democracy either.

The IMU is also indirectly impacting Uzbekistan's ability to institute democratic reforms. As mentioned when discussing Option "A," the civil liberties associated with a liberal democracy are inconsistent with the ability to mitigate a serious threat to the regime. It is thus unlikely that the government will agree to democratic reforms until the security situation is stabilized. The inability to institute meaningful democratic reforms also adversely affects the ability of the government to implement significant economic reforms. Moreover, as a direct result of security concerns, border controls have been tightened, leading to increased regional tension, increased tariffs, and decreased trade. Ironically, the compounding effects of the inability to institute democratic and economic reforms could easily lead to regime instability. This highlights the paradoxical situation into which the relatively small IMU is able to place on the government: the actions the government is forced to take to eliminate the threat could very well end up eliminating the government.

H. CONCLUSION

It is nearly impossible to definitively prove that the IMU is the primary or most significant threat to stability, security, and development in Uzbekistan. Likewise, it is equally impracticable to propose that economic policies, authoritarianism, or something else is the primary threat. The problems are all inextricably interrelated. The reality of the situation is that the government of Uzbekistan is the internationally recognized sovereign authority of the landmass constituting Uzbekistan, and that government consistently seeks international assistance in dealing with the threat posed by the IMU. It is, for the most part, the perception of the threat of the IMU that complicates the situation: the government feels that it cannot do enough, while outsiders conclude that the government is overreacting. But, since the government is legitimately in power, the U.S. must deal with the government of Uzbekistan's perception of the threat.

In American terms, the IMU appears to be an insignificant threat that could easily be dealt with by properly applying the tenets of the Internal Defense and Development Strategy (Joint Pub 3-07.1, 1996, pp. C1-C6). However, by analyzing the situation in context it is evident that the threat that the IMU poses is having some dramatic effects on the government of Uzbekistan's ability to implement any noteworthy reforms. Recognizing that the United States has strategic national interests at stake in Central Asia, the preconditions set by the U.S. of democratic reform and human rights accountability are counterproductive. The logical focus of assistance to the region should be to help the government of Uzbekistan counter the insurgent threat. Only in the process of assisting the government of Uzbekistan to defeat the IMU will the United States gain influence over the evolution of democratic reform that is necessary to stabilize the region, develop the economy, and protect American interests.

I can legitimately be accused of oversimplifying the situation in regard to the internal security of Uzbekistan. Other fundamentalist Islamic groups exist in Uzbekistan and the government is not completely free from blame. Ahmed Rashid (2002) highlights the Hizb-ut-Tahrir as another Islamist group, with a significant following, intent on overthrowing the Uzbekistani government. But I would submit the models provided here can serve as a useful tool for analyzing any insurgent effects on government and counterinsurgency actions. A good counterinsurgency campaign plan should be able to effectively mitigate insurgent threats from a variety of sources while establishing the government as the legitimate bearer of authority. Rather than focus on all the potential problems Uzbekistan faces – which are variations on the themes already mentioned - it seems more profitable to examine what the U.S. is doing and can do better to foster stability and security overall in Uzbekistan.

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IV. U.S. ASSISTANCE TO UZBEKISTAN

The United States government, through policy and action, has recognized the need to be engaged in Uzbekistan. However, I argued in Chapter II that U.S. assistance has not been as effective as it could be in securing our national interests and I concluded Chapter III by arguing that countering insurgent threats would be a more logical focus of our assistance. Therefore, prior to recommending an improved strategy for engagement with Uzbekistan it is necessary to have a basic understanding of past and current assistance programs. I am not attempting to conduct a comprehensive audit of all the assistance the U.S. has directly and indirectly provided to Uzbekistan. Rather, my fundamental purpose is to illustrate that the various well-designed, good-intentioned programs that the U.S. has created suffer from a lack of unity of effort and do not directly produce results that support U.S. interests.

A. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CONTROLLED FUNDS

The Department of State has programming and oversight responsibility for the most significant amount of assistance to Uzbekistan through the foreign operations section of the U.S. annual budget. Figure 4, below, summarizes the total amount of funding authorized for Uzbekistan as obtained from the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations from FY 1996 through the FY 2003 request.

	FSA	FMF	IMET	NADR	PC	CSD	ERF	Total
1996	8,905		293		1,095			10,293
1997	21,550	1,000	286		1,335			24,171
1998	20,450	1,550	457	42	1,257			23,756
1999(est)	27,610	1,650	485	901	1,714			32,360
2000	20,042	1,750	547		1,703			24,042
2001	24,800	2,445	494	330	1,830	700		30,599
2002(est)	28,890	207	1,000		899		83,500	114,496
2003(req)	31,500	8,750	1,200	1,200	1,298			43,948
All amounts in thousands of U.S. Dollars.								

Figure 4. Foreign Operations Assistance to Uzbekistan (Data compiled from: U.S. Department of State, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002)

Freedom Support Act (FSA) money accounts for the bulk of the assistance provided to Uzbekistan. Money in the FSA account, for the most part, is used to fund USAID programs in Uzbekistan. However, the FSA account is also used as a catchall

accounting classification to provide other humanitarian and security related assistance (U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 49). Foreign Military Financing (FMF) money is intended to increase military cooperation between the recipient country and the U.S. and NATO by enhancing interoperability in peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations while also providing funds to enable the recipient country to participate in Partnership for Peace exercises (Beckwith, 2002). International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds increase military professionalism and demonstrate the role of the military in a democracy by bringing foreign students to U.S. military schools, sending U.S. training teams to a foreign country to conduct training, and providing English language training to foreign soldiers (Beckwith). Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds comprise security related assistance that is not strictly military in nature. A key use of NADR funding in Uzbekistan is the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance, or EXBS, program (U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 341). Peace Corps (PC) funding provides the resources necessary to operate PC programs in Uzbekistan. The category of Child Survival and Disease (CSD) funds, provided in 2001, was merged into the Development Assistance (DA) account in 2002 to streamline the budget structure (U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 19). Uzbekistan does not receive any DA funds. However, USAID, with FSA funding, operates programs to accomplish the intent of the CSD program. The Emergency Response Funds (ERF), provided in 2002, were authorized by congress, in excess of the FY 2002 foreign operations budget request, in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The breakdown of the funds is: a \$25 million increase to FMF, a \$40.5 million increase to FSA, and an \$18 million increase to NADR-EXBS (U.S. Department of State, 2002, p. 340).

In order to illustrate the planned and desired effects of this funding I will examine the FY 2002 budget justifications for the Department of State and USAID. These justifications were published prior to September 11, 2001 and represent the accumulated knowledge of almost a decade of foreign operations budget experience in Uzbekistan.

1. Policy Refresher

Going back to Chapter II, the guiding principles for our engagement with Uzbekistan are the fostering of democracy, transition to market economy, and honoring

the principles of human rights. I have argued that this is not the most effective way to secure our national interests in Uzbekistan. However, it is our current policy and has a direct impact on funding and programs provided to Uzbekistan to secure our national interests. The Department of State FY 2002 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations for Uzbekistan carries an implicit warning:

Internally, Uzbekistan remains an authoritarian state; it is in the U.S. interest to see it evolve democratically, with respect for human rights. Uzbekistan has also failed to move toward a market economy, hurting the country's prospects for economic success and stability and impeding U.S. trade and investment. (U.S. Department of State, 2001)

This warning is intensified and the consequences explained in the FY 2002 USAID program for Uzbekistan:

The unwillingness of the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) to introduce market-oriented reforms in the financial sector has constrained economic recovery . . . Its authoritarian politics and state-controlled economy have stymied any transition, contributed to human rights violations and limited foreign investment . . . The lack of political will to undertake economic reforms led USAID to shift its assistance strategy focus from the macro-economic level to the micro-and local levels, focusing on private sector development through education and training. (USAID, 2001)

What has essentially emerged as the policy position for Department of State-controlled funds is to forgo meaningful engagement with the government of Uzbekistan and adopt a grassroots approach to push for government reform by developing an effective civil society – an outside-in approach. As I will explain below, some of the Department of State-controlled funds are provided to the government of Uzbekistan to shore up glaring deficiencies in security. However, there is not a determined effort to assist the government of Uzbekistan in improving its performance.

