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
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














SKETCH  
OF THE  
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES  
OF THE  
LATE EMIGRATION  
TO THE  
BRAZILS.

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*By* RALPH RYLANCE.

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1808.



SKETCH

GALLES AND CORNWALL

LATE MINORATION

TO THE

BRITISH

IN GREAT BRITAIN

LONDON

PRINTED BY RICHARD CLAY AND COMPANY

THE BUNGAY PRESS, BUNGAY, SUFFOLK

1902



*To WILLIAM ROSCOE, Esq.*

SIR,

THE following sketch is an attempt to illustrate the great truth which you have so ably demonstrated—that National Justice is National Policy. I am anxious to atone to the Public for its many imperfections by inscribing it to one whose whole life, public and private, is a consistent, and uniform example of that moral principle; and of those virtues which ought to actuate nations as well as individuals.

I am, SIR,

With the highest respect,

Your most devoted Servant,

THE AUTHOR.



TO WILLIAM ROSSCOE, Esq.

The following sketch is intended  
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which ought to actuate nations as well

I am, Sir,  
With the highest respect,  
Your most devoted servant,  
T. A. Arthur.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

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SINCE these sheets were sent to the press, several discussions have taken place in the two Houses of Parliament relative to the affairs of Portugal. No attempt has, indeed, been made by the most devoted adherents of administration to prove that they had the smallest concern in the Emigration; no one has tried to vindicate, or even to repeat the false statements which were at first published *by authority* respecting this event. And even the advantageous consequences which had once been so fondly anticipated, have scarcely been alluded to by Ministers in open debate. But, for the purpose of throwing upon their predecessors the same blame which their own conduct in the Baltic has drawn down, the Ministers have made some *partial* disclosures of the object of the Expedition sent to Lisbon by the late Ministry, under the Earl of St. Vincent.

In conformity to the new system of policy, which teaches rulers only to defend their measures by trying to shew that other rulers have “done likewise”—and allows this point to be proved by disclosing *scraps* of state secrets, carefully selected for the purposes of a debate, Mr. Canning, who now fills the office once held by Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville, is reported to have thrown in the face of the Opposition, during a debate on the Copenhagen expedition, a few paragraphs of certain “*most secret*” instructions to Lord St. Vincent, directing him to rendezvous in the Tagus with a fleet,



there to expect the arrival of an army, and to make propositions of an important nature to the Portugueze government. The details of this subject cannot be known until the whole of the papers are produced. But taking the account of the plan as said to have been given by Mr. Canning himself, it proves only that the late Ministers acted prudently, vigorously, and with scrupulous justice in the whole of the affair alluded to.

From his statement it appears, that Lord St. Vincent was sent to the *assistance* of Portugal, as soon as Bonaparte threatened to invade that ancient ally—that the Admiral was directed to state the extent of the danger which our government had ascertained then threatened the court of Lisbon, and to animate them *in their own cause*—how?—By demanding their fleet?—By “*asking deposit*” of their whole naval resources?—No such thing—but by offering freely, generously, unconditionally, the powerful aid of the English fleet, and whatever else our vast resources could furnish to the protection of our ally. The only terms imposed were, that Portugal should be resolved to defend herself with our assistance; and for the execution of such a resolution *no pledge* whatever was even hinted at.

If the Portugueze cabinet should reject this liberal offer; if they should think all resistance vain, and should positively refuse to stir in their own cause, although the danger was hourly approaching—then Lord St. Vincent was directed to propose a retreat to the Brazils, and to



renew the former generous offers of assistance, of fleets, armies, and subsidies, for enabling the court to effect this important measure. Still no hint at "*security*"—no talk of "*pledge*"—not a whisper about "*deposit*"—not a glance of the eye towards our ally's ships and arsenal. All that our Government wanted was, to be allowed to help him in defending himself against the pressing danger, or in escaping from it.

A third case was, however, possible, and must be provided for. It was possible that both the former offers might be rejected—that the court of Lisbon might refuse both to fight and to fly—that from timidity, treachery, temporising policy, want of energy, or whatever other cause, they might be found resolved neither to resist the impending danger, nor to retreat before it—that, in short, they might be bent upon a line of conduct which must deliver them over immediately, and of their own free will, into the hands of the common enemy. Then, and not till then, Lord St. Vincent was most wisely and most justly directed to use the proper means for preventing such a misfortune, because our interposition would then be rendered necessary, not by our own fears, but by the conduct of the Portuguese themselves—because it would then be imposed upon us as a duty by the wilful proceedings of the Portuguese cabinet, not recommended by any mean and selfish views of interest. In truth, every man now perceives, that the last case provided for by these instructions is one not merely different from, but quite opposite to, the late case of



Denmark—that the keenest enemies of the late disgraceful expedition, could have had nothing whatever to say against it, if it had only been directed to such a case as the one supposed for Lord St. Vincent's conduct—and that the measures of the present Ministry in the Baltic are universally reprobated, exactly because they omitted the two propositions which the Admiral in the Tagus was directed to make in the first instance, and began with the demand of the fleet, which Lord St. Vincent was never to think of until the Portugueze should throw themselves into the arms of France.

Until the papers explaining the whole of this affair shall be made public, we must rest content with these few remarks on the contrast between the measures of the late and the present Ministers. It may be necessary to add, for the information of such readers as do not accurately recollect the events of 1806, that as soon as the Prussian war turned away Bonaparte's immediate attention from Portugal, Lord St. Vincent was recalled, the army countermanded, and the whole expedition, which had originated in the threatened dangers of our ally, ended in a free offer to assist him in repelling them. Had the planners of the Baltic pillage been then at the head of affairs, who is there so sanguine as to conceive that they would not have taken such steps towards Portugal as would have almost certainly defeated the project of Emigration now so much rejoiced in?



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# THE EMIGRATION

TO

THE BRAZILS.

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**L**ORD STRANGFORD, in his letter to Mr. Canning, dated the 29th of November last, declares, that “ this grand and memorable event is not to be attributed only to the sudden alarm excited by the appearance of a French Army on the frontiers of Portugal. It has been the genuine result of the system of persevering confidence and moderation adopted by his Majesty towards that country.” The conduct of his Majesty’s present Ministers has been on



a late occasion blamed for its harshness, suspicion and rigour, and it must be a matter of great satisfaction to those who did thus blame it, as well as to the country at large, to discover in them qualities of a more amiable nature, and to contemplate the *genuine results* which their persevering confidence and moderation have produced. Many, who have been disposed to deny that they possessed these virtues, will be led to suppose that they assumed them for a specific purpose, and will naturally enquire what important object it could be that put them upon this self-denial. Others will find room for astonishment in taking a retrospective view of their measures, and will be eager to reconcile their apparent inconsistency, in treating one inferior neutral power with cruelty and oppression, and in holding forth to another the most indulgent offers of support and protection. The solution of this problem has been attempted, but not with success. “Denmark (it has been said) betrayed every symp-



“ tom of shyness and disaffection to the cause  
 “ of England, while Portugal faithfully dis-  
 “ charged to her the duties of a dependant  
 “ ally.” How far this assertion is founded  
 in truth, a patient investigation of facts will  
 best determine; and such an inquiry will be  
 doubly satisfactory, when it leads to an es-  
 timate of the immediate and ultimate effects  
 which this emigration is likely to produce on  
 the interests of Great Britain.

It may be of use to trace back the remote  
 causes which brought on this measure, and  
 thus to ascertain the value of the advantages  
 which the alliance with the court of Lisbon  
 confers on this country, and to consider the  
 means by which these advantages may be im-  
 proved. The impression which Ministers are  
 anxious to make on the public mind, of the  
 good resulting from their exertions, naturally  
 excites a spirit of inquiry into the purposes of  
 those exertions; and if they are conscious of  
 having acted from the dictates of true policy  
 and a love of their country, they will have



every thing to hope and nothing to fear from the result of such an inquiry.

