

Enclosure to Tokyo's
Despatch No. 365,
June 9, 1949

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time for the individual speeches be increased in order to permit a fuller expression of the candidate's views. Some of the political leaders did not think that the competitive speeches helped their candidates, but they conceded that the popularity of this type of meeting warranted an increase in the number of competitive speeches. Some of the party leaders complained that the audience was composed largely of partisan supporters who heckled the opposing speakers and applauded their own candidate creating disorder and giving the impression to the audience in general that the particular candidate had a large popular following.

The provision of the law relating to the private speech meeting drew the most criticism from the various party leaders and officials interviewed. There was no party line on the suggested changes in the regulations regarding private speech meetings. The majority of those interviewed, regardless of party affiliation, favored an increase in the number of private speech meetings authorized, and a number of leaders supported the proposal that the number of private meetings should be unlimited. A minority (the Democrats in Kyoto, the Democratic Liberals in Kyoto and the Socialists in Hiroshima) favored the elimination of all private speech meetings. There was agreement that there was not adequate publicity by the election committees as to the time and place of such meetings. In one prefecture (Hyogo), for example, the committee put up only an average of 10 posters announcing the holding of each private speech meeting. In addition the parties complained that the posters drafted by the election committee lacked imagination and were too much alike. The parties and officials were in favor of turning over to the political parties and candidates the responsibility for making their own arrangements for private speech meetings and all the publicity attendant upon such meetings. One suggestion was made to the effect that the parties should be responsible for all the arrangements for private meetings with the election committee continuing to pay the expenses. The selection of the place for the private meetings by the committee was the subject of universal criticism. The committees selected public buildings, usually schools, which were often located in inaccessible places or in areas away from the center of a party's potential audience. There was general agreement that private speech meetings should not require the presence of the candidates, nor for that matter should street speeches require a candidate to be present.

The provisions in the election campaign law relating to the number of times a representative of a candidate could speak for the candidate were the subject of considerable criticism by the various party leaders and election officials. There was general agreement that the representatives of a candidate should be permitted to speak more often without his presence. It was obvious that in some cases this criticism stemmed from the poor showing made by some candidates in speech meetings and the fact that the party would have been able to provide more effective speakers. In other cases the criticism was based on the fact that if more people had been able to deliver speeches, without the presence of the candidate, more voters would have been reached and the electorate would have been better acquainted with the policies of the various parties. In addition, as one Democratic Party official stated, speeches are the principle weapon of a candidate and a party that lacks extensive financial support.

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The Election Committees.

The Prefectural Election Committees are responsible for the supervision of the election in each prefecture, and they in turn supervise and direct the work of subordinate committees in the cities and towns within their jurisdiction. The prefectural election committee is assisted by a secretariat and in the case of all prefectures visited this secretariat was drawn from the regular staff of the General Affairs Department and/or the Local Affairs Section of the prefectural government. The members of the secretariat served concurrently.

In actual fact the secretariat ran the elections in most instances, although there was some variation in the degree to which the election committee participated in the supervision of the election depending on the personality of the committee chairman. Also the degree to which the secretariat sought the guidance of or consulted with the committee varied from the extreme in which the secretariat took complete responsibility for the election at the suggestion of the election committee, to the case where the committee did take general responsibility for the formulation of policy leaving the implementation to the secretariat. Where the committee was at all active the question of the budgeting and expending of election funds was a bone of contention between the committee and the local government as represented by the committee secretariat. In two prefectures the election committee complained that it had no control over the financial aspects of the election, that the committee was ignored in making the original estimates of funds needed for the election, that the committee was without influence in determining how the funds received from the national government should be expended, and that in actual fact the suggestions of the committee on such matters as the putting out of publicity materials concerning the election were rejected by the local government officials on the basis of insufficient funds. One Election Committee chairman pointed out that if it is the intention of the law to establish an election committee to supervise the campaign and the election which is independent of the local and national government, then it is essential that the committee have a role in the determination of how the election funds are to be spent.

Another aspect of the financial problem is that of local governments supplementing the funds allotted by the national government for the election. In all cases there was a complaint that not enough money was provided for the election and in all cases the money spent on the election exceeded the amount received from the national government. Whether or not this was primarily due to inadequate funds or whether it should be attributed to poor management on the part of local election officials is not immediately evident. It would appear, however, that there was not sufficient money allocated by the national government to provide adequate campaign services. In the case of a prefecture like Osaka, the

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prefectural, city and town governments contributed 13.5 million yen to finance the House of Representatives election over and above that allotted by the national government. In other prefectures the money expended from local funds was less in total, but proportionately high in terms of the economy of the prefecture. One election official suggested that instead of allotting money to the prefectures on the basis of population, that it would be better to allocate the money on the basis of polling places. He pointed out that a city of 200,000 people concentrated in a relatively small area would require fewer polling places than a city of the same population that was spread out over considerable distance where more polling places would be required in proportion to the population. This official is assuming that the total amount allotted by the national treasury for the election was adequate and that it was the distribution of the funds by the national committee that was the cause of the shortage of funds in his prefecture.

Party leaders and election officials showed considerable understanding, of, even if they did not always agree with, the basis need for economizing in election expenditures both in terms of public funds expended and the amount of money a candidate and party were permitted to spend on the election. On the other hand, it was pointed out that there is a point beyond which a cheap election is in fact a delusion. Too drastic limitations on campaign expenditures, whether public or private funds, tends to encourage rather than discourage the spending of money outside of the provisions of the law. On the basis of the information obtained in the prefectures visited, it appears that the majority of the candidates spent considerably more than the legal limit, and that because outlets for the spending of money were severely limited this money went into channels which did not afford the voters as a whole any opportunity to learn more about candidates and parties. For example, parties and candidates could not put up posters, distribute handbills, etc., where they might actually exceed their authorized campaign expenditures by putting out very elaborate campaign materials, or by distributing more than the quantity permitted. If this had been the case, as it has been in past elections, the voter would at least have received some benefits from the increased publicity. Instead as the campaign progressed it became obvious to most candidates that they were not getting adequate publicity through the authorized channels and therefore they sought to increase their chances of being elected by distributing money where it would do the most good and would be the least conspicuous. It is recognized, of course, that bribery in any one of many forms has been prevalent in past Japanese elections and that it is very difficult to control this type of activity, but at the same time it is possible that the absence of sufficient outlets for campaign propaganda made the distribution of money more of a necessity than usual.

Funds for the Public Managed Campaign.

The problems of providing more funds for the public managed election campaign was a subject of frequent discussion with party leaders and election officials. The easiest and most common solution was to suggest that the national government put up more money for the election. Barring this possibility, and assuming the need for more funds for election campaign there was a division of opinion as to whether the candidates should be required to give more money to the election committee for their campaign, or whether the public managed campaign should be limited

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in scope and, the parties and candidates allowed to participate more freely in the campaign. All groups realized that to require more money from each candidate would eliminate many good candidates from the competition. One interesting suggestion was advanced by the election officials in Osaka. They suggested that each candidate be required to put up a total of 50,000 yen for his public managed campaign and that the guarantee bond as such be eliminated. At the present time the candidate is required to put up 20,000 yen for his public managed campaign and 30,000 yen as a guarantee bond, but the 30,000 yen is returned to him after the election if he receives more than a specified number of votes. While the deposit of 50,000 yen with the election committee for the campaign would be in reality an increase in the amount of money the candidate was required to furnish for his campaign, since no portion of it would be returnable, the suggestion that the guarantee bond is no longer necessary is worth consideration. It was the contention of the election officials that the purpose of the guarantee bond, which was originally instituted to discourage irresponsible candidates with no chance of being elected from competing, was in effect accomplished by the requirement that a candidate contribute 20,000 yen to the government for his public managed campaign.

Political Party Activity in the Campaign.

In almost all cases the political party leaders stated that their party was unable to assist its candidates in the election campaign even to the extent they had assisted them in previous years. The Communist Party constituted the main exception to this, although even this party desired a relaxation of the restrictions on party activities. The only other exception was in the case of the Democratic Liberal Party in two prefectures where the party organization had been strengthened as compared to 1947 when it was extremely weak.

With the exception of the Communists, political parties do not, and have never, rendered any financial assistance to their candidates to meet campaign expenses. In the past the parties have been moderately active in assisting their candidates by providing speakers, holding party rallies, putting out general party publicity, and similar activities. Either as a result of the provisions of the campaign law, or as a result of the interpretation of these provisions, the parties were for the most part inactive in the campaign. In the past the elections have provided an occasional and much needed stimulus to party organization, and serve as a means of building up party organization. Moreover, the Japanese voter is inclined to consider the candidate more important than the party, and the absence of party activity in this election campaign only served to reinforce the importance of the candidate as an individual and the relative unimportance of the party in the minds of the voter.

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Other Aspects of the Campaign Law.

There was general agreement that the provisions of the campaign law relating to the role of the press in the campaign should be relaxed. The party leaders and election officials also recommended that the newspaper advertisement for each candidate be placed in a newspaper of the candidates own choosing. House-to-house canvassing of voters was generally disapproved, but there were several complaints that the interpretations of the law prohibited a candidate from soliciting friends and acquaintances whom he met on the streets. The election officials and several party leaders in Osaka suggested an increased in the mailing privileges from the present 1,000 postcards to the former 10,000.

In Osaka one party pointed out that the distribution of candidates biographies by the election committee was made only three days before the election and that this did not allow sufficient time for the voter to study this material. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ leader suggested that the distribution should be made earlier in the campaign, and if the period during which a candidate could register his candidacy was reduced to the first five days of the campaign the biographical material could be distributed earlier.

Check-off Ballot.

The election officials, with the exception of those in Shimane, favored the introduction of a check-off ballot, that is a ballot which lists the candidates names and requires the voter only to mark the name of the candidate he wishes to vote for. The election officials considered that this type of ballot would reduce the number of invalid ballots, would make ballot counting easier, and would make it easier for the voter to cast his ballot. While the Shimane election officials agreed that a check-off ballot would reduce the number of invalid votes they contended that the people would not understand how to use this type of ballot, whereas they had had long experience with the write-in ballot. All of the election officials agreed that it would be administratively possible to print up the ballots and distribute them prior to the election providing the period during which a candidate could register his candidacy was reduced to about the first five days of the campaign. The election officials pointed out that in actual practice most candidates register their candidacy during the opening days of the campaign. Some questions were raised as to how to meet such problems as the withdrawal of candidates and the changes in party affiliation of candidates after the ballots had been printed. As to the withdrawal of candidates the election officials thought that the only way to meet this problem was to delete the candidates name from all the ballots, but at the same time they suggested that no refunds of guarantee bond or campaign funds deposited with the committee be made for any reason after a candidate has notified the committee of his candidacy. The second problem that of the changes in party affiliation of candidates after registration was more difficult to solve. The best suggestion made was that the responsibility for designation of official party candidates rest with the parties and not with the candidates. In this way the various officials thought there would be fewer cases of changes in party affiliation.

