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Doc. # 2053

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Vol. 53

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 4, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages:.....9859 to 10035....

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(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

SAFFORD, Captain Laurance Fry (Resumed)

9863

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

142-B

9862

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHERS

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Monday, February 4, 1946.

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.
2 Chairman Barkley was called to the White House for the
3 usual Monday morning conference of the leaders and will be
4 detained a little while and we will go ahead, without objec-
5 tion.

6 Does counsel have anything to present to the committee
7 at this time before the examination of the witness is resumed?

8 Mr. Masten: Mr. Chairman, on page 9850 of our tran-
9 script Captain Safford referred to a telegram which was sent
10 on December 1, 1941 from Washington to Admiral Hart and the
11 Commandant of the 16th Naval District, for the information al-
12 so of Admiral Kimmel and the Commandant of the 14th Naval
13 District. Inasmuch as that telegram or dispatch has not
14 previously been made a part of this record we would like to
15 have permission to have it copied into the transcript at this
16 point.

17 The Vice Chairman: Without objection it is so ordered.

18 Mr. Masten: It was distributed to the committee last
19 Saturday.

20 The Vice Chairman: All right.

21 (The dispatch above referred to is in words
22 and figures as follows, to-wit:)

23 "NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

24 Extension Number 2027

25 From OPNAV

URGENT

Released by ADM L. NOYES

CINCAF

COM 16

Date 1 DECEMBER 1941

PRIORITY

COM 14

CINCPAC

Typed

by MCCLELLAN

011926

AMBASSADOR TSUBOKAMI IN BANGKOK ON 29TH SENT TO TOKYO
AS NUMBER 872 THE FOLLOWING 'CONFERENCES NOW IN PROGRESS
IN BANGKOK CONSIDERING PLANS AIMED AT FORCING BRITISH TO
ATTACK THAI AT PADANG BESSA NEAR SINGORA

AS COUNTER MOVE TO JAPANESE LANDING AT KOTA BAHRU.
SINCE THAI INTENDS TO CONSIDER FIRST INVADER AS HER ENEMY,
ORANGE BELIEVES THIS LANDING IN MALAY WOULD FORCE BRITISH
TO INVADE THAI AT PADANG BESSA.

THAI WOULD THEN DECLARE WAR AND REQUEST ORANGE HELP.
THIS PLAN APPEARS TO HAVE APPROVAL OF THAI CHIEF OF STAFF
BIJITTO.

THAI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES HAVE BEEN SHARPLY DIVIDED
BETWEEN PRO BRITISH AND PRO ORANGE UNTIL 25 NOVEMBER BUT
NOW WANTTO AND SHIN WHO FAVOR JOINT MILITARY ACTION WITH
ORANGE, HAVE SILENCED ANTI ORANGE GROUP AND INTEND TO FORCE
PREMIER PIBUL TO MAKE A DECISION. EARLY AND FAVORABLE

1 DEVELOPMENTS ARE POSSIBLE."

2 CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY OF UNENCRYPTED VERSION OF
3 ORIGINAL 011926 DEC 1941. DECRYPTED FROM ORIGINAL CODE ON
4 1/31/46

5 S E C R E T /s/ V. H. Cook

6 Comdr. USNR

7 011926."

8 - - -

9 Mr. Masten: We would also like to add to exhibit 142
10 as exhibit 142-B the material which was distributed to the
11 committee last Friday or Saturday and which relates to cir-
12 cular No. 2494 from Tokyo and is translated as follows:

13 "Relations between Japan and England are not in
14 accordance with expectations."

15 That intercept appears at page 251 of exhibit 1 and the
16 four pages which have been distributed to the committee are
17 further information in connection with that message, which is
18 one of the so-called "hidden word" messages from Tokyo to
19 Washington and other points. We would like to add that as
20 exhibit 142-B.

21 The Vice Chairman: It will be so received.

22 (The document above referred to
23 was marked Exhibit No. 142-B)

24 The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything else at
25 this time?

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Mr. Richardson: No.

3 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD

4 (resumed)

5 The Vice Chairman: Captain, do you have anything you
6 want to present to the committee before your examination is
7 resumed?

8 Captain Safford: No, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: I would like to ask you just a few
10 more questions, please, Captain.

11 I understood you to state to us Saturday that you would
12 provide the committee a copy of the memorandum from you to
13 Colonel West. Have you been able to locate that over the
14 week end?

15 Captain Safford: I have a copy, yes, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: You have it?

17 Captain Safford: Yes.

18 The Vice Chairman: Well, counsel had inquired about it.
19 Does counsel desire to examine it?

20 Mr. Richardson: You may proceed and I will look it over.

21 The Vice Chairman: I will proceed to ask you a few more
22 questions then, Captain.

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Captain, did you read to the commit-
25 tee from your memorandums or tell the committee everything

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 you know about anybody trying to get you to change your testi-
3 mony about the winds message?

4 Captain Safford: I have. There is nothing to be added
5 to that.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. You gave us all the in-
7 formation either in your oral statements or the memorandums
8 that you read to us bearing on that subject?

9 Captain Safford: That is correct, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right. Now, I believe you stated
11 that the copy of this winds execute message that should have
12 been kept in the files of your division would have been in the
13 safe of then Commander, now Captain, Kramer, is that right?

14 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and the personal or immed-
15 iate custodian was Lieutenant Commander H. S. Harrison, U. S.
16 Naval Reserve.

17 The Vice Chairman: Well, who would have had access to
18 Captain Kramer's safe?

19 Captain Safford: Normally only the people on duty under
20 Captain Kramer. That is, all the translators had access to
21 those messages when necessary, though everything was normally
22 cleared through Commander Harrison.

23 The Vice Chairman: Commander Harrison was in immediate
24 charge of the files in Captain Kramer's safe?

25 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: And nobody would have had access to
3 those files without the knowledge of Commander Harrison?

4 Captain Safford: Except in Commander Harrison's absence.

5 The Vice Chairman: Well, now, what was the situation
6 there? If he wasn't there could anybody --

7 Captain Safford: Commander Harrison left the office
8 every day to go to lunch and occasionally he would make a
9 messenger trip in place of Captain Kramer, but he was in the
10 office almost all the time. Captain Kramer was absent from
11 his office a good part of the time.

12 The Vice Chairman: Well, how many people do you think
13 would have had access to Captain Kramer's safe, lunch time
14 or any other time? How many people could have gone into
15 Kramer's safe and had access to these secret files?

16 Captain Safford: Not more than ten at the most.

17 The Vice Chairman: So about ten people then would have
18 had access to Kramer's secret files?

19 Captain Safford: That is correct.

20 The Vice Chairman: I believe you said they were trans-
21 lators.

22 Captain Safford: The translators and the yeomen on duty
23 in Kramer's section and the head of the section could call for
24 a file at any time. I could call for a file from Kramer, or
25 the people that relieved me could have called for a file.

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: People where?

3 Captain Safford: The officer that relieved me could have
4 called for the files or it is possible that the Director of
5 Naval Intelligence might have wanted to see them. Any higher
6 authority would have been given the file without question if
7 he had requested it.

8 The Vice Chairman: I understand that, Captain. I assume
9 Admiral Stark could ask for one of those files and it would
10 be brought to him.

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: I am trying to get down to the point
13 of how many people had the combination to the safe or the key
14 to the safe or could get in there?

15 Captain Safford: To the best of my knowledge the combin-
16 ation to the safe was held by Kramer and Harrison alone. There
17 was a copy of the combination in a sealed envelope in my safe.
18 There was another copy of the combination in a sealed envelope
19 in the safe of the Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations. That
20 was required for all safes in naval operations, so in case of
21 casualty to the man who regularly opened the safe the safe
22 could be opened when we had to.

23 Shef-
24 Shack
25 fls

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
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21 casualty to the man who regularly opened the safe the safe
22 could be opened when we had to.

23 Shef-
24 Shack
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Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 The Vice Chairman: When did you ever use this secret
2 combination that you had to Kramer's safe?

3 Captain Safford: I never used it.

4 The Vice Chairman: Do you know of any of these other
5 people having the secret combination, in an envelope or
6 otherwise, ever having used the combination to enter the
7 safe?

8 Captain Safford: I know of no occasion when we ever
9 had to open those sealed envelopes, and enter the safe.
10 I might add, whenever an officer was relieved, we changed
11 the combination on his safe and substituted the new cards,
12 and that was the only time we ever had to go into those
13 envelopes.

14 The Vice Chairman: Then is it your best judgment,
15 Captain, that Captain Kramer and Commander Harrison were
16 the only two people who were actually in control of this
17 safe and the secret files in it?

18 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: And anybody else going in there
20 for any file that had been called for, or that was needed,
21 would really have to go to Captain Kramer or Commander
22 Harrison to do that?

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: All right.
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Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 combination that you had to Kramer's safe?

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19 The Vice Chairman: And anybody else going in there
20 for any file that had been called for, or that was needed,
21 would really have to go to Captain Kramer or Commander
22 Harrison to do that?

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: All right.
25

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Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1 Now, this winds execute message that you have testi-
2 fied about was kept in the secret file in Captain Kramer's
3 safe?

4 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: Now, I would like to ask you just
6 one more question, I believe, Captain, and invite your
7 attention to the last line of your written statement that
8 you presented to the committee, in which statement, as
9 you prepared it, and as it was distributed to the committee,
10 -- you wrote the statement yourself, did you?

11 Captain Safford: I wrote the statement myself.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right. You used the words
13 "Pearl Harbor"?

14 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Well, when you read the statement
16 to us, you said you wanted to change those words "Pearl
17 Harbor" to "England and the United States."

18 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Why was that change necessary?

20 Captain Safford: I had used the words "Attack on Pearl
21 Harbor" mentally as synonymous with the outbreak of the
22 war. I realized, in my statement in the winds message there
23 was nothing whatsoever which pointed at Pearl Harbor
24 specifically.
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1 The Vice Chairman: So you had just used the words
2 "Pearl Harbor" inadvertently?

3 Captain Safford: I used the words "Pearl Harbor" in-
4 advertently, and I made that correction when I noticed it.

5 The Vice Chairman: You say here, "The War and Navy
6 Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification
7 of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese themselves."

8 Well, that was not correct, was it?

9 Captain Safford: That was not correct, and when I
10 read it, I realized it.

11 The Vice Chairman: When you first wrote your state-
12 ment, why did you use the words "Pearl Harbor" if that was
13 not correct?

14 Captain Safford: I wrote that statement, the final
15 draft, on Thursday night, and the next night at 5:30
16 it had been presented to Commander Baecher for clearance
17 to the committee counsel, and I had not had the opportunity
18 to proofread it, to see exactly what impression I might
19 be giving, or if I made a mistake inadvertently.

20 The Vice Chairman: Well, you did make a mistake when
21 you used "Pearl Harbor" in that sentence?

22 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: And you changed that to "England
24 and the United States"?

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Senator George

h4

1 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

2 The Vice Chairman: Because you realized that there
3 was nothing in the winds execute message that related to
4 Pearl Harbor at all?

5 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. Thank you.

7 Senator George will inquire.

8 Senator George: Captain, you were aware of the con-
9 stantly deteriorating relations between Japan and the
10 United States for some three months at least, were you not?

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

12 Senator George: Prior to Pearl Harbor?

13 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

14 Senator George: You had known of the Secretary of
15 the Secretary of State's statement made in the council to
16 both the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of War in November,
17 specifically about the 26th of November, that sets forth
18 the safety and security and defense of the country was in
19 the hands of the Army and Navy?

