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Mozambique

August 1973

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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Armed Forces

WARNING


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This chapter was prepared for the NIS by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Research was substantially completed by May 1973.



MOZAMBIQUE

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Armed Forces

A. Defense establishment

Portuguese armed forces stationed in Mozambique consist of 43,000 army troops, 3,500 naval personnel (including 800 naval riflemen, or "marines") and 18 ships and patrol craft, and 3,500 air force personnel (including 900 paratroopers) and 105 aircraft (11 jets). Personnel are well trained in counterinsurgency operations, but there are shortages of pilots and air force technicians; morale is generally good, but there is some disgruntlement among middle officer ranks of the army because of repeated tours in Africa. Much of the equipment is obsolete, and there are shortages of numerous items, including artillery, engineer and communications equipment, navigational aids, transport aircraft, helicopters, and spare parts for maintenance and overhaul. Available resources have been effectively adapted, however, and are adequate for the present level of insurgency. (S)

Approximately 7,000-8,000 armed, foreign-supported, and foreign-based insurgents oppose the Portuguese on active fronts in the three northern districts: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Tete. Guerrilla attacks and harassment have intensified during the past year, particularly in Tete District, where the main objective is disruption of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project; a few incidents—possibly probing attempts aimed at supply lines to Tete and communication lines to Rhodesia—also have occurred south of Tete in Beira and Vila Pery districts. The Portuguese are capable of continuing to protect construction of the hydroelectric project, which is currently on schedule. The Portuguese control all population centers and maintain all lines of communication; they are capable of controlling the situation and continuing to maintain their position in Mozambique, although they cannot eliminate the externally supported insurgency. (S)

The armed forces are assisted in the maintenance of local security by approximately 41,600 personnel in the various paramilitary forces, as follows: 4,000 in the Special Groups (including 800 in the Special Parachutist Groups); 21,400 Public Security Police (PSP), which includes 6,100 in the PSP proper—of

whom 600 are from the metropole—and 15,300 in the intervention militia; 700 in the Fiscal Guard (also called Customs Guard); about 15,000 in the protection militia, which protects the villages and agricultural workers in the fields near the villages; and 500 in the Port and Railroad Police. An unknown number of armed personnel in self-defense units of the Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense of Mozambique (OPVDCM) provide protection for public and private institutions, including various commercial firms and other vulnerable institutions. A special force of 10 groups of 60 men each, largely former guerrillas, is being organized for use in Tete District under the control of the Directorate General of Security; the name of the new force has not been announced. (S)

Portuguese counterinsurgency techniques include the use of a limited fortified village system, which has been developed extensively in Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts and is progressing steadily in Tete District. The program of resettling rural Mozambicans in villages for protection by local militia units also denies sanctuary and support to the insurgents. The army's modest civic action program, which provides food, education, medicine, employment, and other assistance to the rural population, has been helpful in holding the allegiance of the Mozambicans, but resources are lacking for expansion of the army's nonmilitary activities. (C)

1. Military history (S)

Portugal's hegemony in Mozambique has been under attack since September 1964, when the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) launched attacks from Tanzania on settlements and military outposts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts. The Portuguese confined FRELIMO activity generally to these districts for almost 4 years, although a few guerrilla attacks occurred in Zambezia¹ and Tete districts during that period. The principal tactic used in containing the insurgency was a system of fortified

¹For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the apron of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

villages, most of which were situated near roads to permit rapid assistance from the Portuguese forces. Several hundred thousand persons from the border areas affected by the insurgency were moved into the villages, called *aldeamentos*; protection militia and self-defense units were organized, trained, and armed to protect the villagers from subversion and guerrilla attacks. Early in 1968 the insurgents began operations in Tete District and also stepped up the use of road and antipersonnel mines and increased the number of ambushes and mortar attacks against the fortified villages and army outposts in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. In June 1970 the Portuguese initiated an offensive in these districts to seize and hold guerrilla base camps and to cut infiltration and supply routes, particularly in Cabo Delgado. In May 1971 the offensive into Cabo Delgado and Niassa was resumed, and a minor offensive was undertaken in Tete in an attempt to offset any gains the insurgents might have made during the rainy season. Tete District has been widely affected since the wet season months of 1971, with an increasing number of incidents south of the Zambezi River. The Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project is well protected, however, and construction is proceeding on schedule. The fortified village program is progressing slowly in Tete District, but several thousand persons have been moved into areas not affected by the insurgency, and self-defense units are being organized and trained to protect the villages. During the late summer of 1972, ambush attacks occurred south of Tete District at points near Vila Gouveia and Macossa in Vila Pery District in central Mozambique, indicating possible probing attempts aimed at Portuguese supply lines to Tete and the lines of communication from Beira to Rhodesia. Guerrilla activity continues in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, although not on an intense scale, and some troops may have been moved from these districts to augment forces in Tete. Many parts of the northern half of Mozambique have not been affected at all by the insurgency; only scattered incidents have occurred in the central region, and the south is completely unaffected. The insurgents are based in Tanzania and Zambia and transit Malawi between the two nations. They receive a steady flow of support from a variety of sources, but the bulk of their military aid is from China and the U.S.S.R. The strength of the Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique has been more than doubled since the insurgency began, but the additional personnel include an increasing number of Mozambicans.

FRELIMO's collaboration with Rhodesian nationalists—the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union

(ZAPU)—in the border areas with Tete District has led to small-scale antiguerrilla operations across the border into Mozambique by Rhodesian troops. Some Rhodesian equipment, including helicopters, has been lent to the Portuguese for short periods, but most of Rhodesia's support consists of information and intelligence provided in its close liaison with Portuguese military and police officials. The Portuguese also coordinate items of mutual intelligence interest with South African officials. Some supplies are purchased from South Africa for use in Mozambique; these consist chiefly of medical supplies, canned foods, vehicles, and possibly some radios for the army and small quantities of small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment for the police. Assistance from Rhodesia and South Africa has been extremely limited, however, chiefly because Portugal does not seek aid.

2. Command structure (C)

The Commander in Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique, currently an army general, is responsible to the Minister of National Defense and Army through the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces in Lisbon; he is subordinate in all matters of policy and civil administration to the Governor General (a civilian), who is the highest authority in the state. The Commander in Chief may be from the army, navy, or air force. He is appointed by the Minister of National Defense and Army, with the approval of the service to which he belongs and the concurrence of the Superior Council of National Defense, which includes the Minister of Overseas. The headquarters of the Commander in Chief, organized as a unified command with representation from the three services, is located in Nampula rather than Lourenco Marques, capital of the state. The headquarters consists of a Chief of Staff, a Director of Operations, and five small staff bureaus or sections that are generally comparable in functions to most of the U.S. joint ("J") staff system, as follows: Personnel (equates to U.S. J-1), Intelligence (J-2), Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), and Psychological Warfare (includes civil affairs and public information). The Director of Operations is a special adviser to the Commander in Chief on various priority projects and activities of a limited duration; his responsibilities are not in conflict with those of the Operations Section of the staff. Personnel and logistics functions are only coordinated and monitored by the joint staff, each service having primary responsibility for handling those matters. The Commander in Chief maintains effective liaison with the Governor General in

Lourenco Marques and personally coordinates important matters, such as policy, but delegates responsibility for routine liaison functions to the commander of the army's Southern Territorial Command, which is headquartered in Lourenco Marques. The Commander in Chief has been directed by governmental decree to cooperate with the General Command of Security, which was created by a Ministry of Overseas decree in August 1972 under control of the Governor General to assure coordination of operations by the various security forces. The degree of participation by the Commander in Chief is not known. He controls all units assigned to an intervention role, including being responsible for direct operational command as well as commitment of these units to an operational area or to a special operation. Intervention units include the commando companies, air force paratroop battalions, the special marine detachments, the special groups, and the special parachutists groups; selected army infantry units may be assigned to the intervention forces as required.

