







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The true and lively Portraiture
of the Honourable and Learned
Knight S^r Walter Raleigh.

THE
PRINCE,
OR
MAXIMS
OF
STATE.

Written

By Sir WALTER RAVVLEY,
and presented to Prince HENRY:

Sapere & Silere.



London, Printed, MDCXLII. 5

The Contents.

Of causes preserving a State or Common-wealth.

Of Mysteries or Sophismes.

Of Axioms or rules of preserving a State.

Rules for preserving of a Kingdome. { *Hereditary.*
Conquered.

Kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a Prince.

Kingdomes new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by 10. Rules.

Rules politique of Tyrants.

Sophismes of a barbarous and professed tyranny.

Sophismes of the sophisticall, or subtil tyrant to hould up his State.

Of preservation of an Aristocracy.

Of preservation of an Olygarchy, by { *Sophismes.*
Rules.

Of conversion of States in generall.

Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: Generall and Particular.

Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts.

Of sedition.

The Contents.

Causes of sedition are of two sorts.

Of alteration without violence.

A Method, how to make use of the booke before, in the reading of story.

*Old age is not ever unfit for publique Govern-
ment.*

Example of the like practise in Charles the first.

*Of observation for the Affirmative and the Nega-
tive.*

Of defence for David in marrying Abishag.

Politick Nobility.

Of Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdome.

Observations.

*Of wayes of such as aspire to the Kingdome, and markes
to discerne them.*

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O F GOVERNMENT.



Government is of two sorts. 1. *Private* of himselfe. *Sobriety*. Of his Family; called *Oconomy*.

2. *Publique* of the Common-wealth, called *Policy*. A man must first governe himselfe, ere he be fit to governe a Family: And his Family, ere hee bee fit to beare the Governement in the Common-wealth,

Of Policy.

Policy is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth, and some part of it according to that State, or forme of Government wherein it is settled for the publique good.


State, is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth, or of the Governours that rule the same, specially of the chiefe and Soveraigne Governour that commands the rest.

The State or Soveraignty consisteth in 5. points.

1. Making or annulling of Lawes.
2. Creating and disposing of Magistrates.
3. Power over life and death.
4. Making of Warre, or Peace.
5. Highest or last appeale.

Where these 5. are, either in one or in more, there is the State.

These 5. points of State rest either in; 1. One Monarchy or Kingdome. 2. Some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisdom, called an *Aristocracy*. 3. Many, called a *Free State* or a *Popular State*. These three sorts of Government have respect to the Common good, and therefore are Iust and Lawfull *States*.



These all respect there owne, and not the publique good, and therefore are called *Bastard Governements*.

1. *Monarchy*.

A *Monarchy*, or Kingdome, is the Governement of a State by one head, or Chiefe, tending to the Common benefit of all.

Monarchies or *Kingdomes* are of 3. sorts touching the right or possession of them; viz.

1. *Hereditary*, by discent, as the *English, French, &c.*
2. *Elective*, by suffrage of the other *Orders*; or some of them, as the *Polonian*.
3. *Mixt*, or of both kinds; viz. by Discent yet not tyed to the next of blood, as the ancient *Jewish State*.

Monarchies are of 2. sorts, touching their power or authority; viz.

1. *Intier*. Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and warre, doth by law and custome

custome appertaine to the Prince, as in the *English* Kingdome, where the Prince hath power to make Lawes, League and Warre, to create Magistrates; To pardon life Of appeale, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making Lawes; yet ever subject to the Princes pleasure, nor negative will.

2. *Limited, or restrained* that hath no full power in all the points or matters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of peace, as the making of Lawes &c. But in Warre onely as the *Polonian* Kings.

2. *Aristocracy or Senatory State.*

AN *Aristocracy* is the Government of a Commonwealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other vertues for the publique good.

Aristocracies are of 3. sorts, viz. where the *Senators* are chosen, for 1. *Vertue*, *Riches*, and the Common good, as the *Venetian*.

2. *Vertue* and the publique good without respect of wealth, as sometimes the *Roman* when some of the *Senators*, were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schooles.

3. *Vertue* and Wealth, more respecting their private, then the publique good which inclineth towards an *Oligarchy*, or the Government of the Richer or Nobler sort, as in *Rome* towards the end.

3. *Free State or Popular State.*

THE *Popular State* is the Government of a State by the Choiser sort of people, tending to the publique good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every *Iust State*, some part of the Government is, or ought to bee imparted to the people; As in a Kingdome, a voice or suffrage in making Lawes; and sometimes also, in levying of Armes (if the charge bee great, and the Prince forced to borrow helpe of his Subjects) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seeme to have proceeded from themselves. So consultations, and some proceedings in Judiciall matters may in part bee referred to them. The reason, least seeing themselves to be in no number, nor of reckoning, they mislike the state or kind of Government: And where the Multitude is discontented, there must needs bee many Enemies to the present state. For which cause, Tyrants (which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other meanes, whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in *Rusheland, Turkey, &c.*

4. Tyranny.

A Tyranny is the swarving, or distorting of a *Monarchy*, or the Government of one tending not to the publique good, but the private benefit of himselfe, and his followers. As in the *Russe* and *Turkish* Government, where the State and Wealth of other orders are employed onely to the uphoulding of the greatnesse of the King, or Emperour. This is the worst of all the Bastard States, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a *Monarchy*, which resembleth the Sovereaign Government of God himselfe.

5. Obligarchy, or the Government of a few.

AN *Oligarchy* is the swarving, or the corruption of an *Aristocracy*; or the Government of some few that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without any respect of the publique good. The chiefc end of these Governours

is their owne greatnesse and enriching. And therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their Estates. This State is not wholly so bad, as is the *Tyranny*, and yet worse then the *Common-wealth*, because it respecteth the good of a few.

6. *Common-wealth.*

A *Common-wealth* is the swarving or depravation of a *Free or Popular State*, or the Government of the whole Multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other orders.

These two *States*, to wit; The *Oligarchy* and *Common-wealth*, are very adverse the one to the other, and have many bickerings and dissentions betweene them. For that the Richer or Nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect, because they are superiour, but in some respects onely, to wit, in riches, birth, parentage, &c. On the other side, the Common people suppose, there ought to bee an equality in all other things, and some State matters; because they are equall with the rich or noble, touching their *Liberty*, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching Government and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are wise, vertuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to governe a State.

These severall States are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complections of the body. So in the *Roman State*, the people had their *Plabiscita*, and gave the suffrage in the election of Magistrates: Yet the Senate (as the State stood) for the most part swayed the State, and bare the chiefe rule. So in the *Venetian State*, the Duke seemeth to represent a Monarch, and the Senate to be his Councill: Yet the Duke hath no power in State matters,

matters, but is like a head set on by art that beareth no braine. And so that State is Senatoricall or Aristocraticall.

