

INTERP. K108 - (1 March 46)

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34

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INTERROGATION OF
(Marquis) KIDO, KOICHI
(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 1 March 1946, 1400 - 1630 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) Kido, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Lt. Suzukawa: The Marquis would like to make a revision on what was said the day before yesterday.

A Day before yesterday, I said that if the Finance Minister participated in the Imperial Conference, it was KAWADA instead of KAYA.

Q You are not sure he was there, but if he was there, it was KAYA?

A Yes.

Q According to my information, OGURA was Finance Minister in the Second Konoye Cabinet.

A Afterwards.

Q That is the Third Konoye Cabinet?

A Yes.

- Q Isn't it true that when the Cabinet changed, the only immediate change was Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and all other Cabinet members continued on, at least for the time being?
- A I believe there were other changes, too.
- Q We were talking about your entry on July 5. At the end of your diary on that date, you mention a conversation with Prince KONOYE to the effect that he had received a letter from Mr. HULL. Do you remember what that particular letter had to say, in effect? Was that an official diplomatic cable, or letter, or was it some personal letter he had received?
- A I believe it was official.
- Q Do you remember what Mr. HULL said on that occasion? I don't recognize that particular letter as of that date.
- A I believe this was a letter which has been known as "the oral statement of the Secretary of State".
- Q What did he say in his oral statement, according to your recollection, generally speaking?
- A I believe that it said that the Foreign Minister of Japan could not be trusted. I believe that became the cause of the collapse of the KONOYE Cabinet.
- Q In other words, on or about that time, there was a statement on the part of Mr. HULL that he didn't have any confidence in MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister of Japan?
- A The Secretary of State has said it tactfully but his implication was such.
- Q I understand. On July 7, you talked with War Minister TOJO REGARDING reinforcement of the Kwantung Army. Do you recall why he deemed it necessary to reinforce that Army at that particular time?
- A I believe this was a report concerning the mobilization conducted there in order to complete or to make more thorough preparations there.

- Q And why was it necessary to increase the war preparations and the strength of the Kwantung Army? Was it contemplated there was to be some offensive campaign entered into there?
- A An offensive operation was not contemplated but because the forces there were very weak, even for defense, such a thing was done.
- Q MATSUOKA was openly advocating offensive action along the Manchurian-Russian border, but you don't think TOJO and the Army leaders took any steps in that direction?
- A I believe that the Army had no military plans whatever in taking offensive action in that area because it was inadequately prepared.
- Q They were concentrating their plans on the South and French Indo-China and places of that type? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q What did the Navy Minister, OIKAWA, have to say about the war preparations when you talked to him that day?
- A He explained to me of the situation of the Navy.
- Q What did he say?
- A He explained that the fleet's complement was not yet up to full strength and that the gathering of materials necessary for the fleet was still being done and that preparation is not complete as yet.
- Q Preparation for what? What was the Navy preparing for?
- A To put the fleet on full strength. To fill the complement of the ships.
- Q Is it true that the Navy at that time was in the process of building up its strength so that Japan might move into the South Pacific, if such a decision were made?

- A Hitherto, the fleet's complement has been reduced but now they are trying to put it back in full strength and it was just bringing it back to full strength.
- Q He, no doubt, talked to you about the possibility of the Navy being called upon to assist in the southern program, didn't he?
- A I believe it was preparing for such an eventuality.
- Q In other words, the Navy was in the process of building up its strength so that if it was officially decided there should be naval and military operations in French Indo-China and other southern territories, they would be in a position to carry them out?
- A And I believe it was also due to the bringing of the fleet units into Pacific waters from the Atlantic side and also the stationing of American ships at Hawaii.
- Q The Navy Minister, in his conversation with you, anticipated that there might be a clash between the United States and Japan on the seas and was preparing for that eventuality if it came. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Did he have anything to say about the French Indo-China campaign and whether the Navy would be called upon to participate?
- A At this time, he didn't say anything about it.
- Q You did talk to him about that on other occasions, did you not, about French Indo-China operations?
- A We didn't discuss on that matter as far as my memory is concerned.
- Q Tell me, it is true, is it not, that in some of your conversations with the Navy Minister or Navy officials it was disclosed that Japan had a plan to attack Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, which might have to be carried into effect in certain eventualities?

- A I did not hear, even for a single time, of the attack to be made upon Hawaii.
- Q I am confident that you didn't have anything to do with the planning of these naval operations that might take place in the future in the Pacific, but certainly in those days when the relations were strained between the United States and Japan, I would think a man in your position would quite logically ask the question "How would we proceed to fight the United States if we can't negotiate?" Didn't you ask such a question and didn't you get some answer to satisfy you as to what the over-all picture would be in case of war?
- A I had the impression that it was difficult to attack Hawaii; that the United States and Japan might clash in Southern areas; and also we heard about the preparations made in the southern areas, like the concentration of force in Takawa and Formosa and other secret preparations but not a thing was said about Hawaii.
- Q By "preparations", you mean preparations made by Japan in southern areas so you would be prepared in the event of war?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't it ever disclosed to you that the possibility of attacking Pearl Harbor in connection with such a war had been gone into and analyzed and even though not decided upon at that date was examined and considered. Didn't you have such information as that?
- A I didn't hear anything about it.
- Q We are told by the Naval people that the plan to attack Pearl Harbor, as you undoubtedly know now, at least, was originated by YAMAMOTO and that a great deal of time had been spent during the spring and summer of 1941 in drawing up those plans for use in case it was decided to go in that direction. Wasn't that fact ever disclosed to you?
- A It was after the attack on Pearl Harbor has been made that I have heard that the Navy air forces had been trained to carry out the attack there and that the Japanese forces has made maneuvers for that attack.