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Despatch No. 365,
June 9, 1949

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The majority of the political party leaders favored the introduction of a check-off ballot. It was pointed out by several party leaders that the check-off ballot should list the candidates name in both Japanese characters and phonetic script, and that a sample ballot should be distributed prior to the election to acquaint the voters with its use.

Size of the Electoral Districts.

On the question of the size of the electoral district there was no agreement among the party leaders and election officials. The DLP maintained the most consistent attitude in favor of a small, single-member electoral district. Among the other party leaders and election officials the most frequent opinion was expressed in favor of the present electoral district system. The reason advanced for this was that the small districts would encourage bribery and gerrymandering. Some thought the single-member district would help the communists, others thought it would be to the disadvantage of the communists. The Communists were in favor of a large electoral district system, and barring that they preferred the present system.

Jane M. Alden
Jane M. Alden

CONFIDENTIAL



THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FE

894.00/6-1449

6 DIVISION OF NORTH EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUL - 5 1949

United States Political Adviser for Japan

No. 385

Tokyo, June 14, 1949.

RECD JUN 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(For Department Use Only)

ACTION FE

Action Assigned to *NA*
Action Taken *Text of enclosures circulated to FEC members*

INFO DCR ITP OLI EUR

Subject: Soviet Protest over Japanese Police Action in Labor Demonstrations.

Date of Action *July 6, 1949.*
Symbol *NA*
Officer *W. Friedman*
Forwarded to DC/R *file*

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

C

Sir:

1/ With reference to this Mission's airgram no. A-138 of June 4, 1949, concerning labor riots at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly on May 30 and 31, 1949, during which one labor demonstrator was killed, I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter addressed to the Supreme Commander on June 11, 1949, by Lieutenant General Kuzma N. DEREVYANKO, Soviet Member, Allied Council for Japan, protesting strongly against alleged police brutality in dealing with labor demonstrations. General Derevyanko's letter was released to the press at the time of its dispatch on June 11 by the Office of the Soviet Member, plainly indicating the propaganda motive behind this action.

2/ The Supreme Commander has not made formal reply to the Soviet Member's letter, but on June 13 released to the press an exceptionally blunt comment on the Soviet Member's communication. A copy of General MacArthur's statement is enclosed.

In view of the extraordinarily caustic character of the Supreme Commander's comment, there is a possibility that the Soviet Government may make further issue of this matter, either in the Far Eastern Commission or in the Allied Council for Japan. This Mission has accordingly requested the G-2 Section of General Headquarters for full details of the May 30-31 riots.

Respectfully yours,

Cloyce K. Huston
Cloyce K. Huston
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

JUL 29 1949
FILED

DECLASSIFIED

NND 780069
By *JH/maw* NARS, Date *10/1/78*

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

894.00/6-1449

DMR



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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894.00/6-1449

*6. DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
JUL - 5 1949*

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

No. 385

Tokyo, June 14, 1949.

RECD
JUN 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(For Department Use Only)

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Action Taken *Text of enclosure
circulated to FEC members*

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Charge d'Affaires ad interim

JUL 29 1949
FILED

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NND 780069
BY *Thelma* NARS, Date *12/1/78*

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

894.00/6-1449

DMR

Tokyo's Despatch
No. 385, June 14,
1949.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Enclosures: *att.*

- ✓ 1. Letter from General Derevyanko
to General MacArthur dated
June 11, 1949.
- ✓ 2. Press release, June 13,
1949.

gmm

Parchment Mat to Department.

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Enclosure no. 1 to Despatch no. 385 dated June 14, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject, "Soviet Protest over Japanese Police Action in Labor Demonstrations".

(COPY)

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN
TOKYO
OFFICE OF THE MEMBER
FOR
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
GENERAL OF THE ARMY, DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Dear General:

The ever increasing pressure on the part of the present Japanese Government upon the democratic rights of the Japanese people, the suppression of the legal activities of trade unions and other democratic organizations, and also the arbitrariness and chastisement committed by the Japanese police in connection with trade union leaders, progressively minded persons and participants of various labor demonstrations and meetings to the present time have become facts deserving serious attention.

Calling attention also the fact that the illegal activities of the governmental and police organs, intended to forcefully impede the democratization of the nation, are taking place before the eyes of the American Occupation authorities. General Headquarters SCAP does not take any measures to the prevention of these activities flagrantly violating the Potsdam Declaration and policies of the FEC to the democratization of Japan. These facts explain the increasingly great concern in the broad Japanese public opinion for the fate of democratization of their nation.

The masses of the people are indignant at the activities of the present Japanese Government resorting to the brutal suppression of the democratic movement by analogous methods of violence and repression existing during the period of the militaristic domination of Japan.

The occurrence in Tokyo on 30 and 31 May of the brutal suppression by the Japanese police of the peaceful demonstration consisting of representatives of trade unions, student and other public organizations has aroused a just indignation in the entire nation and beyond its borders.

As is

June 14, 1949.

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As is known, this suppression was inflicted upon participants of a peaceful demonstration of laborers, employees, and students who gathered for the sole purpose of expressing their protest against the new "Public Safety Regulations" which were preconceived for further limiting the rights of labor and public organizations to hold gatherings, meetings, and demonstrations.

The Japanese police, attempting to disperse the demonstration, began ruthlessly clubbing them, as a result one member of the Tokyo City Transportation Union, laborer Kinji Hashimoto was killed by the police. Demonstrators who were headed to the building of the Headquarters Tokyo Metropolitan Police with protests against this bloody suppression and with demands that punitive measures be taken against the ones guilty of the crime were not admitted there and were subjected to new beatings by the police. Gathering on the following day near the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly Hall, the representatives of numerous trade unions and student organizations, with intentions to demand punishment of those guilty of the killing of the laborer Hashimoto, were again subjected to brutal beatings by specially mobilized police numbering about 2,000 policemen. As a result of this one hundred demonstrators received wounds and injuries and more than 60 persons were arrested.

Bringing the above contents to your attention, I wish to express my hopes that, on your part, proper measures will be taken to prevent illegal activities and anti-labor measures which are practiced at this time by the Japanese Government.

At the same time I wish to express my hope that you will take appropriate measures for punishing those guilty of the brutal suppressions of labor demonstrations and killing of laborer Hashimoto.

Respectfully

FOR THE MEMBER, ALLIED COUNCIL
FOR JAPAN FROM THE U.S.S.R.

General Leitenant

/s/ K. Derevyanko
/t/ K. DEREVIANKO

11 June 1949
No 1216

Enclosure no. 2 to despatch
no. 385 dated June 14, 1949 from
the United States Political Adviser
for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject,
"Soviet Protest over Japanese Police
Action in Labor Demonstrations".

(COPY)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
Far East Command
Public Information Office

Immediate Release:

13 June 1949

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S COMMENT ON GENERAL DEREVYANKO'S LETTER

"The Soviet letter, replete with inaccuracies and misrepresentations of fact, could be disregarded as routine Soviet propaganda did it not so completely unmask the Soviet role as an incitor of disorder and violence in an otherwise orderly Japanese society. The thorough duplicity of its apparent championship of fundamental human rights on the one hand and the Soviet callous indifference to the release for repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war on the other--its talk of greater liberality for Japanese workers and the Soviet practice of labor exploitation, is a shocking demonstration of inconsistent demagoguery. The purpose of the letter is obviously two-fold: to incite irresponsible and unruly minority elements in Japan to violence and disorderly resistance against the duly constituted government of Japan and the lawful orders and processes thereof with a view to creating confusion, unrest and bewilderment in the ranks of the law-abiding Japanese masses, and to screen the Soviet unconscionable failure to abide by the requirements of International Law and specific Potsdam commitments in the return of over four hundred thousand Japanese citizens, long held in bondage, to their homeland. This failure to meet international commitments and maintain normal standards of human decency in the disposition of captives finds little parallel in the history of modern civilization, and is calculated so to outrage moral sensibilities that even the Japanese Communists have been moved to register a bitter and indignant protest. The burdened effort at this late date to challenge the number long publicly recorded as held in Soviet hands by charging mathematical error is small solace indeed to hundreds of thousands of Japanese homes from whom no sophistry can conceal the fact that a family member in Soviet custody has failed to return; and as to whom, contrary to all international covenants respecting prisoners of war, no word whatsoever has been received during the long period of captivity.

"For

Tokyo's Despatch no. 388,
June 14, 1949.

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"For the Soviet to speak in derogation of the status of labor in Japan is hypocrisy compounded. His premise is based upon such fantastic exaggerations as obviously to belie the truth. The Japanese labor laws match the most progressive in their liberality and advanced concepts, and the labor movement here, despite its immaturity, has advanced more rapidly and with less friction than has its counterpart in many of the democratic countries of the world. Incidents of violence have been rare indeed and no segment of Japanese society has made such democratic gains as labor which enjoys rights and liberties and safeguards largely unknown to the peoples of the Soviet Union, which, following the totalitarian concept, holds under ruthless suppression individual liberty and personal dignity.

"For the Soviet to speak of 'Democratic rights', 'the suppression of legal activities', 'arbitrariness and chastisement', is enough to challenge the late lamented Ripley at his imagination's best and leads one to conclude that now there must really be nothing new under the sun."

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

[Handwritten initials]

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

JUN 27 1949

DEPARTMENT OF STATE Tokyo, June 20, 1949.

No. 396

UNCLASSIFIED

Action Assigned to *NA*

Action Taken *no action*

REC'D
JUNE 24

ACTION
FE ENC

INFO
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Y

Subject: Transmitting Copies of "Report of Surveillance" dated
May 28, 1949, on (Local) General and By-Elections in
Japan for the Period from January 1 to May 1, 1949.

