

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco

Place: Tokyo
Date: 5 November, 1945

INTERROGATION NO. 268

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: Japanese Army Military Supply Service; Evacuation of Casualties; Hospitalization.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each.

- a. Lt General K. WATANABE - Medical Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry
- b. Major G. AKIZUKI - " " "
- c. Major T. MATZUNAGA * " " "

Where Interviewed: Room 238, Meiji Bldg, Tokyo.

Interrogator: Captain Walter M. Drozd

Interpreter: Mr. N. YOKUKAWA

Allied Officers Present: None

was

Note: This ~~is~~ the second interrogation of the above listed personnel. At the first interrogation a list of prepared questions had been given to Lt. General WATANABE with instructions to prepare written answers. ~~to~~ These answers were delivered to Captain Walter M. Drozd on 5 November 1945.

The compiled documents contain the following material.

- a. Chart and discussion of the Japanese Army System for evacuating casualties from the front lines to hospital in Japan proper.
- b. Statistics of the number wounded and sick in overseas areas - number evacuated to Japan proper - major diseases encountered in different areas of operation - a number and percentage breakdown of the causes for combat (wounded) casualties.-
- c. Difficulties encountered in executing the evacuation of casualties.
- d. System of determining medical supply requirements. Depot supply system. System of medical supply distribution.
- e. Comments on the efficiency in the operation of the overall medical supply and evacuation services.

In addition the following summary is a compilation of the answers received on different ~~topics~~ ~~aspects~~ the different aspects of medical services ~~aspects~~ discussed at the interrogation.

2. Distribution of produced medical supplies for the period 1943-45 was as follows:

Of the total Army, Navy, and Civilian requirements for 1943 ~~the~~ a joint consultation of the Army Department, the Welfare Ministry, and the material mobilization section of the Munitions ~~Ministry~~ Department approved production of only 80%. The factories however were capable of producing only 60% of the total requirement. Inability to produce the approved requirements was attributed to subsequent shortages of raw materials and fuel.

Of the 60% produced -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 50% |
| Navy " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 60% |

In 1944 desired requirements were cut to 60%, and only 40% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 35% |
| Navy " | 15% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

In 1945 desired requirements were cut to 40%, and only 10% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Army received | 40% |
| Navy the " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

1. Factories producing medical supplies and equipment were said to have been bombed for the first time in May 1945. The following is a list of the factories bombed and the percentage destroyed.

2. Distribution of produced medical supplies for the period 1943-45 was as follows:

Of the total Army, Navy, and Civilian requirements for 1943 ~~the~~ a joint consultation of the Army Department, the Welfare Ministry, and the material mobilization section of the Munitions ~~Ministry~~ Department approved production of only 80%. The factories however were capable of producing only 60% of the total requirement. Inability to produce the approved requirements was attributed to subsequent shortages of raw materials and fuel.

Of the 60% produced -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 30% |
| Navy " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 60% |

In 1944 desired requirements were cut to 60%, and only 40% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 35% |
| Navy " | 15% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

In 1945 desired requirements were cut to 40%, and only 10% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Army received | 40% |
| Navy the " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

3. Destruction of medical supplies in Japan proper through aerial bombardment was estimated at approximately 2% of total stockpiles. In the Tokyo area depot 5000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. In the Osaka area depots 15,000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. (A standard medical supply box contains approximately 60 pounds of medical supplies.)

4. Casualty statistics resulting from aerial bombardment of Japan proper were given as follows.

Military personnel - (since March 1945)
Killed - 2,100
Wounded - 3,400
Total 5,500

This total does not include the bombing of Hiroshima where approximately 20,000 army casualties were estimated. Of these 20,000, 10,000 were said to have been killed; the other 10,000 were wounded. No figures were available on the bombing of Nagasaki.

Civilian casualties (from Dec. 1941 - Aug. 1945)
Killed - 260,000
Wounded - 420,000

This total of 680,000 casualties includes the casualties sustained in the bombing of Hiroshima. Nagasaki is not included.

5. Hospitalization in Japan proper encountered difficulties. It was indicated that numerous hospitals were bombed in urban areas. The limited hospital facilities were supplemented by employing available schools, temples, etc., however the facilities were very inadequate.

6. Military authorities planned in 1945 to remove certain of their hospitals into rural areas. This plan was 80% completed. Civilian hospitals on the other hand were not removed even though such a plan was completed, due to difficulties of transport and shortages of equipment.