Q When was it you first learned that Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked in connection with Japanese-American relations. What was the earliest day you personally knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked?

A I did not know until the very start of the war.

Q You mean after the attack had been made?

A Until I have heard about the attack.

Q In other words, you learned of the attack after it actually happened?

A Yes. I always thought Japan would attack the Philippines and Malay instead.

Q And you didn't know anything about the plans of the military and the navy for the attack until it had taken place?

A Yes, I remember to that effect?

Q Had it not occurred to you in your own thinking that it might be a possible strategic move in order to fight the war?

A Because it would require great force, even for operating in the southern areas. I don't even think that Japan would even make an attack upon Hawaii and also looking at the actual facts, the attack on Hawaii was only for the purpose of nullifying or pulverizing the American fleet and not for the purpose of occupying it.

Q Wasn't it a common topic of conversation among your friends at the Juichi-kai meetings as to what would take place in case of war, where attack would be made, Malay, Pearl Harbor, Philippines? Isn't that something that was talked about regularly and speculated upon?

A In the event that Japan struck, it was believed that Hong Kong, Manila and Malay would be the objectives.

- Q Weren't there those present at these friendly gatherings of yours that were so bold in their thinking that they brought forth the thought that it would be a good idea to attack Pearl Harbor in order to nullify the fleet?
- A I believe that we all were saying that Japan would not be able to put their hands out to Hawaii.
- Q The Emperor, no doubt, knew about these operational plans for attack of Pearl Harbor and the actual plan to attack it long before the attack took place, did he not?
- A I believe that the Emperor was informed previously because the Naval General Staff submitted directly to the Emperor the general outline of the attack.
- Q I think you indicated before that the Army and Navy didn't discuss operations with you but they did discuss operations with the Emperor.
- A Because the decision of the Imperial General Headquarters is usually transmitted to the Emperor so the Emperor was informed of the plan.
- Q How long before the attack would you say the Emperor knew about the plan to attack Pearl Harbor?
- A I do not know when they submitted the plan to the Emperor.
- Q He, no doubt, knew that the Navy had plans drawn early in the fall of 1941 for use if such procedure was finally decided upon, didn't he?
- A Because the Emperor does not know anything about it during its preparatory stages and the time he was informed was after it was decided upon, the time the Emperor usually knows about it is way after the thing has actually been planned.
- Q When was the actual decision made that attack would be made on Pearl Harbor?
- A I do not know.

- Q I don't know whether there is great significance in the fact whether you knew the attack was going to happen or not. I can't imagine that the Emperor knew it for some time prior to December 7 and not telling you about it. It was too big a thing to keep but you say he never talked to you about it?
- A No, he never talked to me about it.
- Q Did he ever tell you later on he wanted to tell you about it but was bound to secrecy, or didn't he in effect apologize for not having let you in on the secret?
- A Later on, the Emperor said that it was a military secret and that he was unable to tell me about it. Such a case has arisen a number of times.
- Q In other words, he apologized for not being able to tell you something he would like to have told you. Did he indicate in that conversation how long before the attack he knew it was going to take place?
- A I haven't heard anything about it.
- Q Would you venture an opinion as to how long before the attack the Emperor knew it was going to take place?
- A I do not know when it was decided, so I do not know.
- Q You know it was decided more than just a few days prior to the attack because of the necessity of all the operations having to unfold in order to get there. The Emperor knew about the attack - the fleet units left their bases in order to go to Pearl Harbor.
- A Yes.
- Q I talked some time back at great length with Admiral FUKUDOME and I also talked with others who tell me that around September 6, near the time when the Imperial Conference was held but not in any way connected with it so far as I know, there were war games and naval games held here in Tokyo involving the details of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. Do you think the Emperor knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor as early as September 1941?