Action Symbol *NA*
W Green
Action to DC *file*

The Charge d'Affaires ad interim has the honor to enclose here-
with two copies of a "Report of Surveillance" dated May 28, 1949,
covering the local general and by-elections held in Japan during the
period from January 1 to May 1, 1949, as prepared by the Legal and
Government Division of the Military Government Section of Eighth
Army Headquarters.

The report, which relates only to local elections for the period
mentioned, covers 210 by-elections and 418 general elections, or a
total of 628. It is of interest to note that there were only 2,947
candidates for 2,055 offices, or about 44% more candidates than va-
cancies to be filled. The report also draws out the fact that polit-
ical parties have had little influence in the local elections, as the
voter normally casts his ballot for the person rather than for a polit-
ical party.

Enclosure: *[Handwritten mark]*

Two copies of "Report of Surveillance"
dated May 28, 1949, covering General
and By-Elections in Japan from January
1 to May 1, 1949.

S 350/400.1

CKHuston:gmd

Parchment Mat to the Department

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

894.00/6-2049

JUN 22 1949

FILED

DMP

[Handwritten initials]

D-396 Tokyo

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY
Military Government Section

REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE

General and By-Elections
1 January to 1 May 1949

Prepared by
Legal and Government Division

28 May 1949

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
Military Government Section
Legal and Government Division
APO 343

28 May 1949

REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE

Reported Local General and By-Elections

1 January to 1 May 1949

I. Definition of Local Elections

Elections in Japan are of two types: the general elections whether national or local and the by-elections whether national or local. The general elections are those which are held in accordance with the laws for (1) the regular election on the expiration of the incumbent's regular four-year term of office, (2) vote of non-confidence against the premier, governor or mayor, (3) action from recall petitions, which results in either the vacancy of the offices of governor and mayor or in the dissolution of the assembly, (4) death of the governor or mayor, and (5) resignation of the governor or mayor. In Japan the term by-election has a particular definition. The by-elections in Japan are held for members of the National Diet, members of local assemblies and members of the Agricultural Land Commission and Agricultural Adjustment Committee. They are held only to fill unexpired terms of office. By-elections are provided for (1) members of the House of Representatives in Article 79 and 80 of the Law for the Election of the Members of the House of Representatives, (2) members of the House of Councillors in Article 71 and 72 of the Law for the Members of the House of Councillors, (3) members of the Agricultural Land Commission in the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law in Article 15, and (4) members of the Agricultural Adjustment Committee in Article 13, Cabinet Order No. 247 of 1948. By-elections for all local public bodies are provided for in Section VII in the Law Concerning Local Autonomy.

Both the general and the by-election can be a no poll election. When the number of candidates running equals the number of vacancies to be filled, there is no contest and no vote is required.

II. Election Laws and Cabinet Orders

There are four laws which provide for and govern the conduct of these local general and by-elections. Laws numbered 1, 2 and 3, listed below, provide a reason for having these elections and laws numbered 3 and 4 provide the method and means for conducting them. The Cabinet Order for each law issued in terms of each law gives implementing details to aid in its administration.

1. The Law for Election of Members of the House of Representatives in Article 67 states, "public officials of the State and local public entities who, in accordance with the provisions of law, are prohibited from holding concurrently the office of member of the House of Representative, shall not (file notice of candidacy for the House of Representatives) until after the persons concerned have resigned the office of public officials."

2. The National Public Service Law in Article 102 states, "no person in the service shall be a candidate for elective public office."

3. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy provides not only a reason for having elections but also the processes by which they can be conducted. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy in Articles 57, 92, 127, 141 and 143 provides the legal restraints against chiefs or assemblymen of local public bodies from becoming Diet members concurrently. The time limit within which all of the elections must be held is provided for in Article 24 as follows, "..... the elections of the assemblymen of an ordinary public body and the chief thereof shall be held forthwith within 60 days of the date on which reasons have occurred for holding such elections....." Moreover, in Chapter IV the legal procedure is established for holding all local general and by-elections.

The no poll election for local governments is provided for in Article 58 of the Law Concerning Local Autonomy. This Article is based upon similar provisions in the former three famous organic acts: The Law Concerning the Organization of Prefectures, the Law Concerning the Organization of Cities, and the Law Concerning the Organization of Towns and Villages.

4. The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures, Law No. 194 as of 29 July 1948, is the corrupt practices act of Japan which limits political contributions and expenditures and establishes penalties for infractions.

III. Election Surveillance Program

On 11 February 1949, a command letter was dispatched by Headquarters Eighth United States Army to subordinate headquarters concerned indicating the general end by-elections which would probably occur in their zones of responsibility and requesting two reports for each election. The first report was to be submitted immediately upon announcement of the local or general by-election, giving the name and location of the vacancy and the date of the election. The second report to be submitted within fourteen days following the date of the election required more detailed information, including an evaluation of the results. A negative report was requested for each prefecture not holding any elections.

The extensive surveillance of polling places and ballot counting stations was not required as on 23 January 1949 for the national general elections. On that occasion all the military government teams, together with

the many other surveillance teams composed of troops from the tactical units under their supervision, were required to be in the field an extended period of time and to cover a wide area carefully. The sparsity and degree of campaign activity in these local elections demanded little attention in comparison.

The Information Officer and the Legal and Government Officer of the teams had crowded schedules on many of these local elections as surveillance was exercised. Work of a preparatory nature for the holding of the election was performed throughout the areas of election. Typical of this type of program developed by all the military government teams is that from Shiga as reported by that Team:

"In order to insure a well informed vote in the past elections, the following have been done:

- "a. Election circulars were produced and distributed locally.
- "b. Mobile public address systems toured the prefecture.
- "c. Spot announcements were made at railway stations.
- "d. Commercial theaters ran slides urging the people to vote.
- "e. Conferences held with leaders of PTA, Women's and Welfare organizations.
- "f. Newspapers and printed articles encouraged the people to vote.
- "g. Leaflets were scattered by airplane over the three cities of the prefecture on one occasion.
- "h. Circulars covering the Election Laws were distributed.
- "i. Letters were sent to all election officials by the prefectural information section.
- "j. Large posters were made and distributed.
- "k. 21 sign-boards have been erected through the prefecture."

The election report from the Osaka Military Government Team, (Tab A,) after showing specific facts for an assemblyman's election, has included (1) a statement of the activities of the Team's legal and government officer, and (2) a summary of some of the candidates' campaign "platforms."

IV. Summary of Results

The 628 reported local general and by-elections held in Japan from 1 January to 1 May 1949 included 362 for executive positions and 266 for assembly positions. There were 210 by-elections, 57 for prefectural assemblies, 7 for municipal, 27 for town and 119 for village. There were 2,947 candidates contesting for the 2,055 offices. Thus, there was an average of approximately 1-1/3 candidates per office.

The position of political parties in Japanese local elections particularly so in towns and villages to a marked degree resembles that of the parties in the United States or in Great Britain. Political parties have meant little. The voter casts his or her ballot for the person rather than an adherent to political parties. The following figures show the degree to which the number of political party candidates was overwhelmingly dwarfed by the number of independent candidates:

<u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Number of Candidates</u>	<u>Winners for Number of Position</u>
Democratic-Liberal	167	91
Democrat	51	23
Social Democrat	80	23
Communist	142	34
Minor Party	30	9
Independent	<u>2477</u>	<u>1875</u>
TOTAL	2947	2055

Other tabulations to show details of the elections are compiled in Tab B.

As has been traditional for the past half century in Japan, the majority of the elections in the towns and villages averaging 5,000 to 10,000 population with but 1,000 to 2,000 qualified voters, have been uncontested; the number of candidates always equals the number of vacant positions to be filled. During this four months period covered in this report, 47% of the total number of elections, or 293, were of this nature. In a few cases even in which completely new village assemblies were to be elected, no formal public vote was held because only the minimum number of candidates filed. Thus, there were no poll elections for the 22 seats in the town assembly of Miwa Machi in Hyogo Prefecture nor for the 16 seats in the village assembly of Uchimaki, Nara Prefecture, of Doshi, Yamanashi Prefecture, of Kamiasakuna, Ehime Prefecture and of Okawa, Kyoto Prefecture.

Prefectural and municipal elections have demonstrated usually much more political activity because more importance is attached to campaigning for public office at those levels. Here, political party activity becomes more noticeable, and most of the major parties are represented. The candidates

during the four months of this year were far greater than the number of positions to be filled.

In contrast with these facts the election interest among the voters was manifested more sharply in the town and village elections in which an average of approximately 75% of the registered voters went to the polls on election day as compared to the turn-outs of 50% to 60% of the voters in the prefectural and city elections. In seven by-elections for the Tokyo metropolitan assembly the abstention rate averaged 70% and in a Kyoto prefectural assembly by-election it averaged a little more than 60%. Much of the present discrepancy between the lighter vote in the cities as contrasted with the heavier vote in towns and villages can be explained by the fact that elections occurred during the slack season in agricultural areas; distance between the polling stations and places of work in the country are shorter, and working hour schedules in the country are not as rigid as in cities.

In virtually all the elections, independent candidates predominated both in total number of candidates and number of winning candidates. Political parties usually enjoyed a better position in prefectural and municipal elections as contrasted with that in towns and villages. In this year's reported local elections nearly 90% of the successful candidates were independents.

The National Election Management Commission's recent survey of the results of local elections indicates that political parties polled 57.3% of the popular vote. Most of this total is derived from city and prefectural elections and represents the voting for relatively few candidates. The popular vote for the elections reported by the National Election Management Commission is shown below:

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Popular Vote</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Democratic-Liberal	1,018,711	33.8%
Democrat	189,932	6.3%
Socialist	158,048	5.2%
Communist	265,860	8.8%
Minor Parties	96,519	3.2%
Independent	1,290,242	42.7%
TOTAL	3,019,312	100.0%

As to the strength of showing of particular political parties, the Democratic-Liberal Party fared best as it did in the national elections. It elected approximately two-thirds of the candidates. The number of elected independents who, for many reasons, might be considered Democratic-Liberal Party sympathizers would, if tabulated, swell the party's ranks tremendously. Hundreds, if forced to choose a party label, would identify themselves as Democratic-Liberals. The Party's success at the polls reflects more its continued popularity with the Japanese people than any particular adeptness at political

strategy. In fact, the lack of the Party's discipline, shown at times, so diluted its strength that were it not for its overwhelming popularity, it would have fallen far short at the polls of effectively capitalizing on the results.

