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Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

December 4, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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PEARL HARBOR REPORT
VOL. 15 (5)

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S. Con. Res. 27

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Tuesday, December 4, 1945.

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Congress of the United States,
 Joint Committee on the Investigation
 of Pearl Harbor Attack,
 Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
 10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
 Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
 Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
 Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;
 Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,
 of counsel, for the joint committee.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

When we recessed Congressman Gearhart was examining General Miles. You may proceed, Congressman.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

(Resumed)

- - -

Mr. Gearhart: General Miles, since our interrogation of yesterday I have ascertained to my satisfaction that the message of December 7th was sent in identical form to the usual points of distribution throughout the world in identical language. That seems to be established as a fact.

Now I am directing your attention to your message of November 27, 1941. As it appears in the pamphlet that has been furnished us of copies of messages nothing would indicate that I can see that that message was sent to all of the distributing departments in outlying bases of the United States. The message that I refer to is the one reading as follows:

"Japanese negotiations have come to practically a stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. MILES."

General Miles: Yes, sir, that message went to Hawaii, Panama and all nine corps areas in the United States; that is including the West Coast Command, of course.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Gearhart: Then as a rule, or would you say it was a rule that all messages of this type that were sent out were sent out in identical form to all of the overseas outlying posts, such as Hawaii, Panama?

General Miles: As a rule that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That brings me to the point of inquiring again for the purpose of clarity why was the Marshall message of November 27th sent out in different forms, one form to Hawaii and another one to Manila?

General Miles: I regret, sir, that I cannot answer that question. I had no part in the drafting of those messages.

Mr. Gearhart: Have you any information or have you any way of telling or have you as a military expert an inference which would explain the fact that General MacArthur and General Short acted differently on those different messages?

General Miles: I have no knowledge or information bearing on that, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Don't you think it was just as important not to alarm the people of the Philippines as it was not to alarm the people of Hawaii?

General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I would very much rather that that question be answered by the two gentlemen who will succeed me in this witness stand who did have a very direct hand in preparing those messages. I feel myself incompetent to

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

answer.

Mr. Gearhart: Then you prefer not to comment upon this additional phrase that was put in the message to General Short: "But these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent." You prefer that that comment be left to General Marshall?

General Miles: I would, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And still as head of Military Intelligence you are supposed to understand these messages and keep yourself abreast of the reasons of the whys and wherefores of these distinctions, are you not?

General Miles: I did know the substance of that message so that I was informed of the substance, at least, of that message pretty thoroughly I think.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General Miles: What is that, sir?

Mr. Gearhart: I say you testified yesterday that you have not observed the distinction in these two messages.

General Miles: I think I testified, sir, that I did not at that time, yesterday, remember this particular distinction that you were drawing up, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I have reminded you now. Do you have any further comment to make now?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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General Miles: I would very much rather not comment on the Chief of Staff's message because it was the Chief of Staff's message and because I had no part in its drafting, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact isn't it true that in Washington and the Washington Naval and Army circles there was a fixed belief that Singapore and Hawaii were so impregnable and so invincible as fortresses that they would not be attacked?

General Miles: I never heard that opinion expressed in Washington circles, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, it was up to you to keep in contact with the policies and philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was it not?

General Miles: No, sir. I had nothing to do with what might be called the Joint Strategical Staff unless and except when I was informed by the Chief of Staff or by his direction through General Gerow what was going on. I commonly had no part in any of the activities of the, I think you call it the Joint Strategical Board.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, directing your attention to the message that was sent to the President by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark under date of November 27th, I will read you the first paragraph:

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

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3 "If the current negotiations end without agreement,
4 Japan may attack: The Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya;
5 the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Rus-
6 sian Maritime Provinces."

7
8 Can you account, or do you know why absolutely no
9 mention is made of Singapore or of Hawaii?

10
11 General Miles: No, sir, I do not. I had no part in
12 the drawing up of that particular document.

13
14 Mr. Gearhart: Wouldn't you say it was a legitimate in-
15 ference that a possible attack upon those two bastions was not
16 within the contemplation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of
17 the Army and Navy high authorities of the United States?

18
19 General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I would rather not
20 pass on the implications of a paper signed by the Chief of
21 Staff or Chief of Naval Operations in which I had no part in
22 drawing it up.

23
24 Mr. Gearhart: All right, get back to your own personal
25 self.

26
27 General Miles: Yes, sir.

28
29 Mr. Gearhart: Will you cite me one document which you
30 have yourself signed in which you spoke of the possible at-
31 tack that might occur upon Hawaii?

32
33 General Miles: I do not think there was any document
34 in those particular days which I signed in which the possible
35

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

1
2 attack on Hawaii was mentioned because it was an obvious con-
3 comitant, if you like, result, an obvious possibility in any
4 war in which we might become involved with Japan, so obvious
5 that it would be known to all military men.

6 Mr. Gearhart: It was a possibility but did the Army and
7 Navy regard it as a probability?

8 General Miles: I think they did, sir, regard it as
9 probable for reasons that I have already testified, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And still it is not mentioned in this
11 tremendous volume of literature that has been placed upon
12 the desks of the committeemen anywhere, that there was a pos-
13 sibility, a probability that Hawaii singled out alone would
14 be the object of attack?

15 General Miles: That is true, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: But there is plenty in all of this liter-
17 ature, an abundance which points out the possibility of at-
18 tack in the Philippines, in the Kra Peninsula, in Thailand,
19 in Indo-China, everywhere except on those two very great for-
20 tresses at Singapore and Hawaii.

21 General Miles: No, sir, not everywhere except. I do
22 not think you will find any mention of the obvious fact that
23 in a war with Japan the Panama Canal might be attacked, the
24 Island of Guam might be attacked, the Island of Samoa might
25 be attacked, Midway, and so forth, and so forth.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

General Miles: Those things were quite obvious as possibilities in a war with Japan.

Mr. Gearhart: They are all mentioned over and over again in this literature that has been laid on our desks, except Singapore and Hawaii. Singapore has been spoken of as possibly being menaced by an invasion of the Kra Peninsula but that is as far as any of this literature has gone in respect to Singapore and it has not gone that far in respect to Hawaii anywhere along the line.

If I am mistaken in that will you point it out?

General Miles: I do not know what documents you are referring to, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Gearhart: I am referring to every document that has been laid before us.

General Miles: Well, I cannot very well answer about that but I think you are mistaken, sir. I do not remember any document of importance which specifically mentions the possibility or probability of attack on Panama, Guam, Midway, Samoa.

Mr. Gearhart: Why, there has been specific mentions of Guam as an object of attack, there has been specific mention of Panam, of the Philippines, specific mention of Indo-China, the Kra Peninsula, but never a specific mention of the Hawaiian

Witness Miles:

Questions by Mr. Gearhart

Islands. If you have anything to the contrary I would like to have you point it out and if you find one document among all of these I will be surprised.

Why, even on the 27th, after Mr. Hull had handed his final statement to the Japanese a letter was written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which they point out all of these other places as possible objectives of Jap attack and Hawaii is not mentioned even then.

General Miles: Do they point out Panama or Guam?

Mr. Gearhart: No.

General Miles: Or Samoa?

Mr. Gearhart: No, but they point out the Burma Road, Thailand, Malay, Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, the Russian Maritime Provinces and discuss each one on the basis of the paper later on.

But, General Miles, things happened on the 6th of December which suddenly centered your attention upon Hawaii as a possible object of attack, did there not?

General Miles: Things happened on the morning of the 7th of December, sir, which centered my attention on the probable Japanese attack somewhere coincident with the delivery of the Japanese reply at one o'clock that day.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You are familiar with the so-called 14-part Japanese reply to the Hull message of November 26, are you not?

General Miles: I am, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: When they speak of it as the 14-part message they are referring to the method the Japanese used in transmitting that message, are they not?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: It came in in installments, in other words, rather than in a solid typed coded message, is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Thirteen parts of that message were received in Washington on the 6th day of December, were they not?

General Miles: On the late evening of the 6th they were received, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: When did they start coming in and when was the 13th part finally received?

General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I cannot answer that question with any degree of certainty. You will have witnesses before you who can answer that, sir, witnesses who handled that particular activity.

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Gearhart: I will yield.

The Vice Chairman: I just want to see if I am right about it. I understood General Miles was supposed to return

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

at another time and a special inquiry would be made along that line. Is that correct, Mr. Gesell?

Mr. Gesell: That is correct, Congressman Cooper. The procedure called for having here at one time all witnesses concerned with those messages so that we could get a composite and detailed investigation into that.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. Gearhart: I will yield.

Senator Ferguson: Just for a question of the Chairman. As I understand it now, Mr. Chairman, the plan is to call General Marshall on Thursday morning. I am just inquiring as to how we might proceed with General Marshall on the particular items that we are omitting from General Miles, such as the wind message.

Mr. Gesell: I think we indicated - if I may answer that - we indicated in the memorandum distributed to the committee that we felt, under the circumstances, an exception should be made to our procedure as to General Marshall, and that General Marshall should be questioned concerning the wind message and questioned concerning the events of the 6th and 7th, inasmuch as he may not be available again for some time to appear before the committee.

Our thought was there should be no division of his testimony,

Witness Miles

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test all subjects should be covered with him while he is on
the stand.

The Chairman: The Chair might say in that connection
that the exigencies of General Marshall's departure have made
it necessary to rearrange, if not disarrange, the order of
witnesses, because of the necessity for him to leave before
the time when he would be regularly reached.

Now inasmuch as he will be away the Chair understands he
will be asked about all matters within his knowledge, just as
if he had not come on the stand until he had been reached in
the regular course of the schedule.

Mr. Gesell: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, that is not the inquiry
I am making this morning. My inquiry is along this line: If
we are to properly examine General Marshall on these points
it appears to me evident that the men who dealt with him on
those points, such as General Miles, General Gerow, should
be questioned on those points first, so there will be no
necessity of calling General Marshall back to try to get in-
formation from him after he leaves, because we haven't any
idea what these gentlemen are going to say as to their dealings
with him in relation to these particular messages.