20 Captain Safford: I knew nothing about that, sir.

21 Senator George: You had no information about that?

22 Captain Safford: No, sir.

23 Senator George: Well, you did know that practically
24 the diplomatic relations had broken off, did you not?

25 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

c2

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

h5

1 What I knew was entirely from my reading of the inter-
2 cepted messages passing between Washington and Tokyo.

3 Senator George: You were familiar with the so-called
4 war message, or "This is to be construed as a war message,"
5 that went to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet on the 27th
6 of November?

7 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, I had been permitted to
8 read that.

9 Senator George: Therefore you knew that diplomatic
10 relations had ended, that is, from all the information you
11 had, you knew that conditions had progressed to the point
12 where diplomatic relations had practically ended?

13 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

14 Senator George: And you testified, I believe, in your
15 direct, that for three months you regarded war as inevit-
16 able with Japan -- or did you use the word "inevitable"?

17 Captain Safford: I do not recall making that state-
18 ment, but I did regard war with Japan as just a matter of
19 time.

20 Senator George: Just a matter of time?

21 Captain Safford: Yes.

22 Senator George: In other words, you regarded a war
23 with Japan as certain within some reasonably early time,
24 and for some three months you had had that view?

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

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Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator George: Well now, Captain, let me ask you, what was the special significance of the winds execute message of December 4 -- I believe you have identified that day -- to you? What additional special information did it give to you, or convey to you?

Captain Safford: It confirmed the suspicions that I, and I believe most of the high ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments held, that Japan was intending to proceed with its program of conquest in the Far East, and that would include invasion of Thailand and the capture of Malaya and Netherlands East Indies, if and when Japan decided to make war on England.

The United States would not necessarily be involved. In fact, the whole tone and purpose of the diplomatic negotiations between Tokyo and Washington had been to isolate the Far East and to persuade the United States to give a free hand out there. So the winds message meant not only that Japan was about to declare war on England and attack foreign territory out in the Far East, it also meant that Japan realized that the United States would not yield, as a matter of principle, and that she had determined to bring the war to us rather than to start the war in the Far East with a neutral but hostile nation on the flank.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

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Senator George: Well, it was abundantly clear, was it not, after Secretary of State Hull's message, or answer to the Japanese note, that the United States would not yield, and I believe you testified that the winds execute message did not designate any time or place where the war on the United States would begin, and therefore, I am asking you what additional significance did the winds execute message, conceding for the purpose of the question that it came through as you have testified, what additional significance it had to you, in view of the reply of the Secretary of State, in view of what had happened, in view of the message of November 27 to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in view of the Marshall message to General Short, the Military Commander of the Hawaiian Area?

Is the committee to understand that it only had the additional significance of confirming what you already believed, what you had already concluded?

Captain Safford: My interpretation was that it gave a tip-off or preview of what Japan's reply to Secretary Hull's note of November 26 was going to be.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

1
2 Senator George: Well, now, we come to the 14 parts
3 message of December 6. I believe your testimony is that
4 you left your office at about 4:30 on the afternoon of
5 December 6, at which time some portions of the 14-part message
6 had come in, but that you had not carefully studied the
7 portions that had been received; is that correct?

8 Captain Safford: That is correct.

9 Senator George: And then you left your office and
10 learned nothing more about the 14 parts message, or the
11 message directing the delivery to Secretary Hull at 1:00
12 p.m., until you were advised over the radio on Sunday after-
13 noon, after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

14 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

15 Senator George: You did not follow up, during Saturday
16 evening or Saturday night, or early Sunday morning, the
17 14th part of the message?

18 Captain Safford: I did not.

19 Senator George: Well, you did not think that there
20 was anything especially significant about so much of the
21 14 parts message as you had seen before you left your office
22 at 4:30, did you?

23 Captain Safford: I considered that as the confirmation
24 of my evaluation of the winds message 48 hours earlier.

25 Senator George: You mean the first 13 parts or the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

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13 parts taken all together?

Captain Safford: What I had seen, the five or six portions in their garbled form. They did not arrive in serial order, they were quite mixed up as we broke them down, but we could get the sense of the whole thing. The Japanese were rejecting the American proposal of November 26th.

Senator George: And that reply was somewhat more abusive in tone, was it not, than the ordinary Japanese message?

Captain Safford: The ordinary Japanese message had been very courteous in tone up to this particular message.

Senator George: Up to this particular message?

Captain Safford: Yes.

Senator George: And did you take any steps to see that your evaluation of the 14 parts message was transmitted on Saturday afternoon or evening, or night, or early Sunday morning?

Captain Safford: No, sir, I did not.

Senator George: There was nothing in the 14 parts message itself that indicated an attack at any particular place?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator George: If any particular place was indicated at all it was in the pilot message, the message we refer to

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

1
2 here as the pilot message, the message directing the de-
3 livery to the Secretary of State Hull at a given hour?

4 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt there?

6 The Vice Chairman: I believe we agreed Saturday we
7 would not have any interruptions.

8 Mr. Keefe: I wanted to ask the Senator only a question,
9 to clear this up.

10 The Vice Chairman: Are we going to have the rule lived
11 up to?

12 Senator George: I have no objection, so far as I am
13 concerned.

14 The Vice Chairman: All right.

15 Mr. Keefe: He is referring to the pilot message.

16 The Vice Chairman: Do you want the Senator to yield?

17 Mr. Keefe: I ask the Senator if he will yield, yes.

18 Senator George: I will be glad to.

(4)
19 Mr. Keefe: You referred to the pilot message as being
20 the message which called for delivery at 1:00 o'clock. My
21 understanding of the situation is that the pilot message,
22 referred to as such, is the message that came in first indi-
23 cating that the 14 part message would be received, and that
24 the message, as heretofore referred to, the last message
25 received was the 1:00 o'clock message. I am offering that

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

1 so the record will not be mixed up.

2 Senator George: I think, Congressman, you are correct.
3 I was referring to the 1:00 o'clock message, that is the
4 message directing delivery of the 14 parts message to the
5 Secretary of State.
6

7 You did not see that until the 8th?

8 Captain Safford: I did not see that until the 8th.

9 Senator George: You did not know anything of it until
10 the 8th?

11 Captain Safford: It is possible that my people on watch
12 telephoned it out, but I have forgotten it if they did.

13 Senator George: Well, Captain, you say that the winds
14 execute message was seen by you under the circumstances de-
15 tailed by you on the 4th of December?

16 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

17 Senator George: That is your testimony, as I understand it.

18 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

19 Senator George: That message contained the definite
20 statement, along with others, of "west wind clear", did it
21 not?

22 Captain Safford: That included "west wind clear".

23 Senator George: Meaning war with England?

24 Captain Safford: Meaning war with England and invasion
25 of Thailand and attack or occupation of Malaya and the

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George

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Netherlands East Indies.

Senator George: Well, Captain, can you give any reason why, on the afternoon of December 7, after the attack at Pearl Harbor, I believe, the message referring alone to England, using the same code words or same weather forecast terms "west wind clear" was sent out? If it had already been sent out on December 4 why was it again repeated on December 7?

Captain Safford: I do not know.

Senator George: Well, if your memory is not playing tricks with you and there really was, as you have testified, the winds execute message of December 4, which contained the same information, why was it again repeated, and your answer is that you are not able to say, is that correct?

Captain Safford: I never saw or heard of that FCC intercepted winds message which was broadcast about 6 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor until the summer of 1944.

Senator George: You haven't any reason to think it was not reported to the Navy Department on the afternoon of the 7th, have you?

Captain Safford: The FCC document stated that that message was telephoned to Colonel Dusenberry, I believe, of the Army, and I think it was at his home. I have no personal knowledge and no record can be found that that message was

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator George
Mr. Clark

1 delivered to the Navy Department either by telephone or in
2 written form.

3 Senator George: I have no further questions.

4 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Clark of North Carolina will
5 inquire, Captain.

6 Mr. Clark: Captain, you understand that the intercepted
7 messages have been referred to in this hearing as magic,
8 do you not?

9 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Clark: I believe General Marshall of the Army and
11 Admiral Stark for the Navy established a rather particular
12 method for the handling and distribution and final disposi-
13 tion of magic, did they not?

14 Captain Safford: Are you referring to within the
15 War and Navy Departments and in Washington? Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Clark: Now, on the Army side, copies of this magic
17 were enclosed in a leather pouch which was locked and sent
18 by messenger from person to person among those who were
19 entitled under that plan to have access to magic?

20 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Clark: And when that was presented to an officer
22 he was permitted to read the message and then return it to
23 the pouch to be carried on to the next person?

24 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.
25

LaCharity
follows
10:40

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 Mr. Clark: And I believe Admiral Stark established in
3 the Navy a very similar method except perhaps they did not
4 use the leather pouch?

5 Captain Safford: I believe we ended up by using leather
6 pouche: the same as the Army did.

7 Mr. Clark: So that the system in the two Departments
8 was practically the same?

9 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Clark: Now, that having been established by the
11 Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations,
12 no one would have the right to vary or change that method
13 except with the knowledge and consent of General Marshall
14 and Admiral Stark, would they?

15 Captain Safford: Yes, or except in emergency, when
16 the officer who made the change had to accept the responsi-
17 bility for it if he guessed wrong.

18 Mr. Clark: And that would have to be some high ranking
19 officer, to assume that responsibility?

20 Captain Safford: I believe that Kramer made an emergency
21 change on the evening of the 6th of December 1941.

22 Mr. Clark: Was that for the purpose of expediting the
23 delivery of magic?

24 Captain Safford: That was for the purpose of expediting
25 delivery.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 Mr. Clark: And it was supposed to be made available
2 very promptly when it came in?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Clark: Am I right in thinking that this magic was
5 distributed to the White House, to the Department of State,
6 the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief
7 of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, the
8 War Plans Division, the head of Intelligence in the Army and
9 the Navy?

10 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Clark: And was there anyone else to whom it was
12 accessible to your knowledge?

13 Captain Safford: The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
14 always saw it. I believe that the Naval Aide to the President
15 always saw them and reviewed them, with Kramer, in the name
16 and acting for the President.

17 Mr. Clark: The offices I have named or people in those
18 offices were trusted to see the magic?

19 Captain Safford: Yes, sir. There was one more exception.
20 Captain Schuirmann, who was the Navy liaison officer with
21 the State Department, was sometimes shown them by the direct
22 orders of Admiral Stark or Admiral Ingersoll. There was an
23 exception made in his case in each individual instance.

24 Mr. Clark: Now, aside from the ones you have mentioned,
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark 9882

1 do you know of anyone else who was entitled to examine
2 this magic?

3 Captain Safford: The Director of Naval Communications
4 and the Chief Signal Officer of course were entitled to see
5 it. And I was entitled to see it because my people were
6 working with it. Everybody working with it. The heads of
7 the Far Eastern Section of the Naval Intelligence and Military
8 Intelligence were, of course. We who were working with it
9 had to see it in order to know what was going on.

10 Mr. Clark: It was limited to a comparatively few
11 people, was it not?

12 Captain Safford: Just as few as we could and still
13 have the proper people know it.

14 Mr. Clark: I see.

15 By whom was this distribution made in the Navy Department?

16 Captain Safford: The distribution was normally made
17 by Captain Kramer.

18 Mr. Clark: Do you know who did it in the Army?

19 Captain Safford: Colonel Bratton.

20 Mr. Clark: Now, do you think of anyone in that group
21 who were entitled to examine magic that you would not classi-
22 fy as a highly intelligent and completely loyal American?