7. Hospitalization of casualties caused by bombings was directed to either civilian or army institutions. There was, however no direct cooperation between civilian and army institutions. In June, 1945, Lt General Kanibayashi, Chief, Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and Chief of the Medical Directorate of the Inspectorate General of the Lines of Communications, inaugurated a plan for the mutual support of ~~the~~ both army and civilian medical services. This plan made army hospitals primarily responsible for service to casualties whether military or civilian when injury was incurred in front line areas. The remainder of the people were the responsibility of the civilian hospitals. This plan was never put into operation.

8. It was indicated that the plan composed for the defense of Japan proper required ~~an~~ stockpiles of medical supplies adequate for three to four months of combat operations. ~~xxxxxx, xxxxxxxx, xxxxxx~~
~~xxxxxx, xxxxxx~~ This reserve was to be stored in the District Army Depots. An additional reserve of 3 to 4 months was to be stored in the depots of the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters.

Hospitalization of civilians vs. Army. - priority -
treatment
facilities
attempt to increase facilities

War War Ministry concerned with difficulties. What
measures taken to overcome - Availability of physicians,
nurses, etc - Did change occur from military
priority to civilian priority. - Civilian complaints

Killed in homeland -

Reasons for dead in overseas theatres.

Netherlands Indies - specifically -

Philippines,

Oki

Iwo

Burma

China

Japan

etc.

Open cities - open zones. -

- Civilian & Army drain on supplies -

Factories bombed - Shortage of coal & fuel & shipping.

Evacuation

How - at night etc.

Effect on .

1. When evac was not possible what action was taken with casualties?

Computation of requirements.

How much longer could war continue

Requirements -

Requirements

Feb. 1945 - No more supply shipments.

Program was only a manner of distribution of available supplies. - started in April.

Factories in Tokyo & Osaka bombed May 1945 - in the first time.

Sankyo factory - 40% destroyed - Shinagawa Tokyo
produces Vitamins and Diastase.

Koujo-Tokyo

Chiota factory 100% - Med instruments. -

Shionogi - factory - factory OK:

Amagasaki

its depot ^{Raw Materials} completely destroyed.

Niogo-ken
Osaka area

Tanabe⁽²⁾ factories - Osaka - 2/3 destroyed. other
Medicines - drugs. completely destroyed

Fujisawa - factory - medicines drug Osaka,
Raw Materials depot completely destroyed
factory O.K.

[Kokumin Giyū Tai
nation unit

of difficulties in transport and equip-
ment setting up facilities.

Many hospital patients were recuperating
patients that were transferred. □ □

Did not work together but casualties
caused by bombing were entered
into either hospital.

- Plan for coordinated action for invasion

Army Hosp & Civ hosp - were to have same
function - ~~starting~~ ^{plan originated in} June 1945

- Plan - 16-60 - men - 16-45 women -

(Civ volunteers to enter civ hospitals)
people at front ~~to~~ with soldiers entered
army hospitals.

Japan divided into 8 district Army
Every district Army ~~had~~ had,

Reserve for Invasion ←

3 to 4 month reserve for soldier casualties
— for sick soldiers — 3 month supply —

Imperial Japanese General HQ had
reserve of — which would supply
lost Army 3-4 — of those wounded
and 3 month supply for those sick,

— total 6 month supply.

Civilians had less than Army & Navy but
both A & N ready to treat civilians.

Inspectorate Gen Line of Communications
responsible for carrying out plan.
— however War Ministry together
with his Gen of T of C worked it out.
Gen Kambayashi headed this
plan of defensive aid supply.

Difficulties in Hospitalization.

Hospitals were bombed —

Osaka

Nagoya

Tokyo.

Almost all hospitals in ~~the~~ town
bombed destroyed.

— Schools, Temples etc were set up
as hospitals. — etc

Not adequate room for casualties
in prefectures & other hospitals. —

— They now need supplies &
equipment.

Military ~~Hospital~~ Authorities tried to remove
its own hospitals into hills, — 80%
of Army hospitals planned for movement
were moved. — No civil hospitals
removed to hills — There were
plans but not carried out, because

(93)
30/2204

Tokyo Depot in Shibuya - destroyed - 5000 boxes. - med supplies
for 100 men in each box — (30-40 hits — 66-88%)
30/2204

Osaka Depot — 15,000 boxes — destroyed. —

Hospitalization.

Since March 1945 — wounded by bombing — 3,400
— military personnel. (Army) —
Dead by bombing — 2,100
total 5,500

This is not complete — in that it is only an approximation
of total wounded etc personnel — Reports from
areas not forthcoming for communications base
Hiroshima and Nagasaki not included.
20,000 at Hiro - three 1/2 dead or wounded.

