

to be sent to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~Princes~~ Prince KANIN and Prince SAIONJI  
(~~has been~~ designated)

(The above is just a general outline of the plan. Though the plan has been <sup>a detailed</sup> drafted <sup>in regard to</sup> ~~in~~ details on each respective matter, the details are omitted due to its complexity.)

On this day at midnight, the plan was completed. Just before disbanding Col SHIGEFUJI tried to distribute <sup>to each individual</sup> secret ~~secret~~ funds <sup>and activity</sup> for conferences <sup>from the secret fund</sup> for its activities. (Note: Questions arose later on this secret ~~secret~~ fund.) Lt Col SAKATA and I determinedly opposed it and refused it. <sup>this</sup> I returned it with Lt Col SAKATA so that it can be <sup>is attributable to the character of</sup> ~~is attributable to the character of~~ <sup>with foresight and appropriate leadership from peace</sup> ~~with foresight and appropriate leadership from peace~~ <sup>time</sup> ~~time~~ and after peace has been established. Col SHIGEFUJI and Lt Col HASHIMOTO were greatly delighted as if everything had already been accomplished. However, I ~~could not~~ <sup>cannot</sup> help but to discern serious flaws in looking at every aspect of that plan. There <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ such things as <sup>the</sup> attempt to cooperate with persons other than the military, especially with such person as Dr OKAWA, the lack of proper occasion, and the total absence of



correlation with the plan of construction. On February 8 at 9 AM, Col. SHIGEFUJI and others of the previous day met at the home of Maj. Gen. TATEKAWA, and discussed and decided upon the plan of destruction and the seizure of government. This was decided to be presented to Gen UGAKI. (Note: This plan included both the first and the second proposed plans, whose basic principles <sup>of which</sup> are the same and whose general outlines <sup>is which</sup> are as given before.)

Now, it was only to wait for the day of execution. However, the information I received thereafter were only those of highly questionable nature. For instance, it was reported that the attitude ~~of~~ <sup>was</sup> the chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, who said that <sup>he</sup> ~~the~~ sentiment beneath the surface is very earnest for executing the plan, <sup>had stiffened;</sup> that Col NAGATA and Col OKAMURA <sup>had</sup> ~~were~~ reported to have started vigorous opposition, and the attitude of the Vice-Minister of War <sup>in theory, had</sup> ~~was~~ said to have inclined toward ~~the~~ <sup>and that the attitude of the deputy</sup> opposition, <sup>and that the attitude of the deputy</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>of</sup> the chief of staff took on a very mean attitude toward the changes. (Note: <sup>He reportedly was</sup> ~~He is~~ <sup>to become the</sup> ~~aspiring for the War Ministry~~ <sup>in</sup> the UGAKI cabinet.) Everyone was acting arbitrarily



without any control and ~~no~~ <sup>giving no</sup> information was given,  
(I took the penetrating and made all the contact  
made ~~himself~~ <sup>totally</sup> on my initiative, and among  
them, the ~~important~~ <sup>and significant</sup> mobilization  
of 10,000 persons by Dr OKAWA, ~~was~~ <sup>who has been</sup> ~~found to be extremely~~ <sup>found to be extremely</sup>  
questionable. Furthermore, Dr OKAWA and Col SHIGEFUJI  
made merry every night in pleasures at ARAKI-  
MACHI YOTSUYA-KU and ~~was~~ <sup>what's more, they had the</sup> ~~totally~~ <sup>independent</sup>  
indignation to state in front of the geisha girls  
and host in it. They were babbling their tongues  
"who knows? we might not be living tomorrow!" about all the  
off before the geishas, and the thing that ~~made us~~  
most disappointed <sup>me</sup> was the fact that they had  
no study of the plan of reconstruction, the principle,  
the program, the political platform, and the political  
measures. (note: This is ~~the~~ <sup>can be judged and corre-</sup> ~~proved~~ <sup>lated</sup> by the statement made by Lt Col HASHIMOTO and  
HASHIMOTO and this conclusion was reached by  
particularly by the request made to me by Col YAMA-  
NASHI of the fact that I was requested by Col  
YAMAWAKI of the Staff Headquarters, who was ~~planning~~ <sup>the</sup>  
entirely about the reform that he would like to borrow  
anyone, <sup>if there is one,</sup> who has studied the program, <sup>the</sup> political  
platform, and the political measures for the construction  
of a future society; and by his statement that  
reminded that the chief of the military affairs section  
appears to have some part of a plan, but seems  
when he had in mind, had ~~some~~ <sup>some</sup> plan, ~~more or less~~



to be experiencing  
~~but seemed to be in~~ great difficulties.

Thusly, the <sup>planned</sup> reform was <sup>not based</sup> ~~not announced~~  
on a genuine spirit for real national reform  
for a real change of government with sincerity of spirit,  
but it was merely a <sup>series of</sup> violence <sup>based</sup> on a despicable  
spirit ~~heart~~ <sup>one</sup> desiring to fulfill its selfish dirty desires  
by aggravating <sup>the attempt to usurp</sup> the activities <sup>of the</sup>  
~~of the~~ <sup>evil forces in the manner of the</sup> vile politicians and  
and <sup>in</sup> ~~proceeding~~ <sup>the</sup> Emperor's army, <sup>and</sup>  
~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> taking possession of the Emperor's army. This  
was especially so with UGAKI and <sup>also</sup> the vice-chief of  
staff.

I could not help but <sup>firmly</sup> ~~oppose~~ <sup>determinedly</sup> ~~determinedly~~ <sup>oppose</sup> a re-  
form of such <sup>a</sup> nature. I <sup>then</sup> recognized the need  
for stopping this violence. Fortunately, Col NAGATA  
and Col OKAMURA <sup>had</sup> started a vigorous opposition  
movement <sup>against it, and so did</sup> and Lt Col SUZUKI <sup>also</sup> ~~opposed~~. Lt Col  
<sup>in particular</sup> SUZUKI maintained a ~~particularly~~ close relationship with  
Col SAKATA.

Time, however, flew quickly and finally the  
~~debated~~ cabinet <sup>inquiry</sup> ~~meeting~~ <sup>meeting</sup> of the three  
proletarian parties <sup>was held</sup> <sup>as planned</sup>,  
opened by three combined proletarian factions.  
<sup>Nevertheless, the</sup> ~~the~~ smallness of its scale and the lowness of its  
spirit, however, were flabbergasting. Upon meeting



ASO, Hisashi, head of the <sup>People's</sup> Public Party (TAISHU TO) which was the <sup>backbone</sup> nucleus of the proletarian factions of that time, it became clear that there was very little liaison with Dr. OKAWA and that the mobilization of 10,000 men was absolutely a fantastic dream. <sup>Looking at it from every aspect, it became</sup> From every aspect, <sup>as a result of</sup> ~~as a result of~~ <sup>it being</sup> ~~it being~~ <sup>evident that</sup> ~~it being~~ <sup>indefinitely call it off,</sup> ~~it being~~ <sup>the most prudent thing to do,</sup> so I made up my mind and <sup>tried to</sup> ~~persuaded~~ <sup>the most radical elements,</sup> ~~its greatest radicals~~ Col SHIGEFUJI and Lt Col HASHIMOTO, but no matter how much I explained <sup>about the situation,</sup> they wouldn't listen to me. Rather, they became more and more <sup>stubborn,</sup> ~~stubborn,~~ <sup>heeding my advice</sup> ~~stubborn,~~ deciding to proceed recklessly without <sup>going any further.</sup> Finally, Lt Col HASHIMOTO distributed 300 bombs (as mentioned before) to the followers of Dr OKAWA. (Note: These bombs were frequently faulty). Consequently, there ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> an inseparable, dirty bond between Lt Col HASHIMOTO and Dr OKAWA was formed. The majority <sup>couldn't do anything, no matter how recklessly</sup> ~~was unconcerned~~ <sup>to what,</sup> Col SHIGEFUJI and Lt Col HASHIMOTO <sup>proceeded.</sup> ~~could recklessly~~ do. <sup>Finally,</sup> ~~It was said that~~ <sup>reportedly</sup> Gen. UGAKI <sup>finally</sup> ~~called~~ <sup>it was</sup> Dr OKAWA and told him to stop because ~~everything~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~not an~~ <sup>no</sup> ~~opportunity~~ <sup>time.</sup> ~~at the present.~~ Dr OKAWA



complied with this, so the March Incident ended  
abruptly. Nevertheless, this stimulated such  
radicals ~~without being accomplished~~ ~~and others~~  
as Lt Col HASHIMOTO, ~~however~~, were stimulated and  
signer it indicated <sup>and others</sup> that there were higher officers <sup>in the</sup>  
inner circle ~~central body of the army participating in the change~~, <sup>reform, it</sup>  
made them embrace the strong sentiment that by force  
there should be no ~~disregard~~ ~~in the course of~~  
of circumstances they can't object to the next attempt for  
carrying it out; and they made the above sentiment  
reform and made them prepared  
strong, thus making the ~~preparation~~ for the "October  
Incident".

Matters of Attention concerning the March Incident

- (1) Difference between ~~the change~~ <sup>reform of military government</sup>  
and reform of Imperial Way. ~~the Imperial Way~~
- (2) A thorough plan, particularly the plan of reconstruction  
-- plans of reconstruction and destruction.
- (3) Time of <sup>reform</sup> ~~the change~~.
- (4) Establishment of preparation, guiding spirit and  
~~preparation from scratch at the establishment of~~  
guiding principles from normal time  
~~the spirit of leadership and the principle of leadership~~
- (5) Control, unity, and liaison.
- (6) Liaison problems with the non-military.
- (7) Problem of using <sup>the</sup> secret ~~secret~~ fund



With the March Incident resulting in failure, Lt Col (art)  
HASHIMOTO energetically enlarged and strengthened the  
SAKURA KAI <sup>so influenced and</sup> and accentuated its activities ~~so~~  
that <sup>the speeches and actions of the leaders</sup> its ~~leading~~ voice ~~and~~ action became <sup>inflammatory</sup> inflammatory.  
Simultaneously <sup>severe</sup> criticism arose against a section  
of its leaders indulging in <sup>merry-making</sup> ~~pleasure~~ for instance,  
some of the SAKURA KAI leaders ~~were~~ continued  
to indulge in frequently <sup>in making-merry on the</sup> ~~pleasure~~ with the pretext  
of studying or of setting up <sup>the means of leadership for this</sup> ~~means of~~ ~~conduct~~ the  
organization ~~as~~ <sup>and those who came to know about this</sup> ~~the persons who knew about this~~  
criticized <sup>that they were using</sup> the SAKURA KAI as good  
bait ~~and~~ <sup>were</sup> making ~~great~~ use of the secret ~~secret~~  
fund <sup>allotted to</sup> the March Incident, ~~It~~ <sup>Upon inquiry</sup>  
of certain leaders, <sup>it was</sup> found out that the <sup>probably</sup> ~~criticisms were~~  
~~directed~~ <sup>at</sup> the merry-making of Col  
SHIGEFUSI and Dr. OKAWA in connection with the  
March Incident. <sup>what</sup> Irrespective of the truth <sup>is, the</sup>  
a great internal dissension <sup>thus</sup> developed within  
SAKURAKAI ~~developed~~ <sup>dissension</sup>  
the SAKURAKAI  
and a strong sign of a split was evident.  
Since I figured that <sup>the aftermath of the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>would</sup>  
~~draw~~ the SAKURA KAI <sup>down into a dreadful abyss,</sup> I presented  
a plan at the regular <sup>meeting held in the middle of</sup>  
~~from the SAKURAKAI and promote it on a regular~~



June, 1931, for the purpose of receiving and developing  
standing such as ~~retraining~~ ~~ineffective~~, ~~blind activity~~  
the SAKURAKAI normally - that is to check it from acting  
having no plan of constructive reasoning and group  
blindly and heedlessly with a theory a constructive plan  
of mass psychology; making the SAKURAKAI avoid  
and an understanding of mass psychology, prevent the  
becoming a tool for the realization of selfish interests  
use of the SAKURAKAI as a tool for the realization of  
and thus avoid dissension and dissoluteness; and  
one's personal ambitions, prevent its severance and  
thus in order that there be no shortcoming in  
dissolution and leave nothing wanting for the  
carrying out the heretofore plans of the SAKURAKAI  
executions of its original aim should the occasion arise.  
I submitted a proposal in session of the regular  
that is, the gist of my argument was  
meeting of July 1931. It was a proposal  
containing the following gist:

"In order to establish ~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> guiding spirit  
and ~~a~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~outline~~ <sup>outline</sup> of action of the SAKURAKAI ~~but~~ itself  
the leaders ~~should~~ <sup>should</sup> understand the necessary ~~items~~ <sup>items</sup> for  
national reconstruction in regard to philosophy,  
sociology, logic, economics, political science etc. ~~which~~  
For this purpose it would be <sup>best to</sup> invite suitable scholars  
and realize this objective through informal talks  
and through it, we could perceive the character  
and intelligence of the scholars and afterwards  
the suitable ones into a group for use later."  
That suitable ones can be banded into an organization  
and made to be of service later on."



My plans <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ fortunately taken into consideration  
by the ~~governing body~~ <sup>readers</sup> and <sup>it</sup> was decided to ~~be carried~~ <sup>put it into</sup>  
~~practice~~ <sup>immediately</sup>. I ~~had negotiations made~~ <sup>discussed this</sup> with Capt (Lieutenant)  
SUZUKI who <sup>was an auditor of the Imperial University and</sup> ~~as an instructor~~ <sup>led special connections</sup>  
with many of the instructors, and <sup>made him</sup> ~~conduct the negotiations~~ <sup>succeed</sup>. I ~~carried~~  
~~out during~~ <sup>the latter part of June</sup> with professor YOSHIDA  
Seichi ~~at its head~~ <sup>as the beginning</sup>. However, the readers of the  
SAKURA KAI ~~abandoned this~~ <sup>undertaking</sup>  
~~on the ground~~ <sup>that the scholars in general have</sup>  
~~for the reason~~ <sup>no conclusion, judgment, nor executive power.</sup>  
~~and~~ <sup>no executive power.</sup>  
~~in early July~~ <sup>I, utilizing my vacation</sup> ~~to tour~~  
the KANSAI area. <sup>During this trip a</sup> ~~problem~~ <sup>broke out</sup> ~~centering on the~~  
SAKURA KAI <sup>that is, the readers</sup> ~~of the~~  
~~SAKURA KAI~~ <sup>starting a nationwide movement</sup>  
~~as a means for~~ <sup>the country to</sup> ~~achieve~~ <sup>speedy procurement of membership,</sup>  
~~and that it proposed~~ <sup>meeting</sup>  
of all company grade officers of the 28th graduate  
class and below, who were ~~meeting~~ <sup>in TOKYO</sup>, and  
~~it published~~ <sup>a manifesto</sup> and distributed ~~it~~ <sup>to the</sup>  
company grade officers (28th graduate <sup>and below</sup> class) throughout  
the country. There were diverse comments on this matter



from the standpoint it appeared as if  
but ~~the judgment~~ of the SAKURA-KAI, ~~itself~~, ~~was that~~  
it was bringing forth <sup>an</sup> unexpectedly good results.  
The ~~general staff~~ <sup>leadership</sup> of the organization ~~was~~ <sup>appeared to be</sup>  
highly slotted. ~~This was my impression~~  
~~at that outlook~~ ~~the way of~~ ~~impression~~ when  
I returned to TOKYO on August 4 ~~and~~ <sup>met</sup>  
Lt Col HASHIMOTO and the officers of the Reserve  
Section of the ~~Staff~~ <sup>Headquarters</sup>. It was in this way  
that the "October Incident" ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> perpetrated.