In the seven Tokyo Ward assembly by-elections the political parties overwhelmed the independents in number of candidates and winners. Greater activity occurred in Koto Ward with four Democratic-Liberals, one Socialist-Democrat, one Democrat and one Communist; in Shinagawa Ward with four Democratic-Liberals, two Democrats, one Socialist, one Minor Party and one Communist; and in Shinjuku Ward with three Democratic-Liberals, one Democrat, one Socialist, one Independent and one Communist. Although a Democratic-Liberal won in each of the three cases just given, a similar split among three Democratic-Liberal candidates, cost the party a victory to an Independent in Arakawa Ward.

As long as the Democratic-Liberal Party retains its overwhelming popularity it will not be too greatly handicapped from lack of discipline and poor political strategy. If its fortunes begin to wane, the Party will suffer election reverses to a proportionally far greater degree. Evidence that the Party's leaders are aware of this weakness can be seen in the purge of dissident members which is taking place in a number of local chapters.

The Democratic Party's local branches demonstrated negligible activity, winning between 1% and 2% of the total number of offices. The Party, which was in bad odor with the people because of the unsavory incidents that occurred during the Ashida Cabinet, has suffered a radical decline in its political policy and activity has been further hamstrung by the bitter wrangling going on in Tokyo between the Inukai faction, which favors a merger with the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Ashida faction, which opposes cooperation with the present conservative government. The Inukai faction is presently represented in the Yoshida Cabinet.

As a result, many Democrats joined the Democratic-Liberal Party or formed a common front by running as Independents. Currently the Democratic Party's label is of no apparent asset, and many local politicians affiliated formerly with the Democrats probably find it more profitable to run as independents, at least until such time as their opposition role in the Diet gains approval. Outside of Tokyo the Party's disunity also cost it what could have been a victory in the prefectural assembly election held in Ukyo Ward, Kyoto in February, when a total of 4,800 votes cast for the Democratic Party and split among 3 of the Party's candidates, enabled the single Communist candidate to win with 3,400 votes.

The Socialist Party has been muddling along in some confusion resulting from its disastrous defeat in the 1949 general election. Communist raids on the Party in addition to complete paralysis in its own activity because of

the ideological split between left and right wing groups, caused a considerable exodus from the Party into the camps of both the "liberals" and other conservatives. The vacuous attitude of the Socialist Party during the local elections in the months of January, February and March resulted in its candidates winning but 23 offices. In this it matched precisely the result obtained by the Democrats. Most of the Party's candidates trailed others badly.

The Communist Party has continued to demonstrate its strength. With telling effects the Party has continued its sound policy of "grass roots financing"; Communist candidates receive aid to "operate" locally, which practice the other parties have looked upon with some disdain. It also allows its candidates substantial leeway for meeting local conditions. Analysis of the Communist position shows that although its candidates won less than 1% of the total number of offices, party-wise it did much better by obtaining nearly 20% of the total offices won by all political party candidates. The Party's tactics were concentrated on winning at least one seat in prefectural and city assemblies and piling up an impressive vote in elections for prefectural and municipal chief executives as well. Town and village elections were generally "ignored." The Party continued its strategy of running but one candidate in each election, except for local assembly elections when a large number of vacancies existed and few candidates entered the race. The strategy was successful in Kyoto and nearly so in Tokyo, in which the abstention rate was exceedingly high.

Although the Communist position as a whole has not changed appreciably since the general election, the Party demonstrated further gains in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka, as well as in the Kanto region. Scattered elections in Nagano, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Shizuoka and especially Saitama resulted in the Communist Party polling anywhere from 20% to 30% of the valid vote and as high as 36.8% in the election for mayor of Ichikawadaimon Machi, Yamanashi Prefecture. Even though unsuccessful, many of the Communist candidates in these areas made good showings, in direct contrast to those made by the Socialists. Proximity to the Party's central headquarters in Tokyo accounts in a measure for a good deal of the strength shown in the Kanto region because representatives from Tokyo readily swarm into any nearby target area to help direct the Party's campaign. On the other hand, Communist strength in Chugoku and Tohoku Regions decreased. Elsewhere the Party's position remained substantially unchanged. Results of some of the more significant elections listed in Tab D are indicative of Party strength in the given areas.

In elections for village headman in Torii-mura, Ano-gun, Shinano Prefecture, village assemblymen in Okavara-mura, Sosaku-gun, Kyoto Prefecture, and village assemblymen in Yonozu-mura, Nishikanhara-gun, Niigata Prefecture, four Communists won because elections went in uncontested fashion.

Minor parties like the New Farmers and the Social Renovation, played

an insignificant role in both local general and by-elections by putting only 30 candidates in the field out of the total of 2,947 and by winning only 9 of the offices. A number of these winners were Labor-Farmer Party candidates, and their performance was anything but spectacular. The People's Cooperative Party, a poor fifth in the national general election of 1949 by securing but 14 members in the House of Representatives did not sponsor any candidate officially in any of these local elections. This action is to be taken as a definite withdrawal by the party from the political arena. In the general elections of 1947 for local government, this Party placed in 23 prefectures 113 candidates in offices. This 1947 showing is in sharp contrast with this first four months period of 1949. If anything, the by-elections seem to reveal a trend away from minor parties, which are really little more than local political cliques resembling masks which present a respectable front for more personal ambitions.

V. Analysis

Local general and by-elections occurring as they have during this past quarterly period serve as a useful barometer in calculating a trend of the public's opinions between the intervals of the national general elections or the larger number of local general elections taking place at one time as will probably be the case in 1951. These local elections are the principal means whereby the Japanese people manifest their reactions to current social and economic conditions. They are also indicators of results of the many Occupational and Japanese governmentally sponsored policies or programs designed to improve Japanese political development.

Considered individually, either the local general or by-election can and often does indicate changes in the relative strength of political parties or factions in a particular locality.

Uncontested Elections

The traditional occurrence of uncontested elections in the towns and villages and occasionally in some of the smaller cities in Japan is based upon a number of reasons and the growth of practices and customs now "entrenched in the soil."

In these small localities in which the families for many decades have sold goods from nearby shops, worked and harvested neighboring paddy fields or fished the same coastal areas, personalities with Japanese qualities of leadership have loomed large, been elected and remained the officials years in and out.

Political group action, not political party action, has resulted. Moreover, in more carefully worked out detail in Japan perhaps than in most other countries, definitely planned political meetings prior to elec-

tions are held by the leaders of the citizenry in which political action regarding particular persons is determined. The sole candidate or candidates are selected for the particular office in advance. Selection is frequently made for representation by buraku or a paddy field area and a formerly important administrative subdivision of the towns and villages. Localism is strong at the baraku level. This fact yields a uniformity of vote for all candidates as the householders of each buraku usually vote for their own citizens. When variations do occur, they generally reflect differences in population among the baraku with due allowances made for individual popularity. The "election" is a result of well determined agreements; selections and eliminations are simply, but firmly made.

Other explanatory reasons for this Japanese custom today are present. After all there have been few political plums to be had in the towns and villages and this is the fact in present day Japan. What plums there are must at times be passed around; some rotation of offices take place. Salaries are too low to be a strong incentive for men of outstanding ability. The weak financial position of most local entities has never permitted large scale patronage; less so today. The increasingly heavy burden of taxes in the late years has caused larger numbers of the town and village citizens to fasten a more critical eye on their public officials making the conduct of local affairs more difficult and making conditions decidedly more risky to line one's pockets as in the past. Finding the money today to build new schools or nagging the people for contributions to pay some police costs is not an easy task, to say nothing of constantly begging prefectural and national government officials for subsidies to make ends meet. Local officials have many onerous duties. In any case, interest in running for public office in smaller communities is not to be thought of in the same light as for city, prefectural or national elections. Particularly is this true in the office of town and village assemblyman as the position is a part-time one, and the scope for exercise of individual initiative is sharply limited by inadequate finance not to say tradition. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy provides the legal authority for a wide latitude of action and rendering of needed services. Accomplishment requires proper financing.

Individual Candidates

It is axiomatic from the discussion given above that men and women in these rural localities come forward to the voting citizenry as personalities rather than as members of a political party. Moreover, allegiance to a political party even on the national stage has been whimsical in Japan. Hence, the voters demonstrated their customary penchant in the town and village elections; their party affiliations developed in the city and prefectural elections. Moreover, in the towns and villages, both the voters as well as the candidates themselves seemed more preoccupied with the practical down-to-earth problems of town and village administration--building a new

school, constructing a new drainage ditch, or paying the police--than with political philosophy, which to a great many, is incapable of a particular realization because of the present systems of financial and political controls which are difficult to circumvent.

Accurate evaluation of by-election results depends largely on knowledge of the "story behind the news," particularly in Japan in which the changing fortunes of political parties at the local level is often in direct ratio to the personal popularity and ever-shifting allegiance of a handful of prominent politicians. The predominance of independent candidates at the local level makes it practically impossible to determine the significance of elections without knowing also the political leanings of the candidates and the groups which support them.

Communist Party's Report

The Communist Party in its own election report published on 17 April in Akahata, the official party organ, boasted that "The rate of Communist votes in prefectural, county and city elections increased by 1.3% as compared with the general election in January." The figure is a distortion of the truth, having been arrived at by comparing different sets of figures in the National Election Management Commission's General Election Report and By-Election Report. Based on the Commission's figures, the Communist popular vote was 9.6% while the number of Diet seats gained was 7.5% of the total in the 1949 House of Representatives election. By comparing the latter figure on percentage of seats gained in the general election with the percentage of the popular vote in the three months period, 1 January--31 March, local elections of 8.8%, the Communist Party is able to point to a 1.3% increase. These percentages are compared improperly. Actually a comparison of the popular vote in both the Diet election and those in this four months period 1 January to 1 May, reveals a 1.2% in decrease. However for the local elections all such percentage evaluations are unsatisfying and not too informative. Any positive statement as to the trend of the Communist Party's, or any other party's strength in local elections in Japan must be tempered by two imponderable factors: (1) the political character of the independent vote and (2) the knowledge that strong personalities count for more than parties or party platforms at the local level.

Socialist-Communist Relationship in Local Elections

During the past three and one half years there has been a concerted drive by the Communists to maneuver the Socialist Party into mutual collaboration; if not that, then to take as many members from the Socialist Party as possible. The Communist Party's maneuvers of hacking away at the Socialist front has been both at the policy makers and at individual members. These adroit concerts and mass harangues have been effective.

