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INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 14 February 1946 - 1400 - 1600

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q I was just reading your diary as of July 4, 1934, where the Grand Chamberlain had had a conference with the Emperor and you wrote in your diary to the effect that the situation immediately after the fall of the SAITO Cabinet was not only serious nationally but was serious internationally. What was the international situation in those days and what was serious about it or what did the Grand Chamberlain think was so serious about it?
- A Concerning the international situation, previous to this, Japan has been placed in an isolated position due to her withdrawal from the League of Nations and this more or less served as a stimulus to the other nations in gaining their ill-feeling.
- Q In other words, you think the international situation was tense because Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. It was also tense, I presume, because of the Manchurian Incident which was involved in the withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Evid. Doc. 4134

Philip # 192

- A Yes, SAITO has been said to be a peaceful man and his Cabinet was said to be a pacifistic cabinet and the fall of that Cabinet would imply that the Government is inclined toward militarism.
- Q The immediate cause of the fall of the Cabinet did not have any military significance. It was the embezzlement by some Government officer. Isn't that right?
- A The reason why the SAITO Cabinet fell was because of its implication with the bribery and that was entirely a plot in the prosecutor's office. There were some that were inclined toward fascism and it is believed that those persons within that prosecutor's office are being responsible for such propaganda.
- Q Who did they try to bribe and what did they try to bribe that party to do?
- A As related previously, it was the involvement of government officials in the bribery with the Imperial Insurance Company.
- Q But the military men we have been discussing weren't involved, were they, in this bribery attempt?
- A No, it was just a means of making the Cabinet fall.
- Q I see. Do you think it was inspired by those people that we spoke of as the military group or perhaps the expansionist group? Did they have anything to do with the incident taking place in order that the Government might fall, do you think?
- A There was no direct connection with the military nor those persons that were advocating expansion into the continent but I believe those persons that had that type of mind were indirectly connected with it.
- Q The people involved in the incident were thinking in the same terms as the military group but you don't think the military group was directing them?
- A These same groups were the ones who attacked the Zaibatsu.
- Q They were also the groups, were they not, that did not like a pacifist government and favored a more aggressive and military type of government?
- A Yes, and I believe it was mostly done by those persons that wanted to reconstruct the Government.

- Q You mentioned something about a secret report on the incident being made to the Throne. I suppose that is this incident we are talking about that caused the fall of the Cabinet?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the attitude of Admiral OKADA with reference to the internal affairs of Japan, such as political parties, etc.? Did he favor the abolition of political parties - dissolution of the parties?
- A No, he was absolutely opposed.
- Q He favored a political government?
- A Yes.
- Q What was his attitude with reference to expansion into China and Manchuria?
- A I believe as a Navy man, he was vigorously opposed.
- Q How was he able to get the support of the military group, or, let us say, the Army group, to his selection if he was opposed to their expansionist ideas?
- A Just like SAITO, OKADA was opposed to the military and at the time the Cabinet was formed, I believe that the military has made numerous requests but the military did not want to reverse the decision of the Emperor.
- Q In other words, the military group had not gotten quite strong enough to really dictate the formation of the Cabinet like they did later on. Is that right?
- A At this time, because the Manchurian problem has become solved, the military did not vigorously oppose, although it did not favor the OKADA Cabinet.
- Q On July 13, you indicate that Prince FUSHIMI expressed his policy with reference to the Naval reduction conference. What was his policy on that point? What did he advocate or what did he favor with reference to naval reduction?
- A I do not know the contents. It was just a personal submission given by the member of the Imperial family.

