

823

1st Testimony ~ this affidavit
R 20517-89

Kawabe - Masatogu
(Sogo)

Memo for Cross Examination

The Examinee Objects to & moves to strike out three portions of the affidavit,

1. That portion of ¶ 3 on page 3
which refers to an order issued by
imperial Headquarters & the operations
to be carried out under it. This applies
particularly to the fourth and fifth
sentences of ¶ 3.

2. The first two sentences in the ¶
which begins at the bottom of page 4
pertaining to reports the orders and
detailed regulations accompanying them.
This includes the last 3 lines of page 4
and the first 3 lines on page 5.

3. The entire all of ¶ 12, ^{which is a} ~~A~~ single
sentence at the top of page 8.

2

which recite orders received from the
War Ministry for the Court Martial
of ~~the~~ ^{certain} Officers.

~~we submit that the orders themselves are
the best evidence of~~

~~In the absence of any evidence
no explanation is offered for the failure to
produce the original orders. We respectfully
submit that the witness should not be
allowed to testify as to the contents.~~

no outstanding duties

Hsuehshou Campaign - a negative duty of Gen Hata

When was Gen Hata appointed Commander in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces?

[Feb 38]

~~is not in text~~
when

was any ~~territory~~ portion of China north and west of Nanking occupied by the Central China Expeditionary Force when General Hata assumed command?

[as of]

How far north & west of Nanking did the Central China Expeditionary Force occupy at that time.

How close was the Central China Expeditionary Force to the Hwai River [100 miles]

How far is it from Nanking to the ^{inland}

On the point on the Hwai River which was reached by the forces under Gen Hata in Apr 1938?

When did Gen Hata's troops begin their

and date of capture

Affidavit

43
1.3

Advance [from Hanking] in the campaign
in which they reached the Hwai River?

Was the advance to the Hwai River carried out
by Gen. Hata on his own responsibility, or was
it made in order received by Imperial Hdq.
(not with out) that order ^{if you}

1st of 101 is not about 1

44
1.1

When ^{were} orders received by the Imperial
Headquarters, ^{for the operations} which resulted in the capture
of Hsuechow? Apr.

45
1.1

What ^{was the} strength of the central
~~Chinese~~ ~~defending~~ ~~forces~~ under Gen. Hata
at the time of the Hsuechow operations.
off. 10000 about 6 Div + ¹ Brigade ^(main) ^(division)
What was the strength of the ^{Chinese} ~~enemy~~
forces when Gen. Hata attacked at
TAI ERH CHWANG 200,000
was the resistance stubborn on
the part of the Chinese troops?

What casualties were inflicted upon the Chinese troops.

[What casualties were sustained by the troops under General Hata?]

How many Chinese troops were captured?

Was this an easy campaign?
Was this not a very difficult campaign?

if easy
why did the imperial order to prepare for winter operations throw you into a panic?

if difficult
is that the reason why the imperial order to prepare for the winter operations threw you into a panic?

What
was
the
reason
for
this?

When do you reconcile this fact with the fact stated in your affidavit that Gen Hata was not engaged in any substantial operations?

6.

Hankow Campaign

How Many Troops were there under the Command of General Hata at the end of May 1938.

How Many Troops were there in the ^{2nd division} Second Army under Prince HIGASHIKUNI when ^{was} this army ^{was} brought under the Command of General Hata.

How Many Troops were there under Lieut Gen OKAMURA when they were ^{reinforced} ^{under the command of} General Hata?

Were there any other reinforcements of the Central China Expeditionary Force prior to the Hankow Campaign?

A

I direct your attention to the statement of Gen Hata in his interrogation Exhibit 256 on page 3445 of the Transcript, Paragraphs where he was asked the numerical strength

of these forces which came down from the north and replied that while he was not certain he thought about 300,000 or 400,000. Do you agree with the recollection of General Hata?

1. K. Hata
2. H. Hata
3. H. Hata

What is the distance between Nanking + Hsuechow?

~~Nanking - Hsuechow~~

What is the distance between Hsuechow and Hantow?

By rail 500
By air 300

1. H. Hata
2. H. Hata
3. H. Hata

What is the distance between Nanking + Hantow? [400 mi]

~~the distance between the two cities~~

What General was in command of the Chinese forces defending Hantow?

Chang Hsi-shan

1. H. Hata
2. H. Hata
3. H. Hata

How long was the campaign which resulted in the capture of Hantow?

one month or so

Was it a long or difficult campaign?

the distance between Hsuechow and Hantow?

top
p. 6

(1) ^{if easy} - why did Gen Hata resent the transfer of ⁽³⁾
~~it~~ a part of the air force to Canton?

^{if difficult} was it due to the difficulty of this campaign that
Gen Hata resented the transfer of a part of the air force
to Canton?

(2) What casualties were sustained
by the Chinese troops in this
campaign?

(3) How many Chinese troops were
taken prisoners

^{fill}
if easy: why did Gen Hata feel bitter because
he could not get the air forces which
(4) you say I ^{mentioned} [you affidavit] the
Japanese Army in Manchuria had
promised to give to the Central
China Expeditionary Forces?

if difficult: was that the reason why

up to
dropped by
me

(5) Do you still affirm as stated in
last sentence in your affidavit
that Gen Hata was not
engaged in any outstanding
operations?

p. 2
6 negative duties

~~these the case~~

[B]

you stated three times in your affidavit - page 2 - page 6 and page 8 that General Hata's duties as Commande in Chief of the Central China Expeditionary ^{Force}, were negative duties.

~~these the case~~ Were [the advance of the Japanese Army from Hankow to to the HWAIRUI] the (battle of) TAI ERH CH WANG and the campaign resulting in the capture of Hanchow; and the [long and arduous] campaign resulting in the capture of Wuichang and the fall of Hankow ~~and the fall of the Chinese government~~ some of [what you call] the negative duties of General Hata?

Comment
needed 10

Abouctei

When did you read in the papers
that someone had testified to the massacre
at Hankow?

Who testified concerning the massacre?

~~Did you read
Was that the testimony?~~

Was that the testimony of A. A. Darrance who
at the time was the ^{manager of the} ~~manager of the~~ ^{Chowder} ~~Chowder~~ ^{Air} ~~Air~~ ^{Company} ~~Company~~
at Hankow ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{was} ~~was~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{American} ~~American
Minister of Commerce?~~

(A 2590-3414)

©

was the testimony to the effect
~~that~~ ~~that~~ ~~after~~ ~~the~~ ~~fall~~ ~~of~~ ~~Hankow~~ ~~he~~ ~~saw~~ ~~Japanese~~ ~~soldiers~~
taking, ^{capturing} ~~capturing~~ ~~Chinese~~ ~~soldiers~~ ~~into~~
the ~~rear~~ ~~part~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~camp~~ ~~and~~
burning ~~and~~ ~~destroying~~ ~~those~~ ~~who~~ ~~were~~
to the ~~surrounding~~.

D

And did you read that he also testified that he saw on the streets of Hankow "Chinese men dressed in Chinese gowns with their hands tied behind them and they had been shot?"

look at

The Testimony of Barrance appears at pp. 3392 - 3396 of the transcript of Proceedings

administration of civil affairs

Under the ~~first~~ ^{second} administrative plan, all political and economic affairs in the occupied territory of central China under the control of the army.

Who was the ambassador appointed

when you refer to on p. 6 of your affidavit

was he the ambassador to the Wang Ching Wei government at Nanking

was the KIA IN (China Affairs Board) the

Office
in 1938

means ^{through} which Japan exercised control over all political and economic affairs in the occupied portions of China.

Business of War

were captured Chinese soldiers treated as prisoners of war
were they placed in camp

were the China Incident a war?

Had
you

and

do you agree with the statement of Gen. Hata, E. 356 T.P. 3451 in which he said "although I actually was a war all they ever considered I was as a China Incident. Actually I was war"?

(E)

I draw your attention to the statement of the defendant Muto who in 1939 became chief of the military office in Moscow E. 255 T.P. 34339

the T.P.

that while the China Incident was actually a ^{captured upon it as an incident} war the Japanese Government, decided in 1938 that Chinese captives would not be regarded as prisoners of war. do you agree with that?

Adro

Were the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding ~~Treatment~~ ^{Treatment} of P/W applied to captured Chinese soldiers?

You state (if ?) your affidavit)

that the Chinese P/W were delivered to the Central Govt of China when was that Govt. located in 1938?

Wang Chin
Government
Wei, 30 Mch
1940

Who was the head of it?

Do you refer to the Puppet Govt.

were not Japanese soldiers who had known ~~was it the view of the military authorities~~ away their arms ^{systematically} sought out by ~~the~~ units of ~~that~~ former Chinese soldiers ~~when~~ the Japanese army and ~~what~~ ^{what} found ~~they~~ ~~was that?~~

cc
Quarta

7.

Secret Fund.

~~you~~ you mentioned [on p. 7^m] of your affidavit
the use of secret funds, how was
the secret fund created.

What ministry or government agency
in Japan made the secret funds
available for the army in the field

To whom were the secret funds sent?

~~Who was required to ^{intend one agency} receipt for the
secret funds.~~

~~Since it was a secret fund~~
what accounting was made of
these secret funds.

Since it was a secret fund is it
true that the officer in the field who
received for it was not required
to account for its use.

were not these secret funds
used to assist and promote
the so-called autonomous
movement in China.

These funds were ~~quite~~
in addition to the regular army
budget were they not?

And the statement on page
7 of your affidavit we had no
other fund is not correct.

~~To whom were these~~

(1) How much in secret funds were sent to the Central China Expeditionary Force ^{under the command of Gen Hata}, while you were chief of staff from ~~December~~ February to December 1938.

Perhap
out

(2) How much in secret funds were sent to the China Expeditionary Forces under command of Gen Hata - while you were general chief of staff from Aug. 1942 until the summer of 1943.

out

Were any part of the secret funds returned to ^{the} (source) ^{war ministry} ^{Tokyo} ^{Japanese court in Tokyo}?

(3) What accounting was made what use was made of the secret funds of these secret funds

Were the expenses of maintaining
the Army in the field paid
out of the secret funds -

(if to answer yes)
or

~~Is it not a fact that the Expeditionary
forces in China [like armies in other
theaters of operation] were provided
with substantial funds from the
regular Army budget to meet
normal + routine operating
expenses.~~

And your statement that
you had no other fund is not
^{true}
correct.

or
[Then the statement in # 9 of your
affidavit "we had no other fund"
is not ^{true} correct.]

additional threat

When did Harbour Campaign
start

~~Start~~ on 2 May

Hoshimoto Gun came & a

that China used General might

be engaged in operations &

Harbour in the near future

are the they suffer Lurcher

Direct examination of KAWABE, Masakazu
by Mr. Logan

21,698

Continuing with the witness' affidavit, Exhibit 2479 A, the affidavit stated that the witness was chief of staff under Gen. HATA, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces from February to December 1938, and later general chief of staff under Gen. HATA when he was commander of the China Expeditionary Forces from August 1942 to summer, 1943.

21,699

HATA succeeded MATSUI as Chief of the Central China Exp. Forces. His duties differed from those of MATSUI, being negative and restricted to maintaining peace and order with the strength of about six divisions in the triangular zone connecting Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. He did not take over the duties concerning military operations from MATSUI. Despite his negative duties, he carried out the Hsuchow campaign. About the beginning of April, 1938, The North China Exp. Forces reached Tsinan * while the Central China Forces reached the Hwai River.

The 10th Division suffered considerable loss at Taierchwang, and the fifth division was unsuccessful. The North China Exp. Forces had difficulties in advancing. It was therefore necessary for the two expeditionary forces to expel the enemy to the west and secure contact. Imperial Headquarters issued an order for the operation. The HATA forces began the movement about May 10th and opened an attack against the enemy at Taierchwang with about three divisions, while the North China Exp. Forces opened attack with about four divisions. The result was that the enemy was driven away about May 20th and the battle of Hsuchow came to an end.

21,700

In the last stage of the battle at Hsuchow, about the middle of May, the Imperial Headquarters issued an informal order to carry out Hankow operations with the Central China Ex. Forces as the main strength. They were then to continue Hsuchow operations on the one hand and prepare for Hankow operations on the other *. This threw them into a panic. In

the middle of June they received from Imperial Headquarters a formal order to effect Hankow operations.