(2) The Chairman: The plan is to put General Gerow on prior
to General Marshall's appearance, if we get through with

Witness Miles

General Miles in time.

Senator Ferguson: That does not answer my question.

The Chairman: The Chair does not know whether he can answer your question or not. The Chair cannot control questions that will be asked the witnesses by members of the committee.

Senator Ferguson: That is perfectly all right, if that is the rule.

Mr. Gearhart: I might say, Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware of the understanding we had with reference to grouping all the witnesses on this question and interrogating them at a subsequent meeting of this committee, but in view of the change in the program that has been made it becomes incumbent now to go into this question with this witness, who is one of the actors with respect to what was done.

The Chairman: Go ahead. We will probably save time by going into it now to such an extent as the gentleman may be able to testify about it.

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, if that is to be the procedure we will, of course, want to present certain documentary material concerning those events, so there can be the fullest kind of examination. We did not cover it in our examination at all, as the committee is aware, for the reasons I have indicated.

The Chairman: Of course the counsel will understand the change of the program by the necessity of calling General Marshall

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 as soon as possible may make it necessary to change the
3 collateral program surrounding his testimony and his activities.

4 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Chairman, just a point of inquiry.
5 The program that has been outlined is entirely possible, as I
6 would conceive it. General Miles may not have with him certain
7 documents and records that he might want to refer to. In fair-
8 ness, that ought to be borne in mind.

9 General Miles: I am prepared to answer any questions, sir.

10 The Chairman: We can probably find out about that by
11 going ahead.

12 Mr. Gearhart: I do not intend to ask any questions that
13 will require the revealing of a lot of documents, but I do
14 want to ask these questions now in order to prepare myself, as
15 I hope other members of the committee will, in their examination
16 of General Marshall when he appears.

17 Now you have told us that the 13 parts arrived on the 6th.
18 That is correct, is it not?

19 General Miles: On the evening of the 6th, yes, sir.

20 Mr. Gearhart: Do you know when the last one was received
21 on the evening of the 6th, the 13th part?

22 General Miles: No, sir, I do not know accurately the
23 hour in which that was received, but you will have witnesses
24 before you who can testify to that, which is more than I am
25 able to do.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Gearhart: Do you know when the 14th part was received on the 7th of December?

General Miles: I understand that that was received fairly early on the morning of the 7th, at 7 or 8 o'clock. Again I am not able to testify as to the accurate hour.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you know when the so-called parallel one o'clock directive was received and decoded?

General Miles: That also was received on the morning of the 7th, but I am unable to identify the hour.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you know whether it came before or after the 14th part of the reply to Mr. Hull was received?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not of my own knowledge know that.

Mr. Gearhart: As soon as those several parts were received they were immediately delivered to the usual recipients of that kind of information, is that not correct?

General Miles: I again would much prefer that question be answered by the officers who actually did it and will be witnesses before this committee.

WARD A. HULL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: That was a matter peculiarly within
2 your jurisdiction, was it not?

3 General Miles: It was a function of my department to
4 make those deliveries from my officers to the Secretary of
5 War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, G-2, and
6 Secretary of State.

7 Mr. Gearhart: And the President?

8 General Miles: No, sir, not the President.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You did not make those deliveries to the
10 President?

11 General Miles: Not at that time, no, sir. That was
12 done by Navy.

13 Mr. Gearhart: You were impressed with the importance
14 of that 14th part of the message, were you not?

15 General Miles: When I read it, I was very much im-
16 pressed with the 14th part

17 Mr. Gearhart: Did you make any out of the ordinary
18 directions in reference to its immediate delivery to the
19 ones that were entitled to receive copies from an emissary
20 from your division?

21 General Miles: It had been delivered to the recipients
22 about coincidental with its delivery to me, with the exception
23 of General Marshall with whom I was in touch either directly
24 or through Colonel Bratton to get this information to him.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Did you make any special effort, by telephone or otherwise, or by calling at his office, to inform General Marshall of the receipt of that 14th part of the message?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Were you successful in contacting him?

General Miles: I was, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: When did you inform him of the 14th part of the message?

General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I have written notes on my activities on the 6th and 7th which, perhaps for clarity and saving time, I might read.

My wife and I dined at the house of Admiral Theodore Wilkinson, then Chief of ONI. We were there from 8 p.m., until about 11 p.m. Shortly before we left, I think about 10:30 p.m., Commander Kramer came to the house, bringing with him a summary, I think, although it may have been the full translation of the first 13 parts of the Japanese reply to our note of November 26. This was the first knowledge I had that these 13 parts were in.

These 13 parts had little military significance. They concluded only with a Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of November 26 as a basis of negotiation -- a result which had been expected and discounted for some time.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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I therefore contented myself that night by calling Colonel Bratton at his home about 11:30 p.m., and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our offices then.

Mr. Keefe: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman, to ask the counsel whether or not we have received the first 13 parts as they came in? I have the full message, but in the form that it was received and delivered that night, have we been furnished the first available copies of those 13 parts?

Mr. Gesell: Yes. Of course, the first 13 parts are printed in Exhibit 1.

Mr. Keefe: I see.

Mr. Gesell: By parts. Congressman Keefe, when you were absent yesterday, we stated we were building up documentation on these crucial messages, and it had been our plan to present that to the committee in connection with General Marshall's testimony. We are a little ahead of that now.

The Chairman: The Chair suggests that General Miles be permitted to complete his recital as he started out to do, so that we may have that in the record in regular form.

Go ahead. General.

General Miles: Early on the morning of the 7th, Colonel Bratton called me at my house, told me that important information was in and that he was trying to get in touch

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

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with General Marshall. I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired. Either Colonel Bratton or I called General Gerow. These telephone messages were designed to effect a meeting of the Chief of Staff with General Gerow, Colonel Bratton, and myself, which subsequently took place in General Marshall's office.

I then went to my office. There I saw the full Japanese reply, and the 1 p.m. delivery message, and discussed them with Colonel Bratton. The latter message and the 14th part of the Japanese reply struck me immediately.

Some arrangement had been made for us to be notified when General Marshall arrived. When so notified, I went to General Marshall's office. What took place in his office is best recalled by me in a memorandum I prepared for the Chief of Staff, dated December 15, 1941, subject: "Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941."

This is the memorandum that I refer to, as my recollection of what occurred.

Mr. Gesell: May I interpose there?

The memorandum that General Miles is now reading we are just distributing to the committee. I sent for it as soon as this change in program developed. It is included in a series of memoranda, some prepared by General Gerow,

Witness Miles

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one by General Miles, and some by other officers, all recording events that took place on the 6th and 7th. I feel it will be of advantage to the committee to have all these memoranda in the record as a basis for this examination.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you desire to read the memorandum of December 15, 1941 at this time?

Mr. Gesell: Well, General Miles is starting to read his memorandum of December 15. I thought perhaps all of them should be introduced as an exhibit, since they all relate to the same subject matter.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gearhart: What number will it bear?

The Chairman: Just a moment. One at a time, please.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: So that the record may be clear, I want to know when these papers that have just been handed to us were prepared and as to why we could not have them earlier; I want you to explain that on the record.

Mr. Gesell: You are asking me?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: These documents relate to a phase of the case which we had anticipated would come on several weeks

Witness Miles

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from now. I think they were prepared and put in our hands a day or two ago. We had not distributed them because we did not think they were a matter to come immediately before the committee.

Senator Ferguson: I find, Mr. Chairman, I received papers this morning that are on my desk here, that are material to the committee's examination, and I wondered why I had not received them before.

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The Chairman: The Chair is not in a position to explain why any document that comes to us did not come sooner. I suppose counsel are making every diligent effort to get the documents to us as soon as possible.

Mr. Gesell: What documents are you referring to?

Senator Ferguson: I am talking about the one signed by L. T. Gerow, Brigadier General, dated November 27, 1941, placed before me this morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell: That is right. That was placed there this morning. We were going to introduce that in connection with General Gerow's testimony. It is his memorandum.

Senator Ferguson: Do you think it has no connection with General Miles whatever?

Mr. Gesell: I do not know whether it has any connection with him.

Senator Ferguson: Isn't it connected directly with

Witness Miles

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General Miles' testimony? I understand he was the Intelligence Officer, and I assume he had all matters pertaining to intelligence under his jurisdiction, and therefore he should be questioned on it.

The Chairman: This seems to be a paper prepared for the Chief of Staff by General Gerow on November 27. It does not seem to mention General Miles in any way. It is presented by General Gerow, and directed to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gesell: This is General Gerow's memorandum concerning the message of November 27.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that, but we were talking yesterday with General Miles about the information that was known in the Philippines, and he was telling us what he knew was known in the Philippines. This memorandum would indicate some things in relation to knowledge in the Philippines. There is attached to it, an instrument, "H. R. Stark, 26 November, 1941, G.L. Tucker," indicating that certain messages were going to the High Commissioner of the Philippines from the President.

My inquiry is why we could not have these at the time they were received, rather than to have them placed on our desk here at the opening of this morning's session, when we are examining the witness.

Witness Miles

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Mr. Gearhart: I think I can answer that question myself. The reason is, the members of this committee are not supposed to have before them, or consider any evidence whatsoever, until it is offered to us by the counsel of the committee. That is the policy which has changed this committee from an investigatory body into a judicial body.

The Chairman: That statement is without the slightest foundation in fact or theory, or even suspicion. Documents have been filed before us so voluminous --

Mr. Gearhart (interposing): I will point out I have received about four feet high of written matter, any part of which could have been served upon me within the previous two months that we were waiting for these hearings to commence brought to me and given to me at a time when it was utterly impossible for any human being to read it, and at the same time keep up the proceedings in this committee room.

Now, of course, I would not say for one moment that anybody planned it this way, but the result of it is -- and there is no escaping this conclusion -- that we are now sitting here listening to testimony, listening to the reading of documents which we have had no chance to contemplate or evaluate before these hearings commenced. That is a judicial proceeding. We are sitting as judges on the bench listening to evidence as it is fed to us, spoon-fed to us,

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if you please.

