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Vol. 56

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 7, 1946

Washington, D. C.

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

KRAMER, Captain Alwin Dalton (Resumed)

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E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 56

(5)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Thursday, February 7, 1946.

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Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

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WARD & SAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 The Chairman: The committee will come to order. The
2 chair understands that counsel concluded last evening.

3 Mr. Richardson: Yes, I had but I have some other matters,
4 Mr. Chairman.

5 Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the committee has indicated
6 that it proposes to make the evidence and proceedings contained
7 in the earlier investigations a part of the record of the
8 committee here, I would like to ask the committee to reserve
9 exhibit numbers 143 to 149, inclusive, to cover the seven
10 reports, the Roberts, the Hart, the Navy, the Army, the Hewitt,
11 the Clarke and possibly the Clausen if the Clausen should
12 come in, reserve those exhibit numbers for those reports so
13 that those exhibits might run in a list of exhibits in con-
14 secutive numbers.

15 The Chairman: Without objection that will be done.

16 (Exhibits Nos. 143 to 149, inclusive,
17 reserved.)

18 Mr. Richardson: Now, next: Some time ago the committee
19 or the members of the committee asked that the testimony of
20 Admiral Bloch and Admiral Stark and of General Marshall be
21 collated and mimeographed copies of it made up, the same as
22 had been done for General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

23 Now, we have done that and we will have during the day
24 available for distribution to the committee the compiled tes-
25 timony of Bloch and Stark and Marshall if the committee wants

1 us to deliver it to the members of the committee in view of
2 the later determination of the committee that all of the ear-
3 lier reports, which would include all of the testimony, is to
4 be put in the record generally and printed copies of all of
5 this will in due course be laid before each member of the
6 committee under the page proof sheets that are now being
7 delivered to us. We have the mimeographed copies if members
8 of the committee want us to furnish them.

9 The Chairman: Thank you, counsel.

10 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, I inquired yesterday
11 something about the progress that was being made with regard
12 to printing and I understood from Mr. Masten -- is he here
13 now?

14 Mr. Richardson: He was here just a minute ago.

15 Mr. Masten: We have solved that.

16 The Vice Chairman: You have taken care of that all right?

17 Mr. Masten: Yes.

18 The Chairman: The chair might state -- this is off the
19 record.

20 (Discussion outside the record.)

21 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ALWIN D. KRAMER

22 (resumed)

23 The Chairman: Captain, I only have a few questions. I
24 have to go and preside over another committee at 10:30, so
25 I will have to be brief and I would be anyhow.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 You are familiar, of course, with the Japanese intercepts
3 setting forth the conditions under which an execute message
4 might be expected. That is, if communications were cut off or
5 diplomatic relations broken so that the ordinary methods of
6 communication could not be utilized, that if this broadcast
7 about the weather should appear that would mean certain things.

8 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

9 The Chairman: With respect to the United States and
10 Great Britain and Russia.

11 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

12 The Chairman: That was the basis upon which you were
13 looking for, and as far as you know, and I believe you testi-
14 fied, that everybody in the Department was looking for or ex-
15 pecting an execute based upon that?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 The Chairman: As a matter of fact, the conditions under
18 which such a message should come through were never fulfilled.
19 That is, there was never any breaking in communications nor
20 in diplomatic relations prior to the 7th of December, is
21 that true?

22 Captain Kramer: Precisely, sir.

23 The Chairman: Now, the message that you referred to as
24 the one having been brought by your door on the 5th of De-
25 cember and taken to Captain Safford, I want to clear up in my

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

2 own mind whether you regarded that message as an execute
3 based upon the previous messages with regard to the winds
4 situation?

5 Captain Kramer: I did so regard it, yes, sir.

6 The Chairman: You did?

7 Captain Kramer: However, if I may intersperse at this
8 point, Mr. Chairman, in the last few minutes here I have been
9 making some notes regarding this winds message which I con-
10 sider part of the answers to some of the questions of coun-
11 sellor yesterday afternoon which, however, were not included
12 in my answer due to interspersed questions about points that
13 came up in the part of the answer that I gave. If I may do
14 so I would like to cover these loose points at this point.

15 The Chairman: Yes, go ahead.

16 Captain Kramer: I mentioned the fact regarding this
17 so-called skipped file number, that there are a number of
18 reasons why such a file number should be cancelled or skipped
19 in the JD file by Section GZ. I specifically covered two of
20 the points, the two primary reasons why such file numbers
21 were skipped.

22 There are two others which I meant to include in that
23 and explain them. I would like to do so now.

24 One reason is the fact that occasionally the numbering
25 machine which we used skipped a number in changing from one

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

1

2 number to the next. I previously indicated that there were
3 fourteen copies to number. There was no automatic shift on
4 the machine at the end of fourteen numberings, it had to be
5 done by hand.

6 The notation in the particular blank we are talking
7 about, 7001, in the file indicates it was cancelled. It may
8 have been cancelled rather than skipped. However, earlier
9 in the year file No. 2074 has a notation in Lieutenant Har-
10 rison's handwriting that the number was skipped in error.

11 I should like to mention at this point that for the first
12 time since 1941 I have had access to these files or, rather,
13 I might put it I have examined these files this Monday. In
14 the course of this examination I looked back into the 1940
15 files and found similar cancelled numbers. In fact, there is
16 one block of numbers from, as I recollect, No. 4100 through
17 4499 that is skipped in that file; in other words, a block
18 of approximately four hundred numbers skipped in that file.

19 At the time it was noted, a day or two later, as I re-
20 collect it, I said not to bother going back to fill in those
21 numbers.

22 Regarding another possibility of a cancelled number, it
23 will be noted in this exhibit 142 that there is a notation
24 under file No. 4647 by Lieutenant Harrison in his handwriting,
25 he customarily used handwriting because he was not a typist, -

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

1

2 that that number was cancelled by Army after being numbered
3 by Navy.

4 In other words, apparently, a dispatch, a decryption
5 was sent over to us by Army and subsequently cancelled. My
6 guess at this time as to the reason for the cancellation is
7 that it was Army practice not to include in these numbered
8 series messages bearing on the text of this decryption work.
9 They customarily left that out of the file. That was not,
10 however, the Navy practice. We left them in the files.

11 That covers the points I wanted to bring out about the
12 cancellex number. Regarding the interpretation of the mes-
13 sage --

14 The Chairman: May I ask you then if you are through
15 with that part just this question: If I understand your tes-
16 timony, there was nothing unusual part icularly about this
17 7001 being a blank sheet?

18 Captain Kramer: That is precisely the point I am trying
19 to emphasize, sir.

20 The Chairman: So that whatever should have been on it or
21 might have been on it if it had been filled out was somewhere
22 else in the files, is that true?

23 Captain Kramer: It would not necessarily be anywhere
24 else in the files. It might, of course, be because of a
25 duplication of the file number message.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

1
2 The Chairman: Yesterday you talked about changing the
3 file numbers or switching it from one file number to another
4 and I got the impression that it might be located on some
5 other file number. Maybe I was wrong about that.

6 Captain Kramer: No, sir, that was purely a question of
7 the number they gave to a particular message. That number
8 might be cancelled for the various reasons I have given.

9 The Chairman: Well, if that number were cancelled,
10 though, would it appear on some other file?

11 Captain Kramer: Oftentimes it was reallocated if it
12 occurred the same day, particularly to fill out the solid
13 block, but particularly during the latter part of 1941 that
14 was rare because of the fact that with the earlier episodes
15 of that kind I had cautioned the men doing that particular
16 work on the point and there are none apparently in the lat-
17 ter part of 1941 of that kind of error, skipping or allo-
18 cating numbers erroneously. By that I mean, as I explained
19 yesterday, the two primary reasons for the cancellation of
20 numbers would be allocating a number to a part of a multi-
21 part message the first parts of which we had previously re-
22 ceived. In other words, it was purely a clerical matter of
23 making a proper check of our files to see whether or not we
24 had those previous parts of that multi-part message before
25 allocating a number to the current part that had come in.

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

2 The Chairman: Are we to understand then your testimony
3 to mean that there is no particular significance to be at-
4 tached to the fact that this 7001 is a blank sheet?

5 Captain Kramer: That is precisely what I mean to in-
6 dicate, sir.

7 The Chairman: All right. Now you were about to inter-
8 pret the message.

9 Mr. Richardson: I think he has one thing further he
10 wants to say.

11 The Chairman: Proceed in any way you wish.

12 Captain Kramer: I am going off this subject of the
13 cancelled number now but it is on the general subject of this
14 winds message. I have been under the impression during the
15 past four years, purely as a matter of memory, that in that
16 piece of teletype that was shown me by the GY watch officer
17 only one country was involved. I so indicated the first time
18 I had occasion to testify on that point before the court of
19 Admiral Murfin.

20 The Chairman: You referred to that as a court of Ad-
21 miral Murfin. It was the Naval Court of Inquiry?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 The Chairman: Yes.

24 Captain Kramer: I am still under that impression. I,
25 however, am not positive and have never been positive on the

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

2 precise wording of that message since I first attempted to
3 recollect what the wording was.

4 In that connection, too, I should like to emphasize this
5 point. I heard Captain Safford in the last few days indicate
6 that in that piece of teletype Russia was also included but
7 in the negative form. I can categorically state that if any
8 of that phraseology had appeared in the negative form in my
9 mind it would have thrown the whole thing out because there was
10 no provision whatsoever for a negative form of any of these
11 phrases.

12 Regarding the question of my memory, I would like to com-
13 ment to this effect: My contact with that piece of teletype
14 totaled only a few seconds in duration, I probably saw it
15 not over ten or fifteen seconds. I did not see it while Cap-
16 tain Safford was examining it. He was standing, - he was
17 holding it and standing in front of me. At no occasion from
18 December of 1941 until the question was asked me before
19 Admiral Murfin's Court of Inquiry was the question of what
20 country was involved brought up in conversation or on any
21 other occasion. That question took me, you might term it,
22 cold.

23 In that connection, too, I would like to comment on my
24 testimony before Admiral Murfin's Court of Inquiry, that my
25 testimony was given without any preparation whatsoever. I had

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

2 been detached two days before from the South Pacific, ordered
3 north under priority one transportation by air. I had been
4 traveling two days and arrived in Pearl Harbor around mid-
5 night.

6 I phoned Captain Layton, whose number as Fleet Intelli-
7 gence Officer I readily found, to find out what my assignment
8 was to be. It was then that I first learned that the purpose
9 of ordering me up on fast transportation was to testify before
10 this Court of Inquiry. I was not aware even that it was
11 meeting there.

12 I called Captain Layton from the airport. It was not
13 until the following morning at 8:30 that I first learned that
14 I was free to disclose to this Court of Inquiry anything
15 having to do with radio intelligence. In other words, I was
16 still strongly impressed by all the security indoctrination
17 connected with this work. I was not at all certain that it
18 was proper in the interest of national security to disclose
19 any matters concerning radio intelligence or cryptanalysis
20 before this Court of Inquiry. For that reason I stopped at
21 Captain Layton's office before proceeding to where the court
22 was meeting and asked him about that specific point and was
23 first assured at that time, one-half hour before I commenced
24 testifying, that this court had full authority to delve into
25 all aspects of crypt-analysis as far as the Navy was con-

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

2 cerned, that such testimony would be made a top secret sup-
3 plement to their record of proceedings.