Portugal was once in the first rank of European nations in point of wealth and influence. Her power extended along the western and a great portion of the eastern coast of Africa, over the southern parts of Asia, and the islands of the Indian ocean. The acquisition of Brazil opened to her new sources of opulence and strength. She had uncontrolled dominion in all the seas within those boundaries, and could confine the commercial intercourse with both quarters of the world to her own European territory. These vast possessions gave her an importance in the eyes of nations, from which her own circumscribed domain seemed for ever to preclude her. She was respected at home and feared abroad. Happy, had she discovered and adopted the true principles of national glory—had she, with an enlightened and liberal policy, strengthened herself, by cultivating the interests of her colonies—had she learnt to improve by com-



merce what she had gained by conquest! But the genius and spirit of the Portugueze were more fitted to acquire than to preserve; and the meridian of their glory lasted no longer than the lives of those great men who had accomplished it. Portugal abused her power. Her policy was narrow, bigoted, and cruel. By measures as absurd as they were flagitious, she alienated from herself her most valuable possessions, and others she lost by an obstinate adherence to the same line of conduct long after she had seen its fatal tendency. Possessed of a scanty and exposed territory at home, her first duty was to counterbalance it by cherishing her colonial strength; but that strength she wasted in ruinous and persecuting wars, which drained the mother country of her best blood, for the purpose of destroying the very sources of her greatness and prosperity. A long succession of weak and impolitic princes has completed her downfall; and when her history comes to be considered, the wonder will be, not how so mighty an empire should



fall so soon, but how it should have stood so long.

Her ecclesiastical institutions tended to hasten her ruin, and accomplished what political despotism had left undone. When the spirit of liberal opinion enlightened the rest of Europe, the fiends of priestcraft and papal tyranny here found a den to skulk to; and they repaid this hospitality by devising new means of deluding and oppressing the people. No instance could be found more demonstrative of the mode in which superstition and abject slavery act upon each other, than the progressive debasement of the Portuguese nation. Independence and frankness of spirit soon disappeared, and gave place to dastardly submission and hypocrisy. The population became reduced and industry decayed, till the nation gradually dwindled to a shadow of its former self—to a petty state, thinly inhabited by a lazy and uncultivated race of slaves.

The more she declined in strength and consequence, the more did her local position ex-



pose her to the superior power of Spain. But Spain, like herself, was declining, and needed more to exert her remaining energy in preserving her own dominions entire, than in seeking new conquests. Besides, from political and commercial relations, Portugal had become the ally of Great Britain. In the protection of the first maritime power in the world she found a safeguard against any encroachments of her neighbour. The violation of the Portugueze territory would expose the Spanish Transatlantic dominions to equal violation; and thus a perpetual check existed, to which Portugal in great measure owed her preservation.

But the crisis of her fate arrived when France attained that acknowledged and undisputed sway, which laid at her feet all the nations on the continent of Europe. Neither Spain nor Portugal were in a condition to act otherwise than in general obedience to the dictates of Bonaparte. They both made immense sacrifices; the one to preserve his good will,



the other to maintain her neutrality. Both awaited in suspense the mandate of the "Great Nation," when it was announced to the world that the house of Braganza should no longer reign.

What a picture did Portugal hold out at this period of a nation in the lowest state of decline! Her army in a condition of total ruin and decay, ill cloathed and worse paid, distressed and discontented with the harshness and bad faith of government, with officers entirely destitute of rank, fortune, spirit, or honour, ignorant of their profession, and doubtful of subsistence. The navy, though in point of ships better circumstanced, was, with regard to men, if possible, worse. No proper supplies of rigging and stores, no bodies of hardy and experienced seamen, no officers of acknowledged skill and bravery—the whole marine so neglected, that in case of emergency recourse must be had to the pressing of landmen, the worthless and unprincipled rabble of Lisbon.



With respect to finances, the state was, properly speaking, bankrupt. The bad faith of government had ruined its credit, and prevented it from fulfilling its engagements. In the whole department of the treasury there prevailed one system of abuse and peculation. Not a symptom of activity or even common attention appeared in the public functionaries, except in their depredations on the public purse.

Add to this, there existed, as may well be supposed, an utter indifference in the nobility and in the people as to whatever regarded the fate of the country. The only sign of public spirit that appeared, was a considerable degree of ill-humour among the great families, and in the lower orders evident signs of disaffection, where apathy did not prevail.

There was no energy, no virtue in the government, to rouse the people from this state of abasement; nor, indeed, could it be expected; for where a nation is degenerate, its government must be corrupt. The Prince



Regent himself, a man of feeble talents, and of weak and irresolute character, was entirely swayed by his favourites. In his cabinet the French influence had been long predominant. The man of greatest abilities in it was not, perhaps, devoted to their cause; but he had been brought into power by the French party, to the exclusion of those ministers favourable to the English interests. But this was not all which tended to degrade the cabinet of Lisbon. The Prince Regent was governed by favourites, and these were men of the basest character. They had obtained the greatest influence over his mind, naturally weak and quite uneducated. They directed all his pursuits, whether of business or pleasure. They regulated his domestic concerns, and managed at will his behaviour, even to his family. To them even the late prime minister\* was obliged to

\* The count de Villa Verde, who had died a few months before, and whose place was not filled up. He was a man of the meanest talents, devoted to grossly sensual pursuits, incapable of attending to any department of business except the



give way when they chose to interfere in matters of state; and as they had one object in common, the acquisition of wealth, he did it the more freely—he submitted to the slaves, that he might rule the master. Thus a common game was established among them by compromise, and for one common object, the plunder of the public.

This is not the government to raise and direct the energies of a people at a time of public danger. No hope could be entertained for a country thus circumstanced, either from vigorous resistance, or from a manly appeal to the feelings and the mercy of a powerful enemy. The politics and the character of the court of Lisbon were known at Paris, and the result was, that the house of Braganza should reign no longer.

On the 20th of October, 1807, the Prince

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the patronage of office, and insatiable in his thirst for this as well as every other gratification of avarice. It would be difficult, *even at present*, to find in any court in Europe a *premier* so utterly unfit for his station; and this is surely stating the thing pretty strongly.



Regent issued a proclamation, in which, after stating that he has done his utmost to preserve neutrality, and has found it impossible, he has acceded to the cause of the continent, by uniting himself to the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, and to his Catholic Majesty, with the view of accelerating a maritime peace; and therefore orders the ports of his kingdom to be shut against the ships both of war and merchandize belonging to Great Britain, &c. &c.

Hence it appears that the French influence was now more than ever predominant. Yet even that concession did not satisfy Bonaparte. He pursued his measures for dethroning the house of Braganza. This brought on new concessions on the part of the Prince Regent, and he proceeded to the exclusion of British subjects from his dominions. He listened not to the remonstrances of our Chargé d'Affaires, nor to the offers of protection which our government made him. He thought not of "his possessions in America, as affording an ample ba-



“ lance to any sacrifice he might make here.”\*  
 He fondly hoped to retain his European dominions, and with the view of obtaining Bonaparte’s good will and consent, he signed an order on the 8th of November for the detention of British subjects and the seizure of British property. This procedure terminated Lord Strangford’s mission. The proclamation of the 20th October had amounted, according to the new code of the law of nations, to a declaration of war; and, according to a late precedent, illustrative of that code, it might have amply justified the seizure of his fleet and the burning of his capital by the forces of his Britannic Majesty. But our envoy chose rather to adhere to that *persevering confidence and moderation*, which a great power should ever exercise in these cases towards an inferior one. He knew and he foresaw “the genuine results of forbearance and “long suffering.” They are duties sacredly prescribed to individuals, and the duties of individuals, it has been wisely observed, are the

\* See Lord S.’s dispatch.



duties of nations. He proceeded not, therefore, to any violent threats; he presented a final remonstrance to the court of Lisbon, “took  
 “down the arms of England from the gates of  
 “his residence,” and proceeded to the fleet under Sir Sidney Smith, which was then cruizing off the coast of Portugal. The embarkation of Lord Strangford was effected *without loss* on the 17th of November.