Causes of States and Common-wealths in generall.

Causes of States or of Common-wealths are of 3. sorts, viz.	}	1. Founding or setting a State where to bee considered.	}	1. <i>Measure.</i>
		2. Preserving a State.		2. <i>Parts</i> and their <i>Qualities.</i>
		3. Changing and altering a State.		

Founding a State.

In founding a State are to bee considered 2. things. } 1. *Proportion.*
2. *Parts.*

P*roportion* is a Just Measure or Mediocrity of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that order, as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind; to wit, so that a Monarch bee not to Monarchicall, nor strict, or absolute, as the *Russe* Kings; nor Aristocraticall, that is overmated or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the *Scottish* Kingdome; but ever respective to the other degrees. That an Aristocracy bee not to magnificent nor intier to it selfe, but communicate with the people some commodities of State or Government as the *Venetian*; and sometimes the *Roman* allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make *Plébiscita* &c. So a *free State* or *Common-wealth* that it bee not over popular, viz. That it depreffe not to much the richer, wiser, nor learned sort; but admit them to offices with a *Caution* out of the rules and misteries of that *State*. That they seeke no alteration of the present *State*. The reason, because the moderate *States* in their severall kindes (as all other

other things that observe the meane) are best framed for their continuance, because they give lesse cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the wealth, honour, and liberty which they see in others, that governe the State; And so are lesse subject to stirres, and commotions, and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set.

Parts.

THe *Parts* of the *State*, or those *Magistrates* that beare place or sway in the publique Government.

Parts or *Partakers* of publique Government, are

1. *Counsell* or *Senate*, which consulteth of all matters pertaining to Warre and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more speciall care that they be men expert in matter of Policy, because it is their trade and vocation, as men use to choose Pilots and Masters of shippes such as know the Art of Navigation, and not Husbandmen &c. And so the contrary.

2. *Magistrates* and *Officers* which are to be executioners of that which is consulted and found to be expedient for the Common-wealth, wherein are to be observed the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of Government; The time of their continuance, and the manner of their election or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be choosen.

3. *Judges*; To determine in civill and criminall matters, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner of Judgement and Judiciall proceeding.

1. *Superiour*, which are to be such and of that kind as agree with the *State*; as *Consuls* for a year, and not perpetuall *Dictatours* in a *Senatory State*. *Prators* and *Censors* that oversee manners and orders of the people.

For a Kingdome *Licentnants* of Shires, *Marshals*, *Masters* of Horie, *Admirals*, &c.

1. *Civill.*

Inferiour, as *Conservatours* of Peace, *Constables*, &c.

Overseers of Youth, that take care of their education for civill and warlike exercise.

Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity and prize of victuall.

Ediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

Quastours or *Treasurers* to keepe and despenche the publique treasury.

Attuaries or *Recorders*, which keepe the publique records.

Gaolers, to keepe Prisons, and Prisoners.

Surveyours of Woods and Fields, &c.

As *Bishops*, or *Pastours*, *Elders*, *Wardens*.

1. *Kindes* of *Magistrates*, as

In *Magistrates* are to be observed,

2. *Ecclesiasticall.*

2. *Time of Magistrates*, whereof some are perpetuall, some for a time, *viz.* for more yeares; a yeare, halfe a yeare, according to the necessity of the Common-wealth, and not perpetuall; or at least not hereditary in a Kingdome. Yearely in an *Aristocracy*, or halfe yearely in a *free State*.

3. *Manner of choise*, by whom and how to bee chosen, where especially they are to bee chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot.

Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth.

In preserving of States, two things required.

1. *Mysteries or Sophismes.* } 1. General to all States.
2. Particular for every severall State.

2. *Rules or Actions.* } 1. General to all States.
2. Particular for every State.

Mysteries or Sophismes.

M*ysteries or Sophismes of State*, are certaine secret practizes, either for the avoiding of danger; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present State, as it is set or founded.

State Mysteries are of 2. sorts. 1. *General*: That pertaine to all States; as first, to provide by all meanes, that the same degree or part of the Common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality. In quantity as that the number of the Nobility, or of great persons, be not more then the State or Common-wealth can beare. In quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more then that is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights beare downe the Skale: So in Common-wealths,

wealths, that part or degree that excelleth the rest in *Quality* and *Quantity*, overwayeth the rest after it, whereof follow alterations and conversions of *State*. Secondly, to provide by all meanes, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames (*viz.*) of *Nobility* and *Gentry*, and the Base, Rascall and beggerly sort. For this maketh the *State* constant and firme, when both the Extreames are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together, it is not to bee feared. To these two points, the Particular *Rules* or *Sophismes* of every Common-wealth are to bee applied.

2. *Particular*: That serve for preservation of every Common-wealth in that forme of *State*, wherein it is settled as in a Kingdome. That the *Nobility* may bee accustomed to beare the Government of the *Prince*, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the *Princes* eye, it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the *Princes* Court under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to bee attendant upon the *Prince*, as of speciall favour towards them and theirs, that so they may bee trained up in duty and obedience towards the *Prince*, and bee as *Hostages* for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their Parents, especially if they bee of any suspected note. To that end, serves the *Persian* practise in having a band or traine of the *Satrapas* children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imited by our traine of *Henchmen*, if they were of the Nobler sort. Againe, sometimes to borrow smale summes of his Subjects, and to pay them againe, that hee may after borrow greater summes and never pay: So in an *Oligarchy*, least it decline to a Popular *State*, they deceive the people with this and the like *Sophismes* (*viz.*) They compell their owne sort, to wit, the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of *Magistrates*, for provision of Armour, war-like

like Exercise, making an Execution of lawes, &c. By that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent, and to neglect those assemblies under pretence, that they will not draw them from their businesse and private earnings: Yet withall to cite thither some few of them (*viz.*) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people, or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations, greatnesse of fines, if they should misdooe. To the end to make them unwilling to come againe, or to have to doe with those consultations; by which meanes the Richer sort doe still governe the *State* with the peoples liking and good contentment.

Axioms.

Axioms or
Rules of pre-
serving the
State, are

1. *Generall*, that serve for all *Common-wealths*.
2. *Particular*, that serve for *every severall State*.

Generall Rules.

1. **T**he first and principall Rule of Policy to be observed in all States is to professe, and practize, and maintaine the true worship and religion of Almighty God, prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chiefe end of all Government. The *Axiom*, that God bee obeyed simply without exception, though hee command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to humane Policy, as in the *Jewes* Common-wealth, That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God foure times, leaving none to defend their coast; though being beset with many

Enemies. Not to sow the seventh year, but to suffer the ground to rest untill'd without respect or feare of famine, &c.

