

SECRET

1st Mar Div

7 24 67

HEADQUARTERS
7th Communication Battalion
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

SER: 00-37-67

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, First Marine Division
Subj: Command Chronology for period 1 March to 31 March 1967

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) FMFPacO 5750.8
(c) DivO 5750.2B

Encl: (1) 7th Communication Battalion Command Chronology

1. In accordance with the provisions of references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

W. M. Clelland
W. M. CLELLAND

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF
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0037-67
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7th COMMUNICATIONS BN

MAR 1967

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
7th Communication Battalion
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602


COMMAND CHRONOLOGY

1 March to 31 March 1967

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- PART II - NARRATIVE SUMMARY
- PART III - SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
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ENCLOSURE (1)



PART I
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. DESIGNATION

7th Communication Battalion

COMMANDER

LtCol W. M. CIELLAND
1-31 March 1967

SUBORDINATE UNITS

Headquarters Company

Captain G. M. MIZER
1-31 March 1967

Communication Company

Major D. G. BISHOP
1-31 March 1967

Radio Relay and Construction Company

Major J. W. HENRY JR.
1-31 March 1967

Communication Support Company

Captain T. C. TERRELL
1-31 March 1967

2. LOCATION

1-31 March:

Headquarters, 7th Communication Battalion
Headquarters Company
Communication Company
Radio Relay and Construction Company
Communication Support Company

CHU LAI, RVN
CHU LAI, RVN
CHU LAI, RVN
CHU LAI, RVN
DANANG, RVN



3. STAFF OFFICERS

Executive Officer

Major E. A. HUERLIMANN JR.
1-31 March 1967

Adjutant/S-1

2ndLt R. L. DANIELS
1-31 March 1967

S-3

Major J. T. HOPKINS JR.
1-31 March 1967

S-4

Major A. E. JENSEN
1-5 March 1967
Captain G. M. MIZER
6-31 March 1967

S-5

Major J. W. HENRY JR.
1-31 March 1967

4. AVERAGE MONTHLY STRENGTH

<u>OFF</u>	<u>USMC</u>		<u>USN</u>	
	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>
28	700	1	11	

PART II
NARRATIVE SUMMARY

The 7th Communication Battalion had many significant commitments during the month of March. Radio, radio relay, and radar beacon support continued to be provided to the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines for Operation DESOTO. Additional support was provided to Operation DESOTO by providing radio operators to be utilized with Forward Air Control teams. A radio relay system was established between Task Force XRay and 5th Marines (Forward) and radio teams embarked on Swift Boats in support of Operation BOONE.

The battalion remained heavily committed in March providing communications for Task Force XRay and continued communications support to the 1st MarDiv, 3rd MarDiv, III MAF, 1st MAW, Chu Lai Defense Command and 2nd Republic of Korea Marine Brigade. In addition, the Construction Platoon has proceeded in its efforts for the expansion and rehabilitation of the Chu Lai Cable System. Installation of the Telephone Central Manual, AN/MTC-9, by Communication Company; in conjunction with the improvement of the cable system has resulted in greatly improved telephone service in the Chu Lai area.

The battalion Savings Bond program has been very gratifying with 88 percent of the battalion participating. Also, over \$650.00 dollars has been contributed to the 1st Marine Division Association Scholarship Fund.

The efforts of the battalion in the area of Civic Action are progressing well. A new dispensary in XUAN TRUNG was completed and dedicated. Large quantities of vegetable seeds were distributed to farmers in the hamlets and some hybrid Guatemalan Corn seed was planted in AN TAY (1) as an experiment. The enthusiasm of the people for these Civic Action programs and their friendliness toward Marines has increased during this month.

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PART III
SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION

8 March 1967 Promoted 50 personnel to Lance Corporal and Corporal.
 Ref: MCO 1418.9E and AC/S G-1 memo of 3 March 67

9 March 1967 Submitted special report on personnel recommended for promotion to SSgt and reclassification.
 Ref: CMC msg ~~020909Z~~ Mar67 and CG 1st MarDiv msg ~~050637Z~~ Mar67

15 March 1967 Submitted Report of Personnel on 2nd Tour in RVN.
 Ref: CG 1st MarDiv msg 12~~0721Z~~ Mar67

17 March 1967 Submitted Special Report of Comm-Elec Personnel to 1st MarDiv CEO's Office.
 Ref: Telecon w/1st MarDiv CEO's Office of 16 March 67

20 March 1967 Promoted 24 Corporals to Sergeant.
 Ref: MCBul 1430 of 20 March 67

22 March 1967 CONGRINT answered re: Hardship Discharge, case of SSgt G. H. SIDDALL 1948611 USMC.
 Ref: CMC msg 172~~041Z~~ Mar67 (NOTAL) and CG 1st MarDiv msg 19~~0821Z~~ Mar67 and CO, Radio Relay & Construction Company ltr 6/JWH/dch over 191~~0~~ of 22 March 67

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24 through 27 March 1967

An exchange of personnel was made between this organization and 11th Motor Transport Battalion. MOS's involved 3516 and 3537. Exchange was made based on RTD's and in connection with Division mixmaster program.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv ltr 7/EJM/pci over 1300 of 12 March 67

26 March 1967

Adjutant attended tax information program held at Task Force X-Ray Legal Office.

Ref: CLICO msg 090814Z Mar67

30 March 1967

Promoted 8 PFC's to LCPL.

Ref: Telecon w/G-1 1st MarDiv of 29 March 67

31 March 1967

Personnel shortages and overages within the Battalion as of 31 March 67 are reflected in TAB A, enclosure (1).

Submitted semi-monthly Savings Bond/Savings Deposit Report. Battalion Savings Bond percentage: 88%. Savings Deposit participation: 6 Officers, 16 Enlisted.

Ref: DivO 3500.1E

2. TRAINING

3-4 March 1967

Sixty (60) enlisted attended NCO class on Fundamentals of Leadership given by the Battalion Commander.

Ref: BnMemo 3/FRL/frl over 1500 dtd 16 February 67

4 March 1967

Ten (10) enlisted attended Land Mine and Booby Trap School at 1st Engr. Bn.

Ref: CG TFXRay msg 100833Z Feb67

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5, 12, 26 March 1967

Forty-two (42) enlisted attended Orientation Lecture and Tour conducted by Bn S-3.

Ref: a. DivO 1306.13B
b. CG 1st MarDiv 240637Z Feb67
(TAB B, enclosure (1))

6 through 27 March 1967

One (1) enlisted attended Comm Center School conducted at Camp Hansen, Okinawa.

Ref: Telecon Isherwood 303 on 2 March 67

7 March 1967

Sixteen (16) enlisted enrolled in Administration School conducted by Bn Admin Chief. Classes conducted twice weekly from 1830 to 1945. (Tuesdays and Thursdays)

Ref: BnMemo 3/WJH/wjh over 1320 dtd 18 February 67

10 March 1967

Seventeen (17) enlisted attended Driver Safety Lecture conducted by Bn Motor Transport Chief.

Ref: CLICO msg 080830Z Mar67

13 March 1967

Thirty (30) enlisted given NBC Evaluation Test.

Ref: BnMemo 3/FRL/frl over 1500 dtd 10 March 67

13 through 22 March 1967

One (1) officer attended Registered Publication Custodian School at Yokuska, Japan.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv msg 160132Z Feb67

15 March 1967

Thirty-one (31) personnel fam-fired the M-14 to zeroize weapons and fix battle sights.

Ref: CG III MAF msg 171506Z Feb67

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20 March 1967
Switchboard Operation Improvement Training Schedule submitted for the month of April.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv msg 110521Z Dec66 (TAB C, enclosure (1))

20 through 27 March 1967
One (1) enlisted man attended MJMS School on Okinawa.
Ref: CG III MAF msg 290320Z Nov66

22 March 1967
Thirty (30) enlisted attended special guard school on M-26A1 grenades. Conducted by the Sergeant of the Guard.
Ref: BnO 1601.1B

23,24 March 1967
Thirteen (13) enlisted attended class on 2nd Echelon Maintenance of new FM radio equipment. Conducted by FLSG-B.
Ref: CG TFXRay msg 110122Z Mar67

23 March 1967
Nineteen (19) enlisted attended NBC School (Monitor/Survey and Decontamination) conducted by Bn NBC NCO.
Ref: BnMemo 3/FRL/frl over 1500 dtd 21 March 67

24 March 1967
Thirty (30) enlisted attended special guard school on Flare, M-127, conducted by Sergeant of the Guard.
Ref: BnO 1601.1B

27 March 1967
One (1) enlisted man attended Crypto Comm Security School at Yokuska, Japan.
Ref: CG 1st MarDiv msg 220923Z Feb67

27 March 1967
Bn S-3 conducted school for 23 members of Bn Guard on use of Metascope.

SECRET3. OPERATIONS

2 March 1967

LtCol Park, Comm-Elec Officer for the 2nd ROKMC BDE and 10 men arrived for tour of 7th Comm Bn, COC/FSCC, MDF, switchboard and Radio Relay Hill.

Ref: Telecon with LtCol Park on 1 March 67

3 March 1967

Capt Chung, Lt OH, and 6 men of 2nd ROKMC BDE arrived for same tour as mentioned above.

7 March 1967

Comm Spt Co established mobile radio station at USNH DaNang East for communication support of visiting LtGen Krulak.

Ref: 5th Comm Bn Operations assignment

10 March 1967

All preparations for installation of Telephone Central AN/MTC-9 which commenced on 6 February 67 were completed.

Letter submitted to CG, TFX on protection of Communication Facilities.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv msg 090855Z Mar67 (TAB D, enclosure (1))

11 March 1967

Provided 4 radio operators to 3rdBn, 7thMar to act as Forward Air Control team.

Ref: Telecon assistant CEO TFX on 11 March 67.

12 March 1967

Operational Phase I of AN/MTC-9 was completed. Devote, Auditor, and Chu Lai switchboards phased out and newly installed AN/MTC-9 designated Chu Lai Switch.