It had appeared plainly to Sir Sidney Smith, that the Portugueze government was “so much  
 “influenced by the terror of the French arms  
 “as to have acquiesced in certain demands of  
 “France operating against Great Britain.” The distribution of the Portugueze force, he observed, was made wholly on the coast, while the land side was left totally unguarded.\* British subjects of all descriptions were detained; and it therefore became necessary to inform the Portugueze government, that the

\* It is a remarkable fact, that the first step of our Portugueze allies, when they heard of the Copenhagen business, was to fit out their fleet and to fortify the Tagus.—This precaution *could* only be taken against England—against the perpetrators of the Baltic massacre.



case had arisen which required, in obedience to his instructions, that he should declare the Tagus in a state of blockade.

Lord Strangford "agreeing that hostility " should be met by hostility," the blockade was instituted, and the instructions acted on to their fullest extent. Still, it seems, one object was kept in view, that of inclining the Prince Regent to re-consider his decision of uniting himself to France, and to urge him by every persuasion to emigrate to his dominions in South America.

It appears that they had thus anticipated the desires of ministers; for on the 23d Nov. Lord Strangford received dispatches by the messenger Sylvester, authorising that blockade, in case the Portugueze government should pass the bounds which his Majesty had thought fit to set to his forbearance. These dispatches having been drawn up under the idea that his Lordship was still at Lisbon, he determined to act as if he had not taken his departure, and as though his functions had not ceased. Leave having been given, Sir Sidney Smith furnished



him with a flag of truce, and on the 27th of November he went thither in his Majesty's ship *Confiance*, bearing that flag. His object was to propose to the Portugueze government, as the only condition upon which the blockade could cease, the alternative stated by ministers, either of surrendering the fleet to his Majesty, or of immediately employing it to remove the Prince Regent and his family to the Brazils.

During the interval of Lord Strangford's absence, and while hostilities subsisted between England and Portugal, a considerable change had taken place. News had reached the Prince Regent that the Portugueze territory was violated, and that a French army was in full march for Lisbon. Its hostility would be directed, he feared, against his royal person most particularly. Although the troops which had entered his kingdom came under the declaration and promise not to commit the smallest act of violence, his presence might lead to a dreadful and useless effusion of



blood. He, therefore, had drawn up, THE DAY BEFORE Lord Strangford went to Lisbon, two edictals or proclamations, in one of which he announced his intention of going to reside with his family and court at Rio de Janeiro till the conclusion of a general peace; and having declared the motives of that measure, appointed a regency during his absence. In the other, of the same date (Nov. 26) among a variety of orders referring to his first decree, he gives particular injunctions to preserve tranquillity, and to provide for the troops of the Emperor of the French and King of Italy good quarters and every thing they may require during their stay in the kingdom; averting all and every insult that may be intended, and threatening to punish with rigour any that may occur; commanding that his subjects should “*maintain always the good harmony which ought to be displayed to the armies of nations with whom we find ourselves united on the continent.*”

It appears that when Lord Strangford ar-



rived, the measure of emigration had been fully resolved on, and in part carried into effect. The embarkation had in all likelihood taken place, and all the shipments had been made.\* The royal coffers were not, perhaps,

\* It is most positively asserted by all the British residents in Lisbon who have lately returned, that the Prince was on board of ship when Lord S. went on shore to seek him on the 27th; and that the flag of truce which Sir Sidney sent to request an audience on the 26th, returned with a notification from the Prince, that he was at that moment occupied in embarking. This was the first communication that took place between our envoy and the court of Portugal from the time of his leaving Lisbon, when the Prince of Brazil declared against us. It cannot be doubted that these particulars are entitled to our belief on every account. The proclamations of the Prince are dated Nov. 26th. Lord Strangford saw his Royal Highness late on the 27th; on the 29th the whole Portuguese fleet, royal family, court, troops, property, and all were at sea. This proves of itself the utter folly of conceiving that Lord S.'s conference on the 27th could have affected the proceedings of the court in the smallest degree. Further, the dispatch of Lord S. if carefully examined, does by no means state any thing at all inconsistent with the supposition of his having gone ashore after the Prince Regent embarked. He does not say that he saw the Prince on shore. He carefully avoids stating, in direct terms, that his conference with the Prince had any hand in promoting the emigration. He says nothing which can be construed into a direct attempt at mis-stating the



embarked, for the Prince declares he had exhausted his treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices to preserve neutrality. When Lord Strangford arrived, very little negotiation could be necessary, although his Lordship states “*that very interesting communications took place*, the particulars of which will “be detailed in a future dispatch.” There are many who assert that the interview took place on board the fleet; that the conference

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facts, when the real truth comes to be known. But the dispatch is so drawn up as to make ninety-nine readers in a hundred believe that Lord S. went on shore on the 27th—saw the Prince there—talked him out of his alliance with France—and prevailed upon him to take refuge in the Brazils under the protection of England. It is impossible that Lord S. should have written this dispatch; and the government which so attempts to deceive the public, by ascribing to itself and its agents what does not belong to them, seriously injures the character of the nation over whose affairs it presides. If any additional evidence were wanting, to prove the truth of the statements above made, we might mention that similar assertions have been repeatedly made in the public papers in favour of opposition—and have never been denied by those under the influence of government.



merely consisted of a request made by the Prince Regent for the blockading squadron to let him pass, and of an offer which the British commander made of a force to escort him to Brazil. Certain it is, that on perusing both the edicts which were published the day before this interview, we find no mention made of the *hopes* which the Prince entertained of succour from the British fleet, although there are abundant proofs of apprehensions which he felt from the French army. Whether he judged it prudent to give a colouring to his hopes and apprehensions, in order to leave as favourable a remembrance as possible with the invaders; or whether he did not in some sort apprehend that on passing the bar of the Tagus his fleet might have the same destination which that from the Baltic had a few weeks before: whether any such considerations weighed on his mind or not, he certainly made no shew of dependance on the aid of Great Britain. He, however, accepted the *overtures* of Lord Strangford, and on the 29th the whole fleet, men of



war and merchantmen, to the amount of thirty-six sail, left the Tagus, and passed through the British squadron, under a mutual salute of twenty-one guns. The Prince was attended by the whole royal family of Braganza, together with many of his faithful counsellors and adherents, and other persons attached to his present fortunes. A squadron of four sail of the line was appointed to accompany them, and Lord Strangford having remained with the royal family till the fifth December, left them with a fair wind steering for the Brazils, and returned to England.

On the 19th of December Mr. Canning sent a note to the Lord Mayor, informing him of Lord Strangford's arrival that afternoon, and of the sailing of the Portugueze fleet. On the 21st a Gazette was published, containing his Lordship's and Sir Sidney Smith's letters relative to the emigration. A strange coincidence that Lord Strangford and these dispatches should arrive on the same day, and a period



of three days should elapse ere they were prepared for publication !\*

Incomplete and garbled as they appear to be, still in the great points they agree—namely, that Portugal declared war against England—that our fleet consequently instituted a blockade of the Tagus—that the Prince Regent tried every humiliating means of averting the wrath of Bonaparte—that he only resorted to the protection of England in the last necessity—as a *pis aller*—and that if by any means short of becoming a mere vassal in word and in deed to France, nay of losing his crown, he could have remained, he would have preferred his little kingdom of Portugal to the

\* It is, no doubt, *possible* that Lord S.'s dispatch may have been written off the coast of Portugal, that he sent Mr. Gambier home with it, and arrived himself with the duplicate. He certainly arrived before Mr. Gambier. And if that which he gave in himself coincides with that which Mr. G. brought a few days after, then we shall be entitled at least to believe that the published one was not written after his Lordship's arrival in London. It is to be hoped, *on every account*, that there is such a coincidence.



“augmented strength and splendour” that awaited him in the new world. They further evince, and corresponding circumstances lead us to conclude, that our Ministers had given up the idea of this emigration. Sir John Moore had been ordered from Sicily with a strong force to co-operate (as is most natural to imagine) with Sir Sidney Smith; but how it could happen that no provision or orders for him awaited his arrival at Gibraltar, must be guessed at by those who can judge of the abilities and views of the present Ministers.