4 That is what I mean by being caught cold on what my
5 recollections were in testifying before that court.

6 The Chairman: Is that all you wanted to say about that?

7 Captain Kramer: In further amplification of the question
8 of my memory I should like to make this brief comment also.

9 Every other -- perhaps not other, but every message that
10 was typed up and disseminated by Section GZ of Naval Communi-
11 cations was seen by me at least six or eight and sometimes
12 as many as a dozen times. I invariably examined the file of
13 current traffic quite closely; in fact, early in the year I
14 studied it closely enough to write a gist of each message;
15 the last month or so before December 1941, when we had ceased
16 the practice of gisting the day's traffic because of the ur-
17 gency of getting the material out promptly I studied these
18 things particularly closely because I did not have a gist
19 before me while the recipients to whom I normally delivered
20 this material were examining it. I felt that it was a part
21 of my job to be thoroughly familiar with what they were
22 looking at so that in case questions were asked, references
23 given, personalities whose names appeared therein were asked
24 about, that I would be familiar with what they were talking
25 about and could elucidate.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

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By contrast this particular winds message that I have described I saw only once and for not more than fifteen seconds or so.

One further point in connection with this winds message. Captain Safford has testified that the translation of the setup of these winds messages is incorrect. I agree to that to this extent. The version on the work sheet from which the translation was made in the Navy Department was garbled, appreciably garbled.

Mr. Richardson: You are speaking now, Captain, of the original winds code message?

Captain Kramer: Original setup of this message, yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: All right.

Captain Kramer: I think it is Circular 2343.

The Chairman: 53.

Captain Kramer: I have had occasion in the last few days to examine that work sheet again and confirm my memory on that point. Without changing those garbles the translation as it appears in exhibit 1 is still correct, but by modifying the garbles or clearing these garbles it can be made to fit fairly precisely the British translation submitted by Singapore to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Lucas: Just a moment.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Chairman

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Captain Kramer: One final point in connection with this thing --

Senator Lucas: Will you kindly go into that just a little more, that last statement you made about fitting the parts?

Captain Kramer: That is what I am going to do now, sir.

Senator Lucas: But you are starting with another subject.

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U.S. SENATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1 Captain Kramer: No, sir. That version furnished by
2 the British to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
3 which was put on the Kopek channel, was put on that cir-
4 cuit and came into the Navy Department, as I recollect,
5 the same date that we had our translation in that winds
6 set-up.

7 It was for that reason that no message was drafted by
8 the Navy Department covering this winds set-up. We felt
9 it was fully and adequately covered by the translation
10 of the circuit already. It was in more emphatic form.

11 From current examination, it was in more precise
12 form than the version we had in the Navy Department.

13 That is all I have to state.

14 The Chairman: I am sorry, Captain, I have to go to
15 another committee, and I will not be able to finish my
16 examination.

17 Will it be agreeable to the committee if I reserve
18 the right to resume my examination later, unless some
19 other member covers the points I have in mind? I am sorry
20 I have to leave, but I have to go to another committee.

21 Thank you very much.

22 The Vice Chairman: Captain, do you now have, or have
23 you ever at any time had any interest in the prosecution
24 or the defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 with this Pearl Harbor attack?

2 Captain Kramer: Most emphatically no, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: Have you ever at any time exer-
4 cised yourself in helping to prepare any type or form of
5 prosecution or defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else
6 connected with the Pearl Harbor attack?

7 Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: Have you ever at any time, or do you
9 now feel that the officers of the General Staff of the Army
10 or the Navy, in effect, are crooks or would indulge in
11 framing Admiral Kimmel or anybody else connected with this
12 Pearl Harbor attack, or that they are not to be trusted?

13 Captain Kramer: Such phenomena are inconceivable to
14 my mind, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now, with respect to the so-called
16 winds execute message, Captain, just a few questions in con-
17 nection with that.

18 I have before me page 12 of the statement read to this
19 committee by Captain Safford. I assume counsel can supply
20 you a copy of it, if you do not have it.

21 Captain Kramer: I have one.

22 The Vice Chairman: I ask you to please turn to page
23 12 of Captain Safford's prepared statement, which he read
24 to this committee about the middle of the page, and I

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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1 invite your attention to the paragraph beginning:

2 "When I first saw the winds message, it had already
3 been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge
4 of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communi-
5 cations Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all
6 three 'code phrases' on the original incoming teletype
7 sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil
8 or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting the following
9 three translations:

10 "War with England (including NEI, etc)

11 "War with the U.S.

12 "Peace with Russia."

13 "I am not sure of the order; but it was the same in
14 the broadcast, and I think England appeared first. I
15 think Kramer used 'U.S.' rather than 'United States.' It
16 is possible that the words 'No war' instead of 'Peace'
17 were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to
18 Russia."

19 Now, having read that part of Captain Safford's testi-
20 mony, Captain, are you prepared to give this committee in-
21 formation bearing on that?

22 Captain Kramer: I think the testimony I have given
23 already covers most of this point. I can only reiterate
24 those statements. Anything appearing in one of these winds
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h4 1 broadcasts indicating a negative form, in other words,
2 as interpreted on this page, peace with someone would
3 have immediately discarded it in my mind as being a signal
4 in this winds system.

c2 5 I might further comment along that line that I think
6 it would be a very strange sort of disguising on the part
7 of the Japanese to have said "No north wind."

8 The winds set-up was to be ostensibly an authentic
9 weather broadcast.

10 I would like to comment further, that there were at
11 least six or eight false alarms on this weather broadcast.

12 From the time we were set up at the end of November,
13 I was called down, I definitely recollect one time, I
14 believe three times at night to check with the GY watch
15 officers on some of the reams, yards of teletype paper
16 covering the plain language broadcasts of the Japanese.

17 In every case that I have just described what I
18 examined was on long lengths of teletype with solid
19 blocks of Japanese news appearing on the teletype as well.

20 In each case a careful examination of this plain
21 language broadcast of weather made me reach the conclusion
22 that it was nothing more than ordinary weather broadcasts.

23 The specific piece of teletype that was shown me and
24 which I accompanied the watch officer with to Captain Safford's
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5 1 office, was a short piece of teletype paper torn off
2 the teletype machine. I presumption at the time was that
3 the GY watch officer had determined that it fitted the
4 general conditions required by this weather broadcast,
5 namely that it appeared in its proper location in the
6 text of a news broadcast, either at the beginning or at
7 the end or both, and that it had been repeated the required
8 number of times.

9 That was part of the function of the GY watch officer,
10 not only on this particular weather system but on all sys-
11 tems. They were the breakdown people, they identified sys-
12 tems; they turned into my section only the final Japanese
13 text.

14 That applies to everything except incompletely recovered
15 codes in which the coded Japanese text would be turned into
16 my section.

17 I therefore personally, in the case of this Friday
18 morning so-called winds message had no occasion to check
19 on these points the question of whether it appeared in
20 its proper context of a news broadcast or whether it was
21 repeated the proper number of times. It may have been
22 repeated the proper number of times on the piece of tele-
23 type paper. I am not positive as to the precise wording
24 of that.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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In the last few weeks, I have had occasion to see some interrogations conducted by General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan of high Japanese officials who were concerned with these broadcasts.

In view of their statements that no such weather signal was made, it is my present belief, in the light of my recollections on this matter, as well, that what I saw Friday morning in December before Pearl Harbor was also a false alarm on this winds system. It was, nevertheless, definitely my conception at the time that it was an authentic broadcast of that nature. I am still of that opinion, that it used that precise wording, keeping in mind, as I indicated this morning, that my recollections on that are that only one country was involved.

The Vice Chairman: What country was that?

Captain Kramer: To the best of my recollection, it was England.

I would like to point out one other item in connection therewith.

I have already indicated that the first time the question of what country appeared on that winds broadcast came up in conversation, or anything that we had in connection with this matter was when that one question was asked me by the Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor.

Witness Kramer

My first reaction was, without having thought about it since December, 1941, that it was the United States, because of the fact we were at war with Japan, so of course, it must have been the United States.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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I would like, however, to invite the committee's attention to the fact that later on, in the course of questioning me at Pearl Harbor, on page 187 of the transcript of that Court of Inquiry, I made the statement that through the latter part of that week and until the attack on Pearl Harbor there was still nothing whatsoever in this traffic to indicate any overt intentions of the Japanese directed at the United States. That I believe appreciably modifies my first hasty reactions to the first time the question was propounded to me.

The Vice Chairman: Then, Captain, returning to the testimony here of Captain Safford which I have read, it states there:

"When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer."

Is that true?

Captain Kramer: I am fairly definite on the point that I did not make the original translation. I may have corrected a hand-written translation already made by the GY watch officer who had all these three Japanese phrases, the translation on hand in pursuance of instructions from Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes, to be able to take care of this matter during the night promptly by the Navy Department Communications Officers.

WORD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 The Vice Chairman: Well, if you and the watch officer
2 went to Captain Safford's office and simply handed him the
3 paper he could not have known who translated it, could he?

4 Captain Kramer: Unless he recognized the handwriting
5 I do not see how he could.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. Was not the thing
7 supposed to be typewritten?

8 Captain Kramer: It was a piece of teletype paper, which
9 of course is typewritten.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right. Then he goes on to say:

11 "Kramer had underscored all three 'code phrases' on
12 the original incoming teletype sheet."

13 Had you done that?

14 Captain Kramer: I do not recall that, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: "Below the printed message was
16 written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting,
17 the following free translations:" which I have read.

18 Did you write in colored pencil or crayon in your
19 handwriting these phrases that are mentioned here in Captain
20 Safford's statement?

21 Captain Kramer: I have no recollection that I used any
22 colored pencil or that I made the original translation. I
23 can most emphatically state that any translation I might
24 have made would most emphatically not have used the expression
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 "war". That was entirely outside the provisions of the
2 winds set-up called for by the message appearing in Exhibit 1,
3 which refers only to disruption of communications.

4 The Vice Chairman: Well, you are confident, Captain,
5 that there was no use of the word "war" in this so-called
6 winds message on that occasion?

7 Captain Kramer: Certainly not by me, sir.

8 The Vice Chairman: Did you see or hear anything to
9 indicate that anybody at that time saw or thought they saw
10 the word "war" in the message?

11 Captain Kramer: No, sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: I understand then, Captain, that
13 these messages, including the number 7001, were in your
14 custody.

15 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And were kept in your safe in
17 your office?

18 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Now, were any of those files ever
20 stolen, filched or removed from the file there in your
21 custody?

22 Captain Kramer: In my period of duty in that section
23 there was never such an occasion, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: And all of the files were in their
25

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 proper order and in their proper place and kept there in
2 your safe?

3 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

4 I might further amplify that answer, sir, to this
5 effect, that the so-called numerical file, after a series
6 of messages were numbered for dissemination, a copy was
7 invariably and immediately inserted in that numerical file.
8 Messages were never removed from that numerical file for
9 reference or for any other purpose. That numerical file
10 had two primary purposes, one to have a solid file of what
11 had been translated and disseminated and, two, the primary
12 purpose was to have something to which the translators
13 could turn in case of references to back traffic when future
14 messages were received.

15 We had a very complete and involved cross-index system
16 on 3 by 5 cards covering every originator in the Japanese
17 Diplomatic Service. By that I mean every consulate, every
18 embassy, every legation that originated messages had their
19 own serial numbers for their series of messages.