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25 March 1967

Operational Phase II of AN/MTC-9 was completed. 7th Comm Bn switchboard phased out, and full service to 1st Hospital Co initiated.

28 March 1967

As of this date AN/MRC-62 circuit activated on 28 January 67 between TFX Chu Lai and 3rdBn, 7thMar at DUC PHO in continuous operation in support of Operation DESOTO.

Ref: 7th Marines Frag Order 1-67

29 March 1967

Capt Byrd from DCA arrived to discuss DCA Circuits. Discussed how expansion of cable system by replacing field wire with polyethelene cable is expected to improve service.

31 March 1967

Established Radio Relay System TFXRay and 5th Marines (Forward) for support of Operation BOONE to commence 1 April 67.

Ref: CG, TFX msg 310150Z Mar67

Provided 2 radio operators with AN/PRC-25 radios to Swift Boats for Operation BOONE.

Ref: Telecon assistant CEO TFXRay on 30 March 67

Construction Platoon performed tasks on expansion and rehabilitation of the Chu Lai Cable system. Completed 25 Work Orders, and 85 trouble calls during March.

4. PLANS

16 March 1967

Mr. Corporan (GS-12) USA First Signal Brigade arrived for futher conference detailed engineering to support the Dial Central Office.

Ref: Telecon Mr. Corporan on 15 March 67.

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26 March 1967

Embarkation planning data submitted to Task Force X-Ray.

Ref: CG TFX msg 241105Z Mar67

27 March 1967

Mr. Corporan departed Chu Lai area after rough sketches and plans for inside and outside plant of DCO completed.

29 March 1967

Major Sedgewich (USA) received information on Chu Lai Cable system, multichannel availability, and communications within COC/FSCC (Project Oregon).

Major Harris (USA) made liaison visit to check buildings available in the Bn Area. Also, interested in equipment that would stay in messhall (Project Oregon).

5. Inspections:

1 March 1967

Legal records and procedures inspected by Division Legal Inspection Team. Results satisfactory.

Ref: Div LegO ltr 17/WTW/djf over 1010 dtd 7 March 1967

8 March 1967

Technical Inspection of 7thCommBn Training Program conducted. Results satisfactory. The Battalion Orientation Program is considered excellent.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv ltr 3:TR;jgn over 1010 dtd 21 March 1967

Technical Inspection of 7thCommBn Ammunition Handling and record keeping conducted. Results satisfactory.

Ref: CG TFXRay ltr 8/AOB/jjc over 5041 dtd 11 March 1967

A Food Services Technical Inspection held on 7thCommBn. Overall rating is satisfactory with minor discrepancies.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv ltr 32/WWC/jdm over 5041 dtd 15 March 1967.

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10 March 1967

Civic Action Technical Inspection conducted. The results of the inspection are considered satisfactory.

Ref: CG 1st MarDiv ltr 32/WWC/jdm over 5041 dtd 25 March 1967

30 March 1967

Technical Inspection of mail facilities held by FMFRAC mail inspector. Verbal report indicated results as satisfactory with no discrepancies.

6. Logistics

12 March 1967

The AN/MTC-1 switchboard was shipped to the 3rd MarDiv. List of all outstanding requisitions and shortages were provided.

Ref: Telecon 1st MarDiv CEO on 9 March 1967

15 March 1967

TFXRay assigned 7thCommBn responsibility of performing second echelon maintenance on vehicles belonging to 7th CIT.

Ref: Telecon with TFX MTO on 13 March 1967

16 March 1967

Battalion Aid Station damaged by fire. Approximately \$4,750.00 will be required to repair damaged and replace equipment and medical supplies. BAS is operating efficiently at present time.

17 March 1967

Two (2) Radio Terminal Sets AN/MRC-62A's received.

22 March 1967

Four (4) milk dispensers installed in 7thCommBn Messhall. Fresh milk is served daily.

31 March 1967

During the month of March the 7thCommBn mess collected \$1148.00 in Com-rats.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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31 March 1967

A Special Allowance for Electronic Items, general supply items, and Motor Transport items submitted to CMC.

Ref: (a) DivO 4441.16B

(b) DivO 4441.14C

TAB E, Enclosure (1)

Logistic Summary Report for March submitted this date.

TAB F, Enclosure (1)

7. Civic Action

Conducted regular civic action program in assigned hamlets, consisting of Medcaps; Dentcaps; English language classes; education assistance; building guidance and assistance; road repair; distribution of soap and clothing; and medical house calls for the incapacitated. A total of 31 Medcaps and 2 Dentcaps were held, and a total of 603 people were treated. A new dispensary in XUAN TRUNG was completed and dedicated. A total of 205 student kits were distributed thru the hamlet schools. Large quantities of vegetable seeds were distributed to farmers in the hamlets and some hybrid Guatemalan corn seed was planted in AN TAY (†) as an experiment. Very gratifying assistance was offered by the people following a mortar attack on Chu Lai. The location of the mortar site and the impact areas were reported; recovery was made of identifying fragments; and location of some equipment and the storage facility used in the attack were provided. Base visits and ocean swimming were provided small groups of children on a weekly basis.

1 March 1967

Evacuated a boy for broken arm to be treated. Distributed 25 student kits in XUAN TRUNG. Distributed vegetable seeds in THANH LONG. (Daily Civic Action Activity Report of 2Mar67)

6 March 1967

XUAN TRUNG Official reported location of mortar attack site and provided information which led to recovery of mortar carrying bags and equipment at LONG BINH. Assistance in the locating of the impact areas and recovery and identification of mortar fragments was provided. (Daily Civic Action Activity Report of 7Mar67)

7 March 1967

Provided quantity of Guatemalan corn seed for experimental planting in AN TAY (†). (Daily Civic Action Activity Report of 8Mar67)

14 March 1967

Received a warm letter of thanks from family for saving life of woman in AN TAY (†). Woman had been given up as lost and a coffin had been started. (Daily Civic Action Activity Report of 15Mar67)

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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24 March 1967

Assisted sister of Village Chief dangerously ill from typhoid. Sister later recovered.
(Daily Civic Action Activity Reports of 25 and 26 March 1967)

25 March 1967

XUAN TRUNG Dispensary dedicated with appropriate ceremonies.
(Daily Civic Action Activity Report of 26Mar67)

30 March 1967

Total of 31 Medcaps and 2 Dentcaps held during March. Total of 603 people treated. (Medcap Team Activity Report for month of March 1967 of 30Mar67)

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SECRETPART IV
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- ✓ TAB A - Table of MOS by rank of M/L and O/H of personnel of 7thCommBn as of 31 March.
- ✓ TAB B - 7thCommBn Republic of Vietnam Orientation and Indoctrination Briefing
- ✓ TAB C - 7thCommBn Switchboard Operation Improvement Training Schedule dtd 20 March 1967
- ✓ TAB D - 7thCommBn ltr on Protection for Communication Facilities
- ✓ TAB E - 7thCommBn ltr on request for Special Allowance
- ✓ TAB F - 7thCommBn Logistic Summary Report dtd 31 March 1967
- ✓ TAB G - MEDCAP News Release in "SEA TIGER"

SECRET

7th Communications Bn. (Officers)

AUS	E-9		Capt/E-8		Col/E-7		LtCol/E-6		Maj/E-5		Capt/E-4		Maj/E-3		Maj/E-2/1		TOTAL	
	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H		
0130										1	0						1	1
0106																	1	0
2105											1	1					1	1
2501													0	3			0	3
2502					1		1		6	1	11	3	7	4			28	12
2805													1	3			6	5
2810													0	3			3	3
3002											1	0					1	0
3010																	0	1
3502											1	1					1	1
5910													0	2			0	3
TOTAL	1	1	7	1	17	5	9	16	8	4	12	30						

SECRET

SECRET

7th Communications Bn (Enlisted)

MOS	E-9		Gen/E-8		Col/E-7		Maj/E-6		Maj/E-5		Capt/E-4		1st/E-3		CWO WO/E-2/1		TOTAL
	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	M/L	O/H	
0122																	0
0111							1	2	4	2	1	6	6	2	2	2	11
0111																	0
0819					1	0	0	1		0	1						1
1111																	1
1169							0	1									0
1311																	0
1315																	0
1111																	3
2111																	2
2511			1	0	3	3	4	3	16	8	23	28	43	107	57	40	147
2529			2	1	1	1	2	0									5
2531									1	3	4	23	9	35	9	9	23
2532											25	11	26	34	9	15	60
2533									7	8	25	10	27	8	32	10	91
2539			1	1	2	1	2	1									5
2541											3	12	11	6	11	8	29
2543			1	1	2	1	4	2	4	3	5	9	10	31	10	9	36
2561			0	2	5	5	5	1	11	4							21
2811					1	1	2	3	2	0	2	0	2	0			9
2812							0	2	1	0	1	0					2
2813					0	4	1	1	1	1	3	0	2	0	3	0	10
2814					0	2	1	2	2	2	1	0					4

SECRET

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7th Communications Bn (Enlisted) Contd

AOS	E-9		Gen/Pl-8		Cpl/E-7		LsgCpl/E-6		Pvt/E-5		Capt/E-4		1st/E-3		CWO		TOTAL	
	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H	W/L	O/H		
2821																		
2822																		
2826																		
2831																		
2847																		
2861			1	2	0	2	4	2	20	22								
2862									2	5	1	0						
2863							1	0	1	1								
2867					0	0	1	0	0	1								
3041					1	0	1	1	1	3	3	3	2	7	3	2	11	16
3051									1	2	6	4	4	7	3	3	11	16
3371					1	1	1	0	2	2	3	3	1	7	2	2	13	15
3381					0	1											0	
3516			1	0	2	1	1	2	5	2	6	10	8	7	6	5	29	27
3531									3	5	8	15	12	23	33	9	56	52
5711									1	0	0	1	0	3			1	1
8101					1	1	2	1	3	2	5	3	0	3			11	10
9999	1	1	1	1													5	5
TOTAL	1	1	11	11	20	24	33	25	90	81	138	172	181	291	190	116	667	721

SECRETS-3

HEADQUARTERS
 7th Communication Battalion
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

Encl 1300
 B/JTH/wjh
 1 March 1967

BATTALION BULLETIN 1300

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Distribution List

Subj: Republic of Vietnam Orientation and Indoctrination

Ref: (a) DivO 1306.13B

Encl: (1) Outline of Orientation and Indoctrination Lecture on Vietnam
 (2) Orientation and Indoctrination Lecture
 (3) Handouts for each Marine
 (4) Listing of Reference Materials and Training Aids

1. Purpose. To provide a Republic of Vietnam Orientation and Indoctrination Program for 7th Communication Battalion.

2. General. Every Marine joining 7th Communication Battalion, officer and enlisted, will attend a Republic of Vietnam Orientation and Indoctrination briefing.