### The "October Incident"

When I met Lt Col HASHIMOTO on August 4, he  
told me "-----". With this <sup>as an</sup> opportunity we  
are to execute a drastic reform. ~~Further~~ <sup>in</sup>  
~~decentral changes will be effected.~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~  
regard to the <sup>problem of</sup> national reconstruction, we have the  
full understanding of the leaders of the General Staff  
Headquarters." ~~Staff~~ ~~of~~ ~~my~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~  
(Note: the extent of this understanding <sup>was</sup> not clear. It <sup>was</sup>  
not known whether it <sup>was</sup> a definite understanding or an  
indication of the items inserted in the estimate of  
the situation.) He continued "In this manner  
shall the administrative power fall into the hands of  
~~the~~ ~~military~~ ~~government~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~substitution~~ ~~of~~ ~~military~~  
the military. In another word, ~~I~~ ~~want~~ ~~you~~ ~~to~~  
~~give~~ ~~up~~ ~~the~~ ~~to~~



draw up the plan for the seizure of the government <sup>with</sup> the military as the <sup>nuclear</sup> ~~central~~ force to be completed by the early part of September. In regard to the political programs and measures, <sup>others</sup> will be studied and drafted after the seizure of government. Etc. I promised to ~~make~~ <sup>draw</sup> up a propaganda plan <sup>to bring</sup> about the natural collapse of the political parties by attacking the corruption of the political parties and arousing the general public to the collapse of the political parties and the sentiment of the masses. He agreed to this.

On August 10, I traveled again and went to HOKKAIDO.

While I was absent, the SAKURA KAI held its regular August meeting at the Military Club (KAIKOSHU). At this meeting the organization made a 180 degree turn, resolving to become a cultural organization and will not concern itself at all with current ~~problems~~ <sup>problems</sup>.

This ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> a very grave problem. This change to a cultural organization was merely a ~~superficial~~ <sup>superficial</sup> make-up. It was the plot of the radical elements centering around the China section and the Russian section, who were planning a national reform, and their attempt <sup>to show</sup> ~~to show~~ that it isn't otherwise. (This matter became clear through



a direct statement made by the radical elements (later on)

## Outbreak of the Manchurian - Mongolian Problem on September 18

On this morning, I visited Lt Col SAKATA <sup>at</sup> the War Ministry and Lt Col HASHIMOTO <sup>at</sup> the <sup>General</sup> Staff Headquarters to <sup>obtain</sup> ~~ascertain~~ the real picture of the incident, and at this time Lt Col HASHIMOTO informed me, "Since it <sup>has been</sup> decided not to execute the national reforms at this time, I am returning ~~that an internal change of the nation would not be~~ the propaganda plan to you for the time being, but I want ~~executed at this time~~ <sup>you to make a further study of it</sup> ~~made~~ <sup>made</sup> ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~clear~~ <sup>clear</sup> that the ~~change~~ <sup>reforms would</sup> ~~would not be carried out.~~

I believed Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO's word and thought that the national reforms would not be executed and ~~an internal change will not be executed and that all~~ efforts would be exerted toward ~~the solution of the~~ Manchurian - Mongolian Problem.

however, On the night of October 3 (Saturday), I received an urgent letter (sealed letter) from Lt Col HASHIMOTO. It said, "Tomorrow, the 4th, <sup>we are holding</sup> ~~there will be~~ a preliminary meeting. Please come to MORIGASAKI MANKIN. We will be <sup>expecting you</sup> ~~waiting~~ (actual text). (It was postmarked, KYOBASHI,



SHINTOMI MACHI. <sup>Because of the place of</sup> ~~thought it was~~ <sup>redundant</sup>  
and the <sup>marking</sup> point of <sup>departure</sup>, I went to the designated  
place on 4 October with the premonition that something  
~~was~~ going to happen. When I reached MANKIN  
and told the proprietor that I wished to see Lt Col  
HASHIMOTO, he asked who I was and transmitted  
this information upstairs. Then I was ushered in.  
There were three persons in the room - namely, Maj  
<sup>CHO</sup> HAGA who recently <sup>left for China</sup> ~~took post~~ as resident military <sup>officer</sup>  
of CHINA and Capt TANAKA <sup>Nishida</sup> and Capt OHARA  
of the Bureau section of the <sup>General</sup> Staff Headquarters.

They said,

"The national <sup>reform</sup> ~~change~~ will be executed now.

"Starting with the War Ministry, <sup>and</sup> the <sup>General</sup> Staff  
Headquarters, <sup>as well as</sup> the <sup>1st</sup> <sup>Korps</sup> <sup>Guard</sup> <sup>Division</sup>, the <sup>1st</sup> <sup>Division</sup>  
are all preparing for <sup>the</sup> national <sup>reform</sup> ~~change~~. This is true  
also with the navy.

"Firstly, the government will be seized by the  
military through a coup d'etat and then a  
political change will be carried out by putting  
dictatorship into force."



They requested me to participate in it <sup>for the above</sup> ~~with the~~ reason and the fact that the SAKURAKAI was operating as the pivot SAKURAKAI as a center and a part of the activities. (Note: This was their means to persuade people, particularly officers assigned to units to participate, ~~practicable only with the officers assigned with troops~~)

They continued

"We have <sup>been working for this reform day + night</sup> ~~strived for a change continuously~~ since the outbreak of the Manchurian - Mongolia Incident and we were <sup>have gone</sup> ~~able to return~~ home only two or three times. We <sup>want</sup> ~~hope~~ that you join <sup>in this plan</sup> and help us.

I was surprised by <sup>the</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>nature of the thing</sup> ~~unexpected~~ ~~remarks~~. But I could not help but have some doubts. I <sup>will</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>try</sup> ~~try~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~to <sup>ask</sup> ~~ask~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>points</sup> ~~points~~ <sup>discussed</sup> ~~discussed~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>them</sup> ~~them~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>show</sup> ~~show~~ <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>questionable</sup> ~~questionable <sup>point</sup> ~~point~~ <sup>by</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>an</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>interrogation</sup> ~~interrogation~~, <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>part</sup> ~~part~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>points</sup> ~~points~~ <sup>I</sup> ~~I~~ <sup>doubted</sup> ~~doubted~~. <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>follows</sup> ~~follows~~: (Questions in mine, answers theirs)~~~~

Question: If the <sup>officers, who are the backbone</sup> ~~central~~ <sup>are to</sup> ~~figures~~ <sup>participated</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>this</sup> ~~this <sup>national</sup> ~~national <sup>reform</sup> ~~reform, <sup>there</sup> ~~there~~ <sup>probably</sup> ~~probably~~ <sup>will</sup> ~~will~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~be~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>plan</sup> ~~plan~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~and <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>principle</sup> ~~principle~~, <sup>program</sup> ~~program~~, <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>political</sup> ~~political~~ <sup>measures</sup> ~~measures~~ <sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the <sup>construction</sup> ~~construction~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>a</sup> ~~a~~ <sup>future</sup> ~~future~~ <sup>society</sup> ~~society~~. <sup>What</sup> ~~What~~ <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>their</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>substances</sup> ~~substances~~? <sup>What</sup> ~~What~~ <sup>do</sup> ~~do~~ <sup>you</sup> ~~you~~ <sup>know</sup> ~~know~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~it~~?~~~~~~~~~~

Answer: It is a secret and cannot be <sup>told</sup> ~~given~~. <sup>Besides, we</sup> ~~truthfully~~ <sup>do</sup> ~~do~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>know</sup> ~~know~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>details</sup> ~~details~~.



is the plan you have been working on day and  
Question: What ~~plan~~ <sup>is the plan</sup> were you drawing up night after day  
night since the outbreak of the ~~Japanese~~ <sup>Manchurian</sup> ~~Incident~~  
Incident?

Answer: A plan of destruction

Question: The plan of destruction should be made within  
the scope of the plan of reconstruction after the  
letter has been drawn up. In other words, <sup>mustn't</sup> ~~is~~  
these two conform to one thought?

And don't you think that the plan of destruction  
would be unreasonable without <sup>if</sup> clarifying the  
plan of reconstruction is not clarified?

Answer: The plan of reconstruction is being drafted by others.

Question: Who do you mean by others?

Answer: The ~~fact~~ <sup>speaking</sup> faction centering around Dr. OKAWA, Shumei.

Question: Generally, <sup>speaking</sup> what kind of destruction is to  
be carried out?

Answer: A demonstration by navy bomber units;  
the ~~hacking~~ <sup>murder</sup> to death of all the ministers while  
they are attending the cabinet conference at the  
official residence of the prime minister; a surprise  
attack and seizure of the Metropolitan Police Board.



Question: Why are such destructions necessary?

Answer: In order to wipe out all the arch-villains.

Question: Would national reconstruction be possible by such destructions?

Answer: A change can be brought forth by destroying the central figures of the government.

Question: As an example, how would you bring about an economic change? Or did you give this any consideration?

Answer: (silence.)

Question: As far as I know, Dr OKAWA is not constructive. <sup>He has been tried in the</sup> ~~With the March Incident, he~~ <sup>experiment is through.</sup>

<sup>He</sup> Is the central body of the army, <sup>become</sup> so mentally infirm as to entrust its most important plan of reconstruction to such a man?

Answer: Actually, <sup>has been</sup> ~~there is~~ no liaison established with <sup>be made to agree</sup> among the leaders of the central body of the army, but they will <sup>be made to agree</sup> ~~wait~~ <sup>wait</sup> before the execution of the plans. It is for this purpose that Dr OKAWA is making a plan of reconstruction.



Question: This is the basis of destroying the nation's  
army. Don't you think that the leaders of the  
army should not ~~move~~ <sup>make to move</sup> nor be ~~moved~~ by that?

Answer: We disagree.

Question: In my opinion, a change and a reconstruction  
of our nation are essential. However, an accurate  
study of the time, the extent, and the methods of  
carrying them out is necessary. An adequately  
constructive plan is especially needed.

An attempt for a quick change without any  
constructive plan and with a method that will destroy  
the military is too violent. Please discontinue  
it.

Answer: ~~The~~ <sup>Your</sup> argument ~~is~~ may be ~~not~~ <sup>right</sup>, but following the  
outbreak of the Manchurian - Mongolian Incident, we  
have made the company grade officers in TOKYO  
join and have ~~made~~ <sup>established</sup> close contact with the  
outside (note: non-military men) ~~so that there is~~ <sup>hence</sup> ~~it~~  
~~anything~~ <sup>anything</sup> we can do now. (We cannot discontinue even  
if we wanted to) Besides, due to shortages of time, ~~because time was so short~~, a constructive  
plan ~~was~~ <sup>can</sup> not be made. Please join and help us.



Question: I agree to the principle of national reconstruction  
but I absolutely cannot agree to its method.

This sort of ~~questioning~~ <sup>interview</sup> had ~~been~~ <sup>taken</sup> place and  
result, ~~of which~~ <sup>it became</sup> ~~made~~ <sup>clear</sup> that ~~it was merely~~ <sup>the fact that they have only been</sup>  
~~one of their hasty actions~~ <sup>the participation of the central body</sup>  
~~acting blindly~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~the matter~~ <sup>of the army participating</sup> was an absolute falsehood.  
It seemed as though they began to ponder over the  
matter as a result of this ~~questioning~~ <sup>interview</sup>.

After having had ~~reflections~~ <sup>lunches</sup> we exchanged our  
views in the fashion of a <sup>'discussion'</sup> ~~conference~~ meeting.  
They told me that they ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> heard that I had ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~studying~~ <sup>studying</sup>  
and had ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~studying~~ <sup>studying</sup> the ~~matter~~ <sup>matter</sup> They asked me  
at for some time. ~~How~~ <sup>How</sup> about giving ~~me~~ <sup>me</sup> a summary  
of ~~what~~ <sup>what</sup> ~~kind~~ <sup>kind</sup> of a future society is ~~projected~~ <sup>projected</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~short~~ <sup>short</sup> -  
what is it? ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> future society? ~~you~~ <sup>you</sup> are planning?

I said:

" a ~~moral~~ <sup>moral</sup> society ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~live~~ <sup>live</sup> and ~~let~~ <sup>let</sup> ~~live~~ <sup>live</sup> with  
the ~~Emperor~~ <sup>Emperor</sup> as the central figure ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~needed~~ <sup>needed</sup>. For this  
purpose, we must eliminate all the exploiting organs  
standing between the Emperor and the common people  
and ~~thus~~ <sup>work</sup> ~~enable~~ <sup>enable</sup> the betterment and ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~prosperity~~ <sup>prosperity</sup> of  
the people's livelihood ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> a phenomenal betterment of



the Japanese people.

<sup>Consequently</sup> ~~Therefore~~ everything must be planned with this as its basis. (note: It is said that my words have been incorporated predominantly in their plan.)

At 6 PM, I excused myself and went home.

As a result of this meeting, I learned the following facts:

- (1) The radical elements hitherto in the SAKURA KAIGUN are planning a coup d'etat.
- (2) The assertion that the central body of the army is supporting them is nothing more than their tactic, for its veracity is highly doubtful; in fact, it is ~~understood~~ <sup>deemed</sup> that there is no connection. It is presumed, however, that the chief of one section of the <sup>Head</sup> Staff Headquarters is involved in this.
- (3) There are not few among the navy officers who are individually supporting this.
- (4) Among the army officers, it seems as though about 100 persons in the regiments and schools have joined.
- (5) The coup d'etat is scheduled to be executed on or about October 21.



(6) There are many ~~points~~ <sup>points indicating</sup> ~~reasons to believe~~ that this undertaking is connected with the KWANTUNG Army.