23 Captain Safford: No, sir.

24 Mr. Clark: I presume that magic was limited to a
25 comparatively few because of its very great significance and

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 importance?

3 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and to minimize the chance
4 of a leak and to enable us to place responsibility in case
5 a leak should occur.

6 Mr. Clark: I see. And, of course, a leak was to be
7 avoided because of the great importance of magic?

8 Captain Safford: We were afraid our source of informa-
9 tion would dry up.

10 Mr. Clark: I didn't quite get that.

11 Captain Safford: We were afraid our source of informa-
12 tion would dry up if there was a leak.

13 Mr. Clark: You are familiar with the episode between
14 General Marshall and Governor Dewey in which General Marshall
15 went to some trouble to be sure that the Governor thoroughly
16 appreciated the importance of keeping the magic secret?

17 Captain Safford: I read about it in the newspapers.

18 Mr. Clark: How is that?

19 Captain Safford: I have read about it in the newspapers.

20 Mr. Clark: Well, that indicated that General Marshall
21 regarded magic as being highly important, did it?

22 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: After the original winds message which
24 disclosed that weather forecasting language was to be used
25 as a code there was a great interest in all the group who had

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 access to magic to know whether and when the winds execute
3 message might come, was there not?

4 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: I believe you had your people on a 24-hour
6 basis?

7 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Clark: And you were, I think, as you have expressed
9 it, straining every fiber to pick this winds execute message
10 out of the air?

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Clark: Can you think of anything that the War and
13 Navy Departments in those days just before Pearl Harbor, when
14 so many people thought we were on the brink of war with
15 Japan, considered of more interest or considered of more
16 importance than the winds execute message?

17 Captain Safford: That was the most important message
18 we had up to the time of the pilot message on December 6.

19 Mr. Clark: And it was so considered by the group who
20 had the right to read magic?

21 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Clark: And they were expecting or at least they
23 were anxious to know whether the message came and when?

24 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Clark: And I believe you have testified that you

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 received this message and immediately put it in the process
3 of handling and distribution and disposal just as in the
4 case of all other magic?

5 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and in addition it was
6 telephoned around to various people by Admiral Noyes and so
7 far as I know that was the first time that had ever been done.

8 Mr. Clark: Now, you say it was telephoned around.
9 What do you mean?

10 Captain Safford: I am afraid I am possibly giving
11 second-hand information, but if the committee wants to hear
12 it I will answer the question.

13 Mr. Clark: I am very much obliged to you, Captain,
14 but so far as I am concerned we can leave it out.

15 You put this particular message in course of distribu-
16 tion on the 4th of December?

17 Captain Safford: I sent it originally up to Admiral
18 Noyes with the expectation and belief that he was going to
19 telephone it to a selected list of the same officials who
20 received all other magic. He would not give it to the
21 Army distribution list. He would only give it to the Navy.

22 Mr. Clark: I am very sorry, I am not hearing you, for
23 some reason, Captain.

24 Captain Safford: I sent the first winds execute message
25 to the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes. It

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 was my expectation and my belief at the time that he tele-
2 phoned the substance of that message to somebody in the
3 War Department who was authorized to receive it and also to
4 the Naval Aide to the President and to the various officials
5 in the Navy Department who were entitled to receive magic
6 information.

7 Mr. Clark: Do you know whether he did telephone it
8 or not?

9 Captain Safford: I do not know of my own direct knowledge.

10 Mr. Clark: Well, now, the question I asked you, was
11 whether you filed this for distribution in the same manner
12 as other magic.

13 Captain Safford: Would you repeat the question?

14 Mr. Clark: The question was whether or not on the 4th
15 day of December you filed this particular message for dis-
16 tribution in the same manner as other magic.

17 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, we did that also.

18 Mr. Clark: That is what I was asking you.

19 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Clark: That, of course, was three days before Pearl
21 Harbor?

22 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: Can you think of any reason at all why
24 this important message, this message of such wide interest,
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 shouldn't be immediately handled and distributed and examined
2 and disposed of in exactly the same manner as all other
3 magic?
4

5 Captain Safford: No, sir.

6 Mr. Clark: So far as you know that was done?

7 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Clark: And if it was done then that message went
9 immediately to the group of people we have just referred
10 to as being entitled to receive magic?

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Clark: Captain, will you tell me, please, exactly
13 why this message made such an impression on your mind?

14 Captain Safford: Because I expected to see a very
15 strongly worded war warning sent out to Admiral Hart and
16 to Admiral Kimmel as the direct result of receiving this
17 winds execute message.

18 Mr. Clark: But I am asking you about the impression
19 that the message made on your mind, not your impression of
20 what some naval officer might have been going to do.

21 Captain Safford: I understand.

22 To me that message meant that the war would commence
23 within two or three days in all probability, possibly
24 Saturday, December 6, possibly Sunday, December 7. That
25 was the best estimate that could be made as to the timing

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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implied by a message of that nature.

Mr. Clark: Now, can you think of any reason why it wouldn't have made exactly the same or very similar impression upon the minds of the members of this group who were so interested in that very question, too?

Captain Safford: I can see no reason why it did not make the same impression on their minds.

Mr. Clark: Well, it was almost bound to make the same impression?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 Mr. Clark: As a matter of just plain common sense.

2 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Clark: So that if the members of that group later
4 denied having ever seen that message that could not be
5 explained upon any theory that it was not important, or
6 that they were not interested, or that it didn't mean any-
7 thing to them?

8 Captain Safford: No, sir.

9 Mr. Clark: And their statement that they hadn't seen
10 it would have to be knowing and willful?

11 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Clark: Now, you have referred in your testimony
13 to the fact that the only theory upon which you can explain
14 what has happened, is that this message was destroyed to
15 cover up mistakes; is that right?

16 Captain Safford: I believe I have given that implica-
17 tion.

18 Mr. Clark: Yes, sir. Of course, it wouldn't have
19 done any good to have destroyed the message and all records
20 about the message, in the War Department unless it was also
21 done in the Navy Department?

22 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Clark: And in the Secretary of - well, it wouldn't
24 be there.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 No one in the Navy below the rank of Admiral Stark
2 would rest under any duty or obligation or have any right
3 to send a warning message to the Commander of the Fleet
4 in the Pacific, would he?

5 Captain Safford: The Director of Naval Intelligence
6 had always the authority to send out what we might call
7 enemy information.

8 Mr. Clark: Yes, but I am not talking about that.

9 Captain Safford: He could not direct action to be
10 taken.

11 Mr. Clark: Pardon me. You referred here to the kind
12 of a warning message that would put the Navy on the alert
13 and have it ready for imminent war. No one below Admiral
14 Stark would have the right to send that message without
15 his knowledge?

16 Captain Safford: Without his knowledge, except in an
17 emergency.

18 Mr. Clark: Well, there wouldn't be an emergency of
19 that kind if he was in Washington?

20 Captain Safford: If Admiral Stark was available no
21 one junior to him would take that step.

22 Mr. Clark: And he was available at that time.

23 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, he was in his own office,
24 so far as I know.
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 Mr. Clark: So then, it comes down to the proposition
2 that nobody below him in rank would have any duty to cut
3 loose and notify the Commander of the Pacific Fleet as to
4 something about war breaking out, would he?

5 Captain Safford: No, sir.

6 Mr. Clark: Therefore nobody below him in rank would
7 have any motive for covering up any mistakes, would they?

8 Captain Safford: It would be the duty of somebody
9 below Admiral Stark to prepare a message of warning and
10 submit it to Admiral Stark for approval and release.

11 Mr. Clark: But what I am asking you is this; if that
12 authority and that responsibility rested upon Admiral
13 Stark it wouldn't be neglect of duty for some man below
14 him in rank not to have sent out that kind of message?

15 Captain Safford: No, sir.

16 Mr. Clark: Therefore, there would be no mistake to
17 be covered up, would there? I am talking about below
18 Admiral Stark.

19 Captain Safford: That question goes beyond anything
20 I want to answer.

21 Mr. Clark: Well, Captain, you are dealing with a very
22 serious situation here, and I am submitting to you a fair
23 question.

24 Captain Safford: It is possible that some subordinate
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h4

1 might have given Admiral Stark some very bad advice at
2 that particular time. I don't know. That is only --

3 Mr. Clark: Pardon me, Captain. I am confining myself
4 to the sending of a warning, the kind that you have been
5 talking about, not advice.

6 Now, I am asking you if it is true that it wouldn't
7 be a mistake or a breach of duty for any man in the Navy
8 Department below Admiral Stark to have failed to send that
9 kind of a warning message?

10 Captain Safford: You are right.

11 Mr. Clark: And the same would be true in the Army as
12 to everybody below General Marshal, wouldn't it?

13 Captain Safford: You are right.

14 Mr. Clark: So that the neglect of duty if there was
15 any rested in the realms of Admiral Stark and General
16 Marshall.

17 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Clark: Captain, did you know that it was then and
19 is now, a violation of the criminal law of the United States
20 to secrete or remove or deface or destroy a public record?

21 Captain Safford: I knew that in a general way.

22 Mr. Clark: To have cleaned the record of the winds
23 execute message of all reference to it in the War and Navy
24 Departments, General Marshall and Admiral Stark would have
25

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 had to violate the law?

2 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Clark: And destroy public records?

4 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: Now, do you charge that they did that?

6 Captain Safford: I am merely stating that not only
7 the translation of the winds message is missing, but the
8 intercepted messages of that time which were also public
9 records are also missing and unaccounted for. I cannot
10 go beyond that statement.

11 Mr. Clark: You don't mean to make that kind of a
12 charge?

13 Captain Safford: I will not make that charge and I am
14 not denying that charge.

15 Mr. Clark: I am not asking you about denying it, I
16 am asking you if you make that charge.

17 Captain Safford: I understand.

18 Mr. Clark: I ask you again whether or not you make
19 such a charge against General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

20 Captain Safford: Not personally.

21 Mr. Clark: What is that?

22 Captain Safford: Not against them personally.

23 Mr. Clark: Well, if you made it at all against them
24 it would be personally, wouldn't it?

25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Do you make any assertion to that effect against General Marshall and Admiral Stark?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Mr. Clark: Do you make any suggestion to that effect against them?

Captain Safford: I am not going to make any suggestions of any sort.

Mr. Clark: I beg your pardon?

Captain Safford: I am not making suggestions of any sort.

Mr. Clark: And you don't make any suspicion of that character against them?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir, there is a suspicion.

Mr. Clark: Against them?

Captain Safford: Against them.

Mr. Clark: And you as a witness before this committee are suggesting this suspicion?

Captain Safford: No, sir, I am answering a question.

Mr. Clark: Well, my question was whether or not you did suggest a suspicion against them.

Captain, on yesterday, the press carried pretty well throughout the country and the world the news that there was a suspicion cast in that direction by your testimony

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h7

1 here.

2 I want to know from you, please, sir, whether by your
3 appearance and testimony before this committee, you mean
4 even to create the suspicion in the minds of the committee
5 or the public that either General Marshall or Admiral Stark
6 violated the law of this nation by destroying a public
7 record in order to cover up a mistake?