The papers in their interest speak highly of this measure, as indicative of the vigour of Government; but in the eyes of all Europe it is more indicative of the vigour of our enemies. In the first place they procured the exclusion of British commerce in Portugal, while they continued to drain that country of its treasure by repeated threats. In the next place, they suffered the Prince Regent to humble himself to all strokes, in order to retain his dominion; and after all they compelled him to take refuge with the British power, which



he did, as his proclamations testify, with great reluctance. In this, as in all other matters, our Ministers, it may be feared, are the dupes of Bonaparte. He was unwilling to burthen his new conquest with the maintenance of a useless vassal, and he was equally averse to staining his character with another crime in destroying the house of Braganza. He foresaw that if he dethroned our ally, and yet kept him a prisoner in Portugal, England would immediately seize upon the Brazils, and retain them in her hands, safe both from his violence and intrigues. He wished to give us no such undivided sway over that rich empire—no such independent footing in South America. It was his interest to retain a strong hold over the rulers of Brazil; to send some one thither who should keep us out of it; to hamper us with a native government, which might possess the colony in trust for him to our exclusion, and return it after the war should be at an end. He wished to occupy our force in distant expeditions, and to ruin us by expenses of blood and treasure. After emptying, there-



fore, the coffers of the Prince Regent, he sends him to get them filled again by England. After banishing him from his native kingdom, he leaves him upon the hands of our Ministers, who have sent a force to settle him in his new dominions, and after that a *chargé d'affaires*, and some barrels of silver to replenish his exhausted treasury. Thus our South American bullion, taken from the ships at Cadiz and from the Spaniards at Buenos Ayres, flows back again to the sources whence it sprung, with a high interest of infamy and curses upon it. Thus has Bonaparte given another proof of his experience in that most complicated and most refined branch of warfare, the art of turning the blind hostility of his adversaries to his own account.

An opinion has lately gone forth, that Portugal, with true fidelity, transmitted to England the overtures which had been made to her, in consequence of secret articles at the treaty of Tilsit, to employ her ships in the projected invasion of these realms. And



Denmark, it is said, for refusing to avow the same communication, and thereby seeming to subscribe to those secret articles, was *visited* by the English fleet. But who does not see, that in a cabinet so discordant and so weak as that of Lisbon, every movement and every project was known to France? Who does not perceive that she had a party there, by whose aid she could work every wire and pulley of the machine; and skilfully apply the vacillation of the Prince Regent to every purpose of annoyance to England.

The bugbear of invasion has ever terrified Ministers out of their common faculties. They certainly should by this time know that Bonaparte never *aims too directly at this object*. He has employed the alarm of invasion heretofore in a way which fully answered his end; and in this bait of secret treaty at Tilsit he only enlisted in his service those spies and informers whom it is our folly to encourage, and whose information has never done us any



good. That in thus laying a snare for our Government he should have produced a mischief to this extent, is a result which probably he himself never foresaw. That England should so grossly abuse her maritime power, and draw down the indignation of states hitherto in alliance with her, by a single act, is a point which he had not yet hoped to gain. In the affair of Portugal he might calculate with more exactness. He knew the avidity with which we should swallow secret information respecting invasion. The possession of eight ships of the line and some frigates would be a prize which we should patiently go all lengths to attain. And, moreover, he knew that the project of emigrating to the Brazils had been pressed upon the Prince Regent at various periods by the British Ministry, and offers of assistance liberally made in furtherance of the measure. He knew that by an act of aggression against Portugal he should drive her to this proceeding, and consequently, when his views became clearer, and



his projects ripened, he put his threat in execution, and the intended consequences ensued.

Thus the emigration of the court of Lisbon was planned by Bonaparte, and our Ministers eagerly lent their hand to execute it. While he takes possession of the ports of Lisbon and Oporto, and shuts up the whole of that kingdom against us, we are employed in transporting to a distant region the house of Braganza, and are sending treasures to augment their strength and splendor. It will now be matter of inquiry, what are the advantages in prospect as a reward for the part we have taken in this adventure. Yet before that part of the subject comes under consideration, it is impossible to avoid contrasting once more the conduct of Ministers towards Denmark with that which they manifested towards Portugal. There is something so problematical and so difficult to expound in all their doings, that no one can view them without declaring either that they are too wise to be found out, or too absurd to be rationally accounted for.



Both these countries were maritime, and both, from their inferior strength, were interested in preserving their neutrality. Denmark had rigidly maintained hers; but Portugal, after making immense sacrifices, threw herself into the arms of France. Of what use was her boasted fidelity to her ancient ally, England, respecting the determinations at Tilsit, when she thus proclaimed her readiness to second those determinations? Yet was her fleet safe from attack, and her capital from bombardment. But Denmark in vain protested to the English agent, Mr. Jackson, when the armament was ready to attack her; she in vain protested that no overtures had been made to induce her to break her neutrality—she in vain asserted her right to maintain that neutrality against any power whatever. These remonstrances were answered at the mouth of the cannon; she was robbed of the means of supporting her independence, and thus thrown on the protection of our enemies, whom this very proceeding has increased in



number and animosity against us. If Ministers have abjured the cause of justice, let them not act contrary to their favourite doctrine of expediency. On a bare supposition that Denmark had joined in the secret articles of Tilsit, they seized her fleet and stormed her capital; then when Portugal openly avowed the cause of France, and declared herself ready to join the maritime league against England, why were Ministers so tardy in their vengeance? Why did they not hasten Sir John Moore from Sicily, and order him to act in concert with Sir Sidney Smith in forcing the passage of the Tagus? But indeed the Portuguese had taken warning by the example of Denmark, and were determined to be better prepared. All the disposition of their force was made, as Sir Sidney Smith says, on the coast; the land side was left wholly unguarded. This shews that they apprehended more hostility by sea than by land. A sudden panic turned the scale in our favour; the Prince Regent of himself, and without the smallest communication from us, determined to take refuge in his co-



lony of Brazil ; we offered assistance, he accepted it, and his court and followers sailed for South America, under convoy of four British ships of the line. The colonies of Denmark are to be attacked and her traffic ruined, while British wealth and British influence are exerted in favour of a power which had forsworn our cause.

Let it not be said that the Danes had the same chance of purchasing our assistance by surrendering their fleet. They had sworn to preserve their neutrality, and they were resolved to maintain their independence. The plea of compulsion would not have availed before the states of the continent. They would have said—you ought to have pushed it to the last extremity, and have left it to the honour of England, whether to persevere in this unjustifiable demand or not. They did push it to the last extremity—they did leave it to the honour of England. They lost their independence, and she her honour.

It will be for posterity to judge dispassionately of these transactions. A stain remains



on the English name, which her Ministers have not power to wipe away. Not on the Cabinet of England has Europe fixed her eyes—it is on her parliament, on the congregated representatives of the people, on the people itself that she now looks with doubt and apprehension. It was to England that she once could look for support with confidence—it was on England that she depended as the last champion of her liberties—it was England, once arbitress of the world, and patroness of public justice, that she invoked to establish peace and harmony in her distracted regions. She now looks on England with other eyes; she views her as a culprit arraigned at the tribunal of nations, and she bids her place her deliverance on God and the righteousness of her cause. Let her clear herself not by recriminations on her adversary, not by saying that “such things are done and suffered among you,” but by appealing to those eternal principles of truth and justice, without which the dispute can never cease, and war may be waged eternally, for



without them peace is but a hollow and an empty name.

The transfer of the Portugueze government from Lisbon to the Brazils,\* had long been regarded as a measure rendered indispensably necessary by the increasing difficulties of the mother country. Possessed of a narrow and defenceless territory at home, and of a fertile, extensive, and compact colony in South America, the Prince Regent, on considering the perils which surrounded him here, and the safe and honourable retreat which awaited him there, would have been less tardy in making his election, had his mind been capable of liberal and extended views. He might have recollected that his ancestors had not hesitated to prefer this step to the probable loss of their dominion from the encroachments of their hostile neighbour, and from France the natural ally of Spain, and that had England not been able to save them, by brilliant

\* Dumouriez, *Etat Present de Portugal*, liv. ii. c. 9.



campaigns in North America and the West Indies, from the power of the Bourbons, they would have carried that measure into execution. He had still greater motives for emigration; for the late political changes in Europe had all contributed to overthrow the independence of Portugal. He has at length been forced by a humiliating panic, into a line of conduct which prudence and the good of his country had not power to dictate.