3. Discussion. It is my intent as Commanding Officer to personally welcome every new member to 7th Communication Battalion. Besides meeting each officer and SNCO individually upon his joining the battalion I desire to have a "Welcome Aboard" briefing for groups of 10 and 12 men whereby they can receive the information contained in this bulletin. This is not meant to supplant the Company Commanders Program, but to supplement it.

4. Action. Company Commanders submit to S-3 the names of all newly joined men to attend this briefing. Names to arrive at S-3 each Friday by 1600. The briefing will be held each Sunday at 1300; followed by a tour as outlined in enclosure (1).

5. Self-Cancellation. 1 December 1967.

W. M. Clelland
 W. M. CLELLAND

DISTRIBUTION: "A"

SECRETBnBul 1300
1 March 1967Orientation and Indoctrination on Vietnam

(OUTLINE)

- I. Welcome Aboard by Commanding Officer
- II. Briefing on Vietnam
 - a. History
 - b. Terrain in I Corps
 - c. Climate
 - d. Village
 - e. Marine Areas
- III. Conduct of Military Personnel
 - a. Black Market
 - b. Money Changing
- IV. Missions of 7th Communication Battalion
- V. Handouts for every Marine
- VI. Tour of Chu Lai Combat Base and Village
 - a. Walk from 7th Communication Battalion to hamlet of Xuan Trung. Hamlet is 300 meters from Battalion Area. See "House of Band Aid", 7th Communication Battalion MEDCAP Center.
 - b. Ride from Xuan Trung to Sam Hai and MAG-36 gate.
 - c. Ride to Swift Boat/Junk Fleet/Naval Support Facilities areas.
 - d. MAG-36 to TFX CP. Point out working areas.

EnBul 1300
1 March 1967

- e. Ride from TFX CP to Chu Lai Airfield.
- f. Chu Lai Airfield to USO. Stay USO 1 hour - 1½ hours. Coke, hotdogs, beach time.
- g. Return to 7th Communication Battalion.

Enclosure (1)

SECRETBnBul 1300
1 March 1967

VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to Vietnam and to 7th Communication Battalion. As you were traveling from CONUS most of you probably had many questions you wanted answered: Where is Vietnam? What is it like there? Why are Marines in South Vietnam? Why am I here?

To begin with, South Vietnam is located in Southeast Asia or what used to be French Indochina. It is bordered on the South and East by the China Sea, on the West by Laos and Cambodia and the North by Communist North Vietnam. South Vietnam is divided into four Military Corps Regions at present; Marine Corps interest is centered in I Corps. To possess a clearer understanding of the struggle in South Vietnam, we must look briefly into the history of the area.

Much of Vietnam's history is the story of its relations with China. The Vietnamese for many centuries have both admired China for her culture and feared her for her power. During the thousand years that the Vietnamese were ruled by China (second century BC to tenth century AD), they adopted much of the Chinese culture but were not absorbed into the Chinese race as were the people of the Canton area. Winning free of Chinese control in 1038 AD, the Vietnamese maintained their independence for the next 800 years with the knowledge that it was held more or less at the whim of China. Varying degrees of Chinese influence prevailed throughout these years.

BnBul 1330
1 March 1967

As trade was opened between the East and West the different European Powers of the time all sought a foothold in this country. Trade declined after 1700 and almost ceased. The only Europeans who remained in any numbers after 1700 were the Catholic missionaries.

Colonization of the country developed and toward the middle of the nineteenth century pressure was mounting in influential French Quarters for positive action to establish a position for France in Vietnam of the kind other European Powers enjoyed elsewhere in Asia. Thus began the French Military Conquest of Vietnam beginning with the capture of Tourane (DaNang) in 1858.

During the early 1920's a number of Nationalistic groups found inspiration in the Chinese Nationalist Movement. Of these, the best known and most important was the Vietnam Nationalist Party which adopted the methods and political program of the Chinese Nationalist Party, but it failed to create an effective organization within the country.

The leadership of the clandestine nationalist movement in Vietnam was taken over by the Indochina Communist Party. Formed in Hong Kong in 1930, it united several existing independent communist groups under the leadership of Nguyen Ai Quoc, later known as HO CHI MINH.

After the fall of France in 1940, the strategic control of Indochina was passed from the French to the Japanese while internal affairs remained with the French. This was done by an agreement struck between Japan and the Vichy Regime, a puppet government set up by the Nazi's to rule France during World War II.

Enclosure (2)

2

SECRETEnO 1306
1 March 1967

Ho Chi Minh offered to provide intelligence information from his sources in Vietnam on Japanese activities to the Allied Forces in exchange for money and arms. This offer was accepted and a small amount of aid was received from the U.S. and Nationalist China which was used to mold and strengthen the communist "Viet Minh" as it was now called. The Viet Minh also began waging limited guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. During this period increasing numbers of patriotic non-communists joined or at least supported the Viet Minh as the true independence movement of Vietnam.

When it became obvious in March of 1945 that they were losing the war, the Japanese interned all French officials and troops bringing an abrupt end to French rule in Indochina. At the instigation of the Japanese, the Emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai, (then in France) proclaimed Vietnamese independence under Japanese "Protection". Bao Dai felt that the only means of preventing the return of French control was a united and independent nation. Recognizing only the nationalistic character of the Viet Minh, he decided to abdicate in its favor and, on August 23, 1945, handed over his imperial seal and other symbols of office to Ho Chi Minh.

The French, however, had no intention of giving up Indochina and prevailed upon the allies to allow their reoccupation of the former colony. In late September, 1945, French troops landed in Saigon at about the same time Nationalist Chinese troops entered Vietnam from the North to disarm the Japanese.

BnBul 1300
1 March 1967

Vietnamese of every political persuasion rose up in defense of their newly won independence, but with British assistance, the French managed to gain control of all strategic points in the South. In the North, the Chinese were dealing directly with the provisional government which had been established by Ho Chi Minh in August of 1945. In February, 1946, a Franco-Chinese agreement was concluded whereby China supported France's return to Indochina in exchange for the surrender of all of France's extraterritorial rights in China. Faced with the loss of Chinese support, the Viet Minh were forced to negotiate with the French. In March, 1946, French troops landed in the North. Immediately differences developed between the French and Viet Minh Forces, as neither side was willing to submit to the other. Ho Chi Minh decided to risk a long war of liberation and on December 19, 1946, the Viet Minh launched the first attack. The war touched off by this attack lasted for eight years and caused the Vietnamese unending misery. It was financially disastrous to France, still suffering from the destruction of WW II and cost them 35,000 killed and 48,000 wounded. The battle of Dien Bien Phu, at which the French suffered a heavy defeat both psychologically and militarily, brought an end to the fighting.

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A military truce, agreed to on 21 July 1954 ended the war and partitioned Vietnam at the 17th parallel with the communist Viet Minh in the North and the non-communists in the South. In addition, an understanding supplementing the conference agreements provided for free elections in 1956 to re-establish the unity of the country.

Final negotiations for the armistice were made directly between the French High Command and the Viet Minh. The truce agreement was reached over the objection and without the concurrence of the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) which advocated United Nations control until such time as free elections could be held. The United States did not concur, but agreed to observe the substance of the agreement and stated that a grave view would be taken to any attempt to use force to upset it. France then proceeded to complete the transfer of the remnants of its administrative and military control to the State of Vietnam with its capitol at Saigon. The government of Ho Chi Minh transferred its capitol to Hanoi and moved steadily to achieve its program of communization North of the 17th parallel. Despite the Geneva Agreement, a well organized Viet Minh underground network remained in the South. This marked the transition period of the Viet Minh to the Viet Cong.

When the state of Vietnam, which had signed none of the Geneva Agreements, objected to holding elections for unifying North and South in which more than half of the population would go to the polls subject to communist coercion, Ho ordered guerrillas into action. Fighting began in late 1956 to persuade the people to oppose the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

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Viet Cong propaganda, terrorism and guerrilla activities increased in tempo throughout the late 50's, and by 1960, battalion size operations were being conducted. Any official worker or establishment that represented a service to the people by the government in Saigon became fair game for the VC. In 1964 alone, 436 South Vietnamese hamlet chiefs and other government officials were killed in bombings and other acts of sabotage, and at least 8,400 civilians were kidnapped by the VC.

Today the war in South Vietnam has reached new proportions with the outright participation of thousands of North Vietnamese regular troops as well as weapons and equipment provided by the communist bloc. The tiny Republic of Vietnam has been publicly singled out by communist leaders as the next to submit to them in their program of attempted world domination.

The United States has honored its commitments to support the Geneva Agreement and has aided the fledgling government of the Republic of South Vietnam in its struggle to establish peace. However, to the Peiping Leaders, a new dimension has been added to the conflict, that of proving the United States a "Paper Tiger". It was said in Peiping that the objective in South Vietnam is the capitulation of the United States. The United States is not going to capitulate and will continue to meet its commitment of assisting the government and people of South Vietnam in preserving their independence.

For this purpose, and this purpose alone, United States Marines were Landed on the shores of South Vietnam on 8 March 1965.