1941 — Aug 15 — 1945

Analysis
Since 1941 — dead — 260,000
wounded — 420,000 } Hiroshima
included.

Dai Nippon Drugs mfg. - - Osaka -
1/2 of factory destroyed.

Tokashimaya Ind. Co. Ltd. Tokyo -
1/2 destroyed - bags & boxes
for medical use.

SHIMAZU - Mfg Co - Kyoto - X Ray

Shibaura - Elec Co - Shinagawa Tokyo - X Ray -
← completely destroyed

2 cos producing glassware for med use.
destroyed. 100% - all in Tokyo.

Actual shortage of raw materials started in
July 1944.

1943 - 100% req. from ~~planned~~ A.N.C.
80% after War Ministry levels

~~60% is all factories could supply.~~

100%
of required prod - 100% - 60% was produced
by factories. 30% for Army - 10% Navy - 60% for Civ.
Decrease of 20% decrease in prod was subsequent
unability for get the planned raw materials
to factories.

1944 - Submitted Plan 100%
 - ~~Approved Plan~~ - 60%
 Production 40% = 100%

→ War Plan
 Low Min
 Nat'l Well. Products
 final computing

Army got - 35% ←
 Navy got - 15% =
 Civ & 50% =

1945 - Submitted plan - 100%
 Approved plan - 40%
 Production 10%

Army - 40%
 Navy 10%
 Civ 50%

include shortage of
 raw materials
 shortage of coal
 & bombed factories

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 259

PLACE: Tokyo.
DATE: 5 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: JAPANESE ARMY MILITARY SUPPLY SERVICE; EVACUATION OF
CASUALTIES; HOSPITALIZATION.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each:

- a. Lt. General K. WATANABE - Medical Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry.
- b. Major G. AKIZUKI - " -
- c. Major Y. MATZUNAGA - " -

Where interviewed: Room 238, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo.

Interrogator: Captain Walter M. DROZD.

Interpreter: Mr. N. YOKUKAWA

Allied Officers Present: None.

Note: This was the second interrogation of the above listed personnel. At the first meeting a list of prepared questions had been given to Lt. General WATANABE with instructions to prepare written answers. These answers were delivered to Captain Walter M. Drozd on 5th November 1945 and include the following data.

- a. Chart and discussion of the Japanese Army system for evacuating casualties from the front lines to hospitals in Japan proper.
- b. Statistics of the number wounded and sick in overseas areas - number evacuated to Japan proper - major diseases encountered in different areas of operation - a number and percentage breakdown of the causes for combat (wounded) casualties.
- c. Difficulties encountered in executing the evacuation of casualties.
- d. System of determining medical supply requirements. Depot supply system. System of medical supply distribution.
- e. Comments on the efficiency in the operation of the overall medical supply and evacuation services.

In addition the following summary covers the several aspects of the medical services discussed at the interrogation.

1. Factories producing medical supplies and equipment were said to have been bombed for the first time in May 1945. The following is a list of the factories bombed and the percentage destroyed.

- a. Sankyo factory - located in Shinagawa, Tokyo area - produces Vitamins and Diastase - 40% destroyed.

- b. Chioda factory - located in Honjo, Tokyo area - produced medical instruments - 100% destroyed.
- c. Shionogi factory and raw material depot - located at Amagasaki - Hiojo-ken in the Osaka Area - raw materials depot - 100% destroyed.
- d. Tanabe factories - (2) both produced medicines and drugs - located in the Osaka area - one factory 100% destroyed - other factory 68% destroyed.
- e. Fujisawa factory - located in the Osaka area - produced medicines and drugs - factory intact, however, its raw materials depot adjacent to factory 100% destroyed.
- f. Dai Nippon Drug Co. - located in the Osaka area, produced medicines and drugs - 50% destroyed.
- g. Takashimaya Independent Co., Ltd. - located in the Tokyo area produced bags and boxes for medical supplies - 50% destroyed.
- h. Szimazu Mfg. Co. - located at Kyoto - produced X-ray equipment - no report as to destruction.
- i. Shibauro Electric Co. - located at ~~Epinagawa~~ Tokyo, produced X-ray machines - 100% destroyed.
- j. Two factories producing glassware for medical use - both located in Tokyo area - 100% destroyed.

2. Distribution of produced medical supplies for the period 1943-45 was as follows:

Of the total Army, Navy, and Civilian requirements for 1943, a joint consultation of the Army Department, the Welfare Ministry, and the material mobilization section of the Munitions Department approved production of only 80%. The factories, however, were capable of producing only 60% of the total requirements. Inability to produce the approved requirements was attributed to shortages of raw materials and fuel which developed after requirements were approved.