8 Captain Safford: In --

9 Mr. Clark: Let me add, I think you owe it to them and
10 to yourself and to the public to make a frank statement
11 in response to that question.

12 Captain Safford: In my own mind that suspicion does
13 exist.

14 Mr. Clark: Captain, I have been impressed by your
15 testimony that you are a man of fine ability. I believe
16 you have been diligent and interested in your work. I don't
17 mean to ask you an unusual question, or one that would be
18 embarrassing, but I am a little perplexed, and consequently
19 I want to ask this final question;

20 You have testified here to the existence of the winds
21 execute message and have referred to a certain memorandum
22 that might have been made in connection with it, and you
23 have testified both the winds execute message and interception
24 memorandum have disappeared from the face of the earth, but
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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it seems from this record and all of the witnesses we
have heard and the records in previous examinations, that
there isn't a line of written evidence to corroborate your
statement, or support it in any respect, nor is there a
word of oral evidence to corroborate or support your state-
ment in any respect, and, in fact, all those who would have
had access to this message had it been distributed in the
regular course in which magic was distributed have denied
that they ever saw it.

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Now, can you suggest any theory to me as a member of
committee under which I might consistently accept your
statement as being correct?

If so, I would like to have it.

Captain Safford: I realize that my statements are
diametrically opposite to the testimony that you have quoted.

Mr. Clark: That is all I have.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will
inquire, Captain.

Senator Lucas: Captain, I should like to develop a
thought or two advanced by the able Congressman from North
Carolina.

You stated definitely that you thought the message that
came in on the 6th and 7th, known as the 14-parts message
was an extremely important one as far as the breaking of

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Witness Safford Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 our relations with Japan at that time was concerned?

2 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: In fact, that was more important, was
4 it not, than the execute winds message?

5 Captain Safford: It was more important to the State
6 Department and to the White House, but not to the Navy
7 Department.

8 Senator Lucas: Well, of course, the Navy and War
9 Departments would know about the 14-parts message?

10 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Lucas: And did know about it?

12 Captain Safford: Did know about it.

13 Senator Lucas: Now, can you tell this committee, in
14 view of your statement of the importance of this 14-parts
15 message, why it is you have labored so long on the execute
16 winds message, and yet on the 6th of December you left at
17 4:30 and never took any more interest in the 14-parts message?

18 Captain Safford: I regarded my work as completed when
19 that 14-part message had been intercepted, relayed to the
20 Navy Department, broken down enough to see that we did
21 have the correct key, with a minor change in it to make
22 smooth language, my best watch officer available to process
23 it, and the officer who was charged with responsibility was
24 there and assured me he would stay with it until the distri-
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 bution had been completed. I figured I could do no more.

2 It merely expresses my confidence in the people under me.

3 Senator Lucas: Did you have that same confidence in
4 your people with respect to the winds execute message?

5 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, I did.

6 Senator Lucas: And still have?

7 Captain Safford: And still have.

8 Senator Lucas: The point I am trying to develop in
9 order that I might weigh your relative comparison of the
10 importance of the two messages deals with the fact that
11 you were extremely interested in the winds execute message,
12 and that you labored overtime in order to try to get that
13 message, and you did a great number of things after the
14 message came in, as I recall, in order to see that it was
15 properly delivered, as you say -- that is correct, isn't
16 it?

17 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, and also to make the final
18 arrangements to set my own house in order before the war
19 hit us.

20 Senator Lucas: What do you mean by setting your
21 own house in order?

22 Captain Safford: We had a few codes and secret papers
23 exposed to danger of capture in outlying stations. Everything
24 that we could think of had been taken care of prior to that,
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 which came within my cognizance and responsibility, had
2 been completed prior to 4 p. m. on Saturday, December 6.

3 Senator Lucas: Did you have a copy of this winds
4 execute message for your own files?

5 Captain Safford: I did not have a personal file.

6 Senator Lucas: Did you have a file over which you had
7 control, to which you had access, in your department where
8 this message was filed?

9 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, in Captain Kramer's file.

10 Senator Lucas: You had access to Captain Kramer's
11 file where the winds execute message was filed?

12 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: How long did you have access to that
14 file after the winds execute message came in on December 4?

15 Captain Safford: Up until the 15th of February 1942.

16 Senator Lucas: The 15th of February, 1942?

17 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, now, was there ever any discussion
19 with you and anyone else in the Navy up to that time about
20 this winds execute message?

21 Captain Safford: There was not, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: Did you ever have occasion to go to that
23 file and investigate up until the time you left to see whether
24 it was there?
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: How was that?

Captain Safford: No, sir, I never checked it one way or the other.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: You did not?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: Didn't you say something in your original statement to the committee about examining that file in the presence of Ingersoll and some other men when they were getting ready to submit the file to the Roberts Commission?

Captain Safford: About the 15th of December 1941 Captain Kramer brought in to me a special folder of messages leading up to Pearl Harbor which he was preparing to give, to show or give to Admiral Noyes, and as I understood it to be given or shown to the Roberts Commission. In fact, I think the order came down from Admiral Noyes to prepare this special folder. I checked it over with Kramer to see that it was reasonably complete, that we had the important messages there, and that we did not have a lot of unimportant messages there. I believe that I suggested no change. I approved what Kramer had and it was sent up to Admiral Noyes.

Senator Lucas: Why would Kramer discuss that with you?

Captain Safford: As verification of his own judgment before he gave it to Admiral Noyes because I was very familiar with events.

Senator Lucas: And you now state that in your opinion this execute winds message was in this folder that Captain Kramer discussed with you?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 Captain Safford: In my opinion and to the best of my
3 recollection the winds execute message was in that folder
4 I have just described.

5 Senator Lucas: What other messages were in that folder?

6 Captain Safford: There was the pilot message, the 14-part
7 message, the 1:00 p.m. message, there was this message from
8 Tokyo to Berlin which had been introduced in testimony, every
9 message that was in that folder, I believe, has been intro-
10 duced as evidence.

11 Senator Lucas: Did you personally examine each and every
12 one of the messages?

13 Captain Safford: I looked through each one to see if
14 it read up and told a complete story.

15 Senator Lucas: And again you saw the wind execute
16 message, these same figures of speech, that you witnessed
17 on the day the message came in?

18 Captain Safford: Yes, sir. That is, the English.
19 There was no Japanese there at all.

20 Senator Lucas: That is your best recollection?

21 Captain Safford: That is my best recollection.

22 Senator Lucas: Captain, when you received this execute
23 message you telephoned Admiral Noyes?

24 Captain Safford: No, sir, I sent it up to him by an
25 officer messenger.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: Yes, and you do not recall what subordinate
3 in your office took it?

4 Captain Safford: I do not recall which particular sub-
5 ordinate took it up.

6 Senator Lucas: What happened after that, Captain, with
7 respect to that message?

8 Captain Safford: The next thing with respect to the
9 message, about an hour later Admiral Noyes called me on the
10 office inter-phone, which did not go through a switchboard,
11 and told me that we had better tell Guam to destroy all their
12 excess codes and ciphers.

13 Senator Lucas: Did he say anything about the execute
14 message in that telephone conversation?

15 Captain Safford: He did not specifically mention it.

16 Senator Lucas: Wasn't that a little strange, for Admiral
17 Noyes not to speak about this message in view of its importance?

18 Captain Safford: I did not think it strange, no, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: Now, did you do any more with respect
20 to that execute message after that?

21 Captain Safford: When Kramer commenced his daily
22 routine delivery at noon, he took in one folder, as had been
23 his practice, to let me look at it and tell me the high lights
24 of the news, and that message was present at that time.

25 Senator Lucas: Did you make any further inquiry about it

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 in view of the importance of it?

3 Captain Safford: I did not, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: And no one ever talked to you about it
5 after until these investigations started?

6 Captain Safford: No, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: And it was how many years after you
8 first saw the message until someone first started discussing
9 it with you?

10 Captain Safford: Approximately two years.

11 Senator Lucas: Approximately two years?

12 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: During that time you have been exceedingly
14 busy in connection with the prosecution of the war, have
15 you not?

16 Captain Safford: I have been attending my duties in
17 the prosecution of the war.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, with whom did you first discuss
19 it in 1943?

20 Captain Safford: I probably first discussed it with
21 Commander Lynn who was serving in my office, and who had
22 been on duty before Pearl Harbor and had been working
23 with these magic messages.

24 Senator Lucas: Did he recall it?

25 Captain Safford: He thought he knew about it, but said

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

hl

1 he had never seen it.

2 Senator Lucas: In other words, it was hearsay with
3 him?

4 Captain Safford: That is correct.

5 Senator Lucas: He could have received that informa-
6 tion from you because he was on duty there with you?

7 Captain Safford: He could have received it from me
8 at the time of Pearl Harbor, either before or afterwards.

9 Senator Lucas: Now, when did you next talk about
10 this message and to whom?

11 Captain Safford: Any time that I came in contact
12 with anybody who had been on duty in the War and Navy
13 Departments, prior to Pearl Harbor, and might have been
14 expected to have first-hand knowledge of the winds message,
15 I talked to them to see what they could remember. I
16 remember I specifically talked to Colonel Rowlett.

17 Senator Lucas: What did he say?

18 Captain Safford: He said he knew about it in office
19 gossip, but had not seen it himself.

20 Senator Lucas: Would he be one of the individuals who
21 should have seen it?

22 Captain Safford: He normally would not have, because
23 he was interested in decoding and breaking down the Japanese
24 cipher systems.
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

h2

Senator Lucas: Why did you talk to him about it?

Captain Safford: Because he was one of the officers who had more direct contact with all officers at that time. He had been serving throughout the war there. I knew him personally. And there was a chance he might have been shown it or knew something about it.

Senator Lucas: Did you talk to Captain Kramer about it at that time? He was the individual who translated it. Did you talk to him?

Captain Safford: Captain Kramer at that time was at Pearl Harbor, and later on he went to the South Pacific. He was not available to talk to.

Senator Lucas: Did you communicate with Captain Kramer about this winds message?

Captain Safford: I wrote him one letter asking him if he could recall anything about it, and if so please let me know.

Senator Lucas: When was that, sir?

Captain Safford: I do not know. It was about December, I would say, 1943; possibly January, 1944.

Senator Lucas: Do you have a copy of that letter?

Captain Safford: I do not have a copy of that letter.

Senator Lucas: Do you know whether Captain Kramer has the original?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Captain Safford: I do not know.

Senator Lucas: Do you recall what you said?

Captain Safford: I asked him about the winds message and asked him if he could recall it because we were looking for it.

Senator Lucas: Whatever you said in that letter, Captain, at that time, would probably be your best recollection of what happened in connection with the winds message, would it not?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Your memory would be better then than it is now, would it not?

Captain Safford: As far as that aspect was concerned.

Senator Lucas: In other words, whatever happened with respect to the winds message when you wrote to Captain Kramer, your memory would be more reflective to what actually happened, than it would be now?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: And if, in that letter you said the whole thing was somewhat vague and uncertain -- I don't know whether it did or not, I haven't seen the letter, but maybe we can get it -- that would be true, would it not?

Captain Safford: I believe I did not go into details at all.

3 0 40251125AW JUA 8 GRAW

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: I see.

Captain Safford: And I did not want to suggest anything to Kramer. I was trying to ask a question.

Senator Lucas: I see.

Is Captain Kramer in the room?

Captain Kramer: Yes.