We have been denied the right to personally investigate and to personally have the papers before they were dumped in our laps in this hearing.

That is what I have objected to all along the line, and that I will constantly object to as long as there is breath in my body.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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The Chairman: The Chair wishes that we could go ahead with the witness. The comment about whether we are being fed with a spoon is not very relevant. If the member is not satisfied with that instrument maybe we could get a scoop.

Mr. Gearhart: Undoubtedly other things of the same kind which will contain evidence that ought to be a scoop for the newspapers.

The Chairman: Let us proceed

The Vice Chairman: Counsel offered as an exhibit these documents here. I request that they be received and we be given the number.

Mr. Gesell: Exhibit 39, I believe, Congressman.

(The document referred to was
marked Exhibit No. 39)

Senator Lucas: I would like to make one observation --

Mr. Gearhart: I do not wish to yield. My cross-examination has been interrupted for the last 15 minutes.

Senator Lucas: I am very sorry.

The Chairman: The Chair will try to protect the member from interruption. The Chair understood that he had yielded.

Mr. Gearhart: I had yielded and I think my yieldings to date have been very helpful.

The Vice Chairman: The witness was in the act of reading his memorandum. Do you want him to complete that?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, I would like to have that completed, if possible.

Will you go on with your memorandum, General Miles.

General Miles: "December 15, 1941.

"Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

"Subject: Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

"1. My recollection of what occurred in your office on that morning is as follows:

"I found you alone in your office at about 11:25 a.m. We were almost immediately joined by Colonel Bratton, who brought in the Japanese reply and the Japanese directive that the reply be given to Secretary Hull at 1:00 p.m. that day.

"You then read aloud the Japanese reply, which was of considerable length. You then asked what Colonel Bratton and I thought should be done about it, or what it signified. We said that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply - 1:00 p.m. - an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand, but it might be any one or more of a number of other areas.

"I urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and

Witness Miles

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2 the West Coast be informed immediately that the
3 Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that
4 afternoon, and to be on the alert. You then picked up
5 the telephone and got Admiral Stark. You told him you
6 thought we should send out warning as indicated above.
7 After Admiral Stark replied, you put down the telephone
8 and said that the Admiral did not think any further
9 warnings necessary, since all the forces had already
10 been several times alerted. Colonel Bratton and I
11 nevertheless urged that warnings be sent.

12 "You then wrote out the warning message. There
13 was some discussion as to whether the Philippines should
14 be included or not, but I am not quite clear exactly when
15 this discussion occurred. You again got Admiral Stark
16 on the telephone and read the message to him. He
17 apparently concurred, and asked that the naval forces
18 be informed. You added that at the bottom of the message.

19 "At about this time General Gerow and Colonel Bundy
20 arrived. You asked us in succession, beginning with
21 me, what we thought the Japanese reply and timing meant.
22 I said that I thought it probably meant Thailand, but
23 that the timing had some significance and warning
24 messages should be sent. General Gerow and Colonels
25 Bratton and Bundy concurred. The message in your

Witness Miles

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2 handwriting was then given to Colonel Bratton to take
3 immediately to the Message Center. (There was a little
4 discussion here as to whether it should go to General
5 Gerow's office for typing first, but time was then
6 pressing and I gave it to Bratton for immediate delivery.
7 General Gerow said as Bratton was leaving, "Tell them
8 to give first priority to the Philippines if there is
9 a question of priority" or something to that effect.)

10 Bratton returned in a few moments and you directed him
11 to find out how long it would take for the delivery
12 of those messages. Again he went to the Message Center
13 and returned and reported to you that they would have
14 them encoded in three minutes, on the air in eight,
15 and in the hands of the recipients in (I think) twenty.

16 "Colonel Bratton states that he looked at his watch
17 on delivering your message to the Signal Corps, and the
18 time was 11:50 a.m. He further states that the Message
19 Center gave him no intimation that all four messages
20 would not go over Army radio direct to the four Army
21 Headquarters."

22 Signed by me.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Do you remember when you first saw the
24 full message of the 14 parts?

25 General Miles: I cannot identify the hour exactly, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 I only know that I got down there to the office fairly early
3 after this telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton, and
4 I think that General Gerow, although of that I am not quite
5 certain, and that I had considerable time to read the message
6 and discuss it with Colonel Bratton before the arrival of the
7 Chief of Staff.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Who else was at that dinner party with
9 you at Admiral Wilkinson's?

10 General Miles: It is my recollection that Admiral
11 Beardall, the Naval Aide to the President, was there, but as
12 Admiral Wilkinson will appear before you I think he could give
13 you more accurate information.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Now, when you left the office from day to
15 day at nighttime and General Marshall left his office from
16 day to day at nighttime, did you always leave word as to where
17 you could be found and did he always leave word as to where
18 you could find him if you wished?

19 General Miles: I don't know, sir. I don't believe that
20 we had that in effect in those days. It has always been in
21 effect since. But I should doubt if we had it in effect at
22 that time, although I am not sure.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Now, you had a lot of discussions about
24 the one o'clock directive, didn't you, when that was decoded
25 and laid on your desk?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 General Miles: Yes, sir, I discussed that with Colonel
3 Bratton and, of course, as I testified, with General Marshall.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Various interpretations as to the possible
5 meaning of that message was given by the various persons you
6 talked with?

7 General Miles: I don't remember any details of the dis-
8 cussion, sir, except that it obviously, we thought, fitted in
9 to the time schedule of the Japanese somewhere.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And, as a matter of fact, didn't the
11 officers that you talked with, all of the trained officers,
12 immediately reach the conclusion that that meant an attack upon
13 Hawaii, and that one o'clock in Washington meant dawn there?

14 General Miles: I don't remember that that point was
15 expressed, sir. We weren't trying to guess where it was coming.
16 We wanted to warn the overseas departments that something
17 probably would come at that time somewhere.

18 Mr. Gearhart: But the very use of one o'clock by the
19 Japanese Government in directing their Ambassador and Envoy
20 to present that at that hour certainly excited in the minds
21 of every officer who saw that message much comment in respect
22 to its possible meaning, did it not?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir. It was a very unusual request
24 to make on a Secretary of State of a foreign power, that he
25 receive a message at one o'clock on a Sunday afternoon.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: And isn't it true that the opinion among
3 those with whom you were in consultation was unanimous that
4 it meant trouble in Hawaii?

5 General Miles: No, sir, I have no such recollection.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Was there anything said by any of the
7 officers with whom you discussed this message that all previous
8 maneuvers at Hawaii had all contemplated an attack at the
9 dawn if the attack were to be an attack from the air?

10 General Miles: I don't remember that those maneuvers
11 were discussed at that time, sir.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Well, you wouldn't forget what was discussed in respect to a matter of such tremendous importance, would you?

General Miles: I do not clearly remember the details of the discussion. My clear recollection is of the urgency of getting warnings out.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you have --

General Miles: At the last we knew something about a time, although we didn't know anything about a place.

Mr. Gearhart: You have already testified that you regarded that 1 o'clock directive as highly significant of something. Now you tell me that you don't remember what anybody said about it that they thought was significant.

General Miles: No, sir. If I have given that impression, I have not clearly expressed myself. We all thought it was extremely significant as a time factor. We were guessing in the dark if we tried to determine where the operations, which were to be coincident with the delivery of the reply, 1 o'clock Washington time, would take place.

Mr. Gearhart: You contemplated what 1 o'clock would be at Hawaii, what 1 o'clock in Washington would be at Manila. what 1 o'clock in Washington would be at Indochina, didn't you?

General Miles: I am trying to remember, Mr. Congressman,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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but I do not remember that any of those places specifically were discussed, or that we related the 1 o'clock in Washington to any specific place. We thought the line of action would be Thailand, still thought it that morning, but we wanted our overseas departments and the West Coast alerted, and it was an awful urgency about it.

Mr. Gearhart: All right. What did 1 o'clock in Washington mean in Hawaii?

General Miles: One o'clock, as we now know, meant about 7 o'clock. I think, in Hawaii.

Mr. Gearhart: Why did you put that phrase in your answer "as we now know"?

General Miles: Because I have testified --

Mr. Gearhart: Didn't you know it then?

General Miles: I don't remember the point being discussed on the day in question, the 7th of December, 1941.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, at 7 o'clock in the morning is a likely time of attack upon the Islands, under all of the opinions of the experts in yesteryears who had under consideration the possibility of an attack on Hawaii; isn't that correct?

General Miles: That was a likely time; not the only time.

Mr. Gearhart: What time was that, 1 o'clock in Washington,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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in Manila?

General Miles: I wouldn't be able to say off-hand, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: It was the middle of the night, in round figures; is that not correct?

General Miles: I would not be able to say off-hand.

Mr. Gearhart: Is the middle of the night a likely time of attack anywhere?

General Miles: It depends entirely upon what kind of an attack. Landing attacks have been made at night. There have always been two schools as to whether a landing attack should be made under cover of night, or at dawn when you have the advantage of a little light.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, night fighting was developed in World War II for the first time as an important factor in attacks; is that night correct?

General Miles: No, sir. There was a great deal of night fighting in the first World War.

The Vice Chairman: Certainly.

General Miles: The landing at Gallipoli, one of them, was made under cover of darkness.

Mr. Gearhart: Early morning darkness, though, wasn't it? The idea was to put the attacking force on the ground as the dawn broke; is that not correct?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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General Miles: I wouldn't be able to testify off-hand without looking that up. I do know there were two definite schools of thought as to an overseas landing attack. Do you want to use the cover of darkness, or do you want to use the light of early morning.

Mr. Gearhart: Have you completed?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Three times I thought you had.

Now, as a matter of fact, prior to World War I, a dawn attack was considered about the best kind of attack that could be made because it would catch the enemy usually just before they got up, and it would give the attacking force the benefit of the first light to make their attack; isn't that correct?

General Miles: I am trying to project my mind back to what we knew or thought in those days, sir. I don't really remember. I expect you are correct.

Mr. Gearhart: Generally speaking. I know there are exceptions.

General Miles: I don't want to argue the point. I think you are right. The consensus of military opinion would be that dawn was a very good hour to make a landing attack. Certainly before the first World War.

Mr. Gearhart: I know that night attacks have been made.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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We haven't forgotten the crossing of the Delaware on Christmas Eve when everybody was having Christmas parties. But it was a very unusual thing, and only because of very unusual circumstances that night attacks were ever undertaken.

So a dawn attack was within the range of probabilities; a night attack was merely within the range of possibility in the conception of military and naval leaders prior to World War II; isn't that correct?

General Miles: I think that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: When you consider air attack, it is especially advantageous to the attacking force to ride in on the rays of the sun, so to speak; is that not correct?

General Miles: I believe that is substantially correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That was the conclusion all military and naval experts had arrived at after studying for 50 years the island known as Oahu?

General Miles: Mr. Congressman I think I can clear your line of questioning very easily by saying that on that rather hectic morning of the 7th of December, we probably didn't stop to figure out what hour in the different parts of the world would coincide with 1 o'clock in Washington.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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What we all wanted to do was to get out warnings to all of the four vital areas and tell them the hour we feared something was going to happen. They knew in Hawaii what hour that was in their time. They knew in Manila. They knew in Panama. The main thing was to get the warning out and do it fast.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you mean to tell me that the 1 o'clock directive was not the principal thing discussed when General Marshall sent this message worded as it is? Doesn't it reflect the very fact that 1 o'clock was the one topic of discussion. the one subject that was giving you very much concern at that time?

General Miles: That was one of the two main subjects. The other was the 14th part of the Japanese reply which couched in the language that was used meant very serious trouble, we thought. But, yes, sir, you are right. We wanted to get the hour out to the overseas departments and let them translate it into their own time.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, it was the use of 1 o'clock Washington time that directed your attention forcibly to the possibility, yes, probability of an attack upon Hawaii, for the first time. Isn't that correct?

General Miles: No, sir, I am sorry, I cannot agree.

Mr. Gearhart: Let's refresh your memory by reading the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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message General Marshall sent out on that day:

"Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machines immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but we are alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication."

So General Marshall thought that the important idea was to tell everybody in the field that one o'clock was a significant thing?

General Miles: That is just what I have testified, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but it was particularly significant in its application to Hawaii, wasn't it?

General Miles: Yes, sir. We know that now, looking back on the event.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you want to say and commit yourself as a military expert that it was not significant to you then?

General Miles: It was very significant to me then that this meant the possibility of attack on any one of our vulnerable points. I did not conceive the idea of an attack on Hawaii for the first time through reading that message. I had always thought an attack on Hawaii, as I have repeatedly

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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stated, was possible if not probable, if we got into a war with Japan.

These two messages we had, the 14th part of the reply and the 1 o'clock. meant two things. That war is very likely because of the language used by the Japanese, and (2) something is going to happen coincident with 1 o'clock Washington time. That is all we knew. That is what we sent out. But the main thing was to get it out.

Mr. Gearhart: What time did you meet General Marshall in his office on that fateful Sunday morning?

General Miles: I wrote on the 15 of December, 1941, which was eight days after Pearl Harbor, that I found General Marshall alone in his office at about 11:25 a.m., on Sunday morning.

Mr. Gearhart: When was the conference completed insofar as the determination to send a message was concerned?

General Miles: I wrote on that same day, December 15, that Colonel Bratton looked at his watch on delivering General Marshall's message to the Signal Corps, and the time was 11:50 a.m.

Mr. Gearhart : Eleven-fifty?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Was the message at that time encoded, or did it have to be encoded after 11:50?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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General Miles: It was in General Marshall's handwriting, in plain English, and had to be encoded by the Signal Corps.

Mr. Gearhart: How long did it take them to encode the message, if you know?

General Miles: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: When was the message sent? When was it on the wires? Or in the air -- which was it?

General Miles: The message to Hawaii went by Western Union, I understand, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That means it went by wire to San Francisco, and by cable to Hawaii?

General Miles: That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart: The wire and cable were commercial wire and cable?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, as you sat in General Marshall's office, he writing the message, were there any other and faster methods of conveying information such as you were sending out that were available?

General Miles: Radio is about the fastest method that probably could have been used. There was, of course, the telephone and had that been used, it might have been faster. That depends on getting the communication, the connection in

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Hawaii. We also had a scrambler on the telephone in those days, and that could have been put on and a message sent that way.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, how many radios were available for the sending of that message?

General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I am not prepared to testify as to the technical details of signal communication. You will have witnesses before you who will testify on that.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, now, as a matter of fact, the FBI had a short-wave radio to Hawaii, and that was available to the use of the Army, if you had desired to use it; is that not correct?

General Miles: I have heard that statement made, sir. I don't know of my own personal knowledge.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact the Navy had a short-wave radio that could have been used to transmit this message to Hawaii; is that not correct?

General Miles: I have heard that also, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And right on General Marshall's desk was a telephone that he could have used to call Hawaii commercially, if he had so desired; is that not correct?

General Miles: There was a telephone on his desk.

Mr. Gearhart: And also, there was a scrambler apparatus that could have been attached to the telephone had he desired.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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to use the telephone; is that not correct?

General Miles: Yes, sir. There was, as I remember it, a scrambler apparatus in a neighboring room.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, when you had decided to send the message, and General Marshall had written it out, was there any discussion among those present at that time as to what method of transmission should be utilized?

General Miles: No, sir, I remember no such discussion. It was a very important message, an urgent message, in the Chief of Staff's own handwriting. The Signal Corps had the responsibility of sending such a message by the fastest available means, and I don't think it occurred to anyone in the room to discuss that question or decide as to how the Signal Corps would handle their own affair.

Mr. Gearhart: You had in mind the difference in time in Washington and the time in Hawaii, the time in Manila and the time in Panama, and still the slowest method was selected without any comment from any of the high-ranking Army officers who were then and there present?

General Miles: I did not know what method was selected for the sending of the Hawaiian message until several days later and I am quite sure that neither General Marshall nor General Gerow knew what method was selected. But I would like to point out that General Marshall was so anxious to

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h12

get this message out as rapidly as possible, that after Colonel Bratton had delivered it he directed Colonel Bratton to return and find out exactly how long it would take to send it to the recipients.

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Colonel Bratton came back and made that report as to what he had been told by the Signal Corps.

Mr. Gearhart: And later you learned that it arrived in Hawaii just 22 minutes before the first bomb fell, and that it was not decoded and delivered until some two hours after the last bomb had exploded?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

I discovered that later.

Mr. Gearhart: I would like to have you tell us, General Miles, just where you were all day Saturday, up to Saturday night, until you went to bed and where you were all the time on Sunday until you went to bed.

General Miles: I am afraid I can't sir. I can only identify in my memory two occasions on Saturday. Undoubtedly I was in my office most of the day, but I don't remember anything significant that occurred in the office that I can pin on Saturday, December 6th. I do remember lunching with Admiral Kincaid who was leaving that afternoon to take command of his ships. I do remember Admiral Wilkinson's dinner and what transpired that evening. I do remember telephoning

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h13

Colonel Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do remember what I have testified to, and what I wrote out eight days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall.

Of course, I do recall, if you want to go into that, what happened when the announcement came over the radio that Pearl Harbor was being attacked, and I rushed back to my office. I had returned home for lunch. And I spent the rest of the day, and I think that night in my office.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you know why General Marshall was delayed in getting to the office that Sunday morning?

General Miles: I believe that he was out horseback riding that morning, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: You know that he was informed of this message by telephone by Colonel Bratton, and he said that he would be in.

General Miles: I know he was informed of this message by Colonel Bratton, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: And he was informed quite early in the morning, while he was still out getting his exercise, horseback riding?

General Miles: I cannot identify the hour, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: But he did not present himself at the office until the time you mentioned, around 11 o'clock?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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General Miles: So far as I know, he came in about 11:25.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, a very eminent ambassador arrived in Washington by air that day, did he not?

General Miles: Not that I remember, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I am not sure about it, but didn't Ambassador Maxim Litvinoff arrive from Russia on the morning of the 7th?

General Miles: If he did I have no recollection of it at all, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I may be in error, but I am informed that he was met by General Marshall on that morning; is that correct? Do you know?

General Miles: I have never heard that before, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, there is very much more I might go into, but I have consumed altogether too much time, so I will reserve any further cross-examination until you reappear when we go into these other messages in detail.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the committee, in view of the Congressman's statement, whether it is expected that General Miles will be recalled on that subject?

Mr. Gearhart: From the statement made by counsel, yes.

Witness Miles

h15 Mr. Gesell: We would like direction from the committee on that.

Mr. Gearhart: I understand that you are going to devote special time to a discussion of certain messages, such as the wind message. If you are going to do that, it will be necessary to recall General Miles.

Furthermore, I think that a witness who had such intimate contact with what was transpiring should stand by available for recall any time his appearance may be necessary.

The Chairman: Well, it is difficult for the committee to say at this moment, whether General Miles will be wanted back again.

The Chair assumed from what counsel said that when you went into these wind messages, and other messages, that General Miles was to be recalled to testify about that. Whether General Marshall's appearance earlier than expected will interfere or make that unnecessary, I don't know that the committee could determine at this time.

Mr. Gesell: My only question is, if we are to examine General Miles concerning the events of the 6th and 7th, and the winds message now, there are a substantial number of questions in addition to those the Congressman has asked which should be asked. If he is to be recalled for that

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examination, we can defer that examination on those questions until that time.

The Chairman: The Chair can only express his view, that in view of the more or less superficial result of the inquiry of General Miles on that subject today, it might be well to hold him in reserve for further examination when we reach that phase of the question.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Gearhart: I might say to counsel that my cross-examination of this witness was directed to two specific ideas which I wanted to develop. One was the significance of the one o'clock message. The other the effect it had upon the minds of those who learned of it and what transpired in the sending of the warning message. That is as far as I wanted to go at this time.

The Chairman: The Chair would suggest to counsel, for whatever it is worth, in view of the fact that that phase is to be dealt with later, the Chair sees no necessity for laying the foundation at this time for examination of General Miles on that subject which would be gone into at a later date.

Mr. Gesell: Very well.

The Chairman: Senator George, we passed you.

Senator George: No questions.

The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson: General Miles, since the question of the 6th and the 7th has been brought up this morning, I want to ask you some questions on those dates.

Was there any discussion in General Marshall's office at the time that message was drafted or after, up until the message left the room, as to how the message would or could be sent?

As I understand it, when you arrived there it was 11:25. That gave you an hour and thirty-five minutes up to one o'clock.

Witness Miles

questions by: senator Ferguson

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Is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was there any discussion as to how that message would be sent?

General Miles: I remember no discussion as to what means the Signal Corps would employ in sending that message. The only clear idea conveyed to Colonel Bratton was to get this off as soon as possible. We didn't even stop to have it typed or anything.

Senator Ferguson: Was there anything said about the Army radio being out of order?

General Miles: I never knew that the Army radio was out of order until sometime later, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You knew that the Navy had a high powered radio that you could have reached Hawaii with?

General Miles: I think I did, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you only think that you knew that? Didn't you know that?

General Miles: I can't say positively that I knew it, but I am very sure that it was within my knowledge at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Well now, had you ever used the telephone, the scrambler telephone, to Hawaii?

General Miles: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then you didn't know how long it would

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 take to do that?

3 General Miles: No, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Was there anything said to the effect
5 that the Army wouldn't be up at 7 o'clock in the morning and
6 therefore you would send it by commercial radio?

7 General Miles: No, sir, I remember nothing like that.

8 Senator Ferguson: Was anything said about that?

9 General Miles: I remember no such discussion, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, this was a Sunday in Hawaii, was
11 it not?

12 General Miles: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Would you anticipate that the commercial
14 radio, at 7 o'clock in the morning in Hawaii, it would be before
15 7, would be functioning so that it could deliver immediately a
16 message to the Army?

17 General Miles: You mean, Senator, the commercial cable?

18 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Did you consider that at the
19 time of this meeting, that Sunday morning, before 7 o'clock, a
20 commercial institution may not be functioning at that time?

21 General Miles: No, sir, I didn't consider that, Senator,
22 because the question of the use of commercial cable never
23 arose. I didn't know they were going to use commercial cable.
24 I didn't know they had used it until several days later.

25 Senator Ferguson: General Miles, no more important message

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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ever went over the wires or by communication between these two points, in your opinion; isn't that correct?

No more important message ever was sent between these two points than this particular message?

General Miles: I think that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: And speed was of the essence because it was 11:25 when you got together that morning, although you had had the message from 7 o'clock; is that correct?

General Miles: I cannot identify the hour when I first saw this message. I am quite sure it was not as early as 7.

Senator Ferguson: What time was it?

General Miles: I cannot identify the hour. I can only tell you I think reasonably early. I think between 7 and 8 I had this telephone call with Colonel Bratton and then went to the office.

Senator Ferguson: What time did you get to the office?

General Miles: I don't know, sir. I wish I did. I think I got down to the office before 9 o'clock but I can't identify the hour.

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, would you say that you arrived there before nine o'clock, or what time would you say Bratton called you and told you that the message was in, the one o'clock message?

General Miles: Certainly some time before that.

Senator Ferguson: Well, how long before?

General Miles: Senator, I wish I could answer your question, sir, but I cannot. I remember only that there was a telephone conversation with Colonel Bratton and I was trying to insure that I could meet General Marshall and General Gerow. I did not care whether I went to Fort Myer or went to the Munitions Building. I wanted to meet them, I wanted to see them.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, General Miles, you were the Intelligence officer?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And the purpose of Intelligence is to anticipate what the opposition or the enemy is going to do, isn't that correct?

General Miles: That is the ideal, sir, that we strive to attain.

Senator Ferguson: Now, the purpose then, the use to which you could put this message was to anticipate what the Japs were going to do on Sunday, isn't that correct?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

General Miles: That is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then do you tell us that as the chief Intelligence officer it took you from 9 o'clock to 11:20 to get the only man that had the right to act upon this message and that was General Marshall? Is that what you want to convey to this committee, that it took you two hours and twenty-five minutes to get this message to General Marshall?

General Miles: I cannot state the exact time that it took me but I think you are substantially correct, sir. I do not know when I first saw those messages.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir. Now, will you explain why it took from seven o'clock, if the message was in the office at seven, until nine to get you who was the only man that could act? It took two hours to get you and then two hours and twenty-five minutes for you to reach the man that could act, General Marshall, which is four hours and twenty-five minutes to act on this important message. Will you give us an explanation on that?

General Miles: You are assuming, Senator, that the message came in or was known to Colonel Bratton at seven o'clock. Accepting that assumption -- I cannot deny it because I do not know the hour -- but accepting that assumption, Colonel Bratton first attempted to get General Marshall. He then called me up and I asked him to convey to General

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Marshall when he did get him that I would be glad to go out to Fort Myer, Colonel Bratton having told me that he had important information as I remember it, but I do not think he told me what it was, but I was looking for important information.

Senator Ferguson: Just a moment. Will you read the last part of the answer? You were looking for important information?

General Miles: Yes, sir, definitely; the Japanese reply.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: I then went down to my office. Whether I stopped to have a bite of breakfast, whether I was fully dressed or shaved when Colonel Bratton called me, how long it took me to get my car out and get down to the office I do not know. I would assume that I got down to the office about nine o'clock, perhaps a little before, perhaps a little later, but I cannot identify the hour.

Senator Ferguson: Had you ever known a soldier to go to his duty without shaving? This was important that morning, wasn't it?

General Miles: I do not know whether I shaved that morning or not, Senator, if you press me.

Senator Ferguson: Well, you just told us that that is what you did.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Mr. Gesell: No, he has not said that.

Senator George: He did not say that. He said he did not remember whether he shaved or not.

Senator Ferguson: What did you say about shaving?

General Miles: I said I did not remember whether I was dressed and shaved when Colonel Bratton called me on the telephone, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know if you shaved before you went?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not.

Senator Ferguson: How far do you live from your office, I mean at that particular time?

General Miles: At that particular time?

Senator Ferguson: At that particular time; I am talking about that time.

General Miles: I lived at that time at 1761 N Street.

Senator Ferguson: How far would that be in miles?

General Miles: Well, at ten blocks to a mile it was a little over a mile down to the Munitions Building.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have a car?

General Miles: I had a car, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, do you know what time you got the message from Colonel Bratton that the message was in?

General Miles: No, sir, I cannot identify that hour.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator,

Senator Ferguson: Well, the night before you were at Admiral Wilkinson and that was your opposite?

General Miles: My opposite number, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: In the Navy?

General Miles: That is correct.

Senator Ferguson: You had thirteen parts in this message and from those thirteen parts you could tell that relations were going to be broken off, there was sufficient in those parts?

General Miles: That that diplomatic conference was going to be broken was a clear assumption.

Senator Ferguson: That is correct. Well, now, did you and Admiral Wilkinson -- he was an Admiral at that time, was he not, or was he a Captain?

General Miles: Captain, I think, sir.

Senator Ferguson: He was a Captain?

General Miles: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss that message that night?

General Miles: Not in great detail. I remember that we discussed the --

Senator Ferguson: You expected the next morning that you would have to act on it. How does it come that you did

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

not discuss it or go over it in detail that night that you got it?

General Miles: I think I only saw a summary of it that night but in any event, Senator, please note that the thirteenth part of that message only results or concludes with the statement that the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal, that is of November 26th, as a basis of negotiation.

Mr. Gesell: That is the fourteenth part, isn't it?

General Miles: That is the thirteenth part.

Senator Ferguson: So that gave you an inkling as to what was going to happen.

General Miles: That had already been discounted. We were thoroughly prepared and had been for some days to receive an unfavorable reply to the message of November 26th.

I would like also to invite your attention, Senator, to the fact that we had received a message and decoded it from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington directing him to put this Japanese reply in the safe when he received it and wait for further instructions on delivery.

Senator Ferguson: I am familiar with that and I want to call to your attention now on page 238 of these messages, "Re my 844a", from Tokyo to Washington December the 6th, - will you read that, indicating that on the night that you

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

were with Admiral Wilkinson, then Captain Wilkinson, that you knew or expected there would be a delivery time. Will you read that?

General Miles: Yes, sir. Read the whole message?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: (Reading)

"The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902b (in English).

"This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being.

"Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

That was decoded on the sixth. It indicates very clearly that the message was not to be delivered automatically when received but that the Japanese Ambassador was to keep

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

it secret until he received further instructions and in the meanwhile, although he had been told that was a very long message, he was to put it in nicely drafted form which should have taken some time.

I submit, sir, that that message would not indicate that the Japanese reply was likely to be delivered to the American government on Sunday, the 7th of December.

Senator Ferguson: General Miles, it is a typographical error on page 239 saying that this translation was 1/26/41. It was 12/6/41.

General Miles: That is what I have testified, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Do you know what time this message was translated on the 6th?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: What time did you know of it?

General Miles: My impression is very strong that I knew of that message on the evening of December 6th. I certainly knew it --

Senator Ferguson: Before you went home?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now I will ask you what arrangement was made at the Army for the receipt of the fourteenth part? Isn't it true they stayed up all night to get this and got it some time early in the morning and translated it?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

General Miles: I believe that is true, sir, but I can not testify as to the mechanics of handling that message.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, who delivered the message to you at the Wilkinson home?

General Miles: No one delivered the message to me at the Wilkinson home.

Senator Ferguson: Who delivered it to Wilkinson?

General Miles: Commander Kramer of the Navy is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson: That would indicate to you that it at that time was being delivered to the White House and to the Secretary of State because they were in charge of that delivery?

General Miles: The Navy was in charge of delivering it to the White House.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

General Miles: We were in charge of delivering it to the Secretary of State, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do you know whether or not it was delivered that night to the Secretary of State? Did you know that?

General Miles: I called Colonel Bratton and I am sure that I asked him what was the place of delivery of those messages.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: What did he tell you that night?

2 General Miles: I do not remember, sir, exactly what he
3 told me but he satisfied me that the messages were being de-
4 livered or would be delivered early the next morning when the
5 complete message was in.
6

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand then that the
8 Navy was delivering thirteen parts and you in charge of the
9 delivery of the thirteen parts to the Army decided with
10 Bratton that you would not deliver those thirteen parts un-
11 til morning, is that correct?

12 General Miles: I do not remember, sir, exactly what
13 was decided between Colonel Bratton and myself that night.
14 I called him for the purpose of --

15 Senator Ferguson: Why did you call him?

16 General Miles: May I finish, sir?

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

18 General Miles: I called him for the purpose of finding
19 out what had been done, what was going to be done with these
20 first thirteen parts, but I wish to call your attention,
21 Senator, to the fact that the first thirteen parts as such
22 was not of great military significance. We had already dis-
23 counted through many days the fact that in all probability
24 the Japanese reply to our note of November 26th would be
25 unfavorable and that was all that the first thirteen parts

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Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

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2 told us. When we got the fourteenth part we saw quite a dif-
3 ferent picture, when we got the one P.M. message we saw quite
4 a different picture, but there was no reason for alerting or
5 waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Sec-
6 retary Hull, on the night of December 6th that I could see.

7 Senator Ferguson: So, then, is it your opinion now
8 that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and de-
9 liver the remaining sections on the morning?

10 General Miles: I think that is probably what happened,
11 sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it
12 was promptly delivered, but I am not sure.

13 Senator Ferguson: That is your best judgment at the
14 present time?

15 General Miles: Yes, sir, that is my best recollection
16 at the present time.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, did Wilkinson call Admiral Stark
18 that evening when you were at his home?

19 General Miles: I do not know, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Did you discuss with Wilkinson about
21 calling Admiral Stark?

22 General Miles: Not that I remember, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Did you see Admiral Wilkinson, then
24 Captain Wilkinson, on the morning of the 7th?

25 General Miles: No, sir, I did not.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that the message was going to Hawaii on the 7th, that is the message of the 7th, by commercial radio?

General Miles: No, sir, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: That was not discussed as far as you were concerned?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I want to read certain parts of the thirteen or fourteen part message and see whether or not it did not indicate what the fourteenth part would be. Page 240. (Reading):

"While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire."

Will you see on page 240? I am reading the last sentence out of the one part, part 2 it is. It starts out:
(Reading)

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavors toward the stabilization

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

of East Asia," and so forth.

Was that significant to you, those sentences, or the change of tone of these messages?

General Miles: It signified to me that this Japanese reply was unfavorable and it was going to be unfavorable, just as we had rather expected that it would be, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, the part 2, then, carried out just what you had in mind, that the negotiations would end, is that correct?

General Miles: There is no clear indication that I can see in the first thirteen parts, that the negotiations as such are definitely ruptured. That comes in the fourteenth part. The thirteen parts as I see them, Senator, are a rehash of Japanese arguments which they have put up in this negotiation time and time again, ending with the conclusion that they could not accept our message of November 26th as a basis of negotiation. That did not mean even that they were going to rupture the conference per se, although it indicated that it probably would.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know at the time of the delivery of the message of the 26th that Japan had treated it as an ultimatum and said that the negotiations were de facto broken off?

General Miles: Yes, sir, we knew that Japan was, or

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

certain Japanese officials regarded our message of November 26th as a last word or ultimatum in the diplomatic negotiations in Washington.

Senator Ferguson: Did you personally try to reach General Marshall on the morning of the 7th before he went to his office?

General Miles: I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

General Miles: I did, sir, through Colonel Bratton.

Senator Ferguson: Will you tell us your conversation with Colonel Bratton in relation to trying to reach General Marshall and what did he say to you?

General Miles: Again I would like to refer, sir, to my memorandum which I wrote.

Senator Ferguson: When did you prepare that memorandum?

General Miles: I prepared this part of the memorandum, Senator, last week. I thought for a moment that you were referring to something that was contained in my memorandum of December 15, 1941, but I was wrong.

Senator Ferguson: Did you prepare a memorandum with Colonel Bratton on the 10th of December 1941?

General Miles: I prepared a memorandum which I read over to the Chief of Staff on the 15th.

Senator Ferguson: That was not my question. Did you

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

prepare with Colonel Bratton or for him a memorandum on the 10th of December 1941?

Senator Lucas: On what?

Senator Ferguson: Any kind of a memorandum, the one that he testified from later.

General Miles: I do not recall it at this time, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Colonel Bratton says on page 80 of Top Secret (B): (Reading)

"Colonel Bratton: On or about the 10th of December 1941 I would say, sir, that was prepared by General Miles with my assistance as a memorandum for the record of what happened."

What memorandum was that?

General Miles: I think that is the memorandum which I read into the record of December 15th, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: You haven't clearly identified the paper you are reading from.

Senator Ferguson: I identified it as Top Secret Testimony (B), page 80.

Mr. Murphy: That is better.

Senator Ferguson: You think that that is --

General Miles: I remember only one memorandum written

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

at that time and that was the one written at the specific request of the Chief of Staff for a memorandum of my recollection of what had happened in his office on the 7th of December and that has been written into the record.

Senator Ferguson: Would you just refresh your memory on when the so-called pilot message or the one saying that it would have a delivery time coming, that it came in on the morning of the 6th? You indicated you did not know about that message until the evening of the 6th.

Mr. Gesell: No, he did not say that.

Senator Ferguson: When did you -- now, is counsel telling the witness what he did say or are you trying to tell me?

Mr. Gesell: I am trying to tell you, Senator, that he did not testify.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, why don't you come and tell me?

General Miles: Senator, I think personally --

Senator Ferguson: Just a moment until I get counsel straightened out. What does counsel want to tell me?

Mr. Gesell: I want to tell you that my recollection is that General Miles did not testify that he saw the one o'clock message, or that it came in on the 6th.

Senator Ferguson: Wait. Now, I am talking about one

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

pilot message, the one that indicated there would be a delivery time. If counsel had been listening he would have got that from the question.

General Miles: May I answer, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, you understood the question.

The Chairman: Yes, go ahead and answer the question. Please do.

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D. B. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Miles: I cannot identify the hour in which I saw that pilot message. I believe that I saw it on the afternoon of Saturday, the 6th, or I may have seen it on the morning of Sunday, the 7th.

Senator Ferguson: Now when you were with Admiral Wilkinson on the night of the 6th, at his dinner, you mean to tell the committee you did not know there was to be a time for the delivery of this message coming in in 14 parts?

General Miles: I do not remember whether I knew it at that time or whether I did not know it until the morning of the 7th. I think I knew it on the afternoon of the 6th, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The pilot message tells you that it will be in 14 parts, isn't that correct?

General Miles: Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson: So that you knew on the evening, the night of the 6th, that there was only one remaining part to come in?

General Miles: I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you and Admiral Wilkinson discuss that at all, that there would be only one more part coming in?

General Miles: I do not remember any discussion of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What time did you go home that night, do you recall?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Miles: I think I left Admiral Wilkinson's house between 10:30 and 11:00, probably nearer 10:30.

Senator Ferguson: Did you communicate with Wilkinson after 10:30 until after the attack?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, there was no collaboration between your office and the Navy in relation to this 14 part message or this one o'clock delivery time?

General Miles: So far as I can remember there was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson: The Board was not functioning at that time?

General Miles: The what, sir?

Senator Ferguson: The Board that Congressman Murphy talked about yesterday.

General Miles: The Joint Intelligence Committee?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How do you account for the fact that you did not confer with the Navy on this important matter? You were the Intelligence Officer and Wilkinson was the Intelligence Officer and, as I understand it, Intelligence is to anticipate what the enemy is going to do. Now how do you account for the fact that you and Wilkinson did not confer

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 on this important matter, which could indicate what the enemy
3 was going to do?

4 General Miles: I do not remember to have conferred with
5 Admiral Wilkinson probably because I saw no particular reason.
6 I wanted to confer definitely with the Army authorities, the
7 Chief of Staff and Chief of War Plans Division and get a warning
8 message out.

9 Senator Ferguson: What did you do to get in touch with
10 the War Plans Division on Sunday or Saturday night?

11 General Miles: I testified, sir, it was my recollection
12 that either I or Colonel Bratton did call up General Gerow that
13 morning.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you reach him?

15 General Miles: I remember very definitely that it was my
16 desire to have this conference as soon as possible with General
17 Marshall and General Gerow.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you reach Gerow before you went
19 to General Marshall's office?

20 General Miles: Either Colonel Bratton or I, whoever
21 telephoned him, did reach General Gerow before we went in to
22 see General Marshall.

23 Senator Ferguson: You say you did reach him?

24 General Miles: We did reach him.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you talk to him about this message?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

General Miles: No, sir, we were not talking over the public telephone about this message.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

General Miles: I think if I personally talked to General Gerow I probably said, "G, we have got something important. Will you come down to your office?"

(8) Senator Ferguson: Down to his office? Is that what you say?

General Miles: To his office, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now did he come to his office and did you meet him there?

General Miles: General Gerow I have every reason to believe did go to his office. I did not actually meet him in his office, I first met him in General Marshall's office.

Senator Ferguson: Did you attempt to meet General Gerow in his office?

General Miles: I do not remember to have done so, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you at General Marshall's office before General Gerow came in?

General Miles: I was, sir, as far as I remember.

Senator Ferguson: Then you had no conversation whatever with the War Plans Division about this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General Miles: That is my recollection, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: They would be in control of putting war plans into effect, would they not?

General Miles: That is true, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did they have any exact knowledge of this message prior to going into General Marshall's office?

General Miles: Well, General Gerow was on the list of those who were to receive these magic messages.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether he received this magic message on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th, or did he have it at all prior to the time that you met him in General Marshall's office?