Of the 60% produced -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 30% |
| Navy " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 60% |

In 1944 planned requirements were cut to 60%, and only 40% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 35% |
| Navy " | 15% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

In 1945 planned requirements were cut to 40%, and only 10% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 40% |
| Navy " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

3. Destruction of medical supplies in Japan proper through aerial bombardment was estimated at approximately 2% of total stockpiles. In the Tokyo area depot 5000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. In the Osaka area depots 15,000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. (A standard medical supply box weighs approximately 30 kilograms).

4. Casualty statistics resulting from aerial bombardment of Japan proper were given as follows:

Military personnel - (since March 1945)

| | | | |
|---------|---|-------|-------------|
| Killed | - | 2,100 | |
| Wounded | - | 3,400 | Total 5,500 |

This total does not include the bombing of Hiroshima where approximately 20,000 army casualties were estimated. Of these 20,000, 10,000 were said to have been killed; the other 10,000 were wounded. No military casualty figures were available on the bombing of Nagasaki.

Civilian casualties (from Dec. 1941 - Aug. 1945)

| | | |
|---------|---|---------|
| Killed | - | 260,000 |
| Wounded | - | 420,000 |

This total of 680,000 casualties includes the casualties sustained in the bombing of Hiroshima. (Nagasaki casualties are not included).

5. Hospitalization in Japan proper encountered difficulties. It was indicated that numerous hospitals were bombed in urban areas. The limited hospital facilities were supplemented by utilizing available schools, temples, etc., however, the facilities were very inadequate.

6. Military authorities planned in 1945 to remove certain of their hospitals into rural areas. This plan was 80% completed. Civilian hospitals on the other hand were not removed even though such a plan was prepared. This was due to the difficulties of transport and shortages of equipment.

7. Casualties caused by bombings ~~was~~ ^{were} directed to either civilian or army institutions. There was, however no direct cooperation between civilian and army hospitals. In June, 1945, Lt. General Kamibayashi, Chief, Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and Chief of the Medical Department of the Inspectorate General of the Lines of Communication, inaugurated a plan for the mutual support of both army and civilian medical services. This plan made army hospitals primarily responsible for service to casualties whether military or civilian when injury was incurred in front line areas. The remainder of the people were the responsibility of the civilian hospitals. This plan was never put into operation.

8. It was indicated that plan for the defense of Japan proper required stockpiles of medical supplies adequate for three to four months of combat operations. This reserve was to be stored in the District Army Depots. An additional reserve of 3 to 4 months was to be stored in the depots of the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco

Place: Tokyo
Date: 5 November, 1945

INTERROGATION NO. 259-

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: Japanese Army Military Supply Service; Evacuation of Casualties; Hospitalization.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each.

- a. Lt General K. WATANABE - Medical Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
- b. Major G. AKIZUKI - " " "
- c. Major T. MATZUNAGA * " " "

Where Interviewed: Room 238, Meiji Bldg, Tokyo.

Interrogator: Captain Walter M. Drozd

Interpreter: Mr. N. YOKUKAWA

Allied Officers Present: None

Note: This ^{was} ~~is~~ the second interrogation of the above listed personnel. At the first ^{meeting} ~~interrogation~~ a list of prepared questions had been given to Lt. General WATANABE with instructions to prepare written answers. ~~to~~ These answers were delivered to Captain Walter M. Drozd on 5 November 1945 *and include the following data*.
~~The compiled documents contain the following material.~~

- a. Chart and discussion of the Japanese Army system for evacuating casualties from the front lines to hospitals in Japan proper.
- b. Statistics ~~of~~ the number wounded and sick in overseas areas - number evacuated to Japan proper - major diseases encountered in different areas of operation - a number and percentage breakdown of the causes for combat (wounded) casualties.
- c. Difficulties encountered in executing the evacuation of casualties.
- d. System of determining medical supply requirements. Depot supply system. System of medical supply distribution.
- e. Comments on the efficiency in the operation of the overall medical supply and evacuation services..

In addition the following summary ^{covers the several} ~~is a compilation of the~~ answers received on different ~~topics~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ aspects of ^{the} medical services ~~XXXXXX~~ discussed at the interrogation.

1. Factories producing medical supplies and equipment were said to have been bombed for the first time in May 1945. The following is a list of the factories bombed and the percentage destroyed.