20 In addition there was a series of circulars by each
21 originating major diplomatic post. All that was very
22 carefully cross-indexed by my chief yeoman. That was the
23 primary file to which we turned for determining the duplica-
24 tion of incoming traffic. Sometimes we received as many as
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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six or seven copies of a particular message. Later copies were as a rule simply filed without any further work on them if it had been received earlier and translated and disseminated. On occasion if the earlier copy were appreciably garbled a corrected translation would be made from one of these later copies if it were in better or less garbled form.

From this exhaustive cross-index I have described and which included references to the numerical file of translations, the translator would determine whether we had a previous translation and could refer then to the previous translation for interpretation of the reference. That numerical file, as I have indicated, was never touched for the purpose of inserting in subsequent folders these back references in disseminating later traffic to the normal recipients of this later traffic. The extra copies that had previously been disseminated and returned were normally retained for a period varying from a few days to a few weeks for that purpose.

In fact, there were two or three other files that we normally kept on other subjects, namely, the war in Europe and the United States negotiations. We had a sub-file for that covering particular phases of the negotiations and on the file arranging all the Washington and Tokyo serial numbers in order.

WASH. FIELD OFFICE

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 The Vice Chairman: Captain, you were constantly using
2 these messages and these files, as I understand it?

3 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: Now, were any of them ever destroyed
5 or removed or done away with during your tour of duty in that
6 office?

7 Captain Kramer: From this basic numerical file there
8 was no occasion that I know of where anything was removed or
9 destroyed from that file with the exception of the fact
10 that if it was determined later, probably a few days or a
11 week later, that we had two identical messages, one of which
12 was a duplication of another, when that was discovered the
13 latest numerical file number would be cancelled as a dupli-
14 cation of the earlier one.

15 Examples of that appear in this Exhibit 142.

16 The Vice Chairman: Well, the point I am getting at,
17 Captain, is this, if anybody had wilfully taken out of
18 those files all messages relating to this winds execute
19 message you would have known about it, wouldn't you?

20 Captain Kramer: I most certainly think I would have, sir.

21 The Vice Chairman: And you say nothing of that kind
22 ever happened during your tour of duty there?

23 Captain Kramer: To my best knowledge and belief most
24 categorically no, sir.
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Well, could anybody have gone in
3 there and filched or stolen all of the messages relating
4 to the winds execute message and you have known nothing
5 about it?

6 Captain Kramer: I don't see how that would be possible,
7 sir, with this possible exception, that the combination of
8 the safe in which these were kept, there was a copy of that
9 combination in a double sealed envelope in some of the front
10 offices. If that envelope had been opened someone else would,
11 of course, be able to open my safe. Otherwise the only
12 people who knew the combination of the safe in which that
13 particular file was kept were three people, Lieutenant
14 Harrison, the then Chief Yeoman Bryant and myself.

(2)
15 The Vice Chairman: Do you feel confident that nobody
16 in the so-called front office who had the combination in
17 the sealed envelope never removed any of those files?

18 Captain Kramer: I am thoroughly confident of that
19 point, sir.

20 The Vice Chairman: All those files were in a locked
21 safe there in your office?

22 Captain Kramer: At all times, yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: Are you positive, Captain, that
24 7001 had no relation whatever to the so-called winds execute
25 message?

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Captain Kramer: From an examination of the files last
3 Saturday in the Navy Department and this study, Exhibit 142,
4 of about a week or so ago, I am almost positive, I am as
5 positive as I can be that that file number 7001 could not
6 possibly have been any winds message. That is in addition
7 to the fact that I have absolutely no matter of any kind,
8 no recollection, no knowledge that a winds message was ever
9 written up by my section.

10 The Vice Chairman: Now, then, one more question, if I
11 may, Captain.

12 Captain Safford says he received orders to destroy
13 notes, memorandum, and so forth. Did you ever hear of any
14 such order as that?

15 Captain Kramer: I first heard of that a few days ago
16 when Captain Safford testified.

17 The Vice Chairman: And heard it from him?

18 Captain Kramer: From him on this witness stand.

19 The Vice Chairman: That is the only time you ever
20 heard of anything like that?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: May I have that question?

23 The Vice Chairman: Captain Safford says he received
24 orders to destroy notes, memorandum, and so forth.

25 Mr. Keefe: All right.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1 The Vice Chairman: You recall that?

2 Mr. Keefe: Yes, I remember.

3 Captain Kramer: I might further amplify that reply in
4 this respect: I have appeared as a spectator in these
5 hearings only four or five times before last Friday, initially
6 while General Marshall was testifying, again while Admiral
7 Wilkinson was testifying, and while Captain McCollum was
8 testifying. I have had at least a half-dozen conversations
9 during the past year with Captain Safford going over a
10 number of points connected with Pearl Harbor. Last Saturday
11 I had intended with my wife to go out of town for the day.
12 I was so astonished by some of the statements made on Friday
13 afternoon I felt that I better remain here Saturday, which
14 I did.

15 The Vice Chairman: You mean statements made by
16 Captain Safford?

17 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: All right. Go ahead.

19 Captain Kramer: That is all I have to say.

20 The Vice Chairman: Could you indicate --

21 Senator Ferguson: May I inquire what question the
22 witness was answering by that last remark?

23 Captain Kramer: I was amplifying my earlier reply.

24 Senator Ferguson: To what question?
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Clark

1 The Vice Chairman: I asked him the question, Senator,
2 I stated that Captain Safford had testified --

3 Senator Ferguson: I wanted it from the witness, what
4 question he was answering, if I can get it.

5 The Vice Chairman: Do you want the reporter to read it?

6 Senator Ferguson: If the Chairman would allow me I
7 would like to ask the witness what question he thought he
8 was answering when he gave that answer.

9 The Vice Chairman: Well, I don't see that that is
10 especially material but if the Captain --

11 Senator Ferguson: I will question him about it later.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right.

13 Senator George would be next in line for recognition.
14 He is not here. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire,
15 Captain.

16 Mr. Clark: Captain, was this piece of paper that you
17 did see at your office door ever distributed as magic?

18 Captain Kramer: I didn't understand.

19 Mr. Clark: The piece of paper that you saw at your
20 office door and which went to Captain Safford's office,
21 was that ever distributed as magic?

22 Captain Kramer: It never came into my office, was
23 never written up, was never disseminated by me.

24 Mr. Clark: You mean it was never distributed as magic,
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 was not distributed by you?

2 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

3 Mr. Clark: Who determined what portion of this radio
4 traffic, as I believe you call it, would be distributed as
5 magic?

6 Captain Kramer: That was done by my office, sir.

7 In amplification of that point and your previous question
8 I might state that nothing was ever disseminated by my
9 office until we had a piece of paper in my office to work
10 from. No piece of paper, either this -- specifically this
11 piece of paper -- that was taken to Captain Safford's office
12 ever came back to my office.

13 Mr. Clark: Well, you were the judge of what should be
14 disseminated, as you call it, of magic. Why didn't this
15 paper come to your office in the first instance?

16 Captain Kramer: The things that came to my office
17 were determined in the first instance by the GY watch officers.
18 There were many systems in various states of analysis. After
19 an attack on a new system the traffic in that new system
20 might be held for periods varying from weeks to years before
21 any of that material ever came to my office. When a system
22 was sufficiently broken down to pull any intelligible text
23 out of it, however, it then came to my office. The determina-
24 tion of what was of sufficient importance to write up was
25 the function of my office and that is what I referred to.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 Mr. Clark: But if someone else determined what
2 should come to your office then you didn't really have
3 the determination of what should be distributed as magic,
4 did you?

5 Suppose something came in that was magic and wasn't
6 sent to your office?

7 Captain Kramer: Then I would have nothing to do with
8 its dissemination, no, sir. However, there was no provision
9 for any other means of dissemination that I am aware of
10 except the special provision set up by Admiral Noyes for
11 handling anything that came in in this particular winds
12 system.

13 That was an unprecedented set-up and was the only
14 instance of that kind that I am aware of.

15 Mr. Clark: Now, did I understand you that anything
16 that came in in the nature of a winds execute would go
17 to Admiral Noyes and not to you?

18 Captain Kramer: It was not very clear cut how that
19 particular message would be handled during the daytime.
20 The provisions set up by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford
21 were primarily intended to promptly take care of that at
22 night.

23 In carrying out the provisions of those instructions,
24 however, apparently the GY watch officer was proceeding
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h2

1 to Captain Safford's office and then to Admiral Noyes.

2 My only possible explanation at this time of why that
3 did not come back to my office for normal dissemination,
4 translating and dissemination -- this is merely presumptuous,
5 I might interpolate -- is that whoever saw it after I saw
6 it, which I have already indicated was a matter of only a
7 few seconds, must have determined that it was only another
8 instance of a false weather broadcast, of which we had had
9 numerous examples during the previous week or ten days.

10 Mr. Clark: Just exactly who would that be?

11 Captain Kramer: I don't know just who it would have
12 been because I don't know who that piece of teletype paper
13 was passed on to.

14 Mr. Clark: Well, who could it have been passed on to.

15 Captain Kramer: My presumption was and still is that
16 Captain Safford was heading for Admiral Noyes office with
17 it.

18 Mr. Clark: Did all the magic that was disseminated
19 as such have to come through your office?

20 Captain Kramer: So far as I am aware, that is precisely
21 correct, sir, so far as the Navy Department is concerned and
22 responsibilities outside of the Navy Department that the
23 Navy had.

24 Mr. Clark: I am speaking only about the Navy Depart-
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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ment that the Navy had.

Mr. Clark: I am speaking only about the Navy Department.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Can you advise the committee with certainty as to whether all messages disseminated as magic had to come through your office?

Captain Kramer: I know of no instance when any dissemination was made not through my office.

Mr. Clark: Who set up this plan for disseminating magic? Who established it?

Captain Kramer: I do not know, sir. It had been in effect for at least 15 or 20 years when I took charge of that office.

Mr. Clark: I see.

You say this particular piece of paper never came back to your office, and was never disseminated as magic?

Captain Kramer: Precisely, sir.

Mr. Clark: I understood you to answer Senator Barkley's question on one point that you considered this some kind of a winds message?

Captain Kramer: I did at the time, sir, because of the fact that it used the phraseology called for by the set-up of that winds message.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h4

1 Mr. Clark: I am under the impression from the testi-
2 mony that has been given here that all of you were very
3 particularly interested in any winds execute message that
4 might come in; is that correct?

5 Captain Kramer: Very particularly what, sir?

6 Mr. Clark: Interested.

7 Captain Kramer: Precisely.

8 Mr. Clark: And on the lookout for it?

9 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Clark: Do you consider that this slip of paper
11 that you saw was a winds execute message?

12 Captain Kramer: I did at the time, yes, sir.

13 Mr. Clark: And you interpreted it to mean what?

14 Captain Kramer: That the provisions called for by
15 Tokyo's Circular 2353 was in effect regarding the country
16 mentioned in that particular winds message.

17 The provisions referring purely and simply to the
18 cutting off of communications with supplementary instruc-
19 tions to burn certain papers.

20 Mr. Clark: Well, broken down in language which I can
21 understand, you interpreted it to mean that it was war
22 with England?

23 Captain Kramer: Not war with England, no, sir.

24 Mr. Clark: Well, what?
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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Captain Kramer: That the winds message applied to England, in my best recollection.

Mr. Clark: And referred to diplomatic relations, rather than war?

Captain Kramer: Perhaps better would be a diplomatic crisis, yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Did you make any effort to ascertain where this piece of paper went, or what became of it?

Captain Kramer: Never.

Mr. Clark: Did you discuss it or mention it to any of the people to whom you had been distributing magic?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Mr. Clark: Did you consider --

Captain Kramer: I would like to modify that, however, by saying that I may have mentioned it in the course of distribution of the other traffic on Friday to the usual recipients.

I am uncertain of that point.

Mr. Clark: Now, did you consider this a winds execute message insofar as the United States was concerned?

Captain Kramer: My best recollection now is, and I believe has been throughout the period since 1941, that it did not apply to the United States.

Mr. Clark: And consequently it was of much less

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h6

1 importance than if it had referred to the United States?

2 Captain Kramer: It was not only of much less import-
3 ance than if it had applied to the United States, but it
4 was nothing new in its reference to England. It was more
5 emphatic in nature than any such winds message might have
6 been. Was the scheme being cooked up between the Japanese
7 ambassador in Bangkok and the Thai Chief of State for an
8 occupation of Thailand and forcing of the Thai premier's
9 hand to throw in Thailand in Japan? We knew about that
10 in appreciable detail.

11 In fact, on 1 December, the subject of the dispatches
12 relating to that were drafted by me, sent, I believe,
13 initially as was usual to Captain Safford's office, and
14 released by Admiral Noyes, and appears, I believe, as an
15 exhibit in this hearing as Opnav Dispatch 011926, dated
16 December, 1941.

17 Senator Ferguson: December what?

18 Captain Kramer: 01. 01 indicates the first day.

19 Senator Ferguson: The 1st of December?

20 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Clark: Captain Kramer, I must confess to some
22 little confusion. As I understand the winds code set-up,
23 it was arranged so that if an execute message came in, it
24 would indicate, or certain words would be taken to indicate
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h7

1 war with the United States?

2 Captain Kramer: I have never had that conception, sir.

3 Mr. Clark: Well, will you, if you don't mind -- well,
4 I think Senator Lucas is going into that. I will not pursue
5 it.

6 Senator Lucas: Go ahead.

7 Mr. Clark: No.

8 It merely related to the severance of diplomatic
9 relations, and not war?

10 Captain Kramer: Not necessarily the severance of
11 diplomatic relations. Fundamentally and primarily severance
12 of communications which, of course, normally accompanies
13 severance of diplomatic relations also.

14 Mr. Clark: Then they would use this weather broadcast
15 too, as a means of communication.

16 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Clark: And certain words used, however, were to
18 indicate certain things, were they not?

19 Captain Kramer: Were to indicate certain countries,
20 sir.

21 Mr. Clark: Yes.

22 Well, anyway, I may be a little confused on the
23 technicalities of that, but what is in my mind is that
24 whenever a winds execute message should come it, it was con-
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h8

1 sidered by all of the people who had access to magic to
2 be very important and significant, and you were on the
3 alert in looking for it?

4 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Clark: Still you now say that a message came in
6 which you regarded as a winds execute message but which
7 doesn't seem to have been of any importance. There is where
8 my confusion is.

9 Now, if this was a winds execute message why did it
10 not have the significance and the importance that the people
11 in the department had attached to it?

12 Captain Kramer: It had importance, yes, sir. No more
13 importance, however, than many other things that we were
14 getting. As regards England in my mind, at least, it had
15 less importance because of its very unspecific character
16 than this contemplated invasion or demonstration before
17 Kota Bharu, which was something specific. Important, yes,
18 sir, in that it would be another straw in the wind indicating
19 a further reaching of a climax in diplomatic relations.

20 Mr. Clark: Well, now, what kind of a winds execute
21 message would have qualified in importance and significance
22 with what was expected here in such a message?

23 I mean to say this, stating the question this way:

24 It is in evidence, and I have already referred to it,
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h9

1 that everyone here who was familiar with magic was parti-
2 cularly interested in a winds execute message.

3 Now, what kind of a message, a winds execute message,
4 would have met that interest and expectation? What would
5 it have had to say to be of that importance and interest?

6 Captain Kramer: I believe the primary interest of
7 all of the high officials in Washington receiving these
8 intercepts was the United States. We were still conducting
9 negotiations with Japan, even though those negotiations had
10 been de facto terminated.

11 One of the principal things that we were still
12 interested in, would be the nature and character of Japan's
13 reply to Mr. Hull's note of 26 November which we had not
14 yet received.

15 There were many indications of Japanese intentions
16 directed at England, specifically, thos Kota Bharu affair.
17 There still was no intention of an overt nature anywhere in
18 this traffic directed at the United States, with the possible
19 exception of the dispatch late in November from Tokyo to
20 Berlin, disclosing for the first time to the Germans their
21 Tripartite partners, the nature and terms of negotiations
22 that were being conducted through 1941 with the United
23 States.

24 Up to that time Japan had been consistently and con-
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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tinually putting off Ribbentrop and Hitler in their direct inquiries on this subject.

The Japanese ambassador in Berlin was not cognizant of the nature and character of these negotiations.

Mr. Clark: Then the lack of interest and importance of the particular message to which you refer that was on this yellow teletype paper was that it did not refer to the United States?

Captain Kramer: That is the best of my present recollection, yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: Well, do you know about that?

Captain Kramer: I am not positive of the wording appearing on that piece of teletype paper. My connection with it was so fleeting that I do not believe it is strange that I do not recollect it.

Mr. Clark: Well, Captain, I do not mean to suggest anything strange about it, but here you were performing a very long faithful service as you were --

Captain Kramer: I would like to state further, sir, that if it had referred to the United States, I am quite positive that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

The fact that it does not impress itself at this time, and without reference prior to four days ago to any of this material -- I remember some details of all this

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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1 traffic -- is a further indication that I did not consider
2 it, as I do not now, as referring to the United States.

3 The fact that it did not impress itself on my memory
4 is a further indication to me now that it in most probability
5 referred to England, which, of course, would not have impressed
6 it on my memory because of the fact that we knew so much
7 more in detail Japanese intentions directed to England.

8 Mr. Clark: That is about what I was fixing to call
9 to your attention, but it still strikes me as strange that
10 with everyone here who knew anything about magic interested
11 in this particular winds execute message, and with tension
12 high on that subject, it is hard for me to understand how
13 an accomplished officer like yourself in this line could
14 have read a message that did refer to the United States,
15 and therefore qualified as a winds execute message without
16 being immediately impressed by that fact.

17 Captain Kramer : I am sure it would have been impressed
18 on my memory if it had referred to the United States.

19 Mr. Clark: And still you can't tell this committee
20 positively whether it did or whether it didn't?

21 Captain Kramer: The reason I have not categorically
22 stated what the wording of that is, is the fact that I have
23 no positive, had no positive recollection of that, and that
24 any statement I would make now as to its precise wording
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h12

1 would be reconstruction in my mind of what it might
2 have said.

3 Mr. Clark: But I am not asking you, Captain, to
4 repeat the wording. I am suggesting to you that if under
5 those tense conditions, this paper had qualified as a winds
6 execute message, you certainly would have known it?

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, I would.

8 Mr. Clark: Then don't you know whether it did or not?

9 Captain Kramer: To the best of my current belief,
10 it did not.

11 Mr. Clark: And you are not in a position to make
12 a positive statement on that particular point to the com-
13 mittee?

14 Captain Kramer: Not purely from memory. I could make
15 a positive statement on reconstruction as I have outlined.

16 Mr. Clark: But you would have to proceed by recon-
17 struction on that most vital and important point in the
18 situation that then existed?

19 Captain Kramer: I am sure, sir, that if the United
20 States had been mentioned, that a dissemination of that
21 piece of paper would have been made.

22 I am further of the belief, sir, that whoever saw
23 that piece of paper after it left Captain Safford's office
24 came to the conclusion that it was only one of many of
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

h13

1 these other apparent winds messages.

2 This particular piece of paper apparently impressed
3 itself on my memory not appreciably more than these other
4 false winds messages for which I was called to the office
5 several times during the night of the week or ten days
6 preceding Pearl Harbor, and which at the time we deter-
7 mined to be false winds messages.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 Mr. Clark: Well, that all looks reasonable to me and
2 still we are left more or less in the realm of speculation?

3 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir, speculation
4 insofar as my precise memory of the wording of that piece
5 of teletype paper is concerned.

6 Mr. Clark: Speculation insofar as you cannot tell
7 this committee positively that you never saw a message that
8 completely qualifies as a winds execute message?

9 Captain Kramer: With reference to the United States I
10 cannot make that categorical statement purely from memory.

11 Mr. Clark: That is all.

12 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will
13 inquire, Captain.

14 Senator Lucas: Captain, in the statement presented to
15 this committee by Captain Safford, the Captain said when
16 you and the watch officer came to his office that you made
17 the statement, "This is it, said Kramer as he handed me the
18 winds message", and he has underscored the word "it".

19 Do you care to elaborate upon your previous statement?

20 Captain Kramer: The "it" which I may have used referred
21 to the fact that this was the first determination of anything
22 appearing with the phraseology called for by this winds
23 system.

24 Senator Lucas: Do I understand you to tell the committee
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 that when you made that statement to Captain Safford that
2 you did not mean that it referred to the United States?

3 Captain Kramer: I did not, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Captain, as I understand this is the
5 only message in traffic if there was such a message of
6 this kind that was not actually translated and delivered
7 to the proper recipients in the days of November and December
8 1941?

9 Captain Kramer: That is not an accurate statement,
10 Senator:

11 Senator Lucas: Well, you correct me, Captain. You
12 may have to do that frequently.

13 Captain Kramer: I should say that the translations
14 disseminated not only during this period but prior and sub-
15 sequent periods was only a small percentage of all traffic
16 received by this section of the Navy Department. I previously
17 indicated that a percentage of that traffic was in various
18 states of analysis by the crypt analyst. Other parts of
19 this traffic were in various states of code recovery by
20 my section. Other parts of this traffic were in minor
21 systems which were given only a partial translation to de-
22 termine their character. If they were purely of an adminis-
23 trative nature they were frequently not translated if we
24 were pressed by more important traffic. By "administrative
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 nature" I mean that some office, diplomatic post of the
2 Japanese, might be asking for more funds for a certain
3 purpose, and elaborating in some detail the purpose for
4 which they wanted their funds, and so forth.

5 Senator Lucas: I understand.

6 Now, did Captain Safford talk with you about this
7 message at any time between December 3 or 4 and the date of
8 the attack on December 7 after you met in his office?

9 Captain Kramer: I have no recollection of discussing
10 this piece of teletype with Captain Safford between the time
11 I took it to his office and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

12 Senator Lucas: Did you ever talk to him about this
13 particular message thereafter?

14 Captain Kramer: To my best recollection and belief
15 the first time it was discussed subsequent to the attack on
16 Pearl Harbor was this past spring.

17 Senator Lucas: And how did that happen?

18 Captain Kramer: Captain Safford is an acquaintance of
19 mine for some years back. He had written me a letter con-
20 cerning certain phases of this subject in late December 1943
21 and early 1944. Shortly after I returned to Washington
22 last spring I had occasion to be in the branch building of
23 the Navy Department where his office was and looked him up,
24 more in the nature of a greeting of him after a couple of
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 years absence. During the course of that and subsequent
2 conversations we discussed some of the points concerning
3 this matter.

4 Senator Lucas: Did you ever agree with him in these
5 discussions that this particular message in controversy was
6 a genuine implementing winds message?