At the beginning of July they had the necessary reinforcements on orders from Imperial Headquarters and reorganized the entire forces for the operations. The new forces were 2nd Army under HIGASHIKUNI and troops under LT.GEN.OKAMURA. Wuchang and Hankow campaign was scheduled for early autumn.

Hankow fell on Oct. 26th and on Nov. 3rd Commander-in-chief HATA formally entered the city. The people were very calm, order was maintained, the buildings were in good condition and one could not believe that a battle was fought recently.

When these cities fell Japan met resistance until they reached the sphere outside the city. There was little resistance after that and it was almost a bloodless occupation. The soldiers * remained calm and showed no excitement.

21,701

There was a definite agreement with the navy on the use of buildings in the city. They selected the best soldiers from each unit to enter the city. They sent units engaged in battle to the rear and sent the best portion of the 13th Division to the city, they being fully trained and educated and mild and obedient. He did not believe there was a single case of violation of military discipline at Hankow. They never received any report of it. He was astounded at the testimony that there had been a massacre in Hankow.

The Army, Navy and Air forces in the campaign had their bases in Nanking and Kiukiang and were under entirely different commands. Part of the air forces had been transferred to the attack of Canton * and the strength was considerably decreased so that long distance bombing was not carried out.

21,702

The Central China Exp. Forces had nothing to do with the Changkufeng Incident which made it impossible

to get the air forces which the Japanese Army in Manchuria had promised. They felt very bitter about it because they were in the midst of the Hankow operations.

HATA's duties were restricted to negative duties relating to peace and order. He did not have sufficient strength under him and had to receive orders from the Imperial Headquarters and get reinforcements to make any military movements. He had no authority to act independently.

Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces was restricted to the duties of strategic operations and military administration, and offensive operations were outside his authority.

When the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic matters hitherto handled by the Commander in-chief were transferred to it but until the board was set up, Special Service Organizations handled them every place on request of the Chinese.

The Communist Army in China tried to win the people. In their villages all people resisted the Japanese. When the Japanese army entered the communists went underground and doubled trouble. The only thing to do was to fight the people in general. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem. It had no knowledge of it and never used the money obtained by traffic in opium.

21,704

Secret funds for the forces were supplied by the War Ministry and they had no other. It was clear that the Commission had nothing to do with the Opium Question. He did not know how far the special services bureau or organizations knew about it.

21,705

Headquarters of Central China Exped. Forces was at Shanghai.; later it moved to Nanking. In

March, 1941, HATA became Commander-in-Chief of the China Exp. Forces, succeeding Gen. NISHIO, and his headquarters were at Nanking. HATA stayed first in Shanghai and at the time of the Wuchang-Hankow campaign he issued orders sending troops of sending of troops at the headquarters in Nanking. He left there about August 25th and moved headquarters to Kiuking, staying there until October 30th. On Nov. 3rd he entered Hankow and stayed until the middle of December. He then returned directly to Nanking.

21,706 HATA laid special stress because of his mission on the maintenance of military discipline. Soon after arrival in Shanghai * he held a conference of Division Commanders to whom he gave instructions on maintenance of military discipline.

21,707 * The witness stated that after the Hsuechow campaign in May, Maj. Gen. HASHIMOTO, chief of the First Division of the Army General Staff, said that the Central Army Expeditionary Forces may be needed to operate against Hankow. The witness said this was the start of the Hankow campaign but it was only a preliminary advance notice. Later on the basis of the talk with HASHIMOTO, the Central China Forces made preparations for the Hankow campaign by capturing Luchow.

Cross examination by Mr. Sutton

21,708 HATA became commander of the Central China Forces February 1938. * North of Nanking his position extended to Pangpu and to the west of Nanking it extended to Wuhu. The witness did not recall the distance. These two points were the northern and western extremities. Pangpu overlooks the Hwai river. The order for the Hsuechow operation was received in April. At that time HATA had about six divisions and one brigade and there were * approximately one hundred thousand troops. When HATA

21,709 * attacked Tai erh chuang the witness heard that there were over 200 thousand Chinese troops there; the resistance was not stubborn. It was extremely stubborn however when it was undertaken by the

21,710 North China Exped. Forces.

- 21,711 HATA prior to the Hankow campaign received approximately seven divisions of reinforcements. * According to his recollection the reinforcements which came from the north consisted of four divisions and one cavalry brigade under the command of HIGASHIKUNI.
- 21,712 Hsuchow and Hankow are in completely different sections. By airplane the distance is about 600 kilometers and the same is true of the distance between Nanking and Hankow. * While he could not say positively he had heard Chen Cheng was in command of the Chinese forces. It was a difficult operation.
- 21,713 It was the witness who resented the fact that part of the air force was transferred to Canton during this difficult operation. By "we" he meant himself and his subordinates. He had merely expressed two of his recollections. One was his discontent over the sending of the air forces from the Kwantung Army was * not realized, and 2, his discontent with the sending of a part of the airforce to another area of operations during the height of the campaign.
- 21,714 Asked whether these various activities were inactive duties as the witness had stated HATA was engaged in, the witness said that was something different. He first mentioned HATA's primary duties and then the operations which were new duties entrusted to him.
- 21,714 * In the areas where the communist armies were active it was difficult to distinguish between the communist army and the people in general and Japanese forces assigned to punitive action against the communist armies had extreme difficulty in identifying the troops. As a result extreme caution and care was required of the Japanese forces.
- 21,715 It was incorrect for him to use the words "fighting the people" * He could not recall the date that he had read a newspaper report on the proceedings of the Tribunal that someone had testified to the massacre of HANKOW. He did not

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KAWABE- cross -exam.

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know that after the capture of Hankow Japanese soldiers threw captured Chinese soldiers into the waters of the Yangtzu River and shot those who came to the surface.

21,716

He did not know that after the capture of Hankow, there were on the streets Chinese men dressed in Chinese gowns with their hands wired behind them who were shot.

The Ambassador mentioned on page 6 of the affidavit was appointed after the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei regime. Prior to this all political and economic affairs in occupied Central China were under the supervision of the army.

21,717

Secret funds are funds specially provided to the army and they are applied to such matters as reception and other social expenses of the commander. They were received from the High Command, the Army General Staff * and sent to the Intendance Agency.

Page

21,722

The witness had no recollection of the amount of secret funds sent to the Central China Expeditionary Forces under HATA from February to December 1938. He also * had no recollection of what was sent to HATA as commander of the China Expeditionary Force from August 1942 until the summer of 1943. Reports on these funds were handled as official accounting documents, but he did not know what they were, or what they contained, or their present whereabouts. When asked whether it was not necessary to account for these funds, he said it wasn't that there was no necessity to make such reports, but from the accounting standpoint the respective responsible persons handled the accounting documents.* Such documents were sent to the General Staff Command in Tokyo.

21,723

21,724

These secret funds were not used to assist and promote the so-called autonomous movement in China. The army in China received this money and although they were called secret funds, they were used as official funds by the forces in the budget, as well as the various units under its command. The secret funds, while called secret, were handled as ordinary funds. When asked whether they were in addition to the regular army budget he stated that so far as the expeditionary forces were concerned, they handled the funds in the ordinary way. No other funds were sent to the Central China forces except this secret fund. These were the only funds received from Tokyo.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Logan

The witness identified Exhibit 2651 as the order of the Commanding Headquarters at Kiuking on October 24th by the Commander of the Central China force prior to the Hankow campaign to raise the morale of the troops. HATA was the commander.

21,729

This document stated * that the enemy seems to have begun a general retreat and the 21st Army has already captured Canton. The army is going to carry out its original plans, swiftly to advance on Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang.

21,730

* The 2nd and 11th armies will advance according to instructions. The two armies are to see that their units are well controlled with regard to the area, order of

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Page

action and numerical strength, so that disorder may be prevented in the advance. It set forth the areas of operation to be placed under control.

21,731

When each army reaches its limits, it is to appoint special units to advance and clear the area. The commanders are to decide the numerical strength and order of action according to their respective area of operation. No greater force than that absolutely necessary for clearing and garrisoning the area is to be admitted into the area.

21,732
21,734

The witness identified Exhibit 2562 as a document issued to the units of the China Expeditionary forces on * December 8, 1942 in accordance with the wishes of the commander and sent to all troops under his command. It is not an order. It is a record of a broadcast the witness made at the time and the purport was to convey the ideas and thoughts of the commander in understandable, plain words to the soldiers.

21,736

The document stated that military discipline is the foundation of the army, and the men should be warned against the tendency of becoming weary of war when it has already been in progress for a long time. If the determination to successfully close the long war should be shattered in battle, or influenced in any way, act with violence and thus impair the prestige of the army, it would not only disgrace the army but would alienate them from the Chinese and prevent them from attaining the object of the holy war. The dignified attitude of the army and the dignity of strict military discipline are the most essential factors to attaining the object * thereby enabling them to annihilate the powerful enemy and maintain public peace and order and win the people's confidence. They should reflect on their conduct at all times so as not to oppose the fundamental principle of the army.

21,737

The keynote of friendly relations between Japan and China lies in showing Japan's sincerity. Far more important is the showing of personal sincerity by both Chinese and Japanese. Every act on the part of the Japanese Army should emanate from the spirit to translate sincerity into action. This practice should be based on the sentiment of

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21,738

neighborliness. They should respect the traditions and customs and manners of the Chinese. In many cases one gets results contrary to expectation because of failure to understand the * character and tradition and customs of the Chinese and treating them in the Japanese manner, or what is better known as the temper of a soldier, and in extreme cases forcing them to obey without reasons.

In carrying out guard duty many forget the spiritual side of things and try to enforce things only through formality and thus increase bitter feelings. They are, therefore, in this way inclined to compromise their honor without realizing it and to interfere with their affairs or incur their ill feeling; and if one loses one's friendly feeling by saying or doing something in a fit of passion and they feel insulted in the presence of the public and have a grudge against the Japanese, then the spiritual combination of the Chinese with the Japanese can not possibly be attained and the prospect of the holy war will be far from bright. Men should realize that the Chinese will admire and be devoted to them only when the latter bear themselves properly and are lenient to the former.

MEMORANDUM

28 May 1947
27 May 1947

TO : Files

FROM : D. N. Sutton

SUBJECT: Secret Funds - Evidence to be Introduced during Rebuttal.

file
KAWABE, Masakazu (Shozo) testified, Exhibit No. 2479-A, R. 21,704:

"Secret Funds of the China Expeditionary Forces were supplied by the War Ministry and we had no other fund."

And again on cross-examination, R. 21,724 - 21,725 that no other funds were sent to the China Expeditionary Forces except the secret funds referred to on page 7 of his affidavit.

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 has been included in the investigation files on the subject witness and is now available

Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office. Room 303.

E P M

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

27 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Crowe
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,
Investigative Division, IPS
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

HATA

WITNESS

KAWABE, Shozo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

A staff study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigation files on the subject witness and is now available

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

EP M

Incl
(Described above)

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

28 May 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Files

FROM : D. N. Sutton

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Masakazu (Shozo) - Cross-Examination

I. First appearance, 22 April 1947, Def. Doc. 970, Exhibit 2479, R. 20,517 - 20,548.

Record Page

20,537

Fengtai Incident, 18 September 1936. In the settlement of this, the Chinese were required to withdraw their troops from Fengtai.

20,538

Denies the testimony of Gen. Ching, Teh-Chun, Exhibit 199, R. 2316, that the Japanese used this incident as a pretext to reinforce their troops at Fengtai.

20,539

Denies that secret funds were used to assist Japanese troops had been stationed at Fengtai since May 1936.

20,542

The "furious exercises" practiced by the Japanese Army at night were to perfect their training.

20,543

The intrigue of third parties firing between the lines was reported to the garrison headquarters in Tientsin.

20,544

Special investigation was made by the Japanese Army and it was found that the Chinese did not do this firing.

20,545

Does not know whether or not this firing resulted in the Chinese being charged with having violated the truce.

20,546

The firing lasted for four or five days, beginning July 9.