2. Freedom Support Act Funds

As evident in Figure 4, the vast majority of assistance to Uzbekistan comes from the FSA. USAID accounts for all of the FSA funds in its FY 2002 Program, stating that \$10 million in FSA funding is transferred to other U.S. Government agencies (USAID). This \$10 million is accounted for in the State Department Congressional Budget Justification for FY 2002. Generally speaking, the State Department says that this money is used to fund an array of security and humanitarian programs. On the security side, the

money funds programs to prevent the proliferation of WMD, improve border security, and to train law enforcement personnel. On the humanitarian side, the money is used to provide “scarce medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, clothing and some food, much of which is provided directly to institutions such as orphanages, retirement homes, etc.” (U.S. Department of State, 2001).

The remainder of the FSA assistance is provided through USAID, which manages five separate activities in Uzbekistan. The first activity is the “Improved Environment for the Growth of Small and Medium Enterprises,” whose aims are to: a) provide resource materials, training, and research opportunities to economics and business curricula in universities to create subject matter experts grounded in modern theory, b) offer entrepreneurs basic business education and develop business associations and advocacy groups, and c) encourage micro-credit activity by providing technical assistance and advisory services for new small businesses. The overall goal is to “improve the business environment to stimulate growth of small and medium enterprises” (USAID)

The second USAID activity is the “Improved Management of Critical Natural Resources, including Energy.” With this, USAID plans to improve the management of natural resources, improve the policy and regulatory frameworks controlling natural resources, and increase public awareness concerning the benefits of efficient natural resources management. To accomplish these goals USAID, in coordination with other international organizations, assists low-level natural resource management officials in Uzbekistan to leverage technology to more efficiently manage natural resources. USAID also lobbies for regional cooperation on trans-national issues (USAID).

The third USAID activity is “Strengthened Democratic Culture among Citizens and Targeted Institutions.” The premise here is that increasing awareness of democracy at a grassroots level will increase the pressure on the governing elites to speed up the reform process in line with democratic principles. To accomplish this, USAID provides technical assistance to develop more effective civic organizations, independent media and media organizations and, increase public participation in the decision making process, and to improve the legal skills of lawyers and judges. This activity is currently focused

on improving conditions at the local level, although technical assistance to improve media reporting also has effects at the national level.

The fourth USAID activity is “Increased Utilization of Quality Primary Health Care for Select Populations.” The overall goal of this activity is to help Uzbekistan transition from a centralized, state-run curative health care system to a more effective primary health care system focused on preventative care. To accomplish this, USAID is directly engaged with the government of Uzbekistan through the Ministry of Health to provide retraining to health care professionals, upgrade laboratory and clinical skills, and improve the regulatory and policy frameworks regarding health care. USAID also provides technical assistance to increase public awareness of personal health care rights and responsibilities (USAID).

The fifth, and final, activity that USAID manages in Uzbekistan falls under the title “Cross-Cutting Programs.” This is essentially the enabler and monitor of all USAID activity in Uzbekistan. Under this activity USAID provides the training and exchanges necessary to make the other activities as effective as possible, while also providing the resources necessary to manage and evaluate the other four activities (USAID).

3. Other Funds

FMF funds for FY 2002, owned and allocated by the Department of State and managed by the Department of Defense, will be applied toward the purchase of communications equipment (Beckwith). IMET funding for FY 2002 will be used to provide English language training for designated officers, as well as to fund attendance at the following military courses: Air Command and Staff, Army Command and General Staff, Army Infantry Officer Basic Course, Army Military Police Basic Course, Army Ranger Course, Army Special Forces Qualification Course, Army Airborne Course, International Defense Management Course, and the Combat Strategic Intelligence Training Program (Beckwith). NADR funds, which were requested and authorized but not spent prior to the ERF (resulting in a zero in the estimate block in Figure 4) were intended to be applied toward improving export controls and border security through a combination of equipment and training (U.S. Department of State, 2002). The final category of assistance provided to Uzbekistan in FY 2002, PC, supports Peace Corps projects in Uzbekistan. The Peace Corps focuses in three areas in Uzbekistan: English

Education and Resource Development, targeted toward integrating Uzbekistan into the world market economy; Business Education and Development, which provides Western business training; and Health, which provides assistance to rural clinics (Peace Corps, 2002).

B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT

In addition to the money and guidance that the Department of State provides, the Department of Defense serves as an important contributor to our relationship with Uzbekistan. Department of Defense engagement is the most significant source of direct government-to-government contact. However, accounting for these engagement activities is difficult for two reasons. First, Department of Defense activity in Uzbekistan falls within the purview of the Department's primary mission, and money spent is thereby counted as operational expenses, not foreign assistance. Yet, the ancillary effects of military engagement could very well be the most effective form of foreign assistance that we provide to Uzbekistan. Second, for security reasons, specific information on engagement activities remains classified, making it difficult to construct a complete picture of Department of Defense engagement in an unclassified format. For these reasons, my discussion about Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan will not be specific.

One exception to the "Department of Defense does not provide foreign assistance" rule is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Budget authority is provided to the Department of Defense in the annual budget of the U.S. under the title "Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction." This allows the Department of Defense to provide assistance, through direct engagement, contracts, or grants, to dismantle WMD and prevent the proliferation of WMD technology and expertise (Budget of the United States Government, FY 2003: Appendix, 2002, p. 276). Although I do not have specific dollar amounts provided to Uzbekistan under this budget authority, the program is specifically aimed at mitigating a known threat to the U.S. and would be desirable regardless of our other policy goals in Uzbekistan. This assistance is also coordinated with other U.S. government agencies that utilize Department of State-controlled funds to achieve similar objectives (Joint Security Cooperation Consultation – JSCC, 2002).

The remainder of the military engagement in Uzbekistan falls under the control of the Commander of U.S. Central Command. The U.S. actively supports Uzbekistan's participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace Program by conducting combined peacekeeping training and participating in peacekeeping exercises. The U.S. also conducts combined training between U.S. and Uzbekistani special operations forces. In addition, the Louisiana Army National Guard has a partnership relationship with Uzbekistan that serves as a good example of civil-military relations and has become important to Uzbekistan (JSCC, 2002). As an indication of the size and expanding nature of our military relationship with Uzbekistan, Major General Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division Commander, noted that, prior to the "War on Terror," the number of military contacts between the U.S. and Uzbekistan was scheduled to increase from 33 contacts in FY 2001 to 55 in FY 2002 (JSCC, 2002). It must be kept in mind that a military contact could be any in a broad range of activities, such as: IMET participation, planning conferences, a one-person subject matter expert exchange, or a full-blown exercise. Overall, military engagement in Uzbekistan has been extremely important to the U.S. in securing national interests and is eagerly sought by Uzbekistan.

There is one unique aspect to Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan worth highlighting. As I have mentioned previously, U.S. policy makes substantial aid to Uzbekistan contingent upon meaningful reform. This has limited the size, scope, and effectiveness of Department of State-funded assistance. Unlike the State Department, the Department of Defense has been able to continuously build upon, and improve its engagement activities in Uzbekistan. This is possible given the direct correlation between the Department of Defense engagement activities in Uzbekistan and the extent to which this improves the readiness of U.S. soldiers and improves the security posture of the U.S. And though, from a Department of Defense perspective, any training benefit that the Uzbekistani military receives from engagement with the U.S. military is largely incidental, the incidental benefits are significant. By working with the Uzbekistani military, the U.S. is able to demonstrate the behavior of a professional military and the functioning of democratic principles. This provides a model for Uzbekistan to emulate; it inspires change instead of demanding change, and does so while the U.S. military is primarily focused on securing its vital and strategic national interests.