Senator Lucas: Do you have that letter, Captain?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, I do. I made it available to counsel, Senator.

Senator Lucas: May I see it?

Captain Kramer: Mr. Baecher has a photostatic copy of it.

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11:30

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Will counsel mark this as an exhibit and put it in the record? Or maybe read it into the record, that might be better. Submit it to the Captain and ask him about it.

(Document referred to handed to the witness.)

Senator Lucas: Captain, have you seen this letter dated December 22, 1943?

Captain Safford: I have, sir.

Senator Lucas: Is that the letter you wrote Kramer?

Captain Safford: That is the letter I wrote to Kramer.

Senator Lucas: Did Kramer ever reply to that letter, do you know?

Captain Safford: He gave me a reply.

Senator Lucas: Do you have the reply?

Captain Safford: I do not have the reply.

Senator Lucas: How is that?

Captain Safford: I do not.

Senator Lucas: Why? Where is it, do you know?

Captain Safford: That was destroyed some time ago, after I took the information out, what little he was able to give me.

Senator Lucas: That is, you mean you destroyed the letter?

Captain Safford: I destroyed the letter.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Well, you say in this letter:

"My dear Kramer-San."

What does the "San" mean?

Captain Safford: That is Japanese for "envoy." "My
dear Envoy Kra mer."

Senator Lucas: I see, that is the Japanese word for
"envoy."

"I am preparing a secret paper covering events which
took place the early part of December, 1941. I am getting
all the help that I can from Linn and from such records
as are still available."

Now, why were you preparing that record?

Captain Safford: For one thing I had been ordered by the
Director of Naval Communications to prepare a history of radio
intelligence up to and including the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas: Had anything been said to you at that
time about the winds execute message or the fourteen part mes-
sage by any individuals who were your superiors in the Navy
Department?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: In other words, the winds execute mes-
sage was not a controversial matter at the time you wrote this
letter?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: You say:

3 "I am getting all the help that I can from Linn and
4 from such records as are still available. My memory is
5 bad as to details."

6 Was that true of the winds execute message at that time?

7 Captain Safford: That is true on the details. You will
8 see I had not been able to establish the date at that time,
9 the exact date. I knew it within two or three days.

10 Senator Lucas: Well, the date is a detail but something
11 else would be details, would it not?

12 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: (Reading)

14 "My memory is bad as to details, which is the reason
15 for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am
16 very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled
17 a year ago."

18 What do you mean by that?

19 Captain Safford: That in the course of time I did not
20 remember as well at that time at the end of two years after
21 Pearl Harbor as at the end of one year after Pearl Harbor.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, now, when you wrote this letter
23 you had no reason whatsoever for talking about the winds ex-
24 ecute message?

25 Captain Safford: Only incidentally, as you will see

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1 later on the second page.

2 Senator Lucas: But there was no controversy at that time
3 as to whether or not a winds execute message was ever received
4 or whether it was missing or anything of that kind?

5 Captain Safford: No, sir. It could not be located but
6 I was concerned mostly with the time of delivery of the four-
7 teen part message.

8 Senator Lucas: And at that time, up to December 1943,
9 which was two years after the war started, you had never dis-
10 cussed the execute winds message with anyone?

11 Captain Safford: I believe I had discussed that with
12 Kramer six or eight months previously, before he went to Pearl
13 Harbor. We did not look for it. We just discussed the sig-
14 nificance of general things. We discussed everything and I
15 believe the winds message came up.

16 Senator Lucas: Yes. I am talking about the details now
17 of the winds execute message. You did not go into that, did
18 you?

19 Captain Safford: We did not go into the details par-
20 ticularly.

21 Senator Lucas: You just talked about it in a general
22 way?

23 Captain Safford: In a general way.

24 Senator Lucas: You further say:
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

"I realize that your reply will have to be censored and therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my letter might fall into unauthorized hands." What did you mean by "unauthorized hands"?

Captain Safford: There is always danger of mail mis-carrying, particularly in war.

Senator Lucas: (Reading)

"I am saving a copy of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the question number and a brief answer, which should not disclose anything to an outsider."

Then you go ahead and ask a series of questions which apparently have nothing to do with the winds execute message at all.

Captain Safford: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: Then on the second page you ask this question:

"Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?"

Who was that, Admiral W.?

Captain Safford: That was Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Lucas: What were you talking about there?

Captain Safford: That had reference to informing Secretary Knox about the significance of the times; that one

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 o'clock Washington time was approximately sunrise at Pearl
3 Harbor and around the middle of the night in the Far East.

4 Senator Lucas: That is, you were talking to Kramer about
5 that in this message?

6 Captain Safford: I was asking him -- he had told me
7 that some time before and I was asking him if he had told
8 Admiral Wilkinson about that.

9 Senator Lucas: What was his reply when he wrote you?

10 Captain Safford: I do not know for certain. I believe
11 he said that he had.

12 Senator Lucas: Why did you destroy that letter, Captain?
13 You have been talking about a good many things that have been
14 destroyed around here in the Navy and Army and I am anxious
15 to know why you destroyed that letter?

16 Captain Safford: That all went into my testimony before
17 Admiral Hart. It became a matter of official record then.

18 Senator Lucas: That is, the letter itself?

19 Captain Safford: No, the facts of the statements in the
20 answer.

21 Senator Lucas: I know but that does not answer my ques-
22 tion. I am asking you why you destroyed the letter in answer
23 to these questions?

24 Captain Safford: Because I had the evidence that I
25 wanted and I could see no purpose in retaining it.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: I see. In other words, you obtained
3 the evidence --

4 Captain Safford: The information.

5 Senator Lucas: How is that?

6 Captain Safford: I obtained the information, such in-
7 formation as Kramer could give me.

8 Senator Lucas: You obtained the information through
9 other sources after that that you had requested Captain Kramer
10 to send to you, is that it?

11 Captain Safford: I beg your pardon?

12 Senator Lucas: I was wondering whether you mean to tell
13 the committee that you had obtained this same information you
14 were requesting from Captain Kramer through other sources?

15 Captain Safford: No. Some of these things Kramer was
16 the only one who could possibly tell me, as to his movements
17 on the night of the 6th of December.

18 Senator Lucas: You asked him in question 17:

19 "When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part
20 14 and other papers?"

21 18. "We can't find the original 'Weather Report'
22 (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of
23 it?"

24 What was that weather report?

25 Captain Safford: That is what we now call the winds

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 message.

3 Senator Lucas: (reading)

4 "We can't find the original 'Weather Report' (sent
5 on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?"
6 What did he say when he wrote back?

7 Captain Safford: Kramer had that confused with the --
8 I think it was with the hidden word message which was re-
9 ceived on December 6th. Anyhow, he said it came in -- or
10 December 7th. He replied that it came in on the morning of
11 December 7th after ten o'clock and was given out on the de-
12 livery trip which ended up at Secretary Hull's office at
13 eleven A.M. on Sunday.

14 Senator Lucas: Why would Kramer be confused about this
15 message? He was the fellow who translated it, wasn't he?

16 Captain Safford: He had not seen it for a long time.

17 Senator Lucas: Well, but you are asking Captain Kramer
18 there in question 18 for information on the weather report
19 which, as you now say, was the winds exe cute message sent on
20 December the 5th?

21 Captain Safford: That is correct.

22 Senator Lucas: And its translation, you asked what be-
23 came of it and you say that he did not understand that ques-
24 tion?

25 Captain Safford: His answer was that it came in on the

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 morning of December 7th and was distributed in the morning
3 of December 7th.

4 Senator Lucas: Well, now, isn't that the false weather
5 message that actually did come in at that time?

6 Captain Safford: The only thing of that nature which
7 was distributed on the morning of December 7th was this hidden
8 word code which said, "Relations between Japan and England
9 are not in accordance with expectations," or something like
10 that.

11 Senator Lucas: That is the one that he was talking
12 about. That is the one he was talking about when he replied
13 to you.

14 Captain Safford: When he replied to me.

15 Senator Lucas: Yes. Now, certainly if there had been
16 an important message, an important message that you claim
17 came in on December 5th, which was known as the winds execute
18 message, with all the furore that we now find about this
19 winds execute message don't you think that Captain Kramer
20 would have been able to reply direct to that question 18 and
21 give you some definite information as to what happened to the
22 so-called winds execute message as you designate here as
23 the "Weather Report"?

24 Captain Safford: Not necessarily.

25 Senator Lucas: Was everybody out of step here but you,

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Captain, in this matter?

3 Captain Safford: I wrote to Captain Welker after V-J
4 Day to see if he could recall anything about it. The letter
5 apparently was lost in a typhoon. I wrote to him some time
6 later and he replied that he not only could remember it, that
7 he had done nothing whatsoever about it. In other words, it
8 was completely erased from his memory.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, I cannot quite understand a num-
10 ber of these ciphers and letters that are in here. Did you
11 have a sort of code between you and Captain Kramer that you
12 were operating under?

13 Captain Safford: May I see what you are referring to?

14 Senator Lucas: Here is a memorandum that was prepared
15 for Captain Safford by Commander Kramer or Captain Kr amer
16 in response to a letter written by Captain Safford in De-
17 cember 1943. You take a look at that, Captain, and see
18 whether or not that is a true and correct copy of the letter
19 you received from Captain Kramer.

20 Captain Safford: That looks like it.

21 Senator Lucas: All right. Now, look at the answer to
22 question 18, Captain and give the committee the information
23 here as to what Captain Kramer meant by that answer.

24 Captain Safford: May I see the original let ter, please?

25 Senator Lucas: Yes, sir. You want to see Captain

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Kramer's letter?

3 Mr. Kaufman: His own letter.

4 Senator Lucas: Yes; that is, your own letter you want to
5 see.

6 Captain Safford: (Reading)

7 "The first one of the quotes was not as indicated
8 in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10-c above",
9 and that refers to messages which were delivered by Kramer
10 on the morning of December 7, 1941.

11 Senator Lucas: Yes. Well, now, do you believe that
12 Kramer's memory was as good as yours about this winds execute
13 message?

14 Captain Safford: I thought it was or I would not have
15 asked him.

16 Senator Lucas: That is exactly what I thought. In
17 other words, you were not certain of your own memory at that
18 time with respect to what happened to the weather report
19 which is known as the winds execute message and you were making
20 inquiry from Kramer to see whether or not he knew anything
21 about it and you were asking him for this information in
22 order to rely upon it or to aid you in fixing a definite
23 opinion as to what did happen to this message?

24 Captain Safford: As to the disposition of it, yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: As to the disposition of the message;

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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yes. Now, was there any man in the Navy Department more interested in the winds execute message than Kramer?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir. That was myself and higher authority. I was responsible for its interception and if I had missed its interception and its interception would have been humanly possible I would have been held to blame. Kramer was only responsible for its brief translation, which took a matter of a minute or two and its subsequent distribution. He took no other personal action on it.

Senator Lucas: I understand, but Captain Kramer was the individual who translated this message from Japanese into English?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Captain Kramer is the individual when he translated it would have known, if his position was the same as yours, that war was definite with Japan as a result of it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: and is there any question in your mind that a message of that kind would make any lighter impression upon Kramer than it did upon you?

Captain Safford: I discussed that matter with Kramer in the spring of 1943 before he left Washington to go to Hawaii and he recalled it and his impression or memory and mine agreed as to the fact of its interception, not the date. I do not

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON D C

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 think we said specifically what date. It was a few days be-
3 fore Pearl Harbor, I think that is as close as we came, but
4 that we received it and what its significance was.

