

THE
DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

OF THE

MARQUESS WELLESLEY, K. G.

DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN

INDIA.

EDITED BY

MONTGOMERY MARTIN.

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INTRODUCTION.

The first volume of the Marquess Wellesley's despatches, &c., contained the documents relating to the origin of the war in Mysore, and to the series of measures and events which terminated in the death of Tippoo Sultaun, and in the occupation of his capital and kingdom by the British forces. This volume contains, in a similar form, the proceedings of the Marquess Wellesley, which followed the reduction of Mysore down to the commencement of the Mahratta war. The contents of this volume may be enumerated in the following order.

The settlement of Mysore, as explained in the documents noted beneath.*

The treaties of Hyderabad arose out of the settlement of Mysore.†

The discoveries made in the palace of Seringapatam, disclosing the treachery of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, led to the final settlement of that part of India, on the principles detailed in the treaty of 31st July, 1801,‡ which, together with a similar arrangement in Tanjore,§ placed our territories in the south of India on a footing of permanent tranquillity, prosperity, and security.

* Letters, &c. numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 45, 107; the treaties of Mysore, page 26, of Seringapatam, p. 43, and in the Appendix, p. 736.

† See letters No. 41, 73, 79, 102, and Appendix, p. 709 and 726.

‡ Nos. 1, 69, 70, 72, 133, 134, 136, and Appendix, p. 720 and 740.

§ No. 69, and Appendix, p. 705.

The settlement of Oude, so essential to the security of our north-west frontier, after a protracted negotiation with the Vizier Saadut Ali Khan, terminated in the conclusion of the treaty of cession under date 10th of November, 1801.*

The settlement of Surat was effected on a principle corresponding with that of the Carnatic and Mysore, by a treaty concluded with the Nabob of Surat, under date 13th of May, 1800,† and with the Guicowar, by articles of agreement dated 6th of June, 1802.‡

A treaty with the Rajah of Nepaul, under date 30th of October, 1801,§ placed our alliance with this frontier state on an amicable basis.

The political and commercial treaties with Persia afforded a check to Zemaun Shah.||

The policy pursued towards the Peishwa and Mahrattas is detailed in the documents specified.¶

The Egyptian expedition, by which the combined troops of England and of India co-operated in the delta of the Nile for the expulsion of the French army from the East, was a useful sequel to the destruction of the French influence at Hyderabad and in Mysore.**

The foundation of a collegiate establishment at Fort William for the instruction of the civil servants of the East India Company is explained in the following documents.††

* See letters, No. 20, 40, 44, (p. 145,) 47, 48, 64, 69, 109, 110, 124, 126, 135, 137, 139.

† No. 57, and Appendix, p. 708.

‡ See Appendix, p. 728, 729; 730, 731. § p. 726.

|| No. 29, and Appendix, p. 715 and 717.

¶ See letters, No. 6, 10, 18, 26, 32, 36, 54, 69, 78, and 90.

** No. 30, 42, 43, 62, 63, 69, 71, 80, 81, 83, 84, 98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 111, 113, 114, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 127, 135, 136, 137, and Appendix, 753, 755, 758, and 759.

†† Letters, &c. No. 39, 85, 86, 87; Appendix, p. 732 and 738.

The measures adopted for the regulation of the private trade of India appears in the several papers noted below.*

The rebellion of Doondiah Waugh,† in which the Duke of Wellington (then Colonel Wellesley) distinguished himself by his able conduct and brilliant successes, is so fully explained in his Grace's despatches‡ as to render a repetition in this work unnecessary.

The Poligar insurrection§ which resulted from the fall of Mysore was temporary in its duration and circumscribed in its operation.

The finances,|| taxation,¶ and police** of India required and received the minute attention of the Governor-General. The naval and military armaments assembled at Trincomalee for the conquest of Java, Mauritius and Bourbon, were subsequently employed in the expedition to Egypt, but the policy of the measure was fully recognized by the Marquess Wellesley's plans being carried into execution before the close of the war. ††

The power vested (for the first time) in the Governor-General, †† as Captain-General of the Forces, gave his Lordship full authority over all military operations. The reduction of the military charges on the ratification of the peace of Amiens,

* No. 60, 69, 94, and Appendix, p. 736.

† See Nos. 31 and 78.

‡ See Vol. I. of the Duke of Wellington's despatches, p. 52, 56, 60, 66 and 79.

§ No. 45 and 183.

|| No. 56 and 59.

¶ No. 69.

** No. 69.

†† Admiral Rainier doubted the power of the Governor-General to send an expedition against the French islands without special orders from home, and refused to proceed thither with the ships under his command. The authority assumed by his Lordship on this occasion was afterwards approved by the King's Government at home. See Lord Hobart's letter, No. 185, and the Marquess Wellesley's Letters to Admiral Rainier in the Appendix, p. 753.

‡‡ Letter, No. 121.

is shewn in the Governor-General's letter to General Lake,* and the intended resignation of the Marquess Wellesley of the Indian Government, is announced in his Lordship's letter to the Court of Directors, dated 1st of January, 1802.†

Goa, to prevent its intended occupation by the French, was garrisoned by British troops.‡

The murder of the Persian ambassador at Bombay (20th of July, 1802), and the Governor-General's declaration to the surviving relations and attendants of that nobleman§ is detailed as below.

The papers relating to Ceylon,|| and several other matters referring to the Governor-General in his public capacity, required insertion in the present work.

The army engaged in the war in Mysore presented to the Marquess Wellesley a star formed of the diamonds captured at Seringapatam; it was declined by his Lordship on public grounds; the army presented it to the Court of Directors, under whose authority the Governor-General accepted it.¶

The prize taken at Seringapatam was very considerable: the Governor-General ordered the immediate distribution of a large part of it among the troops employed in the war, reserving however the ordnance, ammunition, and military stores until the pleasure of his Majesty and the Court of Directors could be received.**

It was proposed by Mr. Dundas and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company to grant £100,000 out of the sum thus reserved to the Marquess Wellesley. His Lordship declined this proposition as injurious to the interests of the army.†† A pension of £5,000

* No. 168.

† See 166 and 172.

‡ Letters, Nos. 38, 39 and 167.

§ Letter, No. 130, and p. 668.

|| No. 130, and 185.

¶ Nos. 52, 170 and 171.

** No. 14 and 15.

†† Nos. 75, 76, and 93.

per annum for twenty years was afterwards granted to his Lordship.*

The King was graciously pleased to express his Majesty's royal pleasure at the co-operation of the Indian army with his Majesty's forces, and those of the Ottoman Porte in Egypt,† and the Grand Seignior conferred the order of the Crescent on the Governor-General and on Major-General Baird.‡

The third volume will contain the account of the Mah-ratta war, down to the peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.§

* No. 108.

† Nos. 185 and 186.

‡ No. 187.

§ The Editor has much pleasure in renewing his thanks to N. B. Edmonstone, Esq. for his continued kind and most valuable assistance in the preparation of the present work. Mr. Edmonstone's aid has been more particularly useful on account of his having filled the important offices of Persian Translator, and Secretary to the Government in the Secret Political and Foreign Departments with so much credit during the greater part of the period of these memorable transactions.

London, August, 1836.

ERRATA.

- p. 12, fourth from bottom—for *of* read *to*.
- 24, letter, No. XIII.—for *Lord*, read *Earl of*.
- 52, letter XIX, fourth line from end of letter—adventures may *be*, read adventures may *become*.
- 56, letter XXI, line 8—for *gave*, read *give*.
- 80, last line—for *or* union, read *nor* union.
- 83, line 10—for *has*, read *had*.
- 86, line 9 from bottom—for *most*, read *more*.
- 91, line 5 from top, for *into*, read *to*.
- 129, line 10 from bottom—for *of* forward, read *of the* forward.
- 162, end of 3rd paragraph—for . put ?.
- 184, last line but one from bottom—for *Most Noble*, read *Right Honourable*.
- 231, paragraph 4, line 17—for *those*, read *they*.
- 244, line 6, reverse bracket.
- 452, letter CXV, line 10, after *India*, omit semicolon.
- 610, line 19 from top, for *Governor*, read *Government*.

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DESPATCHES,
MINUTES, AND CORRESPONDENCE,

&c. &c. &c.

INDIA.

No. I.

From His Highness Omdut ul Omra, Nabob of the Carnatic, to the Earl of Mornington.

Written the 7 Zelhege, 1213 Hegery,
or 13 May, 1799.

MY LORD,

Having read your Lordship's letter of the 24th ultimo,* with great and serious attention, suitable to the importance of the contents, I shall return to it a fair and explicit answer; the candour and sincerity of my character, without a request from your Lordship would have induced me on this, as on all other occasions, to speak without disguise. I have an additional inducement however, for plainness of language and sentiment, in the earnest desire and manly example of your Lordship.

I acknowledge my Lord, that under certain circumstances, explained by the third Article of the Treaty of 1792, the Company are vested with authority to assume the Carnatic, and amongst other things empowered to collect the revenue, which it yields; and I confess, without regard to the consequence of that confession, that the assumption of the control over the affairs and revenues of my country, under the provision of the Treaty, would occasion a severe and heartfelt affliction; yet, if the time should arrive, which should render it necessary, that the Company avail themselves of the objects which that Article secures, I hope that Divine

Providence will endue me with fortitude, adapted to the necessity of the season, and the adversity of fortune, that I may make the sacrifice required of me, if not with cheerfulness, at least with dignity and resignation. And in performing this extreme act which the treaty enjoins (if it ever be demanded of me) I shall have a constant consolation in reflecting on the letter of the treaty itself, which stipulates that as soon as the exigency of the times which required the temporary exercise shall have been satisfied, that I shall be reinstated in all my privileges and authorities; and I should wrong your Lordship's honor, and slur the reputation of those whom your Lordship represents, if I could suspect for an instant, that whilst I was fulfilling every relation to the Company with fidelity and exactness, that they should hesitate on their parts to discharge their relative connective duties.

Possessing these avowed sentiments within myself, and this declared sense of the honor and justice of my allies, I have no disinclination of that strong and rooted kind which your Lordship would seem to indulge, so as to induce me to enter into any new arrangement, rather than conform myself to the provisions of the existing engagements. No, my Lord,—the treaty of 1792, was concluded under such happy auspices, and is calculated from its precision and clearness, to promote and maintain so good understanding between all the parties to it; and is, moreover, so recommended to my affections, by the loved and revered personages who framed it, that I could not for any personal inconvenience, were it ten times greater, so it were created by the treaty, consent that it should be altered even in a letter.

But your Lordship has submitted reasons apparently more cogent, why a new arrangement would be desirable; and these arise out of the supposed defect of the treaty itself, to ensure the objects which it had in view, and the probable deficiency of my means to fulfil hereafter the duties which it imposes.

I cannot overlook a circumstance, which in an affair of this sort, must naturally present itself to the mind of your Lordship; that the treaty which is now suggested to be defective, has had a trial, my Lord, of more than seven years, and without a single exception, has been found for that period,

not only sufficient for all common purposes, but has secured the fulfilment of every engagement stipulated in it, with a harmony uninterrupted, and perhaps I might add, almost unprecedented in any country or age. And if experience be the true test of human institutions, there can be nothing, my Lord, to apprehend of the competency of the treaty of 1792, to continue to the contracting parties to an incalculable date, that happiness, that security, and that universal good-will which it has hitherto produced.

But, my Lord, you have directed my observation beyond the present hour, and have informed me that your Lordship, and the ministers of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, whom may the Almighty preserve, have looked, and do still look with a politic care, and wise prudence, to future probabilities and events as they regard our mutual conditions, and that the prospect is terrifying.

I do not presume to know the grounds on which your Lordship has formed your opinion of the instability and uncertainty of my affairs, nor is it necessary that I should be acquainted with them. It is sufficient for me to know, that they are abundant enough to enable me to keep with punctuality my plighted faith. Your Lordship, however, has supposed, that from a difficulty to raise the kists, periodically payable to the Company, that I have been reduced to so great pecuniary distresses, that to provide a remedy for them, I have had recourse to measures, which I cannot bring myself to name; and that these measures in their expected consequences, may affect the interests of the Company, as connected with the treaty.

Your Lordship has a right undoubted, to expect an explanation of me, as to any public matter, which may regard the affairs of the Company as interwoven with my own; and I shall be happy on all occasions, as I am at the present opportunity, of answering that part of your Lordship's letter, which respects the alleged assignment of certain districts, set apart by the treaty of 1792, as a security for the Company on the possible occurrence of a described event; but as to any thing foreign to this, that may relate either to the internal management of my countries, or the government of my people, I must, on principles as obvious as they are just, decline to enter into a discussion.

The supposed assignment of the districts, alluded to by your Lordship, is stated as having been productive of the greater part of the mischief, which is lamented and deplored in your Lordship's letter, and as having laid the seeds of a more deadly and extensive ruin: and your Lordship relying principally on this, and on reasoning applicable to it, has suggested the necessity of a new arrangement. I am happy, my Lord, to offer an unqualified explanation of this alleged transaction; and I have a double motive to rejoice at the opportunity afforded by your Lordship, since it will serve to free my character and honor from the imputations which at present rest upon it, and will convince you, my Lord, that there are no substantial reasons, which must give your Lordship infinite satisfaction, for any apprehensions on this, or any other ground related with it.

I do most unequivocally assure your Lordship, on the word and faith of a sovereign, that no one foot of the Districts, set apart by the treaty of 1792, have been, or are in any manner or way, directly or indirectly assigned by me, or *with my knowledge to any individual whatsoever*; and having made this solemn and unreserved declaration, I would hope that I need not urge more.

But I have suffered, my Lord, so much from reports founded on an erroneous conception of my conduct in this particular, that I am unavoidably led to be more explicit perhaps, than might be expected by your Lordship. I have been represented, my Lord, to the world, and it were impossible to calculate how far I may yet be injured by it, unless I put a limit to the representation, to have notoriously mortgaged and assigned the Districts, pledged to the Company, and the manner of my doing it has been publicly and confidently spoken of and proclaimed. That the ill-will of those, who are inimical to my interests, may have no further pretence for their assertions, and that it may be unable further to operate to my prejudice on the enlightened mind of your Lordship, I shall briefly state the manner in which payments are made into my treasury from those Districts by the officers of my revenue department, and which are ordinarily said to give rise to the assignments in question; and it is in this simple way—

As my monthly kists require to be paid with regularity, and

as the expence and danger of the remittance of money in specie, from a distant country to the Presidency are great, my aumils, or managers, for the amount of their respective payments, procure bills from soucars for the particular sums to be remitted; and these bills are indifferently purchased of native bankers, who may have money unemployed at Madras! They are taken without reference to me, or to any connected with my durbar. They are paid in specie, or grain, and never superinduce an agreement of any sort to which I am made a party, directly, or collaterally. The transaction ends as it originates, with the managers and the soucars.

Having convinced your Lordship, as I would believe, that the evil anticipated by your Lordship of the expected failure of my resources to answer the exigencies of the treaty, can never happen from any of the causes mentioned by your Lordship; and that the treaty in its operation, is capable of insuring all those advantages which it was designed to secure, I shall not enter, my Lord, into a detail of the new proposals founded on supposed circumstances, which I have shewn to your Lordship to have been without existence.

The wisdom and justice which pervades many parts of the arrangement proposed, I cannot but admire, as I have hitherto admired, all the public acts and propositions of your Lordship. They are the certain and avowed offsprings of a great and comprehensive mind; and although I cannot so far accede to the measure, as to give it, inasmuch as regards myself, all the weight and authority of a treaty; yet I shall endeavour, as circumstances allow, to observe the genuine maxims which your Lordship has used to enforce your proposals, and the conduct which they would inculcate.

You need not be told, my Lord, of the unconquerable and insurmountable obstacle in the way of any new engagement, which could not be overstepped without outraging every principle that should make engagements binding; for your Lordship is not unacquainted that my revered and honoured father, with his departing spirit, entreated and enjoined me that I should not consent to the alteration of a treaty, which he had painfully concluded; and I assured him on the most sacred obligation that religion imposes that I would obey

his dying commands. Does it remain for me to conjure your Lordship, by the nobleness of your own nature—by your filial piety—by the reverence you owe to God—by each and all of these, not to renew an application which I cannot accede to, without a breach of all moral and religious duties, and cannot listen to without reproach.

My Lord, Praise be to the Almighty God, that in consequence of your Lordship's wise and resolute measures, the strong Fortress of Seringapatam, which is equal to the wall of Alexander, and which has for a great length of time withstood all the attempts of other princes, has been captured, and the extensive country of Mysore restored to tranquillity and safety, by the annihilation of the disturber of that country. This has conveyed to my mind unspeakable joy and gladness. It was right that such a glorious victory, and the acquisition of such honourable advantages, should be derived purely from your Lordship's good fortune; and it will remain for ever on the records of time. Verse—"It is a happy plan that has succeeded, this affair has been effected by you, and is such as is done by the brave." The victories which my friends have obtained by Divine favour, has given the greatest joy to me who am their ancient ally, I consider them as an auspicious omen of my own happiness, and am persuaded that your Lordship will manifest your kindness towards me, especially in support of my rights. The talooks of Carrore, the two Sealams, and as far as Tungarpeatty, have always been dependencies on Trichinopoly. The father of Tippoo arrogantly usurped these talooks, I hope they will now be restored to me by your Lordship's justice. Another request that I have to make, and with which I trust your Lordship will not only be not offended, but that you will grant my desire is this—when friends acquire an immensity of power, those who are their sincere and ancient friends, are inspired with certain hopes of obtaining their wishes. The troops, for which I pay nine lacks of pagodas yearly, in the service of the Company, were employed with those of my friends in the reduction of the Mysore country. I trust, therefore, that I shall be allowed to participate in the conquered countries, in proportion to the sum I contribute for those troops, and that thereby through your Lordship's justice and equity, I

who have always followed the fortunes of my friends, and prayed for their acquirement of such successes, may obtain my wishes.

May your days be happy.

What more?

No. II.

From Lieut.-General Harris, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, May 13th, 1799.

This morning Purneah, who has so long been at the head of the principal departments of the Mysore Government, and enjoyed the confidence of the late Suldaun, paid me a visit, having arrived last night from the army, which remained under his command.

After the customary ceremonies of an Eastern visit, Purneah stated, in reply to my questions concerning Futtch Hyder, and the reason of his absence, that prudence required the presence of a person of rank with the troops; but the Prince was ready to attend my summons. This led to farther conversation on the subject of the troops of the *Sircars*, still remaining in arms near Seringapatam, and produced from Purneah a direct proposal for an arrangement, by the adoption of which alone, in his opinion, the immediate restoration of order and tranquillity could be obtained.

The following is the outline of the Plan proposed. 1st. That one of the family of the late Tippoo Suldaun, should be placed at the head of the Government, to be established in this Country.

2nd. That the Prince should pay to the English such tribute as shall be agreed upon.

3rd. That the English troops shall garrison such Forts, as they deem necessary for the security of the Country.

Purneah further suggested, that Futtch Hyder should be the Prince selected, and under this arrangement, which he very strongly pressed on my consideration, he declared he would be responsible for the immediate settlement of the Country; and he intimated, through the discussion that he expected, as *Dewan*, to be charged with the administration of the revenues under the Government, which it was proposed to establish. He stated, that the troops who, under any other plan would, he feared, become a lawless banditti,

pillaging the country, and only to be quelled by force, would under this remain quiet, on the hope of future employment in the Service. The family of Tippoo Suldaun would be preserved in a respectable rank, and the power of the English established by an arrangement, the moderation of which, would do honour to the national character.

I informed Purneah in reply to his proposal, that my powers did not authorise me even to give an opinion on his plan, that I would state it to your Lordship; but that he must clearly understand, I made no promise regarding the event. I insisted that Futteh Hyder should immediately repair to Scringapatam; and waving the consideration of permanent settlement, requested him to suggest measures for the temporary arrangements of the remains of the Suldaun's army, and the re-establishment of order in the Country.

This, he said, was difficult, unless a prospect of the adoption of such a plan, as he had suggested was held out. About 3000 of the cavalry were he informed me, mounted on horses the property of the State; the men would not serve us; and although he thought his influence would be sufficient to cause their horses to be delivered up, together with the elephants and camels of the Sircar, which were also with his army; arrears were due to the troopers, and the persons employed to attend the horses, which they had a right to expect. The rest of the cavalry were Sillahdars, whose horses were their own; and whom it might be difficult to disperse at once, by dismissal from the service, without the risk of great inconvenience to Government, and distress to the country from their licentious conduct; Meer Cummer ud Deen's party he informed me, had joined that now with Futteh Hyder.

After much discussion, it was agreed, that the proposal of *Purneah*, should be submitted to your Lordship's consideration; and that he should immediately receive an order from me, to deliver up the elephants, camels, horses, &c. the property of the State. That I should cause a small advance of money for the supply of their immediate wants, to be paid to the troopers and horse-keepers of the *Bargeer*, or regular cavalry; and that all Jagheedars, Sillahdars, &c. should be directed to return to the lands assigned to them respectively for their support, under the late Government, of which they should remain possessed until further orders;

restricting *at present*, their collection of the revenues of these lands, to the arrears of the last year only. This, as a temporary arrangement seemed satisfactory, and Purneah returned to his camp to put it in force.

In the course of conversation, the possibility of an arrangement was hinted, for the establishment of a Hindoo Government, in favour of the ancient family of Mysore, but *Purneah* cautiously evaded entering into this idea, in the slightest degree. The Mahomedan interest is so intimately blended with every department of the State in this Country, that no plan by which it is set aside in favour of an Hindoo Prince, could produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquillity, and reconciling the troops, and most powerful class of the inhabitants to the change of Government.

I have the honour to be, My Lord,
Your most obedient and faithful Servant,
G. HARRIS.

No. III.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

Fort St. George, 14 May, 1799.

Having judged it necessary to entrust the conduct of all political affairs in Mysore, until my arrival at Seringapatam, or until further orders, to the exclusive management of my private Secretary, the honourable Mr. Henry Wellesley, and of my military Secretary Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick, the services of the Commissioners appointed under my instructions of 22nd February are no longer required. That Commission is, therefore, now superseded.* I request you to express to the members of the commission my entire satisfaction in the zeal, ability, and discretion with which they have discharged the trust reposed in them in every part of their proceedings, of which I have hitherto been apprized.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* The instruction conveyed in this letter, was not to take effect until the arrival of Mr. Henry Wellesley at Seringapatam, which will account for the apparent discrepancy of the letter dated May 20th 1799, [see next page] addressed to the members of the Army Commission, for a specific purpose.

No. IV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 17th May, 1799.

Although his highness the Nizam has unreservedly committed the interests of his government in the final adjustment of the concerns of the triple alliance to my charge, yet being desirous of consulting him in the present important conjuncture of affairs, as far as is consistent with a prompt and efficacious arrangement, I desire that you will, without delay, intimate to his Highness and the Minister my wish to be informed of their sentiments, not only with respect to the general arrangement of affairs in Mysore as affecting the combined interests of the triple alliance, but also with regard to his Highness's particular views and pretensions. You may assure his Highness of my entire disposition to meet his wishes to the utmost extent compatible with the general objects and interests of the alliance; and that it is with a view to consult his wishes, as far as may be practicable, that I now solicit his sentiments and opinion. You will obtain his Highness's and the Minister's reply as early as possible, and forward it, in duplicate, to me to Fort St. George, and to Seringapatam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. V.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, and the Members of the Army Commission.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 20th May, 1799.

I have great pleasure in expressing my entire approbation of the manner in which you have hitherto executed the powers entrusted to you. Unexpected circumstances, for which I could not make a particular provision, not only justified your deviation from the letter of my instructions, but would have rendered an adherence to their letter inconsistent with their spirit. You very properly considered that my first objects must be (as I had expressed it,) in all cases, the safety of the army, and the success of the expedition; and that

these important considerations must always be paramount to the strict execution of any special instruction.

I am desirous of learning the nature of all the steps taken to conciliate the various Leaders of Troops dispersed in Mysore. Effectual measures of conciliation are absolutely necessary to the restoration of tranquillity in the country, and to the establishment of a final arrangement.

I desire that you will immediately ascertain and report to me the condition of the late Sultan's family, and the characters, dispositions and views of his sons respectively, and their connections with parties and politics, either foreign or domestic.—This enquiry will naturally lead to the question, how far any of the sons of the Sultan had either entered into his views of establishing an alliance with France, or had disapproved them. The state of the family of the ancient Rajas of Mysore, and the characters and description of the persons composing it must also form an immediate object of your investigation to be reported to me.

It is also my wish to receive the opinion of the Commission with respect to the most eligible settlement of the Country of Mysore, in every possible view of that extensive and intricate question. I request, therefore, that you will, immediately, take this important subject into deliberation; if unanimous in your opinion, you will report it collectively; and if you should differ, you will each of you report your opinions separately, in writing, on the question, and transmit them to me for my consideration. As you may be assured of the most liberal construction, on my part, I shall expect that you will be perfectly unreserved in your communications and sentiments upon this momentous subject. My judgment is perfectly without prejudice on any part of the question, and I am anxious to learn the result of your observations, with a view to assist me in forming a correct opinion.

I will, however, state a few general points which may serve to explain the considerations requiring immediate attention in the examination of this question:

1st. That mode of settlement is to be preferred which shall unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order, with the greatest practicable degree of security for the continuance of both.

2nd. For this purpose not only the interests of the Company, but those of the Nizam, of the Mahrattas, and of the leading Chieftains in Mysore must be conciliated.

3rd. The Military power of Mysore must be broken; or absolutely identified with that of the Company.

4. Seringapatam must be, in effect, a British Garrison under whatever nominal authority it may be placed.

5. The Company must retain the whole of the Sultan's territory in Malabar, and also in Coimbatore and Daraporam with the Heads of all the Passes on the Table Land.

The 4th and 5th of these points are properly matters of detail, but I consider them to be so essential to the stability of any new settlement, that I have stated them here as fundamental articles in every possible view and modification of the question.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 23d May, 1799.

Although the Peishwa's conduct, since my declaration was signified to him has been such as to forfeit every claim upon the faith or justice of the Company, I have determined to allow him a certain share in the division of the conquered territory, provided he shall conduct himself in a manner suitable to the nature of his own situation and of that of the Allies, and shall not attempt to disturb the Settlement which I shall deem most expedient for the affairs of Mysore.

The Peishwa's sudden determination to take the field, accompanied by the tacit acquiescence of Scindiah, and by the orders which you state to have been forwarded to Purseram Bhow appears to me very suspicious. It is possible that before the 10th of May, the Peishwa might have been apprised of the fall of Seringapatam; and his own preparations together with the orders of Purseram Bhow, may have been intended to favour the siege of Bednore, or of some other part of the late Tippoo Sultaun's dominions, with the view of securing the dominions seized in defiance of the consent of

the Company and of the Nizam. Such a proceeding could not be viewed with indifference by me, and ultimately must prove injurious to the interests of the Peishwa, by compelling the Company to renounce his alliance altogether, and to recover, by force of arms, the territory so unjustly invaded. I desire that you will take the most effectual measures in your power to discover the intentions of the Peishwa with respect to the treacherous design which I apprehend him to have formed; and that you will employ such representations or other means as may appear to you most likely to prevent the execution of this design, if really entertained. You will apprise Lieut.-General Harris at Seringapatam, and Lieut.-General Stuart (now occupying the late Sultan's dominions on the coast of Malabar,) of any movement which you may apprehend from the Mahrattas towards the dominions of Tippoo Suldaun. It is almost superfluous to state to you that the whole Kingdom of Mysore, having fallen to the arms of the Company and the Nizam, is at present to be considered as a part of their Dominions by right of conquest, and consequently any invasion of the Kingdom of Mysore must be deemed, on the part of the Mahrattas, an aggression against both the other Members of the Triple Alliance. The Peishwa can derive no right to the conquered territories under an alliance of which he has violated both the letter and spirit. Whatever benefit he may eventually be permitted to derive from our recent conquest, will flow from the mere generosity and liberal policy of the British councils.

Although I have not yet completely arranged in my mind the portion of territory which I mean to cede to the Peishwa; I can now state to you generally, that I expect it will consist of the Territory of Anagoondy, Harponelly, and a part of Rydroog, to this may possibly be added a part of Bednore; but the extent of that addition must depend upon circumstances on which I am not at present prepared to give a decision. It is evidently for the Peishwa's interest to await the quiet cession of the considerable territory which he will acquire under any possible modification of the settlement of Mysore, rather than incur the hazard of provoking that power which has so recently given a signal instance of its vigour and efficiency.

The Peishwa must be aware that the Nizam will not wil-

lingly consent to any partition of Territory tending to enlarge the Mahratta Dominion, and therefore the Peishwa should feel that he must rely on me exclusively for any such consideration and favour. Under such circumstances his wisest policy would be to be guided by your suggestions, and to make no attempt which can serve to confirm my late suspicions of his disaffection to the interests of the Company.

Previously to the cession of any portion of Territory to the Peishwa, I should wish to endeavour to accomplish the whole of the arrangement contained in my instructions to you of the 8th of July 1798.* And I desire to learn from you, without delay, whether a renewal of those propositions under the present circumstances of affairs would prove acceptable to the court of Poonah.

On some parts of these propositions I shall absolutely insist, as indispensable preliminaries to any cession of territory to the Peishwa.

The establishment of a Subsidiary British force at Poonah still appears to me to be a most desirable measure, although its importance has been much diminished by the reduction of Mysore; but a complete adjustment, under my arbitration, of every point now at issue between the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, as well as an engagement to abide by the arbitration of the Company on all future points of difference which may arise between the two courts; the perpetual exclusion of the French from the territories and armies of the Peishwa, and a defensive alliance against any French invasion of India, must be made indispensable preliminaries of whatever cession of territory I may deem it expedient to make to the Peishwa. This general outline of my views will enable you to take such steps as may tend to favour their success; and I shall hope to receive from you, as early as possible, such reflections as shall occur to you upon the suggestions contained in this letter.

I enclose copies of two French papers found in the Palace of Tippoo Sultaun after the capture of Seringapatam. The originals are attested by the Sultan's Byze or usual form of abbreviated signature. You will communicate these papers to the Peishwa and to Nana; and you will not fail to enforce the arguments which arise from the evident design of the late

* See Vol. I. p. 94.

Sultan to employ the French arms for the purpose of recovering from the Mahrattas, and the Nizam, as well as from the Company the territories ceded to each of them under the treaty of Seringapatam.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 23rd May, 1799.

I am apprehensive that the extraordinary tide of success which attends us in Mysore may so elate Azim ul Omrah as to raise the pretensions of his court beyond all bounds of discretion. I rely on you to correct every appearance of such a disposition as well as every symptom of an inclination to hostilities against Scindiah, or the Peishwa. My wish is that the whole arrangement of our conquests should be left implicitly to the Company's government, but I should be glad to be furnished with a general outline of the views and pretensions of the Nizam, which his Highness may be assured will form an anxious object of my attention in framing any new distribution of territory or power.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. VIII.

The Honourable Henry Wellesley to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Camp near Anicul, 25th May, 1799.

No part of the Carnatic is in a more tranquil state than the country we passed through last night and this morning; and there can be little doubt that if the Commissioners of Malabar were to use proper exertions, that the same state of tranquillity and obedience to our Government might be produced in Canara. I am told that the inhabitants of all the villages between this place and Seringapatam express the greatest satisfaction at the fall of Tippoo, and at the prospect of living under the Company's Government.

Ever your's,

H. WELLESLEY.

No. IX.

Lieut.-General Sir Alured Clarke to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Fort William, May 28, 1799.

Thanks to the expeditious passage of the *Success* Galley, I have been honoured with your letter of the 22nd instant, by which I was happy to find you had been dissuaded from undertaking the journey to Seringapatam at this inclement season. The heat here has been intense, and I am told it is so much worse in the Amboor Valley and Baramahl at this time of the year, that you would have found it insupportable, and probably have suffered much ill health in consequence; and as I see a great deal still to be done, that must depend on your strength of mind and active exertions, I should have been sorry that the benefit we may expect from the full operation of both, should have been hazarded by an overzeal for the public good. The more I reflect on the events of the last twelve months the greater surprise and gratification I feel; and the wider view I take of their probable consequences, the more satisfied I am of the wisdom of those measures, and the merit of those persevering exertions that have ensured, so far, a prospect of long peace and general stability to the interests of the British Empire in India. I am aware this is something like a repetition of what I said before, but it presses so heavily on my mind, that I cannot restrain it. I shall wait with much impatience to know the outlines of the plan you may determine on with respect to the possessions of every description that have fallen under our controul, which is a matter of no easy arrangement; but will, I am persuaded, be brought to the most favourable issue that enlightened policy and sound judgment can devise.

No evidence was wanting to corroborate the justice of the war against Tippoo; but if there had, nothing could have proved more satisfactory and complete than the papers you have been good enough to send me copies of. They are such as one would be desirous of recording immediately and every where.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect and esteem, my dear Lord, your Lordship's obedient,

And most faithful humble Servant,

ALURED CLARKE.

No. X.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 28th May, 1799.

I think it necessary to apprise you, without delay, that it is my most earnest desire to avoid hostilities with the Mahrattas, and, therefore, although their army should actually have entered the Mysore Country, I do not wish that measures of force should be taken to repel them. I approve the letter which you have written to Purseram Bhow for the purpose of preventing the advance of his army into Mysore, or of inducing him to withdraw it, if already advanced.

It will be advisable to lose no time in taking possession of the Forts of Simogu, Bednore, Chitteldroog, and any others on the northern Frontier of Mysore, which may appear important for the purpose of checking the advance of the Mahrattas. You will judge how far such detachments may be practicable consistently with the essential object of maintaining your main army in a formidable and efficient state. If the Mahrattas, however, should have occupied any forts in that quarter, I desire that no measures of force may be taken to dislodge them; representations may be made to the several Commanders and Killahdars, but no hostility must, on any account, be undertaken against the Mahratta army, unless in the case stated, "that the safety of your own army or their aggression should absolutely demand the use of force."

Whatever forts may actually be in our possession must be maintained, even at the hazard of hostility; but I do not suppose that the Mahrattas will venture to become the aggressors, although it would be conformable to their policy to pre-occupy the northern parts of the country with a view of reducing me to the alternative either of ceding them to the Peishwa, or of engaging in a war for the purpose of expelling his army.

I further think it necessary to apprise you that upon principles of policy too obvious to require explanation, it is my determination to allow the state of Poonah to participate in the division of the country now at the disposal of the Allies.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

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No. XI.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Steuart.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 1st June, 1799.

I learnt with much satisfaction the important intelligence of the safe arrival of the army of Bombay on the frontier of the Province of Canara.

From your several communications it appears that the season is too far advanced to admit of an attempt to reduce the Province of Canara in the event of any resistance being offered to the introduction of our government; but I flatter myself that the orders transmitted from Seringapatam to the Killahdars of the several forts in Canara may enable you to take possession of the country even during the monsoon. I rely on you to make the best distribution of your present force for that purpose.

I now proceed to add such general directions as occur to me with respect to the first settlement of the country if it should fall into our hands. With respect to the policy to be observed upon our entrance into the Government of Canara, our great object should be to reconcile the inhabitants to our authority by the utmost degree of indulgence to their prejudices and customs, and by refraining from any other changes of system than such as evidently tend to alleviate oppression, if oppression were felt by the people under the former government. With this view I empower you to establish such a temporary system of administration of revenue and justice as may appear best calculated to maintain order and tranquillity, and to conciliate the affections of the people.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XII.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-General Harris, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonels William Kirkpatrick, and Barry Close—Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 4th June, 1799.

The Commission which accompanies this Letter* will apprise you of the nature and extent of the powers which I

* See page 23.

have deemed it advisable to entrust to you. These powers necessarily supersede those which I had delegated during the campaign to the Commission appointed to assist Lieut.-General Harris in all matters relating to political negotiation. The favourable situation of affairs in Mysore appearing to render my presence at Seringapatam quite unnecessary; I have again taken the resolution of remaining at Madras, and I, therefore, propose to confide to you such a portion of my authority as may enable you, under my orders, to effect a settlement of the country without my presence. Whatever three Members of the Commission shall be present at Seringapatam, on the arrival of this despatch, will proceed immediately to act under the Commission, and to execute the instructions contained in this letter.

The restoration of the representative of the ancient family of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the Allies, in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated, appearing to me, under all the circumstances of the case, to be the most advisable basis on which any new settlement of the Country can be vested, I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles; and I hope, in the course of to-morrow, to be able to forward to you the Articles of a Treaty, with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the abovementioned plan into effect. In the meanwhile it is absolutely necessary that certain measures of precaution should be immediately adopted in order to facilitate the intended arrangement. These measures relate—

1st. To the satisfaction of the principal Musselman Sardars, and of the Killahdars of the several Forts.

2nd. To the mode of removing the family of Tippoo Sultan from Mysore with the least practicable injury to their feelings. With regard to the first object, I have already forwarded to the Honourable Mr. H. Wellesley a letter to Meer Allum, and a copy of a letter from the Nizam to me, which I trust will enable you to give a complete satisfaction to Kummer ud Deen; and unless you expect any considerable advantage from his influence at Seringapatam in conciliating others of his religion, I desire that you will take the earliest measures to induce him to repair to Gurrumcondah; with the other leading Musselmans you should immediately enter into

such specific engagements as may preclude the possibility of any alarm in their minds with respect to their situation and prospects under any new arrangements of the country. I rely on your discretion to conclude such an arrangement, with as little burthen to the finances of the Company as circumstances will admit. The whole body of Tippoo's Sirdars ought not to become an exclusive charge upon the Company, they must be employed and provided for by the Allies, and by the Rajah of Mysore collectively. The families of the Sirdars, slain during the campaign, must also be provided for in the same manner.

The Killahdars who have surrendered posts, and those who still hold forts in their possession, should be paid their arrears for the month of April, at least, with their pay for the month of May, and for as long a time as we may leave them in charge of their forts. On dismissing any of them, a liberal gratuity should be given them for the purpose of conciliation; all these charges may hereafter be adjusted between the Allies.

As soon as you shall judge that your arrangements with the remnant of the Musselman interest are in sufficient forwardness, you will proceed to take necessary measures for removing the family of the Sultaun. The details of this painful, but indispensable, measure cannot be entrusted to any person more likely to combine every office of humanity with the prudential precautions required by this occasion than Colonel Wellesley; and I, therefore, commit to his discretion, activity and humanity, the whole arrangement, subject always to such suggestions as may be offered by the other members of the Commission. I have appointed Lieut.-Colonel Doveton to take the command of the Fortress of Vellore, which is destined for the future residence of the Sultaun's family. Lieut.-Colonel Doveton is also appointed Paymaster of Stipends to the family; and he has been directed to make every possible preparation for their accommodation at Vellore. After their arrival, no reasonable expence will be spared to render their habitation suitable to their former rank and expectations; and it is my intention to give them a liberal pecuniary allowance. Colonel Wellesley will judge whether it may be necessary to give, either to the whole or to any branch of the family any specific assur-

ance of the exact amount of the sums to be allotted to them respectively, if any such particular explanation should appear necessary for their satisfaction, I authorize you to make the allotment of stipend to each of them, as well as for the establishment of the Zenana, provided that the total sum for the maintenance of the family be not stated at more than three, or at the utmost, four laes of pagodas. The sons of the late Sultaun may be accompanied by such attendants as they may select, provided the number be not so great as to endanger the public tranquillity, or to form a point of union for the adherents of the late Sultaun. It might be desirable that Alli Reza should accompany the Princes, as he appears to be attached to the interests of the Company, and at the same time to entertain considerable affection for the Princes. The females and children of the several families must follow the Princes as speedily as possible. Colonel Wellesley, in my name, will give the most unequivocal assurances of protection and indulgence to every branch of the family. And at a proper time he will deliver the letters for the four eldest sons of Tippoo, forwarded by the Persian translator to Mr. Wellesley. If Lieut.-General Harris should be at Seringapatam, or within reach of it, I am persuaded that his humanity will induce him to exert every effort to mitigate all the rigorous part of this revolution in Mysore, which I feel myself bound, by every principle of duty towards the British interests in India, to accomplish without delay.

I have learned, with the utmost degree of surprise and concern, that the Zenana, in the Palace of the Sultaun, was searched for treasure some time after the capture of the place. I could have wished, for the honour of the British name, that the apartments of the women had not been disturbed.* In the heat and confusion of an assault, such excesses are frequently unavoidable; but I shall for ever lament, that this scene should have been acted long after the contest had subsided, and when the whole place had submitted to the superiority of our victorious arms. If any personal ornaments or other articles of value were taken from the women in that unfortunate moment, I trust that the Commander-in-Chief will make it his business to vindicate the

* See Appendix p. 753, for a satisfactory explanation of this charge.

humanity of the British character by using the most zealous exertions to obtain a full restitution of the property in question.

After this observation, it is superfluous to add my most anxious expectation that the utmost degree of care will be taken to secure the personal property of the Princes, and of the women when the period of their removal shall arrive.

You will, of course, apply to the Commander-in-Chief for such an escort as may be necessary to convey the family of Tippoo to the place of their destination; and you will arrange the time and mode of their departure, so as to preclude the possibility of any commotion or escape. It is desirable that some officer, conversant in the language, manners, and customs of the natives, and of approved humanity, should accompany the Princes, until Lieut.-Colonel Doveton can meet them. His qualifications for the trust which I have reposed in him are too well known to require any illustration.

In exercising the general powers vested in you by the accompanying Commission, I desire that you will not interfere in the management of the Province of Canara, until you shall receive further instructions from me. I have directed General Steuart to make a temporary arrangement for the Government of that Province, and until I shall have received his Report I cannot decide the system of measures most eligible to be adopted in that quarter. You will apprise the Commissioners whose power is superseded by this new Commission of my entire approbation of their services, and you will return them my thanks accordingly.

These regulations are founded on an opinion that the Commander-in-Chief may not always be at liberty to act in a political capacity; and that he may not be able to spare more than one of his confidential staff from about his person; my selection of Lieut.-Colonel Close has been directed, not only by my knowledge of his extraordinary talents, proficiency in the native languages, and experience in the native manners and customs, but by my determination to establish him in the important office of Resident with the Rajah of Mysore, as soon as that Prince shall be placed upon the Musnud.

You will observe that the Commission enjoins all the Commissioners and persons employed under them to take an oath of secrecy previously to entering upon their functions. You will, therefore, communicate a copy of the Commission to any

Member who may happen to be absent from Seringapatam when the despatch shall arrive; but the contents of this despatch must not be communicated by the persons to whom it is addressed to any person who shall not have taken the oath of secrecy prescribed in the Commission, excepting Meer Allum.

It has occurred to me that the removal of your meetings to Bangalore might have an useful effect in drawing the multitude of Musselmans from Seringapatam. This would enable the Commandant of the Fort to commence the repair and improvement of the fortifications, and to proceed in clearing the place, and making it strictly a Military Station. I recommend the earliest possible attention to this measure as being of essential importance to our security in Mysore.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

[Commission.]

Richard, Earl of Mornington, &c., Governor-General for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in India.

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting :

Whereas, the glorious success of the British and Allied Arms in Mysore, under the favour of Providence, has reduced the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun to the joint power and authority of the Honourable the English East India Company, and of his Highness the Soubah of the Dekkan, their friend and ally: and whereas his said Highness has given full power and authority to the Right Honourable Richard, Earl of Mornington, Governor-General for all the Forces and Affairs of the British Nation in India, to conduct and order the interests of his Highness in the said possessions, and to conclude such an arrangement thereof as shall appear to his Lordship to be most expedient for the security and welfare of the Country, and for the common benefit of the Allies.

Now know ye, that for the more speedy conclusion of such salutary arrangement, and for the restoration of order and tranquillity by the settlement of the said conquered territories, I, the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General as aforesaid, do hereby constitute, nominate and appoint _____, or any three or more of them to be Commissioners during my pleasure for the settlement of the territories recently conquered from the said Tippoo Sultaun, and to be and be styled Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, with full powers to negotiate and conclude, in my name, all such Treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional Regulations for the ordering and management of the Civil and Military Government and of the Revenues of the said territories, as may be necessary for the immediate administration

and settlement thereof. The said Commissioners to be nevertheless subject to such orders and instructions as they shall from time to time receive from me, and regularly to report their proceedings to me, keeping an exact diary or daily record thereof under the signature of one of their secretaries: and I do hereby empower the said Commissioners to hold their Meetings at such places, either within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun or elsewhere, as they shall judge most convenient, and to adjourn from time to time, and to change the place of their meeting according to the exigency of the public service: and I authorize and direct the said Commissioners to communicate from time to time with Meer Allum Bahaudur touching the objects of this Commission, and I nominate and appoint

to be secretaries, and to be Assistant-secretary to the said Commission during my pleasure; and before the said Commissioners or any of them shall proceed to act in the execution of any of the powers or trusts vested in them by this Commission, save only the power of administering the oath hereinafter mentioned, he or they shall severally take and subscribe the following oath, that is to say:

I, A. B. do faithfully promise and swear, that as a Commissioner for the Affairs of Mysore, I will execute the several powers and trusts reposed in me according to the best of my skill and judgment without favour or affection, prejudice or malice, to any person whatever. I will not disclose or make known any of the orders or instructions which shall be transmitted to me, or to the said Commissioners by the Governor-General, or by his order, or any of the proceedings of the said Commissioners, save only to the other Members of this Commission, or to the person or persons who shall be duly nominated and employed in transcribing or preparing the same respectively, or in seconding the proceedings of the said Commissioners, or unless I shall be authorized by the Governor-General to disclose or make known the same. I do further promise and swear that I will not demand, take, or accept, directly or indirectly, by myself or by any other person, for my use, or on my behalf, or on the behalf or for the use of any other person any sum of money or other valuable thing by way of gift, present, or otherwise, and that to the Governor-General in Council I will justly and truly account for, answer, and pay the rents, duties, and other revenues and sums of money which shall come to my hands or to the hands of any person or persons in trust for or employed by me in execution of the powers and authority vested in the said Commissioners by the said Governor-General—

So help me God.

Which oath any two of the said Commissioners shall and are hereby empowered to administer to the others of them or any of them; and the said oath shall be entered by one of the secretaries to the Commission, amongst the acts of the Board, and be duly subscribed and attested by the said Commissioners at the time of their taking and administering the same to each other respectively.

And the several Secretaries and other officers of the said Board of Commissioners shall also take and subscribe before the said Board such

oath of secrecy, and for the execution of the duties of their respective stations, and the integrity of their conduct therein, as the said Board shall direct; and when any three of the said Commissioners shall have taken the said oath, they shall immediately constitute a Board, and proceed to act under the Commission. And I do hereby empower and direct the said Commissioners to take charge and render an exact account to me of such public property as has been or shall be found within the territories of the late Tippoo Suldaun, and also to collect and bring to account all such arrears of revenue and all such sums of money as were due to the Sirkar on the 4th of May, 1799, or have or shall become due, from and after that day to the Government of the Allies, and provided always that this order shall not be construed to prevent or impede the distribution among the Allied army of the prize taken in the Fort of Seringapatam, on the 4th of May according to the general order issued by the Governor-General in Council under date the ; and provided also that nothing contained in this Commission shall be deemed to preclude the right of captors of any fort or place taken on or before the said 4th day of May, 1799, to obtain from the Commissioners an attested account of the public property contained therein, in order that the claims of all such captors may be heard and determined by the Governor-General in Council or by the Honourable the Court of Directors or by His Majesty in Council according to the nature of the case. And I do hereby authorize and direct the said Commissioners immediately upon entering on their duties under this Commission to issue a Proclamation notifying the restoration of tranquillity, and promising to all the inhabitants of the territories of the late Tippoo Suldaun security of person and of private property, and encouraging them to resume their ordinary occupations under the protection of the Allies. And I further direct that the said Proclamation shall contain the strictest injunctions to all persons within the said territories, under the most severe penalties, to abstain from acts of violence, outrage, and plunder.

No. XIII.

From Lord Mornington to Lieut.-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 5th June, 1799.

I have given full attention to the draft of the treaty transmitted by you, and although the substance, and many parts of the detail of that draft are perfectly conformable to my ideas, I think the whole transaction would be more conveniently thrown into a different form, from that which you have given to it. I do not see any necessity for ceding the whole Country in the first instance to the Rajah of Mysore, and accepting again as a cession under his authority, such districts as must

be retained by the Allies. I think it will be more convenient, and less liable to future embarrassment, to rest the whole Settlement upon the basis of our right of conquest, and thus to render our cession the source of the Rajah's dominion. For this purpose the proceeding should commence with a treaty between the Nizam and the Company, with power to the Peishwah to accede under certain conditions. The next step should be a treaty with the Rajah, containing all that relates to his connexion with the Company, and to his interior government.

The Rajah after his accession, may be made a party to the general guarantee, contained in my draft accompanying this letter.* The principal points in which I differ with you, are

[*Treaty of Mysore.*]

* *Treaty for strengthening the Alliance and friendship, subsisting between the English East India Company Bahaudur, His Highness the Nulob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, and for effecting a Settlement of the Dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun.*

Whereas the deceased Tippoo Sultaun, unprovoked by any act of aggression on the part of the Allies, entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French, and admitted a French force into his army, for the purpose of commencing war against the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and its Allies, Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur. And the said Tippoo Sultaun having attempted to evade the just demands of satisfaction and security, made by the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and its Allies, for their defence and protection, against the joint designs of the said Sultaun and of the French; the allied Armies of the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and of His Highness Nizam ul Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur proceeded to hostilities in vindication of their rights, and for the preservation of their respective Dominions from the perils of foreign invasion, and from the ravages of a cruel and relentless enemy.

And whereas, it has pleased Almighty God to prosper the just cause of the said Allies, the Honourable English Company Bahaudur, and his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, with a continued course of victory and success, and finally to crown their arms by the reduction of the Capital of Mysore, the fall of Tippoo Sultaun, the utter extinction of his power and the unconditional submission of his people. And whereas, the said Allies being disposed to exercise the rights of conquest, with the same moderation and forbearance, which they have observed from the commencement to the conclusion of the late successful war, have resolved to use the power which

the necessity of holding certain principal fortresses in absolute sovereignty. I have now limited that demand to the fortress

it has pleased Almighty God to place in their hands, for the purpose of obtaining reasonable compensation for the expenses of the war, and of establishing permanent security and genuine tranquillity for themselves, and their subjects, as well as for all the powers contiguous to their respective dominions. Wherefore, a treaty for the adjustment of the territories of the late Tippoo Suldaun, between the English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asof Jah Bahaudur, is now concluded by Lieut.-General George Harris, Commander in Chief of the Forces of His Britannic Majesty, and of the English East India Company Bahaudur in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar; the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P., Governor-General for all the affairs, civil and military of the British nation in India; and by the Nabob Meer Allum Bahaudur, on the part and in the name of His Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asof Jah Bahaudur, according to the undermentioned articles, which by the blessing of God, shall be binding upon the heirs and successors of the contracting parties, as long as the sun and moon shall endure, and of which the conditions shall be reciprocally observed by the said contracting parties.

Article 1st.—It being reasonable and just that the Allies by this treaty should accomplish the original objects of the war, viz. a due indemnification for the expenses incurred in their own defence, and effectual security for their respective possessions against the future designs of their enemies, it is stipulated and agreed, that the districts specified in the Schedule A, herunto annexed, together with the heads of all the passes leading from the territory of the late Tippoo Suldaun, to any part of the possessions of the English East India Company Bahaudur, of its Allies or tributaries situated below the Ghauts on either coast, and all forts situated near to; and commanding the said passes, shall be subjected to the authority, and for ever incorporated with the dominions of the English East India Company Bahaudur, the said Company Bahaudur engaging to provide effectually out of the revenues of the said districts, for the suitable maintenance of the whole of the families of the late Hyder Alli Khan, and of the late Tippoo Suldaun, and to apply to this purpose, with the reservation hereinafter stated, an annual sum of not less than two lacs of star pagodas, making the Company's share as follows:—estimated value of districts, enumerated in the Schedule A, according to the statement of Tippoo Suldaun in 1792, Canteria pagodas, 7,77,170; deduct provision for the families of Hyder Alli Khan, and of Tippoo Suldaun two lacs of star pagodas in Canteria pagodas, 2,40,000; remains to the East India Company, 5,37,170.

Article 2nd.—For the same reason stated in the preceding Article, the

of Seringapatam, which I cannot consent to part with. With regard to Chittledroog, Bednore, &c. lying within the terri-

districts specified in Schedule B, annexed hereunto, shall be subjected to the authority and for ever united with the dominions of the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, the said Nabob having engaged to provide liberally from the revenues of the said districts, for the support of Meer Kummer ud Deen Bahaudur and of his family and relations, and to grant him for this purpose a personal jaghire in the district of Gurrumcondah, equal to the annual sum of 2,10,000 rupees, or of 70,000 Canteria pagodas, over and above and exclusive of a jaghire, which the said Nabob has also agreed to assign to the said Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, for the pay and maintenance of a proportionate number of troops, to be employed in the service of his said Highness, making the share of his Highness as follows—estimated value of the territory specified in Schedule B, according to the statement of Tippoo Sultaun in 1792, 6,07,332; deduct personal jaghire to Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, 2,10,000 rupees, or Conterai pagodas, 70,000; remains to the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahandur, 5,37,332.

Article 3rd.—It being further expedient for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security on the foundations now established by the contracting parties, that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subjected to the said Company Bahaudur, it is stipulated and agreed, that the said fortress and the island on which it is situated, including the small tract of land or island, lying to the westward of the main island, and bounded on the west by a nullah, called the Mysore Nullah, which falls into the Cauvery near Chungul Ghaut, shall become part of the dominions of the said Company in full right and sovereignty for ever.

Article 4th.—A separate Government shall be established in Mysore, and for this purpose it is stipulated and agreed, that Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahandur, a descendant of the antient Rajahs of Mysoor, shall possess the territory hereinafter described upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 5th.—The contracting powers mutually and severally agree, that the districts specified in Schedule C, hereunto annexed, shall be ceded to the said Maharajah Mysoor upon the conditions hereinafter mentioned.

Article 6th.—The English East India Company Bahaudur shall be at liberty to make such deductions from time to time, from the sums allotted by the 1st. Article of the present treaty, for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Alli Khaun and Tippoo Sultann, as may be proper in consequence of the decease of any member of the said families, and in the event of any hostile attempt on the part of the said family, or of any member of it, against the authority of the contracting parties, or against the peace of their respective dominions, or the territory of the Rajah of Mysore; then

tory of the Rajah, the possession of Seringapatam, and the conditions of our subsidiary treaty with the Rajah, will I trust,

the said English East India Company Bahaudur shall be at liberty to limit or suspend entirely the payment of the whole, or any part of the stipend hereinbefore stipulated, to be applied to the maintenance and support of the said families.

Article 7th.—His Highness the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall be invited to accede to the present treaty; and although the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, has neither participated in the expense or danger of the late war, and therefore is not entitled to share any part of the acquisitions made by the contracting parties, namely, the English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur; yet, for the maintenance of the relations of friendship, and alliance between the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, the English East India Company Bahaudur, his Highness the Nabob Nizam ul Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Bahaudur, it is stipulated and agreed that certain districts, specified in Schedule D, hereunto annexed, shall be reserved for the purpose of being eventually ceded to the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, in full right and sovereignty, in the same manner as if he had been a contracting party to this treaty; provided however, that the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall accede to the present treaty in its full extent, within one month from the day on which it shall be formally communicated to him by the contracting parties; and provided also, that he shall give satisfaction to the English East India Company Bahaudur, and to his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, with regard to certain points now pending between him, the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and also with regard to such points as shall be represented to the said Peishwah, on the part of the English East India Company Bahaudur, by the Governor-General, or the English resident at the court of Poonah.

Article 8th.—If, contrary to the amicable expectation of the contracting parties, the said Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur shall refuse to accede to this treaty, or to give satisfaction upon the points, to which the 7th Article refers, then the right to and sovereignty of the several districts, hereinbefore reserved for eventual cession to the Peishwah Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, shall rest jointly in the said English East India Company Bahaudur, and the said Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, who will either exchange them with the Rajah of Mysore, for other districts of equal value, more contiguous to their respective territories, or otherwise arrange and settle respecting them, as they shall judge proper.

Article 9th.—It being expedient for the effectual establishment of Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah, in the government of Mysore, that his Highness should be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, it is stipulated and

give us a sufficient command over them; but, I cannot consent to allow the Nizam to hold Chittledroog; it would be a very

agreed, that the whole of the said force shall be furnished by the English East India Company Bahaudur, according to the terms of a separate treaty, to be immediately concluded between the said English East India Company Bahaudur, and his Highness the Maharajah Mysoor Kistna Rajah Oodiavar Bahaudur.

Article 10th.—This treaty consisting of ten Articles, being settled and concluded this day, the 22d of June, 1799, (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurum, 1214, Anno Higre), by Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, on the part and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid, and by Meer Allum Bahaudur, on the part, and in the name of his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, the said Lieut.-General Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, have delivered to Meer Allum Bahaudur one copy of the same, signed and sealed by themselves; and Meer Allum Bahaudur has delivered to Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, another copy of the same signed and sealed by himself; and Lieut.-General George Harris, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Colonel Barry Close, and Meer Allum Bahaudur, severally and mutually engage, that the said treaty shall be respectively ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor General under his seal and signature, within eight days from the date hereof, and by his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, within twenty-five days from the date hereof.

Nizam's Seal.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, Anno Domini, 1799.*

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

SCHEDULE A.

1st.—The Company's Share.—The following Districts from Nuggur or Bednore.

Korial, (Mangalore) Bekul and Neliseram, 1,33,662 7 $\frac{1}{2}$; Karkul, 11,393 2 $\frac{1}{4}$; Barkoo, 48,389 8 $\frac{1}{2}$; Khoshaulpoor, 26,361 7 $\frac{1}{2}$; Bulkul, 9,177 0 $\frac{1}{4}$; Gairsopah, 9,192 0 $\frac{1}{2}$; Hunawur (Onore), 17,482 9 $\frac{1}{2}$; Mirjaun, 8,953 4 $\frac{3}{4}$;

* Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A. D. 1799.

inconvenient arrangement in every point of view, and I, therefore, request you entirely to discourage the repetition of any

Ancolah Punchmahl, and Shedasghur (or Soonda Payen Ghaut) 28,332 2; Bilghuy, 18,929 4. — Total 3,11,874 6½

COIMBATOOR, &c. viz.—Coimbatore, 80,000; Danaigincotah, 35,000; Cheeor, 27,000; Chinjerry, 27,000; Darapoor Chuckergherry, 64,000; Settimungalum, 30,000; Undoor, 8,000; Perondoora, 14,000; Vizimungul (Aravarcourchy), 20,000; Errode, 20,000; Caroor, 41,000; Coodgully, 15,000; Caveryporam, 4,000; total 3,85,000. Wynaad, from Amudnuggur Chickloor, from Talooks belonging to Seringapatam; Panganoor, 15,000; Suttikal Alambady and Kodahully, 15,200; Oussore, 18,096; Decanicotah and Ruttungeery, 14,000; Vencatigyracotah, 6,000; Ankusgeery and Solaageery, 4,000; Baugloor, 3,000; Talmuttah and Talwaddy (half Talooks) of Hurduntrully, 5,000. — Total, 80,296, together 7,77,170 6½. — Deduct provision for the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and of Tippoo Sultaun, star pagodas 2 lacs in canteria pagodas, 2,40,000. — Remains to the Company, canteria pagodas, 5,37,170,6½

SCHEDULE B.

2nd.—The Nizam's Share.—Gooty—Fyze Hussur Rubal, 15,568; Kona Koomlah, 7,500; Pamri, 11,000; Wurjur Kurroor, 8,998 1; Yurutty Murajcherroo, 5,902; Bheem Rapah, 4,800; Muttoor, 2,700; Pravalli Munnimoorg, 9,426 3; Chunumpilly, 8,951 8; Mulkaira Kootoo, 22,251 8½; Koortunni, 8,800; Yarky, 22,673 1; Pennacoondah, 60,000; Murrug Seera, 8,000; Hundytenantpoor, 16,000; Koorgoor (remainder of), 11,629; Kunchungoondy, (remainder of) 10,000; of Gurrumcondah, all the districts not ceded in 1792, 1,85,810; Puttungerry (from Seringapatam), 10,000, Rydroog (6 talooks), 1,02,856; Kurnool Paisheush, 66,666.—From Chittledroog—Terryullah, (1 talook), 7,800.—Total, 6,07,332 1½.—Deduct a personal Jaghire to Kummer ud Deen Khan and relations, 70,000.—Remains to the Nizam, 5,37,332 1½

SCHEDULE C.

Districts ceded to Maharajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahandur, Talooks belonging to Seringapatam.

Puttun Attockrun, 11,000; Mysore Attockrun, or Rahmut Nuzeen, 11,500; Nuzzer Bar, 14,000; Hurdunhully, 15,000; Periapatam, 6,200; Muddoor, 13,200; Hetghur Dewancotah, 8,000; Betudapoor, 7,000; Tyoor, 8,000; Yelandoor, 10,000; Malwelly (Gulinahabad), 9,000; Tulkar Sosilah, 8,100; Nursipoor, 10,200; Yestoorah, 7,200; Bailoor, 15,700; Arkulgoor, 4,300; Chinipatam, 12,100; Bullum Mungezabod, 10,000; Hussen, 7,900; Honavully, 9,400; Nagmungul, 4,700; Belloor, 3,100; Maharage Droog, 10,000; Gram, 3,500; Ramgheery, 7,400; Turkarumb, 7,400; Ahmudnugger, Chickloor, 10,000; Kurp, 12,000; Toorwy Khaira, 9,000; Coonydghul, 5,008 9; Hoolioordroog, 4,000;

such proposition on the part of Meer Allum. The question of ceding any part of Soonda to the Peishwah, may be re-

Kirkairy, 4,065; Chennyputtan, 9,138; Nooggairly, 3,000; Mairlatesh and Kishnagepoor, 6,100; Suckynputtan, 6,200; Banoravar, Guradungilly, Huranhelly, 10,000; Boodehall, 7,000; Nidghul, 6,000; Pasghur, 10,000; Hagulwary, 12,000; Goomnairpollum, 10,000; Bangalore, 55,000; Magry, 8,400; Mudgerry, 36,000; Coorgherry, 4,000; Cankanhelly, 8,900; Nulwungle and Doorbillah, 16,000; Anicul, 10,300; Byroodroog, 4,000; Hyboor, 7,000; Dewankelly, 20,045; Ootradroog, 5,000; Chinroydroog, 8,000; Toonikoor and Devroy, 18,000; Nidgegul and Macklydroog, 16,000; Kundykeera and Chullnaighelly, 16,000; Chota Balapoor, 80,000; Colar, 80,000; Jungumcotah, 13,000; Chuckmoogalum, 8,134 4; Kudoor, 7,129 7 $\frac{1}{2}$.—Total, 7,78,321 0 $\frac{1}{2}$.