The province of Brazil\* possesses many advantages of situation and resources. Its long line of sea coast and its excellent harbours, with the variety of timber which it produces, afford it every facility of becoming a great naval power. It is the most populous district of all South America, and the commercial turn of its inhabitants might, if wisely directed, contribute highly to improve these natural advantages. Its favourable position for

\* I have taken the whole that relates to Brazil from Brougham's Colonial Policy, vol. i. p. 87, 470—484; and refer the reader to that work for a more ample view of the subject.



trade with Africa and the East Indies gives it a decided superiority over every other part of the peninsula. It seems to need only an energetic government to cultivate and employ all these resources, and by wise and temperate measures to lay the solid foundations of a mighty empire.

The way in which the emigration has at length been conducted, affords at first sight many grounds of joy and exultation to the court of Portugal. Its navy and its fleets of merchants-vessels with a numerous host of settlers, protected by the first maritime power in the world, the prospect of a peaceable establishment among their transatlantic brethren, and the assurance of a nearer and closer alliance with Great Britain, are circumstances calculated to cheer the drooping hopes of the family of Braganza. After he has been confirmed and settled in his new dominion, should the Prince of Brazil entertain projects of extending it, he may calculate with certainty on ample assistance



from the arms of England, especially when it is considered how anxious our government must be to retrieve the losses which have attended our late expeditions in that quarter.

The commercial relations of this country with the new kingdom of Brazil will also be considered as fraught with mutual benefit. The extension of such a trade between the two states as would create new channels for the produce and manufactures of one, while it contributed to the increasing prosperity and welfare of the other, might in time create an ample balance for the interruption of the ancient connection, which so long subsisted between England and Portugal. A new stimulus would be given to the people of Brazil, by the influence of a native government within their boundaries; the various and valuable products of the soil would be raised in greater abundance, and supplied with greater regularity in proportion as their intercourse with this country became enlarged and secured. A reciprocity of benefit would thus



ensue, and so long as England keeps the dominion of the seas, they would continue to increase in spite of the hostile influence of France, and the violence of her ruler.

These are the golden dreams which haunt the slumbers of the Prince Regent, while the breezes of the tropics waft him to Brazil. These are the views which the sanguine hopes of our merchants catch with avidity, and contemplate with fond anticipation. These are the prospects which revive the deadened spirit of enterprize in our marts and harbours, and give a new impulse to our stagnant commerce. But the reverse of the picture ought to be contemplated. Our countrymen ought to be cautioned from a too ardent pursuit of the rewards which attend their exertions. They should remember that all political changes must be gradual and slow, or they will not be lasting. They should recollect the embarrassments which arise from an overflow of commerce to a colony where commerce is still in its infancy, and where it has been cramped in



its growth by odious institutions and absurd monopolies. The profit of such a commerce depends upon contingencies, and must be hoped for with moderation. The husbandman sows only on such land as is prepared by previous culture, and his harvest must be brought forth by the regular and propitious return of the seasons. It is but too likely that this maxim may be forgotten, and when the present state of our commerce is considered, the excess of speculation and enterprize is of all errors the most to be dreaded. On every occasion that evil is the prolific source of others, but in this particular case there are arguments of the most important nature to deter us from it, and they deserve to be separately and distinctly stated.

1. The territory of Brazil when first discovered by the Portugueze was inhabited by savage tribes, and was remarkable only for its extent and fertility. As it was wanting to all appearance, in those precious commodities which rendered her other acqui-



sitions objects of national avarice, and moreover as it required industry and perseverance to improve its resources, the Portugueze for a long time neglected it. During the period of their Asiatic conquests this colony was slowly peopled by malefactors, and by those whom the persecuting system of the times drove from the mother country. Among the latter were a great body of Jews, the victims of the cruel bigotry of the Inquisition. These carried over with them the industry and skill by which they had enriched European Portugal. Under their cultivation the country flourished, and the attention of Government was by degrees attracted to this encreasing source of national opulence. Encouragement was given to Portugueze settlers by permitting them to subject large tracts of land, which they held as fiefs to the crown, with absolute power over the natives whom they conquered, and with all the prerogatives of royalty except capital jurisdiction, coinage and tythes. Thus the country was parcelled out to these



territorial lords and their subvassals to a very great extent. This arrangement, though ultimately detrimental, had the immediate effect of drawing to the colony a number of adventurers from the mother country. The whole of Brazil was thus subdued, and gradually cultivated. It was productive of various useful articles, particularly of the woods peculiar to that region. The demand for sugar gave rise to the importation of Negroes from the opposite coast of Africa; and the shortness of the passage, together with the extent of Portugueze settlements in that quarter enabled the Brazilians to carry on this traffic with uncommon facility.

This colony was conquered by the Dutch in the early part of the seventeenth century, but it was subsequently restored to the Portugueze without any unfavourable consequences from the change.

The discovery of the gold and diamond mines at the beginning of the eighteenth century gave a new importance to the settle-



ment. A series of absurd and impolitic institutions was the offspring of this discovery. Companies were formed and monopolies granted. The colonies suffered in common with the mother country from that short sighted administration which, to alleviate the miseries of the people, ordained the destroying of a third of the vines of Portugal and the sowing of the ground with grain. By a succession of measures equally impolitic the commerce of Brazil was distressed and injured to such a degree, that it might seem as if the government had studied to derive the least possible benefit from her foreign possessions. Other nations adopted more liberal and judicious plans of œconomy, and thus their trade flourished, while that of Portugal languished and died away. She had suffered from successive revolutions, which only served to give her new tyrants, more narrow-minded and bigoted than those who preceded them. Thus did this powerful country owe her decline to the faults of her governors. She retains only



the fragments of her former greatness; yet by a better system of policy she might unite them and again become powerful and independent.

Brazil, as has been before observed, is the most valuable colony of Portugal. It is better governed and peopled than any of the Spanish dominions; its position is more compact and its force more concentrated. Its proximity to Africa, and connexions there, afford it every facility of cultivation by the Negroes; while their admixture with the Indian race, and the firm alliance of the most warlike tribes, render this advantage as safe to the colony as the smaller proportion of slaves is to the Spanish settlements. Further, the possession of Brazil has secured to Portugal the powerful alliance of Great Britain, which late events have strengthened in a great degree. It yielded to the mother country a revenue equal to one fourth\* of its na-

\* This is the estimate given by Mr. Brougham (Col. Policy. vol. 1.) but later accounts make the proportion somewhat smaller.



tional income, and was the source of a great proportion of its commerce. It may be safely affirmed that the possession of this territory has constituted the only stay and prop of the falling fortunes of Portugal.

So far the history of Brazil has been glanced over; it is now time to examine the character of its inhabitants and the present state of the colony. The admixture of Jewish blood in its population has produced its usual fruits, avarice and low cunning. These characteristics are mingled with the indolence peculiar to all countries where the necessaries of life are easily procured, and where riches are accumulated with facility. Indolence is the parent of many vices. These have flourished as in a genial soil, and their contamination has spread far and wide. The Negroes have imbibed them; their licentiousness and base vices are proverbial. Who indeed can contemplate the monstrous offspring of slavery and corruption without horror! By absurd



sumptuary laws the government thought to check the growth of luxury. They forbid the wearing of gold and silver, the produce of the colony. Thus the evil was augmented; for the money that would have been spent that way, went to purchase useless domestic slaves. The progress of dissipation and licentiousness was thus accelerated; and according to the evidence of travellers and historians, the Brazilian towns are polluted by every vice that can disgrace humanity. The country parts are at present comparatively free from those evils, but the contagion of vice in a torrid climate is more rapid than that of the plague.

