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17 April 1946

Statement of Brigadier General Courtney Whitney,
Chief, Government Section, SCAP

at Second Meeting of Allied Council for Japan in reference to Item II, 2, of Agenda: "Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel From Public Office."

I take this opportunity to appear before you in behalf of the Supreme Commander to clarify any misconceptions which may exist in the minds of any member with regard to the scope and application of the Supreme Commander's purge directives of January 4th. My appearance is responsive to the statement placed in the agenda by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reading as follows:

"According to the available information, undesirable persons, falling under the directive dated 4 January 1946, in many cases have not been yet removed from the leading positions they hold. Since this fact endangers normal progress of democratization of Japan and may negatively affect loyal realization by the Japanese authorities of all directive instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in general, it is desirable that the Allied Council be informed on this matter as fully as possible by the appropriate representative of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

I wish to make it quite clear that the information referred to by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, while more than faintly reminiscent of matter which has recently appeared in the Soviet press, was not obtained from General Headquarters, SCAP, nor has any attempt been made from that source to verify the accuracy thereof, any explanation therefor or the effect, if any, upon the "normal progress of democratization of Japan" or the "loyal realization by the Japanese authorities of all directive instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

Furthermore, as far as I know, neither the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics nor any other members of this council have any accurate knowledge whatsoever of the manner and degree of Japanese compliance with the Purge directive of the Supreme Commander

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of January 4th, as neither he nor any other member has sought information from General Headquarters on this point.

As the matter now stands, therefore, there is on the record a statement as to the manner of compliance by the Japanese Government with this directive and the adverse effect thereby brought to bear upon success of the occupation. The situation therefore leaves me with no other recourse than to proceed to give a complete detailed picture of the development of the directive in question and its compliance by the Japanese Government - to comply with General Derevyanko's desire "that the Allied Council be informed on this matter as fully as possible." To do so will obviously be long and tedious but, with the assistance of my aids, I expect to accomplish the task if, to borrow the words of a distinguished American "it takes all summer."

For a comprehensive understanding of any seeming slowness in compliance with these directives, it is necessary that a full understanding be had of their historical development, and the underlying occupational purposes sought thereby to be served. I shall ask you, therefore, to bear with me while I trace this matter through the course of its evolution - after which I shall be pleased to answer any questions to the full extent of my ability.

The immediate question here raised by the rember of the Council for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics charges that the manner in which these directives have been complied with by the Japanese Government "endangers normal progress of the democratization of Japan." Apart from the fact that compliance with them is under the close observation of SCAP and its timetable meets with SCAP's full approval, I note that General Derevyanko's charge was made before results of the recent election were known. I doubt that, had he envisaged the manner in which the Japanese people would respond to their first real opportunity for democratic expression in their history, he would have been so quick to hold up for example any move theretofore made in the administration of Japan as endangering, in slightest degree, the normal progress of its democratization.

Ponder well these facts:- Over 27,000,000 people, or 73% of the entire electorate, cast their votes despite the handicap of transportation difficulties in present day Japan - Consider this against the

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previous all time high of eleven and a quarter million people -- Did the voting constitute a free expression of the people's will? - It custed the party long entrenched in political power, apparently not so much for what it presently stands for as for what it, or the group who composed it, formerly stood for, and moved sharply toward a more liberal concept in the relationship between government and people - It seated 38 women in the National Diet despite the first occasion on which women have had the right of vote, much less to run for political office - it ignored the professional politicians in favor of representatives from all walks of private life - resting the political future of the Japanese people in the hands of men and women with little or no political experience but of the people's own free and unrestricted choice - It demonstrated to the world a free and honest and orderly election such as few, if any, of the Western democracies can boast in more complete degree - It demonstrated democracy both in its form and in its substance.

The Independence underlying the action of the electorate is probably best reflected in the results themselves where no party has received anything like a majority vote. This is probably due to the fact that, contrary to misconceptions in some quarters in the use of the words "democratic", "reactionary", "conservative", "right wing," "left wing", as applied to Japanese politics, strong elements of all of the major political parties espouse doctrines consistent with the development of democracy, and advocate programs embodying democratic principles for political, social, financial and economic reforms of far reaching significance and scope.

Grant that the Japanese people in their democratization yet have a long way to go, but give them credit where they are due credit. And give Allied policy and the execution of policy the credit for reshaping the lives and the aspirations and the thoughts of a whole people away from the tradition and the prejudice of the ages to an enlightenment which would permit, in seven months and ten days, that demonstration of democracy at work which you witnessed on April 10th - a demonstration indeed of the free expression of a people's will -

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demonstration of a people who, given the opportunity to regulate their own political destiny, rejected the philosophy of the extreme right, exponents of which had led them into the disaster of war, and no less firmly rejected the philosophy of the extreme left -- selecting instead a cross section of the intervening shades of political philosophy, thus making possible the realization of a social system within which the powers of government and the rights of man are in balance. Therein lies the challenge which confronts the elected members of the new National Diet -- a challenge to further the gains already made in democratic process.

It thus does not mean that the democratization of Japan is complete -- not by any means. But it does mean -- and unmistakably mean -- that the Supreme Commander in policy and action is oriented to the course which leads to success in this unprecedented undertaking -- that the leadership of which he spoke to you the other day is bearing the fruit which, after the neutralization of Japan's war making potential, more than all else is the objective sought within the framework of Allied policy.

He who fails to see in that election an eloquent demonstration of democracy on the march -- who sees it in the slightest support for the fear that the normal progress of Japan's democratization is being endangered -- either fails to understand the meaning of the word "democracy", or is blinded, by prejudice, to fact.

Turning now more specifically to the allegation made by the member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the bare fact that persons subject to dismissal under the terms of the Purge directives are still in office is of little significance. The important fact is that the Japanese Government has and is complying with the directives. Their plans have been presented to SCAP and their actions have been taken with the full knowledge of SCAP. Their rate of progress is entirely consistent with occupation purposes and policy.

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In every field of occupation activity, it has been the consistent aim of the Supreme Commander to operate within the existing framework of the Japanese Government. He has felt that from the very beginning there was no better way of training the Japanese people in democracy than to encourage them to use their own governmental machinery, making their own changes and improvements. He has frequently made it clear that he had full faith and confidence in the ability of the Japanese people and the Japanese Government to accomplish their own salvation under the guidance of the Allied Powers.

The directive of 4 January laid the basis for the comprehensive action now being taken to destroy the influence of militarism and ultra-nationalism in Japan, not only by removing and excluding individuals falling into specific categories from public office, but also by excluding undesirable persons from the new Diet and infusing new blood into that institution. The order is definite in its requirements. It provides for the collection of records of the political background of Japanese officials and those desiring to enter the government service, as well as candidates for the Diet. All action taken by the Japanese government is recorded in order that the Supreme Commander may have an adequate and simple check on compliance.

Under the directive the Japanese government has been required to institute a program of removal of officials of the national and prefectural governments and to exclude from all government service, including the Diet, anyone who falls within the category of undesirables defined in the directive itself, and further elaborated in the Japanese program which has been prepared pursuant to the directive. Because of the many thousands of persons affected by the directive, it is obviously impossible to attempt to determine whether a particular individual is in fact an active exponent of militant nationalism. This would take endless time, involve the Supreme Commander in attempting to analyze the intentions and motives of individuals, and, in all respects, would have been wholly unrealistic. As I have indicated, it was, therefore, determined that all persons who held certain positions of responsibility and influence in public life, or certain enterprises or organizations of nationalistic and expansionistic character, or were affiliated with the Army, Navy, Special Police, or intelligence agencies would automatically be excluded from public office.

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The draft is not a punitive instrument but was intended to eliminate from public life those who had participated actively in bringing Japan to her present pass; hence, the directive was intentionally made flexible and it so provides (in Par. 18) that "This Headquarters had made and may make more restrictive requirements respecting employment of certain classes of individuals in all levels in special fields." It is susceptible to expansion or contraction as circumstances may require.

Merely to enumerate the categories of persons who are excluded from government service under the directive demonstrates the sweeping nature of its provisions. This list embodies the categories enumerated in the directive of 4 January as applied and interpreted under the Cabinet and Home Ministry ordinances and regulations for the enforcement of Imperial ordinance No. 542 of 1946, which constitutes the present purge program. The following constitute the removal and exclusion categories:

a. Category "A" includes any person arrested as a suspected war criminal unless released or acquitted.

b. Category "B" includes any person who has at any time been a member of:

(1) Board of Fleet Admirals and Field Marshals
Supreme Military Council
Imperial General Headquarters
Army and Navy General Staffs
Supreme Council for Direction of the War; or

(2) Who at any time was commissioned active service officer (including official of the officer rank under the former system) under the regular appointment provisions of Rikungun Hoju Rei (the Army Replacement Regulation) or other old similar ordinances and regulations and who thereafter served on active service under Rikugun Bukan Fukueki Rei (the Army Soldiers Service Ordinance), Rikugun Fukueki Jorei (the Army Service Regulations) or other old similar ordinances and regulations; or

(3) Any person who, having finished the courses of Kambu

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Kohosei (Reserve Officer's Cadet), Soju Kohosei (Reserve Pilot Cadet), was appointed Reserve Service Officer (Yobieki Shoko), and who volunterred to serve on active service under the Imperial Ordniance No. 731 of 1939; or

(4) Any person who was commissioned active service officer or active service special duty officer (Geneki Tokumu Shikan) under the regular appointment provisions (including Imperial Ordinances No. 500 of 1942 and No. 146 of 1944) of Kaigun Bukan Ninyorei (The Naval Officers Appointment Ordinance), Kaigun Koto Bukan Hoju Jorei (The Naval Officers Appointment Regulations) or other old similar ordinances or regulations, and who served thereafter on active list under Kaigun Bukan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Officers Service Ordinance), Kaigun Tokumu Shikan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Special Duty Officers Service Ordinance), Kaigun Koto Bukan Junshikan Fukueki Rei (The Naval Officers and Warrant Officers Service Ordinance) or other old similar ordinances and regulations; or

(5) Any reserve officer who after having been called up, was transferred to active service upon his application under Kaigun Bukan Ninyo To Tokurei (The Special Regulations for the appointment of Naval Officers from Naval Reserve and Other Matters) or Imperial Ordinance No. 173 of 1934, or any officer or special duty officer on reserve list who, after having been called up, volunteered for active service under the provisions of Article 2 of Kaigun Bukan Fukueki Rinji Tokurei (The Naval Officers Service Provisional Special Ordinance); or

(6) Commissioned or non-commissioned officer, enlisted man or civilian employee who served in or with the Military Police

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(Kempei-Tai), the Tokumu Kikan, Kaigun Tokumu Bu, or other special or secret intelligence or military or naval police organizations; or

(7) Any person who held any of the following offices in the Ministries of War or Navy (unless appointed after 2 September 1945):

Minister
Permanent Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Vice-Minister
Parliamentary Councillor
Chief Secretary

Any civilian official of the Civil Service rank of chokunin or above, or who occupied a position normally held by a person of such rank.

c. Category "C" includes all influential members of ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic societies. It covers any person who has at any time:

(1) Been a founder, officer, or director of; or

(2) Occupied any post of authority in; or

(3) Been an editor of any publication or organ of; or

(4) Made substantial voluntary contributions (a sum or property the value of which is large in itself or large in proportion to the means of the individual in question) to any or a group of the following organizations:

Patriotic Society (Tokyo)
Native Country Loving Academy (Ibaragi)
Native Country Loving Society (Ibaragi)
Asia Young Men's Society (Tokyo)
Loyalist Youth Alliance of Aomori Prefecture (Aomori)

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Chuwa Loyalist True Solidarity (Okayama)

Great Asia Society (Tokyo)

Great Asia Pioneer School (Fukuoka)

Great Righteous Society (Tokyo)

Cardinal Principle Academy (Kyoto)

Great Japan Renovation Society (Tokyo)

Great Japan Statecraft Alliance (Tokyo)

Great Japan Loyalist Comrades Society (Tokyo)

Great Japan Loyalist Society (Tokyo)

Great Japan Imperial Morality Association (Tokyo)

Great Japan Production Party (Tokyo)

Great Japan Truehearted Society (Tokyo)

Association of National Movements for Construction of Greater East Asia (Tokyo)

Greater East Asia Construction Society (Tokyo)

Greater East Asia Association (Tokyo)

Great East Asia Young Men's League (Tokyo)

Greater East Asia Youth Corps (Tokyo)

Eastern Academy (Tokyo)

Equal Benevolence Society

Fukushima Divine Academy

Literary Patriotic Society (Tokyo)

Dark Ocean Society (Tokyo)

Hokkaido National Hall (Hokkaido)

Prefectural Loyalist Movement (Ibaragi)

Restoration Public Opinion Society (Tokyo)

One Heart Academy (Kyoto)

Society for the Study of Management of the Incident (Tok;

Righteous Academy (Tokyo)

Current Affairs Discussion Society (Tokyo)

Kagawa Loyalist True Solidarity (Kagawa)

The House of the Cry of the Crane (Tokyo)

Prefectural Loyalist Movement (Ibaragi)

National Foundation Society (Tokyo)

True Exaltation Academy (Toyama)

Golden Pheasant Institute (Tokyo)

Loyalist Defense Society (Tokyo)

Loyal Restoration Alliance (Tokyo)

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Loyalist True Solidarity (Tokyo)

Kyoto Loyalist True Solidarity Office (Kyoto)

Okayama Loyalist True Solidarity Office (Okayama)

Osaka Loyalist True Solidarity Office (Osaka)

Tsushima Loyalist True Solidarity Hall (Aichi)

Ibaragi Loyalist True Solidarity Office (Ibaragi)

Asia Development and Anti-Communist League (Tokyo)

Asia Development and Anti-Communist League (Tokyo)

Asia Development Movement Comrades Association (Tokyo)

Imperial Morality Restoration Academy (Fukushima)

Imperial Rule Assistance Young Men's Alliance (Tokyo)

Country Pillar Party (Osaka)

National Living Institute (Gifu)

Black Dragon Society (Tokyo)

Ultranationalist Alliance (Tokyo)

International Anti-Communist League (Tokyo)

International Political and Economic Society (Tokyo)

Ultranationalist People's Party (Tokyo)

National Policy Society (Tokyo)

Ultranationalist Alliance (Tokyo)

National Institution Protection League (Tokyo)

Komatsu Loyalist True Solidarity (Yamagata)

Imperial Subject Action Discussion Association (Tokyo)

South Development Young Men's Academy (Fukuoka)

Kurashiki City Loyalist Trust Solidarity (Okayama)

Higher Ethics Society (Tokyo)

Higher Ethics Society Association (Tokyo)

Imperial Shield Academy (Tokyo)

Mito Divine Academy (Ibaragi)

Fresh Rice Plant Club (Tokyo)

Nagasaki Prefecture Creation Society (Nagasaki)

Southern Phoenix Society (Tokyo)

Society for the Study of Japanese Thought (Tokyo)

Okayama City Loyalist True Solidarity (Okayama)

Gallant Roar Society (Wakayama)

Saga Prefecture Renovation Comrade Society (Saga)

Religion and Politics Society (Tokyo)

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Young Men's Asia Alliance (Tokyo)

Society for Complete Triumph of Holy War (Tokyo)

Sacred War Carifying National Movement Headquarters

World Imperializing Society (Tokyo)

Shinano Divine Academy (Nagano)

Sacred Agriculture Academy (Niigata)

Divine Tempest Special Attack Succeeding Party (Tokyo)

East Prosperity Academy (Tokyo)

Rising East Academy (Aomori)

Sincerity House (Kyoto)

Purple Mountain Academy (Ibaragi)

Loyalist Comrades Society (Tokyo)

Imperial State Comrade Society (Tokyo)

Imperial State Movement League (Tokyo)

Great Change Society (Tokyo)

Chinese Problem Society (Tokyo)

Mt. Tateyama Academy (Toyama)

Sky Support Pillar Academy (Osaka)

Heaven Barrier Break Open Association (Tokyo)

Heavenly Action Society (Tokyo)

East Asian Society (Tokyo)

East Asia League (Also known as East Asia League Comrades Association - East Asia League Society) (Tokyo)

East Asia League Comrades Association (Also known as East Asia League - East Asia League Society) (Tokyo)

East Asia League Society (Also known as East Asia League East Asia League Comrades Association (Tokyo)

Society for the Study of the East Asian New Order (Tokyo

Research Institute for East Asia Thought War (Tokyo)

Far Eastern Comrades Association (Tokyo)

Eastern Society (Tokyo)

Eastern Light Society (Yamagata)

Tokyo Creation Society (Tokyo)

South-eastern Asiatic Races Liberation Alliance (Tokyo)

Eastern Sky Society (Aomori)

Eastern Sky Society (Ibaragi)

Toyama Youth Volunteers Society (Toyama)

Tsuyama Loyalist True Solidarity (Okayama)

Waki Loyalist True Solidarity (Okayama)

Yamato Club (Tokyo)

Yamato Solidarity Headquarters (Tokyo)

Yatsuka Loyalist True Solidarity (Okayama)

Yonezawa Divine Academy (Yamagata)

Gallant Figure Academy (Toyama)

General Headquarters of All Japan Special Attack Corps

All Japan Young Men's Club (Tokyo)

d. Category "D" includes all persons who were influential in the activities of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, the Imperial Rule Assistance Society, and the Political Rule Association of Great Japan. Influential person has been defined as any person who has at any time held any of the following positions:

(1) In the Imperial Rule Assistance Association:

President

Vice-President

Standing Adviser

Adviser

Standing Member of the Board of Directors

Member of the Board of Directors

Chairman of the National Cooperation Conference

Secretary-General of the National Headquarters

Director of a Bureau of the National Headquarters or Principal of the Central Training Institute

Chief or Influential Deputy Chief of a Section of the National Headquarters or of the Central Training Institute

Chief of a Prefectural Branch

Secretary-General or Chief of a Section of a Prefectural Branch - 8d -

Chairman of a Prefectural Cooperation Conference

(2) In affiliates of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association:

(a) Dai Nippon Yokusan Sonedan (The Imperial Rule Assistance Youth Association of Great Japan):

President

Vice-President

Adviser

Member of the Board of Directors

Member of the Executive Committee

Secretary

Director of the National Headquarters

President, Vice-President or Member of the Board of Directors of a Prefectural Branch

Director of a Prefectural Branch Headquarters

Chief of a Section of a Prefectural Branch

(b) Dai-Nippon Koa Domei (The Asia Development League of Great Japan):

President

Chancellor

Vice-President

Standing Adviser

Chairman of the Board of Directors

Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors

Standing Member of the Board of Directors

Member of the Board of Directors

Secretary-General

Assistant Secretary-General

Director of a Bureau of the Secretariat

Chief of a Prefecture Branch

(c) Other affiliates:

Any person who has held the position of the representative or highest executive of the National Headquarters of:

Dai Nippon Sangyo Hokokukai

Nogyo Hokoku Renmei

Shogyo Hokoku Kai

Nippon Kaiun Hokoku Dan

Dai Nippon Seishonen Dan

Dai Nippon Fujin Kai

Dai Nippon Romu Hokoku Kai

Kokubo Kikaika Kyokai

(3) Yokusan Seiji Kai (The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society):

Yokusan Seiji Kesshu Jumbikai Iin (Member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Consolidation Preparation Committee):

President

Adviser

Standing Member of the Board of Directors

Member of the Board of Directors

Chairman of the Committeefor Investigation of Political Affairs

Chairman of the Association of Members of the House of Representatives

Secretary-General

Auditor

Chief of a Section of the Secretariat

(4) Dai Nippon Seiji Kai (The Political Association of Great Japan):

Any person who took part in the planning of the foundation of the Association:

President

Adviser

Member of the Board of Directors

Chief Secretary

Chairman of the Committee for Investigation of Political Affairs

Chairman of the Board of Directors

Chairman of the Association of Members of the House of Representatives

Auditor

Chief of a Section

(5) Member of Yokusan Seiji Taisei Kakuritsu Kyogikai (Council for Establishing the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Structure).

(6) Editor of any publication or organ of any of the organizations mentioned in Items 1-5 above.

e. Category "E" includes officers of financial and development organizations involved in Japanese expansionism. This has been defined to bar from government service any person who has at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945 occupied the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President, Director, Advisor, or Auditor of any of the following or, in territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces since 7 July 1937, manager of a branch of:

South Manchurian Railway Company

Manchurian Development Company

North China Development Company

Central China Development Company

Southern Development Company

Formosa Development Company

Manchuria Heavy Industry Company

Nanyo Development Company

Oriental Development Company

Wartime Finance Bank

United Funds Bank

Southern Development Bank

Overseas Funds Bank

Chosen Colonization Bank

Deutsche Bank Fuer Ostasien

Bank of Chosen

Bank of Taiwan

Central Bank of Manchukuo

Manchurian Development Bank

Korean Trust Company

Manchurian Industrial Bank

Federal Reserve Bank of China

Bank of Mongolia

Central Reserve Bank of China

Karafuto Development Company

Manchuria Investment Securities Company

Korean Cooperative Union of Credit

National Banking Bureau of Thailand

Bank of Thailand

South China Bank

Yokohama Specie Bank

Any other bank, development company or institution whose foremost purpose has been the financing of colonization and development activities in colonial and Japanese-occupied territory, or the financing of war production by the mobilization or control of the financial resources of colonial or Japanese-occupied territories.

Any person who has held the position of the manager of a branch or agency, or representative in the territory occupied by the Japanese armed forces, of the Bank of Japan at any time between 7 July 1937 and 2 September 1945.

f. Category "F" includes Japanese officials who have held specified positions in occupied territories. This has been defined to cover all of the following:

(1) Korea:

Any person who has since 7 July 1937 held the position of
Governor-General, or
Superintendent-General of Political Affairs of the Government General of Korea, or
Presidend, Vice-President, Adviser, or Member of Privy Council.

(2) Formosa:

Any person who has since 7 July 1937 held the position of:
Governor-General, or
Director-General of General Affairs of the Government General of Formosa.

(3) Kwantung:

Any person who has since 18 September 1931 held the position of:
Governor of Kwantung, or
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo, or Director-General of Kwantung Board.