Mozambique comprises a military region or command for each of the three armed services. The armed forces commander also serves as the commander of the army's military region. The other service commanders are responsible to the Commander in Chief for intelligence and for all joint operations. For matters of personnel, logistics, and training, the service commanders are responsible to their service chiefs of staff in Lisbon.

B. Joint activities

1. Military manpower (S)

As of 1 July 1973, Mozambique had about 2 117,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49. Of this number, approximately 48% were physically fit for military service. Their distribution by 5-year age groups was as follows:

AGE	TOTAL NUMBER OF MALES	MAXIMUM NUMBER FIT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
15-19	516,000	280,000
20-24	431,000	220,000
25-29	277,000	135,000
30-34	230,000	110,000
35-39	248,000	110,000
40-44	222,000	90,000
45-49	193,000	75,000
Total, 15-49	2,117,000	1,020,000

The number of males reaching military age (20) will average 90,000 during the 5-year period 1973-77.

Portuguese laws of military service apply to Mozambique. The military obligation begins on 1 January of the year in which male citizens become 18, but in time of peace active compulsory military service does not begin until the men are 21. At age 20, each man is required to report to the draft authorities for medical examination, but classification may be made earlier, depending on defense needs. The conscription term is 2 years, but the law authorizes exceptions to be made according to the needs of each of the armed forces. The overseas tour for conscripts from the metropole is 2 years, although it can be extended if required. The overseas tour is in addition to the active duty time served up to the time of embarkation, and most conscripts from metropolitan Portugal spend about 3 years in active military service. Mozambique-born conscripts normally serve 3 years; the annual conscript class is usually called up in two increments. No figures on the total number of Mozambique-born personnel in the armed forces are available, but it is believed that only a negligible number serve in the navy and air force. Approximately 15,000 (35%) of the army's total strength are Mozambique-born, and it is estimated that between 13,500-14,250 of these are black. In addition to the Mozambicans serving in the army, about 30,300 serve in the militia—15,300 in the intervention militia, which carries out antiguerrilla operations under Public Security Police control, and 15,000 in the protection militia, which protects the villages and surrounding agricultural areas. Also, 4,000 Mozambicans are in the special groups and special parachutist groups, which assist the army in combat operations. Plans reportedly call for increasing the strength of these groups to 10,000 men, possibly by the end of 1973. Except for a few officers, all of the personnel in the militia, special groups, and special parachutist groups are black.

Morale in the Portuguese armed forces is believed to be generally good. The average Portuguese conscript accepts his military obligation willingly and adapts well to military service. The black troops have performed well in combat operations with the Portuguese, and there are no known problems of loyalty, although it is possible that there have been a few defections. Leadership is generally competent, and officers of all ranks appear to be firm in their conviction that the Portuguese position must be maintained in Mozambique. They believe that departure of the Portuguese would cause chaos and stress the importance of the military role in the socioeconomic program to develop higher educational and economic levels for the Africans. Repeated tours in Africa have caused some disgruntlement in the officer corps, particularly in the army, which bears the

brunt of the war. The average rotation of duty assignments runs 2 years in Africa and 1 year in the metropole. Continued separation from their families has had an adverse effect on morale, and it is believed that Portugal has moved the families of some of the career officers to Mozambique for the length of their tours. Despite personal hardships, however, the officers are patriotic Portuguese and are loyal to Portugal.

2. Strength trends (S)

Army strength has increased by 9,000 since 1967. The spread of insurgent activity to Tete District in 1968 resulted in a small rise, but the largest increase occurred in 1970 in connection with the Portuguese offensive to cut FRELIMO infiltration and supply routes in Cabo Delgado District, particularly on the Mueda plateau. A slight increase occurred in 1971, probably because of the induction of more Mozambique-born conscripts, although it is possible that a small number of additional troops were sent from the metropole as a result of intensified insurgent activity in Tete District. Navy strength has increased by about 1,700 personnel since 1967. The number of personnel in the air force, after being reduced by 1,200 in 1969, was increased by 400 in 1970 to its present strength of 3,500. Air force strength fluctuation is believed to be caused by temporary deployments. Strengths for the period 1967-72 are shown as of 1 October of each year in Figure 1.

3. Training (U/OU)

No joint field training is conducted in Mozambique, but integration of the three services in the unified command provides experience in joint military operations. The Portuguese Army conducts training for conscripts and for officer and NCO candidates; qualified individuals may attend schools in the metropole.

4. Military budget (C)

Annual military budget proposals are prepared by the state government in Mozambique and are

FIGURE 1. Strength trends (S)

YEAR	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
1967	34,000	1,800	4,300	40,100
1968	36,000	1,800	4,300	40,100
1969	30,000	1,800	3,100	41,000
1970	41,000	1,900	3,500	46,400
1971	43,000	3,500	3,500	50,000
1972	43,000	3,500	3,500	50,000

FIGURE 2. Annual defense budgets (C)
(Millions of U.S. dollars)

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Defense budget	29.4	31.6	32.7	34.9	37.7
Defense budget as percent of total national budget	13.7	13.5	12.5	11.0	10.9
Defense budget as a percent of estimated GDP	2.5	2.6	2.5	na	na

na Data not available.

approved by the Ministry of Overseas in Lisbon. In addition, the Portuguese metropolitan military budget includes funds for the overseas military forces stationed primarily in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Since 1968, annual overseas military budgets have averaged US\$139 million, but the amount allocated to each overseas state or province is not available. Based upon personnel strength data, Mozambique probably receives less than one-third of the total appropriation. Defense budgets, funded by the state government of Mozambique, for the years 1968 through 1972 are shown in Figure 2.

5. Logistics (C)

The Logistics Section on the staff of the armed forces Commander in Chief coordinates and monitors logistical functions for the armed forces in Mozambique, but each service has responsibility for its own logistical support. A branch of the Military Support Organization, a military production facility controlled by the Secretary of State for Army in Lisbon, is in Lourenco Marques to facilitate procurement of subsistence, medical, and POL supplies from local sources and the Republic of South Africa; some vehicles and possibly a few radios purchased from South Africa are believed to be in use by the army in Mozambique. Storage, distribution, and maintenance facilities in Mozambique are adequate for all classes of supplies. The air force distributes emergency items and performs medical evacuation for the armed forces; it transports troops for the army in an emergency situation and on a routine basis as space is available. Civilian air taxi services are used to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties when necessary.