- A Because perhaps the maneuver has only been conducted on the map, the Emperor would only know the result of the study and the maneuver that has been conducted so he would not know of the planning and I do not know if the Emperor has been informed of the maneuver. If he was informed of it, the Emperor would know about it.
- Q If extensive war games and naval games were conducted in Tokyo involving a purported plan to attack Pearl Harbor early in September 1941 in order to determine whether or not it was feasible and if at those games it was decided such a game was feasible, that no doubt would have been reported by the Navy Chief of Staff to the Emperor, wouldn't it?
- A Because I do not know how clear-cut the decision has been made, I cannot tell if it has been reported to the Emperor at all.
- Q I see. Assuming that the Navy decided definitely that such an attack was feasible and could be carried out successfully in case of war by the United States and Japan, wouldn't such a decision be reported normally to the Emperor?
- A I didn't hear anything about it, so I do not know.
- Q Did you know Admiral FUKUDOME personally?
- A I do not know him.
- Q Do you know who he is? Have you heard of him?
- A Yes, I have heard of his name.
- Q On July 8, do you recall the contents of the telegram you received from Mr. TARASAKI of the American Bureau?
- A At this time, the report of definite results of the the negotiations has been given to me. Hitherto, the telegraphic report has been changing from time to time so that the content isn't in my recollection.
- Q You mean you don't recall what this particular telegram said?
- A Yes.

- Q On July 12, you talked to the Emperor with reference to giving an answer to Mr. HULL. Was that answer the one involving Mr. HULL's statement that he didn't have confidence in Foreign Minister MATSUOKA?
- A I believe so.
- Q What did you and the Emperor discuss on that occasion? What was the Emperor's reaction to Mr. HULL's statement with reference to MATSUOKA?
- A At that time, the reply submitted by the Prime Minister has been presented to the Emperor and because the reply was pretty good, I believe there wasn't anything significant in it.
- Q Do you remember what the reply was, in effect, that was submitted to the Emperor?
- A Because this reply was just a simple one given to the Emperor, it wasn't significant at all. Later on, difficulties arose.
- Q What did KONOYE propose to say in his reply to HULL? The one he submitted to the Emperor, the one you refer to?
- A The Prime Minister tried to take Cordell Hull very lightly saying it is just an oral statement he made but the Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, took it seriously.
- Q The truth of the matter is that Prince KONOYE felt somewhat the same way as Mr. HULL so far as MATSUOKA was concerned, didn't he?
- A For that reason, Prince KONOYE was of the mind of agreeing or to get to terms with Cordell HULL.
- Q In other words, both Mr. Hull and also KONOYE at that time didn't have a great deal of confidence in MATSUOKA and his foreign policy?
- A Yes.
- Q On July 14, you refer again to the breach between the Premier and the Foreign Minister. As I understand it, one of the differences in opinion between the two men was this question of whether or not to attack Russia. Is that correct?
- A Yes.

- Q Another difference in opinion between the two men was that MATSUOKA was much more outspoken in his opposition to friendly relations with America than Prince KONOYE, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q Were there any other differences between the two men other than the Russian situation and the American relations?
- A The real cause of the split was that MATSUOKA was indignant by the oral statement made by HULL and KONOYE tried not to make an issue of it.
- Q One of the immediate differences in their opinion was that MATSUOKA wanted to demand an apology for the statement and KONOYE was feeling that he wanted to minimize it.
- A Yes.
- Q Underneath, in addition to the differences over the Russian campaign and relations between the United States and Japan, were there any other fundamental differences between the two men?
- A There wasn't much difference in the matter of political measures and policies but the attitude of MATSUOKA and his characteristics; that is, he more or less was indifferent or abusive to the Prime Minister in that he more or less disregarded him.
- Q In other words, there was definitely a clash of personalities between the two men at that stage?
- A Yes.
- Q What did Mr. OHASHI, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, have to say about the occupation of French Indo-China on July 14, when you talked to him?
- A He was active before in Manchuria and he came here at this time as the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs and he brought documents concerning the diplomatic procedures for the occupation of French Indo-China.
- A Do you remember what that contained in effect - what the terms were and what he had to say about them, and what you told the Emperor that day when you met him?

- A I believe it was a document telling simply that Japan would carry out those things decided at the Liaison Conference. It was a document saying that the negotiations will be started before this was postponed for about five days and now it was finally to be taken up.
- Q The plan was to negotiate the right on the part of Japan to land a certain agreed number of troops in Southern indo-China?
- A I think so.
- Q On July 15, you mention that MATSUOKA in his attitude towards an agreement with the United States was uncompromising. I think we covered this before but I wish you would tell me again in your own words just what MATSUOKA's attitude was toward the United States that was uncompromising. I have in mind his attitude toward coming to an agreement with the United States, not so much the personal statement involved with Mr. HULL.
- A At that time, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said that the oral statement made by Mr. HULL is insulting to Japan.
- Q MATSUOKA said that this is the same case as illustrated in the incident concerning Morocco between Germany and France in which Germany made Cathay, a French foreign minister, resign as a result of the same sort of an incident?
- A MATSUOKA wanted to file a written protest to Cordell HULL and then after that was done to continue negotiations but the Prime Minister said that would break the negotiations and so the Prime Minister said that a reply would be drafted to the oral statement and at the same time a proposal for negotiations would be submitted.
- Q Do you recall what these Directors of Military and Naval Affairs had in mind when you write that they had prepared a proposal involving some slight amendments?
- A As before, a proposal for an understanding between America and Japan has been given to me by TERASAKI and the reply for that has been drafted by the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army and Navy.