(4) South Seas:

Any person who has since 7 July 1937 held the position of:
Director-General of South Seas Administration

(5) Netherland East Indies:

Chief Military Administrator

Superintendent-General of the Civil Administration in the Military Government Areas occupied by the Navy.

Most Senior Civilian Administrator General in the Military Government Areas occupied by the Army.

(6) Malaya:

Chief Military Administrator

Supreme Military Government Adviser

Mayor of Singapore

(7) French Indo-China:

Any person who has since 8 December 1941 held the position of:

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to French Indo-China, or

Acting Director-General of the General Affairs Bureau in the Government General of French Indo-China

Manager of the Bank of Indo-China

(8) Burma:

Supreme Adviser to the Military Government in Burma

Supreme Adviser to the Burmese Government

Chief Departmental Adviser to the Burmese Government, who was of the Japanese Civil Service Bank of Chokunin or of an equivalent position

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Burma

(9) China:

Supreme Adviser to the Nanking Government

Chief Departmental Adviser to the Nanking Government, who was of the Japanese Civil Service Bank of Chokunin or of an equivalent position

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to China after the establishment of the Nanking Government

(10) Manchukuo:

Director-General, or

Vice-Director General of the General Affairs Board

Officers of the Central Organization of the Concordia Society

(11) Others:

Supreme or Political Adviser to the Federal Autonomous Government of Mongolia

Supreme Adviser to the Military Government in the Philippines

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Philippines

Chief of Hikari Agency

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Thailand.

g. The final category of undesirable personnel listed in the directive of 4 January 1946 is Category "G" -- "additional militarists and ultra-nationalists." This is the scoop-net clause which catches within its broad sweeping terminology all active exponents of militant nationalism who may not fall within Categories "A" to "F" of the directive. Category "G" was devised for the specific purpose of making assurance doubly sure that there would be eliminated, in the words of the Potsdam Declaration, "for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking upon world conquest."

In order that the significance of Category "G" may be fully grasped, let me quote it to you. It reads as follows:

(1) Any person who has denounced or contributed to the seizure of opponents of the militaristic regime.

(2) "Any person who has instigated or perpetrated an act of violence against opponents of the militaristic regime.

(3) "Any person who has played an active and predominant governmental part in the Japanese program of aggression or who by speech, writing or action has shown himself to be an active exponent of militant nationalism and aggression."

The general terms used in Category "G" of the directive to make it definite and certain that advocates of irresponsible militaris and expansionism would be excluded from government service required the establishment of additional standards of a more detailed and explicit nature. In consultation with representatives of the Supreme Commander, and with their approval, the Japanese government developed sub-categories. They define as active exponents of militant nationalism under Category "G" the following:

(1) "Any person who held between July 7, 1937 and Septembe 2, 1945 one of the following positions:

a. Minister of State
b. Lord Keeper of Privy Seal
c. President of the Privy Council
d. Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
e. Director-General of the Board of Legislation
f. President of the Board of Information
g. President of the Board of Planning
h. President, Vice President of the Asia Development Board
i. President of the Board of Manchurian Affairs (including those who held the position prior to July 1937)
j. Public Prosecutor General.

(2) "Any person who held between July 7, 1937 and Septembe 2, 1945 one of the following positions and about whom there has been conspicuous evidence as a person fallin under the provisions of Paragraph C.

A. Government Offices

a. Cabinet Councillor
b. Cabinet Adviser
c. Vice President of the Privy Council
d. Board of Information
   Vice President or Director of a Division
e. Board of Planning
   Vice President or Director of a Division

f. Asia Development Board
Director General of General Affairs, Director of a Division or Director General of a Liaison Office.

g. Board of Manchurian Affairs
Vice President

h. Any Ministry
Vice Minister, Parliamentary Vice Minister, Parliamentary Councillor, Director-General of a General Board, or Director of a Bureau

i. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Germany, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Italy

j. Governor General of a local Government-General Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board

B. Others

a. President or Vice President of the Bank of Japan

b. Manager of a branch or agency or representative within the territories occupied by the Japanese armed forces of any of the banks, corporations and other organizations listed below

Any special bank other than those falling under the provisions of Paragraph E.

Any ordinary bank, trust company, savings bank, insurance company or any other financial institution, whose main office is located in Japan proper.

Any national policy company

Any Eidan

Any control association

Any control company

Any corporation in which the government or its agency, a special bank or national policy company is the largest stockholder.

c. Japanese adviser, representative or executive employee of:

Banque de l' Indo-China

Banque Franco-Japanaise

d. Any person who held a position of Adviser to a foreign government including its local organs

within the territories occupied by the Japanese armed forces other than those persons falling under the provisions of Paragraph F.

3. "Any person who has once been an official engaged in "thought prosecution", "protection and surveillance" preventive detention or penal administration, and who is to fall under the provisions of Paragraph G of Appendix "A" of the Memorandum because of the part which he played in any important "thought" case while in office, any fact of trampling upon individual rights, his term of office, and his position while in office, etc.

4. "Any person who has once been in special higher police service, and who is to fall under the provisions of Paragraph G because of the part he played in any important case of arrest, his term of office and his position while in office, etc."

These last two sub-categories have in turn required further definite and specific implementation in order to eliminate from government service persons in the judiciary and the police deemed undesirable from the standpoint of training, past record, or association with the Japanese program of aggression, suppression of the opposition of the militaristic regime or other ultra-nationalistic activities. These sub-categories are being applied to cover the following:

> "Any person who during service with the Special Higher Police or "thought" Prosecution played an important role in the disposals of the following major 'thought criminal' cases:"

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | The Rono Group Case (The Labour-Farmer Group Case) | January 1937 |
| 2. | Nippon Musanto Case (The Japan Proletarian Party Case) | December 1937 |
| 3. | Nippon Rono National Discussion Meeting Case | December 1937 |
| 4. | The Professor's Group Case | February 1938 |
| 5. | The Nippon Kyosan Shugisha Dan Case (The Japan Communist Group Case) | 1938 |

6. The Kokusai Kyosanto Case (The International Communist Party Case) — September 1941

7. Todai-sho Case (The Lighthouse Case) — June 1941

8. Nippon Seikyo Kai Case (The Japan Sacred Church Case) — June 1942

9. The Kiyome Kyokai Case (The Kiyome Church Case) — June 1942

10. The Toyo Senkyokai Kiyome Kyokai Case (The Eastern "Senkyokai Kiyome" Church Case) — June 1942

11. The Dai-shichi-hi Kirisuto Sairen En Case (The Seventh Day Adventist Church Case) — September 1943

12. Any other similar cases.

(b) "Any person who during the tenure of office with the Judiciary or Police Service has committed cruel or oppressive acts against any individual.

(c) "Special Higher Police

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years with the Special Higher Police, and who occupied the position of Police Inspector or above during such period.

(d) "Thought" Prosecution.

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years with the "Thought" Prosecution, and who occupied the position of Public Procurator or above during such period.

(e) "Protection and Surveillance

Any person who has a service record of over 4 years since March 1941 or over 8 years as the Chief of a Protection and Surveillance Station or as a Guidance Officer thereof.

(f) "Preventive Detention

Any person who has a record of over 4 years since May 1941 as the Chief of a Preventive Detention Station or as a Guidance Officer thereof."

But this is not all. To block any possible loop-hole in the application of the directive of 4 January, Category "G" is being applied to any person participating in any of the activities described under the category who was a government official, other than those I have mentioned in the Judiciary and the Police, who was a member of the House of Peers or of the House of Representatives, or a man of letters or an artist, or the owner of any publishing enterprise, or the publisher or editor of any newspaper, magazine or other publication, or any other businessman, including specifically any person who held between July 7, 1937 and September 2, 1945 a position of Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Vice-President or Standing Director of any of influential companies or national policy companies manufacturing finished aircraft or arms, or producing iron or steel.

Category "G" has also been defined to include any Representative or highest executive officer or Ultra-Nationalistic, Terroristic or Secret Patriotic Societies other than those specified in the provisions of Category "C".

Perhaps the most all-embracing application of Category "G" from the standpoint of the national election just held was the making ineligible for re-election to the Diet any person who was "recommended" by the government in the general election of 1942. Although in some instances this may have resulted in excluding from the new Diet some persons who in fact may not have actively supported the policy of Tojo and the military and economic cliques, nevertheless the barring from re-election of any candidate sponsored by Tojo and his government was

deemed wise in the interest of affording the people of Japan the opportunity of putting new faces and new leaders in their parliament.

With a view to the establishment of standards which were susceptible of no misunderstanding in their equitable application, the phrase, "conspicuous evidence as a person falling under the provisions of Paragraph G," has been defined to mean the following:

(1) Facts that a person in question played an important part in the conclusion of:

Japanese-Manchurian Protocol
Tripartite Alliance
Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty
Japanese Thai Alliance Pact

or in the stationing of Japanese forces in French Indo-China or in starting the Greater East Asia War.

(2) Facts that a person in question played an important role in the suppression of opponents of militarism.

(3) Facts that a person in question played an important role in concluding economic agreements with, or in extending credits to countries in the sphere occupied by the Japanese armed forces.

(4) Facts that a person in question played an important part in the financial or production program for Japanese military activities.

You will note that I have constantly used the words "government service." This means, under the directive, not only all positions in the central Japanese and prefectural governments and all their local agencies and local branches, bureaus (including regional administrative bureaus), but, also, all offices and all positions in corporations, associations and other organizations in which the central and the prefectural governments, or any of their agencies, have a financial interest representing actual or working control. In other words, officers of corporations, associations and other organizations such as the President, Vice-President, Directors, Auditors and officers of similar positions are considered to be in the government service if they hold office in any corporation in which the largest stockholder is the government or any of its sub-divisions, agencies or branches, or any

national policy company or Eidan, or any special bank. In addition to any of those corporations, service in the capacity of President, Vice-President, Director, Auditor, or comparable position in any of the following corporations, associations or organizations is considered "government service" within the meaning of the directive of 4 January:

Agricultural Land Development Corporation

Automobile Control Association

Bank of Japan

Cement Control Association

Central Bank of Agriculture and Forestry

Central Bank of Commercial and Industrial Associations

Central Damage Insurance Association

Central Food Corporations

Central Life Insurance Association

Chemical Industry Control Association

Coal Control Association

Electric Machinery Control Association

Fiber Control Association

Gas Control Association

Hokkaido Colonial Bank

Housing Corporation

Hypothec Bank of Japan

Imperial Fuel Company

Imperial Mining Development Company

Imperial Oil Company

Industrial Bank of Japan

Industrial Equipment Corporation

Industrial Machinery Control Association

International Electric Communications Company

Japan Coal Company

Japan Education Association

Japan Electric Supply Company

Japan Export Agricultural Products Company

Japan Fertilizer Company

Japan Iron Manufacturing Company

Japan Medical Service

Japan Securities Exchange

Japan Silk Control Company

Japan Transportation Company

Light Metal Control Association

Metal Industry Control Association

Metropolis High Speed Transportation Corporation

Mining Control Association

National Financial Control Association

National Rehabilitation Bank

Pension Bank

Peoples Bank

Petroleum Control Association

Precision Machinery Control Association

Rolling Stock Control Association

Shipping Management Association

Tohoku Development Company

Trading Corporation

Yokohama Specie Bank

Any Control Company under a Control Company Ordinance, the main activities of which cover the whole homeland:

Central Hats Control Co., Ltd

Central Artificial Leather Control Co., Ltd

Electric Machine Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Synthetic Resin Control Co., Ltd.

Fishing Net Twine Control Co., Ltd

Carbide Control Co., Ltd

Paper Control Co., Ltd

Dyestuffs and Intermediates Control Co., Ltd

Fluor Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Metal Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Metal Recovery Control Co., Ltd

Japan Amino-acid Control Co., Ltd

Japan Starches Control Co., Ltd

Japan Raw Hides Tanning Chemicals Control Co., Ltd

Japan Gallnut Control Co., Ltd

Japan Potato Control Co., Ltd

Japan Clothing Products Control Co. Ltd

Japan Resin Control Co., Ltd

Japan Chemical Medicines Control Co., Ltd

Japan Recovered Fiber Control Co., Ltd

Japan Vegetable Gelatine Control Co., Ltd

Japan Tinned Food Control Co., Ltd

Japan Kalium Salt Control Co., Ltd

Japan Dried Bonito Control Co., Ltd

Japan Gunpowder Control Co., Ltd

Japan Light-Metallic Utensils Control Co., Ltd

Japan Match Control Co., Ltd

Japan Knitted Goods Control Co., Ltd

Japan Sewing Threads Control Co., Ltd

Japan Textile Control Co., Ltd

Japan Sulphuric and Nitric Acid Control Co., Ltd

Japan Sugar Control Co., Ltd

Japan Fiber Control Co., Ltd

Japan Celluloid Control Co., Ltd

Japan Photographic Sensitive Materials Control Co., Ltd

Japan Fodder Control Co., Ltd

Japan Reagent Control Co., Ltd

Japan Aquatic Hides Control Co., Ltd

Japan Publications Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Japan Socks Control Co., Ltd

Japan Carbonic Industry Control Co., Ltd

Japan Silkworm Gut Control Co., Ltd

Japan Rabbit Raising Control Co., Ltd

Japan Bracket Control Co., Ltd

Japan Miscellaneous Goods Trade Control Co., Ltd

Agricultural Implements Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Farm Chemicals Control Co., Ltd

Radio Receiver Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Green Manure Seeds Control Company, Ltd

Asbestos Control Co., Ltd

Petroleum Distribution Control Company, Ltd

Cement Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Alcohol Distribution Control Co., Ltd

Soda Chemicals Control Co., Ltd

Coke Over By-Products Control Co., Ltd

Imperial Fur Control Co., Ltd

Imperial Firewood and Charcoal Control Co., Ltd

Iron and Steel Sale Control Co., Ltd

East Asia Lacwuer Control Co., Ltd

Paint Control Co., Ltd

Organic Compound Products Control Co., Ltd

Oil and Fat Products Control Co., Ltd

National Miso-Control Co., Ltd

National Soy Control Co., Ltd

National Oil and Fat Control Co., Ltd

It should be obvious to anyone that the preparation of questionnaires and their distribution, collection, review, classification, filing, and the taking of action on the basis of information contained in those questionnaires is a task of great magnitude. Unless however, one understands what has been accomplished, he cannot understand what has not been accomplished, therefore, let us see what has been and is being done. In accordance with the directive the Japanese government, in consultation with representatives of the Supreme Commander, prepared a program for the screening of the personnel affected by the directive. Because of the eminence of the election the screening of the qualifications of candidates for membership in

the House of Representatives was given top priority and 3,384 persons were screened to determine whether or not they came within any categories of the purge directive which I have discussed. Of these 474 were disqualified, and 159 withdrew their applications while investigation thereof was in progress. The screening of these candidates for the House of Representatives required the determination, among other things, as to whether or not they were influential members of secret, patriotic or ultra-nationalistic organizations and this, in turn, required an analysis of the history and activities of numerous societies and associations. This resulted in the listing of 911 influential members in 173 organizations of the character required to be dissolved under the Political Society directive which was also issued on 4 January 1946.

Detailed investigation of the records of all persons in the government service with previous careers in the Special Higher Polic and

Thought Prosecution, and career officers and other personnel of the Kempei-Tai, Secret Service (Tokumu-Kikan), and other Secret Police is now in progress. These investigations will be completed by 30 April. In this connection it may be noted in passing that 5,999 police officers and Ministry of Justice officials have been removed from police and protective surveillance stations by the Japanese government pursuant to the directive regarding the removal of restrictions on political, civilian, and religious liberties.

The screening process will be handled in the following manner:

(1) Screening of the persons who have resigned from government service.

a. Investigations will be conducted on all the persons who have resigned from "public office" since January 4, by calling for questionnaires regardless of whether they have voluntarily resigned or have resigned in anticipation of removal under the directive.

Those who were made Chokunin officials by way of honorary promotion on the occasion of their resignation will be excluded from the scope of screening. However, all those who are liable to fall under the criteria of Paragraph G, such as the Special Higher Police or Thought Prosecution, will be subjected to screening, including those of Sonin rank who have left government positions.

b. Investigations will be conducted first on persons who are at present in government service and then on those who have already quitted it.

c. The investigations will be conducted, by separating those who resigned under administrative personnel readjustment from those who resigned for other reasons.

d. In order to facilitate investigation each ministry is compiling a list of the persons who are in or have resigned from "government service," and who are likely to come under the January 4 Memorandum. As for those who have resigned from government service, those on these lists will be

screened first, and other will be screened later.

(2) Screening of the House of Peers.

Investigations on the members of the House of Peers are in progress. The necessary steps are being taken under the following plan.

A list of the names of those who are liable to fall under the January 4 Memorandum has been compiled, and the initial investigations are being made.

Questionnaires have been distributed to all the members of the House. After these have been returned, investigations will be made according to the screening plan as scheduled.

(3) Screening of new appointees after January 4.

Questionnaires will be demanded of all persons to be newly appointed to government positions or to be promoted to Chokunin posts, and also of those who have been appointed or promoted since January 4. They will be examined by the Cabinet in the case of Sonin or higher officials, and by the heads of the respective government offices in the case of Hannin or lower officials. As regards those who are found to fall under the provisions of the January 4 Memorandum, appointment orders, if issued, will be cancelled.

The program for investigation of general government offices will be handled in the following sequence:

From April 5-20 the following personnel are being screened:

Minister of State
President, Vice-President and member of the Privy Council
Person of the Civil Service Rank of Shinnin
Member of the House of Peers

From April 20-30 the following personnel are being screened:

Vice-Minister and Director of a Bureau of each Ministry.

From April 30-May 10 the following personnel are being screened:

Local Governor
President and Director of a Division of the Supreme Court
President and Director of a Division of a Court of Appeal
Chief of a District Court
Public Procurator General
Chief Procurator of a Court of Appeal

Chief Procurator of a District Court

From May 31 to June 10 the following personnel are being screened:

Staff officer of Bank of Japan and other special bank
Staff officer of a Kinko (Cash Office) and an Eidan
Staff officer of a control association
Staff officer of a control company
Staff officer of any other company mentioned in Appendix II to cabinet and Home Ministry Ordinance No. 1

From June 10-20 the following personnel are being screened:

Director of a local bureau or office under the jurisdiction of a ministry
President, Dean and Principal of a university, college and school under the direct control of the Educational Ministry officials other than mentioned above

In short, screening of all holders of public office should be substantially finished by the end of June. In addition all those who have resigned from public office since the 4 January directive will be screened in order to determine whether they fall under the purge directive and consequently are ineligible under the directive for pensions or benefits. By the terms of this purge directive the exercise of any authority or influence of 185,386 persons over the people of Japan has already been prevented.

By this purge directive, tined and tempered to avoid unnecessary disruption in the normal processes of government, the Supreme Commander moved directly and inexorably to drive from their entrenched positions in government and society those groups and individuals who, while not so culpable as to be proceeded against as war criminals, wielded a profound and evil influence upon the people and contributed immeasurably toward the program which plunged Japan into a war of world aggression. If full compliance therewith be completed within the six months period heretofore planned, its purpose will have been most adequately and speedily achieved.

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# THE JAPANESE ELECTIONS

April, 1947.

Government Section
General Headquarters
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
20 June, 1947

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# INTRODUCTION

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The New House of Councillors

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# INTRODUCTION

The inalienable right to choose and dismiss their public officials is one of the principal guarantees afforded the people of Japan by the new Constitution.

In anticipation of the enforcement of the Constitution on May 3, a series of elections was held in Japan throughout April in which every elective public office in the land was at stake: local and national, legislative and executive. Seldom in history have the people of any nation had the opportunity, in such brief compass of time and by such a peaceful process as election, to choose or dismiss the whole of their elective officials. Certainly never before in Japan---not even at the time of the Meiji Restoration---had such an opportunity been presented; indeed, never before had the people even voted for their local executives or for the Upper House of the Diet.

No elections held to select the first public officials to serve under a new Constitution could be without deep and abiding interest and significance. History is not that forgetful. Above and beyond this, however, at least five other reasons combined to augment the significance of the April elections, a series, incidentally, which could not again be held until 1959, if then, in view of the varying terms of the many offices at stake. These were the first elections for a House of Representatives newly become "the highest organ of the state"; the first elections for the House of Councillors; the first popular elections for local chief executives; the first popular elections for strong local assemblies; and the first elections of any type supervised by representatives of the electorate rather than by the government itself.

## The Significance of the Elections

### The New House of Representatives

It is indisputable that the Japanese Diet, under the Meiji Constitution, was never comparable in power or influence with the executive branch of the government. Even during the 1920's, when there appeared to be a trend toward the establishment of parliamentary government as it was known in the Western world, the Diet was nevertheless faced with the reality that a strong visible and invisible executive branch, ruling in the mystic shadows surrounding the throne, could always set at naught any actions of the Diet. The Diet in effect merely advised and assisted. It did not initiate policy; it was competent only to apply minor checks.

Within the Diet itself the House of Representatives was normally considered the less important of the two Houses. This was emphasized in many ways. It was provided, for example, that whenever the Emperor appeared before the Diet the accompanying ceremonies would be held in the chamber of the House of Peers, with the president of that body specifically designated as the presiding officer on such occasions. Furthermore, the House of Peers was a body the bulk of whose members enjoyed the prestige of either being drawn from the ranks of nobility or of having been appointed directly by the Emperor. It was, as Prince Ito frankly characterized it, an assembly of "the higher grades of society." Members of the House of Representatives, on the other hand, had a court rank even lower than bureau chiefs in the executive branch of the government.

Under the new Constitution, the Diet has now become the "highest organ of state power" and the "sole law-making organ of the State." The cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, is collectively responsible to the Diet. Further, through its selection of the Prime Minister, the Diet not only determines those who are to exercise executive power in the government but also possesses the power of dismissal over them. The strong position of the Diet in relation to the judiciary is emphasized by the Constitutional provision that the Diet "shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted."

Under the new Constitution the House of Representatives has now emerged as the stronger of the two Houses; when the two disagree on a disputed point, for example, specific methods are provided whereby the decision of the House of Representatives may become the decision of the

Diet; in no instance, however, may the will of the House of Councillors reverse that of the House of Representatives. Other provisions also emphasize this dominance.