C. Army

The primary mission of the Portuguese Army in Mozambique is to protect the territorial integrity of the state and maintain internal security. The army has had the major role in internal defense operations since armed insurgency against the Portuguese began in

1964. It has been unable to eradicate the insurgency because it cannot deprive the insurgents of their external support and foreign sanctuaries. Although not able to prevent the spread of guerrilla activity south of the Zambezi River, the Portuguese control all population centers and have been able to maintain all lines of communication. The army's resources in Mozambique are limited because of requirements in Portugal's other two African insurgencies, but it is capable of continuing to fight for the Portuguese presence in Mozambique. Repeated tours in Africa have caused some disgruntlement among the middle officer group, but this is not believed to be a limitation on the army's capabilities. The officers are patriotic, and all appear to hold the conviction that Portugal has a moral obligation to remain in Mozambique; there is no evidence of any lack of willingness to serve because of personal hardships. Almost all of the younger officers in the army have experience in counterinsurgency situations, and probably 98% of the total officer corps have served in one or more of the African states during the past 11 years; many have served two or more tours. Army units in Mozambique are adequately but not well equipped for the present level of insurgency. The standard weapon of the infantry—the primary combat arm—is the Portuguese-produced 7.62-mm G3 rifle. Only a negligible amount of field artillery, consisting of obsolete World War II British items, is available, and air defense artillery is lacking. There are no tanks, only a few armored cars, and a shortage of signal and engineer equipment. Repair facilities are severely strained to maintain efficient vehicles because of the high accident rate, and there are shortages of spare parts for all items of equipment; the army salvages all parts that can possibly be used from wornout or damaged equipment, particularly vehicles. (S)

A considerable portion of the army's time is spent in conducting a modest civic action program to assist in the government's overall socioeconomic program to raise the standard of living of the Africans. Although handicapped by inadequate resources, the army provides food, medical services, employment, education, and other assistance to the local African population. Hundreds of Africans have been trained as skilled mechanics and technicians in the army's maintenance facilities and military hospitals. Unit medical officers maintain clinics to provide medical treatment for the local population (Figure 3), and some teach basic hygiene classes for the Africans. The army has operated schools, with classes conducted by both African and white NCO's during their off-duty hours. Training in the metropole has been realistically directed toward preparing the Portuguese soldier for



FIGURE 3. Battalion medical corpsman vaccinating children in resettlement village (U/OU)

dealing with the Africans on a person-to-person basis. Black Mozambicans serve in the army as well as in the various paramilitary forces which assist in maintaining internal security. The black soldiers have performed well in combat operations alongside soldiers from the metropole and in special independent operations; there have been no known incidents of disloyalty, although there may have been a few defections. (S)

1. Organization (C)

Mozambique comprises one of the military regions of the Portuguese Army. The army commander in Mozambique is also the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. He has delegated control of all nonoperational activities of the army to his deputy; the latter is responsible for personnel, recruiting and conscription, implementation of the training program, and control of all logistical facilities. The army regional headquarters is in Nampula, with the unified command headquarters, and most of the army staff officers serve in a dual role—for the military region and for the joint staff. Directives for control of nonoperational matters are transmitted by the Chief

of Staff of the Army in Lisbon; operational orders are transmitted from Lisbon by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Military Region of Mozambique is divided into two operational zones (the Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) and the Tete Military Zone) and two territorial commands (the Central and Southern). The ZIN is subdivided into four operational sectors: A, B, C, and D, with headquarters in Vila Cabral, Porto Amelia, Nampula, and Quelimane, respectively. Sector commanders report directly to the joint headquarters in Nampula. The ZIN encompasses the districts of Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, and Zambezia. The Tete Military Zone, with headquarters in the township of Tete, includes only the Tete District, which was reduced in size in August 1972 by the transfer of Mungari Circunscricao (a rural administrative subdivision of the district) to Beira District. The military commander of the zone is also the governor of Tete District. For more effective control of counterinsurgency operations, which have intensified over the past 2 years, the zone is subdivided into three operational sectors: F, G, and H, with headquarters in the towns of Tete, Fingoe, and Furancungo.

Most of the training and logistical facilities of the Military Region of Mozambique are located within the two territorial commands, which have no subdivisions. The commander of the Southern Territorial Command, which has headquarters in Lourenco Marques, serves as liaison for the Commander in Chief with the Governor General of the state. Inhambane, Gaza, and Lourenco Marques districts are included in this command. The Central Territorial Command, with headquarters in Beira, contains Vila Pery and Beira districts, which were created in August 1972 from the District of Manica and Sofala.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition² (S)

Portuguese Army strength in Mozambique is about 43,000 officers and enlisted men. The number of conscripts is not known, but they probably comprise approximately 95% of the total. It is estimated that 35% of the army consists of Mozambique-born personnel, of whom all but about 5% are believed to be black. The majority of the paramilitary forces, which supplement the army in performance of its mission in Mozambique, are black. There are 39

²For current, detailed information, see the *Order of Battle Summary, Foreign Ground Forces (Portugal)*, and *Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal)*, both published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

battalions or battalion equivalents, most of which are infantry. Several units have designations of other combat arms, such as artillery or cavalry, but they operate as infantry; the designation has been derived from the traditional arm of the unit which operated the center in Portugal where the battalion was formed and trained. Battalions have no standard size but vary according to the operational needs of the sector in which they are assigned. Combat units in Mozambique are divided into two categories: *quadricula* and intervention. *Quadricula* is a term applied to the combat units which are assigned specific boundaries within a sector in which they conduct operations over a long period of time. While in this role, units normally are not assigned to an intervention mission. Intervention is the term applied to those combat units which are used for special assignments and are controlled directly by the Commander in Chief. The army's commando battalion and selected infantry companies—possibly 12—are intervention units. Of the total units in Mozambique, it is estimated that 26 battalions are *quadricula*. Combat support units consist of four battalions (one artillery, two engineer, one signal), four cavalry (armored cars) troops (companies), and three military police companies. The artillery battalion, headquartered in Beira, furnishes three batteries (probably four pieces in each battery) of World War II British-made 25-pounder (88-mm equivalent) gun-howitzers for northern Mozambique—two batteries in Niassa and one in Cabo Delgado; a few additional artillery pieces are at the training center in Beira, and a battery in Lourenco Marques is believed to have 40-mm air defense artillery (probably six pieces). The cavalry units are located in Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nampula, and Mueda; they are equipped with pre-World War II British-made armored cars and possibly a few French Panhards which are used for patrol purposes and in parades. Service support units consist of four battalions (one each of quartermaster, transportation, ordnance, and signal) plus an unknown number of medical detachments. The major concentrations are in the northern districts—Niassa, Cabo Delgado, and Tete—but a small number of units and most of the training centers are in central and southern Mozambique.

3. Training (C)

Men who were conscripted in metropolitan Portugal have completed 9 weeks of basic training, plus advanced and unit training, before they arrive in Mozambique. The length of the advanced training period varies from 7 weeks (for infantry) to 49 weeks

for some specialties (such as medical). The final stage of training takes place in the unit that is to be deployed overseas. The length of time spent in unit training depends on the urgency of operational needs but is usually about 12 weeks. Almost every Portuguese conscript serves overseas, either in Africa or the Far East. The normal overseas tour is 2 years; this service is in addition to the active duty time served up to the date of embarkation. The term can be extended as required; however, the average conscript does not serve more than 3 years. Most of the conscripts from Portugal remain in the unit to which they were assigned in the metropole, although a few, such as specialists and commandos, may be assigned to locally trained units. The men who have received commando training in the metropole undergo 4 weeks of additional training at the Commando Training Center at Montepuez. At present, however, the majority of the personnel in commando units are Mozambicans. Metropolitan units arriving in Mozambique process through one of the replacement centers, where they receive weapons and field equipment. There are replacement centers in Lourenco Marques and Nampula, and it is likely that a facility has been established in Beira to receive some of the troops moved to Mozambique by air. Units usually serve 12 to 20 months in a sector of active insurgency; the remainder of the normal 2-year tour is spent in a quiet area.