Divisions have been made with the Socialist Party. A number of Socialist executive officers have advocated collaboration or at least compromise with the Communists. Many Socialist members have bolted and left the Party. However, the central leaders of the Party during these many months of pressure have maintained the independence of the Party. They have gone straight ahead with their own programs. Most all members of the left wing of the Party, although "radical" and divergent as to views and methods from the members of the right wing, regarding the achievement of the Party's programs, are anti any united front with the Communists.

Since the three day Tokyo conference of the Socialist Party in mid April in which Ex-Premier Katayama was elected President, there has been marked activity through-out the Party's organization. The branch offices of the Party have been rejuvenated; a membership program is being made effective already by a person to person contact, the Party's own goals are being explained carefully and refutations on the spot are being made to the Communist propaganda. Despite this favorable momentum, any resurgence and maintenance by the Socialists of former strength or a better position in future elections, will be dependent upon an ideological policy agreement within the Party's whole organization or a separation of the two factions. At any rate a continuous vigorous leadership is needed to overcome the lethargy into which the Party's local organizations seemingly have sunk.

Elections held in Gifu City on 25 February 1949 for prefectural and municipal assemblymen cast an interesting sidelight on the present Socialist-Communist relationship. The Gifu edition of the Osaka Asahi carried the following news article on 20 February:

"The Labor Front Unification Council, which brings together various labor groups such as the NCIU and JFTU, and the Socialist and Communist Parties, has demanded that either the Socialist or the Communist candidate for the prefectural assembly by-election drop out so that the council can support one joint candidate.

"The Gifu Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party, on 18 February, decided to withdraw Communist candidate FUKUTA Tatsuro, 39, a new-comer, and throw the entire labor support behind Socialist candidate OGAWA Hajime, 46, a new-comer. As a result, favored candidates SHIBATA and MASUDA will be hard hit.

"On the other hand, indications are strong in the Gifu City Council by-election that Socialist candidate SUGIMOTO Takeo, 30, a new-comer, will be withdrawn in favor of Communist candidate TAKAHASHI Kazuyoshi, 40, new-comer, and give him the total organized votes.

"The Communist Prefectural Committee has already announced as its official candidates Socialist OGAWA for the prefectural assembly election

and Communist TAKAHASHI for the city council election, but the Socialist Prefectural Federation has not yet shown any signs of withdrawing the candidacy of Socialist SUGIMOTO from the city council election."

The results of the election for prefectural assemblyman, in which the Democratic-Liberal candidates won, show that the Communist candidate did in fact withdraw in favor of Socialist OGAWA. The combined support of both parties gave the Socialist candidate enough votes to become the runner-up.

However, the Socialists refused to reciprocate in the election for municipal assemblyman. Both candidates SUGIMOTO and TAKAHASHI ran, which removed a major source of opposition to the winner.

Pronouncements by local chapters of the Socialist Party disclaiming "joint struggle" and taking a definite anti-Communist stand by explaining the incompatibility of Communist with Socialist principles would do much to weaken the Communists. At present, some of the local Socialist organizations have been inclined to ignore the injunction of the Party's central headquarters against collaboration with the Communists. For instance, the SHIRAIKI MAINICHI newspaper reports on 4 April that the Socialists have agreed to cooperate with the Communists in future local by-elections in Nagano. There have been similar newspaper reports in February with reference to Hokkaido.

Political Party Local Election Strategy

A more realistic appraisal of each party's chances in local elections by party executives and heads plus tighter party discipline to prevent an excessive number of candidates from running would ensure against dilution of strength. This condition has allowed the Communist Party and other small organized minorities to steal the election. A divided opposition within both the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Democratic Party and low election interest enabled the lone Communist candidate to win the contest for one seat in the Kyoto Prefectural Assembly held in Ukyo-Ward, Kyoto, on 28 February, despite the fact that he received only 19% of the valid vote cast and less than 7% of the registered vote.

An interesting insight into the workings of local politics is afforded in the 8 April edition of the MAINICHI SHIBUN which discusses "the behind-the-scenes maneuvering" in preparation for the forthcoming Saitama gubernatorial election.

"The Saitama Prefectural Association of Town and Village Mayors held a council of country chapter heads of the association at the Urawa Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 6 April to discuss the coming gubernatorial election.

"It was decided that instead of over stressing the political party, they should endorse a man who is not affiliated with any party but who can be supported by representatives of political parties, public organizations, industrial circles, municipal mayors, and all other groups.

"The same afternoon, council representatives called on Prefectural Assembly Chairman NAKAMURA at the Prefectural Assembly Secretariat and conveyed that although there are indications of some prefectural assemblymen trying to run a candidate under their control to monopolize the governorship by one party; the 314 town and village mayors of the prefecture are opposed to this.

"At the same time the mayors decided to launch an active drive among the various groups to select an ideal independent candidate."

A by-election for Sunakawa Town, Sorachi-gun, Hokkaido, also gives an interesting insight into various party election strategies. There were 29 candidates for 14 seats, including 21 Independents, 4 Socialists, 2 Democratic-Liberals, and 2 Communists. Ten of the winners were Independents. Of the party candidates, although the Socialists polled 12% of the vote compared to 11% and 7% for the Democratic-Liberals and Communists, respectively, they had so diluted their strength that they elected but one candidate. The Democratic-Liberals, on the other hand, elected both of their candidates and the Communists one of theirs. The second Communist candidate ran well ahead of the 3 Socialists who failed.

VI. Comments From the Military Government Teams

Many teams have commented on what they consider needless expense caused by resignations which were required by law to qualify for candidacy in the 23 January Diet elections. The expenditures which are completely borne by the prefectures run anywhere from ¥1,500 for a village election to ¥6,263,067 for a prefectural election as that in Miyagi for the gubernatorial race.

In addition, comments on by-election surveillance, platforms, and analysis of results, were submitted by teams to this headquarters.

1. Gunma Military Government Team (Election for Prefectural Assemblyman from Yamada-gun). "Statement of change in political trend between previous election for position to be filled and the Diet election and from the Diet election to the by-election, and your evaluation:

- "1. The Democratic party candidates still remain strong and unchanged.
- "2. The Democratic-Liberals gained support from the Independents in the recent Diet election so they in turn supported the Independents in this election.

"3. Socialist Party strength remains unchanged. The Communist Party support shows small gains in each election.

"4. The trend in this area remains conservative.

"Statement of principal issues expounded by candidates and political parties.

"Eiichiro Kondo, Democrat

1. Rehabilitation
2. Promotion of social education
3. Increase foodstuff
4. Reduction of taxes
5. Democratization of education

"Noboru Sunaga, Independent

1. Repair of flood damages
2. Nationalization of agricultural enterprises

"Yukio Ishihara, Communist

1. Rehabilitation
2. Expose of tax evaders
3. Elimination of transaction taxes

"Otataka Shimazaki, Socialist

1. Promotion of education
2. Revision of local tax system
3. Settlement of mine pollution problem."

2. Tokyo Military Government Team (Seven By-Elections for Members of Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly). "Tokyo Military Government Team had ten surveillance teams in the field on 2 and 3 March. All teams reported the polling places were orderly, the voting and counting were conducted in a very efficient manner. No major violation of election laws occurred."

3. Kanagawa Military Government Team (Election for Mayor of Odawara City). "The Odawara City area is a traditionally conservative area. This is due to the large fishing companies located in the city and an unusually large concentration of well to do and wealthy people who maintain homes. During the election, prior to the one which is reported on for the mayor of the city, the Democratic-Liberal Party polled 18,608 votes and the People's Cooperative Party polled 7,012 votes. It is interesting to note that the

latter party seems to have lost its influence entirely in this area since that time. This is indicative of the situation of that party throughout the entire prefecture. It is assumed that supporters of the party have been absorbed within the body of the Communist and Socialist Parties.

"Prior to the last election of the members of the lower house of the Diet, Mr. Sato, the former mayor of Odawara, resigned to become a candidate of the Democratic-Liberal Party in the Diet race. Upon his defeat, he refused to again become a candidate for the mayor's office. Mr. Suzuki, the successful candidate, ran for election as an Independent. However, he was strongly supported by all conservative parties of the area and the Socialist Party. This is believed to have been caused by popular desire to prevent the election of a Communist mayor to the post. During the Diet race, Nakanishi, the Communist candidate received 2,469 votes in this area. While this comparatively poor showing could not have endangered the candidates of the conservative parties in the mayoralty election, it was felt that a united front was necessary against the Communists in view of the determined efforts being made by the Communists to carry the election. This was the first important election in this area since the surprising large Communist turnout on a national scale in the Diet elections. Therefore, the Communist Party concentrated heavily on a show of strength in this area. They conducted a strenuous campaign prior to the election. This included speeches made by national Communist leaders Tokuda and other famous Communists. It is reported that this speech alone was worth 2,000 votes. Indicative of the interest incited by famous Communist speakers is the report that many voters from other prefectures were present to see Tokuda. The Communist Party was unable to win the election because of the coalition of the other parties. However, they were successful in polling 6,500 votes, an increase of 4,031 votes within less than a thirty day period between this election and the Diet elections. This Communist vote represents about 16% of the total electorate.

"Although the Communist Party was able to stampede local politicians into a coalition against that Party, comparatively little notice or action was taken by other national parties at an important local election. This is an important defect in the operations of all of the national parties except the Communist Party. It is a defect which if not remedied will have serious consequences in the politics of Japan during the coming years.

"The platform of the candidate, Suzuki, was vague and negative. His was a "gentlemanly" campaign involving nothing of any political portent. He is not a strong political figure. He was elected on the basis of his personal reputation, powerful friends, and strong political support.

"The Communist candidate, Uchino, followed the usual party line. An interesting innovation was the inclusion of the taxes paid by prominent

citizens of the area in the party platform. This is part of the protest program against taxes. This same technique has been used several times prior to this by the Communist Party in its publicity."

In the Odawara campaign the Party's platform was greatly detailed. Attention can well be paid to the types of issues pushed forward. Most of them can be whipped into highly emotional and controversial arguments. The 42 "planks" of the general and detailed policies are given in Tab D. This series of items is similar to others developed in other areas throughout Japan.