SERRA (Remainder of).—Serra and Amrapoor, 55,000; Hoosuttah, 50,754; Burra Balapoor, 40,000.—Total, 1,49,754.

NUGGUR above GHAUT.—Kusbah, 29,145 4 $\frac{3}{4}$ 2; Coolydroog, 28,818 0 $\frac{3}{4}$ 2; Koompsec, 8,094 2 $\frac{1}{2}$; Kope, 22,864 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ 2; Wosthara, 6,818 9; Eckairy and Sagur, 39,41 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2; Ghooty (Hoably), 11,006 8 $\frac{3}{4}$; Surbtowanundy, 10,458 $\frac{1}{4}$ 2; Serryanwitty, 17,424; Shaikarpoor, 11,774 $\frac{3}{4}$; Annunta-poor, 10,191 9 $\frac{1}{2}$; Lakouly-danwass, 11,629 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ 1; Ordgunny, 13,614 1 $\frac{3}{4}$; Simoga, 16,883 5; Hoolyhonore, 6,583 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ 1; Biddery, 10,835,5 2; Chingeery Beswapatam, 22,091 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ 3; Turrykeerah, 14,076 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2; Azempoor, 10,696 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ 3.—Total, 3,02,417 6 6.

CHITTLEROOG (remainder of) 12 Talooks.—Kusbah, 20,874 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ 1; Beemsumendar, 12,148 4 2; Dodiary, 12,984 9 $\frac{1}{2}$; Husdroog, 11,936 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ 3; Muttoor, 10,392 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2; Murkal Murroo, 12,662 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ 3; Tullick, 11,854 $\frac{3}{4}$; Burm Sagur, 10,163 6 $\frac{1}{4}$; Kunkopah, 12,542 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2; Bilchoor, 10,683 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2; Hinoor, 10,010 2; Goodycotah, 11,330 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ 3.—Total, 13,79,076 8 1.

Deduct 2 Pergunnahs of Hurdenhelly, viz, Talmall and Talwaddy, included in the Company's share, 5,000; balance, 13,74,076 8 1.

SCHEDULE D.

The Peishwah's Share—Harponelly, (6 Talooks), 1,10,030 8 $\frac{3}{4}$; Soonda (above the Ghauts), 59,377; Annagoondy, 60,101. From Chittledroog, 2 Talooks, viz, Holulkaira, 11,425 4 $\frac{1}{2}$; Mycoonda, 12,228 9 $\frac{1}{4}$. From Bednore 1 Talook, viz, Hurryhur, 10,796.—Total Canteria Pagodas, 2,63,257,3 $\frac{3}{4}$.

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, A.D. 1799.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A.D. 1799.

Separate Articles, appertaining to the Treaty of Mysore, concluded on the 22nd of June, 1799 (corresponding to the 17th of Mohurram, Anuo

served for future consideration. To-morrow, or at farthest on the next day, I hope to be able to forward to you the draft of the treaty with the Rajah. At present, it is not my intention to quit Madras, unless I shall learn from you and my brother, that my presence can be useful in Mysore. My baggage is still on the road, and I could move it at a very short notice.

I cannot at all agree with the Commissioners, that it is necessary to delay our settlement of the Country until Chittledroog shall be surrendered, or taken; and I desire that you will not wait for either event, but proceed forthwith to conclude the necessary treaties, as soon as you shall have taken the necessary precautions suggested in my instructions to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore. I fear that the final arrangement is likely to suffer delay, from our having no person on the spot authorized to sign a treaty on the part of the Nizam; perhaps Meer Allum may think himself authorized to do so at my request, under the full powers which I have received from His Highness,—with a view to obviate every difficulty, I have written to Hyderabad to desire that

Higeree, 1214) between the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, and the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur.

Article 1.—With a view to the prevention of future altercations, it is agreed between his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, that to whatever amount the stipends appropriated to the maintenance of the Sons, Relations, and Dependants of the late Hyder Ali Khaun, and Tippoo Suldaun, or the personal Jaghire of Meer Kummer ud Deen Khaun, shall hereafter be diminished in consequence of any one of the stipulations of the Treaty of Mysore, the contracting parties shall not be accountable to each other on this head.

Article 2.—And it is further agreed between the contracting parties, that in the event provided for by the Eighth Article of the Treaty of Mysore, two-thirds of the shares reserved for Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur, shall fall to his Highness the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the remaining third to the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur.

(The Nizam's Seal.)

Ratified at Hyderabad, by his Highness the Nizam, on the 13th day of July, A.D. 1799.

J. A. KIRKPATRICK, Resident.

Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 26th day of June, A.D. 1799.

your brother will immediately obtain, and despatch full powers to Meer Allum for this purpose, but I think it would be a far preferable arrangement if Meer Allum could be brought to sign the treaty immediately, and thus enable us to proceed at once to the settlement of the Country.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XIV.

Lieutenant-General Harris to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Camp, 7th June, 1799.

Your Lordship's private letter of the 3rd instant, apprizing me that it is your intention, as soon as you receive an account of the value of the ordnance and stores in Seringapatam, to recommend the whole amount to be granted to the army; was received yesterday, and is a most handsome added proof of the zealous interest with which your Lordship has entered into our concerns. A Committee is ordered for the above purpose, and its report shall be forwarded to your Lordship as soon as finished, but as it will be a considerable time in making out, and as a reference to his Majesty and the Court of Directors is required, you need not be under any apprehension that the amount will be of the least injury to the discipline or efficiency of the army; long before it can be received, the division you have ordered will have been completely despatched.

I am, with great regard and esteem,

My dear Lord,

your faithful Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS.

[The following were the orders issued by the Governor-General for the distribution of the prize money.]

General Orders by Government.

Fort St. George, 2d June, 1799.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, having received from Lieutenant-General Harris a report of the ordnance, ammunition, military stores, and treasure, taken by the allied army in the fort

of Seringapatam, has much pleasure in anticipating the sanction of his Majesty and of the Court of Directors, for the distribution of prize-money on this memorable occasion.

His Lordship, accordingly, authorizes and directs the Commander-in-Chief to make an immediate distribution of the treasure and jewels to the troops of the allies, in such proportions as may be conformable to the usage of the British service in cases of a similar nature.

In respect to the ordnance, ammunition and military stores, his Lordship directs that they be reserved entire, until the pleasure of his Majesty, and the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, shall be received.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council feels particular satisfaction, that the happy circumstances, accompanying the glorious and final success of this brilliant campaign, enable his Lordship to afford a substantial proof of the public gratitude towards the army, by bestowing a reward, proportioned to the magnitude and importance of their services, and earned, not more by their labour, courage, and perseverance, than by their exact discipline, regularity, and exemplary subordination.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council,
J. WEBBE, Sec. to the Govt.

No. XV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort St. George, 7th June, 1799.

Nothing can be more favourable than the state of affairs in Mysore; the accounts which I have received from Mr. Henry Wellesley and from Colonel Kirkpatrick, induce me to believe that I shall effect the settlement of the country with more advantage from this place than if I were to proceed to Seringapatam, and I shall therefore remain here, unless they should be of opinion that my presence upon the spot may be useful. In the meanwhile, the information which I have collected has enabled me to determine the basis and outline of the new settlement of the extensive empire which the glorious success of the war has subjected to our power.

I shall transmit to you, by a more convenient opportunity, an accurate view of the motives which have induced me to adopt the settlement of the country now carrying into effect in preference to any other; for the present, it may be sufficient to observe that, to have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, while it would have

afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mahrattas, would have aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond the bounds of discretion, and would have left in our hands a territory, so extensive, as it might have been difficult to manage, especially in the present state of the Company's service at this Presidency. To have divided the territory into three equal portions, allowing the Mahrattas, who had taken no part in the expense or hazard of the war, an equal share in the advantages of the peace, would neither have been just towards the Nizam, politic in the way of example to our other allies, nor prudent in respect to the aggrandizement of the Mahratta empire. To have given the Mahrattas no larger a territory than is now proposed, while the Company and the Nizam divided the whole of the remainder to the exclusion of any central power, would have been liable nearly to the same objection as that stated against a total exclusion of the Mahrattas from all participation. The establishment, therefore, of a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore appeared to be the best expedient for reconciling the interests of all parties. It would certainly have been desirable that that power should have been placed in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons; but the hereditary and intimate connection established between Tippoo and the French, the probability that the French may be enabled to maintain themselves in Egypt, the perpetual interest which Tippoo's family must feel to undermine and subvert a system which had so much reduced their patrimony and power, added to their natural hatred of the English name, and to the aspiring ambition, indignant pride, and deadly revenge, congenial to the Mahomedan character, precluded the possibility of restoring any branch of the family of the late Suldaun to the throne, without exposing us to the constant hazard of internal commotion, and even of foreign war. Such a settlement would have cherished in its bosom a restless and powerful principle of its own dissolution; we could never have expected harmony or concord, or a spirit of friendship and alliance, where no true reconciliation could grow; even submission must have been reluctant and treacherous, where bitter memory of fallen dignity, wealth, and power, must have united every passion and vice with many of the noblest virtues, in a constant desire to recover an empire, originally acquired by an extra-

ordinary combination of falsehood, cruelty, and courage, and maintained for a long time with eminent policy and vigour, as well in its internal Government as in its foreign relations.

You will observe that, throughout this view of the subject I have assumed the justice and necessity of the late war against Tippoo Sultaan, and consequently the right of conquest under which I conceive the absolute disposal of the territory to have accrued to the Company and the Nizam. In the exercise of this right, if I were to look to moral considerations alone, I should certainly, on every principle of justice and humanity, as well as of attention to the welfare of the people, have been led to restore the heir of the ancient Rajah of Mysore to that rank and dignity which were wrested from his ancestor, by the usurpation of Hyder Ali.

The long and cruel imprisonment which several branches of this family have suffered, the persecution and murder of many of their adherents, both by Hyder and Tippoo, and the state of degradation and misery in which it has been the policy of both those usurpers to retain the surviving descendants of their lawful Sovereign, would have entitled the representative of the ancient family of Mysore to every degree of practicable consideration; but it is also evident, that every motive must concur to attach the heir of the Mysore family if placed on the throne to our interests, through which alone he can hope to maintain himself against the family of Tippoo. Something, perhaps, may also be expected from his gratitude, although that quality is not often found among States in any part of the world, and seldom, if ever, among the native States of India.

For some time I doubted whether this arrangement, however desirable, could be attained in opposition to the Mahomedan interest, which I imagined to be firmly established in Mysore, but I am happy to be able to assure you that the jealous policy of Tippoo, added to the brilliant and rapid success of the war, has left no Mahomedan influence in Mysore from which any serious opposition is to be apprehended. I cannot better explain the actual state of the Sultaan's dominions in this respect than by quoting a passage of a letter received this day from Lieutenant-Colonel Close, which corresponds entirely with all the information which I have collected from other quarters.

“ That Tippoo loaded the departments of his Government with dronish Mussulmauns cannot be denied ; but the characteristic of his domination was to retain all power within himself, and to allow of no hereditary claims or fixed offices that might in any shape oppose the dictates of his will. Individuals holding the principal offices of the State, doubtless, exercised authority, and from such cause possessed some influence ; but of these, how many remain ? Buchaun Ooddeen was killed at Sattimungalum. The Binky Nabob fell at Sedaseer, Syed Saheb, Mahomed Saduck, and Syed Ghofar, at the storm of Seringapatam, Purneah is forthcoming, and rests upon our will. Cummur ud-Dien rests upon our generosity, and is perfectly at our devotion ; where then is the Mahomedan influence to embarrass us, or give a turn to our politics ? Tippoo’s infantry are discharged ; his Sillahdar horse are dissolved ; his Killahdars pay us obedience ; his Asophs, if so disposed, have not means to resist us. The stable horse remain, and look to our pleasure for subsistence ; at best, they are but so many loose individuals, connected by no head, and kept apart by separate interests. They are ours for actual service at a nod.” The Rajah of Mysore will, therefore, be easily restored to the throne, and maintained on it under the protection of the Company, the Nizam, and I trust also of the Mahrattas, who certainly all have a concurrent and common interest in the exclusion of Tippoo’s family, especially since the discovery that Tippoo’s alliance with France was directed not only against the existence of the British power in India, but also against the Mahrattas and the Nizam, at least to the extent of recovering the districts ceded to those powers under the treaty of Seringapatam. It is my intention to draw the connection between the Company and the Rajah as close as possible by a subsidiary treaty, under which I mean to retain the general power of garrisoning all his fortresses, such as Bednore, Chittledroog, &c., and I will so clearly define our powers of interference in his internal government as to preclude (if any precaution can preclude) the embarrassments which have occasioned so much distress in the Carnatic, Oude, and Tanjore.

Seringapatam I shall retain in full sovereignty for the Company, as being a tower of strength, from which we may at any time shake Hindostan to its centre, if any combination

should ever be formed against our interests. I shall not at present enlarge upon the advantages, which are likely to be derived to the British interests from this settlement, they are too obvious to require any detailed explanation. The Nizam will acquire such an accession of strength, as, with the aid of our subsidiary force, will enable him to maintain himself against the Mahrattas, while he will not only have acquired no strength which can render him formidable to us, but, by our positions at Chitteldroog, Seringapatam, and along the heads of the passes, together with the establishment of about seven thousand of our troops in the heart of his dominions, he will depend almost absolutely on our power. If this power be used with moderation, I think it must be permanent; we must abstain religiously from all interference with the Nizam's internal government.

The Mahrattas will receive an accession of territory, the value of which is considerable to them, but cannot render them in any degree dangerous to us or to the Nizam, while we retain the power of garrisoning the forts of Bednore and Chitteldroog. As the Mahrattas have no claim of right to any share in this partition, I shall endeavour to connect the cessions made to them with some arrangements which shall tend to give additional strength to our interests.

The French influence in India, thanks be to God! is now nearly extirpated, some adventurers, however, still remain in the service of the Mahrattas; and I shall endeavour to render the cession of territory to the Mahrattas the instrument of annihilating every remnant of a French party in that quarter. I must repeat to you my most earnest and anxious entreaty, that you will never agree to the restoration of any part of the territories of France or of Holland (while connected with France) on the Continent of India. The papers found in Tippoo Sultaun's palace at Seringapatam will sufficiently prove the danger of allowing France to retain even the isles of Mauritius and Bourbon, and if the war should continue, I trust you will strike a blow against those prolific sources of intrigue in peace, and of piracy and buccancering in war.

I transmit to you by this despatch a set of the French papers found in the palace at Seringapatam; it might appear vanity in me to make any comment upon them, further than

to request that you will compare them with the whole course of my communications with the Court of Directors, the Secret Committee and yourself previous to the war. I confess that, in reading these papers, I could not avoid trembling to reflect on the dangers which we have escaped, and which I trust are now effectually averted. If Tippoo had obtained the aid of two or three thousand French, there is not a doubt that he would have rushed into the Carnatic; and I refer you to all the communications from this quarter during the last summer for an estimate of the consequences of such an incursion; all the officers with whom I have conversed, who served in this campaign, have assured me that, with one thousand French, Seringapatam would have been nearly impregnable, not only from the strength of its own fortifications, but from the difficulty of approaching it through that strong barrier which lies at the entrance of the table land from the Carnatic in the neighbourhood of Kankanhelly, Anicul, &c. Through the whole of that line of forest down to Sultaun Pett, a very small body of good French troops might have checked the progress of our whole army.

You will observe, in the return of ordnance and stores taken at Seringapatam,* the magnitude of the Sultaun's military preparations and resources. I have not yet received authentic accounts of the state of his military establishments compared with that of last war, but I expect accurate information on that subject from the records found at Seringapatam. I understand that the Sultaun's horse appeared in larger bodies, and manifested more discipline, as well as boldness, in this war than in the last; that his infantry appeared to be less numerous, but to be greatly improved in efficiency for service, and that it both attacked and resisted our European troops on several occasions with great vigour, firmness, and resolution. Under these circumstances, I confess that it was a matter of exultation and triumph to me to see the standard of Tippoo Sultaun flying under the colours of Fort St. George on the 4th of June.

A little more eagerness than I could have wished has appeared in the army on the subject of the property captured in Seringapatam; the question would have been very awk-

ward, if the amount of the property had approached the first statements which had been made by common rumour, and which extended to the enormous amount of eight or ten crores* of rupees. The army conceive that, as the place was taken by storm, they are, of right, entitled to what was found in it; this is certainly an erroneous opinion, and if the principle had been established, and so large a sum as that which I have stated had been seized by the army and distributed, it is impossible to calculate the mischievous effects which would have resulted to our military power in India; no regular return has yet been made to me of the amount of the property taken; but I have every reason to believe that it does not exceed in value thirty lacs of pagodas, a sufficiently large sum. The official return has been withholden from an idea, that the right is absolute in the captors, and that they are not bound to render any account under the peculiar circumstances of the assault. I shall endeavour to persuade General Harris to make an official return of the property, with a view of saving the rights of Government and of correcting the erroneous opinions of the army; but I shall not hesitate to direct an immediate distribution of the treasure and jewels, as I am persuaded that, in so doing, I shall act conformably to your wishes and to those of the Crown, and the Court of Directors. The army would probably become a little impatient were I to propose to them to postpone all distribution until the orders of the Directors and the King could be received. The question is rendered still more delicate by some orders of Lord Cornwallis, admitting the exclusive right of the army to all property captured in places taken by assault. The amount of the ordnance and military stores being very considerable, I shall endeavour to preserve them entire, until I can receive the orders of the Court of Directors and of his Majesty. I entreat you immediately, upon receiving this letter, to procure from the King and the Court of Directors, full powers for me to dispose of the ordnance and military stores, either by granting them to the captors or otherwise, as I shall judge most expedient for the public service.

*

* A crore is now equal to £1,000,000 sterling; it was then also £1,200,000, owing to the difference of value in the rupee.

You will accompany these powers by a private letter from yourself, stating your wishes on the subject; and I beg that you will despatch these papers by express overland. My own opinion is decidedly that, unless the value of the ordnance and stores should amount to an enormous sum, this also should be given to the army. I take this opportunity of requesting that you will take particular care not to permit any allowance which I have found it necessary to make to any of the officers of this army to be curtailed; a great effort was to be made, and it was essential to send the men of the first talents in the army into the field full of zeal and cordiality. For this purpose I made a handsome allowance to Lieut.-Colonel Close, the Adjutant-General (a most able and excellent officer), and to others of General Harris's staff; to their efforts our success is to be attributed; if you reduce their appointments, it will be impossible to carry on government here in great emergencies.

The extension of our territory and revenue in the Peninsula, as well as the command which we have now acquired over the central part of Mysore, will render a revision of the limits of the Governments of Fort St. George and Bombay absolutely necessary.

You ought to endeavour to negotiate with Portugal the cession of Goa, for which you might give Malacca in exchange. This is an important point. The French look to Goa, and will labour to obtain it, either by force or intrigue. Our artillery throughout India is very deficient; we should feel this severely in the event of a French invasion. Has it ever occurred to you that it would be a good plan to incorporate all the Company's European regiments into the artillery in India? I cannot too strongly press the necessity of attention to the artillery in India; if you do not send out ample supplies of proper men and officers for this useful corps, it will soon fall to ruin; it is already on the decay. Indeed the whole army is alarmingly deficient in European officers; a larger annual supply of cadets, and a reduction in the annual export of writers would tend to secure the commercial interests of the Company in India. I believe these doctrines are not popular in London; but if the efficiency of the army in India be once allowed to decline, the territory, revenue and trade will not long survive: we must either be a

predominant military power, or we must be content to suffer the fate of those whose minds are unequal to the magnitude of their fortunes, and who are afraid of their own strength.

Believe me, my dear Sir, ever yours,
 Most faithfully and affectionately,
 MORNINGTON.

No. XVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore.

GENTLEMEN,

Fort St. George, 8th June, 1799.

On the 5th instant I forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick, and directed him to lay before you the draft of a Treaty* between the Company and his Highness the Nizam, together with four Schedules, containing a description of the respective portions of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultan to be allotted to the Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and eventually to the Peishwa; this Treaty, or one similar to it, must form the basis of the new settlement of Mysore, on which will be founded the more detailed arrangements to be adjusted with the Rajah, as well as the conditions to be required from the Peishwa; each of these two latter objects will require a separate engagement; that which relates to the Peishwa is not immediately within the province of your commission, but I now transmit a draft of the Treaty to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.†

* See page 26.

† The "Subsidiary Treaty of Sreringapatam" is as follows,—it is given here instead of in the Appendix, in order to render the despatch more intelligible.

A Treaty of perpetual Friendship and Alliance, concluded on the one part by his Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the English East India Company Bahaudur in the Carnatic and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on behalf, and in the name of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, K. P. Governor-General for all affairs, Civil

To avoid confusion, I shall for the future style the definitive treaty between the Nizam and the Company the "Treaty of

and Military, of the British Nation in India, by virtue of full powers vested in them for this purpose by the said Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General; and on the other part by Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, Rajah of Mysore.

Whereas it is stipulated in the Treaty concluded on the 22nd June, 1799, between the Honourable English East India Company Bahaudur, and the Nabob Nizam ud Dowlah Asop Jah Bahaudur, for strengthening the alliance and friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company Bahaudur, his Highness Nizam ud Dowlah Asoph Jah Bahaudur, and the Peishwa Row Pundit Purdhaun Bahaudur; and for effecting a settlement of the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun, that a separate government shall be established in Mysore, and that his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur shall possess certain territories specified in Schedule C, annexed to the said Treaty, and that for the effectual establishment of the government of Mysore, his Highness shall be assisted with a suitable subsidiary force, to be furnished by the English East India Company Bahaudur.

Wherefore, in order to carry the said stipulations into effect, and to increase and strengthen the friendship subsisting between the said English East India Company and the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, this treaty is concluded by Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and of the said English East India Company Bahaudur in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar; the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, on the part, and in the name, of the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Governor-General aforesaid; and by His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, which shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

Article 1st.—The friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties shall be considered as the friends and enemies of both.

Article 2nd.—The Honourable the East India Company Bahaudur agrees to maintain, and his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees to receive, a military force for the defence and security of his Highness's dominions. In consideration of which protection his Highness engages to pay the annual sum of seven lacs of star pagodas to the said East India Company. The said sum to be paid in twelve equal monthly instalments; his Highness further agrees, that the disposal of the said sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops to be maintained by it, shall be left entirely to the Company.

Article 3rd.—If it shall be necessary for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or of either of them, that hostilities shall be undertaken, or preparations made for commencing hostilities against any state or power, his said Highness Maha Rajah Mysore

Mysore;" and that between the Company and the Rajah the "Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam."

Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the military force, and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as shall appear to the Governor-General in Council of Fort William, on an attentive consideration of the means of his said Highness, to bear a just and reasonable proportion to the actual net revenues of his said Highness.

Article 4th.—And whereas it is indispensably necessary that effectual and lasting security should be provided against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expense of maintaining the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expense described in the 3rd article of the present treaty; it is hereby stipulated and agreed between the contracting parties, that whenever the Governor-General in Council of Fort William in Bengal shall have reason to apprehend such failure in the funds so destined, the said Governor-General in Council shall be at liberty, and shall have full power and right either to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other branch and department of the government of Mysore; or to assume and bring under the direct management of the servants of the said Company Bahaudur, such part or parts of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur as shall appear to him, the said Governor-General in Council, necessary to render the said funds efficient and available either in time of peace or war.

Article 5th.—And it is hereby further agreed, that whenever the said Governor-General in Council shall signify to the said Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur that it is become necessary to carry into effect the provisions of the 4th Article, his said Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur shall immediately issue orders to his Aumils, or other officers, either for carrying into effect the said regulations according to the tenor of the 4th Article, or for placing the territories required under the exclusive authority and controul of the English Company Bahaudur; and in case his Highness shall not issue such orders within ten days from the time when the application shall have been formally made to him, then the said Governor-General in Council shall be at liberty to issue orders by his own authority, either for carrying into effect the said regulations and ordinances, or for assuming the management and collection of the revenues of the said territories, as he shall judge most expedient for the purpose of securing the efficiency of the said military funds, and of providing for the effectual protection of the country, and welfare of the people; provided always, that whenever and so long as any part or parts of his said Highness's territories shall be placed, and shall remain under the exclusive authority and controul of the said East India Company, the Governor-General in Council shall render his Highness a true and faithful account of the revenues and produce of the territories so assumed; provided also that in no case whatever shall his Highness's actual receipt or

From the first to the ninth article of the draft of the Treaty of Mysore no explanation or particular instruction seems to be

annual income arising out of his territorial revenues, be less than the sum of one lac of star pagodas ; together with one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territories ceded to him by the 5th Article of the treaty of Mysore, which sum of one lac of star pagodas, together with the amount of one-fifth of the said net revenues, the East India Company engages at all times, and in every possible case, to secure and cause to be paid for his Highness's use.

Article 6th.—His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur engages, that he will be guided by a sincere and cordial attention to the relations of peace and amity now established between the English Company Bahaudur and their allies ; and that he will carefully abstain from any interference in the affairs of any state in alliance with the said English Company Bahaudur, or of any state whatever ; and for securing the object of this stipulation it is further stipulated and agreed, that no communication or correspondence with any foreign state whatever shall be holden by his said Highness without the previous knowledge and sanction of the said English Company Bahaudur.

Article 7th.—His Highness stipulates and agrees, that he will not admit any European foreigners into his service without the concurrence of the English Company Bahaudur ; and that he will apprehend and deliver up to the Company's Government all Europeans of whatever description who shall be found within the territories of his said Highness, without regular passports from the Company's Government, it being his Highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigners to remain within the territories now subjected to his authority, unless by consent of the said Company.

Article 8th.—Whereas the complete protection of His Highness's said territories requires that various fortresses and strong places, situated within the territories of his Highness, should be garrisoned and commanded, as well in time of peace as of war, by British troops and officers ; His Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur engages that the said English Company Bahaudur shall at all times be at liberty to garrison, in whatever manner they may judge proper all such fortresses and strong places within his said Highness's territories as it shall appear to them advisable to take charge of.

Article 9th.—And whereas in consequence of the system of defence which it may be expedient to adopt for the security of the territorial possessions of his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, it may be necessary that certain forts and strong places within his Highness's territories shall be dismantled or destroyed, and that other forts and strong places should be strengthened and repaired ; it is stipulated and agreed, that the English East India Company Bahaudur, should be the sole judges of the necessity of any such alterations in the said fortresses ; and it is further agreed, that such expenses as may be incurred on this account shall be borne and defrayed in equal proportions by the contracting parties.

required. It appears to me, that the ninth, tenth, and eleventh articles contain the most eligible foundation of an arrangement

Article 10th.—In case it shall become necessary for enforcing and maintaining the authority and government of his Highness in the territories now subjected to his power that the regular troops of the English East India Company Bahaudur should be employed, it is stipulated and agreed, that upon formal application being made for the service of the said troops, they shall be employed in such manner as to the said Company shall seem fit; but it is expressly understood by the contracting parties that this stipulation shall not subject the troops of the English East India Company Bahaudur to be employed in the ordinary transactions of revenue.

Article 11th.—It being expedient for the restoration and permanent establishment of tranquillity in the territories now subjected to the authority of his Highness Maha Raja Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, that suitable provision should be made for certain officers of rank in the service of the late Tippoo Suldaun, his said Highness agrees to enter into the immediate discussion of this point, and to fix the amount of the funds (as soon as the necessary information can be obtained) to be granted for this purpose in a separate article to be hereafter added to this treaty.

Article 12th.—Lest the garrison of Seringapatam should at any time be subject to inconvenience from the high price of provisions and other necessaries, his Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur agrees that such quantities of provisions and other necessaries as may be required for the use and consumption of the troops composing the said garrison, shall be allowed to enter the place from all and every part of his dominions free of any duty, tax, or impediment whatever.

Article 13th.—The contracting parties hereby agree to take into their early consideration the best means of establishing such a commercial intercourse between their respective dominions as shall be mutually beneficial to the subjects of both governments, and to conclude a commercial treaty for this purpose with as little delay as possible.

Article 14th.—His Highness Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur hereby promises to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him, with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his Highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

Article 15th.—Whereas it may hereafter appear that some of the districts declared by the treaty of Mysore to belong respectively to the English Company Bahaudur, and to his Highness, are inconveniently situated with a view to the proper connection of their respective lines of frontier, it is hereby stipulated between the contracting parties that in all such cases they will proceed to such an adjustment, by means of exchange or otherwise, as shall be best suited to the occasion.

Article 16th.—This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, being this day, the 8th of July, A. D. 1799 (corresponding to the 3rd of Suffer, anno

for securing a provision for the family of Tippoo Suldaun.* The general principle on which that arrangement is founded is, that the Company and the Rajah of Mysore shall be charged exclusively with the expense of providing for the family of Tippoo Suldaun, and therefore should hold (over and above their proportion in the general partition) a territory equal in produce to the amount of this charge.

The tenth and eleventh articles are absolutely necessary for the security of the Company against any contingent increase in the expense of maintaining Tippoo's family, as well as against any possible misconduct in any of its branches; the Nizam may perhaps require (under the principle assumed to justify us in taking a larger share of territory than is assigned to him,) that in the event of any diminution of the expense of maintaining Tippoo's family, the amount of the saving should be paid over to his Highness; but this claim is satisfied by the tenth article, which exempts his Highness from any charge on account of any contingent increase of expense on the same head.

Whatever may be the amount of the Jaghire granted to

Hegere 1214, and to the 7th of the month Assar of the 1221st year of the Sulluwunt era), settled and concluded at the Fort of Nuzzabar, near Seringapatam, by his Excellency Lieutenant-General George Harris, Commander-in-Chief of the forces of his Britannic Majesty, and of the Honourable Company in the Carnatic, and on the Coast of Malabar, the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieut.-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, with the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur, the aforesaid gentlemen have delivered to the said Maha Rajah one copy of the same in English and Persian, sealed and signed by them; and his Highness the Maha Rajah has delivered to the gentlemen aforesaid another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his seal, and signed by Luchuma, widow of the late Kistna Rajah, and sealed and signed by Purneah, Dewan of the Maha Rajah Kistna Rajah Oodiaver; and the aforesaid gentlemen have engaged to procure and deliver to the said Maha Rajah, without delay, a copy of the same, under the seal and signature of the Right Honourable the Governor-General, on the receipt of which by the said Maha Rajah, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honourable the English East India Company Bahaudur, and on the Maha Rajah Mysore Kistna Rajah Oodiaver Bahaudur respectively, and the copy of it now delivered to the said Maha Rajah be returned.

Ratified at Fort St. George, by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, on the 13th day of July, A. D. 1799.

* These articles formed a part of the *draft* of the treaty, but were omitted in the treaty itself, and the substance incorporated in the first article of that document.

Cummur ud Deen by the Nizam under the twelfth article, should be considered in allotting the Nizam's share of territory, in the same manner as the charges of maintaining the family of Tippoo Suldaun are considered in fixing the Company's share; so that upon the whole, the territory holden in sovereignty by the Nizam (after deducting the amount for the provision of Cummur ud Deen, and the territory holden by the Company, after deducting in the same manner the provision made for the family of Tippoo), should be equal in value. The remaining articles of the treaty of Mysore do not appear to require any explanation or particular instruction.

In the Treaty of Mysore no stipulation is inserted for providing an establishment for the Sirdars of Tippoo Suldaun, and for the families of such as fell in battle during the campaign. This charge must fall on the Rajah of Mysore, and I am induced to think that it will not amount to more than one lac of pagodas, I leave it to your judgment to insert an article in the Treaty of Mysore, guaranteeing the provision of the Sirdars if you should think it necessary; but it appears to me that it would be more advisable to secure their maintenance in the subsidiary treaty between the Company and the Rajah, as this arrangement will place them more immediately under the power of the Company.

The Draft of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam* will not require any explanation from the first to the fourth article. In that article the sum of seven lacs of pagodas fixed for the subsidy, is as low as I can venture to rate it: during the Rajah's minority it cannot be felt, and as my present view of the revenues has induced me to refrain from burthening the Rajah with any charge for the expenses of the war, the amount of the subsidy cannot be considered to be unreasonable. The provisions of article 5th are absolutely necessary for the purpose of precluding the embarrassments which have arisen in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore; and I think it a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprize the Rajah distinctly from the first hour of his accession of the nature of his situation, than to leave any channel open for future ambiguity and discussion. This is a point which I hold to be so essential to the very ex-

* See p. 44.

istence of the new arrangement, that if it should appear objectionable (on grounds of which I am not now aware), I see no alternative but that of dividing the whole territory between the allies. No further observation appears necessary on the drafts of the subsidiary treaty. If it should appear unobjectionable to you, I authorize you to proceed forthwith to the conclusion of it in concert with the Commander-in Chief; I empower you to place the Rajah formally upon the Musnud, and to appoint, in the Rajah's name, Purneah to be his Dewan. The extreme youth of the representative of the Mysore family will render it necessary that his nearest male relation should sign the treaty in his name, and engage for his due performance of its several articles. The fortress of Mysore will be most eligible, and as I am informed, the most acceptable, seat of the Rajah's residence. In the event of your placing the Rajah upon the Musnud, I desire that you will, in my name, appoint Lieutenant-Colonel Close to the office of resident at Mysore.

I request that you will state to me without reserve in your next despatch, whether my presence in Mysore appears to you to be necessary or desirable for the despatch of the public service. My baggage is still upon the road, and I shall either finally recall it, or proceed directly to Ryakottah, according to the suggestions which I may receive from you.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

your obedient Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. XVII.

General Order of Lieutenant-General Harris.

Camp, 9th June, 1799.

The Commander-in-Chief notifies in Orders that the Right Honourable the Governor-General with a view of affording to the army the immediate means of lodging their property in security, has been pleased to authorise his directing the paymasters in camp, and in Seringapatam, to receive from individuals such sums of money as they may be desirous of investing in the Honourable Company's funds. For such sums

respectively (of 100 pagodas, or a larger amount), the paymasters will grant receipts to the proprietor, entitling him to a bond of the Government of Fort St. George, bearing an interest of eight per cent. per annum from the day of payment in camp or Seringapatam, and payable in one or two years, at the option of Government. The Commander-in-Chief, who intends to profit by this indulgence himself, recommends to the army in general the adoption of this mode of obtaining immediate security for their property, and placing it to advantage, which, while it obviates all risk attendant on other means of remittance, offers to this army a pleasing occasion to mark that their confidence in the public credit of the state is equal to the zeal and gallantry they have ever shewn in asserting the claims, and defending the rights, of their country.

No. XVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 12th June, 1799.

I conclude that under my letter of the 23rd of May,* you will have made any communication which circumstances may have rendered advisable to the Peishwa of my intention to cede a considerable part of the territory of the late Tippoo Sultaun to the Mahrattas under certain conditions, the justice and moderation of which cannot be disputed. I now direct you to take the first opportunity of assuring the Peishwa of my sincere disposition (notwithstanding all that has past), to cultivate his friendship and to promote his interests. You will proceed to inform him that it is my intention, under certain conditions, to make a considerable cession of territory to him, provided his conduct shall not in the interval have been such as to have rendered all friendly intercourse with him incompatible with the honour of the British Government. You will be careful in whatever communications you shall make on this subject to apprise the Peishwa that he has forfeited not only all claim to any portion of the conquered

* See p. 12.

territory under the terms of the triple Alliance, but also under those of the declaration which I authorized you to make in my instructions of the 3rd of April.* I wish, however, that the general tenor of your communications to the Peishwa should be of a conciliatory and amicable nature calculated to remove any impressions of jealousy or fear which he may conceive from the movements of General Harris's army to the northward of Mysore. You may assure the Peishwa in the most unequivocal terms that this movement has no other object than to secure the tranquillity and good order of our recent conquests; and that nothing can be more remote from my intentions, or those of General Harris, acting under my orders, than to offer any degree of violence to the Mahratta territory.

I wish you to transmit to me, without delay, the names and descriptions of all such districts lying within the territories of the late Tippoo Sultaun at the time of his death as had been conquered from the Mahrattas, or were liable to any claims from that people. I am also desirous to learn what districts of the late Sultaun's dominions would be most acceptable to the Peishwa. These points I imagine you might easily ascertain through the means of Nana. You will take an early opportunity of making the same friendly declarations on my part to Scindiah as I have already directed you to make to the Peishwa. I am anxious to find some mode of engaging the interests of Scindiah in the new settlement of Mysore, under the condition of dismissing all the French officers from his service, and (if possible), under that of his delivering them over to our Government for the purpose of, their being sent to Europe. I desire that you will turn your attention to this subject, and furnish me with an early knowledge of your sentiments upon my suggestion.

I am, Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

* See Vol. I. p. 509.

No. XIX.

Lieut.-General Harris, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD, Camp near Milgottah, 15th June, 1799.

I am sorry to inform your Lordship that concurring reports from the north-westward describe all the country in that direction as overrun by a formidable banditti. Doondiah Waugh, a person whom Tippoo had confined, and who escaped from Seringapatam in the confusion of the assault, has collected a considerable force of horse and foot from the fugitives of Tippoo's army, and other men of desperate fortunes. He has, it is asserted, taken and governed Simoga, threatened Bednore, and its vicinity, and having stopped all communication to that quarter, I am not without apprehension that he may obtain possession of Chittledroog. He has united with Kishapah Naig the Poligar of Bullun, and with a near relation of Meer Mahomed Saduck, who had authority over some of the forts and districts in that quarter, the force of these adventures may be formidable as their followers are numerous, and well armed, and as the present crippled state of the army equipment render it perfectly impossible to move a sufficient force against them.

I am, with regard,
My Lord,
your very faithful and obedient Servant,
GEO. HARRIS.

No. XX.

The Earl of Mornington to Lieut.-Colonel W. Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

(Private.)

DEAR SIR, Fort St. George, June 18th, 1799.

I received your letter of the 13th of May with great pleasure, and I have since learnt that, by Mr. Lumsden's resignation, as well as by the arrangements which Sir Alured Clarke has made for filling the post of Adjutant-General to the army in Bengal, you are likely to be soon at liberty to enter on your new duties.

You are already apprized that my principal object is to effect a reform of the Nabob Vizier's army; and it would be a happy circumstance if any steps towards that most desirable end could be made during the present season before the alarm of Zemaun Shah's return to the frontier of Hindostan can be renewed. I have, therefore, thought it advisable to relax my injunction to you, not to take any step towards the accomplishment of the proposed military arrangements before you shall have received further instructions from me: I leave it to your discretion to act in this matter as you shall deem most expedient.

I entirely approve your suggestion of the advantages to be derived from availing ourselves of any instances of mutiny, treachery, or criminal neglect in any branches of the Vizier's army to reduce such divisions of the army as shall be convicted of these crimes.

The extreme unpopularity of the Nabob Vizier has been an object of serious regret to me: I understand that it arises principally from his excessive parsimony and his ungracious conduct towards the principal personages of his Court. It will be a matter of considerable delicacy to attempt to correct these defects; however, I request that you will direct your constant attention to them; and if any favourable opportunity should occur, that you will apprise the Nabob, in an amicable manner, of the concern with which I have learnt, that he does not pursue a course likely to conciliate the affection of his subjects; and you will signify to him, that the deep interest which I take in the stability, ease, and honour of his Government, renders me particularly anxious to hear that his Excellency has found means of removing the unfavourable impressions which have been conceived of his disposition.

At the same time you will express to his Excellency, in the strongest terms, my cordial approbation of the regularity which has marked his payment of the military subsidy ever since my arrival in Bengal. It is scarcely necessary to point out to you the importance of taking every step to encourage and improve the Nabob's disposition to the punctual discharge of his pecuniary engagements to the Company, forming, as they now do, the source of so considerable a branch of our revenue.

You are already informed of my views in the event of the

death of Almas Ali Khan, they are entirely conformable to your own ideas upon that subject. I request that you will apply to Mr. Lumsden for a copy of a private letter which I addressed to him a short time previous to my departure from Calcutta.* It contains a general outline of my sentiments with regard to the state of Oude.

I wish to call your particular attention to an evil which I consider to be of the first magnitude. I mean the number of real or pretended emissaries of Zemaun Shah who have spread themselves over the provinces of Oude and Benares for the last two or three years, exciting general alarm, and weakening the respect due to the British Government by inculcating exaggerated reports of the force of the Shah.

The imperious tone which the Shah has adopted in his communication with the Nabob Vizier and with the British Government must be abated. Our tacit admission of his presumptuous claims of sovereignty upon our provinces and their dependencies serves only to inflame his pride and ambition, and to degrade us in the eyes of our own subjects. From the papers discovered in the palace at Seringapatam, after the conquest of that place, it appears evident that Tippoo Sultaun had formed a connection with Zemaun Shah. Under all these circumstances, I desire that you will establish, in concert with Mr. Vanderheyden, a most vigilant control over any emissaries who may arrive from the Shah; and that you will, without hesitation, either send them beyond the frontier of Oude, or imprison them, as the case may require. I wish you to understand and to declare that I shall hereafter consider every person as a traitor who shall assert the royal authority of Zemaun Shah over any part of the dominions, either of the Nabob Vizier, or of the Company.

Your attention will necessarily be alive to the intrigues of Ambajee and of the French; with respect to the latter, my principle is very simple: wherever I find a Frenchman in India, within my power, I will send him back to Europe, and I desire that you will adopt this principle as the general rule of your conduct, from which you are never to depart, excepting in cases of a very special nature, which you will always report to me for my determination.

* See Vol. I. p. 386.

I am naturally anxious to visit Oude, but as I see no prospect of being able to return to Bengal before the month of September, it will be impossible for me to move from Calcutta before the month of December; indeed, after so long an absence from Calcutta, I should be desirous of remaining there until the commencement of the rains in the ensuing year, 1800, unless you see any necessity for my visiting Oude at an earlier period. On this question I wish for your unre-served opinion, by which my motions shall be regulated.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours, most sincerely,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXI.

Chief Justice Sir John Anstruther to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

June 25th, 1799.

I had your very kind letter some days ago, and yesterday brought me Tippoo's private correspondence with the French Government, you were so good as to send me. It affords convincing proofs of the good sense and judgment which dictated the commencement of the war, and of the danger which would have attended any delay, or any less exertion of vigour and activity than actually took place.

I am much flattered with the favourable place you gave me in your esteem, and sincerely assure you that I feel nearly as much satisfaction upon private as upon public grounds at the wonderful success of the war, but knowing what I do I cannot help wondering at the slight grounds upon which the fate of empires depend. The slightest delay in your passage, the slightest accident to the ship, an accidental sickness at the Cape, nay, had you yielded to the desires of many of your friends, and come to India without the Government being in you the instant of your arrival, all your exertions would have been in vain, and our empire in India might have been tottering at this day, instead of being fixed upon foundations I trust the most stable.

I am extremely happy to hear your determination upon the question of Seringapatam, which I have not disclosed to a

soul. Its central position, its local strength, joined to the river, being in a great measure a frontier almost all the way across the peninsula, and the facility with which an army may move from it to any point of attack, point it out as a material station for our army, and indeed, a line drawn by Colar Bangalore to Periapatam, affords a shorter line of defence to the Carnatic than we had before, and seems to point out that and Mangalore as a desirable acquisition for us. Gooty and Gurrumcoonda naturally are the places from whence the Nizam will secure his share of the conquest, and in the present circumstances an addition to his power is rather desirable than dangerous, adds to our strength, and not to our alarm, an additional effect of the wise measures of your Government. Were I in your place I should be more puzzled with Bednore than any other part of the country. It is distant from us. The Mahrattas will claim it. They deserve little, and in their present state, although not very formidable, yet might become so; and it is a rich province. I dare say your determination will be the best and the wisest.

The correspondence you sent me I think, in some degree, proves what I have long suspected, that the principles upon which the treaty of Seringapatam was founded were but fallacious, and more suited to defend the treaty in an English House of Commons than to assist its operations in this country. To Tippoo the triple alliance appeared the effect of weakness rather than ability, and moderation was by him, and I suspect by our allies too, supposed the effect of our inability. Besides the remote good arising from the balance of power wisely held to any Indian mind cannot come in competition with any immediate advantage whatever. Our successes have been too rapid for any Indian to give us credit for our moderation, and their false and fickle conduct will, I am afraid, prevent us from practising it long. I have no doubt but had the Frenchman's advice in the last letter in the collection*

* This was conveyed in a letter from M. Dubuc to Tippoo Sultan, dated 16th of December, 1798, urging Tippoo to make overtures to the Mahrattas for their cooperation against the English, and entreating Tippoo so to stimulate the Mahrattas that they might take alarm and attack the East India Company's territories. See p. 134 of Mr. Edmonstone's translation of the discovered documents.

been taken with vigour, that you would not have had the Mahrattas so quiet, and possibly their delay may be in some degree owing to its having been attempted to be carried into execution. Adieu! may every good attend you, and every success follow your measures.

Yours, ever sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. XXII.

Captain (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Seringsapatam, 29th June, 1799.

I should hardly have ventured to trouble your Lordship with a letter on the subject of my appointment as a joint Secretary to the Commissioners for the affairs of Mysore had not their instructions, directing me to communicate with you on the civil administration of Canara, opened the way for me to make my acknowledgments to your Lordship for having twice pointed me out as a person that might be usefully employed. As it is probable that your Lordship may hear that I hesitated for some time in accepting this appointment to Canara, I shall, without reserve, explain the motives by which I was guided on this occasion. I felt a reluctance to quit the coast, where I had served near twenty years. After having been the greatest part of the last nine years in tents, I dreaded that my constitution would not support the fatigue of leading the same kind of life for two or three years longer in investigating the revenues of a new country. I thought it possible that I might be ordered to take charge of a part of Coimbatore, and as I know perfectly, from my long residence in the neighbourhood of that province, that it yielded more than double the estimate of Tippoo Suldaun; I flattered myself with the hope of gaining some credit by augmenting the public revenue. On the contrary, I saw that, by going to Canara, I should only disappoint the expectations which your Lordship might have formed; for I never had any doubts of

the truth of the report which prevailed in 1792, that the Sultaun had overrated the whole of the Malabar coast in order to secure to himself a part of it for keeping up his French connection. This report seems to be confirmed by experience in Malabar, where, after a trial of seven years, the revenue is still lower than the schedule. I could scarcely hope to bring the country up to its estimated value in a short time; to do in one year what had not in the adjoining province been done in seven; and I therefore foresaw a certain unavoidable loss of reputation. But I considered that it was my duty to go, and the more especially as I was conscious that though I should never be able to realize any sanguine ideas that might be entertained on the subject of the revenue of Canara I should yet, from possessing the advantages of long experience, be enabled to render it as productive as it could have been in any other hands.

I understand that two gentlemen have been proposed as my assistants, but I am not sure whether or not they have been actually confirmed. It is hardly necessary to mention to your Lordship that no person can be of the smallest use in this revenue who does not understand some one or other of the country languages; besides this indispensable qualification, an assistant ought also to possess great perseverance and great temper with the natives. I am as yet ignorant how far the gentlemen in question are endowed with these requisites; but if I find them deficient, I shall not fail to report to your Lordship, in full confidence that I shall be furnished with abler assistance.

I shall trust to your Lordship's candour for excusing the freedom with which I have expressed myself in this first address.

I have the honour to be,
your Lordship's most obedient Servant,

TH. MUNRO.

No. XXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 30th June, 1799.

I now proceed to furnish you with such observations as occur to me to be necessary for your guidance in discussing the several articles of the treaty of Mysore with the Court of Hyderabad, if contrary to my hope any such discussion should arise. In the first place, I wish to state distinctly the fundamental principles on which I have framed the new settlement. I have always been disposed to pay not only every attention to the just pretensions of his Highness the Nizam, but even to exceed the limits of his strict rights in allotting the measure of his participation in the advantages of our late conquests, but I cannot admit the claim of his Highness to an equal partition of all or any of those advantages to be founded on any principles of justice or reason. His Highness cannot avail himself of the treaty of Paungul to maintain this claim because the article of that treaty relating to an equal partition of conquests could not be construed to apply to the late war. No other written or verbal engagement existing to support such a claim on the part of his Highness, I have endeavoured to estimate his rights under the alliance by an entirely different, and in my opinion, more equitable standard. My view has been to distribute the recent acquisitions of revenue between the two States in a due proportion to the efficient share, which each has borne in the expense and hazard of the war, as well as to the security which each is likely to derive from the assistance of the other in maintaining their common interests, and in consolidating the basis of the peace.

Although I have assumed this principle as the general foundation of the whole settlement, I am persuaded that a fair review of the details of the treaty of Mysore will convince any impartial mind that I have made concessions to the Nizam far exceeding the limits of the rule which I had thus

prescribed to myself as the just measure of his Highness's rights. It is unnecessary to enter more minutely into this part of the subject; you will find no difficulty in applying these observations to the articles of the treaty.

The preamble of the treaty requires no remark.

The 1st and 2nd articles leave to the Nizam and to the Company shares of territory, as nearly as is practicable, of equal value, after deducting from each the charges for which they have reciprocally engaged to provide on account of the maintenance of the families of Hyder Ali Khan, and Tippoo Sultaun, and although on account of the Jaghire of Meer Cummur ud Deen, it may be observed, on the part of the Nizam, that, under the power reserved to the Company in the 6th article, the Company may derive a greater benefit from its share of territory than that which now appears upon the face of the treaty, because the Company having reserved the power in certain contingencies of diminishing the allowances of the deposed family is not to be accountable to the Nizam for any such contingent advantage. On the other hand, it is apparent that the Nizam will be entitled to similar advantages with regard to the Jaghire of Cummur ud Deen, which his Highness, under his rights of sovereignty over Cummur ud Deen, will at any time possess the power of limiting or suspending, although no such power be expressly reserved in the treaty. His Highness also is exempt from the charge of any contingent increase in the expense of maintaining the deposed family, a contingency by no means improbable.

Meer Allum having objected to the operation of the 6th article, I offered, on the part of the Company, to render annually to the Nizam an account of the expense of maintaining the deposed family, and to divide equally with his Highness any contingent saving within the sum stipulated by the treaty for their annual maintenance, provided his Highness would consent to pay one-half of any eventual excess beyond the stipulated sum. Meer Allum declined this equitable proposal, and agreed to the articles in their present form.

It appears that the Nizam is desirous of retaining a part of Tippoo Sultaun's family within his Highness's territory,

the objections to such a plan must be obvious to every friend, not only of the British interests, but of the alliance between his Highness and the Company, the residence of the deposed family in the territory of the Company can never be an object of jealousy to the Nizam. Within his Highness's dominions it might become an object not only of jealousy to the Company, but of serious danger to the stability of the new settlement of Mysore. In addition to this observation, I must also remark, that the separation of the different members of the family of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun would be heavily felt by them as an unnecessary act of severity. It has been my duty to mitigate the rigour of this sudden change of their fortunes, and having been apprized that any separation of the several branches of the families would greatly aggravate the unavoidable pressure of their actual condition, principles of humanity, as well as of policy, forbid me to adopt the plan suggested by Azim-ul-Omra.

The whole of the deposed family will therefore be settled at Vellore, under the care of Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, and no reasonable expense will be refused by me which can contribute to their comfort or accommodation on a munificent scale, suited to the rank in which they were born.

Before I quit the 1st and 2nd articles, I think it proper to repeat that a mistake has arisen in enumerating the districts of Coimbatore retained by the Company, the district of Kanjam having been omitted in the schedule A.

The necessity of the third article is evident, as without that article Seringapatam would never become an efficient military post in the hands of the allies. I am persuaded that the Nizam will soon feel and acknowledge the security which he is likely to derive from the establishment of a large British force at Seringapatam.

The fourth article contains the basis of an arrangement founded on the strongest principles of justice, humanity, and policy. It does not appear to me necessary to state any thing farther on this, or the fifth article; you will naturally observe that, if the Nizam's claim to an equal partition of territory had been founded in right, and consequently admitted by me, this adjustment so honourable to the moderation, generosity, and wisdom of the British character, would not have taken place.

I have already remarked the operation of the 6th article on the interests of the Nizam, its necessity with a view to those of the Company is obvious. The policy of the 7th and 8th articles, I should trust, would not be disputed even by the illiberal, rapacious, and vindictive spirit of which I have perceived so many disgusting symptoms at Hyderabad, even since the fall of Seringapatam.

That the new settlement of Mysore should be rendered as acceptable as possible to all the powers contiguous to the respective boundaries of the allies, is a principle founded on the soundest maxims of prudence, as well as of generosity. The conditions which I have annexed to the provisional cession of territory to the Mahrattas will, I trust, satisfy the Court of Hyderabad of my sincere disposition to promote the interests of the Nizam by every effort compatible with the laws of my country, and the rules of public faith and justice.

You have already been apprized through my correspondence with Colonel Palmer, of the general outline of the conditions which I propose to require from the Peishwa, as well as of those which the Peishwa has proposed to me, I trust I shall be able, in the course of to-morrow, to forward to Colonel Palmer the draft of a treaty founded on his late communications. The despatch prepared for Colonel Palmer will pass through your hands, and you will communicate its contents to the Nizam, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Hyderabad. I desire that you will furnish me and Colonel Palmer, by the speediest conveyance, with such observations as may occur to you relative to the adjustment of affairs between the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The Ninth Article of the treaty of Mysore is intended to form the foundation of a connection of the most intimate nature between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore; you will inform me whether this arrangement is likely to excite any degree of jealousy in the mind of the Nizam. It is my decided determination not to admit of any relation between the Rajah of Mysore and any other power otherwise than through the Company's Government. I am persuaded that in this determination I have made the best practicable arrangement for the interests of the Rajah, the Nizam, and the Company. The Nizam will not be a party to the subsidiary

treaty with the Rajah. I have not yet determined, however, whether a treaty of general guarantee between the three states to which the Peishwa hereafter may be invited to accede, would not be an advisable measure.

With regard to the two separate articles of the treaty of Mysore, the nature of the first has already been explained in my observations on the 6th article of the treaty. The 2nd requires some further remarks; it was proposed by Meer Allum as a mode of removing all jealousy from the mind of the Nizam, and of reconciling the Court of Hyderabad to Meer Allum's conduct in signing the treaty without having received powers from his Court.

The article appears to me to be perfectly nugatory, unless it be supposed that the Court of Hyderabad possesses sufficient influence with that of Poonah to prevent the Peishwa's consent to conditions which might otherwise prove acceptable to him, or unless it be intended insidiously to favour some unreasonable pretensions of the Nizam against the Peishwa. I shall, however, pursue through the whole of the negociation the course which shall appear to my judgment to lead to the ends of reason and justice, and I will not suffer myself to be diverted from those ends by any intrigues at either court.

It is difficult to express to you the degree of disgust which has been occasioned in my mind by some of the late official documents from Hyderabad. It is evident that Meer Allum, notwithstanding his obligations to the British Government, and personally to myself, has employed every art to create discontent against both, by the tenor of his unfounded complaints, addressed to Azim ul Omra, from Seringapatam. I am credibly informed that the cause of Meer Allum's conduct is no other than his disappointment at not having personally shared in the distribution of the spoils of Seringapatam; and I understand that he has the imprudence to proceed so far as to hint his right to a share in the prize, equal to that allotted to Lieutenant-General Harris. The rejection of this unreasonable claim was immediately followed by the most marked symptoms of a discontent, which has never since been removed. This is a proceeding unworthy of his character, inconsistent with his professions, and incompatible with his obligations to the British Government; from this moment he

will ever be, in my opinion, an object both of suspicion and contempt. The conduct of the Nizam, and of Azim ul Omra, is of a similar character. Nor can I conceive any attempt more despicable in principle, or indiscreet in policy, than that which they have made, to deprive our army and the Nizam's of the just and customary rewards of their gallantry and honourable labours.

I will transmit to you by an early opportunity copies of the orders of Lord Cornwallis, during the last war, respecting the right of the army to property found in places taken by assault.* I will add copies of my late orders on the same subject. You will remark that Lord Cornwallis' opinion proceeds far beyond mine on this subject, although practically our determination has been the same. The plain truth is, that the claims of the army under such circumstances have never been resisted in His Majesty's service, nor do I think they could have been resisted at Seringapatam on any grounds of justice or policy, unless the amount of the captured property had been so enormous, as that its distribution must have affected the discipline of the army. The Nizam's force formed so small a proportion, either in point of number or efficiency, of the whole army, that it would have been the height of injustice to have admitted his Highness' claim to an equal participation of the whole prize, an admission which would have deprived our army of its reasonable advantages, without serving that employed by his Highness. No other principle, therefore, could be adopted but that of allowing his troops to share ratably with ours; excepting always his cavalry, the irregular construction of which rendered such an arrangement impracticable. For his cavalry, therefore, a compromise was made with Meer Allum. Whether Meer Allum defrauded his Highness' infantry of their share of the prize money, and reserved it for his Highness' private use, to the prejudice of those who had so well earned it in the field, is a question which I confess freely it never occurred to me to ask; nor will I degrade the character of the British Government by mixing in such a transaction, although the consequence of my refusal should be the total loss of his Highness' alliance.

* See Appendix.

When Lieutenant-General Harris communicated to me Meer Allum's requisition to be admitted on the part of the Nizam, to make a valuation of the treasure, I immediately gave my assent to Meer Allum's proposition with some expressions of surprise, that the Commander-in-Chief should have thought any reference to me necessary. Subsequent information, however, has convinced me that the Commander-in-Chief not only acted with propriety in declining Meer Allum's original proposal, but that he has also been completely justified in suspending the execution of my orders; for it now appears that the Court of Hyderabad, as well as the whole army, would have construed the concession into a formal recognition of the personal right of the Nizam to one-half of the captured property.

I shall close this letter with some general reflections arising out of the recent conduct and language of the Nizam, Azim ul Omrah, and Mustakeem oo Dowlah.

It is with infinite regret that I perceive throughout the whole tenor of the reports of their recent conversations a spirit extremely dangerous to the stability of our connection with the Court of Hyderabad. The language of Mustakeem oo Dowlah is particularly offensive, and as he is nearly connected with Meer Allum, it is not difficult to trace the source of his insolence and boldness in the disappointed avarice of his patron and kinsman; it appears, however, that the language which he used had been previously concerted with Azim ul Omra, a circumstance which renders it the more deserving of animadversion. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of bringing Mustakeem oo Dowlah to a distinct explanation of his statement of the powers which the Nizam had vested in me. That statement is, if possible, as false and absurd as it is disrespectful to the supreme power of the British Government vested in my hands. His Highness the Nizam, since the fall of Seringapatam, on two distinct occasions declared, in the most positive terms, that he would not in any degree interfere to restrain those plenary powers which he had requested me to exercise with respect to all his interests in the conquest of Mysore. I desire that you will take an early opportunity of reprimanding Mustakeem oo Dowlah, in the most public and pointed manner, for the disrespectful terms in which he has spoken of the British

Government, and that you will deprive him of his pension if you should deem it necessary to proceed to such an act of severity; at the same time, you will take an opportunity of signifying to the minister the extreme concern with which I have learnt that he has suffered any of his servants to utter with impunity expressions so unwarrantable. It may not be useless to embrace this occasion of awakening Azim ul Omra to a just sense of the extensive advantages which have been acquired by the Nizam's Government, within the last year, by means of his connection with the British power. Within that short space of time the Nizam has been delivered from the violence and arrogance of an armed party in the centre of his dominions, which menaced the independence, if not the existence of his throne. His enemies have been deterred by the intervention of the British power from prosecuting against his Highness' kingdom designs which he possessed no means of resisting, and which probably would have terminated in his destruction. His most formidable enemy has been utterly destroyed, with scarcely any expense to his Highness' treasury; and in place of that enemy has been substituted a power, connected with him by all the ties of interest and public faith, and affording perfect security to his dominions in that quarter, formerly the most vulnerable. He has acquired a large accession of territory and revenue, as well as of reputation and glory, by the conduct of his troops under the direction of British officers during the war.

Finally, from a weak, decaying, and despised state, he has recovered substantial strength, secured the means of cultivating and extending his resources, with power and honour at home and abroad, and resumed a respectable posture among the princes of India. These have been the consequences of his connection with the British power, acquired without effort or hazard on his part.

It is for his Highness and Azim ul Omra to determine whether these benefits are all counterbalanced by our adherence to the invariable practice of our military service, and by our justice to the merits of that army which has secured his tranquillity as well as ours. Perhaps it may occur as a prudential consideration, whether his Highness' disappointment at not being permitted to lay hands on rewards, appropriated by the custom of the British Government to encourage the

zeal of those who risk their lives in the public cause, should be so far indulged, as to hazard any interruption of that friendship from which he has derived advantages so solid, substantial, and honourable.

The treaty of Mysore appears to me to be highly favourable to his Highness' interests.* If, however, he should object to the basis and fundamental principles of it, he will not excite an emotion of alarm or uneasiness in my mind. I am perfectly prepared to carry the new settlement into effect by the aid of British arms alone; and his Highness must be aware of the advantages which he will open to the Court of Poonah, if he should compel me to resort to such extreme measures. But if his Highness should object merely to partial details, or particular stipulations of the treaty, I trust he will not hesitate to ratify it, relying on me to remove all such objectionable parts, unless they should appear upon examination either to be necessarily connected with the whole arrangement, or counterbalanced by advantages, which had escaped his Highness's observation.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 4th July, 1799.