Conscripts born in Mozambique normally serve a 3-year term, including a minimum of 16 weeks in one of the training centers. Mozambicans normally do not serve outside the state, but qualified personnel may attend schools in metropolitan Portugal. The basic training phase in a training center lasts 9 weeks, during which physical conditioning and basic military skills are stressed. The second cycle consists of 7 weeks for those being assigned to infantry units; 9 weeks are required for specialties, such as typing, bugling, and use of machineguns. The length of time spent in training for qualification in other specialties, such as medical aides, is not known. The principal training center is at Boane, with a capacity for training 6,000 men per year. Other training centers are located at Vila Pery, Namialo, Beira; Nampula, Montepuez, and Lourenco Marques. The facilities at Boane include the Driver Training Center and the School of Military Application, which conducts courses for reserve (*militiano*³) officer and NCO candidates. The 11-week course for officer candidates begins in August of

³A *militiano* officer or NCO equates roughly to a U.S. reserve officer or NCO on extended active duty. The word *militiano* translates as "militia," which is not used in order to avoid confusion with the local self-defense forces.

each year. The NCO candidate course also lasts 11 weeks and begins each January. Locally trained officers and NCO's serve as instructors at all of the training centers, as well as in combat and other duties. The training center at Montepuez trains only commandos and is the home station of the commando battalion in Mozambique. Driver training is also conducted at the center in Lourenco Marques, and the only artillery training provided locally is at the center in Beira.

4. Logistics (C)

The army's logistical system in the Military Region of Mozambique provides adequate support for the troops conducting counterinsurgency operations, but its effectiveness is hampered by a lack of spare parts and of north-south rail links, the vulnerability of the east-west rail lines, and an inadequate road system. Logistical support operations are severely handicapped by mud during the wet season, and the unpaved roads are also extremely vulnerable to guerrilla mining activity at all times.

The chief of the 4th Bureau (logistics) on the army commander's staff has overall responsibility for coordinating logistical support requirements, which are prepared by the chiefs of the quartermaster, medical, engineer, signal, and ordnance services, also on the army commander's staff. The chief of the 4th Bureau handles procurement, provides truck transportation, and arranges for distribution of supplies. The service chiefs control storage of supplies and their issue to the troops. A branch of the Military Support Organization, controlled by the Secretary of State for Army in Lisbon, is located in Lourenco Marques to facilitate procurement of items such as uniforms, footwear, food supplies, and, to some extent, POL. The Military Support Organization buys POL products from commercial organizations, which handle the distribution. Most supplies are obtained from the metropole and are received in Mozambique at one of four ports—Lourenco Marques, Beira, Nacala, and Porto Amelia. Innumerable complications have arisen on the few occasions that northbound shipments have been inadvertently offloaded in a southern port, or vice versa. A few items, including canned fruit and vegetables and some medical supplies, are obtained from South Africa. During most of the past year, the majority of the troops have been moved by air between the metropole and Mozambique. The transport capability of the air force has not been sufficient to move battalion-size units cohesively, however, and the army is considering the return to the use of ships for routine rotation

Within Mozambique, most supplies are moved by trucks (commercial and military), as well as by rail and ships; emergency items are delivered by military or commercial aircraft. Routine troop movements within the region are handled chiefly by military trucks, but both military and commercial aircraft are used as available, particularly in emergencies; so ne troops are probably moved by rail and ships.

Maintenance is adequate but slow. A new maintenance facility in Nampula, which became operational in the summer of 1972, handles major repair and rebuild requirements; prior to its opening most of the vehicles and engines needing major repairs or complete rebuilding had to be sent to Lisbon. A vehicle repair facility in Mueda performs some major repairs, but its capacity is extremely small. Commercial facilities in Beira are used for some major repairs. Military maintenance facilities make extensive use of cannibalization to obtain spare parts, repairing or rebuilding every salvageable item. Vehicle maintenance problems are numerous because of poor drivers, rough roads, and an increasing number of accidents caused by mines laid by the guerrillas (Figure 4). Units perform as much of their own maintenance as possible; repairs beyond their capability are handled by direct support ordnance maintenance detachments, which also are responsible for forwarding items requiring maintenance in fixed installations. Battlefield casualties are evacuated to the nearest medical aid station and may be moved successively to the higher echelon aid stations, the nearest military or civilian hospital, and to one of the three major military hospitals—in Nampula, Beira, and Lourenco Marques. The air force performs medical evacuation for the army, but civilian air taxis are also chartered to evacuate casualties, particularly at night, and to deliver medical supplies to isolated units. Critically wounded patients are flown to the metropole, accompanied by paratroop nurses.

Units in Mozambique are lightly equipped, but stocks of weapons, equipment, and ammunition are generally adequate to support requirements at the



FIGURE 4. Trucks destroyed by guerrilla mines (C)



FIGURE 5. Engineers constructing a military road (U/O)

present level of insurgency and could probably support a slight increase. The most common small arms used are Portuguese-manufactured 7.62-mm, G3 automatic rifles and FBP 9-mm submachineguns (FBP is derived from the name of the factory—*Fabrica Militar de Braco de Prata*—in Lisbon). Artillery is obsolete and consists of an insignificant quantity of British World War II 25-pounder (88-mm) gun-howitzers and a few anti-aircraft machineguns. Cavalry units in Lourenco Marques, Beira, and Nampula have a few armored cars that are used for patrol; they are chiefly pre-World War II British models, although a few are French Panhards that may have been procured from South Africa. Some vehicles, principally $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks have been obtained by Portugal from South Africa, and it is likely that a few are in use in Mozambique. The principal light truck is the $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton German Mercedes UNIMOC which is assembled in Portugal. The standard heavy truck is the French Berliet, also assembled in Portugal. Communications equipment is in short supply, but a small number of radios may have been purchased from South Africa. Engineer equipment consists chiefly of simple machinery for construction and repair of roads (Figure 5), bridges, and landing strips.

D. Navy (S)

The primary mission of the Portuguese naval forces stationed in Mozambique is to safeguard the 1,535-mile coastline along the Indian Ocean, defend the ports, and patrol the coastal and inland waterways, including Lake Nyasa. A secondary mission is to protect coastal shipping. The navy generally performs its missions effectively.

I. Organization

Mozambique comprises a naval command of Portugal. Its commander, a rear admiral or commodore, is subordinate to the Commander in Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique



FIGURE 6. Coastal escorts, the Jacinto Candido (F476) and the General Pereira d'Eca (F477) (U/OU)

for operational matters and to naval headquarters in Lisbon for administrative matters. The naval commander is assisted by a deputy, a chief of staff, and a small staff. The Mozambique Naval Command, with headquarters in Nampula, is subdivided into 10 maritime defense commands: Vila de Antonio Enes, Mozambique, Nacala, Porto Amelia, Lourenco Marques, Beira, Inhambane, Quelimane, Vila do Chinde, and Lake Nyasa, with headquarters at Augusto Cardoso (formerly Metangala). The military communication network operated by the navy is linked directly with Lisbon and has five major radio stations located at Lourenco Marques, Porto Amelia, Beira, Nacala, and Augusto Cardoso, as well as 25 minor stations at sites throughout the state.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition⁴

Portuguese Navy strength in Mozambique is approximately 3,500 officers and enlisted men, including some 800 naval riflemen. Virtually all personnel are believed to be metropolitan Portuguese.

⁴For current, detailed information, see the *Automated Naval Order of Battle (Ships)*, Volume V, *Naval Forces Intelligence Study (Portugal)*, and *Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal)*, all published by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The number of ships assigned to Mozambique varies according to requirements. In late 1972, ship strength included two coastal escorts (PCE) (Figure 6), six patrol boats (PB), one miscellaneous auxiliary (AG), one surveying ship (AGS), one utility landing craft (LCU), four mechanized landing craft (LCM), and three vehicle, personnel landing craft (LCVP). The PCE's are based at Lourenco Marques and are used for coastal patrol and transport of personnel and equipment. Two of the PB's and the LCU, based at Lourenco Marques and Porto Amelia, respectively, are also used in patrol and transport roles, both along the coast and on inland waterways. The AGS, based at Lourenco Marques, is assigned survey work in the Mozambique Channel, and the AG, based at Beira, functions in a variety of roles, including serving as a troop transport, as a stores and POL resupply ship, and as a floating hospital. The small-craft flotilla of four PB's, four LCM's and three LCVP's, based at Augusto Cardoso, performs patrol and transport duties on Lake Nyasa and related waterways.