II. Second appearance, 7 May 1947, Def. Doc. 823, Exhibit 2479-A, R. 21,695 - 21,725.

21,708

In February 1938 when Hata assumed command, the northern and western extremities occupied by the Central China Expeditionary Forces were Pangpu on the Hwai River and Wuku.

- 21,712-
21,713 Admits that the statement in his affidavit that General Hata had only negative duties is incorrect.
- 21,714 States that he was incorrect in using the words "fighting the people" in his affidavit.
- 21,717 Secret funds from the Army General Staff were received by the Army in the field.
- 21,722 Does not know the amount of secret funds sent to the Central China Expeditionary Forces while he was Chief of Staff from February to December 1938.
- 21,723 Does not know what accounting was made of the secret funds.
- 21,724 Denies that secret funds were used to assist and promote the "autonomous movement" in China.
- 21,725 The secret fund was the only fund received by the Army from Tokyo.

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David M. Sutton
FROM : William E. Edwards *WED*
SUBJECT: KAWABE, Masakazu
Affidavit -- Defense Document #823.

In his affidavit, known as Defense Document #823, Defense witness, KAWABE, Masakazu, has made the following statement (see bottom of page 7):

"XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. SECRET FUNDS OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WAS (WERE) SUPPLIED BY THE WAR MINISTRY AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND* * * * (Caps and underlining added.)

Through the quoted statements and those that follow in the affidavit, the affiant obviously has endeavored to negate the necessity for using funds derived from opium traffic by contending that the China Expeditionary Forces had an abundance of funds obtained from the War Ministry secret funds, and therefore would have no need for funds derived from any other source.

It is believed that in his attempt to do so, the witness has unwittingly paved the way for the Prosecution to broaden its predicate which would justify cross-examination of several of the accused on the important question of secret funds and perhaps thereby to lay the adequate foundation for the use of some additional testimony during the rebuttal phase of the case. Even more importantly, in the instant situation, it is believed that this witness through the quoted statement may make it possible on cross-examination directly to implicate the defendant HATA in the secret fund situation.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is therefore respectfully suggested that the following questions might be put to this witness on cross-examination to a good advantage:

1. General KAWABE, you have made the following statement in your affidavit, and I quote from paragraph XI, appearing at the bottom of page 7 of the English translation thereof:

Memorandum to: Mr. David N. Sutton
Page 2
18 April 1947

"XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. SECRET FUNDS OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WAS (WERE) SUPPLIED BY THE WAR MINISTRY AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND. * * * * (Caps and underscoring supplied for emphasis.)

I should now like to ask you how much in War Ministry secret funds did the China Expeditionary Forces receive during the period extending from August 1942 to the summer of 1943, when, as you have stated in paragraph I of your affidavit, you served under the defendant HATA as General Chief of Staff of China Expeditionary Forces?

2. In what manner were such funds transmitted by the War Ministry to the China Expeditionary Forces?
3. Were such funds transmitted to the defendant HATA, as Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, or, to you as Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces?
4. What was your understanding as to the purposes for which such funds were to be used?
5. In what manner and for what purposes were they actually expended?
6. Were they not, in fact, used for other purposes?
7. Was it necessary for the defendant HATA, or for you, to render any accounting of the expenditures of such funds?
8. Were any of such funds returned or remitted to the War Ministry in Tokyo?
9. (If the answer to the question next above is "Yes") To whom, in what manner, and for what purpose were such funds so returned to Tokyo?
10. Now, General KAWABE, in the excerpt taken from your affidavit which I quoted to you a few moments ago, you stated that "secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was (were) supplied by the War Ministry AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND." (Caps and underscoring added.) As a matter of fact, General, the China Expeditionary Forces like all other armies in the several theaters of operation were provided with substantial funds derived from the regular army budget to meet all normal and routine expenses, were they not?

Memorandum to: Mr. David N. Sutton

Page 3

18 April 1947

11. (If the witness agrees to the previous question, as he surely must) Is a matter of fact it is also true, is it not, that the War Ministry secret funds to which you have referred were made available to the China Expeditionary Forces for very special purposes or uses and that all other expenses of the China Expeditionary Forces were intended to be met and paid out of funds provided from the regular army budget?
12. So that now as you will have to admit, will you not, that your statement to the effect that the China Expeditionary Forces had no fund other than the secret funds supplied by the War Ministry was not a true statement?
13. And so therefore, in the last analysis, your statement about War Ministry secret funds does not necessarily have any bearing whatsoever on your previous statement regarding money obtained by traffic in opium? That is a proper deduction, is it not?

WEE/nob

REPORT BY: H. SHIMOJIMA
5 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Address: Unknown

Formerly a Lt. General. Subject was No. 2 man in the Inspectorate General of Military Education, and prospective witness re July 7 Incident.

KAWABE is subject of IPS Case File No. 302 and File 20.

COPIES: 3 File 302
3 " 20
1 Mr. Newbill

REPORT BY: JOHN A. CURTIS
20 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Curriculum Vitae on the above named subject is contained in subject's
personal file No. 200, serial 25.

COPIES 4 File
1 Mr. Newbill

NAME OF WITNESS: KAWABE, Masakasu (Also known as Shozo)

REQUESTED BY : UMEZU, Yoshihiro

DATE : 3 April 1947

Completed as to items 1 - 5, 7 - 8.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Operations, CIS, G-2
Compilation Branch

SUBJECT, KAWABE, Lt. General Masakazu (Shozo)

Chief of Staff of Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China; prior to his appointment as Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in Burma. He was also prominent in 'Lukouchiao Incident'; he supported Colonel Muta's mixed Regiment in its attack of the Chinese Garrison troops; later he fought in Central China; he comes to position of Chief of Staff in China determined to liquidate China Incident and strengthen the National Government (Nanking). He is from Tokyo and is the brother of Torajiro KAWABE, who was formerly Chief of Staff of Nation Defense Headquarters; at the Military Academy he was classmate of Lt. Gen. HOMMA, TANAKA, and ISHIKADA. After graduation he was an instructor at the Infantry School; in 1936 he was promoted to Major General and joined the Headquarters of Lt. Gen. TAJIRI who was Commander of the Japanese garrisons in North China; at the time of Lukouchiao Incident TAJIRI was ill and KAWABE was left in Charge. After fighting in Hopeh, Shansi, Honan and Hupeh he was transferred to the post of Chief Supervisor of Military Education in January 1939 and in the following March he was made a Lt. General; always been ambitious to be the Minister of War; and advocate of war on Russia like General YAMADA who is one of the most radical fascists.

SOURCE: MID, Military Attache in China, 30 December 1942
OSS R & A FE, Washington, 19 July 1944.

Name: SHOZO KAWABE

Census register: A commoner of TOYAMA Prefecture

The date of birth: Dec. 5, 1886

Mar. 29, 1905	Graduated from TOYAMA prefectural TAKAOKA middle-school.	
Jul. 15, 1905	Appointed to be a cadet, and distributed to the thirty fifth infantry regiment.	
Dec. 1, 1905	Entered into the military academy.	
May 31, 1907	Graduated from the military academy and turned back to the former regiment.	
Jun 5, 1907	Appointed to be a probationary officer.	
Dec. 26, 1907	Appointed to be a 2nd Lt. infantry, and attached to the thirty-fifth infantry regiment.	
Mar. 20, 1908	Conferred to the senior grade of the eighth class court rank.	
Nov. 30, 1910	Appointed to 1st Lt., Infantry	Cabinet
Feb. 10, 1911	Conferred to the junior grade of the seventh class court rank.	
Dec. 13, 1912	Appointed to be the entrance into the Military Staff College.	
Apr. 21, 1916	Conferred to the senior grade of the seventh class court rank.	
Aug. 18, 1916	Appointed to be the service to the Inspector General of the Military Education.	
Aug. 6, 1917	Appointed to be a captain of infantry.	
Nov. 5, 1917	Released from the Inspection General of Military Education	War Ministry
Dec. 4, 1917	Released from present position, Appointed to be the company commander of the thirty-fifth infantry regiment	War Ministry
Apr 1, 1918	Released from the official position and appointed to be the residence at Switzerland for the investigation of military affairs.	

Nov. 1, 1919	<p>Conferred to the fifth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures.</p> <p>(A money grant 620 yen)</p> <p>(for the military merit from 1915 to 1920)</p>	
Jun 30, 1920	<p>Conferred to the junior grade of the sixth class of court rank.</p>	
July 11, 1920	<p>Released from the residence at Switzerland, Appointed to the member of Inspector General of Military Education and the acting of the staff.</p>	War Ministry
Aug. 6, 1922	<p>Appointed to be a major of infantry.</p>	Cabinet
June 18, 1924	<p>Released from the present position and appointed to the general staff.</p>	War Ministry
Aug. 7, 1924	<p>Appointed to additional post as the adjutant of Marshal under the Marshal Viscount, Kageaki KAWAMURA.</p>	War Ministry
Mar. 2, 1925	<p>Released from the additional post.</p>	War Ministry
Aug. 2, 1925	<p>Conferred to be the senior grade of the sixth class of court rank</p>	
July 26, 1927	<p>Appointed to be a lieutenant-colonel of infantry</p>	Cabinet
Nov. 11, 1927	<p>Appointed to the additional post as military science instructor of the Military Staff College</p>	War Ministry
Nov. 29, 1927	<p>Conferred to the fourth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures</p>	
Aug. 1, 1929	<p>Released from the present position and additional post.</p>	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1929	<p>Appointed to be the military officer at the Imperial Embassy in Germany</p>	Cabinet
June 3, 1930	<p>Appointed to the additional post as the Technical Headquarters officer in Germany and the Aviation Headquarters officer in Germany.</p>	War Ministry

Aug. 1, 1931	Appointed to be Colonel of infantry	Cabinet
Sept. 15, 1931	Conferred to be the junior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	
Feb. 6, 1932	Released from the present position,	Cabinet
	Released from the additional post,	War Ministry
	Appointed to attach of the General Staff.	War Ministry
Apr. 11, 1932	Appointed to the sixth regimental commander.	
Aug. 1, 1933	Appointed to the educational commander, instructor and member of consideration section of the infantry school.	
Mar. 5, 1934	Appointed to the chief of the first section of Inspector-General of Military Education and member of investigation section of the military correspondence school.	War Ministry
Apr. 14, 1934	Appointed to be the committee of war material investigation meeting.	Cabinet
Feb 14, 1935	Appointed to the additional post as member of the military automobile school investigation section.	War Ministry
Mar. 26, 1935	Appointed to be the mission of the first special investigation	War Ministry
Apr. 29, 1934	Conferred to the third order of the merit with the order of sacred treasures. (for the merit from Showa 6 to 9 incident.)	
Mar. 7, 1936	Appointed to be Major-General.	Cabinet
	Appointed to attach as the Inspector General of Military Education.	War Ministry
	(No insertion on the official gazette)	
	Released from the war material Investigation Committee.	Cabinet
May 1, 1936	Raised to the senior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	

Aug. 26, 1937	Appointed to staff officer of the northern China direction troop (no insertion on the official gazette)	War Ministry
Sept. 7, 1938	Conferred to the second order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures	
Feb. 9, 1939	Appointed to the investigation committee of text-book	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1939	Appointed to be Lieutenant-General.	Cabinet
May 15, 1939	Raised to the junior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Sept. 12, 1939	Appointed to be the representative of Inspector-General of military education	War Ministry
Oct. 14, 1939	Released from the representative of Inspector-General of Military Education.	War Ministry
Mar. 27, 1940	Released from the investigation committee of text-book.	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1940	Dismissed from the present position and additional post.	War Ministry
Mar. 9, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the twelfth division.	
Mar. 1, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the third Army.	Cabinet
June 2, 1941	Raised to the senior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Dec. 12, 1941	Conferred to the first order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures (stopped by the orderment of KUNNAI HATS 898 on the 23rd Oct 1940)	
Apr. 29, 1940	Raised to the second order of merit with the order of Golden Kite. Raised to the first order of merit with the order of the great rising sun. (Merit for the China Incident)	
Mar. 18, 1943	Appointed to the commander of Burma direction army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	

July 1, 1944	Raised to the junior grade of the third class of court rank.	
Dec. 1, 1944	Appointed to be the Commander of central direction Army.	Cabinet
Feb. 1, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the fifth direction Army and additional post as the commander of supervision of central direction. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Apr. 9, 1945	Appointed to the General	Cabinet
Apr. 7, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the General Air Forces. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Oct. 1, 1945	Appointed to the Commander of the First General Army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
May 15, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the First Demobilization. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet

REPORT BY: JOHN A. CURTIS
20 Feb 47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: KAWABE, Shozo

Curriculum Vitae on the above named subject is contained in subject's personal file No. 200, serial 25.