All in all, such are these powers in the aggregate that they serve to raise the House of Representatives to a position of eminence in Japan which eventually must compare with that enjoyed by any national representative body in the world. Election of charter members of this strong new House thus could not fail to evoke maximum interest among the Japanese electorate.

## The New House of Councillors

Although the former predominance of the House of Peers has been reversed in the new Diet, the House of Councillors is yet charged with extremely important responsibilities in the legislative process. It will undoubtedly exercise a stabilizing influence in the Diet as well as check what otherwise might constitute impetuous or immature action on the part of the Representatives. It will be, as Washington saw a second House, "the saucer under the teacup." Even though the House of Councillors may be overriden on legislation by a two-thirds vote, it nevertheless shares equally in the responsibility of initiating and enacting the nation's laws; in those cases in which party lines in the House of Representatives cause a fairly even split on an issue, the House of Councillors will actually assume the role of the determining body.

In the minds of the Japanese electorate, furthermore, the mantle of the House of Peers as representative of scholarship and learning has now descended on the House of Councillors. Though the House of Councillors will be representative of all the people and no longer confined to representation of special interests or chosen occupational or professional fields, its smaller size and special character have led to its acceptance as a body of senior statesmen. This is to be anticipated in an Oriental country, in which respect for age is ingrained, and especially in Japan, where the electorate may also seek to invest the House of Councillors with the prestige formerly attaching to the dissolved Privy Council and other groups of elder statesmen. Thus it was not unexpected, in March, to find JIJI SHIMBUN (Tokyo) calling for the election to the House of Councillors of men who were "mature in experience, noble in character, and thoughtful in judgment", whose deliberations would be conducted with "graceful gravity." During the same month, SHIN NIPPON (Kyoto) urged voters to back "cool and level headed Councillors who can evaluate politics from a lofty view point" and who will "not fail to act...whenever they perceive rashness or excesses in the Lower House."

The dual constituency feature of the House of Councillors, by which 100 members were elected from the nation at large and 150 from the 46 prefectures, was designed to encourage the election both of individuals who were well-known locally and of well qualified nationally famous leaders from all fields of endeavor. In addition, as HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN (Sapporo) pointed out, the national constituency avoided "much of the danger of local pressure."

The direct election dual constituency feature of the House of Councillors is a bold experimental venture, decided upon after months of careful study. It is a system of democratic election for the second House of a bicameral legislature which is unusual in the field of political science. The first election for this House was therefore of interest not only to the Japanese people but as well to scholars and statesmen throughout the world--for here is a plan which, if workable, might well be transplanted to other democracies.

## First Public Election of Local Executives

The April elections provided the Japanese people with their first opportunity in history to choose local chief executives: 46 governors, 209 city mayors, 10,210 heads of towns and villages, and 22 heads of Tokyo wards. In the past all had been chosen by methods which made no proviso for popular selection or desires; governors were appointed by the Home Minister; city mayors and town and village heads were chosen by local assemblies from lists approved by prefectural governors, and heads of Tokyo wards were appointed by the governor of Tokyo.

The inevitable result of such a system had been to leave local chief executives remarkably indifferent to the desires and needs of the people whom they served.

Governors, for example, owed allegiance only to the Home Ministry; trained in blind obedience to Tokyo, their primary duty was to guarantee that their prefectures conformed with standards established by the central government; deviations from the norm were not acceptable.

The practice of requiring continuing approval by governors for chief executives of towns and villages naturally served to ensure that such officials would hew to the line in so far as instructions from above were concerned. In addition, dependent for elections upon local assemblies which represented an electorate comprising only a segment of the population, these executives too frequently developed their own cliques and machines for patronage and control of local governments. Destitute of any sense of public service, indifferent to the desires of the populace, such executives in many cases used their positions to become minor tyrants and despots. Instances of mayors who had perpetuated themselves in power for 20, 30, or 40 consecutive years were not rare in pre-war Japan.

Local government legislation which provided for the popular election of local chief executives thus marked a sharp break from the past, providing the Japanese people not only with their first opportunity in history to select their local chief executives, but also with their first opportunity to establish local governments which would be other than pale reflections of centralized authority and over which the voters themselves could exercise continuing and effective control. Both press and voters were fully aware of the implications of the election; MAINICHI, for example, pointed out that local governments constituted "the foundation of the central government," that "democratic politics should be started in a small way" and that "the reconstruction of Japan will depend on how our prefectures, cities, towns and villages rise from the ashes."

## Popular Election of Local Assemblies

The April elections also represented Japan's first elections for local assemblies on the basis of universal sufferage and the first election for local assemblies in which membership had been much more than an honorary position. Voting in previous elections was based on limited manhood sufferage with the consequent result that the assemblies normally represented the most conservative elements of the Japanese people. Membership, however, meant little in the way of exercise of legislative powers, for assemblies met infrequently and were completely dominated by local chief executives. In effect, therefore, assemblies served merely to provide the fiction of popular control of legislation.

Recent local government legislation applied with equal effect to prefectural, city, town, village, and Tokyo ward assemblies. Qualifications for voting or election were reduced to the simplest common denominator: 20 years of age and 6 months residence in a given locality. Powers of assemblies were increased sufficiently to guarantee that the executive and legislative branches of local governments would be on a plane of equality and that local legislation would be free from domination by the Central Government. No longer would local chief executives be enabled to count on approval of their wishes by complaisant local assemblies. No longer would the national government be enabled to revoke the acts of local assemblies or to require their dissolution. So great, therefore, was the interest generated by this first experiment in local self government that it was fully anticipated the rate of abstention from this election would not only be the lowest for any election since universal suffrage was instituted in Japan but also one of the lowest for any election in Japanese history. As MAINICHI pointed out, this represented "the perfect conclusion" to the month of elections.

## First Publicly Administered Elections

Of primary importance was the fact that these were Japan's first publicly administered elections. In the past all elections were supervised in detail by government officials, with the Home Ministry exercising control on behalf of the Government. The system normally insured familiarity with election laws on the part of officials but was subject to criticism in that election officials frequently showed bureaucratic indifference to just complaints on the part of the electors and in that government super-

vision of elections always provided opportunity for intervention by a government determined to maintain itself in power.

The new committees, exercising full and complete powers over the administration of elections, were chosen by local assemblies; prefectural committees by the corresponding prefectural assemblies, village committees by the corresponding village assemblies, etc. Inasmuch as each member of a local assembly cast but a single vote in the assembly's election of committee members, committees were thus roughly representative of the political complexion of local assemblies and thus of local electorates as well.

Legislation provided for separate committees for each echelon of local government: prefectures, cities, towns, villages, and Tokyo wards, with the prefectural committees exercising general supervision over lesser committees. Except in the election of members of the House of Councillors from the national constituency, where a central committee sits in Tokyo, no national supervision is exercised over the prefectural committees, which are thus subject only to the election laws and the courts.

This essentially local character is further stressed by legal requirements that members of any given local committee have the right to vote in the specific local area served by that committee.

All in all, approximately 10,500 election administration committees were established throughout Japan: prefectural committees had 6 members each; city, town, village, and ward committees 4 each; and the committee representing the national constituency of the House of Councillors had ten. In essence, therefore, with the April elections, control and supervision of all Japanese elections was transferred for the first time from one man--the Home Minister--to approximately 50,000---citizens representing all shades of political opinion and all strata of society and all elected by a free and democratic process.

Basic Factors Involved

## Timing of the Elections

Two basic factors influenced the timing of the April elections: the Constitution and the purge ordinances. In view of the desire of the Japanese Government to complete all elections prior to the enforcement of the Constitution (May 3rd) this became the limiting date for the termination of the elections. Further, since enforcement of the purge ordinance indicated the desirability of screening as many candidates as possible prior to elections, the earliest date and order of elections were thus dependent upon the speed with which screening could be completed. A third, although minor, complication, was introduced by the Local Government laws, which required that where elections of local assemblies and of local chief executives were to be held, those of chief executives should precede and, further, that neither of these two elections might be combined with that of the House of Representatives.

Since previous Japanese elections had never involved candidates for more than one office at a time, the Home Ministry had originally proposed separate elections for governors; for mayors and chiefs; for prefectural assemblies; for town, village, and ward assemblies; for the House of Representatives; and for the House of Councillors. When, however, it became apparent that this would then require a total of 8 elections in some localities, (including run-off elections where leading candidates for local chief executives failed to receive a required minimum percentage of all votes cast (37½%)) it was decided to carry out such doubling up of elections as was possible according to law. In consequence, decision was made to combine all elections for local chief executives (whether for prefectures, cities, towns, villages, or wards) into one and to do the same with respect to local assemblies. Thus the total of regularly scheduled elections was reduced to four (House of Representatives, House of Councillors, local chief executives, and local assemblies) with a fifth election day necessary in those localities in which candidates for local chief executive failed to obtain the requisite minimum number of votes.

A voter would thus cast one vote in the election for the House of Representatives (for a candidate from the district in which he resided); two votes in the election for the House of Councillors (one for a candidate

from his local constituency and one for a candidate from the nation at large); two votes in the election for local chief executives (one for his prefectural governor and one, dependent upon where he lived, for his city, town, village, or ward head); and two votes in the election for local assemblies (one for a prefectural assemblyman and one for an assemblyman for the city, town, village, or ward in which he lived.)

From the outset it was apparent that screening of candidates for local assemblies could not be carried out prior to May 3, since approximately a half a million purge questionnaires would be involved. It was therefore decided to hold this election last to make possible prior screening for all other elections and then to ensure that all victorious candidates for local assemblies be screened before the assemblies actually met.

Imperial Ordinance Number 1 of 1947, which applied the principles of the national purge to local public offices, was issued on January 4, 1947. As soon as possible thereafter the machinery for enforcement and the schedule of elections were prepared. This schedule was as follows:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Local Chief Executives | | 5 April |
| Local Chief Executives | (Runoff where necessary) | 15 April |
| House of Councillors | | 20 April |
| House of Representatives | | 25 April |
| Local Assemblies | | 30 April |

It was recognized that the program had certain inherent flaws---it called for a concentration of elections which might lead to apathy before the month was over and it provided not only for the new experience of voting for previously appointive offices but for the new and probably confusing experience of voting for two offices at the same time.

As opposed, however, to the overriding limitations imposed by the enforcement of the Constitution as one fixed date and that of the completion or near completion of the purge as another, it was felt that these were essentially minor points. Neither is inherently undemocratic, and the only possible alternative in avoiding confusion would have been to have 8 separate election days during the 25 day period. This alternative was not only undesirable in view of the problem of continued excusable absence from work which so many elections would have posed for Japanese industry and agriculture, but might well have decreased the problem of confusion for the voters only at the expense of increasing the problem of apathy as the result of such a large number of elections.

## Public Interest in Elections

The far-reaching historical significance of the April elections has already been noted from the standpoint of the number of "firsts" involved; all naturally served to create deep and widespread interest on the part of the electorate.

Above and beyond these, however, so many other political issues were at stake that the elections could not have failed to excite wide interest even had none of the "firsts" been involved. This exceptional interest stemmed from a wide variety of sources: the deep public interest in whether the Social Democrats and Communists would be strong enough to oust the Liberals and Democrats from power, as had been suggested by a year-long series of demonstrations and strikes; the uncertain political leanings of over 4,000,000 enfranchised repatriates, some of whom had undergone political indoctrination while awaiting return to Japan; uncertainty as to the true strength of the Communist party; the fact that these were the first post-war local elections; and realization that the elections would be viewed internationally as a yardstick of progress toward that revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies which is a requirement of the Potsdam Declaration.

Demonstrations and strikes throughout 1946 and early 1947, which had culminated in the proposed general strike of February 1, had indicated substantial dissatisfaction with the Yoshida Cabinet, particularly in respect to its financial and foodstuffs policies. Although it had long been obvious that most demonstrations were carefully staged to suggest a degree of

popular support they had never commanded, it nevertheless seemed apparent that the Cabinet had lost heavily in popular support. Indeed, a public opinion survey conducted in January by the newspaper ASAHI had indicated that 45.3 percent of those questioned favored the opposition Social Democrat Party, more than supported the two government parties combined.

To enable repatriates to be integrated as speedily as possible into Japanese life special provision was made to permit all repatriates to vote in national elections without reference to the usual six months residence requirement. Since many repatriates had undergone political indoctrination while awaiting embarkation for Japan, and since many had voiced dissatisfaction with the meagre aid the government had been able to give them on their return to Japan, there was some reason to believe many of their votes would go to opposition parties. With approximately 4,000,000 repatriates eligible to vote, out of a total electorate of approximately 40,000,000, it was thus apparent that a close election could be markedly influenced by the votes of the repatriates.

The true strength of the Communist party was very much a matter of interest. Hunger and strife make good growing weather for Communism; since the inception of the Occupation, when thousands of its adherents were freed from prison cells, the philosophy and its leaders had been given the fullest liberty and freedom of action in open and fair competition with democratic forces and beliefs. So certain were the party's leaders of their crescent strength, for example, that they had freely and confidently predicted an increase in the number of their Diet seats from 6 to 50.

As the first post-war local government elections, the elections on the 5th and 30th of April were naturally of marked interest as a barometer of the extent to which liberal tendencies, already evident in the national arena, had penetrated into the field of local government. The last major local government elections had been held in 1939; local assemblies therefore still remained strongholds of conservatism in respect to both parties and tendencies.

The Japanese press and citizenry were portentously aware of the importance of free and fair elections as one of the significant methods of achieving the aims of the Potsdam Declaration. It was recognized throughout Japan that the elections provided such an opportunity as would but rarely be available for illustrating with dramatic emphasis the emergence in Japan of at least one of the distinguishing qualities of a democratic state: the guaranty of fair and impartial electoral processes and procedures. As MIYAKO NEWS commented on April 28th: "The local assembly elections (April 30) will close the curtain on a drama which the world has been waiting to see...whether or not Japan is becoming democratic."

## Political Battle over H.R. Election Law

Of the several major laws which govern Japanese elections, the most important is the House of Representatives Election Law, many of whose provisions are applied mutatis mutandis to all other elections for public office. Any change in the House of Representatives Law thus exercises a far-reaching effect on all other national and local elections.

The extent of this influence was well illustrated late in March, when amendments to the law were under consideration. So bitter was the struggle which raged in the Diet over the passage of certain amendments that the April elections were publicized as might otherwise hardly have been possible. Further, so long did the parliamentary discussions continue, that for a while it was questionable as to whether the law would be passed in time to insure that texts of the revised law could be forwarded to all election administration committees prior to April 5th, the date of the first election which would be affected by the amended law. Distribution was actually completed in time, but members of many election administration committees had all too little time to familiarize themselves with the new legislation. This, coupled with the fact that this was the first election which the Committees had ever supervised, undoubtedly contributed to some uncertainty on the part of committee members with respect to various legal points and to increased reliance upon assistance from governmental officials who had served in previous elections.

The Bill for Partial Amendment of the House of Representatives Election Law had been scheduled for passage by a plenary session of the Lower House on 23 March. Original proposed amendments, concerned with such technicalities as election administration committees and lifting of franchise restrictions, had the support of all political parties. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats, the People's Cooperatives, the Communists, and the Independents held in committee the bill, which had been placed first on the House of Representatives agenda, and thus prevented the House from conducting business on that day. The same agenda was scheduled for plenary sessions on the 24th, 25th and 26th, with the same result. The House of Representatives Negotiating Conference (whose decisions required unanimity) refused to alter the agenda so as to permit other important bills to be acted upon separately by the House, and the non-Government parties steadfastly refused to allow the Election Law Bill to be reported out of committee. The underlying cause of this impasse was the fact that the Liberal and Progressive parties had on foot a plan to introduce in the plenary session of the House a special amendment of their own which would radically alter the substance of the Election Law. Specifically, the scheme of the majority parties was to win committee approval of the uncontested technical amendments and, following the committee chairman's report to the plenary session, to introduce and pass, without committee deliberation, an additional amendment providing for the substitution of the single ballot and medium-size electoral district for the restricted plural ballot and large constitutency. These amendments would have increased the number of electoral districts for the House of Representatives from 53 to 117 and would have limited the number of votes cast by any elector to one, as opposed to two to three permitted by the old system. The Opposition parties strenuously objected to these changes, not only because they felt the majority parties manifested a lack of sincerity by refusing to reveal and to submit their projected amendments to the committee for discussion, but also because earlier in the session, when the subject had arisen, the Government parties had pledged not to propose important alterations in the Election Law Bill until such time as the House could deliberate them thoroughly. Both sides appreciated, of course, that the change as such involved no contravention of democratic principles, involving merely a selection between two democratic alternatives.

Having a majority of the votes, plus the strong backing of Prime Minister Yoshida, Home Minister Uehara and State Minister Shidehara, the Government parties finally made no secret of their intentions. With no less determination, the non-Government parties announced that they would employ every possible parliamentary device to thwart "the trickery and underhandedness" of the majority parties. If the business of the House could be held up through 27 March, they reasoned, the session would end and their purpose would be accomplished.

In the Election Law Committee of 18 members, the minor parties proved that they were skilled parliamentarians as well as rough-and-tumble artists. They consumed 2 days debating their motion to increase the size of the committee from 18 to 45. At the same time, they introduced and debated for hours a motion of nonconfidence in the committee chairman, who had cut short an interpellation being made by a Social Democrat member. They notified the House that they would introduce a resolution of nonconfidence in the Speaker unless the opposition came out in the open with the details of its amendment. They announced that they would embarrass the Government by scheduling lengthy interpellations on all bills placed on the House of Representatives agenda and would also introduce and discuss amendments to all bills. They debated at length on such nonessentials as moving the committee hearings to a larger room and calling for recesses for lunch, dinner, and party conferences.

On 27 March, the Cabinet extended the 92nd Diet for 4 days. Simultaneously, upon the insistence of the Speaker, the 5-day deadlock ended when the Government parties agreed to the Social Democrat demand to deliberate in committee all amendments proposed to the Election Law Bill, and the Social Democrats in turn, agreed to give up their obstructionist program and carry on "with sincerity." All factions introduced their amendments in plenary session, after which they were fully discussed by a new committee of 30 members. By a vote of 16 to 14 in the committee, the Government parties' amendments carried and the amendments of the minor parties were lost. The Election Law Bill, as amended in committee, was passed by the House of Representatives on 30 March, and by the House of Peers on the following day.

Thus ended one of the bitterest fights in Japanese legislative annals--- a fight which, perhaps as no other method could, succeeded in riveting public attention on the forthcoming elections.

## Mechanics of Elections

The phrase "democratic elections" does not lend itself readily to hard and fast definition; democracy itself implies a degree of freedom of action which defies all but the broadest of classifications. There are, nevertheless, certain characteristics which might be called typical of democratic elections; these would include the following:

1. Universal adult sufferage, limited only by illiteracy or legal incompetence.

2. Universal right of candidacy, limited only by minor restrictions on age, residence, illiteracy or legal incompetence.

3. Reasonable frequency of registration for voting.

4. Ease of organization of political parties.

5. Equal opportunities in campaigning; candidates', parties' and voters' freedom from fear of reprisals.

6. Secret ballot.

7. Right of candidates or representatives of parties to witness counting and tabulation of votes.

8. Adequate and impartially applied election laws, providing penalties for all acts designed to favor one candidate or party at the expense of another.

9. Administration of elections by committees truly representative of the general electorate.

Since at least the form of parliamentary government had existed in Japan for over 50 years, the opening of the post war period found Japan with election laws modeled upon those of the Western democracies. A limited number of amendments were made late in 1945; the ensuing elections for the House of Representatives had indicated that these revised laws, if properly enforced, could ensure fair and democratic elections.

Prior to the April, 1947 elections, a few additional changes were made (see below); by April it could fairly be said that the laws which would govern the month's elections would not only withstand every democratic test which could be devised, but that in some instances they were even more liberal than the laws of many of the western democracies from whence they had originally sprung. In last analysis, therefore, supervision of the 1947 elections involved not so much changes in context of Japanese laws as insurance that the laws were applied and enforced with consistency and impartiality.

Once the dates of election had been set, necessary schedules for screening and the opening of election campaigns were established and screening commenced. The schedule follows:

1 - 15 February: Screening of local screening committee members.

5 Feb - 11 March: Collection of questionnaires of candidates and forwarding to the Cabinet for members of House of Councillors, prefectural governors and mayors of five principal cities.

10 Feb - 11 March: Collection of questionnaires of mayors, (excluding five principal cities) ward, town and village chiefs, superintendents of polls and ballot opening stations and presiding officers of elections.

16 Feb - 25 Feb: Screening of holders of principal public offices.

20 - 25 Feb: Screening of electoral committee members and holders of public offices in local public organizations.

25 Feb - 21 April: Collection of questionnaires for candidates for House of Representatives.

28 Feb - 2 March: Screening of candidates for members of House of Councillors, prefectural governors and mayors of five principal cities.

8 - 17 March: Screening of candidates for mayors (excluding five principal cities), ward, town or village chiefs, superintendents of polls and ballot opening stations, and presiding officers of election.

12 - 14 April: Issuance of certificates of eligibility to candidates for members of House of Councillors, prefectural governors and mayors of five principal cities.

15 March: Opening of campaign for election of governors.

16 March - 23 April: Screening of candidates for members of House of Representatives.

18 - 20 March: Issuance of certificates of eligibility to candidates for mayors, and ward, town and village chiefs.

20 March: Opening of campaign for House of Councillors, mayors of cities and chiefs of Tokyo wards.

25 March - 14 April: Collection of questionnaires of candidates for prefectural assemblymen and five principal cities assemblymen.

26 March: Opening of campaign for chiefs of town and villages.

26 March - 23 April: Issuance of certificate of eligibility to candidates for House of Representatives.

26 March - 30 April: Screening of present principal public office holders of public information media, political parties and economic organizations.