4. The Miyagi Military Government Team In the local general election for the office of governor which SASAKI Kasuji won, expenses totaled ¥6,263,067 and 494,300 out of 792,399 registered voters cast their ballots. The Team's commentaries were:

"The change in the political trend between previous governor's election in April 1947 and Diet election of 23 January 1949 showed parties to be weak, with Independents polling most of the votes. At the Diet election, however, the Democratic-Liberal Party had come to the front and took the majority of the Diet seats.

"For the political trend from the Diet election to the by-election very little change was noted as the Democratic-Liberal Party elected its candidate. One independent candidate made an excellent showing, however, indicating all the political power is not vested in the Democratic-Liberal Party.

"The present prefectural assembly was elected at the time when no party was particularly strong, and is therefore controlled to a large extent by Independents. Since the recently elected Governor is of the Democratic-Liberal Party, it is foreseen that cooperation between the Governor and the Assembly will not be at its best. It is possible that a vote of non-confidence would obtain if such a vote were called for. In such a case, it is believed the final result would be resignation by the governor.

"Principal issues expounded by candidates:

Kiyoshi TAKAHASHI - Restoration of damages caused by war and floods, improvement of financial conditions, improvement of culture, increase in production, counter measures for unemployment and labor problems.

Kanroku SAITO - Revision of illegal taxation and cleaning up of the Prefectural Government.

Kazuji SASAKI - Restoration of damages caused by natural disasters, maintenance of local financial policy, restoration of industry, utilitarianism.

Takayuki MIYATO - Revision of taxation and the establishment of a wholesome financial structure.

Chiyoji YOSHIKI - Strengthening of industry in rural communities and counter measures for floods.

5. Hokkaido Military Government District The report covered six separate elections; costs for each locality, political trend by parties and a recommendation are given.

"The cost of by-elections to local entity were as follows:

a. Hokkaido Prefectural Government	¥1,393,150
b. Sapporo City	756,100
c. Asahigawa City	410,180
d. Muroran City	392,720
e. Shiribeshi sub-Prefecture	2,011,444
f. Iburi sub-Prefecture	1,112,631

TOTAL ¥6,076,575

"The political trend by parties showed that (a) for the Communist Party there was no deviation from the Party's Diet campaign issue. Stress was laid on the seeming laxity of collection by officials of all taxes on blackmarketeers and big business. This is a typical Communistic tactic. The Party made a gain of 3.3% in Sapporo; the Party's number of votes obtained and its percentage of the total vote cast in the Diet and by-elections were respectively 5,115 or 6.3% and 5,186 or 9.6%. The percentage gain indicates a trend which is tempered by the individual candidate's local popularity.

"b. The Democratic-Liberal Party's candidates stressed the perfection of better governmental administration and an expansion of industry. This trend does not deviate from the Diet campaign issues. The Party retained its popularity as three out of seven candidates were elected.

"c. The Democrat Party's candidates stressed improvement of business, schools and governmental administration. Three out of three candidates were successful.

"d. The Social Democrat Party's candidates stressed perfection of the local reclamation and repatriation programs, but all opposed the government workers lay-off and taxes imposed on the masses. The popularity of the Social Democrats has fallen considerably. In 1947 this Party was the majority party in the Assembly; now it ranks third. It is believed that the majority of Hokkaido's people want a stabilized government and do not want radicals in their Assembly. None of the Socialists were voted into office.

"e. The New Farmers Party's candidates stressed farming, fishing and small business cooperatives. As their campaign speeches were along socialist lines none of their candidates were elected. This Party is the majority party in the Hokkaido Assembly by having twenty one seats.

"There were no criminal incidents or serious violations of election laws reported.

"It is recommended that paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, Article 67, Laws Relating to House of Representatives General Election, January 1949, be deleted. These paragraphs make it mandatory that public officials of State and local public bodies resign their positions prior to filing for candidacy. The monetary loss computed in man hours lost by voters and election expenses is an additional burden on Japan's economy. If candidates were allowed to run for Diet seats without resigning their positions and were made to resign upon being elected, the prohibition of holding two offices concurrently would be fulfilled. If the paragraphs mentioned above had been deleted from the current law, one by-election would have been necessary in Hokkaido instead of six, thus saving the Nation some millions of yen."

6. Aomori Military Government Team In an election for the mayor of a town, 82.5% of the 5,745 registered voters cast ballots. Moreover only 71 or 1.29% of the ballots cast were declared invalid.

"Inasmuch as this was an election for headman the campaign was restricted to the area of Goshogawara-machi. Notices of the election, personal history statements and platforms of the two candidates were posted on bulletin boards throughout the town by the Election Committee. Speech meetings under the auspices of the Election Committee were held throughout the town. Newspaper announcements concerning the election were made along with information concerning the candidates.

"The statements of principal issues expounded by the two candidates are summarized as follows:

YAMAUCHI - Perfect accomplishment of the present projects now under construction and planning in the town. Improvement of the education and culture facilities of the town to make it the center of these activities for Kita and Nishi guns.

TAKAHASHI - Stabilization of the financial condition of the town. Improvement of instruction of general public concerning self-governing ideas. Greater cooperation on part of all organizations and institutions in the town for the general welfare of Goshogawara-machi.

"At the election for headman held on April 5, 1947 YAMAUCHI Kyuzaburo ran last in a field of three candidates for the same post. This was his second try for the post."

VII. Conclusion

Local general and by-elections in addition to reflecting the political temper of the people often indicates: (1) the existence and nature of political, social, economic, and ideological problems affecting the objectives of the Occupation, (2) the magnitude of the issues as revealed by the trend of successive election, (3) the grounds for a proper course of action which military government teams can pursue locally, and (4) the specific areas in which greatest attention should be focused.

Through careful analysis military government units can determine the extent to which Occupation policies and their own activities are directly or indirectly made issues in the campaigns. By watching the fortunes of parties and organizations which on the one hand endorse them, and by observing the fate of those which are highly critical of them on the other hand, military government should be able to determine which areas or which programs should receive increased attention. Campaign criticism of unpopular policies and programs should be studied with a view through increased dissemination of information, to clear up popular misconceptions and overcome outmoded traditions or prejudices; or else it may be considered altogether appropriate to urge revision or abandonment in whole or in part. For it should be readily apparent that only those programs and policies which stand a chance of gaining popular acceptance will take root permanently; all others, besides awaking antipathy towards their would-be benefactors, will be scuttled unceremoniously at the first opportunity. Military government's comments and evaluations form the backbone of all election reports, without which bare statistics are often devoid of real meaning.

Aside from drawing pertinent conclusions as to the significance of local elections in their area of responsibility, which is perhaps the most important reason for their surveillance, military government can also do much to educate the Japanese in the essentials of intelligent politics. By encouraging the Japanese voters to form political parties to take a more active stand in adhering to concrete issues as well as to compete actively in every election, and by educating the people in the methods of successful election techniques, military government teams are aiding the citizenry to secure the desired maximum effective expression of the people's will and the assurance of the defeat of highly organized pressure groups. This task becomes a progressively more important part of the mission of military government in the Occupation.

VIII. Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the system of plural voting be adopted in place of the highly restrictive (single voting) system now used. In Japan today, the political situation far outmodes the one in which the system was established. The system was adopted to ensure minority representation which one-half century ago in Japan was to come from particular rural areas. The conditions of those years, not to say the intervening ones, are far removed from those of today. The conduct of the pressure groups today with their socially insidious tactics completely negates the effects desired by the early law makers.

2. Further, it is recommended that provisions of the election laws be changed in which incumbents of elective positions are required to resign prior to running for another office. Needless expenditures now saddled upon the local public body concerned would be eliminated.

HEADQUARTERS
OSAKA MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAM
APO 25

JSG/sk
3 May 1949

SUBJECT: Summary of Election (Reports Control Symbol IG-22)

TO : Commanding General
Eighth Army
APO 343

1. Type of election - Election for Prefectural Assemblyman
2. Date of election - 23 April 1949
3. Location of election - Kitakawachi-gun, Osaka Prefecture

4. These data pertain to the area covered by this election for the following elections: (a) the last previous election held for the position to be filled by this election, (b) the National Election held 23 January 1949, (c) the present election

a. Number of eligible voters:

	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
(1) Male	30,865	31,070	30,331
(2) Female	34,895	35,150	34,154
(3) Total	<u>65,760</u>	<u>66,220</u>	<u>64,555</u>

b. Number of actual voters and percentage to eligible voters:

	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
(1) Male	22,339 72.5%	25,433 81.5%	21,087 69.4%
(2) Female	24,291 69.6%	24,341 69.2%	23,323 68.3%
(3) Total	<u>46,630 70.9%</u>	<u>49,774 75.1%</u>	<u>44,410 68.8%</u>

c. Number of invalid ballots and percentage to total votes cast:

TAB A

Ltr, Hq OMT, APO 25, subj: Summary of Election, dtd 3 May 49, cont'd

	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
Total	594 1.2%	972 1.9%	707 1.9%

d. Total number of votes obtained by each political party and all independents:

Party	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
(1) Democratic-Liberal	21,215	26,013	
(2) Democratic	10,224	3,011	13,602
(3) Social Democrat		8,808	
(4) People's Cooperative			11,159
(5) Communists	11,515	7,578	
(6) Social Renovation		989	
(7) Labour Farmer	2,548		
(8) New Liberal			
(9) Japan Farmer			
(10) Other Parties: Proletarian Union ("Musun Domei")		307	18,942
(11) Independent	534	2,095	43,703
Total	46,036	48,801	

5. Number of surveillance teams and other personnel other than military government personnel.

29 in total

6. Were the candidates' purge questionnaires available at the Election Administration Committee's Offices and at the Screening Committee's Offices?

Yes

7. Candidates. If any change from or additional information to Filing of Candidacies (Reports Control Symbol MG-20), place under remarks. Place asterisk before elected candidate.