COPIES 4 File
1 Mr. Newbill

KAWABE, Masakasu

Request by: UMEZU, Yoshihiro

Address: at present in Sugamo Prison.

He was a General in the Japanese Army.

The facts to be proved by witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of defendant UMEZU during the period in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that UMEZU took no part in any of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment, and was not responsible for the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

Documents:

1. Principles of plans of operations of the Imperial Army 1940-1943
2. Principles for preparation of operations of Kwantung Army 1942
3. Operations plan of Kwantung Army 1940-1944
4. Border Guard Regulations of Kwantung Army - Sept or Oct 1939

Location of documents - Secret Instruction File. Headquarters of Kwantung Army, (Operations Room) Hsingking, Manchuria.

The relevance of these documents is that they will prove the character and scope of operations and other plans of the Japanese Army, and notably of the Kwantung Army, vis-a-vis the USSR.

KAWABE, Masakazu

Request by: UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Address: at present in Sugamo Prison.

He was a General in the Japanese Army.

The facts to be proved by witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of defendant UMEZU during the period in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that UMEZU took no part in any of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment, and was not responsible for the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

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The relevance of these documents is that they will prove the character and scope of operations and other plans of the Japanese Army, and notably of the Kwantung Army, vis-a-vis the USSR.

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3038

11 June 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Loose, Handwritten Sheets, Corrected Decoration Data on Certain Defense Witnesses, and Additional Decoration Data on KOSHI, Saburo

Date: 6 May 1947 Original () Copy (x) Language: Japanese, English

Has it been translated? Yes () No (x)

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL)

) Board of Decorations, Japanese Govt

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:)

PERSONS IMPLICATED: See below

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Data on following personalities:

KOGA, Kiyoshi
ARIYOSHI, Chuichi
GODO, Takuo
HANEDA, Toru
IKAWA, Tadao
ISHIMARU, Shitowa
MURAKAWA, Kengo
ONODERA, Naosuke
BABA, Tsunego
FURUMI, Tadayuki
IKEZAKI, Tadatake
HATTA, Shiroji
IWAI, Takeo
INAHARA, Hatsuji
IWATA, Ainosuke
KANAT, Shoji
KANEKO, Kiyoto
KAWABE, Masakaza

KOMURA, Sakahiko
KOTANI, Etsuo
KUSUMOTO, Masataka
MANAKI, Yoshinobu
MATSUDA, Reikichi
MISHIMA, Yasuo
MIZUNO, Shinko
MURAMATSU, Tsuneo
NAKAMURA, Benko
NAKAYAMA, Hajime
NAKAYAMA, Yasuro
MISHIMURA, Susumu
SAITO, Masatoshi
SHIMOMURA, Nobusada
SHIRAI, Seishin
SHIZUKI, Ihei
SHIRAI, Masatoki
SUETAKE, Kamezo

Doc. No. 3038

Page 1

Memorandum to: Mr. Crowe

From: Mr. Edward P. Monaghan

Date: 29 April 1947

Lt. Gen. Matsui, Takuro

a. He was in Nanking at the end of the war and it is believed he is still there, a prisoner of war of the Chinese.

Lt. Gen. Sawada, Shigeru

a. The witness is either in Shanghai or Nanking, having already been tried by the Chinese there.

Lt. Gen. Kawabe, Shozo

a. The witness is now in Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan, a prisoner of the Allies.

Lt. Gen. Harada, Kuniakichi

a. The witness is now in Java or Singapore, having been sent there from Tokyo by the Allies.

Gen. Okamura, Neiji

a. The witness is now in Peking, a prisoner of war of the Chinese.

The facts to be proved by these witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of the accused HATA during the time in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony of these witnesses, all of whom were associated with the accused HATA in various capacities at time charged in the indictment, is in its tendency to establish that the accused HATA took no part in any of the conspiracies charged to him, and was not in any wise connected with the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

Edward P. Monaghan
Chief, Investigative Section

21 April 1947

To Mr. Smith Crowe

Re: Information requested by you from the request for order and process for the production of Kawabe, Masakasu as a witness in behalf of defendant HATA, Shunroku.

It is cited in the request that the facts to be proved by the witness is the policies, utterances, and actions of the defendant Hata during the time in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that Kawabe, Masakasu associated with the accused Hata in various capacities at the time charged in the indictment, is in its tendency to establish that the accused took no part in any of the conspiracies charged to him and was not in any wise connected with the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

J.G.Lambert
Investigator

Def. Doc. No. 823 - continued

and that the persons responsible for them acted upon permission from the War Ministry. In part 10 he justifies the war against villagers by stating that the communist army in China went underground and could not be distinguished from the soldiers which made it necessary to fight the people.

Affiant states in part 10 that the General had nothing to do with the opium problem in China and in part 12 he claims that the court-martial of air force officers in 1942 were held upon orders of the War Ministry.

In part 13 he shows where the General's headquarters were at various stages of the campaign, and in paragraph 14 he again re-states what he explained in parts 2 and 7, that General HATA had only negative duties of maintenance of peace and order, that he gave strict instructions concerning discipline and was not involved in any irksome task.

COMMENT:

This absolving of General HATA of all responsibility of aggressive action regarding civilians, prisoners of war, etc., is directly contradictory with the theory of the government officials in Tokyo who disclaim knowledge of the excesses that went on in these various campaigns. The witness in several instances testifies as to orders coming from Imperial Headquarters but does not show that he saw them or was present when they were received.

In cross-examination the prosecutor will inquire further as to the witness' knowledge of what occurred with regard to the war crimes, and other charges involved, since his affidavit contains many conclusions and opinions.

Translated by
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (translation)

Being duly sworn on oath in accordance with the procedure of my country, I, Masakazu Kawabe, hereby depose and say:

I was born on December 5 in the 19th Year of Meiji at Nōka Higashi-Noziri-mura Higashi-Tochinami-gun Toyama prefecture, which is my permanent address, and I live at 2874 Koganei Koganei-machi Kitatama-gun Tokyo.

My career runs as follows:

1907	graduated from the Military Academy
1915	graduated from the Military Staff College
1936	major-general
1936	commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in North China
September 1937	vice-chief of the staff of the North China Area Army
February 1938	chief of the staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces

Def Doc No. 823

January	1939	chief of the Department of the Inspector-General of Military Education
March	1940	commander of the 12th Division
March	1941	commander of the 3rd Army
August	1942	chief of the staff of China Expeditionary Forces
March	1943	commander of the Burma Area Army
December	1944	commander of the Central Army
March	1945	<u>general</u>
April	1945	commander of Whole Air Force

I. I served as chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, from February to December, 1938, and later as general chief of the staff under General Shunroku HATA, Commander-in-chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, from August, 1942, to summer, 1943.

II. General HATA was appointed commander-in-chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General Iwane MATSUI. His duties, however, essentially differed from that of his predecessor, Commander-in-Chief MATSUI. His was a very negative one, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order with the strength of about six divisions in the triangular zone connecting Nanking, Hangchow and Shanghai. Therefore he did not take over the duties any report concerning military operations from the ex-Commander-in-Chief MATSUI.

III. In spite of negative restriction of his duties to the maintenance of peace and order, he carried out the Hsueh campaign for the following reason. About the beginning of April, 1938, the North China Expeditionary Forces reached Tsinan while the Central China Expeditionary Force reached the Hwai River. The 10th Division, however, suffered a considerable loss at the battle of Taierhchwang, east of Hsueh, and the 5th Division also was unsuccessful in attacks, thus the North China Expeditionary Forces had difficulties for further advance. It was, therefore, found necessary for the two expeditionary forces to expel to the west the enemy forces and secure their contact. The Imperial Headquarters issued an order to carry out such operation. Under these circumstances the Hata Forces began movement on about May 10 and opened an attack against the enemy forces at Taierhchwang, east of Hsueh, with the strength of about three divisions, while the North China Expeditionary Force attacked them with about four divisions, with the result that the enemy forces were driven away on about May 20 and the battle at Hsueh came to an end.

*Hsueh
campaign*

IV. At last stage of the battle at, ^{the} Hsueh namely, about the middle of May, the Imperial Headquarters issued an informal order that we should carry out Hankow operations with the Central China Expeditionary Forces as the main strength. We were then

to continue Hsuechow operations on the one hand and prepare ourselves for Hankow operations on the other. This compulsory operation orders threw us into no small panic. In the middle of June, we received ^{from} the Imperial Headquarters a formal order to effect Hankow operations.

At the beginning of July we had necessary reinforcements for Hankow operations on orders from the Imperial Headquarters and re-organized the entire forces for the operations. The troops reinforced to us the 2nd Army Under Prince Higashikuni and the troops under Lieutenant-General OKAMURA. Wuchang and Hankow campaign was scheduled for early autumn.

Hankow fell on October 26 and on November 3 Commander-in-Chief Hata made formal entry into the city. At that time people in Hankow remained very calm, order was maintained, the buildings were in good order, and it was difficult to believe that battle was fought in the city recently.

When Wuchang and Hankow fell, we met with resistance of the enemies until we reached a spot two or three 'ri' outside the city, but after that little resistance was made and it was almost a bloodless occupation; therefore the soldiers remained composed and showed no excitement.

Commander-in-Chief HATA not only issued strict orders to each unit under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline, but to prevent disorder in the city after

*Kow
Many*

the occupation, he gave each unit as instructions of the chief of the staff, detailed regulations accompanying the orders. Those instructions indicated the directions the Army and Navy or individual unit of the Army should take, and fixed the areas of occupation by the Army and Navy. We also made a definite agreement with the Navy regarding the use of the buildings in the city, and selected the best soldiers out of each unit to enter the city; that is, we transferred the units engaged in the battle to the rear and sent into the city the very best portion of the 13th Division which was not only full trained and educated but was mild and obedient. As we gave such strict orders and instructions and took every precaution with minute care, we believe there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow, such as massacre, violence, plunder and etc. Nor did we receive any report or even hear of them. I read in the papers that someone testified to the massacre in Hankow, and I am astounded at such ^{an} inconceivable testimony.

Hankow

The Army and Navy air forces engaged in Hankow campaign had their bases in Nanking and Hsikiang respectively and were under entirely different command. However, part of the air forces had been transferred to the attack of Canton, and the strength was considerably decreased so that long-distance bombing was not carried out.

V. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do

with the Canton operations, and we resented at the transfer of part of the air forces.

VI. The Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Changkufeng Incident either. The occurrence of the Changkufeng Incident made it impossible for us to get the air forces which the Japanese Army in Manchuria had promised to give us. As the Central China Expeditionary Forces were in the midst of the Hankow operations at that time, we felt bitter about it.

VII. The Authority of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was restricted to negative duties relating to the maintenance of peace and order. He had not sufficient strength under him and he had to receive orders from the Imperial Headquarters and get reinforcements upon their instruction in order to make any military movements. He had no authority to act independently.

Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces were restricted to the duties of the strategic operations and military administration, and offensive operations were beyond his authority. His was the authority over the defense of the occupied territories and administration was in the hands of the ambassador after his appointment.

VIII. Since the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs hitherto handled by the Commander-in-Chief

130-A-
IN

were transferred to it, but till the set-up of the Board was completed, special service organizations handled them in reality in every place upon request of the Chinese authorities.

PW

who ordered them shot or pushed overboard

IX. As regards to the Chinese prisoners of war, we made it a rule to deliver them to the Central Government of China as there existed no treaty concerning them. Persons responsible for them were the Commanders-in-Chief (i.e. the Commanders-in-Chief of each army under General (HATA), and they acted upon permission of the War Ministry.