(7) <sup>In regard to</sup> ~~With~~ the execution of the coup d'état, <sup>not a few</sup> ~~will be~~ embrace the personal feeling to liquidate ~~more of those persons~~ <sup>especially those with many</sup> ~~opponents to the SAKURAKAI,~~ <sup>personal</sup> ~~who have ex-~~ <sup>pressed opposition to the SAKURAKAI in the past,</sup> ~~from persecutions.~~ <sup>There were not few who</sup> ~~followed~~ <sup>personal antipathy.</sup> <sup>(With its execution, these officers</sup> ~~are~~ <sup>said to be caught and be put to the sword)</sup>

From any angle of perspective, <sup>the success of</sup> ~~their plan would~~ <sup>be</sup> impossible. ~~Not only that, since~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~will gain any result of~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~and such a thing~~ <sup>violates</sup> ~~the principle~~ <sup>upon</sup> ~~for which the army~~ <sup>is established,</sup> ~~and one cannot help but to say~~ <sup>the great danger</sup> ~~that it has a great~~ <sup>chance of destroying</sup> ~~the military which serves as the~~ <sup>only powerful instrument for reconstruction,</sup> ~~and that~~ <sup>it will bring forth</sup> ~~tremendous loss.~~ <sup>one cannot</sup> ~~Though~~ <sup>another measure may be resorted to,</sup> ~~I nevertheless~~ <sup>expected</sup> ~~to stop it~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~in such a way~~ <sup>as to</sup> ~~fully~~ <sup>enlightened</sup> ~~them so that they can~~ <sup>to make them</sup> ~~fully understand~~ <sup>comprehend</sup> ~~the matter~~ <sup>for the benefit of</sup> ~~the nation and the army.~~

The following morning I was persuaded to accompany ~~them to the~~ <sup>them to the</sup> ~~headquarters of Maj. CHO.~~ <sup>to the</sup> ~~confidential~~ <sup>office of</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>I joyfully complied,</sup>



thinking it would be a good opportunity to make the situation clear as to ~~prevail~~ <sup>side out</sup> ~~to them~~ <sup>his confidential</sup> ~~was merely in name~~ <sup>and</sup> it actually was a restaurant in KYŌBASHI. (I forgot the name).

I explained to Maj. <sup>CHŌ</sup> WAGA, Capt TANAKA (HWA) and Capt OBARA that their contemplated action would bring about a great disadvantage <sup>and that they</sup> ~~chiefly~~ <sup>loss</sup> to our nation, ~~destroying the nation's~~ <sup>and that they</sup> ~~surely~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~absolutely~~ <sup>hopeless</sup> ~~in view of the~~ <sup>unfavorable</sup> ~~international situation brought about by~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~the destruction of the army and its ill effects on~~ <sup>relationship and cause</sup> ~~all aspects of our production~~ <sup>and economy</sup> ~~so that there is practically~~ <sup>no hope for success</sup> ~~and I explained as much as~~ <sup>possible</sup> ~~to them to call it off~~ <sup>I was not able to attain my objective</sup> ~~I could finally~~ <sup>to no avail</sup> ~~as I was only able to~~ <sup>make them</sup> ~~think it over~~ <sup>as a result of</sup> ~~this meeting~~ <sup>the</sup>

following matters became clear to me:

- (1) That they ~~had~~ <sup>house of assignment</sup> been staying at ~~an~~ <sup>at</sup> ~~several~~ <sup>several</sup> ~~days~~ <sup>day</sup> after ~~night~~ <sup>day and night after night</sup> continuously since Sept. 19, except for two or three days.
- (2) That ~~their~~ <sup>the houses of assignment, which would</sup> ~~headquarters~~ <sup>which can be considered their</sup> were located in AKASAKA, SHINBASHI, YOTSUYA, ŌMORI, and KYŌBASHI.
- (3) Occasionally (about once every four or five days) a ~~group of~~ <sup>group of</sup> ~~company guide officers, who were~~ <sup>company guide officers, who were</sup> ~~partly~~ <sup>partly</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~charge~~ <sup>charge</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~guide~~ <sup>guide</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~party~~ <sup>party</sup>



members, were gathered and a party to raise

so as to raise their morale was ~~given~~ <sup>given</sup>.

(4) Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO is having a meeting <sup>day after day</sup> with persons from various places. He occasionally comes to the ~~house~~ <sup>house</sup> of assignment, which is his ~~headquarters~~ <sup>headquarters</sup>.

The thing which ~~should be questioned~~ <sup>should be questioned</sup> the most is first the source of the funds with which they ~~planned~~ <sup>planned</sup> so many of themselves ~~planned~~ <sup>planned</sup> day after day.

The second thing ~~which should be questioned~~ <sup>which should be questioned</sup> is whether they had planned this ~~endeavor~~ <sup>endeavor</sup> with the patriotic ~~spirit~~ <sup>spirit</sup> of public spirited men.

~~At the first quarter~~ <sup>At the first quarter</sup>, it ~~was said~~ <sup>was reported</sup> that the funds were either brought from the KWANTUNG Army by Maj. <sup>CHO</sup> HAGA or obtained from the SEIYUKAI. (This is not clear to me even to this day). <sup>These</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> week passed

~~In the meantime~~ <sup>In the meantime</sup>, I spoke to Maj. IKEDA, <sup>who stopped together</sup> ~~with me~~ <sup>with me</sup> the other day in making a study about the content and my conception of the ~~comp d'etat~~ <sup>comp d'etat</sup> plan of the HASHIMOTO faction, as I requested ~~him to dispose~~ <sup>him to dispose</sup> the matter properly

through Col. IMAMURA, Saka (Chief of Section 2), <sup>his good</sup> ~~friend~~ <sup>friend</sup>. The major sympathized with my thoughts and immediately contacted Col. IMAMURA. The colonel



was greatly alarmed and ~~he~~ promised to do his best.  
However in order to ascertain their action and  
state of affairs and give them an opportunity to repent,  
~~as stated as possible so that they could be re-understood,~~  
I cautioned ~~him~~ that the higher authorities should  
not as yet take on ~~any~~ <sup>an</sup> oppressive attitude.

Col IMAMURA asked Maj Gen TATEKAWA,  
"Recently, I have heard a ~~rumor~~ <sup>rumor</sup> to the effect that  
~~in the recent past~~ that  
a faction under Sir OKAWA is planning some kind  
of a plot. What are the facts?"

The Maj Gen answered "It is true. I ~~mentioned~~ <sup>sent for</sup>  
OKAWA recently and requested him to stop the activities,  
whereupon he cheerfully ~~said he would~~ <sup>consented</sup>. Upon receiving  
this information, I could not help but ~~to~~ <sup>request</sup> that  
Maj Gen TATEKAWA had ~~some sort of~~ <sup>some</sup> understanding <sup>in regard</sup>  
~~to~~ <sup>of</sup> this matter, ~~and question~~.

On October 12 I met Capt TANAKA, Hisashi <sup>on</sup> the  
streets. He ~~was making an on-the-spot reconnaissance~~ <sup>stated that he was making</sup> ~~and that~~  
of the prime minister's official residence. Capt OHARA  
was doing it, too. He requested me to assemble  
at MATSUASA in OMORI ~~today~~ <sup>that day</sup> at 6 PM. I  
~~said I will~~ <sup>consented</sup>. At 6 PM, I went to the designated place.  
The persons who met were Lt Col HASHIMOTO, Maj ~~SHO~~ <sup>SHO</sup>,



Capt MANAKI, two others (I forgot their names) and myself. On this night Capt TANAKA (Hiroshi) <sup>showed</sup> ~~discussed~~ us the plans in regard to the execution of the coup ~~assault~~. ~~The details of the plan for the execution of the~~ ~~d'etat, classified as very secret.~~ ~~a summary of its~~ ~~camp d'etat will be executed.~~ ~~Though there are~~ ~~text was as follows - however, there were not a few~~ ~~not few kept secret from us~~ ~~the contents are as follows:~~ ~~things kept secret from us;~~

Time of execution: October 21

Whether it will be executed during the day or early in the morning will depend on the situation.

Participating Officers, <sup>numbered about 120</sup> ~~as exclusively~~ ~~number~~ officers residing in TOKYO, ~~are they~~ ~~approximately~~ ~~to~~ 120 men.

Forces participating:

10 infantry companies from <sup>each</sup> ~~the~~ ~~infantry~~ ~~regiments~~ of the Imperial Guard Division. One company of Ng. (TN) Imperial Guard Intelligence (Unit?)  
About one company from the 1st and 3rd Infantry (TN) Presumably regiments.)

When executed during the night, practically all of the 3rd (TN) 3rd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment will be employed. ~~Among~~ ~~the~~ ~~participating~~ ~~forces~~, ~~the~~ ~~company~~ ~~officer~~ ~~who~~ ~~are~~ ~~followers~~ ~~of~~ ~~OKAWA~~ ~~shall~~ ~~take~~ ~~part~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~company~~ ~~command~~ ~~under~~ ~~the~~ ~~influence~~ ~~of~~



practically all of  
entire company and the officers, allied with NISHIDA,  
~~OKAWA~~ and practically all of the attached companies of  
Mitsugi, shall take part with the companies they are attached  
to. Outside the officers allied with NISHIDA, Mitsugi. ~~Others~~

Participants are Dr OKAWA and his followers, and  
a faction of KITA, Kazuteru and NISHIDA, Mitsugi.  
Drawn sword band of naval officers  
A navy officers' band with drawn sword - comprised of  
about ten persons (from YOKOSUKA)

Navy bombers from KASUMIGAURA -- 13 planes  
Planes from SHIMOSHIZU -- Three or four planes

### Execution of the Plans

- (1) Make a swift attack on <sup>the meeting place of</sup> ~~the place where~~ the cabinet meeting is in  
session at the official residence of the prime minister and  
attack the prime minister and others with swords <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~  
~~It will be under the command of Maj' NAGA will be in command.~~
- (2) Make a swift attack <sup>on</sup> and <sup>occupy</sup> ~~occupy~~ the Metropolitan  
Police Headquarters. ~~It will be under the command of~~  
Capt OHARA will be in command.
- (3) Encircle the War Ministry and the General Staff Headquarters  
<sup>cut off</sup> ~~disrupt~~ all communication with the outside and make  
a strong demand to the higher <sup>command</sup> ~~command~~ for their  
approval and ~~approval~~ arrest those who do not assent. Issue



orders for army action.

(4) Field Marshal TOGO will go to the Imperial Palace <sup>simultaneously</sup> ~~at this same time~~.

Request for the issuance of an Imperial mandate to the <sup>"new raising force"</sup> ~~forces of reconstruction~~. (note: they called themselves the "new raising force")

Messengers will be dispatched quickly to ~~Hiro~~ Prince KANIN and to Prince SAIONJI.

(5) Roster of the new cabinet:

Prime Minister and War Minister -- Lt Gen ARAKI

Home Minister -- Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, Kiigoro

Foreign Minister -- TATEKAWA, Mitsugi

Finance Minister -- OKAWA, Shumei

Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board -- Maj. ~~MIYAMA~~ <sup>CHO</sup>

Navy Minister -- R. Adm. KOBAYASHI (as Vice Admiral)

(note: Commander of the KASUMIGAURA  
navy air unit)

Also punishment <sup>against officers and men regarded</sup> ~~will be meted out to any effectors~~  
as known by them (will be omitted),  
and any persons considered by them as unfavorable.

(will be omitted here). A fund of 200,000 yen



was <sup>for</sup> ready to be used at any time. (These plans were each made in detail.)

As of that date, I made a final effort to oppose it. I thought today would be the final occasion so I ~~determinedly~~ <sup>definitely</sup> opposed. I ~~gladly~~ <sup>advocated</sup> the making of a constructive plan ~~as a government need~~ <sup>the first requisite</sup> as a ~~clear~~ <sup>clear</sup> plan independent of the ~~unnegotiated~~ <sup>unnegotiated</sup> and reckless plan ~~against~~ <sup>against</sup> the status quo of the ~~Japanese~~ <sup>Japanese</sup> society. ~~The~~ <sup>The</sup> occasion is also highly inappropriate, ~~unpropitious~~.

### The Army's Destruction

For about two hours, I criticized the defects of their plan in relation with Japan's industry and production, economy, finance and international relationship. They reassured time after time that they will handle the matter of destruction and that they would like me to take on the task of construction. Hereupon I replied, "That's splendid. But since I am at the present undertaking the study and <sup>the</sup> drafting of a constructive plan, ~~and~~ a national ~~reconstruction~~ <sup>reorganization</sup> plan, ~~why not~~ <sup>why not</sup> postpone the ~~execution~~ <sup>drafting</sup> of the destructive plan, until that



The completion of the constructive plan and be made to fit within the scope of that plan and since ~~then when I had the constructive plan drafted so that the~~ I am drafting it, why not postpone it until that plan of destruction can be fitted within the scope of my mind? "constructive plan?" They asked, "When will it be completed?" I replied "I don't know as yet". Thereupon they repeated ~~all the arguments against any more delay.~~ <sup>They repeated</sup> One of them even declared, "at any rate, ~~in all probability,~~ <sup>in all probability,</sup> a person who studies theories does not give much consideration to ~~doing things.~~ <sup>to doing things.</sup> There is no ground for argument now. We can only proceed vigorously <sup>towards</sup> to action."

I ~~was~~ knew that it was practically impossible to make them reconsider, so I exorcised myself and started to go home. At this time, Lt Col HASHIMOTO said,

<sup>for</sup> stop the argument and ~~let us~~ have a drinking party for a number of reasons, "Upon giving the ~~board~~ <sup>board</sup> ~~was surprised with finding that 14 or 15 getate girls.~~ <sup>was surprised with finding that 14 or 15 getate girls.</sup> What an unrepentant and unseemly behavior!!

I went home after scolding them. Before going home, however, I told Capt TANAKA (Hisashi) "I am opposed to the execution of the plan to the bitter end.

Even ~~though you~~ <sup>if you were to</sup> make a great concession and executed it, the alliance with non-military men would be bad, ~~this is especially so with~~ <sup>I mean with</sup> ~~followers as NISHIDA Mitsugi,~~ <sup>followers as NISHIDA Mitsugi,</sup> for example, ~~can you cut off your ties?~~ <sup>can you cut off your ties?</sup>"



Why not cut off your ties?"

He replied "What things coming to this point I cannot do such a thing cutting off my ties at this time would cause ill feelings of this nature to be done."

I said, "When you are about to execute a great matter of national importance, I cannot agree to your allegiance to the friendship of ~~an~~ individual." I desire your reconsideration." I reached home at 11 PM.

After observing <sup>them</sup> ~~one of~~ this faction, I ~~reached~~ the following conclusion:

(1) Judging from the situation, it seems as though Lt Col HASHIMOTO ~~wanted~~ <sup>wanted</sup> to withdraw on four occasions already, because of the situation.

(2) <sup>CHO</sup> Maj HABB and others are determined to carry it out whether it is right or wrong.

Hence, it seemed as though there ~~was~~ <sup>were</sup> two opposing groups formed within the faction. Furthermore, the ~~present~~ <sup>present</sup> situation was now pregnant with the possibility of a grave incident being provoked. Consequently, a measure to check this became necessary.

For this reason, I

(1) Requested the higher authorities to use their influence



and stop it.

(2) Requested that they be <sup>taken</sup> brought into protective custody by the military police if they <sup>do</sup> not comply.

I, however, thought that ~~as~~ <sup>since</sup> a position of ~~an~~ unreasonable oppression would lower the spirit of the officers and make them depressed, ~~and therefore would require caution~~, <sup>we should be very cautious and</sup> ~~confering with~~ I had it delayed to <sup>confer with</sup> Maj IKEDA, and I ~~summed this up~~ notified Col IMAMURA. Col IMAMURA also had the same opinion.