3. Training and logistics

Naval personnel receive almost all their training before assignment to Mozambique but are given some practical training after arrival.

Mozambique has no naval shipbuilding capability. The Portuguese Navy repairs its Mozambique-based force at shipyards in Beira and Lourenco Marques and at Augusto Cardoso Naval Base, Metangula. A large shipyard projected for construction at the new Catembe port (near Lourenco Marques) should also be available for Portuguese naval ship repair when completed.

4. Marines

Portugal has no marine corps, but naval riflemen (*fuzileiros navais*) are commonly called marines. Marines, organized into companies of 150 men, usually guard naval installations but do receive training in amphibious operations and could form part of a naval landing force. Some personnel are given training in counterinsurgency tactics and are designated special marines; these personnel, organized into special marine detachments of 80 men, perform reconnaissance and special-operations missions. In late 1972, there were some 800 marines, including two special marine detachments, in Mozambique. The bulk of this force is assigned to the Mozambique Naval Command, but the two special marine detachments are assigned directly to the Commander in Chief as part of his intervention forces.

E. Air force (S)

The mission of the Portuguese Air Force in Mozambique is to provide air defense; tactical air support for counterinsurgency operations, including close air support and visual, photographic, and armed reconnaissance; air transport of troops and materiel; medical evacuation support; and paratroop support. Although handicapped by the small number and limited capability of available aircraft, by pilots, technicians, spare parts, and navigational aids, and by a less than totally effective tactical air coordination system, the air force has effectively adapted available

resources to support counterinsurgency operations when called upon. In its air defense role the air force has been unopposed in the air, except for insurgent antiaircraft fire, which appears to have increased gradually in effectiveness. While close air support has been effective when employed, tactical aircraft have not been utilized to maximum potential. The insurgents usually do not maintain contact with Portuguese ground forces long enough for close air support aircraft to respond effectively, or they attack at night when they are relatively safe from air attack. The air force conducts few tactical operations at night because of the inadequacy of navigational aids and runway lighting and a shortage of instrument- and night-qualified pilots. In addition, the tactical command and control system has been poorly developed, and a general lack of interservice coordination and cooperation and of understanding of the other's needs and capabilities has limited utilization of existing tactical air resources. The workhorse providing close air support is the North American Texan T-6 piston-engine trainer, which is used as a fighter bomber (Figure 7), which can be armed with a variety of ordnance, including machineguns, rockets, and conventional and napalm bombs. The T-6 is supported primarily by the DO-27 light utility aircraft, which can carry rockets. The higher performance Fiat G-91 light jet fighter (Figure 8) is used to a lesser extent in combat operations; it is employed primarily for reconnaissance operations and psychological effect along the northern and northwestern borders. Reconnaissance support provided by the air force consists primarily of visual and armed reconnaissance operations. Visual reconnaissance is accomplished by a variety of air force aircraft, including Alouette III helicopters and G-91 jets, while the primary armed reconnaissance aircraft are T-6 fighter bombers and DO-27 light utility aircraft. Limited photographic reconnaissance operations are conducted by the air force utilizing C-47-light transports for vertical photography and G-91



FIGURE 7. The North American T-6, which serves as the workhorse in providing close air support in Mozambique (U/OU)



FIGURE 8. The Fiat G-91 is used primarily in reconnaissance operations in Mozambique (U/OU)

and DO-27 for oblique coverage. Air transport aircraft are insufficient in numbers to provide adequate aerial resupply, troop transport, and medical evacuation. Increased charter contracts with air taxi companies and Mozambique airlines are being used to supplement the limited air force capability. While the air force recognizes the potential of the helicopter for use in medical evacuation and troop transport operations, it currently lacks adequate helicopter resources. The Alouette III light utility helicopter (Figure 9) can be used effectively as a gunship and for reconnaissance and medical evacuation operations but is poorly suited for troop carrier operations because of its limited capacity; moreover, it is not available in sufficient numbers to significantly improve ground force mobility. Air force paratroops are extremely well trained and would be expected to perform well either as a component of an intervention force or in independent operations.

1. Organization

Mozambique and the two Far East provinces, Timor and Macao, comprise the Portuguese Third Air Region, which has its operational headquarters at Nampula and administrative headquarters at Lourenco Marques. The commander of the air region is subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Air Force in Lisbon for all nonoperational matters related to the functioning of assigned forces; for all

operational matters, he is responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in Mozambique. In practice, the Third Air Region commander handles operational aspects of the region and high-level coordination with the commander in chief and civil authorities, while a deputy commander oversees the administrative and logistic responsibilities. In executing his primary responsibility of supporting joint operations in Mozambique, the commander of the air region is assisted by a staff which has elements at both Lourenco Marques and Nampula. The staff elements located at Lourenco Marques are delegates of the various air force directorates and maintenance and supply depots in Lisbon. They are responsible for providing advice and assistance to the commander in accordance with their respective specialty and consist of the following sections: Communications and Traffic Control; Engineering and Facilities; Accounting and Quartermaster; Materiel; Medical Services; Aircraft Maintenance Depot; and Supply Depot. At Nampula, the staff is composed of the Second (Intelligence) and Third (Operations and Plans) Divisions and a transportation section which controls airlift operations. The functions normally assigned to the First (Personnel and Training) and Fourth (Logistics and Administration) Divisions are carried out by the various staff elements at Lourenco Marques.

Operational control of the air force in Mozambique is exercised through three operational airbases and



FIGURE 9. Alouette III unloading troops (U/OU)

numerous subordinate satellite airbases. The latter are manned with personnel detached on temporary duty from the parent bases and are normally located adjacent to an army headquarters. A satellite airbase detachment commander is authorized to respond directly to requests from the local ground force commander to the limit of his means. In the event of demands beyond his capability, the detachment commander would request reinforcement or support from his parent airbase commander. The two air force paratroop battalions are a part of the commander in chief's intervention forces and are under his complete control. Each paratroop battalion has two tactical companies and one headquarters and support company. Normally one tactical company from each battalion is deployed, operating under the control of the army sector commander but always subject to withdrawal by the commander in chief. While deployed from their battalion headquarters, the paratroop companies are operational approximately 50% of the time.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition⁶

Air force personnel strength in Mozambique is approximately 3,500, including 900 paratroopers and about 75 pilots. Of the total pilots, only about two-thirds are available for, or assigned to, operational duties. The precise number of indigenous personnel in the air force is not known but is believed to be very small. One paratroop battalion is stationed at Nacala; the other is based near Beira. The aircraft inventory totals 105: 11 jet fighter-bombers (G-91), 27 piston trainer-types (T-6) used as fighter-bombers, 37 light utility (25 DO-27, 8 Auster, 4 Piper Cherokee), 10 light transports (6 Noratlas, 4 C-47), 5 SA-330 medium transport helicopters, and 15 Alouette III utility helicopters. Personnel and aircraft are assigned permanently to bases at Beira, Nacala, Nova Freixo, Tete/Moutize, and Lourenco Marques. The first three airbases support five subordinate airbase base detachments. An extensive air facility infrastructure has been developed in Mozambique which adequately supports air force operations except for those associated with the G-91 light jet fighter. However, improvements are being made to accommodate this aircraft. A civilian volunteer air force, *Forca Aerea Voluntarios* (FAV), has been organized in Mozambique. This auxiliary force is similar in nature to the

⁶For current, detailed information, see the *Free World Air Order of Battle, Volume I, Air Forces Intelligence Study (Portugal)*, and *Military Intelligence Summary (Portugal)*, all published by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Transportation and Telecommunications chapter in this General Survey provides a summary of the airfields system.

