

No. 3387



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

IRAKI, Sadao, et al

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent ; -- IWAKURO, Takeo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. My name is IWAKURO, TAKEO. I was born in Hiroshima-Ken (Prefecture) on 10 Oct, 1897 (30th year of Meiji). At present I live at No. 739, DENENCHŌFU 2 chōme, ŌMORI-ku Tokyo-to.

In March 1928 (3rd year of Showa), I was attached to a section in the Maintenance Bureau of the War Ministry, and in August 1932 (7th year of Showa) was transferred to assume the office as staff to the Kwan-tung Army. After two years in Manchoukuo, I returned and served as member of General Staff (Headquarters), and junior secretary in the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, whereupon in February 1937 (14th year of Showa) was appointed section chief for War Affairs in Military Affairs Bureau. Later in 1939 (16th year of Showa), I was

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dispatched <sup>to</sup> the U.S.A. to assist Ambassador NOMURA. Since then I have taken several posts as regimental commander in the infantry, and at the time of termination of war was Chief Staff Officer of the 28th Army at the Burmese Front.

2. It was since 1 August 1929 (4th year of Showa) when General KOISO, then Major General, came to assume his office as Chief of Maintenance Bureau, I myself serving as his subordinate that I for the first time became acquainted with him. Later during the General's tenure of office as Chief Staff to the Kwantung Army, I also served therein.
3. As Chief of Maintenance Bureau, (From August 1929 to August 1930) the General was greatly distressed then about the ill-equipment of our army and munition industry, and would repeat that it was more than necessary for Japan to avoid war by all means. General KOISO, being transferred to Bureau Chief for Military Affairs in August 1930 (5th year of Showa), was confronted with the dispute between Japan and China, especially with the strained situation in connection with Manchuria.

However, as stated above, he was well aware then of the ill-equipment of our army and munition industry and was of opinion that military activities should be avoided as a means for settling the dispute. Immediately before the outbreak of the incident, Major General TATEKAWA was dispatched to Manchuria by order of the Chief of General Staff. I was not aware then as to his mission, but was later informed that he had been sent to convey the Chief of Staff's

instruction of <sup>forebearance</sup> to the Kwantung Army authorities.

At that time, there was a movement to equip the army in the "World War I" made, for it had been equipped in a more old-fashioned type of the time of the Russo-Japanese War.

However, due to the limited budget and rudimentary condition of munition industry, we had nothing but wooden planes barely enough to organize 26 companies in the whole army, among which the total number of planes available for a front were hardly more than 200. These consisted mostly of scouts (reconnaissance planes) and fighters, and bombers were very few, only about 30 in all. As for tanks, we had about 200 extremely old type ones.

We were a long way from having a mechanized army, and our transport corps had, for the most part, to depend on animal power. The number of automatic-weapons for the infantry as L.M.Gs and H.M.Gs fell far below that required, and we were obliged to use dummy guns (wooden guns) or flags for markings. The new type 90 field guns had been adopted, but we did not attain full equipment owing to insufficiency of manufacturing capacity.

The manufacturing capacity of large calibre guns (above 20 c.m.) were especially insufficient, capable of only making 5 or 6 guns in 3 year's time. Since the capacity of our munition industry had been no more than as stated above, of all our war-time military forces of 32 divisions, only 8 were newly equipped in the "World War I" type.

4. I shall next state as to the attitude of the leaders of War Ministry at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. The outbreak of the Incident came so suddenly that the staff of the War Ministry were all taken aback and fell too restless to take up their work for two or three days after which time they gradually set on to resume their business. Especially on 19th, Sept., telegrams were received in rapid succession from the Kwantung Army, according to which we made every effort to find out the truth about the case, but had failed after all to require any exact knowledge.

Immediately after the outbreak of the Incident, Colonel ADO, Rikichi, the then Section Chief for Military Service, was sent to make investigations on the spot as to the true state of the railway explosion at LIU-T'LIU-KOV. Upon his return he made an address of report on the investigation, at the 1st Conference Room in the War Ministry. I took the occasion to listen to him and learned that there was no doubt as to the explosion being unlawfully committed by Chinese Regulars in Mukden.

The incident had broken out in spite of the feeling of the central-authorities, but adhering to the basic policy of avoiding war, they were keenly bent on carrying out the localization policy as had also been decided upon at the cabinet meeting. As a result, an instruction was shortly issued to the Kwantung Army to keep from advancing beyond the Yin-Kon, Hsimin, Chengchiatun, Chang chung, Kirin line, and troops which had already crossed the line were strictly required to retreat within said line.

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Apparently the whole War Ministry, to say nothing of the Maintenance Bureau, and even the General Staff Headquarters, did not have in hand any proper policy, in particular, towards the incident, and it was after about a week's lapse when the Incident showed signs of expansion that we were obliged to prepare for steps in case of emergency. With reference to materials of war, which I took charge of, supplies to the Kwantung Army had been extremely insufficient, and I was forced to take immediate steps to ask for an increase in fund for supplies.