Fortunately, ~~there was a persistent rumor~~ <sup>the</sup> that the military, chiefly with the officers of the General Staff Headquarters as its nucleus, was plotting something and that ~~there was a rumor~~ <sup>there was a rumor</sup> to the effect that resentment against Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO was getting stronger within the factions. ~~But~~ nevertheless, <sup>it was reported that preparations for executing the plan were</sup> progressing steadily. <sup>in regard to the activities of the members of the HASHIMOTO faction</sup> There were other reports, such as Lt Lt NOMURA of 3gi (3rd Imperial Guard Regiment) requesting secret distribution of pistols and ammunition to the arms committee. ~~There were considerable~~ <sup>There were considerable</sup> number of rumors concerning the activities of the members of the HASHIMOTO factions.



the  
Kōri faction's daily activities, especially their ~~meeting~~<sup>located at various places,</sup>  
merry making at their ~~respective~~<sup>so-called</sup> "headquarters", seemed  
to have ~~attracted~~<sup>attracted</sup> the attention of the Metropolitan Police  
Board, ~~There was~~<sup>since there</sup> ~~no ground~~<sup>no ground</sup> for doubting that detectives  
were put ~~at~~<sup>on</sup> the trail of Lt Col HASHIMOTO.

On October 15, I received a report ~~saying~~<sup>with effect</sup> that  
the day when the HASHIMOTO's faction would ~~take~~<sup>take</sup>  
their ~~plans~~<sup>plans</sup> ~~undertaking~~<sup>undertaking</sup> was very near at hand, and so I informed  
Lt Col SAKATA to that effect and requested that  
Lt Col HASHIMOTO be ~~permeated~~<sup>dissuaded</sup>. The lieutenant colonel  
Recognizing ~~that~~<sup>the gravity of the matter</sup> ~~at~~<sup>the said lieutenant colonel</sup> ~~was not~~<sup>immediately</sup> ~~long~~<sup>tried</sup> to meet  
Lt Col HASHIMOTO but was not able to do so that day.  
When the  
the staff officer of the guard (KEIBI), Lt Col HIGUCHI,  
because of his connection with the SAKURAKAI, personally  
tried to ~~dissuade~~<sup>dissuade</sup> Lt Col HASHIMOTO, which finally  
ended in ~~a~~<sup>an</sup> ~~exchange~~<sup>exchange</sup> of ~~violent~~<sup>violent</sup> words.

On the night of October 16, Lt Col HASHIMOTO ~~made~~<sup>presented</sup>  
a strong demand to the Vice-Minister of War. Lt Gen  
SUGIYAMA, Gen for the latter's ~~approval~~<sup>approval</sup> in regard  
to the undertaking. The vice-minister was reported to  
have been shocked and ~~that~~<sup>turned pale</sup> ~~his face~~<sup>his face</sup> ~~became~~<sup>became</sup> white.  
(Note: It ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> ~~reported~~<sup>generally</sup> ~~generally~~<sup>generally</sup> that the vice-minister



was persuaded on the night of October 16, but in  
considering the circumstance <sup>before and after</sup> ~~therefore~~, I judge that  
it was at midnight of the 15th.

The vice-minister of war immediately called in  
the chief of the Bureau of military affairs, KOISO, and  
the chief of the military affairs section, NAGATA, and  
informed them of the gravity of the affair. Both  
officials were absolutely shocked.

On October 16, <sup>when</sup> the <sup>senior</sup> higher official of the  
Imperial Household Ministry called on the chief of the  
Mobilization Section, Col Marquis INOUE, Saburō  
and asked him if he <sup>knew</sup> ~~knows~~ anything about the  
HASHIMOTO Incident, ~~but~~ the colonel was only amazed.  
Upon returning, the colonel reported this to the Bureau  
Chief, Maj Gen HAYASHI, Kamae. The major general  
also was amazed.

~~The~~ <sup>Thus, the</sup> directing body of the war ministry was ~~not~~  
~~really~~ ~~astonished~~ ~~in~~ ~~regard~~ ~~to~~  
~~other~~ ~~than~~ ~~amazed~~ ~~in~~ ~~that~~ ~~way~~ ~~at~~ ~~this~~ ~~incident~~.  
~~The~~ ~~leading~~ ~~figures~~ ~~among~~ ~~the~~ ~~section~~ ~~chiefs~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~  
~~war~~ ~~ministry~~, ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~general~~ ~~staff~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Imperial~~  
~~Guard~~ ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~1st~~ ~~Division~~ ~~Headquarters~~ ~~on~~ ~~the~~ ~~16th~~  
and tried to <sup>devise remedial measures</sup> ~~straighten things out~~. This was  
It was probably



because  
for the reason that many officers assigned to units  
were involved in it. On the ~~same~~ <sup>They</sup> day, Lt Gen  
ARAKI (then chief of the Headquarters of the Inspectorate  
General of Military Training) and Chief of the <sup>(adviser's)</sup> ~~aid~~ section,  
OKAMURA went together to HATA-~~MA~~ <sup>MA</sup> in  
KYOBASHI <sup>to call on</sup> ~~and visited~~ Lt Col HASHIMOTO <sup>persuade</sup> ~~and~~  
him to give up his plan, but he stubbornly would  
not comply. Thereupon, the directing body of the  
army decided to arrest them for the purpose of  
protecting them and so on the early morning of the  
17<sup>th</sup> about 10 <sup>of the</sup> chief conspirators of this faction were  
detained at <sup>Kojima Teiji</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>other</sup> ~~places~~. <sup>During this</sup>  
~~period of detention,~~ <sup>when</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>detention</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>being</sup> ~~conducted~~ <sup>at</sup>  
~~at their places by the military police,~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~detention~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~conducted~~ <sup>at</sup>  
~~at their places by the military police,~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~detention~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~conducted~~ <sup>at</sup>  
dispatched to me a postcard, <sup>written in pencil,</sup> from KYOBASHI bearing  
the following content <sup>written in pencil</sup>:

"I ~~have~~ <sup>hasten</sup> to inform you that  
I will ~~omit~~ <sup>omit</sup> formalities and get down to business.  
I ~~will~~ <sup>am now going to</sup> ~~visit~~ <sup>visit</sup> the military police headquarters. Please  
help me. 4 AM, the 17<sup>th</sup>." (Just as written in the  
original)



I received this postcard at 7 AM, the 18<sup>th</sup>.  
~~A little before this~~ Lt Col HASHIMOTO, <sup>had</sup> dictated  
~~letter of summons to~~ a request for his followers everywhere. ~~to gather.~~  
Lt Col. KOBAYASHI, <sup>had</sup> prepared <sup>billets for</sup>  
the arriving officers at the TOKYO Hotel.

In dealing with such persons as the battalion commander  
who, <sup>had</sup> rushed over from the force at HIROSAKI, I  
informed the military police unit on October 18 (?)  
through the medium of Capt (MP) YOTSUKATA <sup>SHIKATA (or YOMO),</sup> who  
collaborated with me on my <sup>researches,</sup> ~~study,~~ <sup>by the necessity of</sup>  
~~to handle~~ the officers involved in the incident in  
accordance with the spirit of Bushido. The commander  
of the <sup>Kempeitai however,</sup> ~~military police unit~~ already was handling the  
confined officers, <sup>in accordance</sup> with the spirit of BUSHIDO. This  
can be accredited to the fine character of the commander  
of the TOKYO <sup>Kempeitai</sup> ~~military police unit~~, NAMBA.

My notes will now return to the 17<sup>th</sup>.

As soon as the commanding general of the <sup>the Kempeitai,</sup> ~~military police~~,  
Lt Gen TOYAMA, heard about <sup>Police affairs</sup> ~~the incident~~ on the morning  
of the 17<sup>th</sup>, he immediately reported ~~this~~ to the Metropolitan



Police Board. In reply to this, the Metropolitan Police Board stated, "since everything will be left in general of the military police in the hands of the King's Police Board that he should desire the latter to handle this incident, please take the appropriate action" the incident did not take action against all the military. This notice to the Metropolitan Police Board

by the commanding general of the <sup>Kempeitai</sup> military police was likely to cause unnecessary ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> harmful and was due to the lack of firm conviction and foresight on the part of the commanding general of the <sup>Kempeitai</sup> in regard to the incident, and this was indeed displeasing. Such was the sentiment of generally all the officers, in general.

It was reported that the Metropolitan Police Board <sup>had</sup> found out about the ~~plot~~ <sup>plot</sup> pertinent to the HASHIMOTO Incident. He resigned, ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~sure~~ <sup>sure</sup> about the matter upon discovering that the ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~question~~ <sup>question</sup> has been ~~changed~~ <sup>changed</sup> that the ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~being~~ <sup>being</sup> ~~changed~~ <sup>changed</sup> by Prince CHICHIBU and Prince KAGA, ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~true~~ <sup>true</sup>. ~~It~~ <sup>It</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>not</sup> ~~done~~ <sup>done</sup> ~~anything~~ <sup>anything</sup> ~~about~~ <sup>about</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~matter~~ <sup>matter</sup>. ~~This~~ <sup>This</sup> ~~information~~ <sup>information</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~true~~ <sup>true</sup>.

After the incident ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~exposed~~ <sup>exposed</sup>, the officers involved had been detained separately at various places and the incident had subsided for the time being, scattered or confined, the war minister, Gen MINAMI, reported the incident to the cabinet and ~~news~~ <sup>news</sup> ~~articles~~ <sup>articles</sup> in regard <sup>to it</sup> were permanently banned ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~length~~ <sup>length</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~time~~ <sup>time</sup> ~~any~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~writing~~ <sup>writing</sup> of the



~~incident in the newspaper.~~

The report given to the cabinet, <sup>by the war minister</sup> contained the following points:

"Recently a certain type of conspiracy was ~~a part of the active army officers had~~ planned by a group of active army officers, ~~one form of a conspiracy.~~ However, it was motivated by a feeling of patriotism and not by anything else. ~~It was necessary since they may be exploited by outsiders if left alone and their action may lead to the undermining of military discipline, loyalty,~~ ~~they were confined with the object of protecting them.~~ etc."

~~There were many criticisms against the officers~~ <sup>were numerous</sup> confined. They were such as inviting guests from TOKYO and spending all their time in pleasure or conducting themselves in a licentious and unbecoming manner.

They were confined for twenty days and released one by one. Among the officers involved in the incident, Lt Col HASHIMOTO <sup>CHO</sup> Maj' ABE and Capt TANAKA (Pindhi) were given 10 days' closed confinement while they ~~they~~ were furnished with confinement quarters for the



were not punished. ~~A~~  
~~period of ten days and no one was imprisoned.~~

However, all officers involved in any degree in the incident, irrespective of whether they were in the <sup>inner</sup> ~~central~~ <sup>circle</sup> of the army or were assigned to units, were completely transferred, thus undertaking a complete <sup>change</sup> ~~change~~ of personnel.

### Actions leading to Exposure of the October Incident

The ~~causes~~ <sup>actions leading to the exposure</sup> ~~causes~~ of exposing the "October Incident" are as follows:

- (1) Unscrupulous activities -- The greatest cause is that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~disregarding~~ <sup>disregarding</sup> the ~~principles~~ <sup>principles</sup> of the ~~Meiji Restoration~~ <sup>Meiji Restoration</sup>, ~~and indulging in making~~ <sup>and indulging in making</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~restoration~~ <sup>restoration</sup> ~~and indulging in~~ <sup>and indulging in</sup> ~~pleasure~~ <sup>pleasure</sup> to the extreme. This, as written before, ~~has resulted in~~ <sup>has resulted in</sup> ~~attracting~~ <sup>attracting</sup> the attention of the Metropolitan Police Board.
- (2) The strong demand made by Lt Col HASHIMOTO on the night of October 15 (16) to the vice minister of War, ~~to gain~~ <sup>with his participation</sup> resulted in bringing the incident into broad daylight.

They were always saying that they will make a demand to the higher officers just before the execution







settlement of the  
after the incident has ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> clearly verified  
this.

(4) It ~~was said~~ <sup>is reported</sup> that Dr OKAWA, Shomei, sold  
this to the higher officials of the Imperial Household  
Ministry. On this point, however, there are the  
following controversial statements, as follows:

(a) That ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> spy of the Imperial Household Ministry had  
obtained the confidence of Dr OKAWA. ~~The~~ <sup>When</sup>  
~~this plot was unofficially announced, the spy~~  
~~confidential information of the plot has then~~  
~~reported by the spy~~ <sup>it</sup> to the Vice Minister of the  
Imperial Household, SEKIYA.

(b) That Dr OKAWA himself <sup>had</sup> sold the information  
(c) That TAKUNO, Dampo of the DAI-ICHI  
<sup>the exposure is attributed to</sup> DAI-ICHI  
Newspaper Company, who tried to  
utilize this article to the public and obtain money from  
own purpose of blackening the higher officials,  
of the Imperial Household Ministry. ~~But~~ TAKUNO,  
Dampo, is a man criticized for his  
numerous defects in character,  
doing just that sort of a thing.

I have noted down in this slope the gist of what  
I had seen and heard in regard to the October Incident  
the October Incident which I have seen and heard.  
At this time, I will now elucidate <sup>on</sup> some matters



pertinent to the incident, <sup>and</sup> which ~~may cause some~~ <sup>are being miscom-</sup>  
~~misunderstanding.~~ <sup>prehended</sup>

(1) The October Incident was actually an expression  
of anti-UGAKI sentiment. Among the participants  
in the October Incident, there were numerous  
participants of the March Incident. The March  
Incident <sup>was the sinister design</sup> is ~~ascribed to the membership~~ <sup>of</sup> Gen UGAKI, but the October Incident was  
an attempt to remove the great mistake <sup>in the</sup> ~~per-~~ <sup>sonnel</sup> ~~committed~~ <sup>by</sup> Gen UGAKI ~~in the personnel~~ <sup>of the army.</sup>  
Even though they were often <sup>threatened into confessing that they</sup> ~~belonged to the followers~~  
of Gen UGAKI, <sup>it did not succeed.</sup> they were not so.

(2) This incident was clearly an attempt to liquidate  
all the existing political parties, but in addition it  
was actually <sup>an attempt</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~upset the reckless~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~action of the petty officials of the Imperial Household Ministry~~  
~~to separate the Emperor from the military~~ <sup>to separate the Emperor from the military</sup>  
~~and the military.~~ <sup>It was equally an attempt</sup>  
to annihilate the traitors near the throne who were  
<sup>organizing into</sup> ~~giving more and more power to the political parties.~~

(3) The relationship of the SAKURAKAWA to this incident:  
Although this incident is looked upon as that



conjured by the SAKURAKAI, it is not so. It  
was, <sup>as written before,</sup> an arbitrary plot of the radical element within  
the SAKURAKAI. They, <sup>in fact, stated,</sup> "The  
SAKURAKAI is indifferent so don't depend upon  
it". Even though the <sup>guiding spirit</sup> leadership of the SAKURAKAI  
is ~~in~~ toward dictatorship, it does not  
infer that there is any direct relationship between <sup>them</sup> ~~that~~  
~~or factors~~ and the SAKURAKAI. <sup>This is because</sup> Perhaps those  
SAKURAKAI is not the only organization <sup>thinking</sup> ~~thinking~~  
~~persons~~ <sup>belonging in a league of</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~dictatorship~~  
~~about the progress of~~ <sup>dictatorship</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>for</sup>  
~~the progress of~~ <sup>dictatorship</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>for</sup>  
~~dictatorship~~ <sup>be not confined to the</sup>  
~~SAKURAKAI alone.~~ <sup>primary decisions</sup>

There are many points relative to the October Incident  
which must be studied. They are:

The need of a logical conception of ~~the~~ reforms.