2. To avoid the causes of conversions, whereby States are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions; For that Common-wealths (as naturall bodies) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and State thereof, and are so cured by contrary Medicines.

3. To take heed, that no Magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the Lawes and Policy of that State. As that in a Senate, there bee not created a perpetuall *Dictator*, as *Cesar* in *Rome*. In a Kingdome, that there bee no Senate or convention of equall power with the Prince, in State matters; as in *Poland*.

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is settled, and take heed of the contrary practize, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdome, or Aristocracy. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present State.

5. To that end to have certaine Officers to pry a broad, and to observe such as doe not live and behave themselves in fit sort, agreeable to the present State; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of Government.

6. To take heed that Magistracies bee not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that Common-wealth which is governed by a few of the Richer sort: For if the Magistrate gaine nothing but his Common Fees, the Common sort and such as want honour take in good part, that they bee not preferred; and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to attend private businesse. But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters, the Common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gaine which they see to grow by them, which is the
cause

cause that the *Germaine Olygarchies* continue so firme, for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the Richer sort are by that meanes freed, and secured from being under the poore.

7. To take heed that the State as it is settled and maintained bee not over strict, nor exceed in his kind; (*viz.*) That a Kingdome be not too Monarchicall; Nor a Popular State bee too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour, and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts, though inferiour for place and office; And sometimes popularly with the Common people, which is the cause that some Common-wealths, though they bee very simply and unskilfully set; yet continue firme, because the Magistrates behave themselves wisely, and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour; And therefore, some kind of Moderate popularity, is to bee used in every Common-wealth.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaking and altering of Lawes, as of other Rules which concerne the continuance of every severall State. For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth doth not happen all at once but growes by degrees, which every Common wit cannot discern; but men expert in Policy.

9. To provide, that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the State, as now it stands. This is to bee observed as a very Oracle in all Common-wealths.

10. To observe a meane in all the degrees, and to suffer no part to exceed, or decay overmuch. As first for preferments, to provide that they bee rather small and short, then great and long; And if any bee growne to overmuch greatnesse, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the *Sophismes* are to bee practized (*viz.*) to doe it by parts and degrees; to doe it by occasion or colour of Law, and not all at once. And if that way serve

not, to advance some other, of whose vertue and faithfulness, wee are fully assured, to as high a degree, or to greater honour : and to bee the friends and followers of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) bee more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the *Sophismes* of a Popular State; (*viz.*) to send him on Embassages, and forraine Negotiations, or employ him in some office that hath great charges and little honour, &c. To which end the *Edileship* served in some Common-wealths.

11. To suppress the factions and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions.

12. To encrease or remit the Common taxes and contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the people and Common-wealth. If the people bee increased in wealth, the taxes and subsidies may bee increased. If they bee poore, and their wealth diminish, specially by dearth, want of traffique, &c. to forbear taxes and impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The *Sophismes* that serve for impositions are these, and other of like sort, to pretend businesse of great charge, as Warre, building of Ships, making of Havens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises, wherein some part may bee bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but Princely dealing needs no pretences.

13. To provide that the Discipline and training of youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that Common-wealth: As that in a Kingdome, the Sonnes of Noble-men to bee attendant at the Court, that they may bee accustomed to obedience towards the Prince: In the Senatory State, that the Sonnes of the Senators bee not idly, nor over daintily brought up, but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and Martiall exercise; that they may bee able to beare that place in the Common-wealth

wealth, which their Father held, and contrary wise in a Popular State.

14. To take heed, lest their *Sophismes*, or secret practices for the continuance and maintenance of that State bee not discovered, lest by that meanes they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and with great discretion.

Particular Rules.

Rules and *Axiomes* for preserving of a Kingdome; { *Hereditary.*
 { *Conquered.*

*Kingdomes Hereditary are preserved at home
 by the ordering.*

1. **H** *Imselfe*; (*viz.*) By the tempering and moderation of the Princes power, and prerogative. For the lesse and more temperate, their power and state is the more firme, and stable is their Kingdome and Government; because they seeme to be further off from a Master-like and Tyrannicall Empire; and lesse unequal in condition to the next degree; to wit, the Nobility, and so lesse subject to grudge and envy.

2. *Nobility*; (*viz.*) By keeping that degree and due proportion, that neither they exceed not in number more then the Realme or State can beare, as the *Scottish* Kingdome, and sometime the *English*, when the Realme was overcharged with the numbers of Dukes, Earles, and other Nobles; whereby the Authority of the Prince was eclipsed, and the Realme troubled with their factions and ambitions. Nor that any one excell in honour, power or wealth, as that hee resemble another King within the Kingdome; as the House of *Lancaster* within this Realme. To that end not to load any with too much honour or preferment, because it is hard even for the best and worthiest

Men to beare their greatnesse and high fortune temperately, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The *Sophismes* for preventing or reforming this inconvenience, are to bee used with great caution and wisdom. If any great person bee to bee abated, not to deale with him by calumnation, or forged matter, and so to cut him off without desert, especially if hee bee gracious among the people after the Machivilian policy, which besides the Injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their honour all at once, which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party, and a commiseration in the people, and so greater love, if hee bee gracious for his vertue and publique service. Nor to banish him into forraine Countries, where hee may have opportunity of practizing with forraine States, whereof great danger may ensue, as in the Examples of *Coriolanus*, *Henry* the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like *Sophismes*: (*viz.*) To abate their greatnesse by degrees, as *David*, *Ioabs*, *Iustinian*, *Bellisarius*, &c. To advance some other Men to as great or greater honour, to shadow or over-mate the greatnesse of the other. To draw from him by degrees his friends and followers, by preferrements, rewards, and other good and lawfull meanes; especially, to bee provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the Common-wealth, whereby they may have more opportunity, to sway the State.

3. *People*: (*viz.*) so to order and behave himselfe, that hee bee loved and revered of the people. For that the Prince need not greatly feare home-conspiracies, or forraine invasion, if hee bee firmly loved of his owne people. The reason, for that the Rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise; nor any refuge being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended hath cause to feare every moving, both at home and abroad. This may bee effected by the Prince, if hee use meanes and

art of getting the favour of the people, and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt; (*viz.*) if hee seeme as a Tutor, or a Father to love the people and to protect them, if hee maintaine the Peace of his Kingdome; For that nothing is more Popular, nor more pleasing to the people then is peace.

4. If hee shew himselfe oftentimes graciously, yet with State, and Majesty to his people, and receive complaints of his suppliant, and such like.