7 Captain Kramer: No, sir, I did not. I tried to dis-
8 illusion him of that idea since it was so diametrically
9 contrary to the conception of it that I had.

10 Senator Lucas: Did you ever talk to him again about
11 this same winds message following that conversatinn?

12 Captain Kramer: I have met him I think about half a
13 dozen times during this past year prior to seeing him during
14 these hearings in the last few days where I have had further
15 conversations with him.

16 Senator Lucas: And I presume you two reached the same
17 conclusion about the type of a message this was?

18 Captain Kramer: We did not on that point as well as
19 on a number of other points concerning this. I, however,
20 expressed my opinions to him on a number of points. In fact,
21 he showed me the courtesy of permitting me to examine some
22 of the files that he had been preparing. I looked through
23 some of those files partly with the idea of refreshing my
24 memory on some points that he had material on. That,
25

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1 incidentally, was the first occasion since 1941 that I
2 had seen any pieces of paper connected with this matter
3 with the exception of the exhibits shown to me during previous
4 hearings I appeared at.

5 Senator Lucas: Well, if you never saw this so-called
6 execute message after your conversation with Safford on
7 either December 4th or 5th where, in the course of natural
8 events, or in the course of understanding, would that message
9 go after it left Safford's office?

10 Captain Kramer: I have already indicated, Senator,
11 that that particular message came in as a part of a news
12 broadcast coverage which we had not been customarily covering
13 during the course of 1941 except occasional sampling of
14 that coverage, primarily because of the fact the FCC then
15 had that function of monitoring foreign broadcasts. That
16 coverage was instituted only after we were aware of the
17 Japanese setting up this particular winds system of signals.
18 It was an added burden not only to my section, with limited
19 translating talent, but, of course, to Captain Safford's
20 whole organization, including the monitoring stations and
21 his watch officers in the decrypting section, to examine
22 this plain language coverage.

23 Senator Lucas: Did that come through in Morse code?

24 Captain Kramer: I believe it did, sir. However, I
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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Clark

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cannot be certain of that from first-hand knowledge because of the fact that material coming in in teletype would normally be transcribed onto a teletype ribbon for rapid transmission and such transcription would not clearly indicate whether it was Romagic, in other words, Arabic letter transmission or Kana Morse, Japanese Morse transmission.

Senator Lucas: That is, by an examination of the teletype itself you could not tell whether it was Morse code or not?

Captain Kramer: You could not tell whether it was International Morse or Japanese Kana Morse.

Senator Lucas: There is quite a difference, as I understand it, between the two.

Captain Kramer: There is a difference when picked out of the air, yes, sir, but not when transcribed on a teletype.

Senator Lucas: I mean as far as the interception is concerned, there is quite a difference?

Captain Kramer: As far as the interception, but not when it is transcribed to English letters.

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Well, this message, according to the evidence that is before this committee at the present time, could only go to one place after it left Safford's office and that would be to Admiral Noyes' office, isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer: That was my understanding at the time and still is.

Senator Lucas: Well, it is my understanding that Safford has told the committee that he directed one of the men in his office to take this message to Admiral Noyes but he does not remember who it was. Now, do you recall the watch officer that came to your door that morning?

Captain Kramer: I am not positive of his name. It, however, does impress itself on my memory that he was approximately my height. I recall that because we walked for approximately 150 yards. My belief has been and still is that it was a Lieutenant Murray, one of the watch officers.

Senator Lucas: If Admiral Noyes received this so-called execute winds message or this false weather message, whatever it was, what would be his duties, Captain, with respect to that message?

Captain Kramer: This is purely presumption on my part based on his instructions to me to prepare certain cards concerning this winds message. I presumed if he received such a

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 winds message that he would at once telephone the sense of
3 that message to these usual recipients of this decrypted traf-
4 fic.

5 Senator Lucas: Well, would he follow the telephone com-
6 munication with the delivery to these proper recipients of
7 that type message?

8 Captain Kramer: Would he what?

9 Senator Lucas: Would he follow the telephone communica-
10 tion with an actual delivery of this type of a message to
11 these various recipients? That is the custom you followed,
12 as I recall.

13 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: And I presumed he would follow the same
15 course, would he not? Of course, you are speculating now.

16 Captain Kramer: I do not know about that point, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: All right. In Captain Safford's state-
18 ment on page 14 he says:

19 "It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at
20 the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance
21 of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the 'Magic'
22 distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the
23 Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immed-
24 iate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds
25 Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War
3 Department as rapidly as possible; here the Navy's re-
4 sponsibility ended. The individual smooth translations
5 for authorized Navy Department officials and the White
6 House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in
7 accordance with standard operating procedure."

8 Now, who delivered those smooth copies, who delivered the
9 smooth translations around noon of December 4, 1941, if you
10 know? Whose responsibility would that be? Assuming now that
11 it is in Noyes' office and assuming that the statement of
12 Captain Safford is correct, who would have the responsibility
13 for ultimately making the distribution of the smooth trans-
14 lations as is stated here?

15 Captain Kramer: With the exception of certain deliveries
16 made on my instructions by Lieutenant Harrison I know of no
17 one else who ever made a dissemination in the Navy Department
18 of the final translations except myself.

19 Senator Lucas: That was my understanding. In other
20 words, if Admiral Noyes had considered this message as a winds
21 message, as a winds execute, then it would have been your duty
22 under the previous arrangement that you had to have delivered
23 these smooth translations to the proper recipients?

24 Captain Kramer: That is precisely correct, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: In other words, Admiral Noyes would not

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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have detailed some other officer who was not familiar with
magic and familiar with the recipients to have made the de-
livery in this particular and special case?

Captain Kramer: It would have been unprecedented and
I cannot conceive of his so doing.

Senator Lucas: Well, now, it is a fact, and I think you
stated it categorically, that you as the one individual who
had delivered all these magic messages never received from
Admiral Noyes any instructions of any kind to deliver to the
proper recipients this so-called execute winds message?

Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas: And you know of no one who did make this
delivery?

Captain Kramer: I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas: Do you agree with me that if this winds
execute message was the type and kind as was outlined in
circular 2353 that it would have been absolutely the thing to
do, to make such a delivery?

Captain Kramer: It would have been if it had come into
my section for translation and dissemination. However, as
has been repeatedly pointed out, there were special provi-
sions made to handle this particular winds system messages.

Senator Lucas: Yes, I understand that, but even though
this particular provision was made whereby Admiral Noyes was

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 to receive this kind of a winds execute, as I understood you
3 to say it would still have been your duty if the delivery of
4 the smooth translation had been requested, it would have been
5 your duty to do it?

6 Captain Kramer: It certainly would, yes, sir.

7 Senator Lucas: And if Admiral Noyes, who will testify
8 later about this, - if Admiral Noyes selected any other of-
9 ficer, then he broke a precedent up to that time as far as
10 delivering this magic?

11 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. I might state further, sir,
12 in connection with this whole subject that it was my presump-
13 tion that this particular message would not come into my sec-
14 tion because of the special provisions made by Admiral Noyes
15 and Captain Safford for dissemination. However, if it came
16 into my section it would have been disseminated through the
17 usual channels, via myself. I have not had this particular
18 winds message impressed on my memory during the intervening
19 years partly for that reason, partly for other reasons I have
20 already given and partly because what is apparently a con-
21 siderable issue on this particular winds message apparently
22 came to a head not before at least two years or so after
23 Pearl Harbor.

24 Senator Lucas: Two years after Pearl Harbor, about the
25 time when Captain Safford started writing you asking you

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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while you were serving in the Pacific whether or not you knew anything about this particular message?

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Captain Kramer: That is just about the time, sir, that I was first aware that there were any questions or issues concerning this subject.

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Senator Lucas: And he asked you in question 18 of that letter as to whether or not you knew anything about this particular message and your reply was wholly on another message at that time?

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Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

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Senator Lucas: In other words, your memory two years afterwards did not coincide with Safford's memory about that message the first time that it was ever brought to your attention?

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Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

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Senator Lucas: And as far as you know that is the first time that the so-called winds execute message was ever called to the attention of anyone in connection with the Pearl Harbor controversy?

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Captain Kramer: Precisely, sir.

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Senator Lucas: Now, in this same statement Captain Safford said that it was his recollection that "Kramer and I knew that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message."

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Do you recall that Admiral Noyes told you at any time that he had telephoned the substance of this so-called winds execute message to the proper recipients?

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Captain Kramer: I was never aware of what phone calls Admiral Noyes made, if he made any. In fact, I have no knowledge of what happened to this particular piece of paper, so-called winds message, after I left Captain Safford's office.

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Senator Lucas: All right. Now, returning for a moment, Captain, to circular 2353: Are you the individual who originally translated that message when it was intercepted?

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Captain Kramer: My section translated it, sir, one of my translators did. The "Y" at the bottom before the expression, "Navy translation" indicated that it was a Mr. Cory.

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Captain Kramer: Cory; C-o-r-y, who about eight months later was killed on Guadalcanal as a young officer in the Marines, into which he was commissioned in the spring of 1942.

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Senator Lucas: Well, you were familiar, of course, with this particular message after it came in and was translated?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You were the one who made the delivery of this message --

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Captain Kramer: I did, sir.

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: (Continuing) -- to the proper people here
3 in Washington who were on the "in", so to speak, on magic?

4 Captain Kramer: I think that probably the first delivery
5 was made to Captain Safford because it was my customary prac-
6 tice to bring at once to his attention anything bearing on the
7 technicalities of his section.

8 Senator Lucas: Now, the first part of that message is
9 as follows:

10 "In case of emergency, danger of cutting off our
11 diplomatic relations and the cutting off of internation-
12 al communications the following warning will be added
13 in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave
14 news broadcast."

15 That was thoroughly understood by you?

16 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Lucas: Was there ever anyone who translated
18 those words from that intercepted message in different
19 language than what we find it now in this circular?

20 Captain Kramer: At no time, sir. There was only one
21 translation made of this in the Navy Department. About the
22 same date as this translation we received a translation from
23 the Far East of this same circular.

24 Senator Lucas: Is that the one Captain Safford gives
25 to the committee in his statement which is found on --

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Captain Kramer: A dispatch originated by Commander-
3 in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet as a translation furnished by Singa-
4 port.

5 Senator Lucas: Yes. That is the one that Captain Safford --
6

7 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. That translation from the
8 Asiatic Fleet was essentially the same as ours, disagreed
9 only in certain parenthetical points with reference to the
10 Southwest Pacific. My recollections now of my reaction at
11 the time were that the Asiatic Fleet version of it differed
12 from ours; it further made it -- was probably made more em-
13 phatic than ours because of the closer proximity of those
14 people to danger; that for that reason alone I would not
15 question their translation. I recall at no time going back
16 to the original decryption of ours to determine why the two
17 translations were different,-- I first saw since those days
18 the work sheet of this message a few days ago,--and that there
19 would be no necessity of our briefing and drafting the sub-
20 ject of this message to send to the usual recipients, the
21 Asiatic Fleet specifically and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
22 Fleet, because it was already on that channel, they already
23 had it.

24 Senator Lucas: Well, I notice in Captain Safford's
25 statement that he says:

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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"Consul General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time), sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

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"WHEN CRISIS LEADING TO WORST ARISES FOLLOWING
WILL BE BROADCAST AT END WEATHER REPORTS:

ONE EAST WIND RAIN WAR WITH UNITED STATES.

TWO NORTH WIND CLOUDY WAR WITH RUSSIA.