The reformists (perpetrators) and reasons.

The reformists and their desires.

The drafting of a plan based upon an uniform  
insight.

The army's action and <sup>orders of the supreme command</sup> ~~the Imperial command~~.

The question of <sup>contact and collaboration</sup> ~~relationship and alliance~~ with non-  
military persons.

The question of indulgence or pleasures.



The question of funds  
The question of secrecy.  
The question of temptation.

Problems for future reference concerning the "October Incident"

- (1) The study of the underlying problem as to why <sup>there have been persons planning to</sup> ~~some persons~~ planned to institute a ~~group~~ <sup>group</sup> by ~~even~~ <sup>even</sup> to the extent of using extreme measures.
- (2) The underlying problem of ~~whether~~ <sup>it's</sup> right or wrong for the military to take part in ~~entering into national reform~~ <sup>a national reform</sup> ~~the right or the wrong thing to do.~~ <sup>there isn't it a</sup>
- (3) Whether or not ~~the second or third incidents~~ <sup>will arise</sup> in the future.
- (4) If ~~incidents~~ <sup>incidents</sup> ~~are to continue~~ <sup>are to continue</sup>, how are they to be ~~dealt with~~ <sup>dealt with</sup>? ~~What disposition~~ <sup>What disposition</sup> should be taken? Would a single ~~offense~~ <sup>offense</sup> and ~~suppression~~ <sup>suppression</sup> ~~be acknowledged~~ <sup>be acknowledged</sup>?
- (5) How shall the idea of national reform which ~~is deeply~~ <sup>making a deep impression on</sup> ~~be put~~ <sup>be put</sup> in the minds of the young officers be ~~guided~~ <sup>guided</sup>?
- (6) A national reform is necessary. ~~Should~~ <sup>Should</sup> that reform depend upon a natural evolutionary process?



of the nation itself, or <sup>on a form of a revolution</sup> would that depend upon a  
form of revolution? <sup>through</sup> If it depends upon a revolutionary  
movement, by whom? <sup>leadership</sup> upon whose leadership would it depend?  
If the basis were to be <sup>kept to the minimum,</sup> minimized, would it be  
necessary to depend upon <sup>the strength of the</sup> military forces?

(7) As long as the above is so, the action of the  
military must be <sup>very prudent</sup> unimpeachable to the utmost.

Such careless actions as the March Incident and  
the October Incident <sup>must</sup> be eradicated completely.  
In regard to the ideas of reform now surging among  
the young tide of young officers, not influenced with  
the idea of officers, who should be  
the office of reform should be provided with something  
suitable to rely upon <sup>in order to restrain them from</sup>  
taking a <sup>real and reckless</sup> action.

(8) Is the <sup>drafting</sup> of a national reform plan one of  
the urgent tasks of the present?  
(The End)

### Supplement

A. Of the troops <sup>that tried</sup> trying to join the HASHIMOTO faction,  
(1) One company <sup>joining because of faith</sup> believing in Dr. OKAWA.  
(2) Four companies <sup>joining because of faith</sup> believing in NASHIDA, Mitsugi and



KITA, Kazuteru. However, it does not, <sup>necessarily</sup> mean that all the above troops <sup>were to be</sup> led by their company commanders; but that the officers attached to the company were to take the place of the company commanders and lead them, ~~will lead~~ <sup>instead of</sup> the company commander. (The names of this force's regimental commander and officers were kept secret.)

B. Concerning the 3rd Infantry Regiment, the conspirators did not designate it but I believe that it in all likelihood was involved. This can be presumed <sup>by</sup> in view of the fact that the faction <sup>in question</sup> had remarked that the regimental commander, <sup>had</sup> said, "If all my subordinates are going, I, too, will be going. Etc."

C. It was planned that the participating troops <sup>were to march out boldly on the pretext of going on a maneuver and</sup> ~~boldly go out of the gate claiming that they were going out on a maneuver~~ and then reach the designated position.

D. His Highness, Prince HIGASHI-KUNI has no connection whatsoever with the "October Incident" (the latter, proven by their testimony).

E. In regard to His Highness, Prince CHICHIBU and Prince KAGA it is as written before.

F. In regard to the October Incident Dept. Head TATE-KAWA appears to have had a <sup>fairly</sup> ~~clear~~ understanding; Incident seems to have been a <sup>fairly</sup> ~~clear~~ understanding;



Records that can bear this out are:  
sufficient to bear this out are:  
Records that can bear the above out:

(1) Among the matters discussed at the time of the arrival of the commanding general of the Korean Army and the staff officers of the KWAN-TUNG Army on the Korean Army on the summer of 1931, there were some matters pertaining to the occasion of departure to TOKYO, the matter of reform has been discussed among other matters.

(2) Reply to the <sup>words</sup> written by Col INAMURA (Pertinent to Dr OKAWA's remark)

G. The plan of the faction in question relative to the October Incident was very simple. It consisted only of three sheets of section-paper. Its content was:

(1) One sheet dealt with the attack on the Public Minister's official residence and the Metropolitan Police Board. Also the matter of calling on the Emperor Palace.

(2) Another sheet dealt with personnel matters.

a. Column in red: names of members

b. Column in rose: names of persons believed to be sympathizers

c. Column in white: names of persons who will remain neutral.

d. Column in light blue: names of persons who ought



to be watched,

e. Column in dark blue: names of persons who ought to be caught and exterminated (put to the sword) <sup>simultaneously</sup> with the execution of the coup d'etat. (Generally those who opposed the SAKURAI, for instance, Maj Gen <sup>KOZUKI</sup> KATSUKI, Kijoshi of the War College and Col NAKANO, Naoto of the Military Academy) ~~There~~ <sup>are</sup> also ~~the~~ <sup>were</sup> names of scholars and politicians with a strong national consciousness.

(3) The last sheet contained a systematic chart of the above-named persons' addresses and connections, and the security required against them.

H. It is believed that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> former Home Minister, ADACHI was <sup>considerably</sup> ~~believed~~ <sup>well</sup> informed in regard <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~incident~~ <sup>of</sup> the October Incident.

For instance

(1) The fact that ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> incident <sup>was</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>was</sup> already ~~known~~ <sup>known</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~investigation~~ <sup>investigation</sup> by the Metropolitan Police Board.

(2) ~~Since~~ <sup>Since</sup> the relationship between ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> young officers was quite intimate, it is believed that ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> had ~~known~~ <sup>known</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> it and ~~relationship~~ <sup>relationship</sup> with the young officers and that he



had reported it to ADACHI.

(3) The fact that Prime Minister ADACHI, <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ very much distressed at the dissatisfaction held by the young officers.

(The <sup>text</sup> content of the so-called agreement was planned by ADACHI, whose aim was to seize the power himself by uniting the greater part of the ~~MINSEITO and the SEIYUKAI and by suppressing the people's~~ <sup>MINSEITO and the SEIYUKAI and by suppressing the</sup> ~~discontent of the military rather than to make UGAKI~~ <sup>people's</sup> ~~the premier. NAKANO, Seigo, however, advocated and~~ <sup>discontent of the military rather than to make UGAKI</sup> ~~planned the hand of Gen ARAKI as the War Minister in~~ <sup>the military and seized power for himself. NAKANO,</sup> ~~view of the fact that UGAKI did not have the confidence of~~ <sup>the premier. NAKANO, Seigo, however, advocated and</sup> ~~ARAKI had a great deal of it, as he demanded~~ <sup>planned the hand of Gen ARAKI as the War Minister in</sup> ~~the military and that Gen ARAKI was very popular,~~ <sup>confidence of the military. While Gen</sup> ~~and suggested for the latter becoming the War Minister.~~ <sup>view of the fact that UGAKI did not have the confidence of</sup> ~~nevertheless, it~~ <sup>ARAKI had a great deal of it, as he demanded</sup> ~~didn't matter whether Lt Gen ARAKI accepted or~~ <sup>the military and that Gen ARAKI was very popular,</sup> ~~declined the cabinet post. There seemed to be~~ <sup>and suggested for the latter becoming the War Minister.</sup> ~~some supporting arguments in either case.~~ <sup>nevertheless, it</sup>

I. In regard to the October Incident it is clear that Gen UGAKI had a strong intention for a change during the "March Incident".

(1) The fact that he clearly said "If you ~~will~~ <sup>will</sup> work it up to that extent, I'll rise" ~~has come up to this point, I will commit myself~~ when Dr OKAWA showed him the plan (general outline) and <sup>urged</sup> called upon him to rise.



(2) The fact that he remarked, "The time has come when the army must rise!", when the Vice-Chief NIYOMIYA, the Bureau Chief KOISO, and the Section Chief TATEKAWA explained the situation and urged the uprising of the army. It is, however, not determinable whether he affirmed from the bottom of his heart the plan <sup>to have</sup> that the military employ troops and surround the Diet and force the resignation (of the cabinet).

#### J. Punishment of the perpetrators of the March Incident and the October Incident:

In regard to the March Incident,  
(1) There was no punishment inflicted nor transfer of personnel, <sup>carried out after</sup> ~~in~~ the March Incident. (Despite the fact that 300 bombs <sup>had</sup> been distributed to civilians)

In regard to the October Incident, it is as explained above. ~~The above was true for the October Incident~~  
(2) In regard to these two incidents, the views <sup>outlook</sup> also differ individually, but

a. Even though the Higher officers did wrong they were excused without any reprimand.

b. The victims of the October Incident were, after all, the victims of the March Incident.



as long as it is the standard practice to  
c. If the persons who destroyed the nation's army  
and spirit, those who destroyed the nation's army and  
and created the spirit of insubordination  
spread the spirit of insubordination  
(Lower ranking officers giving orders to higher ranking  
officers), can get away only with imprisonment,  
these incidents would continue to arise in the  
future.

## Prospectus

Upon ~~carefully~~ <sup>considering</sup> looking into the situation of Japan,  
I find that the nation has ~~been~~ <sup>been</sup> ~~broken~~ <sup>broken</sup> into a  
state that there has been no strong  
spirit for advancement and the state of the nation which  
has advanced ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~now~~ <sup>now</sup> since the Meiji Reformation  
that the state of the country which has been ascending steadily  
had now tended towards decadence so that I could  
not help but to lament and grieve. If it continued  
to proceed in such a condition, we, the Japanese  
people will not be able at all to hold on to our  
present world position as prestige, and needless to  
say, according to the present tendency, it will only  
leave a brief prominence on the history of the world and  
gradually go down into the category of Greece and  
Netherlands. The fact that bitter feeling will be



## Prospectus

Upon carefully considering the state of the empire, we find that the nation is lagging passively, that the spirit of progress is being driven away and becoming ineffectual and that the state of the nation, which has been ascending steadily ever since the Meiji Restoration, is now heading toward decadence, for which we cannot help but lament and regret deeply. It is obviously clear that should this situation continue, we, Japanese, needless to state, absolutely will not be able to maintain our present world position and prestige and will <sup>finally</sup> lapse into the rank of Greece and the Netherlands with the trend of time after leaving a brief period of prominence in the history of the world, thus leaving an undying regret.

Although the reason why our country has reached such a state may be ascribable to numerous factors, we cannot help but point <sup>first</sup> out the great responsibility of the administrators, who are the backbone of our country. Now, let us try and look at their activities. In spite of the



be found only in the leftist group, teach us? Furthermore, the fact that the poisoned dagger of the corrupt <sup>politicians</sup> ~~political party faction~~ is being thrust toward the military is clearly evident upon considering such problem as the "London" /naval/ Agreement. Nevertheless, the military, paralyzed by this turbid phase of society, lacks the courage and determination even to rise up against this corrupt administration and is now presenting a cowardly phenomenon of having the Privy Council, which is made up of persons who are senile and have already seen their better days, express on their behalf what they should assert.

The reason for the degradation of the military into such a state cannot be ascribed to one cause, but the primary cause is the lack of a definite principle and policy and the loss of fervent unity on the part of the officers, in general, caused by the decline of the customs of the warrior class owing to the long period of peace. It is clear that the poisoned dagger of the politicians, directed toward the navy in the past, will appear soon as an army disarmament question. Hence,



who comprise the backbone of the military ~~power~~, should solidify our unity thoroughly and progress with this spirit every day in order to prevent such blunder as the Naval Disarmament question again as well as to have the courage to clean the guts of the corrupt administrators with a firm patriotic fervor.

2. Upon considering the present social stratum, it is an accumulation of phenomena of great concern to our country, such as the immoral activities of high ranking administrators, the corruption of political parties, capitalists and peers heartless to the public, organs of public opinion unconcerned of the future of our country and leading the national thoughts toward degradation, desolation of rural communities, depression and unemployment, the appearance of various ideological organizations, the rapid stride of degenerative culture, the lack of patriotism among the students, <sup>and</sup> the selfishness of government and public officials. Nevertheless, there has been no attempt made by the <sup>administrative power</sup> political ~~regime~~, which has the responsibility of guiding this situation into the right path, to solve this, nor has they



shown any sincerity. Consequently, the prestige of the administrative power has dropped lower and lower and the people have been placed in a very insecure position, economically, ideologically and politically. Thus, with the national spirit becoming weaker and weaker and <sup>the</sup> vigor existing since the Meiji Restoration about to disappear, the national power is on the downward trail. Furthermore, upon view-  
<sup>ing the aspects of</sup> our foreign affairs, ~~aspect~~, the administrators, forgetting our country's 100 year plan and only absorbed in currying favors with foreign countries, have no interest whatsoever for overseas development, while the vigorous progressive spirit prevalent since the Meiji Restoration has completely disappeared. As a result, the problems of population and food are threatening the nation hourly. This situation has placed a great reef in the path of our empire and we, upon considering the future of our empire, cannot help but become enraged at the situation, wherein our loud cry for the removal of the above situation is being laughed off by the administrators.



The above stagnation in domestic and foreign policies are attributable to the greed and lust of the politicians and the lack of a public service policy. The people, together with us, <sup>actually</sup> have the spirit to restore the root of power into the hands of the masses with the Emperor as the nucleus and are ardently hoping for a cheerful administration. We, of course, are service-men and do not have the qualification to participate directly in the national administration, but an open sincerity of service may at times and on occasions bring about the manifestation of this spirit and contribute to the betterment of government administrators and to the expansion of our national administration. We are gathered here now to remind ourselves of the decline of our national prestige and this, too is the reason for us to reflect and expostulate the principles of military men.



