

**GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)**  
**Description of contents**



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price & date of NPR corresp.

10 Feb

312.0 CASCAD

EXC

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

27 November 1951

312 CAS-X

MEMORANDUM FOR: All CAS OFFICERS

SUBJECT: Procedure for Development and Processing of NPR Correspondence

1. Reference: memorandum for all CASA Officers, file 312 CAS(A)-C, subject, "Procedure for development and Processing of NPR Correspondence," dated 10 February 1951.

2. All NPR directives will be processed in accordance with reference cited in paragraph 1 above.

3. Except in extreme emergencies, no NPR directive will be issued through U.S. channels prior to issuance of orders by the Chief, General Group.

4. In extreme emergencies, arrangements may be made to distribute through U.S. mail or Courier Service channels Japanese and English directives for General Group Headquarters, NPR.

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION:

*for* *R.C. Thomas*  
FRANK KOMALSKI, JR.  
Colonel Inf  
Executive Officer

O'BRIEN/fm

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

LHW

312( )CAS-A

SUBJECT: Address of Correspondence

- TO:
- Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region, APO 500
  - Chief, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, APO 309
  - Chief, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15
  - Chief, Kyushu Civil Affairs Region, APO 1105
  - Senior Adviser, NFR Service Group
  - Senior Adviser, General Group School Center, NFR
  - Senior Adviser, Mortar Training Center
  - Senior Adviser, Camp McKnight

Effective with receipt of this letter, all correspondence intended for the Chief, Civil Affairs Section will be addressed as follows:

Chief, Civil Affairs Section  
GHQ, SCAP  
APO 500

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION:

J. A. O'BRIEN  
CWO USA  
Ada Off

CAS FILE COPY

K-352  
24 NOV 1951

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

312( 5 Feb 51 )CAS-A

O'BRIEN/sm

SUBJECT: Correspondence

LHW

TO: Chief, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, APO 309  
Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region, APO 500  
Chief, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15  
Chief, Kyushu Civil Affairs Region, APO 1105

CAS FILE COPY

1. Reference: Letter, this section, file and subject as above, dated 5 February 1951.
2. Paragraphs 3c and 3d of the reference letter are rescinded.
3. Paragraphs 3a and 3b will apply to all correspondence originating in the Civil Affairs Regional headquarters.

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION:

J. A. O'BRIEN  
CWO, USA  
Adm Off

7-216  
20 SEP 1951  
8

HEADQUARTERS  
KYUSHU CIVIL AFFAIRS REGION  
APO 1105

AS 312

24 August 1951

SUBJECT: Registered Documents

THRU: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Attn: Chief, Civil Affairs Section (Administration)  
APO 500

TO: Headquarters & Service Command  
GHQ FEC  
Attn: Adjutant General  
APO 500

1. Reference, Paragraph 3, Disposition Form, your headquarters,  
Subject: Registered Documents, dated 10 August 1951.

2. Negative Report submitted herewith.

FOR THE CHIEF:

W. H. GARDNER  
Major Armor  
Adm Off

312 ( 24 Aug 51 )CAS-A 1st Ind

O'BRIEN/sm

GHQ, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, APO 500

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, GHQ, FEC  
APO 500

LHW

J. A. O'B.

A-252  
27 AUG 1951  
7

CAS FILE COPY

Ltr. Hq Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15, Subj: Registered Documents,  
16 August 1951

312 ( 16 Aug 51 )CAS-A 1st Ind

O'BRIEN/sm

GHQ, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, APO 500

TO: Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command, GHQ, FEC, APO 500

LHW

J. A. O'B.

CAS FILE COPY

6  
A 169  
21 AUG 1951



HEADQUARTERS  
KINKI CIVIL AFFAIRS REGION  
APO 15

ADM: 312

16 August 1951

SUBJECT: Registered Documents

THRU: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Attention: Chief, Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

TO: Commanding General  
Hq, Hq and Service Command  
GHQ FEC  
APO 500  
Attention: AG

In compliance with paragraph 3, Disposition Form,  
HC 312 (AG), Hq, Hq and Service Command, GHQ FEC, APO 500,  
dated 10 August 1951, subject as above the following report  
is submitted for this headquarters:

NEGATIVE

FOR THE CHIEF:

W. D. JOHNSTON  
Lt Col      Inf  
Adjutant

Lt Col Glover  
74-2133 ✓

312

Takoa NAKAYAMA

CAS

DS

1

In view of the curtailment of all activities pertaining to Civil Affairs, this section is unable to comply with request contained in attached communication. For this reason attached communication is returned without action.