Name	Political Party	Total Votes Obtained	Period of Time for which Elected	Remarks
* YASUDA Riichi	Independent	18,255	2 year term	
NISHII, Yoshitaro	Socialist- Democrat	13,602		

Ltr, Hq OMG, APO 25, subj: Summary of Election, dtd 3 May 49, cont'd

<u>Name</u>	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Total Votes Obtained</u>	<u>Period of Time for which Elected</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
INOUE, Yaichiro	Communist	11,159		
HATANAKA, Kosuke	Independent	687		

8. Number of violations reported or observed:
No violations reported or observed to date.

9. Extent of local publicity given to the election and campaign:

a. Seven thousand (7,000) posters were put up at various places in towns and villages.

b. Seventeen banners showing the date of the election were displayed in front of town, village and District Offices.

c. Thirty-five thousand (35,000) public reports on career of all candidates were distributed to each household. Careers of candidates were also broadcasted.

d. In order to decrease the abstention rate 5,000 posters were posted in towns and villages, and for 3 days prior to the election, chief of the district office and 6 other officials engaged themselves in a public information program on the street, through the use of a broadcasting car.

e. Sixty-thousand (60,000) handbills were distributed to newspaper readers on 15 and 22 April 1949.

f. Sixty-seven thousand (67,000) entrance tickets were sent to eligible voters.

g. Notices stating candidates' names and careers were posted in each voting district and polling-booth.

h. House to house visits were conducted by Primary and Junior High School boys to encourage voting.

10. Remarks:

a. Full details of any criticism expressed in regard to the Occupation Forces or policies of the United States.

Ltr, Hq OMT, APO 25, subj: Summary of Election; dtd 3 May 49, cont'd

No criticism expressed

b. Any significant political strategy or trend

Tetsu Katayama, leader of the Socialist-Democrat party and Wataru Narahashi and Tetsuo Iwaki, influential members of the Democratic party came down to the electoral district from Tokyo and gave campaign speeches on 22 March 49.

c. Statement of principal issues expounded by candidates and political parties.

YASUDA, Independent

Principle issues presented by Yasuda were protection of the rights of farmers and small business; promotion of education with emphasis on rehabilitation of school buildings, strong measure against unemployment; stepping up of production through cooperation of labor and management; resistance against unfair taxation.

NISHII, Socialist-Democrat

Nishii did not present any main principle issues other than what the Socialist party advocates.

INOUE, Communist

Main principle issue of Inoue was for the cooperation of farmers to protect their rights to insure the fulfillment of their demands and resistance against unfair taxation.

HATANAKA, Independent.

The only principle issue that Hatanaka expounded was the electrification of electric train line between Shijonawate and Kizu. A local problem in Kitakawachi-gun.

d. Details of serious violation of election laws or SCAPIN, including all violations directly effecting elected candidates or elective public officials:

No violations reported to date.

e. Any unusual incidents or other matters:

Number of votes cast for communist candidate decreased by 356 votes, or 3.2%, as compared with that of last previous election.

FRANK KOWALSKI JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

LOCAL ELECTION AND BY-ELECTION SUMMARY

(Reported By-Elections Held During the Period
1 January to 1 May 1949)

1. ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS, MAYORS, CHIEFS OF SPECIAL WARDS

a. Elections for Prefectural Governor: 1

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Winning Candidate</u>
1 Democratic-Liberal	1 Democratic-Liberal
1 Communist	
3 Independents	

b. Elections for Mayors of Cities: 11

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Winning Candidates</u>
6 Democratic-Liberals	5 Democratic-Liberals
2 Socialists	6 Independents
6 Communists	
19 Independents	
1 Minor Party	

c. Elections for Mayors of Towns: 77

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Winning Candidates</u>
12 Democratic-Liberals	4 Democratic-Liberals
1 Socialist	41 Independents
13 Communists	2 Democrats
86 Independents	<u>No Election Contests (30)</u>
2 Democrats	1 Socialist
	29 Independents

d. Elections for Village Headman: 273

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Winning Candidates</u>
22 Democratic-Liberals	10 Democratic-Liberals
3 Democrats	2 Democrats
3 Socialists	2 Minor Party
8 Communists	89 Independents
3 Minor Party	
196 Independents	

TAB B

No Election Contests (170)

1 Socialist
 1 Minor Party
 1 Communist
 167 Independents

- c. Election for Chiefs of Special Wards (Tokyo-to): 1
 (Special break-down--figures not to be noted separately,
 having been included in par c, above).

Candidates

1 Democratic-Liberal
 1 Communist
 3 Independents

Winning Candidates

1 Democratic-Liberal

2. LOCAL GENERAL AND BY-ELECTIONS

- a. Elections and By-Elections for Prefectural Assemblies: 57
 No. of Seats: 59

Candidates

71 Democratic-Liberals
 24 Democrats
 31 Socialists
 48 Communists
 83 Independents
 14 Minor Party

Winning Candidates

28 Democratic-Liberals
 8 Democrats
 1 Communist
 2 Minor Party
 19 Independents

No Election Contest

1 Independent

- b. Elections and By-Elections for City Assemblies: 9
 No. of Seats: 85

Candidates

16 Democratic-Liberals
 6 Democrats
 3 Socialists
 11 Communists
 2 Minor Party
 153 Independents

Winning Candidates

11 Democratic-Liberals
 1 Democrat
 1 Socialist
 2 Communists
 70 Independents

c. Elections and By-Elections for Town Assemblies: 42
No. of Seats: 463

Candidates

20 Democratic-Liberals
5 Democrats
17 Socialists
27 Communists
4 Minor Party
494 Independents

Winning Candidates

15 Democratic-Liberals
2 Democrats
10 Socialists
13 Communists
366 Independents

No Election Contests (7)

3 Democratic-Liberals
3 Democrats
2 Socialists
2 Communists
47 Independents

d. Elections and By-Elections for Village Assemblies: 158
No. of Seats: 1,086

Candidates

9 Democratic-Liberals
5 Democrats
13 Socialists
20 Communists
3 Minor Party
760 Independents

Winning Candidates

7 Democratic-Liberals
3 Democrats
7 Socialists
10 Communists
2 Minor Party
601 Independents

No Election Contests (85)

4 Democratic-Liberals
2 Democrats
1 Socialist
2 Minor Party
5 Communists
442 Independents

e. Elections for Special Ward Assemblies (Tokyo-to): 7
(Special break-down--figures not to be noted separately,
having been included in par a, above) No. of Seats: 7

Candidates

17 Democratic-Liberals
4 Democrats
7 Socialists
7 Communists
1 Minor Party
4 Independents

Winning Candidates

6 Democratic-Liberals
1 Independent

Translation of the planks announced in the ODAWARA Sunday News
Dated Jan. 30, 1949.

SUBJECT: Communists' planks on Odawara Municipal Administration.

On Feb. 1, the Odawara local committee of the Communist Party announced its planks on municipal administration along with the recommendation of Takechiyo UCHINO as a candidate of mayor.

Planks on Odawara Municipal Administration.

Odawara Local Committee,
the Japan Communist Party.

General policy

1. From the municipal administration for the ruined life to that for the stabilized one.
2. Reduction of the commodity price through the proper taxation.
3. Democratic reconstruction of the municipal finance corrupted by the bureaucracy and bosses.
4. Cleaning the collapse of the municipal affairs.
5. From the tourist city to the productive one.
6. Absolute exposure of the tax evasions of the bosses and villa-dwellers.
7. Opposition to the fascist rule of the Government.
8. Democratic mayor for the people or boss-like mayor for the riches.

Detailed policy

1. Instant cessation of the appropriation of a considerable amount of expenditures for entertainment.
2. Stop appropriating for tourist's facilities, but reconstruct the medium and small commerce and industry.
3. Save the useless expenses exploiting people.
4. Absolute investigation of the illegalities about bicycle race course.
5. Abolishment of all the compulsory donation.
6. Reduce the expenses of the municipal police to half that of today and establishment of the popular police.
7. Personnel cut of the reactionary directors with pay in excessive number.
8. Publication of the city-owned assets and their profit.
9. Establishment of the Municipal Administration Supervision Committee by the people.
10. Construction of the great Odawara including Kohzu.
11. Construction of tram way between Odawara and Kohzu.
12. Public management of the municipal bus.
13. Public management of the fish market.
14. Public management of the vegetable market.

TAB C

15. Building the city-operated residence.
16. Establishment of the municipal hospital.
17. Building the citizen club.
18. Setting heavy progressive taxation on the Residential Tax, 90% of which shall be imposed by estimation. Establishment by selection of the whole Tax-payers Tax Assessment Committee and the same committees in each quarter.
19. Income Tax and Business Tax shall be decided based upon the Residential Tax.
20. Absolute emancipation of land and purging the Farm-land Committee.
21. Opposition to the full delivery.
22. Establishment of the Agricultural Bank to loan out cheap money.
23. Strengthening the Agricultural Cooperative Association.
24. Agrarian administration of the forest co-owned by eight villages.
25. Vesting the fishery ground right to the city and fishery right to the fisher-men.
26. Full distribution of the linked goods.
27. Proper price of rice to cover the productive cost. - Proper price of fish.
28. Establishment of the Fishery Bank to loan out cheap money.
29. Establishment of the Democratic Commerce-Industry Association instead of the corrupted Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
30. Establishment of the special bank for the medium and small enterpriser to borrow the cheap money.
31. Reduce the power tariff for the medium and small enterprisers to that of the large scaled industry through the wholesale registration.
32. Bright window through high efficiency attained by high pay for the city employees.
33. Cheap loan of the livelihood expenditures.
34. Expansion and strengthening of the Life Cooperative Association related to the traders.
35. Immediate rehabilitation of the flood-stricken areas.
36. Releasing of big residences.
37. Securing the livelihood of the people requiring protection.
38. Full equipment of the school facilities.
39. Proper practice of the 6-3-3 school year system.
40. Educational expenses shall be fully borne by the National Treasury.
41. Full arrangement of the hygienic facilities.
42. Reconstruction and adjustment of the road and drain-covers.