- Q What concessions were they willing to make in the negotiations?
- A I believe that the reply was such that Japan was willing to come to terms with the proposals.
- Q Well, was that reply ever sent?
- A I believe it was sent.
- Q There was never any reply sent whereby Japan agreed to all the proposals and demands made by the United States, was there?
- A This wasn't a conclusive reply, it was more or less voicing Japan's position in regard to it. It was more or less a step along it.
- Q It was an effort to keep the negotiations open and evidence of willing to negotiate further.
- A And so KONOYE sent a counselor to Foreign Minister SAITO to tell them to work accordingly with the will of the Prime Minister but there was no reply whatsoever from the Foreign Ministry. But they found out that the Foreign Minister arbitrarily has sent a telegram rejecting the oral statement of Hull. So the Prime Minister became indignant and said he cannot work side by side with the Foreign Minister.
- Q Is it true that the Foreign Minister actually dispatched a protest to the United States over the statement of Mr. Hull?
- A There were stories to that effect.
- Q You don't know whether it was actually sent or not?
- A No.
- Q Was MATSUOKA ever asked to resign from the Cabinet?
- A I don't believe that was ever requested of him.
- Q Had he resigned voluntarily, it would have prevented the Cabinet from falling, would it not?

- A If the Foreign Minister resigned voluntarily, the Cabinet would not fall.
- Q MATSUOKA felt that the United States was attempting to bring about his removal from the Cabinet and interfering in Japanese Affairs?
- A Yes.
- Q The truth of the matter was that the United States did object to MATSUOKA's foreign policy and was trying to bring pressure to have it changed?
- A And in talking with Ambassador NOMURA, HULL retracted his statement, saying that he didn't mean it so seriously. At this time, I, for one, felt that it would be a good thing for the Foreign Minister to resign because it would be terrible for any personal animosities between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to cause a change of Cabinet.
- Q Normally, that would be solved by the person that was out of step with the rest of the Cabinet resigning, would it not?
- A Yes.
- Q Did MATSUOKA refuse to resign?
- A When I met Prince KONOYE, I said that it would be a good thing to make Foreign Minister MATSUOKA quit but the Prime Minister said then MATSUOKA would say that the Foreign Minister had been removed on demand from America and would publish propaganda to that effect and that would bring forth unfavorable repercussion throughout Japan and the Prime Minister said there was no other recourse but to resign himself.
- Q MATSUOKA never offered or volunteered to resign, did he?
- A And because MATSUOKA had connections with the Rightists there was great fear that propagandizing in that effect would have terrible consequences.
- Q MATSUOKA was unfriendly with the United States and decided, did he not, that Japan should take a strong position against the United States and have a showdown and fight the United States, if necessary, to put over Japan's foreign policy?

- A But MATSUOKA didn't say it that clearly and on the other hand, he did say that Japan and America must work harmoniously. That is why he was difficult to comprehend.
- Q As a result, the Cabinet resigned and Prince KONOYE was called on to form a new Cabinet, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q And in the new Cabinet, Mr. TOYODA was given the Foreign Ministry in lieu of Mr. MATSUOKA?
- A Yes.
- Q You say you think there were some other important changes in the Cabinet? Do you recall what they were? There was no change in the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry, was there?
- A No.
- Q Or the Finance Ministry?
- A The Finance Minister changed to OGURA and the Minister of Commerce and Industry changed to SAKONJI, AND THE Minister of Home Affairs to TANABE.
- Q Did you ever get a letter from MATSUOKA after the Cabinet changed stating his position with reference to what had taken place?
- A Yes, he sent me a long letter.
- Q What did he have to say by way of summary?
- A He sent me a letter giving indignant remarks concerning why this Cabinet has been changed and he was very much irked.
- Q What did he say? What was he complaining about?
- A I believe he was complaining that the Cabinet has been executed under the manipulation of America.
- Q Did he have anything further to say about the United States other than what you have already told us?

- A I believe that the greater part was devoted to his dissatisfaction with Prince KONOYE.
- Q Didn't he have anything further to say when he talked to you on July 27 about the change in the Cabinet?
- A I believe this was the same thing. He more or less talks about everything by himself.
- Q Did MATSUOKA thereafter, during the remaining half of 1941 take any active part in Government affairs?
- A No, he didn't do anything because he contracted a serious illness.
- Q He didn't have any further influence, you don't think in what took place in the latter half of 1941, after the fall of the Cabinet?
- A No, he didn't do anything.
- Q On July 19, when you talked with War Minister TOJO with reference to the fall of the Cabinet, do you remember what he had to say?
- A In this conversation, the subject matter was MATSUOKA and he was saying that MATSUOKA's opinions and his actions cannot be grasped; he cannot be comprehended.
- Q What was the main difference between MATSUOKA and the War Minister, and the military group headed by TOJO? They didn't see things eye-to-eye, as I understand it. What were his differences?
- A At this time, the military was anxious to settle the China incident through the good offices of the United States through Japanese-American negotiations but MATSUOKA at that time more or less obstructed that and therefore at that time, the military and MATSUOKA more or less did not agree but as a rule, the militarists and MATSUOKA were in complete harmony.
- Q Well, they didn't see eye-to-eye on the Russian campaign.
- A MATSUOKA was President of the Manchurian Railway and he over-estimated the Japanese defense at the Russo-Manchurian border and after the China incident, many of the troops were dispatched to China from there and therefore the defenses were weakened.