Given the fact that Uzbekistan has compulsory military service, the effects of a professional military rooted in democratic principles could eventually permeate all sectors of society. This inside-out approach – the converse of the Department of State approach – has certainly proven effective thus far. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Beth Jones, acknowledges, the strength of the military-to-military bond with Uzbekistan makes other aspects of diplomacy easier:

there is a lot of talk about how because we have new military relationships with several of these governments [Uzbekistan is one] that somehow we're giving a bye to human rights and democracy. In fact, the opposite is the case, and we are finding it easier. Because we have so much more contact, we have an easier time of discussing each of these issues with the governments of the region, particularly Uzbekistan. (Jones, 2002).

C. POST-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ASSISTANCE

As a result of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the subsequent “War on Terror,” the United States has dramatically increased assistance to Uzbekistan. The results are highlighted in Figure 4, under ERF. Uzbekistan has received an \$83.5 million supplement (and may be even more since the numbers cited are only estimates). Additionally, the U.S. and Uzbekistan have entered into a broad political and strategic partnership agreement. The agreement recognizes that both countries will actively cooperate in military security matters and security from the perspective that democracy and a free-market economy increase stability. The categories of cooperation are: political relations, including democratic and economic transformation; security cooperation, which includes a pledge of U.S. support against external threats to Uzbekistan and improved military-to-military contacts; economic relations, which includes structural reform support; humanitarian cooperation, which involves education, health, and environmental issues; and legal cooperation, which includes the establishment of a rule-of-law state, judicial reform, an improved legislative process, and increased public awareness (“United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework,” 2002).

This increase in assistance and the cooperative agreement radically change the relationship between the U.S. and Uzbekistan. In order to fulfill the pledge of cooperation, the U.S. is going to have to change its policy of making meaningful

assistance contingent upon measurable reform and become a *partner* in the process. The question then becomes how do we effectively and efficiently accomplish this?

D. CONCLUSION

As the preceding discussion indicates, the U.S. is already committed to assisting Uzbekistan. Committing resources and personnel automatically sends a signal of resolve. But there are two different perspectives when it comes to evaluating that resolve. From the U.S. perspective, the message sent, and what we assume has been received, is that we are committed to assisting Uzbekistan, and will send more support once measurable action toward democratic and market reform has been taken. However, from the Uzbekistani perspective, the message received is that the U.S. does not have enough resolve to support the difficult reformation process. Unfortunately, both points of view, though seemingly incompatible, are likely to persist without a change in the way business is done.

Without question, the various forms of assistance the U.S. provides to Uzbekistan are all noble; there are no “bad” assistance programs in Uzbekistan. Each of the various assistance programs fills a necessary void at the micro-level. However, with the exception of programs directed toward mitigating the WMD threat, none is expressly designed or directly linked to securing vital or strategic U.S. interests. The Department of State-funded programs focus on creating the impetus for reform from outside the government, and these programs operate independently from others. Meanwhile, the primary reason for conducting Department of Defense engagement in Uzbekistan is to improve the readiness of U.S. forces. There is no overall concept for reforming the military in Uzbekistan, just some well-designed engagement activities that happen to have high ancillary effects. Although the security-oriented assistance provided to Uzbekistan using FSA and NADR funding could, arguably, be linked to securing U.S. interests while also assisting the government of Uzbekistan secure its vital, strategic, and important interests, the programs are piecemeal, failing to address the larger structural issues. Taken together, what they amount to is sticking a finger in the leaking hole of a disintegrating levy. I would argue that even these programs fail to secure our national interests. Unity of effort and economy of resources are not phrases that could be used to accurately describe U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan.

However, it would not take much to fix this. While not expressly designed to counter an insurgency, each of the assistance programs currently budgeted could be neatly plugged into the counterinsurgency “mystic diamond” from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III. The USAID, humanitarian, and Peace Corps programs address “Option A” - the hearts and minds approach. The security-oriented and law enforcement assistance programs address “Options B and D” – cutting off insurgent links with the populace and interdicting outside support. And the military engagement activity indirectly supports “Option C” – targeting insurgents with military force. By thinking about these programs in these terms, our assistance could be made to seem far more useful for counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan than is currently the case and would gain an internal consistency and coherence that would also assist us while addressing the Uzbekistani government’s number one concern. At the moment, engagement between the U.S. and higher-level Uzbekistani government officials regarding the structural reforms necessary to implement an effective counterinsurgency program is notably lacking. At the same time, the outside-in approach to reform that the State Department has adopted only increases the friction between the government and populace, which in and of itself does not help stimulate reform in the face of an insurgency. Additionally, there is really no evidence to suggest that our assistance programs target areas that the Uzbekistani government considers high priority.

To summarize my argument thus far: the U.S. has significant interests in Uzbekistan, the threat of insurgency is preventing the government of Uzbekistan from taking steps toward necessary reform, and current U.S. assistance is not as effectively applied as it could – or arguably should – be. The remainder of the thesis will address what the U.S. should do to assist in stabilizing Uzbekistan and protecting U.S. interests.

V. A FRAMEWORK OF U.S. ASSISTANCE

Ironically, the United States does have a framework for integrating the oversight and execution of foreign assistance to countries facing developmental challenges. Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense contains this framework. The terminology is a bit confusing and must be clarified a bit. The term Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, is defined as:

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02, 2001, p. 174).

By this definition, all of the various U.S. programs in Uzbekistan could qualify as FID. However, Joint Pub 3-07.1 unifies the various aspects of FID within an organizational structure characterized by unity of effort, unity of command, and clarity of purpose. Therefore, the definition of FID ranges from the minimalist definition of Joint Pub 1-02, where a single action by a single agency to assist a nation constitutes FID, to the concept embodied in Joint Pub 3-07.1, where individual actions by separate agencies are an integral part of the overall U.S. FID effort. For the purpose of this thesis the latter definition is of primary concern. It is worthwhile examining this concept of FID as it effectively and efficiently organizes U.S. assistance and appears to be the perfect model for conducting engagement with Uzbekistan.

A. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

If FID is the overall framework for the organization of the U.S. effort in a foreign country, Internal Defense and Development, or IDAD, is the strategy on which the framework depends. IDAD is defined as:

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (Joint Pub 1-02, p. 221)

It is important to note that the IDAD strategy is that of the host nation and U.S. support is designed to supplement host nation efforts. In the perfect scenario (i.e. there is no threat to the established regime), the IDAD strategy exists to preempt insurgency and violence.

If an insurgency or other threat develops, the IDAD strategy becomes an active strategy to mitigate the threat. The strategy is carried out by adhering to four interdependent functions: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C1).

1. Four Interdependent Functions of IDAD

a. Balanced Development

Balanced development consists of the political, economic, and social programs that a responsible government designs and enacts to look out for its citizens. These programs equally favor all individuals and groups within a society in order to deny the opposition or insurgents the ability to build up popular support because of a legitimate grievance. Properly identifying and taking steps to correct potential socially destabilizing conditions is a critical aspect of balanced development (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-1). Referring back to Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III, balanced development is characteristic of Option “A” (the hearts and minds approach).

b. Security

The meaning of security in relation to IDAD is twofold. It consists of the security of government resources and security of the population. This type of security is necessary to protect the population from the threat of the insurgents and also to provide a secure environment for the development of the country. The ideal environment is one in which the people are able to provide for the majority of their security with limited government support. However, it is equally important to deny the enemy access to popular support that may include some population control measures (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C1-C2). Security is most characteristic of Option “B” (interdicting the ability of the insurgents to connect with the populace) from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III.

c. Neutralization

Neutralization consists of a wide variety of actions designed to minimize the threat that the insurgent force poses to the government and the population. The range of actions could be from discrediting the insurgent movement or its leaders through information campaigns, arrest of members for breaking the law, up to large-scale combat actions to destroy the insurgent force. It is critical that all neutralization efforts adhere to

the country's legal system and observe individual rights. By acting lawfully, the security forces enhance the legitimacy of the government, deny the enemy an exploitable issue, and enjoy the international credibility of a humanitarian oriented force (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C-2 – C-3). Neutralization characterizes Options “B, C, and D” from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III (Option “C” is targeting the insurgent group directly and Option “D” is interdicting the ability of the insurgents to receive outside support).

d. Mobilization

Mobilization refers to enlisting the manpower and materiel support from as large a segment of the population as possible. In maximizing the manpower and materiel available to the government, the amount of support available to the insurgents is minimized. Together with the other interrelated functions, mobilization provides the means necessary to enact programs that respond to the needs of the populace. With a type of citizenry-government cooperative agreement, the counterinsurgency effort is able to encompass a much larger area (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3). Mobilization primarily characterizes Options “A and B” from Figure 3 (Counterinsurgency Options) in Chapter III, although all of the options would be impacted through the application of this function.