Enclosure (2)

SECRETBnBul 130C
1 March 1967TERRAIN IN I CORPS (CENTRAL VIETNAM)COAST:

The I Corps Area, as is all of South Vietnam, is bounded on the East by the South China Sea. No general statement can be made to typify this coastal region as it varies considerably from place to place. In some locations, high cliffs rise up from the edge of the ocean while at others, low, sandy beaches extend inland to the area known as the lowland. For example, in the Northern Coastal Region of I Corps, lagoons and tidal channels run parallel to the coast and are separated from the sea by a narrow sandy belt, while around the DaNang area, mountain spurs from the highlands extend out to the sea giving a considerable variation in terrain over a short distance of coastline.

In the flat areas along the coast, the beaches extend inland usually about 100-150 meters but can extend much further as is the case at Chu Lai where the soft sands reach inland some 4000 meters.

Fishing is the main source of income for the people living on the coast, but most families have their own rice paddy. Numerous fishtraps, some quite elaborate, will be found throughout the bays, rivers, lagoons and canals of the coastal and lowlands areas. These should not be harmed if at all possible. The income of most of these coastal people is comparatively higher than the people of the other regions. This fact, coupled with the need to have ports through which supplies from North Vietnam can be imported, makes the coastal area a desirable target for Viet Cong control.

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THE LOWLANDS:

The lowland region of I Corps is made up of a narrow coastal plain stretching the entire length of the Corps area and of several valleys extending into the central highland. The region is quite fertile. Although it encompasses only about one-sixth of the total area of I Corps virtually all of the crops are grown here. Rice is by far the principal crop encompassing about 90% of the cultivated land. The remaining 10% is devoted mainly to the raising of tea, sugar cane, coffee, fruit trees, bananas and pineapples. The lowland region also contains the bulk (Approximately 75%) of the I Corps population which is estimated at over 2,200,000. Control of the lowlands would give the Viet Cong guerrilla the rice needed to sustain himself as well as considerable manpower to be forced into service as replacements.

Besides the huge rice fields, sugar cane fields are in this area although not in such great numbers. When the cane is fully grown, it offers excellent concealment of which the Viet Cong have often taken advantage. From a few feet inside a cane field, one can have excellent observation to the outside but cannot be observed himself. This is made to order for snipers and should be held in mind by Marines when operating in these areas.

Highway No. 1 and a railroad traverse the length of I Corps through the lowlands area. Highway No. 1 is the major artery of Vietnam linking the North to the South and is capable of supporting military vehicles the year around. However, it has been subjected to Viet Cong interdiction in the past and may or may not be open at any given time.

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1 March 1967

The Lowlands region is the strategic key to the control of the I Corps. It is not large in comparison to the highland region, but it is agriculturally productive and contains the majority of the I Corps population. The individual riflemen can look to spending much time operating in this region.

THE PIEDMONT:

Piedmont is a term used to indicate the hilly terrain separating the jungle highlands from the lowlands. The piedmont is sparsely populated with the majority of the people living in the valleys between the hills. Most of the land in the hills is covered with a dense growth of trees that reach to a height of 150 to 200 feet and form a dense canopy. The villages in this region are typical of most Vietnamese villages and will be dealt with later. Virtually all parts of the valleys are devoted to rice cultivation.

THE JUNGLE HIGHLANDS:

This region, occupying about three-quarters of I Corps, consists of forested hills and mountains with deep, steep-sided valleys, rolling to hilly surfaces with grass and open forests, and numerous and sometimes marshy basins.

The population in this region is sparse, composed mainly of highlander tribesmen (Montagnards) living a simple life of hunting and slash and burn farming. Potatoes and sugar cane being the principal crops.

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THE CLIMATE

The weather in Southeast Asia has a strong influence on military operations there. Of the two monsoons, the Southwest has the greater effect on overall activity since it brings heavy rains to most of the country between May and September: one exception is the strip of land East of the Coastal Mountain Range in central Vietnam which remains dry. This particular strip of land includes I Corps.

The Northeast monsoon, which effects I Corps, begins in September and lasts through January. The average rainfall per month is extremely heavy from September through November and then tapers off during the months of December and January. For example, DaNang receives an average of 23 inches of rain each October and 15 inches each November. This period of heavy rainfall obviously effects all types of military operations, but the effect varies with the amount of mechanization of any given unit and its particular operating area. Motor transport and tracked vehicles will at times be limited to surfaced highways. There can be no mistaking that the heavy rains impose a handicap on movement of foot troops as well as mechanized forces, because they most certainly do, however, the foot soldier can and will continue to operate.

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The monsoon, in that it imposes the greatest restrictions, received the majority of the attention devoted to climate and weather in Southeast Asia. However, the remainder of the year also brings to bear another difficulty; intense heat. During the dry season temperatures reach up to 100 degrees F and temperatures up to 130 degrees F have been recorded in the sandy coastal region. For a foot soldier to move, carry equipment and fight in an atmosphere of such intense heat requires that he be in outstanding physical condition. In such a situation no substitute exists.

THE VILLAGE

Vietnamese villages are generally made up of several small hamlets located in close proximity to one another. The village will always be located along some access route such as a road, river or trail. Hedges surround each hamlet and in many cases, more hedges separate houses and gardens within the hamlet. The presence of the hedges severely limits the fields of observation, compounding the difficulty encountered in entering and searching a village.

MARINE AREAS

The Marine offensive effort is essentially based upon three locations in the I Corps area: Hue-Phu Bai, DaNang and Chu Lai. Each area has two things in common: an airstrip and rice paddies.

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PHU BAI

Phu Bai is located approximately 10 miles South of the old imperial capitol of Hue on Highway #1. The Marine base camp is located on the high ground overlooking the airstrip and is approximately 7 miles inland from the coast. The location of the camp affords excellent observation and fields of fire in all directions.

DANANG

The port city of DaNang, the largest city in I Corps area, is the home of the III Marine Amphibious Force. The DaNang airfield, located a short distance West of the city, is one of the world's busiest and is the site from which thousands of flights are launched each month in support of U.S. and RVN Operations. Marine Ground Units stretch out for miles to the North, West and South, providing protection against Viet Cong attacks.

CHU LAI:

The Southern-most of the three Marine Bases is unique in that only scattered villages existed in the area prior to the arrival of the Marines. Today, Chu Lai is a bustling complex, housing Marine Units of all types. The immediate area around the airfield is typified by the broad, sandy expanses that stretch up to five miles inland from the beach. However, areas adjacent to the beach under Marine control differ considerably.

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SECRETBnBul 1300
1 March 1967CONDUCT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

The meaning of our efforts here in the Republic of Vietnam does not rest in the number of square miles of terrain we occupy or in the number of Viet Cong or NVA who are killed. Our success can only be measured in the extent to which we can assure the Vietnamese people the freedom to choose and to establish the kind of government they wish and a peaceful community in which to cultivate their aspirations as a people. To accomplish these ends, we need the wholehearted cooperation of the Vietnamese citizenry. We cannot hope to gain such cooperation, unless our conduct toward them, as a people and as individuals, is such as to gain their trust and confidence. Our enemies seek to gain this cooperation through the diligent application of force and terror. Such methods are foreign to us and the American people, whom we represent here.

There have been indications that some of our men do not fully understand their legal and moral position in relation to the Vietnamese citizen. Admittedly, in a war such as this, it is not always easy to distinguish friend from foe and the distinction must be established at every encounter.

We have every right, morally and legally, to destroy the enemy unless he surrenders. We have no right to mistreat in any way, a noncombatant civilian or a prisoner of war. It is of the utmost importance that each of you understands this and realizes that for any mistreatment of non-combatant civilians, a Marine will be tried and punished in the same way as if he were to engage in the same conduct in his home town. Under the law the penalties for aggravated assault, rape, and murder are severe, extending to many years of imprisonment, dishonorable discharge, and even death.

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BLACK MARKET

A pack of cigarettes kills a Marine. Does a statement like this surprise you? Well it should. Whenever the term "Black Market" is used most of us think of items such as TV sets, radios, tape recorders and the items being moved clandestinely by a gang wearing face masks and stealing truck loads of equipment at one time. This is not the Black Market Operation that we are really concerned with. Our interest is how a "Pack of Cigarettes Kills a Marine".

Americans are noted for their generosity. In fact, we seem to shower gifts on all we come in contact with. Now suppose one Marine gives a Vietnamese citizen a pack of cigarettes. Harmless in its intent but lethal in the end result. This pack of cigarettes is worth from fifty cents to seventy-five cents on the Vietnamese market. Let us say that this pack of cigarettes is sold on the market in piasters. In this hamlet a VC or VCS lives and has a mission to perform. He keeps the VC tax collector informed of the money transactions that take place in this hamlet. In comes the tax collector and informs the person who sold the cigarettes that his tax on them comes to forty cents.

Now what is the cost of a bullet on the world market or Communist Bloc market? Forty cents is a good price to pay for a bullet. So now that pack of cigarettes has purchased a bullet for the VC.

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One of our buddies, a fellow Marine, is out on a Combat Patrol. That Marine has come to Vietnam to help bring peace to a country that has known war and bloodshed for many years. A shot is fired, a Marine falls and is dead. The newspapers will report a casualty. The Marine Corps will mourn him. An Epitaph which can be written, but won't be is that "A Pack of Cigarettes Kills a Marine". Was it your pack, was that Marine YOU?

MONEY CHANGING

As you come more and more into contact with the local populace you will develop friendships. This is a way of life that we can all look forward to. But, it can be abused very easily. Requests by a Vietnamese may be received by some of you to exchange MPC into Piasters. This is illegal and is punishable under UCMJ and Vietnamese Law.