I have already stated to you the grounds of my decided opinion, that the Peishwa has forfeited all right to claim any share in the advantages of the late war with Tippoo Suldaun. In this place therefore, I shall only observe, that the plea of inability to fulfil its engagements stated by the Durbar of Poonah, in the 5th article of the Peishwa's proposition, is a direct admission that the Mahratta State is not entitled to any share of the partition of Mysore, for whatever might be their inclination, nothing less than an effective co-operation in the field could have been deemed to amount to such a performance of their engagements, as could constitute the foundation of a right to participate in the division of our recent

* See p. 26.

conquests; but even their inclination has been at least equivocal, and by their continued intercourse with the enemy, they have precluded themselves from the benefit of your declaration made in my name, under the express condition of their renouncing all such intercourse during the war—their conduct in the former war cannot serve as a plea to justify a totally different behaviour in the present; it might as well be contended that the Nizam should be now punished for his want of zeal in the former war, as that the Mahrattas should be now rewarded for their alacrity at that period.

You must, therefore, understand and explain distinctly to the Peishwa, that I cannot consent to negotiate with him under any admission of his right to an equal, or any, share of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun. Whatever cessions may be made to the Peishwa from those territories, must be deemed gratuitous on the part of the Company, and of the Nizam, excepting in as far as they shall be compensated by correspondent concessions on the part of the Peishwa.

It may be necessary to observe, that it is my intention to exclude both the Nizam and the Mahrattas, especially the latter, from any interference in the affairs of the Rajah of Mysore, who is to be considered as a dependant of the Company. You will judge whether any specific engagement, on this subject, will be necessary to restrain the Court of Poonah from intriguing in Mysore.

The whole system of my policy, is a sufficient earnest of my anxiety to expel the French from the service of Scindiah; but it might be dangerous to proceed to any steps which tend to fix Scindiah in the interests of France. I desire you will keep this object constantly in view, nothing would be more satisfactory to me, than to find means of conciliating Scindiah's interests in the present pacification; perhaps it might be possible to arrange this most desirable object, by some equitable adjustment of his pecuniary claims on the Nizam and on the Peishwa; on this subject you will concert your measures with the Resident at Hyderabad.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXV.

From Sir Sidney Smith, to His Excellency the Right Hon. the Governor-General of the British Possessions in India.

MY LORD,

Tigre, off Cyprus, 9th July, 1799.

[Received at Fort William 15th Oct. 1799.]

I feel I cannot do better towards meeting the natural impatience, and relieving the anxiety of our friends and coadjutors in India, than to transmit copies of my late despatches to Rear Admiral Lord Nelson, containing the detail of the siege of Acre, which Bonaparte was forced to raise precipitately, after sixty-three days labour, and eleven fruitless attempts to carry the place by assault. He returned towards Cairo with the remnant of his exhausted army, which was originally twelve thousand men on the Syrian expedition, and is reduced at least one third. Egypt will afford him a reinforcement of about twelve thousand men, left there under General Kleber, so that his *utmost* force is now twenty thousand men, but by no means so formidable as they were before they met with a check, and felt their situation as it really is, cut off from all resource, and in a country by no means congenial to their habits, or furnishing the means of supplying their wants, still, however it is my duty to state that we have experienced desperation to be a strong principle of action both in Bonaparte and a portion of his followers, consequently as they find themselves hard pressed on this side by the Ottoman armies, they may push across the Isthmus, and carry terror among those who don't know them; it is necessary, therefore, that his Majesty's and the Right Honourable Company's servants in India, should continue to be on their guard, notwithstanding the recent defeat of that portion of the French army which entered Syria, and if the British forces should have it in their power to attack the first of the enemy's troops, which make their appearance to the southward of the Isthmus, the success of his Majesty's arms, which (after what I have witnessed) I look on as certain, cannot fail to have the same good effect on the opinion of the natives, that our early successes had in this country, in which case the most formidable part of the evil is

done away, and the rest must be subject to the ordinary course of events in war, where a succession of fresh troops have to deal with a fatigued, diminished and dispirited enemy. If this is the case with them in Egypt, I am happy likewise, from recent official information to be able to say, it is equally so in every other quarter where the French arms have hitherto carried all before them. The Russian and Austrian combined armies under the command of General Suvarof, have beaten them out of Italy. The Austrians on the Rhine have been equally successful, the enemy having been driven back across the river. In Switzerland, the Austrians have everywhere been received as liberators, and the French expelled. We have no direct news from the interior of France, but these events according to the spirit which I know to prevail, both in Paris and the provinces bid fair to overturn the monstrous system, which has nearly reduced all the surrounding nations to the same pitiable state which France is in herself, and consequently to restore tranquillity to Europe.

Sir Charles Whitworth writes me word, that he has exchanged the ratification of a subsidiary treaty with Russia, by which she engages to furnish us 45,000 men, which will no doubt, enable Government to support your Lordship in the laudable exertions you are making to secure our Empire in India. You may be apprehensive on hearing, that the French fleet sailed from Brest, in the latter end of April, and had not been heard of when the last letters left London; they have however, made their appearance on the coast of Italy, having entered the Mediterranean on the 5th of May; they are followed by our superior fleet.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
With perfect respect and regard,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. XXVI.

From the Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, 3d August, 1799.

My last separate letter to your Honourable Court, was dated on the 6th of June,* at which period I informed you, that I was occupied in framing a general settlement of the conquered territories of the late Tippoo Sultaan. In this despatch, I shall submit to your Honourable Court, a summary abstract of the principles by which my conduct has been governed in framing this settlement, and of the means which I have employed for carrying it into effect.

From the justice and success of the late war with Tippoo Sultaan, the Company and the Nizam derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms. This right of conquest entitled the Company and the Nizam, to retain the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of any portion of it to any other party, might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right.

The Mahrattas, whatever might have been their disposition, having taken no share in the war, had forfeited every pretension to participate in the advantages of the peace. The numerous progeny of Tippoo Sultaan, (even if it had been possible to adjust their several pretensions to the succession,) could plead no title which had not been superseded by the conquest of the kingdom; nor was it possible in estimating their claims, to forget the usurpation of Hyder Alli, and the sufferings of the unfortunate family, expelled by his crimes from the throne of Mysore. A lineal descendant of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore, still remained at Seringapatam; but, whatever might be the hopes of his family, from the moderation and humanity of the conquerors, this young Prince could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory.

To the free and uncontroled exercise of the right of conquest thus vested in the Company and the Nizam, no

* See Vol. I. p. 593.

obstacle existed in the internal state of the kingdom of Mysore. The whole body of the people had manifested the most favourable disposition to submit to our authority; the commanders of most of the principal fortresses had surrendered, or expressed their readiness to surrender to our arms; and within a few days after the fall of Seringapatam, I was satisfied that no difficulty would arise from the influence of the Mahommedans introduced into Mysore, under the usurpation of Hyder Alli and Tippoo Sultaun. It had been the uniform policy of the latter to destroy every vestige of hereditary right, established office, or territorial possession among his subjects, and to concentrate not only the whole authority of the State, but the whole administration of the Government in his own person; during his reign, therefore, his numerous Mahommedan chiefs possessed neither individual weight, nor collective force; many of them had fallen at Malavelly, Sedasere, and Seringapatam, during the course of the war; and most of the survivors, together with their families, were actually in the fortress of Seringapatam, subjected to our discretion, and confiding in the clemency of the British Government, without union, spirit, or strength to resist its power. The inclination and temper, both of the surviving chiefs and of the people, were also most happily disposed to receive any new settlement, which might promise to secure them against the revival of a despotism, the barbarity and caprice of which have never been surpassed even by any of the Mahommedan conquerors of India.

In regulating the exercise of our right of conquest, it appeared to me that no principle could more justly be assumed, than that the original objects of the war should constitute the basis of the peace, and of the general settlement of our territorial acquisitions. These objects had been repeatedly declared by the Allies to be a reasonable indemnification for our expence in the war, and an adequate security against the return of that danger, which originally provoked us to arms.

With a view to each of these just and necessary objects, it was requisite that the Company and the Nizam should retain a large portion of the conquered territory; but it required much consideration to determine the precise extent of that portion, as well as the just rule of partition. The war had

not been undertaken in pursuit of schemes of conquest, extension of territory, or augmentation of revenue. In proportion to the magnitude and lustre of our success, it became a more urgent duty to remember, that a peace, founded in the gratification of any ambitious or inordinate view, could neither be advantageous, honourable, nor secure.

The approved policy, interests, and honour of the British nation therefore required, that the settlement of the extensive kingdom subjected to our disposal, should be formed on principles acceptable to the inhabitants of the conquered territories, just and conciliatory towards the contiguous native States, and indulgent to every party, in any degree affected by the consequences of our success.

To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, to the exclusion of any other State, would have afforded strong grounds of jealousy to the Mahrattas, and aggrandized the Nizam's power beyond all bounds of discretion; under whatever form such a partition could have been made, it must have placed in the hands of the Nizam many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore, and exposed our frontier in that quarter to every predatory incursion; such a partition would have laid the foundation of perpetual differences, not only between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, but between the Company and both those powers.

To have divided the country into three equal portions, allowing the Mahrattas, (who had borne no part in the expence or hazard of the war,) an equal share with the other two branches of the triple alliance, in the advantages of the peace, would have been unjust towards the Nizam, and towards the Company; impolitic, as furnishing an evil example to our other Allies in India, and dangerous, as effecting a considerable aggrandizement of the Mahratta empire at the expence of the Company, and of the Nizam. This mode of partition also, must have placed Chitteldroog, and some of the most important northern fortresses, in the hands of the Mahrattas, while the remainder of the fortresses in the same line, would have been occupied by the Nizam, and our unfortified and open frontier in Mysore, would have been exposed to the excesses of the undisciplined troops of both powers.

The Mahrattas unquestionably had no claim to any por-

tion of the conquered territory, and any considerable extension of their empire was objectionable, especially when accompanied by the possession of strong fortresses bordering on the line of our frontier. It was, however, desirable to conciliate their goodwill, and to offer to them such a portion of territory as might give them an interest in the new settlement without offence or injury to the Nizam, and without danger to the frontier of the Company's possessions. On the other hand, it was prudent to limit the territory retained in the hands of the Company and of the Nizam within such bounds of moderation as should bear a due proportion to their respective expences in the contest, and to the necessary means of securing the public safety of their respective dominions.

For the information of your Honourable Court, I have annexed to this despatch a comparative statement of several plans for the partition of Tippoo Sultau's dominions, drawn up under my instructions with a view to the relative interests and power of the Nizam, the Mahrattas, and the Company; to the nature, produce, and geographical boundaries of the country, and to the position and strength of the several fortresses and passes; an attentive investigation of every comparative view of these important questions terminated in my decision that the establishment of a central and separate government in Mysore, under the protection of the Company, and the admission of the Mahrattas to a certain participation in the division of the conquered territory, were the expedients best calculated to reconcile the interests of all parties, to secure to the Company, a less invidious, and more efficient share of revenue, resource, commercial advantage, and military strength, than could be obtained under any other distribution of territory or power, and to afford the most favourable prospect of general and permanent tranquillity in India.

Having decided these leading principles of the new settlement, I proceeded to determine the rule of distribution for the respective shares of the Company, the Nizam, and the Mahrattas, to fix the most eligible position for the cessions to be made to each party, and to define the limits of the new government of Mysore.

To the Company's share naturally fell the Province of Ca-

nara, the Districts of Coimbatore and Daraporam, with all the territory lying below the Ghauts between your possessions in the Carnatic, and those in Malabar. These acquisitions appeared the most eligible, not only on account of their intrinsic value in point of produce, but as securing an uninterrupted tract of territory from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, together with the entire sea-coast of the Kingdom of Mysore, and the base of all the eastern, western and southern Ghauts. To these I thought it necessary to add the forts and posts forming the heads of all the passes above the Ghauts on the Table Land. The possession of the base of the Ghauts alone formed no effectual barrier for the inhabitants of the Low Lands against an enemy possessing the summits of those mountains; and I, therefore, considered the acquisition of all the entrances of the Passes situated above the Ghauts, to be an essential object of security, against every possible approach of danger from the Table Land. This acquisition derived a further importance in my opinion, from the means which it appeared to afford of curbing the refractory spirit of the Polygars, and of all other turbulent and disaffected subjects in the Carnatic, and on the coast of Malabar; I also considered the district of Wynaad to be an useful possession with a view to the tranquillity of your territories on the latter coast. The last addition which I deemed it necessary to make to your share of the conquered dominions, consisted of the fortress, city and island of Seringapatam, the possession of which would effectually secure the communication between your territories on both coasts, and consolidate all your lines of defence in every direction.

To the Nizam, it appeared most expedient to allot the districts of Gooty and Gurrumcondah, bordering on the cessions which he acquired by the peace of 1792, together with a tract of country, the frontier of which should be drawn nearly along the line of Chitteldroog, Sera, Nundydroog, and Colar, leaving, however, these fortresses to the southward to form the frontier of the new Government of Mysore. The Nizam certainly could not assert any just claim to an equal participation with the Company in the advantages of the peace. The operation of the 6th Article of the Treaty of Paungul, respecting an equal division of conquests, was

limited to the war which ~~terminated~~ ^{terminated} in 1792. Since the peace of Seringapatam, the 10th is the only Article of the Treaty of Paungul which can be considered to continue in force; and no subsequent engagements had been contracted with the Nizam which could entitle him to any advantages in the present peace exceeding his relative proportion in the expences and exertions of the allied force during the late war. It was, however, desirable that the territorial revenue retained in sovereignty by the Company (after deducting whatever charges might be annexed to the tenure) should not exceed the Nizam's portion, and accordingly I determined that this principle should be observed in the partition; reserving, however, to the Company, as a just indemnification for their superior share in the expences and exertions of the war, the principal benefit of whatever advantages might flow from any engagements to be contracted with the new Government of Mysore.

For the Mahrattas, I resolved to reserve a portion of territory, the revenues of which should not exceed two-thirds, nor fall short of one half, of the portions retained in sovereignty by the Nizam and the Company respectively, after deducting their respective charges; considering that any cession to the Peishwa must be viewed as a matter of mere favour, it appeared to me that the share to be allotted to him was amply sufficient, it would contain Harponelly, Soonda above the Ghauts, Annagoondy, part of the district of Chitteldroog, part of Bednore above the Ghauts, and other districts, but the frontier fortresses of Chitteldroog and Bednore would remain for the protection of the new Government of Mysore. I also determined that no portion of territory should be ceded to the Peishwa unconditionally, and that the cession should form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

The territory remaining unoccupied by this partition could be bounded to the northward by a strong line of hill forts and posts, forming a powerful barrier towards the southern frontiers of the Nizam and of the Mahrattas, from Punganoor on the line of the eastern, to Bednore on that of the western Ghauts, and would be entirely surrounded to the east, west and south, by the territories of the Company

above and below the Ghimbatane Company also holding the Fort of Seringapatam in the centre of the Table Land.

The necessity now occurred of determining in what hands the new Government of Mysore should be placed, and although no positive right or title to the throne existed in any party, it seemed expedient, that my choice should be made between the pretensions of the family of Tippoo Sultaun, and those of the ancient house of the Rajahs of Mysore.

The claims of humanity on both sides rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. No alternative remained, but to depose the dynasty which I found upon the throne, or to confirm the Mahommedan usurpation, and with it the perpetual exclusion and degradation of the legitimate Hindoo sovereigns of the country. The usurpation, although not sanctioned by remote antiquity, had subsisted for such a length of time as to have nearly extinguished the hopes of the Hindoo family, and to have accustomed them to the humility of their actual fortunes, while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, born in the state of royalty, and educated with the proudest and most exalted expectations of sovereignty and power, would be proportionably sensible to the sudden change of their condition, and to the unexpected disappointment of their splendid prospects. In this view of the subject it would have been more grateful to my mind (securing a munificent provision for the ancient family of Mysore) to have restored that of Tippoo Sultaun to the throne; if such a restoration could have been accomplished without exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal commotion and foreign war, and without endangering the stability of the intended settlement of your interests and those of your Allies in this quarter of India.

Since the peace of Seringapatam, and more especially since the year 1796, the destruction of the British power in India has formed the favourite and unremitting object of Tippoo Sultaun's hopes and exertions. His haughty mind never could be reconciled to the sacrifices which he was compelled to make for the purchase of peace in 1792; and his increasing eagerness to recover the extensive portion of his dominions, then ceded to the allies, urged him to pursue a systematic course of intrigue against the British power among all

the native states, and to revert to his ancient and hereditary connection with France, as the only effectual means of gratifying either his ambition or revenge.

The proofs which I had obtained, previous to the war, of the nature and objects of his machinations, were sufficient to satisfy my judgment; they have since been corroborated by the voluminous records discovered in the Palace of Seringapatam; it is now incontestable that Tippoo Suldaun's thoughts were perpetually intent upon the ruin of the British power, that he trusted to have accomplished our expulsion by instigating the French to invade India; and that he prosecuted this unalterable purpose with all the zeal and ardour of passionate resentment and vindictive hate, as well as with the steadiness of a deliberate maxim of state.

Perhaps the most wise policy which Tippoo Suldaun could have pursued would have been to have rested satisfied with the dominions remaining in his hands after the peace of 1792. But a policy of so moderate and pacific a spirit being utterly incompatible with the impetuosity of his temper, with the principles of his religious faith, and with the military character of his government, it might be at least a matter of rational speculation, whether a close alliance with France (however dangerous in its remote consequences) was not his true interest, in the actual state of his immediate views and pursuits. The possession of his lost dignity, wealth, and power could not be recovered without the conquest of a great part of the Company's territory, nor effectually secured without the total subversion of the British interests in India;—a French army was the only instrument by which such an enterprize could be attempted;—an alliance with France was, therefore, the necessary consequence of Tippoo Suldaun's restless, but natural desire to restore his empire to its former splendour and strength. In addition to his correspondence with the French at Tranquebar, with those at the Isle of France, and with the executive Directory at Paris, his embassy to Zemaun Shah, his intrigues at Poonah and Hyderabad, and his correspondence with Mons. Raymond, (all which transactions appear distinctly in the records discovered at Seringapatam) furnish abundant evidence that his antipathy to the English was the ruling passion of his heart, the

main-spring of his policy, the fixed and fundamental principle of his councils and government.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun must have been educated in the same principles, and encouraged to indulge in the same prejudices and passions, and instructed to form the same views of the interests and honour of the throne of Mysore. These sentiments would necessarily acquire additional force in his mind from the issue of the late war. Our unexampled success had subverted the foundations of his father's empire, and transferred to our possession every source of the civil or military power of Mysore. Placed on the throne by our favour, and limited by our controul, he would have felt himself degraded to a state of humiliation and weakness so abject as no Prince of spirit would brook. Under such an arrangement our safety would have required us to retain at least all the territory which we now hold by the partition Treaty of Mysore. Whatever we retained must have been considered by the prince as a new usurpation upon his royal inheritance, and an additional pledge of his degradation and disgrace. In proportion to the reduction of his territory and resources he would have less to lose and more to regain in any struggle for the recovery of his father's empire; nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose that the heir of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, animated by the implacable spirit and bold example of his parents, and accustomed to the commanding prospect of independent sovereignty, and to the splendour of military glory, might deliberately hazard the remnant of his hereditary possessions in pursuit of so proud an object, as the recovery of that vast and powerful empire, which for many years had rendered his ancestors the scourge of the Carnatic, and the terror of this quarter of India.

In the most narrow view of the subject, it must be admitted that the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of any settlement of Mysore, founded on a partition of his father's dominions, and on a limitation of his own independence. If, therefore, a prince of this race had been placed on the throne of Mysore, the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principles of its own dissolution. With such a prince no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiments, or union of

views could ever have been established ; the appearances of amity or attachment must have been delusive, even his submission must have been reluctant, if not treacherous ; while all his interests, his habits, prejudices, and passions, his vices, and even his virtues must have concurred to cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause, to exasperate the animosity, and to receive the aid of every enemy of the British nation. Whatever degree of influence or strength might have been left to the native Government of Mysore in such hands, would always have been thrown into the scale opposed to your interests. The hostile power of Mysore would have been weakened, but not destroyed ; an enemy would still have remained in the centre of your possessions, watching every occasion to repair the misfortunes of his family at your expense, and forming a point of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of France.

Under these circumstances, the same anxiety for the security and repose of your possessions, which originally compelled me to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultaun, now appeared to require that I should provide effectually against the revival of any degree of a similar danger, in the person of his son.

On the other hand, the restoration of the descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore was recommended by the same course of reasoning which excluded the heir of the Mahomedan usurpation.

The indignities which the deposed family of Mysore had suffered, especially during the cruel and tyrannical reign of Tippoo Sultaun, and the state of degradation and misery to which they had been reduced, would most naturally excite a sentiment of gratitude and attachment in their minds towards that power, which had not only delivered them from oppression, but had raised them to a state of considerable affluence and distinction. Between the British Government and this family, an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune. They had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultaun,

or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the usurping family, and consequently be adverse to the French, or to any state connected with that family, in its hereditary hatred of the British Government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts. His interest must therefore be to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency, and vigour. The effect of such an arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere destruction of the hostile power which menaced our safety. In the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources might be absolutely identified with our own, and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity and alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence, and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects, and allies.

In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations, and sentiments of generosity and humanity, favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title, and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect; nor could it be doubted that their government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country, composed almost entirely of Hindoos.

These considerations induced me to adopt the resolution of preferring the descendants of the Rajahs of Mysore to the heir of Tippoo Sultaan.

I determined at the same time to grant to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaan a more magnificent maintenance than either had enjoyed during the late reign, and to provide with the same liberality for the principal Mahomedan officers and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaan, and for the families of all those who had fallen in the course of the war.

For the accomplishment of a settlement founded on the principles which I have had the honour to detail to your

Honourable Court in the preceding paragraphs, I issued a special commission on the 4th of June,* appointing Lieutenant-General Harris, The Honourable Colonel Wellesley, The Honourable Henry Wellesley, Lieutenant-Colonel William Kirkpatrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Close, commissioners for the affairs of Mysore, with the ample powers specified in the commission; and I named Captains Malcolm and Munro to be secretaries, and Mr. Edward Golding and Lieutenant Charles Pasley assistant secretaries to the commission. As the favourable state of the country has rendered my presence at Seringapatam unnecessary, I accompanied the commission with instructions directing the commissioners to proceed without delay to lay the foundations of the new arrangement, and for the purpose of precluding the intrigues of the natives, and of all the great interests which were in suspense; I enjoined the commissioners and their secretaries to take an oath of secrecy, in order that no part of my plan might transpire until the arrangements for the whole had been completed.

The commissioners assembled at Seringapatam on the 8th of June, and under my instructions, their first act was to make provision for the principal surviving officers and chiefs of the late Suldaun, and for the families of those slain during the campaign. I am happy to inform your Honourable Court, that this measure produced the most salutary effect in tranquillizing the minds of the principal Mahomedans remaining in Mysore, and in placing the clemency and generosity of the British Government in the most conspicuous and honourable light. It was determined, that Meer Kunnur ud Deen should be settled at Gurrumcondah, with a jaghire from the Nizam, and another from the Company. This arrangement having been concluded, Kunnur ud Deen departed from Seringapatam on the 19th of June, with many expressions of gratitude towards the Company's Government. The Brahmin Poorneah, who had been the principal financial minister of the late Suldaun, having given satisfactory proof of his readiness to serve the new Government in the same capacity, it was determined that he should be appointed Dewan to the young Rajah of Mysore.

* See p. 23.

The next proceeding of the commissioners, in pursuance of my directions, was to undertake the painful, but necessary task of removing the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun from Seringapatam to the Carnatic.

I had previously given orders that the fortress of Vellore should be prepared for the reception of the families, and I had appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton to the command of that fortress, and had also entrusted him with the payment of the stipends allotted to both families, directing him to spare no reasonable expense in providing for their accommodation, on a scale suitable to their former rank and expectations. The four princes, Futteh Hyder, Abdul Khaulik, Mòyez oo Deen, and Moyee oo Deen, with their families, arrived at Vellore on the 13th of July; they expressed their satisfaction in the accommodations provided for them. The remainder of the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun will be removed as soon as may be practicable.

Previously to the departure of the princes from Seringapatam, the commissioners had cautiously abstained from all intercourse with the family of the Rajah of Mysore; but as soon as the four elder sons of the late Sultaun had left the capital, the commissioners paid a visit to the young Rajah, whom they found with others of this persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation, which excited the strongest emotions of compassion; it was determined to fix the residence of the Rajah in the ancient town of Mysore, as being the most eligible situation for the seat of his government.

On the 5th of June I had furnished the commissioners with the first draft of a treaty between the Company and his Highness, the Nizam, for the partition of Mysore, and having received the fullest communication of their sentiments and of those of Meer Allum, on the subject, I made such alterations as appeared to be advisable. On the 22nd of June this treaty was executed by the commissioners and Meer Allum, at Seringapatam, and ratified by me in council at Fort St. George, on the 26th of the same month, and by his Highness the Nizam, at Hyderabad, on the 13th of July. A copy of this treaty is annexed to this despatch under the title of the Partition Treaty of Mysore.*

* See p. 26.

On the 30th of June the Rajah of Mysore was formally placed on the musnud, by the commissioners, assisted by Meer Allum.

On the 8th of June I had forwarded to the commissioners the first draft of the subsidiary treaty, to be concluded between the Company and the Rajah of Mysore. After an ample discussion with the commissioners who had communicated the whole arrangement to the Brahmin Poorneah, and conciliated his co-operation; and after the adoption of several alterations, this treaty was executed in the fortress of Nuzzerbah, near Seringapatam, by the commissioners, and certain proxies on the part of the young Rajah, on the 8th of July, and ratified by me in council on the 23rd of July, under the title of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam*

In framing this engagement, it was my determination to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the Government of Mysore and the Company, and to render the Rajah's northern frontier in effect, a powerful line of our defence. With this view, I have engaged to undertake the protection of this country, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas; but recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double Governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the internal affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparations for hostility.

Under this arrangement I trust that I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Rajah's territory, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants. It appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprize the Rajah distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependance on the Company, than to

* See p. 43.

leave any matter for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as affecting the Rajah or the allies, has already been stated in this despatch.

I entertain a sanguine expectation that the Rajah and his ministers being fully apprized of the extensive powers reserved to the Company, will cheerfully adopt such regulations as shall render the actual exercise of those powers unnecessary. Much indulgence will be required at the commencement of the new Government, and it is my intention to abstain from any pressure upon the Rajah's finances, which by embarrassing them, might tend to the impoverishment of the country, and to the distress of the people.

Soon after the enthronement of the Rajah, the Brahmin Poorneah was appointed by the commissioners to be his Highness' Dewan.

The eminent talents and integrity of Lieutenant-Colonel Close, added to his extraordinary skill in the country language, and his experience in the manners, customs, and habits of the natives of India, induced me to select him for the important charge of resident with the Rajah of Mysore. He was accordingly appointed to that office immediately after the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam had been signed; and the commission was then dissolved on the 3rd of July.

Although your Honourable Court will perceive in the commission the names of two persons, of whose merits it may be difficult for me to form an impartial judgment, I feel it to be my duty to recommend the conduct of the commissioners to your most public and distinguished approbation.

The conclusion within one month of two treaties, so extensive in their consequences, and complicated in their details, together with all the subordinate arrangements connected with this important settlement, will appear the most extraordinary effort of diligence and ability, when it is remarked, that reference was necessarily made to me at Fort St. George, in every stage of the business. It will also be satisfactory to your Honourable Court to observe, that the whole arrangement has been conducted at Seringapatam, with a spirit of humanity and liberality, which cannot fail to conciliate the good will of the inhabitants of Mysore.

The command of Seringapatam will remain in the hands of

Colonel Wellesley; it is a trust of great delicacy and importance, which it is my duty to repose in a person of approved military talents and integrity, and to superintend with peculiar vigilance and care.

Although I shall deem it prudent to detain the army in the field for a short period of time, I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court, that far the greater part of the dominions of Tippoo Sultaun is now in a state of perfect tranquillity.

A detachment from the army of Bombay took possession of Mangalore on the 4th of June, and the province of Canara, with the exception of the fortress of Jemaulabad, appeared disposed to submit cheerfully to our authority. I have little doubt that the commanding officer of Jemaulabad will soon be induced to surrender to the Company's arms; in any event, however, the fort will be reduced without difficulty. In this confidence, a collector has been appointed for the province of Canara.

The remainder of the territory allotted to the Company in Coimbatour, has passed into our hands without any difficulty, and collectors have been appointed for the administration of the revenue. The fort of Gurrumcondah is in the possession of his Highness the Nizam, and those of Sera and Chitteldroog are now garrisoned by the British troops. Some disturbances have taken place in Bidnoor, in which province an adventurer had assembled a banditti, which had distressed the inhabitants of the country; a division of the army being now on its progress towards Bidnoor, I have every reason to expect that the commotions in that quarter will speedily be quelled.

Since the fall of Seringapatam, the conduct of the Mahrattas has been of the most conciliatory nature; it would be premature at present to enter into any detail on the subject of the negociations depending at Poonah; but I have the satisfaction to assure your Honourable Court that no interruption to the settlement of Mysore is likely to proceed from the Mahrattas. Whatever may be the secret inclination either of the Peishwa or of Scindiah, their mutual weakness and reciprocal jealousy are sufficient securities against any danger from that quarter.

The advantages resulting to your interests from the recent

settlement of Mysore, are sufficiently obvious, as they appear in the preceding parts of this despatch, and in the papers which accompany it. It may not, however, be useless to submit to your Honourable Court, in a connected form, a general view of the whole of this important question, together with the reflections which have arisen in my mind from an anxious and assiduous attention to every branch of the subject.

Since the first war with Hyder Ali, the tranquillity of your possessions has been continually menaced by the power of Mysore. Even in the intervals of peace, which have succeeded to the several wars in which the company has been engaged with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun, your security in the Carnatic has ever been precarious. During the cessation of actual hostilities, the designs of the Sovereign of Mysore have still continued uniformly hostile, and his means of executing them have always remained considerable, while the degrees of your safety have fluctuated with the state of your military establishments and preparations, and with the distribution of your force.

The baneful effects of this perpetual state of uncertainty and solicitude, have been felt not only in the decay of agriculture, and of the arts of peaceful industry on the coast of Coromandel, and in the rebellious spirit of certain descriptions of your subjects on that coast, and on the coast of Malabar, but occasionally throughout all India, in the diminution of the British Influence and consideration at foreign courts, in the rising hopes of the turbulent and disaffected, and in the decline of public and private credit, shaken by repeated rumours of war, and by the constant necessity of guarding against a surprise from the sudden aggression of an enemy, whom no clemency or moderation could conciliate, and no faith could bind.

The reduction of Tippoo Suldaun's power and resources effected by the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, had weakened, but not extinguished the cause of these complicated evils. Soon after the conclusion of peace, this cause and its effects appear to have recovered a considerable degree of activity and vigour, until in the year 1796, the intrigues and military movements of Tippoo Suldaun compelled the Government General to assemble the army on the coast of Coromandel,

and in the Autumn of 1797, such apprehensions were justly entertained of his designs and power, as induced the Government of Fort St. George to abandon the prosecution of an expedition ably planned, intimately connected with your interests, and which had already brought a heavy charge on your finances.

Judicious indeed, and provident was the policy which dictated the relinquishment of that enterprise, since subsequent discoveries and events have manifested the great probability, if not the absolute certainty, that the departure of the large force destined for Manilla would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo Suldaun to invade the Carnatic, or to attack the dominions of the Nizam, even without waiting for succours from France, the assistance of which might not, perhaps, have appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable a portion of our army.

But the apprehension of the designs and movements of the power of Mysore had never, perhaps, been more anxiously or more justly entertained, than between the months of June and September, 1798. It cannot be denied that during that period, your interests were menaced by a combination of the most serious dangers. The anxiety and fears hitherto entertained with regard to the designs of Tippoo Suldaun, were now confirmed by a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French projects of the most extensive hostility against your possessions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, was considerably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French in the Mediterranean, by the apparently desperate state of our alliances in the Deccan: by the peculiar situation of the Court of Hyderabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and French faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of Zemaun Shah; by the dispersed and defective condition of the army of Fort St. George; and above all, by the general persuasion, that an early attempt to assemble or to move that army, would serve only as a provocation to the enemy to invade and desolate the Carnatic, without furnishing the means of repelling the invader.

The situation of our allies at this period of general dependency, is now well known to your Honourable Court.

It will therefore be sufficient in this place to observe, that the degree of danger with which the Nizam and the Peishwa were threatened by the impending storm, exceeded that which menaced our possessions in the same proportion, as the distractions and weakness of the Governments of Poonah and Hyderabad rendered them less able than the Company to counteract the machinations or to repel the assault of the enemy. It is true, that Tippoo Suldaun's views against the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, were ostensibly limited to the recovery of the cessions made by him to those powers in 1792. But it cannot be doubted, that his ambition and rapacity would have augmented with the progress of his victories, and his revenge was not of a temper to be mitigated by success.

Your Honourable Court is apprised of the changes which successively and rapidly took place in the condition of our alliances and of our army, substituting at Hyderabad in place of a French faction and a French army, British influence and a considerable British force, and producing ultimately the happy restoration of confidence and energy among your servants at Fort St. George. It is therefore unnecessary to dwell on that part of the subject; but it may be expedient to advert to the state of the general expectations at different periods of time previous to the war, and to compare our actual situation with those expectations, as well as with our position in the month of June, 1798.

At that time, even the most sanguine dispositions, and those least affected by the prevalent panic, would probably have been content to have detached Tippoo Suldaun from his alliance with the French nation; in the hope that, without the aid of a French force, he would not attempt to disturb the tranquillity of the Carnatic.

Even at a later period, when the subversion of the French party at Hyderabad, the restoration of the Nizam to the condition of an efficient ally, and the advanced state of our military preparations had inspired a general spirit of confidence and zeal, the most confident and zealous would have deemed the issue of the approaching contest prosperous as well as honourable, if it had effected a considerable reduction of the power and resources of Tippoo Suldaun, and had obtained a reasonable indemnity for the expenses of the allies.

The entire destruction of Tippoo Sultaun's power, or the absolute transfer of his resources to any hand, less inimical or less violent, would have been deemed a glorious termination even of a long and expensive contest.

But the success of your arms in the short period of the late campaign has not merely excluded the French from Mysore, provided an ample indemnity to you and your ally for the charges of the war, destroyed the hostile power of Tippoo Sultaun, and effectually precluded its revival, but has transferred the sword of your implacable enemy into your own hands, and turned to your use the main springs of his wealth and strength.

By the partition treaty of Mysore you have acquired an augmentation of direct territorial revenue to the annual amount of about star pagodas 6,47,641,10, (£259,056 sterling).* By the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, you have secured an annual subsidy of star pagodas 7,00,000, (£280,000 sterling), making together, with your new territorial revenue, the sum of star pagodas 13,47,641,10, (£539,056 sterling), and leaving (after deducting the provision allotted for the families of Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun) an annual increase of your funds in this quarter of India, equal to star pagodas 11,47,641,10, (£459,056 sterling). But a reasonable expectation is entertained, that the territory acquired by the Company, under the treaty of Mysore, will yield, in the course of a few years, a sum not less than, star pagodas 14,78,698, (£591,479 sterling). If such an advance in the nominal revenue of the acquired districts should actually be realized, the positive augmentation of your available annual resources, in consequence of the late settlement of Mysore, will amount nearly to 20 lacs of star pagodas, (£800,000 sterling). But in estimating the increase of your annual available resources since the month of June 1798, the augmentation which took place in the subsidy payable by the Nizam, is not to be omitted. By the treaty of Hyderabad, concluded on the first of September 1798, the annual subsidy was augmented from Arcot rupees 6,44,556, to Arcot rupees 24,17,100, making an increase annually of Arcot rupees 17,72,544, or star pagodas 5,64,982, (£225,992 sterling). Thus, the total augmentation of your available annual resources since June 1798, in this quarter of your possessions,

* Calculating the star pagoda at 8s.

amounts actually to, star pagodas 17,12,623, (£685,048 sterling), and, if the increased revenue of the newly acquired territory should be realized, (according to just expectation), it will amount to star pagodas 25,43,680 (£1,017,472 sterling).

Against these acquisitions must be placed the expense of whatever additions it may be found necessary to make to your military force, either in consequence of the extension of your territory, or of the subsidiary engagements which have been contracted with the Nizam and with the Rajah of Mysore.

The subsidiary force at Hyderabad must be considered as a part of your efficient strength prepared for your service on any emergency, and ready to aid you in any future war, as it has aided you in the last. It does not appear to me probable that it will be necessary to make any considerable addition to the military establishment of Fort St. George, in consequence of the treaty of Hyderabad, nor do I apprehend that the requisite increase of that establishment, and of the army of Bombay, in consequence of the two treaties annexed to this despatch, will bear any proportion to the increase of your revenue and resources. For it must never be forgotten that, while your territory has been extended, your frontier has been contracted and strengthened, your principal enemy utterly destroyed, and an ally, and dependant of the Company, substituted on his throne.

I do not yet possess the means of stating with sufficient accuracy to your honourable Court, either the amount of the charges incurred in consequence of the various measures of preparation and precaution, which became necessary on the discovery of Tippoo Sultaun's hostile designs in June 1798, or the amount of the expense which is to be placed to the account of the operations of the late war. The accumulated charges both of our preparations and of the war must be considerable; but whenever a statement of the expenses of the late war can be submitted to your honourable Court, your wisdom and justice will necessarily distinguish the charges incurred for the purpose of assembling an effective army in the field, from those actually belonging to the operations of your armies in Mysore, and to the siege of Seringapatam.

From the moment that Tippoo's negotiations had transpired, it became an indispensable duty to place the Carnatic in a posture of complete defence. The experience of former wars with Mysore, the nature of the frontier of the Carnatic,

exposed in various points by its almost innumerable passes to the incursion of the enemy, the actual state of affairs in India and in Europe, all concurred to convince me, that the only rational system of defence against Tippoo Suldaun was to assemble your armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, in such force, in such a state of equipment, and in such a position, as should excite in the mind of the Suldaun a just alarm for the safety of his capital; no other plan was calculated to secure the Carnatic against the ravages of his numerous cavalry; because no other plan would have compelled him to concentrate his forces within his own territories, for the defence of the vital point of his empire. His capital was not only the object of his pride, but the centre of his power; it was his strongest fortification, the principal granary of his army, his only arsenal, the repository of his treasure, and the prison of the legitimate claimant of his throne, as well as of the families of all his great chieftains; whose obedience he secured, by retaining the objects of their reverence and affection within the walls of the fortress of Seringapatam. On the preservation of that fortress, therefore, depended the fate of his kingdom, and (although I did not neglect any practicable precaution against a contrary course of events) my judgment was always decided, that he would never abandon the defence of Seringapatam, but with his life.

The success of the plan (founded on this opinion) fully answered its primary purpose; since no part of the Suldaun's force ventured to enter the Company's possessions in the Carnatic during the late hostilities. It also fully answered the secondary purpose of enabling your armies (when our pacific negotiations had failed) to act offensively with promptitude, vigour, and effect.

Neither the expense of the magazines of grain and other stores on either coast, nor of the battering train, with its equipment of cattle, ought therefore to be charged to the account of the war; for every expense incurred previous to the 3rd of February 1799 (the day on which Lieutenant-General Harris received orders to march) must, and would have been incurred, if no war had taken place; and ought to be charged to the account of the indispensable defence of your possessions, according to the only plan, which could provide effectually for that object.

The expenses of moving the battering train to Seringapatam, as well as of maintaining the army in Mysore, cannot have much exceeded the charges which must have been continued if the whole had remained within your frontier; and when it is considered that, if the army, with the battering train, had not moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary, system of defence already explained, must have been protracted until all dangers from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should have been averted;* your honourable Court will probably sanction my decided opinion, that the rapid movement of the British forces towards the scene of their certain triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical measure which could have been adopted, to frustrate the views of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of your possessions.

For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable reduction in the expense of a defensive system, during the continuance of the war between Great Britain and France; while every hour of delay in the movement of our army afforded to Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving succours from the French, and consequently of aggravating to the Company, both the expense and hazard of the impending contest.

On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements which had been made for its equipment and supply in every department, and the period of the season, left no doubt that the great object of the war would be attained in one short campaign. Nor did this calculation prove to have been in any degree sanguine; for although an alarm of a deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on the 16th of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate examination, that at that time (exclusive of the immense depôt established in the district of Coorga) a quantity of grain remained in camp sufficient to maintain the whole of the fighting men of the army, at half allowance, until the 20th of May; and on the 13th of that month, Major-General Floyd returned to Seringapatam with the large supplies, which had been forwarded from the Carnatic, under the care of Lieutenant-

* The war between England and France lasted for fifteen years, after the fall of Seringapatam. — *Ed.*

Colonels Read and Brown. It may also be useful to remark in this place, that if any accident had protracted the operations of the siege beyond the 4th of May, ample time would still have remained for the reduction of the place previous to the rising of the Cauveri; since the four eldest sons of Tippoo Sultaan, with an escort of 1500 men, and a considerable train of attendants, crossed that river on the 18th of June, on which day the water was nearly as low as on the day of the assault.

Reviewing all these circumstances, your honourable Court will hereafter compare the expense incurred by the movement of the army to Seringapatam, with the probable charges of any other practicable plan of policy, or of military operation; in any view of the subject it will probably appear, that the increase of your revenue and pecuniary resources obtained by the issue of the war, far overbalances the combined expense of the preparations for your defence, and of the operations of the late campaign.

But in addition to this positive indemnification for your expenses, your honourable Court will also consider the augmentation of your commercial and military resources arising from the conquest of Mysore.

Hitherto, all traffic between your subjects or dependants, and those of the late Sultaan has been nearly prohibited, by the restraints to which his hatred of the British Nation, or his ignorance and prejudice had subjected the communication with your possessions. These restraints being removed, and every proper encouragement to commercial intercourse being substituted in their place, it may reasonably be expected that the neighbouring, and now united countries of the Carnatic and Mysore, will mutually consume a considerable portion of their respective productions and manufactures; and that even a proportion of British commodities will soon find a market in Mysore. My information with regard to the articles produced, manufactured, or consumed, in the countries acquired by the Company, and by the Rajah of Mysore, is at present too imperfect to enable me to form any accurate calculation of the imports from the coast of Malabar to Europe; but it appears probable, that your investment in the article of pepper, may soon be augmented to any extent, which you may deem advisable.

Your military resources may be considered to have received a great augmentation, not only from the additional supplies of grain, provisions and cattle, which your connection with Mysore places at your disposal, but from the new channels, which it opens for recruiting the native force, both of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay; under this head may also be considered the superiority of the climate of Mysore, to any in this quarter of India, and the means which it affords of preserving the health and consequent efficiency of European troops.

Highly as I estimate these immediate and direct advantages of revenue, and of commercial and military resources, I consider the recent settlement of Mysore to be equally important to your interests, in its tendency to increase your political consideration and influence among the native powers of India, together with your means of maintaining internal tranquillity and order among your subjects and dependants, and of defending your possessions against any enemy, either Asiatic, or European.

These are principles of substantial and durable security, the operation of which must be felt throughout every part of your possessions, and in every branch of your affairs both in India and Europe.

The balance which it was the policy of the treaty of Seringapatam in 1792, to establish between the native powers of India, was soon deranged by the course of events; our influence in the general scale proved insufficient, not only to maintain peace between our allies, but to check either the rapid decline of their respective resources and strength, or the growing ascendancy of the French faction at Hyderabad, or the systematic machinations of Tippoo Sultaun. Experience has manifested that the power preserved to that infatuated and restless Prince, must always have been thrown into the scale opposed to our interests, and that in no possible combination or conflict of the views of the courts of Poonah, and Hyderabad, could the interposition or neutrality of Tippoo Sultaun become favourable to our security. If he menaced war, or sought alliance with either, or with both those states, his uniform object was our disturbance. If he remained neuter either in their dissensions or union, it was in order to preserve his own strength unimpaired and unembarrassed for that con-

test with ours, which formed the favourite scope of all his views. In no case, has his power been brought into action, or remained at rest, without a hostile design, and an injurious effect upon our influence and consideration. The balance is now in our own hands, we now possess the irresistible power either of concentrating the most efficient part of the resources of Mysore in one mass, for our single defence against any possible combination; or of throwing the same weight into that scale, which shall appear to require such an aid for the preservation of the general tranquillity, on the solid basis of moderation and justice.

If the Nizam or the Mahrattas, notwithstanding their real interest in maintaining the new order of things, should harbour a disposition to disturb it, our means of defence, as well as of offence with regard to both those states, are become so powerful, as well from the advancement and strength of our frontier, as from the other relative considerations already stated in this despatch, that the internal union of all the divided feudatory chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, or even a confederacy between the Peishwa and the Nizam, could no longer be formidable to your possessions; and your honourable Court is apprized, that the first of these events is highly improbable, and the latter nearly impossible—on the other hand, it is evident that, having annihilated the power of Tippoo, no injury can result to us from the interminable feuds of the Mahratta Empire, or from the mutual jealousy of the Peishwa and the Nizam.

The connexion, between the Nizam and the French is entirely dissolved, under circumstances which, I trust, will render its renewal impracticable, at least, for many years.

It is certainly true, that an alliance between the Mahrattas and the French, might prove highly injurious to the British power in India; but it is well known, that whatever may be the disposition of the Mahrattas towards us, it would require a most violent exercise of injustice and oppression, on our part to dispose the suspicious and cautious councils of the Court of Poonah, to favour the progress of a French force in India.

But, although we have nothing to apprehend from the Nizam, or from the Mahrattas, danger may still perhaps be apprehended from an invasion of Oude by Zemaun Shah. I

am not disposed to undervalue this danger, but I am satisfied that it is less formidable now, than it has been at any former time. The loss of such an ally as Tippoo Sultaun, must materially affect the hopes of Zemaun Shah; and it is obvious, that although he should persist in his threatened invasion, our means of repelling it are greatly increased; since the army of Fort St. George, in a case of exigency, might now co-operate against Zemaun Shah with that of Bengal. Even during the late alarm of invasion from Zemaun Shah, (although war with Tippoo Sultaun was apprehended, and 3,000 native volunteers with a considerable force of artillery, had been detached to the coast of Coromandel) we still were able to maintain an army of at least 20,000 men, on the frontier of Oude.

The intrigues of Tippoo Sultaun among the Rajahs inhabiting the coast of Malabar, among the Poligars in the Carnatic, and among every other description of your disaffected or refractory subjects, were the sources of continual commotion within your territories, while the vicinity of the hostile frontier of Mysore, offered refuge and impunity to every offender against your authority, and to every disturber of the public peace. It may reasonably be expected, that the establishment of your influence in Mysore, will operate as a powerful check on the spirit of disorder in your own possessions, and by removing the causes of internal weakness, will enable you to oppose every foreign attack with greater confidence and vigor.

With regard to any danger from the designs of France, it is evident that the probability of her making any effort to disturb the tranquillity of India, will be greatly diminished from the moment that the intelligence of Tippoo Sultaun's fate shall reach Europe. Perhaps it is not too sanguine a view of our situation, to consider the annihilation of the only native ally of France in India, as the final ruin of all her ambitious and vindictive projects against this great source of the wealth and power of Great Britain. The aid and co-operation of some native State must always be indispensably necessary to any European force, in attempting a serious impression on your possessions in India; without such aid, it seems impossible that any European army should be able to advance from the sea-coast, or even to maintain itself wherever it might

land. If however, contrary to every reasonable expectation, France should still persist in her projects against the peace of India, she will have to contend unsupported by the arms, and (what is of more importance) by the resources of any Indian ally, with a British army, animated by recent success, unembarrassed either by any native enemy in Mysore, or by any French faction at Hyderabad, and free to act on any point which France might venture to assail.

Such appear to me to be the consequences of the late settlement, as they relate more immediately to the interests of the Honourable Company; but it will be proper to consider them also as they affect our allies.

Although the advantages offered to the Peishwa by the treaty of Mysore, may not be calculated to satisfy the rapacious character of the Mahratta State, it is reasonable to suppose, that under all the circumstances of the case, they will be received as a distinguished testimony of our amicable disposition towards the Court of Poonah; and that they will tend to appease its characteristic jealousy, if not to conciliate its cordial attachment.

The establishment of an Hindoo State in Mysore, with the restoration of the temples and endowments of that religion, must be grateful to the Government of Poonah, independently of the advantages arising from the substitution of a power of the same religion, and of pacific views, in the place of an odious Mahommedan usurpation, scarcely less hostile to the Mahratta than to the British nation.

With regard to the Nizam, his ambition would also have been more gratified with an arrangement, which should have thrown into his hands a larger share of territory and power; and the distribution of the property captured at Seringapatam, among the British troops and those of his Highness, disappointed his private expectations of appropriating a large portion of that property to his own use. The solid and permanent benefits however, which have resulted to his Highness from the recent improvement of his connection with the Company, and particularly from the new settlement of Mysore, are so obvious and considerable, that they may reasonably be expected to overbalance any temporary disappointment of his avarice or ambition. The existence of his throne was saved by the destruction of the French party at Hyderabad, in October, 1798.

The formidable power of Tippoo Sultaun, which perpetually menaced his Highness's possessions, and filled his Court and dominions with intrigues and treason, has been annihilated, and a friendly and allied state established in Mysore. His Highness has received a large increase of territory, revenue, and power; together with several important fortresses tending greatly to secure the tranquillity of his dominions. His expenses in the war have been inconsiderable; and if a comparison were to be instituted of the advantages accruing to him, and to the Company from the whole arrangement, those obtained by his Highness would probably be found to preponderate; for, the danger from which he has been delivered was even more imminent than that which menaced the Company's possessions; and while his expenses have borne no proportion to ours, he has attained equal benefits both of indemnification and security. The collateral benefits derivable by the Company from its connexion with the Rajah of Mysore, will necessarily extend to the Nizam, and be scarcely less felt by him than by us, while he shall remain faithful to his alliance with the Company; and the advantages which his Highness would receive from the proposed mediation of the Company between him and the Mahratta empire, are highly estimated by all those who understand the interests of the Court of Hyderabad. If that mediation should fail, his Highness will receive an increase of territory beyond the amount of the proportion acquired by the Company, in the general partition; I have the satisfaction to know, that although his Highness's extravagant expectations have not been gratified to the full extent, his most able and experienced counsellors are fully sensible of the extensive and solid benefits acquired by his Highness, under the general operation of the late treaties. I am, therefore, persuaded, that his Highness's just sense of the permanent interests of his state, will command his cordial co-operation in the maintenance of the new settlement.

The interests of the Rajah of Mysore, being identified with those of the Company, and the safety, prosperity, and honor of the Peishwa, and of the Nizam, being amply secured by the treaties of Hyderabad and Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam; I entertain a confident expectation, that the recent settlement of the dominions of

Tippoo Sultaan will prove not less durable, than I trust, it will be found equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English East India Company, and to the just and moderate policy prescribed by parliament, for the Government of the British empire in the East.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXVII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas to the Earl of Mornington.

Wimbledon, 18th March, 1799.

MY DEAR LORD,

Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.

The financial state of our affairs in India, and the arrangement of them in future, will be the subject of official correspondence from the Court of Directors, by some early conveyance; but the present situation of the finances and commerce of India have suggested to my mind many important considerations, which I would think it wrong to withhold from you in the form of a private communication, as the opinions I shall lay before you may probably operate upon your conduct previous to the period when the same opinions may reach you in the more tedious form of despatches through the medium of the Court of Directors. This mode of earlier communication with you is the more necessary, as I am aware some of the opinions which I hold will be the cause of a difference of opinion among the Directors, and must ultimately be settled by the authority of the Board of Control, a form of proceeding necessarily productive of delay.

If there had been the prospect of the war coming to any speedy conclusion, I should not have been uneasy by the circumstance of a very considerable addition of the debt in India, for the purpose of continuing a large investment from an Indian capital, because from the experience I have already had in extricating their affairs under very unpromising circumstances, I should have felt perfectly satisfied that a few years after the return of peace, would have sufficed, speedily,

to wipe off the debt which the mixt exigencies of war and commerce had created. This, however, has its bounds, for if the debt in India is allowed to increase so much as to become unwieldy and unmanageable, we are cut off from the means of extricating our affairs when peace shall have returned. The loans, from being made in times of difficulty, are accomplished at an exorbitant rate of interest, and thereby exhaust the whole of the surplus revenues, which is to operate as the sinking fund for the redemption of the debt after the return of peace. It is the more necessary I should give a particular attention to these considerations, because it is very natural for the Court of Directors to turn their eyes chiefly to the state of their affairs in Leadenhall-street, and both they and the Proprietors are flattered, by the view of sales at home, uncommonly large, and a swelling balance in their coffers at home; while, at the same time, it is obvious to every person who will take a comprehensive view of their affairs, that this flattering delusion, permitted to go on for a very few years, would bring irretrievable ruin upon the finances of India, and totally disable us from maintaining there that pre-eminence of wealth and power which has proved so important to the general interests of the British Empire.

Viewing this subject in all its bearings, I am well aware of the importance of keeping up the means of a large investment from India. This principle is important, not only from the encouragement it affords to the navigation and shipping of the kingdom; from the addition it makes annually to the wealth and capital of the country, and from its being a fruitful source of revenue; but in addition to all these and similar considerations, I must add the necessity of such an investment, as immediately connected with the prosperity of our Indian provinces. *It is to the increased exports from India to Europe, that we are to attribute the increase of Indian prosperity, industry, population, and revenue;* and the manufacturers of that country would be reduced to very deplorable circumstances if any severe check was to be given to the usual investment and exports from India. These considerations necessarily lead to the conclusion of bringing home as large an investment as our means will enable us to do. I see no difficulty in accomplishing this, but it must be done by means of resources which do not lead to the ruin of our

finances in India. The same circumstances which have led to put the whole commerce of the world into the hands of this country, do operate in a proportionable degree to extend beyond the example of all former times, the trade of the East India Company, and the produce of their sales in Leadenhall-street. This ought to be encouraged by every means; but the overflowing balance from thence arising after defraying their necessary burdens at home, ought to be employed in the purchase of bullion, to be consigned to India and China, for the purchase of a large and profitable investment. The times, from the influx of wealth into this country, are highly favourable to such an operation, the beneficial effects of which are obvious in a variety of ways. Your Lordship states, and all the other settlements concur in the same statement, that our Indian possessions are greatly distressed from the want of specie. The measure I have mentioned effectually removes that distress, and is likewise productive of another essential benefit. It is stated that the increase of the loans at so high a rate of interest, checks all private credit, and obstructs all other pecuniary transactions; but this inconvenience would not be found, if the system I have alluded to, was carried into execution.

It is with much satisfaction I observe in some of your Lordship's recent despatches, that you find yourself warranted by the opinions of some of the most intelligent persons upon the spot, that the export of manufactures from this country may be considerably increased. This is certainly the most desirable of all resources for the supply of a commercial investment from India, and it ought to have no limits, except what are prescribed by the power of selling them in India or China.

Another commercial resource, is what can be got in India upon the foundation of the remittance plan. This, I understand, has likewise received a check, in consequence of the high rate of interest paid for the government loans in India; but if these loans are stopped, and the capital of the debt itself considerably diminished each year by the remittance plan, an effectual cure is administered to this inconvenience, and the commercial resources of the Company materially aided, without the necessity of extravagant loans for that purpose.

These are the outlines of the system which, in my opinion, ought to be pursued during the remainder of the war, and as

during its continuance our commerce will remain unbounded, and the wealth of the world continue to be collected here, no inconvenience whatever can arise from the export of bullion to India and China; on the contrary, I understand it would rather be in this point of view, materially convenient. The result, therefore, of what I have stated, is that the investment ought not to be diminished, but kept up at its present standard, and the resources for doing so are,—1st, The surplus revenues in India, after defraying the expense of establishment and the interest of debt. This fund will increase in proportion as the debt is diminished by the plan of remittance. 2ndly, By bills upon the East India Company to the amount of what can be got there, applicable to the reduction of the capital of the debt in India. 3rdly, An increased amount of the export of manufactures from this country, which generally upon an average, has been reckoned for some years past for India, exclusive of China, to amount to about five hundred thousand pounds. And lastly, a remittance of bullion to whatever amount may be necessary, joined to the above mentioned resources, to keep up the usual investments from India.

If this system is adopted, and invariably adhered to, we will be enabled, without any material inconvenience, to continue the war so long as our inveterate enemy shall be disposed, or in a condition to carry on the contest. The many other collateral advantages resulting from such a system, and connected with the prosperity and safety of India, are so obvious, it is unnecessary to trouble your Lordship with detailing them.

Having stated all that appears to be necessary, so far as concerns the finances of India, and the commercial resources of the East India Company, as connected with their finances, I wish now to direct your Lordship's attention to the trade of India, in a more extended point of view.

It is notorious that at no period the capital or commercial powers of the East India Company have been able to embrace the whole, or near the whole of the wealth of India, exported from thence by trade to Europe. This is placed beyond a doubt by a great share of the Indian trade now in the possession of neutral nations, a great part of which rests upon the capital and fortune of the servants of the East India

Company. Your Lordship will recollect that at the time I introduced the proposition for renewing the Charter of the East India Company, I endeavoured to remedy this obvious absurdity by obliging the East India Company to allot a certain proportion of tonnage to the purposes of private trade. They agreed to it with reluctance, and it is so managed as to render the provision almost illusory. I need not enumerate to your Lordship the causes which have rendered it of no avail. They appear in the applications made to the Government of India by the resident traders in India, and are recorded in the correspondence between the Board of Trade and Supreme Council in India, so that they must be perfectly familiar to your Lordship. In truth, there is no remedy for this evil but two—1st, Alluring the trade of India to resort to the port of London, by diminishing the expenses of doing so. The 2nd is, By authorising the Government of India to license the *appropriation of India-built shipping to the purpose of bringing home that Indian trade, which the means and capital of the East India Company is unable to bring home.* The first of those ways will, I trust, be effectuated by the Bill which Mr. Pitt has agreed to introduce for the reduction of the duties upon imports from India, and the second must be accomplished by giving to the Government in India that authority to license India-built shipping, to which I have already alluded.

This last measure will, I take it for granted, undergo much discussion before it can be carried into execution, but it must be carried. The whole weight of the shipping interest will be opposed to such a proposition, under a most false and erroneous idea that it is prejudicial to their interests. Nothing but ignorance of the subject could lead them to entertain such an idea. They made an attempt to accomplish it by inflaming the interests of the ship carpenters in the river Thames, at the time of the general mutiny in the navy. It was an unhandsome proceeding upon their part, and was resisted by me in a letter I then addressed to the principal ship builders in the river. I do not know whether they did not choose to answer it, or whether they found it to be unanswerable; but I never received any reply to it. I have often thought upon the subject since, and the more I have thought upon it, the more I am convinced of the truth of every propo-

sition which that letter contains; I send you a copy of it,* and you may rest assured, that no exertion shall be wanting on my part speedily to introduce into practice the system detailed in that letter.

It has not reached me in any authentic form, but I am credibly informed that your Lordship, upon the application of the resident traders in India, has authorized a number of India-built ships to be taken up, for the purpose of bringing home the surplus trade of India. I hope the information is true, both because it is a measure of much wisdom, and because it will bring the point directly to issue, and you need not be under any apprehension as to the result of it.

Although, from the influence I have stated, there may be a contest in the Court of Directors with regard to the subject last mentioned, I do not believe there will be any material objection offered against any of the other measures I have had occasion to treat of in this letter; indeed, one leading principle has already been acted upon to a considerable extent, for the Court of Directors have already sent out to India, bullion to the amount of £759,226, and they have it in contemplation to send more. In short, I make no doubt of their being induced to send out what is requisite for the accomplishment of the commercial plan, I have detailed in the course of this letter.

I have nothing further to trouble you with at present. It is only necessary for me to remind you, that although the opinions I have laid before you, rest for the present merely upon the footing of a private unofficial communication, I trust they, or the substance of them, will speedily be conveyed to you in due official form.

I remain, my dear Lord,
Your's very faithfully,
HENRY DUNDAS.

* See Appendix.

No. XXVIII.

The Right Hon. Henry Dundas, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, 21st March, 1799.

[Received at Fort William, 5th August, 1799.]

By this conveyance I have troubled your Lordship with a despatch* on the general system of alliance, which we ought to pursue with a view to the security of our Indian possessions, and likewise with a despatch on the subject of our Indian finance and commerce.† In the present letter, I wish to bring under your view a few observations on the interior administration of our different settlements.

On the subject of Bengal, I have much satisfaction in feeling that I have occasion to say very little. The wise system adopted during Lord Cornwallis's administration, and to which I make no doubt you will adhere, leaves me no reason to apprehend any real danger to the wealth and resources of the valuable provinces under your immediate administration. I think, for the last two years I have observed, that the arrears of land revenue were somewhat larger than they used to be; I trust this has been owing to some accident, and not to any defect in the system of permanent security given to the landowners of India. Among the many other important benefits expected to arise from that beneficent plan, a prominent one was the regularity in payment of the stipulated jumma, and nothing has ever occurred to me, or been stated to me which had a tendency to lessen the prospect of that benefit resulting from it. I could not however, refrain from bringing the circumstance to which I have referred, immediately under your view.

As we have limited the extent of land revenue in India, by the measure of a permanent settlement, it has sometimes occurred to me to reflect, that the principles which led to the adoption of that system, naturally opened a prospect of other sources of revenue, in so far as it entitled us to expect an increase of the wealth, industry and population of the country. Every circumstance which has since happened, has led to the conviction that these effects have been produced by it. The increasing produce of the revenue on salt, opium and spirit-

* See Vol. I. p. 608.