These four interdependent functions form the backbone of the host nation's IDAD program. The goal is the development of these functions by “building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society” (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-1). In order to accomplish this goal, it is necessary to adhere to four principles in each of the interdependent functions. The four principles are: unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and a responsive government.

2. Four Principles of IDAD

a. Unity of Effort

This principle is necessary to most effectively use limited resources and to ensure synchronization between the various elements of national power and the four interdependent functions of IDAD. This principle implies some organizational design, which will be discussed later, but the overall concept is coordinated action and centralized control at all levels (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).

b. Maximum Use of Intelligence

All operations must be based upon timely and accurate intelligence from reliable sources whether the operation is military, political, economic, or informational in nature. In addition, strict attention must be paid to counterintelligence so that the insurgents do not have time to devise a counter-plan or move their forces from the area (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).

c. Minimum Use of Violence

Discrete use of force is the guideline for counterinsurgency operations; however, at times, the best means to minimize violence may be the overwhelming use of force. Nevertheless, excessive violence by the military or security forces of a country, while expedient and effective in the short term, degrades the legitimacy of the government and will not build popular support (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).

d. A Responsive Government

The most enduring method of gaining popular support is to demonstrate that the government is operating in accordance with the needs of its citizens. This increases the ease with which the government mobilizes the population and resources while demonstrating competence in the realm of administration, management, and leadership (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-3).

3. Organizational Concept for IDAD

The IDAD strategy, as contained in Joint Pub 3-07-1, provides a basic concept for the organizational design of the host nation's IDAD program. Although the organizational configuration may vary greatly depending on the country, the overall concept includes a national level organization with sub-national branches. The organization should strive for centralized direction and de-centralized execution of the various programs. The generic structure for the counterinsurgency planning and coordination organization is depicted below in Figure 5 (Generic Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization).

The chief executive of the country, the President in the case of Uzbekistan, is in overall charge of the organization. The director and the staff of the planning and administration offices are independent members of the organization, while members of corresponding branches or agencies of the national government staff the rest of the

offices. As mentioned, the national level organization's primary purpose is to provide centralized direction of the counterinsurgency effort. However, the appropriate agencies or branches of government are represented in the organization in order to coordinate and direct the IDAD effort of their particular government agency. The national level



Figure 5. Generic Counterinsurgency Planning and Coordination Organization (From: Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-4)

organization prepares the national IDAD plan and coordinates programs. The director oversees this process and gains the chief executive's decisions concerning the delineation of authority, establishment of responsibility, designation of objectives, and allocation of resources (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C-4 – C-5).

The sub-national organizations are created along the lines of existing political organizations, i.e. provinces, districts, or states, or may be created for particular urban areas if the need dictates. Dubbed Area Coordination Centers (ACC), it is the responsibility of these organizations to serve as the civil-military headquarters at their level of organization. In such a capacity, the ACC plans, coordinates, and executes programs and operations in support of the IDAD program. The ACC should have direct

control over the military and government agencies within its jurisdiction while not replacing the current government administrative apparatus. Staffed by a senior government official, the ACC is suitably organized to tailor the IDAD programs to the particular needs of the area of operations. The organization will vary depending on location, but the ACC should, similar to the national organization, be staffed by members of the government with experience in the government agencies taking part in the IDAD effort (Joint Pub 3-07.1, pp. C-5 – C-6).

The final organizational structure for IDAD is the civilian advisory committees. These committees are comprised of influential citizens embedded within the national and sub-national coordination centers. The civilian advisory committees provide a critical link between the population and the government and, when used properly, will increase the local populace's stake in, and commitment to, government programs. The civilian advisory committees should fairly represent all of the population, including minorities. Good examples of influential civilians to serve on the civilian advisory committees and act as key communicators are: clergy, educators, labor officials, health care professionals, local media personalities, and business leaders (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. C-6).

B. U.S. FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

IDAD boils down to the host nation's strategy for preventing or solving insurgency unilaterally. The framework of FID supplements the host nation's IDAD efforts with U.S. advice and assistance. An effective FID program incorporates all U.S. elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, informational, military – in concert with the host nation IDAD program in order to foster internal solutions to the supported nation's problems. By focusing on internal development, the usefulness of the FID program is exponentially enhanced by addressing areas beyond strict counterinsurgency (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3). Since the most significant manifestations of the supported country's problems are likely to occur in the economic, social, informational, or political arenas, the principle focus of U.S. efforts should be the programs that address these needs by building or bolstering viable institutions that respond to the needs of the people (Joint Pub 3-01.7, p. I-1).

1. Applying the Elements of National Power

As with the four interdependent functions of IDAD, within the FID framework the elements of national power must be applied in coordination with each other to ensure a complementary relationship. It may be determined by national policy that certain elements of national power should be emphasized over others, yet the necessity for coordinating the response of the various elements does not disappear in order to send a consistent signal of U.S. resolve. A brief examination of the elements of national power illustrates their complementary and all-encompassing nature.

a. Diplomatic Element

Diplomacy is often the first element of national power emphasized in U.S. foreign policy (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3). The range of the diplomatic response is wide – from recognition and promises of assistance to the severing of diplomatic ties. However, in the case of a country that is a potential candidate for U.S. FID, the diplomatic element sets the stage for U.S. engagement with the country. The diplomatic element effectively bridges the gap between U.S. interests and the assistance that the U.S. will provide to a given country. The goal of exercising the U.S. diplomatic element of national power is to create a functional political system in the target country that can effectively and responsibly manage the elements of national power within that country. The proper signaling of U.S. commitment and resolve is a critical aspect of the diplomatic element.

b. Economic Element

It is a fair generalization to make that economic problems pervade all aspects of a country's internal strife. Poor economic conditions may not be the root cause of all societal ills. However, such conditions foster an environment in which lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency can gain a foothold and expand. The economic element of U.S. national power can be applied in various ways, including, direct financial assistance, favorable trade arrangements, assistance in establishing macro and micro-economic systems, agricultural or industrial assistance, and security assistance, to name a few (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3).

c. Informational Element

The informational element of national power is critical to an effective FID program in order to keep the public informed of the positive steps the government is taking and to let people know how they can benefit. Just as important is effectively countering the propaganda professed by the insurgents. The informational element of national power comprises the disciplines of public diplomacy, public affairs, and psychological operations (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-3 – I-4). Without proper application of this element of national power the overall effectiveness of the FID program cannot be maximized.

d. Military Element

The military element of national power plays an important supporting role in the overall FID effort. One aspect is psychological due to the fact that the commitment of U.S. troops to a FID effort signals resolve disproportionate to the commitment. Another aspect is practical in that U.S. military officials may “have greater access to and credibility with HN (host nation) regimes that are heavily influenced or dominated by their own military” (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-4). The military elements within a country are critical to the security of the country and are entrusted with creating a stable environment that is necessary for further development. Therefore, engaging the military element is the first step in securing the precondition of stability that is necessary for success of the overall FID effort. Furthermore, in countries with compulsory military service, the effects of professionalizing the military will reach nearly every segment of the society.