29 March - 7 April: Collection of questionnaires of municipal and ward assembly candidates.

31 March: Opening of campaign for House of Representatives.

5 April: Election of prefectural governors, mayors, and ward, town and village Chiefs

9 April: Opening of campaign for run-off election of prefectural governors, mayors, and ward, town or village Chiefs..

10 April: Opening of campaign for assemblies of prefectures, cities and Tokyo wards.

11 - 20 April: Collection of questionnaires of candidates for town and village assemblymen.

15 April: Run-off election of prefectural governors, mayors, and ward, town or village Chiefs.

20 April: Election of members of House of Councillors.

23 April: Opening of campaign for election of town and village assemblies.

25 April: Election of members of House of Representatives.

30 April: Election of prefectural assemblymen and assemblymen of cities, towns, villages, and wards.

7 - 27 May: Screening of successful candidates for prefectural, municipal, ward, town and village assemblymen.

prefecture, city, town, village, and Tokyo ward thus has an election committee responsible to the public at large and charged with responsibility for all elections held in the corresponding voting district. Prefectural committees have six members; others have four. The method of electing committee members provided for representative membership; committees were required to meet at the request of any member.

Election procedures on the vote casting and ballot counting levels were the same for all April elections. Under the general supervision of the respective election administration committees, elections in each local entity were directed by a superintendent of elections, chosen by the committee. The superintendent, in turn, was assisted by superintendents of the polls and polling witnesses, superintendents of the counting of ballots and ballot counting witnesses, and election witnesses. In general these officials were required to possess the right to vote in the particular election they were supervising.

Each city, town, village, or ward, constituting a voting district, included one or more polling places. Each polling place had a superintendent of the poll, appointed by the chairman of election, minor officials, and a number of polling witnesses, appointed by the candidates. Each candidate had the right to nominate one polling witness at each polling place; whenever the number of witnesses nominated exceeded ten the witnesses chose ten from among their own number.

The superintendent and officials were neutral; the polling witnesses were the direct representatives of the candidates and enjoyed the normal prerogatives of challenge, etc. Each superintendent was responsible for the proper conduct of the election machinery at his polling place. This included maintenance of law and order, assurance of secrecy in voting, comparison of the names of prospective electors with polling lists, and the like. Procedure at the polls was relatively simple; names of prospective voters were checked against the polling lists, voters received their ballot papers and designated their choice thereupon, the necessity of writing the candidate's name serving as a type of literacy test.

Except in cases in which the superintendent of the poll was also a superintendent of the counting of votes, at the close of the election the superintendent of the poll, accompanied by at least one witness, delivered the ballot box, the record of the poll, and the register of electors to a superintendent of the counting of the votes, at the nearest ballot counting station.

The latter superintendent was appointed by the election administration committee and was assisted by a number of witnesses for the counting of the votes, appointed by the candidates in the same way as the witnesses at the polls. As with polling places, a given local entity might have one or more ballot counting stations, the number being determined by population. All electors had the right to attend the counting of ballots in their respective districts.

The final step in election procedure was the election meeting, the final tabulation of all votes cast in any given election, as received from the ballot counting stations. Dependent upon the election in question, such meetings were held in prefectural capitals, cities, towns, villages, or wards, or in the case of the national constituency of the House of Councillors, in Tokyo itself. The meetings were presided over by superintendents of elections, assisted by election witnesses appointed by the candidates in the same manner as the witnesses at the polls and the witnesses at the counting of ballots. Meetings were open to all electors.

Validity of elections: Complaints concerning the validity of elections were filed with election administration committees or the appropriate courts. When the legal provisions governing elections were violated, the elections could be voided either in whole or in part, if the violation was deemed likely to affect returns. Other stringent penalties were provided for all possible violations of the election laws, with fines or penal sentences as punishment.

PRECAUTIONS TO INSURE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

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Observing and Reporting

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## PRECAUTIONS TO INSURE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS

Especial precautions to ensure the democratic nature of the April elections may be grouped into four categories: measures taken to (1) strengthen election laws; (2) screen candidates; (3) ensure non-interference by police and (4) provide for surveillance by Occupation Forces.

### New Legislation

As noted above, by the fall of 1946 Japan was possessed of a full and well rounded body of election law. The bulk of the law had been developed over the 50 years preceding World War II; what had actually been at fault in Japanese elections during this period was not so much the structure of the law as the manner of its application. Only a few additional amendments had therefore been deemed necessary in the early days of the Occupation to prepare for the Diet election in 1946.

The 1947 elections, however, presented a somewhat more complicated picture, in view of the very number of elections; the novelty of those which had never been held before; the electoral status to be accorded the tremendous number of repatriates, who had newly returned to Japan; the problem of limiting election expenditures despite the rampant inflation; and the difficulties engendered by the paper shortage, which made adequate publicity for candidates and platforms almost impossible. Several amendments, beyond those made to election laws in 1946, were thus deemed necessary prior to the 1947 elections.

### National Election Laws

#### House of Representatives Election Law

Changes made early in 1947 in the House of Representatives election law fell in two general categories: those designed specifically to strengthen the democratic character of the legislation and those technical changes deemed necessary by the Government but in respect to which the question of democratic character was not in issue.

Of the first type, perhaps the most important was the proviso that supervision of the elections be transferred from the Government to the election administration committees. As noted above, separate committees, elected by local assemblies, were constituted for every prefecture, city, town, village, and Tokyo ward. In so far as the House of Representatives election was concerned, prefectural committees assumed full responsibility for supervision of elections in their own prefectures; there was, therefore, no national supervision of elections; each of the 46 separate prefectural committees was autonomous in its own right and had no responsibility to the Central Government beyond that of reporting the names of winning candidates in the prefectural districts.

As will be noted below, a determined effort was made prior to the April elections to achieve the ideal of universal adult suffrage in so far as the ideal was compatible with necessary restrictions on individuals who were incompetent, quasi-incompetent, or serving jail sentences. Special provisions were thus made to provide franchise and the right to run for office to individuals in the following categories, who had previously been denied the right to vote or to run for public office:

Those who had been declared bankrupt and had not yet liquidated their obligations;

Those who were poor and received public or private aid or relief;

Those who had no definite domiciles;

Those who had permanently lost their franchise by virtue of a sentence of confinement or penal servitude for more than six years;

Those who had been condemned to confinement or penal servitude for less than six years and had not yet served a period of probation twice the length of their original penal sentence.

Further provisions to ensure broadening of the franchise included two special periods of registration immediately prior to the elections and a temporary suspension of the 6 months residence requirement to permit recent repatriates to vote in the national election. For these see "Broadening of the Franchise" below.

Respect for age in Japan had led to a provision in the House of Representatives election laws that in case of a tie the elder candidate should be declared elected. This article was altered to provide for determination by drawing of lots, if a recheck of ballots still confirmed the existence of a tie.

Another proviso in the law permitted a candidate for the House to run for election simultaneously in as many districts as he desired, on the assumption that if he did not win in one district he might in another. This, of course, not only benefited a wealthy candidate who could afford several candidacies, but also raised the problem of a candidate's winning in two or more districts and then leaving one or more of them without a representative, since he was permitted to choose the one district he wished to represent. This article was altered to permit candidacy from only one district at a time, although candidates could still run from any district they wished without regard to their own residence.

In previous elections candidates had been required to report the location of their campaign office to the nearest police station. This provision, suggestive of old time police surveillance, was altered to make the local election administration committee the recipient of the report.

In earlier elections considerable criticism had been voiced of the tendency of teachers to utilize their students in their campaigns, either as general assistants or by directing students to solicit their parents' votes. The following article was therefore inserted in the law:

"No persons shall conduct their election campaign by making use of their positions specially related to children, pupils, or students of schools under the age of twenty."

In view of the relative unimportance of most local offices, previous legislation had permitted Diet members to hold certain local offices concurrently with membership in the Diet. With increased responsibilities given to local officials in line with the spirit of local autonomy, it appeared inadvisable to permit continuance of this dual role and officials of local public entities were therefore prohibited from combining their offices with membership in the House of Representatives.

In the past, Japanese laws had been designed to avoid elections to fill vacancies wherever possible. In consequence, in case of the death, purging, disqualification, or resignation of an office holder, the normal practice had been to recognize the runner-up in the last previous election as entitled to succeed to a position, provided he had received the minimum number of votes required for the elected candidate (25%). This practice, of course, was far simpler than holding a special election and had a specious reasonableness about it, since it merely permitted a runner-up to succeed a victor, a practice common enough in many walks of life. Insofar as elections were concerned, however, it had been criticized, for it meant that the new appointee could never represent the majority of the electors in his district and indeed, was generally of a political tinge completely opposite to the original choice of the electorate. In the present election, therefore, these regulations were changed and the period during which a runner-up might succeed to a vacancy was limited to a period of five days from the date of announcement of results--the period allowed the winning candidate to decide if he wished to accept the position.

Technical changes in the law provided for the previously noted increase in election districts from 53 to 117, for a tenfold increase in fines assessed for violations of the election law, and for an upper limit of 20,000 on the number of postcards which could be sent to electors by candidates. Previously a candidate had been permiteed to send free of charge one piece of mail matter to each elector in his district.

## House of Councillors Election Law

Since popular election of members of the House of Councillors was inaugurated in Japan only with the April elections, the House of Councillors election law was necessarily a new law. In all of its major provisions, however, it was based entirely on the House of Representatives Election Law, variations stemming from differences in the corporate structure of the two Houses rather than from an attempt to establish separate standards. In actuality, the laws are so similar that it would have been entirely possible to hold the two elections simultaneously, with the same electorate and using the same election registers, the same polling stations, the same officials, the same ballot boxes, etc. In view of the importance of the April elections, however, and of the heavy work load involved in screening the purge questionnaires of the candidates, it was decided to separate the elections in 1947, although in future years, should election dates again coincide, a single election could be held to elect members of both houses.

In its technical aspects, the bill provided for the election of 150 members of the House of Councillors from the prefectural constituencies and 100 from the national constituency, the entire nation comprising one electoral district for this latter election. In the April elections, therefore, each voter cast two votes, on separate ballots, one for a prefectural constituency candidate and one for a national constituency candidate. Fixed period of office is 6 years, with half the members of the House being elected every three years. In this first election, however, the 50 percent of the candidates who polled the greatest number of votes in each of the prefectural and national constituencies qualified for six year terms and the remaining 50 percent for three year terms.

Individuals were permitted to file from only one of the two types of constituencies; in order to be elected a prefectural constituency candidate needed to poll at least one fourth and a national constituency candidate at least one eighth of the total number of valid votes cast in the district concerned, divided by the number of members to be elected from that district.

## Local Government Reform Legislation

Local government reform legislation, passed in 1946, was incorporated in four laws, one applying to prefectures, another to cities, a third to towns and villages, and a fourth to Tokyo Metropolis. In so far as elections were concerned, however, the four may be considered as a unit since they are parallel in all respects.

The bills were notably important, of course, in that they introduced the principle of popular election of local chief executives and paved the way for strong local assemblies. With reference to the processes of election, however, the bills were correlated with the House of Representatives election law, so that the same fundamental guarantees of democratic elections which appeared in the House of Representatives election law were applied to the local elections.

Two additional provisions in the local government laws were also noteworthy as far as elections were concerned. For the first time in Japanese history provision was made for a wide variety of methods by which the populace might exercise continuing control over elected officials: recall, by which chief executives, legislators, members of election administration committees, and inspectors could be removed from office; initiative, by which voters might request the passage of legislation; and reform, by which they might cancel legislation of which they disapproved. These provisions appear in no other Japanese laws. Another reform of great interest abolished provisions which in the past had prevented public school teachers, as government officials, from serving in local assemblies. Inasmuch as teachers, in small communities, normally were among the most intelligent and most articulate of the citizenry, it appeared highly undesirable to deprive local assemblies of such members. Revised legislation therefore permitted teachers to be elected to local assemblies without the necessity of first resigning from their positions and thus depriving themselves of their principal means of livelihood.

## Supporting Measures

The election laws noted above, which dealt in general with the April elections, were further strengthened by a series of laws and ordinances providing for limitation of election expenses, for limitations on the use of paper, and for supplementary registration immediately prior to elections to ensure the registration of all those eligible to vote.

The election expense ordinance was designed both to limit expenses and to ensure that full publicity was given to all contributions and expenditures. The following limitations were established for campaign expenditures:

| | |
|---|---|
| House of Councillors (National Constituency) | Y75,000 |
| House of Councillors (Prefectural Constituency) | 50,000 |
| House of Representatives | 50,000 |
| Governors of Prefectures (Depending on Population) | 25,000/50,000 |
| Mayors of Cities " " | 5,000/20,000 |
| Chiefs of Tokyo Wards " " | 5,000/20,000 |
| Mayors of Towns and Villages | No Provision |
| Prefectural Assemblies | 12,000 |
| City and Tokyo Ward Assemblies | 1,200 |
| Town and Village Assemblies | No Provision |

Comparison of these amounts with expenditures for comparable Western elections is not possible because of the lack of yen exchange standards. Assuming, however, that a figure of Y100 to $1 might represent equivalent purchasing power, it will be apparent that these figures are extremely low; the highest permissible expenditure would thus be $750 while a $12 maximum would be placed upon expenditures for candidates for city and Tokyo ward assemblies.

In general the law provided for the following chronology in reporting election expenses and receipts of individual candidates:

| Date of Expense or Receipt | Date of Filing |
|---|---|
| Prior to filing candidacy | Within 3 days of filing candidacy |
| Date of filing to 11th day before election | By 8th day before election |
| 10th day before election to 4th day before election | By 2nd day before election |
| Total expenditures and receipts | Within 15 days after election |

In respect to expenses and receipts of parties, the law provided that a report on receipts and expenses prior to the announcement of an election should be made within ten days of that announcement and that further reports should cover successive ten day periods and should be made within five days of the end of any such period. A final report was due within 15 days after an election. In all instances, reports of expenses and receipts were made public by election administration committees shortly after receipt.

By the early spring of 1947, the great shortage of paper in Japan had created a serious problem in so far as elections were concerned. Only small quantities of paper could be procured at fixed prices, the bulk of the stocks being available only on the black market. In addition, the preparation of paste for posters involved black market purchase of starch made from foodstuffs. It soon became apparent, therefore, that unless draconian limitations were placed on the amount of paper and number of posters which could be used by any candidate that the wealthier candidates would have the field to themselves as far as publicity was concerned. A special law therefore provided that election posters should be limited in size to 11 by 16 inches and in number as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Candidates for the House of Councillors from the National Constituency (not more than 1,000 posters to be used in any one prefecture) | 10,000 |
| Candidates for the House of Councillors from the Prefectural Constituencies, for the House of Representatives, for Governor, and for Mayor of the Five Principal Cities | 1,000 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Candidates for Prefectural Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies and for Mayor of Cities other than the principal five | 300 |

As opposed to previous legislation, which had provided each candidate with one free postal card for each elector in his district, the following limitations on postcards were established:

| | |
|---|---|
| Candidates for House of Councillors from the National Constituency | 30,000 |
| Candidates for House of Councillors from the Prefectural Constituencies and for the House of Representatives | 20,000 |
| Candidates for Governor | 10,000 |

Each candidate was further prohibited, during the entire course of the campaign, from purchasing more than 1 newspaper advertisement, of a standard size specified by a local election administration committee. No other types of publicity involving use of paper were permitted.

Although no bill on the matter was necessary, a further measure designed to strengthen elections was the doubling of the number of polling places throughout the country. For the April elections the number totaled 42,617 as contrasted to 21,089 during the election of April, 1946, and 14,480 in the 1942 election for the House of Representatives.

## Broadening of the Franchise

Broadening of the franchise went hand in hand with the strengthening of the election laws; democratic elections naturally require not only fair and impartial procedures but also the participation of the greatest possible number of adult citizenry.

Revision of the House of Representatives election law prior to the April, 1946, elections had been marked by the greatest possible single step toward universal adult suffrage: the enfranchisement of women, which in a single move had more than doubled the number of those eligible to vote. The same law had also reduced the voting age from 25 to 20.

In preparation for the 1947 elections, therefore, it was felt that only three changes in the laws needed to be made to ensure the broadest possible extension of the franchise:

1. Granting of the franchise to certain minor groups previously denied the right to vote: individuals who were bankrupt, those who had no definite domiciles, those who were receiving public relief, and the like.

2. Holding special registration days immediately prior to the April elections to insure registration of all those newly eligible to vote.

3. Extension to repatriates of the franchise in national elections without reference to normal six months residence requirements.

In respect to the first point, as previously noted, election laws were revised so as to permit exclusion from the voter's roll only of those adult citizens who were actually serving jail sentences or who were legally classed as incompetent or quasi-incompetent.

With respect to the second point, previous Japanese law had provided for a single annual registration of all voters, with a date in the late fall used as a fixed day for determining age, period of residence, etc. Such an arbitrary system was quite unfair insofar as elections held in the following spring or summer were concerned, for it meant that an individual's eligibility for the franchise was determined not by his age or residence at the time of election but by his age or residence status on an arbitrary date which could have fallen nearly a year prior to the election in question. Especial precautions were therefore taken prior to the April elections: a first supplementary registration was held from March 18 to 24, to provide for all voters newly meeting voting requirements

by March 23; a second supplementary registration was held from April 5 to 10 for those meeting requirements as of April 10th.

With reference to repatriates, a clear line was drawn between local and national elections. In view of the general desire to integrate repatriates as speedily as possible into the national life, it was felt that as many as possible should be given the opportunity to vote in April, particularly in that no further countrywide elections were scheduled until 1950, when half of the House of Councillors will be chosen. On the other hand, local elections undoubtedly required at least a modicum of readjustment to community life, particularly in that many repatriates had not been able to return to their former homes, in view of destruction by bombing, lack of surviving relatives, and the like. The problem was solved by permitting repatriates to vote in the national elections without reference to the normal residence requirements, but keeping the requirements in effect in so far as local elections were concerned.

A comparison of eligible electors in the recent House of Representatives election well indicates the extent to which the recent legislation has succeeded in broadening the franchise in Japan:

| Year | Men | Women | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1938 | 14,075,010 | - | 14,075,010 |
| 1942 | 14,594,287 | - | 14,594,287 |
| 1946 | 16,278,926 | 20,557,564 | 36,836,490 |
| 1947 | 19,569,839 | 21,326,483 | 40,896,322 |

The Purge

## Screening of Candidates

The Potsdam Declaration called for the elimination for all time of "the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest." The process of removing and barring from major public offices those individuals deemed to fall in the above categories commenced in Japan early in 1946 and was accelerated in January of 1947 by Imperial Ordinances which extended the provisions of the purge to all elective public offices, local as well as national.

In so far as the April elections were concerned, this meant that all successful candidates as well as all election officials would need to be screened and approved before they took office. Screening standards, of course, were those used in all instances of the application of the purge. In addition all individuals subject to the purge, whether candidates or not, were forbidden to engage in any form of political activity in connection with the campaigns, other than voting.

With over 205,000 elective offices at stake, it had early been apparent that it would be impossible to screen all candidates prior to the election; decision was thus reached to require that candidates for all offices but local assemblies receive clearance before filing for candidacy but to permit candidates for local assemblies to run without final clearance but with the understanding that they would need to be fully cleared before they could accept office. In all cases, of course, candidates were required to submit purge questionnaires prior to filing candidacy; the questionnaires were then placed on public display at the offices of the local election administration committees and screening committees concerned. These screening committees were those normally charged with the application of the purge ordinances.

The following figures summarize the scope of the screening as it applied to the April elections:

| | Number of Questionnaires Submitted | | | Number of Candidates Filing* | | | Number of Offices |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Male | Female | Total | Male | Female | Total | Total |
| Member of House of Councillors | 1,371 | 35 | 1,406 | N 233<br>L 324 | N 13<br>L 7 | N 246<br>L 331 | N 100<br>L 150 |
| Member of House of Representatives | 3,315 | 115 | 3,430 | 1,515 | 84 | 1,549 | 466 |
| Governor | 463 | 3 | 466 | 210 | 2 | 212 | 46 |
| Mayor | 1,212 | 1 | 1,213 | 635 | 2 | 637 | 209 |
| Member of Prefectural Assembly | 12,555 | 185 | 12,740 | 7,004 | 111 | 7,115 | 2,490 |
| Chief of Town and Village | 46,330 | 51 | 46,381 | 19,945 | 12 | 19,957 | 10,210 |
| Member of City Assembly | 23,082 | 460 | 23,542 | 17,607 | 346 | 17,953 | 7,272 |
| Member of Ward Assembly (Tokyo-to) | 2,489 | 29 | 2,518 | 2,145 | 37 | 2,182 | 895 |
| Member of Town and Village Assembly | 338,540 | 3,606 | 342,146 | 229,337 | 1,784 | 231,121 | 183,224 |
| Total | 429,357 | 4,485 | 433,842 | 278,955 | 2,398 | 281,353 | 205,062 |

* Does not include subsequent withdrawals.

CANDIDACIES FOR APRIL, 1947 ELECTIONS.

During the month prior to the election of local assemblymen, a total of 190,590 individuals were screened by the various public office qualifications examination committees: 5,345 for major election position and 185,245 for minor, Preliminary screening for principal elective positions resulted as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Screened for House of Councillors | 1406 |
| Barred | 31 |
| Screened for House of Representatives | 3430 |
| Barred | 138 |
| Screened for Prefectural Governor | 466 |
| Barred | 20 |
| Screened for Mayor of the Five Principal Cities | 43 |
| Barred | 1 |

Of the 185,245 individuals screened on the minor level, 483 were considered unfit to hold public office.

The tremendous discrepancy between the number of individuals investigated and the number actually found subject to the purge stems, of course, from the fact that the only individuals who filed were those who believed that their records would entitle them to clearance.

Candidates with even slightly questionable records were chary because:

a. Copies of all purge questionnaires were available for public scrutiny at appropriate election administration and screening committee offices, and

b. Screening committees were required to post on designated billboards current reports on all applicants for screening who had been passed, purged, or whose applications were pending.

The net result of such extensive publicity was naturally to limit candidacies to those individuals who had no fear of the result of close public scrutiny of their questionnaires.