† See p. 301.

ous liquors, all tend to corroborate this observation. I wish therefore to direct your attention to consider, and report to me, how far in your opinion, there is, either in the articles I have mentioned, or in any others of a similar nature, any prospect of raising more revenue on articles of general consumption among the natives of India. This can never be attempted but with a perfect consideration to their happiness and content; and I am likewise aware that a people whose wants are very limited and simple, do not present to their Government the same various objects of taxation, which exist in other countries differently circumstanced. It appears however, to be a point worthy your consideration, if possible, at all times to insure a revenue in India, equal to all the exigencies, not only of our expensive establishments, but for the payment of a tribute to this country, through the medium of a beneficial and encreasing commerce.

The circumstance connected with the Government of Bengal, to which one can look with the least confidence is the situation of Oude. I trust the late arrangements made by Lord Teignmouth, may enable your Lordship to give further improvement to this essential part of our system. I have nothing very minute to suggest; all I have to say, is comprehended under two general heads. The first is, a just and pure administration by the Vizier of his own country, in which is comprehended an accurate collection of his real revenues, and an economical expenditure of them. The second is, that he could be induced to keep up an efficient military establishment for the security of his own, and our frontier. This object never can be accomplished, but by dispersing his useless rabble, and forming an army to be kept up and disciplined under our immediate superintendance.

Respecting the affairs of the Coromandel coast, I had so full a communication with you before your departure, it is not necessary to add much more at present. I think for some time past the interior administration of affairs there, have considerably improved. Their revenues are encreasing, their estimates are made with more accuracy, and their accounts are kept much more regularly than they used to be; and I have a perfect reliance on the assiduity, talents and integrity of Lord Clive, that the improvement will be progressive. Our chief difficulties in the administration of the Carnatic,

are, first—the anomalous connection in which we stand with the Nabob of Arcot. Secondly, a similar inconvenience attending the Government of Tanjore. Thirdly, the insubordination and distractions so frequently prevalent in the northern Circars.

The double Government existing in the Carnatic has long been felt as a serious calamity to that country. It enfeebles the natural resources of the country, and above all, tends to continue that system of intrigue and consequent corruption which has been imputed to the Madras Government so much more than to our other settlements. It is singular to remark, that the country of Oude is the other part of India, where the purity of the Company's servants has been most suspected, and that the same circumstance of a double government has always been assigned as the cause. Consistently with our treaties with the Nabob of Arcot, we cannot at present materially meliorate his government, but must wait favourable opportunities, and embrace such means of conciliation and attention to him, as are most likely to accomplish this desirable object. We must lay our account with being at all times obstructed in our views, by that corruption and intrigue to which I have referred. Nothing will counteract it but a pure and steady government, acting instantaneously against any of the Company's servants, who may be detected in those practices. Lord Hobart's administration was characterized by a very laudable spirit in this respect, and you cannot doubt, that the same purity and spirit will actuate the conduct of Lord Clive, who will have the additional advantage of the newly-established judicature to aid him in the punishment of those offenders. I have always thought however much it has been the fashion to clamour against it, that the Supreme Judicature at Calcutta, has had very beneficial effects in preserving the purity of the servants under that presidency.

The affairs of Tanjore are more simple in their nature, and less complicated in their administration. It is exposed in a certain degree, to the same inconveniences which have been injurious to the government of the Carnatic; but from the recent transactions which have taken place there, and from the feelings of gratitude which appear to operate on the mind of the Rajah, I flatter myself he will be inclined more and more, to listen to the admonitions of our government, to whose

power and justice he is indebted for his situation. If those sentiments regulate his conduct, our part is simple and easy; we have nothing to ask of him, but a pure and virtuous administration of the affairs of his country, the effects of which will be equally felt by him and us, in the respective interests we have in the prosperity of Tanjore.

The northern Circars have certainly never produced to us those advantages which the extent of the country, and the fertility of the soil in many parts, entitle us to expect. I know not to what cause to attribute it, but the inhabitants of some of its higher parts seem to be in a state of very uncivilized society, and this can only be gradually removed by a steady, just and vigorous government. We must not too rapidly apply to that part of our possessions the same principles of government, which have been wisely applied to the more civilized Provinces of Bengal. I believe the same observations may to a considerable degree be made, with regard to some parts of the Circars, that I shall immediately bring under your view, with regard to the Malabar Provinces.

From the situation of the countries in our possession, on the Coast of Malabar, they are calculated to be either a great security, or a great annoyance to our power in India; and whether they shall be one or the other, depends much on the manner in which they are managed.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Your's most faithfully,

HENRY DUNDAS.

No. XXIX.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort St. George, 5th August, 1799.

The annual menace of Zemaun Shah's invasion of Hindostan having recently been renewed, I think it necessary to take immediate measures, with a view to impose an effectual check upon the designs of that Prince. Although the zeal and ability which Mehdi Alli Khan has shewn in conducting the negotiations committed to his charge merit commendation, yet he has manifested so much indiscretion throughout his conduct, that I cannot think him a proper person to be entrusted with the sole management of measures of so important

and delicate a nature, as those which I have it in contemplation to adopt at present at the Court of Persia, or eventually at that of Cabul. At the same time, I am far from wishing to subject Mehdi Alli Khan to any disgrace, or even to withhold from him a suitable reward for the services he has rendered; but I think it necessary to apprize you, that with a view to the object before adverted to, I have determined to send a gentleman on an embassy to Baba Khan, and eventually to Zemaun Shah. Mehdi Alli Khan's local knowledge and address may render him useful, and, therefore, I think it advisable that he should be directed to consider himself under the orders of the gentleman who may be deputed. The gentleman whom I have selected for this duty, is Captain John Malcolm, Assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad, in whose abilities, knowledge, activity and integrity I repose the utmost confidence. He will be directed to receive a considerable part of his instructions from you, and will make all his equipments at Bombay, whither he will proceed in the course of a few days.

As I expect the best effects from the mere promulgation of this measure, I have resolved to make the embassy quite public. Upon the whole of this subject, it is my intention to write to you more particularly hereafter.

I am, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXX.

Spencer Smith, Esq. to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Constantinople, 24th August, 1799.

I am too much flattered by your Lordship's reception of my past correspondence, and assurances of reciprocity, not to endeavour to cultivate a commerce, of which the balance must be so vastly to my advantage. It is not, however, easy for me to find a moment free from interruption for private scribbling, in a climate which has rendered me a valetudinarian, and at a post where I have more than enough to do was I in health; your Lordship will therefore appreciate the goodness of my intentions accordingly.

What I have done in point of political cooperation, is suffi-

ciently stated in my correspondence with the Presidency of Bombay for me to pass that topic over here; as indeed I may such articles of public intelligence as enter into my letters to Mr. Manesty, which of course reach you by *ricochet*.

I have just received most interesting letters of about a month old from Sir William Hamilton and Lord Nelson, who, with the King of the *two* Sicilies (as he is become again) and Mr. Acton, were all together on board the *Foudroyant* in the Bay of Naples, settling the new government.

The Admiral arrived there most fortunately in time to annul a disgraceful treaty on foot between the enemy and Cardinal Ruffo, and to save the King's honour by rejecting with disdain any terms but unconditional submission within a very limited number of hours on the part of rebels. So that while the French in the castle of St. Elmo were enticed by a decent capitulation (which I forward to Bussora) the rebels in the castles *Nuovo* and *dell' Uoro* came out without any honours; the principals were seized, and conducted on board the ships of the squadron, and their accomplices confined in fourteen transports under our guns. And thus *John Bull* fights almost alone on one element for the common cause, and recovers kingdoms for sovereigns, who by following half measures have been kicked out of them by a set of thieves.

An express was just arrived (on 25th past) at Naples from Tuscany, Mr. Wyndham was returned to Florence, and that once happy country was again free from French tyranny, as well as Lucca. F. M. Sowwarof, after beating Messieurs Macdonald, Moreau, and Co., on the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th, was advancing to Genoa. Mantua surrendered on or about the 25th. The Arch Duke Charles was at Zurich, with his *left* communicating with the Field Marshal's *right* over the Alps, whose summit between *Bernard* and *Gothard* was occupied by a central army under General Bellegarde, aiming at turning Massena by the *Valais*, and Mont Blanc.

So much for *terrafirma*. In the Mediterranean, Lord St. Vincent, laying with a single ship of the line at Gibraltar, has had the mortification of seeing the combined fleets, 61 sail of the line, pass him to the westward on the 9th past, and only able to precede them by a privateer 24 hours to Portugal, and by another privateer who met Lord Keith with 35 sail off Ivica on the 14th, who immediately set out after them.

My brother, after the siege of Acre, and revictualling at Cyprus, returned to the coast of Egypt on the 18th of July, just in time to throw himself into the castle of *Aboukir*, which the Turks had stormed on the 16th, where he was preparing for a second edition (but rather more offensive) of his herculean labours in Syria.

The siege of Acre forms such an epocha in the annals of these times, that I regret my want of leisure to keep pace with events, and give that heroic achievement a more distinct place in my historical correspondence, far independent of my fraternal feelings upon that point. No one as a minister and a man can better judge of its salutary influence in the common cause. Had Acre fallen, Constantinople would have tottered; Vienna felt the shock, and Europe, as Buonaparte himself elegantly expresses it, "*prix par les reins.*"

I have the honour to be,

My dear Lord,

your faithful Servant,

SPENCER SMITH.

No. XXXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort St. George, Sept. 3d, 1799.

Since the date of my last separate letter to your Honourable Court of the 3d of August,* few occurrences have happened of sufficient importance to be communicated by the present despatch. But as a considerable part of the army still remains in Mysore, and as some detachments of it have been actively employed, notwithstanding the happy termination of the war, it may not be unacceptable to you that I should review the cause and nature of the operations in which the army has been engaged since the date of my last letter.

It might have been expected that, in the complete settlement of Mysore, some difficulties would arise from the attempts of the various Poligars and others who had been

* See p. 72.

dispossessed by Hyder Ali Khan and Tippoo Sultaun. The early settlement of the country, however, has not been materially delayed by any resistance of this nature. It has, however, been somewhat impeded by the endeavours of a few of the commandants of the principal fortresses to obtain an unreasonable price for their submission, and of others to favour (by a demonstration of an intention to resist) their retreat with the plunder which they had found means to collect. It is to be imputed to one of these causes that the Fort of Gurumcondah did not surrender to the British detachment by which it was surrounded on behalf of the Nizam, until it had been seriously threatened; and that Lieut.-Colonel Bowser was actually obliged to breach one of the lower walls of the fortress of Gooty before his Highness' garrison was admitted. The refusal of the Kelladar of Jemaulabad (the only place of considerable strength in Canara) to submit to the British Government is to be imputed to a similar cause; but that place will certainly be reduced as soon as the state of the season in Canara will admit of the march of a sufficient force against it; an event which may be expected to have taken place within the course of the month of August.

The only impediment of any importance to the speedy and quiet settlement of the whole of the country assigned to the Rajah of Mysore by the partition treaty, has proceeded from some disturbances which have arisen in the province of Bednore, but which are now happily quelled.

A partizan of the name of Dhoondia, originally in the service of the Patan State of Savanore (or Shanoor) having committed various depredations on the territories of Tippoo Sultaun, had incurred the resentment of that Prince. Tippoo Sultaun having contrived to secure the person of Dhoondia, compelled him to conform to the Mahomedan faith, and afterwards employed him in military service; but, either detecting him in some treacherous projects, or suspecting his fidelity, the Sultaun confined him in irons at Seringapatam some time previous to the commencement of the late war. From this situation he was released, together with several other prisoners, by the inconsiderate humanity of the British troops on the 4th of May. He immediately fled from Seringapatam, and being joined by a few of the Sillahdar cavalry of Tippoo Sultaun's disbanded army, took the direction of Bed-

nore, in his way to which province his force received some augmentation, some of the principal Asophs and Killadars in Bednore betrayed their trusts to him; and in this manner many of the principal places of the district had fallen into his hands before it was in the power of Lieut.-General Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him. In the mean while Dhoondia, had laid the rich country of Bednore under severe contributions, which he exacted with the most unrelenting cruelty, perpetrating throughout the province the most atrocious acts of rapine and murder.

At length a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James Dalrymple of the Madras establishment, moved against Dhoondia from Chitteldroog on the 21st of July, and overtook a party of his banditti, consisting of about 250 horse and 400 infantry. The shocking cruelties which these plunderers had recently committed rendered it necessary to make a severe example; it was, therefore, determined to refuse them quarter, for the purpose of deterring others from similar enormities.

Dhoondia having crossed the Tungbuddra, Hurrlyhur, a fort on the eastern bank of that river, was taken on the 30th of July by a division of Colonel Dalrymple's detachment.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple attacked this banditti on one side, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Bednore in another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of native cavalry and infantry. On the 31st of July Colonel Stevenson crossed the Tungbuddra, and advancing against Simoga, took that place by assault on the 8th of August. On the same day the fort of Hoornelly, situated on the western bank of the Tungbuddra, was taken in the same manner by the detachment under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple.

Both detachments having now effected the passage of the Tungbuddra, it was determined to make a combined attack on the camp of Dhoondia, which occupied a strong position near the town and fort of Shikarpoor. Accordingly Lieut.-Colonel Dalrymple, on the 17th of August, charged Dhoondia's cavalry, and drove them with considerable loss into a river situated in their rear. Our infantry at the same time attacked the fort of Shikarpoor, and carried it by assault;

Dhoondia escaped by means of a boat prepared for the occasion.

Colonel Stevenson (the progress of whose detachment had been impeded by difficult roads) now arrived and assumed, as senior officer, the command of the united detachments, and immediately pursued Dhoondia so closely as to compel him to take refuge in the Mahratta territory, within the limits of which Colonel Stevenson, on the 20th of August, saw him encamp with the remnant of his banditti, which it would have been easy for Colonel Stevenson to have taken or destroyed had he been at liberty to pass beyond the boundary of the Mahratta dominion. But my particular orders having strictly prohibited any violation of the frontier of the Mahratta empire, Colonel Stevenson, with great judgment and discretion, halted his army on the line of the boundary, and signified to the Mahratta officer of the adjoining district that the respect of the British Government for the rights of the Mahratta State precluded the further progress of their army.

As Dhoondia had, on several occasions, by acts of robbery and murder, rendered himself extremely obnoxious to the Mahrattas, there is no danger of their affording him an asylum in opposition to the remonstrances of the British Government; and I have received accounts from Colonel Stevenson that Dhoondia Punt Ghoklah, a chief commanding a division of the Peishwa's army, had plundered Dhoondia's camp within a few hours after it had been pitched within the territory of the Mahrattas, had carried away all his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns, and entirely deprived him of the means of future depredation. The province of Bednore will be completely delivered from the banditti which had acted under Dhoondia's command, for, although they continued to retain some posts in the country at the period of his flight, those posts will certainly be evacuated on the approach of the British troops.

I think it my duty to request the particular attention of your Honourable Court to the judicious and spirited conduct displayed during the late operations against Dhoondia, as well by Colonel Stevenson as by Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple; and I am persuaded it will be satisfactory to your Honourable

Court to observe the great activity and energy which has marked this movement of the troops within so short a period after their late brilliant successes, and in the midst of a season of the year which has hitherto been supposed to render military operations impracticable.

Lieutenant-General Harris, with the main body of the army, had advanced to the eastern bank of the Tungbuddra to the support of the detachments under Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Dalrymple. Judging, however, that it was no longer necessary after the dispersion of Dhoondia's followers, and after the flight of their leader, to detain the army in Mysore he immediately determined to form the subsidiary detachment for the permanent protection of Mysore, and to recal the remainder of the forces into the Carnatic. Having made his arrangements for this purpose, and left the honourable Colonel Wellesley in command of the troops which are to remain in Mysore, General Harris quitted the army on the 25th of August at Hoonelly, and arrived here on the 30th following. I am now occupied with him in making the necessary arrangements for the general distribution of the troops into garrison and cantonments.

I have availed myself of the opportunity of my residence at this Presidency to enter into the consideration of various branches of its internal Government, and it is my intention, with the assistance of Lord Clive, to take early measures for the improvement of the administration of your affairs in this quarter.

As I was on the point of closing this despatch, accounts reached me from the army in Mysore, purporting that the fortress of Bednore, and every other place of any consequence in that province, were in the possession of the Company's troops, and that tranquillity was every where established.

I have the honour to be, honourable Sirs,
 with the greatest respect,
 your most obedient and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poonah.

SIR,

Fort William, Sept. 16th, 1799.

I received your letter of the 28th of August on my arrival yesterday at this Presidency.

It would be useless to speculate on the probable motives which have governed the conduct of the Peishwa in the course of the late negotiation. I shall content myself for the present with observing, that I have from the commencement of it entertained considerable doubts of his sincerity.

I desire you will immediately inform the Peishwa and Nana Furnavese that I consider all negotiation on the basis of the treaty of Mysore to be concluded; but that, although I deeply regret his Highness's rejection of an arrangement, which had no other object than the improvement of the friendship and alliance subsisting between the three States, and which was at least as much calculated to promote the interests of the Peishwa as those of the Company and the Nizam, I do not feel any diminution of my amicable disposition towards his Highness.

You will further apprise the Court of Poonah that, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the Company's Government will proceed immediately, in concert with his Highness the Nizam, to a division of the reserved territory, I rely with confidence that his Highness will take effectual means to prevent any of the officers of his Government from attempting to interrupt, in any degree, the execution of this measure; and that he will compel them to respect the rights of the Company and the Nizam in their recent acquisitions on the side of the Mahratta frontier, with the same solicitude which the Company's Government invariably manifests to respect the rights of all its neighbours.

You will also inform the Peishwa that, although he has not thought proper to accede to the treaty of Mysore, I am not on that account less confident that he will perceive the necessity and propriety of causing all his subjects, of every description, to abstain, with the utmost care, from trespassing in any manner on the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. The

Peishwa is already generally apprized of the union of interests subsisting between the Company and that Rajah: but it may be proper to inform him further, that the Company are bound to defend the Rajah's territories against all powers without exception.

While I wish you to continue to cultivate the best possible understanding with the Court of Poonah, I must desire you to refrain carefully from any interference in the disputes which are now likely to be revived between Bajee Rao and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You are never either to invite or encourage any renewal of the late negotiation; but to reply to every attempt of that nature, that your instructions permit you merely to transmit to me any propositions of that tendency which may be made to you.

I am, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIII.

General Order—Public Department.

Fort William, 17th September, 1799.

The Governor-General has great satisfaction in resuming his seat in Council at this presidency in recording his sense of the zealous co-operation which he experienced during his absence, from his Excellency the Honourable the Vice-president in council, in the prosecution of the late war against Tippoo Sultaun, and particularly in the prompt despatch of the extensive and important supplies of money, grain, and other Articles which were required from Bengal for the use of the army destined to act against Mysore.

No. XXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 22nd September, 1799.

I embarked from Fort St. George on the 5th instant, and arrived here on the 14th following, after a pleasant and favourable passage.

At the time of my departure from Fort St. George the

state of affairs in Mysore was perfectly satisfactory. General Harris had arrived at the Presidency from the army to the charge of which Colonel Wellesley had succeeded.

Soon after my arrival at this place I learned from Poonah the failure of the negotiation which I had directed to be opened with the Peishwa on the basis of the partition Treaty of Mysore. It was broken off ostensibly upon the article respecting the exclusion of foreigners from the service and dominions of the Peishwa; to this article the Peishwa would not assent, excepting under limitations, which would have defeated my object in the stipulation. I am not satisfied that the ostensible was the real cause of the failure of the treaty; I suspect either that the Peishwa has been insincere throughout the negotiation, or that Scindiah has contrived to influence the Peishwa against the measure. In consequence of this event I have adopted immediate measures for dividing the reserved territory between the Company and the Nizam conformably to the stipulations of the 2nd separate article of the treaty of Mysore.

Although this issue of the late negotiation is unfavourable to my design of acquiring such an influence at the Court of Poonah as should enable me effectually to hold the balance between the Peishwa and the Nizam, I apprehend no other serious disadvantage from it. The Peishwa will probably regret the loss of a considerable territory which he might have acquired on terms, not only moderate and just, but highly beneficial to him; and he will view with jealousy the transfer of that territory to the hands of the Company and of the Nizam. But however his perverse temper may incline him to overlook the reason or justice of the question between us, the consciousness of his own weakness, and of our strength, affords us ample security against any rupture with the State of Poonah on this occasion. I consider the same argument to be equally applicable to the probable conduct of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Before my departure for Fort St. George I had placed the affairs of Tanjore in such a train as will lead, I trust, to a speedy and favourable settlement. I left in Lord Clive's hands my plan of a new arrangement in the form of a treaty,* which was to be immediately proposed to the

* See Appendix.

Rajah. The leading principle and object of this treaty is to secure an ample provision for the Rajah, and to vest the government of the country exclusively in the Company.

I ordered the preliminary steps towards the introduction of a system of judicature and definite settlement of revenue into the Company's possessions on the coast, and into the ceded and conquered districts to be taken at Fort St. George; and I am now employed in forming the details of the plan which I hope to transmit to Fort St. George in the course of a few weeks.

Vizier Ali having effected his escape to Jynagur, has been placed under personal restraint at my desire, by the Rajah of that place, who, I hope, will soon deliver the assassin into my hands.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that I have received accounts which seem entitled to credit, that Zemaun Shah has been under the necessity of moving towards Herat for the purpose of defending his dominions against the revolt of his brother Mahomed Shah, and an invasion threatened from Persia. This danger the mission of Captain Malcolm to the court of Baba Khan, will, I trust, serve to confirm and augment; and in the meanwhile I hope to be able to effect such a reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments as shall afford us a reasonable degree of security against any future attempts which may be made by the Shah to disturb the peace of India. I have already commenced my operations at Lucknow for this purpose with a fair prospect of success.

Before I left Madras the finances of that presidency had reached a point of prosperity, unexampled at that presidency since 1793; and I have now the satisfaction to inform you that the condition of the finances of Bengal, notwithstanding the heavy demands to which our resources have been subjected, is daily improving.

I remain, my dear Sir, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXV.

Major-General Sir J. H. Craig to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Cawnpore, 25th September, 1799.

I beg to offer to your Lordship my compliments of congratulation on your safe return to the Presidency.

The services that have been rendered to the national interests in these parts by the decided energy of your Lordship's administration, are too conspicuous not to be acknowledged by all, while the benefits derived from them are of too solid a nature not to inspire a general sense of gratitude in the public mind, and the testimonies of their sentiments, which will no doubt be offered to your Lordship, have certainly never stood upon a fairer foundation than upon this occasion.

Amongst others, I find that it has not been uncustomary for the officers at the different stations in this country to offer their sentiments by a public address, and I see by the public papers that one of my colleagues in command has already stood forward in the present instance. I am ignorant how far the example may have been followed by other stations; but I think myself called on to request of your Lordship, that if the station under my command is apparently backward upon the occasion, your Lordship will not attribute it to our not joining most cordially in the general sense of admiration and gratitude, or to our not feeling every inclination to manifest our respectful attention to your Lordship, by means that we conceive to be proper in our situation.

The truth is, that I have had so many occasions of very publicly expressing my decided opinion on this subject, (and that long before it would be foreseen that an occasion would so soon occur, which if any occasion can do so, would warrant the practice,) that I imagine no one here will think it a proper step to propose it. My idea is, that military addresses are highly improper in every point of view. If we assume the right of expressing our approbation of the conduct of our superiors, we have at all times equally the power of marking our disapprobation at least by withholding any testimony of the former sentiment; and from thus passing

our judgment on the actions of those with whom the direction of the affairs of Government rests. I should think it not improbable, at last, that we might be brought to think that we could manage them better ourselves.

But, exclusive of the impropriety and indecency of this assumption towards our superiors, and not adverting to the danger to which I have alluded, and which must, at least, be looked upon as possible I confess, my Lord, that being entirely a soldier of the old-school, I cannot but consider all deliberation in any public assembly of an army, as subversive of every idea of discipline and subordination. If I call together the officers under my command, and submit a proposition to their consideration, it is inconsistent with every notion of justice that they should not enjoy full liberty of discussion, and I should feel extremely mortified, and should consider myself as having voluntarily stepped into a situation highly unbecoming my station, and equally militating against my duty to the service were I to find myself involved in a political opposition with some of the unthinking, hot-headed boys which abound in every army.

This opinion of mine, in relation to the propriety of officers as such, in a body, expressing their sentiments on public occasions, is very well known here, and it is supported by all the old and respectable officers, who view the subject precisely in the same light that I do. It is indeed on their account, my Lord, that I take the liberty of intruding the subject on your Lordship. My own sentiments I trust your Lordship will do justice to, but I am anxious that your Lordship should know that it is solely on grounds of what they conceive to be their duty, that the higher ranks of the officers of the station under my command think themselves obliged to abstain from offering any public testimony of what they individually feel on the occasion.

I have the honour to be

Your Lordship's most faithful

and obedient humble servant,

J. H. CRAIG.

No. XXXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY DEAR LORD,

October 2, 1799.

The latest intelligence from Mysore indicates a disposition on the part of Purseram Bhow to form a closer connexion with the English authorities in that country than appears to be necessary for the mere purpose of cultivating that degree of good understanding which it is expedient to maintain with all contiguous states.

The general character, recent condition, and actual situation of Purseram Bhow, combined with the distracted situation of the Mahratta Empire render it extremely probable that this ambitious chieftain should be desirous of strengthening his political position by obtaining the countenance and support of the British government unexpectedly established on the borders of his territory.

Although I am not satisfied either with the particular conduct of Bajee Row, or with the general system of Mahratta affairs; and although the course of events might render the active friendship of Purseram Bhow useful, our national character and policy, require that we should discourage any advances from feudatories of the Mahratta Empire of a nature hostile to the Peishwa's authority.

Your Lordships will perceive that this degree of reserve will not preclude such an intercourse between our officers, civil and military, in Mysore, and those of the bordering Mahratta States (whether Purseram Bhow or any other) as may appear necessary to the maintenance of good understanding, and useful in the adjustment of those differences which frequently arise upon the borders of contiguous states. In confining our correspondence with the officers of the several Mahratta powers within these limits, my object is to avoid any step which might furnish a just ground of jealousy to the Peishwa, and at the same time to preserve such a degree of communication with his feudal chiefs on the borders as may be occasionally improved to any extent which we may find expedient.

Although the apparent disposition of the persons in authority at the Mahratta frontier at present affords a reasonable hope

that they will not countenance any violation of the territories of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore, it is proper to provide against the contingency of a change of their disposition. With this view it is necessary that orders should be sent to the officer commanding in Mysore to repel any such violation of territory in the most prompt and decisive manner. Severe and instant chastisement applied, in the first instance of any acts of aggression and plunder within the borders, or those of the Rajah, will have the salutary effect of deterring the Mahrattas from the habitual indulgence of their predatory disposition. We must cautiously avoid all offence, and religiously respect the Mahratta frontier; but if any party of Mahrattas should be found in arms acting within the limits which I have described they must be punished on the spot, without waiting for any reference to your Lordship or to me.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to Major-General Sir J. H. Craig.

SIR,

Fort William, 9th October, 1799.

I return you many thanks for your obliging letter of the 25th of September.*

Your sentiments with regard to our late happy successes, your just view of the principles of military discipline, and the correct boundary which you have drawn between the individual feelings of the officers, and the collective duties of the army on the present occasion, afford me the most sincere satisfaction.

The natural desire of honourable distinction, and the sense of public character have disposed me to receive with gratitude and pleasure, the testimonies of uninfluenced and unsolicited good-will, which have been presented to me by the British inhabitants of Madras and Bombay, and by the British and Native inhabitants of Calcutta. The favourable sentiments

* See page 122.

of the army bear an estimation in my opinion proportioned to my great respect for that body; but I entirely concur with you in the danger of admitting any army in its military capacity, to the exercise of any share of a deliberative voice in political affairs. Military addresses, even on subjects immediately connected with the interests of the army, are unnecessary and irregular; the rules of the service having prescribed established channels through which the interests of the whole, or of any branch of the army may at all times be conveyed to the civil power, without injury to that freedom of judgment which, over the affairs of the army is essential to the maintenance of public order.

With these sentiments, it would be criminal in me, for my personal gratification, to countenance in my own instance a practice which my own conscientious judgment condemns, as tending to produce insubordination in the army, and confusion in the State.

It has therefore given me particular pleasure to learn from the Commander-in-Chief, that he has prevented several complimentary addresses of different stations of the army from reaching me; and I have already returned him my thanks for having anticipated my wishes on a subject of such delicacy and importance.

My acknowledgments are equally due to your judicious conduct on the present occasion, and I have the honour to assure you, that the continuance of your zealous and able exertions to restore and improve the discipline of that part of the army placed under your command, will always be the most acceptable pledge which you can offer to me, of your personal approbation and esteem. Your public conduct and that of the higher ranks of the officers at Cawnpore, as stated in your letter of the 25th, render your individual sentiments on the late transactions additionally valuable to me; and I shall always reflect with pride and satisfaction, that my endeavours in the discharge of my duty towards my country, have been approved by persons who have manifested so just a discrimination of the genuine principles, on which that duty is founded. I am happy to learn from your authority, the beneficial effects which have been produced in the vicinity of your station, by the prosperous settlement of Mysore. I have every reason to believe, that the same effects have been ex-

tended to every part of India, in which the nature of our cause, and the splendour of our triumph have been understood. You will be glad to hear, that I have been able to garrison Goa with British troops; this arrangement took place on the 6th of September; and I trust it will effectually secure our new acquisitions against any possible disturbance either foreign or domestic.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXVIII.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, October 25th, 1799.

I have great satisfaction in informing you, that in consequence of a negociation which I had opened with the Government of Goa, a detachment of British troops, consisting of about eleven hundred rank and file, (furnished by H. M's. 75th 77th, and 84th Regts.) under the command of Colonel Sir William Clarke, was admitted into that place on the 6th of September, with every demonstration on the part of His Excellency the Governor and Captain-General, of the most perfect cordiality and the most distinguished attention.

The importance of providing in the most effectual manner for the safety of Goa, was strongly impressed on my mind as early as the month of July, 1798, at which time I entered on the consideration of the measures which might eventually be adopted for that important purpose. My anxiety on this subject was increased considerably, by the subsequent establishment of the French in Egypt. The extensive preparations however, which became indispensable in consequence of that event, combined with the hostile proceedings of Tippoo Sultaun, would have precluded the possibility of my furnishing a force for the special protection of Goa, even if I had been certain of the disposition of the Portuguese Government to receive it. Under these circumstances, I deemed it useless to commence any formal negociation on the subject; determining however to make an attempt to place a British garrison in Goa, on the first favourable occasion which should occur.

Immediately, after the fall of Seringapatam, I lost no time in adopting the measures necessary to the accomplishment of an object, rendered considerably more urgent by the discoveries which followed the conquest of Mysore, and which are already before your Honourable Committee in the papers found at Seringapatam.*

I selected Mr. Uthhoff, (one of the Commissioners in Malabar,) for the office of Envoy to the Government of Goa, and his conduct, in the course of this important and delicate transaction will, I am persuaded, obtain the approbation of your honourable Committee.

The question respecting the payment of the British troops, employed in defence of Goa, has been agreed to be referred to the respective Governments of Great Britain and Portugal, in Europe. In the meanwhile, care will be taken to keep the accounts of the expenses of those troops, in a regular and separate form.

I have in the same manner proposed to His Excellency the Governor of Goa, to submit to the decision of our respective Governments in Europe, certain claims which are advanced by the Government of Goa, to a part of the territory of Canara, recently conquered by our arms, and secured to us by the treaty of Mysore.

The details of all these proceedings will be transmitted to your honourable Committee, by the Government of Fort St. George.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XXXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, 24th October, 1799.

My despatch of this date to the Secret Committee will apprise you of the success which has attended the measures which I directed Mr. Duncan and Mr. Uthhoff to take with a view to the important object of establishing a British garrison at Goa.

* Vol. I. Appendix, p. 711.—Letter from Tippoo, to the French Directory, and note of demands by Tippoo's Ambassadors.

It is my intention to augment that garrison without delay, but even at present it is sufficient to secure us against any possible attempt of an European enemy in that quarter, it will also operate as an effectual check upon the Mahrattas. You are already informed of my opinions with regard to the importance of the possession of Goa to our security and interests in every point of view; and I should hope that the present might prove a favourable opportunity for accomplishing the great advantage of obtaining the cession of Goa either to the crown or to the Company in exchange either for Malacca or the Spice Islands, or for some equivalent pecuniary compensation. It appears to me, that the attempt to obtain this cession ought not to be delayed, and as I know you concur with me in my estimate of its value, I rely on you that the negotiation with the Court of Lisbon will be immediately opened.

The claims of Portugal to any part of the Canarese dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun are so obviously weak, that I do not think it necessary to trouble you further on that subject than to request you to advert to the length of time during which the places claimed by the Portuguese have belonged to the State of Mysore, and to the nature of the conquest which brought them under our power. The Governor and Captain General's pretensions to be considered as an Ally in the late war, appear to be founded principally on the share which his Excellency bore in issuing an order for a royal salute to be fired from Fort Alguada on the occasion of the fall of Seringapatam, and of the death of Tippoo Sultaun. Although this claim is certainly more powerful than any which can be alleged by his Highness the Peishwa, I do not expect that, in the most liberal construction, this meritorious effort of forward and active zeal of his Excellency the Governor and Captain-General will be deemed to entitle her most faithful Majesty to any portion of our conquests. Even if the principle could be applied to cases of alliance in war, I doubt whether any degree of promptitude and alacrity manifested in rejoicing over the destruction of our late enemy, could justify a claim on the part of the Governor and Captain General to the rights of an accessory after the fact.

The general aspect of affairs becomes every day more favourable in Mysore, the whole of the country is now re-

duced to our authority and to that of the Rajah and Nizam; and a seasonable fall of rain affords a prospect, that even in this year we may realize no inconsiderable part of our new revenue and subsidy without injury to the country.

With regard to the Court of Hyderabad, its temper returns, and with it the establishment of an additional regiment of cavalry to the subsidiary force will soon be admitted. The Court of Poonah continues in the same state of weakness and confusion, and the distractions of the Mahratta empire have recently been aggravated by hostilities which have broken out between the Rajah of Kolapore and Purseram Bhow. The latter is stated (by accounts which appear credible) to have fallen in an engagement with the former. Upon the whole no apprehension appears to me justifiable by the actual state of the Mahratta empire. For the present I have been compelled by the perverseness of the Peishwa's disposition to proceed to carry the second separate article of the Treaty of Mysore into effect; but I shall anxiously watch any opportunity of renewing my proposals at Poonah on their original basis; and I do not yet despair of success.

At Fort St. George the whole state of affairs is astonishingly improved, and I am perfectly satisfied with the present course of that government. You will soon receive my new Treaty* with the Rajah of Tanjore, vesting the whole administration of his government and revenues in the Company. You will also, I trust, learn the success of the steps which I had ordered for disarming the Southern Polygars, who had begun to revolt even during the short period of the late war. We are now employed in framing a code for the introduction of a permanent settlement of revenue, and a system of judicature for the Company's possessions in the Peninsula, I have ordered two members of the board of revenue to proceed immediately from Madras to Calcutta for the purpose of aiding in this salutary work: and I trust that its benefits will be extended in a short time over the whole of the northern Circars, the Jaghire, the countries under the Company's dominion ceded in the last war, and those conquered in this (with the exception of Malabar and Canara) the countries of

the Southern, Eastern and Western Polygars, and the kingdom of Tanjore.

I found Bengal and the provinces in a state of profound tranquillity; the effect of our success in Mysore has utterly annihilated the spirit of insubordination and contempt which for some time past has been gaining ground among our Mahomedan subjects. I have commenced a negotiation with the Nabob Vizier for the reform of his military establishments. The resident with Scindia has proceeded to Jynagur, in order to receive from the Rajah the person of Vizier Alli. I shall soon write to you in detail on the state of our courts of justice, of the revenue and general finance, and of our commercial interests. With respect to finance I shall only say, that great and unprecedented as the effort has been which I was compelled to make within the last, and must make within the present year, our resources have corresponded with the exigency of the occasion, and public and private credit have improved to an astonishing degree, and are still progressively improving.

I think it necessary to apprise you of my intention to adopt without delay a plan for the improvement of the civil service at Bengal in a most important point. The state of the administration of justice, and even of the collection of revenue throughout the provinces affords a painful example of the inefficacy of the best code of laws to secure the happiness of the people, unless due provision has been made to ensure a proper supply of men qualified to administer those laws in their different branches and departments. This evil is felt severely in every part of this government, and it arises principally from a defect at the source and fountain-head of the service—I mean the education and early habits of the young gentlemen sent hither in the capacity of writers. My opinion, after full deliberation on the subject is decided, that the writers, on their first arrival in India should be subjected for a period of two or three years to the rules and discipline of some collegiate institution at the seat of government. In such an institution they might attain the groundwork of the several native languages necessary for their respective stations, together with the principles of general law, those of the Mahomedan and Hindoo Codes, and the voluminous regulations enacted by the Governor-General in Council for the ad-

ministration of justice in Bengal and the provinces; other branches of knowledge, also, suitable to their intended duties might be acquired, and habits of activity, regularity and decency formed instead of those of sloth, indolence, low debauchery, and vulgarity now too apt to grow on those young men, who have been sent at an early age into the interior parts of the country, and have laid the foundations of their life and manners among the coarse vices and indulgencies of those countries. I shall not pursue this topic further at present, intending to make it the subject of ample discussion at an early period. But I now wish to inform you that I feel the mischief to be so pressing, that I intend, without waiting for orders from home, to proceed to found such an institution at Calcutta. I have already taken some steps towards the measure, and I hope to be able to carry my plan into effect with little (if any) additional charge to the company.

I rely on your active and zealous support of this arrangement, in which I feel the greatest interest.

Ever, my dear Sir,
Yours sincerely and affectionately,
MORNINGTON.

No. XL.

The Earl of Mornington to his Excellency the Vizier of Oude.

Fort William, 5th November, 1799.

Some days have elapsed since I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, wherein your Excellency, after observing "that the benefits even both immediate and future, of a reform of your military establishment, are even more strongly impressed on your Excellency's mind than they were described by me," assures me that you would, "without a moment's delay, consult with Colonel Scott upon what was practicable and what occurred to your Excellency's mind, and communicate to me what should be conjointly determined upon as advisable."

From the period of my receiving this letter, I have anxiously expected to learn from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott that your

Excellency, in conformity to your promise, and in pursuance of the suggestions of your own discernment, had entered fully and unreservedly with that gentleman upon the discussion of this urgent and important business. But although this expectation has been hitherto disappointed, such is my confidence in the punctuality and prudence of your Excellency, that I continue to be firmly persuaded that I shall soon have the satisfaction of learning from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott that considerable progress has been made in the new arrangement.

The general considerations which render it extremely necessary that this arrangement should be carried into execution without delay, have been already fully explained to your Excellency, and you have concurred with me in my views on the subject. One argument in favour of a speedy determination on this subject, possibly may not have occurred to your mind, and I, therefore, take this occasion explicitly to state it to your Excellency.

The Company are bound by existing treaties "to defend the dominions of your Excellency against all enemies;" but the number of British troops ordinarily stationed in your Excellency's dominions not exceeding 13,000 men, would not, it is obvious, be adequate to that purpose in the event of an invasion of those dominions; while, on the other hand, it must be evident to your Excellency, that various circumstances in such an event might render it impossible for the Company's Government to augment the ordinary force, either to the extent or within the time required by the emergency. The probable result of such a situation of things requires no explanation to a person of your Excellency's penetration.

If this danger were even remote and doubtful, it would behove a prudent government to guard against it by seasonable precautions. What then must be your Excellency's duty and mine when that danger certainly menaces your dominions? Of the hostile intentions of Zemaun Shah against your Excellency's possessions no doubt can be entertained, since the discoveries made at Seringapatam. Whether these intentions will be carried into effect at a more early or more distant day, may be a question; but it is the part of wisdom to preclude the possibility of their success. But Zemaun Shah is not, perhaps, the only power against whose restless and unprincipled ambition your Excellency should be protected,

other enemies may arise in other quarters, and it becomes you to provide against every contingency.

It might not be in the power of the British Government, on a sudden emergency, to reinforce the troops in your Excellency's country with sufficient expedition; my firm opinion, therefore, is that the Company can in no other manner effectually fulfil their engagements "to defend the dominions of your Excellency against all enemies," than by maintaining constantly in those dominions such a force as shall at all times be adequate to your effectual protection, independently of any reinforcement which the exigency might otherwise require, but which might not be disposable in proper season.

The Seventh Article of the Treaty with your Excellency, by Sir John Shore, provides for the occasional augmentation of the Company's troops in your Excellency's dominions in terms which evidently render the Company's Government competent to decide at all times on the requisite amount of such augmentation. The same article binds your Excellency to defray the expense of any force which shall be deemed necessary by the Company for your defence.

The precise numbers of the additional force which I judge necessary for the effectual protection of your Excellency's dominions, will be stated to you, in my name, by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott.

To enable your Excellency to defray the expense of the additional British force, which is now become indispensably necessary to the security of your Excellency's dominions, without any new charges upon the finances of your Excellency, nothing further is requisite than that you should disband the numerous disorderly battalions at present in your service, which, instead of contributing in any degree to the defence of your country, or to the support of your Government, have long proved injurious to the prosperity and strength of both.

For the details of the plan by which the dismissal of these troops may be most easily and speedily effected, I beg leave to refer your Excellency to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, who is in full possession of my sentiments on this subject, and on whose prudence, judgment, and experience, I rely with the utmost confidence.

The advanced period of the season absolutely requires that

the British troops in Oude should immediately be augmented to the amount which will be stated to your Excellency by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott; and I earnestly recommend to your Excellency the early adoption of those measures which will be pointed out to you by Colonel Scott, for the purpose of relieving your Excellency from the heavy expense at present incurred in maintaining that force, whose numbers are dangerous only to your Excellency and your subjects. By such a reform your Excellency will be fully enabled to defray the charge of the additional troops.

It will not be in my power to furnish your Excellency immediately with the full number of additional troops, which are necessary for the effectual security of your Excellency's dominions; but I am so deeply impressed with the necessity of carrying the measure into effect as speedily as possible, that your Excellency may rely on my making every practicable exertion to complete the proposed force at so early a period of time as shall place your Excellency's country beyond the reach of any surprise, either from foreign or domestic enemies.

I have, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLl.

*The Earl of Mornington to Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick,
Resident at Hyderabad.*

(Secret.)

SIR,

Fort William, 6th November, 1799.

The general state of the Nizam's health for some time past, and the communications which I have lately received from you on that subject, joined to the great changes recently produced in the political state of India by our conquest of Mysore, have suggested to me the necessity of revising the principles which regulated my instructions to you of the 8th of July, 1798,* with regard to the conduct proper to be pursued by the

* See Vol. I. p. 94.

Company's Government in the event of his Highness's death. If we neglect to interfere in settling the succession upon the death of the Nizam, the Mahrattas will not fail to avail themselves of our inactivity, and will establish a preponderant, if not an exclusive, influence at the Court of Hyderabad.

The establishment of the exclusive influence of the Mahrattas at Hyderabad would be equivalent in its operation on our interests to the absolute subjugation of the Deccan by the arms of the Mahratta power; and it should be no less our care to prevent the Mahrattas from governing the territory of the Nizam in the name of a prince elevated to the Musnud by their interference, than to check the progress of any hostile attempt which they might make to extend their dominions at the expense of the Court of Hyderabad. It is, therefore, now as necessary that the succession to the Soubahship of the Deccan should be settled by the Company's authority as it was in July, 1798.

In every view which I am enabled to take of this question, it continues to appear to me desirable that we should raise Secunder Jah to the Musnud in preference to any of his brothers. The right of primogeniture is in his favour; his connections are among those persons best affected towards our interest; he is the only son of the Nizam who has ever maintained any authorised intercourse with us, or who has ever manifested any desire to cultivate our friendship. Ali Jah was disposed to connect his views with those of Tippoo Suldaun; Feridoon Jah has carried on intrigues in the same quarter, and Jehander Jah has been suspected of endeavouring to engage the Mahrattas to take him under their protection.

In favouring the pretensions of Secunder Jah, we must not overlook what is requisite to the improvement of our connection with the Court of Hyderabad, and to the establishment of that connection on a basis of the most solid advantage, and of the most permanent security.

No obligation of treaty binds us to take part in any contested succession, arising either from the total silence of the Nizam respecting his intended successor, or from a disputable declaration of his Highness's intentions on the subject. Even in the case of an unequivocal nomination of a successor by his Highness, we should not be bound by the Treaty of Sep-

tember, 1798, or by any other obligation to support that successor against any rival, whose cause might be espoused by the Mahrattas. Whatever secret or political motives therefore may exist to induce us either to interpose our influence in the settlement of the succession, or to prefer the pretensions of Secunder Jah, our faith is not pledged to raise that prince to the Musnud, or unconditionally to support him upon it against any effort of the Mahrattas, or of any other power in favour of another candidate.

Having stated the general principles which should govern our conduct in the conjunction under contemplation, I shall proceed to furnish you with an outline of the particular conditions on which I am willing to support the succession of Secunder Jah against all competition.

These conditions are as follow :—

1. The Treaty of September, 1798, shall be confirmed by Secunder Jah, for himself and his heirs, in all points not expressly altered by the New Treaty.

2. The subsidiary force shall be augmented to four regiments of native infantry, two regiments of native cavalry, and three companies of artillery, including a proportionable increase of gun lascars.

3. The additional force shall be subsidized at the same rate as that now serving in the Nizam's dominions.

4. A territory to be selected by the Company, producing a net revenue at least adequate to the payment of the whole subsidy (under the treaty of 1798 as well as under the new engagement), shall be assigned to the sole and absolute management of the Company: the Company to account to the reigning prince for any surplus of revenue exceeding the amount of the subsidy, which may be realised from the said territory under their management.

5. The Peishcush at present payable by the Company to the Nizam, on account of the northern Circars, shall be remitted for ever.

6. If the number of troops stipulated to be subsidized, should at any time appear to be inadequate to the purpose of securing Secunder Jah on the Musnud, against the attempts of any competition, whether supported or not by the Mahrattas, or by any other power, the Company will augment the subsidized force to such an extent as the Company may judge

necessary; and Secunder Jah shall in that case defray the expense of such temporary addition of force.

7. All Rahdary duties on goods passing to and from the respective territories of the contracting parties shall be abolished. No articles of merchandize shall pay duty more than once, and a proper tariff shall be established for the regulation of the single duties to be so levied; and a treaty of commerce shall be concluded between the two states on just and equitable principles of reciprocal interest and common benefit.

8. Secunder Jah shall engage to pay at all times the utmost attention to such advice as the Company's Government shall occasionally judge it necessary to offer to him with a view to any objects connected with the advancement of his interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states.

Such is the outline of the terms upon which I propose to support and maintain the succession of Secunder Jah, whether he should obtain the previous nomination of his father, or not, or even if it should be pretended that his Highness had declared in favour of some other of his sons. You will prepare without delay an instrument in the Persian language in conformity to the foregoing outline, in order that Secunder Jah (at the moment of his father's death, or whenever that event shall appear to approach) may be apprised of the terms on which we are ready to support his cause, and may be enabled by immediately executing a formal instrument, to accede to my propositions in a regular manner.

I think it necessary to permit you either totally to suppress or to modify the Eighth Article according to your discretion, apprising you, however, that I consider it to be of great importance to obtain such an ascendancy over the councils of the Nizam, as is described in that Article.

Secunder Jah must not be allowed to procrastinate his determination. If at the end of a stated and short period of time he should not determine to accept the proffered Treaty, you will proceed in concert with Azim ul Omrah and Meer Allum, to place one of the younger sons of the Nizam on the Musnud, previously stipulating that the prince succeeding to the Musnud shall fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty proposed to Secunder Jah.

I am aware that the objects proposed might be obtained from Secunder Jah with less difficulty, previously to the death of the Nizam, and that it would on that account be desirable that a negotiation should be opened immediately with Secunder Jah. But many objections occur to deter me from such a step. The attempt (if it should transpire either by accident or design) would probably lead to mischievous consequences; I am, therefore, of opinion that no such attempt should be hazarded until the Nizam shall be at the point of death.

It is manifest that our power of settling the succession in the manner described, and of obtaining the advantages which I have enumerated, will depend in an eminent degree, if not absolutely, on the local position of the subsidiary force at the time of his Highness's death. It is, therefore, of the last importance that the force should not only be kept together, but stationed as near as possible to the residence of the Nizam; and I accordingly direct you to adopt every practicable means of accomplishing these most desirable and essential objects without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLII.

Sir Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington.

Camp of his Highness the Supreme Vizier,
near Jaffa, the 9th November, 1799.

MY LORD,

[Received 8th April, 1800.]

It is my duty to give your Lordship early information that a disposition on the part of the French army in Egypt to treat for their return to France, by the evacuation of their new "colony," has been at length openly manifested; first, by an official communication to that effect from General Buonaparte to his Highness the Supreme Vizier, in a letter full of the pretended predilection of the French for "Islamism" as a ground for peace, and since in a more reasonable strain from his successor in the command, General Kleber, by letters addressed to his Highness and to me.

General Buonaparte made an attempt to renew the intercourse with me, which he had abruptly broken off from a fear of the defection of his army, that defection having been increased rather than diminished by his unqualified abuse of the English commander, to whom alone the army could look for favour in the hour of their distress. The Aid-de-camp sent off to the Tigre appeared to have been commissioned to say that General Buonaparte had ever spoken of me in terms of the utmost respect, although his writings, for *political* reasons, contained matter calculated to discourage his army from deserting to me at a critical moment of their sufferings in Syria. I could not help cutting the conversation short by saying what I really felt at the time, knowing the man as I do, viz., "that I should be very sorry to have his approbation." However, it being evident, from this and other circumstances, that the discontent of the army was kept under only by the terror his severity inspired, I took occasion to acquaint him of his being (together with General Berthier) recalled to command the army in Italy (N. B. not then in existence) this, as I expected, was eagerly caught at. A second flag of truce asked whether I was serious, and a confirmation being sent, he embarked in a few days afterwards for Europe, giving only a few hours notice of his intention to those who were to accompany him, and causing the command to devolve on General Kleber by a sealed packet; it was given out in the army that he was gone to Constantinople to make peace, which affords a proof how much the army wish for some such means of extrication.

Having early apprized Lord Nelson of the probability of General Buonaparte's quitting Egypt singly and *incognito*, I entertain strong hopes that some of his Lordship's cruizers may have fallen in with him, although the *Theseus*, which I had detached with a squadron for that purpose, has returned unsuccessful.

I have been employed assembling a force, and directing an attack on Damietta, which took place on the 1st instant. Like that on Aboukir, it failed of entire success from the same causes, viz. the insubordination, disorder, and obstinate inactivity inherent in a Turkish fleet and army. The attack, however, like that in the Red Sea of Yambo Arabians, has had the good effect of proving to the French army that these

irregular hosts can be brought *hand to hand* with them; and it is likewise evident, that a succession of these sort of engagements must annihilate them to a man, although they may each time remain masters of the field of battle from the effect of European tactics, which, as at Damietta, produces a corps de reserve, or a flanking charge of cavalry, to route the *victorious rabble*. The French superior officers, with whom I have had frequent intercourse of late by flags of truce seem fully sensible of this, and extremely anxious to quit a theatre whereon they can neither gain honour or secure their profits, and where it is evident to them that they do their country no sort of service since I have communicated the glorious news from India (sent me by Mr. Manesty, extremely apropos). Allow me, my Lord, to take this opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on the signal success which has crowned the well combined measures of Government in India by the able and gallant exertions of Lieutenant-General Harris and his highly distinguished army, at the same time that I offer your Lordship and them this tribute, in the proof of the additional and extensive utility of your joint labours.

It is but justice to the French army to say that, though they evidently dread the appearance of the conquerors of the Mysore in Upper Egypt, they are under no sort of apprehension of the Vizier's motley disorderly multitude; but they are sensible that, reduced as they are to 18,000 men, they could not profit by a victory, where they are exposed in the end to be assailed by regular troops both from the Red Sea and the Mediterranean; and I trust a demonstration of the truth of this will be made in support of my assertion to that effect, should the conference I am about to hold with General Desaix and Mr. Poussielgue on board the *Tigre* close without our settling the terms of evacuation.

I have the honour to be,
with the utmost respect, my Lord,
your Lordship's faithful, humble Servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. XLIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, Nov. 16th, 1799.

[Received at Calcutta, 4th March, 1800.]

MY LORD,

I beg leave to acquaint your Lordship that I arrived here on the 6th instant, in the quality of his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Ottoman Porte.

Your Lordship will have known from Mr. Dundas, and from some of the Directors of the East India Company, with whom I conferred confidentially in London, that I am authorized, in considering this post as one that may afford me occasions of interesting communication with Asia; and that my attention was particularly directed by them to that object. I may be allowed, on my own part, to say, that no part of the duty connected with this mission is more agreeable to me than the intercourse it establishes with your Lordship; and that my exertions shall be unremitting, in so far as I may be enabled, while here, to contribute to the benefit of the British interests in India, and to the glory and success of your administration there.

I reached Constantinople in a conjuncture, the circumstances of which claim your Lordship's particular notice. The enclosed letters* had just been received here from the Grand Vizier, whose head-quarters were then at Damascus; and the Russian Envoy at this place, and my predecessor, Mr. Smith, had been applied to, to favour the negotiation, thus set on foot, for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. The conferences which had passed, and one which I also had on the subject, do not enable me to furnish you with more than the above papers. For, as Sir Sidney Smith is acting, and with the most brilliant success against that army, and has intercepted the original letters written by the French General, and opened a communication upon them with the

* Referring to Buonaparte's address to the Grand Vizier, and the reply of the latter; Kleber's proclamation; the Grand Vizier's reply thereto; and the report of the Capigi Bachi.

Vizier; I have referred all proceedings on this negotiation to him, who, no doubt, will comply with every proposal, consistent with the dignity and interest of the allies, to procure the deliverance of Egypt. Orders are also sent to the Grand Vizier on this occasion, to act with Sir Sidney Smith: and I have requested Sir Sidney to acquaint your Lordship, by the most expeditious conveyance, of any proceedings that may take place in consequence of the dispositions thus shewn by the French to quit the Turkish provinces.

I am sorry I have no authority to say whether the Grand Vizier is justified in the construction he has put upon the letters from Buonaparte and Kleber. But as they are written after the defeat at Acre, after Buonaparte's flight, and after a proclamation has been circulated among the French troops; it is, I perceive, Sir Sidney Smith's opinion, as well as the Vizier's, that this step did proceed from a desire to evacuate Egypt.

Our interests in India are so nearly concerned in defeating the attempt of the French to establish themselves in Egypt, that every facility will be afforded on the part of the British influence in this part of the world, to remove the French troops now there, if the terms they propose shall prove at all acceptable. At the same time, it is my duty to point out that, in case the suggestion thus made by the French Generals, has proceeded from the very unfavourable aspect which the affairs of France lately assumed on the continent of Europe, that cause is liable to much variation. The last accounts from Switzerland leave very little hopes of any part of that country being now occupied by the allied troops, or that they will be able to do more than take up winter quarters in the rear of Feldkirk, and the line from whence the Arch Duke commenced his operations this campaign.

On the other hand, the Court of Vienna is, I apprehend, acting without sufficient concert with Russia and England, in directing the civil and military agents attending its armies to take possession of all they conquer, in the name of the Emperor of Germany, and not in that of the lawful Sovereigns. So much so, as to have given occasion to some very strong remonstrances, which, if without effect, may possibly force the other allies to refuse further cooperation with the Aus-

trians. The enclosed paper* has, in consequence of what I allude to, been delivered to the foreign ministers at Petersburg, and will, I make no doubt, appear to your Lordship a paper of the highest import in the present crisis.

Should, unfortunately, any disunion take place among the armies now employed on the continent against France, we may hope that the Emperor of Russia, whose zeal is, undoubtedly, very great in this important contest, will still offer military, as well as naval, succours to be employed against the French in Egypt. Such aid is stipulated by treaty, and applications for it have been of late renewed by the Porte, and favourably met on the part of Russia. Yet it appears the French are still 15,000 strong, besides numerous bodies of natives, embodied under them; their position, as your Lordship will see by the annexed map, with its explanation, is as secure as the nature of the country will admit. They receive, as I learn from Admiral Blanket, supplies even of ammunition by the aid of the neighbouring powers; and if the present negotiation fails, the inadequate assistance which could be spared by Russia, or admitted by the Porte into its provinces, does not present the means of driving the French from their present post, however able and brilliant our naval operations against them continue to be.

As to the Turks, your Lordship will perceive, by the annexed paper,† that very little is to be expected from them. Besides, I fear, there is great insubordination among the rulers in the distant provinces of the empire, which obliges the Grand Vizier to proceed with more than usual caution, and occasions a material diminution of the force he apparently has along with him.

I am, my Lord, totally without authority for what I am about to add, but as the whole of the information before me leads me to foresee the probability of its becoming necessary to employ considerably more force than is now preparing, to

* This was a *note verbal* from the Emperor of Russia to the foreign Ministers, declaring that his Majesty's desire is to re-establish the former kingdom of France, the Government of the United Provinces, of the Helvetic Cantons, and of the Germanic empire; but that he will withdraw his forces unless these measures be vigorously prosecuted.

† A document, in French, shewing the actual state and disposition of the Turks.

attack the French in Egypt; I, individually, presume it is worthy your Lordship's attention to consider whether, in that event, a respectable diversion could be made from the Red Sea by troops from India, and the naval force under Admiral Blanket.*

The rescuing Egypt from the French would be a glorious continuation of the splendid victories which those troops have lately gained in India, with such unequalled benefit to their country.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest respect, my Lord,
your Excellency's most obedient, humble Servant,

ELGIN.

No. XLV.

Lieut.-Colonel Scott, Resident at Lucknow, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

Lucknow, 22nd November, 1799.

A meeting having been appointed by his Excellency the Vizier, at the resident's house on the 12th instant, for the purpose, as I understood, of concerting with me the means of carrying into immediate effect the important military reform recommended by your Lordship, his Excellency imparted to me his secret, though determined, resolution of abdicating the government, but did not until the 20th authorize me to make a communication of his intentions to your Lordship.

This resolution of his Excellency is of so extraordinary and interesting a tendency in its intermediate object, and involves considerations of such magnitude and delicacy in its execution and future consequences, that I feel it my duty to recite to your Lordship, as distinctly and as fully as my memory will allow, in a connected detail, the several conversations which have taken place upon the subject, and as they were not of long duration, and committed to paper immediately upon their conclusion, I trust, that no material part of them can have escaped me.

His Excellency began by observing, that he had frequently

* This suggestion was made by Lord Mornington (see Vol. I. p. 587.)

declared to me the impossibility of his conducting the affairs of his country under existing circumstances; that probably, I had not comprehended the full drift of those expressions, or had conceived they were uttered in a moment of ill-humour, that the real meaning of them was an earnest and sincere desire to relinquish a government which he could not manage with satisfaction to himself, or to the advantage of his subjects.

Desirous of penetrating into the motives which influenced his Excellency to such a resolution, and of discovering the sincerity of his declarations, I entreated his Excellency would impart to me the causes which rendered it impossible for him to regulate and conduct the affairs of his government.

He replied, that they were well known to me, to which I observed, that I must candidly confess, that under the present total want of arrangement for the despatch of public business, and without the aid and advice of able, zealous and responsible ministers, to take a share in the laborious and incessant concerns of this extensive empire, the affairs of it must fall into confusion, and the interests of his subjects be neglected, but that if his Excellency would condescend to avail himself of the advice and assistance, which I was commanded by your Lordship to afford, and which I was at all times, and all occasions ready to exert to the utmost of my abilities I would be answerable, that the affairs of the country could be conducted to the prosperity and happiness of his people, to his own ease and to the acquisition of a great name.

His Excellency replied, that this was true, but that it was impossible for one person to judge of the feelings of another, and that his mind not being disposed to the cares and fatigues of government, he had come to the fixed resolution of retiring from them; and added, that as your Lordship would on his abdication exalt one of his sons to the Musnud, his name would remain.

Acknowledging the justness of the remark of the impracticability of penetrating into the secret feelings of another person, I desisted from further reasoning; but to take away every ground on which the expectation or hope could be built of the selection of a successor, I adverted to the right attached by our government to primogeniture, so strongly exemplified in his own person; in which remark his Excellency acquiesced,

and said, whichever of his sons your Lordship thought proper.

His Excellency declared in unequivocal terms, that in relinquishing the empire, he renounced every wish of interfering in its concerns, or of residing within its limits, and that the money he was in possession of, was sufficient for his own support, and for the procurement of every gratification he could desire in a private station, but he trusted your Lordship would establish suitable allowances for his sons and the other branches of his family, whom he wished to leave at Lucknow.

Anxious on so solemn an occasion as the abdication of an empire, to be in possession of some written document, lest my recital of a private conversation, without the presence of a third person should be denied or affirmed to be in part misrepresented, I asked His Excellency, if he did not think it advisable to address himself direct to your Lordship; this he declined, on the pretence that there was no person about him in whom he could confide in an affair of so much secrecy and delicacy.

I then informed his Excellency, that I should immediately communicate the substance of the conversation to your Lordship, but he desired that I would prepare the draft of a letter in English, and before the despatch of it, submit for his perusal a translation in the Persian language.

This I promised to execute, and exhorted his Excellency to reflect most seriously in the interval on the measure he had in contemplation, which was the most momentous that could be undertaken by a Sovereign.

Having prepared in Persian an abstract of the conversation, I waited upon his Excellency on the 14th, when he declared his perseverance in the determination he had two days before revealed to me, accompanied by some explanations of the motives which influenced his resolution; these however, not being new in substance, called from me only a repetition of that advice and those assurances, which I had frequently urged to his consideration.

