

# The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the  
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER

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VOL. XXXII (No. 6)

JUNE, 1918

NO. 745

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## The Open Court Publishing Company

CHICAGO

Per copy, 10 cents (sixpence). Yearly, \$1.00 (in the U.P.U., 5s. 6d.).

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Entered as Second-Class Matter March 26, 1897, at the Post Office at Chicago, Ill., under Act of March 3, 1879  
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# THE GOSPEL OF BUDDHA

By

DR. PAUL CARUS

*Pocket Edition. Illustrated. Cloth, \$1.00; flexible leather, \$1.50*

This edition is a photographic reproduction of the *edition de luxe* which was printed in Leipsic in 1913 and ready for shipment in time to be caught by the embargo Great Britain put on all articles exported from Germany. Luckily two copies of the above edition escaped, and these were used to make the photographic reproduction of this latest edition. While the Buddhist Bible could not in any way be considered a contraband of war yet the publishers were forced to hold back many hundred orders for the book on account of orders in council of Great Britain.

When the book was first published His Majesty, the King of Siam, sent the following communication through his private secretary:

"Dear Sir: I am commanded by His Most Gracious Majesty, the King of Siam, to acknowledge, with many thanks, the receipt of your letter and the book, *The Gospel of Buddha*, which he esteems very much; and he expresses his sincerest thanks for the very hard and difficult task of compilation you have considerably undertaken in the interest of our religion. I avail myself of this favorable opportunity to wish the book every success."

His Royal Highness, Prince Chandradat Chudhadharn, official delegate of Siamese Buddhism to the Chicago Parliament of Religions, writes:

"As regards the contents of the book, and as far as I could see, it is one of the best Buddhist Scriptures ever published. Those who wish to know the life of Buddha and the spirit of his Dharma may be recommended to read this work which is so ably edited that it comprises almost all knowledge of Buddhism itself."

The book has been introduced as a reader in private Buddhist schools of Ceylon. Mrs. Marie H. Higgins, Principal of the Musaeus School and Orphanage for Buddhist Girls, Cinnamon Gardens, Ceylon, writes as follows:

"It is the best work I have read on Buddhism. This opinion is endorsed by all who read it here. I propose to make it a text-book of study for my girls."

**THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY**

122 S. MICHIGAN AVENUE

CHICAGO

ILLINOIS





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## READINGS FROM THE UPANISHADS.

PAUL W. COTTON.

"Truth is the solemn vow of the good."

—*Sanatsugatiya.*

### I.

GOETHE, in the "Italian Journey," writes from Rome: "In the evening we came upon the Coliseum, when it was already twilight. When one looks at it, all else seems little. The edifice is so vast that one cannot hold the image of it in one's soul: in memory we think it smaller, and then return to it again to find it every time greater than before." It is with similar feelings that the modern mind wanders through the magnificent ruins of ancient speculation.

There is a grandeur about the Upanishads that is not surpassed and but rarely equalled by any other book in the world. They are a gigantic, primeval forest of thought. There are trees in this forest that tower into the heavens, trees whose roots clutch the center of the earth, and there is a vast growth of matted underbrush whose inextricable confusion clogs the footsteps of the soul.

We have lost the key to so much of it, we impatient ones who are only too ready to clap the label of absurdity on all that we cannot understand, on all that he who runs shall not read. But the Upanishads are not for those who are in a hurry. There are yet in this world poor, time-starved souls who insist on seeing Rome in a day, who vainly endeavor to pinch the pyramids between the leaves of their Baedeker. It were well for them to keep clear of the Upanishads. They were not born to follow the star and they will never find the babe in the manger.

Let the earnest seeker who has opened these pages plod on patiently across the dreary sands of vanished rite and ceremony.



Many wells of living water lie ahead of him. By and by there is a flash of green, the oasis appears and a voice speaks to him out of the sky:—

“The intelligent, whose body is spirit, whose form is light, whose thoughts are true, whose nature is like ether (omnipresent and indivisible), from whom all works, all desires, all sweet odors, and tastes proceed; he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is never surprised.

“He is my self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley, smaller than a mustard seed, smaller than a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed. He also is my self within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than heaven, greater than all these worlds.

“He from whom all works, all desires, all sweet odors and tastes proceed, who embraces all this, who never speaks and who is never surprised, he, my self within the heart, is that Brahman(n). When I shall have departed from hence, I shall obtain him (that Self). He who has this faith has no doubt; thus said Sandilya, yea, thus he said.”

What has happened? The soul feels a deep sense of peace and security steal over it slowly but inevitably, like the light of day entering a darkened room. It knows itself with a divine instinct to be “beneath the shadow of a great rock in a weary land.” All wars and rumors of war are very far away.

These words are the key to the Upanishads. Man has forgotten much that they taught, he cannot forget his vision of eternity. That is why the Upanishads still appeal, that is why they have withstood the tides of time for 3000 years. The Hindu sages that uttered them had a spiritual penetration that burned like a mountain of fire. Here is that “white radiance of eternity” of which Shelley sang. This vision is aloof from the world of phenomena only because it is verily the Immortal, the Thing-in-Itself, and sometimes its weight of pregnant utterance becomes too heavy for the medium of language and withdraws into the dim distance like scornful thunder lost in limitless skies.

“The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less this fire. When he shines, everything shines after him; by his light all this is lightened.”

It is of the Self they are speaking, that Self of which man is the temporary representative, yet eternal fulfilment. And because



they held the truth these unfathomable winds of thought have risen out of the inaccessible realms of the Himalayas and passed over the world.

## II.

You will find eternity in the Bible but it is an eternity conceived and complicated by considerations foreign to the thought of the Upanishads. The nearest approach to them is Job, and how utterly alien to Hindu philosophy are the conceptions of Job! Job strives with God, he has words with the Eternal and after futile arguments comes to know his own nothingness. There is throughout the Old Testament a distorted sense of personal relationship to the Deity which attains its full perversion in the Psalms.

In the Upanishads man is never, like Job, reduced to nihilism and despair. He cannot be dazed and deluded by appearances since his knowledge of the Self saves him. It is his lack of knowledge of God that drives Job to distraction. A Hindu Job would have consoled himself with some such thought as this:

“I know that great person of sunlike luster beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly passes over death; there is no other path to go.” It is knowledge, not faith, that saves.

Despite their intimate revelations of God the Upanishads view the Creator, as it were, from a distance. He is generally spoken of in the third person and is rendered chiefly by wondrous negatives. There is an indefinable haze of wonder over these pages which simplicity serves only to enhance. You are led within the shrine, the veil is drawn aside, but the seraph nevertheless remains a seraph.

Every religion or philosophy is an attempt, more or less successful, to fathom the godhead. The Upanishads contain the most beautiful presentation of God ever achieved by humanity. Science has not passed beyond these thoughts, science has but confirmed them. The Great Mystery is still as beautiful and mysterious as ever and this book is eloquent with the burden of the Great Mystery.

It is because man has ventured to speak of that of which he has no sensorial cognizance that the world is so great and so wonderful. The scientific truth followed the intellectual intuition. So knowledge came into being and knowledge is salvation. Such is the doctrine of the Upanishads. It is from this great root that Buddhism sprang. The best of Buddhism is to be found in the Upanishads. From this root also has risen our science and philosophy and the “X”

that hovers ever beyond them is revealed in these old treatises, in so far as man may speak of the Unknowable.

The doctrine of the real and the ideal has never been more clearly stated or more satisfactorily adjusted. The sublime conception which is so insisted on here: that beneath this fabric of appearance we call the world stand the pillars of eternity,—this is the *Leitmotif* of all great thinkers from Plato to Carlyle and seems to have been from early times one of the ruling ideas of mankind.

The far-sighted seers of the Upanishads dared to assert at a time when science was unknown the eternal unity of God and nature, the certain proof of which is the greatest achievement of modern thought. The Upanishads are the first and most profound poetic exposition of the monistic doctrine.

Their spirit is the spirit of praise and their truth is wrapped in a veil of poetic beauty that is like the changing light on sunlit seas. On the shores of the infinite they have built their altars and there they chant forever the endless peace of the Unconscious. The prayers of the Upanishads are beyond good and evil.

They do not shut their eyes to the bitterness of life and the struggle of existence. "Man is sacrifice," they say. "The first twenty-four years are the morning libation." But there is little in them about the suffering of mankind. The miracle of life has for them swallowed up all sorrow. It is enough that man can see and understand. Truth is the sovereign balm, and he who can find no comfort in truth will never appreciate the wonder and beauty of life. To these sages the world is ever a *new* world and their wisdom comes forth with the delight and naïveté of the child. This is the special happiness of early civilizations.

In that fine dialogue in the Khandogya Upanishad between Uddalaka and his son Svetaketu, the father is asked: How can this universe which has the form and name of earth, etc., be produced from the Sat (the Self) which is subtle, and has neither form nor name? He replies:

"Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree."

"Here is one, Sir."

"Break it."

"It is broken, Sir."

"What do you see there?"

"These seeds, almost infinitesimal."

"Break one of them."

"It is broken, Sir."

“What do you see there?”

“Not anything, Sir.”

The father said: “My son, that subtle essence which you do not see there, of that very essence, this great Nyagrodha tree exists.”

“Believe it, my son. That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.”

What could be more simple, more deep, more true? In such flashes of miraculous insight is the eternal made manifest, the direct relation of man to the universe of which he is a part.

Here it is not a question of sin and atonement, of repentance and contrition. Emotionalism is severely absent; the intellect rules. All that is demanded is a heart hungry for knowledge and ears that do really hear the truth. “When the intellectual aliment has been purified, the whole nature becomes purified.” Jesus meant the same thing when he said: “The light of the body is in the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.” But it is a far cry from those words in John: “In my father’s house are many mansions. I go to prepare a place for you,” to that sentence in the Svetasvatara Upanishad: “That which is beyond this world is without form and without suffering.” Here lies the typical line of demarcation between the Christian and Hindu philosophy.

Somehow the confident assertions of Paul with his glorification of a personal immortality pale before this superb doctrine of a cosmic identity. For this alone is commensurate with the hugeness of life: that a man should know he is part of the World-Soul and that this Soul lives and speaks in him; that his strength lies in the fact of his being one with nature and not above and apart from her. Beside such a conception the eternity of personality seems a trivial matter.

Do we need more than the present world war to convince us that the life of the individual is of comparative insignificance compared with the mysterious movements of race which animate mankind? The individual is but a spoke in the wheel that is ever rolling toward an unimaginable goal and it is only in man and the spirit of man that he lives eternally. If the individual would feel rock-bottom beneath his feet let him take to heart this admonition of the Kātha Upanishad:

“The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among things, as great and omnipresent, does never

grieve." Or if he will have it from his Bible he can turn to the words of the Founder of Christendom who eight centuries later enunciated the same truth: "This is eternal life: that they might know thee, the only true God."

### III.

The Upanishads present no system of ethics, they have no ten Commandments to offer. They were written by men who were already masters of themselves. They do not plead or inveigh; they are a calm intellectual presentment of truth. In their treatment of holy things they lack the intrusive familiarity of Mohammed, the tender sentiment of Jesus. There is a certain reserve in their lofty eloquence, a diffidence in the face of a great subject which could only be felt by the finest of minds. And at times a breath comes from them cold and unreachable as the peaks of the Himalayas and eternal and pure as their snows.

Yes, God is indeed great, but he is great precisely because he is non-human and passionless, beyond love and beyond hate. He is "smaller than the kernel of a canary seed" but also "greater than all these worlds." In his creation they find him everywhere and in the spirit of the Orient they cry exotically:

"Thou art the dark-blue bee, thou art the green parrot with red eyes, thou art the thunder-cloud, the seasons, the seas. Thou art without beginning, because thou art infinite, thou from whom all worlds are born."

Men come forth from him as bubbles from the sea, as sparks from the fire, and return to him again, but men are lost only to find themselves in him.

"If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand; for this one does not kill, nor is that one killed."

All is eternal life. "There is one eternal thinker thinking non-eternal thoughts." The forms may fade and crumble but there is no cessation or diminution.

Such are the greatest religious and philosophic thoughts of the greatest race of history. The halo of the infinite is never far away from this atmosphere. It is a remarkable sign of man's intellectual preeminence that in so early a stage of his cultural development he should have seen so clearly and so far. These sages already realize the eternal dissatisfaction of men.

“Man is the sea rising beyond the whole world. Whatever he reaches he wishes to go beyond. If he reaches the sky he wishes to go beyond. If he should reach that heavenly world, he would wish to go beyond.”

These primitive images have in them the largeness and scope of Homer.

And shall man then ever attain? We speak of progress but the world rolls round and round like a wheel, and man is after all much the same, yesterday and to-day. Like a child building a house of cards, he rears through the ages with patient, meticulous care vast edifices of civilization and then with his mailed fist hurls them once more into chaos and destruction with a sort of fiendish delight.

As the river of time flows on it becomes apparent that in the ultimate analysis progress proves to be wholly spiritual and intellectual, and the inner conviction of the sages of India grows more and more to be a world force for the propagation of truth, all the securer because their thought rests firmly upon the axis of the macrocosm and not the microcosm.

The light of the Orient has dawned upon many minds. Schopenhauer found no study so beneficial and elevating as the Upanishads. The enlightened souls of the western world can regard only with the deepest reverence and admiration the supreme wisdom that could write: “There is no image of Him whose name is Great Glory.”

In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad King Ganaka, being granted a boon by the Brahman Yagnavalkya, questioned him thus:

“‘Yagnavalkya,’ he said, ‘what is the light of man?’

“Yagnavalkya replied: ‘The sun, O King; for having the sun alone for his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns.’

“Ganaka Vaideha said: ‘So indeed it is, O Yagnavalkya.’

“Ganaka Vaideha said: ‘When the sun has set, O Yagnavalkya, what is then the light of man?’

“Yagnavalkya replied: ‘The moon indeed is his light; for, having the moon alone for his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns.’

“Ganaka Vaideha said: ‘So indeed it is, O Yagnavalkya.’

“Ganaka Vaideha said: ‘When the sun has set, O Yagnavalkya, and the moon has set, what is the light of man?’