5 Senator Lucas: Yes, and what its significance was, you
6 discussed that?

7 Captain Safford: Yes.

8 Senator Lucas: And notwithstanding that, later in the
9 fall you are still asking him for information?

10 Captain Safford: One question out of eighteen.

11 Senator Lucas: Yes, but that is the big question, Cap-
12 tain, in this entire proceeding here right now. In one ques-
13 tion out of eighteen you say but that is the only one that I
14 am vitally interested in, sir.

15 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: And it goes without saying that you were
17 still looking for some information about this message or you
18 never would have written to Kramer and the fact of the matter
19 is at that time there was no execute winds message in contro-
20 versy at all insofar as the Navy Department is concerned.

21 Captain Safford: When I had talked about that message
22 with Kramer in the spring of 1943 neither of us had the
23 slightest knowledge that we would not find everything pertain-
24 ing to that winds message in the files.

25 Senator Lucas: Are you certain that when you talked to

1 Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Kramer in the spring that you did not have in mind the same
3 answer that he gave you in this letter, where he specifically
4 refers to the message that came in on the 7th?

5 Captain Safford: I am positive.

6 Senator Lucas: Why would he put that in writing? Why
7 would he answer about a completely different message than
8 what you were inquiring about? Does his memory play him
9 tricks, too?

10 Captain Safford: I cannot understand. I was very sur-
11 prised when I received that answer because the other answers
12 I got just as I expected.

13 Senator Lucas: In other words, of all of the questions
14 that you asked him here, which were nineteen in all, in your
15 letter of December the 22nd, the only answer that came back
16 from Kramer which was wrong was Number 18 dealing with the
17 implementing winds message?

18 Captain Safford: That was the only one in which I was
19 disappointed.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, the only one you were disappointed
21 in?

22 Captain Safford: Yes.

23 Senator Lucas: And it was at complete variance with the
24 question, his answer was at complete variance with the question
25 propounded by you?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

3 Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that those let-
4 ters be incorporated in the record at this point?

5 The Vice Chairman: Well, I was going to suggest that,
6 that they be copied by the reporter in full at this point in
7 the record. It will be so ordered. Counsel will please sup-
8 ply the reporter with the two letters and they will be spread
9 on the record in full at this point.

10 Mr. Kaufman: The offer will be a letter from Captain
11 Safford to Captain Kramer dated the 22nd of December 1943, a
12 memorandum from Captain Kramer to Captain Safford dated 28
13 December 1943 and a letter from Captain Safford to Captain
14 Kramer dated 22 January 1944.

15 The Vice Chairman: All right, it will be so ordered.

16 (The documents above referred to are in words and
17 figures as follows, to-wit:)

18 "NAVY DEPARTMENT

19 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

20 WASHINGTON

21 22 December 1943

22 My dear Kramer-San:

23 I am preparing a secret paper covering events which took
24 place the early part of December, 1941. I am getting all the
25 help that I can from Linn and from such records as are still

Witness Safford

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1
2 available. My memory is bad as to details, which is the rea-
3 son for preparing this memorandum, and I have forgotten or am
4 very vague as to certain things which I clearly recalled a
5 year ago. I am writing to you to ask you to help me as far
6 as you may be able to do so.

7 I realize that your reply will have to be censored and
8 therefore you must be guarded as to what you state. Also, I
9 am phrasing my questions very carefully, in the event that my
10 letter might fall into unauthorized hands. I am saving a copy
11 of my letter so it will be merely necessary to give the ques-
12 tion number and a brief answer, which should not disclose
13 anything to an outsider.

14 With reference to events on December 6, 1941:

- 15 1. What time did you see Mr. R. that evening and show
16 him the papers?
- 17 2. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in, or did you see
18 him first and go over to Mr. R. with him?
- 19 3. What time did you see Admiral S. that evening and
20 show him the papers?
- 21 4. If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral
22 S. first informed?
- 23 5. How and when was Admiral W. first informed?
- 24 6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a.m.
25 What time did you leave the Navy Building and go home?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 7. What time did you get down to the Navy Building the
3 next morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700).

4 8. What time did you see Mr. R. that morning and show
5 him the new papers?

6 9. Was Mr. H. there or was he called in?

7 10. My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper
8 setting the conference time at 1 p.m. Do you recall taking
9 any other papers with you, and can you give me a hint as to
10 their contents?

11 11. Were Mr. K. and Mr. S. called in that morning or were
12 they notified in any way?

13 12. How long did you stay with Mr. R.?

14 13. When did you see Admiral S. that morning?

15 14. With reference to a certain conference held that
16 morning, do you know who attended it and how long it lasted?

17 With regards to what happened afterwards:

18 15. Did you ever tell Admiral W. what you told me?

19 16. Or McCollum, or anyone else?

20 17. When did Admiral W. first see or learn about Part
21 14 and other papers?

22 18. We can't find the original "Weather Report" (sent
23 Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

24 19. Can you offer any pertinent remarks?

25 Things seem running better out at the Annex now that

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Wright is here. I think he has done a marvelous job of creat-
3 ing order out of chaos, but his task is by no means finished.

4 I hope you are enjoying the balmy climate of Hawaii. I
5 certainly think that you, personally, have benefited by the
6 change of duty.

7 Please give my regards to Dyer, Huokins, Williams, and
8 the others.

9 With best wishes for the Holidays,

10 Sincerely,

11 L. F. SAFFORD,

12 Captain, U.S. Navy.

13 Commander A. D. Kramer, U.S.N.,
14 Fourteenth Naval District,
15 Pearl Harbor, T.H."

16 - - - -

17 "JOINT

18 INTELLIGENCE CENTER
19 PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
20 Commandant, Navy 128
21 c/o Fleet Post Office
22 San Francisco, Calif.

23 28 December 1943

24 MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. SAFFORD

25 1510 First indications of arrival

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Adm B., Adm.

T., Col. B. of M.I.D., Adm. W., etc.

1. Did not, personally, but left with one of Adm. B's

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 ass'ts in the situation room on Penn Ave. with positive in-
3 structions re-urgency (to be delivered at once). He was
4 entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the evening
5 he had seen it.

6 2. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and
7 I know only that he knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and pos-
8 sibly had seen it c/o Col. B. by then.

9 3. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.)

10 4. Believe Item 5 phoned that eve (see next). Possibly
11 Adm. T. did too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached of-
12 fice next A.M. (about 0900).

13 5. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining
14 Adm. B and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief
15 concern was getting it to Item 1 and 2, which are covered
16 above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, and Adm. B. also,
17 saw it and were informed re-others, particularly Item 1. I
18 don't recall whether B then phoned re-Item 1 to check delivery
19 or not. Believe at this time Item 5 phoned 3.

20 6. Left Item 5 place about 0030, stopped by, then pro-
21 ceeded.

22 7. About 0730.

23 8. Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945,
24 2nd about 1100 at Item 8 house, c/o Adm. B.

25 9. No; at his office. Item 11 (first one) was shown it

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 at his home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of
3 phone calls including Item 2. Meeting was then arranged for
4 Item 2, 11 (both) and others at Item 2 office at 10:00 A.M.
5 where I was instructed to be with it and anything else. Meet-
6 ing held at 1000 as scheduled and new items (1st batch) de-
7 livered together with old. Col. B. was on hand there too for
8 Item 11 (second).

9 10. (a) I don't recall precisely how our friend's num-
10 bers ran in the hundreds (or thousands) but in units from
11 about 02 to 09 or 10.

12 (b) The first few of these, NOT including first sentence
13 last half this item, were on hand by 0900 and were completed
14 and being delivered at 0945 (to Item 8) and 1000 (see Items
15 9 above). Item 5, 3, T, and others got them about 0930 at a
16 meeting held in Item 3 office.

17 (c) On returning about 1020 from Item 9 office the re-
18 mainder of #02-10 were arriving, including this item, i.e.,
19 1st sentence last half, and also quotes in Item 18. These
20 were delivered to all hands, including Items 11 (both) at
21 Item 2 office by 1100 with my comments to Item 11 (first
22 one) on how the hour tied with the sun, and moves in progress,
23 elsewhere.

24 11. Yes. See 9 and 10 above.

25 12. Did not. See 8 above.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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13. About 0900 at his office with others, and left night before matters. 1st batch of new given about 0940, 2nd about 1045 (all this was not personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed in to him promptly however.)

14. There were 2 I know of, and I believe another c/o Col. B. The one in Item 9 above was at least 1 1/2 hours. Another started about 0900 with 10, 11, 12, 16, 20, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later.

15-16. Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If re-general security (i.e: lack) late in spring, yes.

17. See Items 13 and 14 above.

18. The first one of the " " was not as indicated in parentheses, but as indicated in Item 10-o above. It went into Z files. GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army.

19. For the most part covered above, until Item 15 (16) is clarified."

Another insert is to follow here

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

WASHINGTON

22 January 1944

My dear Kramer-san:

Thanks for your very prompt reply. I did not receive your Dec. 28th letter until Jan. 17th, and had almost given up hopes. What a break for you, as well as the cause, to be ordered to Admiral Halsey's staff. I can see the hand of Providence in it.

I am sending by separate cover (air mail) a condensation code to use. If you want to add to it, use numbers #151-#200 inclusive. I would like to hold it down to a single sheet of paper. I am also sending by ordinary mail a copy of #35 and a clipping to give to #42 at some auspicious occasion. You will understand this letter better when they arrive.

With regard to taking #42 into confidence, wait patiently for the proper moment, and then shoot the works. Tell him everything he will listen to and show him whatever documentary proof you may have. Use your own judgment and don't force the issue. Do as good a job as you did on #136 and #137. In my opinion the proper moment for disclosure would be any of the following:

hl
fls
Shel
15f

WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

h2

- 1 (a) #42 is detached from Sopac
 2 (b) #5 is detached from Sopac;
 3 (c) #10 is detached from Sopac;
 4 (d) #9 calls on #42 or #10;
 5 (e) #18 calls on #42 or #10;
 6 (f) #42 discusses #31 or attack on #92
 7 in your presence;
 8 (g) #42 asks you the reason for the alleged failure of
 9 20-G to know what was going on;
 10 (h) #137 (plus 3 years);
 11 (i) #6 visits #42;
 12 (j) #42 visits #6.

13 Be prudent and be patient. I am just beginning to get
 14 things lined up on this end. No one in #15 can be trusted.
 15 Premature action would only tip off the people who framed
 16 #31 and #32, and will also get #8 and #10 into very serious
 17 trouble. Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the
 18 prestige afforded by #42. Tell #42 that I knew #31 was a
 19 scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was
 20 victim of a frame-up until about #114 (plus 2 years), could
 21 not confirm it until #132 (plus 2 years), and did not have
 22 absolute proof until about January 18, 1944. #8 has over-
 23 whelming proof of the guilt of #15 and #65 plus a list
 24 of about fifteen reliable witnesses.
 25

Please answer the following questions by Item No.:

1
20. Re your Item #2, is Col. B. #59?

2
3
21. What or whose job in the Navy did Col. B.'s job
correspond to?

4
5
22. Do you know what Army officers were notified or
shown the papers by Col. B., and when?

6
In amplification of my items #15 and #16:

7
8
I recall your telling me that you saw #2 about 0900
(EST) on #137.

9
10
He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This
means War!"

11
12
You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three
months."