They consisted of general accusations against the refractory and perverse dispositions of the people at large, of complaints against the fidelity and zeal of the men immediately about his person, of the arrogance of some of the Amils and of the open disobedience of others. I replied,

that the remedy to this aggregate of evils was easy and within his Excellency's own power, that a vigilant, strong and just administration would secure the obedience of the bulk of his subjects, on the firm principles of attachment to his person and government, that a conciliatory and encouraging conduct on his part, would secure fidelity and enlivened zeal, and that the reform of his military establishment on the principles so forcibly and repeatedly urged by your Lordship, was the specific measure that would curb the arrogance of the Amils, and enforce a prompt execution and implicit observance of any revenue regulations which his wisdom might establish; and in conclusion, I again pledged myself, if his Excellency would reject the interested advice of favourites, and be guided by the impartial and friendly counsel which your Lordship would convey to him through me, that the affairs of his government could be conducted with ease to himself, to the acquisition of an high reputation, to the prosperity of his country and to the happiness of his subjects.

Having presented for his Excellency's perusal, the abstract in Persian of the first conversation his Excellency retained it, and expressed his intention of addressing himself direct to your Lordship.

On the 16th I sent a message to his Excellency, intimating a desire of waiting upon him the following day, to which I received an answer, that if my intended visit was to confer on the subject known to us, he was intent upon it and preparing the necessary paper; and as he meant to pass the 17th at a Garden, and purposed visiting me on the 18th, if I had not any urgent business to communicate, he could wish that the interview might be postponed until that day.

His Excellency did me the honour of a visit on the 18th, and after consulting me on the settlement with one of his Amils was taking his leave, when I took the liberty of asking his Excellency whether he had made any progress in his intended address to your Lordship, to which he replied, that he had written something.

On the 19th, his Excellency sent me a verbal message, that he purposed breakfasting with me on the following morning. In the evening my Moonshee waited upon him, and expressed my acknowledgments for the honour his Excellency intended me; but, that as he had honoured me with

a visit the preceding day, it was my wish as well from respect as inclination, to attend upon him. He replied, that amongst friends it was the same thing, that my house was his, and his mine.

According to appointment, his Excellency honoured me with a visit on the 20th; and when retired into a private apartment, produced the letter which I had presented to him on the 14th. Wishing to make some alterations in it, he desired the attendance of the Moonshee who had written it; pen and ink being brought, his Excellency with his own hand, wrote several alterations and additions which had been previously traced with pencil.

Having added at the end of the paper, that he would place his son on the Musnud with his own hands, his Excellency observed, that it was introduced with a view of shewing to the world, that his abdication was at his own suggestion, and voluntary; to which I replied, that I trusted it never could be imagined, that the English Government had used compulsive means, or even persuasions for the removal of his Excellency from his hereditary dominions.

His Excellency delivered the paper into my hands desiring, that after a copy of it was taken, it might be returned to him with a fair copy, and enjoining me to lose no time in addressing your Lordship on the subject.

After receiving the paper, I observed to his Excellency, that your Lordship would naturally make this reflection, that if his Excellency, (a man of mature judgment, sound understanding, and extensive experience,) found it impossible to conduct the affairs of the empire, what grounds were there to expect that a young man, uninstructed in the ways of the world, and unpractised in business, could possess the necessary qualifications for so arduous a situation. To which his Excellency replied, that he would have the benefit of that advice and assistance so often proffered to him.

I was then going to prepare his Excellency to expect, that your Lordship's wisdom would most probably suggest some modifications of the treaty or comprehensive arrangements for the future government of the country; but before I could make any progress, he interrupted me by saying, that your Lordship's answer might be expected in the course of twenty days.

After talking some time on other subjects, the Nawaub observed, that your Lordship would feel much uneasiness at the contents of the paper; to which I replied, that your Lordship would certainly be concerned and surprised at the momentous measure determined on by his Excellency. He said, the measure was doubtless momentous, and the most serious that a sovereign could undertake, that he considered it not only a renunciation of a kingdom, but of the world; but added emphatically, that the execution of it was indispensable, since he was neither pleased with the people nor they with him, and that in fact his mind was not from the first disposed to the cares of government, nor reconciled to them upon experience.

His Excellency some hours after his departure sent me a note, requesting that I would return by my Moonshee the draft of the paper, corrected by himself, being desirous of considering of some further alterations. It was accordingly sent, when he expressed himself obliged by my readiness in returning it, and promised to restore it immediately. In the evening it was brought back to me by one of his favourite servants, (Ruttun Chund,) a person whom I had never seen before, with some corrections.

A copy of the Persian paper as it now stands, and one shewing the alterations, together with translations, are herewith transmitted for your Lordship's information.

Having thus detailed the whole of the conversations which have been held on this important subject, I shall take the liberty of making such reflections on his Excellency's resolution as occur to my mind; and though, as his Excellency justly observed, it is not possible to penetrate into the internal feelings of another person, yet an attentive study of his Excellency's character, and a review of his conduct since his exaltation to the empire, may serve to throw some light upon his sentiments.

His Excellency for a series of years, felt and enjoyed the comforts of a private station; ambition, (if that quality ever had possession of his breast,) might have been weakened by the despair of gratifying it, and at length have subsided in other habits and pursuits. The tenour of his discourse strongly indicates the act to be the result of mature and long deliberation, and not the sudden suggestion of passion; it is

not therefore improbable, that at the moment of ascending the Musnud he was meditating the period and the means of retreat.

Power, since his accession to the empire, has only been exercised in acts that tend to the gratification of his ruling propensity, avarice; timid in his disposition he is afraid of secret enemies amongst the old servants of his brother whom his unkindness has disgusted, and unconciliating in his manners, he has acquired no new friends. In his public conduct as a prince, he has in no one instance evinced a desire for the prosperity of his country, nor shewn a wish to transmit his dominions to his posterity, improved in their resources, or meliorated in their administration.

Unequal himself to incessant application to business, with a neglect inexplicable, unless from a jealousy of having his secrets penetrated into, it has been his aim to conduct the affairs of his government in seclusion without ostensible assistance; and with an avidity unaccountable, unless from a secret wish of abandoning his empire, he has grasped at immediate and trifling advantages to the relinquishment of future and substantial benefits; and whilst accumulating wealth in his private treasure, suffers the pensioners and public servants to experience the most severe distress by a long detention of their established allowances.

The money and jewels found upon his accession, have been removed from the usual place of deposit to the women's apartments, and it is generally believed, that his accumulations amount to a crore of rupees.* A sum however enormous, probably not much exaggerated, when it is considered, that in addition to Nuzzurannas and other means of acquiring wealth which have been practised, he has uniformly, as it is affirmed, appropriated to himself the same monthly sums for his personal expences as were fixed by his brother, though the establishment of every department has been considerably diminished, and the strictest economy observed in every household arrangement.

Your Lordship will observe by the additions in the paper, that his Excellency dwells even to repetition, on the expressions of "existing circumstances, or in this manner, and certain causes." It is not easy to conjecture what may be the

causes which he insinuates, but conceals with so much reserve. If they have a reference to my conduct, I can only affirm, that it has been confined to expostulations and advice, and that he has never asked my assistance until his own measures have failed, and then expecting the exertion of my influence to enforce payment of demands, under an implicit and unbounded confidence in the statement which he was pleased to make of the case, inquiries and investigations on the other side of the question, without which I invariably and candidly told him, I could not interfere, may be regarded by him as a distrust of his own principles of probity and justice, and as a design to support his Amils against him.

His Excellency has no children alive by marriage. Four sons of the age of manhood usually attend him, the eldest of whom, (Gazee u deen Hyder,) is 25 years of age, or more, and appears to be of a mild but rather heavy disposition. A son five or six years old sometimes makes his appearance at the Palace, and there may probably be several other children in the Mehl.

Not to interrupt the thread of the narrative upon this important subject, I omitted to introduce in their proper places the frequent allusions made by me to the Reform of the military establishment. In every conversation however, I took occasion to press the subject upon his Excellency's consideration; but he invariably, and somewhat impatiently, evaded the discussion by declaring, that under the proposition to be submitted to your Lordship it was totally unnecessary.

I have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, and

Most faithful humble Servant,

W. SCOTT.

Translation of a paper prepared in Persian by the Resident at Lucknow, at the desire of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, submitted to his Excellency on the 14th of November 1799, and returned to the Resident on the 18th of the same month, when the alterations which appear on the face of the Persian paper, were written by his Excellency's own hand,* in the

* They are here placed in small type *over* the original words.

presence of the Resident and his Moonshee Mohubbut Ally Khan. The alterations which appear in red ink* in this translation, are subsequent corrections by his Excellency, he having sent for the draft for the purpose.

On Tuesday, the 13th of Tummadie ul Sannie, A.H. 1214, or 12th of November, 1799, his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, honoured me with a visit, and in a private conference enjoined me to address the right honourable the Governor-General to the following effect :

That his Excellency finding it impossible under existing circumstances for certain reasons, to conduct the affairs of his government, with ease to himself and to the advantage of his subjects, was desirous from the suggestions of his own mind, cordially and voluntarily to relinquish the empire. I entreated his Excellency to explain the motives which influenced him to relinquish so great an empire, and begged that he would state the whole of the causes which induced him to that resolution, in order that measures might be taken to remove them, since by the friendship and assistance of the English Company, and by the zealous exertions of myself, his sincere well-wisher, the administration of his government could assuredly be conducted to the prosperity of his country, to the happiness of his subjects, to the ease and satisfaction of himself, and to the acquisition of a great name. His Excellency replied, that this was true, but that owing to *(the dissensions, enmity, disobedience and negligence of the people here,)* *(and certain causes,)* the incessant toils and cares of government, his mind was utterly withdrawn from it and disgusted, and that on this account he entertained the firm resolution of relinquishing the empire, and as his Lordship would nominate one of his sons to succeed him, his name would remain established.

After the relinquishment of the government, his Excellency had no wish *(at Lucknow)* of residing *(here,)* nor of interfering in the smallest degree in the concerns of the country. What his Excellency possessed was sufficient for his necessary expences, but that whatever his Lordship might establish for his sons and other branches of his family, would be a source of great satisfaction to him, and that his Excellency would with his own hands place his son on the Musnud.

A true translation.

W. SCOTT, Resident at Lucknow.

* They are here placed in italics *over* the original words.

No. XLV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 28th Nov. 1799.

I. According to the latest accounts dated on the 2nd of November, the affairs of Mysore were in the most favourable condition. The whole of the country (including Sondah and the rest of the reserved territory, now about to be divided between the Company and the Nizam) having been completely settled, with the exception of the inconsiderable possessions of the Polygar of Bullam, against whom a small detachment had been sent, the army in Mysore was on the eve of being distributed in garrisons and cantonments.

Under the disadvantages resulting from the recent military operations throughout the country, Purneah had discharged the first monthly kist of the subsidy stipulated by the late treaty of Seringapatam, namely, that for the month of July, and had announced his intention of soon paying the kists for August and September.

I have very great satisfaction in informing your honourable Committee that the measures which I concerted with Lord Clive, previously to my departure from Fort St. George, for the purpose of reducing the southern Polygars to order and legal government have been executed with the greatest ability and success by Major Bannerman, and that the military power of that refractory race of people is now completely extinct.

The settlement of Tanjore has been arranged with the same happy success. Previously to my departure from Fort St. George, with Lord Clive's assistance, I framed the outlines of a new treaty between the Rajah and the Company vesting the entire and exclusive administration, civil and military, of that country in the Company's government. This treaty* was ratified by me in council on the 26th instant.

II. The affairs of Oude have occupied a considerable share of my attention. No probability existing that Zemaun Shah will be able in the course of the present season to renew his

* See Appendix.

hostile attempts against Hindostan, and a conjuncture so favourable coinciding with our successes in Mysore, the most eligible opportunity appeared to be opened for carrying into execution such a reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments as should secure us from all future danger on the frontier of Oude, and should enable me to introduce a variety of necessary improvements in the government of that country. With this view it was my intention to establish a considerable augmentation of our troops in Oude without delay, and to induce the Vizier to disband, under certain regulations, a proportional part of his own useless and dangerous force. I had accordingly given orders to the Resident at Lucknow to commence a negotiation with his Excellency for this desirable purpose, and had also directed the movements of several bodies of troops in the provinces to be so arranged as to enable me, before the expiration of the cold season, to increase our force in Oude considerably. Before, however, the Resident at Lucknow could open the proposed negotiation with the Vizier, or had disclosed to him any part of my intended plans, his Excellency, of his own accord, made a proposition to the Resident which necessarily supersedes every other arrangement.

III. For several months past his Excellency had intimated to the Resident from time to time an earnest desire to communicate to me an improved system for the government of Oude. But whenever the Resident had pressed his Excellency for a more full explanation of the nature of the proposed arrangement in order that it might be transmitted to me, his Excellency had evaded the discussion with evident symptoms of agitation of mind. At length on the 12th of November, at an interview which his Excellency had himself desired (and it is important again to remark that at this period no proposition had reached his Excellency from the Resident or from me with relation to the increase of the force in Oude), his Excellency signified an anxious desire and a fixed determination to abdicate altogether the government of Oude, and requested the Resident to draw, for the purpose of being forwarded to me, the enclosed paper which I received last night.*

* See p. 153.

IV. His Excellency appears to have adopted the resolution of abdicating the government upon the maturest deliberation. Your honourable Committee will observe that his Excellency declares this resolution to have originated in the reciprocal aversion subsisting between himself and his subjects (an aversion, which, on his part, he declares to have grown into absolute disgust), and in his sense of his own incompetency from various other considerations, to administer the government either with satisfaction to himself or advantage to his people. But although such considerations may in some degree have influenced his Excellency's determination, I am inclined to believe that the principal causes are to be traced in the timidity and the avarice of his disposition; for it is proper to apprise your honourable Committee that he has intimated an expectation of being permitted to retire with the treasures which he may have amassed.

V. Your honourable Committee will remark that the Resident has used several arguments, but without effect, to dissuade his Excellency from the proposed abdication. If therefore his Excellency should ultimately persevere in this declared intention, it must be deemed entirely and absolutely his own voluntary act.

VI. Whatever may have been the motives, or whatever shall be the ultimate decision of his Excellency on this occasion, it is my intention to profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent; and I entertain a confident hope of being able either to establish, with the consent of the Vizier, the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oude and its dependencies, or at least to place our interests in that quarter on an improved and durable foundation.

VII. It occurs to me to be necessary to add in explanation of the close of the third paragraph of this letter, that although the necessity of a reform of the Vizier's military establishments had been for a considerable time under discussion between his Excellency and me, and had even been fully admitted by his Excellency, no detailed measures with a view to the execution of such a plan had yet been suggested, nor had my intention of immediately augmenting our force in Oude been communicated to his Excellency when he opened his mind to the Resident at Lucknow.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 12th Dec. 1799.

This letter will be presented to your Lordship by a prelate of the Armenian Church, the Archbishop and Nuncio of Mount Ararat.

He arrived here lately from Armenia, in his progress to visit the different Armenian churches in India, a septennial visitation of which takes place, as I understand, under the direction of the Chief Patriarch of the Armenian Church. I received the Archbishop of Ararat at my levee soon after his arrival here; on this occasion he presented to me an address, subscribed by himself and another Armenian divine (the Nuncio of Jerusalem) congratulating me on the happy termination of the late war with Tippoo Suldaun.

As the Archbishop now proceeds in the discharge of his mission, to Fort St. George, I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship's countenance and attention during his residence at the seat of your government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVII.

Lt.-Col. Wm. Kirkpatrick to Lt.-Col. William Scott, Resident at Lucknow.

SIR,

Fort William, 16th Dec. 1799.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to his Lordship, dated the 22nd of November,* containing a paper communicated by you to his Lordship in pursuance of the earnest injunction of the Vizier.

I have the honour to enclose an answer from his Lordship to that paper, together with a translation of the same in Persian.

* See page 152.

His Lordship is pleased to authorize you to make such alterations in this paper (adhering to its general spirit and tenor) previously to the communication of it to the Vizier, as circumstances not at present in the knowledge of his Lordship may suggest to you to be necessary or advisable. You are even empowered not to deliver the paper to his Excellency if, previously to your receipt of it, his Excellency should either have actually acquiesced in the general tenor of the treaty forwarded to you on the 22nd ultimo, or have indicated a disposition to do so; and you should have any reason to apprehend that the communication of this paper might have the effect of retarding or of otherwise disturbing the arrangements. His Lordship, however, is inclined to think that the train of reasoning contained in this document is equally calculated (by establishing the reasonableness and necessity of the modification of his Excellency's wishes proposed by his Lordship), to remove any objection which his Excellency may have started to the main principle of the treaty, and to confirm his approbation of it, should he have already acceded to it.

In the event of your communicating to the Vizier the accompanying paper, or the substance of it, you will previously affix to it a copy of the treaty transmitted to you on the 22nd ultimo, with such alterations in the same as you may have thought proper to adopt in consequence of the authority given you for this purpose.

You will perceive that the enclosed answer of the Governor-General to the paper containing the formal annunciation of the Vizier's determination to abdicate the Government is silent on that passage of the letter which relates to the maintenance of his Excellency's name. The reason why his Lordship has not judged it necessary to notice this topic is, that it did not appear to him to have originated with his Excellency, but to have arisen rather out of what had dropped from you in the course of the discussion; a consideration which, joined to the general character of the Vizier, disposes his Lordship to believe that his Excellency may not insist on this point. If, however contrary to the expectation of his Lordship, his Excellency should appear anxious on the subject, his Lordship conceives it will be sufficient to answer,

that as his Excellency's absolute and formal abdication of the government is neither wished for nor approved by his Lordship, and that as his Excellency will not only retain, together with his wealth, all his present distinctive honours and titles, but will also possess the power of transmitting both to his heirs, there can be no more danger of the extinction of his name than attaches equally to every other human establishment.

I am further directed by the Governor-General, to signify to you his Lordship's desire, that you will furnish him as soon as possible, with a detailed report of the causes which appear to you to have led to the recent and unexpected proposition of the Vizier. In reviewing this transaction, his Lordship wishes you to consider and state particularly, whether his Excellency has in any, and in what degree, been influenced on this occasion, by any of the measures adopted by his Lordship with a view to the reform of his Excellency's military establishments.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WM. KIRKPATRICK, Military Secretary.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, 16th December, 1799:

The Right Honourable the Governor-General having received from the Resident at Lucknow a paper in the Persian language (with a translation of the same in English), prepared by the Resident in conformity to the desire of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier, and subsequently transmitted to the Governor-General, in consequence of the earnest injunction of his Excellency; and the Governor-General having given the most attentive consideration to the wishes of his Excellency the Nawaub Vizier expressed in that paper, the Resident is hereby commanded to address his Excellency in the name of his Lordship, to the following effect:—

His Lordship is fully apprised of the various difficulties which obstruct the due administration of the Government of Oude in his Excellency's hands, as well as of the nature of those secret causes which disturb the tranquillity of his mind. The Governor-General entirely concurring in the truth of his Excellency's voluntary and candid declaration, that the adverse disposition, enmity and disobedience of his people, added to the negligence of his ministers, render it impossible for his Excellency to conduct the affairs of his Government, either with ease to himself or advantage to his subjects.

The Governor-General has observed, with the most anxious concern, the inveterate abuses which have disgraced every branch of the Civil Government of Oude, perverted the administration of justice, impaired the sources of revenue, industry, and commerce, and destroyed the foundations of

public prosperity and individual happiness in that fertile, but declining country. His Lordship has also lamented the unequivocal symptoms which have occurred within his own knowledge, of the disorderly and mutinous spirit of his Excellency's army; of the refractory temper of a great proportion of his people, and of the general disaffection unhappily prevailing towards his Excellency's person and Government. The pressure of these calamities has been much aggravated, in his Lordship's judgment, by his certain conviction of the utter insufficiency of any instruments or means which his Excellency's own service or resources can furnish, to repress evils of such magnitude, violence, and power. His Lordship, therefore, has always been satisfied that the direct aid and interposition of the Company's Government, strengthened by the liberal confidence and cordial cooperation of his Excellency, were indispensably necessary to restore the welfare of his people, the dignity of his Government, the security of his person and dominions, and the repose of his mind.

Under these impressions, his Lordship represented to his Excellency the urgent necessity of a speedy reform in his Excellency's military establishments, as a measure preliminary to the introduction of any possible improvements in other branches of the Government, and absolutely requisite for the immediate protection of his Excellency's person and dominions against domestic treason or foreign invasion.

His Excellency has repeatedly declared the proposed reform to be indispensably necessary to the accomplishment of the salutary purposes already enumerated, and in the same spirit of candour and justice has acknowledged this important measure to be impracticable without the aid and interposition of the British Government, employed to invigorate his Excellency's authority, and to confirm his power.

The Nawaub Vizier's abdication of the Government was never in the Governor-General's contemplation, nor has his Lordship ever deemed such a step to be necessary, with a view either to the reform of the army or of the Government of Oude. The resolution which his Excellency has signified, is therefore entirely novel to his Lordship's mind, which had never formed any other view than to conciliate his Excellency's entire confidence in the power and wisdom of the Company, and his cordial acceptance of their assistance in correcting the abuses of which his Excellency has complained, and in improving the administration of his affairs.

The resolution to make an absolute and formal abdication of the Government having, however, originated in his Excellency's mind, and being the result of his own free will and mature deliberation, grounded on incontestible facts, and maintained by arguments of considerable force, the Governor-General will distinctly state for the Nawaub Vizier's consideration, such modifications of his Excellency's original resolution as appear to his Lordship calculated to secure the just object which it is designed to accomplish, and the extensive interests which it involves.

The Governor-General, however, must declare, without reserve, that he considers the formal abdication of the Nawaub Vizier, in the manner proposed by his Excellency, to be utterly incompatible with his Excellency's proposed objects, as well as with the security of every interest connected with the prosperity of Oude.

In considering the arguments on which his Lordship's objections are founded, it is necessary to state the nature and effect of his Excellency's abdication according to the terms of his own proposition.

The nature of the Nawaub Vizier's proposition is, that he should relinquish the Government altogether, quit Lucknow, and abstain from all interference in the concerns of the country, that the Governor-General should nominate one of his Excellency's sons to succeed to the Musnud, and to be placed on it by his Excellency's own hands; that his Excellency should retire with possessions, which he states to be sufficient for his necessary expenses; and finally, that the Governor-General should establish a provision for the expenses of his Excellency's sons and of the other branches of his family.

Whatever latitude the practice and laws of Hindostan may admit with regard to questions of succession to sovereign power, the Governor-General is decidedly of opinion, that in the event of his Excellency's abdication, no reasonable ground would exist for the exclusion of his Excellency's eldest son. His Excellency's abdication, therefore, on the terms proposed, must be accompanied by the immediate accession of his Excellency's eldest son to the Musnud.

Under whatever terms or arrangements a successor might be placed on the Musnud, he must retain all the necessary responsibility and state of that elevated situation, and must be rendered accountable for all the public debts, and for all the arrears of the civil and military establishments. The discharge of these demands, and the provision to be made for the unavoidable expenses of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun would necessarily diminish those funds which the Nawaub Saadut Ali Khaun probably proposes to reserve entire for his own separate use. His Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali cannot reasonably expect that those treasures which now form a part of his Excellency's means of fulfilling his public engagements, and consequently a part of the Company's security can be absolutely alienated from the Musnud of Oude, and the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun subjected to the same engagements as the Nawaub Saadut Ali, with reduced means of fulfilling them.

The Nawaub Saadut Ali, upon his abdication, would therefore deem it just to transfer a large portion of his treasures either to his successor or to the Company, and he would thus necessarily reduce in a proportionate degree the funds allotted for his own private maintenance.

It is for his Excellency's serious consideration, whether the tranquillity of his mind would be restored by the establishment of his eldest son in a situation which might produce a relaxation of filial duties, affections, and obligations, and might excite sentiments of distrust and jealousy, if not of animosity and aversion.

The Governor-General is persuaded that after his Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali had actually abdicated the Government, his Excellency would neither feel nor express any desire to resume sovereign authority, or to contend with the exalted dignity and power transferred to the hands of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun. But the history of the world has proved that few princes have possessed the fortitude to remain

content in retirement after the abdication of sovereign power; and the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, adverting to historical examples, and to the uniform experience of former ages, would always apprehend the possibility of a change in the Nawaub Saadut Ali's resolution, and would perpetually anticipate the revival of the spirit of ambition, of the desire of empire, grandeur, and honour, the natural passions of great and noble minds. Such apprehensions and jealousies in the mind of his Excellency's successor might produce the most fatal attempts against his Excellency's repose, and even against his personal safety.

His Excellency states it to be his intention to quit Lucknow after his proposed abdication, but does not expressly signify whether the place of his residence would be fixed within the dominions of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, or of the Company. If his Excellency, deprived of power, should remain in Oude, the disquietudes and dangers of his situation would be greatly multiplied in number, and aggravated in effect. He would be surrounded by solicitude and alarm, and menaced not only by the jealousy of his successor, but by the enmity of all those among his Excellency's former subjects, who may now be discontented with his Excellency's Government, or disaffected towards his person.

Even if it were possible, in point of justice, that his Excellency should abdicate, reserving to himself the sole property in his entire treasure, and should be settled in Oude, under the government of the Nawaub Ghauzee u deen Hyder Khaun, with such an immense mass of wealth, it is evident that his Excellency's peril would be increased in proportion to the magnitude of his treasure; nor would the Company engage to protect his Excellency's property, or his personal safety, within the territories of Oude, under the government of his Excellency's successor.

His Excellency's danger would certainly be less within the Company's provinces, but it would be too sanguine an expectation to suppose that anxiety and danger would not reach his retreat even in that situation, while the Musnud of Oude should be occupied by a successor suspicious of his Excellency's intentions, and jealous of his wealth.

On the whole, therefore, it would be contrary to every principle of justice and good faith, that his Excellency should abdicate with this treasure, leaving his successor with reduced means to satisfy engagements contracted by his Excellency himself, and leaving the Company with a diminished security, and an increased charge to provide for the defence of the country, and for the maintenance of his Excellency's numerous family.

Even this arrangement would expose his Excellency to perpetual hazard and vexation in his retirement.

His Excellency, however, being incapable of insisting on any proposition, of which the injustice towards his successor and the Company is manifest, no alternative would be left but to encroach on the funds destined for his private maintenance, and thus his abdication, accompanied by the accession of one of his sons, would at once reduce his Excellency's income, and aggravate the solicitude of his mind.

Such are the objections to his Excellency's abdication in the manner proposed by himself, as far as they relate to his individual comfort and

personal case. The Governor-General, however, is satisfied that his Excellency would readily sacrifice these considerations to the advantage of his subjects; and if the surrender of a large portion of the funds requisite for his Excellency's private maintenance, if the degradation of his dignity, the exposure of his person to danger, and of his mind to perpetual agitation and alarm, could secure a wise and just administration of the Government of Oude, or could restore the happiness of the people, the Governor-General would applaud his Excellency's benevolent determination to incur the pressure of such accumulated sufferings for the public good; but his Lordship is satisfied that the Nawaub Saadut Ali's abdication, accompanied by the accession of one of his sons, would be as injurious to the interests of the people of Oude, as to those of the Nawaub Saadut Ali himself.

The same wisdom and penetration which have opened to his Excellency's view the real nature of the embarrassments in which he is involved, and convinced him of his inability to extricate himself by his own exertions, will equally satisfy him, that evils of such magnitude and inveteracy cannot be remedied otherwise than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration founded on principles of substantial justice and of true policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the British Government.

It must be obvious to his Excellency that the immediate accession of his eldest, or of any of his sons, to the Musnud, would be altogether incompatible with the establishment of such a system. What rational hope could be entertained that any of these young princes would be competent to the correction of those evils which his Excellency himself, aided by all his knowledge and experience of public affairs, has confessed, himself, unable to remedy.

Under the administration of a successor, destitute of his Excellency's experience and knowledge, all the existing evils in the state and condition of the country of Oude would, of necessity, be augmented, and with the rapid increase of every abuse in the Civil and Military Government, the danger of the country from foreign enemies, and the domestic misery of the inhabitants, would be aggravated in an equal proportion.

Long and severe experience has manifested the inefficacy of any partial or indirect interference of the British Government for the reform of the administration of Oude. The same causes which have hitherto frustrated every endeavour of the Company's Government to accomplish that salutary object by the mere effect of advice and admonition, would continue to operate under every divided Government. No beneficial result can be expected from the utmost efforts of the wisdom and justice of the Company whilst another power shall exist in the country to exclude the introduction of every salutary reform, or to counteract its operation.

If a wise system of administration could be established and enforced under a divided authority, his Excellency must be sensible that his own government afforded the most favourable prospects to the Company; the Governor-General confidently expected to find in his Excellency the Nawaub Saadut Ali whatever the personal character of the Sovereign of Oude could supply to counteract the inherent defects in the frame of the Government. The sense entertained by his Excellency of his own diffi-

culties and the unreserved communication which he has made of their causes, afford the strongest pledges of his sincere disposition to effect a substantial reform. If with these inclinations on the part of his Excellency, and with the anxiety of the British Government for the establishment of a just and efficient system of administration throughout the country of Oude, both parties now despair of accomplishing their common views under the present constitution of the Government what prospect can remain of such improvement under a successor whose youth and inexperience might not only render him insensible to the present system of abuse, but might expose him to the evil influence of every person interested in its perpetuation? If, therefore, the Nawaub Vizier should be disposed to relinquish a large portion of his treasure for the purpose of substituting one of his sons on the Musnud, the Governor-General must object to such an arrangement; because he is convinced that, under such a successor, the present abusive system of Government would become absolutely incorrigible, and the inhabitants of Oude would be exposed to the utmost extremity of distress.

But let his Excellency seriously reflect on the situation of his successor, deprived of the treasures of the State, and possessing no other resource than the current collections from the country to provide for the arrears of the civil and military establishments, for the sums due to the native public creditors, and for the necessary expenses of the Government. The Governor-General is persuaded that his Excellency will acknowledge the necessary operation of such an arrangement on the condition of the people. Their sufferings must accumulate in proportion to the embarrassments of the Prince on the Musnud; and the result must inevitably be a state of general confusion, and ultimately of desolation and despair.

With regard to the interests of the Company, they are inseparably connected with the safety of his Excellency, and with the prosperity of Oude; every objection, therefore, to his Excellency's abdication affecting either of these important objects, must be considered to apply with equal force to the security and honour of the British Government. But his Excellency's proposition involves the immediate interest of the Company directly, and in the most serious and important articles of its military resources, and of the protection and defence of its own dominions.

His Excellency was placed on the Musnud by the justice of the British Government, and has been maintained in that high situation by the British Power; and he is bound towards the Company by certain public engagements, the just performance of which it is equally the duty of his Excellency and of the Governor-General to secure. Since his Excellency's accession he has been enabled to make a considerable addition to his treasure, while the arrears of certain branches of the public establishments have increased, and no provision has been made for their discharge. Under these circumstances, his Excellency's retirement from the Government in favour of any other successor than the Company would indeed exonerate his Excellency from his engagements under the late treaty; and (on the conditions stated by his Excellency) would leave him in possession of whatever public treasure has devolved to him by the removal of Vizier

Ali, or has since been accumulated by himself, under the protection of the Company. But the embarrassments of the state of Oude and of the Company would be augmented in the same proportion in which his Excellency would be relieved. His Excellency's successor would be left in a situation of the utmost distress, with resources utterly inadequate to the present payment of the subsidy; while the security of the Company for the future payment of that demand would be shaken to the foundation by the desperate state of the country. The Governor-General has already adverted to this argument in preceding passages of this paper; but the particular obligations of the arduous trust reposed by the Company in his own person compel his Lordship to declare that, on this ground alone, (if no other objection had existed) he should have deemed himself compelled by his duty towards his country, and towards the English Company, to discountenance and even to oppose the retirement of his Excellency from the Government of Oude, on the conditions of his appropriating a share of the public treasure to his own use, and of his leaving at the same time a successor on the Musnud, bound by the treaty which his Excellency concluded with Sir John Shore, but deprived by his Excellency of the power of executing its stipulations.

His Lordship also declares his opinion, that the interests of the Company would be directly injured by a transfer of the Musnud of Oude (even if accompanied by a transfer of the whole treasure) to one of his Excellency's sons, because none of those young Princes can be so well qualified as his Excellency to discharge either the duties of alliance and friendship towards the Company or those of protection towards the people of Oude.

Having thus enumerated the obstacles which preclude the Governor-General's acquiescence in the Nawaub Vizier's proposition as communicated by his Excellency's command, his Lordship submits to his Excellency's consideration in the annexed draft of a treaty, an arrangement which appears calculated to reconcile his Excellency's desire of retiring from the Government of Oude with the principles of national justice, sound policy, and public faith, as well as with those of personal dignity, security, and honour.

The Governor-General adheres to the judgment which he originally formed respecting the Government of Oude, retaining a firm conviction that it can never be administered with ease to his Excellency, or with advantage to his subjects, without the direct introduction of the British power; and his Lordship also continues of opinion, that his Excellency may be enabled to invigorate and amend the administration of the Government of Oude, and also to secure for himself a safe and dignified retreat from the cares and dangers of his present situation without proceeding to the extremity of a formal abdication of the Musnud.

The Governor-General, however, is willing to accede to the Nawaub Vizier's desire of retiring from Lucknow, and his Excellency may rely on the most anxious exertions of the British Government to afford him every demonstration of respect and attachment wherever he may fix the place of his retirement. It must be evident to the wisdom of the Nawaub Vizier that the evil dispositions, enmity, and disobedience, of which his Excel-

lency now complains, as well as those causes which have withdrawn his mind from the Government of Oude, and disgusted him with his present situation, must ever expose his residence in any part of Oude to disquietude and disturbance. His Lordship, therefore, strongly recommends, that his Excellency should fix the seat of his future residence within the Company's dominions.

His Excellency appears to be fully convinced not only that it will ever be impossible to apply an effectual remedy to any of the evils existing in the state of Oude, while a divided authority shall be exercised in the country, but that no other power than the British Government is competent to exercise a single and individual authority over that extensive empire for the beneficial purposes of restoring public order, internal tranquillity, and external strength.

The Governor-General, therefore, advises the Nawaub Vizier to vest the exclusive administration of the civil and military Government of Oude and its dependencies in the hands of the Company, with such ample powers as shall enable the Company to act with vigour and promptitude in every branch and department of the State.

The Nawaub Vizier is well apprized that no temporary power can be efficient. Instability in the constitution of a Government is the source of languor and weakness in all its operations. The subjects of a temporary Government are perpetually agitated by the expectation of change; and the Government itself cannot establish any systematic or comprehensive plan of administration. In such a state, mutual doubt and uncertainty destroy that confidence which forms the most solid foundation of the reciprocal duties of allegiance and protection between the people and the governing power.

The Nawaub Vizier, by his own voluntary declarations, and by the extraordinary communication which he has directed to be made to the Governor-General, has imposed on his Lordship a solemn duty of the utmost delicacy, but of the most comprehensive extent; affecting the dearest and most valuable interests of a great Empire, not merely for the present moment, but to the most remote period of time; and touching the honour of the British name, as long as that name shall be commemorated among mankind. This duty is to be discharged with respect towards his Excellency, but with a freedom proportioned to the importance and solemnity of the occasion. With these sentiments, in replying to the Nawaub Vizier's communication, his Lordship conceives himself to be bound to consult the permanent and perpetual interests of the inhabitants of Oude in the establishment of a just and wise system of government, on such solid foundations as shall assure its continuance, by the best securities which the nature of circumstances can afford in this quarter of the globe.

The Governor-General, therefore, strongly recommends that the powers to be vested by the Nawaub Vizier in the Company shall be perpetual in duration, as well as ample in extent; and his Lordship, in the name of the English Company, hereby declares, that he will not accept the administration of the Government of Oude under a limited or temporary com-

mission; because such a commission would only serve to delude the Nawaub Vizier, his subjects, and the Company, by vain expectations of a reform, which could neither be effectual nor permanent.

With these preliminary observations, the Governor-General requests the attention of the Nawaub Vizier to the articles of the annexed draft of a treaty, which his Lordship trusts will be found to contain the most liberal provision for his Excellency and his family, as well as the most salutary arrangement for the Government of Oude.

If his Excellency should be pleased to conclude a treaty on the basis of the annexed draft, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott is furnished with full powers for the purpose. The Nawaub Vizier's retirement from Lucknow may be accomplished at any period of time most convenient to him, without any formality offensive to the honour or dignity of his Excellency; and as it has been generally understood that the Governor-General's public duties may detain his Lordship for some time to come within the Company's provinces, his Excellency might retire from Lucknow at a proper season for the ostensible purpose of meeting his Lordship either at Benares, or at any place to be appointed in Bahar or Bengal. In the mean while his Excellency must be sensible that every consideration of his own security and interests, as well as of the peace of Oude requires, that no part of this important transaction should transpire until the necessary arrangements shall be sufficiently mature to admit of its final disclosure.

With this view the Governor-General trusts that the Nawaub Vizier will afford every facility towards the augmentation of the British force in Oude, as well as to its distribution, in such manner as the Resident shall recommend.

The Nawaub Vizier will consider the contents of this paper to be derived exclusively from his Excellency's own unsolicited and unsuggested proposition, as signified to the Resident on the 12th of November, 1799.

If his Excellency's wisdom should dispose him to decline any arrangement founded on the annexed draft of a treaty, the Governor-General most earnestly and anxiously solicits his Excellency to advert, with all practicable despatch, to the indispensable necessity of adopting effectual measures for the reform of his military establishments previous to the conclusion of the present favourable season. His Lordship relies on the Nawaub Vizier's repeated assurances, that this most urgent and important object will neither be frustrated nor delayed.

MORNINGTON.

No. XLVIII.

The Vizier of Oude to the Earl of Mornington.

Received at Fort William, 21st December, 1799.

I have just now understood from a letter received by Colonel Scott from Colonel Collins, that Rajah Pertaub Sing, of Jyepore, having secured the assassin, Vizier Ali, had delivered him up to Colonel Collins, and that officer was proceeding with him in safe custody to this quarter; intimation of which pleasing intelligence afforded me the sincerest joy and satisfaction. This event must be attributed to the wisdom and prudence of the Company's Government, and to the fear entertained of their power and influence, and will doubtless be an example and disappointment to the enemies of the two states. May the just and righteous God ever in this manner abandon and punish the enemies of our respective governments, and may he prosper to all friends, this grateful intelligence.

I hope from your Lordship's kindness, that, deeming me desirous of receiving the pleasing accounts of your Lordship's health, you will continue to gratify me with letters until I may have the pleasure of a personal intercourse with your Lordship.

A true Translation,
N. B. EDMONSTONE.

No. XLIX.

Lieutenant-General Stuart to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Head Quarters, Bombay, 21st December, 1799.

As the returning ships of the season are preparing to leave this port, I cannot think of quitting India without conveying to your Lordship my grateful acknowledgments for the numerous instances of attention with which you have been pleased to honour me, and to express my unfeigned sentiments of veneration for your eminent character. The full establishment of the British Empire in India has been accomplished

under your Lordship's administration. By the energy and wisdom of your councils, the English arms have been directed to the most decisive and resplendent conquest that has been achieved in any age. But a discerning mind, my Lord, will not fail to respect the moral goodness of your Government, and to distinguish on a scale, even superior to victory, the uniform exercise of authority for virtuous purposes.

I shall not engage your Lordship's time further, at present, than to inform you that I have taken my passage on the *Woodford*, and expect, finally, to sail from the coast of Malabar in the first week of February. It will afford me infinite satisfaction to receive any commands that you may have for England previous to my departure; and although I cannot flatter myself of being of any service to you in that country, I beg you to accept of my fervent wishes for the continued prosperity of your Lordship's administration of these invaluable possessions,—and I have the honour to remain, with perfect respect,

My Lord,
Your Lordship's most faithful, obliged,
and devoted servant,
J. STUART.

No. L.

The Honourable P. Speke, Member of Council, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

1st January, 1800.

Nothing can be so cordially grateful to me, as any mark of your Lordship's favour. A seal of Tippoo Suldaun's the gift of your Lordship, is indeed a most auspicious commencement of the new year. May it bring your Lordship, if it is possible, an increase of glory. No length of time can ever weaken in the slightest degree, my sensations at the prodigies we have seen in the East in the year 1799, or my admiration of the talents and great qualities that could give them in so short a space, both birth and maturity.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,
Your Lordship's highly honoured
and most faithful Servant,

P. SPEKE.

No. LI.

The Honourable William Cowper, Member of Council, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Calcutta, January, 1st, 1800.

I am highly honoured and gratified by the receipt of your Lordship's note, and the seal which accompanied it. I will ever keep it in memory of the great and glorious events of this past year, and allow me, my Lord, to add, that I shall never look upon it without emotions of grateful respect and attachment for the noble donor.

I have the honour to subscribe myself, my Lord,
Your Lordship's faithful and devoted Servant,
WILLIAM COWPER.

No. LII.

(Military Department.)

Fort William, January 11th, 1800.

Minute by the Governor General,

I think it proper to record the annexed papers for the information of the members of the Council, and of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

To the Earl of Mornington, K.P. &c. &c.

MY LORD, Madras, November 12th 1799.

The army which by your Lordship's directions, proceeded to the capital of the late Tippoo Suldaun, and achieved the conquest of Mysore, resolved upon the plains of Seringapatam, to request your Lordship's acceptance of a star and badge of the order of St. Patrick, made from the jewels of the Suldaun, as a mark of their high respect.

In the name, and by the desire of that army, I have now the honour to present your Lordship with the star and badge.

In performing this pleasing duty, I am proud to feel and to acknowledge, that the splendid success of the late campaign must, under divine Providence, be in justice referred to the instructive wisdom and characteristic energy of your Lordship's councils. Those councils have formed a memorable

era in the history of India. From their effects the Company has gained a new source of increasing prosperity, and in their operation the wide spread interests of the British empire in the East, being consolidated and raised on a firm and durable basis, have attained an eminence of elevation and security hitherto unknown.

The glory of having been made by your Lordship instrumental to the acquirement of some of these inestimable advantages, excites in my mind feelings of satisfaction and gratitude, which no language can adequately convey.

A copy of the letter to me from Major-General Floyd, President of the Prize Committee, I have the honour to enclose.*

I remain with the highest respect,

Your Lordship's

very faithful and devoted humble Servant,

GEORGE HARRIS,

Lieut.-General and Commander-in-Chief
of his Majesty's and the Honourable Com-
pany's Forces, on the coasts of Coromandel
and Malabar.

* Enclosure.

To Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief, &c.

SIR,

Choultry Plain, November 9th 1799.

The army, that under your command achieved the conquest of the empire of the late Tippoo Sultaun, in the spring of this year, being anxious to offer the Earl of Mornington, K.P. Governor-General, whose wisdom prepared and directed that event, some marks of its high esteem, has caused a star and badge of the order of St. Patrick to be prepared, in which as many of the jewels as could be found suitable, were taken from the treasury of Tippoo.

I have now the pleasure of sending you the same, in a gold box and a wooden case.

I have the honour to request you will be pleased to present the star and badge to the Earl of Mornington, in the name of the army, as a mark of its respect.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, and most humble Servant,
J. FLOYD, M.G. President Prize Committee.

To his Excellency Lieut.-General Harris, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's Forces, on the Coasts of Coromandel and Malabar.

SIR, Fort William, January 7th, 1800.

Any mark of the respect of that gallant army, which achieved the conquest of Mysore, must ever be esteemed by me as a distinguished honour.

The resolution now communicated to me by your Excellency, having been adopted by the army in the hour of victory, and on the field of conquest, affords a most satisfactory testimony of their intention to associate my name with the memory of their unexampled triumph.

Under this impression, the sentiments of public zeal and the just sense of honourable ambition, concur to render me sincerely desirous of accepting the gift of the army, and wearing it as an emblem of their glory, and of their good will towards me.

I am satisfied that it never was in the contemplation of the legislature of Great Britain, to prohibit the acceptance of such honorary marks of distinction; but an attentive examination of the laws relating to the Government of the British possessions in India will convince your Excellency, that I could not accept the gift, which you present to me in the name of the army, without violating the letter of existing statutes, and without creating a precedent, which might hereafter become the source of injury to the public service.

I must therefore request your Excellency, in assuring the army of my high estimation of the honour which they design to confer upon me, to signify that my acceptance of it is precluded by the positive letter of the law.*

I return your Excellency my thanks for the obliging expressions of your letter; it is the unfeigned wish of my heart that your Excellency may long enjoy the grateful recollection of your eminent public services; and that you and the unrivalled army employed in the late glorious war, may receive from your king and country every public demonstration of the same sentiments of admiration, gratitude and affectionate respect, which your conduct has excited throughout the British empire in India.

I have the honour to be with the greatest esteem and regard, Sir,
Your Excellency's most faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

* The Governor-General in the following letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors, had previously signified his intention to decline accepting the star.

To the Chairman of the Honourable Court of Directors.

DEAR SIR, Fort St. George, 6th August, 1799.

You will perceive by the public papers, that the army have come to a resolution to present me with a diamond star, as a testimony of their respect.

Although I feel highly gratified at the favourable opinion, which an army so distinguished for their gallantry and exertions entertain of my conduct, I have upon full consideration, determined to decline this mark of honour, and it is my intention to signify to the army, the grounds on which I have formed this decision, whenever the honour intended shall be offered to me.

No. LIII.

The Earl of Mornington, to Lieut.-General Stuart, &c.

SIR,

Fort William, 12th January, 1800.

I have had the honour to receive your several letters, of the dates noted in the margin; the last announcing your intention of embarking for Europe early in the month of February. I lament extremely, that the state of your health should compel you to adopt this measure; and I shall regret with a sincerity proportionate to my high sense of your professional character, the loss which the public service will sustain by your departure from India.

I am much obliged to you for your suggestion relative to those islands of the Lacadives and Maldives, which formed part of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and I propose hereafter to give the necessary directions on that subject. These possessions certainly depended either on Malabar or on Canara; and in either case, the sovereignty of them has devolved on the Company. Whether it may be expedient to take formal possession of them, is a question for future consideration.

I request you will convey my thanks to Captain Walker, for the supplementary memoir on Malabar, enclosed in your letter of the 2nd November. I have received great satisfaction from his several able communications on that subject, and I entertain so high a sense of his talents, integrity, knowledge, and general character, that after your departure from India, it would be very satisfactory to me, if I could induce him to enter into my family. Having however, no situation to offer him but that of aid-de-camp, I fear his interests might suffer by the arrangement. My intention is to endeavour to select at all times, from the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay, officers of high character, qualified to give me information with regard to the local details of each Presidency. I found the greatest advantage under this plan, in the assistance of Major Beatson previously to the late war; and I am satis-

At present, the intention of the army has only appeared in the resolution of their Prize Committee. I trust that you and the Court of Directors will approve my conduct in this respect.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

fied that Captain Walker's services might be employed with great public benefit in my family.

You carry with you to Europe my most cordial good wishes and sincere regret for your departure; if my anxious and repeated recommendation can have any effect, you will meet with the just reward of your eminent services upon your return to your native country; it will give me great satisfaction to learn that justice has been done to my wishes, and to your merits.

Believe me with great respect and esteem, Sir,
Your most faithful and obliged Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. LIV.

The Governor General in Council to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, 18th January, 1800.

In conformity to the intention expressed in our letter of the 31st ultimo from this department, we shall now enter into a detail of the negotiations opened at Poonah, under the direction of the right honourable the Governor-General, in consequence of the treaty of Mysore.

It is necessary, however, to premise that soon after the capture of Seringapatam the Governor-General thought it proper to apprise the Resident at Poonah, that he did not intend to admit the Peishwa to an equal participation with the Company and the Nizam of the advantages resulting from the success which had crowned the efforts of the combined Armies. His Lordship observed, on this occasion, that in strict justice the Peishwa was entitled to no share whatever in these advantages, nor could the Court of Poonah, acting as it had done during the war, found the slightest claim upon the terms of any assurances which had been made to it on the part of the British Government. Considerations of policy would, however, his Lordship remarked, incline him to extend the benefits acquired by the exclusive exertions of the Company and of the Nizam, even to the Peishwa, faithless as his conduct had been. Of the cessions

which on this ground it might be expedient to make to the Mahratta Government, his Lordship could not then state the precise extent, since, in the decision of such a question, much would depend on the behaviour of the Peishwa under the new posture of affairs, and much on the dispositions which he should indicate towards the Nizam.

This communication was made to the Resident, with a view to enable him to regulate his language with regard to any expectations or hopes which he might understand the Peishwa to have formed in consequence of the overthrow of the Government of Mysore.

The Governor-General, at a very early period after the reduction of Seringapatam, conceived the design of accomplishing the whole of the arrangement with the Court of Poonah, sketched out in the instructions of the 8th of July, 1798, to Colonel Palmer by means of the territorial cessions, which it was now in the power of his Lordship to make to the Peishwa. The establishment of a subsidiary British force at Poonah still appeared to his Lordship to be a most desirable measure, although its importance had been much diminished by the conquest of Mysore. But whether a renewal of this proposition, under the actual circumstances, should prove acceptable or not to the Court of Poonah, there were some parts of the original plan of alliance on which his Lordship declared it to be his determination absolutely to insist, as indispensable, preliminaries to any cession of territory whatever to the Peishwa. Such was a complete adjustment under the arbitration of the British Government of every point then at issue between the Courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, as well as an engagement to abide by the arbitration of the Company on all future points of difference which might arise between the Courts. Such also was the perpetual exclusion of the French from the territories and armies of the Peishwa and a defensive alliance against any French invasion of India.

The Resident was subsequently directed by the Governor-General, while the negociations for the final settlement of Mysore were yet depending to take the first opportunity of assuring the Peishwa of the sincere disposition of the British Government (notwithstanding all that had passed) to cultivate his friendship, and to promote his interests, and to in-

form him that it was intended under certain conditions (the justice and moderation of which were indisputable) to make a considerable cession of territory to him, provided his conduct should not, in the interval, be such as to render all friendly intercourse with him incompatible with the honour of the British government. This reservation was suggested by a suspicion that the Mahratta forces on the southern frontier of that state had been secretly ordered by the Peishwa to enter and take possession of some of the contiguous districts of the conquered country, subsequently to his learning the fall of Seringapatam.

It having become necessary about this time that the army in Mysore should make a movement in the direction of the northern frontiers, the Resident at Poonah was further directed to assure the Peishwa in the most unequivocal terms (for the purpose of removing any impressions of jealousy or fear which that movement might create) that the measure had no other object than to secure the tranquillity and good order of our recent conquests; and that nothing could be more remote from the intentions of the Governor-General, or those of Lieutenant-General Harris (acting under his Lordship's orders) than to offer any degree of violence to the Mahratta territory. The same conciliatory and amicable declarations were directed to be made to Dowlut Rao Scindia.

Your honourable Court will observe that those articles of the Treaty of Mysore relative to the Peishwa, were framed in exact conformity to the intentions of the Governor-General as announced by his Lordship to the Resident at Poonah so early as the 23rd of May.*

That treaty being ratified by the right honourable the Governor-General in Council at Fort St. George on the 26th of June, was transmitted on the same day to the Resident at Hyderabad, who, upon its ratification by his Highness the Nizam, was directed to forward without delay a copy of the same to the Resident at Poonah. Colonel Palmer was instructed immediately on receipt of the treaty, to communicate it to the Peishwa, and to invite him to accede to it. The mode in which it appeared to the Governor-General to be expedient that the Peishwa should accede to the treaty of

* See page 12.

Mysore, being by a separate treaty to be concluded between his Highness and the Company, a draft of such a treaty was transmitted by his Lordship's orders to the Resident.

Colonel Palmer was desired by the Governor-General to suggest any alterations or amendments in this draft which might appear to him advisable; but if no point arose requiring a deviation from the fundamental principles of the proposed treaty, and of his Lordship's instructions, the Resident was directed and empowered to proceed to the completion of such treaty without further reference to the Governor-General.

Although the Governor-General was anxious, if the subsidiary force should be applied for, that it should be made permanent; yet the importance of establishing a British force at Poonah in the actual crisis was such, that his Lordship signified to the Resident, that he was disposed to accede even to a temporary arrangement for that purpose, provided the period was made definite, and not too short. This qualification appeared necessary to his Lordship, because it was obvious that without it the expense of providing the new military force might suddenly become an additional and embarrassing burden upon the finances of the Company.

With a view to obviate, as far as possible, any objection by the Court of Poonah to the article relative to the subsidiary force, on the ground of expence, the Governor-General endeavoured (respecting the Mahratta collections in Surat) to provide the means of relieving the Peishwa, in a considerable degree from the burden of the subsidy. Nor was it improbable that the government of Bombay would be disposed to allow to the Peishwa, by way of commutation for his claims in Surat, a much larger sum than he ever had, or could have derived from that source of revenue. At a subsequent period Colonel Palmer was empowered, as an additional means of facilitating his negociation, to treat for the cession of Bancoot, or Fort Victoria, to the Peishwa.

The counter propositions of the court of Poonah, founded on those which had been submitted to the Peishwa on the part of the Governor-General, were delivered to Colonel Palmer on the 16th June, and transmitted by him to his Lordship on the following day. Your honourable Court will observe,

that the plea of inability to fulfil its engagements, stated by the Court of Poonah in the 5th article of the Peishwa's propositions is a direct admission that the Mahratta state was not entitled to any share of the conquered territories of Mysore, for whatever might be their inclination, nothing less than an effective co-operation in the field could have been deemed to amount to such a performance of their engagements, as could constitute the foundation of a right to participate in our recent conquests; but even their inclination had been at least equivocal, and by the continued intercourse with the enemy, they had precluded themselves from the benefit of the Resident's declaration, made in the Governor-General's name, under the express condition of their renouncing all such intercourse during the war. Their conduct in the former war could not serve as a plea to justify a totally different behaviour in the late one. It might as well have been contended, that the Nizam should be now punished for his want of zeal in the former war, as that the Mahrattas should now be rewarded for their alacrity at that period.

On these grounds, the Governor-General directed the Resident to explain distinctly to the Peishwa, that his Lordship could not consent to negotiate with him under any admission of his right to an equal, or to any share of the dominions of the late Tippoo Sultaun; and that whatever cessions might be made to him from those territories, must be deemed gratuitous on the part of the Company and of the Nizam, excepting in as far as they should be compensated by correspondent concessions on the part of the Peishwa.

By a letter from the Resident at Poonah, dated the 29th June, the Peishwa's minister did not scruple to express a hope that his Court would be admitted to an equal share of the conquered Territory of Mysore. Such a pretension appeared to the Governor-General the more extravagant and untenable, as his Lordship did not admit even the Nizam's claim to equal partition, for although a share of free territorial revenue, holden in direct sovereignty had been assigned to His Highness the Nizam, equal to that of the same description retained by the Company, yet His Highness's right extended only to a share of the conquests, proportioned to his expence and exertions in the war, and if any advantage

had been given to the Nizam beyond that proportion, it was wholly gratuitous. Under this principle of partition it was obvious that the Peishwa was destitute of every claim; and admitting even that the stipulations of the treaties of Poonah and Paungal applied to the late war, (which they evidently did not, those of the 10th article excepted) the Peishwa would still be excluded from all participation in the conquered territory, by the very terms of the 10th article of the treaty of Poonah, which specify, that the allies respectively shall be entitled to a share of such conquests only as shall be made subsequent to the entrance of their respective armies into the enemy's country.

In addition to the foregoing arguments, with which the Resident at Poonah was furnished by the Governor-General for the purpose of justifying the principles of the treaty of Mysore to the Court of Poonah, his Lordship observed, that if the Peishwa's pretensions to a share of the conquered territory were unfounded, the selection of districts which he had demanded in order to constitute that share, was still more extravagant, both with respect to their value and geographical position.

His Lordship further remarked on this occasion to the Resident at Poonah, that the benefits which accrued to the Mahratta State, from the subversion of Tippoo Sultaun's dominions were of much greater importance than the acquisition of territory. Since it had appeared from the various authentic papers, found in the palace at Seringapatam, some of which were in the Sultaun's own hand writing, that it was his determined resolution, by the aid of the French, to recover from the Mahrattas, as well as the Nizam and the English, the territory which he had been compelled to cede to them at the conclusion of the war in 1792. His Lordship directed this circumstance to be particularly pointed out to the Court of Poonah; observing, that it ought to make a considerable impression on the Peishwa's mind, and convince him how essentially his own security was concerned in uniting cordially with the other allies, to oppose a barrier to the designs of the French. In conclusion, the Governor-General desired it might be represented to the Peishwa, that in the place of a formidable power, hostile to the Mahratta State, from the impulse of bigotry, ambition and revenge, was now substituted

a friendly dominion, under a Prince of the same religion with the Peishwa; and that, together with this eminent advantage, he had it in his power to make a considerable addition to his territorial possessions, by acceding to an arrangement of which the effect would assuredly be the re-establishment of his authority, and the prosperity and security of his government and country.

The conduct of the Court of Poonah in the pending negotiation, although in some respects unreasonable and unsatisfactory, had not hitherto been calculated to extinguish the hopes entertained by the Governor-General, of the Peishwa's ultimate accession to the treaty of Mysore, on the principles and conditions of his Lordship's propositions, which were not now less favourable to the true interests of the Peishwa than in the summer of 1798, when that Prince had manifested an eager desire to treat with the Company on a similar basis. It soon appeared, however, that either the Peishwa had not been sincere in any stage of the negotiation, or that the subjection in which he continued to be held by Scindia (who probably foresaw the destruction of his own usurped power, in the proposed arrangements between the Company and the Court of Poonah) operated to prevent his concurrence in a plan which would not have conduced more to the security of the British interests, and to the general tranquillity of India, than to the re-establishment of the rights and authority of Baajy Row himself.

Your honourable Court will observe with astonishment that the Peishwa is represented by the Resident as expressing a reluctance, not merely to comply with any particular article of the proposed treaty, but to recognize one of its most inseparable principles; namely, that the Mahratta State would not commit any act of aggression against the Rajah of Mysore's territories. This reluctance appeared the more extraordinary to the Governor-General, as the Peishwa had not long before declared a similar engagement with regard to the Nizam to be superfluous, because the Mahratta State was already bound by treaty, *not to commit any aggression against the allies of the Company*. The conduct of the Peishwa in thus avowing a disinclination to comply with the just and reasonable condition referred to, joined to the intimation conveyed by Nana on that occasion (*viz.*, that this reluctance

might be overcome by an increase of the Peishwa's share in the conquered territories) amounted, in the Governor-General's opinion, to an indication of a spirit so hostile to all good understanding, as greatly diminished his Lordship's desire to pursue the negotiation any further. For this reason the Resident was instructed, in the event of the Peishwa's not having acceded to the treaty of Mysore, within the period fixed by the 7th article of that treaty (i. e. by the 19th of August), and of the negotiation having been in consequence broken off, to signify both to Baajy Row and to the Minister, not only the extreme displeasure excited in his Lordship's mind by the last communication from the Court of Poonah, but also the determination of his Lordship not to renew the late discussions between the two Governments, until he should be better satisfied of the sincerity of his Highness's disposition, to cultivate and improve his connection with the British nation.

The Resident was directed to call upon the Peishwa, in the event of his not having acceded to the treaty of Mysore within the limited period, to adopt effectual measures for withdrawing immediately such of his troops as might have entered the territory of Mysore, whether by or without his Highness's authority, to the end that when the Company's forces came to take possession of the reserved districts, destined to compose the Peishwa's share, there might be no danger of any thing occurring of a nature prejudicial to the friendship and good understanding actually subsisting between the two Governments.

Such was the state of the negotiation on the departure of the Governor-General from Fort St. George. On his Lordship's arrival at this Presidency, he received a letter from the Resident at Poonah, by which it manifestly appeared that nothing was further from the intention of the Peishwa than to accede to the treaty of Mysore, on the conditions which had been proposed to him.

In consequence of these advices Colonel Palmer was immediately directed to inform the Peishwa and Nana Furnavese, that we considered all negotiation, on the basis of the Treaty of Mysore, to be concluded; but that, although we deeply regretted his Highness's rejection of an arrangement, which had no other object than the improvement of the friendship

and alliance subsisting between the three States, and which was, at least, as much calculated to promote the interests of the Peishwa as those of the Company and the Nizam; we did not feel any diminution of our amicable disposition towards his Highness.

The Resident was further instructed to apprise the Court of Poonah that, conformably to the stipulations of the treaty of Mysore, the Company's Government would proceed immediately, in concert with his Highness the Nizam, to a division of the reserved territory. Colonel Palmer was at the same time informed that we relied with confidence on the Peishwa's taking effectual means to prevent any of the officers of his Government from attempting to interrupt, in any degree, the execution of this measure, and on his compelling them to respect the rights of the Company and of the Nizam, in their recent acquisitions on the side of the Mahratta frontier, with the same scrupulous attention which was invariably manifested by the Company's Government, in regard to the rights of all its neighbours.

To these communications the Resident was ordered to add a declaration of our confidence, notwithstanding the Peishwa had not thought proper to accede to the treaty of Mysore, that he would perceive the necessity and propriety of causing all his subjects of every description to abstain, with the utmost care, from trespassing in any manner on the territories of the Rajah of Mysore, which the Company were bound to defend against all powers without exception.

Colonel Palmer was in conclusion directed never either to invite or encourage any renewal of the late negotiation, but to reply to every attempt of the nature, that his instructions permitted him merely to transmit to the Governor-General in Council any propositions of that tendency which might be made to him.