X. The Communist Army in China endeavoured to win the people, In the villages under its control all the people offered resistance to the Japanese Army. No sooner had the Japanese Army entered the villages than the communist went underground and they doubled our trouble, because we could not distinguish underground soldiers from the villagers. In those areas we could not but fight the people in general.

again

Special Secret Fund

W.C. Edwards Study

XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. Secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was supplied by the War Ministry and we had no other fund. Therefore, it is clear that the Commander-in-Chief had nothing to do with the opium question, but I am not quite certain how far the special service bureau or the special service organizations know about it.

XII. *The court-martial of the air force officers who attacked*
XII. The court-martial of the air force officers who attacked Tokyo in April 1942 was held upon orders of the War Ministry and everything was carried out strictly in accordance with orders.

XIII. The headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was in Shanghai at first since General HATA was appointed Commander-in-Chief but later it moved to Nanking. Then in March 1941 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces in succession to General NISHIO, and the headquarters was in Nanking at that time. Therefore, General HATA stayed at first in Shanghai while he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces (1938) and at the time of Wuchang-Hankow campaign he issued orders of deapatch of troops at the headquarters in Nanking. He left there on August 25 and moved the headquarters to Kiukiang where he stayed until October 30. On November 3 he entered Hankow and stayed there until the middle of the same month. After holding a requiem service for the war-dead, he returned directly to Nanking.

XIV. The duty of General HATA as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces was not a positive one. His was the negative duty of maintaining peace and order in the occupied areas, therefore he laid special stress on the maintenance of military discipline. Soon after his arrival in Shanghai he held the conference of Division Commanders when I remember vividly that he gave whole-hearted instructions concerning the

maintenance of military discipline. General HATA was not involved in any irksome as he was not engaged in any outstanding operations.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

At Sugamo Prison
6 December, 1946.

I, Tomoharu Kokubu, hereby certify that the affiant was sworn to and affixed his signature to the above statement in my presence. (He did not, however, affix his seal as he was not in possession of it)

/S/ Tomoharu Kokubu (seal)

At Sugamo Prison
6 December, 1946

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to state the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ Masakazu Kawabe

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

22 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witness - KAWABE, Shozo

The following additional information which is already in evidence is herewith forwarded to you:

1. Record page 3377-3378 - In the affidavit of this witness, he states that General HATA's duties in Central China during 1938, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Force, were negative in nature and that HATA was in the position of merely maintaining peace and order in Central China. General TADA, Hayao, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo, August 1937 through December 1938, testified as follows:

"As such, I made the plans for the capture of Japanese armed forces --

"THE PRESIDENT: "campaign".

"COLONEL MORROW: Did I say "campaign"?

"(Continuing reading):"

--"culminating in the capture of Shanghai 12 November, 1937, the campaign ending in the capture of Nanking 13 December, 1937, and the campaign which finally resulted in the taking of Hankow 27 October 1938.

"The plans for the capture of Shanghai were made when the incident broke out in Shanghai; during the battle of Shanghai, plans were drawn up for the capture of Nanking, and plans for the capture of Hankow were drawn up in June or July 1938."

2. Record page 7,335 to 7,337 - The following excerpts have a bearing on the affidavit of the above witness in two respects - (1) Regarding the July 7, 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident and (2) Regarding the statement that Japanese armies intended merely to maintain the status quo in Central China during 1937 and 1938.

(Memorandum to Mr. D. N. Sutton re Witness KAWABE, Shozo)

Exhibit #671A is an excerpt from the newspaper "Japan Advertiser" and is a statement by ARAKI, one of the defendants, and reads as follows:

"Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade."

Exhibit #672 is a telegram from the defendant TOJO, the Chief of the Kwantung Army, Headquarters, dated June 9, 1937, and reading as follows:

"Judging the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid of the menace at our back."

Smith N. Crowe Jr.

SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

21 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witness KAWABE, Shozo

The following have been found relating to the subject matter of the testimony of the above witness, in addition to that already forwarded to you:

1. Record Page 3,320 - Mr. Wang Len-Ch'ae, on July 7, 1937, the Executive Advisor for the Third District of Hopei Province and concurrently the magistrate of Wang-Ping Hsien, within which Lukouchiao is located, testified as follows:

"The war of Lukouchiao was started as a consequence of the Japanese military maneuvers which they performed upon Chinese soil freely without any treaty rights and without notifying the local Chinese authorities beforehand."

2. Record Page 3,325 - Mr. Wang, after tracing the history of the clash on July 7, 1937, and on the following day stated that he was in Wang-Ping under orders to guard the city against attack from the Japanese. At this time and before he had received any communications which would authorize him to leave the city, he was asked to go out of the city to effect a truce, which he refused to do. The firing then continued and the witness testified as follows:

✓
7-24-47
"After 6 p.m., the firing quieted down. The Japanese commander, one named KAWABE, Shozo, also sent a note to me and asked me to go out of the city for negotiation, failing which, I should see that all the inhabitants be evacuated because they would bombard the city with heavy artillery. I declined the demand."

3. Record Page 3,332 - In summation, Mr. Wang testified as follows:

(Memorandum to Mr. David Sutton, subj: Witness KAWABE, Shozo)

3. (contd)

"Judging from the above accounts, one would readily realize that the Japanese invasion was a studied and systematic scheme which was not meted out overnight. They should be made to shoulder the full responsibilities of the war."

4. Record Page 3357 - Colonel David D. Barrett, in July 1937, the Assistant Military Attache of the Embassy of the United States, Peiping, China, stated that, upon hearing of the clash at Marco Polo Bridge, he went to the City of Wanping and then testified as follows:

"On my return to Peiping I reported to Colonel Stilwell what I had observed substantially as noted above, and stated that as far as I could determine the clash had been on a very small scale and was not nearly so serious as many other clashes which had occurred since September 18, 1931. I further stated that I believed the incident could easily be settled if the Japanese really so desired, as I had observed absolutely no signs of any aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese."

5. Record Page 3,363 - 4 - Colonel Barrett, in summation, testified as follows:

"In my opinion, the action of the Japanese in conducting night maneuvers near Wanping during the first week of July 1937 was deliberately provocative. The Japanese could not but have been aware of the strained relations then existing between Japan and China, and of the chances for misunderstanding and friction which might arise during such maneuvers. The fact that movements of large Japanese forces from Manchuria to areas south of the Great Wall began within a period of twenty-four hours after the Japanese attack at Wanping inevitably suggests that the Wanping incident was the carefully prepared excuse for the second stage of Japan's undeclared war on China, the first stage having been begun at Mukden on the night 17-18 September 1931."

Smith N. Crowe Jr.
SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David N. Sutton
FROM : William E. Edwards *WES*
SUBJECT: KAWABE, Masakazu
Affidavit — Defense Document #823.

In his affidavit, known as Defense Document #823, Defense witness, KAWABE, Masakazu, has made the following statement (see bottom of page 7):

"XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. SECRET FUNDS OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WAS (WERE) SUPPLIED BY THE WAR MINISTRY AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND* * * *" (Caps and underscoring added.)

Through the quoted statements and those that follow in the affidavit, the affiant obviously has endeavored to negate the necessity for using funds derived from opium traffic by contending that the China Expeditionary Forces had an abundance of funds obtained from the War Ministry secret funds, and therefore would have no need for funds derived from any other source.

It is believed that in his attempt to do so, the witness has unwittingly paved the way for the Prosecution to broaden its predicate which would justify cross-examination of several of the accused on the important question of secret funds and perhaps thereby to lay the adequate foundation for the use of some additional testimony during the rebuttal phase of the case. Even more importantly, in the instant situation, it is believed that this witness through the quoted statement may make it possible on cross-examination directly to implicate the defendant HATA in the secret fund situation.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, it is therefore respectfully suggested that the following questions might be put to this witness on cross-examination to a good advantage:

1. General KAWABE, you have made the following statement in your affidavit, and I quote from paragraph XI, appearing at the bottom of page 7 of the English translation thereof:

Memorandum to: Mr. David N. Sutton
Page 2
18 April 1947

"XI. The China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China. We had no knowledge of it and we never used the money obtained by traffic in opium. SECRET FUNDS OF THE CHINA EXPEDITIONARY FORCES WAS (WERE) SUPPLIED BY THE WAR MINISTRY AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND. * * *" (Caps and underscoring supplied for emphasis.)

I should now like to ask you how much in War Ministry secret funds did the China Expeditionary Forces receive during the period extending from August 1942 to the summer of 1943, when, as you have stated in paragraph I of your affidavit, you served under the defendant HATA as General Chief of Staff of China Expeditionary Forces?

2. In what manner were such funds transmitted by the War Ministry to the China Expeditionary Forces?
3. Were such funds transmitted to the defendant HATA, as Commander-in-Chief of the China Expeditionary Forces, or, to you as Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Forces?
4. What was your understanding as to the purposes for which such funds were to be used?
5. In what manner and for what purposes were they actually expended?
6. Were they not, in fact, used for other purposes?
7. Was it necessary for the defendant HATA, or for you, to render any accounting of the expenditures of such funds?
8. Were any of such funds returned or remitted to the War Ministry in Tokyo?
9. (If the answer to the question next above is "Yes") To whom, in what manner, and for what purpose were such funds so returned to Tokyo?
10. Now, General KAWABE, in the excerpt taken from your affidavit which I quoted to you a few moments ago, you stated that "secret funds of the China Expeditionary Forces was (were) supplied by the War Ministry AND WE HAD NO OTHER FUND." (Caps and underscoring added.) As a matter of fact, General, the China Expeditionary Forces like all other armies in the several theaters of operation were provided with substantial funds derived from the regular army budget to meet all normal and routine expenses, were they not?

Memorandum to: Mr. David N. Sutton

Page 3

18 April 1947

11. (If the witness agrees to the previous question, as he surely must) As a matter of fact it is also true, is it not, that the War Ministry secret funds to which you have referred were made available to the China Expeditionary Forces for very special purposes or uses and that all other expenses of the China Expeditionary Forces were intended to be met and paid out of funds provided from the regular army budget?
12. So that now as you will have to admit, will you not, that your statement to the effect that the China Expeditionary Forces had no fund other than the secret funds supplied by the War Ministry was not a true statement?
13. And so therefore, in the last analysis, your statement about War Ministry secret funds does not necessarily have any bearing whatsoever on your previous statement regarding money obtained by traffic in opium? That is a proper deduction, is it not?

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. David Sutton
FROM : Mr. Smith N. Crowe, Jr.
SUBJECT: Witnesses in the China Phase - KAWABE, Chozo

Hereto attached are data regarding the witness
KAWABE, Chozo.

1 Incl:
Data re KAWABE

Smith N. Crowe Jr
SMITH N. CROWE, JR.
Assistant Counsel

18 April 1947

MEMORANDUM RE: KAWABE, Chozo

I. Subpoena subject of testimony.

a. I have received no information from the Investigation Department regarding the subpoena subject of testimony. However, the affidavits of this witness have been served on us by the Defense.

b. Defense Document 970 indicates that this witness will discuss the beginning of the China Incident, on July 7, 1937, and disavow that the responsibility lay with the Japanese Army.

c. Defense Document 823, another affidavit of this witness, is an attempt to absolve the defendant HATA from all responsibility under the counts of the indictment. Particularly with regard to his activities in China after the year 1937 is this true. The witness will state that HATA's duties, as Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, were negative in character, being restricted to the maintenance of peace and order in Central China; that HATA issued strict orders to the units under his command to take the utmost care to maintain military discipline in the City of Hankow after its fall in November of 1938; that there was not a single case of violation of military discipline in Hankow "such as massacre, violence, plunder, etc." that, after the China Affairs Board was founded, political and economic affairs were no longer handled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Armies in China; that Chinese prisoners-of-war were delivered to the Central Government of China; that the China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the opium problem in China; that the Central China Expeditionary Forces had nothing to do with the Canton or Changkufeng Incidents.

II - Information from the Investigative Division - Witness has been a military man all of his life. He was a commander of a brigade of the North China Garrison Army with Headquarters at Peiping. This brigade was involved in the July 7, 1937, Incident, being on maneuvers near the village of Fengtai, a hour's walk from the Marco Polo Bridge. However, the witness was not present, being in Shanghai Kwan on the Manchurian Border on an inspection trip on July 7, 1937. Witness remained in China with the Central China Expeditionary Forces. From the 1st of September, 1937, until the middle of February 1938, he was attached to the Terauchi Army Group as Vice-Chief of the General Staff. In the middle of February 1938, he was in Shanghai as Chief of the General Staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces.