5. If hee sit himselfe sometimes in open Courts and place of Justice, that hee may seeme to have a care of Justice among his people. If hee bestow many benefits and graces upon that City which hee maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to bee in the middle of his Kingdome, as the heart in the middle of the body, or the Sunne in the middle of Heaven, both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and least the furthest parts at one end move, whilst the Prince is in the other. If hee goe in progresse many times to see his Provinces, especially those that are remote.

6. If hee gratifie his Courtiers and Attendants in that sort, and by such meanes as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with *Monopolies*, and such like.

7. If hee commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seeme grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe, as the *French Kings*, who for that purpose, as may seeme, have erected their Court at *Paris*, which acquitteth the Prince from grudge and envy, both with the Nobles and the people.

8. If hee borrowes sometimes summes of money of his people, though hee have no need, and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his Exchequer or other Officers.

9. If hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred

or contempt of his person, which may be done, if hee shew himselfe not too light, inconstant, hard, cruell, effeminate, fearefull, and dallardly, &c. But contrariwise, Religious grave, just, valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the false Doctrine of the Machivilian Policy; with feare, the better meanes, to keepe the people in obedience, then love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.

9. If the Prince be well furnished with Warlike Provision, which is to be rumored and made knowne abroad: If it be knowne, that hee is revered and obeyed by his people at home.

10. If hee provide so much as lieth in him, that his Neighbour Kingdomes grow not overmuch in power and Dominion; which if it happen, hee is to joyne speedily with other Princes, which are in like danger to abate that greatnesse, and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it. An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of *Spaine*.

11. If hee get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other meanes, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom hee hath differences, if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his owne Lydging abroad, about that Princes Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other pretence; which must be Men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turne.

12. To observe the Lawes of his Countrey and not to encounter them with his Prerogative, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them their commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his Courtiers and Ministers.

13. To provide especially that that part which favoureth the State as it standeth be more potent, then the other that favoureth it not, or desireth a change.

14. To make specially choyce of good and sound men to beare the place of Magistrates, especiall of such as assist the Prince in his Councils, and Policies, and not to leane

overmuch to his owne advise, contrary to the rule of Machivill, who teacheth that a Prince can have no good Councell except it bee in himselfe; his reason, because if hee use the Councell of some one; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and supplant by him: And if hee Councell with more, then hee shall bee distracted with the differences in opinion. As if a Prince of great, or meane wisdom could not take the judgement of all his Counsellours in any point of Policy, or of so many as himselfe thinketh good, and to take it either by word or in writing; and himselfe then in private peruse them all, and so after good and mature deliberation make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one. For the Proverbe is true, that two eyes see more then one; and therefore, the advises and consultations of a Senatory State is compared by some to a feast, or dinner, where many contribute towards the *Shot*, by which meanes they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare: And yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite.

15. The Prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of *Solomon*; which may seeme the reason; why our Kings of *England* had their Kings bench in place of publique Justice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that sate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some special causes may bee selected, which may throughly bee debated and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the helpe and advise of his learned Councell, and so bee decided publicquely, as before is said, by the Prince himselfe; At least the Prince is to take accompt of every Minister of publique Justice, that it may bee knowne, that hee hath a care of Justice, and doing right to his people, which makes the Iusticers also to bee more carefull in performing of their duties.

16. To bee moderate in his taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, to doe it by Parliaments, and with their consents, making the cause apparant unto them, and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them. Finally, so to use it, that it may seeme rather an offer from his Subjects, then an exaction by him

17. To stop small beginnings, unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the Nobles, with Caution that such as are free, bee not drawne into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole Common-wealth set in a combustion; as in the example of the Barons Warres, and the late Warres of France, which grew from a quarrell betwixt the *Guision* faction and the other Nobility.

18. To stirre up the people, if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the Common-wealth, by some rumour or feare of danger at home, to make them more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldome to bee used least it bee supposed a false Alarme, when there is need indeed.

19. To have speciall care, that his children, especially the heire apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King (*viz.*) in learning, specially of matters pertaining to State, and in Marshall exercise, contrary to the practize of many Princes, who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason of their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State.

2. Kingdomes new gotten, or purchased by force, are preserved by these means.

1. First, if they have bene Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions

as have his owne Countrey, it is an easie matter to retaine such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes blood of the said Countrey bee wholly extinct. For men of the same quality, tongue, and condition, doe easily shole and combine themselves together, so much the rather if the people of that Countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their owne liberty, wherein specially is to bee observed, that the lawes and customes of that purchased Countrey bee not altered nor innovated, or at least it bee done by litle and litle. So the *Burgundians* and *Acquitaines* were annexed to *France*. The reason, because partly they have bin accustomed to serve; and partly, for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their Prince, if the blond Royall bee once extinguished. As for the invasion of a forraine Countrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living; It is not the part of a just Civill Prince, much lesse a Prince Christian to enforce such a Countrey; and therefore, the Machivilian practizes in this case to make sure worke by extinguishing wholly the blond Royall is leud, and impertinent: The like is to bee said, of murdering the natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession. A thing not onely against Christian Religion: but inhumane Justice, cruell, and barbarous.

2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives bee transplanted into some other place, and our Colonies consisting of so many as shall bee thought meet be planted therein some part of the Province, Castles, Forts, and Havens, seised upon, and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the *Babylonian* Monarch which transplanted 10. tribes of the *Iemes*: And of the *Romans* in *France*, *Germany*, *Britany*, and other places. The reason: 1. For that otherwise forces of horse and foote, are to bee maintained within the Province which cannot be done without great charge. 2. For that the whole Province is troubled and grieved, with removing and supply-

ing the Army with victuals, carriages, &c. 3. For that Collonies are more sure and faithfull then the rest. As for the Natives that are removed from their former seates, they have no meanes to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may bee so served, if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to bee quiet. The Turkes practize in *Asia*, where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the Souldiours, whom they call *Timariote*. That the Prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase, especially for a time, till things bee well settled; especially if the Province bee great and large, as the *Turke* in *Greece*. The reasons: 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keepe things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects. 2. They conceive that they have refuge by the Princes presence, if they bee oppressed by the Lieutenants and inferiour Governours: Where it will bee convenient for the winning the peoples hearts, that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression. 3. Because being present hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, hee cannot doe, or not doe in time.

3. If the Prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new purchases bee committed to such as bee sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour; And not to Natives, or other of their owne Subjects, that are gracious there for their Nobility, or vertue; especially if the Province bee great, and somewhat farre distant, which may soone seduce the unsetled affections of those new Subjects. As for such Governours as depend wholly upon the Princes favour being not borne, but created Noble, they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their duty; and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as Instruments and Ministers

thers to keepe them in subjection, and not for any good will.

4. To have the children of the chiefe Noble men, and of greatest authority, Hostages with them in safe keeping; the more the better: For that no Bound is stronger, then that of Nature to containe the Parents and Allies in obedience, and they the rest.