Poster of SAKURA KAI members

X stands for secretary

General Staff Headquarters

- Lt Col (Inf) MUTAGUCHI, Kenya
- X Capt (Inf) FUTAMI, Akizaburo
- Maj (Art) KAWA~~ABE~~BE Torashiro
- Capt (Air) TERADA, Saichiro
- Maj (Inf) NODA, Kenzo
- Capt (Inf) AKIKUSA, Satoshi
- Capt (Art) HAMADA, Hitoshi
- Lt Col (Art) HASHIMOTO, Kingoro
- Capt (Inf) OBARA Shigetaka
- 1st Lt (Inf) AMANO<sup>(TENNO)</sup>, Isamu
- Capt (Art) KARAKAWA, Yasuo
- Maj (Inf) ISAYAMA, Haruki
- Maj (Inf) NAKANO, Hidemitsu
- Capt (Inf) ~~NAKA~~<sup>CHO</sup>, Isamu
- Maj (Inf) WACHI, Takazo
- Capt (Art) MATSUMURA, Shintaro
- Capt (Inf) MATSUMURA, Tomokatsu
- Maj (Art) ENDO, Saburo
- X Capt (Air) MORIMOTO, Junzo
- Capt (Art) IHARA, Junjiro



Maj (Inf) HIRATA, Masataka  
Capt (Inf) NAKAYAMA, Yasuto  
Maj (Inf) FUJITSUKA, Jozao  
Capt (Inf) TANAKA, Hisashi  
Maj (Inf) MUTO, Akira  
Lt Col (Cav) ISHIMOTO, Jozozō  
Lt Col (Inf) NEMOTO, Hiroshi  
Lt Col (Art) KAGESA, Teishō  
Capt (Inf) IMAI, Juko  
Capt (Inf) OHASHI, Kunao  
Lt Col (Inf) ADACHI, Juzozō  
Capt (Inf) MIHARA, Jishio  
Lt Col (Inf) UENO, Kanichiro  
X Capt (Art) ~~KANO~~<sup>ONO</sup>, Dakan (TN Ichihiro?)  
1st Lt (Inf) KAWAHARA, Sadao  
Maj (Art) OKUDA, Chisato (TN Senri?)  
Maj (Inf) SATO, Yukinori  
Maj (Inf) IIDA, Yasujiro  
Capt (Inf) AOZU, Rikutarō

War Ministry

Lt Col (Inf) SAKATA, Yoshio



Capt. (Inf) TANAKA, Kiyoshi  
Capt (Art) WATANABE, Hideto  
Maj (Eng) MAEDA, Masami  
Maj (Inf) OKAZAKI, Seizaburo  
X Capt (Inf) HAYASHI, Motoomi (TN Jomomi?)  
Capt (Inf) IWAKURO, Hideo  
Capt (Inf) SANADA, Joichiro  
Maj (Inf) TOMINAGA, Kyoji

Inspectorate General of Military <sup>Education</sup> ~~Service~~

Lt Col (Inf) SAKANO, Kazuyoshi  
X Maj (Inf) KITASHIMA, Masami

Home Guard Headquarters

Lt Col (Inf) HIGUCHI, Kiichiro

Military Police Headquarters

Maj (MP) MIURA, Saburo

Capt (MP) MIBA, Tokinari

Maj (MP) UEKI, Shiguo

Capt (MP) AKAFUJI, Shoji

Capt (MP) YOKOYAMA, Kenzo



X Capt (MP) KAWAMURA, Aizō  
SHIKATA  
Capt (MP) ~~YOTSUKATA~~, Ryōji

KōJIMACHI Military Police Detachment  
Maj (MP) ŌKI, Shigeru

AZAFU Regimental District Headquarters  
Lt Col (Inf) KOSHI, Satoru

Scientific Research Station  
1st Lt (Inf) IKUTAME (in SHODAME), Nakao

military Staff College

~~Staff College~~  
Lt Col (art) HORI, Matsuyuki

Lt Col (art) HATA, Yūzaburō

Maj (car) KATAOKA, Kaoru

Capt (Inf) NAGAI, Yatsuji

Capt (car) SAKAI, Yoshio

Capt (Inf) MISHIMA, Harisada

X Capt (Inf) AOKI, Kazuo

Capt (car) WATANABE, Fujio

Maj (art) SANO, Tadayoshi



Maj (car) ŌUCHI, Juntoku

Capt (Inf) FUKUYAMA, Kanrō

1st Lt (Inf) TSUJI, Masanobu

Capt (Inf) ŌNO, Kametake (佐武)

Capt (Inf) SASAJI, Taro

Capt (car) HONGŌ, Jadao

Army Automobile School

Maj (Inf) HARAGUCHI, Keinosuke

Army TOYAMA School

2d Lt (Inf) TSURUTA, Kunie

2d Lt (Inf) IKEDA, Sanai

2d Lt (Inf) ISHIKAWA, Kanichi

2d Lt (Inf) ITO, Chishiro

2d Lt (Inf) UEDA, Minoru

Military Academy

Capt (art) YAMAMOTO, Seikō (清工)

Army Infantry School

Maj (Inf) YONEFUJI, Chibumi



1st Infantry Regiment

Maj (Inf) IKUTA, Torao  
X Maj (Inf) MEGATA, Shunzuke

2nd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment

X Maj (Inf) TANAKA, Nobuo  
2d Lt (Inf) KONDŌ, Sempachi

3rd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment

Capt (Inf) ~~HAGA~~ CHO, Kosho (VI 2)

Imperial Guard Mountain Gun Regiment

Maj (Art) HINOKI, Masao  
Capt (Art) FUKUCHI, Haruo

1st Infantry Regiment

Maj (Inf) DOBASHI, Yuetan

Officers assigned to Schools

Maj (Inf) IWASA, Satoshi (1st Konoye Infantry, Rokuseyo Middle School)

Maj (Inf) KOHAMA, Daizen (2nd Konoye Infantry, Kurita #5 Middle School)

Maj (Inf) TASAKA, Yasohachi (3rd Infantry, Meiji Middle School)

Maj (Inf) MATSUZAKI, Naoto (2nd Konoye Infantry, Keihoku Vocational School)



Kyozo MATSUZAWA

P. 1

~~The Ministry of Information~~  
Subject: Renovation of the Functions of Information  
Education and Propaganda  
~~including those against enemy~~

~~including those against enemy~~

(The Decision of the Cabinet Council of 17 November, 1942.)

As the war takes on a prolonged and sustained aspect,  
~~The long-protracted, enduring prospects of the Greater~~  
it becomes increasingly necessary that we <sup>(establish)</sup> conditions  
~~East Asian War have led to an enlarging necessity for the~~  
upon which we can gain complete victory in the  
~~establishment of full victory conditions in~~  
war of thought. It has become a matter of our  
~~the intelligence combat.~~ <sup>Intensely</sup> the

urgent necessity and extreme importance that  
~~instruction and enlightenment of the people~~  
we guide and develop public opinion at  
~~opinions, the excitement of the national spirit~~  
stir up <sup>(and)</sup> national morale, fire the fighters  
~~and the fighting will~~ must be included

spirit of the nation, while at the same  
<sup>active</sup> ~~actively~~ the propagation against enemy



Kyozo MATSUZAWA

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~~be carried out to make the enemy lose their fighting~~  
We must make our propaganda against the enemy  
~~wild and to provoke their interior entanglement, as~~  
more lively and active so that we may lead the  
~~the same time the strengthened propagational politics~~  
enemy into internal disorder and lapse of fighting  
~~for the Asian countries and areas are instantly~~  
spirit. Simultaneously we intensify our thought  
~~wanted to make them understand our true~~  
warfare towards the various countries and territories  
~~wishes and cooperate with us for the establish-~~  
ment of Greater East Asia, to give them a good  
~~ment of the new order. From the aspects~~  
understanding of the true intentions of our Empire,  
~~of these situations we must unify and rearrange~~  
to make them coordinate and cooperate with  
~~the informational and propagational functions~~  
the reconstruction of Greater East Asia.  
~~in every circle as below and make the~~  
in view of these demands made by the  
~~action of the national policy, <sup>more</sup> powerful and~~  
interests, we will have all the  
~~con. under a unified project.~~



Kyōzō MATSUZAWA

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1. ~~The cabinet council's decisions including those various functions of information and propaganda matters merely consulted at the cabinet council controlled and organized according to the following that should be made public are to be using methods to strengthen and accelerate the~~  
~~announced by Intelligence Bureau. However, execution of the nation's policies under a unified~~  
~~the details of the matters are to be done by project.~~

~~the ministers after connecting with the~~  
1. Matters decided upon by the cabinet council (including

2. Except those matters of the above item, when the ministers make announcements such as statements that have grave relations with the leading of the popular opinions, they should connect with Intelligence Bureau beforehand



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and consult of the contents and the way of

them.

3 Army and Navy Intelligence Departments

should be, <sup>only</sup> in charge of genuinely military

informations and propagations in principle.

The announcements of Intelligen Bureau that have  
important concerns with the war direction.

must be related to Military Intelligence Dep'ts  
before hand, and on the other hand -

the letter's announcements that have important

concerns with the leading of the public

opinions must be related to the former before



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4. For the purpose of encouraging the anti-enemy

propagations epoch-makingly the instruction as

well as the supervision of Intelligence Bureau for

DOMEI News Corporation and Japan Broadcasting

Corporation should be made more powerful.

The matters <sup>that are</sup> under co-administration of some

ministries should be rearranged adequately

and the <sup>necessary</sup> renovation of the functions of Intelligence

Bureau should be carried out.



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Abstract of General Mobilization Law.

Art. 20 When it is necessary for the general mobilization of the country at war time, and according to the imperial edict, the government may provide for any restrictions or prohibition of the writings of the press or other publications.

The government may prohibit selling and distribution of the press or other publications and may seize them which have violated the restrictions or prohibition of the above clause and are prejudicial to the general



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mobilization, and in this case it may

seize the original print together.

The restriction of the writings of  
the press and others edict.

art. 1 Concerning the restrictions or prohibition

of the writings of the press or other publications

according to art. 1 Clause 1 of

General Mobilization Law (including hereafter

that in and by no. 317 edict 1938), and

the prohibition of selling and distribution of

of the press or other publications and seizing

of them and of the original print



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according to Clause 2 of the same article will  
be laid down in this edict.

Art 2. The matters that fall into <sup>one of</sup> the items  
below are prohibited to be written in the  
press or other publications.

1. The official secrecy concerning the business  
of the general mobilization that is appointed  
by the office according to <sup>the regulation of</sup> art. 44 of  
General Mobilization Law
2. Military secrecy according to the regulation  
of Military Secrecy Protection Law
3. Military source secrecy according to the



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regulation of military source secrecy protection

Law

Art. 3 Prime minister may restrict or prohibit

the matters from being written on the press or

other publications; by the instructions concerning

the matters that fall into one of the items

below.

1. The matters that may provoke great

harm to the foreign policy.

2. The matters that are necessary to be

hidden from foreign countries.



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3 The matters that may provoke great harm to the execution of the financial or economical politics

4. Other matters that may provoke great harm to the execution of the national policy.

Art. 4 The prohibition of selling and distribution of the press and other publications and seizing of them and of the original print should be carried out by prime minister.

Art. 5. The prime minister in this edict means Governor General of Korea, Governor General of Formosa, Governor of Saghalien Government



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and Governor of South Sea Government in

Korea, Formosa, Saghalien and South Sea Islands  
correspondingly.

Additional Rule

The edict will be put in force from

the day of promulgation.



Doc. 1907

(120)



THE LAST STATEMENT OF GENERAL MATSUURA

July 1935

Note: General MATSUURA had been Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry for a long time. At the time of this case, he was Principal of the Infantry College.

Translated by: T. HARA.  
Checked by: M. SADAYASU.

W



Checked by: M. Sadayasu.

The Truth of the Transfer of the Inspector-General  
of Military Training /MASAKI/

July 1935.

I deem it a sorrowful event, quite antagonistic to the principles of the Japanese Army, that the War Minister, abusing his official authority, should transfer the Inspector-General of Military Training, who is one of the three top-ranking officers of the Army. Therefore, I want to describe herewith the truth of this matter for the sake of posterity.

Information about the transfer of the Inspector-General of  
Military Training.

There have been rumours about the transfer of the Inspector-General of Military Training ever since ~~the~~ the fall of 1934. Above all, in the early part of 1935, according to what the M.P.'s found out, there was evidence that Major KATAKURA and two others of the "Tosei" faction met in one of the waiting-rooms in Tsukiji (Tokyo), and that they had a confidential talk, which was in effect as follows: "There is a definite need of transferring the Inspector-General of Military Training - in this connection Deputy Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA has reported the high-handedness of the MASAKI faction to the Chief of Staff, His Imperial Highness Prince Kan-in, who agreed with him, so we are confident of it ..."

In March 1935, following the intention of the War Minister of transferring MATSUURA, Supreme War Councillor KAWASHIMA had a conversation with the War Minister about a plan ~~for~~ bringing about smooth understandings among the War Minister, the Inspector-General, General ARAKI and others. On this occasion General KAWASHIMA was informed by the War Minister that Chief of Staff Prince Kan-in had an inten-



tion of removing Inspector-General MASAKI (Gen. KAWASHIMA told MATSUURA that he was informed that the Deputy Chief of Staff had told this matter to the Vice-Minister of War, but that he was not certain of the fact). Therefore Gen. KAWASHIMA, worrying that the transfer of MATSUURA might affect the Inspector-General, told the War Minister that if such is the case he had better speak to Prince Kan-in definitely; and the War Minister in turn answered that he would speak definitely in case the matter touched upon MASAKI.

Then since about April 1936 there have been talks in the air of removing the Inspector-General of Military Training. The reason for this was that the Inspector-General had interfered with the policy of the Government concerning the problem of "The Organ Theory of the Emperor" and the problem of the administrative organization in Manchuria, and also that the Inspector-General had issued an address on the Tenno theory, the theory of "the Emperor as an organ" (this in spite of the fact that he had consulted with the War Minister and the Chief of General Staff). Rumor has it, as a result of the above, that the removal of MASAKI was one of the higher policies of the Cabinet, and that it had been worked out secretly among the senior statesmen of the Imperial Court. We doubted strongly that it was true, and imagined that it was just a silly talk which would not be materialized (Matsuura paid a visit to the Inspector-General on the 9th, and asked him if he had been told of a matter of personnel, and his answer was that he had not been consulted yet and that he was planning to have an interview the day after next.)