- Q Well, MATSUOKA and the Army thought differently about the campaign into Russia, he advocating it and the Army opposing it. Isn't that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q But you said that the Army wanted to settle the China Incident through negotiations with the United States and MATSUOKA objected to it. How did he object, by stating openly he didn't want to negotiate with the United States? What did he do?
- A He did not say he would not negotiate with the United States but rather for various reasons he would like the negotiations. His true sentiment would not be made clear.
- Q In other words, although the Prime Minister and the military people and the Government, itself, generally, you think, were honestly desirous of negotiating settlement of the China War through the United States, the Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA, was not wholeheartedly trying to bring that about but was interfering with the operation, would you say?
- A Therefore, if the negotiations had been started through MATSUOKA on his own initiative, he may have been very active in that respect.
- Q I don't quite understand your answer. What did you mean by that?
- A If the negotiations were initiated by MATSUOKA and had been conducted through him, he probably would have been very much on fire for it.
- Q You mean, if he had personally gone to Washington and conducted the negotiations rather than NOMURA?
- A Not to that extent but perhaps under his direction and under his proposal.
- Q Under whose directions and proposals were negotiations being conducted if the Foreign Minister didn't have anything to do with them?
- A Because the negotiations started while he was absent, he called it a plot and a conspiracy and he became very indignant.

- Q In other words, he resented the fact that an effort was made to negotiate settlement of the China War with the United States while he was absent in Europe?
- A That more or less irked him from the beginning and he wouldn't advocate that.
- Q Did he complain to you about that when he returned from Germany, personally?
- A Previous to this, he came and talked to me about his true feeling in regard to that matter and at that time, he expressed all sorts of "indignancies" and dissatisfaction regarding it.
- Q What was the objection he voiced to the way negotiations were being conducted during his absence?
- A As said before, the matter that the persons outside of the Embassy have started the negotiation and he said because of that it was a plot and he couldn't get over that fact.
- Q What kind of a plot did he think there was - a plot to do what?
- A Perhaps he just made all sorts of remarks just because of the fact it wasn't conducted through official channels.
- Q You think after his successful negotiation of the Tripartite Pact and his negotiation of the Neutrality Pact with Russia, as you said once before, he became "big-headed" and rather vain and he resented the fact that anyone should deprive him of the privilege of negotiating with the United States? Is that a fair statement?
- A And while stopping in Moscow, MATSUOKA told the United States Ambassador to Moscow, Steinhardt, saying it would be a good thing to start American-Japanese negotiations to settle the China Incident and he asked Steinhardt to tell President Roosevelt to start negotiations. MATSUOKA thought at first that the Japanese-American negotiations has been conducted through his own initiative, but later he found out it was through the initiative of other persons outside of regular diplomatic channels and so he felt strongly about it.

- Q Do you think these personal feelings on the part of MATSUOKA during the spring and summer of 1941 interfered greatly with the possibility of their being successful - the negotiations with the United States being successful?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the difference, if any, between Prince KONOYE and MATSUOKA with reference to the Tripartite Pact? Did they see eye-to-eye on that, or did they have a difference of opinion?
- A At the beginning, Prince KONOYE desired to include Russia into the Tripartite Pact but after the start of the Russo-German War, Prince KONOYE lost all interest in it and with the beginning of the Japanese-American negotiations, Prince KONOYE wanted to make the Tripartite Pact just a matter of form and to nullify its effectiveness. He was of the mind that if an understanding can be reached with America, he will completely lean toward America. MATSUOKA, because of Germany, was strongly in favor of the Tripartite Pact.
- Q By that you mean that Matsuoka was in favor of very close cooperation with Germany and Italy in economic, military and other affairs, while Prince KONOYE favored the minimum amount of cooperation under the Pact that was signed?
- A Yes, and Prince KONOYE wanted to change toward America if an understanding can be reached with her and it was difficult for KONOYE to abandon completely the Tripartite Pact, but he nevertheless was willing to solve the Pacific problem by reaching an understanding with America.
- Q Was there anything in the Tripartite Pact that would prevent Japan having friendly relations with the United States?
- A No, there is no provision barring Japan from negotiating or having friendly relations with the United States.
- Q Was it a violation of the spirit of the Pact for Japan to enter into friendly negotiations with the United States?
- A There is nothing that would forbid it only that there were a strong voicing by the United States that no understanding can be reached unless Japan withdraw from the Tripartite Pact. But the proposal presented to Japan up to this time by America did not demand Japan to withdraw from the Pact.