5. To alter the Lawes, but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present Government.

6. To keepe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may bee, that they may seeme, by being conquered, to have gotten a Protectour, rather then a Tyrant; For the Common-people if they enjoy peace, and bee not distracted, nor drawne from their businesse, nor exacted upon beyond measure, are easily contained under obedience; Yet notwithstanding, they are to bee disused from the practise of Armes, and other Exercises which encrease courage, and bee weakened of Armour, that they have neither Spirit nor will to rebell.

7. If there bee any faction in the Countrey, to take to him the defence of the better, and stronger part, and to combine with it, as *Cesar* in *France*.

8. To looke well to the Borders and confining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equall power to himselfe, to joyne league with some other Borderers, though of lesse strength to hinder the attempts (if any should bee) by such Neighbour Prince. For it happeneth often, that a Countrey infested by one Neighbour Prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the *Romans* were called into *Greece* by the *Aetolians*; The *Saxons* by the *Britaines*, the *Danes* by the *Saxons*.

9. To leave their Titles and Dignities to the Natives, but the command and authority wholly to his owne.

10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the *Sophismes*

Sophismes of Policy, especially those that appertaine to a Tyrannicall State, which are soone detected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser and better sort of his Subjects, whereof must needs follow very evill effects.

The *Sophismes* of Tyrants, are rather to bee knowne, then practized, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannicall States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

Rules Politique of Tyrants.

Rules practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts: *viz.* 1. *Barbarous* and *Professed*, which is proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of themselves without others helpe, as in the *Turkish* and *Russe* Government.

2. *Sophisticall* and *Dissembled*; As in some States, that are reputed for good and lawfull Monarchies, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet settled nor have power sufficient of themselves; but must use the power and helpe of others, and so are forced to bee *Politique Sophisters*.

1. *Sophismes of a Barbarous and Professed Tyranny.*

1. **T**O expell and banish out of his Countrey all honest meanes, whereby his people may attaine to learning, wisdom, valour, and other vertues, that they might bee fit for that estate and servile condition. For that in these two, learning, and Martiall exercise, effect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: (*viz.*) Wisdom and Valour. For that men of Spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile State. To this end to forbid learning of liberall Arts, and Martiall exercise; As in the *Russe* Government,

So *Julian the Apostata* dealt with the Christians. Contrary-wise, to use his people to base occupations, and Mechanical Arts, to keepe them from Idleness, and to put away from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may bee fotted, and so made unfit for great enterprizes. So the *Egyptian Kings* dealt with the *Hebrewes*; So the *Russe Emperour* with his *Russe* people: And *Charles the fifth* with the *Netherlanders*, when hee purposed to enclose their Priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Government.

2. To make sure to him and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other meanes, especially his Guard, or Prætorian band; That being Partakers of the spoile and benefit, they make like that State, and continue firme to it; as the *Turke* his *Ianizaries*, the *Russe* his *Boya-rens*, &c.

3. To unarme his people of weapons, money, and all meanes, whereby they may resist his power; And to end, to have his set & ordinary exactions, viz. once in two, three, or foure yeares; and sometimes yearely, as the *Turke*, and *Russe*; who is wont to say, that his people must bee used as his flock of sheep: viz. Their flecce taken from them, lest it overlade them, and grow too heavy; that they are like to his Beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there bee any of Extraordinary-wealth to borrow of them in the meane while, till the tax come about, or upon some devised matter to confiscate their goods, as the Common practise is of the *Russe* and *Turke*.

4. To bee still in Warres, to the end, his people may need a Captaine, and that his forces may be kept in practise, as the *Russe* doth yearely against the *Tartar*, *Polonian*, and *Sweden*, &c.

5. To cut off such as excell the rest in wealth, favour, or nobility, or bee of a pregnant, or spiring wit, and so are carefull to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold office,

of any honour, but onely of him; as the *Turke* his *Basbaes*, and the *Russe* his *Ruezzes*.

6. To forbid Guilds, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among the people, that they have no meanes or oportunity to conspire or conferre together of publique matters, or to maintaine love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the *Russes* practise.

7. To have their Beagles, or Littners in every corner, and parts of the Realme, especially in places that are more suspect, to learne what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may prevent all attempts, and take away such as millike their State.

8. To make Schisme and Division among his Subjects, (*viz.*) To set one Noble man against another, and one Rich man against another, that through faction and disagreement among themselves, they may bee weakened, and attempt nothing against him; and by this meanes entertaining whisperings and complaints, hee may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the *Russe* made the faction of the *Zemsky* and the *Oppressinio*.

9. To have Strangers for his Guard, and to entertaine Parasites, and other base and servile fellowes, not too wise, but yet subtile, that will bee ready for reward to doe and execute what hee commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men cannot flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises and such like, may bee contracted into one or two, (*viz.*) To bereave his Subjects of will and power to doe him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitation.

2. *Sophismes of the Sophisticall, or subtill Tyrant to hold up his State.*

1. **T**O make a shew of a good King by observing a temper and mediocrity in his Government, and whole course of life; to which end it is necessary, that this subtill Tyrant bee a cunning Polititian, or a Machivilian at the least, and that hee bee taken so to bee, for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded, and is thought thereby not unworthy for to governe others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent, and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, habite, and other demeanour.

3. To pretend care of the Common-wealth; and to that end to seeme loath to exact Tributes and other charges; and yet to make necessity of it, where none is: To that end to procure such Warre as can bring no danger towards his State, and that might easily bee compounded, or some other chargeable businesse; and to continue it on, that hee may continue his exaction and contribution so long as hee list. And thereof to employ some part in his publique service, the rest to hoord up in his Treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes; as *Edward* the fourth in his Warres against *France*, when having levied a great summe of money throughout his Realme, especially of the *Londoners*, hee went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech and publique writing of the expense of such taxes and impositions as hee hath received of his Subjects, that hee may so seeme to bee a good Husband, and frugall, and not a Robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To that end, to bestow some cost upon publique Buildings, or some other worke for the common good, especially upon the Ports, Forts, and chiefe Cities of his

Realme, that so hee may seeme a Benefactour, and to have a delight in the adorning of his Countrey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid Feasting and other meetings, which increase love, and give oportunity to conferre together of publique matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses. To that end, the Curfieu bell was first ordained by *William the Conquerour*. to give men warning to repaire home at a certaine houre.

7. To take heed, that no one grow to bee over great, but rather many-equall great, that they may envy and contend one with another; and if hee resolve to weaken any of this sort, to doe it warily and by degrees; If quite to wrack him and to have his life, yet to give him a Lawfull triall after the manner of his Countrey; And if hee proceed so farre with any of great power and estimation as to doe him contumely or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto Honour, which great Spirits doe most desire, and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace, then to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dismissal; True in *Atheists*, but not in true Christian Nobility.