It is to such a community that settlers from Europe are introduced; it is with such a people that their trade must be established. What a momentous duty has Great Britain to perform! She has set the glorious example to the commercial world of abolishing the slave trade in her own colonies. She must prove that she was in earnest in



that great work, by procuring its abolition from the face of the earth. This doubtless will be the first way in which her influence with new Portugal will be exerted. No views of temporary expediency will avail —she must strike at the root of the evil. By this measure she will for a while retard the advantages of her commerce with Brazil ; but they will flow to her in future with increased plenty, and the blessings of heaven will attend them.

Another characteristic of the Brazilians is fanaticism. This owes its origin to the Inquisition established in that state. The intercourse with Great Britain should tend to efface that repulsive passion, and to counteract its effects. But this also must be a work of time and exertion ; it will at first embarrass the intercourse of the two nations ; and unhappily the known principles of the present ministry are not the best calculated to smooth away such difficulties.

2. The next point to be enumerated is the in-



novation caused by the settlement of the Royal Family in Brazil. The revenues arising from it when a colony, amounted, as before stated, to one fourth of the national income. The establishment of the court will doubtless be different, but it will require great revenues to give it augmented strength and splendor. Treasure from England must in the first instance fill the Royal coffers of Braganza; but they will have to be supplied by the resources of the country. An increased trade will improve these resources; but the demand will for a time be greater than the means of supply. Much may undoubtedly be hoped from the lessons which adversity must have taught the Prince Regent; but he is not an Alfred nor a William Penn. His are not the faculties to rouse a people to activity and virtue; to cherish the germs of independence and industry where they appear, and to plant them where they are wanting. He will not be the hero to second the efforts of our ministers, to banish from his domi-



nions the destructive and ignominious slave-trade. His education and habits of life are so diametrically opposite to those of our *no popery* administration, that he will rather be inclined to resist than to acquiesce in their measures for enlightening the minds of his people on the subject of religion.

Perhaps it may here be said that no interference of this kind will be attempted, and that matters of conscience will be suffered to take their course unmolested. It may be their object to put him in quiet possession of his transatlantic dominions and leave him there. If so, the prospect of a flourishing trade with Brazil is more distant than ever. It is only by active aid that Great Britain can expect reward for the sacrifices and the exertions she has made for the illustrious house of Braganza. She must not only secure them in their inheritance, but new model their institutions, and improve the genius and habits of the people. If she neglect this great point, she will have no reward



but a temporary mart for her merchandize, which will be soon glutted, and produce no lasting benefits. The opening of a new empire in South America will then dwindle to a traffic of the wares of this country, for the gold, and drugs, and cotton, and woods of Brazil. These are not the considerations which prompted Lord Strangford to call the Portugueze emigration, a "grand and memorable event." It is to a comprehensive scheme for conquering and cultivating the continent of South America, that the labours of the British Ministry will be directed. The measures which they have of late taken with respect to European intercourse, prove that they consider Britain independent of commerce; and on this principle they will sacrifice the consideration of a few cargoes of merchandize to the grand object of the emigration. Hence again arises a just ground of concluding, that the intercourse with Brazil should at first be limited,



and that time should be given for their great plan to unfold itself.

3. The project of establishing the Portuguese government in South America by British influence, brings into remembrance our late affairs with the Spanish Colonies. A paltry and unauthorized expedition to Buenos Ayres laid the foundation of a series of disasters and disgraces to the British Arms, which will not soon be forgotten, either by our enemies or by ourselves. The country may now fairly calculate her gain or loss by those expeditions. She has made no addition to her wealth, for that is going back again; she has not acquired an acre of territory, for she has been forced to surrender, and totally to evacuate the country. She has lost some of her bravest troops, and the others who return thence, return with the galling consciousness of defeat, which while it damps their ardour adds fire to that of the Spaniards. She has acquired no glory or respect to her name;



on the contrary it is coupled with disgrace and contempt among the Spaniards of South America, and this will prove no very warm recommendation to her friends in Brazil. It is natural then that this country should be anxious to redeem her losses and repair the injury she has there suffered, in fame, in troops, and in treasure, by a more worthy exertion of her military force in that quarter. And there is every reason to conclude that an expedition for this end must be on a different scale from any that preceded it. The Spaniards are flushed with success, and prepared for another attack. They will not again be taken by surprize. A war may not terminate by the storming of a fort or the taking of a town. Campaign after campaign may be fought, and the object may not be accomplished. There will however be the prospect of a refuge against defeat, and a strong hold in case of danger offered to us in the dominions of our ally. Yet this alliance may involve even him in wars with the neigh-



bouring colonies, especially if French intrigue travels thither with its usual quickness, and circulates with its usual subtilty.

And here, who is there that regrets not the unfortunate series of expeditions of this country to South America? Is it not matter of chagrin, that our arms should have met with these disgraces. Might they not, if directed by wise and well concerted plans, have been attended with the same eclat, and the same triumphs as those which wait on the French arms in Europe? Our troops are equally brave and equally active; yet their bravery and activity have been wasted by the blunders of greedy adventurers and bad generals. In a few weeks France conquered Austria, and vanquished Russia; in a few weeks she overthrew the Prussian monarchy, drove the Russian Emperor back into his dominions, and forced him into a peace. Yet it has required months to gain a footing for our forces in an obscure Spanish settlement, from which they have been at length disgracefully driven.



In the same time, by a better application of our power, South America might now have been conquered.

It is natural to conjecture, that this favourite scheme of ministers will now be renewed. We hear daily of projected expeditions to South America, and no doubt they are connected with the grand plan of conquest, which the Portugueze emigration has given rise to. For reasons already stated, these military operations will tend to narrow and obstruct the channels of commercial intercourse. There is so much labour to recommence, so many battles to fight over again, and withal so many disadvantages which our own blunders have created, to surmount, that it will in all probability be long ere a regular trade is settled with the Portugueze colony. Whatever may be said of the energies of war, peace is the handmaid of commerce. It is peace that must ensure the sowing and the planting, it is in peace that the harvest must be gathered. It is peace that must secure to the



labourer and the artisan the rewards of their industry, and above all, it is in peace alone that an infant commercial colony can thrive and flourish. If we would supply the commerce which war has lost us in Europe, we must beware how we kindle the flames of it in those regions where we now direct our views. The prospect in South America is not a clear one; we have pursued too closely our old practice of creating difficulties to ourselves. We form great hopes in the establishment of our ally in his colonial territories; but we took care to create a due portion of animosity against us, ere we escorted him to his new home. We caused our name to be execrated from one end of that peninsula to the other;\* that when our flag should appear off their coasts, the inhabitants might be ever ready to take up arms, and to excite

\* No Spanish proclamation has been published during the present war, without a preamble alluding to the disgraceful affair of the frigates, and now the siege of Copenhagen is added.



the subjects of our friend and ally to rebel. Thus, in order that we might continually feel the extent of our power, we created a perpetual necessity of exercising it.

4. They know little of the character of Bonaparte, who think that he will be satisfied with excluding our commerce from Lisbon and Oporto, and with occupying our force in distant expeditions. By shipping off the Prince Regent, he has virtually created him his viceroy over Brazil. He holds the territory of Portugal as surety for his good behaviour while in that office. The ties which bind the colony to the mother country he will draw closer and closer. He will offer every temptation to the Transatlantic Portuguese. He has already published a sort of invitation to them to continue their commerce to their native ports, and he will take care that the old channels shall be free and uninterrupted. It is against England that his never sleeping enmity is directed. He has banished



her from the continent as much by his intrigues as by the force of his arms; a treaty has been as fatal as a battle. Each new measure of policy furnishes materials for another still more complicated; so that by the multitude of experiments he has already so successfully made, he is now more and more an adept in the science of chicanery. Our maritime power is no barrier to this species of warfare. It defies the resistance or the pursuit of fleets and squadrons. It travels like the stealing pestilence, unseen, except in its effects.