2. FID Tools

The tools, or methods, available to the U.S. government in supporting a FID effort are limited only by imagination and organizational skills. The critical component of any of the tools employed is the direct linkage to the purpose of the FID effort and integration with other tools and elements of national power. For example, a military civic action program designed to improve irrigation in a particularly underdeveloped but populated area can easily be synchronized with all of the elements of national power and integrated with the host nation’s IDAD plan. Military civic action (MCA) consists mainly of U.S. troops advising or supervising indigenous military forces in construction projects, support missions, and services that benefit the local populace (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. I-13).

Walking through this hypothetical scenario, which coincidentally could be useful and executable in Uzbekistan with the assets and programs currently in place, illustrates how the various tools available can be integrated to exponentially increase the effects of a relatively small MCA project.

In the FID framework, the host nation identifies the population in the area as vulnerable to insurgents and economically underdeveloped through its IDAD organization. The U.S. FID organization offers the assistance of an MCA program to improve something like say, irrigation in the area. The diplomatic element of power is exercised in this case by committing U.S. troops to a host nation program, thereby strengthening resolve by assigning a valuable U.S. resource to a local, host nation issue. Getting local leaders involved in the project and creating linkages with the national government can further enhance the diplomatic element by demonstrating and exercising a responsive government. The economic element can build off of the effects of the MCA project by developing the agricultural knowledge of local farmers so that they can maximize the benefits that improved irrigation brings. Additionally, economic programs can provide assistance to improve or create entrepreneurial businesses that support and benefit from improved irrigation and more effective farming. The informational element can likewise benefit if integrated with the MCA project. Public affairs can heighten awareness and interest in the program. Getting local media involved will also provide an opportunity to develop their skills and integrate them into the national IDAD plan as it relates to the informational element of national power. Public diplomacy can emphasize that the government is taking action in support of the people and that the host nation military is compassionately providing a beneficial service. Psychological operations can be employed to mitigate the effects of insurgent propaganda while more specifically addressing the needs and concerns of the local populace. The military serves as the catalyst for this synergistic effort. The military element of national power is disproportionately small compared to the potential benefits.

As this scenario illustrates, the tools available to each of the separate elements of national power are tailored to the specific situation. Joint Pub 3-07.1 provides examples of tools available to the military element of national power, separating them into theoretical categories of U.S. support. The categories are: indirect support, direct support

(not involving combat operations), and combat operations (pp. I-5 – I-14). The categories are not exclusive and may all operate simultaneously; they merely organize the tools according to the level of U.S. commitment and acceptable risk (pp. I-4 – I-5). Regardless of the categorization process, the coordination and integration of the various elements of national power and the host nation IDAD program does not instinctively occur. This requires a well-led organization, focused on a common goal, and an appreciation for lateral coordination.

3. FID Organization

Due to the fact that every FID effort is different in size, scope, goals, and environment there is no prescribed organization for overseeing a U.S. FID effort. A small effort (or, indirect support in Department of Defense terminology) may not require a supervisory organization in addition to what already exists, while a larger effort could quickly exceed the management capabilities of in-place organizations (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-3). When the decision is made to support a foreign government through FID it is critical to analyze the goals of the effort, assets and resources available, host nation mechanisms, and environmental factors to create an organizational structure that can effectively manage the diverse assets committed to the FID effort, make the assets “usable” to the host nation, integrate the various elements of national power, and maximize the effectiveness of the assistance provided. This is no easy task. Although there is no template for designing a FID organization, there are some principles to follow and in-place organizations from which to learn. For the purposes of this discussion I am going to assume that the FID effort requires an organization in excess of what the U.S. Country Team and the geographic Combatant Commander can provide.

The first principle to bear in mind is one of leadership. The Department of State is generally the lead agency for FID (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-3) and the Ambassador of the country has complete authority over all official U.S. government activities within the country (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-12). Furthermore, the Country Team possesses in-depth knowledge about the situation in the host nation that will impact on the FID effort. Having said that, a robust FID effort requires a visionary leader who understands the problem, is knowledgeable about the assets available, can easily communicate with the host nation IDAD organization, and can effectively communicate with, coordinate, and

task the variety of U.S. government agencies involved. This is a full-time job and most likely exceeds the time that the Ambassador, or any member of the Country Team, has available. Nevertheless, the head of the FID organization should be directly accountable to the Ambassador, with the Secretary of State and President completing the chain of command. This ensures a direct link between U.S. policy and execution of the FID effort and removes agency parochialism as a potential source of conflict or narrow-mindedness within the organization.

Another principle critical in the design of a FID organization is integration of multiple government agencies. Integration is far more complex than coordination. Ideally, the agencies – representing the elements of national power – are all incorporated into the organization in a seamless manner to create a synergy that benefits the host nation and supports U.S. interests in the most efficient manner (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-1). This implies that the representatives of the various agencies have to interact on a peer basis, working for the benefit of the FID organization. As illustrated in my hypothetical example of the MCA project, each agency adds value, sometimes more value than the “main effort” or “lead agency.” This presents a complex organizational design problem for our traditionally bureaucratic government. Keeping the management organization small, with a knowledgeable core of agency representatives, seems like the most effective way to overcome this obstacle.

Coordination is a third critical principle. The representatives within the FID organization will be required to coordinate the support of their agency along traditional lines of organization, while the FID organization itself will need to be able to effectively coordinate with the IDAD organization within the host nation. Additionally, depending on the situation, the FID organization may have to coordinate with other nations providing assistance to avoid a duplication of effort and to maximize the benefits of U.S. assistance (Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-1). The requirement for effective coordination will most likely increase the size and structure of the FID organization.

Examples of effective organizations also provide some insight when designing a FID organization. The most easily adapted organization is that of the U.S. Country Team in the host nation to be supported. Figure 6 (Country Team Concept), below, provides a

generic concept for the organizational design of U.S. government agencies working in a foreign country. The Ambassador, as mentioned previously, has complete authority over all official U.S. government activity within the country. The remainder of the Country Team includes State Department and other government agency personnel organized into functional roles. The representatives in a Country Team vary depending upon location but accurately represent the U.S. government activities (i.e. engagement) within the country. In designing a FID organization, the agencies and functional areas represented on the Country Team serve as a model for what agencies need to have representation. Ideally, the expertise and experience of members of the Country Team are fully utilized. Depending upon the situation, workload, and other factors, it may be advantageous to have members of the Country Team also filling roles in the FID organization.




Figure 6. Country Team Concept (After: Joint Pub 3-07.1, p. II-11)

Another organization to consider in developing a FID organization is the joint staff of the Combatant Commander. Although the organization of the joint staff is focused on military matters, it is designed to handle the planning, execution, and support of a myriad of tasks – from humanitarian assistance to combat operations – simultaneously. Although it is unlikely, and undesirable, that the FID organization

should achieve anywhere near the size of the joint staff, the integration and coordination mechanisms that the joint staff has implemented to unify the array of interests within the military could be useful to the FID organization.

C. CONCLUSION

The framework provided in Joint Pub 3-07.1 is infinitely useful in organizing the various forms of assistance that the U.S. provides to countries facing internal development threats. The synergy created by unifying the full array of assistance tools within a single organization that is focused on a single goal in support of U.S. interests is invaluable. The framework capitalizes on the inherent “goodness” of each of the assistance tools or programs but is able to magnify the effects through integration. By working in concert with the host nation government and its IDAD program, the framework also develops the concept of a responsive government and assists with the difficult development process. Although the FID organization’s focus is on a single goal – to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, which should be counterinsurgency in the case of Uzbekistan – the process of implementing and executing the FID framework achieves precisely what the last three administrations have been striving for in Uzbekistan: democratic and market reform along with honoring the value of human rights. The FID framework presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1 is an active doctrinal concept within the U.S. government that may have been too often overlooked in the difficult process of applying foreign policy and providing foreign assistance.