5. Next, with reference to "The guiding principle of Manchukuo", (Ct. Ex. No. 230) sent by Lt. Gen. KOISO, Chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, to Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA Heisuke, Vice Minister of War, dated 3 Nov. 1932 the said principles were the expression of views within the Kwantung Army Headquarters in reply to the draft policy dealing with Manchoukuo by the 2nd Dept. of General Staff (Headquarters), which had been forwarded to the War Ministry and further to the Kwantung Army and in response to which, as above stated, the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army had them dispatched in the name of the Chief Staff Officer to the Vice Minister of War upon inspecting them in person. In addition, this document was transacted as an ordinary business-document. (It was customary of document of such kind, except those concerning business of <sup>routine</sup> and less importance, to be dispatched in the name of the Chief of Staff.)

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on root) and CHI-HYQ (T.N. to rule an object) operations were carried out at the same time. The former was a kind of a thoroughgoing measure to uproot and check all evil sources and was taken charge in main by the Manchukuo Govt. It was a policy to develop industry, rule well and to accomodate wanderers and vagrants.

The latter was a swipe-out movement aimed directly at the bandits, and was carried out under co-operation of the Manchukuoan Army and the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army used no little funds to call on and placate bandits, which were usually the step taken up first, and only when the bandits made no response to the <sup>repeated</sup> arguments did they resort to arms. In suppression campaigns, chiefly the Manchukuoan Army used to lead the way. Whenever the bandits surrendered arms, they were forgiven. Their weapons were bought up, and they were either returned to their native places or enlisted in the Manchukuoan Army or otherwise, when not qualified for military service, in the engineering and construction unit (labor service corps) of the National Road Bureau or in other labor services fitting their experience. Such was the policy practices in order to convert them to civilian life as law-abiding people, and we never killed a soul who had surrendered himself. Especially in the case of General Ting-Chao who had returned to civilian life upon surrender, he felt so grateful for the treatment he received that he called on Commander in Chief MUTO in Hsinking to pledged allegiance to



Manchukuo.

Strenuous efforts were made to maintain transport and Communication lines for the purpose of contributing to the restoration of public peace and order and to the development of industry.

The planning for industrial development was made in response to the request of the Manchukuoan Govt. or studied on our own accord, as a result of which any definite plan we formed was submitted to the Manchukuoan Govt. for approval. It was left to the discretion of the Prime Minister of Manchukuo to decide whether to accept or reject any plan.

Further with regard to industrial development, General KOISO rejected to an extreme the ideas of interest cherished by the Japanese people (national egoism) in order to check the dominance of grafters, whereupon he was subjected to their censure. He stood firm however and adhered to his views, persistently wishing that a fair chance be given to any enterprise from any field at home and abroad in establishing itself, in compliance with principles of open-door and equal opportunity. However, due to the insufficient condition of public peace and order, it was to be regretted that even the Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves.

8. A certain KYOWA Association (T.N. The Association of Harmony) had been organized in Manchukuo, which however tended to lapsing into a political body of a "one party for one state" character. Pursuant to instructions of Army Commander MUTO, General KOISO advised the president of General Affairs of the Manchukuo Govt. to the effect that though there was no objection to maintaining it as a cultural body it would be inadvisable to encourage its

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growth as a political party. I understand that Army Commander MUFO had also refused the request by the said body to become an adviser.

9. In compliance with the Army Commander's strict policy, Kwantung Army forces had made every effort to keep from advancing beyond the Great Wall into North China areas. However, in April 1933, (3th year of Showa), upon repulsing the obstinately defiant Chinese Army, some of the forces pursued them far off the battle-fields beyond the Great Wall for a time. General KOISO, Chief of Staff, was then in Tokyo on business, but I remember that on learning this, he wired to the Army Commander suggesting the prompt withdrawal of troops within the line of the Great Wall.

On the next occasion in May, when we made pursuit beyond the Great Wall, General KOISO had already returned to his post. This time it was a counter-attack carried out by order of the Army Commander, who was of the opinion that unless we deal a smashing blow on the Chinese Army which had moved to make a serious attack on the Great Wall line we should never be enabled to bring an end to any war around the Great Wall. The conclusion of the Tang-Ku agreement in the end of May was attributable to this action, hereafter being able to restore peace in the adjacent zone to North China. The motive as to this action was quite different to that with regard to our first advance beyond the Great Wall Line, as I recall that the former

action was taken up for the purpose of rendering any of our future advance beyond the Great Wall unnecessary.

10. The last time I met General KOISO was in 1939(14th year Showa ) when I was Section Chief for War Affairs and sent on an errand of Lt. Gen. YAMAMAKI, Vice Minister of War, to call on Gen. KOISO, who was their Minister of Overseas Affairs, at his room in said Ministry. This visit was made to ask for the General's mediation, since there was a great difference then in opinion between the Army and Navy with regard to the conclusion of a tripartite alliance, and the atmosphere was impending that this might bring about at any time a split in public opinion. In reply to this, the General expressed his views in a letter to the effect that the disruption of the national view was by no means advisable; that in his opinion, a tripartite alliance would probably result in German profit at Japan's cost which would mean greater detriment, and less benefit to us, and that therefore, the subject should be let dropped whereupon we should lead the national view to unification.

On this 5 day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT: IWAKURO, Takeo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

at Tokyo

Witness:(signed) SANMONJI, Shohei(seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IKAKURO, Takeo (seal)