It has already been observed that he had a powerful party in the court of Lisbon. These friends to his interest are still near the prince, and belong to the council which governs him entirely. In vain might our government attempt to purchase their services by bribes. Mercenary and treacherous as they are, they have so much dread of their patron and so little respect for the abilities of



our ministers, that they would not hesitate to pocket the fee of their corruption, and dupe their benefactors. Let us recollect that the very last act of the Prince's authority when he quitted the Tagus, was to enjoin the most respectful homage to be paid to the French troops, "*as belonging to the power with whom he was united on the continent.*"

It may be asserted indeed, that the Prince and his territory are now completely in our power; and that he can only move as we direct him. But any control on our part will be a violation of the terms on which he accepted of our protection.—“No matter,” say the partizans of ministers, “it will be the imperious duty of government, to wean him from his attachment to his native land, and by persuasion, or compulsion, to destroy that partiality which he evinces towards France. Should he prove refractory, and still suffer himself to be misled, we can at all events seize and bring home his fleet.”

Thus a fruitful source of vexation and dis-



agreement is ready to spring from this union of the house of Braganza with our South American projects. Either his colonies will imbibe that unnatural and strange dislike to the mother country which America shewed to England ere she revolted, and thus refuse him a settlement; or they will warmly espouse his cause.

If they be disposed to revolution, no chance is left us of aggrandizement in America but conquest; and, if they espouse his cause, we are bound to treat them in all respects as an independent people. Here let it be remembered, that among all our well known schemes for subduing South America, or at least of establishing a commercial intercourse with that Peninsula, one measure was constantly suggested;—we must urge the Spanish colonies to throw off the yoke and assert their independence. We have therefore to proceed on this mighty enterprise with the cap of liberty in one hand, and the crown of Portuguese despotism in the other. Whilst we



rivet the allegiance of his colonies to our ally, we sow the seeds of disaffection and alienation in those of his European neighbours. Are not the governments of Spain and Portugal twin sisters in tyranny and persecution? Will not an exhortation to the Spanish settlements to shake off their chains be in effect a libel on the crown and dignity of the Prince Regent? Will not his subjects in Brazil be roused into action by these measures, sooner than by any patriotic exertions which their governor can possibly make?

It will require the invention of a Machiavel to devise a line of policy to answer these contradictory purposes. No scheme, no project appears so full of peril and difficulty as this of freeing South America. If we take the safest path, and leave the court of Lisbon to manage for themselves, there is every reason to believe, that they will renew the trade to Portugal and revive their relations of amity with France. For before they left Europe, they seemed to be seized with that epidemic dread



of English alliance which is so general among the nations of the continent; and they will doubtless endeavour to do without it as soon as they can. This strong prejudice against England daily gains ground, and on a review of late occurrences it is hard to tell whether we or the French take most pains in propagating it.

Of one thing at least we may be sure. Bonaparte will employ all his talent for intrigue to outwit us in this as he does in every other affair; and our ministers have yet to shew that they can be a match for him. We have been baffled both in warfare and in negotiation in the most unaccountable and complicated way; our adversary has uniformly put us upon that line of conduct, which while we thought it counteracted his views, effectually seconded them; making at the same time our enemies despise us, and making enemies of our friends.

Thus on a review of the probable consequences of the Portugueze emigration, it ap-



pears that we are not to expect much immediate advantage from that measure. The present state of Brazil—the necessity for abolishing the slave-trade—the innovations and changes attending the establishment of the ancient seat of government in one of its colonies—the prospect of long and ruinous wars in South America,—and the intrigues of the French to destroy our new alliance—are all considerations which should caution us against speculating too deeply on the chance of a reviving commerce. It will be a more pleasing occupation to contemplate the ultimate benefits likely to arise from this event, and to calculate how all the obstacles just recapitulated may best be overcome.

From causes already shewn, the Prince Regent will find the colony which he has chosen for his retreat, in a very backward state of improvement. He will see the effects of those despotic regulations which have blasted its rising prosperity, and cramped its growth. In consequence of absurd restrictions and



odious monopolies, the country is many degrees poorer, and more uncivilized, less peopled, and worse cultivated than it would have been under a more genial and free government. The population, according to Sir G. Staunton, amounts to 200,000 whites, and 600,000 other inhabitants.\* The present state of society among them has already been noticed, and the prospect of its amelioration by free intercourse with Great Britain pointed out. The intercourse which heretofore subsisted was shackled and confined. Brazil was supplied with British goods from Portugal, and also directly from our own colonies, notwithstanding the rigorous prohibitory laws to prevent smuggling. In return for our manufactures thus transmitted, both in the regular way through the mother country, and by contraband traffic to the colony, Great Britain received through the same channels the pro-

\* This is below the truth; but the current estimates are ludicrous exaggerations of it.



duce of Brazil—gold, cotton, woods, and drugs. This trade, although obstructed, was very considerable ; so that an extensive market for British goods is already open, and, according to the authority above quoted, has of late been overstocked with our manufactures. Should the court of Rio de Janeiro adopt a more liberal policy, the obstacles which impeded its commerce will in time be removed. Hence the industry of the inhabitants will be roused, more commodities will be raised than before, and more of our goods consumed in exchange. The population will proceed more rapidly ; a regular and increasing commerce will subsist between the two countries. But these advantages can only be calculated on as the results of that more enlightened system of government which it is the Prince of Brazil's duty to adopt, and the interest of this country to encourage. Liberality and moderation cannot soon supplant those principles of bigotry and despotism which are so deep rooted in the breasts of his counsellors. It



must be after a lapse of years, when the precepts and example of this country shall have had due weight with them, that they may be expected to forsake their perverse institutions. Then, as industry and commerce are encouraged and protected, the new kingdom may rise to that importance for which it seems formed by nature. By a wise course of proceeding on the part of this country and its own governors, Brazil may become all that our warm anticipation figures it at present. Meantime individual instances of successful speculation may occur, but they will not affect the general truth of the proposition, that a change in the principles of its governors must precede the improvement of the nation, and any further increase of its commerce with this country must depend on the increase of its population, and the more industrious cultivation of its territory.

It will in a great measure rest with England to effect this favourable change in the government of Brazil. In order to reap, in their full



extent the advantages of her connection with this new kingdom, she must adopt a different line of conduct from that which she now pursues, and forego the idea of an immediate good in the prospect of attaining a lasting benefit. She must, as has before been hinted, abolish the slave trade of Brazil.

When we consider the members who compose the Portugueze cabinet, all deficient in energy, and all actuated by a narrow and shortsighted policy, we may easily guess the effect which a proposal of this nature will have on their minds. They will foresee in it, not the future glory and prosperity of their country, but its ruin and downfal. Nor can we be surprised at that, when we perceive enlightened people even in this country asserting that such a measure ought never to be urged. It would interfere, say they, with the established order of things in Brazil, and would produce confusion and uproar at a time when concord and tranquillity are most to be recommended. They do not recollect, that of all states where



slavery exists, Brazil is the one where the abolition of the traffic is most absolutely necessary, and that from the nature of its present circumstances, this is the most proper and convenient time for accomplishing that great object. The prince regent is bound by every tie of duty and of interest to follow the example which Britain holds forth to him. In framing a new system of government it behoves him to copy those institutions which form the basis of her greatness, and which give permanence to her prosperity. He may not indeed possess talents equal to the exigencies of his arduous situation, but he may remember that it is sometimes the property of misfortune to create talents, or at least, to call them into action. How could he better begin the task than under the influence and direction of a powerful ally, who is pledged to accomplish so glorious an undertaking, and who will therefore the more freely second all his measures to that end? The righteousness of his cause will engage the persevering co-opera-



tion of his best subjects, and the prospect of the incalculable good resulting from it will give energy to their exertions, and will ensure their success.

It is from that epoch that the commercial prosperity of Brazil will be dated. No nation can be great or independent where the importation of slaves is permitted; and that government which, by wise and well timed measures effects the complete abolition of the trade, and prepares the way for the gradual destruction of slavery, opens to itself new sources of power and new means of support. But in this particular instance, the most memorable results may be foreseen. The very root of the abomination will be destroyed, and all its ramifications will die away of themselves. From the condition of a miserable and oppressed colony, Brazil will rise to the rank of a free and powerful state. She will then avail herself of her natural advantages to their full extent. Possessed of a fertile and vast territory, with an extent of coast alike favourable



to commerce with Europe and with India, commanding the navigation of the Amazons, and enabled to seize at any time the keys of the Plata, she would have at her control the Spanish and French colonies, and would subject to her own dominion the immense continent of South America.