Let us look a little closer into this type of transaction. You may be offered \$50.00 or \$75.00 dollars in MPC to change into Piasters. You will be told half of this money is for you. An easy way to make some money. But, what chain of events led to the Vietnamese having MPC in his possession? Did he get these MPC's from a Marine buying a footlocker or souvenir of Vietnam? Did some Marine use MPC's to purchase a coke, beer, whisky? Was this money the earnings of a prostitute? Or, perhaps the worse transaction of all. Did these MPC's come off the body of a dead Marine?

Smokey the Bear says "Only you can prevent Forest Fires". This statement holds so very true for what we want to accomplish in Vietnam. Only YOU, individually and collectively can prevent an illegal transaction.

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MISSIONS OF
7TH COMMUNICATION BATTALION

1. Install, operate and maintain communications for CG Task Force X-Ray to include:
 - (a) Torn-tape relay and Task Force X-Ray Communication Center
 - (b) Cable Systems, expansion and rehabilitation
 - (c) Telephone Exchange Augmentation
 - (d) Chu Lai Defense Command Communications
 - (e) Multi-channel radio back-up to the cable system for emergency service to 5th and 7th Marines and the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion
 - (f) Intercommunications Systems
2. Augment the 1st Marine Division as required to support Tactical Operations.
3. Operate and maintain AN/MRC-62 multi-channel circuits to 1st Marine Division Headquarters and ROKMC (KMB).
4. Provide message relay guard for 5th and 7th Marines, 1st FAG, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, FLSG-B, and 2nd ROKMC (KMB).
5. Establish system and technical control agencies and procedures to restore systems and to maintain circuit quality.
6. Operate as required AN/TSC-15 circuits with III MAF and 1st Marine Division Headquarters.
7. Maintain circuit interconnections between AN/TRC-90/TRC-24 site and Task Force X-Ray MDF.

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8. Coordinate Communication Matters of mutual interest with Division organizations as appropriate.
9. Provide Communications support to other commands.
 - a. Communication Support Company OPCON 5th Comm Bn in support of III MAF.
 - b. Radio Relay Detachment TAD 5th Comm Bn in support of III MAF.
 - c. Communication Center personnel augmentation for 1st MAW.
 - d. Communication Detachment in support of KMB.
 - e. Communication equipment and men to 3rd MarDiv for DONG HA and PHU BAI.
10. Provide over the counter message service for 17 units in the Chu Lai complex. They are: 1st Shore Party; "D" Company, 1st Medical Battalion; Detachment 1st Radio Battalion; 7th Communication Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; Detachment 1st Dental Company; 3/7(Rear); Sub-Unit #2:HqBn; MCB-8; MCB-4C; Chu Lai Defense Command; NSF Chu Lai; Coastal Division 12; Junk Fleet; 1st Hospital Company; "C" Company, 37th Signal Battalion (USA); Task Force Burgess (USA); and other agencies such as the American Red Cross. (As of 28 February 1967)
11. Perform other communication services as directed by this Headquarters.

END OF LECTURELEAVE FOR TOUR

SECRETEnBul 1300
1 March 1967**HANDOUTS FOR EACH MARINE****KEY PHRASES.**

<u>ENGLISH</u>	<u>VIETNAMESE</u>
Halt	Đứng lại
Lay down your gun	Buông súng xuống
Put up your hands	Đưa tay lên
Keep your hands on your head	Đưa tay lên đầu
I will search you	Tôi khám ông
Do not talk	Đừng nói chuyện
Walk there	Lại đây kia
Turn Right	Xây bên phải
Turn Left	Xây bên trái

"The courage and skill of our men in battle will be matched by their magnanimity when the battle ends. And all American military action in Vietnam will stop as soon as aggression by others is stopped."

21 August 1965

Lyndon B. Johnson

**THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS**

AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY FORCES, YOU WILL COMPLY WITH THE GENEVA PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTIONS OF 1949 TO WHICH YOUR COUNTRY ADHERES. UNDER THESE CONVENTIONS:

YOU CAN AND WILL

DISARM YOUR PRISONER
IMMEDIATELY SEARCH HIM THOROUGHLY
REQUIRE HIM TO BE SILENT
SEGREGATE HIM FROM OTHER PRISONERS
GUARD HIM CAREFULLY
TAKE HIM TO THE PLACE DESIGNATED BY YOUR COMMANDER

YOU CANNOT AND MUST NOT


MISTREAT YOUR PRISONER
HUMILIATE OR DEGRADE HIM
TAKE ANY OF HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE
REFUSE HIM MEDICAL TREATMENT IF REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE

ALWAYS TREAT YOUR PRISONER HUMANELY.**THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS****NINE RULES**

1. REMEMBER WE ARE GUESTS; WE MAKE NO DEMANDS AND SEEK NO SPECIAL TREATMENT.
2. JOIN WITH THE PEOPLE; UNDERSTAND THEIR LIFE, USE PHRASES FROM THEIR LANGUAGE AND HONOR THEIR CUSTOMS AND LAWS.
3. TREAT WOMEN WITH POLITENESS AND RESPECT.
4. MAKE PERSONAL FRIENDS AMONG THE SOLDIERS AND COMMON PEOPLE.
5. ALWAYS GIVE THE VIETNAMESE THE RIGHT OF WAY.
6. BE ALERT TO SECURITY AND READY TO REACT WITH YOUR MILITARY SKILL.
7. DON'T ATTRACT ATTENTION BY LOUD, RUDE OR UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR.
8. AVOID SEPARATING YOURSELF FROM THE PEOPLE BY A DISPLAY OF WEALTH OR PRIVILEGE.
9. ABOVE ALL ELSE YOU ARE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MILITARY FORCES ON A DIFFICULT MISSION, RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL YOUR OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL ACTIONS. REFLECT HONOR UPON YOURSELF AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

NINE RULES

BnBul 1300
1 March 1967



STANDING ORDERS, ROGERS RANGERS

READY REFERENCE FACTS ON
SOUTH VIETNAM

Enclosure (3)

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SECRETBnBul 1300.
1 March 1967**THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS****1. HANDLE HIM FIRMLY, PROMPTLY, BUT HUMANELY.**

The captive in your hands must be discerned, searched, secured and watched, but he must also be treated at all times as a human being. He must not be tortured, killed, mutilated, or degraded, even if he refuses to talk. If the captive is a woman, treat her with all respect due her sex.

2. TAKE THE CAPTIVE QUICKLY TO SECURITY

As soon as possible evacuate the captive to a place of safety and interrogation designated by your commander. Military documents taken from the captive are also sent to the interrogators, but the captive will keep his personal equipment except weapons.

3. MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. EVERY SOLDIER IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY IN HIS HANDS.

It is both dishonorable and foolish to mistreat a captive. It is also a punishable offense. Not even a beaten enemy will surrender if he knows his captors will torture or kill him. He will resist and make his capture more costly. Fair treatment of captives encourages the enemy to surrender.

4. TREAT THE SICK AND WOUNDED CAPTIVE AS BEST YOU CAN.

The captive saved may be an intelligence source. In any case he is a human being and must be treated like one. The soldier who ignores the sick and wounded degrades his uniform.

5. ALL PERSONS IN YOUR HANDS, WHETHER SUSPECTS, CIVILIANS, OR COMBAT CAPTIVES, MUST BE PROTECTED AGAINST VIOLENCE, INSULTS, CURIOSITY, AND REPRISALS OF ANY KIND.

Leave punishment to the courts and judges. The soldier shows his strength by his fairness, firmness, and humanity to the persons in his hands.

THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS**NINE RULES****FOR PERSONNEL OF
1ST MARINE DIVISION**

THE VIETNAMESE HAVE PAID A HEAVY PRICE IN SUFFERING FOR THEIR LONG FIGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. WE MILITARY MEN ARE IN VIETNAM NOW BECAUSE THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED US TO HELP ITS SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE IN WINNING THEIR STRUGGLE. THE VIET CONG WILL ATTEMPT TO TURN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AGAINST YOU. YOU CAN DEFEAT THEM AT EVERY TURN BY THE STRENGTH, UNDERSTANDING AND GENEROSITY YOU DISPLAY WITH THE PEOPLE. HERE ARE NINE SIMPLE RULES:

DISTRIBUTION: 1 to each member of the 1st MarDiv

NINE RULES

BnBul 1300
1 March 1967

Standing Orders, Rogers Rangers

CONTINUED

11. DON'T EVER MARCH HOME THE SAME WAY! TAKE A DIFFERENT ROUTE SO YOU WON'T BE AMBUSHED.
12. NO MATTER WHETHER WE TRAVEL IN BIG PARTIES OR LITTLE ONES, EACH PARTY HAS TO KEEP A SCOUT 20 YARDS AHEAD, TWENTY YARDS ON EACH FLANK AND TWENTY YARDS IN THE REAR, SO THE MAIN BODY CAN'T BE SURPRISED AND WIPED OUT.
13. EVERY NIGHT YOU'LL BE TOLD WHERE TO MEET IF SURROUNDED BY A SUPERIOR FORCE.
14. DON'T SIT DOWN TO EAT WITHOUT POSTING SENTINELS.
15. DON'T SLEEP BEYOND DAWN. DAWN'S WHEN THE FRENCH AND INDIANS ATTACK.
16. DON'T CROSS A RIVER BY A REGULAR FORD.
17. IF SOMEBODY'S TRAILING YOU, MAKE A CIRCLE, COME BACK ONTO YOUR OWN TRACKS, AND AMBUSH THE FOLKS THAT AIM TO AMBUSH YOU.
18. DON'T STAND UP WHEN THE ENEMY'S COMING AGAINST YOU. KNEEL DOWN, LIE DOWN, HIDE BEHIND A TREE.
19. LET THE ENEMY COME TILL HE'S ALMOST CLOSE ENOUGH TO TOUCH. THEN LET HIM HAVE IT. JUMP OUT AND FINISH HIM UP WITH YOUR HATCHET.