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, Chozo (contd))

He was appointed Assistant Inspector General of Military Education in January 1939. In February, he returned to Tokyo to assume this position. He remained at that post until March of 1940, when he went to Manchuria to serve one year. In March, 1941, he was made Commanding Officer of the Imperial Japanese Army in Manchuria. In August, 1942, he became Chief of the General Staff of all Japanese task forces in China. In March, 1943, he became Commanding General in Burma, remaining there until August of 1944.

III - Examination of case file - As examination of the case file on this witness reveals the following:

1. References to the China Incident -

a. Information obtained from CIS MID Military attache in China, December 30, 1942, states that the witness assumed command of the troops in the attack on the Chinese at Marco Polo Bridge, when his commander, General TASHIRO, was sick, and that he supported Colonel MUTA's Regiment in its attack the night of July 7, 1937, on the Chinese Garrison Troops.

b. In the December 20, 1945 interrogations of the witness, there appears the following at 200-15-4, 5:

"Q. Were there any orders to create an 'Incident'?"

"A. As far as I was concerned, I desired good relations with the Chinese and do not know about anything else; there was an agreement with China, and other countries, that Japanese troops could be stationed in Peiping; after July 7, Chinese and Japanese troops became enemies, broke relationships, and the Japanese took Peiping, as a result, for their own protection; the first real fighting took place at Nanyen on July 29th on orders from Headquarters at Tientsin to attack Nanyen, the order coming to me from General Katsuki; there was no special plan for the operation; a division arrived from Korea on July 20th at Tientsin, I think, and my Brigade and the new division took part in the Nanyen fighting.

"Q. Why was the division sent from Korea?"

"A. The division from Korea had arrived for support in connection with negotiations for settlement of the incident of July 7th.

"Q. Did you or your next superior Commander ask for reinforcements?"

"A. The division must have arrived as a result of orders from Imperial Headquarters; the first time I knew of their presence was at Nanyen on July 29th."

(Memorandum re: KAWABE (contd))

c. In the interrogation of December 20, 1945, at 200-15-8,9 appears the following:

"Q. How far on each side of the Peiping-Tientsin Railway were Japanese guards allowed to be in connection with their duties under the international agreement?

"A. The distance varied at certain points on the Peiping-Tientsin-Mukden line.

"Q. What was the authorized distance at Marco Polo Bridge?

"A. In the vicinity of Marco Polo Bridge, the authorized distance was about three kilometers from the railroad at Fengtai and included the Marco Polo Bridge.

"Q. The Chinese version is that the Japanese soldiers were outside the authorized area during the night maneuvers on July 7th; what do you have to say about that?

"A. I am quite certain that the Japanese had not gone beyond the authorized limits on the night of July 7th; when such maneuvers were to take place, the Chinese Army Headquarters at Peiping was to be notified as to the time and place and, although I was absent at the time, I am certain that the Chinese Headquarters had been notified, but I have no confirmation that Chinese units near Fengtai were notified; in my opinion, the incident occurred because of a general antagonistic feeling between Chinese and Japanese at the time and it seems that young Chinese were bitter against Japanese; I am certain, judging from the later investigation, that the Japanese were within the limits; the grounds had been used previously by the Japanese and were well known to both parties."

d. In the interrogation of December 20, 1945, the witness was asked who the inner group of officers in the Army in Japan were. In answer to this question, he made the following answer, which obviously refers to the July 7th Incident:

"A. I know nothing about what happened, being away from Japan so much, but I have often wondered what the policy at home was; in China, we tried to settle matters by diplomatic means but the home office continued to send more troops; the General Staff in Tokyo was responsible for that, such staff including Prince Kanin (Chief) and Lt. General Tada (Vice-Chief)."

e. In the interrogation of the witness on January 25, 1946, the following appears at 200-27-6:

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, (contd))

"Q. I would like to know whether the offensive action after July 7 in and around Peking resulted from orders from you in China or whether you know the Imperial General Staff in Tokyo brought about these actions of the Japanese troops?

"A. I have nothing definite to go on but I think that the headquarters in Tientsen issued orders in accordance with instructions received from the General Staff in Tokyo.

"Q. What do you base that statement on; what facts or information or hearsay?

"A. I base this on the fact that the division from Korea was an entirely separate organization and would not have moved without orders from higher up."

f. In the interrogation of January 25, 1946, at 200-27-14, the witness stated that he was not present on the night of July 7, 1937, in the area of the Marco Polo Bridge, but was in Shanghai Kwan. He stated the following, which may be of some significance:

"Q. Did you know that these maneuvers were planned and to be carried out at that time?

"A. I did not know maneuvers were scheduled for that day, but as I had given specific orders to concentrate on night maneuvers, I was not surprised that night maneuvers were carried out."

g. In the interrogation of the witness of January 28, 1946, at 200-23-7, the witness stated the following:

"Q. Do you remember that this Chinese General was given an ultimatum about the 26th of July 1937 before the Japanese Army made its advances or do you remember about that ultimatum from the Japanese demanding that all Chinese troops withdraw from the Peking-Tientsin area?

"A. I only know that there was an agreement between Sung Cheh Yuan and the Commander of the Tientsin Army; because my position was subordinate to the Tientsin Army I do not know the details.

"Q. Who would be the general who would have made this demand as matters stood then?

"A. Lt. Gen. KATSUKI."

(III.- Examination of case file -)

2. Other facts -

(Memorandum re: KAWABE, (contd))

a. Section 3 of file 200 shows information from CIS stating that while Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army in Burma, the witness issued a statement August 1st, 1944, hailing Burma's independence and awarded 1,000 rupees and a letter of commendation to each of the families of two Burmese who have been honored for special services rendered to the Japanese.

IV - Cross-reference file on case file - An examination of the cross index file reveals the following:

1. In File 319-65-4, the accused MUTO, in an interrogation of April 17, 1946, stated the following:

"Q. General, in early 1937 you had detailed operational plans for possible operations against Russia and also operations in Central China is that not correct?

"A. Yes, those plans were drawn up already when I entered the Operations Section. They had been in existence for a long time.

"Q. General, just how detailed were those plans. Were they in detail as to operations against particular cities?

"A. The General Staff's plans were only general. The details were made by other units. For example, operations involving Manchuria were to be solved by the General Staff of the Manchurian Army.

"Q. Please give me an example of the operational planning for Central China in 1937.

"A. The plans involving China in 1937 were on the premise of a total war with China. These plans included the strength and objective of large units. In general, the attack would be toward Nanking."

2. In the April 2, 1946 interrogation of the accused TOJO, the latter was confronted with a document entitled, "Lessons from the China Incident, #7". This document was published April 15, 1939, by the inspector general of Military Education. It described the effect of gas and chemical warfare upon the Chinese Army and listed some examples, e. g. "some died of asphyxiation, sticking their noses and mouths into the ground". When asked about this evidence of the use of gas against the Chinese armies, the following appears at 20-200-9, 10:

"A. I don't know about this. I have never seen it before and I did not issue it. It was issued by the Inspector General of Military Education. The responsible officer is Shozo KAWABE. These are all because of defects in Chinese defensive equipment. Many times the Chinese mistook smoke for poison. I

(Memorandum re: KAWABE (Contd))

think that these suffocated because they thought the smoke was gas and choked themselves."

3. In the interrogation of TANAKA, Ryukichi, of May 11, 1936, TANAKA stated the following with regard to the use of non-Japanese in building the Burma Thailand Railroad, at 234-134-2: "In Burma those responsible for gathering workers were KAWABE and KIMURA, both of whom are in Sugamo." TANAKA states that he did not mention this in his testimony before the Tribunal.

V - Evidentiary document card file in Document Division - This source of information has not been examined.

VI - Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony -

1. Reference to the witness by name:

a. On Record page 2,333-4, Prosecution witness Ching Teh-Chun stated the following:

"This was what happened during the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident and the War of Resistance thereafter.

"Leading Japanese officers who instigated this Incident were:

"KAWABE, Seiso, Brigadier Commander.

"But the instigator at the very beginning of Japanese aggression in North China was DOHIHARA, Kenji, the same man who instigated the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931. All these men should be held responsible for the war of aggression.
* * * *"

2. Examination of record citations of the subject matter of his testimony has not yet been completed.

VII - Summary of testimony given - This witness has not yet testified.

VIII - Decorations - The memorandum of March 11, 1946, shows the witness having received the following decorations:

1. April 29, 1934 - The Order of the Sacred Treasure, 3d Class, recommended by the War Ministry for achievement in the Manchurian Incident.

2. December 27, 1939 - Order of Verdienst-Kreuz Mit Dem Stern Adler, Deutch Reich, recommended by the Foreign Ministry for the

(Memorandum re: KAWABE (cont d))

furtherance of Japanese-German
amity.

3. April 29, 1940 - Military Order of the Golden Kite, Second Grade, and the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, both recommended by the War Ministry for achievement in the China Incident.

In addition to these, the Curriculum Vitae shows the following:

September 7, 1938 - Conferred the Second Order of Merit with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.

IV - Non-listed investigation -

In an interview with TANAKA, Ryukichi, the latter told me that the witness was the man in command of troops in the area of the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937. The top commander, TASHIRO, was very ill and died about the 15th of July, 1937. For this reason, KAWABE, who was second in command, was actually in charge. TASHIRO was replaced before the attack on Nanyang by General KATSUKI, the latter ordering the attacks subsequent to the July 7, 1937 ~~war~~ maneuver squirmish.

An examination will be made of the documents pertaining to the subject matter of this witness's testimony and will be forwarded as soon as completed.

Smith N. Brown Jr.

Later the same night it was reported that Japanese units were fired upon by Chinese in two separate incidents, whereupon the regimental commander gave his battalion permission to fight back in the event of another attack. A third instance of firing by Chinese resulted in a full scale attack by the Japanese. Deponent suggests that the incident of 7 July may have been brought about by the intrigues of a third party which is not identified (p. 6).

* * *

Comment: Deponent's claim that no preparations were made for operations against the Chinese is a much less realistic story than the admissions of the commanders in the Mukden Incident, that they had plans to meet any contingencies since they were aware of the anti-Japanese feeling. The inconsistencies of maintaining that no preparations were made for operations against the Chinese, and at the same time admitting "furious field exercises" is evident, since field practice is normally directed against a hypothetical enemy.

Def. Doc. 970

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION (Translation)

DEPONENT; KAWABE, Shōzō

Having first duly sworn an oath as on
attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure
followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

To the questions asked by Messrs. MIYATA and Blakeney, Defense Counsel, at Tokyo, on November 2 in the 21st year of Showa (1946), I, KAWABE, Shōzō, replied as follows:

- Q. Tell us about the term of your service at Peking as Commander of the Infantry Brigade stationed in China.
- A. From April, 1936 (Showa 11) until August, 1937 (Showa 12).
- Q. Tell us about the strength of the army which you, as Brigade Commander, commanded at the time, and how you stationed the troops.
- A. I had two infantry regiments, the strength being about 5,000. The headquarters of the 1st Regiment of Infantry was at Peking. One battalion each was posted at Peking, Fengtai and Tienchin, and one company was sent to Tungchow. The headquarters of the 2nd Regiment of Infantry was posted at Tienchin, where two battalions were also stationed. One battalion was posted at Shanhaikwan and along the railway east of Tienchin. The headquarters of the Brigade was at Peking.
- Q. Where was the headquarters of the Army? And in what manner were the technical corps posted?
- A. The headquarters of the Army was at Tienchin, and cavalry, artillery, engineer and tank corps were also posted there.
- Q. Were there other military organs at Peking?
- A. A Special Service Agency, military attaches to the Embassy and a KEMPEITAI unit were at Peking, and these three were all independent organs.
- Q. Give an outline of the disposition of the Chinese Army at the time of the Lukuochiao Incident.
- A. In North China, the 29th Army under the command of Sun Chieh-wei was stationed in the area, including Tienchin, Peking, Paoting and Kalgan. The headquarters of the Army was at Peking, and one division each was stationed near Peking, Tienchin, Kalgan and Paoting.
- In the neighborhood of Lukuochiao, about a battalion was stationed at Manyuen, Peiyuan, Papooshan and Hwapingchen. It seemed that at Lungwangchiao was posted a part of the battalion.
- Q. Were the Japanese and Chinese armies on good terms before the outbreak of the Incident?
- A. The relations between the both armies were very friendly until the fall of 1936 (Showa 11). Both armies often inspected each other's maneuvers and tests of arms so the friendly relations between both armies were promoted remarkably. But on Sept. 18, 1936 (Showa 11), a skirmish was begun between Japanese and Chinese units when they were marching near Fengtai and passed each other. It was peaceably settled by the efforts of the staff members of both armies. As the res-

part of the Chinese troops stationed at Fengtai were moved elsewhere. This seemed to have left an unpleasant impression on the part of the Chinese Army. And after the Hsian Incident, which took place in December in the same year, the sentiment of the Chinese in the vicinity of Peking generally became unfavorable toward Japan, and the communists' secret maneuvers became more active. Accordingly, it cannot be denied that the Chinese troops were affected by the communist movement. Although in the Chinese higher circles there was still seen a strong trend toward the harmonious collaboration of Japan and China; among the lower circles of the army it was observed there was an anti-Japanese sentiment which was very keen.