- Q The demand was that Japan minimize its cooperation with the powers of Germany and Italy?
- A I believe that if America understood the true feeling of Prince KONOYE, an agreement between Japan and America would have been reached.
- Q But MATSUOKA was in favor of and advocated close cooperation with Germany and Italy and a minimum of cooperation with the United States.
- A Yes, there was that difference.
- Q While Prince KONOYE was contrary in that he desired more cooperation with the United States and less with the Axis powers. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the attitude of the War Minister with reference to the Tripartite Pact in those days?
- A TOJO wanted the settlement of the China Incident through Japanese-American negotiations, but as a military man, he favored the Tripartite Pact.
- Q In other words, TOJO wanted to try to negotiate a settlement of the China War but have Japan still maintain close cooperation with the Axis powers?
- A On that point, he was greatly different from Prince KONOYE.
- Q Why was it, would you say, that TOJO desired this close cooperation with Germany and Italy? What did he expect Japan to gain by that cooperation?
- A I believe that TOJO was thinking of an aggressive policy if he had the opportunity.
- Q In other words, from your conversations with TOJO, it was your impression that he was thinking along the same lines as the Axis powers insofar as what Japan should do in the Far East; that the time had come for Japan to expand its border or her borders out in the Southern Pacific?
- A I believe that when the opportunity presented itself, it desired to establish a co-prosperity sphere.

- Q And by "co-prosperity sphere", would you say that General TOJO had in mind acquiring bases and territory in the Southern Pacific?
- A I don't believe he had any territorial ambition. I believe he only wanted to obtain a dominant position.
- Q How did he propose that Japan should acquire a dominant position in China and on the continent and in the South if it didn't involve securing bases and territory?
- A I believe he intended to work in close harmony with China after the settlement of the China incident through Japanese-American negotiations and Japan, in cooperation with China would bring the other countries into her fold and work in harmony with them. He took on the policy that it would be a good opportunity now to bring French Indo-China into the fold because France was powerless and also because Britain was involved in Europe, Thailand would more or less be willing to come into the fold. That was the way of thinking, TOJO was conducting.
- Q And TOJO, in his conversations with you, indicated that he felt that countries such as French Indo-China and Thailand should be brought into the fold. What did he have in mind by "bringing into the fold"? How did he propose that Japan should acquire domination of those countries?
- A I believe that the general plan was to negotiate with those countries and have Japan take the position of leadership there.
- Q How did he propose, to your way of thinking, that Japan would exercise her leadership in those countries if she didn't actually establish bases there.
- A Japan was to obtain rights to voice her opinion in those countries and this was to be obtained through negotiation and through treaties in complete harmony with those countries.
- Q In other words, it was TOJO's philosophy that while France was down and subservient to Germany and while England was occupied by war in Europe, Japan by forced negotiations with those countries should move in and replace France and England, respectively, insofar as their influence was over those countries. Is that right?

- A Yes, I believe it amounts to that.
- Q Insofar as French Indo-China was concerned, he fostered and sponsored not only gaining economic privileges but also the stationing of troops in French Indo-China. That is correct, isn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q It was also TOJO's thinking and philosophy that troops should be sent into Thailand, was it not?
- A Because Thailand is an independent country and she was contemplating alliance with Japan, so I do not think that he was contemplating the dispatch of troops there.
- Q He eventually caused the dispatching of troops into Thailand, did he not, after the war started?
- A Well, after the war started, he did send the troops there but at this time, I wasn't aware that any troops were to be sent there. I didn't hear any systematic story nor information about it but this is something which I have been able to obtain piece-meal from time to time.
- Q In addition to Thailand and French Indo-China, what other countries or territory did TOJO indicate he thought Japan should dominate?
- A I believe for acquiring Malayan tin and rubber and the oil of the Dutch East Indies, Japan was contemplating applying pressure but it did not plan the sort of a thing which later was conducted as far as my knowledge goes at that time.
- Q What sort of pressure did TOJO in his talks with you indicate should be used in acquiring this dominance of Malay and the Dutch East Indies?
- A He didn't say any definite thing concerning what pressure would be applied.
- Q But he, in effect, in his many conversations with you, took the position that Japan should as a matter of foreign policy acquire dominance over Indo-China, Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies and China?
- A Japan was thinking about getting supremacy in those regions.

- Q From your many talks with TOJO, you would conclude, as you did a minute ago, he was for expansion by Japan and for the taking of measures looking toward such expansion rather than measures merely for the defense of Japan?
- A The military at this time were more concerned about obtaining oil from the East Indies and all those natural resources because the flow of scrap iron and oil from America has been stopped.
- Q Well, TOJO and the military people whom he led had a foreign policy of Japanese expansion as distinguished from mere self-defense of the Japanese Islands. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Although you indicate that War Minister TOJO in these days in July had not stated to you any positive plans for the sending of large military forces into these territories, it is true that at that time, he openly advocated the sending and stationing of troops into French Indo-China irrespective of treaty rights, did he not?
- A Yes.
- Q And it was MATSUOKA that came forth with the statement that he felt a treaty could be negotiated through Germany with Vichy France?
- A Yes.
- Q Although TOJO did not openly advocate the landing of military forces in all these places in July 1941, he did go so far as to advocate in his talks with you that it was necessary for Japan and Japan should send troops into French Indo-China?
- A Yes.
- Q Tell me your opinion as to how Foreign Minister TOYODA was succeeded to succeed MATSUOKA.
- A TOYODA has been made Foreign Minister because successful conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations has been desired and TOYODA is a Navy Man and he resided in England for a long time and he is pro-American and for that reason he has been selected for that post.