Among the prominent figures in Japanese politics found subject to the purge during April were:

Kawai Yoshinari, Minister of Welfare
Narahashi Wataru, Member Executive Committee Democratic Party
Inukai Ken, Executive Committee Democratic Party
Ishiguro Takeshige, Secretary General Democratic Party
Zen Keinosuke, Member Elect of the House of Councillors, former head Economic Stabilization Board
Imamura Hitoshi, Member House of Representatives from Social Democratic Party
Matsuoka Matsuhei, Liberal Party
Chizaki Usaburo, Campaign Manager Democratic Party.

In some instances candidates who were screened by local committees were considered doubtful and final decision was referred to the central committee for interpretation of the scope of the purge ordinances as they applied to these individual cases. Since final decision in some cases could not be reached until after elections were held, a small number of candidates were granted temporary clearance certificates with the understanding that final decision in their case would need to await action by the central committee. This, in a few instances, led to later purging of individuals successful in the elections.

## Political Repercussions

All of the major political parties were affected to some degree by the loss of members and candidates. The order in which the political parties were numerically most severely affected was, Liberal, Democratic, Social Democratic, People's Co-operative and Communist.

The Liberal Party lost the largest number of candidates for the Diet,

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a total of 41 (6 additional purged as of 20 May 1947). The Democratic Party was the next highest loser in candidates for election with a total of 31, but was the greatest loser in prominent leaders.

The Social Democratic Party had 25 of its candidates for the Diet purged. Although this number is relatively high in comparison with the two formerly mentioned parties, none of its prominent leaders was affected.

The People's Co-operative Party lost 7 candidates for the Diet. In this party also its top leadership remained unaffected but the loss of these candidates was strongly felt, coming as an additional blow to the loss of 15 Diet members who joined the Democratic Party, on 31 March 1947.

The Communist Party lost one candidate for the House of Representatives and of all the political parties was the least affected by the purge.

Eighty-two Independent candidates out of a total of 2,850 were barred from the Diet elections.

In the gubernatorial election of 5 April the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties each lost four candidates to the purge. The Democratic Party lost none and the People's Co-operative Party, one. The Communist Party had three of its candidates removed. Eight of the Independent candidates were barred from the elections.

Of the candidates for mayor of the five largest cities of Japan (Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and Osaka) one Independent candidate was barred from the elections. In this regard none of the political parties was materially affected as evidenced by the very low number purged.

In summary then, in the national elections, the Liberal Party lost the largest number of candidates in the purge but its party leadership remained unaffected. The Democratic Party lost both a considerable number of candidates for office and a considerable number of party leaders. The Social Democratic Party which emerged as the plurality Diet party, lost not quite as heavily as the conservative parties as a result of the purge. In comparison with the Liberal and Democratic Parties, however, the Social Democratic Party remained a solidified political unit.

Non Interference by Police

The problem of police and elections is an ancient one, no less in Japan than in the Western World. Police, enforcing election laws, guarding ballot boxes, forestalling violence, and the like, perform a host of essential functions in connection with elections. In view, however, of the tremendous discretionary powers with which they are vested, the police can also be a powerful weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous government, creating opportunities to embarrass or crush the opposition, overlooking violations by the party in power, their presence at the polls on election day being utilized to induce a general apprehension on the part of the voters.

With care, however, the good features can be retained and the bad eliminated; the 1946 election had been a case in point. Several months prior to the 1947 elections, therefore, special instructions, enjoining the strictest impartiality in elections, were sent by the Home Ministry to all police districts. Among other instructions, local police forces were directed not only to ensure implicit and impartial compliance with election laws, but were also warned to guard against over-precipitous acts such as arresting candidates merely on suspicion immediately prior to an election. Particular stress was laid on the fact that on election day police were not to be in evidence at the polls although they might be held in readiness in nearby stations for any calls for aid in suppression of violence. Excerpts from these instructions follow:

"It goes without saying that impartiality in elections is requisite. In view, however, of the historical importance and special nature of conditions at this time, it is doubly imperative that impartiality be especially observed and that careful attention be paid not to give rise to the slightest suggestion of interference (in elections)...You are required to fulfil your duty with firm determination and...to live up to expectations both at home and abroad.

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"No reports to this Ministry are required other than those of a business nature concerning election crimes. Prefectural and local police stations may not collect any so-called election information other than that which concerns election crimes...

"As several elections, governed by different sets of laws, are to be run off, it is highly important that these laws be fully understood. It is especially necessary to avoid any incidents arising from misunderstanding..

"Other than in a case where a request has been made by a promoter or where his presence is necessary, no police officer shall be dispatched to a campaign meeting. When such an officer is dispatched, he must be careful to remain inconspicuous...

"In the arrests of violaters of the election laws, emphasis should be laid on vicious offenses, such as buying up votes, disturbing elections, etc...Detention of a person should be conducted according to legal proceedings and instances of administrative detention must not occur...Except in important or urgent cases, detention of a person or candidate or an important campaigner should be carried out after the election date...

"No policemen should be dispatched to polling places or ballot counting stations except in cases of urgent necessity...However, police may guard ballot boxes when the stations are closed."

Reports for all elections from surveillance personnel in all prefectures indicate that the performance of the Japanese police in the April elections was commendable. No complaints against their activities were lodged with military government teams; no criticisms against their activities were voiced by surveillance teams. Laws were fairly and impartially enforced; with a single exception the only police reported in polls on election day turned out to be those who were casting their own votes.

Surveillance by Occupation Forces

GHQ, SCAP

One of the major objectives of the Occupation is the establishment of a peaceful and responsible government, conforming closely to principles of democratic self-government and supported by the freely expressed will of the people. By definition, therefore, the ensurance of fair and impartial elections for Japan becomes one of the principal tasks of the Occupation forces.

The task of surveillance of any election is necessarily a delicate one, a modern threading of the seaway between Scylla and Charybdis. It requires, firstly, that surveillance teams not only be impartial but that the electorate accept them as such, and, secondly, that teams, whilst ensuring that the administration of elections be left entirely to officials entrusted with such responsibility, be ever vigilant that such officials be not derelict in their duty.

The procedures of election surveillance tried and tested in the 1946 elections having proved highly satisfactory, it was decided to adopt similar procedures for the 1947 elections. This called for assignment of responsibility for pre-election and post-election surveillance in each prefecture to the prefectural military government teams and for augmented surveillance on election day proper by roving teams comprised of representatives of both military government teams and tactical troops. Throughout the four campaigns and elections the senior military government officer in each prefecture assumed full responsibility for surveillance.

The program of general surveillance called for insurance that all elections and campaigns were conducted in strict accordance with applicable laws and ordinances; the populace as a whole was encouraged to bring to the attention of military government teams any infractions of election laws in which corrective action was not taken immediately by appropriate Japanese authorities.

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Election day standards of surveillance were designed to ensure observance at each election of the greatest possible number of polling places and ballot counting stations.

The January Conference

First steps toward preparations for surveillance of the 1947 elections were taken by SCAP in January, when approximately 75 officers representing army, corps, and regional military government headquarters, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, corps and division G-2, and all prefectural military government teams attended a 4 day conference at Government Section SCAP. Officers who attended were those who were to be directly responsible for surveillance of the elections.

Technical aspects of election laws and methods of surveillance and reporting were discussed and copies of a handbook containing principal election laws were distributed.

Command Letters

Command instructions, directing Commanding General Eighth Army to exercise surveillance over the April elections, were dispatched on January 28 (Local Elections) and February 21 (National Elections.) Typical of these instructions were the following, issued in connection with the national elections:

"As with the forthcoming local government elections, the pending elections for Diet members inaugurate a new and highly significant phase of Japanese political life. These will be the first elections in Japanese history in which members of the Upper House will be chosen by the populace, the first national elections which have been supervised by representatives of the people rather than by the government, the first post-war elections in which there has been a clearcut distinction between the parties in power and a recognized opposition, and, of course, the first elections for a Diet which under the terms of the new Constitution will become "the highest organ of state power" and "the sole lawmaking organ of the state."

"In view of this historic importance and of the material influence which such elections will exert toward that revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies which forms a requirement of the Potsdam Declaration, it is imperative that the coming elections be so conducted as to ensure a free and positive expression of the will of the Japanese people. Assurance of such elections thus becomes a major responsibility of the Occupation Forces.

"The Japanese election laws and ordinances provide adequate machinery for fair and impartial elections and spring from many years of experience. Through some provisions may seem inadequate by Western standards and others may appear to impose unnecessary restrictions, all have been carefully worked out and not only embrace but also regulate familiar Japanese customs and practices. If Japanese officials, therefore, faithfully execute the provisions of these laws, the desired type of election can be assured.

"However, in the past, despite efforts to ensure fair elections, local administrative officials, mostly in conjunction with the desires and wishes of the central government, have frequently abused their authority. Prefectural governors and police under their control have at times intimidated opposition candidates, coerced voters, falsified returns, committed or failed to punish fraudulent and coercive practices, and by these and other devices used their positions to influence the outcome of elections. In order, therefore, to fulfill properly his duty of surveillance, each Military Government Officer will need to be especially watchful of the following coercive practices:

(1) Privileges granted to favored candidates.

(2) Unlawful exclusions from the registration lists.

(3) Interference by police or government officials with legal campaigning.

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(4) Efforts of either major or petty political machines to buy votes with bribes of scarce commodities or cash.

(5) Excessive campaign expenditures, in cash or kind, or failure to report campaign expenditures. Failure of officials to publicize campaign expenditures.

(6) Excessive contributions by individuals.

(7) Interference with access to the polls or with free and secret voting.

(8) Denial of legitimate candidacy; illegal candidacy; evasion of the purge ordinances. Failure of proper officials to make purge questionnaires available for public inspection.

(9) Dishonest tabulation or reporting of results.

(10) Failure of authorities to prosecute violators.

(11) Use of violence, threats of violence, or other intimidation.

(12) Use by school teachers, school officials and members of educational associations of students below the age of twenty who are presently under the tutelage or influence of the aforementioned. (The purpose of such a prohibition is to prevent a candidate from taking advantage of his special relationship with school children and using them in a campaign).

(13) Efforts of any individuals or groups--landlords, labor union leaders, employers, etc.--to utilize economic pressure to influence voters.

"To assist officers and election teams entrusted with surveillance of the forthcoming political campaigns and elections, the following suggestions have been prepared. Adherence on your part as Military Government officers to these recommendations will aid measurably in obtaining the fair and impartial elections which the governments of the Occupying Powers desire.

"1. Study and examine carefully the provisions of the two laws which control the election of members of the Diet: Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives and Law for the Election of Members of the House of Councillors. Familiarize yourself with the provisions of the ordinances and instructions which implement these laws. Chapter Three of this publication includes the texts of the two pertinent laws and Chapter Four the most important of the applicable ordinances and instructions.

"Each officer should have a working knowledge of election machinery, qualifications for candidacy and voting, campaign rights and restrictions, voting and tabulating procedures, supervisory procedures, methods of reporting expenditures, and punitive provisions. These points are summarized briefly in the following chapter.

"2. Hold conferences with the important officials of the prefectures and of as many cities, towns and villages as possible. There are two sets of officials concerned:

"a. The Election Administration Committees of the prefectures, cities, towns, villages, and Tokyo wards (also referred to in some Japanese translations as "Commissions for Overseeing" the elections) have primary jurisdiction over the campaigns and the elections, the prefectural committees supervising the activities of all others.* Because the committees have legal control of campaigns and elections and because they are new agencies of government, it is imperative that their importance and prestige

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* A national election administration committee also sits in Tokyo, but its powers over prefectural committees extend only to the election of members of the House of Councillors from the national constituency.

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be developed as rapidly as possible. Each Military Government officer and team will therefore be especially careful to recognize this new state of affairs and to indicate to all executives and to the committee his clear understanding of and insistence upon the supremacy of the committee in election affairs.

"b. The governors, mayors, and chiefs of local entities are the legal administrators of their areas of government and therefore have certain responsibilities with respect to campaigns and elections. These executives control the police, have authority to assign minor officials to assist in various capacities, and possess experience which may be useful.

"At the initial conferences, at least, it is suggested that the whole committee and the governor, mayor, or chief (depending upon which echelon is being contacted) be present in order that the same information can be given to all concerned at the same time. These officials should be advised of:

"(1) The importance attached by the Supreme Commander to the absolute necessity of a completely free and fair election as one of the significant methods of achieving the aims of the Potsdam Declaration.

"(2) The fact that personnel under your command will observe the administration of election laws from the inception of the first campaign until the results of the last elections are made public and that you will insist on conscientious and scrupulous enforcement of the election laws and ordinances and their punitive provisions.

"(3) Your intention of exercising extensive surveillance on election day in particular.

"(4) Your intention of utilizing all available channels of information to encourage the Japanese public to report directly to you all violations of the election laws, as well as all violations of civil or personal liberties, whether by candidates or by officials, in which Japanese authorities have failed to take necessary action.

"(5) Your determination not to interfere with the administrative responsibility of the appropriate officials and your intention of referring to them for their action all complaints which are brought to your attention, meanwhile following closely the final disposition of all such cases.

"(6) The fact that publicity on the entire program will be stressed to the utmost both by radio and the press.

"In this connection, it should be noted that the voting districts, as distinguished from the election districts, for all Japanese elections being the same, the same election administration committees and the same local chief executives are concerned with all elections, both local and national, held in any given district. It is therefore desirable to discuss both local and national elections at the same time.

"3. Hold conferences with executives of political parties and as many candidates as possible. Instruct them carefully in the points summarized in paragraph 2 above. Make it crystal clear that all violations will be publicized extensively by official statements, newspaper articles and the radio and that Occupation Forces will follow to their ultimate disposition all cases in which Japanese officials have not fulfilled their duties. At such conferences each officer must of necessity be extremely cautious not to be put in a position of criticizing or of taking sides with parties or candidates either directly or indirectly.

"4. In connection with the above hear all complaints brought to your attention, record them carefully, and refer valid ones to the appropriate Japanese authorities for action. Follow with all practicable speed the final disposition of such cases. Report to SCAP by the quickest means available all serious violations or other malpractices, whether or not they are corrected by Japanese officials.

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"5. In connection with all these issues, pay especial attention to the attempts of governmental officials to obtain control of political parties, women's organizations, youth groups, and the like, either by gaining appointment as advisors or honorary officers or by providing governmental subsidies. Unless they are bona fide members of such organizations and have been duly elected to office, government officials should not act as officers or advisors. Neither should the organizations be subsidized in whole or in part by governmental entities or offices.

"6. Maintain complete records of your activities in this surveillance program and report them monthly in the routine Military Occupation Report according to the headings listed below:

a. Activities of local officials and police.

b. Major Parties and candidates.

(1) Meetings and campaign practices.
(2) Outstanding arguments and platforms.

c. Extent of local interest in the campaign and the attitudes of major groups and organizations: labor, business, religious, agricultural, cooperative, professional, etc.

d. Summary of areas visited and contacts with Japanese officials.

e. Complaints and other evidence of delinquencies, malpractices, and other violations of the election laws, including those previously reported to SCAP by other means. Report on the disposition of these by Japanese officials.

f. Criticisms or incidents engendered by the Allied program of surveillance, as previously reported to SCAP.

"The categories listed above will of course be expanded because each surveillance team will desire to include the unpredictable items which it will note. In addition, complete summary reports for each election by prefectures, detailing the progress of the entire campaign and election, should be forwarded to SCAP, via normal channels, within two weeks after each election is completed. Sample summary report forms for use in this connection have already been distributed to all concerned.

"7. Team organization and its area for contact and surveillance must be planned, scheduled and coordinated most carefully. Team composition of one officer, an enlisted man and an interpreter as used in the national elections last year was successful and can be set up again. The teams should perform as a functioning unit, hence, each must have instructions on courses of action and proper conduct before entering the field. Detailed advance planning, including learning and plotting the locations of polling places and ballot counting stations, is an essential prelude to election day. On election day observe as many polling stations as is practicable. Repeat visits at least twice. Ballots will be counted in the evening of election day and the following days until finished; stations in which the counting takes place should also be observed at least twice.

"8. Above all, remember that it is essential that throughout the campaign a policy of strictest impartiality must be scrupulously maintained. Allied personnel must not participate in the campaign. They are observers only. Nothing in their word or in their behaviour should be permitted to indicate preference for or discrimination against any party or candidate no matter how great nor how lowly the position involved. Any incident which may embarrass the Occupation Forces and any criticism of the behaviour of the Occupation Forces must be reported immediately to SCAP. This is a Japanese election under Japanese laws and execution must be carried out by Japanese officials. In no case may you interfere with the administrative authority of these officials. Your duties are (1) to observe (2) to refer violations to Japanese officials following action to final disposition, and (3) to report to higher authority."

These instructions were accompanied by three handbooks of election laws, which included verbatim and annotated texts of all laws and ordinances pertinent to the national and local elections.

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Observing and Reporting in the Field

Since general responsibility for surveillance of the April elections had been delegated by SCAP to Commanding General Eighth Army, the role of SCAP during the campaigns and elections was essentially an advisory one.

Continuous contact with military government teams was maintained by representatives of Government Section from the time of the January Conference until the termination of the elections. Three members of Local Government Division visited teams throughout Japan in the weeks before the first election, to ensure that teams were familiar with election laws and ordinances and to ensure uniform compliance throughout Japan with SCAP instructions on surveillance. In addition, on each election day, approximately twenty representatives from SCAP were assigned to assist military government teams on election surveillance.. Thus, on each election day, SCAP representatives were stationed in the majority of the principal cities and prefectures throughout Japan to lend such technical assistance.and advice as might be desired.

Throughout the campaigns Government Section remained the principal point of contact with the central government in respect to election matters. Military Government teams had been authorized to report directly to SCAP any serious breaches in the election laws as well as any criticism of activities of Occupation personnel in connection with the elections. All reported breaches of the laws were called immediately to the attention of the Government. No criticism of the activities of Occupation personnel was received.

## Military Government

### Surveillance Responsibility

As noted above, surveillance responsibilities of military government teams were essentially limited to observing, referring violations of Japanese laws to Japanese authorities, and reporting to higher headquarters. These activities were normally divided into pre-election, election day, and post election periods.

Pre-election activities of military government teams normally opened with an initial conference with the prefectural election administration committee, major prefectural officials, principal candidates, and party officials. At the conference, as noted above, participants were advised of (1) the importance attached by the Supreme Commander to a fair and impartial series of elections; (2) the intent of the prefectural military government team to exercise surveillance over all elections, although interfering in no way with the execution of their duties by Japanese officials; (3) the intent of the team to encourage the Japanese public to report all cases of violation of election laws or civil liberties where Japanese officials failed to take action; and (4) the intention of the team to follow to final disposition by Japanese authorities all such cases as were reported to them.

In ensuing weeks Military Government teams made extensive use of all channels of information to ensure that the public was aware of the fact that the elections would be observed by the Occupying Powers and that instances of failure to act on the part of Japanese officials should be brought without delay to the attention of Occupation authorities. Newspaper stories, radio announcements, and posters were all utilized to emphasize this fact and special conferences were held in cities outside of the prefectural capitals to ensure that municipal, town and village committees, candidates, officials, and parties were apprised. During this period special attention was also focused on endeavors to remind electors that candidates' purge questionnaires were on public display in appropriate local government offices.

In addition candidates and parties were encouraged to hold as many campaign rallies as they desired. No prior notifications to military government were required for any such rallies and no restrictions were placed on election speeches.

Election day activities were concentrated on surveillance of polling and ballot counting stations and are discussed below.

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Post election activities were characterized by following to final disposition all cases referred to Japanese officials. In this connection, a final check on election violations has been instituted by Government Section, designed to ensure that all reported violations are carried to final conclusion, whether originally reported to Occupation authorities or directly to the Japanese government.

Complete election reports for all prefectures and all cities of greater than 100,000 population were prepared for all elections by prefectural teams. The following report from, used for local elections, is typical:

REPORT FORM ON SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTIONS

(Skeleton Outline Only)

1. Name of Prefecture.....
   (Add separate reports for each city over 100,000, answering only applicable questions)

2. Number of Registered Voters
   (Men .....
   (Women .....
   (Total .....

3. Number Actually Voting
   (Men .....
   (Women .....
   (Total .....

4. Number Persons Claiming Registration but not Registered
   (Men .....
   (Women .....
   (Total .....

5. Number of Surveillance Teams .....

6. Number of Polling Places .....

7. Number of Polling Places Visited .....

8. Number of Ballot Counting Stations .....

9. " " " " " Visited .....

10. Availability of Candidates purge questionnaires at Election Administration Committee's Offices and at Screening Committee's Offices .....

11. Amount of publicity given to the fact that candidates purge questionnaires are available at Election Administration Committee's Offices and at Screening Committee's Offices

| | Press | Radio | Political Gatherings |
|---|---|---|---|
| | ..... | ..... | ..... |

12. Number of people examining candidates questionnaires:

    At Election Administration Offices .....
    At Screening Committee Offices .....

13. Number of Seats in Prefectural Assembly .....
    Number of Candidates by Parties .....
    .....
    .....
    .....
    Number of Independents .....
    .....
    Number actually elected by Parties .....
    .....
    .....
    .....
    Number of Independents elected .....

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14. Number of Seats in City Assemblies (For Tokyo give Ward Assemblies) .....

Number of Candidates by Parties .....

Number of Independents .....

Number Actually Elected by Parties .....

Number of Independents Elected .....

15. Number of Seats in Town and Village Assemblies .....

Number of Candidates by Parties .....

Number of Independents .....

Number actually Elected by Parties .....

Number of Independents elected .....

16. Number of Candidates for Governor by Parties .....

Number of Independents .....

Winning Candidate: Name ..... Party .....

17. Number of Candidates for Mayors of Cities by Parties (For Tokyo give Chiefs of Wards) .....

Number of Independents .....

Number actually elected by Parties .....

Number of Independents elected .....

18. Number of Candidates for Chiefs of Towns and Villages by Parties .....

Number of Independents .....

Number actually elected by Parties .....

Number of Independents elected .....