Your Honourable Court will perceive, on a reference to the correspondence of the Resident, that the Peishwa throughout the negotiation manifested great anxiety that the objects of it should be carefully concealed from the knowledge of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You will find likewise that, although the Governor-General had provided, in his plan of a treaty, for the absolute dismissal of all the French in the service of the Peishwa, and was not insensible to the importance of procur-

ing their general expulsion from the Mahratta empire, the Peishwa unexpectedly anticipated his Lordship's wishes in this respect, by spontaneously proposing that all the French then in the service of the Mahratta State should be expelled, and that if obstruction should be offered the two Governments, should concert together the means of removing it. Your Honourable Court will observe, that the Peishwa was particularly solicitous that this part of the negotiation (evidently pointing at the French officers in the service of Scindiah) should not transpire; and that for this purpose his Highness suggested the adoption of extraordinary precautions. Notwithstanding, however, so many appearances of an earnest, and (as it seemed) a prudent desire to keep Scindiah in ignorance of the tenour of the pending treaty; you will find, by the subsequent despatches of Colonel Palmer, that his Highness not only himself revealed the whole transaction to Scindiah, but consulted with that chieftain respecting the conduct proper to be pursued on the occasion. Although, therefore, the Court of Poonah continued to indicate a wish to keep the negotiation open, it was evident, as well from the duplicity of Baajy Rao in this last stage of it, as from various instances of his caprice and exorbitant pretensions during its progress, that no advantage could result to your interests from a longer pursuit of the object under such unfavourable circumstances, and especially while Scindiah maintained an exclusive and despotic sway over the Councils of Poonah. The Governor-General, therefore, finally determined to relinquish the measure for the present, and to await a more propitious conjuncture, and in pursuance of this resolution, his Lordship proceeded to the division of the reserved territory, between the Company and the Nizam.

We shall conclude this account of the late negotiation at Poonah with observing, that its failure has not excited in us any apprehension for the general tranquillity. For while the justice and liberality of our propositions have been so manifest, and our conduct throughout the negotiation so moderate and conciliatory, as to preclude any reasonable ground of complaint on the part of the Court of Poonah, the actual state of the Mahratta empire affords us abundant security against any aggression on the part of that restless and ambitious nation.

The failure of the negotiations is indeed to be attributed to the same causes which leave us without any apprehension of its effects. The Mahratta empire, in its present distracted condition, is in fact rendered incapable of forming or of maintaining any engagement with other States, and the weakness and instability of the Councils of Poonah are become more conspicuous as well as more desperate from the perverse and intractable character of Baajy Rao. In such a posture of affairs, the arguments on which the Governor-General (in his separate letter to your Honourable Court of the 3rd of August, 1799),* rested the policy of a cession of territory to the Peishwa, are no longer applicable to the actual circumstances of the case, and the direct and immediate advantages of territorial acquisition by the Company, under the division of the reserved territory, are unquestionably preferable to any contingent benefit which could be expected from a more intimate connection with the Mahratta empire in its present condition. The Governor-General in Council, however, will anxiously observe any change of circumstances which may favour an improvement of our political relations with the Court of Poonah.

We have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

your most faithful, humble Servants,

MORNINGTON.

ALURED CLARKE.

PETER SPEKE.

WILLIAM COWPER.

No. LV.

Minute by the Governor-General.

Fort William, January 19th, 1800.

The 10th regiment of native infantry having arrived at Cawnpore, after an absence from this Presidency of more than three years and a half, the most noble the Governor-General in Council has great satisfaction in expressing his

* See p. 72.

entire approbation of the exemplary conduct of this distinguished regiment, in the several arduous and important services on which it has been employed in the Peninsula of India during its long absence from these provinces.

His Lordship in Council is happy to bear this public testimony to the merits of the European officers, under whose command this corps has attained so high a state of discipline, regularity, and order; and he entertains a just sense of the fidelity and attachment to the service manifested by the native officers and private soldiers of the regiment throughout the whole period of their laborious duties at Hyderabad, in Mysore, and during their long march from the Deccan to the province of Oude.

The conduct of the artillery and lascars, who have been attached to the regiment during the time of its absence from these provinces, is equally entitled to commendation.

To perpetuate the memory of the services of the 10th regiment, to distinguish the individuals who have served in the corps, and to recommend their laudable example to the emulation of the whole native service, the most noble Governor-General in Council is pleased to order that honorary medals be conferred on all the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the 10th regiment, and also to the lascars belonging to the artillery, which has been attached to that regiment during the time of its absence from these provinces.

MORNINGTON.

No. LVI.

The Governor-General in Council to the Honourable the Court of Directors, for the Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies.

HON. SIRS,

Fort William, January 23d, 1800.

Being convinced, on a consideration of the present importance of the British interests in India, that it is highly expedient to establish a regular plan for affording to your Honourable Court, at a stated period annually, a complete and distinct view, in the most compendious form, of the state of the Indian finances, and being satisfied, after much attention to the subject, that it is scarcely possible to devise a

more concise and perspicuous mode of arranging the matter necessary to be laid before you for this purpose, than the mode observed by the late Select Committee of Finance of the House of Commons of Great Britain in their first report, dated March the 31st, 1797. We propose to adopt the form of that report in this despatch as closely as circumstances will admit.

We conceive that, the period of the close of our official year in India is of all others that which is best calculated for enabling us to afford, in the proposed view, the most complete and accurate information.

We shall, therefore, proceed to lay before your Honourable Court a view of the public debts bearing interest at the close of the respective official years 1797-8 and 1798-9, as well as of the actual revenues and charges in those two official years respectively, of the demands outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799; of the estimates of the expected revenues and charges for the current year 1799-1800; and of the progress which has been made and may be expected to be made in the reduction of the public debts.

I.—Public debts bearing interest :—The total amount of public debts bearing interest at the several Provinces, as they stood on the 1st of May, 1798, was, sicca rupees, 7,18,73,261, * viz., Bengal, 4,91,83,471; Fort St. George, 1,61,58,469; Bombay, 60,47,659; Bencoolen, 4,83,662.—Total 7,18,73,261.

The annual charge at the several Presidencies for interest on the principal above stated, at the same period, was, sicca rupees, 59,51,282, viz., Bengal, 42,39,555; Fort St. George, 12,36,134; Bombay, 4,39,343; Bencoolen, 36,250.—Total, 59,51,282.

The increase in the public debts at the several presidencies between the 1st of May, 1798, and the 30th of April, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 1,04,05,002, viz. Bengal, 72,74,510; Fort St. George, 17,89,941; Bombay, 13,40,551.—Total, 1,04,05,002.

The annual charge at the several Presidencies for interest on the above increase of debt was on the 1st of May, 1799, sicca rupees, 12,90,938, viz., Bengal, 7,23,906; Fort St. George, 3,87,486; Bombay, 1,79,546.—Total, 12,90,938.

The total amount of the public debts of the several Presidencies as they

* In the statement of the public accounts in this despatch, the Bombay rupee is reckoned of equal value with the Bengal sicca rupee; the star pagoda is converted into Bengal money at the rate of crs. 400 per 100 star pagodas, and the dollar at Bencoolen, at 2½ sicca rupees per dollar.

stood on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 8,22,78,263,* viz., Bengal, 5,64,57,981; Fort St. George, 1,79,48,410; Bombay, 73,88,210; Bencoolen, 4,83,662.—Total, 8,22,78,263.

The total annual charge for interest thereon at the period above stated, was, sicca rupees, 72,42,220, viz., Bengal, 49,63,461; Fort St. George, 16,23,620; Bombay, 6,18,889; Bencoolen, 36,250.—Total, 72,42,220.

The sum to be issued by the Commissioners in Bengal for reducing the public debts in India at the rate of 2 per cent. on the principal outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 16,45,565.

And the total amount of the annual charges of the public debts, including sums applicable to the reduction thereof, as it stood on the 1st of May, 1799, was 88,87,785.

We beg leave to state in this place, that the observations of the Select Committee of Finance in their first report, regarding the public debt in England, apply exactly to the above statement of the public debt in India, viz.

1st. "That its amount is not to be considered as if it could only be extinguished by a redemption at par, in as much as the progressive reduction of the debt by the present sinking fund constantly operates, by buying up the debt according to the current price of the stocks," the effect of which will be stated more fully in a subsequent part of this address.

2nd. "That the funded capital of the public debt includes in it the amount of the capital purchased by the Commissioners for reducing the public debt."

And 3rdly. "That the annual charge upon the public by way of interest, includes in it the interest of the stock purchased by the Commissioners."

II. Actual revenues and charges in the years 1797-8 and 1798-9,

The total amount of the revenues collected in the official year 1797-8 was sicca rupees, 6,66,27,065, viz., Bengal, 4,92,35,489; Fort St. George, 1,43,16,593; Bombay, 30,22,385; Bencoolen, 52,598.—Total 6,66,27,065.

The total amount of the revenues collected in the official year 1798-9 was, sicca rupees, 7,14,25,026, viz., Bengal, 5,06,98,124; Fort St. George, 1,74,09,931; Bombay, 32,64,373; Bencoolen, 52,598.—Total 7,14,25,026 And consequently the amount of the revenues collected in 1798-9 exceeded the amount collected in 1797-8 in the sum of sicca rupees, 47,97,961, viz., Bengal, 14,62,635; Fort St. George, 30,93,338; Bombay, 2,41,988. Total, 47,97,961.

The total amount of the charges in the official year 1797-8 was, sicca ru-

* The accounts for 1798-9 not having been received from Bencoolen, the revenues, charges, and debts of that settlement are here stated at their amount in the preceding year.

pees. 6,14,20,632, viz., Bengal, 3,34,07,555; Fort St. George, 1,86,00,634; Bombay, 85,77,180; Bencoolen, 8,35,263.—Total, 6,14,20,632.

The total amount of the charges in the official year 1798-9, was, sicca rupees, 7,34,83,473, viz., Bengal, 3,28,59,710; Fort St. George, 2,88,53,865; Bombay, 1,09,34,635; Bencoolen, 8,35,263.—7,34,83,473. And consequently the amount of the charges in 1798-9 exceeded the amount of the charges in 1797-8 in the sum of sicca rupees, 1,20,62,841, viz., Fort St. George, 1,02,53,231; Bombay, 23,57,455. Deduct, 1,26,10,686. Decrease in the charges at Bengal in 1798-9, 5,47,845. Net excess, 1,20,62,841. The amount of the revenue collected in 1797-8 was 6,66,27,065; the amount of the charges in that year was, 6,14,20,632. The amount of the charge for interest of the public debts in that year was 49,02,398.—Total, 6,63,23,030. And consequently the surplus revenue in 1797-8 was 3,04,035; the amount of the revenues collected in 1798-9 was 7,14,25,026; the amount of the charges in that year was 7,34,83,473; the amount of the charges for interest of the public debt in that year was 63,31,381.—Total 7,98,14,854. And consequently the amount of the charges in 1798-9 exceeded the amount of the revenues collected in that year in the sum of 83,89,828.

III. Demands outstanding on the 1st of May, 1799. The amount of the outstanding demands, including arrears of allowances, &c. not bearing interest on the 1st of May was, sicca rupees 1,85,24,814, viz., Bengal, 1,53,06,298; Fort St. George, 16,21,738; Bombay, 15,96,778.—Total, 1,85,24,814.

IV. Estimate of the expected revenues and charges in the year 1799-1800. The total amount of the revenues expected to be collected in the official year 1799-1800 is, sicca rupees, 7,72,57,591, viz., Bengal 5,25,29,429, Fort St. George, 2,15,05,676; * Bombay, 32,22,486.—Total, 7,72,57,591.

The total amount of the estimated charges of the official year 1799-1800 is, sicca rupees, 6,90,99,350, viz., Bengal, 3,59,33,064; Fort St. George, 2,01,71,686; Bombay, 1,29,94,600.—Total, 6,90,99,350. The amount of the revenues expected to be collected in 1799-1800 is 7,72,57,591. The amount of the charges estimated for that year is 6,90,99,350. The amount of the estimated charge for interest of the public debts in that year is 72,42,220.—Total 7,63,41,570. And consequently the estimated surplus revenue in 1799-1800 is 9,16,021.

V. Reduction of the public debt.—The annual sum applicable to that purpose on the 1st of May, 1799, was, sicca rupees, 16,24,000, viz, the original appropriation of 2 per cent. on the estimated amount of the public debt on the 1st of January, 1798, being 6,50,00,000, was 13,00,000.

The further appropriation at the same rate on the amount of the increase of the debts between the 1st of January and the 31st of December, 1798, being, in round numbers, 1,03,60,000 was 2,07,000. The estimated

* There is reason to expect from advices received from Fort St. George since the date of the estimate of that presidency, that the estimated receipts from the new territorial acquisitions in Mysore, as well as on account of the subsidy of the Rajah of Mysore will be considerably exceeded.

amount of interest receivable on securities redeemed and to be redeemed was 1,16,800. The total appropriation in 1799-1800 was 16,24,000.

The amount of government securities redeemed in 1798-9 was, sicca rupees, 15,90,186 viz., principal in 8 per cents, 12,43,379, ditto in 6 per cents, 2,89,729.—Add, interest which had accrued on the principal, but which was not due at the time of purchase, 57,060.—Total, 15,90,186.

The amount actually applied to the purchase of securities on account of the appropriation for the year 1797 being, sicca rupees, 13,00,000 was 12,97,466.

The interest which was received in 1798-9 on account of securities previously redeemed was 51,249.

The total amount appropriated in 1798-9 to the purchase of government securities was 13,48,715. And consequently the gain being the difference to the Company between the actual rate of purchase and a redemption at par was 2,41,471.

With regard to the further progress which may be expected to be made in the redemption of the debt now existing, we cannot venture at present to question the calculation stated in the Accountant General's letter dated the 10th of January, 1798, of the sum to be appropriated annually, being likely to produce on an average eight per cent. per annum, although the late purchases have considerably exceeded that rate.

In the event of that calculation being correct, the whole of the debts existing on the 1st of January, 1798, viz., sicca rupees 6,50,00,000 will be redeemed in nineteen years; to be reckoned from the 1st of May, 1799, and the further increase of debt incurred between the 1st of January, 1798, and the 31st of December of the same year inclusive, viz., sicca rupees, 1,03,60,000, will be redeemed in twenty years, to be reckoned also from the 1st of May, 1799.

In one point of view, however, there seems to be some reason for considering the calculation above stated of the average produce of the fund as rather too high, although, if it should prove so, the error in the calculation cannot by any means be regarded as a subject of regret.

It is probable that such an addition may be made in a few years to the active capital of these provinces from the increasing confidence of the natives in the solid establishment, good faith, and just laws of the British Government, combined with the natural augmentation of capital to be expected from the growing prosperity of the country, as to raise public credit, and consequently the value of the public securities, in such a degree as shall reduce the produce of the funds to be

invested by the Commissioners considerably below the estimated average of eight per cent. per annum.

If, however, this should prove to be the case, Government would be enabled to raise money at a reduced rate of interest for the discharge of the eight per cent. debt, and consequently to obtain for the Company by such reduction of interest an advantage probably more than equivalent to the deficiency in the estimated produce of the sinking fund; while the reduction, which would naturally follow in the general rate of interest to be paid for mercantile purposes, would afford the most substantial aid towards promoting the general industry and trade of the people, subject to the authority of the British Government in India.

The preceding observations apply only to the general sinking fund established at this Presidency on the 3d of April, 1798, for the redemption of the whole of the Company's debts in India.

We cannot at present enter into any detailed view of the effect of the separate sinking fund established at Fort St. George on the 1st of October, 1799, for the purpose of confirming the restoration of public credit of that Presidency, and of aiding the general sinking fund in Bengal, so short a period has elapsed since its institution.

We beg leave, however, to observe that, the separate sinking fund at Fort St. George, as well as the general sinking fund in Bengal, has been of essential advantage to public credit.

It is scarcely possible to form any estimate of the produce of the sinking fund at Fort St. George, of any distant period, since its operation is to cease as soon as the public securities of Bengal shall be at par, which may be the case, at a short or a more remote period, according to circumstances, but which cannot be considered as coming within the scope of calculation at present.

It must, however, be evident to your Honourable Court, that the Government will then have to consider the propriety of extending the operation of the sinking fund at Fort St. George to a more distant period.

We shall, therefore, content ourselves on the present occasion with stating, that the sum applicable to the reduction of the debts of that Presidency, amounting on the 1st of May,

1799, to sicca rupees 1,79,48,410, at the rate of two per cent. was 3,58,968.

Having now completed our proposed view of the finance of India, and of the ordinary revenues and charges, according to the order observed by the Select Committee of Finance, we shall proceed to lay before your Honourable Court, a view of the extraordinary receipts and disbursements in the past year 1798-9, including the deficit before stated, on a comparison of the revenues and charges of that year; and also in like manner, a view of the estimated receipts and disbursements in the current year 1799-1800; in order to shew, in the clearest point of view, the whole amount of the extraordinary services to be provided for, and our means of providing for them in each of those years respectively.

The amount of the deficit on a comparison of the ordinary revenues and charges in 1798-9 was as is before stated, sicca rupees, 83,89,828.

The amount of the extraordinary services to be provided for, exclusive of the deficit above stated was 3,93,34,275, viz., temporary loans and bills falling in course of payment in the same year, Bengal, 61,00,623; Fort St. George, 25,17,852.—Total, 86,18,475.

Arrears of bills at Bengal, 17,83,505. Investments for Europe, Bengal, 58,26,426; Fort St. George, 26,20,886; Bombay, 13,39,384.—Total, 97,86,696.

Supplies to China.—Bengal, 12,93,099; Fort St. George, 9,14,268; Bombay, 17,474.—Total, 22,25,201.

Supplies from Bengal to Bencoolen, Ceylon, Amboyna and Malacca, Prince of Wales' Island, St. Helena, and the Cape of Good Hope, 31,13,123.

Arrears and other miscellaneous disbursements, Bengal, 60,71,986; Fort St. George, 63,62,768; Bombay, 13,72,521.—Total, 1,38,07,275.—Total, 3,93,34,275.—Total, 4,77,24,103.

The amount of the extraordinary means of providing for the above services was 1,99,83,302, viz., sale of imports, Bengal, 18,75,009; Fort St. George, 10,80,269; Bombay, 20,00,834.—Total, 49,56,112.

Specie received at Madras from England, and Bills drawn by that government on the Court of Directors, 24,95,203.

Miscellaneous receipts.—Bengal, 68,51,996; Fort St. George, 47,06,593; Bombay, 9,73,308.—1,25,31,897.—Total, 1,99,83,302. And consequently the total amount of the deficit of the year 1798-9 was sicca rupees, 2,77,40,801, the amount of the loans actually made to provide for the above deficit was 2,18,30,396 viz., Bengal 12 per cents. 65,28,631; 10 per cents, 65,89,142; 6 per cents. 3,06,589. Fort St. George, 12 per cents. 33,60,579; 10 per cents. 25,06,359; 8 per cents. 7,72,224. Bombay, 12 per cents, 12,73,945; 10 per cents 4,78,300; 9 per cents. 14,829.—Total, 2,18,30,596.

The amount of the difference between the deficit before stated, and the sum actually raised as above stated, and which was supplied by a reduction of the estimated balance, and an increase of the arrears of bills of exchange from other Presidencies was 59,10,205.—Total sicca rupees 2,77,40,801.

The amount of the estimated extraordinary services to be provided for in the current year 1799-1800 is 5,98,39,631, viz., temporary loans, Bengal, 61,20,000; Fort St. George, 1,14,23,448; Bombay, 5,67,833.—Total, 1,81,11,281.

Arrears of bills at Bengal, 50,00,000.

Investment for Europe.—Bengal, 90,51,724; Fort St. George, 45,83,231; Bombay, 30,50,000.—Total, 1,66,84,955.

Supplies to China.—Bengal, 15,00,000; Fort St. George, 2,40,328; Bombay, 2,00,000.—Total, 19,40,328.

Supplies to Bencoolen, Ceylon, and other subordinate settlements.—Bengal, 20,60,000; Fort St. George, 12,79,310; Bombay, 55,000.—Total, 33,94,310.

Arrears and other miscellaneous disbursements.—Bengal, 69,98,080; Fort St. George, 67,50,490; Bombay, 9,60,207. 1,47,08,777.—Total, 5,98,39,651.

The amount of the estimated extraordinary means of providing for the above services is 2,02,65,576, viz., Bengal, 25,00,000; Fort St. George, 12,57,214; Bombay, 20,30,000.—Total, 57,87,214,

Specie from, and bills on England, Bengal, 34,80,000; Fort St. George, 26,88,720; Bombay, 12,00,000.—Total 73,68,720.

Miscellaneous Receipts. Bengal, 29,16,052; Fort St. George, 34,08,710; Bombay, 7,84,880. 71,09,642—Total, 2,02,65,576.

Add the estimated amount of the surplus revenue for 1799-1800, being as is before stated, 9,16,021—Total, 2,11,81,597. And consequently the total amount of the estimated deficit of the current year 1799-1800 was, 3,86,58,054.

The amount of the loans estimated to be made in 1799-1800, 3,88,46,641, viz., Bengal, 2,84,00,000; Fort St. George, 78,56,641; Bombay, 25,90,000—Total, 3,88,46,641.

On a view of the information afforded by the preceding statements, the following results will appear—

1st. That the amount of the loans contracted at Bengal and Fort St. George on the condition of theirs being re-payable in one or two years, at the option of Government, for the payment of which provision was to be made in the last and current years (a large portion of which, it was indispensably necessary to discharge at Fort St. George at the critical period of the army taking the field), was sicca rupees 2,67,29,756.

2nd. That the amount of the advances for investments for Europe at the several Presidencies within the same period, was 2,64,71,651.

3rd. That the amount of the provisions made for the supply of the treasury at Canton, within the same period, (which has since been largely increased) was sicca rupees 41,65,529.

The extraordinary magnitude of these services, and the heavy drains upon our finance for the support of the several possessions obtained by conquest from the French and Dutch, combined with the extreme urgency of effectual provision being made for the vigorous prosecution of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, will, we trust, fully satisfy your Honourable Court that, under all the circumstances of our situation, it was not possible for us to have raised so large pecuniary supplies within the limited period, in which they were required, on terms more advantageous for the Company than those on which the respective loans were elected.

We have now the satisfaction to acquaint your Honourable Court that, although the late eight per cent. loan was opened under most disadvantageous circumstances, in consequence of the heavy pressure of the draughts upon us from Fort St. George, which kept our general treasury in a state of insolvency during the whole period in which the loan was open, the sum subscribed to it amounted to about thirty-three lacs of sicca rupees.

We have the farther satisfaction to acquaint you that the state of public credit is now more favourable than it has ever been during the last three years; the discount being this day (January 23rd,) on eight per cents. about five per cent., and on six per cents. about thirteen and a half per cent.; and that, under the present promising appearances of the continuance of peace in India, of the progressive improvement of the public revenue, and of the beneficial effects of the sinking funds established at this Presidency and Fort St. George, combined with the advantages resulting from the mode which we have lately adopted of borrowing money on obligations, payable only according to priority of date and number, and with the aid of the annual supply of bullion to be expected in consequence of the large amount of the provisions which we have made for the supply of the treasury at Canton, we entertain considerable expectation that the state of public credit will be so far improved in the course of another year as to raise our ordinary eight per cent. notes to par.

We have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON and Council.

No. LVII.

Sir J. Anstruther, to the Earl of Mornington.

MY DEAR LORD,

Chowringhee, January 24th, 1800.

I had the honour of yours yesterday, enclosing copies of two letters from General Harris, upon the subject of the present made to you by the army, which achieved the conquest of Mysore, and a copy of your letter to General Harris, dated 7th January, 1800.

It is almost unnecessary after what your Lordship knows of my sentiments upon the subject, to say how perfectly I coincide in every sentiment contained in your letter. You know too, that my opinion upon the subject was early formed long before I had the possibility of any personal communication with you, and while the matter was only known here through the medium of Madras newspapers.

At the same time that I am under the necessity of saying, that the letter of the law stands in the way of the receipt of such a present, I must regret that it prevents the acceptance of a gift equally honourable to the giver and the receiver; I am fully sensible that the spirit of the law never intended, or could intend to put such cases like the present, yet I am far from being sure that the letter of the law is either improvident or unwise. That which is to day the honourable testimonies of the esteem of a gallant army, for that wisdom which guided, and that vigour which animated, its exertions, may, to-morrow become the reward of some less glorious service.

If the army is to express its opinion of the abilities and talents of the Governor-General, by a large and a valuable present, why is not the civil service to do the same.

If upon the occasion of a great, a splendid and important conquest, why not upon any other occasion in which it may appear to the givers that the conduct of the Governor-General merits their approbation, till in the end the letter of the law becomes indeed a dead letter.

In enacting the laws which prohibit the receipt of gifts or presents in India, the legislature had in view the extreme difficulty in most cases, and the impossibility in many, of penetrating into the motives which actuate the giver and the

receiver. It therefore thought it wise to prohibit the receipt altogether, without in any case entering into the honourable or the dishonourable motives which might influence the conduct either of the giver or the receiver. I must therefore in the present instance, add my mite of approbation to your Lordship's determination, although I own I do it with a full persuasion that the letter of the law alone stands in the way of your acceptance of this mark of the esteem of an army, which under your auspices has achieved the most splendid conquest, which ever graced the British arms in India, but of which, even the splendour was almost effaced by its important and permanent consequences.

I am, my dear Lord yours, very sincerely,

J. ANSTRUTHER.

No. LVIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Secret Committee of the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, January 25th, 1800.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the duplicate of your letter overland, dated the 18th of June, 1799.* The original has not yet reached me.

I have great satisfaction in being able to acquaint you, that your adoption of the measures which I recommended of sending large supplies of bullion to India, has been attended with advantages to the public interests fully adequate to my most sanguine expectations.

It is to this measure, combined with the prosperous issue of the late war in Mysore, that I attribute the improved state of public credit, visible in the present prices† of government securities, and in the terms on which we have borrowed money at the several Presidencies.

It is also owing to this measure that we have been enabled to make provision at the several Presidencies in India, for the supply of the treasury at Canton in the ensuing year, 1800-1, to an amount which will fall little short of a million sterling.

* See Vol I. p. 614.

† January 23, 1800. $\left. \begin{array}{l} 8 \text{ per cent } 5 \\ 6 \text{ ditto } 13\frac{1}{2} \end{array} \right\} \text{discount.} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} 12 \text{ per cent } 1\frac{1}{4} \\ 10 \text{ ditto } 10 \end{array} \right\} \text{premium.}$

The proportion of the bullion received in Bengal, amounting to sicca rupees 34,80,000, has also contributed to produce another very important effect; the late coinage of silver having completely relieved the government, as well as the community from the inconvenience and loss of batta on the exchange of gold for silver money; this has been for many years a serious subject of complaint at this Presidency; and I have no doubt, when further progress shall have been made in the coinage and circulation of the last supply of specie by the Asia and Charlton, that we shall experience its beneficial effects in the further improvement of public credit.

On a consideration of the large amount of the provisions which I have made in India for the supply of the Treasury at Canton for the ensuing year 1800-1. I confidently expect, that your anxiety, with regard to the provision of your China investment will be completely relieved.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that, although our pecuniary embarrassments have been great, we have contributed very largely towards the supply of the treasury at Canton; while no part of the treasure consigned by the Honourable Court, to the Supra-cargoes has as yet been applied to any other than the intended purpose.

Your approbation of the arrangements which I formed at Fort St. George, in April, 1798, preparatory to the execution of the orders of your Honourable Committee, relative to the succession to the kingdom of Tanjore, is very satisfactory to me. I trust that the final settlement made under my directions, with the Rajah of Tanjore; and reduced previously to my departure from Fort St. George, to the form of a treaty ratified by the Governor-General in Council on the 26th of November last,* will equally meet the approbation of your Honourable Committee.

I entertained a confident persuasion that the principles of justice and good faith, which governed my decision in the case of Wynaad, would obtain the sanction of your honourable Committee; and although the spirit in which that resolution was formed, was not capable of mitigating the vindictive disposition of the late Tippoo Sultaun towards the British nation;

* See Appendix.

I have every reason to believe, that it conduced in a considerable degree, to impress the surrounding powers with a conviction that the war which ensued between that Prince and the Company, had not been provoked by the British Government.

Wynaad having been finally assigned to the Company by the partition treaty of Mysore, I directed as soon as circumstances would permit, that it should be taken possession of on their behalf. The Pyché Rajah had in the interval established himself in Wynaad under pretences, which had they been as substantial as they are frivolous, it was his duty to submit to my examination and decision, before he presumed to introduce his authority into the district. These considerations, joined to the refractory character of the Pyché Rajah, have determined me in the event of his offering any resistance to the establishment of the Company's authority in Wynaad, to punish his contumacy in the most signal and exemplary manner.

The decided approbation with which you have honoured the subsidiary treaty, which I concluded with the Nizam on the 1st of September, 1798,* is highly satisfactory to me, independently of the eminent advantages which have been already derived from that treaty, I entertain a sanguine expectation, that it will lead to further beneficial consequences of the utmost importance.

The sanction which your Honourable Committee has been pleased to give to the opinions recorded in my minute of the 12th of August, 1798,† respecting the succession to the Nizam affords me the utmost satisfaction. Our political position in India is so materially changed since that period, in consequence of the happy termination of the late war with Tippoo Sultaan, that the necessity no longer exists for an unconditional support of the pretensions of Secunder Jah. I continue to think it desirable, that this prince should succeed his father in preference to any of his brothers; but this arrangement is not now so indispensable to the interests of the Company, as to be enforced by their government gratuitously, at the hazard of a war with a rival candidate, probably supported by the Mahratta State. These reflections induced me some-

See Vol. I. Appendix E.

† See Vol. I. page 159.

time after my return to this Presidency from Fort St. George, to consider the subject of the succession to the Nizam, and your Honourable Committee will find the result of my attention to this important question, in the accompanying copy of my instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad, under date the 6th of November last.* It is possible that circumstances may hereafter suggest the expediency of some alterations in the details of the plan described in my letter to Captain Kirkpatrick; but I foresee no probability of my being compelled to depart from any of its fundamental principles; or to renounce in a material degree any of the advantages which it is calculated to secure to the Company.

The events which have occurred in India since the date of your letter, preclude the necessity of my troubling your honourable Committee with any remarks on those paragraphs of it which relate to the hostile disposition and designs of Tippoo Suldaun, I shall only observe, that it affords me the highest satisfaction to find, that your honourable Committee had so entirely concurred, (while the consequences were yet in suspense) in the view which I had taken of that Prince's conduct and projects, and in the justice and policy of the measures which I had proposed to adopt.

The short duration of the war rendered it inexpedient for me to assume the management of the respective countries of the Nabob of the Carnatic, and of the Rajah of Tanjore on behalf of the Company. The immediate effect of such an assumption would have been a considerable failure of actual resource at a period of the utmost exigency; I shall hereafter communicate my sentiments at large, with respect to the state of Tanjore and the Carnatic. The latter now occupies my particular attention, and I fear that the perverse councils of the Nabob of Arcot, will prove a serious obstacle to any effectual improvement of your affairs in that quarter.

I am happy that in abstaining from the full exercise of my legal powers, during my residence at Fort St. George, I have met the approbation of your honourable Committee; from the hour of my arrival at that Presidency, until my departure from it, Lord Clive and his council, as well as the whole civil and military service of that establishment, and all the prin-

* See page 135.

cipal inhabitants of the settlement, afforded me the most zealous and cordial assistance in the discharge of my duty, and the most satisfactory testimonies of their attachment to your interests and government.

I am concerned to inform your honourable Committee, that I have now every reason to believe, that the proposition of the Nabob Vizier to abdicate the sovereignty of his dominions was illusory from the commencement, and designed to defeat by artificial delays, the proposed reform of His Excellency's military establishments. I have the satisfaction however, to be enabled to acquaint your honourable Committee, that I entertain no doubt of ultimately accomplishing my original object of reforming his Excellency's army, and of substituting a British force in its place. A very considerable increase of our permanent force in Oude will be immediately made; and a further augmentation of it will take place as soon as possible. The disbanding the greater part of his Excellency's undisciplined and useless force must necessarily follow. Of the measures now in progress in Oude, I shall at present say no more, than that they are calculated to secure the external defence and internal tranquillity of his Excellency's territories; to reduce your military expences by transferring the charge of a very large body of your troops to the funds of the Nabob Vizier, and to diminish his Excellency's military expences, while the effective strength of his kingdom will be considerably augmented. It will no doubt, become necessary to raise some additional corps, in the place of those which are to be furnished for the service of Oude; but this augmentation will be kept within as narrow bounds as possible, and will at all events, bear no proportion to the relief resulting to your finances, from the intended increase of the troops to be paid by the Vizier.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LIX.

The Earl of Mornington, to the Honourable Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRS,

Fort William, January 27th, 1800.

On the 13th instant, I had the honour to receive under the signature of the Secretary to your honourable Court, an official copy transmitted by your directions of your resolutions of the 24th of September, 1799,* adopted in consequence of the glorious and decisive success of the British arms against the deceased Tippoo Sultaun.

I request your honourable Court to receive the cordial assurance of my most grateful acknowledgements, for the distinguished honour of your favourable acceptance of my endeavours to discharge the duty of my station in your service.

I entertain a confident hope that the settlement which I have been enabled to effect by the treaty of Mysore, and by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam, will correspond with your Honourable Court's expectations of lasting peace in India, and of increasing prosperity to the Honourable Company's affairs. The glory of your triumph does not surpass the value of your acquisitions, nor the solid and permanent advantages resulting from the terms of the pacification; I have the satisfaction to assure you, that the beneficial effects of the late war, and of the treaties in which it terminated, are now sensibly felt in every branch of your extensive and complicated interests; and that, in every part of India, while the moderation, equity and humanity of the Honourable Company are the theme of general praise, the British power is the object of universal confidence and respectful awe.

No part of the resolutions of your Honourable Court was more satisfactory to me, than that which expresses your just sense of the services of the Governments of Fort St. George and of Bombay, and of the commanders, officers and troops employed in Mysore, during the late successful contest.

On this occasion, it is a pleasing duty to repeat to your Honourable Court the sentiments of gratitude, which I have expressed in several of my despatches, and in various recorded proceedings, towards His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief

* See Vol. I. page 635.

of his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's forces in India.

To his Excellency's cordial and active co-operation, I attribute the speedy equipment of the native volunteers from this establishment, the spirit and alacrity with which they embarked for the coast of Coromandel, and their early arrival at Madras, by which a most effective and seasonable addition was made to the army opposed to Tippoo Suldaun.

To the same zealous and able support must be ascribed the considerable augmentation made to the artillery of the army in the Carnatic, by detachments from Ceylon and Bengal.

During my absence from Bengal, I committed the arduous charge of this government to his Excellency's hands, under a strong apprehension that the difficulties of the impending contest with Tippoo Suldaun, would be aggravated by the approach of Zemaun Shah to the frontier of Oude.

The concert and correspondence subsisting between Tippoo Suldaun and Zemaun Shah, are now matter of public notoriety; and, if a fortunate coincidence of events had not recalled Zemaun Shah from Lahore, to the defence of his own dominions, it is my decided opinion, that the personal services of Sir Alured Clarke must have been required in the field for the protection of Bengal, while your army in Mysore was engaged with the forces of Tippoo Suldaun.

During this period, under the direction of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the British Forces on the frontier of Oude were maintained in a state so respectable, as to afford every prospect of effectual security in any contingency which could have arisen; and the judicious distribution of our army in Oude and Benares, at that crisis, unquestionably preserved the Vizier's dominions from internal commotion, under the combined dangers of the revolt of Vizier Ali, and of the approach of Zemaun Shah.

In his capacity of vice-president in council at Fort William, his Excellency, by a most zealous effort, and under circumstances of extraordinary difficulty and embarrassment, furnished me with such timely aid as enabled me to order Lieutenant-General Harris into Mysore, with treasure sufficient for the army during the campaign.

The detail of these circumstances in their full extent,

could not have been brought under the particular notice of your Honourable Court, previously to the 24th of September, 1799. In the station in which you have placed me, it is a duty of public justice and gratitude, to bear this sincere and respectful testimony to the meritorious conduct of Sir Alured Clarke; whose approved military talents, experience and honourable spirit, would have acquired additional lustre in Mysore, if the exigency of the public service, and my earnest entreaty had not demanded his presence in Bengal.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sirs,

Your most obedient and faithful Servant,

MORNINGTON.

No. LX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, January 29th, 1800.

Your kind letter of the 27th of September, 1799, reached me on the 13th instant, together with those of the 6th and of September, and the duplicate of the 23rd of July. I need not say how happy I feel in the honourable reception given to my packet, by the *Sarah Christiana*; it was peculiarly satisfactory to me to perceive that the motion of thanks to me was postponed, until the whole circumstances, causes and conduct of the war with the Sultaun could be fully before Parliament. I am very anxious however, that you should cause distinguished notice to be taken of the services of Sir Alured Clarke. They are particularly enumerated in my separate letter by this despatch to the Court of Directors. I sent a copy of my letter to Sir Alured after I had made it up for despatch, and I enclose a copy of his answer to me, which reflects the greatest honour on his character. You will really oblige me by obtaining a peerage for him, and I wish you to state the application to the king, as a personal request from me.

My despatches in various departments for these last eight months, have nearly anticipated the answers to all your letters; and I trust in God that before this time, my brother

Henry's arrival in England has satisfied your expectations respecting the settlement of Mysore. To have retained the whole territory for ourselves, would have raised such a flame both at Hyderabad and Poonah, as could hardly have been extinguished without another war. Henry will have informed you of the difficulties which delayed even the settlement as ultimately effected at Hyderabad. The Nizam's pride would not have been satisfied without a considerable cession of territory; and territory is more acceptable to his Highness's ministers, as affording a larger field both for patronage and speculation; money or jewels accompanying territory would also have been acceptable no doubt; but, distinct from territory, would not have contented the Nizam, and as they would have passed directly into his private coffers, would have been inaccessible to his ministers. The present settlement is more gracious, and as effectual in point of real power, as that which seems to have formed the extreme point of your wishes.

The affairs of Oude continue in the same uncertain state; but advantage will certainly flow from what has passed.

The private tonnage this season has given me much trouble, it is difficult to decide such a question permanently on principles supposed contradictory to the orders of the Court of Directors. I shall endeavour to proceed, at least so far as to prevent the trade from taking a bent towards foreign European markets in this year; and you ought, in justice to my situation to decide the question at home.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours most faithfully and affectionately,
MORNINGTON.

No. LXI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

January 30th, 1800.

I think it necessary to request your immediate and particular attention to the novel circumstance which has recently occurred of a Danish frigate entering the river Hooghley. She is said to be designed to protect the homeward-bound

trade of the Danish nation from Bengal. Under the same pretext, a squadron of Danish ships of war might be introduced into this river. The same pretext might equally be applied to serve the purposes of other neutral and friendly nations; all of whom might suddenly become our enemies. Hitherto the frigate in question (owing, possibly, to a strong suggestion which I conveyed to the Chief of Serampoor) has not attempted to proceed higher than Kedgeree; but I wish to know from you how this Government is to act in the case of a foreign ship of war attempting, without permission, to pass Fort William. Considering the value of our commercial fleets which remain for a great part of the year in Saugor roads, or at Kedgeree and Diamond harbour, it becomes a question whether the privilege of the river to any extent, however limited, ought not to be placed under very strict regulations in the case of foreign ships of war; and particularly during a period of war in Europe.

Among other regulations on this head one might be, that no foreign ship of war, the destination of which had not been formally announced to the Government in India by the Government at home, should be at liberty to enter this river. In the present instance, the only intimation which I have received respecting the Danish frigate has been from the Danish Government at Serampoor.

You already know how injurious Tranquebar has proved to our interests during the whole of the present war, I assure you that the Danish settlement of Serampoor is in some respects a still greater evil. Its vicinity to the seat of Government in Bengal renders it peculiarly obnoxious; adventurers of every nation, jacobins of every description, swarm at Serampoor, and it is the asylum of all our public defaulters and debtors.

These circumstances cannot fail to have the effect of occasionally unsettling the notions of many of our native subjects with regard to the extent and source of the authority of this Government; and this impression is assisted by the affectations of importance and state, sometimes assumed by the Chief of this paltry factory which, as it happens, is placed exactly opposite to the cantonment* occupied by the garrison of Fort William.

* Barrackpore, 16 miles from Calcutta.

You are not, perhaps, apprized that Colonel Bie is *Governor and Commander-in-Chief of all the Danish dependencies in the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa*; and that he announces himself in this high character through the channel of the public newspapers.

I will conclude with assuring you that you would render a most important service to our national interests in this part of the world, if you could devise any means of annihilating the whole of these petty European States throughout the continent of India: but above all, those of Tranquebar and Serampoor.

I remain, &c. &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, February 5th, 1800.

[Received 10th June.]

MY LORD,

Little had happened since I last had the honour of writing to your Lordship from hence, till I received the letters and enclosures, which I now have the honour of forwarding. The first collection was captured by one of Lord Nelson's cruizers; and although thrown overboard, they were recovered by the activity of our sailors. Your Lordship will read them, I am sure, with much interest. The second set have come here from Vienna, and require no comment from me, further than the assurances I have received from the Porte, that M. Des-corches will not be permitted to come to Constantinople, nor the Grand Vizier be allowed to treat with him in Egypt.

Sir Sidney Smith, in the mean while, is carrying on a negotiation with deputies from the French army in Egypt. He has concluded an armistice for a month, from the 28th of December, in the hopes of arranging the evacuation of that province. Not having accounts of a late date from himself, I only know the fact indirectly.

The Grand Vizier has taken El-Arish by assault. Still, as we know that an expedition is fitting out from Brest of six sail of the line, and some frigates, with some thousand troops,

and a good deal of money on board, as a reinforcement for Egypt; and as a fleet of ships has, within these few days, been seen off Candia, steering towards Egypt, I hope the intention (if it has existed) of making a diversion through the Red Sea by troops from India, may not be abandoned.

Naples, I am sorry to say confidentially to your Lordship, is by no means in so tranquil a state as could be wished. The rigour with which the King has persecuted the defaulters during the late invasion of the French, has rooted so very deeply the hatred towards the ancient Government, that the Russians who have gone there of late to form a garrison, have actually represented to the Court, now at Palermo, the impossibility of restoring order, unless more moderation is adopted.

The misunderstanding between Russia and Austria, which I have already had the honour of mentioning to your Lordship, is not removed. The Russian troops pass the winter in Bohemia: but lately the Austrian General, Frölich, who took Ancona, not only excluded the Russians from the capitulation, but consented in the capitulation to a declaration made by the French, that the Russians disregarded all laws of war. Upon this acknowledgement, the Emperor of Russia, not obtaining any satisfaction, has prohibited the Austrian Ambassador from appearing at the Court of Petersburg till the Emperor of Germany removes this insult and injury.

Lord Minto, in the mean time, speaks in the most favourable terms of the present views and intentions of Austria.

From France I know absolutely nothing but what your Lordship will find in the papers. . . . Thank God! we have little communication from thence at this place.

I have nothing from England subsequent to the date of my last letters to your Lordship.

I have the honour to be,
with great truth and regard,

My Lord,

your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,

ELGIN.

No. LXIII.

Sir Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD, Tigre, off the Coast of Syria, 6th February, 1800.

[Received at Fort William, 22nd April, 1800.]

I lost not a moment after the ratification of the articles of convention for the evacuation of Egypt to send Admiral Blanket a copy with a request for him to forward the same to your Lordship, through the most proper channel in order to curtail any expense on your western frontier that might be deemed to have become necessary from the removal of the French army, their presence in Egypt being to be considered as the object of armaments and fortifications in that quarter. I now send a duplicate direct to your Lordship through the Honourable Company's very zealous and active agent resident at Aleppo; and although the ordinary conveyance will do for a public document, and convey it quicker than any European officer could possibly carry it, I feel incumbent on me to say a few words which cannot be trusted to the chance of their falling into wrong hands, and which may induce your Lordship to suspend your orders for the absolute discontinuance of your preparations to the westward.

Although everything is apparently settled finally, and the French army decidedly bent on profiting by the opening now fairly made for their return home; yet, when they come to learn that Buonaparte on his return home has usurped the reins of government, and become almost Dictator from the ascendancy of his active, enterprizing, and vindictive character over his consular colleagues, Sieyes and Ducos, Generals Kleber, Desaix, and other principal officers of the Egyptian army may not dare to carry through the measure, and appear before their arbitrary Generalissimo after having thwarted one of his favourite projects, the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, in conjunction with any northern power he may be able to influence, of which project he was full when he quitted Cairo, though the army anxiously hoped he never would have it in his power to realize it. General Kleber could not have known of the success of this modern Cromwell, when he confined his pretensions in our late negotiation

to the security and honour of the army under his command, his rancour against Buonaparte may stimulate him to carry his army home in order to oppose him with the best of all possible weapons, a body of veterans that has his name in execration for having, on all occasions, sacrificed them, and ultimately deserted them without leaving them a hope of return. As to succour, they deprecate its arrival as the seal of their perpetual exile; and I know of no man so fit or so likely to become the Monk of this entire imitation of the History of England as Kleber. Desaix is too volatile and too much absorbed in Indian projects; he dreams of nothing but attacking England in all its extremities, and pores over the conquest of Mexico till he fancies himself Hernando Cortes disciplining Thalascalans to assist his European followers in the execution of the most gigantic schemes of conquest and colonization.

If I can but succeed in transporting this guest of mine, to whom I gave a passport five days ago, fairly on his native land, he loves his country too much, and has too precise ideas of real liberty to be a quiet spectator, much less an active instrument of Buonaparte's usurpation; and although I feel it my duty to warn your Lordship of a possible change in the Egyptian arrangement, I do not despair of again garrisoning Toulon with anti-jacobins, unmixed with the element of which Babel was formed, as in 1793.

Your Lordship's most faithful,

humble servant,

SIDNEY SMITH.

No. LXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Nabob of Oude.

Fort William, 9th February, 1800.

The duty imposed on me by my public station, and the concern which I take in your Excellency's personal honour and welfare, as well as in the prosperity and happiness of the inhabitants of Oude, compel me to communicate to you, in the most unqualified terms, the astonishment, regret, and

indignation which your recent conduct has excited in my mind.

In order to apprize your Excellency in the most unequivocal manner of the causes and objects of this letter, I propose to state my observations with reference to the following distinct propositions in your Excellency's correspondence with me, and in your declarations made to the British Resident at Lucknow.

1st. Your Excellency, since my arrival in India, has repeatedly complained of the ruinous condition of your internal government, and earnestly solicited my direct interference, as being indispensably necessary for the purpose of effecting a complete reform in your affairs, and especially in your military establishments.

2nd. After having received from me a plan for the reform of your military establishments,* you expressed, in the most deliberate and unqualified terms, your approbation of the same, and your hope that it would be carried into effect.

3rd. You have recently declared to Lieut.-Colonel Scott, that this same plan for the reform of your military establishment never, in any measure, met with your approbation or acceptance, or was deemed expedient by you.

4th. You have attempted, by various means, to delay, and ultimately to frustrate the execution of the plan above mentioned, of which you had, after full deliberation, expressed your entire approbation.

5th. The means which your Excellency has employed for this purpose are calculated to degrade your character, to destroy all confidence between your Excellency and the British Government, to produce confusion and disorder in your dominions, and to injure the most important interests of the Company to such a degree as may be deemed nearly equivalent to positive hostility on your part.

In the beginning of August, 1798, your Excellency informed me, by letter, that the organization of your government, which had for a long period of time been very loose and confused, was become in the last degree ineffective and irregular, adding a request that I would instruct Mr. Lumsden (the Company's Resident at Lucknow) to afford your Excel-

* See page 212, and subsequent letters.

lency his effectual aid in establishing your authority on a *new basis*. A variety of circumstances having rendered it impossible for me to give immediate consideration to your Excellency's representation, your Excellency in a subsequent letter, written in June, 1799, revived the subject, observing, "it will be impossible to remove the embarrassment under which I labour until I shall have carried into effect the retrenchment of superfluous expenses, and shall have established a systematic settlement of the country, and of the *military (which is indispensable)* for promoting the security and ease of the ryots,* the prosperity of the country, and the tranquillity of the people." Your Excellency added "although I have been informed by Mr. Lumsden that your Lordship has written to him upon this subject; yet nothing regarding it has been written by your Lordship to me; and I therefore hope you will repeat your orders to the Resident to be aiding and assisting me in all matters, so that I may *concert with him* the means of *removing my embarrassments*, and, *with his assistance*, carry on the affairs of my government in a manner to produce ease and satisfaction to my mind." Your Excellency concluded by declaring, "I rely on your Lordship for support and assistance in everything."

Such forcible representations of the disordered state of your Excellency's government in its military as well as civil branches, combined with my own intimate knowledge of the actual existence of the evils so repeatedly and emphatically described by your Excellency, authorized a full confidence in the sincerity of your Excellency's reiterated wishes for my active interference in your affairs, and for my assistance in remedying the defects of which you so justly complained. I therefore determined to adopt, without delay, those measures now apparently not less requisite for the ease and satisfaction of your Excellency's mind, than they had long been manifestly essential to the safety of your person and to the security and prosperity of your dominions. Under this impression, while yet occupied by most important affairs at Fort St. George, I appointed Colonel Scott to reside with your Excellency, furnishing him at the same time with such instructions as appeared to me to be best calculated to enable him to accomplish the apparently earnest wishes of

* Small farmers and cultivators of the soil.

your Excellency for establishing an improved system of civil and military government within your dominions.

In considering the course of measures best adapted to this salutary purpose, I became satisfied that it was absolutely necessary to commence with that reform of your Excellency's military forces, which your Excellency had declared to be indispensable. I was originally led to this conclusion by a review of the correspondence and negotiations which had passed between your Excellency and Mr. Lumsden in consequence of the advance of Zemaun Shah to Lahore, towards the end of the year 1798; and I was further confirmed in my opinion by a retrospect of the events which had followed the rebellion and flight of Vizier Alli.

The conduct of different corps of your Excellency's army had in several instances previously to the approach of Zemaun Shah, abundantly manifested that no reliance could be placed either in their fidelity or discipline. Many of them had mutinied, and were prevented from proceeding to acts of open violence against your Excellency's person by the presence of the Company's troops. Your Excellency, when consulted by Sir James Craig and by Mr. Lumsden on the measures of defence to be adopted against the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, declared that "no confidence was to be placed in your troops," and you not only avowed your military force to be inadequate to contribute any assistance towards the defence of your dominions, but required the presence of part of the British army within your capital for the express purpose of protecting your person and authority against the excesses of your own disaffected and disorderly troops, in the same moment when the services of the whole of the British army were most urgently demanded upon your Excellency's frontier to resist the approach of Zemaun Shah. Hitherto, however, the fidelity and utility of your Excellency's troops had been distrusted principally on grounds suggested by their repeated contumacy and disobedience. That they were actually capable of betraying the interests of your Excellency in a crisis of positive danger, was subsequently proved beyond a possibility of doubt by their treacherous conduct during the commotions excited by Vizier Alli.

The necessity of commencing the general improvement of your Excellency's government by a radical reform of your military establishment being then manifest, Lieut.-Colonel

Scott, together with a letter which Sir Alured Clarke addressed to your Excellency, by my desire, delivered to you such further explanations of the proposed measure as the occasion required. It is remarkable that the delivery of Sir Alured Clarke's letter to your Excellency had been preceded within the short space of five days by repeated complaints on the part of your Excellency of the turbulent and disorderly state of your troops.

In the plan of reform for your military establishment presented to your Excellency at that period of time, I proposed that the greatest part of your useless and dangerous forces should be disbanded, and should be replaced by a suitable number of the Company's troops. The reception which your Excellency gave to the proposition corresponded with the expectations which your Excellency's repeated declarations and applications to me had led me to form. Your Excellency perused the letter of Sir Alured Clarke *with satisfaction, and declared your thorough concurrence in the sentiments which it contained.* Your Excellency also, at a subsequent conference with the Resident on the 5th of September, observed, of your own accord, that the proposed measure *was not impracticable, but such as you hoped might be accomplished.*

It is of importance to remind your Excellency in this place that, soon after the opening of these discussions by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, a fresh mutiny broke out among your Excellency's troops, which your Excellency was enabled to quell solely by the assistance of the British Resident at Lucknow.

Having in a letter to your Excellency dated the 26th of September, 1799, expressed my satisfaction in your ready concurrence in the expediency of the measure which had been generally proposed in the letter of Sir Alured Clarke, and particularly explained by Lieut.-Colonel Scott, and having at the same time earnestly exhorted your Excellency not to suffer any consideration to delay for a moment the necessary alterations in your military establishment (referring to the plan which had been minutely detailed to you by Lieut.-Colonel Scott), your Excellency in reply declares "the benefits, both immediate and future, of such a reform are even more strongly impressed upon my mind than they have been described by your Lordship; *a year before this time, under a sense of the benefits in question, and of the evils ari-*

sing from the failure of my resources, and the increase of my expences, I planned, *of my own accord*, in my mind, a *reform of the system*, and was *the first to propose it.*"

To the observation which I had submitted to your Excellency relative to the possible return, in a more formidable shape, of the dangers which had already threatened the safety of your Excellency's person and dominions, your Excellency answers in the same letter, "please God, by introducing a reform in the *military system*, all dangers and all apprehension of disturbance will be removed."

These extracts from your Excellency's own letters, and from Colonel Scott's reports of your verbal communications noted and recorded at the time, warrant me in declaring that your Excellency, in the most direct terms, originally solicited me to prepare a plan for the reformation of your military establishment, and that you afterwards positively approved the plan prepared and submitted to you at your own request. I leave it to your Excellency to judge with what emotions I now learn from Lieut.-Colonel Scott, that you have not hesitated to assert that this identical plan franed at your own suggestion, and approved by your deliberate sanction, *had never, in any measure, met with your approbation or acceptance, or been deemed expedient by you.*

In this place it may not be inexpedient to observe, that even if your Excellency had not professed your approbation of the plan in question, it would have been equally my duty and right to have required your Excellency's adoption of a measure, the execution of which is indispensably necessary to enable the Company to fulfil their engagement "of defending your dominions against all enemies."

In my letter to you of the 5th of November last* I have sufficiently established the right of the Company to augment their forces within your Excellency's dominions to whatever extent the British Government in India may judge requisite to the permanent security of the common interests. I have also explained in what manner your Excellency is bound by the 7th Article of the Treaty concluded between your Excellency and Sir John Shore, to defray the expense of any force which the British Government shall deem necessary for

* See p. 153.

the effectual protection of your dominions. The right of the British Government to make such an augmentation, even against your Excellency's consent, in the event of an invasion of your dominions, or of any sudden or temporary alarm either of domestic or foreign danger, has never been disputed by your Excellency; but I understand that you have expressed to Lieut.-Colonel Scott an intimation, that the same right does not extend to a permanent increase of the standing army of the Company in Oude. Can your Excellency then suppose that the treaty was intended to provide against dangers merely of a temporary and transient nature, and that it did not embrace the permanent and perpetual security of your dominions, and the lasting interests of that party which has bound itself to protect them against every danger, whether existing or contingent? If a danger shall exist, permanent in its nature, but of which the immediate approach to your Excellency's dominions may be so sudden and rapid as to preclude the possibility of providing against it by any other means, than a consistent and permanent system of preparation and precaution; shall it be contended that the legitimate protector and guardian of your dominions is not bound by every principle of duty to provide such a system without delay? and is not the season of peace and tranquillity the most favourable for the establishment of external security and internal order?

It is certain that the resources of your Excellency are inadequate to the double burthen of the proposed additional force of the Company, and of your own existing military establishment. But if your resources could bear this accumulated pressure, I should still feel myself bound to require that your Excellency should reduce your own disorderly troops. The expediency of disbanding as large a proportion of your own troops as can possibly be dispensed with in the business of the revenue collections, and in the purposes of ceremony and state, does not rest solely on the inefficiency of your troops in a military view, but also on their disaffection, and insubordination, and on the danger with which such a body of armed men must ever menace your person, and the public tranquillity in time of peace; a danger infinitely aggravated in the season either of domestic convulsion, or of foreign attack. The dismissal therefore of the troops in question, is not only recom-

mended by considerations of economy, but indispensably requisite by the soundest maxims of prudential policy. So long as these troops shall be entertained, a large proportion of the Company's force must be constantly employed to maintain the peace of the Country; and in the event of an invasion of your Excellency's dominions by a foreign enemy, the necessity of diverting a still more considerable part of the British army from the defence of your frontier, for the purpose of controlling your own licentious and disaffected soldiery, would increase exactly in proportion to the magnitude and imminence of external danger. It must therefore be obvious to your Excellency, that the continuance of these dangerous troops in your service, instead of leading to a diminution of the requisite amount of the British force in Oude, would require a far more considerable augmentation of that force than any hitherto proposed.

Your Excellency always professing the utmost anxiety for the reform of your own troops, having however delayed to concert the necessary arrangements for that purpose with Colonel Scott, it became my duty to accelerate the adoption of those measures for the defence of your Excellency's dominions, which daily became more urgent. It would have been highly gratifying to me, if your Excellency's activity on this occasion had been proportioned to the exigency of the case, or to the earnestness and apparent candour of your own declarations; but the responsibility in this case attaching, according to the stipulations of treaty, solely on the Company I could not have been justified by any consideration, in suspending the measures incumbent on the Company's Government.

On these grounds I determined early in the month of November last, to introduce immediately into your Excellency's dominions as great a proportion as possible, of the force which I deemed necessary to their effectual and permanent defence, in addition to the Company's troops already stationed in Oude.

I communicated this determination to your Excellency, in a letter written on the 5th of November, and forwarded by me to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott.*

Before Lieut.-Colonel Scott could deliver this letter, your Excellency had made a proposition to him, which, as he cou-

* See p. 153.

ceived, precluded the necessity of presenting any letter to you; and accordingly it was not delivered until your Excellency thought proper to recall the proposition in question.

In the meanwhile the additional troops which I had determined to send into your Excellency's dominions, continued to assemble for that purpose; because in every event the necessity of the intended reinforcements must have remained unalterable.

The proposition of your Excellency, to which I have adverted was, that you should abdicate the government of your dominions, and, appropriating to your private use all the treasures of the state, retire from Lucknow. You signified at the same time, a desire that one of your sons should be substituted on the Musnud.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott remonstrated against your Excellency's declared resolution to abdicate the government; but your Excellency persisted, and finally enjoined him to communicate it to me, as the result of your deliberate consideration.

This unexpected determination of your Excellency, although it induced Lieutenant-Colonel Scott to withhold my letter of the 5th of November, until further orders from me, did not prevent him from occasionally pressing upon your consideration the subject of the reform of your military establishment. Your Excellency however, invariably evaded the discussion by declaring, that under the resolution which you had announced of abdicating the government, it was totally unnecessary to proceed at present in the proposed reform.

Your Excellency has been in possession for some time past, of a formal and detailed answer from me (authenticated by my signature) to your declaration of your resolution to abdicate the sovereignty of your dominions.* To the arguments by which I endeavoured to modify your Excellency's original plan of abdication, and to the terms on which I declared myself willing to facilitate your retirement from the cares of your government, (the administration of which you have acknowledged yourself to be utterly unequal to conduct.) Your Excellency has not yet returned any reply; you have deemed it sufficient to signify to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, that under

* See minute by the Gov.-General, p. 159.

my determination not to admit your Excellency's proposition in the terms stated by yourself, you were ready to abandon your design of retirement, and to retain the charge of the government; supporting this apparently new resolution on general grounds of justice to your family. I will not at present enquire whether means might not still be devised for securing ample justice to your family, without reducing your Excellency to the painful and dangerous necessity of continuing in a station, the duties of which you have declared yourself to be incompetent to fulfil, and of governing a people whom you have declared "neither pleased with you, nor you with them; with whose evil dispositions, enmity, disobedience and negligence, you are disgusted; and from whose government your mind is utterly withdrawn."

Having requested your Excellency to return a formal and precise answer to my detailed observations and proposals, in consequence of your Excellency's declared wish to abdicate the government, I shall abstain from entering into any minute examination of the nature of the subsequent change in your Excellency's mind, until I shall be furnished in a regular manner, with an explicit statement of the motives which induced that change. I must however remark, that every circumstance accompanying your Excellency's conduct, which has hitherto fallen under my observation, on this extraordinary occasion, appears to me to indicate that your Excellency never previously entertained the design of abdicating your government, however convinced of the truth of those incontestible facts which you alleged as the motives of your abdication, but that you professed such a design with the sole view of defeating by delay, the long meditated measure of a reform of your military establishment.

It is most painful to be compelled to state a charge of so serious a nature, against a person of your Excellency's high rank and exalted dignity; but what other conclusion can I draw from your Excellency's conduct, when Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, that after you had engaged his attention and mine for nearly two months, by your ostensible intention to abdicate the government, you suddenly relinquished that intention, and at the same moment declared for the first time, that if "the reform of your military establishments were to be adopted on the principles proposed, it would annihilate your Excellency's authority in your own dominions," al-

though not only the general principles, but all the material details of that reform, to which you now object, had been repeatedly approved by your Excellency, as being essential to the maintenance of your authority, and indispensable to the peace and safety of your dominions.

But your Excellency has proceeded to other measures of a tendency infinitely more dangerous, utterly incompatible with all your professions, and repugnant to the fundamental principles of your connection with the Company, and to every duty of friendship and honourable alliance.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, "that your Excellency, instead of affording any cordial assistance for devising and carrying into execution a plan for the dismissal of your battalions, has thrown every possible impediment in the way of that measure, by endeavouring to restrict the additional British force to one position and by delaying to furnish Lieutenant-Colonel Scott with the statements of your military establishments repeatedly required, and absolutely necessary to the commencement of the undertaking."

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott informs me, that your Excellency is equally desirous of *impeding the progress of the additional British troops, by exposing them to difficulties in obtaining supplies of provisions*; to prove this intention on the part of your Excellency, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott states, that although he had repeatedly applied to your Excellency for the necessary purwannahs to your several aumils, your Excellency had not yet issued a single purwannah; the consequence of which was likely to prove not only seriously distressing to the British troops destined to the protection of your dominions, but dangerous to the peace of the country through which those troops proposed to march.

It is impossible for me to express in terms of sufficient force, the sentiments which this intelligence has occasioned in my mind.