“Yagnavalkya replied: ‘Fire indeed is his light; for, having

fire alone for his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns.'

"Ganaka Vaideha said: 'When the sun has set, O Yagnavalkya, and the moon has set, and the fire is gone out, what then is the light of man?'

"Yagnavalkya replied: 'Sound indeed is his light; for, having sound alone for his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns. Therefore, O King, when one cannot see even one's own hand, yet when a sound is raised, one goes toward it.'

"Ganaka Vaideha said: 'So indeed it is. O Yagnavalkya.'

"Ganaka Vaideha said: 'When the sun has set, O Yagnavalkya, and the moon has set, and the fire out, and the sound hushed, what is then the light of man?'

"Yagnavalkya said: 'The Self indeed is his light; for, having the Self alone as his light, man sits, moves about, does his work, and returns.'

"Ganaka Vaideha said: 'Who is that Self?'"

Let us answer him out of the Khandogya Upanishad:

"That Self is a bank, a boundary, so that these worlds may not be confounded. Day and night do not pass that bank, nor old age, death and grief; neither good nor evil deeds. All evil-doers turn back from it, for the world of Brahman is free from all evil.

"Therefore he who has crossed that bank, if blind, ceases to be blind; if wounded, ceases to be wounded; if afflicted, ceases to be afflicted. Therefore, when that bank has been crossed, night becomes day indeed, for the world of Brahman is lighted up once for all."

Note: (The quotations in this article are from the translation of the chief Upanishads by Prof. Max Müller, issued by the Oxford Press.)

## THE UPANISHADS.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE Upanishads form perhaps the most classical book of religious literature in the world, and no one who has not studied their problem can really claim to have understood the central proposition of religious thought. Mr. Paul W. Cotton presents to us the beauty of the Upanishads with an enthusiasm that naturally seizes a man who grasps their underlying idea for the first time. Chris-

tianity has nothing like it, as Mr. Cotton points out, and so the very kernel of religion, a treatment of the nature of the soul, is lacking in the most important and most powerful religion that is now spreading over all the world. In fact if Christianity wants to fathom the problem of the soul in its philosophical significance its thinkers will have to go back to India, where this subject has been attacked in the most systematic way and is well presented in both its affirmative and its negative aspect. The former, presented in the Upanishads, is best formulated by the Hindu sage Shankāra-carya, the latter by Gautama, the Shakya sage, who on having solved the world problem claims the title of the Enlightened One, the Buddha.

The question is the same as the problem of unity, a problem which was also raised by the Greek sages and received a special treatment by Plato. It is the same question which was treated by Kant in his problem of the thing-in-itself and his solution was similar to that of the Upanishads, that the thing-in-itself is unknown and unknowable—a solution which led some of the followers of Kant to say boldly that the thing-in-itself does not exist. This interpretation of Kantism agrees exactly with the view of Buddha who came to the conclusion that the self is non-existent.

Further I would say that science reaches the same conclusion, and modern psychology is for that reason called the psychology without a soul. Mr. Cotton thinks in his enthusiasm for the Upanishad theory that science upholds it and proves it, but the fact is that the theory of the self as an independent entity is mystical and absolutely untenable. The old Brahman conception of the soul is an illusion, while the Buddhist view is an anticipation of a truly scientific conception.

The difficulty may be reduced to simple terms. To use the Kantian method, we are puzzled in the face of all things with which we are confronted by the question, "What is the thing-in-itself?" We see a tree. It consists of roots, trunk, branches and foliage. The whole of the tree is a combination of all its parts, and these parts cooperate among themselves. Is there a tree in itself independent of its parts, or is the cooperation and combination of its parts the tree? Science does not uphold the idea that there is a tree in itself, that this tree in itself is a mystical and spiritual entity, a thing which is eternal and everlasting, world without end, that has never originated and will never pass away.

In a certain sense there is a tree in itself, and it exists, but not as an entity. The tree in itself is a possibility. It has existed as



a pure form in itself. It is the Platonic idea of a tree, and this idea of a tree is not a concrete existence, but a mathematical possibility. In this sense the realm of ideas is eternal and everlasting. It has never originated. It exists in potential combinations, and such possibilities are as eternal and everlasting as the truths of mathematics. Briefly, there are no things-in-themselves but there are forms-in-themselves.

In mathematics the triangle is a definite combination of three lines and there are many possible triangles. There is the right-angled triangle, the obtuse-angled triangle and the acute-angled triangle, with all possible combinations of angles and lines. The rules about the triangles, the results of definite combinations of lines, are studied in geometry and trigonometry. What we study in mathematics is not concrete definite material objects but possible combinations—pure forms, and these combinations can be realized in the actual world.

The same is true of other forms such as conic sections, which are actualized in astronomy. The astronomer can calculate the courses of planets and satellites. He can predict the position of a star from to-day to to-morrow and the night after to-morrow. The laws of mathematics are absolute and reliable and the same is true of all forms.

In the domain of living beings we find combinations originate as specks of living substance, and our physiology regards them as combinations just as crystals or non-living matter form combinations. We see that the cooperation of parts produces new and higher units. These units originate and decay. They pass away as soon as the cooperation stops. Buddha has pronounced the rule that all combinations which originate through cooperation of parts originate and pass away. They combine not in order to be animated by a thing-in-itself that is incarnated in them, but their cooperation is the reality which produces the union. Here the Brahman philosophy steps in and says, "the union of these parts is the real thing." It is, to use Kant's expression, the thing-in-itself, or as the Brahman says, the self or the *atman*.

The truth of cooperation producing new things is also visible in the work of human activity. A wagon is constructed by fitting four wheels on axles, by further putting a box on the axles and in front of it a tongue for furnishing a place to hitch the horses. The whole is a wagon, or, as the Buddhist philosopher in "The Questions of King Milinda" sets forth, it produces a new unit which exists although there is no wagon in itself.

The same is true of modern inventions where the cooperation is more visible such as a steam engine or a watch. There is no steam engine in itself but the cooperation of its parts makes it do work by producing a unit fit for some definite purpose.

The watchmaker does not take a watch in itself and fit it with bodily parts; but the parts of a watch, its wheels and its cogs, its dial and hands, are put together, and as soon as the spring is wound and placed in its right position the watch runs and indicates the time. To believe in a watch in itself would be silly, and there is no reason whatever to think that any living being is an atman or a thing-in-itself, which only uses its members for performing some work.

Buddhism denies the existence of a thing-in-itself, of an atman, of a self, but does not deny the importance of the cooperating whole which the parts of a thing produce. The unit produced in this way in a human body is the soul, and this soul consists in the function or, to use the Buddhist term, in the *karma* which it performs. Karma is transferable by inheritance and education, and it is the kind of karma a man does which characterizes him, and the realization which human beings try to accomplish is the essential portion of a man. In this sense Buddhism finds its application in the moral sphere of active life, while according to Vedantic Brahmanism the deeds of a man do not touch him but pass by and are of transient significance. The immortal soul remains what it is and has been through all eternity, a kind of small god who mysteriously has arisen out of the unknown depths of being and will continue to exist without let or hindrance. Buddhism, on the contrary, insists on the significance of deeds. What a man does he is. He changes his existence by changing his works. He lives in his works, and his works are himself. There is an atman or self, but this atman is a temporary cooperation of the parts of which the man exists, the interaction of his thoughts, the doing of his deeds and the purpose which he pursues. There is no atman that exists independently without his personality.

There is no need here to point out all the distinctions between Buddhism in its theory of the *anatman* and Vedantic Brahmanism in its trust in an eternal atman or a metaphysical thing-in-itself independent of a man's personality. We have discussed this problem again and again in *The Open Court* and in other publications. We will only say here in connection with the publication of Mr. Cotton's article that the imposing beauty of the atman theory preached in the Upanishads is an illusion which has fascinated

some of our best philosophers in India as well as in the Occidental world. We believe that the problem ought to be weighed and considered, but we trust that any clear-headed thinker will reject the theory. It is a question of either there is a thing-in-itself or there is not, *tertium non datur*. And in this dilemma we see no other solution than the Buddhist conception of the theory of the soul.

## BEETHOVEN'S NINTH SYMPHONY.<sup>1</sup>

BY BARON VON DER PFORDTEN.

CLOSE to Beethoven's *Missa solemnis*<sup>2</sup> in miraculous power stands another of his works, the Ninth Symphony in D minor, Op. 125, known briefly as the "Ninth." There is hardly another composition about which there has been so much controversy as about this one. There is a superabundance of literature dealing with the subject, and the layman is almost submerged in the flood of attempts at its elucidation. The most serious feature is that the opinion is thus spread abroad again and again that the Ninth Symphony is quite peculiar, and if comprehensible at all can be understood only by the aid of complicated explanations. For this reason I shall here attempt to simplify its exposition as much as possible. Our course shall lead, as always, from the outside inward, from the external form to the content of the symphony.

It has been authentically proved that ever since the year 1793 Beethoven had it in mind to elaborate the theme of Schiller's well-known "Hymn to Joy." To all appearances he was so persistently affected by this hymn that he could not get away from it. Nevertheless, thirty years went by before the plan was consummated, and indeed quite differently from the way originally sketched. For instance, Beethoven's first idea had been to set the whole poem to music. It would then have become a cantata arranged for solo voices, chorus and orchestra, and at all events we would have had a magnificent work in it; scruples with regard to style would hardly have been aroused. It could then have been a matter only of feeling Beethoven's conception with him and comprehending from it his arrangement into form, just as with all his creations. But now he surprises us with something quite unexpected. He puts separate

<sup>1</sup> Translated from the German by Lydia G. Robinson.

<sup>2</sup> For Baron von der Pfordten's appreciative analysis of this remarkable composition see *The Open Court* for September, 1910.

selected passages of the text to music and inserts them into the finale of a symphony which has simultaneously arisen in the meantime. This is something new which it is well to notice particularly. Beethoven's fantasy for piano, chorus and orchestra, Op. 80, may be regarded as the forerunner of the Ninth Symphony, but we need not enter into it here.

If we examine the construction of the symphony closely it will be a long time before we discover the new element which perplexes us. The first movement is an *Allegro ma non troppo, un poco maestoso* in two-four time. It may safely be said that the theme itself and its construction are particularly rich, interesting and significant. In form it is one movement of a symphony, and as such it is not hard to understand, at least for those who have approached it through a progressive study of Beethoven's works. I purposely refrain from speaking here of the emotional content; we shall come to that later.

The second movement, a *Molto vivace* in three-four time, may be compared in style to the first movement of the Symphony in C minor. Here too we have a very short theme, only one measure, only three notes in an octave interval, more rhythmical than melodious. From this develops a tempestuous *Scherzo*. In place of the trio there comes a sharply contrasted *presto alla breve* in D major. The Coda is audaciously dramatic, a regular hunt; but we are familiar with this style from earlier experience.

The third movement is not only inexpressibly beautiful but it is also remarkable for a particularly delightful lucidity. There are two parts, an *Adagio molto e cantabile* B flat in common time and an *Andante moderato* in D in three-four time. If the director can trust his orchestra to take the first part very broadly, then in spite of the prescribed acceleration of the tempo the second will conform throughout to the unity of the movement. The two parts alternate, then are played with variations and completed. A counter theme like a fanfare comes in between. The whole thing is wonderful but not in the least unclear or hard to understand. Up to this point we have a symphony in proper form.

Now I would like to ask what auditor, not knowing what comes next, would expect anything different from the usual finale? Suppose Beethoven had made the fourth movement of this symphony also purely instrumental and only for the orchestra, who would have taken offence? After these first three movements would any one have had the feeling that now a vocal finale must follow? Honestly, are not even connoisseurs surprised at it over and over

again every time they hear it? At every performance of the Ninth Symphony do they not feel that the conclusion is doubtful? Let us not criticise it yet, but it seems certain that the climax is not a natural one. Let us see how it is brought about.

The D minor sixth resounds *fortissimo* with a sustained B flat passing to A, a piercing dissonance which seems all the harsher because we are entirely unprepared for it. It is like an agonizing outcry of the whole orchestra, the strongest conceivable contrast to the heavenly transfiguration of the preceding movement. And if this beginning is bewildering the following *unisono* of the basses is not less so, bearing the indication "In the character of a recitative, but in *tempo*." Here Beethoven dramatizes the single groups of his orchestra for a musical treatment whose course can hardly be described in words, much less interpreted. The outcry is reiterated with increased power and a second recitative of the basses replies. Like a memory from the remote past sounds the motive of the first movement, after a vehement recitative the theme of the second, and after an inquiring recitative the melody of the third. One more recitative of the basses of an almost threatening energy is followed by an entirely new idea rendered by the oboes, the motto for the finale. The basses interrupt this with a recitative which later on we shall hear again, and now for the first time the D major melody is played clear through, first by the bass softly and mysteriously, then taken up by the orchestra with increasing fulness and grandeur until it is completed in brilliant splendor.

Let us pause a moment. What does all this mean? It is like a controversy of the instruments one with another. Can we guess its import? Kretzschmar describes it delightfully. He says it is like a chaos from which the orchestra is seeking its way out. Thus Beethoven permits us to live through with him the creation of the finale, the birth of his theme, his tonal process of becoming.

The subject of the symphony is joy. It begins with the expression of joylessness in the first movement, in a plaintive and sorrowful discernment of it. This naturally impels one to free himself from such a condition; but in this he is not to succeed, for although the second movement is filled with demoniac humor and the third breathes a divine transfiguration, yet both remain far removed from joy. Hence the outbreak of despair at the beginning of the fourth movement, and hence the convulsive efforts of the orchestra to find the way of salvation.

There is something to be said for such a program. It is musical; it is an emotional program, not an objective one. The hearer is not

conscious of it from the beginning. He has no premonition that the first three movements have such a meaning.