19. Any Women Elected:

| | Yes | No | Number |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governors | ... | .. | ..... |
| Mayors of Cities (In Tokyo, Wards) | ... | .. | ..... |
| Chiefs of Towns & Villages | ... | .. | ..... |
| Prefectural Assemblymen | ... | .. | ..... |
| City or Tokyo Ward Assemblymen | ... | .. | ..... |
| Town or Village Assemblymen | ... | .. | ..... |

20. Number of pre-election campaign meetings held throughout prefecture by each party:

| Party | No. Meetings | Total Att. |
|---|---|---|
| ..... | ..... | ..... |
| ..... | ..... | ..... |
| ..... | ..... | ..... |
| Independent Meetings | ..... | ..... |

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21. Were there an adequate number of polling places? (If not, explain)
Yes .....
No .....

22. Are four election bulletins enclosed? Four are required from each Prefecture. (If not, explain)
Yes .....
No .....

23. No. of Pre-election meetings held by MG Team:

| | | Total Att. |
|---|---|---|
| With Election Administration Committee | ..... | ..... |
| " Officials | ..... | ..... |
| " Candidates | ..... | ..... |

24. Report generally on extent of local publicity given to election (e.g. newspaper stories, advertisements, radio time, placards, postcards, handbills). How did MG Teams contribute to publicizing elections?

25. Number of violations reported to you:

| | |
|---|---|
| Coercion | ..... |
| Soliciting for votes | ..... |
| Interference with free & secret voting | ..... |
| Interference with access to polls | ..... |
| Privileges granted favored candidates | ..... |
| Dishonest tabulation in reporting of votes | ..... |
| Buying of votes | ..... |
| Excessive expenditures | ..... |
| Police interference of any type | ..... |
| Riots or other disorders | ..... |
| Improper disqualification of voters | ..... |
| Violation of purge directives | ..... |
| Others | ..... |

26. Disposition of above violations:

| | |
|---|---|
| Reported to Japanese Officials only | ..... |
| Reported to SCAP | ..... |

27. Campaign expenditures of candidates for governors and mayors of major cities: (List separately)

| Name | Party | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| .... | ..... | ..... |
| .... | ..... | ..... |
| .... | ..... | ..... |

28. Military Government Team's comments and evaluations:

a. Any criticism voiced in regard to activities of Occupation Forces? If so, explain in detail.

b. Comments on activities of local election administration committees.

c. How may election laws be strengthened?

d. Other suggestions in regard to election.

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## Organization of Surveillance Teams

Experience in the April, 1946 elections, had indicated that surveillance team organization of one officer, one enlisted man, and one interpreter was eminently satisfactory; this pattern was therefore duplicated during April, 1947, with personnel being drawn from military government teams, 8th Army tactical troops, FEAF units, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, and the U.S. Navy military government component in Yokosuka.

Although prefectures varied considerably in size and population, the average prefecture had between 800 and 900 polling places, with about 1 in every 4 polling places designated as a ballot counting station. The optimum surveillance would have covered every polling station every election, but it was apparent from the outset that this would be impossible, in view of the extreme isolation of many stations, the blanket of snow which throughout April made many towns and villages in Hokkaido, northern Honshu, and other mountainous areas inaccessible by jeep, and the large number of polling places situated on islands separated from the mainland by up to an eight hour boat trip. Conditions naturally varied from prefecture to prefecture but the law of diminishing returns indicated that approximately 50 percent coverage of polling places throughout the country was about the most that could be expected at any election without assigning a considerable number of teams which at best could cover only two to three polling places. It was anticipated, however, that by varying assignments from election to election nearly every one of the 42,000 polling places throughout the country could be reached at least once during the course of the elections.

Election day surveillance in each prefecture was under the direct supervision of the prefectural military government officer, but though methods varied from prefecture to prefecture the general pattern was the same. On the average each prefectural team had available about 25 surveillance teams, each consisting of three men, a driver, and a jeep. Prefectures were usually divided into 20-25 surveillance districts, and one or more teams assigned to each, with full responsibility for surveillance of polling and ballot counting stations. Insofar as possible teams were assigned to the same district for each of the several elections.

Several days prior to the election, team captains were briefed at military government headquarters and in turn were responsible for briefing their own teams and for determining the order in which stations would be visited. Throughout the period of elections surveillance teams remained in constant touch by telephone with election offices established in prefectural capitals and were able to refer directly to the prefectural teams any problem arising from their surveillance.

An example of surveillance organization is provided by Figure I, "Standard Surveillance Plan for Fukui Prefecture."

The following is a typical pre-surveillance check list, prepared for Military Government teams on the island of Kyushu:

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KYUSHU MILITARY GOVERNMENT REGION
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
Fukuoka, Kyushu, Japan

APO 929
24 March 1947

CHECK LIST

1. Have you allotted your observation Teams specific Polling and Counting places?

2. Have you oriented your observation Teams?

3. Do you have the allotted number of Teams?

4. How many interpreters will be available?

5. Do you have the name of each Team Captain?

6. Are your teams numbered, and vehicles so marked?

7. Have you fully oriented your own organization?

8. Do you know the head of the election administration committee?

9. Do you know how to reach him both by phone or locations?

10. Are you familiar with OD 22, 25, and "Local Elections in Japan, 1947"?

11. Have observation Teams made a reconnaissance?

12. Have you disseminated information for publicity, as set forth in Par 4 a, b, c, d, of OD 22, Eighth Army?

13. Do all observation Team members know that they will be unarmed?

14. Do tactical observation Teams know they will be in their assigned areas twelve hours in advance of opening of polls?

15. Do tactical observation Teams know they will cover same locations at each election?

16. Do you fully understand your requirements for reports:
    (a) Major cities (over 100,000) on separate report.
    (b) Prefectural Report (based on observers' reports).
    (c) Submission of 4 copies of election bulletins on those running on National Ticket.

17. Do you understand that all complaints received will be recorded by you and then the complainant referred to Japanese authorities for correction?

18. SCAP phones for election use are Jockey 25347, 22728, 22352;
    Region phone, Japanese, 36041
    I Corps phone, Jackson 26494

FIGURE ONE




STANDARD SURVEILLANCE PLAN FOR FUKUI PREFECTURE

A typical election surveillance plan. Fukui Prefecture was divided into 25 Election Surveillance Districts and one or more teams assigned to each. District boundaries were based on population and the existing road net. Numbers indicate number of polling places in each district. Dots indicate polling places examined by surveillance teams on 25 Apr. 526 polling places were examined out of a total of 548.

Excerpts from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force Operation Orders for the April Election are typical of preliminary surveillance team arrangements throughout all prefectures:

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OCCUPATION FORCE

Headquarters
18 March 1947

INTENTION

The British Commonwealth Occupation Force will assist US Military Government in the observation and supervision of the Japanese elections within the BCOF area of responsibility.

METHOD

General Outline

(a) The coverage of each election will be phased as follows :-

PHASE 1 - Pre-election coverage

PHASE 2 - Election Day coverage

PHASE 3 - Post-election coverage

These phases will of necessity overlap from one election to the next.

(b) Army formations are responsible for the coordination of the coverage plan within their own areas of responsibility, except in the island of SHIKOKU.

(c) Army formations and BCAIR will provide Observer Teams to assist Military Government upon each phase of election. These teams will operate over the widest possible area, including outlying islands.

Coordination of coverage plan

(a) CHUGOKU Region

(i) Army formations are responsible for the coordination of the coverage plan for each prefecture within their areas of responsibility, in conjunction with US Military Government

(ii) For the purpose of Election Coverage, the Base Area will be included in the area of responsibility of 34 Aust Inf Bde. 34 Aust Inf Bde will arrange mutually with Brit Com Base for the provision of any Observer Teams required.

(iii) Special Overprint Election Maps are being issued separately showing the special areas to be covered by Observer Teams containing European interpreters.

(iv) Close liaison will be established throughout with US Military Government Teams, who will advise as to the allotment of all Observer Teams to areas, and will brief Formation representatives, who will in turn brief their own Observer Teams.

(b) SHIKOKU Region

(i) HQ SHIKOKU Mil Gov Region is responsible for the coordination of the coverage plan for the island of SHIKOKU, in conjunction with 34 Aust Inf Bde.

(ii) 34 Aust Inf Bde will assist by the provision of Interpreter Observer Teams.

(iii) HQ SHIKOKU Mil Gov Region will issue maps to and brief all Observer Teams for SHIKOKU island.

Provision and Types of Observer Teams

(a) General

(i) To ensure the maximum practicable coverage, Formations will provide as many Observer Teams as possible.

(ii) Brit and Ind Div and 2 NZEF (Japan) will arrange mutually with BCAIR for the employment of Air Force Observer Teams provided from the Air Stations within their respective areas of responsibility.

(iii) Observer Teams will consist of :-

Interpreter Observer Teams

Non-Interpreter Observer Teams.

(b) Interpreter Observer Teams

(i) An Interpreter Observer Team is one which contains an interpreter, who may be either British or Japanese.

(ii) It will consist of a minimum of one European interpreter, or one Japanese interpreter accompanied by a British person.

(iii) Interpreter Observer Teams will take part in Phases 1, 2 and 3.

(iv) Attached at Appendix A is a list showing the allotment to Army Formation of : -

CSDIC personnel
FS personnel

For the purpose of overall election coverage, some CSDIC personnel at present allotted to Formations are being re-allotted under instructions issued separately. Personnel at present with the BCAIR will be included in this re-allotment, but as far as possible they will operate with BCAIR Observer Teams. Formations will inform HQ BCOF by 25 Mar 47 when and where these personnel should report.

(v) From within the resources made available to them, and from their own Japanese speaking troops, Formations will provide as many Interpreter Observer Teams as possible.

(vi) Teams containing British interpreters will be specially allotted as follows :-

HIROSHIMA - 30 Teams (includes Base Area)
YAMAGUCHI - 18 "
OKAYAMA - 18 "
TOTTORI - 12 "
SHIMANE - 12 "
KAGAWA -)
EHIME -) 25 "
KOCHI -)
TOKUSHIMA -)

(c) Non-Interpreter Observer Teams

(i) A Non-Interpreter Observer Team is one which contains NO Japanese language speaker.

(ii) It will consist of two or more personnel, and will operate only on Phase 2 (Election Day).

(iii) Its activities will be confined to observation of the conduct of the elections at the polling booths.

(iv) Formations will provide the maximum number of Non-Interpreter Observer Teams necessary to supplement the Interpreter Teams

Tasks of Observer Teams

(a) General

Observer Teams will :-

(i) Cover their allotted areas in accordance with sub-paras (b) - (d) below.

(ii) Refer for correction to the proper local Japanese authorities all violations or delinquencies in the administration laws which may come to their notice .

(iii) Render reports in accordance with instructions below.

(iv) Wear on the left arm an arm band, which will be issued separately, inscribed in Japanese "SENKYO KANSHI-IN" (ELECTION EXAMINER).

(v) Particularly refrain from displaying any arms, sticks, or other weapons which might be considered as being weapons of intimidation.

(b) Phase 1 - Pre-election Coverage

(i) Pre-election coverage will begin on 1 Apr 47

(ii) Interpreter Observer Teams will cover the areas allotted to them and carry out the tasks outlined in the pamphlet "Local Elections in JAPAN (1947)", Chapter 1, (Attached as Appendix B), and in "Pre-election Check List" (attached as Appendix C).

(c) Phase 2 - Election Day Coverage

(i) Interpreter Observer Teams will visit at least twice daily on each Election Day as many polling places as practicable, and will carry out the tasks outlined in the pamphlet "Local Elections in Japan (1947)" Chapter 1 (attached as Appendix B), and in "Election Day Check List" (Attached as Appendix D).

(ii) Non-Interpreter Observer Teams will observe the conduct of the election at as many polling places as possible.

(iii) The approximate number of polling places is as follows : -

(Omitted).

The exact location of polling places will be notified by US Mil Gov Teams to Army Formations ten days prior to the first election.

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(iv) Formations will allot a serial number to each polling place within their areas for subsequent reference and identification in reports, and will inform US Mil Gov Teams, with copy to HQ BCOF, the serial numbers of the polling places allotted to each named Observer Team.

(d) Phase 3 - Post Election Coverage

Separate instructions will be issued later.

ADMINISTRATION

(a) Formations are responsible for the maintenance of their own Observer Teams, including those allotted to SHIKOKU. Teams will be provided with transport, and carry necessary rations, water, POL, bedding etc.

(b) Jeep transport will be provided as far as possible.

(c) Formations will submit demands to HQ BCOF for any additional watercraft required.

Accommodation will be arranged where necessary in accordance with Appendix D to HQ BCOF Q/707/Maint of 10 Feb 47.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

Reports

(a) General

(i) The following proformae are attached as Appendices :-

Appendix E - Pre-election/Election Day Report

Appendix F - Post Election Report Form

(To be issued later)

Attention is particularly directed to para 1 (b) of the instructions on the reverse of the Report Form. Reports will show clearly, by use of the correct block of numbers, the composition of the Team originating the Report.

(ii) Reports will be rendered by the fastest possible means in accordance with the following subparas. Where practicable, reports will be submitted daily.

(b) CHUGOKU Region

(i) Interpreter Observer Teams will submit reports to the Formation HQ concerned. Formations will consolidate all reports for each prefecture and forward them to the appropriate US Mil Gov Team, with copy to HQ BCOF. Brit and Ind Div may delegate responsibility for the consolidation of reports for the prefectures of TOTTORI and SHIMANE to battalions, if desired.

(ii) US Mil Gov Observer Teams will submit one copy of their reports to the Formation concerned for information.

(c) SHIKOKU Region

Interpreter Observer Teams will submit reports to HQ SHIKOKU Mil Gov Region who will forward copies of consolidated reports to the HQ 34 Aust Inf Bde and HQ BCOF.

(d) Any breach in the administration of the election laws and any corrective action taken will be reported to HQ BCOF by the most rapid means available, with copy to the local US Military Government Team.

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## Observing and Reporting

Three factors combined to make election day surveillance in 1947 more difficult than in 1946: (1) doubling of the number of polling places; (2) decrease in the number of Allied personnel available for surveillance duties; and (3) the great increase in the number of elections.

The average number of polling places in 1947 totaled 42,617 as contrasted to 21,089 in 1946.

In 1946 a total of five American divisions, in addition to the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, were drawn upon for surveillance duties; in 1947 only four divisions, plus the BCOF, were available, the 2nd Marine Division having returned to the United States.

Only one election had been held in 1946; four and in some prefectures five were held this year. Where it had been possible to spare large numbers of personnel for two or three days last year, an entirely different problem was created by the necessity of utilizing surveillance teams throughout most of the month of April.

Despite these problems, however, average election surveillance in 1947 nearly doubled that of 1946, from the standpoint of the number of separate polling places visited. As opposed to coverage of approximately 12,000 out of 21,089 polling places in 1946, 1947 totals were as follows. Both years, of course, many of the stations listed were covered twice in each election and some three times.

| Election | Average No. Polling Places | Number of Teams | No. Polling Places Surveyed | Pct. Polling Places Surveyed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| April 5 | 42,617 | 1,399 | 20,972 | 49.2 |
| April 20 | 42,617 | 1,390 | 22,005 | 51.6 |
| April 25 | 42,617 | 1,388 | 22,237 | 52.1 |
| April 30 | 42,617 | 1,354 | 21,166 | 49.6 |

As contrasted to the surveillance each election in 1947 of approximately half of all the polling places in Japan surveillance of ballot counting stations averaged 54 percent for each election:

| Election | Average No. Ballot Counting Stations | Number of Teams | No. Ballot Counting Stations Visited | Pct. Ballot Counting Stations Visited |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| April 5 | 11,063 | 1,399 | 5,942 | 53.7 |
| April 20 | 11,063 | 1,390 | 6,023 | 54.4 |
| April 25 | 11,063 | 1,388 | 5,905 | 53.3 |
| April 30 | 11,063 | 1,354 | 6,059 | 54.7 |

In all instances surveillance included not only inspection of procedures but also affordance of opportunities for citizens to apprise election teams of any complaints they had with respect to the conduct of the stations. Inasmuch as election laws permitted each candidate to be represented at each polling place and each ballot counting station by one representative, ample opportunity was thus afforded all candidates to bring any election irregularity immediately to the attention of Occupation personnel.

The check sheets which follow indicate the actual scope of coverage required at each voting and ballot counting station. It will be noted that visits were not perfunctory but included an examination of arrangements and procedures as well as contact with election officials and representatives of the candidates.

FIGURE TWO

Comparative Number and Disposition of Polling Places in Sapporo, Hokkaido, in 1946 and 1947 Elections.

FIGURE TWO

Comparative Number and Disposition of Polling Places in Sapporo, Hokkaido, in 1946 and 1947 Elections.




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## POLLING STATION CHECK LIST

Surveillance Team #_____

Prefecture_____District_____

Polling Place_____

Date_____Number of Visits____

Time of Visits_____

1. General arrangement of polling places
   (Excellent .....
   (Fair .....
   (Poor .....

2. General management of polling place
   (Excellent .....
   (Fair .....
   (Poor .....

3. Number of registered voters .....

4. Number of officials .....

5. Number of watchers .....

6. Any appreciable delays in voting
   (Yes .....
   (No .....

7. Number of Police in immediate vicinity of polling place .....

8. Any violations of election laws noted?

| | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| Improper disqualification of voters | ... | .. |
| Coercion | ... | .. |
| Soliciting for votes | ... | .. |
| Failure to post list of candidates in front of poll | ... | .. |
| Improper handling of marked ballots by officials | ... | .. |
| Interference with free or secret voting | ... | .. |
| Interference with access to polls | ... | .. |
| Failure to maintain minutes | ... | .. |
| Others (explain) | ... | .. |
| | ... | .. |

9. Any complaints made to surveillance team
   (Yes .....
   (No .....

10. If answers to either 8 or 9 are affirmative, describe action taken.....
.....

11. General comments.....
.....

Signature of reporting officer.....
Rank.....

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# BALLOT COUNTING STATION CHECK LIST

Surveillance Team #___

Prefecture_____District_____Polling Place_____

Date_____Number of Visits_____Time of Visits_____

1. General arrangement of station (Excellent ___ (Fair ___ (Poor ___

2. General Management of station (Excellent ___ (Fair ___ (Poor ___

3. Number of officials ___

4. Number of watchers ___

5. Number of spectators ___

6. Number of police in immediate vicinity ___

7. Any violation of election laws noted

| | Yes | No |
|---|---|---|
| Improper methods of counting | ___ | ___ |
| Spectators excluded from counting | ___ | ___ |
| Failure to maintain minutes | ___ | ___ |

Others (Explain)_____

8. Any complaints made to surveillance team (Yes ___ (No ___

9. If answers to either 7 or 8 are affirmative, describe action taken:

_____

_____

10. Comments_____

_____

Signature of reporting officer_____

Rank_____

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Roles of U.S. Army, BCOF and U.S. Navy.

Since responsibility for surveillance of elections was delegated to Commanding General Eighth Army, and through him to senior military goverrment officers in each prefecture, the principal burden of surveillance fell on U.S. Army units: Eighth Army Military Government and assigned teams from 1st Cavalry Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 24th Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division, assisted in some prefectures by units of the Far East Air Forces. In Western Honshu and the city of Yokosuka, principal assistance in surveillance was provided, respectively, by British Commonwealth Occupation Forces and by the United States Navy.

To all these units, which, for from four to eight weeks assumed in addition to their normal duties all those associated with election surveillance, high commendation is due. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that although upwards of 4500 Occupation personnel participated in the extended program of surveillance, not a single criticism of the action of such personnel has been received from any source whatsoever.

British Commonwealth Occupation Forces.

The British Commonwealth Occupation Forces have an area of responsibility covering nine prefectures, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Okayama, Tottori, Shimane, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi and Tokushima. However the military government activities within the BCOF area are uniformly the same as for other parts of Japan. Responsibilities are centered (1) in the Shikoku Regional Team at Takamatsu which supervises the four prefectural teams in Shikoku, and (2) in the Chugoku Regional Team at Kure which supervises the five prefectural teams in southern Honshu. These two regional teams, because of being in the British area, report directly to Headquarters, Eighth Army as does BCOF Headquarters itself.

The BCOF Forces assisted the Military Government teams in observation and supervision of the Japanese elections. Work of coverage was divided into pre-election surveys, election day observations and post-election surveys. For the prefectures of Hiroshima, Ehime, Kagawa, Kochi and Tokushima observer teams were staffed with the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade, Yamaguchi Prefecture with the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Forces (JAPAN) and Okayama, Tottori and Shimane with the 268th Infantry Brigade Group. British Commonwealth Air Forces were given the responsibility of forming observer teams for surveillance of areas in the vicinity of BCAIR stations at Iwakuni and Bofu in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Miho in Tottori Prefecture. These BCAIR observer teams forwarded their reports to the regular Army Formation Teams. The actual number of observer teams from Army Formation exceeded the numbers required in an early operation order and were as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Hiroshima | 32 |
| Okayama | 18 |
| Tottori | 12 |
| Shimane | 12 |
| Yamaguchi | 39 |
| Ehime ) | |
| Kagawa ) | 25 |
| Kochi ) | |
| Tokushima) | |

The real work of surveillance and surveying was carried on by these teams from Army Formation but on election days over 500 non-interpreter observer teams were employed. These consisted of two or more British personnel whose activities were confined to observance of the conduct of the elections at the polling booths. Because of transportation difficulties in general and conditions in the outlying mountainous regions in particular, the majority of observer teams were transported by jeep. Their continuous traveling gave great coverage to all cities and towns and most all villages in the outlying areas. The observer teams operated for approximately 35 days. Most reported violations were corrected on the spot because they were of minor importance and were caused through ignorance on the part of the candidates and voters and not through wilful violation of the election laws.

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It was apparent from the observer teams' comments that in the majority of districts outside the main cities and towns, the Japanese people manifested most interest in the election of their own chiefs and assemblymen. Thus the evidence in the BCOF area demonstrated as did other parts in Japan that the people were mainly concerned with the candidates who would become officials to influence their everyday activities directly.

The United States Navy.

Yokosuka was one of the principal bases of the Japanese Navy; after the surrender it was occupied by the United States Navy and is at present the principal base for fleet activities in Japan. Along with its other responsibilities the Navy also exercises military government authority over a small area which corresponds roughly to the city of Yokosuka.