8. To unarme his people, and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arme with them, such and so many as hee shall thinke meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.

9. To make scisme or division under hand among his Nobility, and betwixt the Nobility and the People, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine not together, and that himselfe by hearing the griefes and complaints may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter against them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account.

10. To offer no man any contumely or wrong, specially about Womens matters, by attempting the chastity of their

their Wives or Daughters, which hath beene the ruine of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of *Tarquinius*, by *Brutus*, *Appius*, by *Virginus*, *Pisistratus*, by *Harmodius*, *Alexander Medices Duke of Florence*, *Aloisus of Placentia*, *Rodericus King of Spaine*; &c.

11. To that end to bee moderate in his pleasures, or to use them closely that hee bee not seene; For that men sober or watchfull, or such as seeme so, are not lightly Subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their owne.

12. To reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprize, or doe any speciall action for the Common-wealth in that manner as it may seeme, they could not bee better regarded, in case they lived in a free State.

13. All Rewards and things gratefull to come from himselfe but all punishments, exactions, and things; ungratefull to come from his Officers and publique Ministers; And when hee hath effected what hee would by them, if hee see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great cure of Religion and of serving of God; (which hath beene the manner of the wickedest Tyrants) for that people doe lesse feare any hurt from those, whom they thinke vertuous and religious, nor attempt lightly to doe them hurt, for that they thinke that God protects them.

15. To have a strong and sure Guard of forraine Souldiours, and to bind them by good turnes, that they having at least, profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As *Caligula*, the *German Guard*, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by lawfull Kings, as by the *French King*.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause, they bee forced to defend the Tyrant, for their owne safety.

17. To take part, and to joyne himselfe with the stronger part; if the Common people, and meane degree bee the

stronger to joyne with them; if the Rich and Nobles, to joyne with them. For so that part with his owne strength will bee ever able to overmatch the other.

18. So to frame his manners and whole behaviour, as that hee may seeme, if not perfectly good, yet tollerably evill, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.

These Rules of Hypocriticall Tyrants are to be known, that they may bee avoided and meet withall, and no drawne into imitation.

Preservation of an Aristocracy.

Rules to preserve a Senatory State, are partly taken from the Common Axioms, and partly from those that preserve a Kingdome.

Preservation of an *Olygarchy*; by $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Sophismes.} \\ \textit{Rules.} \end{array} \right.$

1. **I**N Consultations and Assemblies about publique affaires so to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assemblies and Councils: But to impose a fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to beare with them under pretence, that they may the better intend their occupations, and not bee hindered in their trades and earnings.

2. In election of Magistrates and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them; or to enjoyne some great charge as incident to the office, which the poore cannot beare. But to impose some great fine upon those that bee rich, if they refuse to beare office, being elect unto it.

3. In Judiciall matters: In like manner to order that the people may be absent from publique Trials, under pretence of following their businessse. But the richer

to bee present, and to compell them by fines to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike Exercise and Armes, that the poore bee not forced to have Armour, Horſe, &c. under pretence of ſparing their coſt, nor to bee drawne from their trades by Martiall Exercifes; but to compell the richer ſort to keepe their proportion of Armour, Horſe, &c. By exceſſive fines, and to exerciſe themſelves in Warlike matters, &c.

5. To have ſpeciall care of inſtructing their Children in liberall Arts, Policy, and Warlike Exercise, and to obſerve good order and diſcipline. For as Popular States are preſerved by the frequency and liberty of the people, ſo this Government of the richer is preſerved by diſcipline and good order of Governours.

6. To provide good ſtore of Warlike furniture, eſpecially of Horſe, and Horſemen; and of Armed men, *v. z.* Pike, &c. which are proper to the Gentry; as ſhot and light furniture are for a popular Company.

6. To put in practice ſome points of a Popular State, *viz.* To lade no one man with too much preferment; to make yearly or halfe yeares Magiſtrates, &c. For that the people are pleaſed with ſuch things, and they are better ſecured by this meanes from the rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatneſſe, to abate him by the *Sophiſmes* fit for this State.

7. To commit the Offices and Magiſtracies, to thoſe that are beſt able to beare the greateſt charges for publique matters, which both tendeth to the conſervation of this State, and pleaſeth the people, for that they reape ſome reliefe and benefit by it.

8. To the ſame end to contract marriages among themſelves, the rich with the rich, &c.

9. In ſome things which concerne not the points and matters of State, as electing Magiſtrates making Lawes, &c. to give an equality, or ſometimes a preferment to the Common-people, and not to doe, as in ſome *Olygarchiſſ* they

were wont; *viz.* To swear against the people, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary, to minister an oath at their admission, that they shall doe no wrong to any of the people; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to shew some example of severer punishment.

For other *Axioms* that preserve this State, they are to be borrowed, from those other Rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular and Tyrannicall State; for the strict kind of *Olygarchy* is kinne to a Tyranny.

Preservation of a Popular State; } *Sophismes.*
 } *Rules or Axioms.*

IN publique Assemblies and consultations, about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publique Justice, and Exercise of armes, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Government, to wit, an *Olygarchy*. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawne to those Assemblies, Magistracies, Offices, Warlike Exercises, &c. By mulcts and rewards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced, by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exercises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath beene in some Popular States; but rather to preferre them in all other matters, that concerne not the State and publique Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Commons, by Lot, or Balloting, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed, that no man bears office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salery, &c. is to be reserved in their owne hands, to be disposed of by a Common Councell, &c. And to see that do man be to highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy be perpetuall, but as short,

as may bee, to wit, for a year, halfe year, &c.

6. To compell Magistrates, when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and Government, and that publicly before the Commons.

7. To have publique Saleries and allowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearely dividence for the Common-people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Iudges of all matters, out of all sorts, so they have some aptnes to performe that duty.

9. To provide that publique Iudgements and Trials, bee not frequent; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilatours, as the law of requital; &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth, which causeth the rich to conspire against the State; whereby, many times, the Popular State is turned into an *Olygarchy*, or some other Government. Hereto tendeth that Art of Civill law, made against Accusers and Calumniatours: *Ad Senatos Consultum Turpilianum, lib. 1. de Calumniatoribus.*

10. In such free States as are Popular, and have no revenue, to provide that publique Assemblies bee not after; because they want salery for Pleadors and Oratours; And if they bee rich; yet to bee wary, that all the revenue bee not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Common revenue among the Multitude is like a purse or barrell without a bottom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue bee stored up for the publique affaires.

11. If the number of the poore encrease too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Country places, and to provide, above all, that none doe live idly, but bee set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farmes and Coppisholds, such decayed Citizens.