Romantic and visionary as this prospect may seem, it is capable of being realised. Many and great difficulties lie in the way, but they are not insuperable. They arise principally from the policy which France will employ to confine the cabinet of Lisbon to their former bigoted views, and from the means she will use to cause England to second that policy. If her intrigues on this occasion be as successful as her former ones, we shall reap just the same advantages from our protection of the house of Braganza, as we have done from our subsidies to the different nations of Europe. We shall have purchased our own discomfiture and disgrace.



Indeed the conduct which can render our interference with Portugal truly beneficial, by attaining those great objects before stated, is only a branch of that total change in the public measures of this country, which she is now called upon to make. She must relinquish those schemes of conquest and aggression which serve only to sow the seeds of continental war, and embroil the nations of the earth in endless discord. She must seek to wipe away that evil name with which she is branded in every quarter of the globe, by recurring to the policy which she has forsaken, and by being foremost to espouse the cause of justice and truth. She must try to recover that credit and that respect from foreign nations, which by rash and ill advised measures she has lost. The war which we carry on with France, we are told is a national war, a war to preserve our independence. It rather resembles a contest where each party strives to destroy the other from a principle of wanton malice, and by means as



horrid as they are unprecedented. What has been the progress of this national war? In every year of its continuance France has gained and England has lost. It may be said, indeed, that the maritime power of the latter has continued to increase, and that it forms the only barrier to the overgrown power of her rival. This is the great obstacle to a peace; the two greatest countries in the world are to employ the immense power they possess to effect their mutual destruction. Even if we could boast of two men, of power and political talent *combined*, equal to those who direct the French government, the contest would only be continued in a way more widely fatal to the interests and welfare of mankind. It seems then as if Providence had ordained that we should be overmatched in what is called state-policy, in order that we may rest our defence and safeguard in uprightness and integrity of heart.

No nation ever had the courage to adopt the



pure principles of justice as the sole rule of its public dealings. Yet they form the sum of all wisdom as well of individuals as of nations. In pursuing a conduct incompatible with those principles, man often falls into error, or wanders wide of his aim; but in acting up to the dictates of eternal justice he may be confident as to the results of his actions; they will always in the end be successful. This, then is the course which England may pursue with the certainty of effecting a glorious deliverance from the perils with which she is environed. If she swerve neither to the right hand nor to the left from the true line of rectitude, she will regain the eminence from which she is falling, and will be able to give peace to the world.

A very brief consideration of the circumstances in which she is placed would point out where this policy ought to begin, and would demonstrate the necessity of its immediate operation.



Among the causes assigned for the late conduct of our government towards Denmark and Portugal, there is one which has claimed repeated notice. The secret treaty of Tilsit purposed to engage all the fleets of the continent for the invasion of Ireland. This seems to be the watch-word to rouse all the fears of our ministers, and to inspire them with the wild panic of madmen. Ireland is the phantom that haunts them day and night. Every wind that blows from Europe makes their nerves shiver for the fate of Ireland. Yet how does this paternal solicitude influence their conduct towards that country? They resort to the most temporising and futile means to quiet their alarms.—They apply caustics to the extremities when the disorder is praying on the vitals.

We read of ministers, in English history, who would have acted differently in a crisis like the present. *They* would have striven by measures of justice and benevolence to regain



the affections of the Irish nation, and to secure their loyalty. They would have perceived how that generous people can be roused in the cause of independence, and would have built up a tower of strength in their heart that might defy the fleets and armies of all Europe. Instead of wasting the national strength in useless expeditions, tarnishing the national honour by attacks on neutral states, or sending fleets and treasure to support a hollow ally, they would have found means to establish peace and unanimity at home, and to prepare the minds of all the subjects of these realms for a crisis more momentous than any that ever threatened them.

Do not these alarms respecting Ireland operate as a motive for carrying on the war, and as a perpetual bar to pacification? Do we not dread, from the manifest conduct of Bonaparte now, that he would in the event of a peace, seize every means of severing the sister kingdom from us? Then by what impe-



rious motives are we not impelled to reconcile all the differences that may exist, and to inspire one common sentiment of attachment and loyalty into the people of both countries? Compared with this object all other considerations are trifling. The possession of Brazil might be important to us. The planting of an independent empire in South America, to open new channels for our commerce, might be a high and magnanimous undertaking. But it is much more important, and at the same time much more magnanimous to consolidate our native strength and to improve our domestic resources. It is of greater moment to destroy those hopes which Bonaparte has formed of sowing dissensions among us, and to convince him by a temperate and enlightened policy that we know how to secure our dominions against his open violence or his secret intrigues. That proof so given, would be the first step towards forcing him to fair and equitable negociation. It would



be an earnest of our adopting those lofty principles, against which neither his strength nor his cunning can prevail. Whatever might be the relative advantages of the two countries, there would then be no need of humiliation or concession. We should have proved to the French Ruler, and to all the world, that we are a great, a united, an invincible people. The confirmation and assurance of the equal benefits of our constitution to every subject of the united kingdom, would place us on an eminence as high and as stable as that to which France has raised herself. No obstacles would then exist to pacification, for each party would anxiously strive to remove them. England would regain her true glory—she would be the nation *without fear and without reproach*. Her example would be remembered to the end of time, for she would have achieved the most glorious of all conquests, the conquest of herself. Her commerce



would then resume its natural channels; it would go on augmenting while there were territories on the earth to explore and cultivate, and while mankind continued to increase and multiply.

The necessity for prolonging war is principally created by dread of a disunion among ourselves. It must therefore depend on us to destroy that necessity, and thus to compel France to acknowledge the folly of continuing a contest so totally destitute of an object. We must relinquish that fatal doctrine of expediency, the source of so many errors, and the cause of so many curses on our country. We must renounce that principle of retaliation, the passion of narrow souls, and cherish the christian virtues of magnanimity and benevolence. We must cease to defend and vindicate our late outrage on Denmark, and seek to atone for it. By being consistent only in measures of ruinous warfare, we continue to



create fresh enemies, and to destroy the remains of our commerce. By persevering in a system of universal blockade, we only fall into a snare laid for us by our enemies, and though it may injure them much, it will hurt us more. By declaring ourselves independent of commerce, we break one of those bonds which unite nations together in amity and friendly connection, and we propagate a doctrine of misanthropic repulsion and exclusion. It is necessary that the earth should be cultivated, and that the produce of one region should be exchanged for that of another. Society is held together by the varied labours and functions of its members, and the great family of nations is connected by the same relations of mutual wants which subsist among the individuals of each separately.

That spirit of rectitude which ought to unite us among ourselves as a nation, would soon lead us to an amicable adjustment of our differences with those states which have broken



off their connection with us. It would thence bring about a gradual reconciliation with those powers with whom we are in actual war, and would put an end to that deep-rooted animosity which has so long grown between us and our rival. The establishing of such a peace would create a spirit of peace, and the remembrance of the miseries of war, contrasted with the happy state of things resulting from concord and amity would tend to confirm it. We might then enjoy the full fruits of our exertions, and look forward every year to an increase of prosperity and happiness.

How long then shall we continue these temporising schemes, and indulge these vain and transitory hopes? It is idle to talk of the acquisition of Brazil as a total indemnification for the loss of our trade to the Baltic, of our intercourse with Portugal, the last of our European connections, and of our commerce with America. We have been driven to such consolation by one species of delusion




after another, as if in contempt of our common reason. By a worthy exertion of our faculties, and by a total change of policy, we may regain all these advantages, and repay ourselves with interest for the loss. But even the remote benefits of this memorable emigration will be blasted and withered in the germ, if we continue to vie with France in acts of aggression and of spoil.


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














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