MAJ ROBERT ROGERS 1759

STANDING ORDERS, ROGERS RANGERS

READY REFERENCE FACTS ON
SOUTH VIETNAM

Enclosure (3)


Vietnam--Place and People

The Place:

- +++ Is in southeast corner of Asia, bounded by Laos, Cambodia, and South China Sea.
- +++ In shape, long and narrow. In size, about the same area as the state of Washington.
- +++ Geography: central highland comprises two-thirds of country, with chain of mountains, dense jungles, some open forests. Narrow coastal plain runs from northern tip almost to Saigon, is very level with numerous beaches, backed by a narrow piedmont of open hills. Delta, in south, takes 25 per cent of land mass, has more than 50 per cent of population. Yields immense rice crop. Has more than 3,500 miles of navigable rivers and canals.
- +++ Climate is tropical, monsoonal, with hot-dry, hot-wet seasons varying through country.

The People:

- ++++ Number about 15.5 million, .85 per cent being ethnic Vietnamese. About one million Chinese, half-million Cambodians, 800,000 Montagnards (mountain tribal groups) make up most of remainder. Eighty per cent of population are farmers. About half of people are concentrated in the area from just north of Saigon south through the delta.
- +++ Worship ancestors, venerate elders, hold family as keystone of society. They are quieter, less excitable than Westerners, place high value on harmony, good manners, tradition.
- +++ Are proud, valiant, have stood up bravely under communist harassment 12 years, longer than any other nation.



The Enemy


The Enemy:

- +++ Is communist North Vietnam and its southern arm, Viet Cong (Vietnamese communist or "Viet Red").
- +++ Controls, directs, supplies entire effort to conquer Republic of Vietnam through COSVN (Central Office for South Vietnam), which heads military, political efforts of North Vietnam in South Vietnam, closely resembles government structure, reaches into every district.
- +++ Trains military, political cadres, terrorists, spies, saboteurs, providing most of VC leadership. These have infiltrated in increasing numbers since 1956.
- +++ Uses systematic terrorism, assassination to wreck economy, destroy fabric of government of 2,600 villages. In past five years communists have assassinated, beheaded or kidnaped 2,000 village chiefs, have driven away able-bodied men, have deluded or terrorized many citizens into cooperating.
- +++ Still failing to win, in 1965 Hanoi began sending regular units of North Vietnamese Army to south. Backbone of communist military in South Vietnam is VC "main force" and NVA units, of about 112,000. VC guerrillas number 113,000, political cadres 39,000, combat support 18,000. (Estimates are as of summer 1966.)
- +++ Estimated average of at least 5,000 men infiltrated South Vietnam monthly during first seven months of 1966, plus supplies, by land and sea from north. Arms are from China, Russia, Red satellites.
- +++ In first half of 1966, however, 10,000 VC and NVA soldiers and sympathizers turned themselves in to South Vietnam government under Chieu Hoi (open arms) program.

Navy--Pearl Harbor

ready
reference
facts
on

SOUTH VIETNAM



Office of Information
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96243

The Stakes In Vietnam

Free World Goals:

- +++ Freedom and independence for 15.5 million South Vietnamese.
- +++ Protect all Southeast Asia by stopping communist aggression in South Vietnam. (Red's announced next target: Thailand.)
- +++ Peace for Free World by defeat in Vietnam of communist plans for "wars of national liberation" (euphemism for externally inspired, directed and conducted aggression against a government). U. S. Commitment:

+++ Three U. S. Presidents have pledged assistance to South Vietnam.

+++ Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), of which U. S. is member, pledged to protect area against communist aggression.

+++ Annually since 1955 U. S. Congress has voted economic, military assistance programs for Vietnam.

Wider Significance:

+++ Security of U. S. and rest of Free World is involved, not only that of Southeast Asia, because communists are testing techniques, tactics in South Vietnam.

+++ To leave South Vietnam to its own defenses would shake confidence of millions who respect and value U. S. commitments, promises.

+++ President Johnson: "We will stand in Vietnam."

Our Military Effort

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam:

+++ Military arm of U. S. Mission in Vietnam; joint team, includes U. S. Army, Vietnam; Seventh Air Force; U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (Coast Guard units attached); III Marine Amphibious Force; more than 8,000 advisers to RVNAF. Combat support elements: Seventh Fleet, SAC B-52 units.

+++ Strength in Fall 1966: about 300,000.

+++ Mission twofold: Support South Vietnam against communist aggression; assist in development of country.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces:

+++ Include Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Brigade, Regional Forces, Popular Forces. Other armed elements: National Police, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, Armed Combat Youth.

+++ Strength: About 700,000. (Ninety per cent land forces.)

+++ Carry burden of war—lost 11,000 dead in 1965.

Free World Forces:

+++ Include Australian, Korean, New Zealand combat units, plus units from Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand.

+++ Strength of combat units: about 45,000.

+++ We succeed by winning the people, depriving VC of safe havens, rest, and supplies.

Building A Nation

Historically dominated by foreign or unenlightened rulers and, since 1940, torn by war and insurgency, Vietnam has missed the opportunity to grow and prosper in peace. Though rich in rice and raw materials she has been poor in production capacity, finished goods, technicians and professional men.

What South Vietnam Has Done Since 1954:

+++ Now produces 90 per cent of textile needs in more than 700 plants opened or enlarged since 1954.

+++ Is approaching self-sufficiency in paper, plastic products.

+++ Has increased by 300,000 tons annual commercial seafood yield.

+++ Has established more than 7,000 rural medical centers.

+++ Secondary school students have increased by 10 times. University and vocational school enrollments have quadrupled.

Revolutionary Development:

+++ Is centrally coordinated program for rebuilding in secure areas, has been called "...core of nation-building", provides high-impact aid, regains confidence of people, prepares community for future economic growth.

Free World Assistance:

+++ Forty-one nations give economic aid to South Vietnam (U. S. aid since 1954: \$3 billion-plus) and 15 international voluntary agencies work in country.

SECRETEnBul 1303
1 March 1967LISTING OF REFERENCE MATERIALS AND TRAINING AIDS

1. The following references and training aids are held in Training Library (S-3). Company Commanders can draw from this library as they see fit to augment company program.
2. Some materials are as follows:
 - a. Department of Army Pamphlet No. 550-40, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Vietnam.
 - b. MCBul 3480 of 11 May 1966, A Marines Guide to the Republic of Vietnam
 - c. DivBul 5080 of 30 Jan 1967, The Story of Fort Page
 - d. MACV Command Information, Pamphlet Number 1-67, TET - A New Year's
 - e. MACV Office of Information, Pamphlet Number 2-67, The Enemy in Vietnam
 - f. MCBul 3480 - Professional Knowledge Gained from Operational Experience in Vietnam (Series).
 - g. FMFPacBul 1500 - Tactical Trends and Training Tips (Series)
 - h. DivBul 05080 of 31 Jan 1967, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Image(4) (Held in S&C Files)
3. Training Aids used during briefing:
 - a. Maps
 - (1) Southeast Asia Briefing Graphic (Scale 1:1,000,000)
 - (2) Pictomap Supplement (Scale 1:25,000 Chu Lai)
 - (3) Chu Lai and Vicinity (Scale 1:12,500)
 - b. Chart
 - a. Missions of Seventh Communication Battalion
 - c. Handouts
 - a. See Enclosure (3)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
7th Communication Battalion
1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/WJH/wjh
2000
20 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced), FMF
Ref: (a) CG 1st MarDiv 110521Z Dec66
Encl: (1) Training Schedule for the Month of April
1. In accordance with reference (a) enclosure (1) is submitted.

W. M. CLELLAND

TAB C
ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

Switchboard Training Schedule

DATE	WATCH	CLASS	REFERENCE	HOUR	INSTRUCTOR
4Apr67	11	Switchboard Procedures & Operating Techniques	ACP-134	1	CPL JACKSON
6Apr67	2	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
10Apr67	Make up	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
12Apr67	1	Operating Characteristics MTC-9	TM-11-5805-288-15	1	SGT WATPERS
15Apr67	2	*DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
17Apr67	Make up	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
19Apr67	1	Pole Climbing	FM-24-26	1	CPL VANCE
21Apr67	2	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
24Apr67	Make up	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
26Apr67	1	Telephone Installation	Bell Tele. Spec.	1	CPL KINNAIRD
28Apr67	2	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-
30Apr67	Make up	-DO-	-DO-	1	-DO-

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
 7th Communication Battalion
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

3/JTH/frl
 3000
 10 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, Task Force X-Ray
 (Attn: Communication Electronic Officer)

Subj: Protection for Communication Facilities

Ref: (a) CG 1stMarDiv (Rein) 090855Z Mar 67

1. In accordance with the instructions contained in reference (a), the following report is hereby submitted:

a. Re-examination of protective measures has been completed this date.

b. The following protective measures have been implemented and are in progress.

1. Command Bunker

7th Communication Battalion Command Bunker completed 4 Mar 67. Command and control of communications systems in support of CG, Task Force XRay will be conducted from this facility. Additionally, control of 7th Communication Battalion assigned portion of the CLDC perimeter is also exercised from this location.

2. Switchboard Bunker

The CHU LAI switchboard (Central Office, Manual AN/MTC-9) to be activated 2400 12 March 67 has been placed in bunker. Remaining to be completed is the overhead and front side. Estimate completion three weeks.

3. Radio Relay Bunker

Foundation completed, materials on site, estimate structure completion three days, sand bagging will be completed 7 April 67.

TAB D
 ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

4. Radio Bunker (Primary)

Structure completed. Sand bagging will be completed 24 Mar 67.

5. Radio Bunker (Secondary)

Construction commenced on three comm bunkers about 15 Feb 67. Back up HF and FM comm facilities will be installed and remoted to Task Force XRay COC and FSCC. Estimate sand bagging will be completed 1 May 67.

6. Other Protective Measures Completed

- a. COC/FSCC radio terminals sand bagged.
- b. Revetments for one AN/TSC-15 and one MRC-83.