12. To bee well advised what is good for this State, and

not to suppose that to bee fit for a Popular State, that seemeth most popular; but that which is best for the continuance thereof: And to that end, not to lay into the Exchequer, or Common Treasury, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it bee practised, confiscations, and fines of the Common people would bee frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

Conversion of States in Generall.

CONVERSION of a State, is the declining of the Common-wealth, either to some other forme of Government, or to his full and last period appointed by God.

Causes of Conversions of States, are of two sorts: Generall and Particular.

GENERALL, (*viz.*) 1. Want of Religion: *viz.* of the true knowledge and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable finnes that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of *Saul*, *Uzziah*, the Jewish State; the foure Monarchies, and all other.

2. Want of wisdom, and good Councell to keepe the State, the Prince, Nobles, and People in good temper, and due proportion, according to their severall orders and degrees.

3. Want of Iustice, either in administration (as ill Lawes, or ill Magistrates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should bee, or there bestowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintaine and defend it selfe; *viz.* Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captaines, Souldiours, &c. Execution when the meanes or provision is not used, or ill used.

2. *Particular*: To bee noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the Common-wealths.

Particular causes of Conversion of State, are of two sorts.

1. **F**orraine: By the overgreatnesse of invasion of some forraine Kingdome, or other State of meane power, having a part within our owne, which are to bee prevented by the providence of the chiefe, and rules of policy for the preserving of every State. This falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine State.

2. *Domestique*: } Sedition or open violence by the stronger part.
Alteration without violence.

Sedition.

Sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it selfe with force of Armes against the superiour power, *Quasi disio secedens.*

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.

General. } **L**iberty. } **W**hen they, that are of equall quality in a Common-wealth, or doe take themselves so to bee, are not regarded equally in all, or in any of these 3.
} **R**iches. } Or when they are so unequall in quality, or take themselves so to be, are regarded but equally, or with lesse respect, then those that bee of lesse defect in these 3. things, or in any of them.
} **H**onour. } **F 2** **I. In**

1. **I***n the Chiefe*: Covetuousnesse or oppression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (*viz.*) when the Magistrates, especially the Chiefe encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure, either with the publique or (private calamity, whereby the Governours grow to quarrell among themselves as in *Olygarchies*) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrell against the chiefe, as in Kingdomes: The examples of *Wat Tyler*, *Iarke Straw*, &c.

2. *In the Chiefe*: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to bee, as *Coriolanus*, *Cyrus minor*, Earle of *Warwick*. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of preferment; wherein some have overmuch, and so wax proud and aspire higher; or have more or lesse, they deserve as they suppose; and so in envy, and disdain seeke Innoyation by open faction, so *Caesar*; &c.

4. Some great necessity or calamity; So *Xerxes* after the foile of his great Army. And *Senacheris* after the losse of 185. in one night.

1. **E***nvoy*, when the chiefe exceed the mediocrity before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to conspire against him; as *Brutus Cassius*, &c. against *Caesar*.

2. *Feare*, *viz.* Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practise or force to prevent his owne danger, as *Artabanus* did to *Xerxes*.

3. *Lust* or *Lechery*, as *Tarquinius Superbus*, by *Brutus*; *Pisistratinda*, by *Armodius*; *Appius* by *Virginus*.

4. *Contempt*; For vile quality and base behaviour, as *Sardanapalus*, by *Arbaces*; *Dionisius* the younger by *Dion*.

Other de-
grees.

5. *Contumely*; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as *Caligula*, by *Chareas*.

Other de-
grees.

6. *Hope of Advancement*, or some great profit, as *Mithridates*, *Anobarsanes*.

Alteration without violence.

CAuses of alteration without violence are; 1. *Excesse* of the State; when by degrees, the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity, wherein it was, or should have been settled, and exceedeth in power, riches and absolutnes in his kind, by the ambition & covetousnesse of the Chiefes, immoderate taxes, and impositions, &c. applying all to his owne benefit without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth it selfe into another State or forme of Government, as a Kingdome into a Tyranny, an *Olygarchy* into an *Aristocracy*.

2. *Excesse*, of some one or more in the Common-wealth; viz. When some one, or more, in a Common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or vertue; and so by permission and popular favour, are advanced to the Sovereignty: By which meanes, Popular States grow into *Olygarchies*; and *Olygarchies*, and *Aristocracies* into *Monarchies*. For which cause, the *Athenians* and some other free States made their Lawes of *Ostrocismos* to banish any for a time that should excell, though it were in vertue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an unjust law, 'tis better to

take heed at the beginning to prevent the

meanes, that none should grow to that

hight and excellency, then to use

so sharp and unjust a
remedy.

F I N I S.

...of the State; when by degrees the state grows from
this temper and moderate, wherein it was, or should have
been, and afterwards by war, riches and splendour
in its limbs, the ambition & covetousness of the Citizens,
immoderate taxes, and impoitions, &c. applying all to
his own benefit without respect of other degrees, and to
in the end change it into another state or form of
Government, and Kingdoms into a Tyranny, an Oligarchy,
into an Aristocracy.

...of the State; when by degrees the state grows from
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Government, and Kingdoms into a Tyranny, an Oligarchy,
into an Aristocracy.

A METHOD, how to make use
of the Booke before, in the reading
of Story.

DAVID being seventy yeares of age, was of wisdom, memory, &c. sufficient to governe his Kingdome; 1. Reg. Chap. 1.

*Old age is not ever unfit for publique
Government.*

David being of great yeares, and so having a cold, dry, and impotent body, married with *Abishag* a faire Maide of the best complection through his whole Realme, to revive his body and prolong his life, 1. Reg. Chap. 1. Verse 3.

*Example of the like practise in
Charles the fifth.*

David being old and impotent of body by the advise of his Nobles and Phisitions, married a young Maide called *Abishag*, to warme and preserve his old body.

Observation.

VHether *David* did well in marrying a Maide; and whether it bee lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman; or on the other side, for an old-worne, and decrepitate woman to marry a young and lusty man.

For the Affirmative.

AR.G. The end of marriage is Society and mutuall comfort; but there may bee Society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young party. *Ergo* it is lawfull.

Ans. Society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage; but none of the principall end is of marriage, which are:

1. Procreation of Children, and so, the continuance of mankind.
2. The Avoiding of fornication.

As for comfort and society, they may bee betwixt man and man, women and women where no marriage is, And therefore no proper ends of marriage.

The Negative.