- Q What was the attitude of Admiral TOYODA in those days toward the Tripartite Pact?
- A From the beginning, Admiral TOYODA was not in favor of the Tripartite Pact.
- Q What would you say in your conversations with him was his attitude toward the sending of troops into French Indo-China in those days?
- A He was saying that great caution should be taken in respect to that and he recognized the fact that it is necessary to do that in regard to carrying out the Army's program in settling the China Incident.
- Q Did he agree with War Minister TOJO in his reasoning that Japan needed to land troops in French Indo-China even in spite of a treaty to that effect?
- A I don't know what sort of a conversation was had.
- Q I meant did he ever say anything to you to indicate his agreement with TOJO on that point.
- A I didn't hear much about it. Judging from the nature of Admiral TOYODA, I don't believe that TOYODA WOULD favor anything done without first having a treaty. I wish to mention now that the Emperor has always been greatly concerned and worried about the clamor of obtaining a dominant or leadership position. The Emperor said that a dominant or leadership position is not a position to be taken by the leader but that all the other countries select and ask for a leader, and through them to become a leader. This may not be in line with the story but I wish to mention this fact that at the close of this war the same sort of a situation arose. In the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration preceding the surrender of Japan, there was a clause specifying that the Government be made under the free will of the people and that would be in violation of the national structure of Japan. The military objected to it but it was said that if the people willingly selected the Emperor as the leader, it would be all right. The Emperor said to that effect, that if the people selected himself as a leader, it would be all right and it would be absolutely unnecessary to impose the Emperor system upon the people but the people more or less chose the Imperial system themselves.

- A (Cont) The Army always has been trying to impose the Imperial system on the people and that is the difference of opinion there in the same way as the matter of obtaining leadership. The Emperor was saying all the countries should select and desire Japan to be leader and Japan not impose herself as the leader. And the Emperor was saying that the imposition of a leadership position upon other nations would end in failure.
- Q Wasn't that in a broad sense exactly what the United States was complaining of in its negotiations with Japan in 1941; the United States felt that Japan was trying to force herself upon Far Eastern peoples as the leader of the Far East?
- A I believe such a sentiment held by the Japanese people has been considered a great people.
- Q In other words, in these days we are talking about, the Emperor felt that the military people in Japan had adopted and were sponsoring a program of forcing Japanese leadership on China, French Indo-China, Thailand and the South Pacific, and all of Greater East Asia, and that he, himself, thought that Japan should conduct herself in such a way that these countries would want to look upon Japan as a leader.
- A Yes; therefore, the Emperor was saying that Japan should not be too hasty in going about this work.
- Q Well, in making that statement, he was addressing his remarks to people such as TOJO and MATSUOKA, was he not? Who lead the movement to force leadership upon the Far East?
- A Yes, I believe he talked to them about that, too.
- Q And others that were outspoken in favor of forcing leadership upon the Far East were people such as ISHIHARA?
- A Yes.
- Q And MASAKI?
- A Yes.

Q And SUZUKI?

A Yes.

Q Who else would you say led in this movement. We have already named, TOJO, MATSUOKA, ISHIHARA and SUZUKI. Who were the others in the Government or otherwise that felt that Japan should force her leadership on the Far East?

A MUTO and SATO of the directing body of the Army.

Q Were those the outstanding people that in your opinion were leaders of that philosophy?

A Yes.

Q Were there any in the Navy in high office that subscribed to the policy of forcing Japanese leadership on the Far East?

A I don't believe that the high officers in the Navy circles had such a mind.

Q Although you will agree that they were led and dominated by this group of people in their action and cooperated in bringing about an attempt to force leadership on the Far East, won't you?

A Yes.

Q Although you say that as early as July 1941 you didn't get any indication from War Minister TOJO that he desired to use military force to acquire domination of any of these countries other than French Indo-China, when was it in your many talks with TOJO during 1941 that you first learned from him that he had come to advocate the use of military force elsewhere than in French Indo-China?

A I didn't hear any such stories but finally before the Imperial Conference of September, I, for the first time, heard serious reports concerning the imminent clash with America.

Q Do you recall the incident or occasion where you heard that? Does that stand out in your mind?

- A I don't have it in my recollection at present but if I read through this diary, I might come to it.
- Q We may come to that later on. My question is not so much when you first learned that TOJO had made up his mind that a war would be had with the United States as it was when you first discovered that TOJO was advocating the sending of troops into these other countries besides French Indo-China in order to acquire dominance and leadership there, leaving the United States out.
- A At this time, I didn't hear any story about it.
- Q There certainly came a time when the War Minister, or maybe he was Premier then, advocated sending troops into Malay, Dutch East Indies and Thailand. When was that?
- A I believe it was since the Imperial Conference of September.
- Q In other words, the whole question of how Japan was going to bring about her dominance in East Asia came up for discussion and was actually decided upon at the Imperial Conference in September? Is that right?
- A Yes, and at this Imperial Conference, it was brought to light that the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations would bring forth a very difficult problem.
- Q Well, the real clash that came to a head in September and later on in the fall of 1941 between the United States and Japan was a clash between this policy on the part of TOJO and these other men to force Japanese dominance on East Asia and the policy of the United States that that leadership should not be forced on East Asia. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q And it was that clash that brought about the war. Japan, through the military leaders we have mentioned, was insisting upon having Japan dominate China, Indo-China and Thailand, Malay and the East Indies and the United States was opposed to any activity or overt actions on the part of Japan to acquire such dominance and it was the clash of those foreign policies that brought on the war, was it not?