Navy Military Government jurisdiction applies to a population of about 225,000. Both the population and area being relatively small, military government officers have been able consistently to maintain an intimacy of contact with the community.

There were 40 polling places in the area and all were visited on each of the election days at least once and many of them two or three times.

No untoward incidents marked any of the elections, nor were any irregularities observed at any of the polls or ballot counting stations. Interest in the various elections paralleled that reported in other parts of Japan, with greatest interest being manifest in the elections for local assemblies and chief executives and the least in the election of members of the House of Councillors.

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MEASURES TO PUBLICIZE ELECTIONS

Occupation Forces

Japanese

Radio

Motion Pictures

Government Agencies

Press

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## MEASURES TO PUBLICIZE ELECTIONS

Occupation Forces

An intensive program of political education, designed to achieve the twin objectives of helping electors to cast their ballots intelligently and to stimulate participation by all eligible voters, was launched in February.

a. A series of sixteen press conferences was conducted during the period from mid-February to 25 April. During the first month SCAP spokesmen discussed such subjects as the people's sovereignty, voting as a primary responsibility of the people, the people's responsibility for good government, the imperative need for an informed electorate and for independent voting, and essential qualifications of candidates for elective office. Later, immediately prior to the various elections, headquarters officials spoke concerning the duties and responsibilities of prefectural and local government executives and assemblymen, functions of the House of Representatives and of the House of Councillors. Voting techniques were also discussed.

A supplemental conference series helped to explain the objectives and the methods of the purge program, which was directly related to preparations for the elections.

Despite the severe paper shortage the press devoted extensive space to these conferences and also commented frequently and with considerable discernment on the subjects and principles under discussion.

Similar press conferences, many of them informal, were conducted by Military Government units throughout the country as part of an over-all program to stimulate intelligent voting. Military Government also used the newspapers to publish "open letters" and day to day notices, all designed to encourage serious and thoughtful consideration of election issues.

Typical of these were the following statements, issued prior to the elections by the Commanding Officer of the Saitama Military Government Team:

SAITAMA MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAM
APO 201

SUBJECT: Democratic Elections.

TO : The People of Saitama.

1. In recent elections during which Land Reform Commissions were elected in the Machi and Mura of Saitama, it was disappointing to find that in the great majority of cases, no elections were held because agreement had been reached by the various groups before the elections were ever held.

2. One explanation of this phenomenon is a well known characteristic of the Japanese people, that of "Saving Face". It is reported that individuals do not want to be known as unsuccessful candidates and will not run for an election unless assured of success in the election.

3. This "Face Saving" has no place in a democratic election. For one thing, each election is a school in which potential politicians learn their lessons. If there are no schools, there are no lessons. Another objection is the fact that unless the people at large elect their candidates, they cannot hold those candidates responsible for their post-election activities.

4. It was recently brought to my attention that in one of the major cities of the prefecture all the political parties were trying to agree on a single candidate before the election. This is foolish. The place for the selection of an executive to be made is at the polls by the people at large, not by a small group of persons who take it upon themselves to pick and choose for the people. What promise does such a candidate have to make to the people at large, and what blame can those people place upon him if he fails to live up to their expectations? Furthermore what training does such an

election give to the going and promising men in these political parties for future political struggles? Certainly no democratic electorates will want to give their rights away so carelessly.

5. The government of a democratic nation is for, by and of the people. The voters have no right to delegate their power of selection to any small group. If they do this, they are failing to meet their obligations and deserve what may befall them, non-representative government. Let every man and woman who has the vote, exercise that right and make the coming election a truly democratic one.

TIMOTHY J. RYAN
Lt. Col., Infantry
Commanding

* * * *

SUBJECT: Election Law Violations.

TO : The People of Saitama Prefecture.

1. It is essential that in the coming elections every voter make himself responsible for seeing that the election is conducted in a free and fair manner.

2. Any voter who observes violations of the election laws should immediately refer the incident with a full statement of facts to his local election administration committee. These committees are your representatives, their duty is to insure that violators of the election laws are punished. They can only do this if they have the cooperation of all citizens.

3. The following is a list of common election law violations which unscrupulous candidates may be expected to commit. Be alert for any of these violations and report them to your election administration committee:

a. Privileges granted to favored candidates.

b. Unlawful exclusions from the registration lists.

c. Police interference with legal campaign activity.

d. Efforts of either established or petty political machines to buy votes by bribes of scarce commodities or cash.

e. Excessive campaign expenditures, in cash or in kind, or failure to report campaign expenses. Excessive contributions by individuals.

f. Denials of rightful candidacies; improper candidacies.

g. Dishonest tabulation or reporting of results.

h. Failure of authorities to prosecute violators.

4. As a means of democratic training for both the citizens and officials involved, all election law violations should be referred at once to the Japanese election administration committee. Military Government is going to observe the elections very closely from the beginning of the campaign until the final votes are counted. If after reporting a violation, you are sure that nothing is being done against a violator by Japanese officials, do not hesitate to report the incident to Military Government.

5. I have repeatedly asked the people of Saitama not to use the anonymous letter in reporting law violations to Military Government. It is particularly important when reporting election law violations that you give the complete facts regarding the violation, the time, place, persons involved, money involved, etc., and that you be willing to sign your name to your report.

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It is your duty, if it becomes necessary, to act as a witness against those who are attempting to prevent the election from being a free and fair expression of the will of the people.

TIMOTHY J. RYAN
Lt. Col., Infantry
Commanding

In every case, however, SCAP and Military Government teams were concerned with impressing electors with the importance of their responsibilities as citizens. Every care was taken to maintain strict neutrality concerning election issues or political personalities.

b. One of the SCAP press conferences was filmed by a major movie producer. The resulting twenty minute film, which emphasized the responsibility of citizens to participate in all the elections, was shown in most movie theaters throughout the country immediately prior to the elections.

c. SCAP also gave assistance to the Broadcasting Company of Japan in developing a series of daily radio programs, likewise designed to educate voters and to stimulate widespread participation in the elections.

These general educational programs were designed to reach listeners of all interest groups: farmers, fishermen, women, shut-ins and hospital patients, repatriates, the newly-enfranchised, rank-and-file voters.

Speakers included the Prime Minister, the President of the House of Peers, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, labor leaders, representatives of farm unions, of the Fishermen's Association, Japan Red Cross, YWCA, political leaders, prominent women, the Procurator General, professors and cabinet ministers.

In the case of radio, too, a special attempt was made to explain the purposes and the methods of the purge, to emphasize that the way was being prepared for the emergence of new leadership truly representative of the people's will.

d. GHQ also published a Political Affairs Bulletin, for distribution twice monthly to military government units in the field, in which major attention was given to the elections. The Bulletin's purpose was dual, to inform Military Government personnel and to serve as the basis for local education programs. Most Bulletin material was furnished in both English and Japanese, so that it might be made immediately available by military government teams to local newspapers, radio stations, schools, or community groups. Reports from the field indicate that most of the material was widely and effectively disseminated.

Military government teams also conducted pre-election meetings during which representatives of women's clubs and civic groups were urged to devote their energies to getting out the votes of such electors as had indicated only slight interest in their duties as citizens.

Arrangements were made for public gatherings during which Election Administration Committees explained election procedures.

Public meetings were also scheduled to afford candidates - of all political persuasions - an opportunity to discuss election issues. Care was taken to avoid any suggestion of favoritism by Military Government.

Military government units also made use of hundreds of Civil Information and Education bulletin boards throughout the country to post public notices concerning the elections. In many instances loudspeakers at railway stations were used to urge the people to cast their votes.

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Japanese Publicity

The Japanese radio, motion pictures, government agencies and press gave the April elections more intensive publicity than had been accorded any previous election in Japan's history.

## Radio

The Broadcasting Corporation of Japan made radio time available to all candidates participating in the April elections. SCAP advised BCJ concerning program scheduling, but the basic time allocation formula was recommended by the inter-party Negotiating Conference of the House of Representatives. An objective decision was required since BCJ, as a non-profit public service corporation, was committed to a policy of complete neutrality and non-preference. No time was available for sale to political parties or individuals.

All candidates for posts as prefectural governors, whether independents or party candidates, were given opportunity to broadcast three times to their respective constituencies. The time available in each prefecture varied slightly, depending on the number running for election, but all candidates for the same post were accorded equal broadcast privileges. Each candidate used an average of about 30 minutes of broadcast time.

Radio time was also assigned to candidates running for office as mayors of cities of 100,000 or more population. The limited time available made it impossible to expand this service to include mayoralty candidates of all cities.

The provision of the election law requiring that a candidate for executive position must receive a minimum of three-eighths of the total vote cast necessitated a number of run-off elections on 15 April. All gubernatorial candidates and all large city mayoralty candidates in these elections were granted 23 minutes of supplementary broadcast time.

Each candidate for the national constituency of the House of Councillors was allowed time for two broadcasts over a nation-wide station network. Equal time, on a prefectural basis, was allotted to prefectural district candidates.

Similar time allocations were made in behalf of all candidates for the House of Representatives. Since, however, election districts were relatively small these broadcasts were directed only to the respective constituencies of the various candidates.

Additional time, however, was allotted to political parties on a national basis. During the period prior to the Diet elections each of the five parties (Liberal, Democratic, Social Democratic, People's Cooperative, and Communist) utilized seven 15 minute periods for presentation and discussion of party platforms. This arrangement was made specifically in compliance with the recommendation of the Negotiating Conference.

The enormous number of candidates for local and prefectural assemblies precluded the possibility of making broadcast time available to all. However, most prefectural assembly candidates and those running as large city assembly representatives (100,000 population or over) were each granted time for a single five minute broadcast. (Not all took advantage of the opportunity, but the time was set aside for them.) In the few cities or prefectures in which time limitations made such allocations impossible (Tokyo's JOAK, for example, serves five prefectures which had hundreds of candidates) it was necessary to resort to a mere listing of candidates with brief biographical information concerning each.

In addition to these political broadcasts by candidates BCJ sponsored a number of general education broadcasts such as a series to acquaint voters with voting procedures, based on material provided by the Home Ministry.

Throughout the election period broadcasters also presented a daily average of seven brief announcements reminding voters of their duty to go to the polls each election day, and the imperative need for responsible and intelligent voting.

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BCJ also broadcast a number of daily announcements warning voters to guard against possible fraud or illegal attempts to influence elections that might be perpetrated by such agencies as the tonari-gumi, which had been stripped of all bureaucratic authority.

In the huge task of developing and scheduling these election radio programs Military Government personnel throughout the country gave all possible assistance whenever required by BCJ. In particular, care was taken to ensure that no preferential treatment, whether by mistake or oversight, was accorded any individual or political group.

BCJ earned special commendation for its high sense of public responsibility when, immediately following the elections, it rejected a proposed Diet appropriation of Y8,000,000, offered in payment for radio time devoted to election broadcasts, on the ground that it was merely fulfilling its obligations to owners of radio receivers, who by payment of annual license fees, subsidize an independent agency devoted to public service. By its action BCJ established the principle of its direct responsibility to the Japanese people free of government direction or political influence.

## Motion Pictures

News reel companies released a number of films in which attention was given to general election coverage and to the campaigning of prominent candidates. Of special interest was a movie made of a "Man-of-the Street" broadcast, during which then State Minister Tokujiro Kanamori addressed a street gathering to explain the purge program as an essential preliminary to the emergence of new political leadership. This film was noteworthy since it depicted, for the first time in Japan's history, a cabinet minister discussing government policies directly with the people.

From 15 March to 30 April, a total of 1,537,510 feet of film was distributed to theaters as newsreels of which a total of 532,917 feet covered the subjects of elections and purge. In other words, during this period, approximately one-third of the newsreel footage was devoted to election topics.

The Nippon Motion Picture Company produced a two-reel documentary on elections entitled "For Whom Would You Cast Your Vote?". This picture was acclaimed by the political parties and was exhibited by many local organizations as well as in regular commercial chain and independent theaters. It is estimated to have been seen by a total audience of two million persons.

The four major motion picture companies placed "top titles" (motion picture titles preceding the main title picture) on every Japanese picture, whether old or new, to be released after 15 March until 30 April. These top titles read as follows:

"It is the privilege and duty of every citizen in a democratic nation to vote".

"Study your candidates and their platforms, and vote without fail."

"Election dates are: 5 April - for Governors, Mayors, and Headmen; 20 April - for House of Councillors; 25 April - for House of Representatives; 30 April - for Assemblymen. Vote without fail!"

Comprehensive surveys undertaken by the motion picture industry indicate that the election titles and the newsreels were seen by approximately 50,000,000 persons.

## Government Agencies

The Home Ministry prepared a series of posters graphically emphasizing the voter's responsibility for independent and intelligent participation in the elections. Eight hundred thousand were placed in railroad stations, in public buildings and on community bulletin boards throughout the country. In addition, the Ministry issued a series of press releases timed to precede each of the elections, containing detailed information relating to election procedures and administration, with a special effort made to indicate to voters

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where they might have access to detailed information on all candidates.

Bulletin boards also carried listings of all persons affected by the purge and therefore ineligible to hold public office. This means of acquainting the people of Japan concerning the scope of the purge program served also to point up the duty of the electorate to select responsible leadership, worthy and qualified to participate in the re-creation of Japan as a democratic nation.

To reduce abstention election administrative officials placed signboards on public conveyances urging voters to go to the polls. In many communities sirens and bells were rung at specified intervals to attract voters. Extensive use was also made of loudspeakers in railroad stations, at street intersections, on trucks.

## Press

The Japanese press devoted an extraordinary amount of attention to the four elections; for a period of two months the elections constituted the number one news story in Japan's press.

Not only did the entire Tokyo press, followed by many prefectural papers, stress the importance and the revolutionary nature of the April balloting, but on the eve of every election the press unanimously insisted upon the essential need for every Japanese citizen to cast his free and independent ballot.

When it seemed likely that popular interest in the House of Councillors might be less than the interest in the House of Representatives, the press, especially YOMIURI (16 April) and AKAHATA (15 April), called for special efforts to be made to vote for candidates who would properly represent the voters.

This attention was, at times, expressed at the sacrifice of what might otherwise have been regarded as pressing news, and in spite of the great shortage of newsprint.

During the last week of February, for instance, the prefectural press, far in advance of election day or even of the formal opening of the campaign, stressed the regional elections as Japan's first opportunity to establish local self-government.

Later, during the last ten days of March, the presentation of the new election law, with the consequent filibuster of the Socialists in the Diet, and the dramatic incidents of the closing of the Diet sessions, offered topics that attracted widespread editorial and news attention with the press continuing in its limited space, to emphasize the importance of the elections.

Comparisons with past periods of Japanese political history were unavoidable. One of the best editorials on this subject appeared in ASAHI 1 March which pointed out that in the past, because of inadequate local autonomy, Japanese democratic tendencies, whenever allowed to exist by militarist authorities, had been merely nominal and that, in consequence, the people had never enjoyed an opportunity to display even rudimentary political aptitude.

The paper proceeded to point out that, under SCAP guidance, Japan had achieved complete freedom to choose its officials and to conduct open, fair and honest elections.

SHIN HOCHI, on the same day, asserted that the results of the elections would virtually determine the fundamental character of future Japanese democracy.

This was a popular appeal. Japanese papers, as a whole, were fully conscious of the epoch-making nature of the elections in which voters were to participate. Some, like WAKAYAMA SHIMBUN (23 February), and NANSHIN NICHI NICHI (1 March), saw an opportunity for Japan to demonstrate its entire freedom from ancient feudalistic concepts. Others, as for instance,

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NAGASAKI MINYU (26 March), hailed the opportunity to convert government officials, hitherto appointed, into public servants chosen by and responsible to the people. YAMAGATA SHIMBUN (10 March) went so far as to say that the elections would have "a historical significance greater than that of the Meiji Restoration", while YOMIURI (19 March) said "The April elections will decide the fate of our country."

Every major Tokyo newspaper devoted a large amount of valuable space prior to each election to urge citizens to vote.

Often these appeals were based upon the plea that all the world was watching the progress of democracy in Japan. According to HOKKOKU SHIMBUN (3 March), failure to take part in a democratic election would shame Japan. OITA GODO SHIMBUN (23 March) added that argument, later taken up by many other papers, that "An early peace conference depends upon Japan's quick rebirth as a democratic nation as evidenced by the creation of an ideal administration in the coming balloting". OKAYAMA GODO SHIMBUN and SHIMANE SHIMBUN, (both 2 March), described the elections as corner stones in Japan's peaceful revolution.

Newspapers devoted much space to the problem of the absentee vote. During the totalitarian regime, great stress had been placed upon the participation of each citizen in the balloting process, since by this means a supposed popular support might be alleged for the militaristic and ultra-nationalistic factions. Under a system of free voting, some newspapers feared, voters might refrain from visiting the polls.

The press showed great concern about the possibility that, due to the multiplicity of elections, the need for tending farms or for working in the office or factory, or for any other cause, some voters might neglect their civic privileges.

Many reasons were given why abstention might occur.

Early in the campaign some journals, notably IBARAGI SHIMBUN (2 February), HYUGU NICHI NICHI, SHIKOKU SHIMBUN and SHIN IWATE (all 24 February) warned that holding all the elections in a single month might result in progressive loss of interest. This argument was not repeated later and, in point of fact, proved unimportant when actual results showed that the last election in the series was, in reality, better attended than any other.

Two small papers, HOKKAI NICHI NICHI (25 May), and JIMMIN (9 and 11 April), advanced arguments peculiar to themselves. The former alleged that Japanese lacked zeal for democratic reconstruction -- a statement countered by the unanimous testimony of other journals -- while the latter termed abstention "a kind of revolt against democracy".

More realistic reasons were advanced by editorial writers. A paper shortage that restricted the issuance of election bulletins seemed important to NAGASAKI NICHI NICHI (25 April), to GIFU TIMES and OSAKA SHIMBUN (both 23 April), to ASAHI (10 April) and to numerous other journals. This made it difficult for voters to obtain information concerning candidates and issues, JIJI SHIMPO (10 April) said.

Preoccupation with food problems was mentioned by JIJI SHIMPO (10 April) by WAKAYAMA SHIMBUN (27 March) and by SHIN EHIME (26 March) as contributing factors, a statement that many other papers echoed both before and after election.

Confusion arising out of a new election system, especially one involving the use of dual ballots as required in three elections, undoubtedly discouraged a certain number of electors, particularly those who this year voted for the first time. This reason was advanced by NAGOYA TIMES (17 April), CHIBA SHIMBUN (20 April), SHINANO MAINICHI and SHIN IWATE (both 23 April), among others.

Japanese political immaturity, a somewhat vague accusation never expressly defined, was an explanation advanced by SHIN HOCHI (6 April), JIJI SHIMPO (11 April ) FUKUI SHIMBUN (28 March), a paper which seemed to feel that the

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Government had been at fault in not personally notifying each family of exactly who the candidates were and for what they stood -- and by JIHJIN (11 April). SEIJI SHIMBUN, a political organ, (9 April) placed responsibility for abstention upon the city intelligentsia, while MAINICHI (6 April) echoed the earlier complaint of SHIMANE SHIMBUN (23 February) that women showed too little interest in political affairs.

Nevertheless, as the press did not forget to point out, abstentions from voting, while higher in one instance than the average of recent Japanese elections, were in every case much less than the usual abstention rate in the United States or in other democratic nations.

Prior to the elections fears were frequently expressed that excessive campaign expenses would be required of a successful candidate. IBARAGI SHIMBUN (7 March) and JOMO SHIMBUN (9 March) published articles stating that big business interests, semi-official industries and banks which in the past had financed candidates in prewar years would be replaced, as sources of campaign funds, by new yen millionairs, black marketeers and other undesirable bosses. KYOTO SHIMBUN (7 March) and KOBE SHIMBUN (8 March) both dubbed the April elections "black market elections", while YAMAGATA SHIMBUN (28 March) and SAGA SHIMBUN (2 April) declared that election brokers and bosses were still active.

YOMIURI declared (23 March) that the new democratic Japan was a name only and that Diet members must be slaves of either the capitalists or of the party bosses. SEIJI SHIMBUN (1 April) said that bosses and bribery would decide the elections.

It is interesting in this connection that in none of these cases was any specific individual ever mentioned nor any definite instance ever cited. Nothing but vague rumor was reported and even this found no currency after election.

Neither AKAHATA, which (15 March) charged that the Liberals had a 100 million yen campaign fund nor JIHJIN which said (30 March) that the Liberal fund was twice as much, produced evidence, nor mentioned the matters following the elections. Rumored illegal use of funds was never presented in such complete detail as to be used as a basis for prosecution.

Similarly, while NIPPON YORON SHIMBUN (12 March) charged that many "war criminal bureaucrats" were running for election, it gave neither names nor localities where this was being done. The same vagueness characterized alleged "purgee activity" mentioned by SHIMATSUKE SHIMBUN (2 April) and SHIMANE SHIMBUN (30 March).

It is doubtless true, as is evidenced by the fact that the Central Screening Committee later uncovered cases of purgeable candidates, that unrecognized purgees did, in sporadic instances, campaign for election prior to their being discovered and barred, but it is equally true that blind assertions, devoid of specific detail and without either cited authority or adequate proof, were far more frequently erroneous than correct.

A notable feature of the press treatment of the campaign was the constant reiteration, beginning with DAI ICHI SHIMBUN'S editorial of 4 March, that voters should cast their ballots for parties rather than for individual candidates. This advice had its origin in the presence of a large proportion of minor party men and of Independents in the 1946 Diet and was intended to develop a feeling of responsibility among political parties themselves for the activities of their members holding office.

Among the newspapers joining this movement were NAGOYA TIMES (22 and 26 March), YUKAN KYOTO and HOKKOKU MAINICHI (both 22 March) NAGASAKI MINYU (1 April) HOKKAI TIMES, OITA GODO SHIMBUN and TOO NIPPO (all 2 April).

JIJI SHIMPO (29 April) dissented from the chorus by urging voters in prefectural and municipal assembly elections to choose candidates of ability and character rather than party men.

TOKYO SHIMBUN, SEIJI SHIMBUN and ASAHI (all 25 April) varied the appeal by attacking Independents as opposed to the principle of the party government system.