- Q. How were the relations between you and Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang} and other Chinese staff members?
- A. I was not especially intimate with Mr. ^{Sung Choh-yuang}, except on the occasions of formal exchange of courtesies. But I was very intimate with Cheng Tsu-chun, the Division Commander. We often exchanged frank opinions about the friendly relations of the two nations. Our opinions were similar on some points.
- Q. What sort of instructions were given to you by the authorities as to the attitude of the Japanese garrison forces toward China? And tell us how you instructed your men in line with the instructions from the authorities.
- A. It was the fundamental policy of the Army to keep contact with the Chinese Army like a friendly army and bring about better relations between both armies. As a brigade commander, I always kept this in mind and led my men to be on good terms with the Chinese Army. When I went to the General Staff to pay a visit of courtesy after I was appointed Brigade Commander, Major General ISHIMURA, Kenji, who was then Chief of Military Operations, told me privately, clearly showing the intention of the Central Authorities, "The Central Authorities have no intention of fighting a war with China. You will please keep this in mind in line of duty."
- Q. What were the duties of the Stationary Force in China?
- A. The protection of the official institutions and the Japanese nationals in North China as well as the defense of railway, traffic and communications.
- Q. Tell us about the plans for military operations of the Japanese garrison forces against China.
- A. I never received any instructions for military operations against China.
- Q. Please explain about the program of the garrisoning.
- A. In accordance with the duty, that is, the order to defend railway, traffic, communication and to protect Japanese diplomatic establishments and Japanese residents, the Brigade, in peace time, scattered its forces along the railway, Peking and Tientsin and the thus stationed forces took charge of the garrisoning of their respective stations.
- Q. Please explain about the garrison near Peking.

- .. Fengtai, Peking and Tungchow constituted three stations respectively as one unit near Peking, which were put under my command as the Peking garrison district. In Fengtai the commander of the battalion, in Peking the commander of the infantry regiment, and in Tungchow the commander of the company, were ordered to discharge their duties as the commanders of stationary forces.
- .. Explain about the preparation for the operations against China which the Japanese garrison forces in China made.
- .. We did not think of fighting with China, so we made no preparation for operations against China. Our forces were the so-called garrison forces; therefore, in organization we had no moving activity and in munitions we had no stock for operations except those which were continually supplied.
- .. Was the Brigade charged with duty regarding secret information and the investigation of topography necessary for the army?
- .. We were not charged with any such duty.
- .. Were you given directions regarding where to place the emphasis in the education and training of the Japanese garrison forces in China?
- .. We were given directions about education, but it meant the training which aimed at complete preparation and equipment of the forces and was not aimed at the Chinese Army. This was applicable similarly in the case of the forces in Japan. We had no idea of fighting with the Chinese Army, so we did not think of aiming at it.
- Q. Explain about the disposition and the maneuvering areas of the Japanese Army near Fengtai.
- .. One battalion under the command of Major ICHIKI was stationed in the Japanese barracks at Fengtai with some infantry guns attached to it. To the north of the barracks there stretched a narrow parade ground, but near Fengtai there were many farms and no maneuvering areas. About three kilometres west of Fengtai, there was the ballast-collecting place of the railway which was not a farm but was a plain well-adapted for maneuvering. After negotiations with China, Japan was granted temporary use of this plain, with Mt. Ichimonji as its center and we were to use it as a maneuvering area. In that district ballast was collected for the Peiping-Mukden Railway.
- .. Where was the maneuvering area of the forces in Peking?
- .. Though there was a narrow common parade ground for the units of each nation to the east of Kuominkong within the walls of Peking, the Japanese units in Peking used to utilize the exercise grounds surrounding the units of the Tungchow garrison as their area for field exercises.
- Q. Were they at liberty to use the maneuvering area?
- .. Yes, they were at liberty to use it. Hitherto, in case of carrying out maneuvers, the Japanese units had done it by their own choice without the necessity of informing the Chinese authorities of it. However, at the beginning of June there was a friendly desire from the Chinese, saying,

"As a night maneuver is apt to excite the public, you will kindly inform us of it in advance, by which, we would like to announce it to the public previously so as to prevent any excitement". Understanding this, the Army made it a rule to make an announcement in each case through a military intelligence bureau.

Q. About the time when the incident broke out, did they carry out exercises every night?

A. Yes. Almost every night after the end of June they practised exercises. The units practised furious exercises as it was just before the inspection of the second term.

Q. Were you in Peking on 7 July, the very day of the incident?

A. I was not there. In order to attend to the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment which took place, at that time, at the maneuvering area at Nantassu, south of Shanhaikwan, I left Peking on 6 June.

Q. Who was the garrison commander while you were absent?

A. The commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment, Colonel MUDAGUCHI, acted for me.

Q. Were all the units in Peking at their permanent stations?

A. Leaving one company in the city, all the Peking infantry regiments were in Tungchow for the purpose of maneuvering. Therefore, only with one company within the walls of Peiping and a battalion at Fengtai, we had had little strength.

Q. How were you informed of the situation about the outbreak of the incident when you were traveling?

A. Throughout the night of 7 July, there was the inspection of exercises. About 3:00 A.M., on 8 July, on the scene of the maneuvers, a slip of paper with something written down as a telephonic report to me from the commander of the Peking Regiment was brought to me from the signal corps. The paper read, "While a company was practising exercises at the maneuvering area of Lukouchiao, we were fired upon by a Chinese unit and one of our soldiers is missing. The Ichiki battalion has been shifted to the guarding formation and is now searching for the missing soldier." I did not reply to it. When morning came, I made contact with the Army Headquarters at Tientsin and determined to return to Peking. As an airplane was fortunately provided by the Army, I left Shanhaikwan at about noon, and after changing to a train at Tientsin and arriving at Fengtai, at about 3:00 P.M., I immediately hurried to Lukouchiao.

Q. Did you visit the Army Headquarters when you passed Tientsin?

A. The train schedule did not permit me to go, but I established contact by telephone at the station to the Chief of Staff, Hashimoto. The Chief of Staff said, "The policy of the Army is to achieve a solution on the spot. You will watch the situation as it is at present." By this I was informed of the Army's policy of localizing the affair.

- Q. Did you suspend the inspection of the Second Infantry Regiment at Nantassu?
- A. I had ordered the regimental commander to continue the inspection.
- Q. Was the regimental commander there when you reached Lukouchi?
- A. Yes. He was there, and reported the situation in general to me as follows:

"After eleven o'clock last night, I received the following report from the battalion commander, ICHIKI, 'A company carrying out exercises was fired upon by a Chinese unit, and as a soldier is missing, a search is now being made for him. The battalion is now concentrating at Mt. Ichimoji in preparation for any emergency.' Then, I, the regimental commander, ordered the battalion by telephone as follows: 'You will await further orders as you are now. It is expected that the investigation parties will be despatched from both Japanese and Chinese sides to the spot to investigate the situation on the spot.'"

"By the mediation of the Military Intelligence Bureau, it was decided to make a common investigation by sending commit from both Japanese and Chinese sides. Then, with a regiment officer, Lt. Colonel MORITA as the chairman, the committee was despatched to the spot. The Chinese chairman was the chief of the Yuanpin-hsien."

"About 2:00 A.M. there was a report from the battalion commander that our units had been fired upon by Chinese armed forces at the Yuanpin-hsien castle. Furthermore, after 4:00 A.M., there was another report that we had again been fired upon by the Chinese. I, the regimental commander, gave the following order, 'It is an insult against the Japanese that the Chinese had fired upon us again, despite the fact that, as it had begun to get light, the Japanese could be easily identified. If you should be fired upon again in the future, your battalion will be free to fight back.' However, it was about 5:00 A.M. when the party of the investigation committee arrived at the spot by automobile and when chairman MORITA was inspecting the spot, the ICHIKI battalion launched an attack, was deployed and was just about to advance. Thereupon, the Lt. Colonel rebuked the battalion commander for the battalion's unlawfulness. When the battalion commander replied that he had just received an order from the regimental commander that the battalion was free to accept the challenge, there was another volley from the Chinese. So Lt. Colonel MORITA told the Chinese committee, 'The unlawful firing of the Chinese units is as you are now actually witnessing. I cannot disregard a battalion commander's determination to accept the challenge. And the Lt. Colonel agreed to the battalion commander's determination. Then after 5:00 A.M. the battalion attacked the Chinese at Lungwangmiao."

- Q. Then what did you, the brigade commander, do upon receipt of that report?
- A. I gave the following order to the units, "Watch the Chinese under present situation. Do nothing rash." At the same

time, I ordered that the casualties be taken care of.

Q. There is talk that the encounter between the Japanese and the Chinese units at Lukouchiao started from an intrigue by a third party. What do you think about this?

A. I cannot say distinctly about that, but after the outbreak of the incident on 7 July, while the Japanese and the Chinese were facing each other, there frequently was unlawful firing every night. Every time such unlawful firing took place, we investigated the situation, but there was no sign that either the Japanese or the Chinese unit had opened fire. It almost seemed that a third party which did not belong to the Japanese unit nor to the Chinese were firing from the intermediate area between the Japanese and the Chinese which were facing each other. And we could assume that it was an intrigue by someone.

Q. After 7 July, both units were facing each other, while negotiations were in progress between the Japanese and Chinese. Did any untoward incident break out during that time?

A. There were successive outbreaks of untoward incidents, such as the unlawful firing at Mt. Ichimoji on 21 July (company commander wounded), the Langfang incident on 25 July, the Kannanmen incident on 26 July, etc. The anti-Japanese sentiment of the lower class Chinese officers and other ranks was most intense.

Def. Doc. 970

On this 27th day of February 19
At Tokyo

DEPONENT: KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

I, KAWABE, Shōzō, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Depoent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IHEDA, Sumihisa (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

KAWABE, Shōzō (seal)

NAME OF WITNESS: KAWABE, Masakasu (Also known as Shozo)
REQUESTED BY : UMEZU, Yoshijiro
DATE : 3 April 1947

Completed as to items 1 - 5, 7 - 8.

Name: SHOZO KAWABE

Census register: A commoner of TOYAMA Prefecture

The date of birth: Dec. 5, 1886

Mar. 29, 1905 Graduated from TOYAMA prefectural
TAKAOKA middle-school.

Jul. 15, 1905 Appointed to be a cadet, and distributed
to the thirty fifth infantry regiment.

Dec. 1, 1905 Entered into the military academy.

May 31, 1907 Graduated from the military academy
and turned back to the former regiment.

Jun 5, 1907 Appointed to be a probationary officer.

Dec. 26, 1907 Appointed to be a 2nd Lt. infantry, and
attached to the thirty-fifth infantry
regiment.

Mar. 20, 1908 Conferred to the senior grade of the
eighth class court rank.