THREE WEST WIND CLEAR WAR WITH BRITAIN INCLUDING

ATTACK ON THAILAND OR MALAYA AND DUTCH INDIES."

Now, do you consider that message any different than the one which you received in circular 2353?

Captain Kramer: I do not believe I saw until some time later that particular message. I may have. I know that I was told about it, however, because my reactions at the time I was told about it about 3 or 4 December were that that particular subject was getting a pretty wide dissemination.

I was concerned purely from the security angle. I was concerned that if too many people became cognizant of it, inasmuch as this thing was set up in a secret Japanese code, that the Japanese might get wind of the fact that that code was broken.

Senator Lucas: Well, did Admiral Noyes know about this

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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particular message which was sent in by General Foote?

Captain Kramer: Very probably he did.

Senator Lucas: Could it be that this so-called winds ex-
ecute message that we have been talking about was following the
pattern as laid down here in this message that I have just
read?

Captain Kramer: So far as I am aware, sir, those mes-
sages from Java were never used by Captain Safford's organi-
zation in connection with interception or attempted inter-
ception of anything on this winds system. We had our own
translation which was the primary and initial translation and
we had the Asiatic Fleet version of the translation furnished
by the British, which in most essentials were identical.
Those two versions of it were the basis on which instructions,
in my understanding, were sent to our intercept stations and
provisions made, all the provisions made to handle this par-
ticular winds system.

Senator Lucas: Well, do I understand you to say then from
your last answer that Captain Safford and yourself and all
other individuals who were intercepting and decoding and trans-
lating these messages from Japan were following the pattern
as laid down in circular 2353 or circular 2354 and you were
eliminating any message that you might have received from Java?

Captain Kramer: My only reaction to those messages from

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 Java was that, as I have indicated, it was getting a very wide
3 dissemination. Incidentally, I might interpolate that to my
4 best recollection this is the first instance that I was aware
5 that the Dutch were working on this traffic.

6 Senator Lucas: So you had good reasons to discount, I
7 presume, in view of the fact that you fellows had been working
8 on it a long, long time and thought that your system of analy-
9 sis of these intercepts was as good as any, or better?

10 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir. I might amplify
11 my previous answer by stating that although it was obvious
12 that the Dutch had differences on the subject, my first re-
13 action was that very likely the British at Singapore had
14 furnished it to them.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, if Captain Safford was not using
16 these reports that came in from Java, why does he use it here,
17 can you tell that?

18 Captain Kramer: I cannot presume to diagnose the thought
19 processes of Captain Safford.

20 Senator Lucas: Getting back to circular 2353 and 2354,
21 the one which all responsible people in the Army and Navy had,
22 there is nothing in that message which speaks about war with
23 the United States or Russia or Britain?

24 Captain Kramer: Nothing whatsoever in the text of the
25 message. The war angle could be only personal inference and

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 deductions of what a diplomatic crisis involving severance of
3 communications might lead up to.

4 Senator Lucas: That is right. So in the event that any
5 winds implement message had come in on the basis of what is
6 laid down in circular 2353 it could only mean, if this mes-
7 sage is correct, that diplomatic relations were cut off or
8 international communications had ceased, isn't that right?

9 Captain Kramer: Precisely correct, sir.

10 Senator Lucas: And at the time, either on December the
11 4th or 5th, we were still carrying on diplomatic relations
12 with Japan?

13 Captain Kramer: We were, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: And the communications between Tokyo and
15 her people in this country and all over the world were con-
16 tinuing, were they not?

17 Captain Kramer: So far as the United States is concerned
18 they continued in full effect, yes, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: Well, negotiation and communications both
20 continued right up almost until the bomb fell?

21 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Lucas: The first bomb fell at Pearl Harbor?

23 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Lucas: So if this message is correct there was
25 never any reason for Japan ever sending out an implementing

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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winds message because no communications ceased and no diplomatic relations ceased between the two countries?

Captain Kramer: So far as the United States was concerned it appears to me to have been an extremely illogical thing for Japan to have sent such a message with reference to the United States since they took such stringent precautions to safeguard the fact that they contemplated not only a break but actually an overt act directed toward the United States.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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Senator Lucas: All right, now, Captain, one more question.

I have always considered Circular 2353 and 2354 of tremendous importance, and I always thought any implementing winds message following the plan laid down, was also of tremendous importance.

Do you agree with me that if an implementing message had come with the instructions as set forth in these circulars, it would have been followed distinctly and carefully?

Captain Kramer: What instructions do you refer to, Senator?

Senator Lucas: I am speaking now of the latter part of the circular which says, "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast, and each sentence will be repeated twice."

Now, that is clear, isn't it?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: If the words "Higashi --" you pronounce them for me, please.

Captain Kramer: Higashi no kaze ame.

Senator Lucas: If they had appeared only in the middle of the winds execute message, would that, standing along have been sufficient for you to reach the conclusion

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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that that was an implementation of the winds message, or false message?

Captain Kramer: In my examination of these earlier false alarms where I saw the full teletype paper, sometimes running to 12 and 15 yards in length, in analyzing those weather reports, that was one of the points I looked for to see whether it appeared in the middle and at the end.

Senator Lucas: Yes.

Captain Kramer: If it did not appear at the end, it would have tended to discount anything appearing in the middle.

However, its omission from the end would very likely be accompanied by an omission of part of the end of the weather broadcast, due to interference, or atmospheric, and therefore incomplete reception of that news broadcast.

Senator Lucas: That could happen?

Captain Kramer: It might possibly happen, yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: It might possibly happen?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, you would have to consider under those circumstances then, if you received any one of these danger signals, either in the middle or the end of the message, I take it, you would have to give that some weight,

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Senator Lucas

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1 and consideration so far as being a winds execute message
2 is concerned?

3 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, and I did in those earlier
4 things I mentioned.

5 The Vice Chairman: Would it disturb you to suspend
6 at this point?

7 Senator Lucas: No.

8 The Vice Chairman: There is a very important roll
9 call in the House, and as soon as the House convenes, the
10 House members will have to be present for that.

11 Without objection, the committee will now stand in
12 recess until 1:30.

13 (Whereupon, at 12:05 p. m., the committee recessed
14 until 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)
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Shefner

AFTERNOON SESSION

1:30 P.M.

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2 The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in
3 order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ALWIN D. KRAMER

(resumed)

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7 The Vice Chairman: Does counsel have anything at this
8 time?

9 Mr. Richardson: No.

10 The Vice Chairman: Captain, do you have anything you
11 desire to submit before your examination is resumed?

12 Captain Kramer: Mr. Chairman, in the past few minutes
13 I have examined a document presented to me this morning as I
14 commenced to testify. There is a notation on here that it is
15 exhibit 41. I have never seen it before, however. It is
16 information from documentary evidence on messages 901, 2, 7
17 and 10. The first one of those, 901, is what has been
18 termed in this hearing the "pilot" message.

19 Yesterday I testified concerning the time of receipt of
20 the translation of that message in the Navy Department. I
21 was unpositive as to the exact time. My impressions were
22 purely from memory after over four years that it was received
23 late in the afternoon, after the first of the parts of the
24 Japanese note were coming in.

25 An examination of this document would tend to confirm

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 such testimony inasmuch as in the fourth paragraph under 901
3 it states:

4 "Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received
5 by Army SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 P.M. 6 December."

6 In the normal course of processing this material it took
7 several hours. It is therefore extremely unlikely that that
8 message was processed, translated and disseminated prior to
9 late Saturday afternoon.

10 That is the only thing I wanted to bring up at this time,
11 sir.

12 The Vice Chairman: Senator Lucas of Illinois will con-
13 tinue his inquiry.

14 Senator Lucas: Do you recall, Captain, what we were
15 talking about just before lunch? There were a number of
16 things but I am trying to think of the last one.

17 Captain Kramer: I have forgotten just the line of the
18 questioning, sir.

19 Senator Lucas: We were discussing the circular 2353 with
20 respect to whether or not it was necessary in order to com-
21 plete the cycle that the word, for instance, which means
22 "East wind-rain" should appear in the center and at the end
23 of the message.

24 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

25 Senator Lucas: And then there was another warning in

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 there which said that each sentence will be repeated twice.

3 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Lucas: Now, would atmospheric conditions inter-
5 fere with that last instruction with respect to each sentence
6 being repeated twice?

7 Captain Kramer: On that point, Senator, I was somewhat
8 confused at the time and still am confused because it dis-
9 agrees with the subsequent directive on this subject, 2354.

10 Senator Lucas: Yes. In a subsequent directive it says
11 "The above will be repeated five times".

12 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: "And included at the beginning and end."

14 Captain Kramer: That is correct. We expected, cer-
15 tainly, that that would be repeated. Just which of those
16 would apply, we were still uncertain what the Japanese in-
17 tended.

18 Senator Lucas: That is right. In other words, if they
19 followed either one of these circulars, which they would be
20 compelled to do in the implementing wind message, it would
21 be necessary that they either repeat twice or five times?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir. I might comment further on
23 that to this effect, that in 2354 it says it will be included
24 at the beginning and the end; 2353 says in the middle and at
25 the end.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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I have previously indicated that it was only a few days ago that I saw the original work sheets since 1941 of these two messages. There is still doubt in the minds of any person in the United States as to the precise meaning as to what the Japanese intended. Those discrepancies are undoubtedly due to only tentative or erroneous recoveries by my code recovery section. As a matter of fact, that beginning in 2354 from a personal examination of the work sheet appears to be a tentative and erroneous recovery which could very well be better recovered, more precisely and accurately recovered as "the middle."

The expression actually appearing on the work sheet now in the files of the Navy Department is "Boto" meaning "beginning". It was a tentative recovery. In contexts in which that code group have previously appeared it seemed to be a logical recovery. With subsequent appearances of those code groups we very likely would have made a more accurate recovery. That is just another indication of doubt with reference to the precise meaning intended by the Japanese in these two messages.

Senator Lucas: Well, I can understand that from an examination of the two circulars and your explanation of it, too. What I want to know, Captain, is whether or not if this implementing wind message had been a genuine one if it

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 would have been necessary for them to repeat the message
3 twice or at least five times?

4 Captain Kramer: We certainly expected that it would be
5 repeated, yes, sir.

6 Senator Lucas: From what you saw in these three lines
7 that came into your office was that message repeated more than
8 once?

9 Captain Kramer: My recollection is that there was re-
10 petition.

11 Senator Lucas: There was repetition in there?

12 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Lucas: In that particular message?

14 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: And you do not recall now how many times,
16 I take it?

17 Captain Kramer: I am not certain on the number of times,
18 no, sir. I have previously commented on that particular point,
19 that it was the function of the GY section of crypt-analysis
20 to determine the authenticity of codes. They for the most
21 part examined these various other weather reports that had
22 been coming in, threw many of them out themselves as not
23 fitting the precise phraseology on the repetition called for
24 and did not call on me.

25 Senator Lucas: Well, now, in this same message it fur-

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

2 ther states:

3 "When this is heard please destroy all code papers,
4 etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrange-
5 ment."

6 Now, as I understand it there was a message went out
7 from Tokyo to Washington on December the 4th telling them:

8 "Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA,
9 have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use
10 them," and so forth.

11 Are you familiar with that one in exhibit 1 on page 231?

12 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir, I am familiar with that.

13 Senator Lucas: Well, now, that message could have noth-
14 ing to do with the winds execute message.

15 Captain Kramer: Nothing whatsoever, sir. That would,
16 in that connection, tend to prove that there was no winds
17 execute message up to that time.