Incl:

Ltr dtd 21 May 51

Fm: Foreign Service  
of USA w/1st Ind

----- W. P. S. -----

Cas File Copy

F331  
14 JUN 1951  
5

HEADQUARTERS  
HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMMAND  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, FAR EAST COMMAND  
APO 500

HC 312 (AG)

7 May 1951

SUBJECT: Receipt for Manual for Courts-Martial.

THRU : Chief, Civil Affairs Section, GHQ FEC, APO 500

TO : Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region.

1. Distribution of Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951, was completed on 12 April 1951, by Publications Supply Point number 1, this headquarters. Records indicate that two copies of the manual were issued to your organization on that date, and that receipt on WD AGO Form 996 (prepared and issued with the manuals) has not been returned to this headquarters.

2. Attached is another receipt form, WD AGO Form 996, which will be signed and returned to this headquarters without delay.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MILBURN:

1 Incl.  
Form WD AGO 996.

C. A. LEDWELL  
WOJG. USA  
Asst Adj Gen

312 ( )CAS-A 1st Ind

O'BRIEN/sm

GHQ, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, APO 500

TO: Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region, APO 500

WPS

1 Incl  
n/c

J. A. O'B.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FILE COPY

E-269

F-4

cas. SCAP File 287

BASIC: Training Memorandum No. 3, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces,  
Fort Monroe, Virginia, Subject: "Observations on Korea," dtd  
13 March 1951

HC 312 (AG)

1st Ind

HQ, HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMMAND, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, 24 April 1951

TO: Chiefs of Staff Sections and Unit Commanders,  
Headquarters and Service Command

For your information and compliance.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MILBURN:

*Clarence Q. Graham*

CLARENCE Q. GRAHAM  
Colonel, A G C  
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:  
"AT"

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES  
Fort Monroe, Virginia

TRAINING MEMORANDUM  
NO 3

13 March 1951

OBSERVATIONS ON KOREA

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## SECTION I

## General

1. Reference is made to:

- a. Training Memorandum No. 1; OCAFF, 31 January 1951.
- b. Training Memorandum No. 2, OCAFF, 17 February 1951.

2. Purpose.

To bring to the attention of all concerned observations pertaining to training made by the Chief of Army Field Forces during his recent visit to Korea, although it is clear that our basic training doctrines and techniques are sound, these observations continue to reveal certain serious deficiencies which have had far-reaching effects in the number of casualties sustained by our troops. Nothing contained herein will be considered as changing or rescinding instructions contained in references listed in paragraph 1, above.

3. Objective.

The objectives of this training memorandum is to emphasize the deficiencies noted in these observations and to correct them.

4. Application.

Although the observations listed in Section II of this paper, pertain primarily to the Combat Arms, they are equally applicable in many situations to the Services.

5. Dissemination.

It is desired that the contents of this training memorandum be disseminated to all elements under your command or under your jurisdiction with the least practicable delay. It is further desired that, where training programs require the training listed in Section II, every effort be expended and every means explored to effectively drive home the lessons learned in Korea so that those individuals and units now in training may profit from the experiences of those now in combat.

13 March 1951

## SECTION II

## Observations

6. Responsibility of Junior Leaders.

Although the quality of leadership on the part of junior officers and noncommissioned officers is improving, there is room for more intelligent, forceful, and aggressive leadership. This may be attained by giving junior officers and noncommissioned officers greater responsibilities, by requiring of them maximum performance, and allowing them ample opportunity to exercise judgment, initiative, and resourcefulness in the traditional American way. In particular, every effort must be made to increase the prestige of the noncommissioned officer.