7. Protective Measures to be Completed

- a. Sandbag main distribution frame
- b. Sandbag/revet Comm Center (Personnel shelters completed)
- c. Revet AN/TRC-97 tropo terminal

J. T. HOPKINS JR.
By direction

SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
 7th Communication Battalion, FMP
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 FPO San Francisco, California 96602

L/GMM/vrm
 lllll
 31 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A04G)
 Via: (1) Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMP
 (2) Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

Subj: Special Allowance; request for

Ref: (a) DivO lllll.16E
 (b) DivO lllll.14C

Encl: (1) Special Allowance For Electronics Items
 (2) Special Allowance For General Supply Items
 (3) Special Allowance For Motor Transport Items

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) it is recommended that the items of equipment listed in enclosures (1) through (3) be placed on the special allowance list for Seventh Communication Battalion.

2. The addition of the equipment listed are necessary to enable this Battalion to properly accomplish its assigned missions within the Republic of Vietnam.

W. M. CLEVELAND

TAB E
 ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
20120	5820-497-8554	Antennae, RC-292

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
2	7

THIS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

Seven RC-292 antennas are presently installed to support current requirements. Authorization of five additional antennas will permit return of antenna on temporary loan from CommCo, HqPn, 1stMarDiv to that organization.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Headquarters Company T/E NO. 1486
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>PSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
20800	6115-921-5180	60 KW Gen with trailer Model 24800

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	2

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT
JUSTIFICATION

The Battalion allowance of 13 30KW generators are mostly on a continued temporary loan to many units throughout III MAF. Only 2 30 KW generators are under Battalion Control. The Battalion mission to provide continuous reliable communication support demands extensive and dependable electrical power presently provided by another command echelon by a priority system. The concurrent requirement to maintain a camp, large messhall, defensive illumination as well as electronic maintenance precludes use of remaining generators to insure continuous tactical communications. Assignment of 2 heavy duty 60 KW generators is essential to meet Base Camp and communications requirements on a continuous basis.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

T/A NO FSN ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)
 20890 6115-500-4081 Generator Set DC PU-344/G

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	2

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

A stable and reliable source of 400 cycle electrical power is necessary for sustained operation in fixed CP locations for AN/MRC-83's and AN/TSC-15's. The PU-587 used with the AN/TSC-15 Van has not proven reliable for sustained operation.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
20907	5820-082-3998	Radio Set Control Group AN/GRA-39A

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

The operation of the FSCC/COC and the dispersed location of various tactical radio sets requires remote control units to be installed at the operating location of the control agencies. This special allowance will permit installation of the AN/VRC-12 family of radios in the Battalions Communication bunkers. This would provide for a safer operating location for personnel and equipment.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Support Company T/E NO. 4863
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
20940	6115-856-9990	(Gen Set PU-549)

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	6

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

Communication equipment of this company is normally employed in teams. The AN/TSC-15 communications central is powered by one PU-587. An extremely high failure rate has been experienced with the PU-587. Addition of one PU-549 for each AN/TSC-15 will permit a back up power capability for each communications central employed at the individual team location.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Headquarters Company T/E NO. 1886
7th Communication Battalion

T/A NO FSI ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)
21540 4430-466-3641 (Oven, HD-43/U)

ALLOWANCE

PRESENT RECOMMENDED
0 1

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

This item required for the battalion level maintenance shop. The oven will permit proper drying/dehumidifying of electronics equipment in this area of high humidity.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

T/A NO FSN ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)
21650 6130-635-1655 (Power Supply Pt-388/J)

ALLOWANCE

PRESENT RECOMMENDED
1 2

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT
JUSTIFICATION

The addition of one PP-388 would provide a stable source of DC power for fixed installation operation of tactical radios in the Task Force Xray FSCC/COC. Greater economy resulting from decreased use of a vehicular power source plus increased reliability and flexibility will be obtained.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
21954	5820-086-7536	(Radio Set, AN/GRC-125)

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	4

THIS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

This company has the need for a greater FM capability for support of the Task Force Xray FSCC/COC and the Chu Lai Defense Command. This special allowance will provide more flexible and reliable means to support Task Force Xray tactical operations from the combat base.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4083
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
22104	5820-889-3997	Radio Set, AN/PRC-41

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>7</u>

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

Two AN/PRC-41's each are committed in support of 3rd Marine Division (Fwd) and 1st Marine Air Wing. Three AN/PRC-41's on temporary loan from ComCo, HqEn, 1stMarDiv are being used to support the Task Force Xray FSCC. This special allowance enables the Commanding Officer to accomplish assigned tasks without utilizing equipment on temporary loan from another organization.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Company T/E NO. 4883
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
22500	5410-508-1347	Shelter Electrical Equipment S-126/G

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
2	3

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

Division order 4441.16A authorized special allowance of one additional shelter, this shelter does not appear in Div Order 4441.16P. One shelter is presently configured to provide a U.S. Communication Center facility with the 2dROKMP. Another is used as a crypto repair and storage facility. The third is being configured to provide a mobile communication center facility to support tactical requirements of advance, tactical, or alternate command post for CG TF Xray.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Communication Support Company T/E NO. L863
7th Communication Battalion

T/A NO FSN ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)
22650 5805-257-3602 (Switchboard SP-22/PT)

ALLOWANCE

PRESENT RECOMMENDED
6 8

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

This company is providing 5 SP-22's in support of 1st MP Bn Danang and 1 SP-22 in support of 3rd Marine Division (Fwd). This special allowance is required to replace equipment as it becomes deadlined and to have switchboards available for additional tactical commitments.

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Radio Relay & Construction Company T/R NO. 4873
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
45230	3950-473-6324	Hoist Chain Lever and Ratchet

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	3

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

To properly hoist cable and ensure the cable is taut, the utilization of a chain hoist is most expeditious in accomplishing the construction tasks. It also permits proper tension to be made on guy wires. In some instances two hoists are required to effectively accomplish one job. These hoists enables two crews to be employed at all times.

Enclosure (2)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Radio Relay & Construction Company T/E NO. 4873
7th Communication Battalion

T/A NO FSN ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)
 45360 5440-223-6026 Ladder Extension 30 Ft

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
0	4

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

This item is required for the construction and rehabilitation of wire cable systems which are not placed on wooden poles. Extension ladders also facilitate the making of cable splices and cutting in of terminals when located between poles or located near metal/cement poles.

Enclosure (2)

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF ALLOWANCE

ORGANIZATION Headquarters Company T/E NO. 4886
7th Communication Battalion

<u>T/A NO</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>ITEM (MAKE AND MODEL)</u>
51030	2330-141-8049	Trailer, Tank, Water 400 gal 1 1/2 T 2 Wheel M-107/A2

ALLOWANCE

<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>RECOMMENDED</u>
2	6

THIS IS NOT RECOMMENDED ALLOWANCE FOR LIKE UNIT

JUSTIFICATION

Four additional trailers were authorized this organization by CG 1stMarDiv msg 240700Z July 66. Div Order 4441.16B does not included this previous allowance. Six trailers are required to provide the minimum supply of water for personnel in this battalion, to adequately provide water to companies and detachments deployed to remote areas, and to support the TF Kray mess hall which is operated by this battalion.

Enclosure (3)

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
 7th Communication Battalion, FMF
 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 WFO San Francisco, California 96602

L/CMB/vrs
 LHO
 31 March 1967

From: Commanding Officer
 To: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
 (Attn: G-4)

Subj: Logistics Summary Report

Ref: (a) DivO L000.19
 (b) CG 1stMarDiv (Rein) 190319ZMar67
 (c) CG 1stMarDiv (Rein) 280325ZNov66
 (d) CG 1stMarDiv (Rein) 312325ZOct66

Encl: (1) Typewriters; report of

1. The following report covering the month of March 1967 is submitted in accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d).

2. LOGISTIC SITUATION

a. The overall logistical situation is satisfactory except for a few significant problem areas. Repair parts for KW-7 and KW-26 on-line crypto equipment installed in the Chu Lai Communication Center are still in a critical status. Nine KY-8 speech security equipments are deadlined due to failure of the input capacitor which remains on requisition. See paragraph 3a(2) for additional details. The PU-587, 400 cycle power source for the AN/TSC-15 remains a problem. Three (3) PU-587's are on priority O2 requisition; two (2) are deadlined at PL30-E; three (3) are deadlined at battalion level; and three (3) remain operational. See comments under paragraph 4c.

b. On 17 March 1967 we received two (2) Radio Terminal Sets AN/MRC-62A. This organization is still awaiting shipment of three (3) more sets. Shipping instructions have been received on two (2) sets. The status of the third set is unknown at this time. Four PU-463 generators components of the AN/MRC-62A's were received on 24 Feb 1967.

c. 9th Engineer Battalion completed construction on six (6) 24x12x10 bunkers for a Battalion Aid Station and Communication installations.

d. On 12 March the AN/MTC-1 Switchboard installed in Task Force Iray CP was replaced by an AN/MTC-9. The AN/MTC-1 was shipped to the 3rdMarDiv. The Assistant CMD 1stMarDiv has a list of all outstanding requisitions and shortages for the AN/MTC-1.

TAB F
 ENCLOSURE (1)

e. On 15 March 1967 Task Force Kray HTO assigned this battalion the responsibility of performing second echelon maintenance on vehicles belonging to 7th CIT. Vehicles include 2 M-38A1's, 3 M-37's 5 M-100's, and 1 M-101 Trailers.

f. On 16 March 1967 the Battalion Aid Station was damaged by fire. Approximately \$4,754.30 will be required to repair damage to building, replace equipment and medical supplies damaged by the fire. The Battalion Aid Station is operating efficiently at the present time.

3. SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION

a. Critical Items

(1) The following items are reported as requested by reference (b).