The conduct of your Excellency in both instances stated, but more flagrantly in the last, is of a nature so unequivocally hostile, and may prove so injurious to every interest, both of your Excellency and of the Company, that your perseverance in so dangerous a course, will leave me no other alternative than that of considering all amicable engagements between the Company and your Excellency to be dissolved, and of regulating my subsequent proceedings accordingly. I am

however, always inclined to hope that your Excellency may have been inadvertently betrayed into these imprudent and unjustifiable measures by the insidious suggestions of evil councillors, and being ever averse to construe your Excellency's actions in such a manner as must compel me to regard and to treat you as a Prince no longer connected with the Company, by the ties of amity and of a common interest; I trust that my next accounts from Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, may enable me to view your Excellency's conduct in a more favourable light, but lest my wishes in this respect should be disappointed, it is my duty to warn your Excellency in the most unreserved terms, that your Excellency alone will be responsible for all the evils which cannot fail to result from any further perseverance in the fatal and imprudent course of measures which you have recently pursued. I also think it necessary to entreat your Excellency not to delay for a moment, whatever further steps may be pointed out to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, as necessary to effect the two urgent and indispensable objects; namely, the reform of your military establishment, and the provision of funds for the regular monthly payment of all the Company's troops in Oude.

The least omission or procrastination in either of those important points, must lead to the most serious mischief.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXV.

Lieut.-General Stuart to the Earl of Mornington.

MY LORD,

The Hon. Company's ship *Woodford*,
16th February, 1800, off Anjango.

Your Lordship will do me the justice to believe, that your letter, under the 12th of January,* which I have just had the honour to receive, has been no less gratifying than flattering to me. Nor can I here sufficiently express my high sense of your Lordship's goodness on every occasion, and more especially for this recent and handsome manner in which you have been pleased so particularly to notice me.

* See p. 173.

If my health had permitted, I should most readily have sacrificed every private consideration, and continued to exert my best endeavours in the service of my country, under your Lordship's auspices in India. It is impossible that so many motives can ever again conspire to lead me to resume an active life, for while the highest objects were held forth to my ambition, I had the further stimulus of your Lordship's wishes; but there is a period, my Lord, when the mind and the body demand repose, and when the spirits no longer animated by sanguine expectations, are unfit for excessive labour. It is now time that I should withdraw from a scene in which I have acted a part for forty years, and if I shall find an honourable retirement in my native country under that middling state of affluence which is sufficient for a man who has but moderate wants, I shall rest contented. . . But I have not by this resolution, my Lord, absolutely devoted the remainder of my life to ease; for as I have always been of opinion, that it requires the full enjoyment of health to support with firmness the vicissitudes of military affairs, should I have the good fortune to recover that blessing, I shall again, I am sure, think of resuming the exercise of a profession which has constituted my employment and happiness for so many years.

I beg to assure your Lordship that my friend, Captain Walker, as well as myself, feels with due gratitude the very handsome terms in which you have been so good as to express yourself respecting him. He requests of me to make his grateful acknowledgements to your Lordship for the confidence you are pleased to place in him, and for the great honour proposed by admitting him a member of your family. The offer of so distinguished a situation has made that proper impression on his mind that it ought, and which your Lordship had a right to expect. At the same time his appointment under the Presidency of Bombay has been lately improved by being nominated to succeed to the present Auditor-General, who has announced an intention of returning to England soon, and his future prospects are thus, in a great measure, confined to that station. His diffidence, and an apprehension that he would not be able to fulfil your Lordship's expectations, is an additional, and perhaps, a greater motive to induce him to decline the honour which your Lordship's goodness would confer on him. But if your

Lordship should have occasion to employ him at Bombay, either in obtaining any heads of local information there, or in whatever other manner, I am certain that he will, to the best of his judgment, execute your commands with fidelity and alacrity.

I return to England fully impressed with your Lordship's kindness and generosity. Nor can your unsolicited efforts to promote my future comfort and happiness ever cease to be warmly remembered by me while I live. I have indeed but one subject of regret in quitting this country, that in any instance my ideas should not have entirely accorded with your Lordship's superior and more profound judgment.*

A name so great as yours, my Lord, does not stand in need of praise from a person in my sphere, but I know that you value the esteem of every honest man, and in this character, while I congratulate my country on possessing so eminent a statesman, I most seriously wish that success to attend your Lordship's administration, which has already added such conspicuous lustre to the British arms, and established on the most solid basis the English empire in India.

I have the honour to remain,
with the greatest respect and regard, my Lord,
your Lordship's most faithful, obliged,
and devoted Servant,

J. STUART.

No. LXVI.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, February 16th, 1800.

Having fully considered the arguments adduced by Lieut.-General Stuart, in the minute recorded by him previously to his departure for Europe (and approved by you in your letter to me transmitting that minute) in proof of the necessity of an augmentation of the native infantry of your establishment, I am satisfied that some increase of that corps is indispensably requisite. I am in particular convinced that it

* Referring to a proposition of Lieut.-Gen. Stuart's for augmenting the force of the army at Bombay, and the Gov.-General's objections to any increased military expenditure.—[ED.]

is expedient to enable you, as soon as possible, to reinforce the native troops at Surat; and to dispense with the services of the auxiliary troops of the Rajah of Travancore.

For these reasons, I authorize you to make an immediate addition of one regiment of native infantry to the army under your Presidency, and to adopt the necessary measures for that purpose without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

P. S. I take this opportunity of requesting that you will have the goodness to direct all your separate letters to me, to be numbered under two heads.

Official—comprehending such letters as are intended for record, and which should always be countersigned by one of your Secretaries.

Private—containing your communications of that description.

I wish this regulation to commence from the 1st of January, 1800, and I shall observe the same. Accordingly I shall number your letters.

Official, No. 1, dated the 4th of January, 1800.

Private, No.

The numbers are to recommence with every year.

No. LXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Honourable Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, Feb. 18th, 1800.

Having fully considered your several communications relative to the affairs of Surat, I have directed a despatch to be prepared on that subject for my signature in Council, together with the draft of a Treaty to be concluded with Nussur ud Deen previous to confirming him in the station of Nabob.

As it may require a few days to complete these papers, I think it advisable to give you an early intimation of the general principle on which my instructions will be founded.

Being convinced that it is not only the complete right, but the positive duty of the British Government to secure the external defence, as well as the internal order and good government of the City of Surat; and being satisfied that the

original Treaty between the Company and the Nabob Moyeen ud Deen presents no obstacle to any conditions requisite to the permanent establishment of these important and salutary objects, I am resolved not to confirm Nusser ud Deen in the station of Nabob, until he shall have agreed to transfer the whole civil and military administration and revenues of the city into the hands of the Company; reserving to himself an annual stipend sufficient for the maintenance of himself and his family, to be paid by the Company from the revenues of Surat.

An arrangement, founded upon this principle will, of course, include the institution of regular courts of justice under the authority of the Company.

I think it will be advisable that you should proceed in person to Surat for the purpose of concluding this important arrangement. I shall not, however, suggest this measure in my letter in Council; but you will understand my decided opinion to be, that, without your presence at Surat, the proposed reform cannot be carried into effect.

In my official letter (No. 2) of the 16th instant, I authorized you to add one regiment of native infantry to your establishment. A more attentive consideration of your communications relating to Surat, and of Lieutenant-General Stuart's minute of the 21st of January, has convinced me of the necessity of extending that authority to the addition of another regiment, according to the suggestion of General Stuart in that minute.

You will, therefore, proceed without delay to add two regiments of native infantry to your establishment.

It is also my desire, that you should immediately increase the force at Surat to one company of European artillery, two companies of European infantry, and one complete regiment of native infantry.

You will observe, that it is desirable that this force should precede your arrival at Surat.

You may expect my despatch in Council in a few days, but I request that you will not delay these preliminary measures under that expectation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXVIII.

The Earl of Elgin to the Earl of Mornington.

Constantinople, Feb. 20th, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received at Fort William, May 10th, 1800.]

Although Sir Sidney Smith will, no doubt, have sent to your Lordship the earliest accounts of the capitulation which the French have signed for the evacuation of Egypt, yet I lose no time in forwarding the intelligence from hence, and enclosing an abstract of the terms agreed upon.

I most sincerely congratulate your Lordship upon this additional security to our East India possessions. The period of your administration has surely been the most brilliant, and has procured more essential benefits to those interests than any Government ever was so fortunate as to obtain. No one takes a warmer share than I do in whatever must contribute so greatly to your satisfaction and reputation.

There are at this moment eight mails from England missing. It would appear that the Elbe is frozen; and the roads on this side of Vienna are almost impassable. I can, therefore, offer you no news from hence.

We have merely common report from France: nor do we know of any act worthy to be cited of the new Government at Paris.

I wish I could give your Lordship any hopes that the Court of Russia shewed more disposition than of late for continuing a continental war against France. I have not heard from Lord Minto since he went to Prague last month, for the purpose of an interview with Marshal Suwarrow. At first it was said that their conferences had ended as we might wish; but my accounts from Russia state the determination of the Emperor to be, to recal his troops.

By advice from London, it is expected there that Russia continues hearty with *us*; and the same language is held to the Porte. But if it does not act on the Continent, I am not sanguine as to the benefit we are to derive from its efforts.

Meanwhile the Court of Vienna continues its preparations

for another campaign. At present we do not hear any surmise of Buonaparte's having proposed fresh terms of peace to Austria.

I have the honour to be,
with great truth and regard, my Lord,
your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
ELGIN.

No. LXIX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas.

MY DEAR SIR,

Fort William, March 5th, 1800.

Although most of the points touched in your several despatches have already been anticipated, either by my letters to you, by the communications which I trust you have received through Mr. Wellesley, or by my despatches to the Secret Committee and the Court of Directors, I propose in this letter to reply regularly to such of your communications as have not already been directly answered by me.

HYDERABAD.—I received with the greatest satisfaction your approbation of the treaty of Hyderabad.* Subsequent events have abundantly confirmed the justice of the expectations, which you formed upon the first view of that treaty. It was indeed the source of all our recent successes in India; and even if it has in any degree aggravated the characteristic jealousy of the Mahrattas, it has furnished ample compensation in establishing an impregnable barrier against their power. The system on which the treaty of Hyderabad was founded, would certainly be most effectually completed by the conclusion of a similar engagement at Poonah, and I am resolved never to lose sight of that most desirable object.

The various instances in which the jealousy of the Mahratta State has lately been disclosed, are rather to be attributed to the peculiar character of that nation, and to the singular disposition of the present Peishwa, than to any formed aversion to a nearer connection with the British power.

The influence of Scindia has also contributed to frustrate my proposed measures, because their necessary effect must have been to restore the Peishwa to a certain degree of credit

* See Vol. I. Appendix.

and power; and to reduce Scindia in the same proportion. I have no reason to believe that Scindia would be averse to a separate connection with us, but not perceiving any possible advantage which could arise from such a connection under all the circumstances of the present moment, I have taken no steps to cultivate it, while I have avoided any manifestation of an unfriendly disposition.

The distractions of the Mahratta empire must continue to increase, until they shall be checked by foreign interference. No power in India excepting the British now possesses sufficient strength to interpose with effect in these dissensions; and I shall not be surprised if ultimately the subsidiary force, which I am so anxious to establish at Poonah, should be required with equal anxiety by the Mahratta State, as the only means of restoring order, and of saving the whole of that country from plunder and desolation.

Mr. Colebrooke has now resided several months at Nagpoor, and I have every reason to believe, that the Rajah of Berar will prove well inclined to support whatever plan the British Government may ultimately adopt with regard to the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

With respect to the views of Zemaun Shah, the papers found in the palace at Seringapatam have completely justified your opinion of Tippoo's disposition to obtain the assistance of that Prince; and of Zemaun Shah's inclination to afford it.

For some time to come, I trust that Zemaun Shah will be too much occupied at home, to admit of turning his arms against Hindostan; and I am inclined to think that the encouragement of divisions in his own government, and of hostility between the contiguous State of Persia and his dominions, is the system of defence against Zemaun Shah on which it is most safe to rely under the present circumstances of affairs in India.

The profligacy of Scindia's character, the distracted state of his councils and armies, and the distress or rather ruin of his finances preclude the hope of effecting a secure or useful alliance with him.

The establishment of a subsidiary force at Poonah, would compel Scindia to return to his own dominions; and in that event, it might not be difficult to convince him that his best security would consist in imitating the example of the Nizam

and of the Peishwa; and in placing himself under the immediate protection of the British power.

With respect to the general system of policy to be adopted by us in India in consequence of the conquest of Mysore, I shall view all the important considerations connected with that extensive question in a separate despatch, addressed by some future opportunity, either to you or to the Secret Committee.

I conclude, that the power of the French in Egypt is either already extirpated, or that you will continue the war until that indispensable object shall be completely effected. Notwithstanding the present proud and commanding predominance of the British power in India, we cannot expect an uninterrupted continuance of tranquillity while France shall be permitted to maintain a powerful establishment in Egypt.

Since I wrote the preceding paragraph, I have received despatches from Lord Elgin, dated the 22nd December, 1799, by which it appears that Kleber remains in Egypt with 15,000 men, and that Buonaparte is at the head of a new Government in France. Lord Elgin proposes a powerful diversion from India, through the Red Sea, for the purpose of accelerating the evacuation of Egypt by the French, but after a full discussion of this subject with General Stuart, I am satisfied that it would be an useless waste of treasure and blood to attempt such an expedition on a large scale, unless the whole plan of co-operation from the Mediterranean had been previously concerted.* Desultory operations against any places retained by the French on the shores of the Red Sea may be advantageous, they would neither be perilous, nor expensive.

You are already apprized of my entire coincidence in your opinion, respecting the importance of Goa; and I trust that you will be enabled to give full effect to the measures which I have adopted for the purpose of rendering that possession an additional source of strength to the British Empire in India. I also consider the possession of Diu to be a most desirable object, particularly with a view to the coercion of the Piratical States on the north western coast of the peninsula of India.

* This was the suggestion of the Governor-General to Mr. Dundas on the 16th of May, 1799. See Vol. I. p. 587.—[Ed.]

FINANCES.—Notwithstanding the large import of bullion during the present season, the expences of the war, and the considerable amount of the 12 per cent securities, coming in course of payment within the current and succeeding year of account, have compelled me to continue the system of adding to the debt in India, in order to secure a considerable commercial investment for the ensuing season. I have however, the satisfaction to assure you, that every symptom has concurred to confirm my opinion, that the debt in India is likely to become more manageable in every succeeding year. The loans which I have opened at this Presidency during the current year, have been made at a rate of interest much more favourable than any which has been raised since the year 1796, as will appear by the terms of the loans of this year. Although the second loan on the same terms is actually open, the state of the public securities is now—

5th March, 1800.

	Buying.	Selling.	
6 per cent. . . .	13 0 0	14 0 0	} Discount.
8 per cent. . . .	5 0 0	6 8 0	
10 per cent. . . .	10 8 0	9 8 0	} Premium.
12 per cent. . . .	1 8 0	2 0 0	

Having been at the corresponding period in the preceding year—

5th March, 1799.

	Buying.	Selling.	
6 per cent. . . .	24 8 0	25 8 0	} Discount.
8 per cent. . . .	14 8 0	15 8 0	
10 per cent. . . .	—	—	}
12 per cent. . . .	0 2 0	0 6 0	

The distress for specie has gradually vanished, and private credit has proportionably been improved; and I have been enabled to send home with valuable cargoes every regular ship belonging to the Company in India, while on the other hand, I have employed the whole tonnage which the Port of Calcutta could furnish since the month of December; to carry to the Port of London, nearly the whole of the goods of individuals, which had been tendered for exportation previous to that month, over and above the 3,000 tons which the Company is bound by law to furnish.

The finances of the Government of Madras have improved in a still greater proportion than those of Bengal. At that

Presidency they have opened a loan, under which they have been enabled to raise a large supply. The great augmentation of the resources of Fort St. George, under the subsidiary treaties of Hyderabad and Seringapatam, and the partition treaty of Mysore, together with the improvements in the revenues of Tanjore and of the country of the Polygars will render the finances of that Presidency an object of the highest consideration. It may also be expected that industry, population and manufacture, and all the sources of public and private credit will take a new spring in our possessions on the Peninsula of India, in consequence of our increased security in that quarter.

To these causes of progressive prosperity, it is reasonable to add the benefits which cannot fail to accrue from the extension, to that part of our empire of the system of judicature and revenue, under which these provinces have attained so eminent a degree of opulence and internal tranquillity.

I trust that the 8 per cent loan now opened in Bengal, will be rapidly filled, and will enable me to provide for all the services stated in my several estimates; I expect hereafter to be able to borrow money at 8 per cent under the former system of repayment of the public securities according to priority of date.

Notwithstanding these favourable expectations, I am of opinion, that the surplus revenue of India is not likely to afford any considerable or certain resource. The increasing magnitude of our empire in India, and the continual expansion of every branch of our numerous and complicated interests must preclude any considerable reduction of our permanent charges civil, military, or commercial. More cannot be hoped from the utmost exertion of vigilance, integrity and ability in any persons to whom the government of this empire may hereafter be entrusted than to check, by a seasonable and diligent system of revision, that tendency to excess and abuse which is the inherent vice of all great establishments. On the other hand, it is my decided opinion, that the growing resources of India will keep pace with the demands upon them.

With respect to the resource which you expect to derive in India from bills upon the East India Company under the plan of remittance, the prosperous state of public credit in

England and in India will co-operate to render that resource of little avail. The state of the public funds in England will diminish the desire of remitting private fortunes to England from India in proportion to the increase of the public prosperity at home, and the high degree of security which our Indian Empire has acquired by the success of the late war against Tippoo Suldaun, has inspired so general a confidence in the stability of the British power in India, that individuals will think their capital equally safe in India, where it will certainly be more productive than in England,

These circumstances, added to the vast increase of the export of goods from India to England will probably detain much capital in this country, and retard the operation of any plan of remittance which could be devised.

Private merchants, for commercial purposes, will always offer more advantageous terms than the Company; and in time of public prosperity the bills of individuals of undoubted capital will be received by many in preference to bills drawn on the Company on terms less favourable.

The same causes will naturally tend to maintain, if not to increase the present high rate of exchange upon bills on England; and while the natural and current rate of exchange shall be so much higher (as it is at present) than that allowed by the plan of remittance through the Company, it is not to be expected, that individuals will resort to that plan to such an extent as shall furnish any important financial resource.

COMMERCE.—That the export of British manufactures to India, under proper regulations, might be extended to the amount of a considerable resource, I entertain no doubt, but I must observe, that before such an effect can be expected an entire reform must take place in the conduct of the East India Company's exports to India.

The leading points which require minute and diligent care in the management of this branch of the Company's affairs appear to me to be, first, that the goods should be of the first quality; secondly, that they should be invoiced at a reasonable and just price; and thirdly, that they should be assorted in a manner suitable to this market, and conformably to the indents sent from hence.

Under the present system the quality of the goods is fre-

quently defective; for the two last years the invoice price has been considerably increased without any correspondent improvement in the quality of the goods, and the assortments have been injudicious and contrary to the indents sent from hence by those officers who are best acquainted with the nature of the market.

As connected with this subject, in one point of view, I desire to call your particular attention to the defective and unserviceable state of the arms annually exported to India for the use of our troops. This is a disgraceful evil, and of a most pernicious tendency. I am apprehensive that the whole system of the Company's exports to India is rendered subservient to private interests at the expense of the public.

Mr. Pitt's Bill for the reduction of the duties upon imports from India has grievously disappointed the expectation of the commercial part of the community. The duty imposed by that bill upon the *Sugars, particularly on the coarser sort, is much too high*; and the object of inviting the trade of India to the Port of London, will not, I fear, be effected by the general scale of duties adopted in that bill.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF BENGAL.—The increasing arrears of the land revenue of Bengal occupied my attention immediately after my arrival in India.

After full consideration I passed a law for the purpose of remedying the increasing evil* of accumulating balances. The beneficial effects of it have already been felt to so great an extent as to warrant a confident expectation that the stipulated income will hereafter be paid with great regularity.

My judgment and experience coincide entirely with your opinion, that the system adopted by Lord Cornwallis has proved and must continue to prove a fruitful source of happiness, wealth, industry, and population to this flourishing country. That system, however, has still to encounter some avowed and many secret enemies; nor have its benefits been yet fully realized, it has not been carried into execution with cordiality, zeal, and energy proportioned to its merits; it has received no aid of collateral institutions calculated to furnish a supply of men properly qualified to fill the several stations of judicature and revenue; nor has a due and impartial se-

* Regulation No. VII., 1799.

lection been uniformly made of the persons best qualified in the actual state of the service to fill such stations as have progressively become vacant; nor has the administration of justice throughout the provinces been superintended with a sufficient degree of vigilance and care.

I have nearly matured a plan with a view to these salutary objects. The principal measures on which it will be founded will be, first, the institution of a Court of Sudder Dewannee and Nizamut Adawlut distinct from the council; but of which the Chief Justice shall be capable of sitting in council, if appointed from home to a seat in council. The province of this new Court shall be, not only to receive and judge appeals, but also to superintend the administration of justice and the general state of police in all the inferior courts, branches and departments of the judicial institutions.

It is my intention to constitute this court of those persons who bore a principal share in framing the system so happily adopted by Lord Cornwallis. Their talents, integrity, and experience, as well as the peculiar propriety and dignity of their manners render them the fittest to hold this distinguished station, to which it is my intention to annex the highest rank which the law enables me to grant.

The Chief Justice of this new court may hereafter become a member of the Council, in which event he will still continue to preside in the court. In the meanwhile I wish to be empowered by law to give a rank to the Chief Justice of the Sudder Dewannee and Nizamut Adawlut, which shall place him as nearly as possible on a level with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

2nd. The institution of a College or University at Calcutta in which the Writers shall be subject to the rules of collegiate discipline for the first two or three years subsequent to their arrival; and shall study the languages, history, laws, manners, and customs of India, the laws enacted by the Governor-General in Council, and such rudiments of the laws of England as are necessary to enable the judges throughout these possessions to administer the laws of India in the spirit of the British constitution.

3rd. I propose to pass regulations subjecting all persons appointed to offices of the judicature or revenue to public examination in the several branches of knowledge requisite

in their respective stations, before they shall be entitled to receive the emoluments of the office to which they may have been appointed.

4th. In the several stations of revenue and judicature throughout the provinces many public officers are to be found avowedly incompetent to the due discharge of their duties. Some from ignorance, natural incapacity or fixed habits of indolence and dissipation, others from age and infirmity. Such persons have been suffered to retain their stations under the orders of the Court of Directors, prohibiting the grant of pensions of retreat to the civil service. This prohibition is contrary to true principles of economy. The inevitable operation of it has been to fix incapable persons in stations requiring efficiency; and the loss sustained by their negligencies or errors infinitely overbalances the expense of providing for them at the public charge. The application of this prohibition to persons who have grown old or infirm in the public service is illiberal and cruel, as well as impolitic. On the other hand it may, perhaps, be questioned whether those whose ignorance, natural inability, or other defects disqualify them for the public service, can be entitled to any compensation from the state which has already supported them at a considerable expense, under the presumption of their sufficiency to discharge the duties for which they receive emolument.

But viewing the actual state of the civil service at this Presidency, I know that many persons do not, and never will, render justice to the public in the stations which they, now hold, although it would appear an act of great harshness and rigour to remove these persons, without making some provision for them. Their number is not very considerable, it bears no proportion to the mischief occasioned by their evil administration, and by the dangerous example which their conduct affords to the younger branches of the service. My intention, therefore, is (without waiting for orders from home) to remove all persons of any of the descriptions to which I have adverted *from efficient office*; and to provide for them by adequate pensions for life, payable to their agents in India on the condition of their returning to England. The present allowance to the Company's servants out of employment being payable only to such as reside in India would not answer the purpose proposed.

Among the servants now out of employment, but residing in Bengal, few, if any, are qualified for efficient office; the amount of the pensions to be paid under the new plan must bear a just proportion to the period of service as well as to the offices actually enjoyed at the period of removal, it will be for the Government at home to consider whether any permanent plan of pension for civil servants retiring from the service in India shall hereafter be adopted. The measure which I propose to carry into effect, is more immediately applicable to the actual state of the civil service in India; but the principles on which it is grounded may furnish the foundation of a permanent system, which shall for ever secure this Government against the evils of inefficiency, ignorance, and negligence in the subordinate branches of the executive administration.

TAXATION.—The accounts which you will have received this year of the revenue on salt will be highly satisfactory to you, and you will have observed with peculiar pleasure that the revenue arising from the sale of Opium has been completely restored by the improved system of agency, by the extreme care applied to the manufacture of the drug, by the due proportion now preserved between the quantity manufactured and the current demand, and by the measure which I have uniformly carried into effect of publicly destroying all such opium as had been declared to be adulterated. The produce of the two last sales of opium (which included the whole annual quantity for the last season) has exceeded that of the most favourable sales of that drug ever experienced in Bengal, the nett profit to the Company on the two sales in December, 1799, and February, 1800, having amounted to more than 23 lacs of rupees (£287,500 sterling).* I have little doubt that this branch of revenue will continue to flourish under the same judicious system, vigilantly administered. The public service is greatly indebted to Mr. Fleming, second Member of the Medical Board, for his careful inspection of the opium, as well as for his various suggestions by which the manufacture has been placed under improved regulations.

You will observe with great satisfaction the considerable increase which has taken place in the Government customs

* Estimating the rupee at 2s. 6d., its then current value.—[ED.]

at Calcutta since my arrival in India. This is to be attributed entirely to increased care and vigilance in the business of the custom house. The customs were placed for some time under the management of Mr. Haldane, a Member of the Board of Trade, who was principally aided by a young gentleman of the name of Twining, in restoring order to the business of the Custom-house. Mr. Twining has distinguished himself very much in this transaction; he is at present too young in the service to be placed in the enjoyment of a salary adequate to his merits, but I shall take the first practicable opportunity of promoting him; in the meanwhile I have appointed Mr. Dashwood to the collection of the customs. I can rely on his diligence and integrity, and Mr. Twining will act under him.

It is necessary to observe that the right of the Governor-General in Council to raise the duties on goods in the Port of Calcutta is questioned by the lawyers here, in the present indefinite state of our powers of legislation.

An improvement of the tax upon Spirituous Liquors and intoxicating Drugs is now under my consideration, and I have little doubt that this branch of the revenue may be much increased. But here again I feel myself embarrassed by the anomalous constitution of this government. Under the construction given to the laws for the government of the British possessions, it is a received doctrine, that the Governor-General in Council cannot legislate for the town of Calcutta. Therefore the capital City of this empire must be exempt from the operation of any law imposing additional duties on the articles above mentioned, unless I can contrive to pass such a law under the pretext of an improvement of the duties appropriated to the support of the police. I am disposed to hope that sources of just and moderate taxation may be discovered on other articles of general consumption; but this measure must be adopted gradually and with great caution. I must here also observe, that although Calcutta must necessarily be the place of the greatest consumption, as well as that where any new tax would be less sensibly felt than in the country, the supposed restrictions of the law, and the strange conflict of authorities between the Supreme Court of Judicature and the Government, preclude the possibility of my applying any system of taxation on articles of

general consumption to the town of Calcutta. I trust you will, without delay, relieve this government from a predicament so embarrassing.

POLICE.—The Police of Calcutta is now in a deplorable condition, and if speedy measures be not adopted the town will soon relapse into its ancient state of filth and unhealthiness, and will again become fatal to European constitutions. It is my intention immediately to proceed to improve the drains and roads, to widen the streets and avenues, and clear away the jungles, and remove the tanks and other nuisances situated in the neighbourhood of the town. These improvements will necessarily occasion expense; but it is an expense which the Company must incur, or forfeit every title to the character of a wise and munificent sovereign. In aid of this expense it would be just to levy an assessment on the inhabitants of Calcutta; but I have already stated that measure to be impracticable in the limited state of my powers. Various other regulations of police are requisite for the preservation of the peace and order of the town; even these I shall find it difficult to enforce until my right to legislate for Calcutta shall be rendered indisputable by act of parliament.

OUDE.—Of the two general heads, under which you have stated the objects of your anxiety, with regard to the situation of Oude, I trust that the second is now nearly accomplished; namely, the substitution of an efficient military force under the Company's authority, in place of the Nabob Vizier's dangerous and undisciplined army. This reform has not been effected without great reluctance on the part of the Vizier, whose character has been displayed on this occasion in the genuine colours of Asiatic treachery and falsehood. I have nothing to hope from any other quality in his Excellency's mind, excepting his acknowledged pusillanimity, which I flatter myself will induce him to submit to the introduction of such a portion of the British authority into the management of his country, as is indispensably necessary to the just and pure administration of the Government; to the accurate collection and economical expenditure of his revenues; and to the relief of his people from the extortion, cruelty and oppression, under which they now suffer. I shall hereafter submit to you a detailed view of my proceedings in Oude; at present

it may be sufficient to say, that I consider the reform of the Vizier's military establishment to be far advanced, and that in consequence of the success of that preliminary step, I entertain a sanguine hope of being able to carry the same spirit of reform with vigour and effect into every other branch of his affairs.

GOVERNMENT OF FORT ST. GEORGE.—I am happy to be able to express my entire concurrence, in your opinion, with regard to the progressive improvement of the administration of affairs at Fort St. George; and I have no doubt that the same system will continue to be pursued by Lord Clive and by the persons who now constitute his advisers at that Presidency. My long residence at Fort St. George, and the cordiality, temper, and honour of Lord Clive have completely identified the two Governments, and I find no more difficulty in governing our extensive possessions on the coast, with all our recent acquisitions of territory and influence, than in regulating any of the collectorships in Bengal. You will observe, by the public proceedings, that I have lately transmitted to Fort St. George detailed orders for introducing into the possessions under the immediate Government of that Presidency, the same system of internal administration, under which these provinces have so happily flourished. I entertain no doubt, that, under the present Government at Fort St. George, my orders will be carried into effect with the utmost degree of honesty, alacrity, and zeal. The execution, however, of those orders must necessarily be imperfect unless accompanied by the application to the civil service at Fort St. George, not only of all those subsidiary improvements still requisite in Bengal, but of other remedies more peculiarly demanded by the state of the service at Fort St. George. My present inclination is to render the Court of Sudder Dewannee and Nizamut Adawlut in Bengal the Supreme Court of Appeal from all the Company's possessions, and to vest in it the general superintendence of the administration of justice and the regulation of police throughout the British empire in India. This arrangement appears to be well calculated to secure uniformity, consistency, and purity in the conduct of all the subordinate courts of justice, and in every institution of police. I do not apprehend that it will be necessary or expedient to establish any intermediate

Court of Appeal at Fort St. George between the Sudder Dewannee Adawlut in Bengal, and the ordinary Courts of Circuit and Appeal, to be instituted on the coast of Coromandel. I am also inclined to think that the writers destined for Fort St. George may advantageously pass the two first years of their residence in India at the University of Calcutta; where proper professors may be established for their instruction in the languages peculiar to the territories subject to the immediate Government of Fort St. George.

The adoption of a plan for pensioning public officers incapable of service is required at least as much at Fort St. George as in Bengal. But the peculiar evil now inherent in the constitution of the service at Fort St. George is not only unknown in Bengal, but directly contrary to the fundamental principle on which Lord Cornwallis rested all his plans for amending and purifying the administration of affairs in these provinces. He prohibited all indirect and secret emoluments, and all mixture in pursuits of commerce, or of other affairs incompatible with a due attention to the public service; and he established the allowances of the public officers on so liberal a scale as might enable them not merely to subsist during the period of their public labours, but to realize, with due economy, a competent provision after a moderate period of service.

This system is not founded on any principle exclusively applicable to the characters, habits, or interests of the public servants in Bengal. It is founded in a just and correct knowledge of mankind, for no proposition can be more self-evident, or of more universal application, than that the best security against the temptation of illicit profit, is to annex liberal emolument to honest labour. It is, therefore, difficult to conceive on what ground an expectation can be formed, that the public service at Fort St. George should be as pure and correct as that in Bengal; while the civil servants of Fort St. George shall be permitted to mix in pursuits foreign to their public duties; and while the general scale of the allowances at Fort St. George shall remain so low as to preclude those prospects of honest profit deemed necessary in Bengal for securing the integrity of the public servants. I am aware that this remark does not apply with so much force to the commercial as to other branches of the Company's

service at Fort St. George. Some of the commercial allowances have been increased at that Presidency, on the very principle of rendering them so ample as to preclude the temptation of irregular profit; and yet the irresistible application of the same principle to other branches of the service at the same Presidency has never been admitted in practice, however it may have been acknowledged in argument. For it can never be supposed that the Company can deliberately deem it to be a more incumbent duty of Government to secure the honest discharge of its commercial concerns, than to preserve its revenues from speculation, and the administration of its laws from corruption and oppression. It is possible that the limited and precarious condition of the revenues of the Presidency of Fort St. George, and its state of insecurity during the existence of the contiguous hostile power in Mysore, may have retarded the due consideration of this subject. But in the present increased, and, I trust, progressive state of the prosperity and security of that valuable possession, no such obstacle exists to a reform urgently demanded by every principle of humanity, policy, and justice.

I am convinced that the continuance of the present inadequate allowances of the public servants at Fort St. George would prove an insuperable bar to the improvement of the revenues, and to the due administration of justice in that part of our Empire. At present the public servants at Fort St. George, in most of the offices, can find no alternative but poverty or corruption. Is it the part of wisdom or honour in any Government to reduce its servants to such an alternative? During my residence at Fort St. George a most respectable member of the Board of Revenue, Mr. Harrington, resigned his seat at the Board because his salary did not afford him the hope of providing a competent maintenance for his family at the expiration of his service; and he entered into a Commercial House of Agency, withdrawing from the Company's service talents, integrity, and zeal, which had proved highly useful, and might have been exerted with increased benefit to their affairs. I know that Mr. Cockburne, (whose abilities, knowledge, and integrity, are not surpassed by any person in India,) entertains similar intentions of retiring from the Company's service. And

it must be evident to your comprehensive view and long experience of public affairs that this evil will be aggravated in proportion to the increased magnitude and importance of the interests entrusted to the management of the public servants at Fort St. George; and that ultimately a service so defective must be deserted by all who are not disposed to take advantage of its abuses.

The consideration of all these circumstances has induced me to call Lord Clive's particular attention to the scale of allowances at Fort St. George; and it is my intention to accompany the institution of the new Courts of Judicature at that Presidency by a general revision of the salaries of their civil service; the result of which will, I trust, enable me to place all the allowances on a proper level.

The delay attendant upon the expectation of orders from home and the urgent pressure of the evil will, I trust, sufficiently justify my determination to apply, with all practicable despatch, such a remedy as shall appear to my judgment to promise the most speedy, beneficial, and permanent effect.

I entertain little doubt that the revenues, under the management of the Government of Fort St. George, will be considerably improved in all their branches; and that the additional expense of providing for the important objects stated in the preceding paragraphs will be far overbalanced by the consequent amelioration of all our resources in that quarter.

CARNATIC.—The double Government of the Carnatic is a difficulty which continues to present the most serious and alarming obstacles to every attempt at reform. The expectation of favourable opportunities of negociation with the Nabob of Arcot, and of the effects of conciliation and attention towards him will, I am convinced, be ever disappointed by the event. You recollect with what sanguine hopes I looked forward to the result of measures adopted in a spirit of mildness and persuasion, but I have found them entirely vain and fruitless; nor can I cherish the slightest ray of hope that such a course can ever prove successful, during the life of the present Nabob. His Highness is surrounded by European advisers of the most dangerous and profligate character, whose interests are deeply involved in the perpetuation of the abuses of his Government, and who (amongst other

means of perverting his Councils) labour to inspire him with the notion of a distinction of interests and powers between the Royal Government and that constituted by Act of Parliament for the administration of the British Empire in India. In all his conversations and correspondence, he studiously distinguishes his Majesty's Government from that of the Court of Directors; uniformly treating the latter with disrespect, and even with ridicule and contempt. In my last conversation with his Highness he plainly declared to me that he considered his Majesty to be his father, friend, ally, and protector, but that the Court of Directors desired to "obtain his country any how."

The principles of this distinction are encouraged in his Highness's mind by the letters and embassies which have occasionally reached him from his Majesty through channels not only unconnected but avowedly at variance with the British Government in India. All such letters and embassies have the most pernicious tendency to withdraw the confidence and respect of the natives from the governments in India, and to fix their attention on his Majesty's naval or military officers, or such persons (of whatever character) as may accidentally be the bearers of his letters. The frequent letters which his Highness the Nabob receives from his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales greatly aggravate the same evil; and it is with the utmost concern that I feel myself bound by my public duty to request that you will take an opportunity of representing to his Royal Highness that his correspondence with the Nabob of the Carnatic has produced an effect entirely contrary to his Royal Highness's wishes, and has been highly injurious to the public service in India.

Few, if any, of the Company's servants at Madras are now directly engaged in the intrigues of his Highness's Durbar. The principal and most mischievous agents and counsellors of his Highness are to be found among persons who have been the bearers of letters to his Highness from England, and among the attorneys and low practitioners of the law, who notoriously conduct his Highness's correspondence with the Government. Nor can I entertain any expectation that the newly established Judicature at Madras, under its present constitution, will in any degree assist the Government in repressing the intrigues and corruption of the Durbar. My

experience during my residence at Fort St. George leads me to believe that the powers of the Court of the Recorder will prove entirely inadequate to the detection and punishment of the usurious and corrupt practices which that Court was intended to repress, while the establishment of such a Court will tend to confirm the audacity of the tribe of pettyfoggers which now infests the Carnatic, and governs the Nabob's Durbar. I confess that I cannot concur with you in ascribing the purity of the service in Bengal to the influence of the Supreme Court of Judicature at Calcutta. The most corrupt period in the history of Bengal, or perhaps in that of any of our foreign establishments, is to be dated from the institution of the Supreme Court to the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, a period of time, during a considerable portion of which that Court exercised its powers to their utmost possible extent. The purity of Lord Cornwallis's personal example, and the integrity and wisdom of his institutions, the increase of the regular and avowed public allowances, the separation of the legislative, judicial, and executive powers of the Government, and the consequent subjection of the Government itself to the controul of its own laws, were the real foundations of the reform at this Presidency. This constitution was the source, and its operation has been the security, of that reform; neither the design nor the execution of the amended system of administration in Bengal was in any degree aided by the co-operation, influence, or example of the Supreme Court. During the administrations of Lord Cornwallis, and of Lord Teignmouth, the Supreme Court teemed with abuses of every description, and would have afforded a much fitter subject than an instrument of reform. Respectable and honourable as the person is who now presides in that Court, and eminent as his public services have been in the detection and remedy of the abuses abetted by his predecessors, I cannot discover in what manner the influence or authority of the Supreme Court now operate to preserve the purity of the service of Government.

The public servants look exclusively to the person in whose hands the Government resides, and to the practical result of that constitution which he is bound to administer. Under that constitution he possesses ample powers of reward and punishment; and the due exercise of those powers consti-

tutes the vital principle of the public service, and the sole spring from which the purity or corruption of the subordinate officers must ever flow. The responsibility of the Governor-General in Council to the Government at home, and the conspicuous station in which he is placed, sufficiently secure the due exercise of his arduous functions.

The Supreme Court possesses no power of rewarding the public servants, and with respect to their punishment, it can never proceed vigorously or efficaciously without the co-operation of Government; even with that co-operation, the powers of the Supreme Court must be limited by the difficulties of obtaining legal proof of malversation; and even where such proofs can be obtained, the species of punishment which the Supreme Court can inflict can neither be so speedy nor so formidable to the public servants as the powers of suspension and subsequent prosecution at home vested in the Government. Whenever punishment in the form of public prosecution may become requisite, I am convinced that it would be much more effectually inflicted, if the prosecution were always to be instituted in England. With regard to petty cases of abuse every useful purpose would be answered by a tribunal, independent of the Government, but placed towards it in the relation of a mere interpreter of the laws of England, modified by such as may be enacted by the Governor-General in Council.

The supposed controul of the Supreme Court over the person of the Governor-General never can be exercised without occasioning a convulsion in the Government; it is, therefore, either useless, or dangerous, and every trace of it ought to be abolished. The extreme cases in which the crimes of the Governor-General may require the controul of a superior authority, cannot be provided against in India without the application of a remedy infinitely more perilous than the supposed evil; the existence of which is scarcely within the verge of possibility. The remedy of such cases should be left on the same ground as it stands on in Ireland with relation to the possible personal crimes of the chief Governor exercising the sovereign executive power. No power in India should appear to be co-ordinate with the Government, and still less to rival or to control it.

I shall hereafter address you more in detail on the present constitution of the Supreme Court of Judicature, (particularly on such parts of it as have proved practical impediments to the exercise of the control of this government over its own native officers, civil and military and native subjects; (but it would have been uncandid in me to pass without notice a passage in your correspondence, relating to so important a subject, in which I have the misfortune not to concur in your opinion.

I cannot conclude this subject without adding my cordial testimony in favour of the moderation, discretion and propriety with which the present Court (under the direction of Sir John Anstruther) has uniformly exercised its powers, not only without a symptom of jealousy, but with every possible attention to the dignity, vigour and efficacy of the government; but a power radically dangerous ought not to find protection in the temporary forbearance of those hands in which it is vested.

The duty of communicating to you without reserve, my sentiments on the subject of the utility of the Supreme Court of Judicature, has led me to digress from the actual state of the Carnatic.

I am thoroughly convinced, that no effectual remedy can ever be applied to the evils which afflict that country, without obtaining from the Nabob powers at least as extensive as those vested in the Company by the late treaty of Tanjore. At the death of the present Nabob, such a treaty might easily be obtained from his successor, (if after that event it should be thought advisable to admit any nominal sovereign of the Carnatic, excepting the Company.) A young man resides at Chepauk, who is treated by the Nabob as his Highness's son. This young man is certainly the son of a dancing woman, who was received for some time in his Highness's house; and the Nabob declares himself to be the father. Numerous legitimate descendants of Wallajah are in existence. The whole question of the succession will therefore be completely open to the decision of the Company, upon the decease of the present Nabob. The inclination of my opinion is, that the most advisable settlement would be, to place Omdut ul Omra's supposed son on the Musnud, under a

treaty similar to that which was lately concluded with the Rajah of Tanjore, it will however, be expedient that you should immediately consider whether it might not be a more effectual arrangement to provide liberally for every branch of the descendants of Wallajah and Omdut ul Omra, and to vest even the nominal sovereignty of the Carnatic in the Company.

On this subject I request your immediate instructions ; which you will frame with reference to the following most important and interesting considerations.

During the whole course of the late war with Tippoo Sultaun, the conduct of all the Nabob's officers without exception, amounted nearly to positive hostility in every part of his territories through which the British army, or that of the Nizam marched, or even in which supplies were ordered to be procured or collected for their use. When complaints were stated to his Highness he promised redress, but never afforded it in any instance.

I was compelled to seize the persons of some of his principal officers, and to bring them down to Fort St. George, from districts in which our force was not sufficiently considerable to furnish an effectual check to their treasonable practices. In all districts so circumstanced his Highness's officers did not scruple to proceed to open violence for the purpose of obstructing our supplies.

During this arduous crisis, his Highness frequently endeavoured to anticipate my complaints by alleging pretended grievances to justify the conduct of his officers, but upon examination his Highness's complaints uniformly appeared to be utterly devoid of foundation.

At the most critical period of our military preparations, when every European and native at Madras, emulated each other in aiding the public service by loan and contribution, his Highness could not be induced to advance, even on account of his acknowledged debts, any assistance to the public treasury. He indeed, with much reluctance, under the apprehension of a cessation of all friendly intercourse between him and me, engaged to advance a sum on account of his new cavalry debt ; but after the most solemn protestations of punctuality, he broke his faith with every circumstance of infamy and dishonour, at a moment when this viola-

tion of his engagements might have proved fatal to the progress of the army; if I had, suffered myself to be so far the dupe of his repeated assurances, as to have relied in any degree on their performance for any pecuniary supply of the troops in the field.

During the whole of this period, I have every reason to be confident that his Highness possessed the ready means of satisfying a much more considerable demand, than I had deemed it expedient to make upon him.

It was perfectly evident during the progress of our success, that his Highness derived no satisfaction from the triumph of our arms; and it is remarkable that he never appeared in public at the celebration of any of the rejoicings occasioned by the glorious termination of the war.

Whatever suspicions of his Highness's personal disaffection to the British Government might have been warranted by all these combined circumstances, I was rather disposed to attribute them to the weakness of his government, or to the corruption and intrigues of his advisers than to any spirit of positive treachery in his own disposition; but the records of the late Tippoo Suldaun, which fell into our hands after the capture of Seringapatam, have furnished me with the most authentic and indisputable evidence that a secret correspondence of a nature the most hostile to the British power, was opened with Tippoo Suldaun by the late Nabob Wallajah towards the close of his life, through the agency of Omdut ul Omra the present Nabob.

Omdut ul Omra appears to have been extremely zealous and forward in the conduct of this secret intercourse during the life of his father, and no question can be entertained that the late Nabob, as a principal, and Omdut ul Omra as an agent, were guilty of a flagrant violation of the treaty of 1792; as well as of the fundamental principle of their connection with the Company. Omdut ul Omra was a party to the treaty of 1792, and on that circumstance founds all his present rights. Sufficient proof appears that Omdut ul Omra, after his accession, manifested a disposition to maintain the correspondence commenced by his father through him; and I entertain no doubt that his objects in that correspondence were of the same hostile and treacherous character, as they had been previous to the death of his father. The proof arising from

written documents of his overt acts of hostility since his accession, is not so full and distinct as that which relates to his former agency. But this defect may be supplied by oral testimony, as all the necessary witnesses are alive and in our hands.

No doubt exists in my mind, that the British Government would now be completely justified, in depriving the Nabob of all power over his country, and reducing him to the state of a mere pensioner.

The only questions which remain for decision are the time of carrying this measure into execution, and the amount of the provision to be made for the Nabob, for his descendants, and for those of Wallajah. As soon as you shall have received this letter, I request you to despatch an express to me with your opinion, although mine is so decided, that I shall not wait for the communication of yours, if the season should appear to me to be favourable for the great measure which is now become indispensable on every principle of justice and policy.

TANJORE.—With respect to Tanjore, the treaty which I framed previous to my departure from Fort St. George, and which has since been carried into effect by Lord Clive, will, I trust, place the administration of the affairs of that country on an improved foundation. The difficulties which I encountered in obtaining a correct and consistent account of Tanjore, are scarcely to be described or imagined.

After a most tedious enquiry, I brought the several contending parties to a fair discussion (or rather to a bitter contest) in my presence; and after an argument which lasted three or four days, I proceeded to review the whole case in a regular manner, adverting to every fact and argument on both sides of the question. At length the contending parties unanimously concurred in the expediency and justice of the treaty, in the form in which it has been concluded.

A question will arise with respect to the unregistered debt of the late Rajah of Tanjore. I am inclined to believe that some branches of that debt, as well as that of the unconsolidated debt of the Nabob of the Carnatic, are at least as well entitled to consideration as any part of the debt sanctioned by parliament. The subject merits your attention. I shall not feel myself at liberty to act upon it without orders from

home; but I am satisfied that you will find some cases of great hardship among many rather deserving prosecution than payment.

CIRCARS.—The Northern Circars, according to the report of the Board of Revenue at Fort St. George, are now in a state to receive the same principles of government, with some local modifications, which have been applied to Bengal. The new settlement now about to be introduced upon the coast, will therefore include that vast tract of country. It may be convenient to observe to you in this place that my determination to render the new settlement of the land revenue on the coast perpetual, without previous reference to the Court of Directors was founded on intelligence from Mr. Cockburne that the terror of such a reference would render all settlement impracticable, and above all would entirely frustrate the sale of the Havelly Lands.

MALABAR.—The condition of the coast of Malabar, has been so entirely changed by the conquest of Mysore, that the principles stated in your despatches to the Government of Bombay, and in General Stuart's letters to you, are no longer applicable to the actual circumstances of that district. The conquest of Mysore will, I trust, enable us to settle Malabar and Canara on a systematic and durable plan of government. The subject is now under my consideration. One principle however, I am persuaded will appear as evident and incontrovertible to your mind as it does to mine; that whatever may be our ultimate determination with respect to the power of the several Rajahs, it must appear to flow from the generosity, justice and power of the British Government; and not to be derived from a timid submission to the refractory spirit of any rebellious tributary.

COMMUNICATION WITH ENGLAND.—If the war with France should be protracted, and Buonaparte continue at the head of affairs, I am persuaded that some attempt will be made by France against our Indian empire. A regular monthly despatch overland from London to India will, in that event, be of the utmost importance. Indeed, under any circumstances, a speedy and certain communication between England and India, appears to me to be an object in which the interests of both countries are deeply involved. My opinion is, that, in addition to the despatch overland, monthly

packets should be established to sail regularly both from Europe and India. They might carry small cargoes and passengers, which, with the profits of postage on letters, would more than defray their expence.

In reviewing your correspondence, I have not thought it necessary to return any particular replies to your several letters of recommendation. The receipt of them is noted in the annexed memorandum. Being in possession of your principles with respect to recommendations, I do not think any further explanation necessary.

I remain, my dear Sir, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXX.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort St. George, March 26th, 1800.

Having at present under my consideration the state of our relations with the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and the whole tenour of his conduct towards the British Government, I shall soon be prepared to communicate to your Lordship the final result of my determination on these important subjects. In the mean while, the possibility of the sudden contingency of his Highness's death, renders it expedient that I should state to your Lordship, in an official form, the opinions and directions which I communicated to you verbally during my residence at Fort St. George, for your Lordship's guidance in the event of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra's death.

Although the treaty of 1792 was concluded in the name and on behalf of the Nabob Wallajah, and *of his successors*, no obligation of that treaty binds the Company to place, or to support, on the Musnud, any individual of the family (even if any should be nominated by the reigning Nabob) whose pretensions to the succession may be actually disputed, or may appear questionable.

Various rumours exist relative to the birth of the person of whom the Nabob Omdut ul Omra declares himself to be the father. It is, however, certain that the mother of this young man is of low origin; and that she was never married

to the Nabob. It is reasonable to believe, that the succession of this young man would be felt as an injury to the rights of the late Ameer's son, by all who might think favourably of the latter's title: and all such persons would undoubtedly use every practicable effort to defeat such a succession.

Under these circumstances, neither party could claim our support under the existing treaties: and in determining to whom that support shall be granted, we are at liberty to consider the security of the British interests in the Carnatic, the general prosperity of the country, and the happiness of its inhabitants, as the primary objects of our right and duty.

On this principle, it is manifest, that, from the candidate whom we may resolve to raise to the Musnud, we may justly require the most ample pledges for the effectual remedy of the various evils which now afflict the Carnatic.

For this purpose, the successor of Omdut ul Omra must be required to surrender to the Company, in the most absolute manner, the civil and military administration of the Carnatic; not retaining possession of a single fortress, nor maintaining any armed force, under any pretext whatever. No other arrangement would be adequate to the attainment of the indispensable objects which have been stated.

The general principles of the late treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore may be made the model of the agreement to be concluded with the successor of Omdut ul Omra. Such modifications of that treaty, as may be rendered necessary by a variation of circumstances, will readily suggest themselves to your Lordship's mind. The article relative to forts and military establishments, noticed in the preceding paragraph, will admit of no modification. The amount of the provision to be made for the support of the succeeding Nabob, and of the other branches of the family of the late Wallajah, should be regulated with reference to the numbers and rank of the persons to be maintained, and on a scale of reasonable liberality.

Although the elevation of the supposed son of Omdut ul Omra to the Musnud would probably be disagreeable to the principal Mussulmans in the Carnatic, I am of opinion that he might be rendered a better instrument for the accomplishment of the salutary ends proposed, than the son of the late Ameer could be expected to prove. Whenever, therefore,

the death of the present Nabob may take place, your Lordship will place the young man, who passes for his Highness's son, on the vacant Musnud, previously requiring his consent to the conditions generally described in this despatch; unless any objection to this disposition should occur to your Lordship's mind; in which event, your Lordship will be so good as to state your objections to me immediately after the receipt of this letter.

If the Nabob's supposed son should refuse or delay to subscribe to those conditions within twenty-four hours from the present Nabob's death, you will then give the son of the late Ameer the option of the succession on the same terms. If he also should reject the necessary conditions, your Lordship will immediately proceed to establish the Company's authority in the completest manner throughout the Carnatic; and you will suspend all further negotiation on the subject of the succession until the receipt of instructions from the Governor-General in Council.

I am not aware that the Ameer has left more than one son. In the event of his male offspring being more numerous, your Lordship will consider these directions as applicable only to his eldest son; and you will not treat with any younger branch of his family.

Your Lordship will bear in mind the expediency of making a reasonable provision, in any of the cases supposed, for the Nabob's family, and for all natives of distinction and character, as well as for indigent families, at present dependent on the service or bounty of the Nabob of the Carnatic. Any arrangements which may be necessary for this purpose should take place, if possible, in the same instant with the establishment of the Company's authority throughout the country.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXI.

Sir W. Sidney Smith to the Earl of Mornington.

Tigre off Alexandria, April 5th, 1800.

MY LORD,

[Received 21st of June.]

It is my duty to give your Lordship the earliest information that hostilities recommenced between the French and Ottoman armies in Egypt on the 20th ultimo, as it is probable the knowledge of this event will decide your Lordship to continue in the execution of any plan of co-operation you might have formed towards driving this French army out of Egypt by force, that mode seeming to be the only one practicable under the change of circumstances which has taken place since the signature of the convention for the evacuation. This change has been occasioned by the notification made by Lord Keith, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean, to General Kleber of the only conditions under which the return of the French army to France would be allowed, and which the veteran troops composing it refused to listen to. General Kleber readily acquiesced to my proposition, to open new conferences on the subject, and let things remain in suspense till the answer to my despatches notifying the convention should come from London. The Grand Vizier was very liberal on the subject, as General Kleber informs me, in his letter, acquiescing to my proposition for a conference, and as appears from his Highness's letter to me, but the impatience of the Turkish troops to enter Cairo, from which they were only five miles distant, occasioned the rejection of the French General's demand of a delay in the evacuation of the citadel, proportionate to the interval of time there might be previous to the arrival of the consent of the British Government to the free passage of the French army as settled by the convention. General Kleber, in consequence, notified his intention to renew hostilities, and attacked the Vizier's advanced posts on the morning of the 20th ultimo. The circumstances and result of this battle, if it can be so called, are detailed in a letter sent by Mr. Morier open through me to your Lordship. I retarded the evil day as long as I could by negotiation, and the conclusion of a treaty of evacuation in the only possible way in which it could

be brought about. The lamentations of the malcontents of the French army, (forming the evacuation party), or their reasoning in opposition to the colonist party, not being to be considered as any proof of their inability to hold out against us; in fact, the inefficiency of the Turkish force is so much more absolute, that I am apprehensive of the consequences of this defeat placing things in a much worse position than they were at the beginning of the campaign. The Grand Vizier cannot be said to have an army with him at present, and the only chance there is of preventing the total annihilation of his remaining force is, the desperation to which a portion of his forces may be driven from apprehension of re-crossing the desert, which may induce them to make a stand among the last villages on the edge of the cultivated country near Belbeis, the dislodging them from which will be no easy matter, considering the Turkish mode of fighting. This is but a slender hope, but I am endeavouring, all in my power, to realize it by sending a supply of powder to the Vizier, and by such other co-operation as my very limited means enables me to employ on the coast. I expect the theatre of naval war will be transferred hither by the natural propensity of Buonaparte to support his favourite "colony," and his desire to prove to this army that he has not deserted them entirely. Twenty-two ships of the line were ready for sea at Brest the latter end of December. The combined fleet will amount to 48, and from the circumstances of the preparations making at Carthagenæ for the reception of a fleet, it is conjectured that their destination is the Mediterranean. This circumstance may be an additional inducement to your Lordship to turn your attention this way, and to employ a little of that energy and prowess which has so well established our military reputation in India towards changing the contempt in which the French hold our army, into that respect they affect to give exclusively to our navy, but which opportunity will ever (as it has done in the Mysore) prove to be equally due to both.

I have the honour to be,
with the utmost respect, my Lord,
Your Lordship's most obedient, humble Servant,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

No. LXXII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Honourable Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, April 7th, 1800.

I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship copies, in Persian, of various extracts from letters and other papers found in the Palace of Seringapatam. The Persian documents are accompanied by translations in English; and the Persian copies, as well as the translations, are attested by the Persian translator of this Government, whose report to me on the contents of these important papers, and of the other documents which accompany this letter, is annexed to this despatch.*

The embarrassments opposed by the Nabob Omdut ul Omra's officers to the collection and movement of our supplies, during the last war with Tippoo Suldaun, repeatedly called for my interposition during my residence at Fort St. George, and induced considerable doubts in my mind of his Highness's fidelity to the fundamental principle of his engagements with the Company. In the last council which I had the honour to hold at Fort St. George, previous to my departure from that Presidency, your Lordship may recollect that I stated my suspicions, that both the Nabobs Wallajah and Omdut ul Omra, had been engaged in a secret correspondence with Tippoo Suldaun since the peace of 1792. Those suspicions were founded on a cursory view of one of the documents composing the series of papers now transmitted to your Lordship. The subject has since engaged my most serious attention. Several of the most important of these papers have recently reached my hands, and a deliberate consideration of the evidence resulting from the whole of these documents has not only confirmed, in the most unquestionable manner, my suspicions of the existence of a secret correspondence between the personages already named, but satisfied my judgment that its objects, on the part of the

* These documents are voluminous: they completely convict the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, and his father the late Nabob Wallajah, of a breach of the alliance subsisting between them and the Company; and of forming an intimate connection with Tippoo Suldaun, directly adverse to the British interests in India.—[Ed.]

Nabobs Walajah and Omdut ul Omra, and especially of the latter, was of the most hostile tendency to the British interests.

The report of the Persian translator* on the nature of these papers is drawn with so much ability, and so accurately detailed, that I do not judge it necessary, at present, to enter into a more particular comment upon them. I shall hereafter, however, review the whole subject. The object of the present letter is solely to convey to your Lordship my instructions with regard to the measures necessary to effect a more full discovery of all the circumstances of this extraordinary transaction, as well as to secure the British interests in the Carnatic against any possible consequences to be apprehended from the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, during the interval of the requisite enquiry into his conduct.

The proofs arising from the papers would certainly be sufficient to justify the British Government in depriving that faithless and ungrateful prince of all means of rendering any part of the resources of the territories which he holds under the protection of the Company, subservient to the further violation of his engagements, and to the prosecution of his desperate purposes of treachery and ingratitude. But it will be more consistent with the character of the British Government to regulate its proceedings by a regard to its own dignity and systematic moderation, than by the standard of his Highness's crimes. It is, therefore, my intention to proceed to a deliberate enquiry, founded on such further written documents as we may be able to obtain at Seringapatam, as well as on the oral testimony of the principal persons concerned in this correspondence. This enquiry must be concluded previous to the adoption of those arrangements which, I am persuaded, must be the ultimate consequence of a just investigation of this transaction.

With these sentiments, I request your Lordship to lose no time after the receipt of this despatch, in examining the several witnesses, of whom a list is annexed, and in directing Lieutenant-Colonel Close to make such further enquiries as he can prosecute, and to furnish your Lordship with such written and oral testimony as he may be enabled to obtain at Seringapatam.

* See Appendix.

I have annexed to this despatch a memorandum, which may serve to assist your Lordship in the conduct of the intended enquiry. I refer you to that paper, as containing a summary view of my ideas with regard to the mode of regulating the examination of the several witnesses. I cannot, however, relinquish this part of the subject without recommending to your Lordship's most serious attention the necessity of enquiring with the utmost degree of accuracy into the conduct of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, subsequent to the date of the letter N, received at Seringapatam on the 8th of January, 1797; and to trace his correspondence with Tippoo Suldaun, down to the period of our preparations for the last war, throughout the season of these preparations, and throughout the campaign which ensued.

I am persuaded that your Lordship, and all the public officers employed under your orders in the conduct of this examination, will advert to the great importance of observing the strictest secrecy until the period of its final close, and of the arrival of my instructions, founded on your Lordship's report to me of the evidence collected by you.

I request you to forward the result of your enquiries to me by an express vessel (to be engaged immediately for this purpose), and in duplicate over land, in order that my ultimate instructions may be transmitted to you with the least possible delay.

The result of the enquiry directed by this despatch will probably render it my duty to deprive the Nabob Omdut ul Omra of the civil and military government of the Carnatic, under such modifications and regulations as may be deemed expedient to secure the safety of our interests in that valuable possession, with the least practicable degree of pressure on his Highness's feelings. If this despatch had contained a positive instruction to your Lordship to assume the Government of the Carnatic without delay, I apprehend that the necessary preparations for carrying that measure into effect must have occupied a more considerable space of time than will now be required for the proposed enquiry, and for the communication of my judgment upon it, although it is my wish to delay the actual assumption of his Highness's Government until that enquiry shall be completed, I deem it necessary to authorise your Lordship to proceed immediately

to make every arrangement preparatory to that measure, which now appears to me to have become inevitable. In addition to these powers, my confidence in your Lordship's discretion, and my sense of the extreme peril to which the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra may eventually expose the Carnatic, induce me to furnish your Lordship with a general authority of assuming his Highness's civil and military government, and of taking any such further steps as the exigency of the circumstances on the spot may appear to your Lordship to require. In such a posture of affairs, it is impossible to frame any rule from which the pressure of the moment might not demand a departure. I shall, therefore, content myself with apprising your Lordship of my anxious desire to avoid the extremity of assuming the government of the Carnatic previous to the completion of the enquiry, and to the arrival of my final instructions after the result of that enquiry shall have been communicated to me. I cannot foresee any event of less importance than the strong probability of an hostile invasion, or of internal commotion, either in the Carnatic or in Mysore, which could render it necessary for your Lordship to assume the country without previous reference to me. You will, however, understand the intention of this despatch to be, to give you a discretionary power of acting according to your deliberate view of the necessity of the case before you.