7. Discipline.

a. All officers and enlisted men at all echelons must be indoctrinated with the necessity for the strictest discipline, and be taught the consequences resulting from lack of discipline.

b. An integral part of discipline is the establishment of the highest standards of courtesy, dress, conduct, alertness, and attention to duty. Such standards can be attained and maintained by fostering in the soldier pride in himself and pride in his organization.

8. Physical Conditioning.

Officers and soldiers must be hardened physically to meet the exacting requirements of rapid foot movements over great distances and over rough terrain. It is necessary that every logical means, including concurrent training, be employed whereby we can further harden our troops during training. We must improve our ability to operate on foot and without the benefit of transportation and heavy equipment. Effective means are confidence courses, cross-country runs, and speed marches.

9. Hand Signals.

A general weakness in the knowledge and use of hand signals exists. Leaders become casualties if forced to expose themselves unnecessarily in combat in order to give orders. Basic training in its simpler forms of communication is most adaptable to continuous concurrent training throughout all phases.

10. Bayonet Training.

The increasingly prevalent use of the bayonet in hand-to-hand combat by our troops in Korea has produced significant results. The

Over

successful use of the bayonet has resulted in the two-fold advantage of instilling fear in the enemy and confidence in our soldiers. As the enemy learns that our troops are willing to close with him and skillfully use cold steel, he will be more inclined to desert his prepared positions, thus losing his tactical advantage, and flee. We must capitalize on the psychological effectiveness of the bayonet in hand-to-hand fighting and develop in our soldiers a desire to use this weapon and kill with it.

#### 11. Patrolling.

Conduct of foot-patrols day and night has not been up to required standards. Patrols have failed to penetrate to depths required to gain contact and locate forming-up areas; they have failed to observe the area they were to patrol prior to departing, to select alternate routes, to obtain the information required by their missions, and to return by previously designated routes. Often they have been incapable of reporting what they have seen. Patrols have been improperly briefed, units in front of whose areas they operate have not been advised, and diversionary or supporting fires have not been coordinated. Our training must cover more thoroughly these basic subjects and place more emphasis on night patrolling.

#### 12. Tactical Intelligence:

Battlefield intelligence has been far from satisfactory. Much more emphasis must be placed on the timely procurement of tactical intelligence. Not only the members of patrols but every man in the forward area must be made conscious of the importance of getting factual information back to his unit commander. Needed improvement can be accomplished only when each soldier is able to recognize important combat information when he sees it, and when junior leaders fulfill their responsibility in getting the information back to the Division headquarters.

#### 13. Road Discipline.

Limited road nets and poor road conditions hinder troop movements during the best of weather and the lightest of military traffic. Under the conditions now obtaining in Korea, where two or more divisions are often required to utilize one MSR, congestion can become excessive and accidents frequent. Congestion and accidents are due to poor road discipline on the part of both drivers and foot troops. Common faults are: drivers exceeding speed limits, failing to maintain proper distances, halting vehicles on roads, disregarding posted warnings, and showing no consideration for other drivers and foot troops; foot troops failing, while marching, to keep roads open for vehicular traffic, failing to clear roads at halts, and failing to show due regard for their own safety. Our training must be slanted to instruct and to impress our units in the necessity for proper road discipline.



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14. Camouflage, Camouflage Discipline, and Dispersion.

The almost complete lack of use of enemy air power in Korea tends to lull our troops into a false sense of security. Our units and installation, including our men in foxholes, often expose themselves against the horizon in plain view with no camouflage of any sort, and with little dispersion. The modern American soldier is notoriously indifferent to, and poor at, camouflage. He lacks basic camouflage discipline. Immediate steps will be taken in our training to correct this grave deficiency. All individuals must become adept at camouflage. Junior leaders and commanders must rigidly enforce camouflage discipline, paying particular attention to camouflage of foxholes, and emplacements, and requiring dispersion of men, installations, and material.

15. Troop Information and Education.

An uninformed soldier is an indifferent soldier. We must avail ourselves to an even greater degree of the facilities of the Troop Information and Education Program to make our soldiers the best informed soldiers in the world. By so doing, we will insure ourselves of intelligent, cooperative, and loyal effort on the part of our officers and men.

16. Indoctrination.

The signal success of the recent limited objective attacks of the Eighth Army in Korea has demonstrated the capabilities of a fighting force permeated with the spirit of the offensive. In our training we must strive to indoctrinate our soldiers with alertness, awareness, and the spirit and the desire to kill without hesitation a ruthless and treacherous enemy.

17. Care of Weapons Under Field Conditions.

Casualties have been incurred by our troops because of malfunctioning of automatic or semi-automatic weapons at critical times. Investigation revealed that the malfunctions were caused by excessive dirt or dust on moving parts. This indicates failure on the part of junior leaders and individual soldiers to check weapons constantly. During training, the soldier must be taught that his life, and the lives of his comrades, depends upon proper functioning of his weapons. By continued inspection on the part of junior leaders, the soldier will be taught to care for his weapon as he cares for himself.

18. Artillery Support.

All leaders must be made aware of the assistance that can be obtained by Artillery fire, and instructed in the methods of calling for it. Artillery observers must be instructed in the value of proper

Over

evaluation of targets and the necessity for quick and heavy fire on those considered worth-while. Junior Infantry leaders must be impressed with the necessity of following the supporting Artillery fires closely and not depending on the Artillery fire alone to reduce the objective.

19. AAA in Ground Support Role.

On numerous occasions in Korea AA automatic weapons have broken up ground attacks both against field artillery and against infantry positions. Although the normal role of the divisional AA AW battalion is the defense of divisional installations against low flying aircraft, its success in the role of ground support warrants further emphasis of its frequent use in this manner. During training, problems must be included which require the AA AW battalion to be so employed.

20. Armor-Infantry-Artillery Cooperation.

a. Special emphasis will be paid to effective operation of the Armor-Infantry-Artillery Team so that all are familiar with the powers and limitations of each element of the team. In training, the Armor-Infantry-Artillery Team must work together from the first stages of small unit training.

b. Problems involving Armor-Infantry Team daylight attacks, properly supported by Artillery, followed by night disengagements and withdrawals, are desirable.

c. All leaders must understand the technique of injecting close Air Support into Armor-Infantry-Artillery Team operations.

21. Conduct of the Defense.

In all defensive operations each individual and unit must be imbued with the idea of holding assigned positions as ordered even though outflanked and sometimes apparently surrounded. They must remain confident and secure in the knowledge that the over-all plan anticipates that such situations may arise and that organized counter-attacks will strike the enemy at a moment most disadvantageous for him. Actually, in a well organized defense it is the enemy penetrating force which ends by being surrounded and destroyed, rather than our own troops. The key to any successful defense is organized localities that hold and mobile infantry armor teams which counter-attack, assisted by all available massed supporting fires.

22. Night Operations.

a. The Chinese and North Korean Communists often attack during the hours of darkness. The initial success of these attacks has

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revealed their advantage and often the inadequacy on the part of our junior leaders in coping with them. This inadequacy is due to neglect of, or lack of emphasis on, this phase of training and to the difficulty of fighting in darkness. In our training we must conduct numerous night problems, both in the defense and in the attack, employing live ammunition and utilizing all available means of battlefield illumination. In problems involving defense, emphasis should be placed on use of wire, mines, hand grenades, and supporting fires. It is imperative that prescribed night training be realistic and not confined to road marches and bivouacs.

b. Night attacks are usually made on individual Platoon, Company, (Battery) or Battalion perimeters after the enemy has, by infiltration or wide maneuver, completely surrounded the position. Troops that remain in their dug-in defenses and resist with dogged determination repel the attacks with slight loss to themselves and with heavy loss to the enemy. However, small units that attempt to withdraw either under cover of darkness or in daylight, when so surrounded, suffer exceptionally high casualties and may even be destroyed. This technique of stubborn perimeter defense will be taught in small unit problems and in field exercises.