- Q I see, under the same date, Navy Minister OSUMI was very much opposed to the position of the Chief of Staff and threatened to resign unless he changed his policy. What was the issue between the Chief of Staff and the Navy Minister?
- A I do not remember what was said. I believe that the attitude of the Imperial family was presented only.
- Q Under the 16th of July, you refer to this difference in opinion between the Chief of Staff and the Navy Minister some more and again state that the Navy Minister threatened to resign because he feared the policy of the Chief of Staff would bring the United States and Britain together and seriously affect Japan's policy in China. Does that refresh your recollection any?
- A I do not know accurately but I believe that the plan submitted to the Emperor was a very drastic plan which was considered to be impassable at the Conference. They felt that it would be highly inadvisable to present any type of a plan which would not be acceptable at the disarmament conference.
- Q Can we say that the Navy Minister thought the proposed plan of the Chief of Staff was so radical in its terms as not to be successful and would tend to bring the United States and Britain closer together in their opposition to Japan?
- A I can recall the fact now that this plan was far sterner and more radical than that reached at the conference of Prime Ministers.
- Q Well, it no doubt involved a program where Japan was unfavorable to reducing her naval strength and wanted to maintain great naval strength and a high ratio with Britain and the United States.
- A Yes, I believe this was because all those naval heads that favored the London Naval Treaty has been removed and only those that did not favor it remained as head of the Navy.
- Q Who, besides the Chief of Staff FUSHIMI do you recall in the Navy were strenuously advocating an increase in the size of the Navy and great Navy strength rather than reduction of naval strength?
- A I don't remember the names but I believe that the Navy Minister then supported the plan and the rest of the Chiefs of the Navy were of the same mind.
- Q Did the Navy Minister or Navy Chiefs of Staff support the plan?
- A Both.

- Q From your diary, I take it that the Chief of Staff and the Navy Minister didn't see eye-to-eye and that the Navy Minister was threatening to resign because he thought the policy of the Chief of Staff was too radical.
- A It is not so.
- Q Why was the Navy Minister threatening to resign, as set forth in your diary on July 13 and 16?
- A There is a difference in the translation. Here it says these two were of the same mind.
- Q Who do you mean by "these two"?
- A It says here, the Navy Minister expressed the same sentiment as that presented to the Emperor by Prince FUSHIMI and he said if this cannot be taken into consideration, he will have to resign.
- Q In other words, the Navy Minister and Chief of Staff were both advocating the same policy but the Cabinet and the Emperor were opposed to it?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice that the other day, you indicated Prince KANIN was the Army Chief of Staff although the Vice Chief of Staff, MASAKI, really was the responsible party as Prince KANIN was not particularly active. Now I see that the Chief of Staff of the Navy was also a prince. Was it customary for Chiefs of Staff to be princes or from royal families or imperial household background? Was that a coincidence that they were both princes?
- A This is a rare exception and there was the provision that he was only to assume the post for a short period of time which happened to draw out to the extent of nine years.
- Q Is that in the case of the Chief of Staff of the Navy or the Army?
- A Both of them. I believe that this is a means of the military. When they get aggressive, they use the person of imperial blood as their tools.

- Q In other words, you think that the military brought about the appointment of people of royal blood as Chiefs of Staff to help put their program over with the Emperor and the Government?
- A And this is the same because they were proposing to put in Prince HIGASHUKUNI in as Prime Minister in order/start the war with America. to
- Q In other words, the military group fully realized that the Emperor and the Imperial Household and the political government generally opposed their aggressiveness and in order to improve their position, they, in your opinion, caused princes and people of royal blood to be made Chiefs of Staff, thinking they could win over the opposition?
- A Yes, that is the tactics they used.
- Q No doubt that is true but did you ever hear the military group or any of them so state or so express them selves?
- A No, it was never expressed openly but that is easily discernible.
- Q Was it a matter of common talk and discussion among the Imperial Household and Emperor and people of the opposition that that is what they were attempting to do?
- A The people of Imperial blood do not publicly made such statements, or express such sentiment but they know it within their hearts.
- Q In other words, the Emperor, himself, either privately or publicly expressed the feeling that was going on, did he not?
- A And for that reason, they made the provision of putting Prince KANIN in office for a short time until the proper person was selected but he happened to serve in the post for nine years.
- Q In other words, when he was appointed, it was publicly announced that he was appointed for a temporary time?
- A No.
- Q How was it expressed that he would be there for a short time instead of a long time?
- A I believe that this is told to the Minister of War by the Emperor.

- Q I notice in your July 16 entry, it is indicated that this proposed policy on the part of the Navy would seriously affect Japan's China policy. When you wrote that, what did you have in mind that Japan's China policy was?
- A The China policy held by Japan at this time was to conduct peaceful treaty negotiations with China but Japan felt that any unfavorable result of the Naval Disarmament Conference would bring England and America into conflict with Japan into the Far East and also if England and America happened to have the suspicion that Japan is going to use force in China, she felt there would occur a conflict with Britain and America on one hand and Japan on the other.
- Q You think that in July 1934, Japan's policy was not one of aggression but for peaceful relations between Japan and China?
- A Aside of Manchuria, Japan had a peaceful policy toward China.
- Q Then, sofar as Manchuria was concerned, Japan's policy was one of aggression, wasn't it?
- A That was not desired by Japan but that problem became settled at the time. Because the militarists were successful in the Manchurian campaign, they felt that the same tactics or course may be applied to North China or China and any enlargement of the Navy was felt to cause alarm and more or less stimulate the United States and Britain.
- Q The success of the aggressiveness in Manchuria tended to stimulate the military group to go forth and go into China and be more aggressive in China?
- A Yes, that was of great concern.
- Q This Admiral KATO, you mention under August 2 - he was one of the Naval group that saw eye-to-eye with the Army insofar as expansion and aggressiveness was concerned, wasn't he?
- A This KATO was the Naval Chief of Staff at the time of the London Naval Treaty was signed. He was also advocating increasing the size of the Japanese Navy.
- Q Did he collaborate or work in close harmony with those Army men thinking in terms of expansion, such as ARAKI and MASAKI?
- A I don't know his connection with the Army. I don't believe it is very deep.
- Q Well, he favored eliminating the political parties, didn't he?

- A I believe he had considerable involvement with the Rightists organizations.
- Q Can we say that he was an expansionist and for a strong military foreign policy so far as Japan was concerned?
- A As a man of the Navy tradition, I don't believe he had any aggressive or expansionist attitude toward the continent but I believe he was always advocating parity or strength with Britain and America in naval fields.
- Q There were certainly individuals in the Navy that collaborated with and saw eye-to-eye with Army men so far as expansion was concerned. Who would you say they were?
- A I believe as a radical, they were KATO and SUETSUGU. I don't believe there were any great harmony between the Army and the Navy.
- Q Under August 9, you record a conversation with Prince SAIONJI where he refers to the "Greater Asia Principle". What was the "Greater Asia Principle"?
- A This policy was the policy held by the militarists which advocated the solution of Asiatic problems with Japan and China cooperating together.
- Q Did it involve the use of force, if necessary, in order to solve the China problem from Japan's point of view?
- A And these persons joined hands with the faction in China that had the same interests and helped these factions more or less organize the revolution in China and bring forth Government favorable to Japan.
- Q In other words, you think some of the revolutionary activities in China were inspired by the military faction in Japan?
- A The militarists and the Black Dragon Society and the Genyosha of Kyushu were instrumental in aiding the revolutionary factions of China and historically, Japan has previously helped persons like Sun Yat Sen and others of China in the same way.
- Q All of these factions and groups and people you refer to really advocated the principle of Greater Asia for Japan and China and the exclusion of western powers? That was the principle they were operating on, were they not?

A I believe so. I don't believe they openly advocated the persecution of westerners.

Q No but they advocated the policy of Asia for the Asiatics. Isn't that right?

A Yes.

Q And the military group, at least, advocated bringing that about by force of arms, if necessary?

A For gaining that end, there were some advocating that.

Q When we get back to who they were, are we still talking principally about ARAKI and MASAKI and the Kwantung Army generals that advocated the use of arms, if necessary, to accomplish that result?

A And General MATSUI aided this Greater Asia Society which advocated such a policy.

Q Approximately when did this Greater Asia Society come into existence?

A I do not know when the Society was formed but the thinking was existant from the Meiji Era.

Q Was MATSUI an Army general?

A Yes.

Q Was he a member of the Staff Headquarters in those days?

A I do not know but I don't believe he was.

Q Was he closely associated and friendly with ARAKI and MASAKI?

A Yes.

Q He was one of that inner clique that thought along the same lines with reference to Manchuria and China?

A I believe so.

Q Did ARAKI and MASAKI belong as members to this Society, do you think?

A I do not know.

- Q Do you know any other outstanding individuals that were active in the Greater Asia Society besides MATSUI?
- A I do not know their names.
- Q Was this a society of military people or a combination of military and non-military people?
- A I believe it was a combination. It is not an exclusive military organization.
- Q Its main program in broad terms was Asia for the Asiatics?
- A I believe so.
- Q And also it advocated accomplishing that by any means necessary including force of arms if it couldn't be accomplished otherwise?
- A The organization itself does not advocate such a policy but their actions, perhaps, does indicate such a policy.
- Q Is General MATSUI living as far as you know today?
- A Yes, because this Greater Asia Society was still existant until very recently. I believe that the rules and regulations are still somewhere.
- Q On August 17, in your diary, you made/somewhat detailed report to Prince SAIONJI on several matters, the first of which had reference to Japan's administration in Manchukuo. Do you recall what you had reported with reference to Manchukuo? Do you recall what the problems were in Manchukuo and what problems were involved in the administration of Manchukuo by Japan?
- A I believe that the report of the necessity of joining the various divided organs in Manchuria was presented.
- Q There is no question but what in those days Manchukuo was not being permitted to function as an entirely independent government. Its policies were being determined in Tokyo or by Japan. Isn't that correct?
- A Yes, because diplomatic and military matters were still being controlled in Tokyo.
- Q Although Japan on many occasions proclaimed and held forth to the world that Manchukuo was independent, the thinking people and the Government of Japan realized that wasn't the true situation. That is right, isn't it?

- A I believe so because I believe there was a secret agreement.
- Q Why was it that the Government officials of Japan permitted such to be advocated to the world when it wasn't true? Why didn't they come out and say that Manchukuo was a puppet state as it was and admit it?
- A Because actually on the surface, it appeared as an independent country and it was more or less difficult to say that it is a puppet state.
- Q Well, the overt attempt to conceal the truth would indicate that Japan was ashamed of it, wouldn't it?
- A One can say that for an argument but because it has already been settled in that way, there is nothing else that one can do. I believe such a situation would not have existed if there was some element in Japan that would come out clear-cut and in a blunt way pertaining to the situation.
- Q Well, by concealing the true facts with reference to the control of Manchukuo by Japan, Japan really was attempting to minimize and put less emphasis on the fact that she might have been aggressive and violated treaties and world opinion as expressed by the League of Nations.
- A That is right.
- Q But it is your honest opinion that that came about because of the strength of the military faction of Japan and the failure of the civil officials to speak out and admit the true situation.
- A To give a direct answer, I believe that the militarists were making all sorts of excuses all along the line and the situation developed to such an extent that more or less everyone was swept away.
- Q I might say - I'll tell you more about it some day - that General MASAKI has taken the position that all of this trouble came about because you gave poor advice to the Emperor and that you are the one who caused Japan to get mixed up in this aggression. I am not saying this is true or not but I want you to know that MASAKI has taken this position.
- A That is absolutely untrue.

- Q I will admit that what you write in your diary is contrary to the position he has taken but I thought you might like to know the position he has taken.
- A I believe that MASAKI believed the Ronin who were disseminating various propaganda concerning me during that time.
- Q You talked also to Prince SAIONJI on that occasion about the Government's desire to abrogate the Washington Treaty. In referring to that, were you referring to the Government's policy or program to try to obtain parity of naval armament with Great Britain and the United States?
- A This does not imply that abrogation of the Washington Treaty was desired but the Navy sentiment toward that was very strong and I think an inquiry was made as to what policy to take in this respect by the Government.
- Q At least the Navy, itself, advocated parity with other nations and the policy of obtaining parity?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the Army's attitude with reference to Navy parity? Did it take a stand on that question....the War Minister and Army Chief of Staff, and people like that?
- A Just as mentioned, previously, because the War Minister and the Foreign and Finance Ministers objected and had said they did not want any presentation of the plan that will not be accepted in the disarmament conference and so I believe that the military were not in agreement with the Navy.
- Q The military group finally favored expansion into Manchuria and even into China but they weren't pushing the increase in the size of the Navy.
- A That is right because the military did not want any friction to be caused with Britain and America in the solution of the China problem.
- Q In other words, the military felt they could come nearer accomplishing expansion into Asia and driving out British and American influence if they stayed away from the Navy armament question and didn't aggravate it
- A Yes.
- Q They thought that objecting to the decrease in naval strength would make it more difficult for them to put over their program?

A Yes.

Q You also discussed the question of the North China Railroad. Did that involve the negotiations for the purchase of the railroad from Russia in those days?

A I believe so.

Q What was that transaction? What actually happened with reference to the North China Railway, if you recall?

A I don't remember the details but the result was that Japan bought the railway.

Q That was after Japan had already moved its military forces throughout Manchuria, wasn't it? It really was a step completing the dominance of Japan over Manchuria?

A Yes.

Q Did the military group advocate and foster the purchase of the railroad in order to complete the program in Manchuria?

A I believe so.

Q You mention the Japan-Holland Conference. What did that involve and what was proposed to be taken up at that conference?

A I have completely forgotten about it.

Q Why was it, would you say that Japan generally was opposed to disarmament in naval forces or reduction in naval armament in those days? Did she fear that she might be attacked by the United States or Britain and therefore wanted to build up her Navy?

A It did not directly fear that it will be attacked soon but the Navy felt that if it was in an inferior position, it would become attacked.

Q Did it fear that the United States might attack Japan? Was there anything to indicate that the United States had territorial ambitions in Japan or Japanese territory?

A I don't believe they ever had such an idea. I believe that the Navy was worried about trouble arising in China.

- Q Did the Navy people feel that Japan might be attacked by Great Britain in those days?
- A I believe such an idea was held although there wasn't any actual facts to substantiate it. Rather than the fear of being attacked, the Navy was more concerned about the ratio matter; that is, Navy parity and naval equality.
- Q That would be tied up and involved with the question as to whether or not Japan would be able to defend herself if she were attacked, wouldn't it? The truth of the matter is that the military had expanded Japanese influence into Manchuria and wanted to go further into China and in so doing had antagonized Great Britain and the United States because of the treaties and the Navy wanted to build up its strength so Great Britain and the United States couldn't interfere with Japan holding what she already got. Isn't that behind the desire for naval power?
- A I cannot think that the Navy together with the Army was advocating such a stern policy because the Navy was always opposed to the expansion of the Army.
- Q Yes, but once the Army had already expanded into Manchuria and Japan had control of that country and the United States and Great Britain had been antagonized, the Navy wanted to prepare itself so Japan could hold on to what it already had in case Great Britain and the United States pressed the matter of Japan releasing what it already had. Isn't that it?
- A The argument may be so but the sentiment was not so because I wasn't aware of it.
- Q Although you say that the Navy didn't advocate what took place in Manchuria and China, they directly supported what the Army did and they wanted to build up their naval force so that no one could take away what Japan had gained. Isn't that involved in the Navy question?
- A I don't believe that the Army and Navy together in concert was pressing strongly for that policy but that both of them respectively wanted to secure their own interests and to fortify their own positions.
- Q Well, because the military had gotten Japan into unfriendly relations with United States and Great Britain over the Manchurian Incident, the Navy began to feel that it should build up its strength in order to ward off any action that the United States and Great Britain might take on account of that situation.
- A Maybe, you may be able to say that.

- Q Did the Navy people feel that Japan might be attacked by Great Britain in those days?
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- A Maybe, you may be able to say that.

- Q And there, indirectly at least, supported what the Army was doing in Manchuria, although you don't seem to feel they sat down and planned it out that way.
- A Looking back at that at the present time, we may be able to put up such an argument but sentiment at that time was that the Navy was engrossed in the matter of gaining naval parity.
- Q One of the main reasons they wanted naval parity was because of the resentment on the part of the United States and Great Britain over what was going on in the Far East and the Navy wanted to be able to defend Japan because of that attitude on the part of Great Britain and the United States.
- A Yes.
- Q I notice at the end of November 19, there was a Field Marshals' meeting attended by Prince FUSHIMI and the Emperor, among others, and at that meeting the Chief of Navy advocated parity with Great Britain and the United States and the Emperor expressed the opinion that a 10-7 ratio might be sufficient but the Chief of Staff still insisted upon parity and gave his reasons which the Emperor indicated he could not understand. What were those reasons, if you recall, as to why the Navy and Chief of Staff was insisting on parity.
- A I have no recollection whatsoever as to that. The Emperor felt that because Britain and America has two oceans to defend, they need to have strength at the ratio of 10 to Japan's 7. At the Washington conference, the demand of Japan was also the ratio of 10 - 7. The sudden demand for parity was more or less influenced by the fact that the Navy put forth the argument that they had become weak as the result of the London Naval Treaty and there is no logical consistency in their statement.
- Q Well, did the Navy Chief of Staff advance the argument, do you recall, that since the Manchurian and China incidents, it was necessary for the Navy to have parity in order to defend Japan against the opposition on the part of the United States and Great Britain?
- A I didn't hear anything to that extent.
- Q On January 11, 1935, you had a talk at the home of Marquis MATSUDAIRA. What, if any, position did he have in the Government in those days?
- A At this time, MATSUDAIRA had no government position. He was just a member of the House of Peers.

Q Was he the man that later became secretary to the Lord Keeper?

A Yes.

Q Also present was NAGATA, Head of the Army Affairs Bureau. Is that Bureau in the War Ministry?

A Yes.

Q You discussed among other things the agitation for submitting a petition to the throne. What was that agitation? What did it involve?

A It was agitation to submit a proposal to the Emperor directly for national reconstruction.

Q What type of reconstruction was sought? Did it involve the elimination of political parties and the installation of a military government?

A I don't know the details but I believe the movement was for reforming the existing political parties and the Zaibatsu.

Q Who was ITCHO SASA?

A He is a Rightist.

Q And apparently was working in connection with the military at Imperial Headquarters, according to your opinion?

A He utilized the militarists; therefore, he was involved with a section of the militarists.

Q Were the militarists incorporating he and his followers to advocate this change in the Government?

A Yes.

Q They were proposing to file a petition direct with the Emperor to reorganize the structure of the Government. Is that what the plan was?

A I don't remember the details.

Q What was the Dairen Conference that you discussed on that occasion?

A It is a conference of the military higher-ups because the spearhead of the military at the Tsingtao and Shanghai got into a conference occasionally and exchanged information, and that was the conference.

Q Was it a conference of military leaders in Manchuria?

A Yes, the Kwantung armies and the North China armies and those Japanese forces. The conferees were staff officers.

Q You were fearful in those days that the Kwantung Army might again move without authority from the Government and move into China like they had into Manchuria?

A Yes, North China.

Q You mentioned in addition to ITAGAKI a man by the name of HANAYA. Was he a general?

A He was only a Lt. Colonel.

Q I see. How about KAGESA? Was he a military man?

A He also was a Lt. Colonel. They were staff officers.

Q Were they strong advocates of expansion in China and Manchuria?

A Yes.

Q They were close associates of ITAGAKI and his principles and policies?

A Yes.

Q Did HANAYA and KAGESKA later become high military officials in the Japanese Army?

A, Yes, they became general officers.

Q Were they active in the last big war?

A Yes, they were active in this war. They worked mainly in China.

Q They were active also in the China War, starting in 1937. Is that right?

A KAGESKA was an advisor to WANG CHING WEI.

Q Was KAGESKA one of the leaders in the China Incident and the expansion into North China that followed in 1937?

A He was a radical in regard to China.

Q He favored expansion further than Manchuria and into North China by the Japanese forces, would you say?

A He was more active in China rather than in Manchuria.

Q But he favored expansion into China and advocated that, and eventually helped carry it out?

A Yes.

Q How about HANAYA? Was he of a like mind?