<u>Elections For</u>	<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>Election District</u>	<u>% of Total Valid Vote Rec'd by Communist Candidate</u>	<u>% of Total Valid Vote Rec'd by Communist Party in 1949 H.R. Election (Prefecture as a Whole)</u>
Prefectural Governor:	Miyagi		6%	5%
Prefectural and Ward Assemblies:	Hokkaido	Shiribeshi-shicho	5.0%	5.1%
	"	Ebury-shicho	4.4%	5.1%
	"	Muroran-shi	5.5%	5.1%
	"	Asahigawa-shi	9.5%	5.1%
	Aomori	Kita Tsugaru-gun	4%	9%
	Yamagata	Akumi-gun	5%	6%
	Iwate	Shiwa-gun	6%	6%
	Nagano	Hanishima-gun	11%	14%
	Ibaraki	Nihari-gun	20%	8%
	Saitama	Kita Katsushika-gun	25%	13%
	"	Osato-gun	20%	13%
	"	Urawa City	15%	13%
	Tokyo	Minato Ward	23%	18%
	"	Arakawa Ward	15%	18%
	"	Katsusniko Ward	24%	18%
	"	Kita Ward	20%	18%
	"	Koto Ward	15%	18%
	"	Neriwa Ward	25%	18%
	"	Shinagawa Ward	17%	18%
	"	Shinjuku Ward	20%	18%
	Shizuoka	Haribara-gun	22%	8%
	"	Shide-gun	9%	8%
	Kanagawa	Chigasaki	22%	15%
	Gumma	Ora-gun	6%	8%
	"	Yamada-gun	6%	6%
	Ishikawa	Suzu-gun	2%	11%
	Kyoto	Ukyo Ward	10%	13%
	Osaka	Kita Kawachi-gun	25%	20%
	Okayama	Kurashiki City	11%	13%
	Hiroshima	Numakuma-gun	4%	10%
	Shimane	Ouchi-gun	5%	11%
Mayor of City:	Saitama	Kawaguchi	29%	13%
	Kanagawa	Odawara	25%	15%
	Yamanashi	Kofu	14%	10%
City Assembly:	Saitama	Yoshiwara	3%	13%
	Aichi	Nagoya	8%	10%

TAB D



Action Assigned to NA
Action Taken no action
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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Officer W. H. [unclear]
No. 407

United States Political Adviser
for Japan

Tokyo June 23, 1949.

DIVISION OF
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

JUL 20 1949

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(For Department Use Only)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Subject: Background of Riots at Tokyo Metropolitan
Assembly, May 30-31, 1949.

894.00/6-449

With reference to this Mission's airgram no. 138 of June 4, 1949, concerning riots at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly on May 30 and 31, 1949, as a consequence of communist-inspired opposition to new municipal regulations governing parades and demonstrations, the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim has the honor to transmit a memorandum prepared by Foreign Service Officer Richard H. LAMB giving significant background information on this incident.

The information in the enclosed memorandum is based upon discussions with a competent official of General Headquarters and is supported in some respects by information obtained from a Japanese Government employee who was ordered to attend the demonstrations.

At the time of the Korean riots in the Osaka-Kobe district in April, 1948, local police authorities, on instructions from the Commanding General, I Corps, issued an order forbidding demonstrations not previously authorized by the police and specifying that participants in such demonstrations would be subject to arrest. That ordinance was later rescinded because of its apparent violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. Steps to rescind the ordinance were presumably initiated by the Government Section of General Headquarters, which at the same time prepared a "model" Public Safety Ordinance which was sent to the Commanding General, I Corps, with the suggestion that it be used as a basis for future municipal ordinances. The model ordinance reportedly outlined procedures to govern the conduct of only "moving" meetings, that is, parades.

On April 4, 1949, the Commanding General, I Corps, is reported to have issued instructions to all military government teams concerning a new "model" ordinance

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JUL 29 1949
FILED

ACTION COPY

RETURN TO DC/R FILES WITHIN 14 DAYS, WITH A NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

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894.00/6-2349

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to be suggested by military government personnel to prefectural authorities. The new model ordinance dealt with both "moving" (parades) and "standing" (meetings) demonstrations, and not only organizers of unauthorized demonstrations of both categories, but all participants therein would be subject to arrest. The model ordinance suggested by the Commanding General, I Corps, is far more restrictive than that proposed by the Government Section, and the extension of its restrictive provisions to "standing" demonstrations in effect prohibits any spontaneous public meeting where it is impossible to obtain necessary police authorization seventy-two hours in advance. Even more restrictive, of course, is the provision making participants as well as organizers subject to arrest.

It is not certain if communist leaders have been aware of information regarding the Government Section's proposed ordinance and that proposed by the Commanding General, I Corps. It is also apparent that at the time of the riotous demonstrations at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, the Communists were not aware of what attitude the Assembly would take or what kind of draft ordinance was likely to be proposed. From experience in other cities, however, the Communists were convinced that a restrictive ordinance would come under discussion, and it was undoubtedly their intention, through the demonstration, to compell the Assembly to adopt the least restrictive type of measure.

Enclosure:

Memorandum, "Background of Riots at Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, May 30-31, 1949" prepared by FSO Richard H. Lamb.

Parchment Mat to Department.

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M

MEMORANDUM TO DESPATCH NO. 10,
dated June 23, 1949 from the
United States Political Adviser
for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject,
"Background of Riots at Tokyo
Metropolitan Assembly, May 30-31,
1949."

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(COPY)

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Background of the Demonstrations at the Tokyo
Metropolitan Assembly, May 30-31, 1949.

It is believed that the following information, which was obtained from a competent SCAP official who is also a close personal friend, and which was supported in some respects by a Japanese Government employee who was ordered to attend the demonstrations, may be of interest in connection with the Communist-inspired demonstrations which took place at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly on May 30-31, 1949, in protest against the new Public Safety Ordinance for Tokyo which the Assembly was believed to be considering.

At the time of last year's Korean demonstrations in Osaka and Kobe, an ordinance was enacted on instructions from the Commanding General, I Corps, forbidding demonstrations not previously authorized by the police, and specifying that persons who participated in such demonstrations would be subject to arrest. This ordinance, which appeared to be in direct violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and which did not seem to be justified on grounds of military necessity, was considered to be entirely too harsh and was soon rescinded on instructions from SCAP, presumably at the instance of Government Section. At that time a "model" Public Safety Ordinance was drafted by Government Section and sent to I Corps, with the suggestion that it be used as a basis for any ordinances regarding public meetings which might be necessary in the future. The essential points of the "model" ordinance were as follows: (1) permits for mass meetings would be requested at least 72 hours in advance, and if no reply were received until 24 hours before the meeting was scheduled to be held, it could be assumed that permission had been granted; (2) permission would be refused only if there were a "clear and present danger" to public peace, and in the event of refusal, the municipal or prefectural assembly would be immediately notified of the reasons for the refusal; (3) persons organizing or otherwise responsible for holding unauthorized meetings would be subject to arrest; (4) the ordinance would apply only to "moving" meetings (parades, etc.) and not to "standing" meetings.

Apparently

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Despatch NO. 407,
June 23, 1949.

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Apparently no further major directives regarding mass meetings were issued by I Corps until April 4, 1949, when Major-General Coulter, successor to Major-General Swing as Commanding General, I Corps, transmitted a letter (restricted) to all military government teams in I Corps area regarding public safety ordinances. The letter contained a new "model" ordinance, which military government officers were instructed to suggest to prefectural authorities who might be considering such legislation. General Coulter's "model" ordinance appears to have differed from that prepared by Government Section in at least two important respects: (1) it applied to "standing" as well as "moving" demonstrations; (2) not only the organizers of unauthorized demonstrations, but all the participants therein, would be subject to arrest. General Coulter's suggestions, it appears, have been generally accepted (or seized upon) by prefectural authorities, and already ordinances have been enacted in a number of prefectures which embody the two principles indicated above.

It need not be pointed out that the ordinance as suggested by General Coulter is infinitely more restrictive than that proposed by Government Section, and puts much greater power in the hands of the police. The distinction between "moving" and "standing" meetings is important. "Moving" meetings will certainly obstruct traffic and are likely to cause serious disturbances, and it is clearly necessary that the police be informed in advance so that plans and preparations can be made. The extension of these provisions to "standing" meetings, however, in effect prohibits all spontaneous public meetings, in which it will often be impossible to obtain the necessary police authorization seventy-two hours in advance. The provision which makes participants as well as organizers subject to arrest is even more restrictive: it means that anyone who attends such a meeting, including the "man on the street" who happens to walk by and decides to stop and listen, may be legally placed under arrest by the police. Although curiously enough the Communists have not yet raised the issue, these two provisions to a large extent nullify the guarantee of freedom of assembly contained in the Constitution.

With these facts in mind the motives of the Communists in organizing the demonstrations at the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly may perhaps be better understood. There is not the slightest doubt that these meetings were Communist-organized: in at least one Government Kodan the union leaders, who are acknowledged Communists, "ordered" all but a necessary minimum of employees to leave work and attend the meetings, without telling them what their purpose was to be. Even after the demonstrations were

over

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June 23, 1949.

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over many, if not most, of the demonstrators did not know what they were opposing.

It is not certain how much of the above information regarding Government Section's ordinance and the I Corps version is known to Communist leaders. In any event, they could not have known what the attitude of the Assembly was to be, since at the time of the demonstrations the Assembly had not yet begun to deliberate on the subject; and, as will be apparent from what follows, they could not have known what sort of draft ordinance was likely to be proposed to the Assembly. What they did know, however, was that highly restrictive ordinances had recently been enacted in some prefectures, and that the Tokyo Assemblymen, with these examples before them and with last year's riots in Kobe and Osaka in mind, were about to consider a new ordinance for the Metropolis. Although there may have been other motives behind the demonstrations, it seems certain that the primary motive of the Communists was to force or frighten the Assembly into adopting the kind of ordinance which would place the least restrictions on their organizing activities.

As indicated above, those who instigated the demonstration could not have known anything of the proposed draft which was to be submitted to the Assembly, since at the time of the demonstrations there were but two copies of the draft in existence, and its contents were apparently known only to a few SCAP officials. The organizers certainly did not know that the proposed draft followed the more lenient "model" prepared last year by Government Section, and not the more restrictive version which had already been adopted in some prefectures under I Corps jurisdiction.

It is not known whether the draft ordinance referred to above (apparently prepared by a SCAP Section, although my informant did not say so) will be submitted in its present form to the Tokyo Assembly, or whether the recent demonstrations will result in the adoption of different legislation. It is known, however, that some SCAP officials consider the ordinances based on General Coulter's suggestions to be unjustified restrictions of the right of free assembly, and that these officials will not only oppose the adoption of a similar ordinance in Tokyo, but take action to have the ordinance already enacted in other prefectures modified.

Comment:

The above information is based on a single conversation, and none of the facts have been independently confirmed. I have not seen a copy of General Coulter's

letter

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June 23, 1949.

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to the military government teams, and it is possible that the interpretation of his instructions contained in this memorandum may be open to question. I have the highest confidence in my informant's judgment and ability, however, and I agree with him that, if his interpretation is sound, ordinances based on General Coulter's suggestions constitute an unjustified abridgement of the right of free assembly as guaranteed in the Japanese Constitution.

June 5, 1949

Richard H. Lamb
Richard H. Lamb

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JMB