Your Lordship will concur with me in opinion, that the disclosure made by the annexed documents, of the disaffection of the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, supersedes the necessity of any further consideration of the state of the Company's connection with that prince, under the orders lately conveyed by the Honourable Court of Directors to your Lordship in council. While those orders were under my consideration, a combination of fortunate circumstances revealed that correspondence, which at once furnishes an explanation of the perverse spirit of his Highness's councils, since his accession to the Musnud, and demands the application of the sole effectual remedy for the evils which those councils have brought upon his people.

Although the accompanying, as well as the present instructions, to your Lordship, have been read and approved in the Secret Department, by the Governor-General in council, at

Fort William, I have deemed it expedient to transmit this despatch to your Lordship, in the present form, instead of addressing it to your Lordship in council.

I have the honour to be,

My Lord, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXIII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right. Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, 10th April, 1800.

I have the honour to enclose for your Lordship's information an extract of a letter from the Resident at Hyderabad, communicating to me a proposition made by Azim ul Omra, for granting to the Company an assignment of certain districts, belonging to his Highness the Nizam, as a fund for the payment of the regiment of cavalry recently added to the subsidiary force stationed in his Highness's dominions.

The principle of this proposal is perfectly conformable to my wishes; but the local position of the particular districts offered by Azim ul Omra, would render the management of them extremely inconvenient, if not absolutely impracticable, to the Company's servants. The proposal, therefore, cannot be accepted in its present form.

The Resident at Hyderabad, however, thinking it probable that Azim ul Omra might be induced to assign to us, for the purpose stated, districts more convenient in point of situation, I have directed the Resident to consult your Lordship's opinion with respect to this point; and I have authorized him to treat with the minister for the assignment of such districts as shall be approved by your Lordship, stipulating, however, that the management of the same shall be exclusively and absolutely vested in the Company, without reserving any power of interference for his Highness the Nizam's government.

It may be proper to apprise your Lordship, that I shall be well satisfied to commute the whole amount of the subsidy payable by his Highness the Nizam, for an equivalent assignment of territory contiguous to the Carnatic; and I shall be

glad to receive your Lordship's sentiments with regard to the districts which it would be most expedient to demand in the case supposed, as well with a view to considerations of military advantage, as to those of revenue.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXIV.

The Earl of Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan.

SIR,

Fort William, April 16th, 1800.

Previous to your departure from Bombay for the settlement of the affairs of Surat, under my instructions in council of the 10th March last, it appears to me of essential importance, that I should express to you my sentiments with regard to the powers of government which the public interests require you to exercise during your absence from the Presidency of Bombay.

It must be presumed that the Legislature of Great Britain had foreseen that public affairs might frequently demand the presence of the governors of Fort St. George and Bombay, in parts of the territories immediately subject to those respective Presidencies, but remote from the ordinary seat of government.

No special provision, however, has been made by law, for the administration of the government in the absence of the Governor on such occasions, although ample provision has been made for the case of the Governor-General proceeding to Fort St. George or Bombay. It may be inferred, therefore, to have been the intention of the Legislature, that, whenever the public interest might require the presence of the Governors of Fort St. George or Bombay, at any places within the limits of their governments, but remote from the established seat of Government, the Governors should exercise all the powers vested in them by law when in council at the Presidency, as far as circumstances might admit.

Supposing the Legislature not to have adverted to the case in question, it cannot be imagined to have been their intention, that the Governors of those Presidencies should

not quit the seat of their respective governments whenever the public interests might demand their presence in some distant part of the territories immediately subject to their authority.

Until some legislative provisions shall have been made for the case of the temporary absence of the Governors of the different presidencies within the limits of their respective governments, I have no hesitation in declaring it to be my opinion, that it is consistent with the spirit of the law, as well as essential to the public interests, that the Governors respectively should, on such occasions, exercise the same powers as when in council at the Presidency, as far as circumstances may admit.

While the Governors of Fort St. George or Bombay remain within the limits of their governments, it is evident that the members of the respective councils possess no powers distinct from the Governor, and that they are incompetent to perform any act of government otherwise than in his presence, and even otherwise than with his assent in every case excepting judicial proceedings, and those particularly specified in the Act of Parliament.

If, therefore, the necessity of the occasional absence of the Governor from the Presidency be admitted, either the general administration of the affairs of the Government must be suspended during his absence, or he must exercise, under his separate responsibility, to the extent which circumstances may require, all the powers which are vested in him by law when in council at the Presidency, afterwards recording his acts in council.

The legal incompetency of the council to exercise any portion of the public authority independently of the Governor, is not more evident than the expediency of limiting the exercise of the powers of government, in the case under consideration, to the Governor's hands, and of precluding the members of council, in the absence of the Governor, from exercising any such independent authority. The Governor, by law, under all circumstances, is responsible for the administration of the affairs of the Government. He is not only authorized, but bound to act on his separate opinion distinct from that of the council in all cases of deliberate difference on subjects of importance. A deference to the opinions of the members of council, or an inclination to conciliate their

cooperation in the general system of the government, will not justify the Governor in any departure from his own conscientious judgment in any matter affecting the public interests; for the letter and spirit of the law have rendered it not only his right, but his duty to act on his own separate judgment, wherever, in cases of magnitude, it shall be clearly and decisively different from that of the council. If the Governor should submit his opinion to that of the council, he alone is, and ought to be, responsible for the consequences of any act done under such circumstances. The power of acting separately is an active trust in the hands of the Governor, and he must be responsible, not only for its abusive exercise, but for suffering it to lie dormant whenever the public service requires it to be called forth. As long as this responsibility attaches to the Governor, he ought to retain all the powers necessary to the discharge of his duties. Were these powers to devolve to the council during the absence of the Governor, in the case supposed, it is evident that they might be employed during that period, to the subversion of the general system of measures which the Governor might have established.

It is, therefore, my opinion, that during your residence at Surat, no measure of importance should be taken by the members of council at Bombay without your previous sanction, where the case may be such as to admit of the delay of a reference to you; and that all appointments to offices should proceed directly from yourself in the same manner as if you were present at the seat of government.

I also recommend that you direct copies of all the papers of importance to be forwarded to you by the most expeditious conveyance, and that you issue such orders on the subject of them, as you may think proper, under your own separate responsibility.

The members of the council may conduct the ordinary details of government during your absence, and their acts, as well as your own, may be regularly recorded in council on your return to the Presidency.

It is almost superfluous to add, that these suggestions are founded entirely on general principles. I entertain the highest opinion of the zeal and integrity of the members of your council, and I am confident, that, on all occasions, they will manifest the greatest readiness to promote the public interests,

and to maintain the honour, efficiency, and vigour of your government. But it is my duty to furnish you with a permanent rule for the guidance of your conduct, applicable to all future times and contingencies; I have, therefore, stated the principles of the constitution of your Government, without reference to the personal characters of the members of your present council.

I have the honour to be, &c.

MORNINGTON.

No. LXXV.

Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Mornington, to the Right Hon. Henry Dundas.

29th April, 1800.

I understand that if the reserved part of the prize taken at Seringapatam, consisting of stores and ordnance, should come into the possession of the Company, it is their intention to grant the whole to the army, reserving a hundred thousand pounds to be hereafter granted to me.* I am satisfied, that

* *Extract of a Letter from Mr. Dundas to the Earl of Mornington, dated Wimbledon, 4th November, 1799.*

If the booty taken at Seringapatam, had amounted to a sum so large, as to render it improper to give it to the army, or if you had not promised it to them, my intention was it should be burthened with a large sum to be granted by His Majesty at your disposal. It would appear however, by your last private letter to me of the 7th June, that the amount of that booty was no more than what you had thought it right to promise to the army.

In the despatch which goes out with this conveyance from the Secret Committee, respecting the booty to be given to the army, your Lordship will observe an order given to ascertain the value of the military stores captured at Seringapatam, and to report it to the Court of Directors for further instructions. It has not been customary for the Court of Directors to pay for stores of that kind taken by their arms, and they will not be very willing even in this instance to commence the practice. They will however be induced to do it, but it will be done under the reserve of one hundred thousand pounds, to be at their own disposal, and after what I have stated in this letter, your Lordship will easily guess why that reserve should be made. *I have spoke on the subject to the Chairman and Deputy and they enter warmly into my suggestions.* In some shape or other, the

upon full reflection, you will perceive, that the acceptance of such a grant, would place me in a very humiliating situation with respect to the army.

The army would feel, that I had been rewarded at their expence, and they would view the transaction with aggravated jealousy, and perhaps contempt of my character, when they recollected the effort which I made in the face of their prejudices and popularity, to reserve these very stores, for the ostensible purpose of saving the rights of the crown.

It would be said, that my view in the transaction had been personal and ungenerous, and I should lose all influence and consideration with the military branch of the service. But, independent of any question of my character, or of the dignity and vigour of my government, I should be miserable, if I could ever feel, that I had been enriched at the expence of those, who must ever be the objects of my affection, admiration and gratitude, and who are justly entitled to the exclusive enjoyment of all, that a munificent king, and an admiring country can bestow.

If therefore the independence of my family were at stake (which thank God! it is not) I never could consent to establish it on an arrangement injurious to the conquerors of Mysore. Even the appearance of such an arrangement must affect my character; and I therefore trust, that if my services should appear to merit a pecuniary reward from the Company, your friendship will be employed to direct their liberality through some channel wholly unconnected with the prize taken by the army.

idea must be carried into execution; I certainly much prefer the ways I have hinted at, because in those ways, it will come in one sum, whereas in any other mode it must be by instalments from the new acquired territories, which is more tedious and progressive in its effect, and on that account less valuable.

No. LXXVI.

Extract of a Letter from the Earl of Mornington to Mr. Pitt.

Fort William, 29th April, 1800.

The fund from which it appears that this grant is to proceed, will render it impossible for me to accept it.

It seems to be intended to make the sum a charge on the military stores taken at Seringapatam. This arrangement will have the appearance, if not the substance of depriving the army of a part of their prize for the purpose of enriching me. I am convinced you will at once feel the invidious and degrading situation in which this would place me towards that most gallant army. If the real effect of this measure be actually to deprive the army of a sum which would otherwise be divided amongst them, I can never consent to be rewarded at their expence, but even the appearance of such an arrangement would absolutely preclude my acceptance of any grant however otherwise acceptable.

I hope Mr. Dundas will have perceived the force of this objection, and will not compel me to refuse the reward offered by the Company. At least, I trust, that if you have not already anticipated this view of the subject, you will feel the justice of my sentiments when stated, and you will exonerate me from the suspicion of caprice or fastidiousness, when I shall refuse the liberal grant in question.*

No. LXXVII.

The Earl of Mornington to the Right Hon. Lord Clive.

MY LORD,

Fort William, May 3rd 1800.

In obedience to the orders of the House of Commons, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of its resolutions passed on the 4th of October, 1799.†

It is a matter of sincere satisfaction to me, to congratulate

* For further information on this subject, see letter from Mr. Dundas, 26th September, 1800, and Resolutions of the East India Company, 15th January, 1801.

† See Vol. I. p. 633.

your Lordship on the just sense expressed by the House of Commons, of the eminent services rendered by you to your country in promoting the success of the late glorious war in Mysore.

On this occasion, I cannot refrain from renewing to your Lordship, the cordial assurance of those sentiments of gratitude and respect, which your zeal, honour and assiduous exertions impressed on my mind during the whole period of that arduous conjuncture.

Entertaining the most implicit confidence in the continuance of the same happy spirit of unanimity and concord, which has animated the proceedings of Fort William and Fort St. George, since the hour of your Lordship's arrival in India, the distinguished honour conferred on me by these resolutions has received an additional value in my estimation, from the reflection, that your Lordship's name has been united with mine in the high reward bestowed by the Commons of Great Britain on our joint labours in the public service. Under the progressive operation of such an honourable union, cemented by a mutual sense of public duty, encouraged by the applause of our country, and rewarded by the highest distinctions to which generous ambition can aspire, I trust, that, during the future course of our administration, the empire founded by your Lordship's illustrious Father will acquire additional stability, prosperity and splendour.

I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
with great regard and esteem,
your Lordship's most obedient, and faithful Servant,
MORNINGTON.

No. LXXVIII.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Secret Committee of the Honourable the Court of Directors.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

Fort William, 9th June, 1800.

In the 10th paragraph of my letter to your Honourable Committee of the 25th January, 1800.* I intimated my determination to expel the Pychy Rajah from Wynaad, and eventually to punish the contumacy of that chieftain in the most signal and exemplary manner.

In consequence of this necessary determination the requisite military preparations were made in Mysore, with a degree of vigour and promptitude highly creditable to the government of Fort St. George, and to the officer commanding in Mysore, and under circumstances which afford a striking example of the powerful military resources of that valuable possession. It was judged expedient that the operations from Mysore should be combined with the movement of a respectable detachment from the army of Bombay on the coast of Malabar. But in consequence of the inadequate state of equipment of the troops in Malabar, it was found impracticable to move the proposed detachment within the period of the proper season. This disappointment on the side of Malabar has led to the necessity of postponing the intended expedition; but it will be resumed at a convenient season of the year, if the expected submission of the Pychy Rajah to the orders of the British Government should not happily preclude the necessity of any measure of coercion.

I am concerned to inform your honourable Committee that in consequence of the unaccountable and criminal negligence of the officer stationed in the strong fortress of Jemalabad in Canara, that place was surprised on the of April last, by a body of men stated to be composed principally of deserters from the new levies in Canara. The motive of this rash and apparently fruitless enterprise on the part of those who executed it, is at present as unintelligible, as the neglect of our officers is incredible. The lower fortress was almost immediately recovered by a detachment of our troops in Canara; and I have no doubt, that the adventurers who have

* See page 197.

seized the upper fortress, have already been compelled to surrender at discretion.

The disgraceful surprise of this fortress, combined with other circumstances in the civil and military administration of Malabar, has led me to a serious consideration of the necessity of adopting effectual means for strengthening the hands of your Government in that quarter. I most earnestly request your honourable Committee to adopt immediate measures for a formal annexation of the provinces of Canara and Malabar to the Government of Fort St. George.

Since the date of my last letter to your honourable Committee symptoms of a spirit of revolt have appeared among some of the Polygars in those parts of Mysore, which in the partition of that country were assigned to the Nizam and to the Rajah. The only insurgent in Mysore proper of sufficient importance to be specified is the Polygar of Bullam, who has already been compelled to abandon the open country and to take refuge in the jungles. His complete submission to the authority of the Rajah cannot long be delayed.

The disturbances which have taken place in the countries recently acquired by our ally the Nizam, are to be imputed principally if not exclusively to the abusive and weak administration of his Highness's Government. While these districts remained under the temporary management of Purneah, (the dewan of Mysore) his prudent and conciliatory conduct maintained them in a state of sufficient tranquillity and order. The transfer of these districts to the management of his Highness the Nizam, had been made but a few weeks when the extortion and imbecility of his officers provoked and encouraged the revolt of some of the Polygars. These inconsiderable commotions however, cannot prove embarrassing for any long period of time; nor should I have called your attention to them in the present despatch, had they not appeared to derive a temporary importance from the position recently taken by the adventurer Dhoondia Jee Waug.

Your Honourable Committee will recollect, that this person escaped from destruction in August, 1799, in consequence of the respect manifested by the British troops to the frontier of the Mahratta state.* Dhoondia Jee then entered into the

* See p. 116.

service of the Rajah of Kholapore. After some time had elapsed, he either abandoned the cause of the Rajah of Kholapore, or was dismissed by him from his service. Dhoondia Jee then assembling a few desperate followers, began to levy contributions on the territories of the Peishwa and of the Nizam.

According to the usual progress of such predatory armies in Hindostan, his force has received great augmentations within the last two months; and by the latest accounts he had a position from whence he equally menaced Shawnor (Savanore) in the Peishwa's territories, the south-western districts of the Nizam, and the frontier of Mysore.

The desperate and enterprising character of this malefactor renders it necessary to check his further progress, although his army appears to be extremely defective in regard to discipline and to every quality of an effective force. A respectable army has been assembled in Mysore for the purpose of observing his motions; and as the Peishwa is not less interested than the British Government in the punishment of Dhoondia Jee, I have every reason to believe, that his Highness will contribute to this necessary object whatever assistance the distracted state of his own affairs will permit. I have however thought it expedient under the actual state of circumstances, and on the ground of the intimate connection subsisting between the two States, to authorize our troops in Mysore to pursue Dhoondia Jee Waug eventually into the territories of the Mahratta State. It is probable, that the Peishwā has actually granted his formal permission for this purpose; but in any event, I am satisfied that the conduct which I have empowered the commanding officer in Mysore to adopt towards the predatory force of Dhoondia Jee will not excite dissatisfaction at the Court of Poonah.

In every other respect the situation of Mysore is highly favourable and prosperous; the sources of revenue have been considerably improved under the prudent and able management of the Dewan, aided by the talents, zeal and experience of Lieutenant-Colonel Close. The young Rajah took possession of his new palace, erected on the site of that inhabited by his ancestors on the 15th of May last.

In the recently conquered districts subject to the immediate authority of the Company, the most happy prospect appears

of a revenue far exceeding the amount stated in the schedules annexed to the treaty of Mysore.*

The conquest of Mysore required a revision of our political relations with the principal powers of the Decan; this despatch cannot contain a detailed and connected account of the view which I have taken of this extensive and important subject, but I am desirous to avail myself of an early opportunity, to submit to your judgment the general tenor of the principles by which my conduct has been regulated. The only native powers of importance now remaining in India, independent of the British protection, are the confederate empire of the Mahratta States, the Rajah of Berar and Scindia, considered either as distinct powers, or in their feudatory relations to that empire. The restless character of the Mahratta nations, the advantages presented by the local position of some of those states to the future intrigues of France, and the existing establishment of many French officers in the service of Scindia, concurred to render it a measure of indispensable precaution, either to acquire by negotiation and arrangement, an ascendancy in the councils of the Mahratta empire, or to unite ourselves in a defensive alliance with those powers, which form a barrier between our territories and those of the Mahrattas; but it appeared to be still more desirable to frame a system of political connection which should combine the advantages of each alternative, and which while it afforded the means of preserving a powerful barrier against the Mahratta States, should facilitate the formation of more intimate relations with that empire, and should open a prospect of stability to those relations when formed.

This system was the foundation of the policy of the treaty of Mysore, which contains the basis on which I proposed to found a further extension and improvement of our alliance with the Nizam, and a similar alliance with the Peishwa. My despatch in council to the Honourable Court of Directors, under date the 18th of January, 1800, † has apprized your Honourable Committee of the circumstances which have hitherto prevented the success of my proposals at the Court of Poonah. This disappointment enforced the expediency

* See page 30.

† See page 174.

of strengthening the ties which already unite us to the Nizam's Government, and nearly identify the interests of his Highness with those of the British empire in India.

A considerable proportion of the military establishment of Fort St. George is now maintained at the expense of the Nizam. The security of the resources which supply this important contribution is an object of common concern to both states. In addition to this consideration, the Nizam's dominions constitute the only barrier between us and the Mahrattas on the side either of Mysore or of the Carnatic. The conquest of the Nizam's dominions by the Mahrattas would at once elevate that aspiring nation to a considerable eminence of power, and establish a formidable and dangerous rival in the place of a dependant absolutely devoted to our interests.

With these sentiments I have recently opened a negotiation with his Highness the Nizam, and the Resident at Hyderabad has actually concluded a treaty with his Highness on terms which not only provide for a considerable augmentation of the existing subsidiary force, but stipulate provisionally for the substitution of such territorial cessions to the Company in place of the subsidiary payments as would give us the complete possession of the whole of the countries held by the late Tippoo Sultaun previous to the peace of Seringapatam in 1792, with the exception of the districts ceded on that occasion to the Peishwa. This desirable arrangement would establish in the Company's hands a territorial revenue which in the course of a few years of wise and prudent management would render their pecuniary and military resources in the Peninsula of India superior to those possessed at any time by Hyder Ali or Tippoo Sultaun. For the territories placed under the nominal sovereignty of the Rajah of Mysore, by the subsidiary treaty of Seringapatam constitute substantially an integral part of our dominion.

At the conclusion of the war it might have appeared advantageous to have obtained such a cession of territory from the Nizam even at the expense of a considerable pecuniary compensation, or of the cession of an equivalent territory in some other quarter of our possessions. But in that critical conjuncture it would have been dangerous to have opened any question which might have led to discussions of a delicate and difficult nature, and which might have delayed the

final settlement of our conquests. I was confident that the season could not be remote when we might obtain, with the goodwill of the Nizam, by a commutation of the subsidy, the same advantages of an augmentation of our territory and a completion of our boundary in Mysore without any cession of territory, or pecuniary payment on our part; and with the additional benefit of establishing permanent security for the discharge of the expense of the troops employed for his Highness's protection.

The principle of the treaty concluded by the Resident at Hyderabad on this basis is highly advantageous, but as the concessions to the Company which it contains are not expressed with sufficient accuracy; and as some of its stipulations are either improper or useless; my intention is to propose to the Nizam, instead of the treaty which he has executed an improved draft, which, while it shall offer to his Highness the full protection of the Company against any aggression, shall secure to the Company, without ambiguity, the just equivalent which we are entitled to demand for such a guarantee. For although it seems scarcely possible to imagine a case in which it would not be our positive interest to repel any attack on the dominions of the Nizam, it is equally the interest of his Highness to provide for the certainty of our aid, and to augment our means of furnishing it. On the other hand the abuses of his Highness's government rendered those territorial possessions nearly unproductive in his hands, although they may be expected to prove highly valuable under our management. The advantages of the commutation of the subsidy will therefore be considerable, if not equal, to both parties.

As my proposed draft of a treaty will not vary essentially in the leading points from that already executed by the Nizam: and, as I am satisfied that both his Highness and Azim ul Omra justly appreciate the advantages of the general basis of the engagement, I entertain sanguine expectations that the alterations which I mean to propose in several of the articles will be readily accepted by his Highness.

Your Honourable Committee is already apprized that since my arrival in India it has been an unceasing object of my attention to establish such a connection with the Court of Poonah as should enable the British Government to influence

all its foreign relations. You are also informed that I originally proposed with confident hopes of success to accomplish this most desirable arrangement by the restoration of the Peishwa's legitimate authority, and the establishment at Poonah of a large British subsidiary force. Hitherto, either the capricious temper of Baajy Rao, or some remains of the characteristic jealousy of the nation with regard to foreign relations have frustrated my objects and views. The actual state of the Mahratta power appears extremely favourable to their prosecution and success, while the importance of accomplishing them is greatly increased.

To fix the peace of India on foundations of the utmost stability, and to preclude any intrusion of the French, it is necessary only that the British Government should draw the Mahratta power under its protection.

Under this impression, I have lately renewed my endeavours to engage Baajy Rao to place himself under the friendship of the Company's Government. Upon a full consideration of the practical difficulties which obstruct a direct interchange of confidential sentiments between the Peishwa and the British Resident at Poonah, I have determined to conduct the negotiation through the Court of Hyderabad, to which the Peishwa has recently made overtures of a promising appearance. The Nizam has a deep interest in the success of this negotiation, and possesses facilities of communication with Baajy Rao which we cannot acquire.

Various important documents relative to a perfidious and dangerous correspondence which subsisted between the late Tippoo Suldaun and the Nabobs Walajah and Omdut ul Omra, have been brought under the view of your Honourable Committee. An examination of those documents has taken place, but not to the extent, or exactly in the manner desired. It was found that some of the persons proposed to be examined were dead, or placed beyond the immediate reach of the Commissioners. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of the examination, and the gross prevarication and manifest falsehood of some of the witnesses examined, evidence has appeared to satisfy my judgment that an intrigue of a nature hostile to the British interests had been carried on between Tippoo Suldaun, Walajah, and Omdut ul Omra. It is also incontrovertibly established, that Omdut ul Omra employed

or framed, with a view to employ, in his correspondence with the late Tippoo Suldaun, the cypher transmitted to your Honourable Committee. No confirmed proof yet appears that Omdut ul Omra carried on such a correspondence with Tippoo Suldaun, subsequently to the death of the Nabob Wallajah. His concern, however, in such a correspondence, during the lifetime of his father, constitutes, according to a fair and reasonable construction of the spirit of the alliance between the Company and the Nabob of the Carnatic, a violation of the treaty of 1792, for which he is no less responsible (considering the share which he exercised in the direction of his father's government), than he would have been for the same conduct, if pursued during his own immediate administration.

My attention is now directed to the measures proper to be adopted with respect to the Nabob Omdut ul Omra, under the view in which his criminality is placed by the oral evidence collected. I am already satisfied that a due regard to our safety renders it indispensably necessary that we should obtain some more certain pledges of the fidelity of Omdut ul Omra than we now possess. The precise nature or extent of the additional security to be demanded from him will be arranged between Lord Clive and me, and I will advise your Honourable Committee of the result.

I have great satisfaction in informing your Honourable Committee that the reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments has proceeded in regular progress, without any material opposition or difficulty, although with many symptoms of dissatisfaction on the part of his Excellency, and of the most turbulent class of his troops. The augmentation of the Company's troops in Oude has, at the same time, nearly reached the amount originally proposed. The additional subsidy payable by his Excellency, when the augmentation of the troops shall be completed, will amount, in consequence, to about fifty lacs of rupees annually; while the new levies raised to supply the place of the troops to be stationed in Oude, have been hitherto confined to two regiments of native cavalry, and two regiments of native infantry, including in the latter the Bengal volunteers who served in the late war, and are now on their return to these provinces from the

Carnatic. I trust that no further augmentation of your native troops under this Presidency will be found necessary.

Having so far succeeded in effecting a radical reform of the military establishment of the Nabob of Oude, I propose to take into consideration, without delay, the means of introducing such improvements into the civil administration of his Excellency's affairs as have been long necessary to the security of our interests in that country, and to the prosperity and happiness of the people. The reduction of the Vizier's troops, and the augmentation of the Company's army, cannot be deemed more than partial remedies of the existing evils until the resources of the state shall have been improved and secured by the establishment of a just and vigorous system of government.

My latest accounts of Zemaun Shah are perfectly favourable to the prosecution of my views in Oude. He continued at Candahar; menaced on the one hand by the preparations which Baba Khan has made for advancing to Khorasan, and embarrassed on the other by domestic troubles, which appear to have amounted to formidable disturbances of his government. Under these circumstances it seems impossible that Zemaun Shah should be enabled to disturb the tranquillity of Hindostan in the course of the ensuing winter. After that period, the situation of Oude will, I trust, be so improved, as to place the security of that province beyond the reach of danger from any attempt either of Zemaun Shah, or of any other foreign power.

I have the honour to inform your Honourable Committee that the Rajah of Napaul arrived at Benares on the 18th ultimo, having judged it necessary to seek refuge in the Company's territories, from the designs which he supposed to be entertained by his disaffected subjects against his person. This Rajah had formally abdicated the government (about eighteen months before his flight) in favour of an infant son; but had continued to interfere occasionally in the direction of affairs. It appears that he had ultimately resumed the whole administration of the Government, and had exercised it with a degree of rigour which had excited a general spirit of revolt.

I have directed my agent at Benares to manifest to the

Rajah every possible mark of respect and attention; and I entertain considerable expectations that I shall be enabled to improve this occurrence to the attainment of such a degree of influence in the Government of Napaul, as may open the prospect of establishing a commercial intercourse with that country, mutually beneficial to both states.

Captain Hill returned from his mission to Aracan in the month of April last. He was soon after followed by an ambassador from thence, in pursuance of orders from the king of Ava. I have lately dismissed this ambassador with such explanations and assurances with regard to the emigrants from Aracan, as I trust will satisfy the Court of Ava, and contribute to maintain the harmony subsisting between the two governments.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sirs,

With the greatest respect,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

WELLESLEY.*

No. LXXIX.

The Marquess Wellesley to the Resident at Hyderabad.

SIR,

Fort William, June 15th, 1800.

I have received your despatch, No. 79, dated the 20th ult., transmitting to me the treaty executed on the same day by his Highness the Nizam, and by you. I have also received your letters, numbered and dated as noted in the margin.†

The Persian translator regularly laid before me translations of the several reports (dated and noted in the margin)‡ which you had received from the Moonshee Azecz Oollah, of his conferences with Azim ul Omra during the course of the negotiation.

* The Earl of Mornington was created Marquess Wellesley on the 20th of December, 1799.

† No. 80, 23rd of May; No. 81, 25th of May; No. 82, 26th of May; No. 83, 29th of May; No. 84, 31st of May.

‡ April 26th, 28th, and 29th. May, the 3rd, 7th, 10th, 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th.

You have assigned the necessity of despatch to justify this mode of communicating to me the progress of the treaty; admitting such a mode of communication to have been the most expeditious, it has produced considerable inconvenience by leaving me in ignorance and doubt with respect to various important points of the negotiation. Your observations and explanations, transmitted in the usual manner, would have enabled me to form a more accurate judgment of the real temper of the Court of Hyderabad, with regard to the present treaty, than can be founded on the unconnected, incomplete, and unexplained materials now before me.

Defective as those materials are, they are sufficient to prove that you have not stated to the Court of Hyderabad, with adequate force, the great advantages which his Highness the Nizam would derive from the proposed alliance; and that you have conceded to Azim ul Omra with more facility than was prudent, a point which has long and justly constituted the object of his most anxious desire and solicitation.

Being fully apprized of the importance justly attached by the Court of Hyderabad to a general defensive alliance with the Company, against all enemies, I had foreseen the earnestness of the Nizam to obtain such an engagement, and accordingly I had authorized you eventually to yield to his Highness's wishes. But you were not empowered to concede this important benefit unconditionally, or without obtaining a just equivalent. You were empowered to concede it if the concession should appear likely to secure in return the consent of his Highness to the whole, or to any, of those articles, which, under the project of a limited guarantee, I had authorized you to suspend.

But the treaty which you have concluded concedes to his Highness the Nizam the full benefit of the general guarantee without securing to the Company any of those advantages, (the augmentation of the subsidiary force excepted,) the whole of which I had declared necessary to constitute a reasonable equivalent for a limited defensive engagement.

It appears, by the conferences between Azim ul Omra and Moonshee Azeez Oollah, that the Court of Hyderabad sincerely intends to commute the subsidy for a territorial grant to the Company; and the territory to be ceded to the Company is generally described in the fifth article of the treaty.

But the fourth article of the treaty expressly reserves to the Nizam the option of discharging the subsidy either from his treasury, or by an assignment of territory, according to his Highness's pleasure; and in your letter of the 26th of May you admit, that the Court of Hyderabad actually understands the concluding clause of the fourth article, to empower the Nizam to exercise this option whenever his Highness shall think proper. Under such an engagement, if the ratifications of the treaty had been exchanged, his Highness would be at liberty to declare his determination to discharge the subsidy regularly in money, and the territorial grant might be at once avoided. His Highness, under the indefinite terms of the fourth and fifth articles, would also possess full power to modify the grant of territory by any qualifications or conditions which he might prescribe, either with respect to its duration, to the nature or extent of the authority to be exercised by the Company within the assigned districts, or to any other point affecting the stability or efficiency of the assignment.

The proposition for the territorial grant originated with Azim ul Omra, and was received by you with judicious reserve and caution. The manner in which this proposition was introduced by the Minister, as well as the actual state of the countries intended to be assigned, induce me to believe the Court of Hyderabad to be sincerely disposed, and even secretly anxious for a commutation of the subsidy. But my conjecture may be erroneous; and in a matter of such importance nothing should be left to conjecture, or to the precarious will of the Court of Hyderabad. If the Nizam, upon the ratification of the treaty should declare his resolution to discharge the subsidy in money, and should refuse to cede the countries to be assigned, in the complete and absolute manner indispensably necessary to their proper arrangement, the Company would stand pledged to the general guarantee without having acquired any equivalent benefit or compensation.

It is evident, therefore, that, by this treaty, the Court of Hyderabad would secure all its objects, while the situation of the Company would be rather injured than improved. For, if it be admitted that the augmentation of the subsidiary force would add in some degree to our political consideration

in the Deccan, as the additional troops furnished by the British Government would require to be replaced by new levies, the arrangement would be productive of no pecuniary relief or advantage to the Company; and the security for the regular discharge of the subsidy would become more precarious in proportion to the increased amount of the subsidiary payments. The treasury of his Highness would be subjected to increased embarrassment; or, if territory should be assigned, the cession might be burthened by conditions absolutely precluding such a system of management as must be adopted to render the assigned revenues equal to the maintenance of the troops. Any expression in the grant calculated to raise a doubt of its permanence, or to limit the power of the Company's internal Government of the countries, or to favour the Nizam's right of resumption, would evidently prevent us from concluding any settlement worthy of our character, or advantageous to our interests.

In paragraph four of your despatch, of the 26th of May, you plainly admit that the Court of Hyderabad understands the fourth and fifth articles to have secured to the Nizam an arbitrary right of resuming the districts subsequently to the intended assignment, and you endeavour to remove this insurmountable objection to these articles by alleging your construction of their exposition to be different from that maintained by the Nizam and his Ministers. It is painful to me to be compelled to remark, that your argument in this paragraph is founded on principles incompatible with the maintenance of public faith, and exploded by the wisdom, justice, and integrity of the law of nations. To introduce ambiguous phrases into formal instruments designed to constitute the basis of public obligations between great States, is a practice repugnant to the policy, honour, and dignity of the British nation. The perspicuity of our expressions in all acts of obligation upon our national faith should be as manifest as the superiority of our power. If it were possible for me to afford my countenance to a contrary system, common discretion would preclude me from such a course in the present case, when you distinctly avow, that the ambiguous phrases on which you propose to rest the future claim of the British Government against its ally, are at this moment, previously to the ratification of the treaty, construed by that

ally in a sense directly contradictory to that which you desire to maintain. Your further arguments on the article under consideration serve only to prove that the Nizam might be embarrassed in the exercise of the right which he intended to reserve to himself. If your reasoning on this part of the question be admitted, the result would be not an amicable, firm alliance, founded on clear, distinct, and indisputable principles, but an ill defined state of perpetual jealousy, controversy, and animosity, of doubtful claims, and of incompatible rights.

When I received Azim ul Omra's draft of a treaty, it was my intention to have examined separately each article of that extravagant project. I have already expressed my animadversions on several of his propositions; I shall now consider such principles only of that project as have been adopted with or without modification in your treaty, upon the several articles of which I now proceed to state my ideas.

The general tenour of the preamble to the treaty received from you is perfectly conformable to my views: the terms of it appear susceptible of improvement. A draft of the preamble, which I should prefer, accompanies this letter in English and Persian.*

Article 1. The first article requires no remark.

Article 2. This article is principally objectionable on account of its unqualified spirit of hostility. If the contracting parties should have just grounds to apprehend an attack on their territories, or on those of their allies and dependants, it would be reasonable and necessary, that they should prepare to repel it. But such preparations are not to be occasioned by every trivial dispute on the borders, or by every desultory, and perhaps unauthorized, depredation of armies, whose licentiousness and rapacity are the necessary consequences of defective discipline and irregular pay. Still less would it be either prudent or justifiable to resort to arms whenever (according to the words of the treaty) any act shall be committed "incompatible with friendship and good understanding." In your letter, No. 80, you have anticipated this objection, and endeavoured to diminish its force.

It is the essence of a defensive alliance, that a sincere de-

sire to avoid an appeal to arms should constitute its most prominent feature. But this article is entirely silent with respect to the propriety of employing any endeavour to adjust subsisting differences by measures of amicable explanation and discussion. From the first mention of aggression, the article proceeds directly to stipulate for punishment and war.

Article 3. No material objection exists to the expression, and none to the principle, of this article.

Articles 4 and 5. These articles must be considered together.

It appears, by your letter, No. 80, that the amount of subsidy fixed for the cavalry belonging to the subsidiary force is inadequate to the expense of those troops; it is not stated how this deficiency was occasioned; but I cannot suppose his Highness the Nizam to be disposed to avail himself of any error of calculation which subjects the Company to pecuniary loss. In adjusting the amount of the general subsidy, you might, therefore, have corrected any error of account which had occurred in the original settlement. This point will be of no consequence, under the arrangement which I mean to propose for the full and permanent satisfaction of the Company's claims on account of subsidy.

The further discussion of this point will be unnecessary in the event of the Nizam's acquiescence in my proposed arrangement. But the considerations here suggested, as well as those arising from the insufficiency of the cavalry subsidy, constitute powerful arguments, and may be advantageously urged in support of the main article of that arrangement, by which I have stipulated for the absolute cession in perpetuity of the whole of his Highness's acquisitions from Mysore in the two last wars,* adding some modifications with relation to exchanges of territory for the convenience of the respective frontiers of the two States.

The revenues of the countries acquired by the Nizam, under the treaty of 1792, are acknowledged to be greatly injured, and I have no satisfactory grounds for believing that those of the districts, acquired by his Highness under the Treaty of Mysore, are now equal to the amount stated in the

* As proposed by the Resident; the original included only the Nizam's acquisitions in 1792.

schedules of that treaty. It appears to be highly probable that the resources of the countries in question have materially declined since those countries came into the possession of his Highness. They have been ravaged by various insurgents; and it is to be feared that they have been managed on principles which must impair their future prosperity, whatever immediate advantage may have been extracted from those unhappy districts by their rapacious governors and managers.

Article 6. Requires no remark.

Articles 7 and 8. These articles require to be considered together. Notwithstanding the observations stated in your letter, No. 80, these articles require alteration.

The specification of the force to be furnished by the Nizam at the commencement of hostilities, for the purpose of immediate operations with the Company's subsidiary troops, is extremely proper and necessary; but the terms of the seventh article imply, that this specification is to define the full extent of the Nizam's exertions, in point of force, during the whole course of the supposed hostilities, with the single qualification stated in the eighth article. The seventh article is objectionable in this respect. The specification of the local limits in the seventh article, within which his Highness shall be bound to co-operate against the common enemy, is not expressed with sufficient accuracy.

These articles proceed on the presumption, that the Company is as likely as the Nizam to be attacked by an enemy; but this supposition is manifestly contrary to reason and probability. The Nizam, in every view, is more exposed to hostile aggression from various quarters, as well as less able to repel it than the Company. The eventual exertions of the Nizam against the common enemy should not in any case be limited, either with respect to the amount of troops, or to the theatre of the war. A fair view of the nature and objects of the proposed alliance must demonstrate the justice and reason of requiring that the Nizam, in every case of war, should employ his utmost efforts against the enemy. The Company cannot in policy, and will not in practice, contract the scale of their operations in the event of hostilities, whether directed against their own territories, or against those of the Nizam. This limitation of the number of troops to be employed might

be reasonable if the Nizam's interest, in the issue of any supposed contest could be deemed remote, or temporary, or doubtful. But no contest can occur in which the Company shall be deeply engaged without involving the existence of the Nizam's kingdom; the probability is, that, in every case, his Highness would be the first object of attack.

For these reasons, while I consider it to be proper to specify the number and description of his Highness's troops, which shall be furnished immediately, at the commencement of war, to act in concert with the subsidiary force, I deem it to be necessary that his Highness should also be bound, in every case of hostility, to employ his utmost efforts (if required by the nature of the war) against the common enemy.

It may not be useless to observe in this place, that, even if the seat of war should be on the other side, (as the treaty expresses it,) or to the northward of the Nurbudda, it is not probable that any junction of the Nizam's forces with those of the Company in Hindostan proper, would ever be expedient or requisite. In such case, a powerful diversion by his Highness, which would not lead his troops beyond the Nurbudda, would, perhaps, be the most useful operation in which they could be employed.

Article 9. This article merits my entire approbation; it requires, however, a slight alteration in the expression. You have rendered a considerable service to the Company's interests in India in establishing, by treaty, a right to the use of the Brinjarries of the Deccan in time of war.

Article 10. This article is likewise highly satisfactory to me. It is, however, necessary to observe, (and it may be proper to apprise the Nizam and Azim ul Omra) that I consider the operation of this article to prohibit any correspondence with any of the dependants of the Honourable Company, excepting with the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The intercourse at present maintained by the Court of Hyderabad with the Rajah of Travancore, the Nabob of Arcot, and other dependants of the Company, would necessarily cease from the period when this article shall take effect. But whatever may be the issue of the depending negotiation, I think it proper to direct you to insist on the immediate discontinuance of the correspondence occasionally maintained between his Highness the Nizam and the

allies or dependants of the Company, described in this paragraph.

Article 11. I consider this article to be of the greatest value and importance; it certainly counteracts in a considerable degree many of the objectionable parts of the treaty. It does not, however, remove the objections which apply to the 4th and 5th articles.

Articles 12 and 13. The provisions of these articles are properly of a secret nature, and ought to have constituted separate articles. It would have been sufficient in the body of the treaty, if the contracting parties had declared their disposition to admit the Peishwa and Ragojee Bhooslah to the benefits of the alliance, on such conditions as might hereafter be mutually concerted.

Article 14. This article requires no remark.

On the separate articles of the treaty I must generally remark, that you have not discussed them with Azim ul Omra in a manner suitable to their great importance, nor have you availed yourself of a proper extent of the valuable concessions which they convey to the Nizam.

Article 1. The engagement comprehended in this article relative to the Zemindars of Shorapoor and Gulwal, and to the Nabob of Kurnool, is rendered extremely delicate by the tributary relation of those chieftains to the Marhattas' government, as well as to the Nizam; on this account we have hitherto uniformly refused to permit the Company's troops to assist the Nizam in coercing those chieftains. The proposed defensive alliance with the Nizam does not require our unconditional departure from this principle. At the period of negotiating the Treaty of Hyderabad, Azim ul Omra laboured with equal assiduity to accomplish an object so important to the interest of his Sovereign. At that time I refused the concession, not because I saw any considerable objection to its principle, but because it was of too much importance to be granted gratuitously to his Highness, and because I wished to reserve so great a favour for an occasion, when I might be able to derive from it a proper return of advantage to the Company. This occasion is now arrived, and it is reasonable to require a return correspondent with the magnitude of the object.

I entirely approve the clause introduced into this article, by

which the British Government is authorised to investigate and to determine the merits of all disputes arising between the Court of Hyderabad and the tributaries in question.

Article 2. Nothing can be more repugnant to the true spirit of a defensive alliance than the terms of this article; they also indicate a distrust of the justice and honour of the Company's Government, which ought to have been repelled in the first instance.

I entertain no views of conquest upon the territories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of any other native power of India, I cannot, therefore, consent to a formal arrangement for the division of spoils which I have no wish to acquire. If Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or any other power, after the conclusion of defensive engagements between the Company and the Nizam, should be guilty of any unprovoked aggression against either party, and war should appear inevitable, in concerting the operations to be undertaken against the aggressor, the allied states may proceed with propriety to adjust the division of such conquests, as might appear attainable during the progress of hostilities, and convenient to be retained at the conclusion of peace.

It is evident from the 11th article of Azim ul Omra's project, that no rational principles were consulted by him in the plan of partition which he had imagined. It may, therefore, be proper plainly to apprise Azim ul Omra, if he should appear dissatisfied with my modification of this article, that I can never consent to regulate the division of our eventual conquests ~~or~~ acquisitions by any other standard, than the actual share of expense and exertion in military operations which each contracting party shall have contributed towards such conquests or acquisitions.

Article 3. The stipulations of this article belong properly to a separate and secret engagement. But it does not appear necessary that the Company and the Nizam should concert by any formal previous instrument, the conditions on which they will admit the Peishwa and the Rajah of Berar to the benefits of the proposed defensive alliance. My mind, however, being satisfied with respect to the general terms on which it would be expedient to admit those powers to the alliance, I am not unwilling to gratify the Nizam by recognizing the specific terms of the eventual admission of the Peishwa and the Rajah

of Berar to the proposed treaty in the form desired by his Highness.

The review which I have taken of the several articles of the treaty in question, must have convinced you that I cannot ratify it without departing from many leading principles of the policy, interest, and reputation of the British Government. The copy of the treaty transmitted to me is accordingly returned to you, in order that it may be regularly cancelled, together with the counterpart, which you have delivered to his Highness.

Notwithstanding my determination not to ratify this treaty, the discussions which it has produced, and even your conclusion of it under all the circumstances of the case, have contributed to lay the foundation of extensive improvements in our connection with the Court of Hyderabad. In the progress of the negotiation, many important points have been gained for the Company, many inveterate prejudices injurious to our interests in the Deccan, have either been absolutely destroyed or considerably weakened, and the whole scope of the extravagant and absurd policy of Azim ul Omra and of his Court, has been disclosed. In this view of the subject, I consider you to have rendered essential service to the British interests at the Court of the Nizam; and, although in this despatch I have animadverted on some of the principles which you have stated, as well as on some passages in the management of the negotiation, I am happy to be able to express my general approbation of your conduct in this important transaction. The animadversions contained in this despatch are not intended to operate as a censure on your proceedings, but to furnish you and your successors in the Residency at the Court of the Nizam, with rules for your guidance on any similar occasion.

My anxiety to conclude a general defensive alliance with the Nizam, on reasonable conditions, continues unabated; and I now transmit to you in English and Persian the draft of such a treaty* with his Highness, as you are at liberty to execute immediately on the part of the Company.

I entertain a sanguine expectation that the observations which I have made on the treaty concluded by you, will

* See Appendix.

enable you to reconcile the Court of Hyderabad to my rejection of that treaty. I am equally confident that the explanations and remarks with which I shall now accompany the treaty herewith transmitted to you, will afford you the means of convincing the Nizam and Azim ul Omra, that the true interests of his Highness require their immediate acceptance of this engagement.

In the new treaty a very material object of the Court of Hyderabad is more distinctly and more effectually secured than in the treaty already executed by the Nizam. A long period of time must elapse before the territory which I require as a security for the subsidiary payments can become equal to their discharge, it is even doubtful whether the produce of the countries required will ever exceed, in any considerable degree, the amount of the subsidy. If the nett revenues of the districts specified in the new treaty, should, hereafter, exceed the charges of the subsidiary force, or if the present nominal revenue of those districts (a revenue which, under the management of his Highness's officers, never has been realized, and under the same management never can be rendered more productive), should be realized under a more wise and prudent system, enforced by the abilities, experience, and integrity of the Company's officers, it would be reasonable that the increased resources of those countries, now verging to ruin, should be turned to the advantage of that power, under whose happy auspices the improvement had been carried into effect. The augmented revenue might justly be claimed by the Company on various grounds.

1st. Because the Company must suffer immediate pecuniary loss and embarrassment by the commutation of the subsidy in the actual declining condition of the districts to be ceded.

2ndly. Because the expenses incident to the Company's system of management far exceed those incurred by the Nizam's administration; consequently, the probable amount of the surplus which may be realized by the Company, is not to be estimated by the standard of charges usually authorized by his Highness's Government.

3rdly. Because an acknowledgment is due to the Company for the inestimable advantages of protection and security acquired by the Nizam under the general guarantee. In this respect the benefits of the treaty cannot be deemed reciprocal.

The Nizam's present hazard far exceeds that of the Company; and even in the event of an attack upon our possessions, his Highness could not assist us with means of defence bearing any proportion to those with which we should furnish him in a similar exigency.

4thly. Because in the event of an attack being made on the Nizam, the expenses of the Company, over and above those of maintaining the subsidiary force, would far exceed any charge which could fall upon his Highness in the event of any attack being made on the Company's dominions.

5thly. Because this treaty grants to the Nizam without any specified equivalent, the new and extraordinary benefit of the Company's aid in repressing the refractory spirit of such tributaries and dependants as owe a mixed allegiance to him and to the Mahrattas. In this view it may justly be expected that the resources of the territories retained in his Highness's hands may be improved to an amount proportioned to any excess in the produce of the countries to be ceded to the Company.

But whatever view may be taken of this subject by the Court of Hyderabad, it is my determination not to grant the Nizam the complete protection and support which he solicits, on any conditions less advantageous to the Company than those comprehended in the new treaty. I accordingly direct you not to admit any alteration in that treaty, which shall affect any of its principles; mere verbal alterations you are at liberty to receive.

You will not press the Nizam to accept this new treaty with any appearance of solicitude or earnestness. You will confine yourself to a distinct explanation of the reasons which have compelled me to refuse my ratification of your treaty; and to such an illustration of the articles of the new engagement, as this despatch will enable you to furnish. You will then leave the whole subject to the calm and deliberate decision of the Nizam.

In the course of the late negotiation for the purpose of undervaluing the separate and limited guarantee against Scindiah, Azim ul Omra affected to consider the Company to be already engaged to protect the Nizam against any attack from Scindiah, because during the course of the late war I had declared my determination to support his High-

ness against such an attack. The weakness of this argument ought to have been instantly and plainly exposed; for which purpose a distinct statement of facts would have been sufficient. With a similar view of depreciating the value of a guarantee against the Mahratta Empire, Azim ul Omra may affect to suppose me to be at present prepared to force the arbitration of the British Government upon the Peishwa; any such insinuations or errors on the part of the Court of Hyderabad must be repelled or corrected, as being equally at variance with the true intent and meaning of the Treaty of Hyderabad, and detrimental to the favourable issue of the present negociation. The Court of Hyderabad must be sensible of the powerful advantages which it would derive from the general guarantee; but it is absolutely necessary to convince Azim ul Omra and his Highness, that I am equally well apprised of its great importance and value to the Nizam, that I know the precise nature and extent of our obligation under subsisting treaties to interpose between his Highness and his enemies; that I will not suffer that obligation to be stretched beyond its just extent; and that I will not wantonly sacrifice the equivalent due to the Company in return for the new and important concession of the general guarantee.

I now proceed to furnish you with such observations on the different articles of the new treaty, as appear to be necessary.

Title and Preamble. The alterations which I have made in the title and preamble of your treaty are so inconsiderable as to require no observation.

Article 1. This article agrees in substance with your first article, but it contains the important addition which declares the friends and enemies of either party to be the friends and enemies of both. This declaration is contained in a subsequent article of your treaty, but it is not quite so distinctly expressed nor inserted in its proper place.

Article 2. This article is substantially the same as the 2nd article of your treaty. The Nizam in effect acquires by this article all that he would gain by your treaty. The observations contained in the 15th paragraph of this despatch will sufficiently explain to you the necessity of moderating the hostile tenor of your second article.

Article 3. This article requires no remark.

Article 4 requires no remark.

Article 5. No other effectual or satisfactory security than an absolute assignment of territory can be given by the Nizam for the regular payment of the subsidy. The present resources of his country cannot be expected to improve without an entire change in the system of his Highness's government. Of such a change no prospect appears. The difficulty experienced in obtaining a punctual discharge of the existing subsidy will be greatly increased by an augmentation of the subsidiary force, and the risk of failure in the funds necessary to the punctual payment, and consequently to the discipline of the troops, would also be proportionately aggravated.

I have always desired that the subsidy should be secured by a territorial assignment, although the punctuality with which the Court of Hyderabad has hitherto discharged the subsidiary payments has precluded any ground of serious complaint, and any demand from the Company's Government of the security stipulated by the Treaty of Hyderabad; I am of opinion that until the pecuniary payments shall be actually commuted for territory, the punctual realisation of the subsidy must ever be extremely precarious.

This consideration involves the security of an important branch of our resources, as well as the continuance of that harmony now subsisting between the British Government and the Nizam. No event could produce discussions of a more invidious nature at the Court of Hyderabad than a failure in the regular payment of our subsidiary troops. These apprehensions are so deeply impressed on my mind, that, if all prospect of the proposed general defensive alliance were closed, I should be disposed to accept even an inadequate territory in exchange for the subsidy, rather than leave that resource to depend on the defective government of the Nizam, and on the fluctuating state of his Highness's finances. Adverting, however, to the great and positive benefits presented to the Nizam by the proposed treaty, and to the increase of expense which it must necessarily bring upon the Company, the British Government is entitled to require such an equivalent as shall not only preclude any pecuniary loss on account of subsidy, but in some degree defray the ex-

traordinary charges of defending his Highness's country against all enemies.

It may be reasonably apprehended, on a just consideration of the nominal value of the districts required by this article, of the evil government under which they have so long suffered, and of the refractory spirit prevailing in a great proportion of those countries, that their actual produce, deducting all charges of management, will, for a long tract of time, prove unequal to the discharge of the subsidy; and until the nett receipts from the country shall be sufficient for the payment of the troops, the Company must provide the necessary funds for this purpose, a circumstance which cannot fail to subject their government to considerable temporary inconvenience.*

The 5th article suggests no further observations which have not been anticipated in preceding paragraphs of this despatch.

It is unnecessary to state the obvious objections which exist to the extension of our frontier beyond the Toombuddra in the direction of Kopul, Gugunder Ghurr, &c. No reasonable objection can be made by the Nizam to the exchanges stipulated by this article. It is, however, necessary in this place to apprise you of the full extent of my views in this proposition.

If we should acquire the territory specified in the 5th article, our line of frontier and our barrier against any sudden incursions of hostile cavalry in that quarter will require, that all the country situated to the southward of the Toombuddra and of the Kistna should be annexed to the Company's possessions. This cession would include, besides Kurnool, the

* Nominal value of the territory ceded to the Nizam in 1792, canterai pagodas 13,16,666, at 3 Arcot rupees per cant. pag. is	39,50,000
Nominal value of the territory acquired by the Nizam under the Treaty of Mysore, including the Peishcush of Kurnool, cant. pagodas, 7,13,304, at 3 Arcot rupees per C.P.	21,39,912
Total	60,89,912
Sudsidy under the proposed treaty exclusive of Cavalry deficiency	39,42,800
Difference, Arcot rupees	21,47,112

districts of Adoni and Ghazipore or Nundiaul. At present I am ignorant of the value of these districts, and consequently of the proportion which it bears to the revenue of the countries to the northward of the Toombuddra. The possession of the whole line of country to the southward of the Kistna and Toombuddra is so essential to the security and compact form of our general frontier, that, although the districts to the northward should be found more productive than those to the southward of the rivers, I should be willing to cede the former for Adoni and Ghazipore.

The revenues of Adoni, &c, may, however, exceed those of the districts which I propose to offer in exchange, and the Court of Hyderabad may object to the cession of Adoni and Ghazipore, and particularly of Adoni. Whatever may be the difference of value between those districts it would not be a greater concession than the Company can justly claim in return for the effectual protection afforded by the general guarantee of the Nizam's dominions as well as for other advantages already enumerated in this despatch. You will urge this argument with the utmost assiduity, but if it should not be admitted, I would rather provide an equivalent for the amount of the differences of revenue in some other quarter than relinquish the proposed line of frontier. You will exert your utmost efforts to obtain this line on the principles already stated.

Article 5. This object however, is not absolutely indispensable; if you should find that the aversion of the Court of Hyderabad to the arrangement now suggested, is likely to endanger the success of the whole treaty, you will relinquish this point until a more favourable conjuncture shall arise, and you will content yourself with obtaining an equivalent for the districts to the northward of the Toombuddra in some other part of his Highness's country contiguous to the Company's possessions.

Article 6. You are at liberty either to agitate and decide the question of the exchanges previous to the conclusion of the treaty, or to defer that question until the treaty shall have been executed. My wish however, is, to bring the greatest possible proportion of this extensive arrangement to a definite conclusion by this treaty.

Article 7. This article requires no explanation. I have

already stated the indispensable necessity of assigning districts in perpetuity, to be placed under the exclusive management and authority of the East India Company. If the subsidy were a mere temporary charge upon the funds of the Nizam, the perpetual assignment of territory would be objectionable; but, as the subsidy is a fixed and permanent charge, the funds for its liquidation should be of the same nature; nor would the honour or dignity of his Highness's government be in any degree compromised by such an arrangement.

Article 8. The principal design of this article is to close for ever, all questions of account between the Company and the Nizam with regard to the subsidiary force; and to suggest the solid reasons which ought to induce his Highness to consent to this arrangement. The cession will appear both advantageous and honourable, when his Highness shall reflect, that the dominions proposed for cession were acquired principally by the aid of the British arms; that, after the cession, his Highness will possess the same extent of country which he held previous to the war of 1790-1; that he will be enabled, without any pressure upon his finances, to command the services of a large British force; and finally, that he will be effectually protected against all future encroachments of the Mahrattas.

Article 9. The necessity of this article is obvious; its omission in your treaty proceeded from the operation of the objectionable clause at the close of your 4th article. If the new treaty should be accepted by the Nizam, you will communicate a copy of it by express to Lord Clive, and you will concert with his Lordship the time and mode of assuming on behalf of the Company, the districts to be ceded. The object of the clause at the close of this article, is to guard the assigned countries from the depredations of the Nizam's officers in the interval between the date of the treaty, and the actual assumption of the countries by the officers of the Company.

Article 10. This article requires no explanation. It suggests however, an arrangement of considerable weight to strengthen the probability, that, deducting all necessary charges, the surplus revenue of the ceded districts will scarcely prove equivalent to the subsidy. The establishments and garrisons which it would be indispensably necessary for the Company

to maintain in some of these forts, and particularly in Gurrumcondah, Gooty, Ganjecottah, &c. would occasion a considerable expense to the British Government.

Article 11. It may be necessary to remark on this article, that it is not intended, in every supposable case, that the Nizam should continue to pay the whole of the subsidy, until the Company's officers shall have obtained complete possession of the ceded countries. It must necessarily happen, that some districts will be evacuated by his Highness's officers at an earlier period than others; and it is also possible, that some of the Polygars of those districts may oppose a temporary resistance to the introduction of the Company's authority. In the former case, a regular account shall be opened with the Nizam; and he shall be credited for the revenues of every district from the date of its actual delivery to the Company. In the latter case, the resistance of the Polygars shall not operate to the prejudice of the Nizam, and his Highness's responsibility for a proportional part of the subsidy, shall cease from the day on which the disturbed districts respectively shall be delivered to the Company by his Highness's officers.

Article 12. The first clause of this article is indispensable in a treaty designed, not to lay the foundation of future war, but to guard to the utmost extent of human precaution, against the return of that calamity. No reasonable objection can be urged against this clause by the Court of Hyderabad.

For the reasons assigned in the 26th, 27th and 28th paragraphs of this despatch, the unlimited exertions of the Nizam in the common cause must be secured, with a view to the case supposed.

Article 13. This is the 9th article of your treaty, with a slight verbal alteration. I repeat my approbation of your prudence in securing by treaty the right of the British Government to the exertions of the Court of Hyderabad, in points so essential to the success of military operations, as the timely collection of Brinjarries, and the establishment of magazines of grain.

Article 14. Requires no remark, being nearly the same as the 6th article of your treaty.

Article 15. The only observation suggested by this article has been anticipated in the 31st paragraph of this despatch.

Article 16th. This is the same as the 11th article of your treaty, of which I have already expressed my entire approbation.

Article 17. In the 36th paragraph of this despatch, I have stated my sentiments with regard to the importance of the concession, required by the Nizam in the 1st of your separate articles; it is reasonable that some return should be made by his Highness. The stipulations of this article ought to be deemed unobjectionable by the Court of Hyderabad. The maintenance of good order and tranquillity in the ceded districts can never be an object of indifference to the Nizam's Government; and the present article binds the Company to afford his Highness similar assistance whenever he may require it.

It is not intended by this article, that the subsidiary force, or any part of it, should be permanently employed in the protection of the ceded countries, or permanently stationed in any of the forts comprehended within the limits of those districts. In the event of any insurrection of the Polygars, or of the sudden incursion of an enemy, which the ordinary military force stationed in that part of the Company's territory may not be sufficient to check, it is proposed, that a division of the subsidiary troops, although stationed within his Highness's frontier, should be at the command of the Company, until the British Government may be enabled to dispense with its services.

Article 18. This article comprehends as much as appears to me necessary or proper to be stated in a public treaty, on the subject of your 12th and 13th articles.

Article 19. This article is entirely conformable to the general spirit of the treaty. It has no tendency to weaken any of the stipulations framed, with a view to the case of any aggression on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. If the Nizam should accept the treaty, you will ascertain as soon as possible, and report to me the conditions on which his Highness would be disposed to admit Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be a party to the proposed alliance. At a proper season, I shall communicate to you for the information of his Highness, those conditions which I should demand from Scindiah on the part of the Company.

Article 20. You are authorized by this article to declare

the treaty to be complete, whenever it shall have been executed by you and the Nizam; and to act upon it accordingly without delay, in the same manner as if I had formally ratified it in council. I think it necessary however to repeat, that you are empowered to make no other than mere verbal alterations in my draft, that no departure from the substance of any one of the articles can be admitted, and that your power of verbal alteration is confined strictly to cases of absolute necessity.

Separate Articles. I have consented to annex these separate articles to the treaty solely with a view to the gratification of the Nizam's wishes. It is necessary that you should signify these sentiments to his Highness, and inform him, that the conditions on which the Peishwa and Rhagojee Bhooslah should be admitted to the present alliance, appear to me to be more proper subjects of verbal discussion and arrangement between his Highness and the British Government, than of a solemn adjustment by treaty.

Article 1.—Clause 1. The Nizam is not entitled by this clause to more, on the part of the Company, than a just arbitration between his Highness and the Peishwa, founded on the basis of the treaty of Mahr. Azim ul Omra has repeatedly declared that nothing more is desired by his court. To expect more from the British Government would be an injury to its honour and justice. The Peishwa may possibly advance just claims on the Nizam, entirely unconnected with the provisions of the treaty of Mhar. Such claims may be compromised through the amicable endeavours of the British Government; but if any just claim of the Court of Poonah on that of Hyderabad should be clearly established, we can neither deny, nor resist it. The Nizam desires that it should be an express condition of the admission of the Peishwa to the alliance, and the restoration of his authority in the Mahratta empire that he should previously renounce for ever, all claims of Choute on the territories of the Nizam, and should fulfil all the stipulations of the treaty of Mhar. But if the Peishwa shall consent to an adjustment of all his claims of every description on the basis of that treaty, his Highness the Nizam will obtain all that can reasonably be required.

Article 1.—Clause 2. The 3rd separate article of your treaty