General Miles: My recollection is I knew at that time that he had received the Magic messages before going to General Marshall's office. I do not believe that he received them on the night of December 6.

Senator Ferguson: And that would be due to the fact that you had discussed with Bratton the fact that it would not be important to deliver those messages on the night of the 6th?

General Miles: Presumably, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now I want to take up the subject in relation to the British Intelligence. You knew, did you not, that the British were intercepting and decoding the Jap messages the same as you were?

General Miles: I did, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And when did you first learn that the British were decoding these messages?

General Miles: I think it was sometime in January of 1941 that they were given the means of decoding these messages.

Senator Ferguson: And after December, 1941 the British, in your opinion, had access to all of the so-called magic messages, is that true?

General Miles: All that they could intercept, yes, sir. I do not remember whether they always had the same messages that we had.

Senator Ferguson: Now did you have a committee with the British on this question?

General Miles: Did I have what?

Senator Ferguson: Did you have a committee, or Board, liaison or joint committee between the British and the Americans on this question of intercepting these messages, or did you just give them the means of intercepting? You told us you gave them the means of intercepting and decoding.

General Miles: We gave them the means of intercepting, and I also had some discussions during that year 1941 with the British Military Attache and Canadian Military Attache, because certain of these messages were being intercepted by Canada, but not any other part of the British Empire. The Canadians did not have the means of breaking them nor did they

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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know anything about the technical details of decoding. We were very anxious, however, to get from them any messages that they could pick up out of the air which, for any reason, we could not or the British could not.

Senator Ferguson: Where was the means of the so-called tracking the code, as far as the British were concerned, was it in London?

General Miles: I believe it was in London, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did not they have a means of picking it up in Singapore?

General Miles: I imagine they did, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You just imagine it. Don't you know it as an Intelligence Officer?

General Miles: I know nothing now. I might have at the time, but I know nothing now about the details of where the British intercepting stations were, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now after you gave them the means of decoding and intercepting and getting the information in January, 1941, did you ever get from the British any information that they obtained from Japan by means of decoding?

General Miles: I cannot answer that question, Senator, offhand. I would have to look up the record.

Senator Ferguson: Why cannot you answer?

General Miles: Because my memory is not sufficiently good

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

to allow me to say "yes" or "no".

Senator Ferguson: Did you have any files of any memoranda or any evidence that you have received information from the British?

General Miles: I doubt if we made those matters a matter of record. The whole question was treated with great secrecy, and these conversations I spoke of between the British and Canadian Military Attache and myself were always verbal conversations, not reduced to writing.

Senator Ferguson: That is not what I am talking about. I want to know, after you gave Britain the means of getting these communications, decoding the messages, receiving the messages, whether or not they ever gave you any of the evidence, as Intelligence Officer, that they received? That is a clear question, isn't it?

General Miles: It is a very clear question, Senator. I wish my memory were sufficiently clear to enable me to give you a clear answer. Unfortunately it is not.

Senator Ferguson: Now you told us yesterday that Congress would not give to the Army enough money for intelligence work, and you told us about the money, as I recall, that England was spending, that it had a much bigger staff, and so forth.

That is true, isn't it?

General Miles: On the secret service, yes, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And you delivered to them -- that
 is our Government delivered to them the means of decoding these
 messages and after we gave them the means in January, 1941,
 we never received any information from them until we were
 struck at Pearl Harbor? Is that what you want to tell this
 committee?

General Miles: No, sir, that is not what I want to
 tell this committee.

Hook follows

WARD B. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: What do you want to tell the committee?

General Miles: I want to tell the committee that I cannot answer your question from my memory, Senator. I would, if you like, attempt to find the records, or other means of arriving at an answer to that question, but I would not do it purely from memory.

Senator Ferguson: I will ask counsel, have we any files given to us by the Army showing that Britain did give us this intelligence service, that we enabled them to get, or cooperate with us in giving us what they received so we could compare it with what we received?

Mr. Gesell: We have no information, Senator, as to whether the British did or did not give us any results of their interceptions of magic. We can inquire about that if you wish.

Senator Ferguson: Now going back to General Miles, where do you think, General, that you will find information as to whether or not the British were giving us this intelligence?

General Miles: I should look into the records of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division and also in the S.I.S., the Signal Corps.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether any other agency

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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was getting this information? Have you ever heard of any other agency getting it? Now, I am talking about agencies such as the Secretary of State, the White House Executive Branch, the Navy, the Air Corps, the FBI.

General Miles: No, sir, I do not remember ever having heard of any other branch or division of the Government receiving such information.

Senator Ferguson: Then I will ask you why we gave this means to the British if it was not to help us, if that was not one of the purposes.

General Miles: Senator, you phrase one of your questions "The United States Government gave this means," and you phrase the several others that I gave this means. I prefer the former one. I did not personally give the means, of course.

Senator Ferguson: Explain how it got there. You were the Intelligence Officer, and I assume you had full control and full knowledge of all intelligence. Is that correct?

General Miles: I did not have any control whatever over the S.I.S. of the Signal Corps from which these means were found when it was decided to give them to the British Government.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, the S.I.S., the Signal Corps would not be interested in looking over all of the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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intelligence, analyzing it, and determining what it means, would it?

General Miles: No, sir. That was the function of Military Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson: And that was your function?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: All right. Then you would be interested, and not S.I.S. in what the British were giving to us, in what messages they picked up; isn't that correct?

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you now have absolutely no memory of ever receiving any information from the British?

General Miles: I have no recollection of any specific information we received from the British, coming from magic.

Senator Ferguson: But you will look that up. Can you do that noon, General? Can you do that at noon so I can have it?

General Miles: I doubt very much that I can get an answer during the noon hour, but I will try, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Colonel Bratton is sitting right behind you, so you can confer with him, and so we can go into this matter.

General Miles: Do you wish me to confer with him now, sir?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: No. We only have five minutes, and after that you can confer with him.

General Miles: Very well, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I want to go into what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines. As an intelligence officer, do you know what means of intercepting we had on the Philippines?

General Miles: I think I knew that we had a radio station capable of intercepting wireless in the Philippines. I am pretty sure of that, but that again did not come under my responsibility of jurisdiction.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that in the Philippines they had a means of decoding these diplomatic messages?

General Miles: No, sir, I did not.

Senator Ferguson: Would you now be surprised to learn that they did have that means and gave all the messages to General MacArthur?

General Miles: I would, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, how could you evaluate what General MacArthur knew unless you knew what he was receiving? Tell us, as an intelligence officer, how you could evaluate that unless you knew what he was receiving?

General Miles: I knew what he was receiving from us. I thought that he was not receiving any magic directly from

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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any facilities that we had available in the Philippines.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if I told you from the Hewitt Report --

General Miles: From the wat?

Senator Ferguson: From the Hewitt Report. Did you ever hear from the Hewitt Report?

General Miles: Admiral Hewitt, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. If I tell you that he was giving these messages, would that make any difference in your testimony?

General Miles: It would make no difference in my testimony, sir. I am testifying and have been testifying to what I remember, and what I thought I knew at the time.

Senator Ferguson: This will be along the line of cooperation --

Mr. Murphy (interposing): Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: You have in your files there an affidavit from General MacArthur himself as to what he received.

Senator Ferguson: And I have testimony before me showing what he did receive.

Mr. Murphy: The affidavit is in the Clausen Report, which you have.

Senator Ferguson: I have other testimony in the Hewitt

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Report indicating what he did receive. I will produce it this afternoon.

I want to know whether or not you knew about this message. This is a message of H. R. Stark, OPNAV, November 26 1941, G. L. Tucker, from the President, for the High Commissioner, Philippines. I will ask you to look at it and see whether you ever knew about it? You were in the Intelligence Branch.

General Miles: Will you pass it over, please, sir?

(The document was handed to General Miles)

General Miles: I have no recollection of ever having seen that dispatch until this moment.

Senator Ferguson: Will you read it into the record? It may refresh your memory.

The Chairman: May the Chair inquire what exhibit this paper appears in?

Mr. Gesell: This is the dispatch that was laid on the committee table this morning, and will be the subject, or part of the testimony of General Gerow when he follows General Miles, and will also be part of the testimony of General Marshall.

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2505

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Mr. Murphy: Part of Exhibit 39?

2 Mr. Gesell: It is not an exhibit as yet.

3 Senator Ferguson: Will you read it, General?

4 General Miles: (Reading)

5 "From: The President

6 "For: High Commissioner Philippines.

7
8 "A copy of a despatch will be delivered to you by
9 Admiral Hart which with my approval, the CNO and COS
10 addressed to the Senior Army and Navy Commanders in
11 the Philippines. In addition you are advised that
12 the Japanese are strongly reenforcing their garrisons
13 and naval forces in the mandates in a manner which
14 indicates they are preparing this region as quickly
15 as possible against a possible attack on them by U.S.
16 forces. However I am more particularly concerned over
17 increasing opposition of Japanese leaders and by
18 current southward troop movements from Shanghai and
19 Japan to the Formosa area. Preparations are becoming
20 apparent in China, Formosa and Indo China for an early
21 aggressive movement of some character although as yet
22 there are no clear indications as to its strength or
23 whether it will be directed against the Burma Road Thailand
24 Malay Peninsula Netherlands East Indies or the Philippines.
25 Advance against Thailand seems the most probable. I

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

consider it possible that this next Japanese aggression might cause an outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan. I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation and the general outlines of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur, you shall in great confidence, present my views to the President of the Philippine Commonwealth and inform him that as always I am relying upon the full cooperation of his Government and his people. Please impress upon him the desirability of avoiding public pronouncement or action since that might make the situation more difficult." There is apparently no signature.

The Chairman: It is 12 o'clock. We will recess to 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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WARD S. PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Senator Ferguson, you were examining General Miles.

You may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES

(Resumed)

- - -

General Miles: Senator, I am happy to report, sir, that Colonel Bratton has called to my mind a circumstance that enables me to state of my own knowledge that shortly after the British were given the means of deciphering the intercepted Japanese messages the Signal Corps, that is to say, the S. I. S., arranged with the British a simple code by which we could mutually assure ourselves that both got the same messages. If we failed to get one through that code, the British supplied us with that message, and vice versa.