- A If the Japanese-American negotiation was successful, Japan would be able to obtain oil and natural resources from America so the Army was in favor of it and TOJO still held the hope regarding Japanese-American negotiations even upon his assumption of the Premiership and the Navy beseeched Japan that she come to terms as much as possible or make the Japanese-American negotiations by all means successful.
- Q But the demands or the position that the United States was taking in those days was interfering with this policy or program on the part of TOJO and the military leaders to attain dominance of these countries, wasn't it?
- A In the matter of negotiations, there wasn't anything about Japan taking a leadership position in South Asia.
- Q But the leadership principle was present behind the scenes very definitely in the negotiations, was it not?
- A But all those things about leadership would be dissipated if the negotiations were successful.
- Q But when Japan sent troops into China and later in French Indo-China, that was an expression of the program on the part of these military people to assume dominance on the continent, wasn't it?
- A And, therefore, Japan made a great blunder in dispatching troops into French Indo-China at this time. I believe that the difficulty was that the Prime Minister was unable to control and lead the Army and Navy.
- Q In other words, this program of expansion on the part of the military was so strong it became the policy and practical operation of the Japanese Government, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q You stated that in your talks with TOJO up to July 1941 you don't think he had said anything to indicate that he advocated the acquiring of territory other than certain bases in French Indo-China. Is that correct? You made that general statement, did you not?
- A That is right. I didn't hear anything about the acquisition of territory.

- Q Didn't there come a time later in the Fall in October, when TOJO took the position that Japan should acquire territory on the continent - in China?
- A No, I never heard anything about it.
- Q The reason I ask this question is that you several times have referred to Prince KONOYE's memoirs and I read them again in order to refresh my memory. Among other things in his memoirs, with reference to the change in cabinets in the middle of October 1941, Prince KONOYE makes this statement: "Premier TOJO took the position that Japan should sever the Chinese territory on the continent but TOJO also went ahead and said that this could not be done because of PRINCE KONOYE's general statement that Japan did not have any territorial desires. From that statement, I take it as of October 1941, War Minister TOJO was advocating the actual obtaining of territory on the continent. Did you ever have any talks with TOJO that would indicate the same thoughts as expressed by Prince KONOYE?"
- A No, I didn't hear anything like that concerning China. He was faithfully carrying out the fundamental treaty that was concluded with China through Ambassador ABE which was ordered by the Emperor and TOJO was abiding to that fundamental treaty faithfully.
- Q Was that a treaty between Japan and the Nanking Government?
- A Yes.
- Q And did that treaty have something in it with reference to the acquisition of territory on the continent by Japan?
- A There was no territorial provision in it.
- Q Was there anything in that treaty that said Japan was not to have territory on the continent?
- A No, there was no clause whatsoever that said anything about getting territories for Japan.
- Q In view of TOJO's general attitude of expansion and willingness to land troops in French Indo-China, would you say he did not advocate the acquiring of territory in China as implied in Prince KONOYE's memoirs?

- A Because while TOJO was War Minister in KONOYE's Cabinet, he favored wholeheartedly the Japanese-American negotiations and at one time he even favored complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, so I cannot even believe that TOJO favored the acquisition of territory.
- Q If, right in the middle of the negotiations between the United States and Japan, TOJO advocated the obtaining of bases in French Indo-China, it wouldn't be a much more radical step for him to advocate obtaining some bases and territory in China, would it? Would that be a much more radical step?
- A The occupation of French Indo-China was necessary for the speedy conclusion of the China incident but as far as territorial acquisition is concerned, I cannot believe that TOJO ever had such a policy in mind but his personal feelings toward that is unclear to me.
- Q In other words, you feel that TOJO had a policy of wanting to expand and to use military force, if necessary, to expand Japanese leadership in the Far East but once the leadership was attained, you don't think he desired to retain any territory?
- A No, he did not think a bit about acquiring territory because even in his proclamation, when he became Premier, he did not say a thing about acquiring territory.
- Q You think he desired to have Japan dominate these countries either through a puppet government or subservient governments but didn't advocate Japan actually acquiring territory?
- A I am certain of that.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Fred Suzukawa, 0-2034605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 496 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred J. Suzukawa Lt. JAFUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

and _____, _____, _____
indicated in the preceding pages
certify that on the _____ days of _____, 1946, personally
appeared before me (we) (Marquis) Koichi Kido
and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, interpreter,
gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth
therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

[Signature]

Date