- a. Sankyo factory - located in Shinagawa, Tokyo area - produces Vitamins and Diastase - 40% destroyed.
- b. Chioda factory - located in Honjo, Tokyo area - produced medical instruments - 100% destroyed.
- c. Shionogi factory and raw material depot - located at Amagasaki - Hiojo-ken in the Osaka Area - raw materials depot 100% destroyed.
- d. Tanabe factories - (2) both produced medicines and drugs - located in the Osaka area - one factory 100% destroyed - other factory 66% destroyed.
- e. Fujisawa factory - located in the Osaka area - produced medicines and drugs - ~~50% destroyed~~ factory in tact, however its raw materials depot adjacent to factory 100% destroyed.
- ~~x~~Nippon Drug Co.
- f. Dai Nippon Drug Co. - located in the Osaka area, produced medicines and drugs - 50% destroyed.
- g. Takashimaja Independent Co Ltd. - located in the Tokyo area produced bags and boxes for medical supplies - 50% destroyed.
- f. Szimazu Mfg Co - located at Kyoto - produced X-ray equipment - no report as to destruction.
- g. Shibuara Elec Co. - located at Shinagawa - Tokyo, produced X-ray machines - 100% destroyed.
- h. Two factories producing glassware for medical use - both located in Tokyo area - 100% destroyed.

2. Distribution of produced medical supplies for the period 1943-45 was as follows:

Of the total Army, Navy, and Civilian requirements for 1943, ~~the~~ a joint consultation of the Army Department, the Welfare Ministry, and the material mobilization section of the Munitions ~~Ministry~~ Department approved production of only 80%. The factories however were capable of producing only 60% of the total requirement. Inability to produce the approved requirements was attributed to ~~subsequent~~ shortages of raw materials and fuel ~~which developed subsequent to the~~ *requirements were approved.* ~~the~~ *after*

Of the 60% produced -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 30% |
| Navy " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 60% |

In 1944 ~~desired~~ *planned* requirements were cut to 60%, and only 40% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Army received | 35% |
| Navy " | 15% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

In 1945 ~~desired~~ *planned* requirements were cut to 40%, and only 10% was produced. Of this production -

| | |
|-----------------------|-----|
| Army received | 40% |
| Navy the " | 10% |
| Civ. " | 50% |

3. Destruction of medical supplies in Japan proper through aerial bombardment was estimated at approximately 2% of total stockpiles. In the Tokyo area depot 5000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. In the Osaka area depots 15,000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. (A standard medical supply box ~~contains approximately 60 pounds of medical supplies.~~ weighs approx 30 kilograms.)

4. Casualty statistics resulting from aerial bombardment of Japan proper were given as follows.

Military personnel - (since March 1945)

Killed - 2,100

Wounded - 3,400

Total 5,500

This total does not include the bombing of Hiroshima where approximately 20,000 army casualties were estimated. Of these 20,000, 10,000 were said to have been killed; the other 10,000 were wounded. No ^{military casualties} figures were available on the bombing of Nagasaki.

Civilian casualties (from Dec., 1941 - Aug. 1945)

Killed - 260,000

Wounded - 420,000

~~to~~ This total of 680,000 casualties includes the casualties sustained in the bombing of Hiroshima. (Nagasaki ^{casualties are} not included.)

5. Hospitalization in Japan proper encountered difficulties. It was indicated that numerous hospitals were bombed in urban areas. The limited hospital facilities were supplemented by ~~employing~~ ^{utilizing} available schools, temples, etc., however the facilities were very inadequate.

6. Military authorities planned in 1945 to remove certain of their hospitals into rural areas. This plan was 80% completed. Civilian hospitals on the other hand were not removed even though such a plan was ~~completed~~ ^{not completed}, due to ^{the} difficulties of transport and shortages of equipment. *This was*

7. ~~Hospitalization~~ of Casualties caused by bombings was directed to either civilian or army institutions. There was, however no direct cooperation between civilian and army institutions. In June, 1945, Lt General Kamibayashi, Chief, Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and Chief of the Medical ^{Department} Directorate of the Inspectorate General of the Lines of Communications, inaugurated a plan for the mutual support of ~~the~~ both army and civilian medical services. This plan made army hospitals primarily responsible for service to casualties whether military or civilian when injury was incurred in front line areas. The remainder of the people were the responsibility of the civilian hospitals. This plan was never put into operation.

8. It was indicated that ~~the~~ plan ~~conceived~~ for the defense of Japan proper required ~~the~~ stockpiles of medical supplies adequate for three to four months of combat operations. ~~Additional~~ ~~reserves~~ ~~of~~ ~~medical~~ ~~supplies~~ This reserve was to be stored in the District Army Depots. An additional reserve of 3 to 4 months was to be stored in the depots of the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters.