

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Navy?

3 Captain Layton: Captain, United States Navy, yes, sir.

4 Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy?

5 Captain Layton: I entered the Naval Academy in 1920.
6 I graduated therefrom in 1924. I have served continuously
7 ever since.

8 Mr. Richardson: What is your present assignment?

9 Captain Layton: Fleet Intelligence Officer and Combat
10 Intelligence Officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

11 Mr. Richardson: What was your assignment at the time
12 of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

13 Captain Layton: Fleet Intelligence Officer, United
14 States Pacific Fleet.

15 Mr. Richardson: Will you give to the committee in
16 some detail as to what your duties were at the time of
17 the attack on Pearl Harbor, what duties you were performing
18 in Hawaii?

19 Captain Layton: I will read from the staff instructions
20 to the staff of the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
21 Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, and in effect the day of the
22 attack. The instructions I will read are those laid out
23 for the duty of the Fleet Intelligence Officer and his
24 assistants.

25 "Paragraph 214. Intelligence Officer.

Witness Layton

1
2 "A. Directs assembly of enemy information and evaluate
3 the same; disseminating to the various members of staff,
4 indicating where action is required.

5 "B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer
6 information essential for current estimates; monograph
7 material.

8 "C. Maintain section 2 sub-paragraph A, B, C, D, E,
9 F and G of the estimate of situation, enemy forces; maintains
10 location plot of Fleets of possibly enemy or Allies.

11 "D. Directs counter-espionage and counter-information.

12 "E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval
13 Intelligence Manual.)

14 "F. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins.

15 "G. Evaluates intelligence information received of
16 procedures or processes of other navies, and prepares de-
17 finite recommendation as to any action to be taken within
18 our own Fleet.

19 "H. In charge of censorship.

20 "I. Internal security of ships.

21 "J. Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

22 "215. Assistant Intelligence Officer", who was my
23 subordinate and for whom I am responsible.

24 "In addition to assisting 25" - that was my number -
25 "in all duties of the Intelligence Section, performs the

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

following additional assignments:

"A. Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analyses.

"B. Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to the Fleet.

"C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information.

"D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location of plots of fleets of possible enemies or Allies."

Mr. Richardson: Who was your assistant?

Captain Layton: Commander Robert E. Hudson, U. S. Navy.

Mr. Richardson: From whom or through whom did you get your basic intelligence on which you made your reports?

Captain Layton: In accordance with the set-up, the Chief of Naval Operations sub-division of Naval Intelligence was charged with the furnishing of information of all kinds from all sources to the Fleet Intelligence Officer via official channels.

I also received what we then called Combat Intelligence, which is now called Communications Intelligence, and derived via the Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit. This was the unit commanded by the then Commander, now Captain J. J. Rochefort.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 In addition, from time to time and infrequently, we would
3 receive telegraphic information from other Communication
4 Intelligence organizations, for instance, Cavite and OPNAV.

5 Mr. Richardson: When you secured this intelligence did
6 you put it in shape for delivery?

7 Captain Layton: In some cases the actual material was
8 in shape. For instance, reports from OPNAV, various obser-
9 vations. In most cases the Communication Intelligence as
10 delivered or as received by me was not always in shape de-
11 sirable for presentation to the Commander in Chief, and
12 therefore I would work on that, make an evaluation of it
13 and submit it to the Commander in Chief.

14 When I speak of it not being in shape, I refer to some
15 of the station logs received from the Intercept Station at
16 Guam, and the station at Cavite, which was recorded and
17 indexed in accordance with their procedure, but was not in
18 suitable shape for intelligence material requiring a con-
19 siderable digesting, collating, and the putting together
20 of basic elements of intelligence information for the
21 Commander in Chief.

22
23
24
25
Folk
follows

Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl
fls
AL

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Mr. Richardson: Did most of your basic material come through Captain Rochefort?

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Captain Layton: Most of the basic material received concerning the Japanese ship locations came from Captain Rochefort, although I must say the unit at Cavite was of great assistance, both as a check and because they were nearer and could provide probably more accurate information on certain details.

Mr. Richardson: How would information from Cavite come to you?

Captain Layton: Both by mail and by dispatch. In the latter part of October and November most of their information came by dispatch.

Mr. Richardson: To whom did you directly convey your intelligence?

Captain Layton: Directly to Admiral Kimmel, sir.

Mr. Richardson: In person?

Captain Layton: In person.

Mr. Richardson: And in what form?

Captain Layton: At 8:15 each morning I would appear at the Admiral's office with my intelligence material. It invariably consisted of the communications intelligence summary for that day, plus notations of dispatches received in the recent 24 hours that I thought pertinent material, that

Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 might bear upon the subject.

3 This would then be discussed, sometimes briefly, and
4 other times at length, depending upon the state of the
5 material or the nature of the information contained therein.

6 Mr. Richardson: Now, were those intelligence reports
7 made directly to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to
8 the attack on December 7?

9 Captain Layton: They were made daily to Admiral Kimmel
10 during the week prior to the attack on December 7, and for
11 several months theretofore.

12 Mr. Richardson: And in each of those intelligence re-
13 ports that you made, did you endeavor to collate all of the
14 intelligence that was available to you for that day?

15 Captain Layton: The written communications intelli-
16 gence report contained all information noted from observa-
17 tion of enemy naval circuits. Additionally, through conver-
18 sational explanation, additional enemy reports received
19 during the past 24 hours were discussed, and an attempt
20 made to make them fit, or to key them into materials con-
21 tained in the radio intelligence report.

22 Mr. Richardson: Were you the agency through whom dis-
23 patches to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, would
24 pass?

25 Captain Layton: No, sir. The dispatches to the Commander

h2

Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Richardson

h3

1
2 in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were of generally two categories;
3 regular Navy dispatches, that is, secret, confidential, plain
4 language, which would come through the Communications office,
5 and there were the magic dispatches, or dispatches carried
6 in the special channel which has been referred to before,
7 a special radio cryptographic system coming over the same
8 radio channels.

9 When this sent to the Communications office, they could
10 not identify the cipher except to know it was a special
11 cipher and held by the Fleet Security Officer, the then
12 Lieutenant Coleman, now deceased, who would bring out the
13 special machinery wheels and would then decrypt this dispatch,
14 would deliver it to me in person, after having shown it to
15 Admiral Kimmel, or the Chief of Staff, then Captain Smith,
16 the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris, and the Fleet
17 Communications officer, Commander Curts.

18 Mr. Richardson: Would they get that information before
19 it came to you or afterwards?

20 Captain Layton: There were occasions when I saw it first
21 because I would be in the office when it was being deciphered,
22 and would read it, but the Admiral and Chief of Staff had
23 priority on the receipt of this material, naturally.

24 Mr. Richardson: Then in the transmission of intelligence
25 to the Chief of Staff, part of it would be in your Communication

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Intelligence Summary, and part of it would be oral, and
3 part of it would consist of dispatches?

4 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: That had been sent in, where it was
6 your duty to convey that to the Commander in Chief?

7 Captain Layton: Plus other normal dispatches, such
8 as sightings, or reports from Naval attaches, or Naval
9 observers from State Department sources, and others that
10 came in ordinary dispatch form, and was delivered to the
11 Admiral as well as the Chief of Staff and other officers.

12 Mr. Richardson: After this information had gone to the
13 Commander in Chief, would it reach other members of his
14 staff?

15 Captain Layton: Yes, it would. May I explain why and
16 how this was done?

17 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

18 Captain Layton: The radio intelligence organization
19 at that time was a secret. Regulations had been issued as
20 to how it would be handled, who would have access to it, and
21 by whose authority.

22 When I first assumed this job on December 7, 1940, one
23 year before the big day, I made a liaison contact with the
24 Combat Intelligence Unit, 14th Naval District.

25 Mr. Richardson: That is Admiral Bloch?

Witness Layton questions by: Mr. Richardson

h5

1
2 Captain Layton: Directly under Admiral Bloch, for
3 administration.

4 Mr. Richardson: That is right.

5 Captain Layton: I showed them my credentials, and
6 they showed me these regulations, and had me read one page,
7 and this page is more or less in substance as follows:

8 "This is very secret. No one shall know about it except
9 the following named officers and offices:

10 "The Commandant of Operations, in which office is
11 placed the Commander in Chief, his Chief of Staff, his
12 Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as designated
13 by him or by the Chief of Naval Operations."

14 This page was signed by the then Chief of Naval Opera-
15 tions.

16 I was then administered an oath to maintain secrecy
17 and carry out these regulations.

18 Now, in order that other members of the staff who were
19 not by the Admiral's direction on this list who would receive
20 this secret intelligence, or super-secret intelligence might
21 be aware of these facts, I would make up a special intelli-
22 gence folder in which I would not say where it came from
23 but would give it a rating of A-1 in case it was communication
24 intelligence, and would lay out the facts as I saw them,
25 as contained in these dispatches. This was shown to the

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h6

1
2 members of the staff, and their initials appear in blocks
3 at the bottom of the page.

4 I would like to say parenthetically, by Admiral Kimmel's
5 direction, the War Plans Officer was added to this list and
6 I received a written directive to that effect.

7 Mr. Richardson: Now, I think you told us that it was
8 your custom to include in your communication intelligence
9 summary which you made daily the information which had come
10 to you with reference to fleet and enemy vessel locations.

11 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: Now, I call your attention to your
13 intelligence summary as of November 30, 1941.

14 Captain Layton: I have the original before me.

15 Mr. Richardson: That appears in our record, Captain,
16 as Exhibit 115.

17 Now, will you explain to the committee what the signifi-
18 cance would be of your report of November 30, as you ex-
19 plained it to Admiral Kimmel?

20 Captain Layton: It was my practice to take the communi-
21 cations intelligence summary to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15. He
22 would accept it from my hand and sit and read it. Thereafter
23 he would ask me questions regarding specific points and then
24 a brief discussion would take place regarding its contents.

25 Thereafter, he would initial it, and in this case it has
initial also of the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris.
I cannot now recall specific words or discussions regarding
this specific summary.

Shack (9) pm
follows
Hook
AL-1

12,886

1 Witness Layton

2 I would like to say, however, that since the middle
3 of November the tenor of these discussions had been about
4 the apparent change in the Japanese naval tactical organiza-
5 tion as reflected by radio intercepts of their own circuits.

6 It was apparent that the normal volumes of traffic
7 were increasing, that the commanders of certain fleets had
8 decreasing importance. One, for example, the C in C Combined
9 Fleet, the big boss, and the C in C of the Second Fleet,
10 who correspond roughly to our Commander Scouting Forces who
11 commanded normally cruisers and destroyers, had taken a
12 position high and above what he had been in the previous
13 six to eight or ten months.

14 Also a fairly newly organized force, the Third Fleet
15 that they sent out, and that we assumed to be an amphibious
16 force, also was far more important in the traffic than he
17 would have been under normal circumstances.

18 From receiving these from day to day there was no
19 doubt in our minds that a task force was being formed.

20 This same phenomenon had been noted, only not so
21 strongly, first in February 1941, when the Japanese decided
22 to mediate the French Indo-China-Thailand dispute over a
23 border, and with a show of force went down and mediated.

24 The task force organization at that time was fairly
25 well reflected in the traffic. The task force organization

1 Witness Layton

2 at that time was well proven in traffic. When the mediation
3 was over the security measures were reduced and they returned
4 to Tokyo.

5 This same sort of phenomenon had been noted in about
6 July, 1941, when the Japanese, by ultimatum to Vichy and
7 French Indo-China authorities, decided to move in and take
8 over certain Japanese naval bases and air bases in French
9 Indo-China.

10 Then we also received information from magic, from
11 Washington, by the special channel, and were able to fill
12 the picture very nicely.

13 To return to November, 1941, I have spoken of the
14 prominence of two fleet commanders. We had also the
15 commander of the combined air forces, a shore-based air
16 organization, which also contained air tenders with sea-
17 planes aboard, and so forth.

(10) 18 Mr. Richardson: Speaking now of the Japanese forces?

19 Captain Layton: Yes. The Japanese combined air force.
20 They were also quite prominent.

21 Another point of interest at this time that had been
22 noted and talked about, was the fact that fleet units
23 belonging to certain fleets apparently no longer had the
24 same mother. For instance, some first fleet destroyers
25 definitely were working for the second fleet.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Captain, let me caution you right
3 there, in relating this information as you saw it about the
4 middle of November and from then on, I should like to have
5 you confine yourself to information which was communicated
6 to Admiral Kimmel and to his staff generally.

7 Captain Layton: This information was communicated to
8 Admiral Kimmel.

9 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead.

10 Captain Layton: And was written up in the summary,
11 which I will produce later, if you wish.

12 Mr. Richardson: Go ahead. You said something about
13 the ships not having the same mother.

14 Captain Layton: Various units no longer had their
15 normal mothers. In other words, each fleet commander,
16 that we call mother, had certain chickens, and some of
17 these chickens no longer belonged to the mother, but belonged
18 to other mothers of other fleets. This was an unusual
19 procedure, because normally all naval traffic followed
20 an administrative routing, and to have new commanders traced
21 directly as subordinates of another commander was an unusual
22 procedure and indicated he had a tactical interest as opposed
23 to an administrative interest.

24 Mr. Richardson: I see.

25 Captain Layton: The associations of these commanders

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 were entirely with southern addressees, Formosa, Hainan
3 and French Indo-China. Their direction of movement clearly
4 indicated they were by-passing Formosa, and they were going
5 in that general direction.

6 It was noted also that certain Cardivs, carrier divisions,
7 were apparently interested or concerned with this movement.

8 To be specific, the one we called Carrier Division 3,
9 the one we called Carrier Division 4, apparently were con-
10 cerned somewhat with this movement.

11 Mr. Richardson: How many carriers in a division?

12 Captain Layton: Two, sir. As a result of this radio
13 phenomenon, Admiral Kimmel became more interested day by day,
14 and on the 24th told me to contact Rochefort and to see if
15 he was receiving from other units any such phenomena.

16 Rochefort's answer was to the effect that no one had reported
17 this on the circuits. Admiral Kimmel then directed me to
18 order a dispatch, to send a dispatch in a special system
19 to the unit at Cavite and OPNAV, making his observations
20 and drawing the conclusions that had been drawn in the summaries
21 which Admiral Kimmel had been reading.

22 The dispatch that Commander Rochefort originated and
23 was sent to COM14 was the one read here in the testimony
24 the other day. This was replied to by the Fleet Commander
25 of the Sixteenth Naval Operation at Cavite, in which he agreed

1 Witness Layton Questions by: Mr. Richardson
 2 in part and elaborated in part and disagreed to a minor
 3 degree.

4 I have always believed, and I do to this day, that it
 5 was the result of these two dispatches to some degree that
 6 the war warning came on the 27th.

7 Mr. Richardson: Why?

8 Captain Layton: Speaking now from December 6, 1941,
 9 we had this information and no more, we saw this movement
 10 growing; we had reports from shore observers in China,
 11 assistant naval attaches, merchant skippers, consular
 12 authorities, that they had seen these ships loading and
 13 going out, that they had been sighted going south, the
 14 Merchant Marine ships stating that they were going south
 15 in a convoy, and the entire movement was noted as going
 16 south.

17 That was the radio picture. The visual picture, of
 18 course, was not as complete as to detail, or as to destination.

Larry 19
 follows

20

21

22

23

24

25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LaCharity (1) pm
follows
Shack 2:40
AL-1

12,891

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 When the 27th of November war warning message came,
2
3 as more than one officer on the staff has explained, that
4 fits the picture, as we see it, and that was what I thought
5 myself.

6 Mr. Richardson: Coming up to the 30th of November, let
7 me ask you, in the designation of that intelligence summary
8 under the styling of the Third Fleet you make the recital:

9 "No information obtained as to the location of the
10 Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong im-
11 pression that he is under way."

12 Will you explain that statement?

13 Captain Layton: I did not write this summary and I
14 cannot explain that statement other than to say that the
15 operators and the supervisors who sat on these circuits week
16 in, month in, and year in, had the impression, from the
17 type of traffic they were seeing, that he was underway.

18 I can explain it a little further by this, by going
19 back there in these summaries you will see where the Commander
20 in Chief Third Fleet is a very busy originator of traffic.
21 He is talking to the Commander of the Second Fleet, he is
22 talking to the Commander of the Air Force, he is talking to
23 the Resident Naval Officer of Hainan, he is talking to the
24 Resident Naval Officer in Taihoku, to the present Naval
25 Officer in Indo-China, to the Officer in Charge at Palao in

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 the Caroline Islands, he is entirely associated with them
3 and with other high commands, C in C Second Fleet, indicating
4 he is getting ready to go in those directions. He then shows
5 no longer in the traffic. He is still being addressed in
6 the traffic. He is the addressee of other messages. But
7 no messages originate from him that day. The operator gets
8 the impression he is underway. I think that is what is
9 meant in here.

10 Like all things radio intelligence, however, has its
11 limitations. I won't go into the technical details but
12 when you identify one whom you don't know you do it by
13 association, by his activities in the radio circuits, and
14 by his known friends.

15 In this one, however, is an example of the misleading
16 character of the radio intelligence information. In the
17 General paragraph it states:

18 "The only tactical circuit heard today was one with
19 AKAGI and several MARUs."

20 A tactical circuit is one in which one unit calls
21 another unit on strong enough power for us to hear at
22 Pearl Harbor or Cavite. Normally units do not communicate
23 that way. Administrative traffic and command traffic is
24 usually handled up a chain of command to its nearest shore
25 station who broadcasts it, and it is then rebroadcast so that

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 all addressees receive it on an umbrella.

3 The fact that AKAGI was that day exercising with
4 several MARUS was brought to my attention and the Admiral
5 noted it also. He asked me what I thought, as I recall it,
6 and I said the AKAGI was probably talking to some tanker
7 MARUS, MARUS being Merchant ships and probably going to get
8 oil.

9 As a matter of fact we now know the AKAGI was at sea
10 under radio silence and was not talking to the MARUS because
11 this same AKAGI identified here was identified by Cavite
12 on this day as moving southward from the Empire.

13 This, of course, is not to find fault with the time
14 of information. It just has its limitations. It certainly
15 is an inexact science and while the averages are good you
16 cannot follow it on to the last detail and depend upon it
17 without looking it over.

18 Mr. Richardson: Now, referring to this language in
19 the fourth paragraph:

20 "Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers
21 indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the
22 Mandates although this has not been confirmed."

23 What is there in the presence of destroyers which
24 gives an indication of the presence of carriers?

25 Captain Layton: There again is the technique of reading

1 Witness Layton Questions by: Mr. Richardson
2 the enemy's radio signals without reading his messages
3 and taking who does things as a rule and how he does it as
4 a rule and using that as a thumb rule to find out what
5 he is doing now.

6 The Japanese naval organization was so set up that
7 originally the carriers or carrier divisions had been assigned
8 to both first and second fleets. Sometime in the middle of
9 1941 this organization was apparently dissolved. It took
10 us some time to find it out for sure. The carriers were
11 lumped under one organization. But one of the Japanese
12 tendencies had been to keep plane guard destroyers with
13 the same carrier division and when they moved over from
14 the First and Second Fleet into the Carrier Fleet they
15 took their plane guard destroyers with them.

16 The presence of a plane guard destroyer in the Mandates
17 would be the first and probably the only tip-off under
18 normal circumstances if they were under radio silence that
19 a carrier might be there, too. It wouldn't prove that
20 the carrier was there, but under normal circumstances it
21 would be logical to assume it. This, unfortunately was
22 not the case. This plane guard destroyer division it
23 later turned out had been detached from the carriers and
24 had gone to the Mandates to reinforce the Mandate Fleet.
25 The deduction was right at the time but incorrect in fact.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Turning to the Intelligence summary
3 of December 1st I note the statement:

4 "The fact that service calls lasted only one month
5 indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for
6 active operations on a large scale."

7 Will you explain that statement?

8 Captain Layton: Japanese radio call signs normally
9 lasted about six months. It was anticipated on 1 November
10 from the type of traffic before that that the call signs
11 would change about 1 November. They did so do. To find
12 the radio call signs changing in only one month, and when
13 I speak of radio call signs I am speaking of fleet and
14 command call signs, not shore stations, this change was
15 significant and was considered an additional progressive
16 step in preparing for active operations because, first,
17 we saw tactical task forces being formed. We heard of
18 them being formed from eye witnesses who had sighted them
19 on the China Coast.

20 Call signs changing then on 1 December along with
21 the formation of task forces was a logical thought and that
22 they were preparing for operation was also a logical sequence.

23 Mr. Richardson: Now, turning to the second page of
24 the Communication Intelligence Summary of December 2, I
25 note there in reference to carriers the statement:

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers
3 today."

4 Now, when did this carrier silence, approximately, begin?

5 Captain Layton: There had been very little information
6 on the carrier divisions and commander carriers who was there
7 technical commander with the exception of Carrier Division 3
8 and sometimes Carrier Division 4 since early in November.
9 There was no definite information throughout November as to
10 their exact location or activity although from time to time
11 a carrier call or carrier activity would be associated with
12 shore stations, air bases.

13 On 14 November a statement was made:

14 "The carriers remain in home waters with most of them
15 in port."

16 The subject of carrier information thereafter was
17 generally fragmentary but it was noted that BatDivThree,
18 the Carrier Divisions, and two destroyer squadrons have been
19 associated in traffic and addressed letters to the Chief
20 of Naval General Staff, which generally indicated impending
21 operations.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, for how many days prior to
23 December 7 had there been general carrier silence?

24 Captain Layton: I would have to check the record to be
25 exact. Carrier silence was not commented on as such at any

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 time. The lack of information on the carriers was commented
3 on after 27 November. The 27 November summary indicated
4 the carriers were still located in home waters.

5 It is to be remarked here, and I believe it to be of
6 extreme importance in judging all these facts, that in this
7 build-up that I mentioned, since the middle of November the
8 association of forces, the tying together of your task forces,
9 the commander of carriers, or carrier division commander,
10 with the exception of Carrier Division 3, were not addressed,
11 were not associated, and apparently were entirely aloof from
12 the whole proceedings.

13 Mr. Richardson: Now, I called your attention a moment
14 ago to your Intelligence Summary of December 1st and to the
15 language therein quoted:

16 "The fact that service calls lasted only one month
17 indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for
18 active operations on a large scale."

19 Now, it is a fact, is it not, that that opinion was
20 directly presented to Admiral Kimmel?

21 Captain Layton: That is correct.

22 Mr. Richardson: And that is the opinion which in
23 your testimony before the Hewitt Investigation you referred
24 to as being, that sentence, being underlined in red pencil
25 by Admiral Kimmel at the time?

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Captain Layton: I have the original copy here and it
3 is not underlined in red pencil. It was underlined in lead
4 pencil. L-e-a-d.

5 Mr. Richardson: Then the reference "in red pencil",
6 was a mistake?

7 Captain Layton: That was a typographical error on
8 the part of the recorder, I believe.

9 Mr. Richardson: And the underlining, however, was
10 done by Admiral Kimmel?

11 Captain Layton: At that time, yes, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: Now, is the --

13 Captain Layton: Mr. Counsel --

14 Mr. Richardson: Is the absence of information over
15 a considerable period of time of the carriers any evidence
16 of whether those carriers are at sea or in port?

17 Captain Layton: Not necessarily, sir. There have
18 been many times during the course of 1941 and previously
19 when not only carriers but battleships, cruisers and other
20 types were not located by radio intelligence traffic. This
21 is because when carriers or other types of vessels go into
22 home waters, home ports, home exercise areas, they use
23 low power radio direct with shore stations. This is then
24 handled normally on telegraphic land lines to prevent our
25 direction finder stations and intercept stations from hearing

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

hl
fls
AE

1
2 Mr. Richardson: Now, you called Admiral Kimmel's
3 attention to the fact that you didn't know where Carrier
4 Divisions 1 or 2 were?

5 Captain Layton: That was at the time following the 1
6 December 1941 Communication Intelligence Summary which I
7 have been referring to.

8 Admiral Kimmel told me to make out for him a location
9 sheet on the Japanese navy. I proceeded to do so from my
10 current files, derived principally from radio intelligence.

11 I did it at 1 December, 1941, that is, it was so
12 typed, but I am positive in my mind that it was actually
13 delivered to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December, 1941.

14 This location sheet showed the location, to the best
15 of our knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese fleet
16 and which, with the exception of the Pearl Harbor task force
17 was very active. In this location sheet I did not list
18 Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2, because neither
19 one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully
20 15 and possibly 25 days. That is, identifiable traffic
21 as an addressee, or as an originator.

22 Mr. Richardson: Then, Admiral Kimmel at that time
23 called your attention to the fact that you didn't know where
24 those carriers were?

25 Captain Layton: He did, sir.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h2

1
2 Mr. Richardson: And that was the occasion of his
3 remark to you, to which you testified, Admiral Kimmel
4 speaking, "Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond
5 Head and you wouldn't know it? My reply was I hoped they
6 would be sighted before now."

7 Captain Layton: Words said to that effect. I believe
8 that Admiral Kimmel said, "What, you do not know where the
9 carriers are?" And my reply was as you read it, or words
10 to that effect.

11 I must say that his saying "You mean they could be
12 rounding Diamond Head," was to emphasize the fact that I
13 didn't know where they were. I don't believe the Admiral
14 meant to say they were off Diamond Head, and I didn't know
15 it, and I answered saying I hoped they would be sighted.

16 Mr. Richardson: Is there any significance attached
17 to lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the
18 carriers that could be construed by you from your experience
19 as indicating a possibility that they were at sea on a mission?

20 Captain Layton: I believe that everyone who has worked
21 with enemy radio intelligence has always been aware that
22 any force given sealed orders can get under way, go to sea,
23 and as long as they don't use their radio, as long as they
24 are not sighted, can move almost anywhere in the world,
25 provided they are not sighted before they arrive where they

1 Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Richardson

h3

2 are going.

3 Mr. Richardson: Then radio silence would, in itself,
4 be one of the evidences from which it might be possible to
5 deduce that certain warships were under sealed orders pro-
6 ceeding at sea and not using their radio?

7 Captain Layton: That would be a very difficult deduc-
8 tion to make, but one could make such a deduction, and I
9 might say, in hindsight now, not foresight that there was
10 no evidence in this of considerations of radio silence.

11 I would like to point out that had these carriers or
12 carrier division commanders or the carrier commander in
13 chief been addressed in any messages of the thousands and
14 thousands that came out from the Naval General Staff, regard-
15 less of the silence of carriers, then the thought of radio
16 silence would have been paramount, but the fact that they
17 were never addressed, not even once, led to the belief that
18 they were in the same situation as the carrier divisions were
19 in July, 1941, when the Japanese had a task force go down
20 with their ultimatum into French Indo-China.

21 At that time the carriers remained in home waters, and
22 not known as to where they were in a covering position,
23 doubtlessly, in case we took counter-action, but where they
24 continued training, returning to the Empire after the con-
25 clusion of the French Indo-China matter.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

h4

1
2 Mr. Richardson: Now, Admiral Kimmel, in his testimony
3 asserted that there had been quite a number of occasions
4 prior to this period during early 1941 and 1940 when there
5 was a similar absence of call signs from groups of ships
6 and carriers, quite the same in intimation and extent of
7 this absence of signs to which you have just testified.

8 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: Is there any difference in your mind
10 between the earlier lack of information and the present lack
11 of information you are referring to here?

12 Captain Layton: No, sir. I believe it to be identical.

13 In the previous cases they were not addressed, nor
14 did they address messages. In this case they followed the
15 same pattern. I submitted a memorandum to the Roberts Com-
16 mission to that effect prepared by the Intelligence Unit
17 under Commander Rochefort to give a general analysis of
18 periods in which various types of ships were unlocated. Some
19 types of ships were never located by radio intelligence
20 because they didn't appear.

21 Mr. Richardson: If it were felt that war was imminent
22 and a war warning had been received, the fact that the carrier
23 divisions 1 and 2 were lost, would have some significance in
24 the evaluation of that warning, would it not, from an intelli-
25 gence standpoint?

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h5

Captain Layton: The valuation of the enemy information was my job. I evaluated it to the best of my ability.

The formulation of the estimate of the enemy situation and its possible courses of action was not a function of Intelligence, and was laid down in the staff instructions as under Operations and War Plans.

I furnished those Sections with my material. I furnished it to Admiral Kimmel. I did not at any time suggest that the Japanese carriers were under radio silence approaching Oahu. I wish I had. I did not so consider at that time.

My own personal opinion, and that is what we work on, when making estimates to ourselves, was that the carriers were remaining in home waters preparing for operations so that they would be in a covering position in case we moved against Japan after she attacked, if she did, in southeast Asia.

Mr. Richardson: This information that you were giving, the method that you were following in assembling this information, continued every day up to the attack, did it?

Captain Layton: It continued every day up until I left Pearl Harbor on November 29, 1945.

Mr. Richardson: And in conveying that information, you did your very best to acquaint Admiral Kimmel with all of the information at your disposal?

1 Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Richardson
Senator George

h6

2 Captain Layton: Admiral Kimmel had all of the informa-
3 tion at my disposal.

4 Mr. Richardson: And you are not now conscious of
5 having omitted any method of conveying information to him
6 that you did not use?

7 Captain Layton: I feel confident of that. I also feel
8 confident that Admiral Kimmel feels confident of that.

9 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

10 The Vice Chairman: I don't believe I have any questions
11 now.

12 Senator George.

13 Senator George: Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

14 Captain, you say that you transmitted everything that
15 you received to Admiral Kimmel?

16 Captain Layton: That is in general true. Certain
17 things came in to the staff that I received that he received
18 also in the course of routine routing of mail, dispatches,
19 et cetera, which I did not have the responsibility for
20 delivering.

21 Senator George: So far as you know, did the information
22 which you gave Admiral Kimmel pass on to General Short?

23 Captain Layton: I was rarely present when Admiral Kimmel
24 and General Short conferred. However, from time to time in
25 late 1941, whenever Naval task force commanders came in to

Witness Layton

questions by: Senator George

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h7

port, there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's cabin wherein I outlined the recent strategic and tactical disposition of the Japanese navy, their rearmament in the Marshall Islands, in the Carolines, and in general went over the entire picture as against Japan. On at least one and possibly more of these occasions, General Short was present and was so briefed by me.

c6

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

However, when General Short and Admiral Kimmel had conferences between themselves, I was not a party to the conference.

Senator George: Do you recall any conference in which General Short participated late in November or in the first six days of December, 1941?

Captain Layton: I have no definite recollection of what days they were, but I saw General Short in the Admiral's outer office, I saw General Short's aide in the Admiral's outer office waiting for General Short who was inside with the Admiral, and I believe it was the middle of November, 1941 or around the 20th, perhaps, when I last saw General Short in at a general task force briefing where I went over the Japanese situation as to the Mandated Islands, and the general disposition and tactical deployment of the Japanese fleet.

Senator George: You say that was about the middle of November?

Witness Layton

questions by: senator George

h8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Captain Layton: About that time, sir.

Senator George: Now, did you continue to tell Admiral Kimmel, or submit your reports to Admiral Kimmel, indicating the loss of the carriers, or the lack of contact with the carriers, through the means available to you?

Captain Layton: Yes, sir. May I read those to you?

Senator George: Yes, sir.

Captain Layton: 1 December, 1941 --

Senator George: Is that the original paper?

Captain Layton: This is the original paper made out at that time, and bears Admiral Kimmel's initials.

"Carriers, no change."

2 December, 1941:

"Carriers, almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information."

I would like to say that the call sign change had taken place the day before and with some 12 or 15 thousand call signs being changed the lack of identification would naturally show little information on carriers.

"However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change to the first of December, and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

Witness Layton

questions by: senator George

h9

1 About 200 calls is about 6 percent of the total.

2
3 Senator George: That was the 2nd of December?

4 Captain Layton: Yes, sir. That was the 2nd of
5 December.

6 3 December:

7 "No information on submarines or carriers."

8 The 4th of December:

9 "Carriers were not mentioned."

10 5th of December:

11 "Carriers were not mentioned."

12 I beg your pardon. Correction.

13 "No traffic from the commander carriers or submarine
14 force has been seen."

15 6th of December, the summary was not delivered until
16 after the attack.

17 Senator George: Do you have anything on the 6th of
18 December relating to carriers? It wasn't delivered?

19 Captain Layton: No, sir. It was not delivered until
20 after the attack, and contained no information on the
21 carriers.

22 Senator George: Captain, did the message of December
23 3 relating to the destruction reach you?

24 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

25 Senator George: That came through you?

Witness Layton

questions by: senator George

h10

1
2 Captain Layton: No, sir. That came through a
3 special security officer who designed it delivered to the
4 Admiral, Chief of Staff, head of War Plans, Chief of Opera-
5 tions, and to myself, and the Communications Officer.

6 Senator George: Admiral Kimmel had that message, did
7 he?

8 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

9 Senator George: Did he also have as information the
10 message of December 4, 5, or 6? 4, or 5, I believe relating
11 to the code destruction?

12 Captain Layton: Senator, I am not clear on which message
13 you refer to. The message I was referring to was a message
14 stating that purple machines were being destroyed at certain
15 places. Admiral Kimmel sent for me and asked me what a
16 purple machine was.

17 Senator George: That was the December 3 message?

18 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

19 Senator George: That was the information that was
20 sent direct to him, was it?

21 Captain Layton: That was information sent -- information
22 to him, yes, sir.

23 Senator George: Sent as information to him?

24 Captain Layton: Yes, sir, and he sent for me, wanted to
25 know what the purple machine was, and I told him I did not

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator George

hll

2 know but would find out.

3 I went to the Fleet Security Officer, late Lieutenant
4 Coleman, and asked him, and he said it was an electric
5 diplomatic coding machine of the Japs, and I so reported
6 it to Admiral Kimmel.

AL
fls

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

LaCharity (7) pm

Follows

Hook

AL-1

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator George
Mr. Gearhart

2 Senator George: Now, subsequent to that there were
3 two other messages that referred to codes. I don't know
4 whether you have them there or not. Did they go to
5 Admiral Kimmel also as information?

6 Captain Layton: One on 3 December saying:

7 "HIGHLY RELIABLE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT
8 CATEGORIC AND URGENT INSTRUCTIONS WERE SENT YESTERDAY TO
9 JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AT HONGKONG SINGAPORE
10 BATAVIA MANILA WASHINGTON AND LONDON TO DESTROY MOST OF
11 THEIR CODES AND CIPHERS AT ONCE AND TO BURN ALL OTHER
12 IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET DOCUMENTS."

13 That is the one you refer to?

14 Senator George: Yes, sir.

15 Captain Layton: Yes, sir, that was received.

16 Senator George: That was received also?

17 Captain Layton: Yes, sir. That was believed to be
18 another version of the one I previously mentioned, Circular
19 2444, from Tokyo, speaking of purple machines.

20 Senator George: I believe I have no further questions,
21 Mr. Chairman.

22 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart of California will
23 inquire.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Captain, the answers to these questions
25 of mine may be obvious. They are put for the purpose of the

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 record.

3 Is there any absolutely sure method of preventing a
4 surprise attack?

5 Captain Layton: Mr. Gearhart, I am glad you asked me
6 that question. I was a little curious myself at the end of
7 the war to see what the results had been during the war.
8 If I may have your indulgence for a minute I will try and
9 find my paper.

10 To avoid having any personal interest I asked Cincpac
11 Analytical Section. They analyzed all reports from all
12 sources and put them together in what they thought was the
13 best narrative of what happened. I told them that I wanted
14 to have a study made of all our carrier task force raids
15 throughout the course of the war, and that I would like to
16 know what degree of surprise they were able to have against
17 the Japs who were supposed to be looking for them.

18 I told them to go on the cautious side, if anything.
19 And this is what was handed to me by the Chief of that
20 Section:

21 There were 72 major raids by carrier based planes in
22 the Pacific during World War II in which it might have
23 been expected that the element of surprise would be present.
24 Of these 21 or 29-2/10 percent achieved complete surprise;
25 32 or 44-4/10 percent achieved partial surprise; 15 or
20-8/10 percent achieved no element of surprise; and 4 or

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 5.5 percent achieved an unknown element of surprise.

3 In this tabulation raids on the same area within a
4 week's time or on areas under amphibious attack or under
5 bombardment were not included.

6 Mr. Gearhart: That is very interesting. I don't
7 think I got the third one. Will you repeat it?

8 Captain Layton: There were 21, which is 29-2/10
9 percent; 32, which is 44-4/10 percent; 15, which is 20-8/10
10 percent; and 4 or 5-5/10 percent.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, that was surprise to the Japs?

12 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: When they were at war with us, when
14 they were on the lookout for us, using all of their methods
15 to prevent surprise?

16 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Then anything that is done to prevent
18 surprise is merely to reduce the probability of surprise;
19 is that not correct?

20 Captain Layton: In general I think that is true, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, if you were to say anything else
22 you would say there would be a method of preventing surprise
23 absolutely.

24 Captain Layton: There is, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: There is?

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Then if they had sufficient equipment
3 to have carried on an adequate long-distance aerial re-
4 connaissance for 360 degrees around Hawaii the opportunity
5 of a surprise would have been greatly reduced?

6 Captain Layton: Greatly reduced subject to weather
7 conditions which would allow the search to be effective.
8 Weather conditions prevented a plane from seeing forces,
9 at that time, before the installation of radio.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Have you any idea how many airplanes of
11 the long distance reconnaissance type would have been re-
12 quired to keep up a long-distance reconnaissance around
13 that island that was adequate?

14 Captain Layton: That is a little out of my field. I
15 would rather let the Operations people and the aviation
16 people answer those technical questions.

17 Mr. Gearhart: I think the figures you have given here
18 are very helpful. Thank you.

19 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will
20 inquire, Captain.

21 Senator Ferguson: Captain Layton, apparently from your
22 answer about this purple machine you were not familiar
23 with the fact that Washington was intercepting the diplomatic
24 messages that the Japanese were using the machine to decipher?

25 Captain Layton: I was not personally familiar with the

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 machine. I knew that Washington had been in July 1941
3 intercepting and decrypting Japanese high diplomatic traffic
4 because they told us what the Japanese were going to demand
5 of Vichy and what they were going to do if Vichy didn't
6 give in, and they also laid out the bases they were going
7 to take and which they did take. So I was aware that our
8 unit in Washington was working and having success as of
9 July with the Japanese, as you call it now, high level
10 diplomatic system.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you know the name "purple"?

12 Captain Layton: The name "purple" was new to me. I
13 had never heard it.

14 Senator Ferguson: So when the word "purple" came in
15 on the message you were not familiar with what they were
16 talking about?

17 Captain Layton: I didn't know what "purple machine"
18 meant. I thought it probably was one of our code names
19 to cover some device or means of decrypting messages, perhaps.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, you mentioned these
21 messages came to you in July and you knew we were inter-
22 cepting them here in Washington.

23 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: Did you get any specific notice
25 that they were not going to give you any more of that kind

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 of informatinn?

3 Captain Layton: I had noticed, sir. I had written
4 to my opposite number in Washington, Captain McCollum, and
5 had urged him to send us diplomatic traffic of the very
6 nature of which you speak. He replied in a personal letter
7 and said it was determined that we should not have this
8 sent to us because in fact Washington was the place best
9 qualified both by personnel in number and in experience to
10 evaluate it and to disseminate this information to the Fleet
11 and assured me that we would get what we needed at the
12 time we needed it.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you have that personal letter?

14 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you have it with you?

16 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Will you produce it?

18 Captain Layton: Yes, sir. Shall I read it, sir?

19 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

20 Captain Layton: (Reading)

21 "April 22, 1941.

22 "Dear Eddie:

23 "Sorry to be so late in replying to your letter of
24 11 March but I have just gotten out of the hospital after
25 having them trim me down a trifle. I have taken up the

1 and tactical situations with which they will be confronted
2 when the time of action arrives. The material you mentioned
3 can necessarily have but passing and transient interest
4 as action in the political sphere is determined by the
5 Government as a whole and not by the forces afloat.

6 "It does not seem to me to be very practical to build
7 up an organization afloat which will merely duplicate the
8 efforts of the Intelligence Division in the Department. I
9 appreciate that all this leaves you in rather a spot as
10 naturally people are interested in current developments.
11 I believe, however, that a sharp line should be drawn and
12 a distinction continuously emphasized between information
13 that is of interest and information that is desirable to
14 have on which to base action.

15 "In other words, while you and the Fleet may be highly
16 interested in politics, there is nothing that you can do
17 about it. Therefore, information of political significance,
18 except as it affects immediate action by the Fleet, is
19 merely a matter of interest to you and not a matter of
20 utility."

21 Senator Ferguson: Signed?

22 Captain Layton: I have another paragraph.

23 Senator Ferguson: All right.

24 Captain Layton: (Reading)

25 "I think your remarks concerning the slate are very

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 apt and pertinent."

3 The word "slate" means the slate for language officers
4 in case of war.

5 "I would, however, ask you to look at this other aspect
6 of the situation. If the officers concerned are to continue
7 to be of use to the Navy in their specialty they must be
8 given a reasonable opportunity for promotion. Certain of
9 the promotion laws are matters of law and are not within
10 the province of the Bureau of Navigation or of any Selection
11 Board to modify."

12 I don't believe reading this letter any further will
13 have any influence on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Senator.
14 It is a long talk about why the officers have to go to sea
15 and cannot remain at their posts.

16 Senator Ferguson: I think that is of interest to the
17 committee.

18 Captain Layton: (Reading)

19 "A case in point -- I am advised by the Bureau of
20 Navigation that Birtley --"

21 Commander Birtley was then the Officer in Charge of the
22 Radio Intelligence Unit and who was relieved as Officer in
23 Charge by Commander Rochefort later on. I was trying to
24 get him kept on in view of his experience.

25 "A case in point - I am advised by the Bureau of

Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

to stations and providing for shifts in personnel I must consider future requirements as well as present needs.

"In this connection, we ran on a present need basis for several years with the result that our talent all of a sudden disappeared from certain important billets and I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting all of our stations on a functioning basis again. All of them are just now functioning with some degree of satisfaction and continuity and in order to provide for this desirable continuity, I might even say essential continuity, a definite plan for shifting personnel is essential.

"I appreciate that the two boys in Honolulu are doing exceptionally good work and for that reason I would like to see them stay there, but for their own good and more important for the good of the specialized service as a whole, some shift is going to have to be made and Honolulu is the place that a general study of the situation indicates to be the logical place to make the change.

"I hope to have the new silhouettes in the mail within the next two weeks. I am ashamed that they have not been sent out before now but I have been forced to accept a reduction in priority of this work as the powers that be have considered other work more urgent. The instruction models I will have to check up on for you although I had

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(10)

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 understood that they were already being sent out.

3 "I hope that you will keep in touch with me from time
4 to time as I value your comments very highly.

5 "With best regards,

6 "Mac". Over the signature of A. H. McCollum.

7 Senator Ferguson: Now, have you any other letters
8 or memoranda?

9 Captain Layton: No other pertaining to Pearl Harbor, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: Now, that would indicate, that
11 letter, that you were told at that time that you would not
12 getting diplomatic matter except that which the Department
13 here wanted you to know for action?

14 Captain Layton: That affected action on the part of
15 the Fleet, yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: And did you believe up until the
17 time of the attack that you were getting all diplomatic
18 intercepted messages that would in any way relate to the
19 action of the Fleet?

20 Captain Layton: I thought that the Department had
21 sent us everything they had and when I learned a couple of
22 years later that we had been short-changed I was outraged
23 and astonished.

24 Senator Ferguson: Now, we have in evidence three
25 intercepts of so-called diplomatic messages, the one of the

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 intrigue in Thailand and the two in relation to the codes.
3 Do you know of any others? One is on the first of December
4 and the other two are on the 3rd of December. Do you know
5 of any other for action? Those show on their face that
6 they were the so-called magic or purple, or at least inter-
7 cepts. You didn't know them by the name of magic. Are
8 those the only three messages that showed on their face
9 that they were intercepted Japanese messages?

10 Captain Layton: Those are the only ones I recall
11 at present. I am sure there weren't many others, if there
12 were even one.

13 Senator Ferguson: I didn't understand.

14 Captain Layton: Those are the only ones I recall at
15 present, although the setting up on the winds code may be
16 included in that same category.

17 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, how can we find out how
18 many other messages there are that on their face indicate
19 that they were intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages?

20 Captain Layton: I have my file here. If the Senator
21 will give me a little time I will go through it.

22 Senator Ferguson: I will be glad to give you time.
23 I think that is important.

24 Captain Layton: I have one dated 1 December 1941.

25 Senator Ferguson: That is your file?

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Captain Layton: That is the Commander in Chief Pacific
3 Fleet Intelligence file, sir. I have kept it since December
4 1940 when I first reported for duty.

5 Senator Ferguson: What is that message?

6 Captain Layton: It is a duplication of the one you
7 just handed me, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: That I gave you?

9 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: All right.

11 Captain Layton: It started out "Ambassador in Bangkok".

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

13 Captain Layton: I have one here dated 28 November 1941
14 from Cincaf to Opnav, Cincpac, Coml4 and Coml6, which I
15 am sure you have in the record.

16 Senator Ferguson: That is the winds?

17 Captain Layton: Yes, sir. That is the five times
18 winds and the two times winds.

19 The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson has to go to the
20 floor and in the meantime Mr. Richardson has a question or
21 two.

22 Mr. Richardson: Captain, are you the author of this
23 map of Pearl Harbor that has been set up on this side of
24 the room?

25 Captain Layton: I am not the artist, no, sir. The

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 map of Pearl Harbor made from existing records in the
3 Office of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet was con-
4 structed by the direction of the Commander in Chief Pacific
5 Fleet to show this committee if they wished where the
6 ships were at the time of the attack; also where a couple
7 of them moved during the time of the attack and to show
8 what has been referred to as Japanese submarine track around
9 Ford Island.

10 Mr. Richardson: Suppose you take the pointer, Captain,
11 and give us a demonstration on that map of the information
12 it is intended to convey.

13 Captain Layton: This map with its color for sounding
14 does not lend itself to being seen, but I will show with
15 this pointed the course laid down on a captured map from
16 the Japanese midget submarine the course he intended to
17 follow. His course has been projected on the map which is
18 a U.S. Naval confidence chart of Pearl Harbor corrected
19 and brought up-to-date as of December 7, 1941. It is to
20 be remarked when you see me put this submarine on the
21 ground that I am following his track as he laid it down in
22 his chart which was not a correct chart.

23 He comes up the channel here to this point; then he
24 starts almost due north.

25 Mr. Richardson: Does this arrow indicate due north?

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

3 Here he arrives in the vicinity of Hickam Field; this
4 is Hickam Field here; this area here is a Naval Section Base
5 at Bishop Point; this point is Bishop Point.

6 Mr. Richardson: Will you indicate where the entrance
7 net is?

8 Captain Layton: The entrance net was here, sir.

9 And the course of this midget submarine as he projected
10 it in his chart places him almost aground on the corner of
11 Bishop Point; he then was going to proceed on this course
12 to this position and then around Ford Island to this position
13 and then to cut across; and notice that he cuts across these
14 ships that were anchored there at the time, across these
15 ships to this position and down here and down here; and
16 he goes then under a position which the NEVADA has moved
17 to after she was underway during the attack and ground
18 herself; and then he proceeds on out.

19 Actually I can prove, and any Naval officer will believe
20 me, that he was never inside of Pearl Harbor. That was
21 his intended course.

22 Mr. Richardson: Then it is your opinion that the
23 chart which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating
24 that he actually entered the harbor and made a circuit of
25 the harbor was not correct and it was simply a projection

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 of the course?

3 Captain Layton: It was a projected course and not
4 an accomplished course. And furthermore the prisoner in
5 interrogation never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor.

6 As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard
7 when picked up.

8 Mr. Richardson: Where was he picked up?

9 Captain Layton: At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay.

10 Mr. Richardson: Show where the different vessels were.

11 What is this channel to the left?

12 Captain Layton: This is West Loch. It is not used
13 as a rule by Naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to
14 unload at the ammunition depot over here.

15 At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is
16 U.S.S. CALIFORNIA.

17 At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is
18 the oiler NEOSHO. She got under way and moved about the
19 harbor. She was full of high test gasoline and was not
20 touched.

21 Alongside this mooring is the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA.
22 I beg pardon. OKLAHOMA.

23 Alongside of this mooring is the TENNESSEE And WEST
24 VIRGINIA.

25 Alongside of this mooring was the ARIZONA and the repair

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 of the course?

3 Captain Layton: It was a projected course and not
4 an accomplished course. And furthermore the prisoner in
5 interrogation never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor.

6 As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard
7 when picked up.

8 Mr. Richardson: Where was he picked up?

9 Captain Layton: At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay.

10 Mr. Richardson: Show where the different vessels were.

11 -What is this channel to the left?

12 Captain Layton: This is West Loch. It is not used
13 as a rule by Naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to
14 unload at the ammunition depot over here.

15 At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is
16 U.S.S. CALIFORNIA.

17 At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is
18 the oiler NEOSHO. She got under way and moved about the
19 harbor. She was full of high test gasoline and was not
20 touched.

21 Alongside this mooring is the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA.
22 I beg pardon. OKLAHOMA.

23 Alongside of this mooring if the TENNESSEE And WEST
24 VIRGINIA.

25 Alongside of this mooring was the ARIZONA and the repair

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 ship VISTA. The VISTA got underway and moved over here.

3 The NEVADA had been in this position, got underway at
4 the time of the attack and moved down here.

5 These were destroyers.

6 This was a hospital ship, SOLACE.

7 This was a destroyer.

8 This was the cruiser PHOENIX.

9 Later two destroyers.

10 Tender and destroyers.

11 Four destroyers.

12 There were four destroyers.

13 Here was a cruiser, DETROIT.

14 Light cruiser RALEIGH.

15 The old training ship UTAH.

16 And there was the TANGIER.

17 Seaplane tender CURTISS was here.

18 MEDUSA, a repair ship, was here.

19 Mine sweeping destroyers were here.

20 The ships that moved, the principal ships that moved
21 were the vessels from alongside the ARIZONA which grounded
22 itself.

23 The NEVADA moved down here.

24 The cruiser DETROIT, these four destroyers, part of
25 these destroyers, the PHOENIX, these two destroyers, one

1 destroyer. The SOLACE moved over here. And the NEVADA,
2 which I mentioned before.

3 I think that covers the high lights.

4 Mr. Richardson: Where are the oil supplies?

5 Captain Layton: These are the oil supply tanks of
6 Pearl Harbor, and here. There.

7 Mr. Richardson: Where are the beaches where the patrol
8 planes were maintained?

9 Captain Layton: The patrol planes, sir?

10 Mr. Richardson: Patrol planes.

11 Captain Layton: The patrol planes were operating
12 from this section of Ford Island here.

13 Mr. Richardson: Where is the airport where the carrier
14 planes were?

15 Captain Layton: They were in this field here.

16 Mr. Richardson: That is Ford Island?

17 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Richardson: Nothing further.

19 Mr. Keefe: Captain, I understand your testimony to be
20 that you communicated the available intelligence to Admiral
21 Kimmel and his staff each morning?

22 Captain Layton: To Admiral Kimmel each morning; to
23 other members of his staff on every two or three mornings,
24 sometimes every other day, depending on their availability
25 and the amount of material available for them to see. The

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Communication Intelligence summaries that I have referred
 3 to were mostly always shown to the Chief of Staff and fre-
 4 quently to the Chief of Plans, War Plans, and the Operations
 5 Officer. These officers all saw the evaluated intelligence
 6 summaries that I also wrote up for the entire staff.

Shefner⁷
 follows
 3:50 8

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

9
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22
 23
 24
 25

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Keefe: In your answers to questions before the Hart investigation you stated in substance facts which I assume is what you mean to tell us today :

"Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel? 12,932

"A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was free."

"Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring forth discussion concerning the intelligence?"

"A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese dispositions, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general."

That is correct?

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: (Reading)

"Q. Was it usual for any other members of the

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task
3 forces to be present during those discussions?

4 "A. The Chief of Staff was most always present.
5 On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer
6 and the senior Operations Officer were called in and a
7 discussion then held. Often during these discussions I
8 was no longer required and was permitted to retire.
9 When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out
10 two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to
11 port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review
12 for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders, then in
13 port the situation and developments that had taken place
14 during their absence and a general discussion of Japan-
15 ese potentialities, capabilities, strength would ensue.."

16 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: That is generally the manner that you oper-
18 ated?

19 Captain Layton: That is a better general picture than
20 I have told orally here because I had a chance to put ques-
21 tion marks, punctuation and periods in that testimony.

22 Mr. Keefe: And during these discussions you were in the
23 habit of expressing your own opinion and estimate as to the
24 situation that confronted the Commander-in-Chief?

25 Captain Layton: Admiral Kimmel encouraged officers to

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 express themselves and I took advantage of that opportunity to
3 express my own opinions on several occasions.

4 Mr. Keefe: Now, when messages came in which were con-
5 sidered important, there was a general staff discussion as to
6 the meaning and intent of that particular message, was there
7 not?

8 Captain Layton: There were staff discussions almost
9 every day. My participation in the staff discussions was
10 generally of an intelligence nature, such as briefing the
11 staff on the situation as developed and giving them the pic-
12 ture so they would not have to read a lot of material. Then
13 I would be allowed to retire while they discussed specific
14 phases, particularly regarding the war plans.

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, did you have a liaison with the
16 Army through the person of Colonel Edwin Raley?

17 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: He was appointed by the G-2 of the Hawaiian
19 Department?

20 Captain Layton: I understood that at the time, Mr.
21 Keefe. He came to me in the middle of 1941 and said he wanted
22 to establish a liaison with the Fleet.

23 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

24 Captain Layton: I told him that I was delighted and
25 thereafter I saw Colonel Raley from time to time. Shortly

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 thereafter the B-17's were to be flown to Australia and the
3 Philippines and I furnished him all the information I had
4 available of weather or bases, including some secret informa-
5 tion from the Dutch that we had received regarding the air
6 bases in Dutch territory that could be used.

7 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event there was complete, di-
8 rect, friendly and intimate and almost daily liaison with the
9 Army through the officers that had been appointed by the G-2
10 in the presence of Colonel Raley?

11 Captain Layton: Colonel Raley and I saw one another on
12 an average of maybe twice a week in late October and I am
13 sure at least three times a week or more often in late Novem-
14 ber of 1941. Our liaison was so good, - I mean by good, I
15 could get together with his liaison officer. His assistant
16 reported to me, to my desk the morning of the attack and re-
17 mained there for some eighteen hours so that liaison would
18 be intimate and correct.

19 Mr. Keefe: Well, I want to get this one fact clear, that
20 so far as the relations in matters of intelligence between the
21 Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor you had an intimate and a direct
22 and a constant relationship.

23 Captain Layton: I did, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: And you transferred, as I understand it, to
25 the Army through their liaison officer Colonel Raley the im-

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

portant information that you thought the Army should have?

3

4

5

6

Captain Layton: I had to dress it down from some of its very secret action. I could not tell him the sources and because I was under oath I went a little further than my oath allowed.

7

Mr. Keefe: I see.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Captain Layton: But Admiral Kimmel knew I was doing it. I had his permission to make and give Colonel Raley a little more than you could under the oath that I was under obligation to. I would not tell him how it came about we knew these things, but I would inform him of the general details. He knew of this 1 December message, - he did not know it was a message, - regarding the plot by the Japanese to force the British to invade Thailand so that the Thais could call the British the aggressor and then call on the Japanese to come and help them out. He knew that.

Mr. Keefe: You did not have this message which has been introduced in evidence here, or discuss that one, the so-called plotting message, by which the Japs sought to plot Pearl Harbor?

Captain Layton: Unfortunately, Mr. Keefe, it was not transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. Keefe: And some other things were not communicated

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

3

Captain Layton: I think exhibit 1 --

4

Mr. Keefe: Which were considered important.

5

Captain Layton: I think exhibit 1 covers most of those,

6

sir.

7

Mr. Keefe: Now, you made a statement a few moments ago

8

in response to Senator Ferguson's question, that about two

9

years after Pearl Harbor, when you learned that you had been

10

short-changed, you were very much upset and disturbed.

11

Captain Layton: I was outraged, sir.

12

Mr. Keefe: You said you were outraged?

13

Captain Layton: I still am, sir.

14

Mr. Keefe: Now, will you explain that just a little

15

more, Captain?

16

Captain Layton: Perhaps my outrage, being two years after

17

Pearl Harbor, is hindsight, but throughout this war I have

18

been the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Combat Intelligence

19

Officer and directly charged with informing our forces at

20

sea with all pertinent information of the Japanese disposi-

21

tions or intentions or anything else that had to do with our

22

forces and for their own safety had I been negligent for one

23

minute and not informed our forces of things which should be

24

known I would have been court-martialed and possibly shot and

25

deserved it. That, of course, was during the war.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now, I have before me an affidavit of
3 Colonel Edward W. Raley who at the time of making this af-
4 fidavit was at Langley Field, Virginia, and who was allegedly
5 sworn by Henry C. Clausen and in this affidavit Colonel Raley
6 says this:

7 "On 7 December 1941 and for about one year preced-
8 ing I was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after as-
9 suming these duties, I established for purposes of the
10 Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy,
11 through then Commander Layton, U.S.N."

12 I close the quote there and I want to inquire: From this
13 affidavit it would appear that Colonel Raley is drawing a
14 distinction between G-2 of the Army and G-2 of the Hawaiian
15 Air Force.

16 Captain Layton: There is a distinction, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: Did you understand that that was his capacity
18 when he contacted you?

19 Captain Layton: I knew that he was the G-2 of the Hawaiian
20 Air Force. When he came to establish his liaison I understood
21 that he was coming as Army liaison, without distinguishing in
22 my mind G-2, Hawaiian Department or G-2, Hawaiian Air Force.
23 He did, however, say, and I agreed with him, to the effect
24 that this liaison was an ideal one insofar as the Navy and the
25 Air Force were offensive weapons while the Hawaiian Depart-

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 ment was a defense garrison and, therefore, our liaison should
3 be good and intimate and we thereafter carried on that liaison.

4 Mr. Keefe: I am quoting again from his affidavit:

5 "I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the
6 Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one
7 year I had not more than six conversations with Command-
8 er Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These
9 conversations were spread out during this period. As
10 nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with
11 Commander Layton before 7 December 1941 was about October
12 1941.

13 "The information given me by Commander Layton was
14 my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any
15 Navy movement by Japan coming to his knowledge, and
16 which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would in-
17 form me. The only specific information he gave me in
18 this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese
19 Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in
20 the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months
21 before 7 December 1941.

22 "Any information I received from Commander Layton
23 I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Mar-
24 tin.

25 "On 1 October 1941 I conferred with Commander Lay-

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 ton and Colonel Bicknell, who was the Assistant G-2,
3 Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had
4 reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within
5 a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my
6 view. I reported this to General Martin. Attached
7 are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter
8 on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference."

9 Now, I want to get this straightened out because the
10 Colonel's affidavit is here in the record for what it is
11 worth; I have had no chance, or no one on the committee has
12 had any chance to examine Colonel Edward Raley, but I would
13 like to get the exact liaison that existed between you and the
14 Army out there at Hawaii and if I am to read his affidavit cor-
15 rectly, he states that he was merely representing the Hawaiian
16 Air Force and that he reported to the Commanding General of
17 the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin.

18 Now, to a layman this is difficult to understand. It
19 perhaps explains some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred.

20 Now, I understand your story to be that there was com-
21 plete and friendly relations and almost daily liaison with
22 the Army officer. He says he did not have over six conversa-
23 tions in a year and the last one was in October 1941, before
24 Pearl Harbor. Now, that raises a question of fact. If I am
25 to consider Colonel Raley's affidavit at all, I have got to

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 appraise it in connection with the testimony that you have
3 given to the committee. Do you understand the purpose of my
4 questions?

5 Captain Layton: Mr. Keefe, my testimony that I gave
6 you here is the facts and I am sure in my heart that if Colonel
7 Edward Raley -- I think I called him Edwin before -- were to
8 testify here he would say exactly what I have said or words
9 to that effect. Now, I would like to point out one thing.
10 His affidavit was made --

11 Mr. Keefe: I will give you the date. It was made the
12 11th of March 1945.

13 Captain Layton: Perhaps his memory has slipped him on
14 that but he referred to a Japanese attack on Malay, didn't he?

15 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

16 Captain Layton: And may I point out that Ambassador
17 Subokimo's dispatch received by CINCPAC on 1 December was the
18 thing that I testified to as having told him and which he
19 in turn refers to as having been told him here.

20 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

21 Captain Layton: That would indicate that I saw him some
22 time after 30 November, wouldn't it?

23 Mr. Keefe: It would indicate that you saw him after
24 October at least, Captain.

25 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

Mr. Keefe: Well, I want to say to you and I am glad to say so for the purposes of the record --

3

4

Captain Layton: I would like to continue if I may, sir.

5

Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes. Pardon me.

6

7

Captain Layton: I am sure that Colonel Raley in making this affidavit had a bad memory or his recollection was not too good. He has always been a personal friend of mine and I know that if he were to stand here I could recollect things to him.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

For example, as I recall the Army-Navy game was played on Saturday, the 29th of November 1941. He invited myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, to join him at the Officers' Club at Hickam Field the evening before that game. We had a little conversation and I took him outside the club, out onto the veranda away from ears, to tell him what was the latest developments at that time in my office and again impressed him with what I considered the seriousness of the situation. I am sure that Colonel Raley will remember that and I believe that his attitude at that time was one of not considering the importance of this matter as you have brought it up, or of the recollection of the matters that I have brought up.

24

25

Mr. Keefe: Well, I do not want to be prejudging anyone, but the testimony that you have given here so far as I am

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 concerned has a ring of complete sincerity and truth in it and
3 it has impressed me just exactly that way. But, of course,
4 this committee has got to try to understand this testimony and
5 reconcile the differences that exist as best we can. That is
6 what I am trying to do.

7 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: It is going to be a difficult job as we go
9 along and see these differences that crop out in this testi-
10 mony.

11 Well, now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you
12 stated:

13 "I want to say this: I had all the information of
14 intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time try-
15 ing to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the
16 true picture of events to come, and I think I was as
17 surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the follow-
18 ing morning."

19 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir. However, I was
20 not given a lot of pieces of this jig-saw puzzle. All the
21 pieces I had made a pretty good picture and when you work
22 as I have in intelligence I can say it is nothing more than
23 piecing up pieces that do not belong to a jig-saw and pieces
24 that do belong to jig-saw until you form a framework. Then
25 you try to complete the framework of a puzzle until you get

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 enough to show you what your complete picture is. Unfortun-
3 ately, there were other sets of jig-saw puzzles that went
4 with this one that were not given us, so all I could do was
5 use what I had and I was surprised.

6 Mr. Keefe: In other words, Captain, am I correct in
7 saying this, that to me your testimony means that you had a
8 pretty good mosaic or a jig-saw worked out and put together
9 from what information was available to you and that informa-
10 tion indicated that there was going to be war but that it
11 would take place in its initial phases, at least, way off
12 to the Southwest, is that right?

13 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir, backed additional-
14 ly by the past experience of the previous Japanese task force
15 movement to French Indo-China, which took place and which was
16 backed up by diplomatic intercept dispatches to us to inform
17 us as to the nature of these ultimatums as to what the Japan-
18 ese were going to do, which they did.

19 Here again we have the same build-up, we have a possi-
20 bility, we get everything that Washington gives us with that
21 and so our jig-saw puzzle as we make it looked pretty good at
22 that time. As a matter of fact, it looked good in Washington.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, you had in that jig-saw puzzle
24 this war warning message of the 27th --

25 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- did you not?

3

Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

4

5

6

7

8

9

Mr. Keefe: Let me ask you this: Not having ever been an intelligence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and you know what you are talking about, you know your business:

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men in the armed services charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one particular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of November, or must you judge that message in connection with all the other intelligence and all the other information that is available to the Commander in the field?

17

18

19

20

21

22

Captain Layton: It has been my experience, limited as it may be, that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. I believe that certain commanders under them know what their commander means by the way he writes his message. I do not think, - other than that I do not believe I can comment.

23

24

25

Mr. Keefe: Well, I might say to you that a very high-ranking officer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here but whose affidavit appears in this

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Keefe: (Continuing) -- did you not?

Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Let me ask you this: Not having ever been an intelligence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and you know what you are talking about, you know your business:

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men in the armed services charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one particular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of November, or must you judge that message in connection with all the other intelligence and all the other information that is available to the Commander in the field?

Captain Layton: It has been my experience, limited as it may be, that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. I believe that certain commanders under them know what their commander means by the way he writes his message. I do not think, - other than that I do not believe I can comment.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I might say to you that a very high-ranking officer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here but whose affidavit appears in this

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2 so-called Clausen file, I have had a chance to talk with him
3 at some length and the conclusion that I have gotten from that
4 man was that you cannot pick out of intelligence any one single
5 message and say that is the message which determines the re-
6 sponsibility of a commander in the field.

7 Take a man situated exactly as Kimmel was or as Short
8 was: Kimmel gets this so-called war warning message and the
9 implications have been that that ought to be sufficient to warn
10 anybody to go out and do certain things, execute a suitable
11 defensive deployment of his ships when he also has an order
12 before him, War Plan 46, which required him to attack, spear-
13 head an attack into the Marshalls.

14 Now, the point is can I, as one attempting to evaluate
15 this picture, look at that one war warning message of the
16 27th and disregard all the other information and all the other
17 wires and all the other orders that might affect his decision
18 as to what to do? That is what I am struggling with in my
19 mind, trying to get it straightened out.

20 Captain Layton: Any commander who took only one message
21 and based his course of action on one message would most like-
22 ly be relieved of his command because his guess most likely
23 would be wrong.

24 I have a file here and here of probably fifty messages
25 from Chinese sources and diplomatic sources, I mean consuls

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 and assistant naval attaches, Chiang Kai-Shek's representative,
3 and so forth, saying that the Japanese are positively going to
4 invade Russia next week. I did not take any of this to be
5 factual until something else backs it up. You have to have
6 all these things and intelligence must be backedz up by some-
7 thing else. That is what makes the jig-saw puzzle.

8 Mr. Keefe: All right. Having all these messages and fin-
9 ally here is a message comes through which I believe in your
10 statement before the Hart committee, before Admiral Hart you
11 said was the first message of its kind you had ever seen?

12 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

13 Mr. Keefe: A war warning message.

14 Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: It would be striking, it would be called to
16 the attention of anybody, wouldn't it?

17 Captain Layton: It would, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: Now, that message must have been discussed
19 out there, and I believe the evidence here shows that it was
20 discussed in the staff meetings of Admiral Kimmel.

21 Captain Layton: There was a staff meeting that afternoon
22 and evening, yes. I was drafting a paraphrase for delivery
23 to General Short. As a matter of fact, I had a draft -- I
24 had to draft three paraphrases before I found one that carried
25 the picture right without destroying it.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 When I took it to Admiral Kimmel's cabin there were dis-
3 cussions going on at the time. There were about half a dozen
4 of our higher echelon staff in there. At that time the Chief
5 of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought General
6 Short's message from the War Department over there and gave
7 it to Admiral Kimmel.

8 Mr. Keefe: Well, then, you found difficulty, as far as
9 the staff was concerned, in determining what to do, all dis-
10 cussing the message that came from Marshall to Short and here
11 is a message from their Chief of Naval Operations to Kimmel.

12 Now, we are sitting here on this committee judging by
13 hindsight what men should have done. They were faced out
14 there with the situation as it was on the 7th of December and
15 I am trying to put myself in that position.

16 Now, there were a lot of distinguished men on that staff,
17 were there not?

18 Captain Layton: I thought so, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: Very able men?

20 Captain Layton: I am sure of that, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Did you participate in any of those discus-
22 sions with respect to this war warning message?

23 Captain Layton: No, I did not, sir. I was busy making
24 this paraphrase and thereafter I was told to get it to General
25 Short. I was not in on the discussions of the war warning

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 message.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well, in any event, Captain Layton, so far
4 as you were concerned, with available to you all of the in-
5 formation that had come out there to Admiral Kimmel, - you knew
6 of all of it, didn't you?

7 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: You were the one that supplied him with the
9 information?

10 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: You were utterly and completely surprised at
12 this attack the moment that it came?

13 Captain Layton: I was, sir, very.

14 Mr. Keefe: But I understand your testimony to be that
15 had you had the information that Washington had, which they
16 did not send out there, then a situation might well have arisen
17 in your mind?

18 Captain Layton: That is hindsight, sir, but I feel con-
19 fident that had we had all that material, particularly those
20 main intercepts from the consul and from Foreign Minister
21 Togo to the consul telling him to make reports even when there
22 wasn't anything to report, I think there would have been an
23 entirely different situation there, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Well, you people out there knew that the
25 Japs were destroying their codes and orders went out from

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

Washington here to go to our outlying possessions for them to
3 destroy their codes; you knew that, didn't you?

3

4

Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: That simply confirmed the fact that war was
going to start, isn't that true?

7

Captain Layton: It did to me, sir.

8

9

10

Mr. Keefe: But so far as the information which you had
of the places where the war was going to start it led you all
to believe that it was going to start out in the Far East,
11 is that right?

11

12

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

13

14

Mr. Keefe: And that is why everybody was surprised when
it started with an attack on Pearl Harbor?

15

16

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

17

18

19

20

21

Mr. Keefe: Now, when you made the statement that you did
a little while ago, if I understand you correctly you felt
outraged and still feel outraged because of the fact that you
were not supplied with the information which you now feel had
you had it at that time would have given you people out there
an entirely different picture of the situation?

22

Captain Layton: I feel very confident of that, sir.

23

24

25

Mr. Keefe: Well, the funny part of it is, Captain,
from all the witnesses that have been here before this com-
mittee in the higher echelons in Washington everyone of them

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 were surprised from the Commander-in-Chief on down apparently,
3 that there was any attack on Pearl Harbor. Nobody expected
4 an attack on Pearl Harbor apparently, those in Washington
5 here who had all this information. You have read the testi-
6 mony, I assume, or heard it?

7 Captain Layton: I have heard a good part of it, yes,
8 sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: Yes. You got that impression, did you not?

10 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: There are only two witnesses who differ in
12 that respect and I think I am right in that, I have been
13 trying to follow this thing carefully. One is Admiral Turner
14 and the other is Captain Zacharias, they were the only two
15 witnesses and Zacharias' testimony was in the form of a sort
16 of prophecy. Admiral Turner seemed to be the only one that
17 had any idea that there might be any possibility of an attack
18 on Pearl Harbor.

19 Now, was there anybody out there that you knew out at
20 Pearl Harbor that had any idea that there was a likelihood of
21 an attack at that point?

22 Captain Layton: I feel very positive that there was no
23 one there that was not as surprised as I was. I feel confi-
24 dent also that had anyone predicted this attack coming that
25 some thing would have been done.

1 Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Well, Captain, you say that in view of the
3 fact that this book that has been referred to here several
4 times by some Jap, that some Jap wrote predicting the possi-
5 bility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, - you were all familiar
6 with that, were you not?

7 Captain Layton: I translated it, sir.

8 Mr. Keefe: You translated it?

9 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: That had all been presented to Kimmel and his
11 staff and evaluated, was it not?

12 Captain Layton: That was a book dealing with the move-
13 ments or possible actions of the Japanese Fleet after the cut-
14 break of war. It did not predict a surprise attack before war
15 and it was of many of their courses of action.

16 Mr. Keefe: I see.

17 Captain Layton: I do not mean to say for a minute that
18 the Japanese did not have the Pearl Harbor raid as a poten-
19 tiality but it was not by myself in my own mental estimate made
20 as a capability, capability being differentiated in the mili-
21 tary sense as something that they can and will do under the
22 proper circumstances. The Japanese proved that it was a cap-
23 ability.

24 Mr. Keefe: Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart
25 you made this comment, Captain:

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

"I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank discussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the California, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down."

That meant the Philippines and Guam, did it not?

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
r.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Captain Layton: That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe: (Reading)

"Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank."

Now, is that a fair statement of the situation, Captain?

Captain Layton: That is a very fair statement of the situation as I saw it then and as I see it now.

Mr. Keefe: You further said:

"It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds."

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you made that statement before Admiral Hart in the face of the fact that you were the Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Captain Layton: That is right, sir.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

Mr. Keefe: And had all of the available information that came to Pearl Harbor?

3

4

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: And were the individual who discussed it with the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, and with the commanders of his task forces?

7

8

Captain Layton: That is correct, sir.

9

10

Mr. Keefe: Who were Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, I believe.

11

12

Captain Layton: Admiral Brown and Admiral Halsey and Admiral Pye were the three task force commanders.

13

14

Mr. Keefe: Oh, yes.

15

16

Captain Layton: Admiral Newton was a subordinate of Admiral Brown, I believe.

17

18

Mr. Keefe: I think perhaps that is right. My recollection is that Admiral Newton was in command of this task force in which the carrier --

19

20

21

22

23

Captain Layton: That is correct. On the movement just before December 7th Admiral Newton was put in command of that task unit or group because part of the force went to Johnston Island for landing force exercises, so the reference to that as a task force as I have there would be a misnomer.

24

25

Mr. Keefe: Now, you further made this statement. I would like to have this in the record and have you confirm it

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 to this committee and in this record: This question was asked
3 you:

4 "Q Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase
5 concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of
6 27 November?

7 "A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever
8 seen saying 'This is a war warning', I took particular
9 note of it. I thought it over considerably. Meanwhile,
10 its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted
11 the picture up to date, and that we would be at war short-
12 ly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank
13 open and proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify
14 us through a compromise deal with Kurusu-Nomura negotia-
15 tions. It made me feel that the picture we had was a
16 good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times
17 were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a
18 last minute compromise in view of their statement that
19 nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious
20 situation. I saw the Army that evening take their con-
21 dition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and
22 I thought I saw weapons moving in the street and I pre-
23 sumed that they were going into full condition of readi-
24 ness, including the emplacement of anti-aircraft and
25 other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other im-

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

portant points on Oahu."

2

Is that a fair statement?

3

4

Captain Layton: That is a correct statement except one
typographical error or else you may have misread it there where
it was leaving the Philippines on the flank. I think it would
be more properly not leaving the Philippines on the flank.
In other words, as it was stated there, as I understood it,
if it was leaving them on their flank they wouldn't bother
us and go in there but I was apprehensive that if there was
they would not leave us on our flank and proceed southward
from the Philippines in their southward movement, and that
they would attack the Philippines along with the Malay Barrier.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Mr. Keefe: You think that the word "not" should be in
there?

16

Captain Layton: I think so. It would make better sense.

17

Mr. Keefe: I had better read it again as it does make
sense to me:

18

19

"Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it
certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we
would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her
Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping
meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via
Kurusu-Nomura negotiations."

20

21

22

23

24

25

You think it should read, "If Japan would decide not

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward?"

Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: "Hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations."

Captain Layton: Yes, sir, that would read better.

Mr. Keefe: That is the way that that ought to be corrected?

Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is quite important.

Captain, where are you stationed now?

Captain Layton: I am still attached to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Upon the conclusion of this testimony and return to the West Coast I hope to be detached for new duty.

Mr. Keefe: Detached what?

Captain Layton: For a reassignment, sir.

Mr. Keefe: I see.

Captain Layton: I have been on one job too long, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Well, now, that is another thing, Captain, that bothers me. I don't know whether other members of the committee have been bothered or not but I want to ask you because I value your opinion.

There seems to be an attitude that a man who is attached to Intelligence, which is to me a highly specialized field of

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 activity, does not have very much to look forward to in the
3 line of promotion; that in order to meet the attitudes of
4 the examining boards that he must leave the field of Intelli-
5 gence and go to sea and get sea duty and all that sort of
6 thing and thus we have the situation where you are writing
7 to McCollum here at Washington asking him to leave out at
8 Honolulu two men who are experts in their field and whom you
9 wanted there for the purpose of building up and maintaining
10 the highest state of efficiency in intelligence and the answer
11 comes back that, "Well, sorry, but they have got other plans.
12 They have got to go to sea in order to meet the tests of sea
13 duty," and all that sort of thing.

14 Captain Layton: That is true, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: Now, is that a situation that persists in the
16 Navy?

17 The Vice Chairman: That is the law.

18 Mr. Keefe: What?

19 The Vice Chairman: That is the law.

20 Captain Layton: The law is that you must go to sea and
21 you must perform your duties in an outstanding and highly able
22 manner because you see there is selection to promotion.

23 Mr. Keefe: Yes.

24 Captain Layton: If you do not have a record that shows
25 what you have been doing and have commanded ships at sea and

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

have been a sailor you cannot be promoted to higher grade.

3

4

That is the law. McCollum was only trying to protect his of-

5

ficers because if he had left Birtley, for example, over at

6

Pearl Harbor he wouldn't show the sea service on his record.

7

when he came up for selection he would be passed over and

8

he would not get his promotion.

9

Mr. Keefe: All right, Captain, I will betray my ignorance

10

some but I want to know about it. You say it is the law.

11

That is a Congressional Act. Do you understand it to be a

12

law of Congress?

13

Captain Layton: Maybe I overstepped --

14

Mr. Keefe: Or a rule or regulation of the Navy?

15

Captain Layton: I think that is, you might say, a law

16

by doctrine. I can say only that I am not prepared to give

17

testimony of that sort.

18

Mr. Keefe: Well, this committee is bound to make some

19

recommendations to the Congress and if that is the law I would

20

like to know about it. If it is a law passed by the Congress

21

governing the Army and Navy, that is one thing, but if it is

22

a rule and regulation and practice and tradition of the ser-

23

vice, that is another thing.

24

The Vice Chairman: Will you yield there?

25

Mr. Keefe: Yes.

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 The Vice Chairman: My recollection is Admiral Stark
3 testified here that it is a law passed by Congress.

4 Captain Layton: He is in a much better position to know
5 than I, sir. I have been doing nothing but intelligence work
6 for a long time and I haven't paid any attention to the regu-
7 lations other than that pertain to intelligence and I must
8 confess my ignorance on that subject.

9 Mr. Keefe: On the other side of the picture we are con-
10 fronted with a situation where you take a man off a ship who
11 is an outstanding line officer and drag him into Washington
12 to head up the Naval Intelligence Service one month before
13 Pearl Harbor.

14 Captain Layton: It is true that --

15 Mr. Keefe: A man that never had any previous experience
16 in the field of intelligence. That is the other side of the
17 picture.

18 Captain Layton: I believe it is true, sir, that intelli-
19 gence as a line of endeavor with the Navy has not been in the
20 past thoroughly appreciated. I believe as a result of this
21 war, however, there is a very high appreciation among many of
22 the high ranking officers and certainly those who were at sea
23 in commanding task forces would value that intelligence dur-
24 ing this war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Shack
fls
Sher
hl

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

12,962

1 Witness Layton

questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Keefe: Well, the reason for my asking those
3 questions is in line with some that have been asked here-
4 tofore, that it is quite difficult for me to understand,
5 when we spent the money that has been spent by the United
6 States Government in training people as Japanese language
7 experts -- you have been trained as a Japanese language
8 expert, is that correct?

9 Captain Layton: I trained as Japanese language expert
10 and was also assistant Naval Attache.

11 Mr. Keefe: So you would be competent in the field of
12 intelligence, isn't that true, in the Pacific area?

13 Captain Layton: I believe that is correct, sir.

14 Mr. Keefe: Now, the evidence here is that they had
15 such limited numbers of people in the Navy to do this sort
16 of work, and yet it is the most outstanding type of work
17 and most necessary work, perhaps, that has to be done, and
18 I came to the impression that the men would sort of shy
19 away from it because when their name comes up for selection
20 they know when they are in intelligence they get passed up.