18 Senator Lucas: That is exactly the point I wanted to
19 raise. In other words, in view of the fact that they said
20 here in circular 2353, "When this is heard please destroy all
21 code papers" -- in other words, on December the 4th, 1941 if
22 a winds execute message had been sent from Tokyo there wouldn't
23 have been any reason for them on December the 4th to send out
24 that kind of a message, would there?

25 Captain Kramer: No, sir. Also, there would be no point

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 to addressing such a winds system message to Washington in
3 view of the precise instructions that they had sent Washington
4 on the third to retain certain systems and codes.

5 Senator Lucas: Yes. There is another message here about
6 burning of codes some place that I want to call your atten-
7 tion to. It is on page 236 of exhibit 1, Captain, from Wash-
8 ington to Tokyo, December the 5th, 1941:

9 "We have completed destruction of codes, but since
10 the U.S.- Japanese negotiations are still continuing I
11 request your approval of our desire to delay for a while
12 yet the destruction of the one code machine."

13 Now, do you agree with me that that message from Washing-
14 ton to Tokyo, when it talks about negotiations still continu-
15 ing, is in line with what they were talking about in circular
16 2353 about negotiations there?

17 Captain Kramer: There is no connection whatsoever, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: It has none?

19 Captain Kramer: None, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Well, now, will you explain that and get
21 me straight on that, please?

22 Captain Kramer: On page 215 is a directive from Tokyo
23 to Washington.

24 Senator Lucas: In exhibit 1?

25 Captain Kramer: In exhibit 1.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: All right.

Captain Kramer: The translation reads, of a message dated 2 December:

"Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of 'O' code" -- a character Japan intended as "Oite" -- "and abbreviating code (L)", - which we knew as "L.A.) (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)"

That is presumably for distribution.

"Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely."

That, incidentally, is the first time we knew that Washington had more than one code machine. We were curious about that point.

"When you have finished this, wire me back the one word 'haruna'.

"At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

"Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you."

That is the one you referred to initially, sir. In view of that and the fact that Washington's dispatch of 5 December

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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2 refers back to that, it is quite evident, it appears to me,
3 that Washington's destruction of part of their codes was the
4 direct result of that dispatch from Tokyo of 2 December and
5 had no connection whatsoever with any winds system message.

6 Senator Lucas: Well, I refer you, Captain, to the
7 language in there, "We have completed destruction of codes",
8 and I agree with you that is in line with the message that
9 you have read into the record here dated December the 2nd.

10 Captain Kramer: The one of December 5th, Senator, says,
11 "Re your 867."

12 Senator Lucas: Yes.

13 Captain Kramer: Which is the one of 2 December.

14 Senator Lucas: But isn't it a fact when they state,
15 "But since the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are still continu-
16 ing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while
17 yet the destruction of the one code machine" -- in other words,
18 this is circular 2353 -- no, I am wrong on that. You are
19 right and I am wrong.

20 Anyhow, this message of December the 5th definitely in-
21 dicates that no additional winds execute message had been re-
22 ceived or there would not have been any necessity for that.

23 Captain Kramer: It certainly indicates that the Japanese
24 embassy in Washington was not talking about, and presumably
25 had received nothing concerning any winds message.

witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: Well, if this had been a genuine winds execute message and had followed the advice given in circular 2353 when it says, "When this is heard please destroy all code papers", there wouldn't be any necessity for them sending this message of December the 5th.

Captain Kramer: I do not see that it would, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, now, Captain, we have spent a good long time about this so-called winds execute message and assuming that this winds execute message had been a genuine one, what would that have added to what you already had as far as the tenseness of the situation is concerned between Japan and this country?

Captain Kramer: It would have added considerable to the already tense situation between Washington and this country because it would have indicated a contemplated break with this country. To date and up until 7 December, the time of the attack, there was still no indication that the Japanese definitely contemplated a complete break in relations with this country, to say nothing about the slightest indication of any intention to attack this country.

Senator Lucas: Well, is the so-called execute winds message if it had been a genuine one and if it had been understood, more important than the fourteen point message?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, it is not.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: In other words, the so-called winds execute message did not say when war was going to break out?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: It did not say where war was going to break out?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: Assuming Captain Safford's theory of this thing or his explanation is correct, all it said was, "War with United States," that is correct, isn't it?

Captain Kramer: Not necessarily war, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, I am assuming that his theory of this is correct, all that it said on that message was, "War with United States, war with England and peace with Russia." That is what he had on there.

Now, everybody knew at that time that has testified here, practically, that war was coming sooner or later with Japan, didn't they?

Captain Kramer: From the general situation, yes, sir, that is true.

Senator Lucas: Nobody knew when when that message came in?

Captain Kramer: No, sir.

Senator Lucas: And nobody knew where the attacks were going to -- where the Japs were going to attack the United

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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States if they attacked us at all?

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Captain Kramer: No, sir, or that they would attack the United States. In fact, I am speaking from my own personal recollections, but I believe that it was the consensus of the opinion of my associates and many of the high officials in Washington that it was very illogical and foolish on the part of Japan to undertake open warfare with the United States, that it was almost inconceivable that they would in view of the fact that it was very likely that they could get everything that they wanted and as they had got in French Indo-China and what they wanted in the south of French Indo-China without any action being taken by the United States.

Senator Lucas: Well, Captain Safford in his statement to the committee said this:

"The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves."

Assuming, sir, that Captain Safford's statement is absolutely correct, that there was this execute winds message and it said on it just what he contends that it says, is there any reason to deduce a statement of that kind, in your opinion, from that message?

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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Captain Kramer: None whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas: There is one other question. You prepared a file for Secretary Forrester?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You have said that you did not discuss with Safford at that time about the preparation of that file.

Captain Kramer: In reply to that, Senator, I would like to refer to page 15 of Captain Safford's statement.

I do not believe that Captain Safford knew until some years after Pearl Harbor that I had prepared any such folder for Secretary Forrester. When I returned to this country last spring and had some of my conversations with Captain Safford I told him specifically that only one folder had been prepared; no material from my section in the Navy Department had ever been presented before the Roberts hearing.

I testified, I believe, yesterday that during the course of the Roberts hearing I was curious on that point myself. I had no knowledge of whether these deceptions were being presented as evidence in that hearing. I asked my immediate superior, Captain McCollum, about that point. That was the first time I knew that they were being presented.

I was very curious about what safeguards were being maintained on the handling of that in that hearing. Captain McCollum was uncertain.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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As regards the statement made in the bottom of page 15 of Captain Safford's statement, he says:

"I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes" -- and this is the point particularly -- "and after checking Kramer's 'folder' to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order."

At no time during all my duty in that section of Naval Operations do I have any recollection of my presenting a folder to Captain Safford for his checking my manner of presentation or being shown anything except what I showed him.

Senator Lucas: That was your responsibility?

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: Not Safford's responsibility.

Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas: Well, now, when you talked to Secretary Forrestal, according to Safford you told him that you discussed this message along with others with Forrestal for about two hours. Now, in that conversation was there anything ever said about this so-called controversial executive winds message?

Captain Kramer: Captain Safford's statement in that regard is apparently a garbled recollection of our conversations of this past spring. I told him that I was in Secretary Forrestal's office not more than fifteen or twenty minutes ex-

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Sen. Lucas

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plaining the general nature of the material in that folder. He read some of the things in my presence; Captain McCollum was also there. The folder was then left with him to study further since he had not customarily been seeing any of this traffic. On a few occasions he did see it.

One specifically I recall was when I was at Secretary Knox' desk while he was examining a folder and Mr. Forrestal came into the office. Secretary Knox called Mr. Forrestal over to point it out to him, he let him read one of the particularly interesting items in the folder he was reading.

There was no winds message in that at all. There was the one referred to as the hidden word message, which I specifically took pains to point out was an error in that it omitted the United States. That was one that appeared Sunday Morning, 7 December 1941.

Senator Lucas: But insofar as this message is concerned that is in controversy here and the one that Captain Safford claims that he saw and delivered to Noyes, that was not in the file and that was not discussed with Forrestal?

Captain Kramer: No winds message of any nature or kind whatsoever was discussed with Mr. Forrestal. In fact, not even the nature or system by which that hidden word message came was discussed with Mr. Forrestal, only the text of the messages themselves.

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Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Senator Lucas: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Murphy: Captain, when I was questioning Captain Safford on the stand I asked him to give the names of those officers who might corroborate him as to the winds execute and in giving me those names he listed your name and then he also listed Colonel Bratton of the Army; he also listed Colonel Sadtler of the Army and while he was on the stand I read to him what Colonel Bratton had to say about it.

According to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in Top Secret Report at page 7 Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the winds message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941 and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received such information. So much for Colonel Bratton.

I now go to the Army Pearl Harbor Board report dated October 6, 1944 at page 251. This is the testimony of the second witness, Colonel Sadtler, claimed by Captain Safford.

(Reading)

"General Frank: Go ahead.

"Colonel Sadtler: We paid a great deal of attention to that message, and then when the directive came from Tokyo regarding the destruction of codes, that message

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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began to assume some importance, or a great deal of importance.

"General Frank: That is, in the estimation of the people who were handling it?

"Colonel Sadtler: That was in the estimation of General Miles, Colonel Bratton, and myself; others, maybe; I don't know.

"On the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, who was Chief of Naval Communications at that time, called me, about 9:30, with words to the effect, 'Sadtler, the message is in.' I asked him which one it was and he said he didn't know, but he thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and Great Britain. I asked him for the Japanese word, and he said he didn't know it, but to please tell G-2.

"I went immediately to General Miles' office and told him that the word was in. He said, 'Wait a minute, I will call Colonel Bratton,' and in a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles' desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don't know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead; and myself.

"I then reported what General Noyes had told me,

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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and Colonel Bratton took out his little notebook, and he said, 'Which one of these three words is it?' And I said, 'I don't know, but Admiral Noyes says it is the one meaning war between Japan and Great Britain.' 'Well,' he said, 'do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm.' I says, 'I will go back and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone.'

"I got Admiral Noyes, and he said, 'I don't know,' and I said, 'can you verify it?' He said, 'I can't do it right now, as I have to attend a meeting in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,' or some place, I don't know where; but he was unable to verify that at the time, 'and,' he says, 'I will do it later.' I says, "I think later will be too late." I went back to General Miles' office and told them that Admiral Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, that he had to go to a meeting, but he was positive that it was the word meaning Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of that "Winds" message. I would like to add here that my memory is a little bit faulty as to whether it was not Japan and Great Britain. It may have been Japan and Russia, but I am positive it was not Japan and the United States.

"I went back to my office. Rather, General Miles

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 said, 'Well, I don't know what we will do. You keep on
3 the lookout for anything that comes in and let us know
4 just as soon as possible.'

5 "I went back to the office, and then I went down to
6 see General Gerow, who was head of the War Plans, told
7 him to the effect of what Admiral Noyes had said, and
8 didn't he think we should send a message to Hawaii. I
9 don't mean Hawaii -- to Panama, the Philippines, and
10 Hawaii. He says, 'I think they have had plenty of
11 notification.' And the matter dropped."

12 So much for Colonel Sadtler.

13 Captain, you have talked, as I understand it, to Captain
14 Safford on a great many occasions. Do you know of any feeling
15 between Captain Safford and Redmond of the Navy? Was it
16 Admiral Redmond or Captain Redmond?