U.S. Civil Air Patrol and is organized into approximately six units equipped primarily with civilian aircraft. The units, consisting of two to five aircraft, are located at various places in the state and are under the operational control of the airbase commander at Beira. In some cases, the aircraft are privately owned and registered, while others, mainly Auster light utility aircraft, are furnished by the air force. Pilots who fly missions for the FAV are provided fuel and maintenance support for their aircraft but no salary.

3. Training

Air force recruits, including paratroopers, receive their training in Portugal. The annual air force recruit quota for Mozambique, not including paratroop or pilot trainees, is about 25; virtually all are allocated to technical training, such as communications. The quota for paratroop training is unknown. There is no limit for those desiring to enter pilot training, but recruiting is limited because of the expense of transporting the men to the metropole for training. The air force has a small-scale training program to upgrade the skills and qualifications of the FAV pilots through courses in weather, instrument flying, and communications.

4. Logistics

Logistic support of the air force in Mozambique is the primary responsibility of two Third Air Region staff elements—Materiel; Accounting and Quartermaster—and the subordinate aircraft maintenance and supply depots. The Materiel staff element is responsible for the requisition and distribution of necessary materiel consisting principally of aircraft spare parts, POL, and associated equipment. POL is available in adequate supply and is obtained from civilian contractors, who for the most part are responsible for the delivery of fuel directly to the aircraft. At more remote bases, fuel is stored in drums which are delivered by the contractor to the air force. The Accounting and Quartermaster staff is responsible for coordinating requirements for food and clothing and requisitioning them from appropriate sources. Depending on the item, supplies are ordered locally from the army or from air force headquarters in the metropole. A subdepot of the air force maintenance depot in the metropole is located at Lourenco Marques. It is capable of providing all levels of maintenance support to T-6, DO-27, C-47, and Auster aircraft. However, Noratlas and G-91 fixed-wing aircraft and Alouette III helicopters must be returned to Portugal for major inspection and repair

work. Approximately 10 to 15 technicians are sent to this subdepot from the main metropole depot for periods of 6 months' temporary duty to augment the locally hired staff, which numbers approximately 150 to 200. The air force maintenance shops are integrated with those of the civil airline in Mozambique—DETA. While air force maintenance is good in terms of quality and cost, it is slow, mostly because of shortages of spare parts and low stock levels. These deficiencies are major contributing factors to an unsatisfactory rate of aircraft which are in commission (approximately 50%). The principal air force supply depot is at Lourenco Marques, with a subdepot at Beira. The overall air force supply system is weak. It suffers from a lack of long-range planning and programing which causes frequent shortages of necessary materiel. Contributing factors to the supply problem are the long distance between the metropole and Mozambique and the diverse and obsolete aircraft inventory.

F. Paramilitary forces (C)

The paramilitary forces in Mozambique are the Public Security Police, including the intervention militia; the Fiscal Guard; the protection militia; the Special Groups, including the Special Parachutist Groups; the Port and Railroad Police; and the Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense of Mozambique (OPVDCM), which has an unknown number of armed members in self-defense units. A new force, which will be directly under the Directorate General of Security, is being formed, but its name has not been announced. A Ministry of Overseas decree of 16 August 1972 established the General Command for Security under control of the Governor General to coordinate the operations of the various paramilitary forces. An officer has been named to head the command; the extent of his authority in implementing the decree is not known, but it is unlikely that he will coordinate the activities of the new force being organized for the Directorate General of Security.

1. Public Security Police

The Public Security Police (PSP) is the principal paramilitary force; it was given control of the intervention militia by a governmental decree of 30 December 1972. The normal primary mission of the PSP is to maintain order in urban areas, but in Mozambique it also assists in the maintenance of security in rural areas where there is active insurgency. In the war zones, a small PSP unit (usually five or six

men) is stationed in some of the fortified villages to provide increased protection. Prior to being placed under PSP control, some intervention militia units, particularly in Niassa District and in the interior of Cabo Delgado District, were commanded by PSP personnel. It is estimated that the total strength is 21,400; of this figure, 6,100 are PSP proper and 15,300 are in the intervention militia. About 600 personnel of the PSP are from the metropole; they are serving a 2-year overseas tour in four mobile companies dispersed throughout the state. PSP weapons include pistols, 7.62-mm G3 automatic and older model rifles, submachineguns, and possibly some shotguns. Most PSP units probably have radios to communicate with the district commands, which in turn maintain radio communications with PSP headquarters in Lourenco Marques; commercial radio facilities are utilized as necessary. Vehicles include motorcycles, patrol cars, and possibly some Land Rovers and station wagons. At least one unit (in Lourenco Marques) has horses, which are used chiefly for ceremonial purposes but which would be effective in crowd control. Some units use police dogs on patrols.

Prior to being under the exclusive control of the PSP, units of the intervention militia operated under either the district governor or the local PSP commander in the districts in which they were located. Intervention militia units assist the army in patrols as needed and carry out antiguerrilla operations. The size of a unit varies according to the requirements of the area but usually is from 10 to 60 men; some units have as many as 100 men. Personnel are Mozambicans, some white but predominantly black. The principal weapons are believed to be 7.62-mm G3 automatic rifles. Units are located in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, and Zambezia districts. It is likely that some units are also in Vila Pery and Beira districts.

2. Fiscal Guard

The principal mission of the Fiscal Guard (also called Customs Guard) is to prevent smuggling and to enforce export and import laws and payment of customs duties and excise taxes. A secondary function, which is probably more significant than the primary mission, is to provide assistance in the command of the protection militia units, particularly in Cabo Delgado District. Fiscal Guard posts are maintained in the principal transportation and border-crossing centers. Fiscal Guard personnel are also stationed in some of the fortified villages to command protection militia units if required; they are chiefly along the Rio Rovuma and the coastal area of Cabo Delgado District. The total strength is approximately 700. The

commanding officer, a major, and his deputy are on detached service from the army. The only weapons are small arms.

3. Protection militia

Approximately 15,000 men are in the protection militia, which protects the villages and agricultural areas surrounding the villages from subversion and guerrilla attacks. The size of a group or unit assigned to a village varies according to the size of the village and the amount of insurgent activity in the area; the average protection militia unit consists of 15 to 20 men, but some are probably larger. The protection militia units have a variety of weapons, including many items of captured equipment, particularly Soviet-made rifles. The governor of the district in which the villages are located has overall command of the protection militia units, although the OPVDCM has responsibility for organizing and equipping them; personnel of the Fiscal Guard, and occasionally the PSP, provide command assistance as needed. The chiefs (*regulos*) of the tribes living in many of the small villages and surrounding bush have been made chiefs of the militia within their tribal jurisdictions, or chiefdoms (*regedorias*).

4. Special Groups and Special Parachutist Groups

Approximately 4,000 Mozambicans have been organized into the Special Groups (GE) and the Special Parachutist Groups (GEP); of the total strength, 800 are in the GEP. Plans reportedly call for increasing the strength of these groups to 10,000 men, possibly by the end of 1973. Except for a few officers and NCO's, all personnel are black. Both the GE and GEP are part of the intervention forces which are under the direct control of the commander in chief for special assignments in any trouble spot. They usually operate with the army but could perform independent missions. A GE unit consists of about 60 men each, all of whom usually are from the same tribe. The first GE units were organized in January 1970 and took part in combat operations 2 months later. Training is received at a GE and GEP training center in Dondo, although some personnel probably also attend the army's Command Training Center in Montepuez. Weapons are furnished by the army and include the 7.62-mm G3 rifle. The first elements of the Special Parachutist Groups appeared 10 October 1971 in a special ceremony marking the completion by 250 men of 3 months of basic training plus 3 weeks of paratroop training that included 1 week of jump practice. The men were scheduled to receive 4 months of additional training for combat; the facility and location were not

specified. A GEP unit consists of 70 to 80 men; unlike the GE, the GEP units consist of men who are from various tribes.