21 I don't know whether this committee will do anything
22 about it or not, but it may desire to make some recommenda-
23 tion to the Congress, or to the Navy with reference to that.

24 That is why I asked these questions, because I have been
25 impressed with the fact that there is a lot of work that could

Witness Layton

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
The Vice Chairman

1
2 have been better coordinated in this field of intelligence
3 prior to Pearl Harbor.

4 That is all.

5 The Vice Chairman: Captain, let me ask you a question
6 or two, if I may, please, sir.

7 You were the Fleet Intelligence Officer at Pearl Harbor
8 on the 1st of December, 1941?

9 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: And had been for a year or more?

11 Captain Layton: I reported on 7 December, 1940, one
12 year to a day before the attack.

13 The Vice Chairman: And as I understood you to say,
14 you were not present at the staff meetings that were held
15 about the war warning message.

16 Captain Layton: I was not an active member. I walked
17 into the Admiral's cabin during the process of these meetings
18 to show him the paraphrase of the war warning message that
19 I had drawn up to deliver to General Short, and to receive
20 his approval of this paraphrase.

21 I was in there while the Chief of Staff of the 14th
22 Naval District brought in General Short's warning message
23 that he received from the War Department, and I remained
24 there while there was a discussion among other staff members
25 of this.

h2

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
h3 2 I was not directly asked to and I did not venture an
3 opinion.

4 The Vice Chairman: You did not give any opinion?

5 Captain Layton: At that time, I did not feel it was
6 proper, sir.

7 I do not think I could have added anything to the opin-
8 ions already being given, sir.

9 The Vice Chairman: Then you did not attend and parti-
10 cipate?

11 Captain Layton: No, sir, I did not attend and partici-
12 pate. I was an intruder.

13 The Vice Chairman: You did not participate in the staff
14 meeting with respect to the war warning message?

15 Captain Layton: That is right, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: Now, what messages were in Washington
17 that you did not have at Pearl Harbor that would have caused
18 you to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor?

19 Captain Layton: I did not want to give the impression
20 that by after-thought and hindsight I could look at a book
21 of these messages and pick out some and show them to you,
22 and state what they would have meant to me. Offhand, I
23 think the bomb-plot would have been important. I am sure
24 the messages that were passed in the latter part of November
25 from Kita, the consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, plus the

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

h4

request from Togo to Kita for information on our Fleet moving in and out, plus a message I have seen about, I believe, balloon barrages were not being used, I think were all important.

I have not gone over Exhibit 1, sir. I have not read it in detail. I merely have heard these things here in this room and have been impressed. I did read some of the messages that are now in Exhibit 1, two years after Pearl Harbor, when I first learned that they had them.

The Vice Chairman: Are you familiar with the list of messages listed in Admiral Kimmel's statement to this committee?

Captain Layton: Yes, sir, I read that statement, sir.

The Vice Chairman: You read his statement?

Captain Layton: I have read his statement, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Before he presented it here?

Captain Layton: No, sir, I read the statement about, Oh, about a month ago, I think, sir, and again three or four days ago.

The Vice Chairman: I see.

Now, of those messages listed by him as being important, that he should have had in Hawaii, do you agree with him in his conclusion in that respect?

Captain Layton: I agree with the statements that he made there regarding these messages, yes, sir. I think it

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5 1 would have assisted considerably. I think probably, as
2 I recall it, the one from Berlin outlining the conversa-
3 tions that had been held with Ribbentrop and Hitler, and
4 the one from Rome in which the Japanese Ambassador outlined
5 his conversation with Mussolini, they clearly indicated
6 that the Axis were talking to one another regarding a
7 war with the Anglo-Saxons, which was then very imminent.
8

9 The Vice Chairman: Would any of those messages listed
10 by Admiral Kimmel indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

11 Captain Layton: I do not believe any of them would
12 have indicated definitely an attack on Pearl Harbor, unless
13 you take them all together, and discover that Pearl Harbor
14 is the only geographical location in all the magic inter-
15 cepts wherein there was increasing interest along towards
16 the latter part of November, keeping in mind the information
17 we had from intercepts of their traffic, which indicated
18 also a naval interest.

19 It is another one of these things. I cannot say now
20 that I would have been able to say, "Admiral they are going
21 to take Pearl Harbor." I did not mean to give that impres-
22 sion.

23 I mean to say it was a sort of jig-saw puzzle, that,
24 when fitted together, fell into a common pattern.

25 The Vice Chairman: It is a fact, Captain, that none of

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h6

1 the messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his state-
2 ment, except the so-called bomb-plot message refers to
3 Pearl Harbor. Is that true?
4

5 Captain Layton: I would have to review the statement
6 very carefully to make a definite answer.

7 The Vice Chairman: You do not recall now?

8 Captain Layton: I do not recall now, but I thought
9 there were a couple that referred to the movement of ships
10 in and out, or the anchorage of ships, that referred to
11 area C, and area A, Malama Harbor.

12 The Vice Chairman: It is my recollection of all the
13 list of messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his state-
14 ment, none of them referred to Pearl Harbor, except the
15 so-called bomb-plot message.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Will the gentleman yield?

17 The Vice Chairman: Yes.

18 Mr. Gearhart: There were five or six messages that
19 had to do with the ships movements to which the witness just
20 referred. There was one message dividing Pearl Harbor into
21 five areas.

22 The Vice Chairman: That is the so-called bomb-plot
23 message.

24 Mr. Gearhart: And other messages calling for reports
25 on ship movements, and calling upon Honolulu for reports

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h7.

1
2 even when there were no ship movement messages.

3 Captain Layton: Those are the ones I referred to,
4 sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: The so-called bomb plot message
6 is the one dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. You
7 are familiar with that?

8 Captain Layton: I recall having seen that here, yes,
9 sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: My recollection is that is the
11 only one that directly refers to Pearl Harbor, and I
12 believe you substantially agree with me in that respect.

13 Captain Layton: Except those that refer to the move-
14 ments in and out of Pearl Harbor, yes, sir.

15 The Vice Chairman: Now, Captain, you say you kept
16 the Army officials in Pearl Harbor completely advised as
17 to all the intelligence you had?

18 Captain Layton: I do not believe I said that, Senator.
19 I said that I kept Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force,
20 who established Army liaison with me rather fully informed
21 as to the general situation, and as to some of the details
22 of the Japanese task force, its movements, and its implica-
23 tions. I did not for a minute intend to say that I had
24 contacts with Colonel Fielder, then Colonel Fielder. I
25 stated in my affidavit to Colonel Clausen that inasmuch as

Witness Layton

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Colonel Raley was an Army liaison, I saw no reason to establish a liaison with Fielder, and if Fielder for one minute was not satisfied with what he was getting from Washington -- and I did not know that he was getting anything, or nothing -- then, he could certainly establish liaison with me.

The Vice Chairman: Who was your opposite number in the Army in Pearl Harbor?

Captain Layton: May I take a minute to explain what the intelligence functions were? I think I can rather straighten out a little doubt in the minds of the committee.

When I joined there, we were afloat. It had been the habitual practice and doctrine in the Navy that when the Fleet desires liaison with shore-based authorities, whether they be public or private services, or the Army or the FBI, we made this liaison through the Naval District Intelligence Officer in the place where we were.

My liaison through the Army official was, therefore, was through Captain Mayfield, the District Intelligence Officer at Honolulu who was attached to Admiral Block's organization.

There were meetings between the Army and FBI and himself every week or more. I attended one of them shortly after I reported, just to let them know I was there, and to say

Witness Layton

questions by: The Vice Chairman

h9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

that I was willing to cooperate in all matters. But for anyone to imply that I had to search out and find an opposite number, or that the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department should be dependent upon me for sources of information, is rather unusual, for the simple reason the Army and Navy in Washington have close agreement, and have worked in close liaison for years in intelligence, that the Navy passed it down and disclosed it to the Army and the Army disclosed it to the Navy, and in case there was an occasion in which we wanted to consult one another in the field, we consulted then with each other in the field.

Now, it is doctrine in the Army that if you do not know -- and the same applies to the Navy, that if you do not know what you have, or that you want more than you already have, then you go and ask somebody else for it.

Had Colonel Fielder come to me and said, "I want some information," I could give him the same amount in a paraphrased form without revealing the source, had I had Admiral Kimmel's permission. He did not do so.

The Vice Chairman: So you did not give it to him?

Captain Layton: Well, he not being there I could not very well give it to him, sir.

The Vice Chairman: All right.

Was Colonel Fielder your opposite number in the Army?

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h10

1
2 Captain Layton: I would not say he was my opposite
3 number in the Army, because the Fleet might move from Pearl
4 Harbor, say to San Francisco, for example, and then my
5 opposite over there would be another person.

6 The Vice Chairman: All right. I just want to try to
7 get to the point and not take up too much time.

8 You were the intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet?

9 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Who was the intelligence officer
11 of the Hawaiian Department of the Army?

12 Captain Layton: Colonel Field, then Colonel Fielder.

13 The Vice Chairman: Was he your opposite number?

14 Captain Layton: He was the opposite number of the
15 Commandant 14th Naval District Intelligence organization.

16 The Vice Chairman: Did you have an opposite number
17 in the Army?

18 Captain Layton: No, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: You did not?

20 Captain Layton: I did not.

21 The Vice Chairman: There was not anybody in the Army
22 that you were supposed to cooperate with, so far as intelli-
23 gence is concerned?

24 Captain Layton: I would not want to use the word
25 "cooperate" sir. I would cooperate with him any minute. It

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

hll

1
2 is a question of delineation of the line of command and
3 authority.

4 Suppose the Army had set up on Oahu an amphibious
5 force to go to sea and land on some island in accordance
6 with the war plan, then the G-2 of that organization would
7 be my opposite number, and not the G-2 of a local defense
8 garrison.

9 The Vice Chairman: So you did not have any opposite
10 number in the Army?

11 Captain Layton: I did not have any opposite number in
12 the Army in the strict sense of the word, no, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: Then you were in the same position
14 as Captain Rochefort when he testified here, that he did
15 not give the information he had to the Army officials, but
16 he sometimes gave it to them in paraphrased form, or changed,
17 sanitized form, I believe he said.

18 Is that the practice you used?

19 Captain Layton: I gave it to Colonel Raley in the
20 so-called Sanitized form. He never knew the source of
21 information, and he was requested not to ask and promised
22 never to ask.

23 The Vice Chairman: You gave it sanitized form, as did
24 Captain Rochefort?

25 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

Witness Layton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

hl2

1
2 The Vice Chairman: Now, Captain, you, of course saw
3 the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Opera-
4 tions to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

5 Captain Layton: Yes, sir, and Admiral Kimmel, I take
6 that to General Short in person, which I did.

7 The Vice Chairman: You, of course, were entirely
8 familiar with that message?

9 Captain Layton: I was, sir.

10 The Vice Chairman: Did not that give you sufficient
11 knowledge about strained relations between the United
12 States and Japan?

13 Captain Layton: It did, sir.

14 The Vice Chairman: Then you also saw the war warning
15 message of November 27?

16 Captain Layton: I did, sir.

17 The Vice Chairman: You have testified that that was
18 different in form from any message that you had ever seen.

19 Captain Layton: The words "This is a war warning"
20 were a shock to me, to see it written down. I never saw
21 anything like it before, and I was impressed by it.

22 The Vice Chairman: You were impressed by it?

23 Captain Layton: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: You considered it to be just what
25 it said, a war warning?