13
14
#3 continued, "I must get word to #31", and picked up
a message blank.

15
16
Then another idea entered his mind, and he said, "Does
#53 know of this?"

17
18
You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office
last night. This last part (#77) was sent over ten minutes
ago and should be on the General's desk now."

19
20
21
#3 dropped the message blank and reached for the tele-
phone.

22
(End of your tale.)

23
23. Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

24
24. Did #3 get #53 on the telephone and what did he
25

Witness Safford

h4

1 say?

2 25. Were there any other witnesses; If so, who?

3 26. Did you tell #9 or #5, or anyone else?

4 (Be sure to tell Admiral Halsey -- when the time
5 comes.)

6 27. Re your Item #15 and #16. What do you mean by
7 "general security" (i.e. lack) late in spring? Was it the
8 Chicago Tribune leak after Midway? Incidentally, tell the
9 full story of this to #42 and explain that #5 tried to stop
10 the prosecution and attending publicity but #24 insisted
11 (to give Publicity to himself and to #25) and was backed
12 up by #29 and #28.

13 28. Do you know if any of the following were called as
14 witnesses by #36?

15 (a) #5

16 (b) #9

17 (c) #10

18 (d) #6

19 29. Were the JD files in GZ custody or any message
20 from these files ever submitted to #36?

21 30. Were #5, #9, #10, or anyone else, cautioned or
22 warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of #136
23 and #137 or the investigations conducted by #36? In this
24 connection, I am sending you #35 by ordinary ship's mail.
25

Witness Safford

h5

1 I will comment on it in further correspondence.

2 31. Do you know when and how #53 first got the news
3 of #75 and #76, and what action he took?

4 32. Same for #77 and #78.

5 33. Re my #14. I meant the conference on #137 between
6 #3 and #53 which resulted in #89. I did not know of the
7 other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you
8 add any names to those already given by you for:

9 34. The one in #2 office?

10 35. The one in #3 office?

11 36. The one "o Col. B."?

12 37. The one between #3 and #53?

13 38. How much does #9 know?

14 39. Will #9 come through willingly?

15 40. What is your estimate of #5 in this respect?

16 41. Will he talk for #42?

17 42. What about #6?

18 Comment

19 With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 and your Items 18
20 and 10(c), you were describing #80, of which we have copies
21 of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This
22 was sent and received on #137. I was asking about #74 which
23 was broadcast at 0430 (EST) on #134 or #135. (Not sure of
24 exact date.) It was heard by "M" and "W" and sent in by
25

Witness Safford

h6

1 teletype. It was unheard by "S", "H", and "C", who listened
2 for it. (I have this from the Station "A" files, plus
3 statements of #19 and #23.) This message (in Morse) included
4 the words - "Higashi np kazeame. Nishi no kaze hare. (Nega-
5 tive form of kita no kaze Kumori)" The warning was not
6 sent in the manner prescribed by #72 or #73, but was a
7 mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he
8 called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray
9 recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were
10 waiting in my office when I came in that morning and
11 said, "Here it is!" We had been waiting for it and Station
12 "S" had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

13 As a result of #74, #9 prepared #90 - which was a
14 very long message ending up with the translation and signi-
15 ficance of the warning in #74. I read the message in #7's
16 office and was witness to the discussion of it between #7
17 and #5. I took for granted that #90 would be sent and did
18 not know otherwise until #132 (plus 2 years). I believe
19 that I told you about this message and stated that it had been
20 sent. Anyway, I was living in a fool's paradise from
21 #134 to #137. I learned from #19 that #9 knew #90 had not
22 been sent (#19 was informed by #9 at #92).

More Questions

24 43. Do you recall #74?
25

Witness Safford

h7

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44. Did you know any or all of the circumstances of #90, how much, and when did you learn it?

45. When did #9 learn that #90 had not been released?

46. Do you know who blocked #90 or refused to release it? (#5 was pushing it but apparently did not feel he had the authority to release it himself.)

47. Can you throw any other light on the subject?

One final word - I do not know how well you knew #18. I have known him for 18 years. He can be trusted and will come through for us. Get in touch with him out there if you can.

Well, this is about enough for one installment. Please give my best regards to any of my friends that you may run into out there.

Sincerely,

/s/ L. F. Safford

L. F. Safford,

Captain, U. S. Navy.

Commander Alwin D. Kramer, U.S.N.,
COMSOPAC Staff,
c/o F.P.O., San Francisco, Calif.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1964 O 348-000

Four-Star Sea Dog

By J. BRYAN, III

Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

Cusser extraordinary, tattooed like any other gob, one-time owner of a parrot, bluff Buck Halsey, commander of our South Pacific Fleet, is the saltiest admiral of them all.

IT WAS in the restaurant room. Men on the floor shirts, open. "Guadalcanal knows. We got our truck with the Conditioner the plane." "Oct 10." "Kongo of four." "Plenty Johnny hopeless whether you couldn't no sooner in Boston you'd for might be..."

There is only one flaw in his role. When he retires, it won't be to the sailor's usual farm, but to Alexandria, Virginia. He bought a house there in 1939, but has never had time to live in it. His friends doubt his intentions "to play golf and do nothing else—nothing!" They believe that he will not relax until he has discharged a duty of his own assumption. They can cite the day, even the hour, when he assumed it—eight P.M. on December 8, 1941.

His flagship, the Enterprise, had reached Pearl Harbor that afternoon, and Halsey had stepped off his barge into a sucking undertow of accusations against Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, then commander in chief of the United States Fleet.

"Sound asleep," the murmurs said. "Criminal negligence... court-martial..."

Halsey's devotion to Kimmel, an Annapolis classmate, is almost religious. He was shocked to see him cast as a scapegoat. When the Roberts Committee of Investigation asked Halsey how he, almost alone, happened to be ready for the Japanese attack, his answer was, "Because of one man—Admiral Kimmel." It would surprise none of Halsey's friends if, on retirement, he applied himself to Kimmel's exonerated.

PACIFIC had turned in went for men's only U. benchman's were sitting ers, frayed tas saying, ober. Lord nd driving ere loaded here was a out. First ps—" ochas said, and rounds J," he said.

It was the ve a curse u until you pilot, and frantic"— ondering if thing that saving his



Adm. William F. Halsey, Jr., who restored public confidence in the Navy and gave a fearful drubbing to the mushrooming myth of Japanese invincibility.

January 19, 1944

My dear Krazer:

When the proper time comes, show the above to Admiral Halsey as a sort of letter-of-introduction. Assure him that his ambition will come true. And it will not be necessary for him to wait until his retirement to see Admiral Kimmel completely exonerated. But we will need Admiral Halsey's help. Do not hesitate to tell him everything.

Sincerely,

L. F. Safford

SECRET

January 21, 1944

AIR-MAIL CODE FOR PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE

U. S. AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS & GRAVE

- | | | | | |
|----|-----|-------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|
| 1 | | | | |
| 2 | | | | |
| 3 | | | | |
| 4 | #1 | - Mr. Roosevelt | : | #23 - Mason |
| 5 | #2 | - Mr. Hull | : | #24 - Big JRR |
| 6 | #3 | - Ad. S. Turk | : | #25 - Little JRR |
| 7 | #4 | - Ad. Inglesell | : | #26 - Wenger |
| 8 | #5 | - Ad. Wilkinson | : | #27 - Goggins |
| 9 | #6 | - Ad. T. | : | #28 - Ad. King |
| 10 | #7 | - Ad. N. | : | #29 - Ad. Horne |
| 11 | #8 | - Safford | : | #30 - Ad. Nimitz |
| 12 | #9 | - McCollum | : | #31 - Ad. Kimmel |
| 13 | #10 | - Kramer | : | #32 - Gen. Short |
| 14 | #11 | - Mr. K. not (#11-first) | : | #33 - Ad. Bloch |
| 15 | #12 | - Linn | : | #34 - Ad. Hart |
| 16 | #13 | - | : | #35 - Roberts Report |
| 17 | #14 | - | : | #36 - Roberts Commission |
| 18 | #15 | - Opnav | : | #37 - Chief Justice Roberts |
| 19 | #16 | - Nav. Intell. | : | #38 - Ad. Standley |
| 20 | #17 | - Nav. Comm. | : | #39 - Ad. Reeves |
| 21 | #18 | - Rochefort | : | #40 - Gen. McCoy |
| 22 | #19 | - Wright | : | #41 - Gen. McNarney |
| 23 | #20 | - Dyer | : | #42 - Admiral Halsey |
| 24 | #21 | - Huckins | : | #43 - Ad. Beardall |
| 25 | #22 | - Holtwick | : | #44 - White House Aide |

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

- | | | | | |
|----|--|---|-----|--|
| 1 | #45 - Aide to CNO | : | #70 | - Machine |
| 2 | #46 - CincAF | : | #71 | - Minor System |
| 3 | #47 - Com 16 | : | #72 | - Circular #2353(Sets up #74) |
| 4 | #48 - Comsopac | : | #73 | - Circular #2354(Sets up #74) |
| 5 | #49 - Cincpac | : | #74 | - General Intelligence Broadcast containing false "Weather Report" |
| 6 | #50 - Com 14 | : | #75 | - Serial #901 (Sets up #902) |
| 7 | #51 - | : | #76 | - Serial #902 (1-13) (The Works) |
| 8 | #52 - | : | | |
| 9 | #53 - Gen. M. <i>arshee</i> | : | #77 | - Serial #902 (14) (The Finale) |
| 10 | #54 - Deputy xxx #58 Chief of Staff | : | #78 | - Serial #907 (1:00 p.m.) |
| 11 | #55 - D.M.I. | : | #79 | - Circular #2409 (Sets up #80) |
| 12 | #56 - D.W.P. | : | #80 | - Circular #2494 (PL code msg.) |
| 13 | #57 - C.S.O.(Gen. O.) | : | #81 | - Tokyo Circular # |
| 14 | #58 - Minckler | : | #82 | - Tokyo-Washington Serial # |
| 15 | #59 - Bratton (?) | : | #83 | - Washington-Tokyo Serial # |
| 16 | #60 - Dowd | : | #84 | - Tokyo-Berlin Serial # |
| 17 | #61 - Mr. S. <i>timson</i> (#11-last): | : | #85 | - Tokyo-Hsinking Serial # |
| 18 | #62 - Rowlett | : | #86 | - Hsinking-Hongkong Serial # |
| 19 | #63 - Adjutant General | : | #87 | - Message sent on date indicated |
| 20 | #64 - Chief of Air Corps | : | #88 | - Message indicated by following ref. No. |
| 21 | #65 - General Staff | : | | |
| 22 | #66 - M.I.D. | : | | |
| 23 | #67 - Signal Corps | : | | |
| 24 | #68 - | : | | |
| 25 | #69 - J-19 | : | | |

U. S. DISTRICT COURT - WASHINGTON, D. C.

- 1 #89 - * : #111 - Oct. 16, 1941
- 2 #90 - ** : #112 - Nov. 6, 1941
- 3 #91 - Washington : #113 - Nov. 14, 1941
- 4 #92 - Pearl Harbor : #114 - Nov. 15, 1941
- 5 #93 - Guadalcanal : #115 - Nov. 16, 1941
- 6 #94 - London : #116 - Nov. 17, 1941
- 7 #95 - Corregidor : #117 - Nov. 18, 1941
- 8 #96 - Singapore : #118 - Nov. 19, 1941
- 9 #97 - Melbourne : #119 - Nov. 20, 1941
- 10 #98 - Tokyo : #120 - Nov. 21, 1941
- 11 #99 - ~~Einernae~~ Berlin : #121 - Nov. 22, 1941
- 12 #100 - ~~Einernae~~ Rome : #122 - Nov. 23, 1941
- 13 #101 - ~~Einernae~~ : #123 - Nov. 24, 1941
- 14 #102 - ~~Einernae~~ : #124 - Nov. 25, 1941
- 15 #103 - ~~Einernae~~ : #125 - Nov. 26, 1941
- 16 #104 - Nomura : #126 - Nov. 27, 1941
- 17 #105 - Kurusu : #127 - Nov. 28, 1941
- 18 #106 - Gen. Umedzu (Hsinking) : #128 - Nov. 29, 1941
- 19 #107 - Jap. Prime Minister : #129 - Nov. 30, 1941
- 20 #108 - Gaimudaijin : #130 -
- 21 #109 - The Son of Heaven : #131 - Dec. 1, 1941
- 22 #110 - : #132 - Dec. 2, 1941

23 * Message described in par. 50 (Page 9-XI of #35)

24 ** ~~Message originated by #9 on #134 (or #135) but never released.~~

25 ** Message to #31 originated by #9 on #134 (or #135) but never released.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

1
2 Senator Lucas: Well, I am not going to direct any ques-
3 tions to the witness on this letter of January 22nd. It is
4 at some length and I think perhaps counsel should make some
5 study of it over the noon hour and see whether there are any
6 questions in it that are material and pertinent to ascertain.