I am also glad to know from Colonel Bratton that he has much more distinct information, specific information, as to the times of arrival and the sending of telephone messages, and so forth, on the evening of the sixth and the morning of the seventh than I was able to give you and no doubt he will be able to give you that information when he comes before you.

Senator Ferguson: General, you were over Colonel Bratton at that time? He was under you?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You understood the question?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How did you learn about our negotiation with the British in relation to the codes? Who told you about the agreement that had been made in January of 1941?

General Miles: Undoubtedly the Signal Corps told me that, sir. I was in close relation at that time with General Maughborne, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, who was principally responsible, I think, that for that magnificent work of breaking those codes.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand that only because of Colonel Bratton's statement to you that you recall that we were getting messages from Bratton?

General Miles: Senator, the matter was a blank in my mind this morning. I was trying to remember. In a few words he recalled something that I now clearly remember. That very often happens I think, sir, after four years.

Senator Ferguson: Have you examined the book known as exhibit 1?

General Miles: The Magic messages?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: I note that on page 178 that the message that is coming through is 836.

General Miles: Page 178, sir? Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, page 178. Do you have that?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that is a message from Tokyo to Washington?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is about the time that we were delivering the message of the 26th, is it not?

General Miles: That was sent on the same day that we delivered the note of the 26th.

Senator Ferguson: Now, if you will note, there is no other message from Tokyo to Washington in this book until you get to page 185 and the number of the message is 841. Do you have that?

General Miles: 841, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not these numbers were the Japanese numbers or our numbers that are being used on these messages?

General Miles: I understand the number that follows immediately the date is the Japanese number. Our number is to be found at the bottom of the message.

Senator Ferguson: And apparently they were using con-

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

secutive numbers to the messages sent here, is that true?

General Miles: I imagine that was true, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether or not we intercepted the messages between 836 and 841?

General Miles: No, sir, I do not know that point.

Senator Ferguson: Now, I would like to ask, does counsel know whether we did or not?

Mr. Mitchell: This is not a complete series. It was not intended to be in this book. There are messages that came in, administrative messages, visa messages, messages about shipping Japs home and things of that kind that we left out of the compilation. They are available.

Senator Ferguson: My question to counsel is whether those numbers are available?

Mr. Mitchell: I assume they are.

Senator Ferguson: Would you check that?

Mr. Mitchell: We cannot tell till we look it up.

Senator Ferguson: Well, would you check that?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: I will just pass this then for the time being.

Mr. Mitchell: Between those dates?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, between those numbers, 836 to 841.

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

Mr. Mitchell: All right.

Senator Ferguson: We may have to have this witness back.

I wanted to question you now and bring out that these numbers were Japanese numbers and they indicated that they were sending them in consecutive numbers to the embassy here. Is that correct?

General Miles: That is correct to the best of my knowledge, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And you will note that if they sent a message to Honolulu it had another number, did it not? I don't think there is any in this particular book. Is that your recollection whether or not it did have another number?

General Miles: I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, getting back to what you knew, and that is what I am interested in, what you knew that General MacArthur knew.

You say that you did not know about the message that I had you read into the record from the President -- no -- yes, it is from the President to the High Commissioner of the Philippines.

General Miles: That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you know whether or not when a message was sent like that from Stark through the Navy if the Army would get it in the Philippines?

Witness Miles:

Questions by Sen. Ferguson

General Miles: From an examination of that message which I have seen only today I would suppose that that would not be turned over to the Army. It was from the President to a definite High Commissioner. The message does, however, say something about Admiral Hart, but I see nothing to indicate that it would be turned over to the Army.

Senator Ferguson: Here is what it says. (Reading):

"I desire that after further informing yourself as to the situation in the general outline of naval and military plans through consultation with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur you shall in great confidence present my views to the President of the Philippines."

This message indicated that it was to be taken up with General MacArthur, did it not, before he conferred with the President?

General Miles: It directed the High Commissioner to consult General MacArthur and Admiral Hart before he, the High Commissioner, spoke to the President of the Philippine Government.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, as an Intelligence officer would you draw the conclusion that General MacArthur had seen this instrument?

General Miles: I should think it very likely that the High Commissioner in discussing the -- in giving General Mac-

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Arthur some reason for his discussing with General MacArthur the Army data that he was told to discuss, would have shown him a copy of that message from the President.

Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know whether there was close liaison between the Army and Navy and the Philippines?

General Miles: I have every reason to believe there was a close liaison, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then I show you this instrument, and ask you to read it.

(The document was handed to General Miles.)

The Chairman: Would you mind identifying that instrument, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Could we have an exhibit number given to it? Will you show it to counsel?

Mr. Mitchell: It is a typed copy of a message from the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Forces to the Chief of Naval Operations, information copy to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated December 7, 1941.

The Chairman: Has that been filed as an exhibit, or is it a part of any exhibit that has been filed?

Mr. Gesell: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: It was just received through counsel.

The Chairman: Read it.

Mr. Mitchell: It reads this way:

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APR 11 1942
U.S. SENATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain Armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

The Vice Chairman: From whom to whom?

Mr. Mitchell: It is from Hart of the Asiatic Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, information copy, it says to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The Chairman: What is the date of it?

Mr. Mitchell: December, 1941. I do not see a date on it.

Senator Ferguson: December 7. They strike out the number that is not used, and leave the one that is used.

Mr. Mitchell: I would not know about that. That identifies the message. Do you want it numbered as an exhibit?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 40 is used on that document.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you read it into the record, General?

General Miles: Very well, sir:

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

"CLASSIFICATION: SECRET - CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED."

No indication which one it is.

"FROM: Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet

TO: OPNAV

INFORMATION: Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet."

Senator Ferguson: That would be from Admiral Hart, would it not? He was the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet?

General Miles: Yes, sir. "To OPNAV."

Senator Ferguson: That is to whom?

General Miles: To Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral Stark, who was head of the Naval Operations here in Washington?

General Miles: Yes. And for information of Admiral Kimmel of the Pacific Fleet.

"Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

And at the bottom is "TOP SECRET."

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you ever know about that message?

General Miles: To the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first time I ever saw that message, or heard of it.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

Senator Ferguson: Would it be material to evaluate the evidence as to what was going on? Would that have been material?

General Miles: Yes, sir, it would have been very material. It would have been checked and found to be correct, if we had made such promises to the British.

Senator Ferguson: I am going to come to that again a little bit later on so that would be an item that was known in the Pacific, and with close liaison between the two, General MacArthur would have known about that?

General Miles: I should think he would, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You assume that he would.

Now, I call to your attention the basic exhibit of dispatches. Has that an exhibit number. Is that Exhibit 37?

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: Exhibit 37, page 39.

By the way, going back to that other exhibit, the 7th in the Philippines is the 6th here, is it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You would assume then that that came in here on the 6th? Is that correct, General?

General Miles: I did not quite hear.

Senator Ferguson: You would assume it was received here at Washington on the 6th?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

General Miles: It was sent from Manila on the 7th, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And that would be on the 6th here. Have you got page 39 of that exhibit?

General Miles: I have, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Will you read that into the record, sir?

General Miles: (Reading):

"Top Secret.

"2 December 1941

From: OPNAV

Action: CINCAF."

That is from Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Ferguson: Will you interpret those? That is from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart?

General Miles: From Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart.

"PRESIDENT DIRECTS THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WITHIN TWO DAYS IF POSSIBLE AFTER RECEIPT THIS DESPATCH. CHARTER 3 SMALL VESSELS TO FORM A 'DEFENSIVE INFORMATION PATROL'. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY AS U. S. MEN-OF-WAR ARE COMMAND BY A NAVAL OFFICER AND TO MOUNT A SMALL GUN AND 1 MACHINE GUN WOULD SUFFICE. FILIPINO CREWS MAY BE

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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EMPLOYED WITH MINIMUM NUMBER NAVAL RATINGS TO ACCOMPLISH PURPOSE WHICH IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT BY RADIO JAPANESE MOVEMENTS IN WEST CHINA SEA AND GULF OF SIAM. 1 VESSEL TO BE STATIONED BETWEEN HAINAN AND HUE ONE VESSEL OFF THE INDO-CHINA COAST BETWEEN CAMRANH BAY AND CAPE ST. JAIQUES AND ONE VESSEL OFF POINTE DE CAMAU. USE OF ISABEL AUTHORIZED BY PRESIDENT AS ONE OF THE THREE BUT NOT OTHER NAVAL VESSELS. REPORT MEASURES TAKEN TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENTS VIEWS. AT SAME TIME INFORM ME AS TO WHAT RECONNAIZANCE MEASURES ARE BEING REGULARLY PERFORMED AT SEA BY BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WHETHER BY AIR SURFACE VESSELS OR SUBMARINES AND YOUR OPINION AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE LATTER MEASURES."

Senator Ferguson: General, did you ever know about that message?

General Miles: To the best of my knowledge and belief, this is the first time I have ever seen that message.

Senator Ferguson: That indicates that that was sent from Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart under the direction of the President?

General Miles: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: On the second of December, 1941?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Would that message have been of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7 value to you in the evaluation of your information?

General Miles: It would have informed me that a small reconnaissance patrol was being established as per this despatch.

Senator Ferguson: Would not the fact of the source of the instrument be of value to you? Would not that place more value on it than ordinarily?

General Miles: You mean that it came from the President?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: That would have meant to me simply that the President was very definitely interested in the establishment of this naval patrol.

Senator Ferguson: And that he must have had certain things in mind, and you can read from the instrument what he had in mind, could you not?

General Miles: That he wished the Navy to pick up, if possible, movements of presumably Japanese ships or convoys in the waters mentioned.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you would assume that that went to General MacArthur, would you not?

General Miles: Yes, sir, I would have supposed that the Army and Navy in Manila, Admiral Hart and General MacArthur were maintaining so close liaison that an important message like that from the President would be communicated

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