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VI. ADAPTED FID IN UZBEKISTAN

Given the fact that the U.S. has enduring interests in Uzbekistan, and that attainment of those interests is precariously dependent upon a number of variables internal and external to Uzbekistan, the proposition that U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan should be more effectively and efficiently administered is commonsensical. Furthermore, if only we paid attention to the rhetoric of the government of Uzbekistan and the dynamics of insurgency theory, it is only logical that the focus of U.S. support would be reoriented towards counterinsurgency. As I stated in Chapter III, the strength and capability of the IMU or any other insurgent force is less relevant than the fact that the perceived threat results in some very real actions on the part of the government, and those actions stand in the way of democratic and market reform along with the ability of the U.S. to secure national interests. Without getting bogged down in a discussion of leadership theory, my experience is that it is much easier and more effective if you can inspire appropriate behavior and actions versus demand them. I believe this point accurately applies to Uzbekistan as the U.S. seeks democratic and market reform. However, as I also pointed out in Chapter III, the likelihood of Uzbekistan enacting significant reform in the face of an insurgent threat is small. From the government's perspective, attempting unilateral reform would be a suicidal move, and this feeling is partially justified by insurgency theory.

The government of Uzbekistan needs some security guarantees in the form of a dependable partner, whether those guarantees come from Russia, China, or the U.S. remains to be seen. Obviously, my feeling is that it is incumbent on the U.S. to provide those guarantees. Thankfully, the FID framework, presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1, provides the U.S. with the ability to effectively and efficiently address the concerns of Uzbekistan while truly promoting the development of a more democratic and free-market oriented society, all this while definitively securing U.S. national interests.

I will broadly outline a concept for FID engagement with Uzbekistan, incorporating some tactics that may be useful. I must preface this discussion by admitting that I am extremely unqualified to attempt such an endeavor. I am a soldier

and cannot pretend to possess the political acumen of a professional diplomat, the financial knowledge of an economist, the cultural understanding of an anthropologist, or the agronomic skills of a rural development specialist. However, the strength of the FID framework lies in the fact that no single discipline predominates; they are all equally important. The key is to accurately apply each of the disciplines to address a single problem, which in the case of Uzbekistan is counterinsurgency – and that is a soldier’s bailiwick. Understanding insurgency theory has to be considered critical to the effectiveness of the FID program, lending at least some legitimacy to this proposal.

A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Without question, the proposal for the U.S. to support Uzbekistan through the FID framework of Joint Pub 3-07.1 requires a shift in policy. Primarily the U.S. would have to shift from a policy of making assistance contingent upon measurable democratic and market reform, to a policy of becoming a partner in the reform process. In doing so, the U.S. could be criticized by any number of groups or even other countries for supporting a repressive government. However, through public diplomacy, the positive aspect of this criticism could be emphasized. By highlighting the benevolent aspect of our engagement and demonstrating progress, the U.S. could as easily gain international approval while securing national interests at the same time.

However, shifting policy toward becoming a partner in the reform process may not be that radical a shift. Since the “War on Terror,” the U.S. has become increasingly engaged with Uzbekistan. Indeed, the signing of the “United States – Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” nearly completes the process. Excerpts from the press release state:

Uzbekistan reaffirms its commitment to further intensify the democratic transformation of its society politically and economically. The United States agrees to provide the Government of Uzbekistan assistance in implementing democratic reforms ... The U.S. affirms that it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan ... Both countries recognize the need to build in Uzbekistan a rule-of-law state and democratic society. (2002)

Given these statements, there is no way to get around the fact that the U.S. has to significantly increase engagement with the government of Uzbekistan to fulfill this

pledge. The question is how. Once again, I submit that the FID framework is the only solution.

Applying the FID framework in Uzbekistan is not without cost. A management organization would have to be established because the U.S. Country Team in Uzbekistan is currently understaffed without the additional burden of focusing on an intensive FID effort. The primary costs would be in manpower and office space. Additionally, there would undoubtedly be an increased need for foreign assistance to support the various FID projects. It appears from the “Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework” that the U.S. is prepared to increase support to Uzbekistan anyway. One benefit of the FID framework is that it allows for operating with an economy of scale approach: the effectiveness of each of the elements of national power is enhanced through integration with the other elements. When properly managed, the cost of implementing programs would drop – thanks to shared resources – and the effectiveness of each individual program would increase. The FID framework can thus provide superior results at a lower cost. As a taxpayer, that makes me happy.

B. IDAD

One large hurdle to implementing the FID framework in Uzbekistan is IDAD. Going back to Chapter V, U.S. FID supplements the host nation IDAD program. Without this relationship, the only difference between my proposal and our current assistance programs is increased government-to-government contact and improved U.S. agency integration. Additionally, without the close government-to-government contact that the IDAD-FID framework requires, the short-term effects of targeted, efficient assistance programs are diluted, and the long-term benefits of promoting more accountable and responsive governance are jeopardized. Therefore, attaining this relationship is critical to the overall success of the effort.

It could be reasonably argued that within the current political atmosphere of Uzbekistan, the establishment of an effective IDAD organization is unrealistic. The power within the government of Uzbekistan does reside with the president and it would not be difficult to present evidence to support the notion that persons within the government kowtow to the president’s desires. However, in understanding the political environment, the U.S. could use these legitimate criticisms as a catalyst for the

establishment of an effective IDAD organization. Two examples in particular highlight this opportunity.

First, President Karimov has, very publicly, put his reputation at stake in support of reform. His book, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century, published in English in 1998, outlines the numerous challenges that Uzbekistan faces to become a stable, prosperous, integral member of the international community. Karimov, in detail, highlights the necessity for and vision of reform in nearly every aspect of public and private life (Karimov, 1998). The book should be required reading for any U.S. official involved in policy or engagement in Uzbekistan in order to, at a minimum, gain knowledge of the president's publicly stated point of view. However, more importantly, the book is structured in a way that almost perfectly lends itself to serving as the visionary document of an IDAD organization. In fact, moving from the principles established in the book to setting up an organization charged with enacting the philosophy appears to be quite a natural progression. Therefore, the U.S. could emphasize the publicly espoused viewpoints of the president in justification of the establishment of an IDAD organization.

Second, the government of Uzbekistan recognizes the need for an integrated approach to address its problems. Not surprisingly, the most significant manifestation of this has been within the security realm. This is not surprising because of the government's reliance on internal security to address the threat posed by insurgency (see Chapter III). Nevertheless, the government of Uzbekistan has gone through several command and control arrangements between the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of the Interior, and Ministry of Emergency Situations in order to establish an effective method to coordinate responses and share information (JSCC). The IDAD concept accomplishes this integration, only to a far greater extent than the government of Uzbekistan is currently doing. Essentially, the IDAD concept sells itself when expressed in terms of unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness.

In other words, the creation of an effective IDAD organization within the government of Uzbekistan appears to be entirely possible. However, the impetus for the establishment of the IDAD organization must remain with the government of Uzbekistan.

Diplomatic “bullying” by the U.S. to create the organization would likely result in the creation of a powerless organization, designed merely to satisfy U.S. demands. However, by fostering an understanding of the concept of FID, the U.S. government could inspire the Uzbekistani government to create an effective organization.

C. FID

The primary focus of a newly established FID effort in Uzbekistan should initially be on the process. It is essential that each member of the management organization understand the concept and goals of FID, along with how and where their expertise applies. The FID organization should be made completely aware of the interests the U.S. has in Uzbekistan in addition to how the tools available – in the framework of the elements of national power – can be applied to counter insurgent threats, while at the same time strengthening the legitimacy of the government of Uzbekistan. In coordination with the Uzbekistani IDAD organization, the FID organization should identify target areas and apply resources to achieve clearly defined results, integrating as many of the elements of national power as possible in order to take advantage of their cumulative synergistic effects.