5. Port and Railroad Police

The Port and Railroad Police was established in April 1972 to improve security on the rail lines and in port areas; a primary task is to protect the rail line in Tete District. The strength of this force is approximately 500, all of whom are volunteers. The force works closely with the armed forces in performing its duties of protecting the rail line.

6. OPVDCM

The Provincial Organization of Volunteers for the Civil Defense of Mozambique (OPVDCM) is a volunteer civil defense organization under the Governor General. It provides an unknown number of armed personnel for self-defense units which protect public and private institutions, including commercial firms and various other vulnerable installations, mainly in urban areas. A few thousand members perform routine first aid, firefighting, and various civil defense duties, as well as some civic action functions such as teaching classes in child care, sewing, cooking, and hygiene. OPVDCM members also serve as collectors of information for Portuguese intelligence. The OPVDCM is responsible for providing protection for villages in rural areas threatened by the insurgents; it accomplishes this mission by organizing and arming protection militia units which protect their own villages.

G. FRELIMO guerrilla forces (S)

The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) is an African nationalist movement maintaining a guerrilla army of 7,000-8,000 members in parts of north and northwestern Mozambique. This force has slowly evolved from a small cadre of guerrillas who began operations in the extreme northern areas in September 1964. The mission of the FRELIMO army is to maintain military pressure on the security forces through harassment tactics while extending the military conflict to new areas, in the hopes that Portugal will relinquish control of the territory. FRELIMO forces have the capability to harass Portuguese forces in areas of rebel operations through the use of mines, ambushes, and attacks. They are also capable of establishing temporary bases in the northern districts to support their activities and have recently shown some capability to spread the war to previously unaffected areas. The guerrillas, however,

lack the capability to control any significant territory and have been unable to dislodge the Portuguese from any military objective.

FRELIMO's army derives its strength from its access to safe rear area bases in neighboring countries and to foreign support in the form of materiel and training; however, long supply routes from the rear area bases are tenuous. Personnel are familiar with the terrain in which they operate and are inured to the physical hardships of operating in the bush. FRELIMO has shown an ability, in some cases abetted by tribalism, to organize support for guerrilla activities. However, its failure to cultivate broad support from the populace has resulted in a manpower problem. The lack of education and of technical competence on the part of recruits is a handicap. Leadership is another problem area, and political naivete has hindered attempts at subversion. Poor morale and political dissension have resulted in a steady flow of defections with which recruitment is hard put to keep pace.

1. Organization

The president of FRELIMO also heads its department of defense and presides over a general headquarters located in Tanzania. The general headquarters is believed to consist of the following sections: operations and training; reconnaissance; communications; personnel administration; security; and logistics inspection, as well as a special section to support FRELIMO militia units. The chain of command extends from the president, through the army commander, to the provincial headquarters in each affected district (FRELIMO considers the districts of Mozambique to be provinces), down to the army units. For each district where the army is active, there is a central base which serves as a field headquarters. Other subordinate bases are categorized as operational bases from which offensive guerrilla operations are conducted, as relatively safe security bases for administrative and political activity (Figure 10) and supply stores, and as training bases used mainly for recruits.

In addition to this general scheme for organizing bases, districts may be divided into military zones or sectors to which military units are assigned. The units are then responsible for establishing and maintaining bases. Niassa District is divided into three zones: zone "A" comprises the northwestern quadrant, zone "B" the southwestern quadrant, and zone "C" the remaining area. Tete is organized by sector: Sector I includes the area north of the Zambezi and west of Rio Capoche, Sector II the area north of the Zambezi and east of Rio Capoche, Sector III the area south of the



FIGURE 10. FRELIMO members at a subordinate base used to support guerrilla and political activities (U/OU)

Zambezi, and Sector IV the neck of land extending southeastward between the Zambezi and the Malawi border. No similar division is known for Cabo Delgado. Military organization in northern Vila Pery and Beira districts is also unknown, although FRELIMO refers to this area as its "fifth front." Another element of organization is the detachment, which is frequently a subdivision of a sector or zone but may also be an independent element. The detachment refers to a base or small operational area which may be manned by any size unit.

2. Strength, composition, and disposition

The current estimated strength of FRELIMO forces in Mozambique is 7,000-8,000. The number does not include unarmed members and sympathizers, members of the militia, and those in training outside Mozambique. At any given time there are probably about 1,000 training in Tanzania or abroad. Strength increased at a steady pace from 1964 up until 1969. In the period 1970 to 1972 strength in Cabo Delgado remained about the same, decreased in Niassa, and increased in Tete (Figure 11).

FRELIMO forces were once (and may still be) organized into battalions with subordinate companies, platoons, and sections. At present the 12-man section is the principal operational unit, but in some areas—especially in Tete—smaller units are common. Sections may be composed of two or three groups with four to six men each. The probable strength and composition of other FRELIMO units is as follows: three 12-man sections form a platoon, three or four platoons form a company, and three companies form a battalion. The main training base at Nachingwea, Tanzania, is termed a "training battalion."

FIGURE 11. Strength trends of FRELIMO forces (S)

	CABO			TOTAL
	DELGADO	NIASSA	TETE*	
1964.....	100	0	0	100
1965**...	na	na	0	400
1966.....	1,250	1,250	0	2,500
1967.....	1,500	1,500	100	3,100
1968.....	2,000	2,000	700	5,000
1970.....	3,000-4,000	1,500	1,000	6,000-6,500
1971.....	4,000	1,000	1,500	6,500
1972.....	4,000	1,000	2,000-3,000	7,000-8,000

NOTE—Some figures are estimates.

na Data not available.

*Includes Vila Pery and Beira Districts.

**Excludes 1,000 training in Tanzania.

Weapons normally found in a FRELIMO section include one light machinegun, one grenade launcher or light mortar, four automatic weapons (AK-47 or submachinegun), and six semiautomatic or bolt-action rifles; the 7.62-mm heavy barrel, dual purpose machinegun is also used. Specialized units for support weapons are assigned to headquarters elements and may be attached to regular infantry-type guerrilla units. A mortar platoon consists of six sections, each of which has four men and one 82-mm mortar. A mortar section may be attached to an infantry section. An antiaircraft section is composed of two-man squads, each with a 12.7-mm heavy machinegun. An artillery platoon has three five-man sections with one weapon each. The artillery weapon is probably a 75-mm recoilless rifle, but there may be a few 75-mm pack howitzers. Special artillery units have probably been formed to employ the 122-mm rocket. Antiaircraft weapons and the less mobile artillery are used for defense of bases; mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket units are used in attacks on static objectives.

FRELIMO military units are employed in various combinations for offensive operations. Small individual units—groups and sections—numbering about five to twelve men, are used for reconnaissance, sabotage, minelaying, subversion/intimidation, and

occasional ambush operations. This size group usually carries explosive devices but lacks infantry support weapons. FRELIMO has found this type of unit to be effective because of its mobility and elusiveness. Platoon-size units with from 20 to 40 men are employed for ambushes and for attacks upon small settlements, fortified villages, and administrative, police, and military posts. This size unit normally has a few support weapons, most frequently mortars, to increase firepower against static objectives and harass security forces from a distance. Larger units with 100 men or more are formed for special missions against larger settlements and posts. They employ a full range of infantry support weapons. FRELIMO forces are capable of using several hundred men in an attack but rarely do so because it is an inefficient utilization of limited manpower.