Meanwhile, the Inspector-General, on request from the War Minister, went to the official residence of the War Minister on the morning of 11 July for consultation on personnel matters. The War Minister himself told the Inspector-General, before referring to the contents of the August promotions and changes, as follows:



"You organize a faction and make yourself its leader. As long as you are in the position of the Inspector-General taking charge of the personnel matters the administrative control of the Army cannot be attained. Therefore I want you to become a Supreme War Councillor. Although His Imperial Highness, the Chief of Staff has an intention of removing you from the active service. I have reported to His Highness that it can not be done ....." Thereupon the Inspector-General retorted by asking what the War Minister meant by "organizing a faction", of which he had no knowledge whatsoever. The War Minister pointed out, however, Col. Shichida (from Saga) of the Inspector-General of Military Training, MUTAGUCHI (from Saga) of the General Staff, and Col. KODO (from Tosa), Chief of the Appointment Section. The Inspector-General answered that Col. Shichida was there as Chief of the 2nd Section before the Inspector-General himself was appointed, but that he intended to remove Shichida shortly because the latter was not very useful, that MUTAGUCHI had been recommended by NAGATA and others, and that he didn't even know the face of Kodo (Note by MATSUURA: Kodo was appointed by MATSUURA because of his excellent personality). The Inspector-General also insisted that he could not quite agree to the forced retirement of Lt.Gen. HATA, who knew what was right or wrong, and with the promotion of Lt. Gen. KOISO, who had an intimate connection with the March Incident, as CG of the Air Headquarters. (Note by MATSUURA: Last summer His Highness the Chief of Staff, due to the erroneous advice of Deputy Chief of Staff UEDA, expressed his intention to the War Minister substantially as follows: "HATA has such a bad reputation that it is questionable to appoint him divisional commander. How about attaching him to the Headquarters?...." On that occasion the War Minister related to MATSUURA that HATA had ably assisted ARAKI and, although he was engrossed in political affairs, he simply had to do so as MP commandant in order to gather information, and that if there was anything wrong with it, War Minister ARAKI himself, and not HATA, was to blame for it; therefore HATA deserved to be promoted as a



divisional commander. MATSUURA asked the War Minister, "How is HATA assisting Your Excellency?" The Minister answered, "Satisfactorily". Thereupon MATSUURA stated: "Well then he should rightfully be a divisional commander..... I shall tell this to His Highness myself." The Minister said, "All right." Thus HATA was made a divisional commander. It is only a year since, and today this talk of removing him! I can hardly understand the principles of the Minister. Again, former War Minister ARAKI had stated once his opinion about Lt. Gen. TATEKAWA and others, saying: "Men must not be discharged, men are very valuable when a war is expected shortly (then meaning: the crisis of 1936). Since placing them in the central posts needs some consideration, they should be kept in the Provincial posts for the time being." This was the general principle followed by former War Minister ARAKI.

The Inspector-General told the War Minister, that, since the matter was of grave importance, he needed a few days to think it over; and so he left (disagreeing to holding a Big Three Conference on the 12th.).

However, the next day, in the afternoon, there was a telephone call, stating that His Highness' the Chief of Staff was awaiting his arrival. The Inspector-General was much surprised, but presented himself, because the matter concerned His Highness.

On the morning of the 12th, the Inspector-General had an interview with the Minister at the Minister's official residence, and told the Minister that he would like to have the Big Three Conference of that afternoon postponed for two or three days, because he was not ready to present his answer at the conference. War Minister, however, stated that he could not postpone the conference, because the Personnel Bureau would be ~~be~~ inconvenienced in carrying on its official business and the same with the General Staff on account of His Highness making a trip



shortly. The Inspector-General replied: "Well then, I shall be at the conference. But mind you, I shan't be able to give you my answer!" That afternoon at the Big Three conference, the War Minister treated the Inspector-General as if he were a defendant in court, telling him that he would have to be removed from his present position. The Inspector-General in turn expressed his opinion, and repeated that he could not give a ready answer on personnel matters concerning the divisional commander class. He even swallowed, according to his statement, such harsh words as, "Are you trying to interfere in official affairs?" from His Highness, and insisted that he was unable to give a ready-answer. The conference thus adjourned with a decision to hold the second Big Three meeting on the following 15th.

As a matter of fact, to prevent Army personnel matters from being placed at the mercy of the War Minister's arbitrary decision, especially in case of a civilian Minister, <sup>it was arranged</sup> in 1913 to decide personnel matters by consultation among the Army's Big Three; and a memorial concerning this matter with the signatures of the three top-ranking officers of the Army had been submitted to the Throne through the General Staff, which had charge of the Supreme Command. The approval document is now preserved in the General Staff. Consequently, the position of the Inspector-General of Military Training is by no means a trifling one. Above all, sensing that the other two top-ranking officers might submit a memorial to the Throne in case of his refusal to resign, the Inspector-General firmly determined not to resign, even in spite of His Highness words, so long as he held direct Imperial appointment as His Majesty's Inspector-General of Military Training, with a conviction that it is a matter of grave sorrow for the Imperial Army if such <sup>an</sup> important personnel matter as this should be at the mercy of a faction within the Army. The Inspector-General held the opinion that, if after the conference the War Minister should submit a memorial to the Throne, he too might do the same. But if the War



Minister should make him resign against his will, the War Minister should hold himself responsible for having failed to bring about an amicable settlement. Further, if the Inspector-General can be removed, the Chief of Staff, who is the chief of the Supreme Command system, may also be removed. It was deplored that such a practice would be very harmful and set a bad precedence.

In view of the importance of the matter and of information coming from outside on the 13th and 14th (MATSUURA was informed by Yoshio Uehara and also by a certain reserve general who is an intimate friend of the War Minister), Gen. ARAI, Gen. HISHIKARI, and Gen. HONJO, being much concerned about the problem, respectively met the War Minister and the Chief of Staff and urged them in vain to hold over the matter on the ground that it was very serious and would establish a bad precedent. The War Minister remained firm and showed signs of carrying it out. Thereupon preparations were made to present on the one hand the evidences of the March Incident and the October Incident, and on the other hand, Nagata's notes regarding the execution of revolution in view of the War Minister's statement that the latest incident was the conspiracy of MINAMI and NAGATA.

On the 14th the Inspector-General visited the War Minister stating that the execution of this matter would not only hurt the character of His Highness the Chief of Staff, but also cause troubles to His Majesty the Emperor, he told the War Minister: "I don't care what becomes of me, but I want you to give due consideration to the position of the Inspector-General of Military Training." The War Minister answered: "All of my assistants, including the Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice-Minister, Director of the Personnel Bureau, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, insist on carrying it out. The strongest opinion among them is held by the Personnel and the weakest by the Military Affairs. -- You, too, must be in <sup>the</sup> A tough



viewed His Highness again, and stated their opinion. But His Highness merely answered that he could understand fully what Gen. HISHIKARI had said. Thus things were put off until the second Big Three Conference on 15th (incidentally on this day His Highness Prince Nashimoto was asked to be present at the residence of the Chief of Staff). At the conference the Inspector-General discussed the matter in question boldly and fearlessly from the point of view of the position of the Inspector-General of Military Training, and pointed out the developments from the March Incident and the October Incident. The Minister, it is said, kept silent and pretended not to hear the talk. The Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau awaited at the official residence the return of the Minister from the conference. The Minister (also another report has it that he was accompanied by the Chief of Staff) lost no time in going to Hayama, and submitted the memorial to the Throne. As a result, the Inspector-General was removed, against his will, by the other two top-ranking officers of the Army, and his successor, too, was recommended by them - a rueful state of affairs.

Previous to this, about one hour before the Big Three conference was held on 15th, the War Minister requested an interview with the Inspector-General. At the interview the Minister said: "If you consent to resign, you can have your say on the August promotions and changes." But the Inspector-General flatly refused this offer. <sup>What</sup> ~~What~~ was the Minister's conviction in regard to the August promotions and changes? One can only imagine that he laid emphasis on the removal of the Inspector-General only.

Rumors at that time had it that this incident was created by a plot of Gen. UGAKI's faction in its scheme to gain political power by causing a rift between the War Minister and the Inspector-General. Also there were talks in the air then, that there was a tacit understanding to make Minister HAYASHI the successor of



position of being pressed by so many ----" The Inspector-General replied "I do things, not because I am told by others but because of deeply-rooted convictions."

(Note: It is said that the Director of the Maintenance Bureau, YAMAOKA, *and demanded to know if the appointment Section* met the Chief of the Appointment Section, would readily agree with the War Minister in case he should present a memorial to the Throne and carry it out, disregarding the conference of the Big Three. The chief of the Appointment Section replied that the Appointment Section, including the Chief and the Assistant Chief (Lt. Col. KATO), would never handle it, under any circumstances. On the other hand, the Director of Personnel Affairs Bureau, IMAI, said in this connection: "I'm in a bad fix. I am going to quit the post of Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau for Deputy Chief of Staff two reasons:- First, the War Minister together with the Vice Minister and decides personnel matters, disregarding the Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, as was the case when MATSUURA was the Director. Thus the existence of the Director has no significance. Second, the War Minister submits the memorial to the Throne, in disregard of the regulations, which is illegal. I can't do this and so I'll quite...." In spite of all this, the War Minister claimed that IMAI was the strongest proponent of the change of the Inspector-General, which is true? Are the director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau and the Chief of the Appointments Section patching up affairs when they state on one hand that they will not handle the matter? Such is the difference between the faces and hearts of men! Is this not the reason for the agitation of the Imperial Army today?)

In the afore-mentioned interview, the War Minister told Gen. ARAKI and Gen. HISHIKARI that, if the intention of His Highness could be modified to some degree, he would reconsider the matter. Therefore Generals ARAKI and HISHIKARI inter-



the Governor-General of Chosen, and that SAITO had offered HAYASHI the position of Prime Minister on the condition that he make the Inspector-General resign (As a remark of one of the influential persons connected with the Minseito Party). I don't necessarily believe all of them.

On the 16th the resignation of the Inspector-General was announced. Although on the occasion of the Minister's submission of the memorial to the Throne, the Inspector-General had intended to do the same thing himself if it should be effective, he withheld it because he learned it would be in vain. However, it was learned that previous to this, a memorial had been also submitted to the Throne from some other source, and that His Majesty understood the matter thoroughly. On the 17th the Inspector-General, carrying with him a memorial to the Throne, went to Hayama to pay his respects to His Majesty, and submitted the document to the Chief Aide-de-camp, thereby securing the same effect as if he had reported to the Throne himself. The actual thing (probably a bombshell), was to be carried with him on the 20th when both he and his successor would be received <sup>P</sup> in audience by His Majesty.

On the 18th, the Supreme War Council was held. Between 1:30 and 6:00 p.m. an unprecedentedly tense situation prevailed. At this meeting Gen. ARAKI, referring to the March Incident and the October Incident, with which he was connected when he was War Minister, exhibited such evidence as the revolution plan written in Gen. NAGATA's own handwriting, the bomb, etc. He spoke in a tearful voice, while the War Minister remained completely mute. When the Minister answered ~~to~~ Gen. ARAKI's question as to where the faction was and who that person was, that it was probably MINAMI, Gen. KAWASHIMA said: "Factions do exist and higher ranking persons are being played up by lower ranking persons." And he continued that he always rebuked those persons who called people with moderate, impartial views as ~~weak~~ <sup>fickle</sup> and good-for-nothing.



Gen. Matsui fully agreed with Gen. ARAKI, saying that it was the first time he had heard about the conspiracy. Gen. HISHIKARI, on the other hand, did not take a positive attitude, although he often gave Gen. ARAKI such oral support as: "The conspiracy of an officer in active service! -- That's a serious matter -- ~~confound~~ found it!" The Minister stated: "Well, speaking of the trend of thought, NAGATA is a changed man now. He has been studying hard. Times have also changed, you know. Anyhow I'll look into the matter....." He lacked sincerity in his tone of speech.

The Minister also declared that there may be occasions when the two top-ranking officers may remove another top ranking officer. To this, the Inspector-General replied: "That is true, but it can be done only when the Minister, too, takes responsibility and resigns from his post!" Thus, this forced resignation set the most regrettable bad-precedent. The Deputy Chief of Staff, the vice-Minister and the Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau, ~~the~~, trying to evade the responsibility for their brazen-faced, shameless acts, rendered improper assistance. Again, all the newspaper reports concerning this matter were ~~so~~ far from the actual facts, deceiving society at large. There is but a dark outlook for the future unity of the Army when one thinks how far this sort of state of affairs may progress.

The conclusion of MATSUURA regarding this incident is as follows:

Most of Military, being under the influence of propaganda, think that Inspector-General MASAKI was to blame for it, and that the decision of the War Minister was justified. It is so with the Reservists Association and the Kaikōsha (Army Club). Some people say that things settled down as they should<sup>have</sup>, or that it was but a natural consequence because the Inspector-General was really to blame for it. Still there are others who say: "The Inspector-General was the ring-leader



of the Fascists of the May 15th Incident. He exposed the 500,000 Yuan Incident. He cornered the War Minister and the Government into a difficult situation on the question of the administrative organization ~~Man~~ in Manchuria."

None of these opinions and comments is of course correct. But when evil prospers, good cannot resist it. The fact of the matter is, perhaps, that the scheme to remove the Inspector-General, who had opposed the afore-mentioned governmental institutions, originated in the Government, and that Minister HAYASHI (he either simply believed it or had some other intention) ~~agreed~~ agreed to the scheme and went so far as to speak about this matter strongly to the senior statesmen and to His Highness. It is also likely that a certain element within the Army, through the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Vice-Minister, urged the Minister to take action in this matter, thereby bringing about the present complications. For Inspector-General MASAKI, outsiders have full sympathy. Therefore he had better be cautious and bide his time for the time being.

The proceedings of the Supreme War Council on 18 July.

Gen. ARAKI: "Personnel matters should be decided at the conference of the Army's three top-ranking officers. This understanding with the signatures of three top-ranking officers, was submitted to the Throne through the General Staff, and sanctioned by the Throne. Why did you disregard this rule?"

Gen. WATANABE and Gen. ABE: "Imperial sanction has not been obtained. It was merely submitted to the Throne."

Deputy Chief of Staff: "Imperial sanction has been obtained."

The Minister: "I did it, because both the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Vice-Minister said it's all right to do so."

Gen. ARAKI: "~~The~~" Deputy Chief of Staff and Vice-Minister, do both of you really think it all right?"



Gen. WATANABE: "This matter was decided during the time of Field-marshal YAMAGATA. In case the three top-ranking officers do not agree, it can be decided by a majority vote."

The Minister: "If it can not be settled, it can be decided by the other two top-ranking officers."

Gen. MASAKI: "That is true, but it can be done only when the Minister, too, assumes responsibility for it."

The Minister: "To-day there are factions in the Army. The dominant ones are the **SAGA** faction and the **TOSA** faction."

Gen. ARAKI: "Where are the factions? If there are any, they are the AICHI faction and the ISHIKAWA faction."

Gen. KAWASHIMA: "Factions certainly exist. Superior officers are being played up by lower ranking persons. There are some persons who call people with moderate, impartial views ~~as~~ <sup>fickle</sup> ~~and~~ and good-for-nothing. I always rebuke them and tell them that that is not so."

Then Gen. ARAKI related March Incident and the October Incident, and, exhibiting the evidences, such as the note of Major-Gen. NAGATA and the bomb, he scathingly criticized them. The Minister was unable to answer. He only said: "I changed, you know! Nagata has now impartial views and has been studying hard. Anyhow, I'll look into the matter....."

Gen. MATSUI said: "Was there such a thing! That's very improper!" General HISHIKARI, although he supported Gen. ARAKI to a considerable extent, did not take such a positive attitude as to argue about it himself.

It is said that the reports of the March Incident and the October Incident were submitted to the Chief Aide-de-Camp so as to make it effective as a memorial to the Throne. Also a memorial was submitted to His Majesty by the Chief of the Naval General Staff through the efforts of Admiral Kato and others.



An observation on the transfer of the Inspector-General of Military Training.