Suddenly at the finale there is a change; the orchestra falls back into despair. The outcry is repeated, but much more passionately in a horrible chord which gives forth all seven tones of the harmonic D minor scale at once, the diminished seventh, C sharp-E-G-B, on top of the sixth, F-A-D. Now comes the determining change. The basses do not answer in recitative, but a baritone voice sings, "O friends, not these noises! but let us strike up a pleasanter and more joyous song!" These words are Beethoven's own. Their melody is almost exactly the same as that of the last recitative of the basses in the introduction. Here as there follows the redeeming D major melody, but now it is not played by the orchestra but is sung by the soloists and chorus: *Freude, schöner Götterfunken*, "Sing then, of the heav'n descended."

This is the moment when the symphony becomes a cantata. The orchestra has not proved equal to its task. It cannot banish joylessness; it cannot capture joy. Singing must come to its aid. This means nothing more nor less than that absolute instrumental music and the symphonic form are not sufficient. Beethoven must call other means of expression to his aid; and these he finds in song, the union of word and sound.

Now the question is, if this is what Beethoven meant to say, did he succeed in convincing us? I think the honest answer of every auditor must be, No, not in convincing. The immediate impression at every performance, even on those who are well acquainted with it, is one of surprise. Spirited, magnificent, bold and new though we may call it, there is nothing compelling in it, nothing positively overwhelming as Beethoven always is in his other work. It is an experiment and acts as such upon every one whose sensibility is not dulled by familiarity and whose judgment is not in principle obscured by prejudice. The fact is that Beethoven originally wished to set the "Hymn to Joy" to music and then conceived the idea of uniting it with a symphony. This he did, and now we have it before us as he intended it, but we perceive this intention and so it seems to us to be intentional caprice. He must himself have felt that the combination of instrumental and vocal music, of symphony and cantata, of musical poetry and poetry in word and sound meant a break in style. Therefore he attempted to make it plausible, but instead of concealing the gap or bridging it over in the least he shows it to us the more distinctly in all its boldness.

But when we have reached the summit without falling into the



yawning chasm, then a world opens up before us of such splendor and beauty as only Beethoven could reveal. It is remarkable that in the first three movements we had not the remotest idea of any approaching vocal music, but now we hardly give a thought to the orchestra. The cantata triumphs over the symphony. The way this joyous hymn develops is truly wonderful. As early as in the passage, *Und der Cherub steht vor Gott*, "And the Seraph dwells with God," we are given a glimpse into the sacred depths of emotion. The *Adagio non troppo ma divoto*:

<i>Ihr stürzt nieder, Millionen?</i>	"O ye millions, kneel before Him,
<i>Ahnst du den Schöpfer, Welt?</i>	Tremble, Earth, before thy Lord,"

is a veritable prayer. Here Beethoven leads us before his God, and this God is so exalted that it is bliss merely to divine him. But at the same time he is a "loving father" to us all, and therefore our adoring veneration must at the same time be the embrace of all humanity.

<i>Seid umschlungen, Millionen,</i>	"O ye millions, I embrace you,
<i>Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt,</i>	Here's a joyful kiss for all!"

is sung in an *Andante maestoso* in a theme of fascinating power. Now Beethoven's idealism is disclosed as we have heard it in the *Fidelio*:

<i>Alle Menschen werden Brüder</i>	"Brothers all who joy delighteth
<i>Wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt,</i>	Reconciler sweet of hearts!"

All outward sundering must yield; new magic joins what was torn apart. The realm of joy is the realm of brotherhood; only love can bestow it upon us. Thus at last in one grand torrent Beethoven unites the two main themes, the melodies of joy and of the kiss of brotherhood. Here is a typical example of the combined poetical and musical effect and the significance of counterpoint. When the soprano sings, *Freude, schöner Götterfunken*, "Sing, then, of the heav'n descended," and the bass at the same time, *Seid umschlungen, Millionen*, "O ye millions, I embrace you," we have hardly a chance to notice how artistically the effect has been produced. It harmonizes as if it had been determined and constructed for this purpose from the beginning; we perceive it not only as possible, interesting and full of genius, but rather indeed as plausible, as even necessary. Here the master convinces us, but he cannot in the least satisfy himself. As in the *Missa solemnis*, incredible things are expected of the vocalists. It is hardly possible to produce everything as Beethoven heard it in his mind and



exacted of the performers without regard to practicability. He composed for an ideal chorus, for ideal soloists, and the best that can be done is to come as near to this ideal as possible. The staggering *Prestissimo* in which this work ends is particularly venturesome.

So we leave this work with a spirit of thankfulness to and admiration for its creator, if not with the unrestricted unquestioned satisfaction which his other works afford. It seems to me that it is no wonder that the Ninth Symphony continued long and often to be misunderstood and unappreciated. On the contrary it is a wonder that it could finally be performed at all. And the greatest wonder of all is that it is so popular to-day, so often performed and so universally applauded. The conspicuous success of this particular work tends to make us reflect. Have we really advanced so far that we can comprehend it easily and positively? Have we solved its riddles? Do we understand all of it without exception, or have we at last ceased to be conscious that it is so very extraordinary? Has custom so dulled our perception or its problematic grandeur? I am much afraid that there is prevalent, to say the least, a very general false modesty in the affair. People are ashamed to confess what they will hardly admit to themselves. They would be thought greatly behind the times and this they are loath to appear. "Was it maybe some vanity?" as Pogner asks in the "Meistersinger." Oh yes, that too plays a part. Let us drop them both. Only the man who is honorable enough to confess that he is a doubter and inquirer will attain true understanding. And if any one believes it is not very important how we interpret the Ninth Symphony, let his attention be directed to the deductions which may be drawn, and which rightly or wrongly have actually been drawn from it.

To those who agree with the outline of the Ninth Symphony as I have sketched it many beautiful things remain to be said about the emotional content of the separate movements. No one has explained them more poetically than Richard Wagner who tries to guide the hearer to their comprehension through selected passages from Goethe's *Faust*. Indeed we may designate the moods in the Ninth Symphony as Faustian. Still it is noteworthy that Wagner expressly declares that Goethe's verses have not the slightest direct connection with Beethoven's composition. The nature of the more elevated instrumental music consists in giving expression in tones to what is inexpressible in words. He therefore makes use of the poet's words only by comparison, only as a very general indication,

and probably does not expect to accomplish by them a thorough understanding so much as merely to produce a sympathetic emotion. In this sense we may welcome his program. He was fitted to interpret the Ninth Symphony as hardly any one else has been. Everything that he writes about it is instructive and worthy of attention even to the smallest technical details.

For this reason we are all the more curious to discover how he will solve the critical question of the last movement. He writes in so many words: "The progress of the musical composition demands a crisis, a crisis which can only be pronounced in human speech." And he admires the way in which the master by the convulsive recitative of the bass instruments prepares for the approach of speech and human voices as a necessity to be expected. But this only indicates the problem correctly; it does not explain it. We ask, "Why is not instrumental music sufficient here? Why is it not adequate just for joy when it has proved so for heroism (in the *Eroica*)?" Why must "the last attempt to express by instrumental music alone a positive, clearly defined and untroubled joyous happiness" fail so abruptly? Were not Beethoven's dramatics of the soul sufficient for the perfection of his ideas in other instances? We have observed again and again how the language of his orchestra rises to such definiteness that we might feel that it must blossom into words. We have at the same time however convinced ourselves that no one could find such words. Now Beethoven himself adds them, and we must say that he leads music to the edge of the comprehensible definiteness of musical expression. When we are to think of joy only words can teach it to us. Music alone can certainly make us feel it but in this case we are to do more, and this cannot be provided by the absolute, or instrumental, music.

Now we are moving in a circle again. I might ask why the first three movements were sufficient with instruments alone? Are we supposed to feel joylessness and the effort at liberation there in a less definite degree? We would have to explain it thus: It is the experiment of the fourth movement that first opens our eyes. Now for the first time we know under what limitations we have previously suffered. But we have the same feeling with overwhelming force also, for instance, in the *C Minor* symphony just because we cannot grasp it in words.

Accordingly it is a question of a fundamental distinction, and Richard Wagner who never shrank from consequences did not hesitate to draw one here. We can condense it into an axiom: Beethoven's Ninth Symphony signifies the bankruptcy of absolute

or instrumental music. Beethoven himself, the master of the symphony, here shows us that the absolute musical expression of emotion is too indefinite, too general and therefore inadequate. But Wagner's views are purely subjective; nothing would be more unsafe than to adopt them offhand. At any rate he has given clear and succinct utterance to them, and many people have fallen in with his opinion. Nevertheless up to the present time opposition to this view has not yet been silenced. Equally justifiable is the standpoint that now as ever instrumental and vocal music are fundamentally different, and each is of value and significance within its own limits.

Wagner reaches the only conclusion that was logically possible for him. Generally speaking, absolute music is done for; generally speaking there is no sense in writing symphonies any longer; what could be said in instrumental music has been uttered by Beethoven's orchestra; henceforth no one can succeed in imbuing them with meaning; isolated interesting attempts simply prove the futility of their efforts. "The last symphony of Beethoven is the deliverance of music from its most peculiar elements into universal art. It is the human gospel of the art of the future. Beyond music no progress is possible because only the complete artistic production of the future can follow upon it directly—universal drama, for which Beethoven has forged the artistic key."

We should be glad to have Wagner express himself so unequivocally and without reserve. At least these are not empty phrases; for him nothing mattered but the drama, without which he could have created nothing. But we are not in duty bound for this reason to share his opinion. Perhaps he is even right in his conviction that in the symphony Beethoven has said the last word. It is possible that never again will there be a composer of symphonies to equal him. It is a fact that we measure every one who has written symphonies by Beethoven and hitherto have ranked them far below him. Of course this does not prove that the symphony as such is abolished, and least of all does it prove that it is this very Ninth Symphony that abolished it. Beethoven's experiment aspired beyond absolute music in this one particular case, but in so doing he did not put an end to the creation of symphonies. Still this is absolutely what we would have to expect. No more sonatas or symphonies after the Ninth would be conceivable from him himself if he had confirmed the bankruptcy explanation. So finally we shall have to call on him to make the decision; in the end the master is the surest witness.

He is said to have declared the Ninth Symphony to be a mistake, and even to have spoken of working it over, at least of never repeating the experiment: we need not discuss the credibility of this tradition or lay any weight upon it. On the other hand we may regret that Beethoven did not carry out the plan, which had been earlier suggested, of providing a commentary to his own works. Then we could have expected an authentic critique of the Ninth Symphony by the author himself. So we must confine ourselves to the facts. We know that he planned a tenth symphony, that death intervened to prevent its completion and that little or nothing is to be gathered from meager sketches. But instrumental compositions like the last great string quartette were produced after the Ninth Symphony, and this alone may well suffice to put to rest all misunderstanding.

At a memorable Academy meeting on May 7, 1824, three movements of the *Missa solennis* and the Ninth Symphony were produced for the first time. The master was present, stone deaf. He heard not a sound of the wonderful notes which there came to life at his bidding; he heard not a sound of the thundering applause with which the inspired audience greeted him. He stood with his back to the public until Caroline Unger, one of the soloists who took part in the production, motioned to him to turn around. Then he saw how all were applauding and nodding to him. What a moment this must have been, and how indelibly impressed upon every one present! As he stood there in the concert hall facing the crowd of people, so in his life and work he stood in relation to the world—alone and unapproachable, and yet its affectionate benefactor.

## ALL MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL.

BY A. V. C. P. HUIZINGA.

THE statement in the Declaration of Independence which asserts "All men are created equal," has been the subject of so much discussion that Jefferson himself, who drew up this American historical document, could hardly realize the full scope, or the various interpretations of this assertion. It is mostly misunderstood now, and therefore worth our while to review shortly its meaning in the light of its historical occurrence.

For a right understanding of the document, it is well to bear in mind that in the much vaunted political theories of "Natural Rights" in those days is inherent the right of revolution, an under-

taking which the American colonies at that time had taken in hand with much success. The colonies were anxious to justify the fact of this achievement against King George, for nations not less than individuals feel the necessity to justify their acts, because nations as well as individuals are under moral law. Consequently they are led to justify their acts before the world, and to themselves before God. Hence individuals and nations give always in important decisions an account of the circumstances and reasons which prompt their acts, setting forth their views in justification of the same.

Such an account is the Declaration of Independence. It does not apologize, but justifies the momentous act taken by the colonies in breaking away from King George, and adduces as the justifying principle of the action: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

It is plain at first sight that the government becomes secondary in authority because of the fact which is taken for granted, the self-evident truth that all men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In fact, the government exists only to secure these rights, but if, and whenever the government fails to do this, it thereby forfeits its right to be, which is the case of British authority, as is made apparent in the long list of enumerated abuses. It is of interest to note that the Declaration asserts: the government must rest upon the consent of the governed. Thereby the people were declared sovereign, and taxation without representation became impossible. But it should be made clear in this connection that Rousseau, who coined the phrase "the sovereign people" in his *Contrat Social*, does nowhere argue for a declaration of individual rights, with which the state shall not interfere. This is characteristic of the way in which the American people incorporated these principles in a political program with its provisions of "checks and balances" against usurpations of the government against the individual. John Adams maintained the power of the government,

while Jefferson was watching for the individual rights. This is in striking contrast with the French notion of unlimited power of the people, which soon became more tyrannical and destructive of the "natural rights of man" than the ancient régime had been, when, in the name of "Public welfare," the Terror committed its worst excesses. Robespierre himself said: "The government of the Republic is the despotism of liberty against tyranny." The American view maintains, however, that the liberty of the individual is only safe when the sovereignty of the state is limited in the right of its citizens. Thus the "Bills of Rights" are intended as limitations of the sovereignty of the people in favor of the liberty of the individual.