A Yes.

Q Would you say that HANAYA and KAGESKA were leaders in the aggressive action that took place as a result of the China Incident in 1937?

A Yes, I believe they were central figures.

Q And ITAGAKI likewise was in the China incident?

A Yes.

Q Were there others that come into your mind at the moment that were outstanding leaders in the China Incident and the activities that followed in North China.

A I don't remember any others at the present time.

Q We may come to them in your diary later on. What was the purpose of the Manchurian Emperor making a visit to Japan? What was to be accomplished by his visit? You refer to it starting January 22.

A I believe he came visiting Japan on a courtesy call and to congratulate the occasion of the establishment of Manchuria.

Q He was the puppet Emperor in Manchuria, was he not. He is the one we refer to as the puppet Emperor?

A Yes, PUYI.

Q Under February 5, you make reference to a so-called "bomb movement". What were you referring to there?

A This bomb incident is not actually a bombing. It means a "startling incident". It startles a person like a bomb being dropped.

- Q What was the incident you were referring to?
- A I have forgotten what it was. That incident was the sentiment of a movement within the Diet. They felt that they should wait until an investigation has been conducted for which 15,000,000 Yen has been appropriated. If the Diet was not satisfied, there was no other alternative but to dissolve the Diet but I do not remember what the content was.
- Q The 500,000 Yen affair that you mention on that same date was the bribery affair that we talked about earlier, involving the Communications Minister?
- A I believe that was different.
- Q Wasn't Mr. TOKONAMI, Communications Minister, involved in the bribery charge?
- A This is a different one.
- Q Well, what was this incident, then?
- A I don't remember.
- Q You mention that you thought that KUHARA and MASAKI had plotted this particular incident. Does that refresh your memory as to the nature of it and what was back of it?
- A I believe this is just one manifestation of the sentiment held by KUHARA and MASAKI in dissolving the Cabinet.
- Q Who did you say that KUHARA was the other day - a general?
- A He is a member of a political party, the Seiyukai.
- Q What was the incident of the theft of the telegram that you talk about on the same day?
- A I don't know what it was about. I have no recollection.
- Q On March 4 you mention, for the first time, the "Emperor Organ Theory" and then you mention it on several occasions thereafter. What was that theory and who was advocating it? What was sought to be accomplished?

A The "Emperor Organ Theory" is that presented by Dr. MINOBE and other scholars, which placed the Emperor only as a figure-head, while others felt that the Emperor actually is at the head and the Chief of State. The sentiment at this time became strong so that difficulties and problems had arisen because the Emperor was being made a figurehead and they clamored that the national system should be made clear.

Q Who was to be head of state if the Emperor was to be a mere figurehead under this theory of Dr. MINOBE?

A MINOBE and the professors of the University were all of the same mind.

Q Who did they propose would be the actual head of state of the Japanese Government if the Emperor was merely a figure-head? Who was to perform the functions that were formerly performed by the Emperor?

A Who is actually to be the Chief when the Emperor is merely a figure-head is something that is not clear. The difference is that under the Constitution, the Emperor's authority is limited while on the other hand, he is more or less an almighty deity. The difference and the details are not clear to me.

Q Who is Dr. MINOBE - a professor?

A Yes, he is a professor at the Tokyo Imperial University.

Q Is he a professor of political science?

A Of constitutional law.

Q Not international law but internal constitutional law?

A Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Fred Suzukawa, 0-2030605
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 19 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa
2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator

I, (we) Henry Sackett, _____,
and _____,

certify that on 14 day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 August 1946
Date

[Signature]

KIDO, Koichi

Excerpt from Interrogation of (Marquis)
KIDO, Koichi - 14 February 1946

Page 337

Q Would you say that HANAYA and KAGESKA were leaders in the aggressive action that took place as a result of the China Incident in 1937?

A Yes, I believe they were central figures.

Q And ITAGAKI likewise was in the China Incident?

A Yes.

Q Were there others that come into your mind at the moment that were outstanding leaders in the China Incident and the activities that followed in North China.

A I don't remember any others at the present time.