AR.G. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ordained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old impotent, and young party hath no respect to the right end, for which marriage, was ordained by God. *Therefore it is no lawfull marriage.*

2. No contract, wherein the party contracting, bindeth himselfe to an impossible condition, or to doe that which hee cannot doe, is good, or lawfull. But the contract of marriage

riage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition to doe, that which hee cannot doe (*viz.*) to performe the duties of marriage; *Therefore it is unlawfull.*

For the same cause, the civill law determineth a nullity in these marriages, except the woman know before the infirmity of the man, in which case shee can have no wrong, being a thing done with her owne knowledge and consent, because *Volenti ne fit injuria:—In legem Iulian. de adulteris leg. Si uxor &c.*

It provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity, that three yeares bee expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men, that have beene infirme at the first, by reason of sicknesse, or some other accident, afterwards proved to bee sufficient: *De repudiis leg. in causis.*

Defence for David in marrying Abishag.

1. **I**T was rather a Medicine then a marriage, without any evill or disordered affection.
2. It was by the perswasion of his Nobles and Physicians.
3. It was for the publique good to prolong the life of a worthy Prince.
4. It was with the knowledge and consent of the young Maid, who was made acquainted with the Kings infirmity, and to what end shee was married unto him; who if shee did it for the Common good, and for duties sake, having withall the gift of continency, shee is to bee commended; if for ambition, or some vaine respect, it is her owne, and not *Dauids* fault.

Politicall Nobility.

Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdome.

First, tooke the advantage of *Dauids* affection and kinde-
nesse towards him, and made him secure of any ill dea-
ling.

Secondly, of his age and infirmitics, disabling his father
as unfit for Government.

Thirdly, blazed his title, and right to the Crowne.

Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footemen,
and a guard to make shew of State.

Fiftly, being a comly and goodly person, made a Popular
shew of himselfe, and his qualities.

Sixty, joyned to himselfe in faction *Ioab*, the Generall
of the army, who was in displeasure for murdering of *Abner*
and *Amasa*, and feared that *David* would supply *Benajab*
into his place, and so was discontented. And *Abiather* the
high Priest, that was likewise discontented with *David*,
for the preferment of *Zadoch*.

Sevently, had meetings with them, and other his con-
federates, under a pretence of a vow and offering at the
Fountaine of *Ragnell*, in the confines of *Indea*.

Eightly, made a shew of Religion by Sacrificing, &c.

Ninthly, made himselfe familiar with the Nobles and
people, and entertained them with feasting.

Tenthly, drew into his part the chiefe officers of the
Court, and Servants to the King, by Rewards, Familiari-
ty, &c.

Elevently, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and
such as hee knew, would take part with him, and concea-
leth his ambition, and purpose from them.

Twelfthly, had *Ionathan* a favorite of the Court, and
neere about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing
were discovered, and moved at the Court, whilst himselfe
was in hand about his practize.

Observations.

*Wayes of such as aspire to the Kingdome, and
Markes to discern them.*

First, they wind into the Princes favour, by service, officiousnesse, flattery, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practises.

2. They take advantage of the Princes infirmities, age, impotency, negligence, sexe, &c. And worke upon that by disabling the Prince, and secret detracting of his person and Government.

3. They blaze their Title, and claime to the Crowne, (if they have any) with their friends, and favourers.

4. They provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres, make much of good souldiours, and have a pretence (if it bee espied) of some other end, as for the Kings honour, or service, and to bee in readines against forraine enemies, &c.

5. They make open shew of their best qualities and comelines of their person (which though it bee vaine as a dumbe shew, it is very effectuall to winne the liking of the popular sort, which according to the rule of the election of Kings, in the *Bees* Common-wealth; thinke that *Forma est digna imperare*) Activity, Nobility, Ancestry; &c.

6. To have their blazers abroad to set out their vertues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.

7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto them, of the chiefe Peeres, & men of best quality, such as are mightiest, and most gracious with the Souldiours, and the Military men, and most subtile and politique, especially such as bee ambitious, and discontent with the State.

8. To have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinary matter in some convenient place,

not too neere, nor too farre of, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition.

9. To take up a shew and pretence of Religion more then before, and beyond the practise of their former life.

10. They use popular curtesie (which in a great person is very effectuell) feasting, liberality, gaming, &c.

11. To bee over liberall, and winne to them by gifts, familiarity, &c. the chiefe Officers of the Court, and Governours of Shires.

12. To have some neere about the Prince, to keepe them in credite, and remove suspition, if any rise.

13. To disgrace such as they know to bee sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present State, or to the Competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all meanes they can, and to conceale the designs from them, least they bee discovered before they bee ripe.

14. To have some spie neere about the Prince, to advertise them if any inckling of suspition arise whilest themselves are practising.

Note the practises of *Absolon*: 2. Sam. Chap. 16.
and of *Cyrus minor*, in *Xenophon*: Περὶ βασιλῆος
cap. I.

Politicall Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion, and justice, and so highly deserving of the Common-wealth, yet growne into age, grew withall into contempt, and had many, both of his Nobles and Common-people, that fell from him, first with Absolon, then with Adoniah, who affected the Kingdome and rebelled against him. For remedy wherof, hee stirred up himselfe to a publique actions which might shew his vigour and sufficiency to mannage the affaires of his Kingdome.

1. After the victory against *Abolon*, hee forced himselfe to forbear mourning, and shewed himselfe to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his Sonne.

2. After the victory, hee caused a generall convention to bee assembled of the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to *Ierusalem*, which was a renewing and re-establishing of him; 2. *Sam.* 19, 12.

3. Hee gave an experiment of his power and authority, by deposing a person of great authority and estimation, to wit, *Ioab*, Generall Captaine of the Army, and advancing *Amasa* to his place.

4. Hee sent kind Messengers to *Ierusalem*, and to other chiefe and head Townes, and speciall men of *Iudea*, his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, that they were of his owne flesh and blood, with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them, to provoke them with like kindnesse and affection towards him.

5. Hee assembled a Parliament of his whole Realme, and tooke occasion upon the designing of his Successour, to commend unto them the succession of his House, and the continuance and maintenance of Gods true worship and religion, then established, and gave a grave and publique charge to his Successour, now designed, touching the manner of his government, and maintaing of Religion, 1. *Chron.* 12. 13.

6. Hee shewed his bounty and magnificence in congering matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brasse, &c. And caused it to bee published and made known to the Parliament and whole Nation, 1. *Chron.* 22. 13.


7. Hee revived the Church Government, and set it in a right order, assigning to every Church Officers his place and function.

8. Hee suppressed the faction of *Adoniah*, and ordained

Salomon his Successour, 1. Reg. 1. 22. By these meanes,
hee retained his Majesty and authority in his old age, as
appeareth by th'effect; for that being bedred, hee sup-
pressed the faction of Adoniah, (which was growne
mighty, and was set on foote) with his bare com-
mandement, and signification of his plea-
sure, and so hee died
in peace.



F I N I S.





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