When comparing these declarations of France and of the American colonies, it must forever be borne in mind that the American view remains practical, while the French went to the extreme of *Prinzipienreiterei* which declared: "Vivent les principes, périsse le monde!" Such a theoretic conception or interpretation of the principles common to both declarations was, on American soil, well-nigh impossible. Thus Woodrow Wilson observes in *Constitutional Government of the United States*: "We think of the Declaration of Independence as a highly theoretical document, but *except for its assertion that all men are equal* it is not. It is intensely practical even upon the question of liberty." Of course when public expediency determines the measure of individual rights the rule of right has really been broken. This terrible world-war exemplifies in striking manner how under the stress of circumstances individual rights, no less than general rules of right, are set aside by the exigencies of the hour. It also clearly foreshadows a considerable extension and growth in the power and function of government, and a limitation of the rights of the individual. But it should be kept in mind that these views have developed in and are born from actual circumstances. As President Grover Cleveland said when propounding a definite view in a certain case, "we face conditions, not theories." This practical application of the principles is far removed from the theoretic formulation of the French, where Rousseau's will of the people, the popular sovereignty or the general will (*volonté générale*) must be distinguished from the will of all (*volonté de tous*). While the former aims at the common welfare, the other looks only to private interest and is but the sum of all particular wills. He finds the general will, not, as in the American way, by the rule of the majority, but declares that, if the extremes be taken from the sums of the individual wills, there



remains the general will. It is readily seen, how mob rule might easily result from such a theoretic, artificial conception of the general will of the people, then, this absolute power unchecked by rule or law, it is apparent again how the wildest excesses became possible. Even the majority rule as bound by law under stress of circumstances or popular clamor will override legal restraints in behalf of individual or community. It is everywhere and forever difficult to learn that liberty cannot exist without respect for law and order. A more fitting object lesson, therefore, could not well be found than that placed over the courthouse in Worcester, Massachusetts: "Obedience to law is liberty." But to assert similarity to any extent between the principles manifest in the spirit of the French Revolution of 1789 and the spirit of 1779 in America, even by almost identical wording in the "*Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*" and the "Declaration of Independence" is like putting Rousseau's confessions by the side of those of Augustine. Even identical declarations run of necessity apart in their bearing upon, and interpretation by, different people. And how great is not the difference between revolutionary France formulating its extreme theories against the oppressive *ancien régime*, and the American colonies resisting the despotic demands of King George upon his unrepresented subjects across the sea. In fact, the only thing in common in these movements, except the wording of the official documents—the "Declaration of Independence" and "*La déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*"—is their assertion of rights against oppressive government.

The similarity in wording is readily understood when we remember that, in the discussions of the Constituent Assembly which drew up the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, reference was had constantly to the American Declaration of Independence. Rabaut de St. Etienne, the able Protestant minister who took an active part in these discussions, declares explicitly that the Declaration and Bills of Right had served them as a model for the French Declaration. It is therefore not true to fact when the French assert that their declaration rests wholly upon French antecedents, notably upon the writings of J. J. Rousseau. It is still farther from the truth when Americans declare their Declaration of Independence to rest upon the principles of the French Revolution with Rousseau (notably his *Discours sur l'inégalité* and *Contrat Social*) and other political writers as precursors. It is false to assert that "the French gave shape to the thought which America was to work out in actual practice," or that Dumont's



story of "Freedom and Equality" passed over into our Declaration of Independence. Apart from the explicit testimony that the American documents were considered and served as model during the discussions held for the purpose of drawing up the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, the significant fact remains that the American Declaration antedates the similarly worded document of the French by thirteen years. George Mason drew up the Bill of Rights of Virginia June 12, 1776; Thomas Jefferson, the Declaration of Independence officially July 4, 1776; but the committee of five of the Constituent Assembly composed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, and it was prefixed to the Constitution of 1791.

Besides, it was Franklin who urged Mirabeau, one of the committee of five, to prepare the Declaration of the Rights of Man, to publish the address "Considerations on the order of Cincinnatus" four years before the French Declaration of Rights; and one year before this event Mirabeau drew up a Declaration of Rights for the patriots of Holland, "Address to the Batavians Concerning the Stadtholdership," in which he enumerates the right to which the people are entitled as men. Such influence as is exercised has come from the American side upon the French; but, then, rather limited to the framing of the Declaration than involving a real influence upon the French Revolution. But certainly there was no French fire kindled in the American struggle for Independence.

The great German jurist Stahl declares in *Philosophie des Rechts*:

"The French Constituent Assembly was entranced with the philosophical procedure of North America and imitated it with the greatest exaggeration. While disclaiming any intention of drawing up metaphysical and not practical rights, hollow and erroneous deductions from Natural Law were placed at the head of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen."

Stronger still is the case put in recent years by Professor Jellinek, who affirms in his *Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte* that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man is a literal transcription of clauses contained in the Bills of Rights of the American States. Perhaps this position is somewhat extreme, but Dr. Scherger's argument against it in *The Evolution of Modern Liberty*, that the long discussion preceding the draft of the French declaration precludes such a supposition, does not seem weighty, inasmuch as precisely the formal rendering of public documents is of the highest importance. Comparison of, and selection

from, the Bills of Rights of the different States might easily have taken as much time as the formulation of a newly phrased declaration. Moreover, the French who had taken up Rousseau's phrases, "the sovereign people," and "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," might well have been led by the consideration to avail themselves of apt phrases, ready to hand, which had done service in the struggle across the seas, and which therefore might be known to many. The people in general are even more sensitive to an apt and catching phrase than to a catchy melody. Less weight should be accorded his argument against Professor Jellinek's position that the German publicist fails to show how the French became acquainted with them. There seem to be numerous channels in the many eminent Americans who had resided, or were still residing, among them, besides, the French sought out the American ideas. As Von Holst quotes from Kapp, *Leben des amerikanischen Generals Johann Kalb* (p. 242):

"At this precise time it was not only the 'existing European sentimentality,' that was in search of a Dulcinea, most beautiful of women, in the primeval forests of America, under the names of Nature, Liberty, the Rights of Man and Humanity."

Carlyle observes in *The French Revolution*: "Borne over the Atlantic, to the closing ear of Louis, King by the grace of God, what sounds are these, muffled, ominous, new in our centuries? Boston Harbor is black with unexpected tea: behold a Pennsylvanian Congress gather; and ere long, on Bunker Hill, Democracy announcing, in rifle-volleys, death-winged, under her Star banner, to the tune of Yankeedoodle-doo, that she is born, and whirlwind-like, will envelop the whole world!"

"Squadrons cross the ocean: Gateses, Lees, rough Yankee generals, 'with woolen nightcaps under their hats,' present arms to the far-glancing chivalry of France; and newborn Democracy sees, not without amazement, 'Despotism tempered by epigrams' fight at her side. So, however, it is." Lafayette he describes as "fast-anchored to the Washington Formula."

To argue a relationship as to the form of these popular declarations does not involve, however, any real causal connection between the two movements to which they gave expression.

The circumstance that the documents bear relation to one another, can easily be overestimated in significance. In fact, the doctrines proclaimed in these declarations were centuries old. Natural rights and sovereignty of the people had been put forth in ancient and medieval times. In the seventeenth century they were held in England by the Levelers, among whom Lilburn was prominent.

Milton, Sidney, Locke, and others held these views. Did not R. H. Lee charge Jefferson with copying the substance of the Declaration from Locke? But although these views were known and held before, they had no general acceptance. In France and in America, however, under the stress of circumstances to fulfil the respective needs, these views were taken up and formulated in the declarations. The doctrines in their bearing fit each case, and are interpreted and used according to the exigencies of the respective movements, which are manifestly wholly unlike. Thereby the declarations become in regard to these movements merely the occasion in the struggle. And it is natural that a people risen in frenzy against agelong oppression, and quite another type of people determined to resist infringement upon their liberties, read and understand even the selfsame declaration quite differently.

The doctrines contained in the declarations are indeed expressive of the American spirit, with French theoretic exaggeration, as Stahl observes, they become a metaphysical battleax to cut down radically the last vestiges of the hated *ancien régime*.

The Declaration of Independence could be an expression of the American spirit because in America the social and economic conditions were much alike, there was no caste or native nobility, and above all there were no feudal customs or traditions. When Jefferson drew up the now familiar doctrines of human equality, of the natural and inalienable rights of man, and the guarantee of these rights as the sole ground of government, and *the right and duty of revolution* when these rights were subverted—"The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants,"—he voiced truly the American spirit of his time.

Jefferson himself said well, in answer to the charge of Pickering and Adams that the substance of the Declaration had been "hackneyed in Congress for two years before": "Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular previous writings, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind and to give that expression the proper tone and spirit called forth by the occasion."

The constitution of the United Colonies of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield, drawn up in 1639, was based already upon the sovereignty of the people. Thomas Hooker preached the year before a sermon in Hartford in which he declared "that the choice of public magistrates belongs unto the people by God's allowance," that the people have power "to set bounds and limitations of the

power and place unto which they call them" (*Coll. Conn. Historical Society*, I, p. 20).

The political principles then were not new, nor did they originate upon American soil, but they were embodied here in a political program, because there was a setting for them here to realize them when occasion called them forth. They were not only hurled in a defiant, assertive mood against the rich Tories and arrogant officials sent from England to live off the colonies, they were also believed in as practical principles of government. Then again the greater part of the English settlers here were Puritans, who were Independents in England. The Mayflower carried *Pilgrim* fathers to these shores, who before had tasted exile from England in Holland. James I and Charles I persecuted these Independents because they "bred liberal views." Would not their remembered experiences strengthen these liberal convictions, when on these far shores that self-same arrogant autocratic royalty and servile episcopacy against which they or their forbears had stood out years ago, tried again to misrule them by divine right! Then the Puritan tenet appeared indeed natural "that kings are but ministers of the commonwealth, and that they have no more authority than what is given them by the people."

James I, however, proclaimed from the throne in 1609 his doctrine of the divine right of kings as follows:

"God hath power to create or destroy, to make or unmake at His pleasure, to give life or send death; and to God both body and soul are due. And the like power have kings: they make and unmake their subjects like men of chess: a power to take a bishop or a knight, and to cry up or down any of their subjects as they do their money."

The Anglican Church preached these doctrines from the pulpit. Bishop Overall's *Convocation Book* of 1606 attacks fiercely the doctrine that "all civil power, jurisdiction, and authority were first derived from the people and disordered multitude, or either is originally still in them, or else deduced by their consent naturally from them; and is not God's ordinance originally descending from Him and depending upon Him." The *Canons* of June, 1640, affirmed that the most high and sacred order of kings is of divine right, being the ordinance of God Himself, founded in the prime laws of nature and revelation, by which supreme power over all persons civil and ecclesiastical is given them."

Who wonders still that against this monstrous thing of pseudo-Christianity, wantonly torn from the historical Church of Rome,

and nationalized by the baseness of the dissolute King Henry VIII, secularized in his and his successors' service, with priests mere lackeys of king's wages, the cry should rise: "No bishop, no king!" No counterpart of the French: *ni Dieu ni maître!*

In this connection it should be mentioned that the most consistent opponent of the American struggle in this country was the English rector Boucher, who resided in Virginia and Maryland from 1759-75 and died in England in 1804. He published a vehement denunciation of the American Spirit in 1797, *A View of the Cause and Consequence of the American Revolution*.

There can be no question that the struggle in America and the American Declaration were more influenced by religious factors than were the French revolutionary ideas and acts. Ever since the landing at Plymouth Rock, sometimes called the cornerstone of American institutions, the lives of the English colonists had been intensely religious, as were those of the German settlers in Pennsylvania. Without belittling the economic causes at work in the lives of the people in those days one must concede that religion played a large and genuine part in the lives of the colonists and naturally colored their life-interests and views. Therefore it played a large part in the American struggle for liberty and the principles of the Declaration here assume a totally different aspect from the same ideas which the French theorists gave theirs. Jefferson observed to Lafayette that "Liberty becomes with an unprepared people, a tyranny still of many, the few or the one." The French Declaration is one of the rights of man—and of the citizen. "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can be based only upon public utility. The aim of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression" etc.

It gives a more detailed assertion of rights against the age-long abuses to which the people of France had been subjected, whereas the American document on the other hand rather maintains the rights of the colonists upon which the British king would infringe. Hence the practical way in which the Americans take up and work out the principles of the declaration. Jefferson, the champion of human equality, was opposed to the institution of negro slavery, but he left the ownership of slaves. "We the people" meant in those days only the white people. The Americans took the declaration as a practical working instrument, when the times should be ripe for ideal political truths they surely would be applied. Lincoln

stood firmly upon the principles of the Declaration. "The Fathers," said he, "did not mean to say all men were equal in color, size, intelligence, moral development, or social capacity." They did mean "all men are equal in the possession of certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." The founders of the republic then meant merely "to declare the right so that enforcement might follow as soon as circumstances should permit." It shows the sagacity of that great president that the ideal stated must be practically treated in its application,—not, in French fashion, theoretically carried out.

That he was able to battle for it with unwavering determination once the time was ripe for its realization shows his attitude during the Civil War. In singular contrast with the French theorists who carried the ideas to their logical and impossible extremes, defeating their own end, while they created abhorrent conditions which made the very name of "natural rights" odious, stands the practical advocacy of certain rights by the Americans. They were denied their rights as English subjects, therefore they appealed to their rights as men. What the law of the land denied them, they demanded according to natural rights and the law of nature. Hence they never entered upon a violent program to carry out these rights of man. On the strength of them they asked some very concrete popular rights, such as they knew were granted English subjects in the Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus act, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and others. In the American Bills of Rights the people declare for concrete rights, as trial by Jury, freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of elections, security against excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishments, general warrants, and others. These concrete rights are often even copied verbatim from the Magna Charta and English Bill of Rights, but the demands for them are based on the abstract doctrines of natural rights. Hence they are preceded by the statements of abstract principles: the natural freedom and equality of men, the purpose of the government, the sovereignty of the people, the separation of powers, etc. But these principles were not asserted as a new political program: they were, in the words of Lincoln, the stated basal principles on which concrete rights were to be enforced, "as soon as circumstances should permit." On the other hand, the French were enamored of the bare, abstract ideas which they proclaimed, and went to excesses which made not only Burke rail against their "paltry, blurred shreds of paper about the Rights of Man," but which incurred also the opposition of Bentham, Austin, and Maine.



The foregoing discussion tries to explain that the American Declaration means precisely what it says when declaring, "All men are created equal," and that it does not mean "All men are equal *before the law*"—as is generally believed. This is a legal twist of the philosophical doctrine, soon after already in evidence in some of the "Bills of Rights" of the States.

So the *Florida Declaration of Rights*: "All men shall be equal before the law."

*The Rhode Island Constitution*: "All laws shall be made for the good of the whole."

*The Connecticut Constitution*: "All men have equal rights when they form a social compact."

*The South Carolina Constitution*: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws."

*The Virginia Bill of Rights*, antedating the Declaration about a month, states plainly: "All men were by nature equally free and independent."

*The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights* renders the slogan of the struggle four years after the Declaration: "All men are born free and equal."

*The Constitution of New Hampshire* retains the logical sequence in declaring: "All men are born equally free and independent, *therefore*, all government of right originates from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good."

It is apparent that after *the event* of the Declaration has passed, the element of law becomes prominent in its interpretation. The legal mind treats men as under the law, and thinks of 'man as before the law.' But in the historic struggles, both here and in France, the legal notion was not uppermost. It goes without saying that legislation was involved; but, as a matter of historic fact, the asserted rights to whatever abolishment of old and reenactment of new political and legal rights they led, rested in their appeal upon the then acknowledged "natural rights," which, from Hugo Grotius onward, had been a household word with political writers. Calhoun understood clearly that the declaration "all men are created equal" was an abstract principle of philosophic rather than political significance. He calls the declaration of these theories as universal principle "glittering generalities," but he does not fall into the error of combating the declaration as if it possessed political or legal meaning.

Jefferson's declaration appealed to the natural right of man as created being, without reference to the law. The whole document is a declaration that the law should be suited to the rightful claims



of man as human being,—rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. As, in striking contrast to this declaration, the institution of slavery was left by the law, this circumstance was urged against Jefferson, although he himself was opposed to slavery. This shows that it was felt that the declaration treated of men as human beings, but did not deal with men as before the law. Else they would not have urged this contradiction, were it not that the declaration spoke of man as man, not of the equality of man before the law. The negro, to be sure, was still excluded in the practical application of the principle of the declaration, but, as Lincoln affirmed, the declaration enfranchised the negro too, because he also is a human being. Had it meant: "All men are *created equal before the law*," the negro would not have counted, and the institution of slavery would not have been affected by the declaration at all, for the negro had no status before the law, a slave was a chattel of his master. In both ways of reading the declaration the negro was barred from recognition. Reading it as a declaration of equality before the law would keep him out of his rights permanently, because as chattel he did not come under the cognizance of law.

Reading the declaration as the proclamation of human rights pure and simple which all men share equally the negro was kept from recognition by the laws which rest upon this principle of human equality, only as long as "We the people" was reserved for the white men. "In that respect the Declaration of Independence is the greatest outrage ever committed since the world began; for half the people who signed the Declaration of Independence were slave-holders" (Fabian Franklin in *Proceedings of Academy of Political Science*, Volume VII, p. 152). Lincoln with characteristic fairness conceded to Douglas that the fathers in framing the constitution had in mind in their legislation only the white man, but the underlying principle for which the law itself is made, called for revision and reversal of the law. The principle that all men are created equal, however, endures forever. Besides there were antislavery clauses in the draft, but as Jefferson writes, "The clause was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who never had attempted to restrain the importation of slaves and who, on the contrary, still wished to continue it" (Jefferson, *Works*, I, p. 170).

Men are not *created*, either equal or unequal, *before the law*. The Christian forefathers understood better than the present generation that "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath" (Mark ii, 27).

Again, the declaration involved a new constitution, urged new

laws, but did not start out from them as a basis to declare that these should apply equally to all men. This could only be on the assumption of laws of the people already in force, which laws needed to be remedied in their application. Rather it is evident that the declaration calls for new laws, and such laws as will recognize the principles on the strength of which they are to be made, i. e., the recognition of the humanity of all men, the inalienable rights of man as a human being. In the light of historic circumstances it seems stultifying to read "All men are created equal" as meaning "All men are *created* equal *before the law*," when this law is urged on these self-evident truths, of which in the declaration "All men are created equal" is the first. If such a meaning should be put upon it, would in the careful phrasing of the document the word "created" not have been omitted? And would not have been added as in some Bills of Rights "before the law"?

As a matter of fact: All men are not equal before the law, but they should be. In the circumstances under which the document was drawn up it should then have been rendered: "All men should be equal before the law," but in that case the declaration would not assert the reason why all men should be thus equal before the law. The Declaration of Independence, however, shows unmistakably a logical reference to the abstract grounds on which the new legislation should rest. This is what Dr. H. von Holst declared in his well-known *History of the Constitution of the United States*:

"Neither Congress nor the people relied in the declaration upon any positive right belonging either to the individual colonies or to the colonies as a whole. Rather did the Declaration of Independence and the war destroy all existing political jural relations, and seek their moral justification in the right of revolution inherent in every people in extreme emergencies."

The legal twist which wants to repudiate the real meaning of the declaration that all men are created equal,—and read the philosophical doctrine in a legal way to mean: "All men are created equal before the law" is evident also in the superficial but very popular denial of the statement that all men are created equal. It is often asserted that men are not equal, because out of millions of men only a few stand out in their respective careers, and they in such marked degree as if to proclaim how unlike men are. The pugilistic strength of Jack Johnson, the musical ability of Paderewski, the voice of Caruso, the incisive logic of Jonathan Edwards, the oratorical powers of Daniel Webster, the strategy of Von Hinden-

burg, the comic drollery of Charlie Chaplin, the inventive genius of Edison, etc., are few and far between in their respective careers. They not only stand unique in their professions but were predestined to be so from the first, because they were so unlike the majority of their rivals. In the race for preeminence men are too unequal. Moreover, some are born imbeciles, some are physically strong, others physically weak, some are burdened with the curse of heredity, others are blessed with transmitted hereditary qualities, some are gifted with talents, a few with genius; most men are mediocre, while many poor specimens of humanity are a standing refutation of the declaration "All men are created equal."

Surely, if we view men in their social setting, in their careers, their ability, in their relations to one another, it is going off on a tangent from common sense to maintain the proposition that all men are created equal. But this is precisely what we must not do. We cannot read a philosophical declaration as if it were a political or legal document.

Rodney Thomson, illustrator of the *New York Sun*, treats the statement of the Declaration in the *Pictorial Magazine* of March 7 and March 21, 1915, from this mistaken, popular viewpoint. He therefore points out in pictorial representation the incongruities involved, and adds a question mark to the statement. A long train of humans are making their way toward success. Genius and wealth lead, poverty, physical debility, prenatal influence, hereditary disease, inherited weakness, weak mentality, idiocy and congenital deformity lag behind in the race. To be sure, other things being equal, the difference of means to an end, the instrumentality in any pursuit, must affect the outcome. In that sense,

"The race is to the swift;  
The battle to the strong."

Forsooth, not all men are equal in the race for successful achievement in society. But whether first in the race or last, we remain forever human and entitled to life, liberty and happiness.

On the strength of the true facts of the first cartoon, and the mistaken meaning of the declaration that all men are created equal, the answer by the same artist in the *Sun's Pictorial Magazine* of March 21 is even more fallacious.

The country lad, ploughing the field, may indeed aspire to the occupancy of the White House. There are no formal, legal disabilities or barriers, but in view of the graphic truth of the first cartoon, the average country lad would be rather handicapped in

the race. Generally speaking, it would be better for himself and the country not to heed the beckoning angel to illusory aspirations, for in running the race for political or social eminence all men are not equal, though they remain forever equal as human beings, and being of one kindred, enjoy the same essential human rights.

When we accept the religious tenet that all men are equal before God, we do not stumble over the differences among men in their earthly relations. "For there is no respect of persons with God" (Rom. ii. 11). Individual differences, social distinctions, disappear in the sight of God.

When we view men as before God, they are all equal. Similarly this philosophical proclamation means to refer only to man in his specific human qualities. All men, rich and poor, gifted or stupid, strong or weak, of whatever mold or individual qualities they are, have forever inalienable in common the characteristics of human beings. All men are created equal (and alike) in that. All men like to live; all like to enjoy freedom; all like to be happy with such possessions and opportunities as are theirs. This is the true meaning, which is so explicit in the declaration that those have missed it altogether, who urge against this declaration of the essential equality of humanity, political, social, or legal considerations. They have missed altogether the true sense of Lincoln's reaffirmation of it in his Gettysburg address.

"Four score and seven years ago our Fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in liberty, *and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.*"

Lincoln repeatedly affirmed in his plain, direct language the belief in this equality of the formal outlines of human nature, that all men are essentially human. This psycho-physiological principle admits, of course, that the content of each individual as manifestation of this common humanity varies with each person. This variation constitutes his individuality.

The philosophic principle that all men are created free and equal admits also that this freedom may exist even in bonds. The poet declared: "*Der Mensch ist frei, und wäre er in Ketten geboren,*" though it should be also observed: "*Es sind nicht alle frei, die ihrer Ketten spotten.*". It must always be borne in mind that the external conditions effect, and are largely expressive of, the way in which the principle of the essential humanity of all men is recognized among men.

As this principle of human freedom and equality is recognized

among men, liberty in its highest sense, the inner liberty of the soul, will be less banefully affected by untoward social conditions and circumstances. Christ gets a better chance upon the hearts of men. With the discussion of this inner liberty of the human soul the subject does not remain politico-philosophical, but assumes, besides a purely philosophical aspect, a thoroughly theological one as well. In this sense an actual slave declares himself happy that he is not a slave like his emperor. With this regard the prisoner Paul exclaims with persuasive eloquence: "I would to God, that not only thou (Agrippa), but also all that hear me this day, were both almost, and altogether such as I am, *except these bonds*" (Acts xxvi. 29). To this inner liberty refers also Paul's summons in Galatians v. 1: "Stand fast therefore in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage." This theological view of liberty is closely related to the metaphysical discussions on the freedom of the will, and involves also the political and legal views, lying at the root of them all.

It should therefore be observed here that the American Colonists were in this respect much better prepared for the ideas proclaimed in the Declaration on the strength of human rights, because of their religious character and training. They were better prepared to realize the meaning and the practical application of the principles of liberty and equality than the French revolutionists.

Professor Münsterberg renders this observation well in *The Americans*:

"The social sentiment of equality, although variously tinged yet virtually the same throughout the United States, in no wise militates against social distinctions which result from difference of education, wealth, occupation, and achievement. But it does demand that all these different distinctions shall be considered external to the real personality. Fundamentally, all Americans are equal. The statement must not be misunderstood. It by no means coincides with the religious distinctions that men are equal in the eyes of God, and it is not to be association with any ethical ideas of life. Equality before God, and the equal worth of a moral act, whether done by the greatest or the humblest of God's children, are not social conceptions; they are significant only in religious, and not in social, life. And these two spheres can everywhere be separated. It can even be said that, as profoundly as religion pervades everyday life in America, the characteristic principle of equality in the

social community is wholly independent of the ethics of the New Testament. It is still less a metaphysical conception. The American popular mind does not at all sympathize with the philosophical idea that individuality is only an appearance, and that we are all fundamentally one being. The American thinks pluralistically, and brings to his metaphysics a firm belief in the absolute significance of the individual. And finally, the American principle of equality which we wish to grasp is not rationally humanitarian; whether all human beings are really equal is left out of account. It is a question actually of this one social community living together in the United States and having to regulate its social affairs. . . . . One commands and the other obeys, but with a mutual understanding that this merely happens to be the most appropriate distribution of functions under the circumstances in which we happen to be placed. The real man, it is felt, is not affected by this differentiation, and it would not be worth while either to command or to obey if all men did not tacitly understand that each esteems the other as an equal. The man who truly sees social equality as a real part of the social contract, will feel toward those above as toward those below him."

Because we believe and recognize the principle of liberty, it does not follow that it can and must unqualifiedly be accorded to every one. As strenuous an advocate of liberty as John Stuart Mill argues the point in his celebrated essay "On Liberty," that one should never *force* liberty upon any one. Liberty cannot be granted, it must be taken! The inner liberty must be lived; the outer liberty must be appropriated to one's activities. This the French forgot altogether. Hence Fichte's pronouncement at the time of the reaction of the revolutionary period in France, regarding the necessity of an inner freedom to prepare for the political outer freedom. "The enslaved of all nations rouse themselves at the shout of deliverance, the patriot's heart throbs higher at the cry; the poet dreams of a new golden age; the philosopher looks with eager eye for the solution of the mighty problem of human destiny. All, alas! are doomed to disappointment; and over the grave where their hopes lie buried, a lesson of fearful significance stands inscribed in characters of desolation and blood, proclaiming to all ages that where the law of liberty is not written upon the soul, outward freedom is a mockery and unchecked power a curse."

The proposition in the declaration points simply to the human rights, the just claims of a human being as the prime concern in all political, social and legal regulations in guaranteeing man his free



exercise of the psycho-physiological functions which are his as a human being. It concerns itself with the ground on which this higher spiritual life may bloom: "The earth beareth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." (Mark iv. 28.)

The declaration of natural rights allows that this human equality of equally enjoying the exercise of one's human functions, is compatible with social and economic inequality. It is the pathetic story of the French Revolution that liberty was sacrificed to the false notion of these theorists to square the rights of man with those of the citizen. An equality of rights, or an equality before the law, flows naturally from the proclaimed human equality. The French revolutionists, however, did not see how there could be liberty without equality, and they wanted an equality not only before the law, but strove for an economic and social equality to secure liberty. They reversed the logical order in trying for economic equality to secure human equality, for human equality lies at the basis of equality before the law, and is its guarantee, but it does not involve economic or social equality. In fanatic anger thus perverting and misapplying the doctrines of human freedom and equality, the French Revolution shows us that romantic figure Madame de Roland exclaiming on the scaffold: "Liberty, what crimes are not committed in thy name!" A French writer well characterized the motto of the French Revolution: *Liberté, égalité, fraternité* as *un mensonge entre deux songes*, for this it was "a lie between dreams," because the French failed to understand the true meaning of liberty and equality, always starting in their interpretation from the social point of view. This is strikingly illustrated by as radical a writer as Saint Simon, who declares in his *Système industriel*:

"The rights of each associate can only be founded on the faculties which he possesses to cooperate for the common good." (Les droits de chaque associé ne peuvent être fondés que sur les facultés qu'il possède, pour concourir au but commun.)

There is evidently nothing left of the *inalienable* human rights, which were the appeal in the revolutionary time. Rights here flow from expediency, not from natural claims. Similarly Joubert boldly states:

"Men are born unequal. It is the great benefit of society to diminish this inequality as much as possible by granting to all, security, a competency, education and help." (*Pensées. Du gouvernement et des constitutions.*)

It is plainly again a reversal of the logical order, making society basal ground for the betterment of man. Why must the unequally born man be equalized by measures of society if not that society may benefit from men better safeguarded in their human rights. Against this French viewpoint should be urged the emphatic declaration of Channing, whom the French styled "le Fénelon Américain":

"He who has never looked through men's outward conditions to the naked soul and there seen God's image commanding reverence, is a stranger to the distinctive love of Christianity."

For justification of the claims of liberty and equality we need higher ground than society or politics can furnish. Bossuet, though the Catholic Church was then allied with absolute monarchy, brings this query on religious grounds:

"The murmurs of the poor are just. Wherefore this inequality of conditions? *All are made of the same clay*, and there is no way in which to justify inequality unless by saying that God has commended the poor to the rich, and assigned to the former the means of living out of the abundance of the latter, *ut fiat equalitas*, as Paul says, 2 Cor. viii. 13-16."

Because men are of the same clay, the extreme inequality in social conditions has no right of existence, unless, the famous bishop declares, it be in behalf of the "good works" which the Catholic Church proclaims in reference to the well-known quoted texts. France, however, by destroying Protestantism never could be the soil where the claims of the individual would be adequately recognized. This is one of the fruits of the Reformation and to be remembered especially in reference to the conception of liberty.

The declaration "all men are created equal" has as its ethical corollary the high authority of the Golden Rule. Matthew vii. 12: "Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." This ethical principle active in behalf of the individual in society would transform it gradually from within. All reforms, political or otherwise, must thus be brought about, and liberty and equality too must come that way.

Kant seized upon this principle of "man as an end in himself" as the cornerstone of his system of ethics. "So act that the maxim of thy action may serve as a general rule," became the formula to be observed. "You are to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always and under any circumstance

as an end and never as a means only." This recognition of the individual under his rigoristic ethics stamps Kant a Protestant philosopher, if he cannot be the philosopher of Protestantism, as Paulsen (*Kant der Philosoph des Protestantismus*), Kaftan (*Kant der Philosoph des Protestantismus*), and others have proclaimed him. Besides the rejection of all intellectual proofs of religion (*Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*) and his rejection of the value of pious works for an emphasis upon "the good will" are opposed to the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. Protestantism which recognizes "the priesthood of all believers" is more consonant with individualism and democracy than the hierarchy of the Romish Church and could therefore interpret and better guard the principles of liberty and equality.

It nevertheless remains strange, that the French should so misconstrue the ideas of liberty and equality, were it not that bred on revengeful hatred Rousseau's catchwords had inflamed the populace to the extreme sentiments which made in the outburst of the Revolution the reasonable interpretations impossible. For if Rousseau did not influence to any considerable extent the political theories, he certainly had a powerful hold upon the masses, and figures as a considerable factor in the French upheaval. Many writers of that period like Voltaire and Turgot do not believe in absolute equality. Turgot even affirms that inequality of conditions is necessary to stimulate the progress of society, nor would he surrender individual liberty for the principle of public welfare. He says in *Lettres sur la tolérance*: "We forget that society is made for individuals, that it is instituted only to protect the rights of all in assuring the accomplishment of all mutual duties." This recognizes the view that social circumstances, economic conditions, political relations, and legal statutes all should further these human rights, freedom and equality. They can neither create nor destroy them, but should serve them in respecting in the citizen, the man, the claims of the individual as a human being. This personal right is often in danger, it is especially threatened now under the stress of circumstances of this gigantic, murderous war, the personal worth of man and his claims as a human being are absolutely discounted, man is now only a citizen. Under the guise of patriotic sacrifice the respective governments enforce upon the people the most exacting and far-reaching demands, while the people surely are inadequately voiced in the policies of the combat. But in France to-day Max Nordau protests that it is never the duty of the individual to sacrifice himself for the community. This is in line with the modern theory of self-

realization which we do not share. Sacrifice there must be; perhaps here too, it is "to die to live," so far as the individual is concerned. But there should be an emphatic protest against the governments' encroaching upon the rights of man, for the maintenance of which rights governments exist at all. Only to secure these rights were governments instituted among men, and their just powers are derived from the consent of the governed, whose "safety and happiness" is forever the aim of government. Thus the powers that be are ordained by God. This governmental view accords with Calvinistic doctrine, it is also biblical and it holds the paladium of true liberty for those over whom it is exercised.

But it has been repeatedly asserted that the contest in political history has been to rescue liberty from the grasp of executive power. On the long list of champions of political and human freedom one name was dimmed by the reproach of having advocated the extension of executive authority. It would have been plainly against the march of human progress, for it is retrogressive development to control public and private life more and more by governmental restraints. The government at best is but a pedagogue, leading, restraining, perchance educating the people, but it is not in a positive way ethicizing the nation, or moralizing its people. Fichte's remark is significant: "Der Staat geht, wie alle menschlichen Institute, die bloss Mittel sind, auf seine eigene Vernichtung aus; es ist der Zweck aller Regierung, die Regierung überflüssig zu machen." (The state like all human institutions that are merely means will ultimately end; the aim of all government is to make government superfluous.) Fichte's statement is too strong, but we certainly need less and less government, instead of more of it, as time goes on. Governmental authority should not be set up as an independent end in itself, nor should it be under the Church as the Roman Catholic Church would have it. Under God it is to serve the people over which it is instituted, and it is amenable to the will of the people. Tom Paine's remark is a pointed one: "Need made society, wickedness the government."

The respective positions of Church and State, when closely observed, are not so far apart as the vehement conflicts between them would lead us at first to suppose. Both refer to God in justification of the authority which they exercise. The Church would fain leaven society into spontaneous and ready response to the Gospel of Christ. Similarly every government endeavors to cultivate in its citizens a free and hearty cooperation. We must here bear in mind, however, that the Church has a more direct

bearing upon the conscience of her members than the State has, even when its government is a never so perfect expression of the society which it regulates. In keeping with this fact the Church addresses herself more exclusively to the individual as such, and primarily for his spiritual interests. The State naturally views the individual as part of society and in the more external bearings as a citizen. It should therefore be clear that the sphere and the methods of church-endeavors should be distinctly Christian, and always rely exclusively on moral suasion. No constraint but the love of Christ is to be her compelling power over a gainsaying and disobedient people. Only with spiritual weapons may she "go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in." All true gospel teaching asks only for a voluntary assent of those to whom it goes out.

The Christian church, however, feels assured of final victory because of the need of man. Thus the church responds in spiritual nurture to the native need of individual man to bring him to the fulness of Christ, while governments restrain individual man in behalf of society. In fine, Church and State both claim the authority of God, but the Church rests this claim on special grace in the revelation of Christ for the positive bringing in of the kingdom of God upon earth. The State on the other hand relies on the common grace of God as restraining the curse of sinful man. It follows that the position of the Church is more ideally conceived, but for this very reason less justified for application in the visible actuality of this world. For this same reason it remains a very debatable question whether any visible church could make true these ideal claims and extend them over those who do not freely recognize them. The classic biblical passage, Romans xiii. 1-5, makes plain that government and civil authority are conceived as a restraint upon the evil which would unsettle society, and an encouragement to the good works which conduce to its welfare. It therefore appeals invariably immediately or mediately to God for its sanction. The ultimate appeal is always to God, because He announces himself in the heart of every man, and the conscience whispers that "He removeth kings and setteth up kings" (Dan. ii. 21). He is in all and over all, supreme on earth as He is in heaven.

"By me kings reign  
And princes decree justice,  
By me princes rule  
And nobles, even all judges of the earth."  
(Proverbs viii. 15, 16.

Nothing can bring home more potently the heavy responsibility of government authority than this plain injunction that all government is under God. Its *de jure divino* is open to varied explanation, and it is well worth while to emphasize at this time the biblical injunction: "By me kings reign." Then, do they reign as "by me"? It should be asked of any government,—for the form matters little—Is it acting *de jure divino*? As observed already, a stupid, selfish emphasis is laid upon the importance of government in the endeavor to enlarge its executive functions unduly. Thus *de jure divino* becomes a prop to bolster up the arrogant claims of governing classes, but it may also—and more truly—figure as challenging those in high places of government with condemnation from God's own words. Edwin Markham significantly asks in "The Man with the Hoe": "How shall it be with kingdoms and with kings, when this dumb terror shall reply to God, after the silence of the centuries?"

With that accursed fallacy that public expediency should determine the measure of individual rights, misguided power of a temporary majority has too often spoken for "public welfare" and called the instinct of loyalty into its service, throttling the liberty of man. For this "public welfare" Socrates had to drink the hemlock, the Christians were persecuted in Rome, the Huguenots driven from France, the Puritans from England; and Christ was crucified when Caiaphas "gave counsel to the Jews that it was expedient that one man should die for the people." (John xviii. 14.)

While the pendulum is swinging back from the direction of individualism and the state extends its power far into private, individual and human rights, it is well to remember the declaration of the essential equality of all men, of their rights to life, property and happiness, and to think of governments as mere means to that end. Laboulaye well declares in his work, *L'état et ses limites*:

"It is in the respect of the person that one can measure the true grandeur of civilization."

When the Declaration of Independence proclaimed this regard for man and his human right, the African negro remained legally excluded, only so long as the fact of his humanity was not recognized. Then he shared the equality of human rights with the white man, and slavery became impossible. But the same proclamation of human equality might be applied *outside* the United States as well. Just because it is an abstract, philosophical, not a legal statement, the declaration of human rights knows no limitation. It is absolute when it affirms: "All men are created equal." It rings



with the force of Paul's address on Mars' Hill: "God that made the world and all things therein, hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth." (Acts xvii. 24 and 26). Will, then, in the present time legal restraints and hindrances still bar the recognition of the equal humanity of the Mongolians? And how long will the Japanese endure these discriminations against them from the nation which set out with this declaration of the equality of *all* men?

## SOME SKETCHES IN COMPARATIVE ANIMAL AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY.\*

BY ERNST MACH.

With Illustrations by Felix Mach.

THE idea of applying the theory of evolution to the physiology of the senses and to psychology in general, was advanced, prior to Darwin, by Spencer.<sup>1</sup> It received an immense impetus through Darwin's book *The Expression of the Emotions*.<sup>2</sup> Later P. R. Schuster (1879) discussed the question whether there were "inherited ideas" in the Darwinian sense. I, too, expressed myself in favor of the application of the idea of evolution to the theory of the sense-organs.<sup>3</sup>

Ewald Hering in an academic anniversary address characterized memory as a general function of living matter.<sup>4</sup> Memory and heredity come under one concept, if we reflect that organisms which were parts of the parent-body leave it and develop into new, independent individuals, preserving their characters in the transformation. In grouping memory and heredity together, however, we gain wonderfully in breadth of outlook, for by this thought heredity is rendered as intelligible to us as the retention of the English language and other institutions by the Americans of the United States.

Recently Weismann has conceived of death as a phenomenon of heredity; greater length of life and lessened propagation, ac-

\* Translated from manuscript by Lydia G. Robinson.

<sup>1</sup> Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology*, 1855.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, London, 1872.

<sup>3</sup> *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie*, 1866.

<sup>4</sup> E. Hering, "Ueber das Gedächtniss als eine allgemeine Function der organisirten Materie," *Almanach der Wiener*, 1870. Translated into English and published with two other essays on allied subjects under the title *Memory*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1913.

ording to his researches, are conceivable as mutually restricting adaptations.<sup>5</sup>

When a gymnasium student I heard my esteemed teacher, Professor P. F. X. Wessely, say that plants from the southern hemisphere bloom in our latitudes when it is spring in their native place, and I thought instinctively of a "memory" in plants.

The so-called reflex movements of animals may be explained in a natural manner as phenomena of memory outside the organ of consciousness. For instance, pigeons whose brains have been removed, drink even mercury and other liquids with clock-work precision when placed with their feet in cold water. Goltz, in a work on the nerve-centers of the frog (1869), described a whole series of such reflex habits.

Nevertheless A. Weismann is probably wrong in opposing the "inheritance of acquired characters," and advancing a new germ-plasm theory.<sup>6</sup> According to this, the processes of evolution and descent are processes entirely independent of the influences on the evolution of the individual which would abrogate the unitary viewpoint of the evolution theory. I agree with Hering that this feature breaks the harmony of the whole doctrine of evolution, and that such an hypothesis means, as it were, to saw off the branch on which one is sitting.

The expositions of Jean Henri Fabre of Serignan, a master of experimental method and an extraordinary artist in the poetic presentation of the insect world, give us reason to distrust Weismann's theory. Thus Fabre<sup>7</sup> describes in detail the life of the larva of the cerambycid beetle. When eating, it bores a passage into the trunk of the tree which will accommodate its increasing size; it stops the opening lightly with dust, so that the developed insect as it creeps out after its metamorphosis, can escape without difficulty.



By virtue of self-continuing memory this recurs in each succeeding generation. But if the larva is knocked out of the trunk of the tree by a woodpecker without being eaten on its excursion, then is it compelled to return to the tree or will it seek refuge elsewhere?

<sup>5</sup> A. Weismann, *Ueber Leben und Tod*, Jena, 1884.

<sup>6</sup> A. Weismann, *Die Continuität des Keimplasmas als Grundlage einer Theorie der Vererbung*, Jena, 1885.

<sup>7</sup> J. H. Fabre, *Bilder aus der Insectenwelt*, Series 1-4, Stuttgart, Kosmos Verlag.

As an answer my wife once found between her skirts a fat, living lump, which seemed to protest strenuously against the exposure of its abode. Another time we found a larva under a garden seat which stood at the foot of a giant ash. When placed on the tree I saw it run quickly up the trunk and disappear in one of the many bore-holes to be seen in the bark. These two cases seemed to be connected with our observation of a fine big black woodpecker which we had found dead the previous winter.

Aside from disturbances by the woodpecker or other animal life, evolution can run its course exactly as Fabre has conceived. But when such disturbances intervene the variation they cause in the course of progress is very great. For the particular animal in question, it is of little consequence whether it meets its end in the stomach of a woodpecker or in that of a world-controlling (i. e., a world-tyrannizing) gormand, as a stewed or fried "cossus."<sup>8</sup>

Finally, I am indebted to my father, proprietor of the Slattenegg Estate in Carniola, and also to my sister Marie, for certain illuminating information with regard to Weismann's germ-plasm theory. My father raised the Chinese mulberry silkworm—a very dependent degenerate domesticated creature—and also the much larger and hardier Japanese oak-feeding silkworm out in the open oak woods. When the time arrives for the mulberry silkworm to pass into the chrysalis state it has for years been the custom to give them bundles of straw upon which to spin their cocoons. They wait, as it were, for this signal, and follow it obediently. Now it one day occurred to my father not to prepare the usual straw bundles for a small colony of these silkworms. The result was that the majority of them perished, and only a small number, the "geniuses," followed their own cravings and spun their cocoons. Since my sister believes she observed that the next generation spun cocoons in greater numbers, the case certainly deserves further investigation.

Of course it depends upon chance and also upon circumstances *whether* and *how* the personally acquired "engrams"<sup>9</sup> are transmitted. Those which have been put in practice for generations of course make their appearance much more definitely and more true to type. It the question relates to personally acquired and inherited engrams, I cannot help thinking how little of these I myself possess, though that may be because my father was a philologist, and I am

<sup>8</sup> J. H. Fabre, *Ein Blick in's Käferleben*, Stuttgart, pp. 27-29.

<sup>9</sup> This is the term used by R. Semon, in *Die Mneme als erhaltendes Prinzip im Wechsel des organischen Geschehens*. Leipzig: Engelmann, 1911.

a naturalist. But if one tries to think of the son in the same line as the father, then he can understand how perfectly the later acquired engrams are transmitted.

I will now give a few observations previously recorded<sup>10</sup> but now expanded, especially by illustrations, and I believe that for the latter reason they may be of interest to the readers of this journal. At the same time these sketches, as the results of a long and in part very painstaking study, give more than a detailed and circumstantial description, and only experiences (results of experiments) which are given permanent form in pictures are of real value because they are not affected by any personal coloring or increment.

In the autumn vacation of 1873, my fifteen-year-old son brought me a sparrow a few days old, which had fallen from its nest, and wished to keep and raise it. But it was not so simple a matter, for the creature could not be induced to swallow and would soon have succumbed to the indignities of an artificial feeding. Then I fell into the following train of thought: A new-born child would certainly perish if it had not the specially formed organs and inherited impulse to suck. Something similar in another form must exist likewise in the case of the bird. I exerted myself to discover the appropriate stimulus which could incite the reflex movement of swallowing. Finally a small insect (a grasshopper) was swung rapidly about the head of the bird. Immediately the bird opened its bill and beat with the stumps of its wings. I had thus discovered the right stimulus for setting free the impulse and the automatic movement. The bird now grew perceptibly stronger and greedier; it began to snatch at the food, once seized an insect which had fallen on the table, and from that time on ate of its own accord.

It was at this time that I also experienced, as I now remember, a horrible hallucination, although three years ago on the occasion of a visit from Dr. E. v. Niessl-Meyendorf, on his express inquiry, I denied any such thing absolutely; but I will now state it as it occurred. I had fed my sparrow with grasshoppers until it had become large and fully fledged. Then I dreamed that I saw a gigantic grasshopper with its forelegs against my breast playing in an uncanny fashion with its antennae and feelers around my face as if it fain would say:

"Shall my herds before thee fall?  
Room there is on earth for all!"<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> E. Mach, *The Analysis of Sensations*, Chicago, 1914. [Where the author quotes literally from this work we adopt also without further acknowledgment the text of this translation, extracts on pp. 71-76.—Tr.]

<sup>11</sup> From Schiller's well-known ballad, "The Alpine Hunter."

Then I awoke, and the sinister character of the illusion could not continue in the face of my waking consciousness. But I was conscious of having torn out the saltatorial legs of hundreds, yes thousands, of little grasshoppers within a few weeks, and of thus violating my Buddhistic conscience, for since the years of childhood I have consciously perpetrated no act of cruelty nor practiced vivisection.

If I had been an adherent of the Winter King and after the battle on the White Mountain had been handed over alive to the



FEEDING BABY SPARROWS.

executioner by some clerical relative I might also not have come away without terrible hallucinations—and one does not know whether he should pity or envy the man who has never had such illusions. How often may not this emotional drama have been played in the imaginary space behind the mirror-like plane of a knight's castle in Bohemia!

After this digression I return to my nursling. In proportion as its intellect developed, a perceptibly smaller part of the original releasing stimulus was required. The creature gradually became independent and took on successively all the characteristic ways of sparrows. It would jump up on my finger when I held it out, would

whet its bill on it, and delighted the eye by assuming a great variety of the movements of sparrows which it had never seen and could never have learned. The now fully-fledged creature feeling itself in harmony with its surroundings began to indulge in all sorts of pastimes, and when it whetted its bill upon my finger with "childlike




SEEKING SHELTER.

affection" I experienced a real parental joy. Nor did it by any means behave with discretion; it often pecked my hair and beard and sometimes tweaked my ears. Hence the relation between us closely resembled that of potentate and court fool which is sometimes established between parents and children, although the bird



could not take into account the degree of intelligence or power of his human companion.

When I would take my walk in the morning in the meadow near a row of trees I used to take my sparrow with me. He would fly up into the trees but always come down again upon my fingers when I called "tsip, tsip." Finally it became evident that the supposed "he" was a "she," for after the grasshopper diet was changed for more solid and miscellaneous food she began in a parthenogenetic fit to lay an egg and thus after a time yielded to this manner




UNDUE FAMILIARITY.

of life. So I would have little more to tell if my daughter had not continued these experiments with other baby sparrows.

My grandchild brought her a whole nest which had fallen to the ground with five or six sparrows in it, among them males distinguishable by pretty black cravat-like marks. Now a mother could not indulge in the luxury of a grasshopper hunt to bring up sparrows, and so a simplified procedure was devised which served the purpose very well. White bread (a roll) was soaked in milk, and just a pinch of this between the fingers was enough for the

meal of one bird. In this case the process was greatly facilitated by the fact that the old birds helped to procure food as soon as




A SUSPICIOUS OBJECT.



VARIOUS PASTIMES.

the window was open or the young birds were set outside. After the young birds had been set free they would come back into the

room of their own accord when the weather was bad and as soon as the care of the parents became insufficient. Once when my daughter returned from the country she brought me a male bird which had been reared in this way, but hardly had the maid who accompanied her placed the cage upon the table in the garden when the neighbor's cat appeared on the scene and the bird was eaten before I had even seen it. So I was again prevented from studying a male as I had wished to do, and must content myself with completing the bringing up of the weakest, which was another female that had been kept back for fear that it was not equal to the struggle for existence. This one lived with me eight years, and



VARIOUS PASTIMES.


my son Felix and I were able to make plenty of observations of the little creature and continue where I had left off years before.

It delighted my grandchildren when the sparrow pulled my hair or whiskers, and often pecked me hard enough to feel it, for then they thought the bird wanted to wake me up. I could almost have shared this simple interpretation, but what an intelligence, what humor and what a standpoint we would have to believe any young creature capable of if we were to assume the idea of teasing! This might prove to be the case in an intelligent little dog which had been educated by a human being and so had attained a clearer idea of its own ego and that of others. Intelligent creatures like spar-

rows might perhaps reach this stage by training, but it certainly is not innate. Therefore I think that this one had only her own concerns in view and was exerting her native instinct for nest building, for instance, when she played with the hairs on my head and beard.

What more I have to say about this second female sparrow supplements the first and rests upon new personal observations which coincide almost perfectly with those made by my daughter and grandchildren quite independently.

My sparrow regarded a napkin ring as quite harmless when it stood or lay motionless upon the table, but as soon as it rolled or rocked to and fro on a projection around its outer circumference,




VARIOUS PASTIMES.

she set herself to fight it, with her legs sprawled out, head lowered and bill wide open, pecking at it furiously. She evidently considered it alive and perhaps regarded it with the suspicion that it was a competitor in the matter of eating! If any one is surprised at the sparrow let him recall the story of Peter Hele (also called Henlein, 1480) of Nuremberg, against whom a peasant and even his own wife brought complaint because they thought his ticking clocks were living creatures and believed him to be in league with devils and witches!

When I slowly advanced my finger toward the sparrow she attacked it vigorously in contrast to the gentle treatment the hand

of my daughter received, whereby the bird perhaps showed that she recognized the intimate friend who fed her. She would attentively follow up any fold in the tablecloth that started to move; yes, she would lie in wait for it and then rush upon it all of a sudden and belabor the suspicious place with furious strokes of her bill.



MOODS AND POSTURES.

If a napkin were pulled away from her she would often hold on to it resisting with all of the strength of her body. The little creature would pick up bread crumbs and caraway seeds, never forgetting to take a pinch from the saltcellar; sometimes stretching herself mightily, she looked into everything inquisitively, yet with a certain reserve and caution, often tasting of things. The little



pictures entitled "Various Pastimes" show instances of these instructive idylls on the dining table.

I easily discovered in the course of time that my little bird had quite a different physiognomy on beautiful bright days from that in dark, cool or foggy weather, and in every case the mood and temperament were to a great extent dependent upon the weather. The comfortable position when the sun shines in the cage, a siesta, soliloquies, after the bath, or when a favorite morsel came into her feeding bowl or was handed her from above, are easily distinguished in the last illustration.

My companion of many years finally was taken ill with a painful cancerous growth under one wing and became so weak that she was no longer able to get to a higher twig. So my son brought about her translation into the Nirvana of the sparrows by means of a dose of ether, and this quiet little life, and yet indeed so long a one, was at an end.

\* \* \*

I have a few general observations to add. My sparrow early made the discovery that she could not get out of doors through the glass, and after the first attempt never flew against a pane of glass but always sat on the window sill. I mention this because invertebrates, like wasps, bees and butterflies, are incurable in this respect. Then too in the daytime (that is with mind awake) my sparrows were very trustful and friendly and not at all shy; they looked upon human beings as their own kind. But in the evening in the growing twilight other phenomena regularly appeared. The bird would then always seek out the highest places in the room and would not be quieted until it was prevented by the ceiling from going any higher. At my approach it expressed fear, horror, yes I may say the most extreme fear of ghosts, for it ruffled its feathers, puffed itself up, crowded into a corner, opened its bill wide and pecked furiously at any hand that came near it. These defenseless creatures have many kinds of enemies, and their behavior is therefore not without reason. The human child finds himself in very similar circumstances and it is doubtless an error to refer the fear of ghosts back to the stories of "Momus and Lamia" or "Hannibal at the Gates" or other more modern means of terror. This fear is much more probably an old inherent native "engram" passed down through preceding generations. The case is similar with religion, and this thought will admit of further development.

Just as according to Chamisso and Darwin the birds on an uninhabited island learn to fear men only through generations of



experience, so we must reverse the process and strive to unlearn the "shivers" in the course of generations, and this would be a very good thing for us.

According to the observations of my son-in-law the terror of the birds was further increased by covering one's head with a white cloth. My last sparrow became quite excited from this cause even in bright mid-day.

\* \* \*

It is a great drawback to the observation of animals that for the most part they must be fragmentary, since the most important moments are missing. Therefore it is probable that the "engrams" experienced for many generations become alive in one moment, although it is possible to make great mistakes in such moments. *Continuous* observation simply cannot be replaced by anything else. It is remarkable how quickly the animals learn to take man into account as an analogous agent. Thus in one village the sparrows knew the call of my sister and came when they heard it, but they paid no attention to another call, and would fly from a priest who had shot at them.

All animals have a brain with the exception of the very lowest,<sup>12</sup> and there must be continuity in nature as well as in the systems of philosophers, so we must assume that every beginning of psychic life, analogously to the principle of Roux, may be capable of evolution at and from every stage.

Further I agree with the opinion of C. M. von Nuruk<sup>13</sup> that to live with animals is incomparably more valuable than merely to observe them. In this sense the station among anthropoid apes on Orotawa on the Island of Teneriffe may be welcomed as a promising new undertaking.

Further an exact investigation of the processes in the cerebrum would be highly important—the development of experiments of which I need only call to mind the fine observation of Lloyd Morgan's dog,<sup>14</sup> which first began to follow a rabbit on its zig-zag path, but after a few failures took the straight road to the kennel and in that way obtained his prize.

I think that one can often obtain an insight into the psychic life of animals through the emotions, for on the side of feeling

<sup>12</sup> Cf. L. Edinger, *Die Lehre vom Bau und den Verrichtungen des Nervensystems*, Leipzig, 1909.

<sup>13</sup> C. M. von Nuruk, *Leben mit Tieren*, Stuttgart, 1905.

<sup>14</sup> C. Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Life and Intelligence*, London, 1891.

and will man and beast come closer together than on the side of the intellect.

The miracles of the insect-world furnish an immeasurably rich source of material, inviting further investigations through their relative simplicity which makes them more easily accessible to an empirical analytical method. I will refer to single chapters of Fabre's like that on the musical instruments of the locusts; to experiments in the poison of scorpions resulting in the discovery that the sting which was fatal to the matured insect was of only slight injury to the larva; to the fertilization of the emperor moth which we know is accomplished by a fine pollen which the male has brought from miles away.

Thus we become acquainted with systems of reflexes adapted to different ends, which for this reason cannot act together in their combination as a unity toward one end as in the case of the vertebrate. It seldom happens with them that the death of one of the partners takes place in the transport accompanying the act of pairing, whereas in the case of spiders, beetles and grasshoppers the usually weaker male is very often, or almost regularly, eaten.

In spite, however, of this psychological difference, in spite of this enormous disparity, we must not believe it is not an advantage to the study of human psychology to observe the lower animals. On the contrary, whoever understands how to observe the single reflexes taken separately will also know how to combine and unite them in the case of the higher animal, man.

In a subject which is so rich and varied and possesses so many possibilities and conceptions I may close with the words of Solon:

*πᾶσιν ἀδεῖν χαλεπόν.*

## THE SOLDIER-WOMEN OF MEXICO.

BY VINCENT STARRETT.

ON May 20, 1914, the Associated Press correspondent in the City of Mexico sent the following dispatch from Estacion Amargos:

"Women, who follow every Mexican army, took a prominent part in the fight at Zartuche. As the federal soldiers swarmed from the cars some of the women dragged out and broke open boxes of ammunition, carrying the cartridges to the federal soldiers in the face of the constitutionalist fire. Others crouched on the iron

roofs of the cars, took up the rifles of the wounded and loaded and fired with all the coolness and determination of veterans.

"A party of the women made a desperate effort to bring a machine gun on one of the flat cars to bear on the constitutionalist troops, but before they could swing the muzzle and place the cartridge clips in position the soldiers had surrendered and the constitutionalists had swarmed over the sides of the car."

In every conflict instances have not been lacking that the Amazons of old are still accessories to the terrible game of War. From the Russian battle front and from some of the Balkan states comes word of women warriors in blouse and boots, fighting as desperately as ever did the men. The Mexican survival, however, is another matter and is not to be judged by the same standards. In most recent instances patriotism (i. e., love of country) has been the guiding flame of female participants; in Mexico, where patriotism is, at best, an erratic flame, another passion must be ascribed.

Properly, the Mexican *soldadera* is a camp follower, and her primary function is the world-old function of her kind. She is a part of the army, a part of the nation and a part of the Mexican system of things, and in a study of the whole she must be considered. Psychologically, she is vastly more interesting than the *soldado*. Often she rises to the height described by the correspondent in the preceding dispatch, but more often she does not.

A *soldado* is a soldier. A *soldadera* is a woman who follows the army and the *soldado*. In Chicago, in certain circumstances, she would be fined \$25 and costs and sent to the house of correction. In Mexico she is an institution, recognized and something more than tolerated. Her standing in the army, of course, is unofficial, but there are hundreds of her—thousands—almost as many as there are *soldados*.

The *soldadera* has been treated rather more charitably and lovingly under another name by Ouida. The Mexican *soldadera* is no *Cigarette*, however, and she lacks utterly the glamor of the *vivandière*. The tendency of the romanticist is to exalt her virtues, properly enough, while glossing over her vices. In the following poem entitled "*La Cantinera*,"<sup>1</sup> James Stanley Gilbert has done just this, but also he has placed his finger squarely on her *raison d'être* and the primary cause of it.

"As she scrambled down from the transport's deck,  
Her figure parodied grace;

<sup>1</sup> *Panama Patchwork*: Poems by James Stanley Gilbert. Ninth thousand. New York: The Trow Press, 1911.

Eighteen at the most and a physical wreck,  
 Yet she had an angel's face!  
 From head to foot  
 Clung dirt and soot—  
 There was dirt on her angel's face.  
 —Yes, dirt on her angel's face!

“Her hair in inky loops hung low  
 O'er a soldier's canvas coat,  
 And a tattered shift yawned wide to show  
 A short and sunburned throat!  
 No lingerie—  
 We all could see  
 Her short and sunburned throat!  
 —Yes, more than her sunburned throat!


“Her dress—her what? She had no dress;  
 Call it skirt for lack of a name—  
 ('Tis a guess, the wildest kind of a guess)  
 Put shamelessness to shame!  
 So scanty and torn  
 And carelessly worn,  
 It put shamelessness to shame!  
 —Yes, shamelessness to shame!

“She gathered her kit and passed us by  
 Foul bedding and pots and bags;  
 A babe on her hip—another one nigh—  
 Nakedness, filth and rags!  
 On the endless tramp  
 From camp to camp,  
 In nakedness, filth and rags!  
 —Yes, nakedness, filth and rags!

“A drab and a drudge—a regiment's Thing  
 To abuse, debauch, debase;  
 And yet—as though guarded by Beauty's wing—  
 Her face was an angel's face!  
 Though sadly bedimmed,  
 'Twas Beauty who limned  
 The lines of her angel's face!  
 —Yes, modelled her angel's face!

“What of it, you ask? Oh, nothing but this;—  
 I think it not often the case  
 That one clearly beholds in ignorance, bliss,  
 And 'tis proved by an angel's face!  
 For ignorance  
 Of innocence,  
 Shone from her angel's face!  
 —Yes, gave her an angel's face!”

Gilbert, I believe, was not writing about a Mexican woman, but the slattern heroine of his crude and powerful canvas is dis-



TYPICAL MEXICAN SOLDIERS (Cavalry). Far back to the left may be seen some of their women.

tinctly of the *genre*. Heaven forbid that I should go on record as having found the beauty he describes, in the Mexican *soldadera*;

still I have encountered just such types—such exceptions—and his lines are particularly valuable for their final suggestion. Ignorance of innocence—that, at least, is beautifully descriptive of the curious, hopeless creature I am endeavoring to present.

But if, like the "Absent-Minded Beggar," her "weaknesses are great," her virtues are many and should merit some respect.

The Mexican idea of making a soldier is to pour him into a uniform, give him a rifle and let him fight as best he can. He is largely a product of the press gang, seized from street and field, more often than not is an Indian of the very lowest peon class and abysmally low in the intellectual scale. Frequently he is a convict released from the *cuartel* on the condition that he join the army. It is patent, therefore, that his woman cannot be expected to produce a birth certificate or a marriage contract or a genealogy dating from Cortez.

In point of fact, however, she is often his wife, *de facto*, and faithful to the vows she did not take. Frequently, again, she is neither his wife nor faithful. Always, she is a paradoxical creature to be accepted for what she is and not to be analyzed, vivisected or understood.

When a Mexican army goes to war considerable recruiting is necessary to bring it up to even nominal strength. The unhappy Indian, torn from the plow or dragged from prison to fight for "his country," has only a short time to get together his portable goods, including his family. Fortunately, there is little to be done; he whistles for his dog and his woman; the bugle sounds, and the "army" moves forward, leaden-footed, with a forlorn wake of women and children and donkeys, staggering beneath the weight of pots and pans and the sting of fly and whip.

Now the strange psychology of the true *soldadera* becomes apparent. She may have many admirers, whose transitory affection moves her not a jot. Ordinarily (exceptions cheerfully granted) she has only one lover—one "husband"—her man, her *Juan*. He may or may not be her husband, but at any rate he is her *Juan*, her chosen one, and him she adores with the unreasoning love of a dog that clings to a brutal master.

For him crimes may be committed without remorse. Remorse is an emotion she has never felt. She will beg, she will borrow, she will steal for him. It is said that she will not hesitate to take a life for him. On the battlefield she will be at his side whenever it is possible, and she has been known to seize his rifle when he has



fallen and fight over his body with an Amazonian fury equaled only by a mother wild beast defending her young.



TYPICAL MEXICAN SOLDIERS IN THE STREETS OF MEXICO CITY.

After the conflict she is a bustling bundle of energy, unpacking the kettles and the pans and preparing a meal for her adored one.

She rests not until he is comfortable. Her babe, even, is a secondary consideration when her lover is near.

It may be a parade one is watching in the white streets of the capital. It may be the crack regiment that is marching by the reviewing stand with waving banners and beating drums. More interesting than the brown *soldados* in the street are the brown *soldaderas* on the sidewalk, keeping pace with the regiment as it sweeps along, awaiting the end of the march or a temporary halt, that they may rush forth to "their men" and press a canteen or a pannikin of cooling water to their lips.

This may be said for the private soldier of Mexico: He does not flaunt his women in the streets of the city when he is off duty. Not so the officers. When I was in Mexico for the second time in the spring of 1915, the hotels of Vera Cruz were filled with dapper officers and their women. They paraded the streets in their showy attire or reclined gracefully, side by side, in the ancient victorias which are the most popular vehicles of locomotion in the port. In a majority of instances, I was informed, the officers' wives were in other cities.

"Where," I asked, "do these women come from? They are young and many of them are pretty. And there are hundreds of them."

My companion, a hardened mining engineer with fifteen years of turbulent Mexican experience behind him, smiled peculiarly.

"You will recall," he remarked, "that after the fall of the empire a washerwoman came into power."

Yet these officers' women are not the true *soldaderas*. They exist, but theirs is another case. They are younger and more attractive physically, but they are older in experience and sin. And theirs is distinctly the sin of the legal code, for, unlike the authentic *soldadera*, it may not be claimed for them that they are "ignorant of innocence." Intellectually, they are above the *soldadera*; morally, they are far, far below her.

The *soldadera* is not immoral; she is unmoral. She has not forgotten; she never knew. With her, ignorance is truly bliss, for her ignorance is truly ignorance of innocence.

Poor brutalized, degenerate sloven! She is yet the most loyal and faithful part of a faithless army!

## MISCELLANEOUS.

## THE EGYPTIAN MOTHER GODDESS.

Nut, the great mother goddess of the ancient Egyptians, is a personification of the heavens, and there are many pictures of her extant. She is commonly represented as star-spangled and bending over in such a way that both her hands and her feet touch the ground. Under her lies Seb, her husband, the god of earth. His body is painted over with plumes. Nut and Seb were once united in close embrace, but Shu interfered and separated the two, producing a space between them and thus dividing the watery mass above the firmament from the dry land below.

Shu, as well as his female counterpart Tefnut, originated from Tem, one of the several forms of the sun-god. Shu means "dry, empty" and personifies the empty space between heaven and earth, while Tefnut is derived from the root *tef* or *tef tef*, "to spit, to be moist."

Tem, the sun-god, was one god—indeed he is called "the one god," and by emitting the two gods, Shu and Tefnut, he became three, as we read in the second hymn to Amen-Ra, where Tem is addressed: "Thou art the one god who didst form thyself into two gods, thou art the creator of the egg and thou didst produce thy twin gods."

The word *ashesh*, "to emit," means also "to bear," and it seems that the light emitted or poured forth from the sun, as incorporated in Shu, was at the same time conceived as lifting up the sky, as if the sky were resting upon the rays of the sun. Nevertheless, while Shu is said to support the sky Nut is supposed to be leaning on herself, for her two hands and her two feet are called the four pillars of the heavens.

The story of the separation of Seb and Nut by Shu was a favorite subject of Egyptian artists. There are a great number of pictures of the scene, and in our frontispiece we reproduce one of them as presented by E. A. Wallis Budge in his *Gods of the Egyptians* (Vol. II, colored plate facing p. 964). Here the goddess bends over Seb who lies prostrate on the ground. Ra goes up over the body of Nut in his solar barge and goes down again over her neck and head on the other side where Osiris awaits his entry into the Tuat with open arms. In other presentations of the same scene the solar barge is sometimes supported by Shu underneath Nut.

Seb is the son of Shu and Tefnut and at the same time both brother and husband of Nut, and father of Osiris and Isis, Set and Nephthys. Yet in addition he played an important part in the Egyptian doctrines of life after death. The deceased says: "My father is Seb and my mother is Nut," which expression identifies the deceased with Osiris. Thereupon Nu, the overseer of the house of the seal, is made to say,

"The doors of heaven are opened for me,  
The doors of earth are opened for me,  
The bars and bolts of Seb are opened for me,  
I exchange speech with Seb."

In Heliopolis Nut is said to have laid from Seb the great egg from which came forth the sun-god in the shape of a phoenix, the bird Bennu, representing the daily rebirth of the sun. As the father of this egg the god Seb is called "the great cackler" (Kenken-ur) and his sacred animal is the goose. The deceased says: "Hail thou god Tem, grant unto me the sweet breath which dwelleth in thy nostrils. I embrace that great throne which is in the city of Hermopolis, and I keep watch over the egg of the Great Cackler which has come into being wherewith the god Seb has opened the earth. I germinate as it (the earth) germinateth; I live, as it liveth; and my breath is its breath" (*Book of the Dead*, Chapters 54, 56, 59).

The deceased usually identifies himself with the powers that have overcome death, with Osiris, with Benu, with Horus, etc., and he argues that as Seb helped Osiris in the passage through the underworld, so he should now help him.

Nut has always been regarded as a protector of the dead. She is prayed to as a mother in tones of affection and confidence. We read for instance: "Mother Nut hath spread herself over thee in her name of 'Coverer of the sky,'" and she is assumed to feed the soul from sacred sycamores. In the *Book of the Dead* allusions to Nut are frequent, and she is supposed to provide the soul with meat and drink. The text seems to refer to sycamore trees under which the surviving members of the family of the deceased offered water and food, as we read in one place: "Hail, thou sycamore of the goddess Nut! Grant thou to me of the water and of the air which dwell in thee. I embrace the throne which is in Unnu (Hermopolis), and I watch and guard the egg of the Great Cackler. It groweth, I grow; it liveth, I live; it snuffeth the air, I snuff the air" (Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, Vol. II, p. 107).

Nut survived after the abolition of Egyptian polytheism in Christian legends, as explained by Professor Budge (pages 107-108):

"Since the mythological tree of Nut stood at Heliopolis and was a sycamore it may well have served as the archetype of the sycamore tree under which tradition asserts that the Virgin Mary sat and rested during her flight to Egypt, and there seems to be little doubt that many of the details about her wanderings in the Delta, which are recorded in the Apocryphal Gospels and in writings of a similar class, are borrowed from the old mythology of Egypt. Associated with the sycamore of Nut were the plants among which the Great Cackler Seb laid the egg of the sun, and these may well be identified with the famous balsam trees, from which was expressed the oil which was so highly prized by the Christians of Egypt and Abyssinia, and which was used by them in their ceremony of baptism; these trees were always watered with water drawn from the famous 'Ain Shems (a name really meaning the "eye of the sun"), i. e., the well of water which is fed by a spring in the immediate neighborhood, and is commonly called the "Fountain of the Sun." We may note in passing another legend, which was popular among the Copts, to the effect that the Virgin Mary once hid herself and her son from their enemies in the trunk of the sycamore at Heliopolis, and that it is based upon an ancient Egyptian myth recorded by Plutarch which declared that Isis hid the body of Osiris in a tree trunk."

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