The acute shortage of newsprint made it impossible for newspapers to do more than a bare minimum to inform electors of the records of candidates for various offices. Many newspapers, however, did list the names of candidates, with brief biographical data, prior to each election.

The election for chief executives, first of the series of four, occurred immediately following a SCAP spokesman's statement that "democracy faced its greatest crisis". All the Tokyo press, and particularly ASAHI (27 March), pointed out that especial responsibility rested upon the shoulders of young people.

Following the election DAI ICHI SHIMBUN (9 April) which had campaigned vigorously for the defeat of incumbent governors on the ground that they represented bureaucratic influences, commented that the results indicated that "irresponsible promises are powerless in politics".

The House of Councillors election received special press attention. This may have been, in part, because some papers, such as TOKYO SHIMBUN, (5 March) feared that labor unions and other special interest bodies were more interested in this election than in that for the House of Representatives, a sentiment echoed by MAINICHI (20 March), or because, as ASAHI complained (19 March) voters were showing too little interest in the Councillors contest.

Many papers, such as JIJI SHIMPO (11 April), TOKYO SHIMBUN (21 April), HOKKOKU MAINICHI and YUKAN KYOTO (both 15 April) and CHUKOKU SHIMBUN, SHINANO MAINICHI and KAHOKU SHIMBUN (all 17 April) expressed great concern about this matter. All these, and many more, pleaded earnestly for careful attention to the personnel elected to the House of Councillors.

AKAHATA, Communist party organ, made a special plea to its readers to vote for proper candidates. Sanzo Nosaka, Communist leader, predicted that more Communists would be chosen for the Upper House than the Lower House.

YOMIURI played a particularly noteworthy role in this connection. Again and again virtually daily for the ten days prior to the Councillor election, YOMIURI insisted upon the vital importance of the House of Councillors. On 17 April, it pleaded for the election of scholars, a call also published on the same day by MAINICHI and CHUKOKU SHIMBUN and by ASAHI the day before election.

Failure of electors to appear in sufficient numbers, YOMIURI said 13 April, ASAHI (19 April) and AKAHATA in its pre-election issue, would result in gains for Conservative candidates, but SHIN HOCHI, (18 April) predicted that the Councillors would have a unionist and leftist tint. This, TOKYO TOMIN SHIMBUN said, the next day, would be desirable since it would make the Councillors "the most democratic parliamentary group in the world."

The actual outcome of the election pleased many papers. TOKAI YUKAN (Gifu, 26 April), expressed delight because "The Upper House has made sudden and revolutionary strides in comparison with the defunct House of Peers". NAGOYA TIMES (25 April) perceived "the beginning of a new political direction in the election of so many progressives". ASAHI and DAI ICHI SHIMBUN (23 April and 24 April) rejoiced that even the conservatives were liberal-minded representatives. MAINICHI commented (23 April) on the role played by labor and cultural organizations in procuring the success of so many Socialists and commented favorably on the rising political consciousness of urban voters.

Only TOYAMA SHIMBUN (24 April) expressed a contrary view, holding that the returns showed no change from the traditional pre-war standing of political forces.

Following the amendment of the election laws at the close of March, virtually every Japanese newspaper predicted that the result would be to increase Liberal and Democratic strength and to hamper the activities of

Socialists, Communists and Independents. Even before the revision was passed, NIHON KEIZAI (14 March) anticipated a Liberal plurality. ASAHI (18 April) repeated this prediction as it also did five days later, while, on election day morning both YOMIURI and SHIN HOCHI forecast a Liberal victory.

The election outcome obviously took editorial writers by surprise. On the day after election, all newspapers expressed satisfaction at the relatively low abstention rate, which they interpreted as a sign of heightened public interest in the selection of Diet members.

YOMIURI declared that the election "reveals progress in the democratic revolution", and said that the result proved Japan's enthusiasm for the democratic process. It was satisfied that "Japan has pursued political democracy to the present level despite the abundance of adverse conditions."

The KUMAMOTO NICHI NICHI (27 April) suggested that henceforth "political parties will lose their popular support unless they alter their programs to meet changing conditions".

Without important exception the Japanese press hailed the election results as an indication that Japanese had shown a gratifying loyalty to democratic principles. MAINICHI (23 April) declared that Japan was developing political consciousness. TOKYO TIMES and SEIJI SHIMBUN (both 24 April) remarked that while conservatives had been returned to the House of Councillors, the men elected were, as the former said, "new men of education and experience, rather than old-line land-owners and bureaucrats". SEIJI SHIMBUN expressed pleasure that the conservative Councillors were members with deep appreciation of prevailing social conditions.

NAGOYA TIMES (25 April) declared that the elections showed the beginning of a new political direction in the selection of so many progressives, while YOMIURI, on the following day, commented that progress had been made toward a democratic revolution. Amplifying YOMIURI's statement that the people had shown enthusiasm for the democratic spirit, CHUBU NIPPON (Nagoya 28 April), asserted that popular political consciousness had reached the stage of Socialism.

TOKYO TOMIN SHIMBUN (2 May) congratulated Japan on its emancipation from domination by political bosses and said that the results showed that elections had been held in a free atmosphere in which voters could express their free will.

CHUGOKU SHIMBUN (Hiroshima, 1 May) echoed these remarks and approved the "golden mean" chosen by the nation. The paper described the elections as showing that Japan had gained "a peacefully inclined and responsible government established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people."

Throughout the election campaign the Communist press expressed optimism at their prospects and satisfaction over the results obtained.

Desire of MINPO (13 March), AKAHATA (4 April) and other leftist journals for a Communist-Socialist United Front (despite AKAHATA's statement, 18 March, that the latter were purely opportunistic), was in no way damped by the failure of the Socialists to win more than four governorships, while the Communists elected none.

AKAHATA, 13 April, pointed out that while the actual election statistics indicated that Communists had polled about one percent of the vote, the total should more nearly be estimated at 16 percent, "because half the Social Democratic vote and a large number of the Independent votes were really meant for us".

MINPO (27 April), as well as YOMIURI, voiced surprise after the Representatives' election at the extent of Socialist success "despite last minute adoption of the medium district, single ballot system which had been expected to be a serious blow to reformist and radical parties."

MAINICHI reported (28 April) that Communists "were not disappointed because the democratic front showed an unexpectedly large vote."

SHIMANE SHIMBUN (Matsue) and OKAYAMA GODO SHIMBUN (both 2 May) described the election results as "a corner stone in Japan's peaceful revolution". They warned voters, however, that they "must exercise vigilance over the performance of the successful candidates." SHIANO MAINICHI (2 May) voiced the same theme by writing "If the people are unconcerned with administration after election, it can be said that they are exercising only half their rights and duties".

A most reassuring feature of the elections was that, following the election, the Japanese press contained virtually no reference whatever to evils such as had been prevalent in pre-war election campaigns.

None but rare and isolated charges appeared concerning disfranchisement (accidental or intentional) of voters qualified to cast their ballots, of the inefficiency or incapability of election officials, of fraud, irregularities, miscounting or ballot box stuffing.

A certain amount of vote buying and corruption, although far less than in previous elections, was, of course, reported, but the total number of incidents was less and the extent of the crime more restricted than in previous years.

Few, if any, charges were alleged that campaign expenses had violated the official ceilings or that money interests had played any important part in the determination of results.

Boss activity, which had been predicted by TOKYO TIMES (12 April) and dishonest practices, which EHIME SHIMBUN and IWATE SHIMBUN (both 24 April) feared might affect the House of Representatives balloting the following day, were not again mentioned in the press following the close of the campaign period.

This situation stood in sharp contrast to the experience of former years when accusations of election law violations, especially bribery and corruption, had been common phenomena of the press.

POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Political Alignments Before Election

Campaign Issues

Party Platforms

## POLITICAL AND CAMPAIGN ISSUES.

### Political Alignments Before Election.

The course of Japanese politics since the election of 1946 had been one of flexible character, reflecting an effort to meet the existing national emergency. The political parties were grouped as follows:

| Conservative | Opposition |
|---|---|
| Liberal Party | Social Democratic Party |
| Progressive Party | Co-operative Democratic Party |
| | People's Party |
| | Communist Party |

The Liberal Party, controlling the government through its Liberal Premier, majority in the Cabinet, and the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives, together with the Progressive Party, second in Diet strength, formed the coalition cabinet and established the policies of the government. During the period between the election of 1946 and March 1947, the Progressive Party closely aligned itself with the Liberal Party.

In opposing the conservative parties, the Social Democratic Party led the Co-operative Democratic Party and the People's Party and together these three parties formed a common front. The Communist Party, the smallest in Diet representation, normally voted with the other opposition parties.

On 31 March 1947, the alignment of the parties changed with the merger of the Co-operative Democratic and People's Parties, and the renaming of the Progressive Party as the Democratic Party with a change in its policies and platform.

At the close of the 92nd Diet therefore, the political parties were grouped as follows:

| Conservative | Middle-of-the-Road | Opposition | Radical |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liberal | Democratic | Social Democratic<br>People's Cooperative | Communist |

The Diet strength of the parties had changed considerably with the Democratic Party holding the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives, thanks to the new members acquired at expense of the Liberal Party, People's Cooperative Party and the Independent Club. On the eve of the 1947 elections, the Diet representation of the major political parties had changed to the following:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Democratic Party | .. | 145 |
| Liberal Party | .. | 140 |
| Social Democratic Party | .. | 98 |
| People's Cooperative Party | .. | 63 |
| Communist Party | .. | 6 |

The Democratic Party on 31 March 1947, in an effort to become the middle-of the road party in Japan, advocated policies that closely resembled the platform of the Social Democratic Party. This greatly differed from the party's former stand and alliance with the Liberal Party and appeared to be the breaking point of their relations. As a result of pre-election screening, however, the Democratic Party lost some of the leaders who tried to steer away from the Liberal Party, during the period immediately preceding the 1947 elections. Consequently, the Japanese electorate found a Democratic Party that had been greatly affected by the purge, and was torn with internal dissension.

The Social Democratic Party led the opposition throughout the historic 92nd Diet session. Existence of right wing and left wing factions and the strong influence of the latter became manifest during the unsuccessful coalition attempts of January 1947. The Social Democratic Party refused to join the Yoshida Cabinet at the time of the Cabinet's strongest criticism by the Japanese people, and thereby strengthened its position.

The People's Cooperative Party became a powerful ally of the Social Democratic Party upon completion of the merger of the Cooperative Democratic Party and People's Party. It lost 15 Diet members to the Democratic Party in March shortly after the merger, however, and entered the election campaign considerably weakened.

The Communist Party unsuccessfully attempted to align itself with the Social Democratic Party for the election campaign.. In February 1947, a sharp break had taken place in the relations between these two parties. The Social Democratic Party denounced the general strike which it felt the Communists had instigated and rejected the offers of the Chief Secretary of the Communist Party to enter the election campaign together.

The numerous Independent candidates who ran for both local and national seats were with but few exceptions strongly backed by the Liberal and Democratic Parties. In many cases, these candidates agreed to join the parties if successfully elected. Several candidates, especially Councillors, received complete support of the Social Democratic and opposition parties because the parties were unable to provide a more suitable candidate. In general, however, over 75% of the Independent candidates were supported by the conservative parties.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES: Liberal Party.

The main campaign issues as seen by the Liberal Party were as follows:

Socialism vs. Capitalism
Preparation for the Peace Treaty
Stabilization of the People's Livelihood

Candidates of the Liberal Party strongly attacked Socialism in Japan by using, as examples of government control, the present railway and communications systems. The rise in prices and apparent loss of profit existing in these systems were explained as inevitable results of government ownership and control. Nationalization of coal mines and the chemical fertilizer industries were attacked by the same argument. An improved rationing system instead, was advocated as the solution to existing shortages in the nation.

As further arguments the Liberal candidates pointed out that under Socialism the government officials would become virtual owners and the people salaried help. This would not differ from the rigid control exercised by the ruling cliques prior to the surrender.

In preparation for the Peace Treaty, the thorough democratization of Japan was urged. The unsuccessful General Strike of 1 February 1947 was cited as an internal quarrel indicative of unpreparedness for a peace treaty. The people were urged to bring harmony to the nation and stop quarrelling among themselves. Economic recovery was urged through the efforts of the people themselves. They were urged to elevate their moral standards, and to faithfully accomplish whatever was required by the Occupation. They were told to be "good losers."

The Social Democratic Party was attacked on the issue of stabilizing the people's livelihood.

It was argued that the Social Democrats planned to freeze the new yen currency, thus jeopardizing individual savings. Through this action the people would be justified in becoming suspicious of the government. As a result savings would drop. It was further pointed out that interest on war bonds would have to be paid and that the people alone were to suffer if interest on war bonds were suspended.

The Liberal Party candidates in addition pointed out that by request of the Supreme Commander, wages were being raised and efforts continued to lower prices. Many candidates emphasized the need for the people to strive for economic improvement by diligent work and wholehearted cooperation. The candidates added, however, that help from America was necessary for complete economic recovery. Two campaign slogans used were:

"Ways of Capitalism Lead to America"
"Ways of Socialism Lead to USSR".

## Democratic Party.

The main campaign issues according to the Democratic Party were:

Solidarity of the Japanese People
Scarcity of Commodities
Inflation

Candidates of the Democratic Party emphasized the need for equal participation of labor and management to bring about solidarity in the nation. Stringent economic controls (in contrast to free economy as advocated by the Liberal Party, and State control over all key industries as favored by the Social Democratic Party) were advocated to be placed temporarily over key industries. Government control in this case was to insure the procurement of scarce commodities. On economic issues the Democratic Party held a middle-of-the-road course which its members believed fitting to the needs of Japan.

Regarding inflation, the main approach to the solution of rising prices was held to be a balanced financial economy in contrast to the policies of the incumbent Finance Minister. The Democratic Party argued against registration of the new yen currency, and advocated a fixed price system.

On all three of the main issues the candidates stressed the middle-of-the-road policies of the Democratic Party and attempted to show the need for moderate policies in contrast to those of the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties.

## Social Democratic Party

The main campaign issues as seen by the Social Democratic Party were:

The Breaking of the Bottleneck of Production
and Distribution of Coal and Fertilizer
Reformation of the Taxation System
Improvement of Government Officials

Candidates reiterated the party platform advocating state control of the coal industry and nationalization of the fertilizer industry. It was argued that there was no other way to increase the output of food, lower prices and check the black market and inflation.

The attack against the Liberal and Democratic Parties on the issue of the taxation system and the solution advocated by the Social Democratic Party, was the chief source of securing votes, according to Social Democratic representatives. The reforms pledged by the party during the election campaign were to raise the tax exemption point of salaries from ¥5,000 to ¥12,000, and to tax the "new yen class" holding property and assets in excess of ¥200,000.

On the issue of the calibre of government officials, the campaigners pointed out that the Social Democratic Party had been least affected by the purge and had maintained the highest standards in its membership.

## People's Co-operative Party

The main campaign issues as seen by the People's Co-operative Party were:

To reconstruct Japan's economy by the principles of co-operatives.

To contribute to peace and civilization of the world acting on the principle of humanism.

The candidates running on the People's Co-operative Party ticket were pledged to work for the realization of a society where people wholeheartedly cooperate with each other in the spirit of brotherhood. Generally the party as a whole followed the platforms of the Social Democratic Party. The public showed great interest in the cooperative principle, especially in devastated areas such as Hiroshima.

## The Japan Communist Party

The main campaign issues as seen by the Communist Party were:

1. The overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet, together with all reactionary and conservative influences.

2. The imposition of progressive taxes on the profiteers, with the highest taxation on the profiteers in black marketing.

3. People's control over the Zaibatsu - owned enterprises and the key industries.

The Communist party sent a proposal to the Social Democratic Party on 27 February 1947, requesting a close common struggle of the two parties. It asked for cooperation from the Social Democratic Party and the disregarding of party interests. This proposal was refused.

In the 1946 election the Communist Party had strongly advocated the overthrow of the Emperor. Significantly, in the 1947 elections, the party did not mention the Emperor and in addition supported the Constitution of Japan.

PARTY PLATFORMS:

A general classification of the platforms of the five political parties for overall policies may be made as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Liberal Party | - Laissez-faire |
| Democratic Party | - Modified capitalism (Stringent government controls) |
| Social Democratic Party | - State control as a preliminary to government ownership (Key industries, coal, iron, steel, fertilizer) |
| People's Co-operative | - Co-operative unionism |
| Communist Party | - People's control of Zaibatsu-owned enterprises and the key industries. |

Platforms may be summarized as follows:

Economy and Industry:

The Liberal Party advocated measures for increasing production through priority to key industries and participation in world trade relations. The Democratic Party also propounded the necessity for granting priorities, and in addition advocated strengthening of State control for the purpose of industrial reconstruction. The Social Democratic Party proposed state management of key industries; the People's Co-operative Party, co-operative unionism (basic policies similar to Social Democratic Party) and the Communist Party, state management and popular control of key industries.

Political:

All parties stressed the need for improving the existing administration. The Liberal and Democratic Parties advocated reforms of the civil service, and local self-government system; the Social Democratic Party stressed the democratization of administrative machines by destroying bureaucracy; the People's Co-operative Party asked for the improvement of the functioning of local self-government and the transfer of a substantial portion of state affairs from the central to the local government. The Communist Party advocated the overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet, together with all reactionary and conservative influences.

Finance:

All political parties agreed on the need for effecting governmental controls. The Liberal Party advocated the adoption of a priority system for according loans to industries, the granting of free industrial loans, and the reform of the taxation system. The Democratic Party held generally the same views and urged stabilizing national finance through the enforcement of a fixed price system. The conservative parties opposed the Social Democratic Party's policy of suspending interest payment on war bonds. The latter party urged the nationalization of the Bank of Japan and the establishment of an Economic Rehabilitation Bank. The People's Co-operative Party agreed with the policies of the Social Democratic Party and urged curtailing administrative expenditures. The Communist Party advocated progressive taxes, redemption of war bonds and the nationalization of banking institutions with control by the people.

Agriculture:

All parties stressed the need for increasing production of food and improving the rationing system. The Liberal Party and the Social Democratic differed in free deliveries of rice after fulfillment of rice quotas and removal of official controls over perishables, as specified by the former. The Social Democratic Party urged decisions on quota and execution of rice delivery to be entrusted to representatives of the farmers, a policy to establish the rationing system on foods and fuels, and the continuance of official controls on perishables.

Labor:

On labor policies, all parties agreed to the realization of close co-operation between capital and labor through participation of labor in management and the establishment of the rights of labor. The parties advocated the establishment of a minimum wage system and reforms to improve conditions of the workers. The Social Democratic Party urged the enlargement and sound development of labor organizations. The Liberal Party advocated the enhancement of the laboring spirit and the Democratic Party urged speeding up industrial rehabilitation with emphasis on the workers.

Specific platform planks follow:

## THE PLATFORMS OF THE FIVE MAJOR PARTIES.

### POLITICAL

| DEMOCRATIC | LIBERAL | SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC | PEOPLE'S CO-OPERATIVE | COMMUNIST |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Basic reform of existing administration, civil service and local self-government system | 1. Establishment of a democratic and responsible government. | 1. The democratization of administrative machines by destroying bureaucracy. | 1. The amalgamation of political elements which stand against capitalist parties based on class antagonism. | 1. The overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet, together with all reactionary and conservative influences. |
| 2. Public management of elections. | 2. The adjustment and renovation of the administrative organizations. | 2. The accomplishment of a peaceful democratic revolution through parliamentary procedure. | 2. The breaking down of political centralizations. | |
| 3. The fostering of young officials. | 3. The extirpation of bureaucracy. | 3. Large scale improvement of the treatment of government officials and employees. | 3. The improvement of the functioning of local self-government and the transfer of a substantial portion of state affairs from the central to the local government. | |
| 4. Improvement in the treatment of Government officials and employees. | 4. The renovation of local self-government. | | | |
| | 5. The improvement in treatment of government officials and employees. | | | |

### FINANCIAL

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Curbing the vicious inflative spiral through stabilization of national finance and encouraging production. | 1. The adoption of the priority system as regards the according of loans to industries, and the elimination of unnecessary restrictions on the providing of loans. | 1. The curtailment of budget expenditures and the imposition of the heaviest taxes on the new yen class. | 1. The establishment of sound national finance by curtailing administrative expenditures. | 1. The imposition of progressive taxes on the big profiteers, with highest taxation on the profiteers in black marketing. |
| 2. The enforcement of the fixed price system for the purpose of stabilizing currency | 2. Free industrial loans. | 2. The suspension of interest payment on wartime bonds for a period of one year. | 2. The establishment of effective rationing systems which will guarantee regular distribution of essentials at the official price. | 2. The redemption of national bonds. |

| DEMOCRATIC | LIBERAL | SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC | PEOPLE'S CO-OPERATIVE | COMMUNIST |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3. The establishment of the composite taxation system and the renovation of the taxation administration. | 3. The reform of the taxation system. | 3. The establishment of the Economic Rehabilitation Bank. | 3. The prohibition of underwriting of deficit bonds by the Bank of Japan and the prevention of the enormous issance of notes by means of a Currency Deliberation Council. | 3. The collection of enterprise evaluation differential. |
| 4. The curbing of the inflationary trend by absorbing all surplus profits. | 4. The adoption of appropriate measures to seize the incomes of the new yen profiteers. | 4. The adoption of a ceiling on the notes issued by the Bank of Japan. | | 4. The cancellation of indemnities for assets in overseas areas. |
| 5. The building up of the new price structure. | 5. The raising of the basic deduction point in income tax. | 5. The nationalization of the Bank of Japan. | | 5. The nationalization of the banking institutions and their control by the people. |
| | 6. The checking of inflation through (a) absorption of currency through small-lot disposals of government enterprises. (b) public subscription of public loans and (c) restricting the number of notes issued by the Bank of Japan. | 6. The raising of interest rate on free deposits. | | |
| | | 7. The removal of restrictions on blocked accounts after the collection of the property tax. | | |
| | | 8. The participation of the employees and the representatives of the depositors in the management of the banking enterprises. | | |