Nov. 30, 1910 Appointed to 1st Lt., Infantry Cabinet

Feb. 10, 1911 Conferred to the junior grade of the
seventh class court rank.

Dec. 13, 1912 Appointed to be the entrance into the
Military Staff College.

Apr. 21, 1916 Conferred to the senior grade of the
seventh class court rank.

Aug. 18, 1916 Appointed to be the service to the
Inspector General of the Military Education.

Aug. 6, 1917 Appointed to be a captain of infantry.

Nov. 5, 1917 Released from the Inspection General of
Military Education War Ministry

Dec. 4, 1917 Released from present position,
Appointed to be the company commander
of the thirty-fifth infantry regiment War Ministry

Apr 1, 1918 Released from the official position
and appointed to be the residence at
Switzerland for the investigation of
military affairs.

Nov. 1, 1919	Conferred to the fifth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures. (A money grant 620 yen) (for the military merit from 1915 to 1920)	
Jun 30, 1920	Conferred to the junior grade of the sixth class of court rank.	War Ministry
July 11, 1920	Released from the residence at Switzerland, Appointed to the member of Inspector General of Military Education and the acting of the staff.	
Aug. 6, 1922	Appointed to be a major of infantry.	Cabinet
June 18, 1924	Released from the present position and appointed to the general staff.	War Ministry
Aug. 7, 1924	Appointed to additional post as the adjutant of Marshal under the Marshal Viscount, Kageaki KAWAMURA.	War Ministry
Mar. 2, 1925	Released from the additional post.	War Ministry
Aug. 2, 1925	Conferred to be the senior grade of the sixth class of court rank	
July 26, 1927	Appointed to be a lieutenant-colonel of infantry	Cabinet
Nov. 11, 1927	Appointed to the additional post as military science instructor of the Military Staff College	War Ministry
Nov. 29, 1927	Conferred to the fourth order of merit with the order of sacred treasures	
Aug. 1, 1929	Released from the present position and additional post.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1929	Appointed to be the military officer at the Imperial Embassy in Germany	Cabinet
June 3, 1930	Appointed to the additional post as the Technical Headquarters officer in Germany and the Aviation Headquarters officer in Germany.	War Ministry

Aug. 1, 1931	Appointed to be Colonel of infantry	Cabinet
Sept. 15, 1931	Conferred to be the junior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	
Feb. 6, 1932	Released from the present position,	Cabinet
	Released from the additional post,	War Ministry
	Appointed to attach of the General Staff.	War Ministry
Apr. 11, 1932	Appointed to the sixth regimental commander.	
Aug. 1, 1933	Appointed to the educational commander, instructor and member of consideration section of the infantry school.	
Mar. 5, 1934	Appointed to the chief of the first section of Inspector-General of Military Education and member of investigation section of the military correspondence school.	War Ministry
Apr. 14, 1934	Appointed to be the committee of war material investigation meeting.	Cabinet
Feb 14, 1935	Appointed to the additional post as member of the military automobile school investigation section.	War Ministry
Mar. 26, 1935	Appointed to be the mission of the first special investigation	War Ministry
Apr. 29, 1934	Conferred to the third order of the merit with the order of sacred treasures. (for the merit from Showa 6 to 9 incident.)	
Mar. 7, 1936	Appointed to be Major-General.	Cabinet
	Appointed to attach as the Inspector General of Military Education.	War Ministry
	(No insertion on the official gazette)	
	Released from the war material Investigation Committee.	Cabinet
May 1, 1936	Raised to the senior grade of the fifth class of court rank.	

Aug. 26, 1937	Appointed to staff officer of the northern China direction troop (no insertion on the official gazette)	War Ministry
Sept. 7, 1938	Conferred to the second order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures	
Feb. 9, 1939	Appointed to the investigation committee of text-book	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1939	Appointed to be Lieutenant-General.	Cabinet
May 15, 1939	Raised to the junior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Sept. 12, 1939	Appointed to be the representative of Inspector-General of military education	War Ministry
Oct. 14, 1939	Released from the representative of Inspector-General of Military Education.	War Ministry
Mar. 27, 1940	Released from the investigation committee of text-book.	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1940	Dismissed from the present position and additional post.	War Ministry
Mar. 9, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the twelfth division.	
Mar. 1, 1941	Appointed to the commander of the third Army.	Cabinet
June 2, 1941	Raised to the senior grade of the fourth class of court rank.	
Dec. 12, 1941	Conferred to the first order of merit with the order of the sacred treasures (stopped by the orderment of KUNNAI HATS 898 on the 23rd Oct 1940)	
Apr. 29, 1940	Raised to the second order of merit with the order of Golden Kite. Raised to the first order of merit with the order of the great rising sun. (Merit for the China Incident)	
Mar. 18, 1943	Appointed to the commander of Burma direction army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	

July 1, 1944	Raised to the junior grade of the third class of court rank.	
Dec. 1, 1944	Appointed to be the Commander of central direction Army.	Cabinet
Feb. 1, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the fifth direction Army and additional post as the commander of supervision of central direction. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Apr. 9, 1945	Appointed to the General	Cabinet
Apr. 7, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the General Air Forces. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
Oct. 1, 1945	Appointed to the Commander of the First General Army. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet
May 15, 1945	Appointed to the commander of the First Demobilization. (no insertion on the official gazette)	Cabinet

Kaueche Shogo Dec 9 70

~~use~~

Fentai Incident

20 mi Peking

18 Sept 1936

71

As a result ^{temporarily settled} part of the Chinese troops stationed at Fentai were moved elsewhere
left unpleasant impression on the part of the Chinese army.

A Did not Japanese use this as an excuse to reinforce their troops occupying Fentai? Ching R. 2317
Was not a battalion stationed there under command of Maj Tchunogi, Keyoras ... R. 2317

B. Was Fentai one of the points which the Japanese had the right to occupy under the final Protocol of 7 Sept. 1901?

Zun
See, Aids Memoir

Look up: art 9 of the final Protocol - 7 Sept 1901

R. 3314. 54247

Is it quoted by Zun - in Ev.??

was it from Fentai that troops went on maneuvers & raised Pulo Bridge on the night of 7 July 1937?

(?) C. Did Japan (subsequently) demand the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Fentai

Look up
the date was + to art 37. was this another time

Ching Ex 345 (not read)
R 4629

Strained Relations

2. Anti-Japanese Sentiment - Presence of Japanese Army
+ bring about better relations between the armies (p. 2)

units practiced ^{exercise} almost every night after the end
of June - 7 various exercises - "just before inspection"

was this calculated to bring about
better relations between the Chinese & Japanese?

W.C. do not report night maneuvers

W.C. he states notice was given because
of request that "night maneuvers are off"
+ report to public. (p. 4)

notes: "Anti-Japanese sentiment of the lower class
Chinese off + other units was most intense" p. 6

2'1' Notice of Night Maneuvers - p. 4
a rule of the army that night

Was any notice given to the Chinese units
at ~~Wangfeng~~ ^{Wangfeng} ~~Wangfeng~~ ^{Wangfeng} that night maneuvers
would be held over Wangfeng ^{Wangfeng} ~~Wangfeng~~ ^{Wangfeng} on 7 July 1937?

Foot of

W.C. his statement ^{Do you have confirmation of this} ~~Wangfeng~~ ^{Wangfeng} ~~Wangfeng~~ ^{Wangfeng} 20 Dec 1945 - over

Doc 970 carta

3, Attack of Marco Polo

f. 4

[rewards had information to use not then]

What maneuvers ground did the other garrisons use??

only
only

What legal I did - the Japans here + demand the rt to search ^{the town?} Wanjing?
 (walled city?)

Pelaf

Where was the committee (Chun Kwita
Chun Kwita Wang Ken Choi) at the time ~~of~~
the Japans opened fire on Wanjing?

Look up
important

to units under his command
from order "watch Chinese do nothing next"
(chief) staff had notified him of the policy etc.
localize the affair -

f. 5

f. 4

see above

4. (Firing by) Intrigue of Third Parties

w.c. Wang Zen Chai testified R. 3325
negotiate - occurred - he wanted bombard city
with heavy artillery

6.

Did you refer to the commanding
Gen that the firing was by intrigue & not
by the Chinese?

(Page 823)

Kawabe Masaharu

1.

Hata Daitis negative - a.

suffered for Matsui -

f. 2

How many large cities in China did Matsui capture?

How many Hata -

No troops,

How many did Hata take over from Matsui in Feb 1938?

How many troops were under command Hata at the time of the attack on Hsuechow?

Hsuechow?

ans 3 div

f. 5-

What combined strength attacked Hsuechow - is it with China Expeditionary Force - + Cent China Expeditionary Force?

When did Imperial Hdq. issue an order for the attack on Hsuechow -

f. 3

Was the ~~attack~~ operation resulting in the capture of Hsuechow a negative duty?

where is
is that
in the

Negative Duties Corla

re: Hankow

when was the order for capture of Hankow issued.
were you at the time engaged in the
Hankow campaign. p. 4-

was the completion of the Hankow operation -
preparing to attack on Hankow - a negative operation.
(c) why did it "throw you into a panic" p. 4

~~and~~
Reinforcement of troops who decided this

(a) 2nd Army under Prime Higashikuni
how many p. 4

(b) Troop under Lt. Gen. Okamura

how many

Hans
Ephel

W. E. Hata A 3445

E 256 f.

increased by
from 300,000 +
400,000

~~How~~
why did you expect a transfer of a part
of the air force from the tent - chin expedition for
the attack on Hankow?

By the capture of Hankow was so easy why
did you ~~expect~~ feel bitter because you
did not get the air force ^{which the Japanese army in} from Manchuria
had promised to give. p. 6

3. NO. A-1N China Affairs Board

was it the means by which Japan
exercised ^{economic political} control over the territories it occupied
in China.

not to verge

~~1~~

2. no reports of any atrocities at Hankow

Look up reports on Embassy -

Darrance testimony R 3392-6

were you referring to testimony?

Darrance -

4. Business of War

1.7

Horvath - R 32926

What do you mean by the Cent. Govt of China
the working Govt if yes

Foot of

When was it established.

What became of the prisoners captured from
that time

Preservation Govt.
forced the
wrong thing was

[Cork Edwards
about this]

5 Secret Funds

1.7

Amount supplied by War Ministry
In what purpose was the secret fund used.

[Cork Edwards memo]

Secret

[Cork Loderby]

6 - Office

What connection did Secret Service
or Special Service organizations have
with J.

1.7

Page

20485-
20506

Opening Statement of Mr. Lazarus.

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF KAWABE, MASAKAZU,
By Mr. Levin.

20517

* The witness stated that he was 62, and lived at Sugamo. He identified exhibits No. 2479 and 2479-A as his affidavit, and stated that their contents were true and correct. *Exhibit No. 2479-A was admitted only for the personnel record of the defendant.

20518

20520

* The affidavit stated that he graduated from the Military Academy in 1927, and became a major general in 1936. In 1936 he became commander of an infantry brigade in China, and in September 1937 vice-chief of the staff of the North China Area Army. In February, 1938, he became chief of staff of the Central China Expeditionary Forces, and a little after, in January 1939, chief of the department of the Inspector-General of Military Education. In August, 1942, he again was chief of staff of the China Expeditionary Forces; in March, 1943, commander of the Burma Area Army, and in December, 1944, commander of the Central Army, and in April, 1945, after being made a full general, commander of the Whole Air Force.

20521

* The witness was commander of the Infantry Brigade in China at Peking from April, 1936, to August 1937. He had two infantry regiments of about 5,000. The headquarters of the 1st was at Peking, one battalion each being posted * at Peking, Fengtai, and Tienchin, and one company at Tungchow. The headquarters of the 2nd Regiment was at Tienchin, where there were two battalions. One battalion also was posted at Shanhaikwan. The headquarters of the brigade was at Peking. The headquarters of the army was at Tienchin, and the cavalry, artillery, engineer, and tank corps were there. There was also at Peking a Special Service Agency, military attaches, and the Kempeitai unit.

20522

At the time of the Marco Polo Incident, the Chinese 29th Army under Sung Cheh-ye was in the area, including Tienchin, Peking, Paoting and Kalgan, with its headquarters at Peking and a division each near Peking, Tienchin, Kalgan and Paoting.