In order to avoid a “body count” mentality, the FID organization should avoid using the decreasing incidence of insurgent activity as a measure of effectiveness. Instead, the FID organization should be focused on the internal development of Uzbekistani governmental and social institutions, using the pace of reform and increases in popular support for the government as measures of effectiveness. Furthermore, the FID organization should appreciate that reform is a difficult process. In recognizing this, the FID organization should have the flexibility to adjust strategy in order to overcome resistance. Rather than force compliance on the part of the Uzbekistani government in one particular area, the FID organization should shift emphasis to other areas, with a plan to come back to difficult or controversial issues. Through demonstrated partnership, the FID organization will increasingly gain influence, thereby becoming more successful in achieving U.S. goals and securing U.S. interests over the long term.

As far as administering the various tools of U.S. assistance, there appears to be no significant reason to radically shift from our current assistance programs until thorough evaluations are conducted. Unifying the current programs under the FID organization

and defining them in terms of how they assist the counterinsurgency effort achieves the initial benefit of unity of effort and also provides the executors of the programs with a clear focus for adjusting the programs, if necessary. Some local adjustment about where current programs are located is most likely necessary to achieve congruence with Uzbekistani aims and to be able to integrate the various programs so that each builds upon another's success. There are, however, numerous ways in which the U.S. could enhance the FID framework to achieve desirable results. By way of example, I will propose some tactics at the level of national power that could help improve engagement with Uzbekistan and secure U.S. interests. These tactics are by no means comprehensive or infallible; they merely serve as examples of how to maximize the potential of the FID framework.

1. Diplomatic

As mentioned previously, the diplomatic element of national power sets the context for all U.S. activity within Uzbekistan. Therefore, diplomatically, the U.S. government needs to send a clear signal of commitment to Uzbekistan. The signing of the "Strategic Partnership and Cooperative Framework" is one such signal. This needs to be followed up by increased government-to-government contacts. Establishing a FID organization to provide focused assistance to Uzbekistan along with fostering the development of a counterpart Uzbekistani IDAD organization would also be powerful signals of commitment. Additionally, shifting the Department of State's outside-in strategy to a more holistic approach that embraces the government as well as members of society would create a more cooperative atmosphere between the U.S. and Uzbekistani governments as well as between the Uzbekistani government and its citizenry.

Diplomatic engagement is necessary in so many areas that it becomes nearly impossible to enumerate them all. The U.S. could focus diplomatic efforts at the national, regional, and local levels in literally every realm of government. Of course, this is impractical, as well as wholly unmanageable. Because it is widely agreed that Uzbekistan lacks a sufficient legal foundation on which to build a democratically rooted society, initial diplomatic efforts could be focused in this area first. This creates the opportunity for further improvements. For example, it is generally agreed that by promoting the rule of law a government also creates an environment in which a market-

based economy can take root. Then, diplomatic efforts should supplement the other elements of national power, such as assisting in the structural reforms necessary to achieve a market-based economy. The overriding principle to bear in mind when exercising the diplomatic element of national power in Uzbekistan is that our goal is not to replicate our system. Our goal should be to create the environment in which the Uzbekistani people have the ability to make educated and informed decisions regarding their government and their future. The milieu of Uzbekistan is completely different than our own. Because of this, it is predictable that their concept of democracy, given the chance to freely develop, will differ from ours. The diplomatic element of national power should not focus on importing specific democratic institutions but should help create conditions under which these can develop organically.

2. Economic

Addressing the desperate economic conditions in Uzbekistan is integral to stabilizing the country, alleviating humanitarian concerns, mitigating the insurgent threat, and increasing support for the government. Needless to say, strong support from the economic element of national power is critical to our overall success. Economic assistance can take many different forms, several of which we are currently involved in to one degree or another. It seems logical that the U.S., in becoming a strategic partner, needs to change our current practice of not providing the government of Uzbekistan with any direct assistance. Appropriate direct assistance could be in the form of grants or funds targeted for specific use by the Uzbekistani government. It is counterproductive to push for the concept of a responsive government if the government does not have the financial flexibility to respond. In order to build up support for the government and interest in the process, the people of Uzbekistan need some tangible examples of responsive government in action. The FID organization could provide the oversight necessary to grant the government of Uzbekistan targeted funds. Another area the U.S. government needs to place an emphasis is on the mechanisms for achieving structural reform of the economy.

Aside from direct government economic assistance, the programs that USAID administers in Uzbekistan should be evaluated and expanded upon. Without rehashing the programs examined in Chapter IV, the methodology behind the USAID programs

seems particularly well suited to an increased FID program. The USAID programs, in concert with increased governmental cooperation and other U.S. agency integration, could achieve dramatic results. There is also the need for increased assistance in health care, agriculture, ecology, and industry. The Peace Corps is one way the U.S. government could address these needs, but there is also a plethora of U.S. private and non-governmental organizations that would willingly assist. Every one of these aspects of assistance holds profound economic implications. The FID organization serves as an analytical tool to help determine the most effective and efficient means to apply these various tactics and then will act to coordinate them, so that the whole can be greater than the sum of otherwise disparate parts.

3. Informational

As with the economic element of national power, the U.S. has been engaged with the informational element of national power in Uzbekistan, primarily through USAID, but also by supporting Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Increased emphasis on the informational element would be extremely beneficial to FID in Uzbekistan. Through public affairs, the U.S. and Uzbekistan could do more to publicize what the governments are doing and plan to do to support the people of Uzbekistan. I have already mentioned that integrating publicity campaigns with assistance programs results in a synergy that is otherwise unobtainable. Additionally, through increasing engagement with independent media and helping the media develop a professional journalistic ethic, the U.S. could assist in defusing the tension between the government and independent media. One aspect of public diplomacy that would be particularly useful in Uzbekistan is a “town-hall meeting” approach, whereby influential members of the government could hear and respond to the concerns of the people. Then, the IDAD-FID organization could quickly take those concerns and apply resources to them, thereby increasing the effectiveness of both the assistance and the public diplomacy. Psychological operations, a capability residing in the U.S. military, would be extremely useful in conducting target area analysis to develop the important themes that could be incorporated into the various assistance programs. Moreover, psychological operations personnel could work with Uzbekistani agencies to develop responsible projects to more effectively counter insurgent propaganda.

4. Military

The military element is at the same time the most important and least important element of national power in relation to the U.S. FID effort in Uzbekistan. It is the least important in that, aside from being an accessible labor pool to assist in humanitarian assistance and public projects, the military is the least usable element of national power. The military's purpose is to be prepared to violently resolve situations that the other elements of national power are not able to redress. Ideally, the military should never have to be used; making the resources applied to the military element of national power a rather expensive insurance policy. However, the military is also the most important element of national power in that: a) the military deters insurgent activity, b) the military provides a sense of security, and c) the military protects the investment by the other elements of national power. Furthermore, *irresponsible* military action completely erases any gains the government makes toward becoming more responsive via other elements of national power. Therefore, emphasis on the military element of national power is well founded.

The U.S. has been successful in its military engagement efforts with Uzbekistan. At the same time, I stated that there is no overall plan for proactively assisting Uzbekistan with improving its military. This could be initially addressed by establishing a small, near-continuous presence of U.S. special operations forces. Currently, improving its special operation forces is of utmost importance to Uzbekistan (JSCC). A small contingent of U.S. special operations forces could serve in a train-the-trainer role for establishing a training program for Uzbekistani special operations forces. Lessons learned could establish the basis for creating similar programs focused on officer development, non-commissioned officer development, and eventually basic training. In a relatively short period of time, U.S. special operations forces could have a significant impact on the entire indoctrination process of Uzbekistani soldiers. As I previously pointed out, the effects of a professional military, imparted with democratic values, in a country with compulsory military service would affect nearly every segment of society.