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>	<u>DOC #</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>PRI</u>	<u>D.D</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Rifle, M-14	6	09069	6	02	7033	FLSQ-B Repair-6; O/H-8
Pistol, Cal .45	22	06616	22	02	6315	2 pistols are on hand
Concertina	0					None
Stakes, Barbed Wire	0					None
Battery 6TN	31	03569	2	13	6089	Used in 26 M-35 Trucks and 13 PU-482 Generators. On hand stock level is four.
		04268	2	05	6108	
		00190	10	12	6193	
		05079	4	12	6257	
		05514	5	17	6273	
		08057	2	12	7006	
		10038	4	12	7058	
		10816	2	02	7076	
Wire WD-1/TT (MX-306)	0					None
Wire WD-1/TT (DR-8)	0					None
Wire WB-1/TT (RL-159)	448	00216	19	12	6194	None
		00241	200	12	6196	
		05284	100	12	6265	
		07006	129	05	6322	
Lamp Incandescent	0					None
Body Armor, Upper Torso						
8470-576-4193	0					None
8470-576-4194	0					None
8470-576-4195	0					None
Green Towels	903	04882.2	903	05	6123	Partial receipt of 297 on 21Mar67

SECRET

Tent (Med)	66	02148 06105	4 15	02 12	6104 7004	Controlled by G-4; CG 1stMarDiv 010745ZJan67. CP under tin roofs. No problem unless displaced.
Nitrogen	0					None
Acetylene	0					None
Oxygen	0					None
Hydrogen Technical	0					None
Hydrogen Charge	0					None
Chlordane	0					None
Lumber 2x4	0					None
Green Underclothing						
Drawers (S)	99	10261	99	12	7073	
Drawers (M)	76	10262	76	12	7073	
Undershirts (M)	110	10259	110	12	7073	
Undershirts (L)	11	10260	11	12	7074	
Battery BA-386	96	7955.1 10104 10901 10930	10 20 8 50	17 12 12 12	6361 7059 7079 7080	None
Individual Equipment						
Grenade Carrier	0					See CG 1stMarDiv 170035ZJan67(C) None
Belt, M-14	122	10358	122	02	7061	None
Pouch, M-14	131	10355	131	02	7065	None
Holster	25	06707	25	02	6318	None
Pocket, Ammo Cal .45	25	06708	25	02	6318	None
Blanket, Bed	93	07682-1 08652	38 55	02 02	6318 7020	None
Carrier, Intrench- ing Tool	19	08615	19	02	7020	None
Cap, Canteen	32	08618	32	02	7020	None

SECRET

Hat & Mosquito Net	59	08641	19	02	7020	None
		10366	40	02	7063	
Pan, Mess Kit w/cover	21	08653	21	02	7020	None
Shelter Half Tent	67	08654	11	02	7020	None
		10372	56	02	7063	
Line, Tent Cotton	23	08655.1	23	02	7020	None
Pin, Tent Wood	141	08656	141	02	7020	None
Mattress, Pneumatic	106	08658	28	02	7020	None
		10364	76	02	7065	
Helmet, Steel	32	08685	32	02	7027	None

Individual Clothing

None authorized for stock. Requisitions are to effect necessary replacement issues of unserviceable clothing.

Rain Coat 34R	3	08024	3	12	6365	
Rain Coat 36R	8	07338	8	12	6336	
Rain Coat 36L	2	07336	2	12	6336	
Undershirts (XS)	11	08013	11	12	6365	None
Lightweight Utilities	0					None
Jungle Combat Boots	0					None

(2) Repair parts for KW-7 and KW-26 on-line crypto equipment and KY-8 speech security equipment installed in the Chu Lai Communication Center.

RUC	SN	NCUM NOMENCLATURE	QTY	DCG #	DDD	PRI	IKH
21635	5905-995-5199	Resistor (for KW-7)	1	05854	263	02	NSD Chu Lai
21635	5930-955-1742	Switch (for KW-7)	1	06129	298	02	NSD Chu Lai
21635	5960-881-2052	Diode (for KW-7)	4	06272	336	02	NSD Chu Lai
21635	5905-848-6548	Resistor (for KW-26)	4	06745	319	02	NSD Chu Lai
21635	5945-954-3131	Relay (for KW-7)	4	06746	319	02	CI
21635	Part#ON050156	Capacitor C-1 (for KY-8)	10	06375	305	05	NSD Chu Lai
21635	Part#ON050156	Capacitor C-1 (for KY-8)	2	07946	361	05	NSD Chu Lai
21635	Part#ON050156	Capacitor C-1 (for KY-8)	1	06926	035	05	NSD Chu Lai

b. Significant Problem Areas. None not previously indicated.

SECRET

4. MAINTENANCE

a. General Status. The general state of maintenance is satisfactory.

b. Significant Problem Areas. The lack of repair parts in range and depth for the on-line crypto equipments and fixed plant teletype equipment continues to be of major concern.

c. Major Items of Equipment

<u>T/A NR</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>D/H</u>	<u>OPEN</u>	<u>READY</u>	<u>NORS</u>	<u>NORM</u>
MOTOR TRANSPORT							
50140	HPCU	1	1	0		1	0
51090	Trk 3/4T M-37	7	7	7		0	0
51120	Trk 2 1/2T M-35	26	26	23		0	3
51480	Trk 2 1/2T M-49	1	1	1		0	0
51670	Trk 5T M-543	1	1	1		0	0
51570	Trk 4T M-38A1	29	29	29		0	0

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

20447	AN/TSC-15	11	10	10		0	0
21954	AN/GRC-125	2	2	2		0	0
22030	AN/MRC-63	30	30	25		3	0
22050	AN/MRC-87	5	2	1		0	1
22054	AN/MRC-110	3	3	2		1	0
22101	AN/PRC-25	12	12	12		0	0
22104	AN/PRC-41	7	7	6		0	1
22105	AN/PRC-47	15	15	14		1	0
22110	AN/TRC-27	12	12	10		2	0
22190	AN/MRC-62	16	13	12		1	0
22650	SB-22/PT	14	14	14		0	0
22660	SB-86	7	*9	8		1	0
22770	AN/GGC-3	14	14	14		0	0
22783	AN/TCC-14A(V)	30	23	19		4	0
NONE	TT-47/UG	**	4	4		0	0
NONE	TT-171C/UG	**	5	5		0	0
NONE	TT-187C/UG	**	6	6		0	0
NONE	TT-192A/UG	**	3	3		0	0
NONE	TT-253A/UG	**	1	1		0	0
NONE	TT-331A/UG	**	2	2		0	0
NONE	TT-332A/UG	**	2	2		0	0
NONE	TT-333/UG	**	4	4		0	0
NONE	AN/JCC-6	**	3	2		1	0

* 2 in lieu of AN/TCC-9

** Fixed Plant Teletype Equipment installed in the Chu Lai Communication Center which is on the supply account of HqPn, 1stMarDiv.

GENERATORS

20940	PU-454	3	2	2		0	0
20945	PU-482	13	13	10		0	3

SEC

GENERATORS (CONTINUED)

20947	PU-587	11	8	3	3	2
21395	PU-565	4	2	1	0	1

ENGINEER

30340	105CFM Air Compressor	1	1	1	0	0
31220	Saw, Chain Model 99	2	0	0	0	0

COMMENT: AN/TSC-15 and PU-587 400 cycle power source relationship is as follows:

		<u>AN/TSC-15</u>	<u>PU-587</u>
CommSptCo	T/E	6	6
(Danang)	G/H	6	2
	D/L	0	1
	Operational	6	1 (On loan 1stMarDiv CommCo)
CommCo	T/S	5	5
(Chu Lai)	G/H	4	6
	D/L	0	4
	Operational	4	2

The net result is that 7 of 10 operational AN/TSC-15's are without a PU-587 power source.

5. OTHER SERVICES. No insurmountable problems exist.

6. ADVANCED PLANNING. Three (3) C-43 Butler Buildings are programmed for storage and maintenance facilities in the battalion area. CG 1stMarDiv 260339ZJan67 establishes 2 as number 10 priority and 1 as number 18 priority.

7. OTHER MAJOR ITEMS OF COMMAND INTEREST NOT COVERED IN ABOVE PARAGRAPHS

a. On 22 March 1967 four (4) milk dispensers were placed in the 7thCommBn Messhall. Fresh Milk is served daily in the messhall.

b. During the month of March the 7thCommBn mess collected \$1148.00 in com-rats. An average of 1003 rations were served daily plus additional 265 mid-rats. Breakdown is as follows:

Breakfast	708	Mid-Rats Hot (Messhall)	61
Lunch	1122	Mid-Rats Cold (Take-out)	204
Dinner	1179		

8. Enclosure (1) is a report of typewriters submitted in accordance with reference (d).

W. H. CLELLAND

SEC

SECRET

TYPEWRITER: REPORT OF

11" CARRIAGE TYPEWRITERS

<u>T/E</u>	<u>O/H SERVICEABLE</u>	<u>O/H UNSERVICEABLE</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>	<u>OUTSTANDING RQNS</u>
22	21	0	1	RUC 21635, DOC# 08857, Qty 1, DDD 026, Pri 12, To replace like item Code X, 15Jan67.

18" - 20" CARRIAGE TYPEWRITERS

<u>T/E</u>	<u>O/H SERVICEABLE</u>	<u>O/H UNSERVICEABLE</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>	<u>OUTSTANDING RQNS</u>
2	2	0	0	0

Enclosure (1)

SECRET

SECRET**'Country Doctors'**

CHU LAI—The Marine Corps' Medical Care and Assistance Program (MedCap) to benefit the Vietnamese people is turning the hospital corpsmen of 7th Communications Battalion, 1st Marine Division into "country doctors."

They go into the hamlets and villages to work with the people toward improved health and sanitation.

The Vietnamese are grateful and enthusiastic in their support of the program. In a village near Chu Lai, they are building a small hospital—the "House of Band-aids."

There, Navy doctors and corpsmen, like Hospital Corpsman Roy A. Jenks, and Hospital Corpsman Ted Chacona, offer medical treatment.

"House calls" are often necessary to treat patients too sick to visit the hospital. Rugged hills and dense jungle often separate the doctor from his patient, and a long, rough walk is the only answer.

TAB G
ENCLOSURE (1)

SECRET