The cause of this change does not date back to August, as reported by the press. It traces its origin far back to a well-laid plan. In order to understand this fully, it is necessary to clarify the following undisclosed facts:

1. There was a faction made up of Lt. Gen. KOISO and Lt. Gen. TATEKAWA, who were responsible for the March Incident and the October Incident, and the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, NAGATA, as the nucleus, together with Lt. Gen. TERAUCHI (who had been told by KOISO that ARAKI and MASAKI had planned to discharge him, but that MINAMI had spared him; and he believed it), TOJO and MATSUMURA. Kingoro HASHIMOTO, Isamu CHO, KATAKURA, IKEDA, AMANO, and TANAKA (it is said that Akira MUTO and others were also included) supported the NAGATA faction, and, under a tacit understanding with MINAMI and UEDA, constantly published mysterious literature with a view to injuring the reputations of Gen. ARAKI and Gen. MASAKI. Their motive for doing this was none other than to secure their own self-protection, i.e. should Gen. ARAKI and Gen. MASAKI become influential, these people (mentioned above) might be discharged or might not be able to stay in the central posts. Thus they tried to make the people misunderstand Gen. ARAKI and Gen. MASAKI who belonged to no particular faction.

Captain TSUJI also was one of the participants of the October Incident. ~~It~~ It is ~~is~~ a reasonable doubt that he schemed the Military Academy Incident and tried to entrap Gen. MASAKI. Again there is Colonel NEMOTO, who, having been appointed the Chief of the Press section as Tojo's protege, has been quite engrossed in a publicity program designed to hurt the reputation of Gen. MASAKI and ARAKI.

2. A group of young officers (estimated about a hundred and scores in number throughout the whole Army) at first banded together with the extremists of the colonel class mentioned above through the SAKURA-KAI (Cherry Blossom Party). Later,



however, they separated from it and came to admire Gen. ARAKI and Gen. MASAKI for ~~the~~ their strong sense of justice. Declaring <sup>their</sup> severance of relations with officers above the colonel class who are trying to reconstruct the nation solely for the purpose of acquiring their own positions (War Minister KOISO, Foreign Minister TATEKAWA, Home Minister HASHIMOTO, Inspector-General of the Metropolitan Police Cho, etc.), they are now at odds with them. Both Gen. ARAKI and Gen. MASAKI maintain that the reformation of National Government Affairs should be effected lawfully and gradually. And based on this idea both generals are properly guiding the young officers so that they will not ~~do~~ wrong. In spite of this fact, the propaganda of the NAGATA faction has given the public the wrong impression that both generals have been instigating the young officers.

It was under these circumstances that three officers headed by Major KATAKURA met one evening last fall at one of the waiting houses in TSUKIJI (Tokyo). They had a confidential talk that night which was in effect as follows: "We've got to get rid of Inspector-General MASAKI. Since Deputy Chief of Staff SUGIYAMA has already reported the high-handedness of MASAKI to His Highness, everything is now O.K..." (an MP information). And then from about June there were frequent reports from some well-informed sources that the cabinet, too, had a plan of removing the Inspector-General and that an understanding with the Senior Statesmen on this matter had been obtained. As to the reason for his removal, the same sources claimed that Gen. MASAKI had plotted together with Lt. Gen. HATA in the 500,000 Yuan incident (it is generally rumoured that Lt. Gen. HATA came to Tokyo and did it alone), that he cornered the War Minister and the Government in ~~in~~ a difficult situation by giving to Representative TSUGUMO the data on the question of the administrative ~~organization~~ ~~in~~ Manchuria (Major-Gen. MOCHINAGA is being suspected), and that he embarrassed the War Minister by issuing to the Army an address on the "organ



theory of the Emperor", which the Government did not welcome. I am of opinion, however, that these allegations were false, ~~and~~. Such an address, for instance, is usually issued after consultation with the War Minister and the Chief of General Staff and with their consent.

Rumour of late also has it that Governor-general UGAKI, MINAMI and HAYASHI collaborated in the scheme of removing the Inspector-General. But I can ~~hardly~~<sup>not</sup> decide whether or not this is true. The reason for the above scheme seems to be that to those who attempt to make UGAKI Prime Minister, the existence of MASAKI as the Inspector-General of Military Training would aggravate the sentiment within the Army. Hence they want to remove him. ~~Deducing from this~~<sup>Hence</sup>, I imagine that His Highness the Chief of Staff misconstrued the whole situation when he scolded the Inspector-General at the conference of the Big Three, saying, "I want you to resign from your post, because we want to accomplish a very serious problem in this national emergency."

I deeply rue the fact the Deputy Chief of Staff, Vice-Minister and the Director of the Personnel Affairs Bureau gave wrong assistances to their chiefs either from misunderstandings, deliberate intention, or oppotunism, and again that those in the important position of Supreme War Councillor lacked the sense of justice and zeal to save the situation.

The present War Minister was first appointed Inspector-General of Military Training through the recommendations of Gen. MASAKI and Gen. ARAKI, and then appointed as War Minister. Formerly he cooperated with both generals. And now he is a betrayer. On personnel matters, he has no definite view of his own, but is always swayed by public opinion and heresays. In making the change of the Inspector-General, he was swayed by mistaken rumour. That he brought out the resignation of the Inspector-General before touch on the matter of the August promotions and changes which fact is quite different from what the newspapers have reported, is



worthy of note. Again, in spite of the false propaganda that there was a difference of opinions between the War Minister and the Inspector-General on the matter of the August promotions and changes, the fact is that, with reference to the suggested promotion of Lt. Gen. KOISO as CG of the Air Headquarters and of placing Lt. Gen. HATA on the waiting list, MASAKI objected on the ground that to remove HATA who knew what was right or wrong and to promote KOISO who did not, would be putting the cart before the horse. ~~It~~ It is noteworthy that for certain reasons of the Imperial Court the Minister withdrew privately the promotion of Lt. Gen. KOISO. Thus he even involved His Highness in this matter (it is said that His Highness had agreed to it). The responsibility of the War Minister is by no means light. Yet he pretends ignorance! Where is his sense of justice!

In spite of all these, the August promotions and changes have been propagandized extensively as the first step of control within the Army. As a matter of fact, however, there is no principle and no policy. To take but a few outstanding ones, FUJIE, who had been Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School for only four months, has been replaced by KUWAKI of Ishikawa Prefecture; Otani of Saga Prefecture has been replaced by YASUI of Ishikawa Prefecture; Morita of Ishikawa Prefecture has been appointed Chief of the conscription Section; KAGESA, a marked man, has been appointed Chief of the War Affairs Section; Nakamura of Nagoya has been made Chief of the Reward Section. It is no exaggeration to say that he is creating a faction.

The gist of the conversation between the War Minister and Lt. Gen. KAWAOKA on the night of 1 August (at the official residence after the Toyama reception).

Yamaoka: "Why was Gen. MASAKI removed?"

The Minister; "It was the scheme of MINAMI and NAGATA. Others like INAGAKI, SUZUKI (So), UEDA, HAYASHI (Ya) all reported to His Highness the Chief of General



Staff. Although His Highness was of the opinion that he should be put out of the active service, it was decided to have him just resign from the post of the Inspector-General."

Yamaoka: "Could't you tell His Highness 'Then I, too, shall resign?' And wasn't it possible for both the War Minister and His Excellency MASAKI to get together to decide on their successors and report to His Highness?"

The Minister: (after being unable to answer awhile) "Well, I had to think of my position as a Cabinet Minister. It's not so simple as that ...."

Yamaoka: "What do you intend to do with Gen. MASAKI hereafter? Is he going to be removed from the active service?"

The Minister: "I'm not thinking of doing that. To remove him from the active service after what has happened to him already would mean the loss of my face and reputation. I can hardly do that."

Yamaoka: "What if His Highness does insist on that again?"

The Minister: "I'll do my best to ask for His Highness' reconsideration."

The Minister: "What about NAGATA?"

Yamaoka: "Needs an immediate transfer."

(He explained about the administrative organization in Manchuria, the Pamphlet, the Cabinet Council, and other Past developments; also he mentioned his relation with the bureaucrats).

The Minister: "The Vice-Minister, too, suggested <sup>the</sup> transfer <sup>of</sup> NAGATA. It was very improper to join hands with the bureaucrats. As to the Pamphlet, damned KUDO..."

Yamaoka: "Have you any plan to remove NAGATA and send him abroad?"

The Minister: "No."

Yamaoka: "How about IMAI as his successor?"

The Minister: "No... IMAI as Director of the Military Affairs Bureau and HASHIMOTO as Vice-Minister? That doesn't work out! I am now thinking of publing



them apart... Once they suggested to appoint Lt. Gen. WAKAYAMA as a divisional commander; but as I had previously consulted with MA SAKI on this matter, I flatly refused. In the first place, <sup>this</sup> ~~is~~ scheme was conceived by MINAMI and NAGATA, of whom MINAMI is the worse. It would be well to close it, but I can't do that now."

Yamaoka: "If IMAI is not fit for the Military Affairs Bureau, how about YAMASHITA? Although he hails from WOSA, he is really from Tokyo. And his wife is a daughter of Mr. NAGAYAMA. People speak of the ARAKI faction or the MASAKI faction, but where are these factions?"

The Minister: "That's just it. I hear people speak of factions, but I don't think such is the case. I never believe a word of ~~YASAKI~~ Yasakichi HAYASHI; he's no good. IKENUMA is all right. MASAKI is a protege of Field-Marshal MUTO, and so am I; therefore at heart I'm a good friend of MASAKI. I can't very well yield to UGAKI and MINAMI by now."

Yamaoka: "In case of a change of the Minister in future, whom will you recommend? Gen. ABE?"

The Minister: "ABE is unacceptable. May be TERAUCHI or KAWASHIMA. ARAKI's in some difficult situation."

Yamaoka: "What if His Highness doesn't agree to removing NAGATA?"

The Minister: "Since NAGATA is my subordinate, I'll dispose of him the way I want."

The Minister: "What about HATA?"

Yamaoka: "I don't know much about Lt. Gen. HATA."

Yamaoka: "With reference to His Excellency MASAKI, I want you to take <sup>a</sup> sound step by consulting with Inspector-General WATANABE."

The Minister: "There is a difficulty because WATANABE holds an opposite stand."

Note: Among the August promotions and changes the following modifications were made (after the change of the Inspector-General).



1. The plan to appoint KOISO as CG of the Air Headquarters was secretly withdrawn.

2. The plan to make TOJO Chief of Staff of the Chosen Army was changed to attachment to the Headquarters of the 12th Division.

3. The plan to attach MATSUMURA to a certain division was changed to attachment to the 4th Division.



Explanation

Re. Lord Keeper  
of Privy Seal

Explanation on

## The Lord Keeper of Privy Seal

The duty of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal is to assist and advise the Emperor in administering the affairs of state, ~~constantly~~ constantly attending upon him

(Art. II The Regulations for the L. K. P. S. ) ~~so that~~ it would

be no doubt the ~~performance~~ of his duty to advise and assist the Emperor <sup>(at the change of the Government)</sup> in forming his will, to whom <sup>deciding</sup>

the Imperial mandate to organize a new government

should be issued. But as on that point there

had been an established political usage for a

long time, ~~that~~ <sup>would</sup> The Emperor asked the senior

statesman, whose peculiar existence had played



an important rôle in <sup>the</sup> politics of Japan; of his opinion <sup>on</sup>  
about the succeeding Cabinet. In other words on being  
asked who should be the head and organizer of the  
succeeding Cabinet, the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal  
would always answer ~~him~~

That His Majesty would be pleased to ask  
the opinion of the Senior Statesman.

However, Prince SAIONJI, the last living senior  
statesman, would have always consulted with the Lord  
Keeper of Privy Seal before he answered to the Emperor's  
question. Especially since the situation had <sup>become</sup> become  
serious and tense from about 1935, Prince SAIONJI



had made it a custom to consult with ex-ministers,  
military authorities and other prominents of  
various fields before he ~~made~~<sup>making</sup> up his mind.

Among those who were consulted with, the Lord Keeper  
of Privy Seal had been a leading figure. His  
opinion had ~~become~~<sup>was</sup> ~~much~~<sup>more and more</sup> esteemed ~~above~~<sup>than</sup> others

as the situation was ~~made~~<sup>making</sup> serious develop-  
ment. This tendency had grown clearer and more

prominent as the time went on, (shifting gradually) the  
responsibility which was hitherto on the senior  
statesman to the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal.

Finally, after the general resignation of HAYASHI



Cabinet in June 1937, the Emperor asked directly  
 the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal YUASA <sup>as to who should head</sup> ~~to answer as for~~  
 the next Cabinet. On being questioned, <sup>the Lord Keeper</sup> he visited

as usual Prince SAIONJI to consult with. But the

meaning of the consultation was entirely different from

<sup>that of</sup> the previous cases. This time the opinion of Prince

SAIONJI was only taken into consideration by Mr.

YUASA to form his own will as to whom

he should recommend as the head of the incoming

government, ~~to the Emperor.~~

In that respect, the ASAHI reported as follows.

"It has been a political usage up to now that



5

the Emperor asks the opinion of the senior statesman through the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal at the change of the government. Now Mr. YUASA has created a new precedent ~~that~~ <sup>to</sup> be answered ~~and~~ directly to the Emperor on his responsibility as the constant assistant and adviser of Him as to who should be appointed <sup>the head of</sup> the succeeding Cabinet, ... (2 June 1937)

In the subsequent cases, that is, the changes of the government in January and in August, of 1938, the precedent was followed.

1. At the formation of YONAI Cabinet after the resignation of ABE Cabinet in January of 1940,



circumstances were very different from the previous.

In this case Mr. YUASA consulted with each

ex-premier and the president of the Privy Council

personally and <sup>individually</sup> ~~respectively~~, with some of whom <sup>he consulted</sup> only

by phone. <sup>Having</sup> Practically making up his mind

as to whom he should recommend to <sup>the</sup> Emperor ~~to~~ <sup>not</sup>

~~issue the Imperial mandate to form a new cabinet,~~

he sent <sup>the chief secretary</sup> ~~an envoy~~ to Prince SAIONJI in OKITSU

to listen to his view. Thus the position of

the Lord Keeper of Privy seal had become

vitaly important, and his responsibility had

~~grown~~ <sup>grown</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> most grave at the change of the cabinet.



and ~~responsibility~~ <sup>responsibility</sup>

In June, 1940 YUASA resigned his post and

Marquis KIDO was appointed the Lord Keeper of

Privy Seal. Soon after this, <sup>in July</sup> the change of the

government was ~~taken~~ <sup>took</sup> place in July. As this was the

first time with Marquis KIDO to assist the Emperor

in issuing an Imperial mandate to form a cabinet,

his attitude on the occasion was being watched

with keen interest. He called a meeting of ex-

and with Prince SAIONJI

Premiers. After consulting with ~~the~~ <sup>them</sup> he recommended

Prince KONOYE as the head of the succeeding

Cabinet



When the second KONOYE Cabinet resigned,  
and the third KONOYE Cabinet was established,  
in the exactly same way, as the last occasion

Moreover on this occasion a formal communique  
that the conference of ex-premiers had been  
held at the Imperial Palace was announced

by the Information Bureau. The words "the  
conference of ex-premiers" ~~were~~ appeared publicly  
and officially for the first time. The age of the

senior statesman had already come to an end  
by the death of Prince SAIONJI in the previous  
year. So ~~it~~ <sup>there</sup> was only the meeting of ex-premiers