### 23. Psychological Warfare.

Psychological and other forms of unconventional warfare have taken on ever-increasing importance. Further development and progress in this field is desired. Attention to this subject by senior Commanders and their Staffs to develop additional means of effective use will be taken under study.

### 24. Supply Economy.

a. Ample evidence exists that we are more wasteful of individual and organizational equipment than we were in World War II. Officers and soldiers are often supremely indifferent to anything which even remotely resembles supply economy. Our soldiers must and will be made economy minded from the time they first enter the Army until they leave. To accomplish this, supply economy must receive continuing emphasis during training, and individuals causing the loss of, destruction of, or damage to government property will be held responsible, within the provisions of existing regulations, for their actions.

b. Improper maintenance and lack of adequate recovery techniques cause our troops to leave on the battlefield a larger number of tanks and vehicles. This condition can be overcome by intensified training in motor maintenance and recovery. Command responsibility for

Over

maintenance of all types of equipment should be constantly stressed. Repeated inspections must be scheduled by Commanders to insure acceptable standards of preventive maintenance.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

WM S. LAWTON  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

s/ Neil M. Matzger  
t/ NEIL M. MATZGER  
Lt Col, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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O'Brien/mt

WPS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

312 ( )CAS-A

SUBJECT: Correspondence

TO: See Distribution

1. Correspondence received in this section is increasingly at variance in format from the standard forms for military correspondence established in AR 340-15 and TM 12-253.

2. It is desired that the attention of all personnel preparing correspondence be directed to these manuals, and that future correspondence follow as closely as practicable the models illustrated therein.

3. Following are approved headings.

a. For letters originating in Civil Affairs Regions.

HEADQUARTERS  
HOKKAIDO CIVIL AFFAIRS REGION  
APO 309

1 January 1951

b. For indorsements originating in Civil Affairs Regions.

Hq Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, APO 547, 1 January 1951

c. For letters originating in NPR Regions.

OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISER  
1st NPR REGION  
c/o Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region  
APO 500

d. For indorsements originating in NPR Regions.

Office of Senior Advisor, 3d NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15, 1 January 1951

e. For letter originating in NPR Camp.

FEB 5 Rec'd

F-21

5 FEB 1951

13-09

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312 (

)CAS-A, subj: Correspondence

OFFICE OF SENIOR ADVISER  
CAMP KURIHAMA  
1st NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region  
APO 500

1 January 1951

4. Following is approved address for communications addressed to this section.


SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
Attention: Chief, Civil Affairs Section  
APO 500

Where a communication is intended for a specific division of this section, as parenthetic reference, reference may be made in the second line of the address, as:

Attention: Chief, Civil Affairs Section (Logistics)

5. All correspondence must be authenticated by a commissioned officer or warrant officer. The signature of an enlisted man or a civilian is not valid on military correspondence.

FOR THE CHIEF, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION:

  
J. A. O'BRIEN  
CWO USA  
Adm Off

Distribution:

Senior Adviser, 1st NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region, APO 500  
Senior Adviser, 2d NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, APO 309  
Senior Adviser, 3d NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15  
Senior Adviser, 4th NPR Region  
c/o Chief, Kyushu Civil Affairs Region, APO 1105  
Senior Adviser, NPR Service Group (By hand)  
Chief, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, APO 309  
Chief, Tohoku Civil Affairs Region, APO 547  
Chief, Kanto Civil Affairs Region, APO 500  
Chief, Tokai-Hokuriku Civil Affairs Region, APO 710  
Chief, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, APO 15  
Chief, Chugoku Civil Affairs Region, APO 182  
Chief, Shikoku Civil Affairs Region, APO 1050  
Chief, Kyushu Civil Affairs Region, APO 1105