7 Captain, I want to examine you just a moment or two on
8 the first statement that you made in your statement to this
9 committee. You state: "There was a winds message, it meant
10 war and we knew it meant war."

11 Who do you include in that word "we"?

12 Captain Safford: The people who were working on magic
13 and whom I was in close enough touch with to be able to know
14 how they viewed it.

15 Senator Lucas: Name those people, please.

16 Captain Safford: That would be Kramer -- myself first,
17 Kramer, McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson and possibly Admiral Noyes.

18 Senator Lucas: Possibly Admiral Noyes?

19 Captain Safford: Yes.

20 Senator Lucas: Now, those are the five that you have
21 named here when you give out this statement that goes to the
22 press of the country and you want the people of this country
23 to know that you claim that this message meant war, and by
24 that you would have to imply at least that they received the
25 message and that they knew about it at the time. Is that

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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what you want to tell the committee?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Is that it?

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: How can all these fellows be wrong, Captain, when they say they never saw this winds message?

Captain Safford: I cannot explain other people.

Senator Lucas: Well, you never had any trouble with Captain McCollum, did you?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: You were on good terms with him?

Captain Safford: Very good terms.

Senator Lucas: Was there any reason to believe that Captain McCollum would want to secrete or destroy this message?

Captain Safford: To the best of my knowledge and recollection Captain McCollum tried to send out a war warning as a result of that message.

Senator Lucas: Just answer my question now, Captain.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Repeat it for him, please.

(Question read.)

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: Were you on friendly terms with Admiral Wilkinson?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Did you ever have any trouble with him at any time before December the 7th, 1941?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: He never gave you any orders that you could not execute, I take it?

Captain Safford: No, sir. I was not at all well acquainted with him. I had only known him for ten weeks but we were on good terms.

Senator Lucas: Well, do you know of any reason why Admiral Wilkinson, a man who went out and did what he did in this war, would want to secrete or destroy or disturb an important message of this kind?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

Shef--
Shack
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shack (5) am
follows
Shefner
AL-1

9945

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Senator Lucas: Is that true of Admiral Noyes?

2 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Lucas: And Captain Kramer?

4 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Lucas: You were on good terms with him?

6 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: So there is no reason that you know
8 of, of any kind, why these men, who all contend, as I under-
9 stand from previous testimony, that they never saw the winds
10 message, would want to do anything but what was the correct
11 thing in order to prosecute the war, successfully?

12 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: They are loyal and highly patriotic
14 Americans, all of them?

15 Captain Safford: Yes, all of them.

16 Senator Lucas: Now let me ask you this, following
17 Congressman Clark's questions: Do you have a suspicion
18 that any of these men that you mentioned would destroy or
19 secrete any of these messages?

20 Captain Safford: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: But you do have a suspicion toward
22 Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

23 Captain Safford: I presume I have no proper basis for
24 suspicion. I have no proper basis for suspicion against any
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1
2 individual.

3 Senator Lucas: Then you want to change your testimony
4 that you gave awhile ago with respect to having that suspicion
5 against Admiral Stark and General Marshall? I think I am
6 correct in my understanding of your answer to Congressman
7 Clark's question. If I am not, you may correct me.

8 Captain Safford: I would like to change my answer to
9 Congressman Clark's question, and in reply to yours, that
10 I have no suspicion directed against any individual who can
11 be named.

12 The Vice Chairman: What was that answer?

13 (The answer was read by the reporter.)

14 Senator Lucas: We are now talking about the winds
15 execute message?

16 Captain Safford: I am now talking about the winds
17 execute message.

18 Senator Lucas: Congressman Clark asked you a series
19 of questions along that line.

20 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: You answered strictly in the negative
22 until you got to the last question in regard to suspicion
23 and your answer was in the affirmative, and you now desire
24 to make a change in that.

25 The Vice Chairman: Will the Senator yield?

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 Senator Lucas: Yes.

2 The Vice Chairman: I do not quite understand that
3 kind of a reply, Captain. How can you suspect somebody that
4 you cannot name?

5 Senator Lucas: He is changing it.

6 The Vice Chairman: I understood you to say you did not
7 suspect anybody that you could name.

8 Captain Safford: That is correct.

9 The Vice Chairman: What do you mean by that?

10 Captain Safford: Official records have disappeared
11 from the files of the Navy Department, and that is a suspicious
12 circumstance. I have no idea how they disappeared. It is
13 a fact that they are not present and cannot be accounted for.

14 The Vice Chairman: Well, do you have any suspicion
15 against anybody?

16 Captain Safford: I have no suspicion against any
17 individual.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, if these files had been destroyed
19 and you cannot account for them, then some one of these
20 individuals that you named would have to be responsible for
21 the destruction of them, would they not?

22 Captain Safford: Not necessarily.

23 Senator Lucas: Well, name others that would have the
24 custody of the files to the point where they could get in and
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 fool around with them.

2 Captain Safford: I can name nobody.

3 Senator Lucas: I see. Now you said a moment ago that
4 there was no record that the FCC had ever telephoned or sent
5 a written order to the Navy Department with respect to the
6 false winds message -- on December 6th, was it?

7 Captain Safford: No, December 7, after the attack on
8 Pearl Harbor. That is to the best of my knowledge and belief.

9 Senator Lucas: Well, you have made an examination of
10 that, I take it?

11 Captain Safford: I have made an examination and I
12 request to be furnished a written copy, if there was one,
13 or a photograph. I requested that through Captain Walsh of
14 the Navy Department several days ago, and there has been no
15 reply.

16 Senator Lucas: Well, in your testimony on Saturday you
17 indicated that there was apparently a conspiracy to get rid
18 of this message. Then you must include the FCC record on
19 this, must you not?

20 Captain Safford: No, sir.

21 Senator Lucas: Well, would not that be true by implication,
22 in view of the question asked you by Senator George, as to
23 why the Japanese would want to send out a similar message
24 on December 7, I think it was, or the 8th, which was practically
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 the same message as the winds execute message, and then you
2 said you made an examination of the FCC records and there
3 was nothing there whatever to show that such a message was
4 received?

5 Captain Safford: No, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: What did you say?

7 Captain Safford: I said that the Navy Department had
8 received no notification of such a message either by telephone
9 or in writing prior to the summer of 1944, to the best of
10 my knowledge and belief, as far as I have been able to
11 ascertain.

12 Senator Lucas: Do you believe the FCC received such
13 a message?

14 Captain Safford: Yes, sir, but the Navy Department did
15 not know about it at the time.

16 Senator Lucas: And you do not believe that they
17 telephoned?

18 Captain Safford: They telephoned to somebody in the
19 Army, yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: But they did not telephone to the Navy?

21 Captain Safford: I do not think that they telephoned
22 to the Navy, and if they did there has been no record pre-
23 served of it and I never knew of it at that time.

24 Senator Lucas: Was there a written record that they
25

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

1 telephoned or sent a copy of this message to the Army?
2

3 Captain Safford: There is in the files of the FCC.

4 Senator Lucas: There is in the files of the FCC?

5 Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: What about the Army files?

7 Captain Safford: To the best of my knowledge they had
8 no record of receiving this telephone call. I may be wrong.

9 Senator Lucas: Receiving what?

10 Captain Safford: To the best of my knowledge the
11 War Department had no record of receiving this telephone call
12 from the FCC.

13 Senator Lucas: I am talking about whether or not there
14 are any files in the Army that show that a report on the
15 message had been received. You say there is not, to the
16 best of your knowledge; is that correct?

17 Captain Safford: To the best of my knowledge. It was
18 looked for, we will put it that way, a couple of years ago
19 and nothing could be discovered.

20 Senator Lucas: I would like to ask counsel to see if
21 they can find the FCC report on the false winds message of
22 December 8, I believe it was, and whether or not the Army
23 or the Navy has a copy of it in its files. If it is not
24 here I would like to have you make a search. It is not
25 very important.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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The Vice Chairman: It is now a little past twelve.

Do you want to complete, Senator?

Senator Lucas: I have a few more questions.

The Vice Chairman: It is now a little past twelve o'clock. The committee will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

Captain, please be back at that time.

Captain Safford: Yes, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this point before the examination is resumed?

Mr. Richardson: I don't think so, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Do you have anything you want to present, Captain, before your examination is resumed?

Captain Safford: No, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD

(resumed)

Senator Lucas: I may want to return to the line of questioning that I was following just before lunch, but I would like to talk to you for just a moment about another matter.

In this statement that you read to the committee you state on page one that, "this message was intercepted by the U. S. Navy at the big radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland, which serves the Navy Department."

When did you finally reach the conclusion, Captain, that this station was the one that did receive it?

Captain Safford: That was a week ago, about, by the elimination of the other possibilities and by the confirmation of the fact by documentary evidence which I had just been

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 able to see, that Cheltenham was in fact covering other mes-
3 sages broadcast from Tokyo, had received orders to monitor
4 for the winds message, at least to guard specific Tokyo
5 broadcasts and had reported in writing that it was receiving
6 those broadcasts. I had had nothing as strongly confirmatory
7 as that since 1941.

8 Senator Lucas: What other stations could possibly have
9 received this message?

10 Captain Safford: I had thought at the time that Winter
11 Harbor, Maine --

12 Senator Lucas: I am not talking at the time. I am talk-
13 ing what you think today as a result of your latest investiga-
14 tion, what other stations do you believe, if there are any,
15 that possibly could have received this?

16 Captain Safford: There was a possibility that it could
17 have been heard at Ammagansett, Long Island and at Jupiter,
18 Florida. The monthly reports --

19 Senator Lucas: I understand. Now, just a moment.

20 Captain Safford: 'll right.

21 Senator Lucas: Those two are the only two stations, you
22 believe, in the world that were monitoring messages at that
23 time, that could have possibly received it?

24 Captain Safford: No, sir, those are the only ones in
25 the U. S. Navy.