The FRELIMO militia evolved from a "youth league" which became a "youth militia" and finally a "village protection militia." There are approximately 2,000 members of the FRELIMO militia, nearly all of them in Cabo Delgado, where there is a sizable rural population outside Portuguese control and sympathetic to FRELIMO. Clandestine villages loyal to FRELIMO have militia for self-defense. They are poorly armed and trained, most having antiquated small arms. The militia is composed of men considered too young or too old for training as regular guerrilla fighters, others considered unfit for various reasons, and women volunteers. The militia has little military capability (Figure 12).

The areas currently affected by FRELIMO guerrilla operations include most of Cabo Delgado except for southern and western portions, the northern two-thirds of Niassa, all of rural Tete, and parts of northern Vila Pery and Beira. These areas of activity are not controlled by FRELIMO except for small pockets, where the guerrillas are well established. Anywhere within these areas, however, FRELIMO has some offensive capability.



FIGURE 12. FRELIMO militia (U/OU)

3. Training

Training received by FRELIMO guerrillas ranges from poor to good. Some initial training is given at camps in Mozambique; most recruits are then sent to Tanzania for more extensive training; the most promising of these are selected for training abroad, principally in the U.S.S.R. Recruit training inside Mozambique lasts about 6 weeks and includes weapons training on the rifle and machinegun, use of grenades, and elementary guerrilla tactics. Those recruits destined for the militia get rifle training only. Nearly all basic training in Tanzania is taken at Nachingwea, where recruits are organized into training platoons (Figure 13). The 3-month course consists of 2 weeks of military drill, 6 weeks of weapons training and maintenance on the five or six principal weapons in use, and 4 weeks of guerrilla tactics and techniques taught by Chinese instructors. This final part of the course includes training in demolition, mine warfare, ambush and stealth operations, hand-to-hand combat, camouflage techniques, capturing prisoners, combat formations, and political indoctrination. About 20 Chinese have been at Nachingwea since the mid-1960's.



FIGURE 13. A training platoon in Tanzania. Note the Chinese-made tennis shoes; light and durable, they are popular footwear. (U/OU)

Nachingwea has a capacity of 800-1,000 men but only about 300-400 are trained at one time; other instruction provided there includes a 5-week political course, a special weapons course, and a medical course. Other camps in Tanzania with small training programs are located at Bagamoyo, Kongwa, Moshi, Mtwara, Mbeya, Songea, and Morogoro. These camps primarily rely on FRELIMO instructors who have been trained abroad; some of these camps are inactive. A special camp for 122-mm rocket training is believed to be near Arusha and to have a few Soviet instructors.

FRELIMO programs are augmented by training abroad for potential officers and instructors. Most of those selected are sent to the U.S.S.R.; no figures on the number trained are available, but it is at least 100 annually. Various courses are offered by the Soviets; most last 6 months on guerrilla warfare techniques, including weapons training, sabotage, and tactics. Other specialized 6-month courses include those in leadership, communications, sabotage, artillery, and reconnaissance. Trainees receiving top grades from their Soviet hosts go on to advanced courses in leadership and technical subjects for an additional 6 months to a year. Upon returning to Tanzania, these men are destined for commissioning as officers. Training in countries other than the U.S.S.R. has been much less significant. FRELIMO trainees have been sent to Algeria, Cuba, and China.

4. Logistics

The effectiveness of guerrilla operations in Mozambique is greatly dependent on the logistics system, which must support the combatants from rear area bases across the border. This system has been fairly effective in moving quantities of supplies, but at times it is unreliable. In Niassa and Cabo Delgado the supply lines are relatively short from storage areas in Tanzania to combat areas in Mozambique, and the border with Tanzania is 470 miles long. In the Tete area supply routes coming down from the 280-mile Zambian border are much longer. However, the remoteness of the region and the use of Malawi territory as a shortcut have helped FRELIMO.

The FRELIMO logistics system begins at large camps in Tanzania that serve as supply dumps. From these camps military and other supplies are transported by truck to advanced supply points along the border in Tanzania and Zambia. Arms and ammunition are transported in Tanzanian, and sometimes Zambian, military vehicles; FRELIMO also has a small fleet of trucks for ferrying supplies. Sizable supply columns, composed mainly of civilians loyal to FRELIMO, are organized to carry supplies by backpack from these border points to bases inside

Mozambique; columns are given a small military escort. Once at a base inside, smaller columns are organized to transport supplies from base to base as required, and caches of materiel are established by military units for later use.

To make this system work numerous camps both in and out of Mozambique are necessary. There are at least 30 FRELIMO bases in Cabo Delgado, 30 in Tete, about 25 in Niassa, and a few in Vila Pery and Beira. These vary in size, some containing perhaps 200 huts, while others consist of only 10. In addition there are numerous caches. In support of the internal system, FRELIMO has an estimated 16 supply points in Tanzania, 6 in Zambia, and 7 in Malawi.

The principal sources of military equipment are the U.S.S.R., China, and Eastern European countries. Military supplies are offloaded from Communist flag vessels at the Tanzanian ports of Mtwara and Dar es Salaam. Urgently needed items are occasionally flown in. The Soviet Union has traditionally provided the bulk of the arms, and FRELIMO maintains a military attache in Moscow to facilitate this assistance. FRELIMO is one of the few organizations of its type to receive substantial assistance from both the Soviet Union and China, and in recent years Chinese materiel assistance has probably increased. Other Communist countries known to have provided equipment include Czechoslovakia, East Germany,

Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Yugoslavia. About 90% of the weapons in use are of Communist origin. Virtually all of them are Soviet or Chinese, divided about equally. The remaining arms are Western World War II types manufactured in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Despite the generally accepted fact that FRELIMO has more arms than trained men to use them, homemade weapons called *canhangulos* are still occasionally captured. Although weapons may be plentiful, ammunition is sometimes scarce. The ammunition factory built by the Chinese at Mzingu in Tanzania could alleviate this problem.

Weapons in use by FRELIMO can be divided into three categories: individual infantry weapons, infantry support weapons, and explosive devices. Individual weapons include a wide variety of small arms. The AK-47 assault rifle is most popular, followed by various types of submachineguns. SKS carbines and bolt-action rifles are also widely used. The most commonly used support weapons are light machineguns and grenade launchers. Other support weapons in their order of frequency are mortars, 7.62-mm heavy barrel, dual-purpose machineguns (Figure 14), recoilless rifles, and 122-mm rockets. Both antivehicle and antipersonnel mines are widely employed; explosives have also been used but not as effectively as mines.



FIGURE 14. This 7.62-mm machinegun is simple and reliable. The wheeled carriage improves mobility, and the antiaircraft sight makes it a dual purpose weapon. Recent success in firing at Portuguese aircraft indicates the presence of more weapons with antiaircraft capability or increased proficiency with existing weapons. FRELIMO has both Soviet and Chinese versions of this particular gun. (C)

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FRELIMO loses about 600-700 weapons per year to Portuguese security forces; the majority are captured in bases and arms caches, and many are abandoned during clashes. Most weapons captured by the Portuguese forces are automatic individual types popular with the guerrillas. An analysis of captured weapons reveals that 47% are submachineguns, 44% are rifles, 5% are pistols, and only 4% are support weapons.

Weapons stored in Tanzania and those in use by guerrillas in Mozambique are in good condition. In general, guerrilla regulars carefully maintain their arms, but members of the militia are not properly trained in maintenance. Arms that are cached in Mozambique for future use are not usually properly packed and greased for protection. Maintenance of other equipment, such as the vehicles in use in Tanzania, is fair to poor.

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