17 Captain Kramer: It was Captain Redmond in 1941 and in
18 1942.

19 Mr. Murphy: Well, now, Captain Safford has talked about
20 orders from Redmond in the week of December 14th and 15th.
21 He has spoken of Redmond wanting publicity in connection with
22 the trial in Chicago, with apparently some feeling as to
23 Chicago, about his loving publicity. Do you know of any feel-
24 ing between those two men or any reason for any ill feeling
25 between them?

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Captain Kramer: Well, sir, in answer to that question I
3 attended some conferences in late January of 1942 and in early
4 February 1942 aimed at splitting up the three primary functions
5 of the Communications Security Group, then under Captain Safford,
6 into three sub-sections. Captain Safford was in charge
7 of Section 20-G, known as the Communications Security Group.

8 One of its primary functions was the development, the
9 preparation and the dissemination of all United States Navy
10 codes and ciphers. That function occupied a large part of
11 the time of Captain Safford from my general understanding at
12 that time because of the rapid expansion of the Navy at that
13 time, particularly in view of the way developments were taking
14 place in Europe. Among the things being developed were new
15 U.S. Navy machines, cipher machines.

16 There were many conferences that I became aware of be-
17 tween Captain Safford and various manufacturers who were con-
18 tracted to make parts of these machines. Without digressing
19 into that function of Captain Safford's office any more, there
20 was another function which was carried on on only a minor
21 scale, namely, the policing function on our own use of Navy
22 systems. It was a function that I first became aware of in
23 1935, when I went to sea after returning from Japan, although
24 it had been carried on for years before that. It, among other
25 things, required that every ship originating a code or cipher-

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 ing a message had to send a copy of that message to the flag-
3 ship of the Fleet for checking as to violations of security
4 measures.

5 As part of the function and competition in vogue in those
6 days certain demerits were assigned in the Communications
7 competition for such violations. That function, that manner of
8 activity was still going on and was intensified, - in 1941 and
9 was intensified after the war between Japan and the United
10 States broke out. That was another reason, I believed from
11 these conferences, we had for splitting up Captain Safford's
12 three functions.

13 A third reason was a desire on the part of the Director
14 to further intensify our efforts in the crypt-analytical field.
15 Apparently the Director of Naval Communications felt that in
16 view of the contemplated intensified efforts in these three
17 functions the job now became too big for one individual, re-
18 gardless of how remarkable his talents might be, to handle.
19 Therefore, these conferences aimed at splitting up these
20 functions into three sub-sections.

21 During the course of these conferences Captain Safford
22 presented some papers giving his views on how to split up, on
23 how the split-up should take place and what officers should be
24 in charge of the respective contemplated three sub-sections.
25 He suggested himself to head the Communication Intelligence

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 sub-section engaged in crypt-analysis.

3 After these several conferences the final conclusion,
4 whether by Captain Redmond or by higher officers in Naval
5 Operations, I do not know; in any case the decision was to put
6 a Commander John Redmond and a Commander Wenger in charge of
7 that crypt-analytical section, to leave with Captain Safford
8 as his primary function full charge of the continual develop-
9 ment of our own naval codes and ciphers, which function I be-
10 lieve he continued to exercise at least during the early part
11 of the war.

12 Mr. Murphy: In other words, the recommendation of Cap-
13 tain Safford as to his particular assignment was not given to
14 Captain Safford as requested or recommended but given to
15 Commander Redmond?

16 Captain Kramer: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Murphy: The son of Captain Redmond?

18 Captain Kramer: The younger brother of Captain Redmond.

19 Mr. Murphy: A younger brother?

20 Captain Kramer: Who had had long communications exper-
21 ience.

22 Mr. Murphy: Did he ever express any particular peeve to
23 you over that?

24 Captain Kramer: I do not recall any particular expres-
25 sion along that line before my return from the Pacific last year.

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 There may have been; certainly there was during the course of
3 these conferences an expression of his desire to head that
4 section.

5 Mr. Murphy: Well, he did say in his letter to you in
6 the Pacific that both Redmonds, both brothers, the Admiral
7 and the Commander, both loved publicity, didn't he, that they
8 were after publicity in Chicago?

9 Captain Kramer: He said that, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: But did he ever use any stronger words or
11 other words to indicate any feeling as to the Redmonds,
12 either one of them?

13 Captain Kramer: No conversations along that line stand
14 out in my mind although there may have been before my depar-
15 ture from Washington for the Pacific.

16 Mr. Murphy: Do you know if he had any grievances
17 against -- well, I withdraw that.

18 Who would be responsible for making that decision that
19 he did not get the assignment that he desired? In the last
20 analysis who would make the final decision? Would that be
21 Admiral Stark?

22 Captain Kramer: Normally such allocations as to duty
23 in the Division of Naval Operations is made by the Director
24 of that Division. I believe it is customary on occasion,
25 however, to confer with the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 tions on those issues, on those assignments.

3 Mr. Murphy: Well, would Admiral Stark's office have the
4 right to say "Yes" or "No" as to that?

5 Captain Kramer: They most certainly would, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: Did he ever express any feeling to you about
7 Admiral Stark subsequent to his failure to get that assignment?

8 Captain Kramer: No, sir, he did not.

9 Mr. Murphy: Now, did you have any information as to his--
10 he said that for a long time he had a certain attitude toward
11 what happened at Pearl Harbor and then he made a change. Did
12 he ever tell you why he made the change?

13 Captain Kramer: The first indication I had of what I
14 might term bitterness on the part of Captain Safford toward
15 any other officers in the Navy Department was Captain Safford's
16 second letter to me.

17 Mr. Murphy: That was the one I read in detail on the re-
18 cord?

19 Captain Kramer: Dated, I believe, 22 January 1944.

20 Mr. Murphy: Right. Now, then, you went to the hospital
21 at Bethesda on the 28th of September 1945, did you not?

22 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: And you had a visit from Captain Safford
24 on October the 3rd, that is right, isn't it?

25 Captain Kramer: Approximately that date, yes, sir.

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murp hy

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Mr. Murphy: What was the purpose of that visit?

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Captain Kramer: Quite frankly, Mr. Murphy, I was somewhat surprised at that visit. My relations with Captain Safford have been, I believe, cordial; I believe they still are. They have never been intimate to the extent of myself or my wife making social calls on Captain Safford and his wife. It was purely office and official contacts. That is part of the reason at my surprise at his visit to me at the hospital. It was not too surprising, however, inasmuch as he was a long time acquaintance of mine.

We discussed a few things, not bearing on Pearl Harbor. We played a game of chess that evening. He brought me a box of chocolates, for which I thanked him, naturally.

He called again about three or four days later and picked up a book which he had left with me, a book of cartoons, on his first visit. Our conversations then were of the same character. We may have played a game of chess then, too. He was one of probably six or eight visitors I had during that first few weeks there.

Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate did you ever discuss Pearl Harbor with him while you were at the hospital?

Captain Kramer: No, sir, we did not because all our contact was in the company of other patients in the hospital.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I notice here a headline in a New York

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 paper, "Key Pearl Harbor Witness Vanishes."

3 Captain Kramer: I was made aware of that headline, yes,
4 sir.

5 Mr. Murphy: Now, can you tell us where you were on that
6 particular day? This is a headline of the New York Journal-
7 American of Friday, November the 9th, 1945. Where were you
8 that day? Or at least it had reference to your vanishing.
9 Did you leave the hospital?

10 Captain Kramer: The day before, Mr. Murphy, my wife ar-
11 rived in Washington from Florida. After one or two discussions
12 with my doctors and I believe on my request I was permitted to
13 what is termed "subsist" out of the hospital.

14 My wife contacted that afternoon the Red Cross in the
15 hospital about locating a room near the hospital. We got such
16 a room and stayed there that night. The following day, since
17 it was several days before I had any appointment for further
18 treatments, my wife and I went to Washington shopping. I got
19 permission from the doctor before I left the hospital.

20 I learned on returning to the hospital the following
21 morning from the nurse that on the previous afternoon there had
22 been another visitor trying to see me. The visitor was de-
23 scribed to me as a woman. From the description I could not de-
24 termine who it might have been. It was that morning about 9:15
25 in the company of my wife at the hospital that I was preparing

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 to leave the hospital again, having gotten the doctor's per-
3 mission to do so, to go into town, when the medical officer
4 in charge, Dr. Duncan, informed me that he had a phone call
5 just then from the Navy Department to the effect that a Mr.
6 Gearhart and Mr. Keefe were on their way out there to inter-
7 view me. It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to
8 me that it was his secretary or someone from his office that
9 had come out the day before that I first had any clue as to
10 who my previous day's visitor was.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now, there have been statements in the
12 press, - and I am reading now from the New York Times of No-
13 vember the 12th, the by-line of C. P. Trussel, a very able
14 and distinguished writer for that great paper, - there is a
15 statement there that, "Navy Captain issues a denial that he
16 had been beset and beleaguered; asserted that he was feeling
17 very well and would appear before the committee prepared to
18 state fully 'anything I know that they may want to know.'"

19 Now, were you ever beset or beleaguered by anybody in re-
20 gard to this case? And, if so, I think the committee are en-
21 titled to every detail.

22 Captain Kramer: At no time have I been what is termed
23 beset and beleaguered, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: There is a statement further in this article
25 that "Captain Kramer had been badgered and beset by an effort

Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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to breakdown his testimony."

Now, do you know off anybody and if you do I think we ought to have the details.

Captain Kramer: That statement, sir, is false.

Senator Lucas: Did Trussel make those statements?

Mr. Murphy: No, Mr. Trussel is not making them himself but quoting a very distinguished gentleman, not the writer.

Mr. Gearhart: Name him. Don't hold it back.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I come to the Washington Times-Herald, the United Press.

Senator Lucas: What is the date of that?

Mr. Murphy: I don't know the date of this but it is current or about the same time as the New York Times. This is the Washington Times-Herald and the only reason I think it is pertinent to go into these matters is that the composite mind of America is influenced by everything they hear on this case and I think we ought to go into the whole story. I see here a statement:

"I stand exactly on my statement that Kramer is being badgered and beset. Here is the most important witness in the investigation. He entered the Naval Hospital under orders. They took away his uniform, gave him pajamas, bath-robe and slippers. His meals were served in a ward from September 28th to the morning of

1 Witness Kramer

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 November 7th. I know that Kramer is chafing under this
3 restraint."

4 Were you chafing under any restraint at the hospital?

5 Captain Kramer: I was getting restless in the hospital
6 because that was the longest hospitalization I had ever had.
7 My previous hospitalizations in the Navy had never been of
8 more than a few days duration.

9 In that respect I might refer back to about fifteen years
10 ago when I was operated on for tonsilectomy in the Navy Hos-
11 pital in Boston. The normal period in such operations, I was
12 informed, was to keep the patient in the hospital not less
13 than a week. After three days following my operation I walked
14 out of the hospital and returned to my ship. I again was
15 chafing, if you want to use that term, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Well, I am just quoting from the paper, sir.

17 Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: I now quote from the Washington Post, some-
19 thing by the Associated Press, that you were being, - quoting
20 a distinguished gentleman -- that you were being bargained to
21 "change his original testimony, meaning he was being bargained
22 to change his original testimony."

23 Had anybody asked you to change your original testimony?

24 Captain Kramer: At no time during my hospitalization at
25 Bethesda Naval Hospital has anything in connection with in-
terrogation or testimony been brought up in any conversation
in which I engaged.

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