I also exaggerated when I described the military as the least usable element of national power. The military has many assets, in addition to its use as a labor pool, that are useful in FID. It has expertise in the realms of engineering, transportation, water

purification, civil affairs, psychological operations, and medical, among others. These assets could easily be effectively employed in an intensive FID effort. Furthermore, in areas of insurgent activity, where there is need for an ongoing military presence, the conduct of soldiers and the military is critical to retaining popular support. A professional, well-equipped, well-fed, and well-supported military will understand the political importance of maintaining popular support and will not be forced to rely on scavenging the local area for the materials it needs to conduct its operations. For these reasons it is necessary to increase engagement with, and offer direct support to, the military in Uzbekistan and ensure proper integration of the military into the FID effort.

D. CONCLUSION

I have barely scratched the surface of the potential programs of a well-structured U.S. FID effort in Uzbekistan. However, I have elaborated on the concept enough that the benefits are obvious. In the process I have undoubtedly ignored many potential contributing factors. In a way, the fact that I am not solely capable of devising “the solution” underlines my main point. Current U.S. assistance does not adequately address the root cause of problems in Uzbekistan and relies on a too narrow set of tools to accomplish our objectives. A full-time, dedicated IDAD-FID organization would have the time and expertise to analyze the problems in depth in concert with the Uzbekistanis, and would bring necessary experience to bear to identify, and then reach for, the appropriate tool.

Admittedly, I have neglected how U.S. FID could be integrated with assistance from other countries. This is a difficult subject and requires more study. A FID effort of the type described signals a significant strengthening of U.S.-Uzbekistani ties. As discussed in Chapter II, the geopolitical landscape in Uzbekistan is diverse, and such a move by the U.S. would certainly have diplomatic ramifications on our relationships with other countries that have interests in Uzbekistan. Additionally, my analysis is that, given the option, Uzbekistan would choose U.S. assistance to the exclusion of assistance from others, *if* the U.S. offer were resolute. The FID organization could prove valuable in preventing just such an occurrence. By offering to assist other nations in providing assistance in the most efficient and effective manner, the FID organization could be a valuable partnership program which would help to defuse geopolitical tensions in the

region. I would, however, caution against internationalizing the decision-making authority in such an arrangement due to the fact that the U.S. does have vital and strategic interests to secure. Deterrence and coercion theory aside, strengthening our hand is far more valuable in this case than relying on a secondary effect of someone else's action to secure our national interests.

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VII. CONCLUSION

It is too easy and too tempting to be critical of U.S. foreign policy, in a large measure because it is simply impossible to satisfy the diverse opinions that our democratic system promotes, while the process of conducting foreign policy is itself unmanageably complex. Thus, my intent in this thesis has been to go beyond mere criticism. Although it might seem easy to draw the conclusion from my arguments that I strongly disapprove of U.S. foreign policy in regard to Uzbekistan, or even lack faith in the ability of the system to act competently, nothing could be further from the truth. I have had the unique opportunity to witness, at a low level, the difficult process of diplomacy and foreign policy in action in Uzbekistan and hold the officials responsible for the process in the highest regard. However, my training as a Special Forces officer has also taught me to view things from a slightly different perspective, one that I believe is particularly appropriate in Uzbekistan. My assumption is that in the foreign policy process – fraught with political maneuvering, compromise, and concern with secondary effects – sometimes the simplest solutions get overlooked or discounted. Ergo my application of insurgency theory, notably because the government of Uzbekistan itself is overwhelmingly concerned with insurgency – almost to a fault – but because in our counterinsurgency doctrine we not only have the framework necessary to secure our national interests, but also to properly address Uzbekistanis concerns, creating a more democratic society in the process. By outlining the concept of FID as contained in Joint Pub 3-07.1 my aim has been to bring some attention to this neglected subject. Honestly, when I began this project I had no idea that the ideal solution would come out of a military publication. At the same time, I believed that the ideal solution would have to have more of a military flavor to it than is currently the case. After countless hours of digesting congressional testimony, national security literature, foreign policy documents, and academic analyses I am convinced that we have the means for helping Uzbekistan address both its needs and ours via our counterinsurgency doctrine.

Without a doubt, the U.S. has significant national interests at stake in Central Asia and Uzbekistan. These interests go beyond the current “War on Terror” and have significant bearing on our diplomatic relations with Russia, China, and the Middle East.

The costs of not implementing a policy capable of securing our national interests are severe: interregional conflict could involve the use of nuclear weapons. Intraregional conflict would further destabilize Central Asia and lead to an interregional conflict. Proliferation of WMD materials, technology, and knowledge would erode the responsibility that is inherent in WMD ownership and threaten the world order. Failing to address ecological, economic, and social problems exacerbates instability. And idly watching for the development of democratic institutions only ensures that this will never happen. To avoid any and all of these scenarios requires the U.S. to adjust the policy of making meaningful assistance to Uzbekistan contingent upon rapid, measurable reform in democracy, economics, and human rights. U.S. interests will be much better served by a policy that fully embraces Uzbekistan, and provides consistent – not contingent – assistance towards attaining these goals. In becoming a dependable partner, the U.S. will gain influence over Uzbekistan’s development in a manner that is congruent with U.S. interests and principles.

The primary threat to stability and development in Uzbekistan is insurgency – at the moment by the IMU. While legitimate arguments can be made that the IMU is incapable of taking over the country and that government overreaction is only making the problem worse, the fact remains that the government of Uzbekistan takes the threat seriously. Understanding insurgency theory justifies these concerns and provides insight regarding the logic of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts. Defeating the insurgent threat in Uzbekistan is not an unmanageable proposition; in fact, it appears much easier than our successful efforts in El Salvador. However, it requires resources and an understanding that the government of Uzbekistan currently lacks. The U.S. is uniquely qualified to fill this void. In light of September 11, 2001, this historic opportunity to humanely assist in the development of Uzbekistan while securing our national interests is not one to be squandered.

The FID framework, presented in Joint Pub 3-07.1, expertly combines U.S. policy and effective organization to focus on a realistic goal. It enables the U.S. to definitively secure national interests while addressing Uzbekistan’s primary concern. Through effectively integrating the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military elements of national power, the FID framework provides a strategy for addressing a wide range of

issues while maintaining economy of scale and unity of effort. By inculcating the government of Uzbekistan with the principles and functions of IDAD, the FID framework establishes the basis for continued development of a responsive and effective government founded on democratic principles. Additionally, the resolve displayed by the U.S. in establishing such an effort alleviates Uzbekistan's concerns about weathering the storm of reform alone. This in and of itself may represent enough of an impetus for Uzbekistan to willingly begin the reformation process that it knows is long overdue.

Development of a fully functional U.S. FID organization in Uzbekistan is only possible with interagency cooperation. The participants in this process should have an understanding of the concepts that I have presented in this thesis as well as an expertise about how their particular functional areas add value to the FID effort. While personalities and relationships among members of the organization are likely to determine its effectiveness, leadership is critical to the success of this proposal. Strong organizational leadership skills are imperative, but they are not paramount. The leader must also have a depth of knowledge about each of the elements of national power, the stature necessary to effectively function in a diverse and dynamic political environment, as well as willingness to remain intimately engaged in the process at the nuts and bolts level. Finally, based on personal experience, the military must have full-time representation in the organization. Aside from the functional utility of the military in FID, the U.S. military is well respected in Uzbekistan and this influence should be used to open doors that may otherwise remain closed.

Adopting FID in Uzbekistan would enable the U.S. to actively assist and guide Uzbekistan in overcoming many of its internal development challenges. As I mentioned in the introduction, this is a precondition for achieving regional stability, which should be the ultimate goal of the U.S. The counterinsurgency strategy of the FID framework that I have presented here may or may not be applicable to the other countries in the region. However, the FID framework itself is flexible, and by conducting an accurate analysis of the challenges facing other countries in the region, it should be possible to adapt it to their needs as well.

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